Control of Supreme Courts in Early Modern Europe [1 ed.] 9783428548088, 9783428148080

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Schriften zur Rechtsgeschichte Band 181

Control of Supreme Courts in Early Modern Europe Edited by

Ignacio Czeguhn, José Antonio López Nevot and Antonio Sánchez Aranda

Duncker & Humblot · Berlin

Ignacio Czeguhn, José Antonio López Nevot and Antonio Sánchez Aranda (Eds.)

Control of Supreme Courts in Early Modern Europe

Schriften zur Rechtsgeschichte Band 181

Control of Supreme Courts in Early Modern Europe Edited by

Ignacio Czeguhn, José Antonio López Nevot and Antonio Sánchez Aranda

Duncker & Humblot · Berlin

Bibliographic information of the German national library The German national library registers this publication in the German national bibliography; specified bibliographic data are retrievable on the Internet about http://dnb.d-nb.de.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, translated, or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, without the expressed written consent of the publisher. © 2018 Duncker & Humblot GmbH, Berlin Typesetting: Konrad Triltsch GmbH, Ochsenfurt Printing: Meta Systems Publishing & Printservices GmbH, Berlin Printed in Germany ISSN 0720-7379 ISBN 978-3-428-14808-0 (Print) ISBN 978-3-428-54808-8 (E-Book) ISBN 978-3-428-84808-9 (Print & E-Book) Printed on no aging resistant (non-acid) paper according to ISO 9706

Internet: http://www.duncker-humblot.de

Preface When the editors first contemplated a meeting in Berlin and Granada on the subject of the control of the high courts in the early modern period, we realized that even the terminology may include a multitude of terms and instruments as control. For this reason, the meetings – originally planned as a congress – turned into workshops. This shall serve as a broad exchange of views on what control is and could be. This endeavor was supported by the talks given by the participants, to whom I would like to offer my gratitude for attending. In other words these meetings shall prepare a future project that will deal with the control of the courts in the early modern period and shall do so in a European comparative way. Please notice that the term European in this case also refers to the colonies of European countries. The following thoughts are intended as ideas, without claiming to be complete. They shall only provide a first introduction to the matter. Concerning the term control which is defined as the supervision or review of a case, affair or person and so a means of power or authority over someone or something. At the time, the control of the highest courts in Germany concerning ordinary courts and administrative courts is ultimately exercised by the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgericht). According to public opinion, this system is working relatively well, as the result of a survey shows: 69 % of Germans trust their courts. This is the result presented by the European Commission.1 The high regard of the courts is clearly illustrated by a comparison: only the police (74 %) enjoy a better reputation, whereas the federal government (37 %) and the administration departments are far behind (41 %). But in what way is control related to judicial independence? The principle in Germany is that disciplinary and criminal law measures are sufficient. There exists no control by an ombudsman. Certain states of the EU use the method of an Ombudsman, who can intervene in special cases (Slovenia), but is mostly restricted to disciplinary actions against the judge, cases of undue delay or evident abuse of authority. Another model of the Ombudsman is the Swedish and Finnish with the authority to review the actions of the judicial authorities. The Polish Reviewer for Civil Rights as far as cassation or review in cases of obvious mistakes. Ultimately this concept is a result of court constitution orders from the 19th century. Those declared the system of judicial independence, strongly influenced by the French Revolution. In Germany it has been made into law in form of the GVG in 1879. 1

Standard Eurobarometer 87 – Welle EB87.3 – TNS opinion & social, Mai 2017.

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Preface

In addition, how was the situation in the early modern period? There were various control mechanisms. In the German Holy Empire the so called “Visitation” was control by recourse to the Reichstag, by vota ad imperatorem, by the president of the court, by the Geheimrat, by the reigning ruler, by legal means, forbidden supplications by the parties or in strategies relating to the composition of the bench with questions of religious parity. The visitations were part of an external control. Visit from a superior with the authority to supervise to review the situation or check the legal postition. In the early modern period, in the Holy Roman Empire, known as the Reichskammergericht/Reichshofrat and in Spain at the Audiencias y Chancillerias. At the RKG, the estates had the possibility to review the court; this was discontinued in 1588 due to religious disputes. The extraordinary visitations took place in 1707 – 1713 and 1767 – 1776. Another form of external control was the Veedor in the Chancilleria in Spain. His job was to control the compliance with ordinances. He was a member of the Royal Court, which used the Veedor to exercise control over the Chancilleria. In France, we know the enregistrement and the lit de justice as instruments of control. Examples of an internal control system is the so called Multador in the Chancilleria: he was tasked with the compliance of the ordinances and to assist the president in control related duties. A member of the Chancilleria itself is called a multador, so there was no external individual. But there is also the way of exercising control by procedural law. Those included exercising control by law through rules and laws of procedures or court constitutional order. Legal means could be the Segunda suplicación in Castile, depend by paying of 1500 gold wins. The “privilegia de non appelando” and the “privilegia de non evocando” are also ways of control without exercising control. Lastly there is Political control. It is possible to exercise control by exploiting various institutions and benefit from their inter-institutional competition founded in the ambiguity of their political/social competences. In this volume we present the results of the two meetings in Berlin and Granada. We hope, that the investigation on this field will continue in the future. Berlin/Granada, December 2017

Ignacio Czeguhn, José Antonio López Nevot and Antonio Sánchez Aranda

Table of Contents

I. Meeting Berlin Bertram Lomfeld Watching the Watchmen. Power Analyses of Democratic Judicial Systems . . . .

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Ulrike Müßig Control of Courts by Prerogative Writs. Jurisdictional Conflicts as “Constitutional” Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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J. D. Ford Epistolary Control of the College of Justice in Scotland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

Wolfgang Sellert New Findings Regarding the Influence of the Ruler on the Supreme Jurisdiction in the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Mia Korpiola Swedish Court under Scrutiny: An Inspection of the Svea Court of Appeal in 1636 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Mark Godfrey Control and the Constitutional Accountability of the College of Justice in Scotland, 1532 – 1626 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 José Antonio López Nevot The Visitatio Generalis Magistratuum in the Decisiones of Juan Bautista Larrea (1639) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 Miguel Angel Morales Payàn The Complex Relations Between the Executive and the Judiciary: Some Scenes of Dispute During the Mid-19th Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

II. Meeting Granada Anja Amend-Traut External and Internal Control of the Imperial Chamber Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

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Table of Contents

J. D. Ford Control of the Procedure of the College of Justice in Scotland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 Marina Rojo Gallego-Burín La Imagen de Fernando el Católico y la Justicia. En la Literatura Histórica y Política (Siglos XVI – XVII) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 Wolfgang Sellert Kontrolle gerichtlicher Entscheidungen durch Nichtigkeitsklagen und Nichtigkeitsbeschwerden – ihre Geschichte und ihr Missbrauch im Nationalsozialismus 267 José Antonio Pérez Juan Notes on ‘la Visita’ to Castille . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 José Antonio López Nevot La exigencia de responsabilidad del Justicia de Aragón: el proceso de Enquesta 297 List of Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

I. Meeting Berlin

Watching the Watchmen Power Analyses of Democratic Judicial Systems By Bertram Lomfeld Court control is the opposite of judicial independence. From a historical perspective it seems clear, that the less directly controlled they are by any other power, the more independent courts prove to be. And the less controlled and more independent courts are, the more democratic is the legal system. The first aim of this text is to provide a structural typology of court control that might even serve to classify historical steps in the evolution of judicial independence. Yet also from a modern democratic perspective the question of court control is in no way a mere historical phenomenon that could be left behind today. The democratic idea of a separation of political powers with mutual checks and balances amongst them is not an institutional perpetuum mobile. The setup of judicial independence has to be checked regularly with institutional realities of court control. Thus the second aim of this text is a critical analysis of the power relations between courts and other political institutions. Mapping this institutional influence may aid in adapting legal mechanisms safeguarding judicial independence. Analyses focus on recent German law,1 but also include US, French, English and international legal regulations. The power analyses of recent court control mechanisms lead to a third level, the normative question of court control within a democratic legal system. Notwithstanding the independence of courts, some feedback loop with the will of the people is indispensable. Without some form of democratic court control judicial independence could turn into judicial tyranny. In this instance, procedural law plays an eminent role in mediating the courts’ substantial independence with legitimate democratic control. The question of court control reveals a democratic paradox of judicial independence. Modern democratic constitutions guarantee judicial independence as an ele1

German codes and statutes will be quoted in the following abbreviated forms (in brakkets): Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz (ArbGG), Berliner Juristenausbildungsgesetz (Berliner JAG), Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (BVerfGG), Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), Deutsches Richtergesetz (DRiG), Finanzgerichtsordnung (FGO), Gerichtskostengesetz (GKG), Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG), Grundgesetz (GG), Insolvenzordnung (InsO), Patentgerichtsgesetz (PatGG), Richterwahlgesetz (RiWahlG), Sozialgerichtsgesetz (SGG), Strafprozessordnung (StPO), Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (VwVfG), Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (VwGO), Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO).

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ment of the separation of power idea.2 Courts are the backbones of any democratic legal system safeguarding the observance of rules by citizens and state institutions. At the same time democracy is regularly connected with the supremacy of the parliament, which most immediately represents the will of the people. In the words of Montesquieu, the role of the courts is one wherein judges are the mouths only pronounce the word of the law.3 Given the open texture of (at least) modern law, however, these judicial voices necessarily speak with multiple languages, i. e. legal interpretation is not ultimately determinable.4 Furthermore, modern democracies limit parliamentary supremacy with a constitutional frame. To fulfil its function as ‘guardian of the constitution’5 most constitutional or other supreme courts build up as political institutions of the ultimate word.6 If courts use this power to actively reshape the socio-legal order, this political intervention is called ‘judicial activism’.7 The US Supreme court is often accused to establish even a ‘judicial tyranny’.8 Already one of the founding fathers of the US constitution warned in this respect that to consider judges as ‘ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions [is] a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy’.9 The theoretical paradox is much older than these debates. Juvenal famously expressed this idea succinctly in the words ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’10 which has been regularly employed throughout history right through to today, even touching the 2 Cf. Art. 20(3), 97, 98 GG; Art. III of the US Constitution; Art. 64 of the French Constitution. 3 C. Montesquieu, De l’ésprit des lois, Geneva 1748, at I.11.6. 4 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford 1961, at 124 – 135; L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford 1953, at §§ 198 – 206; cf. also B. Lomfeld, ‘Methoden soziologischer Jurisprudenz’, in: Lomfeld (ed.), Die Fälle der Gesellschaft, Tübingen 2017. 5 Cf. BVerfG 20 March 1952, BVerfGE 1, 184 (at 195) and 10 June 1975, BVerfGE 40, 88 (at 93): ‘Hüter der Verfassung’. 6 P. Graf Kielmansegg, Die Instanz des letzten Wortes, Stuttgart 2005; M. Jestaedt/ C. Möllers/O. Lepsius/C. Schönberger, Das entgrenzte Gericht, Berlin 2011. 7 For the discussion around the US Supreme Court cf. K. D. Kmiec, ‘The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism”’, 92 California Law Review 1441 (2004); K. Roosevelt, The Myth of Judicial Activism: Making Sense of Supreme Court Decisions, New Haven 2006. But cf. also S. P. Sathe, Judicial Activism in India, Oxford 2003. 8 C. D. Kilgore, Judicial Tyranny: An Inquiry into the Integrity of the Federal Judiciary, Nashville 1977; M. Sutherland (ed.), Judicial Tyranny: The New Kings of America?, St. Louis 2005; P. Schlafly, The Supremacists: The Tyranny Of Judges And How To Stop It, Dallas 2004; M. R. Levin, Men In Black: How the Supreme Court Is Destroying America, Washington 2005. 9 T. Jefferson, Letter to W.C. Jarvis, 28 September 1820, http://founders.archives.gov/docu ments/Jefferson/98-01-02-1540. 10 Juvenal, Satire VI, line 347. One established English translation by G. Ramsay (Loeb Classic Library, London 1918) is: ‘I hear all this time the advice of my old friends: keep your women at home, and put them under lock and key. – Yes, but who will watch the warders? Wives are crafty and will begin with them’.

Watching the Watchmen

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pop culture in Alan Moore’s cult comic ‘Watchmen’.11 In recent academic debates the question of ‘who will guard the guardians?’ was taken up by economic Nobel laureate Leon Hurwicz.12 His game theoretical analysis framed the question as a problem of implementation. Given the potential of corrupt guards, an infinite number of guardians will always be needed and so implementation is impossible. If we understand the courts to be watchmen of laws and even the democratic constitutions, then this begs the question: who watches them and how? Who controls the courts?

I. Typology of Power and Court Control What does ‘control’ mean? Control is closely aligned with the idea of power. The concept of ‘power’ has been extensively investigated in academic debates, but is no less ambivalent.13 Power denotes some form of social influence, i. e. forces creating social facts. Power is often associated with the use of force in concrete interactions between individual persons. Yet social structures and institutions also have the potential to wield power. Power can be exercised by causing direct physical or psychological effects on other people. In the long run, however, even more power often lies in influencing modalities of interaction, structures or social attitudes. For analytical clarity, the following typology tries to differentiate four distinct varieties or modes of power.14 Structure

(b) Social institutions [Machiavelli]

(d) Social dispositive [Foucault]

Interaction

(a) Personal domination [Weber]

(c) Sphere of action [Luhmann]

Causal

Modal

1. Personal Domination (Causal Interaction) The classical concept of power as causal interaction denotes in the words of Max Weber: ‘Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’.15 Or to put it in a more analytical reformulation: ‘A has power 11

A. Moore/D. Gibbons, Watchmen, Graphic Novel, New York 1986 and its popular movie adaption by Z. Snyder (US/Canada/UK 2009). 12 L. Hurwicz, ‘But Who Will Guard the Guardians?’ (Nobel Prize Lecture 2007), 98 American Economic Review 577 (2008). 13 Cf. for instance the plural conceptions in M. Haugaard (ed.), Power: A Reader, Manchester 2002. 14 The typology takes up structural categories from M. Renner, Private Macht zwischen Privatrecht und Gesellschaftstheorie, in: F. Möslein (ed.), Private Macht und Privatrechtliche Gestaltungsfreiheit, Tübingen 2016 at 505. 15 M. Weber, Economy and Society, Berkley 1978 [1922] at 53 (I.16).

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over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’.16 The decisive element of power here is the individual ability to enforce its will by personal domination. 2. Social Institutions (Causal Structure) Often, individual ability will not suffice to enforce a certain will or the situation is just not about enforcing specific wills. An example could be Machiavelli’s prince. Even given a personal domination in interactions, this ability to enforce his will is not enough to control an entire principality. Governance demands institutional structures that amplify and endure enforcement. Social institutions may even substitute the individual ability to dominate. Machiavelli describes in his book political institutional techniques to govern. Although not for any specific interaction, institutional structures have a causal effect of control. 3. Sphere of Action (Modal Interaction) As opposed to ‘violence’, power may be understood as a broader concept integrating positive and more indirect forms of influence.17 For Niklas Luhmann power reduces complexity within social interaction not so much by direct coercion but through mutual adaptation of communication partners.18 Only reduced possibilities for action allow for successful communication. Power insofar is not pathological but a normal prerequisite of communication. This ‘modal’ form of power does not supress the will of another person but modulates the sphere of action of their communicative relation. Still within the interactional frame, it resembles the ‘radical view’ of Steven Lukes, according to which: ‘A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests’.19 4. Social Dispositive (Modal Structure) The modal perspective may find generalized influence even beyond modes of interaction. Already Talcott Parsons described power as a ‘systems property’.20 The structural and modal form of social influence manifests in Bourdieu’s conception of ‘symbolic power’ and Foucault’s ‘social dispositive’. Habits and conventions including the use of specific language constitute a symbolic frame for any given social 16

R. A. Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’, 2 Behavioral Science 201 (1957) at 202. Cf. H. Arendt, On violence, Orlando 1970, at 44. 18 N. Luhmann, Macht, Stuttgart 1975 especially at 8, 11, 25. 19 S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, London 2005 [1974] at 37. 20 T. Parsons, ‘On the Concept of Political Power’, 107 Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 297 (1963); A. Giddens, ‘“Power” in the recent writings of Talcott Parsons’, 2 Sociology 257 (1968); cf. also N. Luhmann, Macht im System, Berlin 2012. 17

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space.21 Cultural distinctions shape even our bodies (‘habitus’) and stabilise social classes.22 In a similar way, Foucault analyses the power of knowledge formation. Unconscious social structures form attitudes, dispositions, understanding, and in the end constitute our subjectivity.23 Social knowledge structures produce truth and reality.24 Power then denotes ‘how the coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth form an apparatus (dispositif) of knowledge-power’25. This modal and structural form of power could be labelled as social ‘dispositive’.26 This typology of power could serve as analytical matrix for the study of varieties of historical or contemporary court control. If some actor is able to influence concrete judicial decisions he obviously has some causal interactional control over the court. The possibility of effecting its institutional structure like the appointment or distribution of judges would count as some causal structural court control. Whereas an influence on the organisational process of concrete judicial proceedings would wield a modal interactional court control. The most indirect (and mostly longterm) form of a modal structural court control emerges from an influence on the judicial culture, such as a change in legal formation.

II. Executive Court Control Executive state institutions encompass federal and state governments, ministries and all kinds of federal and state administration. Although municipalities often have an independent legislative power, they also serve as local administration. The main administrative instruments are executive legal orders, legal directives and mere factual execution. Judicial control of executive state action is mostly specialised in administrative courts. The central measures for control are set within administrative law. But how can executive institutions control courts? Structure (b) Judge appointments (d) Judicial formation Interaction (a) Executive orders (c) Executive supervision Causal

21

Modal

P. Bourdieu, ‘Social Space and Symbolic Power’, 7 Sociological Theory 14 (1989); cf. also P. Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, Cambridge, MA 1984 and P. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, Stanford 1990. 22 P. Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, Stanford 2000. 23 M. Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, 8 Critical Inquiry 777 (1982). 24 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, London 1977, at 27 and 194. 25 M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, New York 2004, at 19. 26 The English translators of Foucault mostly use the notion of ‘apparatus’ for the French word ‘dispositif’: cf. H. Dreyfus/P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Chicago 1982 at 119. Yet, at least within the typology developed here, ‘apparatus’ is too technical and even implies a possible causal reading as social mechanism.

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1. Executive Orders (Causal Interaction) In former times monarchs might simply have ordered a court to stop a proceeding or to rule with a certain result. Judicial independence is manifested in the absence of this direct executive influence.27 And yet, executive legal orders and government directives or those of any administrative body are binding legal instruments.28 Courts are only legally allowed to revoke or rule against them if these instruments are violating laws or constitutional rights. Administrative courts may only control the observance of legal prerequisites, sound administrative processing and legal limits of executive discretion.29 These clear-cut limits of control give the executive the possibility to appeal against a judicial intervention that is too stringent. 2. Appointment of Judges (Causal Structure) Given that rather weak form of causal influence on the court action, it is not surprising that the appointment of judges becomes so important. Perhaps the most obvious example of causal structural power is the appointment of US Supreme Court judges. The US president nominates judges for all federal courts who, however, have to be approved by the Senate before ruling the rest of their lives.30 In Germany, the judges of the highest federal courts of appeals are elected by a commission (Richterwahlausschuss) organised and presided by the appropriate federal ministry including all the respective state ministers and some members of the German Federal Parliament.31 An even greater influence would be guaranteed with a temporary appointment, which is theoretically possible,32 but not very common in practice. 3. Executive Supervision (Modal Interaction) Historically, not only monarchs had direct executive powers over judges, but executive bodies themselves also exercised judicial power. The king himself or his administrative officials served as judges. Alternatively, separate courts were integrated in the administrative bodies. Still, today the perhaps most far reaching version of modal influence on the concrete court interaction from the executive is to embed a judicial institution directly within the administrative structure. An example is the French Conseil d’Etat, which is the highest court of appeal for administrative af-

27

Art. 97 GG, §§ 25, 26 DRiG and BVerfG 09 November 1955, BVerfGE 4, 331. Cf. § 35 VwVfG. 29 Cf. § 114 VwGO, § 40 VwVfG. 30 Cf. Art. II(2) and III(1) US Constitution. 31 Cf. Art. 95(2) GG and § 1 RiWahlG. 32 § 11 DRiG; cf. BVerfG 26 May 1976, BVerfGE 42, 206. 28

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fairs and at the same time an advisory institution for the government.33 Its official president is the prime minister of the government. In Germany, notwithstanding their guaranteed independence (Art. 97 GG), judges are formally state officials and executive supervision applies to them (§ 26 DRiG).34 The ultimate master of supervision is the respective state minister of justice mediated by the presidents of the courts,35 which are themselves appointed by the executive.36 The substantial work of judges is explicitly excluded from supervision (§ 26(1) DRiG). But it is allowed to supervise for possible judicial misconduct and to admonish judges in that respect (§ 26(2) DRiG). Furthermore, supervision is not limited to organisational issues,37 which in the most extreme case might lead to a transfer of function or dismissal from office due to changes in the judicial organisation (§ 32 DRiG). Although there is no causal influence on decisions of judges, impending executive supervision will effect their judicial sphere of action. Not surprisingly, German judge associations are highly critical of executive supervision and demand a complete self-government of the judiciary.38 4. Judicial Formation (Modal Structure) Executive influence will not completely vanish, even with partial or full self-governance. Every administration features a specific executive dynamic that has a prospective effect upon its substantial tasks. Additional structural influence occurs through the cooperation and dependence on the political administration with respect to the means and support of judicial institutions. The biggest issue in modal structural influence is the education of judges. There is a significant difference, if, for example, judges run through a court clerkship like in the US, or through a general legal traineeship that includes political administrations as is the case in Germany.39 Further33 For advisory competences cf. Art. 37 – 39 of the French constitution and for judicial competences cf. Art. L111 – 1 Code de justice administrative; cf. also B. Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat, Cambridge 2009. 34 Executive supervision was only introduced in Germany in 1935 by the Nazi regime to better control the courts, cf. F. Baur, Justizaufsicht und richterliche Unabhängigkeit, Tübingen 1954, at 58 – 61. For the tension between judicial independence and executive supervision in general cf. R. Schmidt-Räntsch, Dienstaufsicht über Richter, Bielefeld 1985; A. Voßkuhle, Rechtsschutz gegen den Richter, München 1993. 35 Cf. for instance Ausführungsgesetz zur GVG (AGGVG) of Baden-Württemberg (§ 16) and Berlin (§ 14). 36 Cf. for the general courts in Germany §§ 22a, 59, 115, 124 GVG. 37 How difficult it often is to draw the lines shows BGH, 3 December 2014 (RiZ(R) 2/14), NJW 2015, 1250. 38 Cf. the model law of the German judge association on self-government of the judiciary: Deutscher Richterbund, Entwurf fu¨ r ein Landesgesetz zur Selbstverwaltung der Justiz (1 February 2010), www.drb.de. For a more critical position to self-government cf.: F. Wittreck, Die Verwaltung der dritten Gewalt, Tübingen 2006, at 660 et seq. 39 The prerequisites of the judicial formation are provided in §§ 5 – 7 DRiG.

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more an appointment as a German judge requires two legal state exams (§ 5 DRiG), one finishing law school and another after the legal traineeship which is called the Referendariat. The organisation of the Referendariat as well as both examinations, including choice of subjects and the grading process rests in the hands of a special administrative subsection of the district state ministries of justices called the Justizprüfungsamt (JPA). In France one academic institution puts its stamp on a particular personal blending of national political powers. The elite state college École Nationale d’Administration (ENA) not only produces nearly all leading politicians and administrative high officials but also the judges for the highest administrative court, the Conseil d’Etat.40 In democratic systems, the appointment of judges is the most obvious form of influence by the executive on the judiciary. Especially the nomination of constitutional court judges may have a real consequence for the political space in which they operate and the mid-term social climate. The effect of more indirect forms of modal influence by executive supervision is less evident, but surely is no less important. A very strong and often underrated executive long-term influence on the judiciary is the formal and substantial shape of judicial formation. Legal formation not only shapes future judges, but also the legal culture and social order in general.41

III. Legislative Court Control The central legislative institution within a democracy normally is the parliament. The usual two-chamber design establishes a legislative self-control by the other parliamentary body. In federal systems, every district has its own legislative institution and is mostly represented in some form in the second chamber of the federal parliament. Municipalities mostly draft their own communal statutes. Finally, there are a considerable number of global rule-making bodies ranging from international law institutions like the UN to private self-appointed organisations like ICANN.42 Structure (b) Judge Appointments (d) Court competences Interaction (a) Substantial law (c) Rules of procedure Causal

Modal

40 Cf. J.-M. Eymeri, La fabrique des énarques, Paris 2001; J.-F. Kesler, L’ENA, la Société, l’État, Paris 1985; J. Mandrin, L’Énarchie ou Les Mandarins de la société bourgeoise, Paris 1967. 41 D. Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, New York 2004 [1983]. 42 Cf. GS. Koppel, World Rule, Chicago 2010; B. Lomfeld, ‘Occupy Global Law’, 4 Transnational Legal Theory 446 (2013).

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1. Substantial Law (Causal Interaction) The basic instrument of any legislative institution is to draft statutes. Substantive law is not only binding for every citizen but also for executive and judicial state organs. The German constitution explicitly states in Art. 20(3) GG that statutes and the law in general are binding on the executive and the judiciary. The practical effect on judicial decision-making, however, is more a question of legal methodology.43 The legislator may even draft guidelines for this judge-law like in the Austrian and the Swiss civil codes.44 In the Common law tradition the creation of rules by the courts is the standard way to construct the legal system. Yet, both methodological systems recognize some limits to judicial interpretation if the legislature has formulated some clear objectives within the given statute.45 2. Appointment of Judges (Causal Structure) To reiterate, the most basic structural power of the legislative branch over courts is again its influence on the selection of judges. In Germany, judges of the federal constitutional court are elected for a unique period of 12 years to equal parts by the German Federal Parliament, the ‘Bundestag’, and the second federal legislative chamber, the ‘Bundesrat’.46 As mentioned earlier, half of the members within the commission choosing the judges of the other highest federal courts are also from the German Federal Parliament.47 Until recently, an extreme institutional overlap between legislative and judicial functions had been practiced in the United Kingdom, where the House of Lords served simultaneously as second legislative chamber and court of last resort. Since 2009, the new Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has assumed the latter function.48 3. Form of Procedure (Modal Interaction) A very broad form of legislative control that draws clear limits of control at the same time is set by the different procedural laws for respective court systems49: the rules of civil procedure (ZPO) and criminal procedure (StPO) for the general courts, together with specific rules for the federal constitutional court (BVerfGG), for the administrative courts (VwGO), for the social law courts (SGG), for the tax 43 Cf. B. Rüthers, Die unbegrenzte Auslegung, Tübingen 2012 [1968]; Lomfeld, Methoden, 2017, supra note 4. 44 §§ 6 – 8 Austrian civil code (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) and Art. 1 Swiss Civil Code (Zivilgesetzbuch). 45 Cf. for instance for Germany: BVerfG 11 October 1978, BVerfGE 49, 304. 46 Art. 94 GG and §§ 4, 5 BVerfGG. 47 Art. 95(2) GG and § 1 RiWahlG. 48 Cf. part 3 of the UK Constitutional Reform Act 2005. 49 In Germany the different specialised judicial systems are listed in Art. 95(1) GG.

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law courts (FGO), for labour law courts (ArbGG), for patent law courts (§§ 65 – 122 PatG) and for insolvency proceedings (InsO). Taking private law court proceedings as an example the rules of civil procedure regulate prerequisites of permissibility (§§ 1 – 90 ZPO), the formal course of the proceeding (§§ 271 – 297 ZPO), admissible forms of evidence (§§ 355 – 455 ZPO), decision rules within collegial courts (§§ 192 – 197 GVG), the form of judgement (§§ 300 – 321 ZPO), the distribution and calculation of costs (§§ 91 – 127 ZPO and GKG), the enforceability (§§ 704 – 723 ZPO) and the prerequisites, measures and forms of enforcement (§§ 724 – 898 ZPO). The procedural rules define the sphere of action for the courts in its legal interactions. 4. Court Competences (Modal Structure) Even before controlling the sphere of action, the competence of a court decides over its power to take up an issue. An example for a very restricted supreme court power is the French constitutional court (Conseil constitutionnel). As is indicated by its name, i. e. literally ‘constitutional advisor’, it was designed to review laws before they enter into legal force.50 Although its competences were extended in 2008 to an ex post control of laws on submission by the highest courts of appeal,51 its power as political player remains limited compared to the German federal constitutional court or the US supreme court. The latter courts derive their broad mandate from their accessibility for individual complaints.52 Rules of competence in general are a core instrument of modal structural control over courts. Taking again German civil procedure as an example, a court has to set out substantial (§§ 13, 23, 71 GVG), local (§§ 12 – 40 ZPO) and functional (§§ 72, 94, 119, 133 GVG) prerequisites for justifying its competence over a case. A similar form of modal structural control is the admissibility (Statthaftigkeit) of appeal (§§ 511, 543 ZPO) and its limited scope of legal review (§§ 529, 559 ZPO). Yet, legislative limitation of court competences is limited itself by the constitutional right to access to courts and effective judicial protection.53 In democratic systems, the legislator wields its primary control over the courts by substantial laws. The function of courts is to survey the observance of these laws. Yet courts can and do have to interpret the law. In most constitutional systems, controlling 50 Cf. Art. 61 of the French constitution. Additional competences are to control the presidential and parliamentary elections (Art. 58 and Art. 59) and public referenda (Art. 60). Despite its reduced competence, the court fulfils an important democratic function cf. D. Schnapper, Une sociologue au Conseil constitutionnel, Paris 2010. 51 Cf. the new Art. 61 – 1 of the French constitution introduced by the constitutional amendment of 23 July 2008. 52 The competences of the BVerfG are constitutionally listed in Art. 93(1) GG. The individual Nr. 4a. 53 In Germany, guaranteed by Art. 19(4) GG; cf. also BVerfG, 08 January 1997, BVerfGE 95, 322.

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the consistency of laws with constitutional rights is also possible. At a minimum, this level of constitutional judicial review is by definition not subject to causal legislative control. Still, the legal rules for judicial procedure offer a general legislative frame of modal control, and this modal control applies in its structural as well as its interactional form to constitutional courts.54

IV. Judicial Court Control The judiciary controls the executive within the scope of administrative and constitutional law and the legislature with the control if applicable norms are consistent with the constitution.55 Given the setup of independent constitutional courts, the competence of last appeal (the ultimate word) on constitutional issues remains with the judiciary. That does not mean, however, that there is no control as has been demonstrated above in detail. A further often underrated addition is judicial self-control, which again is at least in parts institutionalised within procedural laws. Structure (b) Judicial dialogue (d) Judicial self-restraint Interaction (a) Appeal system (c) Judicial self-government Causal

Modal

1. Appeal System (Causal Interaction) A first rather obvious element of judicial self-control is the appeal system. Most developed legal systems have a three-level judicial order. Every higher level controls the lower level court if it did violate existing laws, i. e. the measures set by the legislature. In the Civil Law tradition, a violation of law occurs if a legislative norm is not applied correctly or even not at all taken into account.56 2. Judicial Dialogue (Causal Structure) Judicial self-control is not restricted to the hierarchical appeal system. A partially institutionalized judicial dialogue also exists between independent courts. Multiple court chambers within courts may control each other. In the event of substantially conflicting results of two highest court chambers, procedural laws often provide for a body to provide solutions for conflict. German procedural laws provide for a plenary session (Plenum) of the two senates of the federal constitutional court 54

Cf. the recent legal reforms of the competences and procedural rules of the constitutional courts in Hungary (4th constitutional amendment of March 2013) and Poland (Law of 22 December 2015). 55 Cf. the ‘konkrete Normenkontrolle’ in Art. 100 GG. 56 Cf. the paradigmatic definition in the German code of civil procedure: § 546 ZPO.

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(§ 16 BVerfGG) and a joined senate (Großer Senat) at the highest private and criminal law court Bundesgerichtshof (§ 132 GVG) or the highest administrative court Bundesverwaltungsgericht (§ 11 VwGO). To protect the unity of federal jurisdiction a common senate (Gemeinsamer Senat) between all highest federal courts is even set out in the German constitution (Art. 95(3) GG).57 The perhaps most sophisticated institutional mechanism of judicial dialogue is an obligatory preliminary ruling such as in European law. According to Art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), any court of a Member State may request the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to give ruling on unresolved issues of EU treaty interpretation. What lurks in the background here is a power struggle between (national and international) judicial systems.58 The positive reading of the term ‘judicial dialogue’ would be an inspiring informal dialogue between domestic and international judicial institutions.59 A starting point for a more open comparative dialogue is the idea of uniform application like in Art. 7 of the UN Convention of the International Sale of Goods (CISG). National courts should take decisions of other national courts on the same provision into account. For the CISG, that practice has led to an impressing body of common case law on international sales without an international court guaranteeing uniformity. 3. Judicial Self-Government (Modal Interaction) Self-government of the judiciary implies internal structures of administrative power and control. In Germany, administrative issues of the courts are in the hands of a president appointed by the executive and a presiding committee (§§ 21a-21j GVG), which is elected by the judges of the court. Its main competences are the distribution of judges within the court bodies and the assignment of businesses. The latter competence is of particular importance for the limitation of possible political influence on single cases and requires an abstract plan, who will handle which sort of incoming cases (Geschäftsverteilungsplan).60 In setting up these distributional plans court committees indirectly shape judges’ spheres of action. A comparable strong influence could be exercised by internal evaluations of judges. Evaluation by the appointed president of the court determines the prospect of professional upgrading. In theory only aptitude, qualifications and professional achievement 57

A detailed procedure is provided by a specific federal law (‘Gesetz zur Wahrung der Einheitlichkeit der Rechtsprechung der obersten Gerichtsho¨ fe des Bundes’). 58 Cf. for instance the ‘dialogue’ between the ECJ (16 June 2015, C 62/14) and the BVerfG (21 June 2016, NJW 2016, 2473) on the legitimate scope and form of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 59 Cf. A.-M. Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’, 44 Harvard International Law Review 191 (2003); C. McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’, 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 499 (2000). 60 § 21e and § 21g GVG. The constitutional importance in light of Art. 101 GG is underlined by a plenary decision of the BVerfG, 08 January 1997, BVerfGE 95, 322.

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should decide on nomination (Art. 33(2) GG). In practice, internal networks and arrangements with the executive power prevail.61 A body of internal control of nomination and other administrative and social aspects are judge councils (§§ 49 – 60 and §§ 72 – 75 DRiG). Disciplinary proceedings and transfer of positions can only be held by special judicial service courts (§§ 61 – 68 and 77 DRiG).62 4. Judicial Self-Restraint (Modal Structure) How active judges intervene with their decisions in political affairs or express political reasons in their justifications is mainly a question of judicial culture. Especially constitutional courts have broad competences and possibilities to intervene but may as well opt for a policy of judicial restraint recognising a general priority of legislative perspective.63 A corrective or supportive element is the public responsiveness of courts (cf. the next section). Judicial self-restraint, however, often is a question of personal leadership. Different court presidents advocate different cultures. An institutional stabiliser may be the internal rules of procedure that courts assign themselves.64 Apart from self-restraint in judicial decisions, there also exists a general percept for German judges of personal moderation or restraint (Mäßigungsgebot), which includes abstention from open political activity (§ 39 DRiG). In modern democratic systems with complex differentiated jurisdictions, the degree of internal judicial control is immense. Already beforehand, the appeal system leads to a vertical control and institutionalised or customary judicial dialogue between different judicial bodies to a horizontal control. The presidents of the courts, especially the diverse supreme courts, play a central role within the control by selfgovernment and the culture of self-restraint. This is why the executive or legislative appointment of presidents is such a powerful means of long-term influence. The informal influence of German ‘executive supervision’ also on the evaluation of judges and their prospects of promotion also include serious dangers of nepotism.

V. Public Court Control In complex mass societies, democracy requires political representation. The separation of power idea acknowledges the reality of political institutions with their internal dynamics of expanding their institutional power. The system of checks and bal61

Cf. the administrative court decision VG Karlsruhe, 29 October 2015, in: DRiZ 2016, 74. For disciplinary proceedings cf. §§ 30, 63 DRiG and for the transfer of position §§ 31, 65 DRiG. 63 Cf. BVerfG 01 March 1979, BVerfGE 50, 290 on the creative leeway (Gestaltungsspielraum) of the legislator. 64 Cf. Geschäftsordnung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 19 November 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2015, 286. 62

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ances limits the influence of each state institution to guarantee the democratic influence of the people. In addition to this mutual political control, the possibility of direct public control is mostly left behind. Public control is regularly mediated by mass media. That is why media are often described as fourth political power within a state.65 Although mass media play an important role for the effectiveness of public control, there are other institutional entry points and procedural prerequisites of any public court control. Structure (b) Jury / lay judges (d) Judicial reasoning Interaction (a) Public critique (c) Judicial transparency Causal

Modal

1. Public Critique (Causal Interaction) The most direct and causal form of public influence is a critical reaction to court decisions. Mostly, this will happen within the mass media forum such as newspaper, television or in some forum on the Internet. For instance, journalists are active drivers of public control in commenting on recent court decisions. Yet, demonstrations or petitions are other conceivable forms of public protest without necessary media involvement.66 A more technical, but for that very reason also extremely effective critique comes in the guise of academic writing. Commenting on and criticising court decisions is a core function of jurisprudence all over the world. 2. Jury or Lay Judges (Causal Structure) A jury system or lay judge introduces a form of causal structural control by some arbitrarily chosen or elected representatives of the public. In most Common Law jurisdictions, criminal law cases are decided by jury verdicts. According to Art. III of the US constitution ‘The Trial of all Crimes […] shall be by Jury’. The US also allows the widest use of juries in non-criminal cases.67 In Civil Law systems, lay judges fulfil a similar function of integrating public voices. In Germany, a criminal case is decided by one to three professional judges and two lay judges (§§ 29, 76 GVG), who are elected by the local political representative bodies (§§ 31 – 42 GVG). Although lay judges are not included in regular private law courts, they are integrated in special 65 The original English term is the ‘fourth estate’ attributed to Edmund Burke in T. Carlyle, On Heros and Hero Worhsip, London 1841, Lecture 5; cf. also J. Schultz, Reviving the Fourth Estate, Cambridge 1998. 66 A good global example offers the public protest with countless demonstrations against court decisions favoring or declining abortion between 1973 and 1975: US Supreme Court, 22 January 1973, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); German BVerfG 25 February 1975, BVerfGE 39, 1; French Conseil constitutionnel, 15 January 1975, Recueil 1975, 19. 67 Cf. Amendment VII of the US Constitution and also Rule 38 and 39 US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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economic law sections (§ 105 GVG), labour law courts (§ 6 ArbGG), administrative law courts (§ 5(3) VwGO), social law courts (§ 3 SGG) and tax law courts (§ 5(3) FGO). Lay judges are considered as regular element of the judicial system (§§ 44 – 45a DRiG). A far more extreme version of causal influence on judicial structures is the public election of judges, which is common practice in some US state jurisdictions.68 3. Judicial Transparency (Modal Interaction) A necessary prerequisite of most public control is the transparency of judicial proceedings and decisions. However, transparency may even shape the sphere of action of judges who reflect the public effects of their decisions or treatment of witnesses. A first element of modal control is thus the possibility for public access to court proceedings. In Germany, regular court proceedings have to include an oral trial (§§ 118, 226 StPO, § 128 ZPO, § 25 BVerfGG) that is open to the public (§ 169 GVG) within the bounds of organisational restrictions (for instance, limited space). Public access includes allowing of the presence of representatives from mass media. However, to protect the personality rights of the parties involved, pictures and live streams may be prohibited or some proceedings may even be completely closed to the public.69 A second, perhaps even more important element is the publication of decisions, including the facts of the case and the legal reasoning behind it.70 4. Judicial Reasoning (Modal Structure) The procedural obligation to provide reasons is one of the most important structural prerequisites for any effective court control.71 Yet, the structure of reasons very much depends on the respective national culture of legal reasoning. In France, the form and scope of judicial reasons was and still is rather limited. Decisions are pronounced including one short rationale without revealing if there were dissenting opinions. Likewise, in Germany, the realms of courts’ decision-making remains a 68

Cf. J. Gibson, Electing Judges, Chicago 2012; M. Streb (ed.), Running for Judge: The Rising Political, Financial, and Legal Stakes of Judicial Elections, New York 2007; cf. also the overview on the different US state systems of judicial selection of the ‘National Center for State Courts’ (www.judicialselection.us). 69 In Germany, sound or film recordings are prohibited (§ 169 GVG) and family law cases are in general closed to the public (§ 170 GVG). For the extreme opposite US policy cf. only the live streaming in the famous O.J. Simpsons murder case (LA County Superior Court, 3 October 1995) assembled for instance in the documentary ‘OJ: Trial of the Century’ (USA 2014). 70 According to the German highest administrative law court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht 26 February 1997, BVerwGE 104, 105) there is a state obligation to publish all judicial decisions which could be of public interest. 71 Cf. for Germany § 30(1) BVerfGG, § 117(2) VwGO, § 313(1) ZPO and particularly detailed in § 267 StPO.

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closed black box. Judges have strict official obligations to keep the court’s internal discussions secret, even after they have left their office (§ 43 DRiG)72 and decisions are pronounced with one rationale.73 The opposite extreme is the English Common Law tradition, where each judge of a collegial court writes his own opinion with the possibility of referring some arguments of another (leading) opinion.74 US higher court decisions are published with the leading rationale and concurring or dissenting opinions may be added.75 The same structure is also a feature of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international courts.76 Paths of inclusion for direct public influence on judicial decisions are essential elements of court control. Lay judges as well as jury members not only add some (however arbitrary) form of democratic representation, but also contribute divergent perspectives and plural forms of reasoning or even emotional communication.77 The necessary prerequisites for further public involvement are not only the publication of decisions, but also the style in which this occurs. To affirm or criticise a decision, one has to understand the leading arguments and be aware of possible alternatives. A respective culture of transparent judicial reasoning would not only enable a much broader public debate and critique, but also increase public acceptance of judicial activism.

VI. Conclusion: Procedural Control What do these analyses contribute to answer Juvenal’s question of who is watching the watchmen, and how? In his Nobel prize lecture, Hurwicz discussed three solutions:78 (1) ‘intervenors’, i. e. guardians ‘whose ethical standards rule out corrupt behaviour’; (2) ‘elective office’, where citizens as voters are ‘top level guardians’; and (3) watching ‘circles’, with a mechanism of circular mutual guarding. His overall conclusion is that implementation is possible if the institutional rules feature a sound underlying mechanism design. After discussing various practices of court control, this study has an ever subtler answer. The number and character of ‘intervernors’ crucially depends on the shape of legal formation. Direct election of judges only plays a very limited role. But there are 72

Cf. also § 30(1) BVerfGG and § 193(1) GVG. The only German exception is the Federal constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) where judges could issue separate or dissenting opinions (§ 30(2) BVerfGG). 74 As an example cf. House of Lords, 28 May 1963, Hedley Byrne v Heller, AC 465 (1964). 75 As an example cf. US Supreme Court, Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992). 76 As an example cf. International Court of Justice, 15 June 1962 (Temple of Preah Vihear), ICJ Reports 1962, 6. 77 Cf. L. Schwarte, Vom Urteilen, Berlin 2012, at 67 – 106. 78 L. Hurwicz, ‘But Who Will Guard the Guardians?’, supra note 12, at 287 – 290. 73

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other forms of public court control. The most far reaching is the public critique of judicial reasoning, which might even be understood as ‘watching circle’, for courts in general are ‘public reasoners’.79 Supreme courts serve to provide ‘argumentative representation’80 for the public, simultaneously a real manifestation of ‘public reason’81 and a ‘Socratic contestation’82, which stimulates, keeps alive and bundles public reasoning on basic questions of living together socially. And yet this discursive paradise is itself replete with power structures. Discursive power influences the structures and spaces of reasons, developing normative justificatory narratives and orders.83 Judges are important players within this public narrative building process. The perhaps most important institutional safeguard against judicial abuse of discursive power is procedural law in large encompassing rules of court procedure as well as organisational regulation of the judiciary. Nearly all the described practices of court control somehow materialise within procedural rules. Thus, the common denominator of court control within a democratic order is its character as procedural control embodied in procedural law.

79 80

578. 81

C. Mendes, Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy, Oxford 2013. R. Alexy, Balancing, constitutional review, and representation, 3 ICON 572 (2005), at

J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York 1993, at 231. M. Kumm, Democracy is not enough: Rights, Proportionality and the point of judicial review, New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 118 (2009), 1. 83 Cf. R. Forst/K. Günther (eds.), Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen, Frankfurt 2011 and the concept of ‘noumenal power’, in: R. Forst, Justification and Critique: Towards a Critical Theory of Politics, Cambridge 2014, at 9 – 11. 82

Control of Courts by Prerogative Writs Jurisdictional Conflicts as “Constitutional” Conflicts By Ulrike Müßig

I. Introduction In the English legal history, the 17th century marks the peak of conflicts between monarchical prerogative and Parliament, carried out between the courts of common law and prerogative courts.1 Everybody knows perfectly well that at the end of the line there stands the Bill of Rights with the constitutive principle of Parliament sovereignty. What is hardly known, though, is the fact that the concept of the sovereignty of the English Parliament is based on its self-understanding as highest court of justice, the highest common law court. This was analysed in length by my article “Constitutional conflicts in the seventeenth-century England” in the Tijdschrift.2 The underlying question was the final saying in an emergency situation (necessity). The necessity was relied on by the Stuart Monarchs as grounds for justifying taxes and forced loans without parliamentary approval. And when Parliament decided to stand against the king openly by issuing Militia Ordinance 1642 it did so on the authority of “necessity”. The control of the (prerogative) courts by prerogative writs was the common lawyers’ battle field against Stuarts’ absolutism in the 17th c. which amounted up to the confrontation between the protagonists Lord Chief Justice Edward Coke and Lord Chancellor Ellesmere. The origins of this conflict lie in the 16th century. Both are the topics of my paper, which aimes at the understanding of jurisdictional conflicts with prerogative courts as “constitutional” conflicts with the judicial sovereignty.

1 P. B. Waite, The Struggle of Prerogative and Common Law in the Reign of James I, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25 (1959), p. 144. Substantive preparatory work and search for literature I owe to my doctoral student Thekla Hengemühle whom I thank for her support. 2 TRG 76 (2008) 27 – 47.

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II. The Prerogative Courts in General After the Church of England broke away from Rom with the Act of Supremacy in 1534 and declared Henry the VIII. as its supreme head3, the monarch banned legal remedies directed at the pope in legal disputes regarding ecclesiastical issues.4 The following period witnessed the establishment of new courts, Star Chamber and Court of High Commission. These so-called prerogative courts evolved from judicial sovereignty of the king’s council. The court of Chancery, which had already previously emerged out of the royal council, was also viewed as a prerogative court. Even though the courts of law (Court of King’s Bench, Court of Common Pleas, Court of Exchequer and the House of Lords) had developed from the king’s council in the 12th century5, the judicial sovereignty remained with the king6 – the residuary royal prerogative of justice, which he made use of in cases where the actions of common law seemed inadequate: the monarch drew such issues to the Chancery or the Privy Council and exercised his residuary royal prerogative of justice by his Lord Chancellor, his appointees (in the Star Chamber and the Court of High Commission) or directly himself7. All these courts emanating from the judicial sovereignty of the king in his Privy Council were not founded on the common law, but on the royal prerogative.8 The judiciary in those courts is undertaken by the monarch himself or politically dependent appointees at their discretion.9 1. The Court of Star Chamber The Star Chamber derived its name from the der camara stellata, a room in Westminster Palace, whose ceiling was decorated with stars and where the Privy Council congregated for judicial matters from 1347 onwards.10 For over a century, the Council of the Star Chamber was nothing more than a council congregation at a special 3 26 Henry VIII, c. 1, quoted after: G. R. Elton (Ed.), The Tudor Constitution, 2. ed., Cambridge 1982, p. 364 f.; see also Ulrike Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2. ed., p. 162. 4 By the Ecclesiastical Appeals Act (1533) (24 Henry VIII. c. 12); see also John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 130. 5 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 17 ff. Ulrike Müßig, Höchstgerichte im frühneuzeitlichen Frankreich und England – Höchstgerichtsbarkeit als Motor des frühneuzeitlichen Staatsbildungsprozesses, Akten des 36. Deutschen Rechtshistorikertages in Halle an der Saale 2006, ed. by Rolf Lieberwirth/Heiner Lück, Baden-Baden 2008, 544 – 577. 6 Therefore the title of the English translation of my “Recht und Justizhoheit” for OUP is “Law and Judicial Sovereignty”. 7 In case his Lord Chancellor or his appointées could not handle the issue alone sufficiently and was asked to do so by the applicants (John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 117; Ulrike Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2. ed., p. 153). 8 Ulrike Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2. ed., p. 153. 9 Ulrike Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2. ed., p. 153. 10 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 118.

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venue11; during the reign of Henry VIII., Lord Chancellor Thomas Wolsey (in office 1515 – 1529) established the judicial duties as the main task of the Council and promoted the basic division from governmental affairs. With the break from Rome, the judicial duty of the Star Chamber was consolidated under Lord Chancellor Thomas Cromwell from 1540 onwards.12 Meetings of the Star Chamber were no longer viewed as Privy Council sessions, but as judicial congregations. Here, the councilmen exercised the royal prerogative of the judiciary as appointees dependent on the monarch.13 At first, civil cases dominated in the judicature of the chamber, later, from the time of the Stuart monarchs, more criminal cases came up, which the king delegated to his appointees only for sentencing, due to the shortcomings of common law in regards to serious crimes.14 For the crown, the advantage was that proceedings before the Star Chamber were undertaken in a, compared to common-law-Courts, shorter and simplified fashion: jurors, whose judgement had in fact been a requirement for sentencing since the Magna Charta (1215),15 were not required in the Star Chamber. It therefore presented a comfortable way for the monarch to penalise seditions against the crown or parochial misdemeanours, especially in cases where a jury court would not have followed the line of the crown.16 The Star Chamber was soon known for its arbitrary sentences. However, proceedings, which could end in a death penalty, could not be conducted without a jury court of peers, and so the Star Chamber did not have the authority to issue death sentences.17 2. The Court of High Commission As a direct impact of the Reformation on the judiciary, the Court of High Commission was established in 1580. It was supposed to function as disciplinary court on behalf of the monarch as head of the Church of England, especially exercising his judicial sovereignty in criminal cases.18 In the 1558 Act of Supremacy,19 which confirmed the 1534 Act of Supremacy, Queen Elizabeth I. (1533 – 1603) was awarded 11

John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 118. John Alexander Guy, The Court of Star Chamber and its records in the reign of Elizabeth I, p. 5; John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 118. 13 Ulrike Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2. ed., p. 154 f. 14 Ulrike Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2. ed., p. 155; John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 118 f. 15 Magna Carta, c. 27. 16 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 119. 17 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 119; Ulrike Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2. ed., p. 157. 18 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 119; Ulrike Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2. ed., p. 157. 19 Eliz. c. 1, quoted after: Select Statutes and other Constitutional Documents illustrative of the reigns of Elizabeth and James I, 4. ed. 1913, p. 1. 12

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comprehensive judicial duties to control the parochial power, to be exercised by herself or by dependent appointees (Art. VIII, Acts of Supremacy 1558). The aim was to enforce the Reformation, initiated by Elizabeth’s father, Henry VIII., and so the High Commission was instructed by letters patent to collect evidence in all cases of apostasy, heresy, heterodoxy, schism and conspiracy against the state church.20 In this role, the High Commission was strongly connected with government policy and illustrated the crown’s claim to leadership in the Church of England.21 The penal power of the High Commission included financial and prison sentences, but not the death penalty.22 The Court of the High Commission was especially unpopular due to its power to demand the ex-officio-oath from the accused. With this oath, to be taken before the first interrogation and so even before notice of the crimes accused of, the accused could be forced to incriminate himself – a process unknown to common law. As the rules of evidence for the High Commission demanded that every fact had to be proven, the accused was often called upon to give evidence, as there was no other way to collect evidence. To ensure a sentencing, the ex-officio-oath was used to coerce the defendant to confess. If one refuses to take the oath, he was imprisoned for being in contempt of the court.23 Especially the puritans were heavily opposed to the ex-officio-oath.24 3. Excursus: The Ex-Officio-Oath The ex-officio-oath was introduced as a “present” from Pope Gregory IX. (rul. 1227 – 1241) to Henry III. (rul. 1216 – 1272) by his papal legate, cardinal Otho (rul. 1227 – 1251)25. The reason for this was the lacking parochial judiciary system. Due to the “remote location” the English bishops had especially not been notified about the reforms in parochial procedures started by Gregory’s pre-predeces-

20 The Letters Patent of 1611, quoted in: Select Statutes and other Constitutional Documents illustrative of the reigns of Elizabeth and James I, 4. ed. 1913, p. 424 f. 21 John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, Illinois Law Review 36 (1941), 127 – 152 (129). 22 Ulrike Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2. ed., p. 163. 23 P. B. Waite, The Struggle of Prerogative and Common Law in the Reign of James I, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25 (1959), p. 144 (148); see also John Hostettler, Sir Edward Coke, Chichester 1997, p. 68. 24 P. B. Waite, The Struggle of Prerogative and Common Law in the Reign of James I, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25 (1959), p. 144 (148). 25 Oddone di Monferrato was missioned by Gregory IX as papal legate several times to northern Europe, including the mediation between the Archbishop of Canterbury and Archbishop of York in London in 1237. In English History he is normally referred to as cardinal Otho.

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sor, Innocent III. (rul. 1198 – 1216)26, which had been confirmed by the Fourth Council of the Lateran.27 After his arrival in England, the papal legate Otho convened a congregation of all English bishops and decreed a number of so-called constitutions regarding the parochial procedures. One of these constitutions concerned the oath de veritate dicenda, which was later known as the ex-officio-oath, as judges could order it of their own motion.28 Regarding the purpose of the new law, the corresponding constitution says: „We establish that the oath of calumny to tell the truth in ecclesiastical causes in order that the truth may be more easily uncovered and causes more speedily finished shall henceforth be administered throughout the realm of England, according to the canons and lawful sanctions, notwithstanding any custom to the contrary.”29

With this, the content of the oath is provided; the taker of the oath must swear to answer truthfully to every question before he is informed of the crime he is being accused of.30 Already with its appearance in England in 1246 the ex-officio-oath was criticised, which led King Henry III. to forbid the use of it outside of marriage and heirloom cases.31 After Boniface of Savoy (1217 – 1270), then the Archbishop of Canterbury (rul. 1241 – 1270), further sharpened the oath, by threatening those who declined to take it with excommunication, Parliament fully banned its use during the reign of Edward II. (1307 – 1327).32 Over the course of the 14th century, a further parliamentary decree was released, the Prohibitio Formata de Statuto Articuli Cleri, limiting not only the taking of oath but also the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts. Many cases were assorted exclusively to the common-law courts and the ecclesiastical courts were also forbidden from ruling in these. Laymen were prohibited from testifying under the ex-officio-oath outside of heirloom and marriage cases.33 However, reports from the late 14th century

26

For the constitutive reorganisation of ecclesiastical jurisdiction by the decretal Ad nostram audientiam (Liber extra 1.4.3.) cf. Ulrike Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2. ed., p. 70 et seq. 27 Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment. The Right against Self-incrimination, New York 1986, p. 45 f. 28 Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment. The Right against Self-incrimination, New York 1986, p. 45. 29 Quoted after: Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment. The Right against Selfincrimination, New York 1986, p. 46. 30 Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment. The Right against Self-incrimination, New York 1986, p. 47. 31 Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment. The Right against Self-incrimination, New York 1986, p. 47. 32 Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment. The Right against Self-incrimination, New York 1986, p. 48. 33 Coke would claim this law in his dispute with archbishop Bancroft.

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show that the ecclesiastical courts defied the Articuli Cleri statute and continued to apply the oath.34 At a later point, the King’s Council began imitating the ecclesiastical courts and to demand the ex-officio-oath from the accused in its proceedings. This is how it became the law of the royal prerogative to coerce the oath. When the Court of the Star Chamber evolved from the King’s Council in the 16th century and the High Commission was created to enforce the royal prerogative in the parochial courts, it adapted the ex-officio-oath into its procedure.35 For this reason, the ex-officio-oath was also known as the Star Chamber oath or the High Commision oath.36

III. The Rise of Opposition Against the Prerogative Courts 1. Criticism by Common Law Lawyers and Puritans The new prerogative courts soon attracted the disapproval of common-law lawyers. On the one hand, they blamed the expansion of criminal law by the prerogative courts, especially in cases of breach of the peace, conspiracy, fraud and slander. However, the second point of critique was more important: as the prerogative courts did not apply the procedures of common law, they were more effective and had clear advantages in the competition of the courts. The common law procedure at this point in time was characterised by out-dated actiones and a very technical process. Hamlet did not complain about „the law’s delay“37 for nothing in his famous monologue.38 While common-law courts relied for witness accounts on a jury verdict, the prerogative courts only allowed written evidence and the relevant facts of the case were determined by the judges themselves. Furthermore, prerogative courts assumed the guilt of those accused, and common-law courts adhered to the principle of in dubio pro reo. In fact, especially in the early days, the Star Chamber, High Commission and the Court of Chancery were highly popular, which can be seen in the following verdict in Caudrey’s Case 1591. Such a rivalry, also in cases that would have actually

34

Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment. The Right against Self-incrimination, New York 1986, p. 49. 35 Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment. The Right against Self-incrimination, New York 1986, p. 49 f. 36 See William Cobbett, Thomas Bayley Howell, Thomas J. Howell (eds.), Cobbett’s complete Collection of State Trials and proceedings for high treason and other crimes and misdemeanors from the earliest period to the present time with notes and other illustrations, vol. 3, London 1809, p. 1321, 1332; more recently also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 37 William Shakespeare, The Tragicall Historie of Hamlet, Prince of Denmarke, Akt 3, Szene 1. The passage referred to is the one begging “to be or not to be”. 38 P. B. Waite, The Struggle of Prerogative and Common Law in the Reign of James I, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25 (1959), p. 144 (145).

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belonged before the commonlaw courts, stoked fears of the common-law judges that the common law would be circumvented by the prerogative courts.39 From the very beginning, the Puritans were the sharpenest critics of the Court of High Commission, as the court were used in particular to suppress this group. Already in 1584, John Whitgift had taken over the office of Archbishop of Canterbury (1583-1604) from the moderate Edmund Grindal (rul. 1575 – 1583). Whitgift was a ferocious proponent of Elizabeth’s anti-Puritan politics and empowered the High Commission as an instrument of these policies. In 1587, Whitgift’s chaplain Richard Bancroft40 was named as a judge on the High Commission, where he aggressively and – at the same time – successfully moved against the Puritans.41 Whitgift himself wrote: „the whole ecclesiastical law is a carcasse [sic] without soul; yf [sic] it not be in the wants supplied by the commission.”42 2. The Verdict in Caudrey’s Case 1591 and the Initial Acceptance of the Peculiarities of Clerical Law Until the begin of James’ I. reign in 1603, there was little aimed resistance against the prerogative courts from common-law judges. Even Edward Coke, who would become one of the main opponents of the High Commission, did not doubt its responsibilities and authority, as Caudrey’s Case43 1591 and his engagement as crown prosecutor shows. The puritan priest Robert Caudrey had filed an action for trespass against one George Atton, who had illegally entered the parsonage in the context of a clerical visitation authorised by the Act of Supremacy. However, Caudrey had lost his sinecure by High Commission verdict, as he had been preaching – in violation of the Queen’s letters patent – from the Book of Common Prayer and holding church services, therefore making it relevant for the trespassing-case if the High Commission judgement hat been legitimate or void. The plaintiff doubted the jurisdiction of the High Commission as well as the legitimacy of the procedure which led to the loss of the sinecure, as there had been neither a jury verdict nor a confession of the accused. The letters patent had furthermore not provided for the loss of the sinecure for the first offence of not using the Book of Common Prayer.44 In his closing statement, the crown prosecutor Coke objected to the plaintiffs arguments and accepted the au39 P. B. Waite, The Struggle of Prerogative and Common Law in the Reign of James I, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25 (1959), p. 144 (145). 40 Archbishop of Canterbury 1604 – 1610. 41 William Epstein, Issues of principle and expediency in the controversy over prohibitions to ecclesiastical courts in England, JLH (Journal of Legal History) 1 (1980), 211 – 261 (216 ff.). 42 John Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, Reasons for the Necessity of the Commission for Causes Ecclesiastical, 1583. 43 Coke Reports, Part V, 1a; also known as Caudrey (Cawdry) v. Atton. 44 Coke Reports, Part V, 1a (3b ff.).

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thorities of the Courts of High Commission45 by pointing to its jurisdiction and necessity in clerical cases and to claiming that, due to the nature of clerical law and the royal prerogative, it was independent from the principles of common law. Therefore, the common-law courts were bound to respect its judgements.46 Apparently, there was a certain amount of tolerance for a new court of ecclesiastical equity, mainly because of the still slightly chaotic situation of the new clerical law47 during the reign of Elizabeth I. and does not see problems with its jurisdiction regarding issues of heresy and schism.48 Therefore the verdict in Caudrey’s Case can be read as legitimisation and strengthening of the High Commission.49 This will change in later years, when the prerogative writs were the judicial means of the common law opposition against the prerogative courts.

IV. The Prerogative Writs as Judicial Means Against the Prerogative Courts 1. Prerogative Writs in General The origin of the prerogative writs has not been completely discovered; it is however possible that they developed from the “wills of grace”50 described for example by Glavill.51 The term “prerogative writs” first appeared in the context of the habeas corpus writ in the Richard Bourns Case52 of 1620, to illustrate these as benevolence on part of the king.53 In the 1759 case R v Cowle54 “prerogative writs” is used as a collective term for the writs prohibition, habeas corpus, mandamus and certiorari.55 45

See Ulrike Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2. ed., p. 166 f. Coke Reports, Part V, 1a (7a, 8a ff.). 47 Internal control; procedural control. 48 P. B. Waite, The Struggle of Prerogative and Common Law in the Reign of James I, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25 (1959), p. 144 (146). 49 William Epstein, Issues of principle and expediency in the controversy over prohibitions to ecclesiastical courts in England, JLH 1 (1980), 211 – 261 (218). 50 S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, The Cambridge Law Journal 11 (1951), p. 40 – 56 (43). 51 Glanvill, XIV, c. 3. For a broader methodological context see Ulrike Seif (= Müßig), Methodenunterschiede in der europäischen Rechtsgemeinschaft oder Mittlerfunktion der Präjudizien, in: Gunnar Duttge (ed.), Freiheit und Verantwortung in schwieriger Zeit, BadenBaden 1998, 133 – 147, 144 et seq. 52 Cro. Jac. 543; also known as R. v. Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, ex parte Bourn. 53 S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, The Cambridge Law Journal 11 (1951), S. 40 – 56 (53); see more below. 54 97 E.R. 587. 55 “Writs not ministerially directed (sometimes called prerogative writs, because they issue on the part of the King) such writs of mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari […] 46

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Modern sources also count the writ quo warranto to this list.56 So the term was used to characterise writs that had certain attributes in a historical context.57 The background for the prerogative writs was the notion that monarchical judicial sovereignty should adhere to the law in material and procedural sense and to offer a legal means to the subjects for the case that courts exceeded the boundaries set forth in the law (rule of law).58 The exercise of this control over courts was viewed as part of the royal prerogative and was placed mainly with the Privy Council, but was later bestowed upon the Courts of King’s Bench59 as the court of the king’s and also in charge of governmental affairs.60 The prerogative writs were introduced to enable such control at the beginning of the 17th century, especially to minimise the use of prerogative powers by the prerogative courts. Those common-law jurists that used the writs as an instrument of power against the prerogative courts would have therefore probably repudiated the term “prerogative writs”.61 The writs were extraordinary legal means62 that were available to the courts themselves.63 Therein they differed from other writs, which served as the court order gained by one party summoning the second party to appear before court.64 While the prerogative writs had initially been developed for purposes of routine, they were now not available in the regular proceedings. Instead, they were deployed at the discretion of the court.65 The writ of error, on the other hand, cannot be described as a prerogative writ, even though it shared certain characteristics with it, such as the fact that it was

may issue to every dominion of the Crown of England.”, 97 E.R. 587 (599); see also S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, The Cambridge Law Journal 11 (1951), p. 40 – 56 (53). 56 See John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 145. 57 S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, The Cambridge Law Journal 11 (1951), p. 40 – 56 (55). 58 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 143. 59 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 143. 60 S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, The Cambridge Law Journal 11 (1951), p. 40 – 56 (55). 61 S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, The Cambridge Law Journal 11 (1951), p. 40 – 56 (52). 62 In Müßig, Rechts- und Justizhoheit (p. 165, footnote 81) the prerogative writs are describead as ‘extraordinary legal means’. This may be mistakable for continental readers familiar with suspense and devolutive effects in the Continental legal systems. The prerogative writs however do not led to such effects. 63 See John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 143 f. 64 See Theodore Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5. ed. Boston 1956, p. 355. 65 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 144.

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used at the discretion of the crown.66 It was more of a regular, everyday legal mean with which orders of one of the courts of record, that is a court, whose verdict had been held in Latin on parchment, could be fought with.67 It was so available to everyone and was not issued by a court. Proceedings that were contended by a writ of honour were mostly continued before the Court of King’s Bench.68 2. The Writs of Prohibition as Legal Instruments to Remove Proceedings from Clerical Courts In the conflict between common-law and prerogative courts, the writ of prohibition was of particular importance. In the times of the Act of Supremacy 1534, separating the Church of England under its new supreme head, the English monarch, from the roman-catholic church, this oldest of the prerogative writs was a mean utilised often by the parties to move proceedings from the clerical courts to the common-law courts.69 After the reformation had been initiated by Henry VIII. and the dissolution of canonical judiciary in England was ordered by the Act of Supremacy 1534, the writ of supremacy rapidly lost in importance and nearly become unnecessary.70 The dispute between common law and prerogative began with the commonlaw courts remembering the writ of prohibition as a means to move legal proceedings from the clerical courts to the courts of the king.71 In the later years of the reign of Elizabeth I. (rul. 1558 – 1603), the writ of prohibition was used cautiously by the common-law courts. In the early proceedings, a certain opposition to the High Commission can be sensed, but they lack a broader political dimension. The 1590 Man’s Case72 dealt with a prohibition, that had been issued due to a illegitimate divorce decree against a clerical court; in Love v Prin (1599)73, a personal injury case was taken away from the High Commission by a common-law court with a writ of prohibition, as it was only a simple injury case, and the victim had not been a member of the clergy. In these proceedings, the jurisdiction of the prerogative and especially that of the clerical courts was doubted only sporadically in single cases, but one cannot deter66

(54). 67

S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, The Cambridge Law Journal 11 (1951), p. 40 – 56

Ulrike Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2. ed., p. 165. S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, The Cambridge Law Journal 11 (1951), p. 40 – 56 (54 f.). 69 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 144, 128 f. 70 P. B. Waite, The Struggle of Prerogative and Common Law in the Reign of James I, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25 (1959), p. 144 (146 f.). 71 P. B. Waite, The Struggle of Prerogative and Common Law in the Reign of James I, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25 (1959), p. 144 (147). 72 78 E.R. 484. 73 78 E.R. 985. 68

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mine a general rejection. Rather, the case of Baker v. Rogers (1599)74 – from the same period in time and in which a priest was relieved of his office for simony – shows that the common-law courts did not question the authority of the High Commission for clerical matters, as the common-law court disallowed the prohibition, reasoning that it was bound by the decision of the High Commission regarding the question if simony had been committed and that it was not allowed to interfere in questions of clerical law. In the case Collier v. Collier (1590/1)75, the ex-officio-oath provoked a writ of prohibition, apparently decreed in regard to the beginning jurisdictional conflict: the High Commission and its procedure were being doubted in its very foundations. When the Court of High Commission interrogated the parties in the matter of unchastity, such a writ was decreed against it by the Court of Common Pleas, claiming that no one could be forced to give evidence against himself. As the ex-officio-oath was a characteristic of the High Commission, the conclusion that the liberty of refraining from self-incrimination would prohibit the use of the oath amounted to a frontal attack on the prerogative court. The Common Pleas’ outbreak was probably due to how fundamentally adverse the ex-officio-oath was to the principles of common law. At the same time, the statement shows that there should be a different kind of standards in heirloom- and marriage cases, and that the High Commission would still have some own authorities and that not its whole existence would be cast in doubt. Furthermore, a connection was established with the law Articuli Cleri, which had already banned the use of the ex-officio-oath outside of heirloom- and marriage cases in the 14th century. Edward Coke was the counsel of the defence for the accused in this case.76

V. Conflicts Between Common Law-Courts and Prerogative Courts Under the Stuart Monarchy 1. The Hampton Court Conference (1604) and its Consequences In the first decade of the 17th century, the conflicts between common law and prerogative courts intensified. At the Hampton Court Conference, called together with the aim of repositioning the Church of England in January 1604, the role of the clerical courts, especially that of the Court of High Commission was discussed. While Archbishop Whitgift defended its existence by claiming that a high level of disobedience often marked the attitude of the accused in religious matters, and that therefore only a sentencing by the High Commission came into question, the opposing Puritans compared proceedings there with those of the Spanish Inquisition and sharply at74

78 E.R. 1018. Moore 906 = 72 E.R. 1265. 76 John H. Wigmore/John T. McNaughton, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 8, Boston/Toronto 1961, p. 280. 75

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tacked the coercion to self-incrimination by means of the ex-officio-oath.77 King James I. tried to seek a compromise between the two groups and approved some of the reforms. The authority of the Courts of High Commission was restricted to severe criminal cases.78 This way, the Puritans and the common-law judges could achieve an interim success.79 This changed when the Anti-Puritan Richard Bancroft was named Archbishop of Canterbury (1604 – 1610). As James I. had tasked those bishops and clerical commissions dependant on Bancroft to implement the changes of the Hampton Court conference, these began to undermine the reforms. The clerical courts began applying the parochial laws more vigorously again, the Court of High Commission gained influence.80 Under these auspices, the conflict between common-law and prerogative courts escalated and for Waite „The end of the compromise was clearly evident; the results of the Hampton Court Conference, the appointment of Bancroft as Archbishop of Canterbury, the rigidity of the Canons – all this in 1604 – could hardly fail to produce an atmosphere in which principles and issues would crystallize, in which logic would supplant reasonableness.”81 2. Edward Coke (1552 – 1634) and his Institutes of the Laws of England (1628 – 1644) Edward Coke (1552 – 1634), who was the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas from 1606, the Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench from 1613,82 and was regarded as the finest jurist of his time,83 emerged as the protagonist of the dispute between common-law and prerogative courts at the beginning of the 17th century. The Institutes of the Laws of England, which he published later, show the position of the common-law jurists in the conflict with the prerogative courts. Coke demanded the control of the judicial sovereignty by the Court of King‘s Bench, which he had presided over since 1613, 84 and he detailed, why the Court of King’s Bench gives its rulings without being influenced by the king.85

77

Thomas Fuller, The Church History of Britain, vol. V, Oxford 1845, p. 298 f. William Epstein, Issues of principle and expediency in the controversy over prohibitions to ecclesiastical courts in England, JLH 1 (1980), 211 – 261 (231). 79 See Ulrike Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2. ed., p. 167. 80 William Epstein, Issues of principle and expediency in the controversy over prohibitions to ecclesiastical courts in England, JLH (Journal of Legal History) 1 (1980), 211 – 261 (231). 81 P. B. Waite, The Struggle of Prerogative and Common Law in the Reign of James I, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25 (1959), p. 144 (146). 82 Müßig, Art. Coke, Edward in: HRG vol. 1, Edited by Albrecht Cordes, 2. ed. 2012, p. 871. 83 Cf. John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., p. 167. 84 Müßig, Art. Coke, Edward in: HRG Bd. 1, ed. by Albrecht Cordes, 2. ed. 2012, p. 871. 85 Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England. Concerning the Jurisdiction of Courts, 5. ed., London 1671, p. 70 f. 78

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The King, Coke reasoned, had transferred all his judicial powers to the courts, who would forthwith exercise this power in his name. Therefore, rulings in questions of the law were only allowed to be answered by these courts. The king was also not empowered to transfer this authority of judicial power for a second time to different institutions. The Court of King’s Bench was also, pursuant to its historical function, the court concerned in legal matters regarding to the king, the king himself, however, could not be the judge in his own proceedings. Coke counts three legal matters as those that regard the king: first, all proceedings brought by the crown itself, that is, all charges that related to treason and severe crimes (called propriae causae regis). Secondly, as propriae causae regis, “regularly to examine and correct all manner of errors in fait(h) and in law, of all the Judges and Justices of the Realm in their judgments, processe, and proceeding in Courts of Record, and not only in the pleas of the Crown, but in all pleas, real, personal and mixt […]. […] for regularly no other Court hath the like jurisdiction […].” Thirdly the courts authority not only included the correction of errors in legal proceedings, but also transgression in the extrajudicial sphere, such as breaches of the peace, oppression of subjects or other forms of misgoverning, so that every kind of public or private injustice could be reviewed by a court and punished.86 Coke’s argumentation draws heavenly on former legal authorities such as Henry Bracton’s De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae/On the Laws and Customs of England from 1264)87 to support his views as long-standing legal tradition. Actually this was wrong88 and Coke was certainly clever enough to know about it:, the legitimisation “since former times” was hard to be topped in the English political discourse and this was the goal he was heading for.

86 Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England. Concerning the Jurisdiction of Courts, 5. ed., London 1671, p. 71: “Thirdly, this Court hath not only jurisdiction to correct errors in judicial proceeding, but other errors and misdemeanours extrajudicial tending to the breach of peace or oppression of subjects […] or any other manner of misgovernment; so that no wrong or injury, either public or private can be done, but that this shall be reformed or punished in one Court or other by due course of law.” 87 For example see Prohibitions del Roy (1607 = Mich. 5 Jacobi 1) 12 Co.Rep. 64 = 77 ER 1343 per Edward Coke, C.J. addressing to Bracton, vol. II, Introductio: Sapiens esse debet qui iudicat, p. 21: „then the king said, that he thought the law was founded upon reason, and that he and others had reason, as well as the Judges: to which it was answered by me, that true it was, that God had endowed His Majesty with excellent science, and great endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason but by artificial reason and judgment of law, … [and answering the king Coke continues]; to which I said, that Bracton saith, quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege.“ For more details cf. Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2nd ed., Berlin 2009, p. 171, 177. 88 Cf. Albert V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of Constitution, 10. ed. 1959, p. 18. Full quotation is given at note 140.

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3. The Common Law Courts’ Use of Writs of Prohibition and Writs of Habeas Corpus After it became clear that the reforms fought out at the Hampton Court Conference had failed, the conflict between the Courts of Law and the prerogative courts became obvious. Those jurists that supported the royal prerogative started acting against the common-law judges. In 1604, following an order form the King, Lord Chancellor Ellesmere convened the judges of the King’s Bench and the Courts of Exchequer, and interrogated them on the question of the possibility of judges of the Courts of Common Pleas, who had probably consciously not been invited, decreeing writs of prohibition even when the case concerned was not pending before their court.89 This can be viewed as an attack especially on the Court of Common Pleas, and an attempt to pit the common-law courts against each other. Answer conceding that judges could only decree prohibitions in cases pending before them would have rendered this writ irrelevant, its purpose specifically being to enable one court to pull on case from another court due to a lack of jurisdiction and put in front of a common-law court. The judges of the King’s Bench and the Exchequer-Court opposed Ellesmere’s suggestion and unanimously decided not to hand in an opinion regarding the jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Pleas. But at the same time they emphasised that precedents before one court justified further proceedings of the same nature before the court, concluding that „for a long time, and in many successions of reverend judges, prohibitions upon information, without any other plea pending, have been granted […]“90. The accounts in the Coke Reports show evidence of a broad front of common-law courts opposing the prerogative courts and recognising the writs of prohibition as legal means. The quotes of ancient Christian texts at the end of the report, presumably inserted by Coke himself, the bible quote ‘Laqueus confractus est, et nos liberti sumus’91, as well as the apocrypha citation ‘Et magna est veritas, et praevalet’92, show the common-law judges viewed themselves as the apologists of a liberal system, guaranteed by the legal views of common law. Shortly after his nomination as Archbishop of Canterbury, Bancroft, too, summoned the common-law judges to the Star Chamber and interrogated them as to their excessive use of prohibitions and what their political view was regarding the role of the High Commission and of the King. Letters of Bancroft composed after this event show, that the answer of the present jurists, among them the former Chief Justice of the Common Pleas Sir John Popham and the then Crown Prosecutor 89

12 Coke Reports 109. 12 Coke Reports 109. 91 “We have escaped like a bird from the snare of the fowlers”, Psalm 124, Vers 7. The complete passage reads: “We have escaped like a bird from the snare of the fowlers; the snare is broken, and we have escaped!”. 92 “The truth is great and will prevail”. 90

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Sir Edward Coke had been to the Archbishop’s liking.93 Nevertheless a new complaint was lodged to the Privy Council in 1605 about the behaviour of commonlaw jurists.94 With the appointment of Coke as Chief Justice of the Common Pleas the attacks on the High Commission increased. The method of choice were again the writs of prohibition as well as the writs of habeas corpus.95 In context of control of the judicial sovereignty by the Court of King’s Bench Coke already refers to some of the prerogative writs in his Institutes of the Laws of England. The Court could for example use habeas corpus to release an unfairly treated party, even if it did not have any privileges regarding the court. Furthermore, a writ of prohibition could be possible, to ensure that clerical courts stayed within their jurisdiction.96 In the spring of 1606, shortly after taking up his duties as the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, Coke was, due to the urging of Archbishop Bancroft, requested to testify before the Privy Council regarding the accusations made the previous year against the common-law judges.97 The exchange held on this occasion between Coke and Bancroft is reported in Coke’s Institutes of the Laws of England98 and vividly shows how important the writ of prohibition was and what scope the Archbishop attributed to it in its use against the prerogative courts. He confronted Coke with a multitude of allegations, many of which were based on the accusation that the writ of prohibition was used by the common-law courts too often and in an unjustified, careless way, and issued on a poor basis of facts.99 But the heart of the problem is hit by those dialogue phrases in which Bancroft accuses the common-law judges to attack the clerical jurisdiction and especially that of the High Commission. He claims that the extensive use of prohibitions in recent times had led to severe insecurities regarding the order of competences and to

93 Edward Cardwell, Documentary annals of the reformed church of England vol. 2, Oxford 1966, p. 90; see also Green, Mary Anne Everett (Editor), Calendar of state papers/Domestic series of the Reign James I., Nendeln 1967 (Reprint of the Edition London, 1857), vol. 12, No. 73. 94 William Epstein, Issues of principle and expediency in the controversy over prohibitions to ecclesiastical courts in England, JLH 1 (1980), 211 – 261 (232). 95 John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, Illinois Law Review 36 (1941), 127 – 152 (129). 96 Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England. Concerning the Jurisdiction of Courts, 5. ed., London 1671, p. 71. 97 William Epstein, Issues of principle and expediency in the controversy over prohibitions to ecclesiastical courts in England, JLH 1 (1980), 211 – 261 (232). 98 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London 1642, p. 601 ff. 99 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London 1642, p. 601, 606 f., 609 f.

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delays in procedure.100 Several times, Bancroft bemoans the ‘zeitgeist against the clerical judiciary’, evidenced by the massive use of prohibitions,101 which had led to an erosion of the same even in cases such as heirloom and marriage cases, which had been among its core authorities.102 He talks of a ‘scientific and conscious obstruction of the clerical courts’ by the common-law judges, who were misusing the writs of prohibition for their own purposes.103 He especially sees the monarch’s authority in parochial affairs questioned in the case of the Court of High Commission as a royal prerogative court.104 To protect the clerical courts from these unjustified prohibitons, Bancroft suggested that only the Court of Chancery, represented by the distinguished person of the Lord Chancellor, and not the common-law courts, should be allowed to issues these writs.105 Apparently, Bancroft hoped to place the (clerical) prerogative courts under the control of another prerogative court, that of the Court of Chancery, to eliminate the interventions by common-law jurists and to bring the conflict between common-law and prerogative courts to an end. Coke denied all allegations against the common-law judges and emphasised that only a parliamentary law could change the legal situation in Bancroft’s favour.106 He counters the arguments by claiming that prohibitions ensured the enforcement of authorities between clerical and secular courts in individual cases; issuing them was therefore not a question of complacency but of justice and could be issued following appeal by either side, including the claimant, who himself had chosen the clerical court as forum, as well as the respondent, who had already accepted the clerical court as forum, or even a third party.107 The clerical courts did have an interest in keeping a case they did not have jurisdiction for; this was the same for the High Commissioners, for example if they could not satisfyingly explain the arrest of a person.108 And, in any case, proceedings in which the use of the writs of prohibition could after100 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London 1642, p. 602 f., 605 f. 101 “[…] the humour of the time is growne to be too eager against all Eccesiasticall jurisdiction.”, Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London 1642, p. 603. 102 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London 1642, p. 608, 609 f., 613. 103 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London 1642, p. 604. 104 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London 1642, p. 615. 105 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London 1642, p. 609. 106 See e. g. Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London 1642, p. 601 f., 608 f. 107 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London 1642, p. 602, 607. 108 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London 1642, p. 602, 615 f.

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wards be shown to be unlawful could be continued before the clerical courts.109 Coke replied to the Archbishop’s suggestion of making the Court of the Chancery solely responsible for prohibitions that common-law judges had always had the right of issuing prohibitions when the clerical judiciary interfered with the worldly one.110 The corresponding passage in Coke’s Institutes is titled Articuli Cleri and so makes a clear connection to the law banning the ex-officio-oath and limiting the jurisdiction of the clerical courts from the 14th century,111 again using historic arguments to provide a basis for his position. This clash made Coke,112 who had previously not played any special role in the conflict between common-law and prerogative courts, one of the fiercest opponent of Bancroft.113 It clearly shows the role of the prerogative writs in the conflict between common-law and prerogative courts. The writs, especially the writ of prohibition, are used systematically – not only in specific cases. The prerogative judiciary is called into doubt as a whole. The writs are used as a political instrument of power with the aim of fighting the prerogative courts, especially the High Commission, and to limit or even shatter its power.114 The leading case for this is the Nicholas Fuller’s Case (1607). 4. The Nicholas Fuller’s Case (1607) and the Attempted Divestiture of the High Commission In an assessment, edited by Coke,115 the High Commission is expressly denied the power to arrest people. This could only be bestowed by an Act of Parliament, and the letters patent, which granted the High Commission certain powers in religious matters, were not sufficient for this. Even though the High Commission was established by the 1 El. cap. 1 law, the monarch could not change the worldly or clerical law in such a manner that the clerical court was entitled to arrest people. 109 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London 1642, p. 608 f., 612 f. 110 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London 1642, p. 609. 111 Cf. here I. 3. excursus. 112 Coke calls Bancrofts accusations against the common-law judges the biggest scandal in the history of English law: “[…] and what scandall it will be to the justice of the Realme to have so great levity, and so foule an impuation laid upon the Judges, as done in this, is too manifest. And we are assured it cannot be shewed, that the like hath been done in any former age […].”, Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London 1642, p. 617. 113 William Epstein, Issues of principle and expediency in the controversy over prohibitions to ecclesiastical courts in England, JLH 1 (1980), 211 – 261 (232). 114 See also John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, Illinois Law Review 36 (1941), 127 – 152 (130). 115 12 Coke Reports 19.

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A further assessment,116 which Coke authored together with the then Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, John Popham for the Whitehall Council, proposed an answer under which circumstances clerical judges could conduct and interrogation under the ex-officio-oath. In their answer both of the high-ranking common-law judges deemed the oath itself as permitted, but wanted to limit its use. The accused had to be informed before their interrogation, what they were being accused of. Also, nobody – layman or member of the clergy – could be forced by the oath to reveal their secret thoughts. Laymen could only be questioned under the ex-officio-oath in two areas of the law, that of heirloom and marriage contracts, as there were often secret agreements in this area and because the sense of shame and honour of the accused, other than in questions of infidelity, unchastity, usury, simony or heresy, were not affected. Referring to Hinde’s Case117, decided already in 1576, the authors reaffirmed the lack of authority to perform arrests. The arguments made by the common-law judges were supported by the common law itself. This assessment stood for an expansive attack against the High Commission, stripping it of its most important method of attaining evidence against laymen. In these proceedings, use of the controversial oath was only allowed in questions of marriage contracts and heirloom questions, as intended by the Articuli Cleri statute; proceedings because of heresy and other clerical crimes, which were the core authority and were the primary purpose of the court, were therefore heavily impeded. This view was transferred into the legal practice shortly afterwards by the Court of Common Pleas by means of a writ. The cause for this was Edward’s Case of 1608,118 in which the layman Thomas Edward was being sued by a member of the High Commission, Dr John Walton, for various insults and slander against him before the same. The court accepted the ex-officio-oath and interrogated him under the same. Coke and his judge colleagues issued a prohibition against the High Commission, holding the accusation of slander to be a worldly one and did not belong before a clerical court. Furthermore the court had been guilty of the Premunire119, in hearing its own case. The following reasoning mirrors Coke’s and Popham’s assessment, recalling that a layman could not be forced under the ex-officio-oath to reveal his secret thoughts. Edward’s Case shows in exemplary fashion how common-law courts used prerogative writs, especially the writ of prohibition, to enforce their view of the law regarding the order of competences in practice. Central to the attempt to curb the power of the High Commission was the 1607 Nicholas Fuller’s Case120, which can be viewed as further escalation of the conflict. The Coke Reports only show the reasoning of this case, but the actual procedural history and its political dimension go much further. Nicholas Fuller, a Puritan Member 116

12 Coke Reports 26. 4 Leonard Reports 22 = 74 E.R. 701. 118 13 Coke Reports 9. 119 See 12 Coke Reports 37. 120 12 Coke Reports 41. 117

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of Parliament and lawyer, attempted, on behalf of the Puritans, to have the Court of High Commission in itself declared as illegal by the common-law courts. Fuller was representing as defence counsel two men who had refused to take the ex-officio-oath and had been imprisoned for contempt of court. He made use of the writs of habeas corpus to achieve their release and questioned the right of the High Commission to imprison of penalise subjects.121 The origins of the prerogative writ of habeas corpus122 can be traced back to the previously mentioned famous clause of the Magna Carta, after which „no free man shall be arrested or imprisoned […] except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land“123, even if the term ‘habeas corpus’ does not appear in the famous document.124 Later, the writ of habeas corpus served exclusively to fight the imprisonment of certain privileged persons.125 In the 16th century the Court of King’s Bench developed the variant habeas corpus ad subjiciedum, with which unlawful arrests could be fought. The writ included the order to present the incarcerated person along with the reasons for the deprivation of liberty before the court, so that the lawfulness could be determined.126 In his Institutes Coke further mentioned that this writ could be granted to persons without special court privilege.127 After he had achieved the temporary release of his clients by the King’s Bench, Fuller extended his attack on the High Commission in his closing statement. He deemed the court “popish” and unlawful, it did not serve Christs’ justice, but that of the Antichrist; and the ex-officio-oath would lead to the damnation of the souls of those taking the oath.128 Before the Court of King’s Bench could rule over the case of the men he was representing, the High Commission prosecuted Fuller himself for heresy, schism and faulty teachings. He immediately refused to take the ex-officio-oath and gained a writ of prohibition in the King’s Bench against the acts of the High Commission.129 In its ruling, the Court of King’s Bench claims the authority to decide which cases are of a clerical nature and therefore belong before the High Commission according to the 1 Eliz. cap. 1 121

John Hostettler, Sir Edward Coke, Chichester 1997, p. 68. Engl. “You shall have a body”. 123 Nullus liber homo capiatur vel imprisonetur nisi per legem terrae = no man should be imprisoned except by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. (cit. in Dietmar Willoweit/Ulrike Müßig (eds.), Europäische Verfassungsgeschichte, München 2003, p. 15. 124 Paul D. Halliday, Habeas Corpus. From England to Empire, Cambridge (Massachusetts), London 2010, p. 15. 125 Cf. e. g. Kayser’s Case (1465), Dyer’s report Vol I, p. 108; John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., p. 146. 126 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., p. 146. 127 Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England. Concerning the Jurisdiction of Courts, 5. ed., London 1671, p. 71. 128 Roland G. Usher, Nicholas Fuller: A Forgotten Exponent of English Liberty, The American Historical Review 12 (1907), p. 743 – 760 (747 f.). 129 John Hostettler, Sir Edward Coke, Chichester 1997, p. 68. 122

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law. Accordingly, a simple attack on the authority of the court, as Fuller had presented in his closing statement, was to be ruled upon by the common-law courts.130 Only if the crime of heresy, schism or something comparable was given, it was under the authority of the clerical courts to act.131 But as soon as the charges before a clerical court included, among others, one of those that belonged before a common-law court, issuing a prohibition was permitted.132 Following this, Fuller was sentenced to pay a fine of 200 pounds and to prison for heresy, schism and faulty teaching,133 but the common-law judges had been able to establish their position regarding the order of competences between common-law and prerogative courts. Regarding the High Commission, they relied upon the Ecclesiastical Appeals Act134 of 1533, according to whose wording, according to which the church was subject to the crown and all power originated from the king,135 they not only wanted to achieve the subjugation of the clerical courts under the king but also the control by common-law courts. If this can in fact be taken from the law is doubtful.136 The conflict now gained a constitutional component.137 Fuller’s Case and Coke’s arguments encouraged the common-law courts in issuing prorgative writs against the clerical courts.138 Even though the focus was always on the writ of prohibition, which had been created for the use against the clerical judiciary, other writs, especially the previously mentioned writ of habeas corpus was used outside of Fuller’s Case in the conflict with the High Commission. This is shown for example by Sir Anthony Roper’s Case139, whose release from prison ordered by the High Commission due to a vicars unpaid pension claims was achieved by this writ. Greater publicity was achieved by Sir William Chancey’s Case140 (1612). Chancey was incarcerated in the notorious Fleet Prison for infidelity and violation of alimony obligation towards his wife. Following an application by his lawyer the Court of Common Pleas issued a writ of habeas corpus for the release of Chancey on bail. 130

12 Coke Reports 41 (42 f.). 12 Coke Reports 41 (43). 132 12 Coke Reports 41 (44). 133 12 Coke Reports 41 (44). 134 24 Henry VIII. c12, also known as Statute in Restraint of Appeals. 135 “[…] That this realm of England is […] governed by one supreme head and king […] unto whom a body politic compact of all sorts and degrees of people divided in terms and by names of spiritualty and temporalty [sic], be bounden and owe to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience; he being also institute and furnished by the goodness and sufferance of Almighty God with plenary, whole and entire power, preeminence, authority, prerogative and jurisdiction to render and yield justice and final destination to all manner folk resiants or subjects within this realm […]”, quoted after G. R. Elton (ed.), The Tudor Constitution, Documentary and Commentary, 2. ed. Cambridge 1982, p. 353. 136 William S. Holdsworth, H.E.L. V, p. 431. 137 John Hostettler, Sir Edward Coke, Chichester 1997, p. 69. 138 John Hostettler, Sir Edward Coke, Chichester 1997, p. 69. 139 12 Coke Reports 47. 140 12 Coke Reports 82. 131

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Even though, was the reasoning of Coke and his colleagues, the High Commission had been ruling in comparable cases for a while, it was bound by law and order of England, pursuant to which it did not have the authority to rule over misdemeanours such as those Chancey was being accused of. These belonged before the commonlaw courts. The common-law courts used the writ of habeas corpus, as these two cases show, in similar circumstances to the writ of prohibition. While in the latter case the accusation was more that of violation of competences by the prerogative court, habeas corpus seems to have been the method of choice when the common-law judges wanted to achieve the quick release of an accused from prison. At the same time the use of a habeas corpus writ included the accusation of excess of authority by the High Commission, as especially the case of Sir William Chancey’s Case shows. Over its direct aim to preserve the rights of the accused from the Magna Carta, this writ had also become an instrument of power at the beginning of the 17th century. 5. The Writs de Non Procedendo Rege Inconsulto in Prohibitions Del Roy (1607) and Brownlow v. Cox and Michell (1615) A preliminary highpoint was reached in the case of the Prohibitions del Roy141 in 1607, when, following the many prohibitions, Archbishop Bancroft took the plea to the king to decree the ambit of the prerogative courts’ competences himself. The king, Bancroft reasoned, could – based on his divine right – take on any and every legal case himself and decide; insofar, the judges where only his representatives. As method of choice, James would have intended the writ de non procedendo rege inconsulto. This writ originates from the older legal sources of England and is viewed as prerogative writ.142 It allowed the monarch to withdraw from the common-law courts such cases in which endings he may have an interest.143 After previous approval by his common-law colleagues and in the presence of the king, Coke extensively replied to Bancroft’s thesis, referring to old cases. The King himself could decide neither criminal nor civil cases and no monarch since the Norman invasion had done so. Only courts, where the judges had sworn to judge by the law and order of the land, could hand down sentences. And although the King could sit in the Star Chamber, he could only do so as counsel and not to hand down a ruling. Following the king’s comment that the law was guided by reason, which he, too, possessed, Coke answered that the law was not only guided by natural, but also artificial reason and the King was not versed in English law. James I. called Coke’s speech ‘treacherous’. Regarding the constitutional impact, the constitutional scholar 141

12 Coke Reports 63. See Brownlow v Cox and Michell, 3 Bulstrode 32 (33) (= 81 ER 27). 143 S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, The Cambridge Law Journal 11 (1951), p. 40 – 56 (41). 142

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Dicey notes: „Nothing can be more pedantic, nothing more artificial, nothing more unhistorical, than the reasoning by which Coke induced or compelled James to forego the attempt to withdraw cases from the courts for his Majesty’s personal determination. But no achievement of sound argument, or stroke of enlightened statesmanship, ever established a rule more essential to the very existence of the constitution than the principle enforced by the obstinacy and the fallacies of the great Chief Justice.”144 A few years laeter, after Edward Coke had already been transferred to the Courts of king’s Bench, King James, supported by his royal counsel Sir Francis Bacon, started a new attempt to have the case of Brownlow v Cox and Michell145 withdrawn from the King’s Bench in 1615 by means of the writs de non procendendo rege inconsulto and to have it decided by the King himself. In 1611, James had awarded to a certain Michell the lone right of creating the writ-documents for the Court of Common Pleas. Brownlow, the original documents’ officer, saw his core right and revenue threatened and proceeded against this. Although the issue itself is rather negligible, it offered the judges the opportunity to decide over the Crown’s authority to appoint people to administrative offices.146 This was followed by the royal counsel Sir Francis Bacon intervening and presenting the common-law judges with a writ de non procedendo rege inconsulto, which should forbid them from deciding the issue before the king had been notified about the matter. Afterwards, the issue was to be withdrawn from the Court of King’s Bench and continued in the Court of Chancery, as the Lord Chancellor was „ever a principal counsellor and instrument of monarchy, of immediate dependence on the king.“147 In the context of the case Brownlow v Cox and Michell, there is an extensive passage by Bacon in his works on the writ de non procedendo rege inconsulto.148 In it, the royal counsel and later Lord Chancellor presents the writ as an instrument to protect the royal prerogative, which had long been in existence and never been disobeyed by the courts.149 The expansiveness of the presentation shows the importance of the prerogative writs as instrument of power in the conflict surrounding the royal prerogative. It should also be available to the king and protect the prerogative from interference by the common-law courts as residual royal power, especially in view of the ongoing conflict of competences between common-law and prerogative courts.

144

p. 18. 145

Albert V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of Constitution, 10. ed. 1959,

3 Bulstrode 32. Samuel R. Gardiner, History of England from the accession of James I. to the Outbreak of the Civil War 1603 – 1642, vol. III, London/New York 1895, p. 7. 147 James Spedding/Robert L. Ellis/Douglas D. Heath (eds.), The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. VII, London 1859, p. 685. 148 James Spedding/Robert L. Ellis/Douglas D. Heath (eds.), The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. VII, London 1859, p. 687 – 725. 149 James Spedding/Robert L. Ellis/Douglas D. Heath (eds.), The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. VII, London 1859, p. 687 f. 146

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Subsequently, Bacon reasoned before the court that the appointment of documents officers was included under one of the four ‘pillars’ of the royal prerogative, namely the regulation of judicial affairs, which is why the Court of King’s Bench could not proceed further with the case after the writ de non procendendo rege inconsulto.150 The judges of the King’s Bench had to concede that the writ had long been in existence,151 but the question was if there were constitutional constraints on it.152 This led to a elaborate exchange of arguments between the judges and the lawyers of the crown, in which Bacon could ultimately not prevail with his position that the writ put a hold on the proceedings without any further possibility of continuation and had to accept that the was monarch only given the option of taking a position in the proceeding.153 And so, by the judiciary, the writ de non procedendo rege inconsulto was not viewed as an authoritarian order to cease all proceedings but rather as a possibility to maintain the rights of the crown in proceedings to which it was not party.154 The proceedings in Brownlow v Cox and Michell were concluded without a verdict in the issue,155 while at the same time the position of Coke and his colleagues to refuse interference by the royal prerogative in the courts had once again become clear.156 The attempt by the prerogative to make use of the prerogative writs for their own ends on the other hand shows, how ironic their use – especially that of the writs of prohibition – by the common law courts against the prerogative courts was. As mentioned above, the writs of prohibition were initially intended as methods of intervention for the king against the clerical courts to prevent a curtailing of royal rights, as the following statement by Fitzherbert form 1534 shows: “The King himself may sue forth this writ, although the plea in the spiritual court be betwixt two common persons, because this suit is in derogation of his Crown”.157 The protection of private interest is only a reflex of the writs of prohibition; mainly, it was intended to protect the royal prerogative from interference from administration and the justice.158 150

3 Bulstrode 32. 3 Bulstrode 32. 152 James Spedding/Robert L. Ellis/Douglas D. Heath (eds.), The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. VII, London 1859, p. 685. 153 3 Bulstrode 32 (33 f). 154 Samuel R. Gardiner, History of England from the accession of James I. to the Outbreak of the Civil War 1603 – 1642, vol. III, London/New York 1895, p. 8. 155 3 Bulstrode 32 (34). 156 S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, The Cambridge Law Journal 11 (1951), p. 40 – 56 (41). 157 Anthony Fitzherbert, The New Natura Brevium, Dublin 1793 (Reprint of the 1534 Edition), 40 E; see also John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 144. 158 S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, The Cambridge Law Journal 11 (1951), p. 40 – 56 (49 f.). 151

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By using the writs of prohibition against the Court of High Commission, which was working with the direct approval of the king, the common-law judges removed them from their original purpose as core writ of the king and claimed the right for themselves to protect the law in the realm as representatives from the king, if need be against his will. Colloquially speaking, one could say they fought the king and his prerogative courts with their own weapons. 6. The Common Law Attacks Against Star Chamber Regarding the conflict between common-law courts and the prerogative court of the Star Chamber the available sources are scarcer; the resistance against this extraordinary civil and criminal court and also the use of writs in this context seems to have been less pronounced. Already during the Tudor era (till 1603) there were only a few disputes between common-law courts and the Star Chamber,159 which were however aimed at limiting the courts power. The 1566 Onslowe’s Case160 included a legal assessment by the common-law courts according to which the Star Chamber did not have the sentencing power in perjury cases and in a further assessment from 1591161 the common-law courts lament the illegal arresting practice of the prerogative court. Even Edward Coke, the protagonist of the common-law judges’ uprising against the prerogative courts was by far not as ferocious in his critique of the Star Chamber as with the High Commission.162 In the discourses on the Star Chamber printed in his Institutes, Coke recognises that the common law did not suffice for especially severe crimes violating the King’s peace and the royal laws and these therefore had to be adjudicated by the Star Chamber.163 At the same place, however, Coke emphasis that the laws establishing the Star Chamber could in no way curtail the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. Crimes that could be penalised adequately by common-law courts did not belong before the Star Chamber.164 Coke also criticised the manner of finding sentences at the court, which in cases of an equal balance of the votes granted the decisive vote to the Lord Chancellor. Allegedly this violated the rule of precedent paribus sententiis reus absolvitur. Still, Coke is far from rejecting the Star Chamber on the whole. At a time he was already opposing the Court of High Commission, he wrote about the Star 159

William S. Holdsworth, H.E.L. I, p. 508 f. 2 Dyer’s Reports 242 b (= 73 ER 537). 161 Printed in William S. Holdsworth, H.E.L. V, p. 495 f. 162 See P. B. Waite, The Struggle of Prerogative and Common Law in the Reign of James I, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25 (1959), p. 144 (146). 163 Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England. Concerning the Jurisdiction of Courts, 5. ed., London 1671, p. 61, 63. 164 Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England. Concerning the Jurisdiction of Courts, 5. ed., London 1671, p. 63. 160

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Chamber:165 „It is the most honourable court, (our parliament excepted) that is in the Christian world, both in respect of the judges of the court, and in their honourable proceeding according to their just jurisdiction, and the ancient and just orders of the court.”166 He also sees the Star Chamber’s right to hand down severe penalties of honour and physical punishment in its long-established tradition which dictated it to follow on its previous rulings balanced by the education and respectability of its members.167 In practice, this is exemplified by the case of Andrew v. Ledsam (1610)168, the case of the writer Ledsam who was being sued by the lender Andrew in the Star Chamber, as Ledsam has led him a loan he could not repay by presenting fraudulent securities. The Star Chamber sentenced Ledsam to pay Andrew back double the amount. And both his ears were to be cut off. Edward Coke as Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and Thomas Fleming as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench were asked of their opinion in this case. They saw the sum of the payment covered by the laws of the realm and simply requested to limit the physical punishment to the cutting of a single ear. And also in Countess of Shrewsbury’s Case (1613)169, Coke a as a member of a committee affirmed the legitimacy of the imprisonment of the Countess, which had been ordered against her for perjury. The countess’ plea for nobility privilege, which should have been relevant,170 was dismissed. This exemplifies Coke’s own inconsequence regarding the prerogative courts. On the one hand, he maintains his basic position, as decisions made by the courts he chaired show, according to which the prerogative courts exercising the royal prerogative were subject to the common law. But at the same time he is prepared to recognise courts with which he had no conflict, as an judiciary independent from the common law courts.171 Here, Dicey’s assessment of the ‘pedantic, artificial and unhistorical’ arguments made by Coke are confirmed. As Holdsworth notes, the common-law courts also had to admit a certain legitimacy of the Star Chamber, even though they viewed its jurisdiction outside of theirs with some scepticism.172 Although the Court of the Star Chamber also used the ex-officio-oath, which had prompted a wave of 165 See P. B. Waite, The Struggle of Prerogative and Common Law in the Reign of James I, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25 (1959), p. 144 (146). 166 Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England. Concerning the Jurisdiction of Courts, 5. ed., London 1671, p. 65. 167 Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England. Concerning the Jurisdiction of Courts, 5. ed., London 1671, p. 65. 168 2 Brownlow & Goldenbourough 49 (= 123 ER 808). 169 12 Coke Reports 93. 170 John H. Wigmore/John T. McNaughton, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 8, Boston/Toronto 1961, p. 282, footnote 64. 171 P. B. Waite, The Struggle of Prerogative and Common Law in the Reign of James I, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25 (1959), p. 144 (149); See also Empringham’s Case (ca. 1611), 12 Coke Reports 84. 172 William S. Holdsworth, H.E.L. I, p. 512 f.

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writs against the High Commission, the common-law judges found no way of handling this, even after Edward Coke had been appointed to the Court of Common Pleas.173 Accordingly, there was never a ruling against the Courts of Star Chamber by the common-law courts, even though a clear scepticism can be detected, at least in the 1630s, towards this prerogative court.174

VI. The Struggle over Habeas Corpus Writs Against the Court of Chancery In 1613, following efforts by the royal counsel Francis Bacon, Edward Coke was was removed as Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and appointed to the formally more prestigious post of Chief Justice of the King’s Bench. In fact, however, this new position was less influential and the King seemed to hope Coke would not able to provoke as much trouble from here.175 But, countering this expectation, Coke again interfered with the order of competences. The renewed attacks by the common-law courts, especially of the King’s Bench were direct at the Court of Chancery under the chairmanship of Thomas Egerton, Lord Ellesmere (1540 – 1617), who had been appointed as Lord Chancellor by James I in 1603. The Lord Chancellor was a close advisor of the king and so an advocate of the royal prerogative. Furthermore, his judicial decisions in equity could possibly revoke the achievements gained by the common-law courts in the conflict of competences.176 Ellesmere claimed the right for him and the Court of Chancery to reopen cases that had already been completed before the common law courts.177 However, this approach violated the statute 4 Henry IV, c. 23 (1403)178, pursuant to which an proceeding that had been concluded before a common-law court could only be reopened by a writ of error.179

173 John H. Wigmore/John T. McNaughton, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 8, Boston/Toronto 1961, p. 281. 174 John H. Wigmore/John T. McNaughton, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 8, Boston/Toronto 1961, p. 282; see also Stroud’s Trial, Cobbett’s Parliamentary History of England, vol. II, London 1807, Sp. 504. 175 William S. Holdsworth, H.E.L. V, p. 436 f. 176 John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, Illinois Law Review 36 (1941), 127 – 152 (131). 177 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 109. 178 Quoted after William D. Evans/Anthony Hammond/Thomas C. Granger (eds.), Collection of Statutes connected with the General Administration of the Law, vol. II, London 1836, p. 350. 179 John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, Illinois Law Review 36 (1941), 127 – 152 (132 f.).

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The Court of Chancery itself had adhered to this view in Throckmorton’s Case (1590)180 – a circumstance that provided wind under the sails for the common-law judges actions.181 In the case of Heath v Ridley, decided in 1614, the judges of the King’s Bench had refused the adjournment of a proceeding which had been ordered by the Chancery, to which the respondent had turned: „It was delivered for a general maxim in law that if any court of equity doth intermeddle with any matters properly treated at the common law, […] they are to be prohibited.“182 Coke claimed that the reopening of cases by the Chancery violated the Praemunire-statute183, which prohibited the reopening of proceedings apart for cases of a writ of error.184 From this rather old law the name of a criminal offence was taken, which sanctioned knowingly calling upon the wrong court and so questioning the authority of the monarch.185 Already in 1616, the year that would mark the peak of the conflict between Coke and Ellesmere,186 the common-law courts developed a further strategy to prevent the further incision of their competences by the Court of Chancery. The use of writs of prohibition to this end was apparently discussed by the common-law judges but ultimately dismissed187 – the Chancery was not a clerical court, at which the prohibitions were directed. The remaining option was the writ of habeas corpus, which had already been used in the conflict with the High Commission to release unlawfully incarcerated a couple of times. It put the common-law courts in the position of being able to guarantee the freedom of the subjects.188 Already in 1585 there are indications in the Year Books, that such a writ was used against Chancery. According to Coke’s Institutes at the Court of King’s Bench could assume proceedings by means of a writ if the Court of Chancery had overstepped its competences.189 So the habeas corpus writ became an instrument of power between the King’s Bench and the Chancery. These writs were intended to free persons who the Chancery had imprisoned for being in contempt of court, as they had refused a new proceeding before the court.190 180

Moore, 291 = Croke’s Reports Tempore Elizabeth I, 221. John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, Illinois Law Review 36 (1941), 127 – 152 (135). 182 2 Blustrode 194. 183 27 Edward III. St. 1 c. 1. 184 William S. Holdsworth, H.E.L. I, S. 462. 185 See 12 Coke Reports 37. 186 See John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, Illinois Law Review 36 (1941), 127 – 152 (127). 187 See Francis Bacons letter to King James I., in: James Spedding/Robert L. Ellis/Douglas D. Heath (eds.), The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. XIII, London 1872, p. 92. 188 John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, Illinois Law Review 36 (1941), 127 – 152 (139 f.). 189 Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England. Concerning the Jurisdiction of Courts, 5. ed., London 1671, p. 71. 190 John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, Illinois Law Review 36 (1941), 127 – 152 (140). 181

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When using a habeas corpus writ the so-called return was central, that is the reply of the arrest party. It shouldn’t be too general regarding the circumstances of the incarceration, as Addis‘ Case191 from 1609 shows. Even before Edward Coke was transferred to the King’s Bench it dismissed a return maintaining that Addis had been held by order of the Lord Chancellor in a case concerning the king as to vague: „for it shews not for what causes he was committed, for it might be for a cause which would not hinder him under his privilege.“192 Those few concrete returns threatened the success of a habeas corpus writ, which was specifically intended to determine the reasons for a person’s imprisonment and to assess the legality of the incarceration. Serious attacks involving habeas corpus probably commenced from 1615. Coke and his colleagues held in Apsley’s Case193, to review the incarceration of Miachael Apsley, which had begun in 1608. The reply of the custodian in Fleet Prison, according to which Apsley had been held due to contempt of court by the Court of Chancery, was criticised as insufficient by the judges of the King’s Bench and after some consultation the release of the prisoner was ordered. The same approach was taken in the same year in Glanville’s Case194. A landmark decision was also Ruswell’s Case. He fought his 1614 arrest in 1615 with a habeas corpus writ. The custodian’s reply, Ruswell had been held for being in contempt of the court by the Court of Chancery, was dismissed by the King’s Bench as being too vague. The reason for the incarceration had to be clearly given, to make it possible for the controlling court to determine the legality of the imprisonment. Ruswell’s defence counsel emphasised: „this Court [the King’s Bench] is the judge of all causes of imprisonment.“195 The fact, that the common-law judges suddenly strictly controlled the reasons for imprisonment clearly shows that they were aiming to limit the power of the Court of Chancery as a further prerogative court, which questioned the supremacy of common law196, and that they were less concerned with the individual concerns. The habeas corpus writs were an ideal instrument of power against the Court of Chancery, whose only option of enforcing its decision was to imprison the persons concerned. Coke’s claim that his control, based on the use of prerogative writs, was an aspect of the royal prerogative, provoked Lord Ellesmeres objection. These writs had at least been created with the aim of limiting the exercise of the royal prerogative by the royal councils and the courts.197 What followed was a severe conflict between the two highest jurists, Coke and Ellesmere.

191

Croke’s Reports 219. Croke’s Reports 219. 193 1 Rolle Reports 192, 218. 194 1 Rolle Reports 219. 195 1 Rolle Rep. 219 = 81 ER 445. See also London BL, Harley MS. 1691, fol. 55v. 196 See William S. Holdsworth, H.E.L. I, p. 461. 197 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 144. 192

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In his treatises the Lord Chancellor heavily objects to the actions of his opponent and the deliberations in the Coke Reports. He criticises the use of prohibitions and habeas corpus writs against the clerical courts, which were endangered of losing their legitimate jurisdiction on the basis of mere contentions.198 He also refuted Coke’s assumption that the reopening of a closed case by the Court of Chancery was illegal, by showing that the Praemunire-statute invoked by Coke only prohibited the reopening by a clerical court.199 Holdsworth agrees with Ellesmere; the accusations against the Chancery were partly without a basis. The actions of the common-law courts had been too harsh and the reliance on the Praemunire-statute had been a misuse of justice.200 The conflict escalated in 1616, when Ellesmere arrested Glanville, who had been freed the previous year, which led the King’s Bench to order his second release.201 In a letter dated January 1616, the royal counsel Bacon reports to the King about the conflict between the Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor regarding the habeas corpus writs.202 After Coke and his colleagues had refused the reply to a habeas corpus writ in the Earl of Oxford’s Case203, which had been reopened in the Chancery, Coke ordered the prosecution of the Chancellor for violating the Praemunire-law.204 This attempt failed and Coke steered himself and the cause of the common-law judges into political margins.205 After Edward Coke in the Case of Commendams206 in June of 1616,207 again openly criticised the king by refusing to follow his order to adjourn the proceeding, he was first suspended and then sacked a couple of months later.208

198 The Tracts of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, quoted after Louis A. Knafla, Law and Politics in Jacobean England, Cambridge/London/New York/Melbourne 1977, p. 283, 291. 199 The Tracts of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, quoted after Louis A. Knafla, Law and Politics in Jacobean England, Cambridge/London/New York/Melbourne 1977, p. 332. 200 William S. Holdsworth, H.E.L. V, p. 438 f. 201 Cf. 1 Rolle Report 219; John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, Illinois Law Review 36 (1941), 127 – 152 (145). 202 Bacon’s Letter to the King on Jan. 27, 1616, in: James Spedding/Robert L. Ellis/Douglas D. Heath (eds.), The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. XII, London 1869, p. 236. 203 21 ER 485. 204 Cf. Bacon’s letter to the King on Feb. 15 1616, in: James Spedding/Robert L. Ellis/ Douglas D. Heath (eds.), The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. XII, London 1869, p. 247 f. 205 William S. Holdsworth, H.E.L. V, p. 438 f.; John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, Illinois Law Review 36 (1941), 127 – 152 (145). 206 = Colt v Glover, 1 Rolle Report 451. 207 Just a few months after the above mentioned case of Brownlow v. Cox and Michell. 208 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 167; John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, Illinois Law Review 36 (1941), 127 – 152 (130).

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Coke’s successor, Henry Montagu, a passionate royalist,209 wanted to avoid the impression that the writ had been used as an instrument of power against the prerogative. In his ruling in Richard Bourn’s Case (1620) he described the writ of habeas corpus as „a prerogative writ, which concerns the King’s Justice to be administered to his subjects; for the King ought to have an account why any of his subjects are imprisoned”.210 Even though this case only touched upon the question if a writ could also be applicable in an ordinary proceeding in the special legal area of Cinque Ports,211 it can be assumed that Montagu wanted to express his political orientation by presenting the writ as the means of a merciful king concerned about the well-being of his subjects.212

VII. Conclusion: Courts’ History as Constitutional History In the conflicts surrounding the control of courts by the prerogative writs the question became apparent if the king had the sole power of exercising the judicial sovereignty, or if his judges could undertake this for him. The common-law judges wanted to secure common law’s claim to supremacy over other branches of the judiciary and legal areas by means of the writs,213 which themselves were an instrument of the prerogative. They so claimed the control of the royal prerogative for themselves. In doing so, the common-law courts, especially Coke, gave a new meaning to the prerogative writs.214 They evolved from a procedural to a constitutional measure, whose impact extended from the simple control by the common-law courts over the adherence to competences by the prerogative courts and which was a rather method of criticising the exercise of the royal prerogative by special courts not intended by the law and which it sought to limit. The reactions of the advocates of the prerogative clearly showed the effectiveness of the writs as an instrument of power in the conflict of competences, and the royal prerogative itself wanted to utilise the prerogative writs to preserve their interests, as the dispute regarding the writ de non procendendo rege inconsulto shows.

209

(52).

S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, The Cambridge Law Journal 11 (1951), p. 40 – 56

210 Croke’s Reports Jac. 543; also known as R. v. Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, ex parte Bourn. 211 For this confederation of coastal towns in Kent and Sussex cf. Ronald and Frank Jessup, The cinque ports, London/New York 1952, p. 16 et seq. 212 S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, The Cambridge Law Journal 11 (1951), p. 40 – 56 (53). 213 John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, Illinois Law Review 36 (1941), 127 – 152 (130). 214 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4. ed., Oxford 2007, p. 144.

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At the same time, the prerogative courts are given a certain amount of competences by Coke, namely in those areas of the law that were out of reach from the common law, such as cases of heresy and schism for the High Commission or crimes that were not covered by common law or legislation for the Star Chamber.215 But then again, Coke’s King’s Bench attacked the Court of Chancery in an area of its core duties. So the rejection of the prerogative is not wholly consistent but is limited to such areas which the common-law judges viewed their areas of competence or where they saw possibilities of points for far-reaching oversteps of competence by the royal prerogative. The constitutional conflict conducted with the writs had a lasting impact on English constitutional law. The widespread rejection of the ex-officio-oath shown by the conflict became the basis for a later constitutional right for the freedom from selfincrimination (nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare) in England as well as on other common-law countries.216 The view of the High Commission expressed by Edward Coke, that the church and the parochial law were subject to common law became an accepted legal doctrine.217 The dispute regarding the constitutional limitations of the royal prerogative continued after Coke’s sacking throughout the 17th century. The prerogative writs continued to play a role in the conflict of competences between courts, the most prominent incident being the Case of the Five Knights (1627).218 The Petition of Right, drafted by Coke and accepted by Parliament in 1628, contains the call for the abolition of extraordinary courts and the guarantee of a fair trial.219 The insistence of Coke and his colleagues with the prerogative writs finally paid off in 1641, when the Long Parliament abolished the Court of the High Commission.220 The same fate at the same time beckoned upon the Star Chamber;221 even though the pressure of the common-law judges had been far lower, public opinion eventually turned against it, as its exercise of prerogative power was often viewed as tyrannical in political cases.222 King James’ II (in office 1685 – 1689) attempt to re215 P. B. Waite, The Struggle of Prerogative and Common Law in the Reign of James I, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25 (1959), p. 144 (149). 216 See John H. Wigmore/John T. McNaughton, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 8, Boston/Toronto 1961, p. 266 ff. 217 William S. Holdsworth, H.E.L. V, p. 432. 218 = Darnel’s Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 1. 219 The Petition of Right in: Samuel R. Gardiner (ed.), The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, London and other 1927, p. 66, 68 f. 220 The Act for the Abolition of the Court of High Commission, 17 Charles I c. 11, Samuel R. Gardiner (ed.), The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, London and other 1927, p. 186; see also John Hostettler, Sir Edward Coke, Chichester 1997, p. 76. 221 The Act for the Abolition of the star Chamber, 17 Charles I. c. 10, Samuel R. Gardiner (ed.), The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, London and other 1927, S. 179. 222 William S. Holdsworth, H.E.L. I, p. 514.

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establish the prerogative courts led to the outbreak of the Glorious Revolution in 1689223 and Coke’s supremacy of law can be traced within John Locke’s antecedent natural law binding every political authority to guarantee life, liberty and individual ownership.224 The jurisdictional conflict between common law courts and prerogative writs can be read as constitutional struggle between law and prerogative. The common law legitimised by reason guarantees predictability and safety225 while the prerogative is exercised by means of discretion. The supremacy of the law makes the adherence of the royal power to the law the rule and the discretion of the prerogative the exception. So the incoronation oath expresses the fundamental adherence of the Crown to the law with the assurance of obeying and maintaining the laws and the legal usages as they are recognised by the commons (the commonalty) of the Kingdom.226 The rule-exception-relation between legally bound ordinary power (ordinary power) and discretionless extraordinary prerogative (absolute power) is mirrored in the ordinary and extraordinary jurisdiction.227 According to the Bate’s Case (1606) which is the central decision for the differentiation between ordinary power and extraordinary prerogatives, the ordinary power is focused on the well-being of individual subjects, on the civil justice and the definition of property: “That of the ordinary power is for the profit of particular subjects, for the execution of civil justice, and the determining of meum“.228 It is exercised by the ordinary courts and corresponds to the ius privatum in Roman law and the common law in English law229 whose laws could not be changed without the participation of the Parliament: “and this is exercised by … justice in ordinary courts, and by the civilians is nominated ius privatum and with us common law; and these laws cannot be changed without parliament“.230 The extraordinary royal power is not exercised for the private good, for the advantage of a cer223

John Hostettler, Sir Edward Coke, Chichester 1997, p. 76. For details cf. Müßig, Recht und Justizhoheit, 2nd. ed., p. 181 et seq., p. 195 et seq. 225 “Certainty the mother of repose”. (Coke Second Reports, 75a = 76 ER 585 (Lord Cromwel’s Case); Third Reports 91b = 76 ER 844 (The case of fines); Eighth Reports 53a = 77 ER 552 (Syns’s Case)). 226 “To hold and keep the laws and rightful customs which the commonalty of the realm had chosen” (Coronning Oath of Edward II (1307 – 1327), cited in accordance Plucknett, p. 159). Cf. also Schramm, pp. 16 et seq. 227 Cf. also Dodderidge, Treatise on the King’s Prerogative Dedicated to Lord of Buckhurste (1610), London BL, Harley MS. 5220, fo. 9v. The differences between absolute and ordinate power, by contrast, are not elaborated in the introductory announcements: “wherein it doth consits and in what causes in discourse wheareof ar detearmined at large manic notable questions of most high importance touching the dignitie Roiall and the estate of the Realme, by the Lawes, Statutes, and publick Recordes of this Realme.“ 228 Cited in: Sources of English Constitutional History, Nr. 91, S. 435, 436 per Chief Baron Thomas Fleming. 229 Here, the term common law is used for the entire English legal system consisting of judge-made and parliamentary law. 230 Cited in: Sources of English Constitutional Hitsory, Nr. 91, pp. 435, 436 per Chief Baron Thomas Fleming. 224

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tain person but only for the general good of the people. Their laws are the rules of politics that are changeable as is society: “The absolute power of the King is not that which is converted or executed to private use, to the benefit of any particular person, but is only that which is applied to the general benefit of the people, and is salus populi; And as the constitution of this body varieth with the time, so varieth this absolute law, according to the wisdom of the king, for the common good; and these being general rules and true as they are, all things done within these rules are lawful”.231 This basis was used in the Bate’s Case (1606) to establish the argument that the taxation of the Corinths was not a tax on local goods but a tarrif on foreign imported goods. The demand of tariffs was a part of the prerogative sphere since the King had absolute power in the harbours with direct access to the sea and thus was independent from the consent of Parliament: “The matter in question is material matter of state and ought to be ruled by the rules of policy. And if it be so, the king hath done well to execute his extraordinary power”.232 In the Ship Money’s Case as well as the Hampden’s Case (1637), it was established that the money needed for ship-building was not a tax but a contribution to the royal task of defending the territory.233 The rule-exception-relation between legally bound ordinary power and discretionless extraordinary absolute power marks the relation between the ordinary and extraordinary jurisdiction. According to the Bate’s Case and the Ship Money’s Case, the adherence to the law of the ordinary power also comprises the adherence to the rules of competence, procedure and the forms of action of the ordinary jurisdiction.234 It can be figured from the Bate’s Case that cases of civil law and those concerning property were only dealt with by the ordinary common law-courts: “That of the ordinary power is for … the execution of civil justice, and the determining of meum”.235 The central part of the common law in contract law was inalienable.236 Sources prove the rejecting attitude of the King’s closest counsels against the arbi231 Cited in: Sources of English Constitutional Hitsory, Nr. 91, pp. 435, 436 per Chief Baron Thomas Fleming. Cf. also Fortescue, In Praise of the Laws of England, Chap. XIII (How kingdoms ruled politically first began), p. 22 (political and royal dominion); Fortescue, The Governance of England, chap. II (Why one king reigns royally and another politically and royally), p. 87 (Dominium politicum et regale); Report of the Venetian Ambassador (1551), in: London PRO, SP 68/V, 341: “the King of England exercises two powers, … the one royal and absolute, the other ordinary and legal.”; Report to the Venetian government (1607), in: London PRO, SP 68/ X, 508: “all justice, both civil and criminal, is in the hands of special officers; but all that concerns the State is absolutely in the King’s discretion; he, like his ancestors, is absolute lord and master.” 232 Cited in: Sources of English Constitutional History, Nr. 91, pp. 435, 436 per Chief Baron Thomas Fleming. 233 The King’s Counsel Sir John Banks attributed the disputed question to both spheres of power: “concerneth the king both in his ordinary and absolute power.” (Sources of English Constitutional History, Nr. 94 C, p. 459; State trials, vol. III, 1016). 234 Judson, p. 114. 235 Cited in: Sources of English Constitutional History, Nr. 91, pp. 435, 436 per Chief Baron Thomas Fleming. 236 Judson, p. 49.

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trary extension of the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber and the Privy Council: for instance, in 1616, Bacon suggests that trials on private law that were marked by the reciprocal claims were unfitting for the privy council and that they should be left to the ordinary courts: “the entertaining of private causes of meum and tuum is not fit for that board … [these cases] should be left to the ordinary course and courts of justice”.237 In 1641, Sir Robert Heath238 who defends the royal prerogative in the Darnel’s Case (also referred to as the Case of the Five Knights) (1627)239 supports the limitation of the jurisdiction of the Privy Council.240 In English law, the supremacy of law assures the continuing existence of the ordinary jurisdiction by the adherence to the law. The royal prerogative beyond the ordinary rules of procedure and forms of action is thus exceptional (equity, prerogative courts).241

237

Bacon, vol. 6, p. 41. Heath was the Attorney General. 239 The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625 – 1660, Nr. 8, pp. 59 et seq.; State Trials, vol. III, 10; Sources of English Constitutional History, Nr. 94 A, p. 457. 240 “I did willingly subscribe to that part of the act … havinge Long been of opinion: that the privie Counsell, and that honorable board the Counsell table, should not have meddled with questions of meum and tuum.” (cited in accordance Judson, p. 50). 241 Judson, p. 114. 238

Epistolary Control of the College of Justice in Scotland By J. D. Ford* On 17 May 1532 a statute was passed in the Scottish parliament authorising the reconstitution of the central civil court known as the session in the form of a College of Justice.1 On 27 May the fifteen judges of the court, who were still to be known colloquially as lords of council and session, albeit now formally designated Senators of the College of Justice, met to swear their oaths of office and to enact rules to govern their procedure. On 10 June the reigning monarch, James V, expressed his approval of the rules in a statement of his ‘gud minde anent the lordes of the session’.2 Declaring that the court was being reconstituted and rules enacted as a result of ‘the ardent affection that wee have for justice to be done and equallie ministrate to all our lieges’, the king went on: ‘Attour, wee promit to our saids lords that we sal not be ony private writing charge or command [or] at the instance of ony person desire them to do utherwaies in ony mater that sall cum before them bot as justice requiris’. The honour of the court would be maintained against criticism, ‘because the saidis lordes chosen upon our session presentis our person and bearis our authoritie in doing of justice’, and the judges would be exempt from the payment of taxation and fulfilment of other charges, ‘because the saidis persones man awaite dailie upon our saide session’. At the king’s instruction, his statement was entered, along with the rules the judges had enacted, in the records of the court’s proceedings, where many other rules and letters were to be recorded over the centuries ahead.3 For some reason, the letter of 10 June * The author is indebted to all those who participated in discussion at the Berlin meeting, and particularly to Mark Godfrey, who also commented on a written version of this paper. 1 The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland (www.rps.ac.uk), 1532/6; Thomson, T./ Innes, C. (eds.), The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, 12 vols., Edinburgh, 1814 – 1875, vol. 2, pp. 335 – 6. 2 National Records of Scotland [NRS], CS6/1, f. 5; Hannay, R. K. (ed.), Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, 1501 – 1554, Edinburgh, 1932, pp. 377 – 8; Campbell, I. (ed.), The Acts of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session, 1532 – 1553, Edinburgh, 1811, pp. 6 – 7. 3 Between 1532 and 1553 the records of the court were collected in a single volume, into which letters from the king or – after his death in 1542 – regents acting for his infant daughter, were incorporated. From 1553 onwards, ‘registers of acts and decreets’ were kept separately from ‘books of sederunt’, and also from several varieties of process papers. NRS, CS4/1 is a looseleaf file containing letters relating to the handling of particular cases, but it is evident from other records of royal correspondence that many more were written. Though royal letters were often copied into the books of sederunt, those relating to the handling of cases were not invariably copied there, and after 1553 they do not seem to have been incorporated into the registers of acts and decreets either.

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1532 and the rules enacted on 27 May came to be associated with the statute passed in parliament on 17 May, a mistake sometimes perpetuated to this day.4 The letter and rules were printed in all the major collections of legislation produced in the early modern period,5 and lawyers generally referred to them collectively as an ‘act of parliament’.6 How this came about is a mystery that need not be solved here.7 For present purposes, the important question is how the king’s promise to refrain from sending private writings to the lords of council and session related to the control that he might exercise over the judges’ proceedings. What was meant by ‘private writings’? If the king would not instruct his judges to do anything contrary to justice, was the implication that he might write on behalf of particular parties to encourage the due administration of justice? Could litigants who suspected they were about to suffer an injustice petition the monarch to intervene on their behalf?

I. Background to James V’s Promise The promise made at the foundation of the College of Justice was not without precedent. On 13 March 1527 the king’s secretary had written to the council proposing improvements in the administration of justice.8 Believing that ‘justice and admin4 This was pointed out at the Berlin meeting by Mark Godfrey, who has drawn attention to Taylor Clerk Leisure plc v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (www.scotcourts.gov.uk) [2015] CSIH 32. 5 Henryson, Edward (ed.), The Actis and Constitutiounis of the Realm of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1566, f. lxvii; Skene, Sir John (ed.), The Lawes and Actes of Parliament, Edinburgh 1597, pp. 113 – 14; Murray, Sir Thomas (ed.), The Laws and Acts of Parliament, Edinburgh, 1681, p. 121. 6 Clyde, J. A. (ed.), Hope’s Major Practicks, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1937 – 1938, vol. 2, p. 20; Mackenzie, Sir George, Observations on the Acts of Parliament, Edinburgh, 1684, p. 135; Stair, James Dalrymple, Viscount, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1693, p. 527. 7 One possibility is that lawyers were confused by the report of a case decided in 1540 by John Sinclair, bishop of Brechin, recently appointed a lord of session (www.uni-leipzig.de/ ~jurarom/scotland/dat/sinclair, n. 57). After mentioning that a ‘privat letter’ had been received from the king instructing the judges to end their proceedings, Sinclair reported that they had proceeded to give judgment ‘because of the generall act of parliament sayand that na judge delay proces and justice, albeit sic letters of delay or dischargeing of letters and proceding be privatlie impetrat be ony persone at the kingis grace’. It may be that by ‘the generall act of parliament’ Sinclair meant an act of 1475 requiring judges to administer justice ‘without parcialite or sleuthe’ (Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1475/33; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 2, p. 111), but if so his reference might easily have been misunderstood. For another possible explanation see Ford, ‘Control of the Procedure of the College of Justice in Scotland’, below at pp. 233 – 4. 8 NRS, CS5/37, ff. 12 – 13r; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, p. 256. The king’s secretary at the time was Thomas Erskine (Stuart, J. (ed.), The Miscellany of the Spalding Club, 2 vols., Aberdeen, 1841 – 1842, vol. 2, pp. 177 – 9), but it is generally thought that the writing of the letter was at least influenced by Gavin Dunbar, the archbishop of Glasgow, and a graduate in utrumque ius, who was made president of the court by the letter

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istratione tharoff is the principalle uphald and sustentation of his graces realme and liegis’, he proposed among other things that, to prevent the ‘inoportune solistation’ of the judges, access to the court should be controlled, after which he went on: ‘Alsua his hienes promittis that he sall gif na lettres to stop justice bot to furdir justice alwais, and gif ony personis be inoportune solistatioune gettis ony sik lettres subscrivit, his grace will at tha haif na place, and at the lordis obey nocht to thaim and thai be to stop or hynder justice’. That letters might still be sent ‘to furdir justice’ was made perfectly plain here, as was an underlying concern with ‘inoportune solistation’ by parties, either of the court or the king. On 14 March the king subscribed a letter warning the lords of council that it would be ‘agane our mynd, send you in writt be our secretar this last Wednisday, the xiii day of Marche’, for attention to be paid to ‘divers our writingis present before you in hindering of justice’.9 The court was to adhere to the instruction sent by the secretary on the previous day, ‘nochtwithstanding ony uthir charge of us gevin or to be gevin be sinistre informatioun in the contrar, of quhat daite that evir it be, bot gif we send the said charge or writ with our secretar to schaw you sic resonable causis as sall muf us tharto for the tyme and be your avis’. In this letter, interventions contrary to justice were blamed on the ‘sinistre informatioun’ of litigants, and the king reserved the right to make representations to the council by way of his secretary when he had ‘resonable causis’ for doing so. Despite the variations in wording, it thus seems that ‘the kingis gud minde’ had already been made up five years before the College of Justice was founded, and that he did intend to retain a degree of epistolary control over his judges. Early modern lawyers identified several earlier precedents for the king’s statements.10 Attention was drawn to legislation introduced in the fourteenth century in which it was stated that justice should be administered equally to rich and poor alike, that no judge should ‘obey or execute any command agains the law, direct to him under quhatsomever seale’, and that it should be ‘lesome to all judges, to quhom sic letters are directed, notwithstanding of them to doe justice’.11 Attention was further drawn to legislation introduced in the fifteenth century in France, partly because it seemed similar to the Scottish legislation, and partly because it had been connected with several constitutions promulgated by Roman emperors which could also have influenced legislators in Scotland.12 The emperors had instructed judges to decide cases in accordance with ius generale, even if a rescriptum, pragmatica sanc(Cairns, J. W., Revisiting the Foundation of the College of Justice, in: MacQueen, H. L. (ed.), Stair Society: Miscellany Five, Edinburgh, 2006, pp. 31 – 2). 9 NRS, CS5/37, f. 13v; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, p. 257. 10 Skene, Sir John (ed.), Regiam majestatem: Scotiae veteres leges et constitutiones, Edinburgh, 1609, pt 2, ff. 29v, 52r and 55v – 6r, and Regiam majestatem: The Auld Lawes and Constitutions of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1609, pt 2, ff. 20r, 40r and 44v; Mackenzie, Observations on the Acts of Parliament, p. 198. 11 Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 1, pp. 467, 498 and 509. 12 Rebuffi, Pierre, Commentarii in constitutiones seu ordinationes regias, 3 vols., Lyons, 1554, vol. 2, pp. 44 – 5.

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tio or sacra adnotatio had been issued to the contrary.13 One constitution made specific reference to the problem of rescripta contra ius elicita, and another to the problem of judges taking advantage of imperial letters suas dilationes excusare.14 Judges were advised to regard any orders issued in relation to cases pending before them as vacantes et nullam penitus habentes virtutem, except where they urged a judge to proceed with the hearing and deciding of a case without informing him quomodo oporteat quaestionem fieri aut iudicium inferri. Commentators on these and related canon law sources tended to consider the extent to which emperors and popes could dispense with the general law, and seem to have had little interest in considering the extent to which it was appropriate for rulers to interfere with the handling of cases while they were still pending before the courts.15 It appears to have been taken for granted that rulers could properly write to judges who were hesitating to decide cases in accordance with the general law. Indeed, the undoubted legitimacy of the imperial and papal practice of issuing rescripts to judges offered powerful support for the exercise of epistolary control by sovereign monarchs. Although it seems likely that the draftsmen of the statements issued in 1527 and 1532 were influenced by at least some of these precedents, it needs to be explained why they were issued then.16 One suggestion is that a problem had arisen when it was declared by parliament on 14 June 1526 that James V, having entered his fifteenth year, was old enough to exercise royal authority personally.17 The suggestion is that it then became ‘inevitable’ that the young king would be subjected to ‘inoportune solistatioune’ and tricked with ‘sinistre informatioun’ by unscrupulous litigants.18 Letters were certainly sent to the lords of council and session in the latter half of 1526. On the first occasion they were presented with a letter, subscribed by the king, ‘dischargeing’ them from further ‘intrometting’ with a case.19 It was objected that the letter had been obtained ‘sinistrelie be meyne of party’, and that the judges 13 Code 1.22.6 and Novels 82.13, in: Mommsen, T./Krueger, P./Schoell, R./Kroll, G. (eds.), Corpus iuris civilis, 3 vols., Berlin, 1875. 14 Code 1.19.7 and Novels 113. 15 For instance, Bartolus, In primam Codicis partem commentaria, Venice, 1570, ff. 33v (ad C.1.19.7) and 35v (ad C.1.22.6); Baldus, Super primo, secundo et tertio Codicis commentaria, Lyons, 1539, ff. 74v – 5 (ad C.1.19.7) and 80 (ad C.1.22.6); Faber, Ioannes, In Iustiniani imperatoris Codicem breviarium, Paris, 1545, ff. 33r (ad C.1.19.7) and 34v (ad C.1.22.6); Innocent IV, In quinqa libros Decretalium commentaria, Lyons, 1554, ff. 3v – 4r (ad X.1.3 rub. et 4) and 164v – 5r (ad X.3.35.6); Hostiensis, Summa aurea, Lyons, 1548, f. 7 (ad X.1.3 rub.); Panormitanus, Commentaria super prima parte primi Decretalium libri, Turin, 1577, ff. 42v (ad X.1.3 rub.) and 43v (ad X1.3.1). 16 On the draftsmen see again n. 8 above. Dunbar, it may be added, had graduated at Angers. 17 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1526/6/8; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 2, p. 301. 18 Hannay, R. K., The College of Justice, Edinburgh, 1933, pp. 30 – 2. 19 NRS, CS5/36, ff. 36v – 7r and 65v; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, pp. 244 – 5.

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were obliged to proceed, ‘thai beand ministers of justice’. Nonetheless, it was agreed that the hearing of the case must be abandoned. Ten days later a letter was received requiring the judges to suspend their hearing of a case while the defender accompanied the king on a journey, and it appears that a similar letter was received in another case, though it was not entered in the records of the court.20 Three other letters that were preserved there instructed the judges to adjourn their hearing of a case until others were present, to delay matters while one of the parties gathered evidence, and to proceed with the hearing of a case without more delay.21 If six cases scarcely signify a problem of epidemic proportions, there may have been other letters that had not yet been presented to the judges when they were instructed to ignore the king’s private writings. In another case heard towards the end of 1526 a litigant tried to prevent a decision from being given effect by producing ‘our soverane lords respeit’.22 Letters of respite or remission were standardised documents issued under the privy seal, which differed from the letters identified so far in being addressed generally to any judicial officers to whom they were presented, but which had it in common with many of these letters that they prevented justice from taking its ordinary course.23 The register of documents to which the privy seal was attached reveals that between 14 June 1526 and 13 March 1527 over a hundred respites or remissions were issued, an exceptionally high figure.24 While the expression ‘private writings’ probably meant letters addressed specifically to the lords of council and session under the king’s signature, the large number of respites and remissions issued in these months gives support to the suggestion that James V’s coming of age was creating difficulty.25 Another suggestion involves construing the difficulty in a different way. Rather than a susceptible boy being solicited and suborned by suitors, it is suggested, a precocious teenager was beginning to release himself from the tutelage of his stepfather, the earl of Angus, whose willingness to raise revenues by selling respites and remis20

NRS, CS5/36, ff. 86r and 157v (where a letter is referred to but not reproduced). NRS, CS5/36, ff. 173v – 4r, 190r and 198r; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, p. 255. 22 NRS, CS5/36, f. 202r. 23 Livingstone, M., A Guide to the Public Records of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1905, p. 161; Thomson, J. M., The Public Records of Scotland, Glasgow, 1922, pp. 70 – 2; Cadell, P. M. (ed.), Guide to the National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1966, pp. 95 – 6. 24 Livingston, M./Donaldson, G./Beveridge, J./Fleming, D. H. (eds.), Registrum secreti sigilli Scotorum: The Register of the Privy Seal of Scotland, 7 vols., Edinburgh, 1908 – 1966, vol. 1, pp. 510 – 50. Figures for single years rarely rose above five or six, though over thirty respites or remissions had been granted in the comparable period 1515 – 1516. Another eightyseven were granted between 14 June 1527 and 13 March 1528. Although it has to be borne in mind that not all respites and remissions were recorded in the privy seal register (Armstrong, J. W., The Justice Ayre in the Border Sheriffdoms, 1493 – 98, in: Scottish Historical Review, 92, 2013, p. 20), the variations are striking. 25 Hannay, R. K., The Early History of the Scottish Signet, in: The Society of Writers to His Majesty’s Signet, Edinburgh, 1936, pp. 26 – 7 and 34 – 5. 21

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sions was symptomatic of a relaxed attitude towards the administration of justice.26 On this interpretation, by promising to refrain from undue interference with the handling of cases before the session the king was distancing himself from Angus’ policies, two years before he finally secured control of his own affairs.27 Whether or not this interpretation of events is found persuasive, what cannot be denied is that the promise made in 1527 formed part of a programme of improvements in the administration of justice promoted by the king’s secretary and those who advised him.28 The subscription of ‘lettres to stop justice’ by the king was certainly regarded as an abuse in need of correction.29 Other abuses were also addressed, and there seems to have been an attempt to distinguish the legally qualified lords of session who would deal with civil litigation from other members of the council.30 The letters sent to the council in 1527 have been identified as an important step towards the foundation of the College of Justice as an independent court in 1532.31 While this makes the reiteration of the king’s promise in 1532 easy to understand, it also raises questions about the purpose of the promise. If the king was not minded to abandon epistolary control of his court entirely, was he nevertheless recognising to some extent that the task of adjudication should be left to the judges he appointed? In undertaking to maintain the honour of the judges because they ‘presentis our person and bearis our authoritie in doing of justice’, was his point that the lords of council and session ought not normally to be susceptible to royal supervision, and that litigants ought to be prepared to accept their judgments as effectively the king’s own pronouncements?32 On the other hand, if one consequence of the foundation of the College of Justice was that the king ceased formally to be a member of the court, would this actually have increased his inclination to write to the judges when he feared they were not discharging their responsibilities correctly?33

26 Emond, W. K., The Minority of King James V, 1513 – 1528, PhD dissertation, St Andrews, 1988, pp. 538 – 42. 27 Cameron, J., James V, East Linton, 1998, pp. 1 – 9. 28 An obvious weakness in the interpretation is that it fails to explain adequately the huge increase in the number of respites and remissions granted after the king came of age. 29 Godfrey, A. M., Civil Procedure, Delay and the Court of Session in Sixteenth-Century Scotland, in: van Rhee, C. H. (ed.), The Law’s Delay: Essays on Undue Delay in Civil Litigation, Antwerp, 2004, p. 116, and Procedural Delay, Appeal and Advocation in the Court of Session in Sixteenth-Century Scotland, in: van Rhee, C. H. (ed.), Within a Reasonable Time: The History of Due and Undue Delay in Civil Litigation, Berlin, 2010, pp. 154 – 7. 30 Emond, Minority of King James V, p. 549; Cairns, Revisiting the Foundation of the College of Justice, p. 30. 31 Godfrey, A. M., Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland: The Origins of a Central Court, Leiden, 2009, pp. 108 – 13. 32 Cf. Digest 1.11.1.1. 33 On this point especially, and on the independence of the court more generally, see Godfrey, ‘Control and the Constitutional Accountability of the College of Justice in Scotland’, elsewhere in this volume.

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II. Reverberations of James V’s Promise Whatever the king’s intentions may have been in 1527 and 1532, his promises did not prevent private writings from being issued throughout his reign. On several occasions the judges were instructed to move ahead with the hearing of cases without delay or procrastination.34 Letters like these appear to have been accepted without demur. On several other occasions the judges were instructed to suspend their proceedings while one of the parties to an action was away in the king’s service.35 Letters like these also appear to have been accepted without demur, with an explicit statement added in some instances that they were ‘thocht resonabile’. On a couple of occasions the judges thought it reasonable for their proceedings to be suspended while the king tried to negotiate a compromise between the parties.36 In other circumstances, however, they were reluctant to accept instructions to suspend their proceedings. When the defender in one action produced a letter from the king ordering them to ‘desist and ceis fra all proceding’ against him, ‘the lordis thocht thai culd nocht proceid in the mattir, because of the inhibitione forsaide’.37 Yet in five other cases they refused to accept the king’s instructions.38 In the first they refused to give effect to a ‘private wryting’ because they believed it had been elicited ‘be sinister menis’.39 In the others they refused to give effect to letters because they believed they had been elicited ‘throw inoportune sollistatioun and wrang informatioune’ or ‘be sinister and wrang informatioun and circumventioun, without cognitioun in the caus’, and since ‘the kings grace hes declarit his mynde in that behalf to the said lords of befor’.40 The court was ordered in another case to keep one party in possession of land until it was proved that he lacked title, ‘nochtwithstanding ony letters gevin or to be gevin in the contrar to stop justice, according to our generale act maid tharupoune, for our will and mynd is nocht that justice be stoppit to ony of our liegis’.41 34 NRS, CS5/40, f. 80r, and CS6/1, pp. 426 – 7; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, pp. 312 – 13, 373, 389, 412 – 13, 485, 505 – 6, 515 and 520 – 1; Campbell, Acts of Sederunt, pp. 14, 24 – 5, 27 – 8, 40 – 1 and 43. 35 NRS, CS5/40, f. 163v, and CS6/11, ff. 19v – 20r and 57r; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, pp. 320 – 1, 467 – 8 and 475 – 6; Campbell, Acts of Sederunt, pp. 12 – 13, 20 – 1, 28 – 9, 34, 36 and 39 – 40. 36 Campbell, Acts of Sederunt, pp. 42 – 3. 37 Campbell, Acts of Sederunt, p. 32. See too Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, pp. 482 – 3. 38 See too NRS, CS5/42, f. 158v; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, p. 354. 39 NRS, CS5/40, ff. 36v – 7r and 37r; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, p. 310. 40 NRS, CS6/1, pp. 297 and 375, CS6/2, p. 177, and CS6/3, f. 149r; Shearer, I. H. (ed.), Select Cases from Acta dominorum concilii et sessionis, 1532 – 1533, Edinburgh, 1951, pp. 62 – 3; McNeill, P. G. B. (ed.), The Practicks of Sir James Balfour of Pittendreich, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1962 – 1963, vol. 1, p. 267. Cf. Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland, pp. 344 – 5. 41 Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, p. 351.

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The king’s promise was often repeated in more general terms. Aware of his tendency to indulge the ‘inoportune solistatiouns of divers our liegis’, James reminded the judges of his expectation that they would ‘minister justice equalie to all parteis, nochtwithstanding ony our charges gevin or to be gevin to you in stoppin therof’.42 ‘Ye sall understand it is oure mynd’, he wrote a few years later, ‘that justice be ministrat indifferentlie till all our liegis’, so that if letters were sent ‘to stop justice, it is our will thai be nocht obeyit, conform to the act maid be you with our consent of befor’.43 At other times he sought to absolve himself of responsibility for letters that were sent. ‘We have hard thar is sum murmour of granting of divers writingis be us in stopping of justice’, he wrote, ‘and geif sa be, we ar nocht content tharwith, and had the samin cumin till our eris or now, we suld nocht have falzeit to have reformit the samin’.44 If letters were presented to the judges, it had to be understood that ‘thai proceid nocht of our knawlege to the hindering or stopping of justice, bot of sinister information and of inoportune laubouris of the impetraris’, who ought to be punished. Six months later James reminded the judges that ‘we have committed the cure of justice to you’, and warned that if they admitted ‘sic privat writingis, any damnage and scaith of party sall ly to your conscience and nocht to ouris’.45 The assumption here appears to have been that responsibility for the administration of justice had been transferred to the judges, and that they would not be discharging the responsibility correctly if they succumbed to solicitation, even if it came to them via the royal letters. The lords of council and session had themselves proposed an alternative response to the problem of ‘inoportune solicitatioun and circumventioun’.46 If the king was persuaded by such means to subscribe letters, ‘quhilkis ar contrar justice, or may stop or hinder the samin’, his secretary should ‘suffer nocht sic writings to be selit or pas throw the signet’ until he had consulted the judges, ‘sa that the saidis writingis may be considerate gif thai be conforme to justice, and uthirwais to have na passage’. The proposal may have been found too difficult to implement, not least because the secretary was expected to assess the justice of letters before he asked advice from the court. Another difficulty was the vagueness of the expression ‘to be selit or pas throw the signet’. The documents entered in the books of the court were typically described as ‘our soverane lordis letters under his signet and subscriptioun underwrittin’, but 42 NRS, CS5/42, f. 30v; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, p. 348. Cf. Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland, p. 204. 43 NRS, CS4/1, f. 2. The 1532 promise is clearly connected here with the rules enacted by the judges themselves and approved in the same letter, but the reference in one of the passages quoted above to ‘our generale act’ may have encouraged the belief that the promise had been made in an act of parliament. 44 Campbell, Acts of Sederunt, p. 26; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, p. 449. 45 Campbell, Acts of Sederunt, p. 27; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, p. 454. 46 NRS, CS5/37, f. 200v; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, p. 263.

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not invariably. In 1534 the judges agreed to register an unusual respite that was said to have been ‘subscrivit be the kingis grace, and under his gret signet’.47 In 1541 they refused to give effect to another respite, ‘because it is ane privat writing, purchest tacita veritate’.48 Lawyers took note of the decision, believing it showed that ‘writingis ar understuid to be privie that ar under his graces hand writ or signet allanerlie’.49 Crucially, the king had declared the respite to be ‘subscrivit with oure hand’ before it passed the privy seal. In another case a respite had not been signed by the king, but he had written a covering letter to the judges requiring them to give it effect, though that letter was then countermanded by another.50 After James V died in 1542, leaving an infant daughter as heir to the throne, the office of governor was conferred upon the earl of Arran, who promptly renewed the by now familiar instruction to the lords of council and session ‘to proceid and do justice equalie as accords to all our soverane ladyis liegis indeferentlie, notwithstanding ony privat writings to be gevin be his grace in stopping and hindering of justice’.51 When the government of the realm was later taken over by the queen’s mother, Mary of Guise, she likewise declared that ‘scho wald have justice done nochtwithstanding ony privat writings gevin or to be gevin in stop and hyndering of justice, conform to the generale act maid therupoun’.52 The queen herself, during her brief personal reign in the 1560s, visited the court and assured the lords of her wish ‘that thai wald proced in all actions dependend befor tham without fere or favour, and that notwithstanding of ony privat writtings or letters quhilk she sall happin to subscrive in hir hand, and direct to tham’.53 Whether assurances were given by the regents who ruled the country after Mary was deposed in favour of her infant son is unclear, perhaps because changes in the record keeping of the court allowed important documents to pass un47

Campbell, Acts of Sederunt, pp. 16 – 18, and see too pp. 18 – 20. NRS, CS6/15, f. 293; Livingston et al., Registrum secreti sigilli Scotorum, vol. 2, pp. 548 – 9. Cf. Liber extra 1.3.20, in: Friedberg, E. (ed.), Corpus iuris canonici, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1879, and also Hostiensis, Summa aurea, f. 13 (ad X.1.3. rub). 49 McNeill, Practicks of Sir James Balfour of Pittendreich, vol. 1, p. 267; www.uni-leipzig. de/~jurarom/scotland/dat/sinclair, n. 57. Although Balfour referred here to the summary of the court’s decisions he usually used (on which see Gordon, W. M., Roman Law, Scots Law and Legal History, Edinburgh, 2007, pp. 283 – 96), the passage quoted is so similar to what Sinclair wrote in his report of the case, and so lacking in foundation in the record of the case, that the author of the summary must have used Sinclair’s report. It follows that the manuscripts of Balfour’s Practicks that have the reading ‘hand writ or signet’ (e. g. National Library of Scotland [NLS], Adv. MS 24.1.10) are more likely to have preserved the original wording than those that omit the words ‘or signet’ (e. g. NLS, Adv. MS 24.2.4b). 50 Campbell, Acts of Sederunt, pp. 40 – 2; Livingston et al., Registrum secreti sigilli Scotorum, vol. 2, pp. 622 – 3; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, pp. 505 – 6; and see too Sanderson, M. H. B., Cardinal of Scotland: David Beaton, c. 1494 – 1546, Edinburgh, 1986, p. 58. 51 NRS, CS1/1, f. 21; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, p. 526. 52 NRS, CS7/1/2, f. 258r; Campbell, Acts of Sederunt, p. 55; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, p. 633. 53 NRS, CS1/2/1, f. 141v. 48

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noticed, or perhaps because there was in fact a decline in the incidence of private writings in this period.54 The earl of Arran appears to have sent one letter to the judges in 1545 and another in 1546, but no others have so far come to light.55 The 1546 case is of some interest. Arran had heard that the judges were proceeding with the hearing of a case raised ‘be ane simple bill, without ony summondis’. The defender was both a servant of the crown and a relative of the governor, which may be taken to explain his decision to intervene, but there could also have been some substance to his complaint that ‘ye proced aganis your daly practik and stile of court, usit and grantit to uthiris in siclik cais’. It may be that it was as unusual for governors and regents to intervene in cases as the records seem to suggest, and that this case was thought to be exceptional because it was the lords of session themselves who were perceived to be impeding the ordinary course of justice.56 Whether or not there was actually a decline in the incidence of private writings in the decades following James V’s demise, particular difficulty was certainly encountered again at the close of the 1570s, when the relatively stable regime of the earl of Morton came to an end and the country was plunged into several years of turmoil.57 On 25 July 1578 a convention of the estates dominated by Morton’s opponents declared an end to his regency, explaining that ‘the administratioun of his hienes realme, guvernament and auctoritie thairof is in his hienes awn handis, to be governit and administrat be him selff with advise of the counsell, quhilk be this parliament salbe appointit to his hienes’.58 James VI was thus placed in a similar position to the one in which his grandfather had been placed in 1526, though he was only twelve years old at the time and it would take him longer – nearly seven years – to gain genuine control for himself.59 By 1578, moreover, the institutional context had changed. The privy council, now a separate body from the session, had become a more regularly functioning organ of administration during Morton’s regency.60 The estates 54

On the record keeping of the court see again n. 3 above. NLS, Adv. MS 25.2.5(1), f. 34; Campbell, Acts of Sederunt, pp. 43 – 4; Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, p. 542. 56 For a general survey of the involvement of regents in the administration of justice see Blakeway, A., Regency in Sixteenth-Century Scotland, Woodbridge, 2015, pp. 158 – 92. 57 Hewitt, G. R., Scotland under Morton, 1572 – 1580, Edinburgh, 1982, pp. 45 – 77. 58 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1578/7/2; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, pp. 94 – 5. 59 Wormald, J., Court, Kirk and Community: Scotland, 1470 – 1625, Edinburgh, 1981, p. 146; Goodare, J./Lynch, M., James VI: Universal King, in: Goodare, J./Lynch, M. (eds.), The Reign of James VI, East Linton, 2000, pp. 1 – 3; Dawson, J. E. A., Scotland Re-Formed, 1488 – 1587, Edinburgh, 2007, p. 302. For a recent attempt to push back the date of James VI’s active kingship see Blakeway, A., James VI and James Douglas, Earl of Morton, in: KerrPeterson, M./Reid, S. J. (eds.), James VI and Noble Power in Scotland, 1578 – 1603, London, 2017, pp. 12 – 31. 60 Goodare, J., State and Society in Early Modern Scotland, Oxford, 1999, pp. 72 – 3, and The Government of Scotland, 1560 – 1625, Oxford, 2004, pp. 128 – 32. On relations between the session and privy council see Godfrey, Control and the Constitutional Accountability of the College of Justice in Scotland, elsewhere in this volume. 55

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meant the king to take guidance from the privy council, the members of which they meant to appoint themselves. When a letter was sent to the lords of session in 1579 instructing them to ensure that a grant made to one of the king’s servants was effectual, it was said to have been written ‘with avise of the lordis of our secreit counsale’.61 Towards the end of the previous year the judges had been directed to deal expeditiously with an action raised by another of the king’s servants because he could ‘nat be lang absent from oure service, to mak lang attendance for persute of the said mater’.62 A few months later the judges were told to postpone the hearing of an action involving the treasurer, both because his presence was required at court ‘for sindrie maters of importance tuiching our service’, and because the king was ‘presentlie singillie accumpanyt of counselors’.63 Another letter urged expedition again in the case in which the king had intervened towards the end of the previous year.64 One of these letters made reference to a fifth that has not survived, and it may be that others were sent to the judges around this time. As well as providing advice when letters were written to the session, the privy council also took to intervening more directly in its handling of cases. When the lords of session were instructed to desist from further hearing of one action by ‘our soverane lordis letteris, past be deliverance of the lordis of secreit counsale’, it was understood by lawyers that the action had been remitted from the session to parliament ‘be warrand of the lords of secret counsall’.65 It was hoped that ‘jugis unsuspect’ appointed by parliament might be able not only to determine the particular action, but also to settle all ‘the deidlie feidis, querrellis and contraverseis’ that were raging between the parties, as eventually they succeeded in doing.66 Shortly afterwards the lords of session were instructed by the privy council to leave the hearing of another action to parliament.67 One of the parties to the action was himself a lord of session, and it had been complained that what the other judges were about to do was ‘altogidder repugnand alsweill to all law as observit prectik, and alwayis ane mater never hard nor admittit of befoir, and verray prejudiciall and hurtfull to be acceptit

61

NRS, CS4/1, f. 5. NRS, CS4/1, f. 4. 63 NRS, CS4/1, f. 6. 64 NRS, CS4/1, f. 7. 65 NRS, CS1/3/1, f. 67; Clyde, Hope’s Major Practicks, vol. 2, p. 24. More is said about the cases mentioned in this paragraph in an essay due to appear in a collection edited by Mark Godfrey and Remco van Rhee in Duncker and Humblot’s Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-American History. 66 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1578/7/34, 1579/10/64 and 1581/10/63 – 4; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, pp. 111, 164 – 5 and 230 – 2; Burton, J. H./Masson, D. (eds.), The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 14 vols., Edinburgh, 1877 – 1898, vol. 3, pp. 261 – 2, 275, 278 – 80 and 401 – 2; Clyde, Hope’s Major Practicks, vol. 2, p. 22; Morison, W. M. (ed.), The Decisions of the Court of Session, 22 vols., Edinburgh, 1801 – 1804, vol. 3, p. 2065. 67 NRS, CS1/3/1, f. 97r; Clyde, Hope’s Major Practicks, vol. 2, p. 24. 62

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within this realme’.68 Around the same time the judges were instructed to desist from further consideration of an action, ‘quhilk forme of proces wes neveir heirto befoir impugnit in jugement’, until parliament had decided whether the practice should be amended.69 The privy council required three other cases to be remitted to parliament when it was alleged that a remission had been obtained tacita et suppressa veritate, and when the king had a personal interest in the outcome of the actions.70 In view of these developments, it seems surprising that the privy council itself issued a declaration on 21 February 1579 that ‘the kingis majestie sould not writ to the lordis of his hienes counsale and sessioun in furtherance or hinderance of ony particular personis actionis and causis in tyme cuming, bot suffer thame to proceid and do justice in all actionis privilegit to be decydit be thame, as they wil answer to God and his hienes thairupoun’.71 It is possible that the expression ‘all actionis privilegit to be decydit be thame’ was being used technically to distinguish some types of action from others, though the range of cases in which the privy council had been involving itself makes this unlikely.72 A more plausible explanation is that a distinction was being drawn between letters sent by the king to direct the handling of cases in the session, and orders sent by the council to have cases remitted to parliament. Even if this is so, however, another surprising feature of the declaration is its failure to distinguish between letters ‘in furtherance or hinderance of ony particular personis actionis’. The king was not to encourage the dispatch of justice any more than to demand its deferment. Whatever the privy council’s intention may have been, later in the same year the lords of session complained to parliament that as matters then stood, ‘oure soverane lordis authoritie and thair jurisdictioun is greitlie troublit and callit in doubt be ressone of sindrie privy writtingis and charges direct aganis them be oure said soverane lord and his privie counsale, sumtyme to forbeir to proceid in civile cause befoir the intenting thairof, sumtyme to stay the proces and remit the cause to parliament’.73 Recalling the promise made to them at the foundation of the College of Justice, they suggested several reasons why it de68

Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1578/7/31, 1579/10/62, 1581/10/63 and 1584/5/ 91; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, pp. 112 – 14, 163 and 354 – 5; NLS, Adv. MS 25.2.5(1), f. 114r; Clyde, Hope’s Major Practicks, vol. 2, p. 22. 69 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1578/7/33 and 1579/10/79; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, pp. 112 and 178; NRS, CS7/76, f. 427; Clyde, Hope’s Major Practicks, vol. 2, p. 22. 70 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1579/10/71; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, pp. 172 – 3; Burton/Masson, Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, vol. 3, pp. 140 and 193 – 4. 71 Burton/Masson, Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, vol. 3, p. 98. 72 On the shifting meaning of the expression see Hannay, College of Justice, pp. 33 – 7, and introduction to Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, p. xxxiii; Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland, p. 84. It probably meant here simply the types of action over which the court had been given jurisdiction – i. e. all civil actions. 73 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1579/10/54; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, pp. 152 – 3.

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served to be reaffirmed. For one thing, just as issuing instructions to the judges ‘tendis to thair discrediting, sua it bringis contempt to oure soverane lordis authoritie’. For another, removing cases from one court to have them heard elsewhere ‘castis the partiis havand thair cause in process (to quhome justice sould alwayis be patent) in greit doubt quhen they fynd not ane outgait to have thair causs decidit quhair they ar intentit’. Furthermore, ‘the kingis majestie, his parliament and privie counsale sal have litill tyme and opportunitie to considder his hienes awin affairis and the cause of the commounweill gif that, at the inoportune sute of privat partiis, the civile cause ordourlie belanging to the jugement of the College of Justice sal be brocht before thame’. On 20 October 1579 it was declared that in future the lords of council and session ought to proceed with the hearing of every civil action raised before them ‘notwithstanding ony privat writing, charge or command at the instance of ony persone or personis direct or to be direct in the contrair’. It may be no coincidence that on the day that it passed its act ‘anent the admissioun of privie writtingis’, the same parliament passed another act ‘anent the admissioun of the ordiner lordis of the sessioun and reformatioun of certane abuses’.74 The approach may have been to leave the administration of civil justice to the session, but to ensure that cases were dealt with there by appropriate people in an appropriate way.75 Shortly beforehand another act had been passed ‘anent the establischeing of the kingis majesties counsale’.76 Appointment to the privy council had again been brought under the control of parliament, and detailed regulations were issued to govern the conduct of the council’s business. Among other things, it was provided that ‘all signatouris, lettres and missives to be subscrivit be his majestie’ had first to be shown for approval to relevant officers of state and then to the privy council, ‘and that the keiparis of the signet, privie and greit seillis answer the same to na signatouris or lettres bot sic as sal be thus subscrivit be the king’. In the following year the privy council ordered exact compliance with the act of parliament, though in significantly different language. The officers of state and keepers of the signet and seals were advised to be more diligent, and the lords of session were urged to ignore any letters irregularly obtained, for it was declared that any such letters would be ‘invalide in themselffis, as privilie and surreptitiouslie purchest, aganis his hienes will and mynd’.77 A few months later a specific source of difficulty was identified when it was added that ‘na privat personis, his majesties domestikkis, presume to present unto his hienes ony sic signatouris, letters or preceptis, or to urge and solist his majestie to the subscriving thairof’.78 In the next two years the council felt obliged to return more than 74 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1579/10/55; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, p. 153. 75 Ford, Control of the Procedure of the College of Justice in Scotland, elsewhere in this volume. 76 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1579/10/49; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, pp. 150 – 1. 77 Burton/Masson, Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, vol. 3, pp. 284 – 5. 78 Burton/Masson, Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, vol. 3, p. 326.

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once to the problem that ‘his hienes bountefull gude natoure hes bene abusit’, particularly by parties who purchased letters to the lords of session ‘for staying or furthering of proces in materis of justice’.79 It was again declared that any letters issued without the council’s approval would be ‘estemit as privat and surreptitiouslie purchest, and to be of nane avale, force nor effect’. Both here and in the privy council’s previous orders, not only was no distinction drawn between writings purchased ‘for staying or furthering of proces’, but ‘privat’ writings were distinguished from those that were obtained with the council’s approval.

III. Increase in the Incidence of Private Writings If the aim of the 1579 act of parliament was to prohibit the privy council from requiring cases to be remitted from the session to parliament, it appears to have been successful, but if it was also to prohibit the king from issuing private writings, it had no more effect than the orders of the privy council would seem to indicate. In a case heard in the session in 1582 the defender produced ‘ane letter grantit be the kingis grace and his secret counsale’, instructing the judges to suspend their proceedings, ‘quhilk letter, be the saides lordis interloquitor, tuk na effect’.80 In this instance the letter, issued under the privy seal, had stated that the lords of session were proposing to proceed in opposition to ‘the commoun law and dyverse actis and statuteis maid be his hienes maist nobill progenitouris’.81 In other cases heard in the same decade the judges received letters that the king seems to have sent without advice from the privy council, either to desire a delay in proceedings involving one of his servants, or to encourage expedition in the handling of an action.82 When another defender produced letters of respite before both the privy council and the session, the privy council declared them to be ‘privilie purchest of oure soverane lord, without cognitioun of the caus’, and declined to give them effect, yet they do not appear to have been challenged in the same way before the session.83 There is indeed no indication that any attention was paid in the session to the privy council’s view that ‘private writings’ were those ‘privilie purchest’. In the 1590s several more letters were received and given effect, especially in the interests of litigants who were detained in the king’s service.84 More than once the judges complied with a request to suspend their pro79

Burton/Masson, Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, vol. 3, pp. 349 and 477 – 8. NRS, CS7/90, ff. 77 – 8; Clyde, Hope’s Major Practicks, vol. 2, p. 17. 81 Livingston et al., Registrum secreti sigilli Scotorum, vol. 8, pp. 131 – 2. Although granted under the privy seal, this letter was not in a standard form, and was treated as a private writing. 82 NRS, CS4/1, ff. 8 – 10; see too CS1/3/1, ff. 150v – 1r. 83 NRS, CS1/3/2, f. 234v; Burton and Masson, Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, vol. 4, pp. 9 and 11 – 12. 84 NRS, CS1/4/1, ff. 93, 156v – 7r, 193 and 200v – 1r, CS1/4/2, f. 290, and CS4/1, ff. 11 – 12. 80

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ceedings which the king made personally when he was present in the court.85 As usual, the likelihood is that more requests and instructions were received from the king than have so far been discovered. By this time the words ‘rege presente’ were frequently being inscribed in the margins of the court’s books.86 In advice written for the benefit of his elder son towards the end of the sixteenth century, James VI urged him after he became king to ‘haunt your Session, and spie carefully their proceedings’, believing that his own presence there had encouraged the equal administration of justice.87 ‘Spare not to goe there’, he continued, ‘for gracing that farre any that yee favour, by your presence to procure them expedition of Justice; although that should be specially done, for the poore that cannot waite on, or are debarred by mightier parties’. In offering this advice James was following up a revealing injunction to ‘studie well your owne Lawes’, which was itself a gloss on the more fundamental injunction to ‘study to know well your owne craft, which is to rule your people’. ‘And when I say this’, James explained, ‘I bid you know all crafts: For except ye know every one, how can you controll every one, which is your proper office?’ The art of kings was to control the practice of all the other arts on which effective government depended, including the art of judging. After 1603, when James moved south to become the king of England, he was no longer able to exercise personal control over the adjudicative process in Scotland by haunting his session, though he did visit the court on one more occasion when he returned briefly to his northern kingdom in 1617.88 However, he liked to boast in England that, whereas his predecessors had struggled to rule Scotland ‘by the sword’, he was able to ‘governe it with my pen’.89 In the second half of his reign the exercise of epistolary control became increasingly important and began to assume dimensions lacking from the practice of earlier rulers.

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NRS, CS1/4/1, ff. 81r and 149r. NRS, CS1/4/1, ff. 67 – 9, 72r, 81r, 83r, 84v – 5r, 86v, 88 – 9r, 91r, 93v, 94v – 5r, 98r, 103 – 5r, 106r, 107r, 109v, 110v – 11r, 113v – 115r, 122r, 125v, 128r, 132v – 3r, 134 – 5, 136v, 139, 148v, 150v, 154v, 155v, 158r, 162v – 3, 166r, 167r, 168, 182v, 183v – 4r, 185, 186v – 7r, 188 – 9, 192r, 193r, 195v – 6, 197v and 200v – 1r, and CS1/4/2, ff. 211v, 212v – 13r, 214v – 15, 219r, 220r, 223v, 226r, 228r, 231v, 234v – 5r, 236r, 237v, 239, 246 – 7r, 251v – 2r, 255 – 6r, 257 – 8, 271v, 275v, 275v – 6r, 281v, 282v – 4, 285v – 6r, 290r, 299, 301v, 306v, 307v, 315r, 326v – 7r, 328 and 331r. 87 McIlwain, C. H. (ed.), Political Works of James VI, Cambridge, Mass., 1918, pp. 38 – 9. On the extent to which the king was actually able to influence decisions of the court see Godfrey, Control and the Constitutional Accountability of the College of Justice in Scotland, elsewhere in this volume. 88 Maidment, J. (ed.), State Papers and Miscellaneous Correspondence of Thomas, Earl of Melros, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1837, vol. 1, p. 301. 89 McIlwain, Political Works of James VI, p. 301. 86

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Several examples survive of letters designed to procure expedition of justice for those the king favoured.90 After hearing about one litigant who had several actions pending before the lords of session, the king ‘thoughte good by these presentes to recommend him and them to your speciall furtherance, that such order may be taken therein as, all unnecessarie delayes being sette aside, yee wille determine the same according to justice’.91 On another occasion, having been ‘mony tymes importuned with petitiones’ from a ‘poore woman’, he ordered her case to be processed ‘with as much diligence as the course of law maie conveniently permitt’, partly because he felt ‘pitty’ for her and partly because he hoped ‘to be no more troubled with her’.92 Significantly more examples survive of letters requiring the postponement of hearings, especially when they involved the king’s servants, though the judges declined to comply with at least one of these letters.93 Others went beyond encouraging dispatch or enjoining delay in the administration of justice and came closer to telling the judges (as Justinian put it) ‘how it would be appropriate for a question to be handled or judgment to be delivered’.94 One of the earliest letters sent after the king travelled south related to a litigant who had left money with several people while he went on a journey, on the condition that it would be restored to him if he came back with proof that he had reached Jerusalem.95 James told the judges that adequate proof had been produced and that no obstacle should be allowed to hinder the recovery of the sums due. The judges decided to deal with the case accordingly, though possibly because the king’s opinion coincided with their own. In another case James expressed concern about the uneven obligations incurred by the parties to a marriage contract and wrote to the judges ‘to the entent that (if it may stande with justice according to the lawes and consuetude of that our kingdome) yee may interpose your decreete thereunto, whereby both parties may be equallie secured’.96 Sometimes the king wrote to the lords of session because he believed that the decision of a case in accordance with the ordinary laws and consuetude would not be appropriate. For example, when he heard that a widow’s action to have tenants removed from land was at risk of failure because her interest in the land had not been properly registered, he told the judges that he thought this ‘very hard’ and urged them to deal expeditiously with her case ‘according to equitie and reasone’.97 90 In addition to the examples below see NRS, CS4/1, f. 18, and Rogers, C. (ed.), The Earl of Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters Relative to the Affairs of Scotland and Nova Scotia from 1615 to 1635, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1885, vol. 1, p. 2. 91 NRS, CS4/1, f. 26. 92 NRS, CS4/1, f. 27. 93 NRS, CS4/1, ff. 16, 21 – 2 and 25; Maidment, State Papers and Miscellaneous Correspondence, vol. 1, pp. 71 – 2; Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 1, p. 6; Clyde, Hope’s Major Practicks, vol. 2, p. 16. 94 Novels 113.2. 95 NRS, CS1/4/2, f. 344. 96 NRS, CS4/1, f. 24. 97 NRS, CS4/1, f. 17.

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Another case was brought to the king’s attention by the debtor of an illegitimate Scot who had lived and died south of the border.98 Having already been required under English law to pay the amount due to the executors of the deceased, he was now being pursued for the same amount in Scotland by ‘the donator to the bastards escheitt, according to our lawes there’. The king thought this ‘a verie hard matter in conscience’ and urged the lords of session ‘to take order, and putt such an ende thereto, as in equitie and conscience you shall finde to be most reasonable and expedient in this case for this poore mans releif’. Sometimes the instruction was not so much to turn from law to equity as to apply the law as equitably as possible. When a victim of piracy ‘heaviely lamented his case unto us, showeing with all that, if he could have any little delay or favour from his creditours, he hopes by his industrie agane to recover his estate and dischardge his debts’, the king recommended the case to the judges’ ‘charitable consideration’, advising that, ‘haveing compassion for his estate, you grant him all the priviledges and favour that the course of our lawes can convenientlie permitt’.99 When he heard that a minor was effectively bereft of support from his family, due to the ‘unworthines’ of his father’s side and the ‘unkyndnes’ of his mother’s, he instructed the judges to search for ‘presidentis’ that would enable the boy to receive the favour he deserved under ‘all lawis both divin and humane’.100 When James VI’s reign came to an end in 1625 he was succeeded not by the elder son to whom he had addressed his advice at the close of the sixteenth century, but by his younger son, Charles I. The numbers of private writings that survive from other reigns are dwarfed by the hundred and eighty that were written between 1625 and 1638, when Charles began to lose control of his kingdoms, and passing references have been found to others that do not seem to have survived. Since most of the letters from this period have been found in a register kept by the king’s secretary, the impression of an abnormally high incidence – almost fourteen letters sent each year – could be misleading, yet there are several reasons for supposing that Charles really was more inclined than his predecessors to intervene in the administration of justice. In the first place, the official who preserved copies of his letters had also collected letters during the last ten years of James VI’s reign, when he had served as master of requests, but far fewer survive from that period.101 In the second place, of the letters gathered in a file in the records of the session, a disproportionately high number were subscribed by Charles I.102 In the third place, as will be seen shortly, the perception later in the seventeenth century was that Charles was peculiarly prone to writing to his judges about cases they were hearing. In the fourth and final place, as early as 1628 the king received a complaint from the lords of session ‘in regard of lettres writen by 98

NRS, CS4/1, f. 19. Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 1, p. 2. 100 NRS, CS4/1, f. 20. 101 McGrail, T. H., Sir William Alexander, First Earl of Stirling: A Biographical Study, Edinburgh, 1940. 102 For this file – NRS, CS4/1 – see again n. 3 above, and for examples see below. 99

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us in favouris of divers persones’.103 The terms of their complaint, which was apparently presented orally, were not recorded, and the king’s response does not mention James V’s promise to refrain from sending private writings in hindrance of justice. However, since his response does recognise that ‘our royall progenitouris have bene alsweill gratiously pleased to extend thare princelie favour towardis that our College of Justice and all the judges and members thareof’, attention probably had been drawn to the promise frequently renewed in the past. For his part Charles was ‘noe les willing to expres our respect unto you in the like kind, bieng verie confident that you will behave yourseffis in administrating of justice’. If he did not renew the promise itself, he did try to explain and defend his own practice. His purpose in writing to the court, he assured the lords of session, ‘was onlie to bring a speedie dispatch for such of our servandis that hade processes depending before you, in soe farr as the course of law wold permitt’. It is true that most of the letters Charles wrote in relation to cases being heard in the session asked ‘that justice may be administred heirin with convenient expedition’, and many were written at the request of his servants.104 It is also true that in most of the letters he wrote Charles instructed his judges to handle the cases raised before them ‘as the course of lawis will permit’, or ‘according to the lawis of that our kingdome’. On hearing, for instance, that several actions were being raised by the University of Aberdeen to preserve the flow of income from property it possessed, Charles encouraged the lords of session to do what they could in general to enable the ‘seminareis of learneing within that our kingdome to floorisch’, and instructed them in particular, in order that the staff of the university might not be ‘distracted from ther studeis and exerceis of ther severall functions’, to ensure that ‘justice be administred thairin with as much diligence and convenience unto them as can be affoorded by the lawis of that our kingdome’.105 In responding to the complaint received from the lords of session, Charles pointed out that if they would provide more expeditious justice as a matter of course, litigants would have ‘no occasione to importune us in this kind’, emphasising that ‘we cannot in justice but heir the complaintis of all our subjectis’. Charles undertook to remit any complaints he received for review in the session, and less than a fortnight later he wrote to the judges again in connection with a petition he had received from a litigant who claimed to have ‘sustened much wrong and prejudice in twoe severall actiones at law’, instructing the judges ‘to give 103 NRS, CS1/5, f. 14v; The Acts of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session, 1553 – 1790, Edinburgh, 1790, pp. 82 – 3; Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 1, p. 279. 104 NRS, CS4/1, ff. 32 – 3, 38 – 40, 43, 45 – 50, 52 – 3, 56 and 63; Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 23, 25 – 8, 37, 43, 50 – 1, 100, 102, 104, 113 – 14, 141 – 2, 163 – 4, 173, 187, 193, 240, 244, 282, 296 – 7, 318, 325, 342, 372, 383 – 4, 392, 396 – 7, 400, 407, 410 and 414, and vol. 2, pp. 420, 436, 464 – 5, 486, 507, 514, 519 – 20, 533, 536, 555, 562, 565 – 6, 568, 573 – 4, 581, 595 – 6, 600, 603, 645, 651, 657, 667, 672, 698, 704 – 7, 709, 716 – 17, 732, 736 – 7, 743, 760, 763, 777, 788 – 9, 797 – 8, 800, 802 – 6, 824, 829, 831 – 4, 836 – 7, 840 – 1, 846 – 8, 851 and 858. 105 Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 2, p. 780. Would that the king’s reasoning prevailed today!

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the peticeoner releiff if you find it suteabill’, and otherwise to adopt measures to ensure that ‘nather wee may be in this kind heirefter trubled with such unjust complaintis, nor the justice of the kingdome [be] exposed to such daring obloquy and detractione’.106 The king’s undertaking to remit complaints directly to the session was rarely fulfilled, however, and his response to the complaint made by the lords of session themselves failed to account fully for his practice. If most of his letters urged dispatch in the processing of actions, many others encouraged delay, notwithstanding the assurance sometimes attached that ‘it be nowayis our intentione to hinder the ordinarie course of justice’.107 Occasionally, when a case involved a litigant from England or Ireland, the lords of session were instructed to remit it to a court in one of those kingdoms.108 Moreover, although the judges were usually instructed to deal with cases in accordance with the laws of Scotland, sometimes reference was also made to ‘justice and the equitie of the cause’, and sometimes they were explicitly instructed to deal with an action ‘according to equitie and conscience, respecting the samyne more then to strict poynts of law’.109 The king felt especially bound to protect the interests of strangers, widows, orphans and the poor. At least in the early years of his reign, he aimed to reassure the lords of session that while he felt obliged to contact them, ‘we would be loath in matters of justice and questionable titles to prefer any pairtie to another by our recommendation’.110 In offering this reassurance, he effectively conceded that there was a potential problem. When the king wrote to the judges it was because one of the parties had petitioned him to intervene, and even if he merely urged expedition in accordance with the laws, his doing so at the instigation of one of the parties inevitably showed favour towards that party. Having denied an allegation made by one of the parties to an action that he had a personal interest in its outcome, Charles remitted the matter for decision to the court, ‘willing you nather to regard any of the pairteis befoir the other, nor anything else, bot that justice be equalie administred by you according to the lawis and customes of that kingdome’.111 The stress here on the need to regard neither party before the other, which is absent from all the other letters examined, tends to confirm that the usual expectation was that one party would be shown favour. In two cases the judges re106

Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 1, p. 283. NRS, CS4/1, ff. 31, 49, 54, 57, 62 and 64; Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 121 – 2, 142, 171, 181 – 2, 185, 253, 329 – 30, 341 – 2, 385, 388 and 407, and vol. 2, pp. 439, 442, 496, 512, 535, 539, 578, 580, 625, 632, 682, 692, 718, 725 – 6, 756, 759, 771 – 2, 811 – 12, 824 – 5, 827 and 859. 108 Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 1, p. 260, and vol. 2, pp. 646, 718 and 720. 109 NRS, CS4/1, ff. 30 and 32; Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 17, 23, 41, 45, 49 – 50, 54 – 5, 76, 89, 97, 168, 171, 190 – 1, 283 and 298, and vol. 2, pp. 508, 533, 646, 737 and 864. 110 Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 17, 43 and 184 – 5. 111 Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 2, p. 722. 107

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ceived firm instructions to favour one party, ‘if you find not a speciall reasone in the contrarie’.112 Charles was more inclined than his father had been to tell the lords of session ‘how it would be appropriate for a question to be handled or judgment to be delivered’. In the space available, it must suffice to offer a few examples. One letter related to an interest in land that had been surrendered to the crown in James VI’s reign and granted by that king to the father of one of the present king’s councillors.113 On hearing that his councillor’s interest was being challenged by the descendant of a previous holder, Charles told the lords of session it was his ‘speciall pleasure that you advert particularlie thereunto and withall the favor that justice can admitt that you tak sick course that what was granted for so good and so deserving a cause to our said cousins father and himself may be still by him enjoyed and possessed’. Another case also related to land that had been acquired from the church and granted to lay tenants after the Reformation.114 James VI had arranged for the land to be held by one person in exchange for payments made to another. On hearing that the holder of the land had fallen into arrears with the payments, and that his creditor was about to claim possession of the whole estate, Charles told the lords of session to make the creditor accept a guarantee for repayment and to see that ‘a finall end according to justice be putt to that actioun’. On the other hand, when he heard of a creditor who had justly acquired land from a debtor only to be ‘trubled in his possessione in a most barbarous maner’, he told the lords of session ‘to sie those wrongis so repared that the like may be prevented in all time heirefter’, adding that if any further action should be raised by the creditor, they ought to ‘assist and countenance him, in so far as convenientlie you can doe’.115 Several other letters were equally prescriptive. After hearing that the members of an inquest were being pursued for their error in identifying the wrong person as heir to an estate, Charles examined the facts of the case, decided that the mistake was understandable, and told the lords of session to ‘declair them and everie ane of them frie and quyt of all errour’, and to ‘pronunce absolvitour in ther favours’.116 Another letter was written on behalf of a man who had been forced to leave the country and whose land was being claimed in his absence.117 It had been explained to the king that he would be unable to defend his title ‘except we, out of our princelie consideration, dispense with the rigour of the law, and grant him our licence to abyd and follow his bussines within the cuntrie for ane whole yeir’. Accepting that the man, ‘being from his cradle bred in poperie, and haveing yeilded humble and tymelie obedience to our lawis and governement, ought not in equitie or reasone to incur the punisch112

Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 17 and 185. NRS, CS4/1, f. 61. 114 NRS, CS4/1, ff. 33 and 37; Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 112 – 13, 253, 329 and 367. 115 Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 1, p. 281. 116 NRS, CS4/1, f. 44; Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 2, pp. 651 – 2. 117 Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 2, pp. 556 – 7; and see too pp. 442 – 3. 113

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ments that ar due to dissobedients onlie’, Charles informed those ‘two supreame twines of judicatoreis, our counsell and Colledge of Justice’, that he did not wish the laws against recusancy to be given effect in the case of this litigant, at least until the case he was involved in had been dealt with. The king’s interference in cases like these cannot have helped to relieve the anxieties of those who perceived on his part a lack of commitment to the reformed religion and a willingness to undermine established property rights.118 The lords of session were in fact instructed by the king to insert into any decreets or interlocutors relating to former church lands a clause ‘declareing that the passing therof shall not prejudge us in the benefite of the same’.119

IV. Decrease in the Incidence of Private Writings In 1639, when Charles was forced to make concessions to his rebellious subjects in Scotland, it was decided in parliament that the 1579 act ‘discharging privie wrytingis from his majestie to the lords of sessioune’ should be ‘ratified and revived’, and that the king should be written to about ‘the prejudice redounding to the countrie by these privie wrytingis’.120 In 1641, when Charles had travelled to Scotland and was personally present in parliament, the proposed act was passed in consideration of ‘the prejudice sustenit by the leigeis in the delay of justice and staying of the executioun of sentenceis be privat wryttingis and warrandis purchest be pairteis for thair awne particular endis’.121 The resort to the language found in the 1579 act disguised the increasing tendency since then for the kings of Scotland to go beyond delaying the course of justice, problematic as that remained, and to encourage not merely the expedition of justice but also the decision of cases in favour of particular parties. In fact, by this time the court was only sitting intermittently, and the king had more urgent issues to address than the interests of litigants.122 Ten years later the court stopped 118 Donaldson, G., Scotland: James V to James VII, Edinburgh, 1965, pp. 295 – 316; Mitchison, R., Lordship to Patronage: Scotland, 1603 – 1745, London, 1983, pp. 22 – 43; Brown, K. M., Kingdom or Province? Scotland and the Regal Union, 1602 – 1715, Basingstoke, 1992, pp. 99 – 111. 119 Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 42 – 3. See too NRS, CS4/1, ff. 29, 51, 55 – 6 and 59; Rogers, Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 69, 99 – 100, 127 – 8, 147 – 8, 171 – 2, 182, 313 – 14, 348, 356, 389 – 92 and 410 – 11, and vol. 2, pp. 426, 501, 647, 656, 701 – 2, 734, 739, 821 – 2, 826, 853 and 860 – 1; Masson, D./Hume Brown, P. (eds.), The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 2nd series, 8 vols., Edinburgh, 1899 – 1908, vol. 2, pp. 2 – 3 and 24 – 5; Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, A1641/8/113; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 5, pp. 697 – 8. 120 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, C1639/8/61; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 5, p. 612. 121 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, A1641/8/117; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 5, p. 699. 122 Stevenson, D., The Covenanters and the Court of Session, 1637 – 1650, in: Juridical Review, 1972, pp. 227 – 47.

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sitting entirely after Scotland was conquered by forces of the republican regime established in England. After the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, the legislation of the 1640s was wholly rescinded, on the basis that it lacked genuine royal approval.123 That it had been felt necessary twenty years earlier to ‘revive’ the 1579 act suggests that it was believed to have fallen into desuetude, but the act had not been formally repealed and arguably it remained in force. It did not take long after the session was revived in 1661 for the question to be raised again whether it was appropriate for a king to write to his judges about cases pending before them. In November of that year the president of the session, Sir John Gilmour of Craigmillar, wrote to the king’s secretary, the earl of Lauderdale, about a letter he had received under the signature of Charles II, asking the judges to suspend their hearing of a case while he tried to negotiate a compromise between the parties.124 After discussing the matter with the president of the privy council, Gilmour decided to ask Lauderdale for clarification before showing the letter to the other judges. ‘To trouble his majestie with cases proper to his ordinare courts’, he observed, ‘I wish it were seriouslie considdered with the consequenses’. Stressing the burden that would fall upon the king’s secretary if the practice were revived, he invited Lauderdale to clarify ‘what is his majesties mynd in this and such lyk cases’. Before Lauderdale had time to respond, another letter he had written was received by Gilmour.125 In this letter, written at the request of a litigant who had ‘done the king good service during his absence’, Lauderdale had stated that ‘his majestie is so tender of the Colledg of Justice that he will not write any letters or recommendations in causes depending before them, but he commanded me to write to your lordship, and to recommend the desire of the petitioner as farr as can stand with justice, for he is a person whom the king values’. It must surely have been obvious that the distinction being drawn here between letters signed by the king and written by his secretary on his behalf was rather contrived. Shortly afterwards, in response to the query Gilmour had raised in the earlier action, Lauderdale explained that it was ‘tendernes to the Colledg of Justice’ that had led him to propose no more than a delay in the court’s proceedings while a settlement was negotiated, for anything else ‘wold have looked like a recommendation of a parties cause, which the king is resolved not to doe’.126 ‘The king is much pressed to grant personall protections’, he added, ‘which by former registers I finde have been ordinarie’.127 Gilmour was then asked to advise the king on ‘how farr these protections are legall, and if in any case he may grant them’. How he answered is not known, but his letter elicited the assurance that Charles II would ‘be more tender’ in 123 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1661/1/158; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 7, pp. 86 – 7. 124 Fifth Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, Edinburgh, 1933, pp. 127 – 8. 125 Fifth Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, pp. 128 – 30. 126 Fifth Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, pp. 130 – 1. 127 Lauderdale added that he was thinking especially of ‘my Lord Sterlins time’, and in a later letter mentioned below he made it clear that he was thinking of private writings as opposed to respites or remissions.

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future.128 Having been asked in addition to explain what was happening in another case, Gilmour told Lauderdale that ‘the trust and place I am in obligeth me in all humilitie to say that, as it is his majesties just inclinatioun not to interpose in privat processes depending befoir the session, so in this it may be expected that his majestie will be pleased to suffer and allow justice to have its owne cours’.129 Various devices were resorted to in other letters written by the king’s secretary during Charles II’s reign. In one he mentioned that the king, ‘althogh he will not recommend busines depending before the session by letters’, was sorry that he did not tell Gilmour when they met ‘how great a value’ he attached to a litigant, ‘and that he did not particularly recommend her concerns to you as much as stands with justice’.130 Two years later a noblemen commissioned to represent the king in the Scottish parliament was advised that while Charles was ‘resolved not to breake his resolution (which constantly he hath, since his blessed restoration, observed) not to recommend any matter to the Colledg of Justice’, he wished him to have the hearing of an action delayed if he could by ‘privat indeavor’.131 One occasion on which instruction was given openly to the lords of session in the king’s name was when it was ordered that a ‘cause depending before you should receive all lawfull and speedy dispatch, according to the lawes of that our kingdome’.132 ‘Though wee still continue our resolution not to medle in matters of justice, or the merite of causes depending, but leave them intirely to our Colledge of Justice’, the king explained, ‘wee shall bee very sorry that our subjects of either kingdome shall have reason to complaine of delay in justice in our other kingdome’. Several other letters related to prize litigation arising from the third Anglo-Dutch war which Charles wished to be dealt with consistently in all his kingdoms.133 On another occasion, in rehearsing his standard claim that the king very rarely recommended particular parties to the court, Lauderdale remarked again that ‘the contrarie cours was too, too frequent in the late kings tyme, as I find by multituds of letters in the registers of my predecessours in this office’.134 If this scarcely justified his own ‘boldnes some tyms to recommend to your lordships justice and favour – and to sum other of my friends – the concerne of my neir relations when they come before you’, as he claimed to believe, it does seem that private writings 128

Fifth Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, pp. 131 – 2. Fifth Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, pp. 132 – 3. For the background to this case, in which one of the king’s illegitimate children had an interest, see Lee, M., The Heiresses of Buccleuch: Marriage, Money and Politics in Seventeenth Century Britain, East Linton, 1996. 130 Fifth Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, pp. 147 – 8. 131 Fifth Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, pp. 187 – 8. 132 Fifth Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, pp. 190 – 1. 133 NRS, CS4/1, ff. 66; Acts of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session, pp. 165 – 6; Lauder, Sir John, Historical Notices of Scotish Affairs, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1848, vol. 1, pp. 131 – 2. Actually, the lords of session themselves asked for advice in prize cases, as is noted in Ford, J. D., The Law of the Sea and the Two Unions, in: Proceedings of the British Academy, 127, 2005, pp. 135 – 6. 134 Fifth Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, pp. 191 – 2. 129

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were issued relatively infrequently in Charles II’s reign, when it was recognised that in principle, if not always in practice, the handling of cases should be left ‘intyrely to the lords justice’.135 Only one example has so far been found of a letter sent to the lords of session about a case by Charles II’s successor, his brother James VII and II, and it concerned one of the prize cases about which letters had already been written.136 This seems surprising, given that one of the unconstitutional practices objected to when James was removed from the throne in 1689 was ‘the sending of letters to the courts of justice, ordaining the judges to stop or desist from determineing causes, or ordaining them how to proceed in causes depending befor them’.137 It may well be that other letters were written that have not yet come to light, but at least part of the explanation is probably that here, as elsewhere in the Claim of Right presented to William and Mary before they received the crown, grievances from earlier reigns were being revived in relation to James’ regime.138 Concern over the independence of the judiciary had certainly been growing. In 1681, while Charles II was still on the throne, an act of parliament had been passed declaring that all jurisdiction descended from the king, that the appointment of judges or officers was ‘not privative of his jurisdiction’, and that in consequence ‘his sacred majesty may, by himself or any commissionated by him, take cognizance and decision of any cases or causes he pleases’.139 According to one of the lords of session, this act ‘was looked upon as a mighty extension and stretch towards arbitrary government’, and was considered inconsistent in spirit both with James V’s promise not to send ‘privy writings’ to the lords of session, and with Charles II’s own acknowledgement that there could be no ‘appeals’ against decisions of the lords of 135

See too NRS, CS4/1, f. 65; Fifth Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, p. 190; Acts of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session, pp. 142 – 3; Lauder, Sir John, The Decisions of the Lords of Council and Session, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1759 – 1761, vol. 1, p. 271; Hume Brown, P./Paton, H./Balfour-Melville, E. W. M. (eds.), The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 3rd series, 14 vols., Edinburgh, 1908 – 1970, vol. 4, pp. 307 – 8. 136 NRS, CS4/1, f. 66A; Acts of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session, pp. 165 – 7. 137 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1689/3/108; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 9, pp. 38 – 40. The complaint about private writings was coupled with an insistence that the king’s judges should hold office ad vitam aut culpam, an attempt to revive an act of parliament passed towards the end of Charles I’s reign (Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1641/8/55; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 5, pp. 354 – 5), which had been repealed at the beginning of Charles II’s reign (Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1661/ 1/158; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 7, pp. 86 – 7). See too McNeill, P. G. B., The Independence of the Scottish Judiciary, in: Juridical Review, 1958, pp. 135 – 44. 138 Interference with the administration of justice is not identified as a feature of James’ rule north of the border in Mann, A. J., James VII: Duke and King of Scots, 1633 – 1701, Edinburgh, 2014. For the situation in England, where one of the central complaints made against James was his interference with the administration of justice, see Havighurst, A. F., James II and the Twelve Men in Scarlet, in: Law Quarterly Review, 69, 1953, pp. 522 – 46. 139 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1681/7/42; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 8, p. 352. The 1681 parliament had been presided over by James, then duke of York and Albany, as the king’s commissioner.

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session.140 Four years later, shortly before Charles II’s death, a further connection was made between the promise not to send private writings and the acknowledgement that no appeals could be raised. In response to a letter from the king demanding an explanation for a procedural ruling, the lords of session provided the explanation demanded but also appended a lengthy defence of the immunity of their decisions from review, in which they rehearsed the arguments lately accepted in relation to appeals.141 Discussion of the legitimacy of writing to the lords of session appears at this point to have been absorbed into, or rather eclipsed by, the debate over the legitimacy of appeals.142 While condemning the practice of sending private writings to the courts, the Claim of Right also asserted the ‘priviledge of the subjects to protest for remeed of law to the king and parliament against sentences pronounced by the lords of sessione’.143 Petitioning the monarch to write to judges who were failing to deal expeditiously with actions or were departing from the customary style or procedure of their court seems at one time to have been regarded as an acceptable practice. Indeed, it even seems to have been considered acceptable for litigants to request the monarch to order a delay in proceedings while they were engaged in public service. When the judges felt the need to disregard a letter from the king they usually explained that it had been obtained by ‘inoportune sollistatioun’ or ‘wrang informatioun and circumventioun’. However, it was difficult for monarchs to write to the judges without showing favour towards one of the parties to an action, and some succumbed to the temptation to tell the judges how a question should be handled or a decision should be delivered. A legitimate practice that was always at risk of abuse appears to have fallen into disrepute before the civil wars, and to have been regarded with suspicion after the monarchy was restored. In condemning the practice of sending letters to stop justice or require decisions contrary to law, the Claim of Right merely restated in different language the promise James V had made a century and a half earlier.144 Yet by asserting at the same time the legitimacy of protestations to parliament for remeid of law, the Claim of Right also identified an alternative avenue for dissatisfied parties to pursue, and in the remainder of the seventeenth century it became the preferred ave-

140

Lauder, Decisions of the Lords of Council and Session, vol. 1, pp. 154 – 5. NRS, CS4/1, f. 66. 142 The letter to Charles II from the lords of session was dated 20 January 1685, while the only letter from James VII to the lords of session was dated 28 February 1685. Although later letters may well have been written, there is less likelihood of their being remotely as numerous as those sent in earlier reigns. 143 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1689/3/108; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 9, pp. 38 – 40. This was certainly a response to a problem that had arisen during Charles II’s reign, as is made clear in Balfour-Melville, E. W. M., An Account of the Proceedings of the Estates in Scotland, 1689 – 1690, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1954 – 1955, vol. 1, pp. 30 – 2. 144 A phrase also used was ‘how to proceed in cases depending befor them contrair to the express lawes’. 141

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nue.145 Although problematic in its own way, the practice of protesting for remeid of law would be developed in a public forum, would be open to procedural regulation, and would be permitted to operate only when the judges had already pronounced their sentences.

145 Ford, J. D., Protestations to Parliament for Remeid of Law, in: Scottish Historical Review, 88, 2009, pp. 57 – 107.

New Findings Regarding the Influence of the Ruler on the Supreme Jurisdiction in the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation By Wolfgang Sellert A question for the German constitutional and judiciary history, which has not been fully answered, is, if and to what extent the judges of the highest courts of the Holy Roman Empire, the Aulic Councel (Reichshofsrat, RHR) and the Imperial Chambers Court (Reichskammergericht, RKG) were protected from influence and interference by the ruler. The RKG and the RHR had consistently condemned cabinet judiciary of the sovereigns. But what was about the courts of the Empire themselves? Were they protected from interventions of the Emperor? Did they defend against intervention of the ruler, such as the Upper Tribunal of Wismar, when the Swedish King Karl XII. (1697 – 1718) required the issuance of judicial acts and protocols? Regarding the RKG and the RHR, I have commented on this in earlier assessments of judicial independence. The survey of the judicial reports and documents of the RHR, located at the Haus-, Hof- and Staatsarchiv of Vienna under the direction of the Göttingen Academy of Sciences and Humanities and started in 2007 – now accumulated and published in 9 volumes1 –, opened new perspectives and questions concerning the independence of the imperial courts. They are the subject of my investigation. I would like to present the results in the following brief summary.2

1 W. Sellert (ed.), Die Akten des Kaiserlichen Reichshofrats, Serie: Alte Prager Akten (APA), vol. 1 (A – D), supported by E. Ortlieb, Berlin 2009; vol. 2 (E – J), Berlin 2011; vol. 3 (K – O), Berlin 2012; vol. 4 (P – R), supported by T. Schenk, Berlin 2014, and vol. 5 (S – Z), Berlin 2014; Serie: Antiqua, vol. 1 (Karton 1 – 43), supported by U. Machoczek, Berlin 2010; vol. 2 (Karton 44 – 135), supported by U. Rasche, Berlin 2014; vol. 3 (Karton 135 – 277 f.), supportet by U. Rasche, Berlin 2016 and vol. 4, supported by T. Schenk, Berlin 2017. 2 For a complete treatment of the subject see: W. Sellert, Control of the Aulic Councel and the Imperial Chambers Court by the ruler. Law and realitiy, in: Kjell Å Modéer/Martin Sunnqvist (eds.), Suum Cuique Tribuere: Legal Contexts, Judicial Archetypes and DeepStructures Courts of Appeal and Judiciaries from Early Modern Europe to Contemporary Times of the Svea Court of Appeal, Stockholm 1614 – 2014 [Symposium in Stockholm, October 2014]. [Rättshistoriska studier], Stockholm 2017.

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I. The Imperial Chamber Court The research has shown that the Imperial Chamber Court was already largely protected from interference by the Emperor as a result of its dislocation from the Imperial Court. So the Aulic Council was located most of the time in Vienna and Prague and the Chamber Court first in Frankfurt am Main and later in Speyer and in the end in Wetzlar. In addition, the Imperial Chamber Court Orders (Reichskammergerichtsordnungen) and the Electoral Capitulations (Wahlkapitulationen) stipulated numerous prohibitions regarding outside interference. The judicial files of the Aulic Council, which have now undergone archival processing, show that these prohibitions did not cover the fiscal matters falling into the exclusive jurisdiction of the Emperor. Apart from that, the Emperor and his Aulic Council have tried only in few cases to intervene in non-fiscal procedures. In contrast, resisted the Imperial Chamber Court successfully and declared in public that thus its independence had been seriously injured. In addition, the Aulic Council as the supreme judicial inspectorate (oberste Justizaufsichtsbehörde) attempted to influence the proceedings at the Imperial Chamber Court by means of what was known as promotoriales. These were non-binding letters of admonition, with which the Aulic Council responded to complaints of the parties, for example, regarding the slow progress of their proceedings before the Imperial Chamber Court. Whether and how the Chamber Court has reacted is still unknown.

II. The Aulic Council The Aulic Council, on the other hand, was less protected against imperial intervention. One problem was, above all, the long-standing practice, at the Aulic Council, of vota ad imperatorem, which required the Aulic Council to submit to the Privy Council (Geheimer Rat) an opinion including a draft decision whenever a legal dispute concerned the Empire and the rights of the Emperor. This provoked the criticism of the Imperial Estates. They argued that almost all judicial affairs were decided by the Privy Council without any consultation with the originators of these opinions. Also, they claimed that the Privy Council did not comply with the decisions proposed by the Aulic Council, but did instead create completely new decisions – usually without involving the originator of the respective Aulic Council opinion. Therefore, so they said, there was no fair and impartial jurisdiction at the Aulic Council but, as a consequence, a risk of arbitrary violations of the Imperial Estates’ interests. Of course, the Interests of the Protestants were in the always controversial religious affairs different from those of Catholics. An evaluation of the Aulic Council files now arranged and described has established, however, that the Aulic Council submitted a votum ad imperatorem only in such judicial affairs in which constitutional, military, political or economic interests of the Empire were affected beyond the individual case, that means, not in all cases as the Estates claimed. Under the now accessible judical files there were only 3 %. The

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opinions were also not submitted arbitrarily by order of the Emperor, but in coherence with the provisions for the Aulic Council at the Councillors’ own discretion. Moreover, it has become clear that the draft decisions created in the Aulic Council were generally not modified in the Privy Council. This is probably related to the fact that there was, mediated through the Imperial Vice-Chancellor, a cooperation between the Aulic and Privy Councils. Because on the one side the Imperial Vice-Chancellor was representative of the Aulic President and thus a member of the Aulic Council. And on the other side he was a member of the privy Council. Although the vota did have a controlling function, they had always also been the appropriate and usual means for communication and coordination between the Emperor, the Privy Council and the Aulic Council. In this context it is also significant that at the Imperial Chamber Court of the 17th century, one was only beginning to develop a strict organizational separation between “judiciary, administration, provision of advice to the ruler in all matters of government” and “preparation of his resolutions in iura reservata and gratialia”. The Aulic and Privy Councils must therefore be regarded more or less as a uniform association of judicial organs, based on mutual understanding, within which there generally did not exist a arbitrary exercise of judicial power (Kabinettsjustiz) in the traditional sense, i. e. by means of sovereign interventions (Machtsprüche). The whole procedure has more similarity with the socalled “Aktenversendung” than with the “Kabinettsjustiz”. Also, one would be misled if one were to judge the dignity of the Aulic Council from the aspect of judicial independence alone. It is true that, in general, the confidence in a court of justice depends to a large extent on its independence and the impartiality which follows from it. In principle, however, this was not the case with the Aulic Council. The confidence of the many thousands of parties who called upon the Aulic Council during the circa 250 years of its existence was based mainly on their belief in the Emperor’s comprehensive power of jurisdiction and his proverbial love of justice. And why should the Aulic Council, to the detriment of a “faster dispensation of justice” (zum Nachteil einer schnelleren Justizbeförderung), submit such vota ad imperatorem in other cases than those important ones where it was prescribed in the Aulic Council order? And, also, one should consider that the vota ad imperatorem could be of significant benefit to the decisions of the Aulic Council. For example, the Aulic Chamber could profit in political affairs from the experiences of the Privy Council. Admittedly, neither the parties nor the advocates were given reasons for the judgements, which would have made it possible to examine the quality of the Imperial Court’s adjudication from an outside perspective. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of the Aulic Council was not arbitrary. This is illustrated, for example, by the vota ad imperatorem edited 1976 by Peter Leyers as well as those published by Friedrich Carl Moser and Heinrich Wilhelm Bergsträßer in the second half of the 18th century. There one can observe how thoroughly the Aulic Council discussed its draft decisions and justified them with legal arguments, often filling several pages.

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The research, however, also led to the conclusion that the Imperial Estates did not succeed in winning for the Aulic Council the independence which had been won for the Imperial Chamber Court. As long as the Emperor, according to tradition as well as law, was responsible as the salvator pacis for peace and justice in the Empire and as long as he was the sole supreme head and judge (“obristes haupt und richter”) of the Aulic Council – summoned and funded exclusively by the Emperor himself (“einzig und allein von [ihm] eigens bestellet […] und besoldet”) – it lacked the basic requirements for an independent judiciary. Efforts to change this would always be rejected by the Emperor, because he (as did Leopold I. in 1663) regarded it as an attempt to cut back the Emperor’s authority and to change a practice which dated back over 100 years. As late as 1790, Benjamin Ferdinand Mohl, to his own regret, had to accept that even if one were to abolish the vota ad imperatorem, no one could prevent the Emperor from intervening in the adjudication of the Aulic Council. Ultimately, the Imperial Court followed the maxim – as formulated in 1773 by a jurist of the municipality of Goslar – that the state power could claim for the State Council the jurisdiction over a case if the general welfare, i. e., the external or internal peace of a country was endangered, or if the situation was expected to result in severely detrimental consequences for a country. Literally it says: dass die Staatsmacht “eine Rechtssache vor ihre[en] … Staats-Rath … ziehen“ dürfe, “wenn die allgemeine Wohlfahrt, das heißt der äusserliche oder innerliche Ruhestand eines Landes“ in Gefahr ist, „oder sehr mißliche Folgen einem Lande bevorstehen.“ Although the vota ad imperatorem remained in force until the end of the Holy Roman Empire, by the 18th century the Aulic Council showed occasional tendencies of some judicial independence. For example, when the Councillor Andreas Hilleprand Fhr. v. Prandau was reprimanded by the Imperial Vice-Chancellor in 1775 because he had not, in relation to a case involving an imperial privilege, submitted a votum ad imperatorem, the Councillor replied that it would make little sense if the Aulic Council had to submit an opinion in each and every case. This would delay the proceedings and damage the Council’s public profile. In another politically charged legal case, Joseph II. requested to be told the names of those Councillors who had maintained, during the voting process, a point of view which he regarded as harmful for the Empire (“reichsverderblich”) and undermining the Emperor’s authority. This request was rejected by the Council’s president, who argued that the Emperor had not adhered to the prohibition of interference as laid down in the Electoral Capitulation. Furthermore, he reminded the Emperor that in each collegiate judicial body, hence the more in the case of the Aulic Council, one of the most important, indeed primary requirements was that all Councillors must be able to freely cast their votes according to their conscience and special insight, without the least consideration of external aspects and without having to worry about personal consequences. Literally it says: Es sei “in einem jeden Justiz Collegio, folglich desto mehr beym kaiserlichen Reichshofrath, eine der wesentlichsten, ja ers-

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ten Erfordernisse, daß alle Räthe frei nach ihrem Gewissen und besonderer Einsicht, ohne die mindeste Nebenrücksicht oder einige Besorgniß, ungescheut ihre Stimmen abzugeben im Stande seyen”. The Emperor then backed down and declared that henceforth there should be no more vota ad imperatorem in puris judicialibus. All in all, these were rather modest first steps towards an independent judiciary, which, in reference to the Aulic Council, did not reach its full potential for as long as the Holy Roman Empire existed.

Swedish Court under Scrutiny: An Inspection of the Svea Court of Appeal in 1636 By Mia Korpiola

I. Introduction In seventeenth-century Sweden, war formed the direct or indirect impetus for many administrative reforms. One of the new institutions born out of warfare was the Svea Court of Appeal, the first royal appellate court, established by King Gustav II Adolf (r. 1611 – 1632) in the capital of Stockholm in 1614.1 Sixteen years later, in 1630, the King left for Germany and the Thirty Years’ War never to return to Sweden again. Gustav II Adolf was killed, aged 37, at the Battle of Lützen in 1632. His only living child and heir was his five-year-old daughter, Christina (r. 1632 – 1654), who now ascended the throne. While Queen Christina was a minor, a regency government consisting of aristocratic Councillors of the Realm reigned in her name and stead.2 During the regency in 1634, an Instrument of Governance, arranging the central government of Sweden, was ratified by the Estates and the Council of the Realm. This Instrument prescribed that the activities of each of the five central government offices, the collegia or Boards, were to be inspected yearly. The Svea Court of Appeal became one of these collegia, the collegium of justice, under its President in 1634. Its President also held the prestigious position of riksdrots, Lord High Justice.3 Accord1 For the early history of the Svea Court of Appeal, see especially Sture Petrén/Stig Jägerskiöld/Tord O:son Nordberg, Svea Hovrätt: studier till 350-års minnet. P. A. Norstedt/ Söners Förlag, Stockholm, 1964; Mia Korpiola (ed.), The Svea Court of Appeal in the Early Modern Period: Historical Reinterpretations and New Perspectives, Rättshistoriska studier, 26. The Olin Foundation, Stockholm, 2014; J. E. Almquist, “Bidrag till frågan om Svea hovrätts uppkomst,” Svensk Juristtidning 25 (1940), pp. 468 – 478; Sture Petrén, “Kring Svea hovrätts tillblivelse,” Svensk Juristtidning 30 (1945), pp. 171 – 184. For an overview of the court in English, see also my forthcoming article “The Svea Court of Appeal: A Basis of Good Governance and Justice in the Early Modern Swedish Realm (1614 – 1800),” The Comparative History of the Central Courts of Europe and the Americas, 1200 – 1800, Mark Godfrey/C. H. van Rhee (eds.), Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-American Legal History, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin. 2 On Queen Christina, see, e. g., Marie-Louise Rodén, Drottning Christina: En biografi. Prisma, Stockholm, 2008. 3 38, Instrument of Governance of 1634 (Regeringsform af Rikets ständer gillad och daterad Stockholm den 29 juli 1634), available online (cited on 25 Jan. 2018): https://sv.wiki source.org/wiki/Regeringsform_1634. For an English translation of the section – and parts of

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ingly, the first inspection of these collegia, “the first comprehensive revision of Swedish state administration”4, took place in 1636, a year that has been called “epoch-making in the history of Swedish administration”.5 The inspection began with the Svea Court of Appeal, the first in rank among the collegia. In this essay, I will first give a short overview of the Svea Court of Appeal and present the Instrument of Governance (Sw. regeringsform) of 1634 as the background and legal authority behind the inspection of the Svea Court of Appeal in 1636. The records of this inspection by the regency government have been preserved and printed.6 In my essay, I will analyse this record and discuss how the inspection was conducted and by whom. Then, I will move to the major points of criticism levelled at the Court before assessing the significance of the inspection on the future activities of the Court and the legacy of the inspection.

II. The Svea Court of Appeal The Svea Court of Appeal was founded by King Gustav II Adolf in 1614. As the name suggests, it became an appellate court receiving appeals from lower instance courts. The annual bulk of work in the Svea Court of Appeal was done during its two annual law terms or “judicial sessions,” i. e., May – July and September – November. The rest of the year, the Court had a few judges on call for urgent business and criminal cases.7 The Court’s fourteen judges belonged to three classes: five Councillors of the Realm including the Lord High Justice (Rijkzens Drotzet), five noble assessors (one of whom was appointed as the Vice President) and four commoner assessors “learned and skilled in law” (Lärde och Laghfarne). When a vacancy was created at the Court, the Court nominated six candidates of which the ruler appointed one.8 Judges could be moved from one class to a higher one through ennoblement the Instrument of Governance – see Sweden as a Great Power 1611 – 1697: Government: Society: Foreign Policy, Michael Roberts (ed.), Documents on Modern History. Edward Arnold Ltd., London, 1968, pp. 18 – 28, here p. 24. 4 Gunnar Wetterberg, Kanslern: Axel Oxentierna i sin tid, 2. Atlantis, Stockholm, 2002, p. 696. 5 C. T. Odhner, Sveriges inre historia under drottning Christinas förmyndare. P. A. Norstedt/Söner, Stockholm, 1865, p. 138: “man med skäl kan betrakta året 1636 som epokgörande i svenska förvaltningens historia.” 6 Printed in “Rådsprotokoller angående Collegiernas redogörelse inför Kongl. Regeringen [hereafter RPACR],” in Handlingar Rörande Skandinaviens Historia, 33. Hörbergska Boktryckeriet, Stockholm, 1852, pp. 155 – 290; examination of the Svea Court of Appeal, pp. 155 – 185. 7 Rättegångz-Ordinantie (1614), Ordinance of Judicial Procedure (hereafter RO 1614), in Kongl. stadgar, förordningar, bref och resolutioner ifrån åhr 1528, in til 1701, Johan Schmedeman (ed.), Stockholm, 1706, pp. 133 – 141, p. 141: from 1 May to 29 June (ifrån Walburgis och intil Petri Pauli) and 8 September to 11 November (ifrån mårmesso in til Martini). 8 11 – 12, RO 1614, in Kongl. stadgar, Schmedeman (ed.), pp. 137 – 138.

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or by becoming Councillors of the Realm. The judges had to have the monarch’s trust, and he could dismiss anyone who had forfeited the royal favour. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal was almost all-encompassing before the establishment of several other royal appellate courts between 1623 and 1634 reduced its geographical scope over the whole of Sweden. In areas governed directly by the King, sentences from town courts (rådstuvurätt) and in the countryside, sentences of second instance provincial courts, so-called lagman’s courts, could be appealed, provided financial interest in the case was high enough. In criminal cases, capital crimes were to be referred to the appellate court. The provinces belonging to the Dukes of Östgötaland (until 1618) and Södermanland (until 1622) as hereditary fiefs had their own court hierarchy with ducal appellate courts at the top. Nevertheless, the decisions of the ducal courts of appeal could be appealed to the royal Svea Court of Appeal. Thus, it exceeded the entire secular judiciary, and was second only to the monarch.9 In addition to appeals, the Court of Appeal inspected the records of lower instance courts, acted as a first instance courts in cases of lese-majesty, as a forum privilegiatum for the nobility in more severe crimes, and investigated claims of denial of justice among other things. The Court also dealt with any matter the monarch commanded it to handle.10 Consequently, the sentences of the Court of Appeal were final as there was no form of appeal against its decision. The establishing of the Court of Appeal did not restrict the monarch’s authority as supreme judge, and the extraordinary remedy of revision, beneficium revisionis, could be petitioned from the ruler in civil causes. This revision could be petitioned within eight days after the appellate court verdict by placing a sum of 200 dalers at the court. In criminal cases, the monarch could exercise his prerogative of pardon.11 How the revision actually worked was left unclear. While King Gustav II Adolf was in Sweden, he mostly granted the revision and adjudicated in person, but after he left the country for Germany in 1630, he authorized the Council of the Realm to act as a “revision court”. This authority fell to the Regency Government during the minority of Queen Christina. During this time the workload of the Revision grew considerably, but no independent new institution was established. Instead, a special revision secretary was employed to prepare the cases for decision in 1647.12 9

13, RO 1614, in Kongl. stadgar, Schmedeman (ed.), p. 139. 13 – 14, RO 1614, in Kongl. stadgar, Schmedeman (ed.), pp. 138 – 139; Rättegångs Process, 23 June 1615 (Procedural Rules for the Court of Appeal, hereafter RP 1615), Kongl. stadgar, Schmedeman (ed.), pp. 143 – 163, here pp. 155 – 157. 11 E. g., 35, RP 1615, Kongl. stadgar, Schmedeman (ed.), p. 161; Heikki Pihlajamäki, “‘At synd och laster icke skall bli ostraffade’: straffrättsligt appellationsförbud i svensk rättshistoria”, Jukka Kekkonen/Pia Letto-Vanamo/Päivi Paasto/Heikki Pihlajamäki (eds.), Norden, rätten, historia: Festskrift till Lars Björne, Suomalaisen lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja, E:11. SLY, Helsinki, 2004, pp. 65 – 99. 12 Stig Jägerskiöld, “Rätt och rättskipning i 1600-talets Sverige,” Den svenska juridikens uppblomstring i 1600-talets politiska, kulturella och religiösa stormaktssamhälle: Föreläsningar vid ett svenskt-finskt tvärvetenskapligt symposium i Uppsala 18 – 20 april 1983, 10

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The main norms regulating the activity, jurisdiction, and authority of the Svea Court of Appeal were its Authorization by King Gustav II Adolf, dated 16 February 1614, the Ordinance of Judicial Procedure (Rättegångz-Ordinantie) of 1614, and the Procedural Rules for the Court of Appeal (Rättegångs Process), signed by the king on 23 June 1615, but which, to some extent, had already been followed from the previous year. These norms determined the geographic and personal jurisdiction of the Court, its place in the judiciary of Sweden as well as on what grounds the Court could hear cases.13 Under the monarch, the riksdrots, the Lord High Justice, supervised the judiciary in Sweden. However, in practice – as long as he was president of the Svea Court of Appeal as well as a Councillor of the Realm – his capacity to do this was limited before 1661 when the offices of riksdrots and president of the Svea Court of Appeal were separated from each other.14 However, even after this, if there was strife within the Court of Appeal about a procedure within the court, the monarch was the natural place to turn to. Thus, for example, because of the strife between the vice president and the assessors of the Court of Appeal in Turku, King Charles XI (r. 1660 – 1697, minority 1660 – 1672) had to resolve how the post to the Court was to be opened in a case where the President and Vice-President were both absent.15 If appellate courts were unsure about the interpretation of the law, they turned to the monarch for guidance. The royal replies became authoritative guidelines to be followed by the Court – occasionally even other Courts of Appeal – in later practice.

III. The Instrument of Governance of 1634: The Legal Authority for the Inspection of the Svea Court of Appeal in 1636 The Estates of Sweden, convened to the Diet of 1634, ratified the Instrument of Governance that had been drafted during the lifetime of the late king. In fact, three days after the confirmation of the death of King Gustav II Adolf had reached Frankfurt, Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna, the leading man in the government, wrote to lament that no “firm Instrument of Governance” had been enacted during the late monGöran Inger (ed.), Rättshistoriska studier, 9. The Olin Foundation, Stockholm, 1984, pp. 219 – 222. 13 Riksarkivet [hereafter RA, National Archives of Sweden], Stockholm, Sweden, Svea hovrätts huvudarkiv [hereafter SHA, Main Archive of the Svea Court of Appeal], E I:1a, Authorization of the King to the Court of Appeal, 16 Feb. 1614, also printed in Kongl. stadgar, Schmedeman (ed.), pp. 141 – 143; RO 1614, in Kongl. stadgar, Schmedeman (ed.), pp. 133 – 141; RP 1615, Kongl. stadgar, Schmedeman (ed.), pp. 143 – 163. 14 Yrjö Blomstedt, “Kuninkaallisen Majesteetin Oikeus Suomessa”, Turun hovioikeus 1623 31/10 1973 Åbo hovrätt, Yrjö Blomstedt (ed.), Turun hovioikeus, Turku, 1973, pp. 31 – 168 at p. 67. 15 Blomstedt, “Kuninkaallisen Majesteetin Oikeus Suomessa”, pp. 86 – 87.

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arch’s lifetime. Nevertheless, he reported to the Council of the Realm that he had been in the process of drafting such an instrument, authorized by the King. Oxenstierna’s draft had been submitted to the King who had accepted it “in realibus and regarding government” (in realibus och så mycket regeringen vidkom). To what extent the contents of the Instrument of Governance were indeed in conformity with the late King’s own wishes, has been disputed and doubted. The final proposal doubtlessly stemmed from Chancellor Oxenstierna’s pen.16 In his memorandum to the Council from 5 December, Oxenstierna reminded the Council that as they well knew, the late King had directed the work of the “five collegia or consilia”, and that in case of the monarch’s minority or severe illness, the five heads of the collegia would act in the king’s place.17 This proved the basis for the 1634 Instrument which starts with a long preamble mentioning that it had been considered necessary to arrange the governance of Sweden in case of the king’s long absence abroad, severe illness, or minority (uti konungens fiärre frånvaru, stora krankhet eller omyndighet).18 However, in practice, the Estates had only agreed to accept the Regency Government and the wording of the Instrument after negotiations with the Council of the Realm. The Diet of 1634 was unusually turbulent, the commoner estates acted in a defiant way, and it was reported to Oxenstierna that “the peasants had never been more insane”, behaving in an aggressive and threatening way.19 The 1634 Instrument of Governance defined the government of Sweden under the monarch and was largely followed in practice by the Regency Government of Queen Christina. However, eventually the 1634 Instrument of Governance was never ratified by the monarch as Queen Christina doubted to what extent it was the work of her father and rejected it after reaching majority. Similar to Queen Christina, her successor regarded it as against royal interests, even “anti-monarchical”.20 The five Great Officials (de fem höge embeten), the leading men of the government, each became 16 Michael Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus: A History of Sweden 1611 – 1632, 1. Longmans, Green & Co, London, New York/Toronto, 1953, pp. 342 – 349; Gunnar Wetterberg, Kanslern: Axel Oxentierna i sin tid, 2. Atlantis, Stockholm, 2002, pp. 613 – 615; Odhner, Sveriges inre historia, pp. 20 – 23; Sven A. Nilsson [med bidrag av Margareta Revera], “Axel Oxenstierna”, Svenskt biografiskt lexikon [hereafter SBL] 28. Stockholm 1992 – 1994, pp. 504 – 524, here pp. 511 – 512. 17 Wetterberg, Kanslern 2, pp. 597 – 598: “in casu minorennitatis regiae, eller desperato morbo, de 5 capita collegiorum konungens vices hålla och förestå skulle.” 18 Preamble of the Instrument of Governance of 1634 (Regeringsform af Rikets ständer gillad och daterad Stockholm den 29 juli 1634), available online (cited on 13 Jan. 2018): https://sv.wikisource.org/wiki/Regeringsform_1634. 19 Georg Wittrock, Regering och allmoge under Kristinas förmyndare: Studier rörande allmogens besvär. Skrifter utgivna av Kungl. Humanistiska vetenskapssamfundet i Uppsala, 38. Kungl. Humanistiska vetenskapssamfundet i Uppsala, Uppsala, 1948, pp. 4 – 77; Nils Ahnlund, Ståndsriksdagens utdaning 1592 – 1672. Sveriges Riksdag; Historisk och stadsvetenskaplig framsättning, 1 series. Riksdagens historia intill 1865, 3. Riksdagen, Stockholm, 1933, pp. 197 – 206; Odhner, Sveriges inre historia, pp. 24 – 30; Wetterberg, Kanslern 2, pp. 600 – 601, 621 – 626; Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus 1, pp. 342 – 349. 20 Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus 1, pp. 342 – 343, 349.

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head of their own government department or board (collegium): The Svea Court of Appeal, the Board of War, the Admiralty, the Chancery, and the Treasury. The great officers were, in accordance with the ranking of 1634, the following: Lord High Justice (riksdrots), Lord High Constable (riksmarsk), Lord High Admiral (riksamiral), Lord High Chancellor (rikskansler), and Lord High Treasurer (riksskattmästare).21 The royal administration, according to the 1634 Instrument of Governance, was accountable yearly on an appointed day either to the King or to each of the central collegia, depending on the branch of the administration.22 The Lord High Justice (riksdrots) was the president of the Svea Court of Appeal, which was mentioned first in the list of the five “collegia or fraternities” (collegia eller broderskap). However, at this time, the Svea Court of Appeal was no longer the only appellate court in Sweden. In 1623, a second court of appeal for Finland had been established in Turku, a third one for Livonia in Dorpat in 1630, and a fourth for the southern Swedish provinces (Götaland) in Jönköping in 1634. A fifth was planned for those regions in Prussia (Pryssen) that were controlled by the Swedes. However, while the younger courts of appeal were outside the immediate system of the collegia, they were considered parallel, though inferior in rank to the Svea Court.23 According to section 38 of the 1634 Instrument of Governance, the activities of all the government collegia were to be inspected in the capital either by the king or in his absence by the five Great Officials together with the High-Governor (överståthavare) of Stockholm at the beginning of each year. As for the Svea Court of Appeal, it was to present its records, acts, judgements, and resolutions for inspection (protocol, acter, domar och resolutionerne).24 Even if the other courts of appeal were left formally outside the collegium system, they were also to be inspected. These courts, represented by their president or vice president, a secretary and two assessors, were to present themselves for inspection in June.25 Indeed, it would not have been possible to conduct the inspection of the other courts of appeal early in the year because Finland, at least, was always cut off from the direct sea route to Stockholm in the late autumn by the storms and ice in the winter. By contrast, June was a good sailing season.

21 5, Instrument of Governance of 1634. Michael Roberts used a different English terminology for the offices (Steward – Supreme Court, Marshal – War Council, Admiral of the Realm – Admiralty, Chancellor – Chancery, Exchequer – Treasurer), see Sweden as a Great Power 1611 – 1697, Roberts (ed.), pp. 20 – 21. 22 36, Instrument of Governance of 1634. 23 8, Instrument of Governance of 1634. 24 38, Instrument of Governance of 1634. 25 39, Instrument of Governance of 1634.

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IV. The Svea Court under Scrutiny The first inspection authorized by the 1634 Instrument of Governance was conducted in 1636. In its capacity as a Collegium of Justice, the Svea Court of Appeal was the first of the collegia to be examined between 29 February and 4 March 1636.26 As the Instrument of Governance decreed, the three other Great Officers of the Realm were among the inspectors. These were the Lord High Constable, Count Jacob De la Gardie (1583 – 1652), Lord High Admiral, Baron Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm (1574 – 1650), and Lord High Treasurer, Count Gabriel Bengtsson Oxenstierna (1586 – 1656).27 Lord High Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna was in Germany at the time and did not participate in the inspection, but his absence may also have been influenced by the fact that his brother was the riksdrots or Lord High Justice and President of the Svea Court of Appeal. On the other hand, Jacob De la Gardie’s older brother Johan De la Gardie (1582 – 1640) was an assessor at the Court which obviously did not preclude his participation in the inspection.28 In addition, in the capacity as High-Governor of Stockholm, Klas (Larsson) Fleming (1592 – 1644) took part in the inspection together with certain Councillors of the Realm: Erik Ryning (1592 – 1654), Governor of Livonia, and Axel (Gustafsson) Banér (1594 – 1642). Banér seems to have had very little if any judicial experience. However, he is mentioned as having criticised the nobility for its abuse of its privileges and rights.29 One must observe that the Swedish Council of the Realm was a relatively small and closely-knit circle of aristocrats in which the Oxenstierna family dominated. Not only did several Councillors belong to it, but some others were affiliated to it through marriage. For example Johan De la Gardie had married Katarina Kristersdotter, a cousin of Axel Oxenstierna, around 1609, while the wives of Matthias Soop (1585 – 1653) and Baron Åke Axelsson (Natt och Dag) (1594 – 1655) were also Axel Oxenstierna’s cousins.30

26

RPACR, pp. 155 – 185, here at pp. 155, 178. For Jakob De la Gardie, see B. Boëthius, “Jakob Pontusson De la Gardie”, SBL 10, Stockholm, 1931, pp. 634 – 657. For Gyllenhielm, see Erik Granstedt, “Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm”, SBL 17. Stockholm, 1967 – 1969, pp. 569 – 575. For Oxenstierna, see Hans Gillingstam, “Släkten Oxentierna”, SBL 28. Stockholm, 1992 – 1994, pp. 465 – 494, here pp. 476 – 477. 28 For Johan De la Gardie, see B. Boëthius, “Johan Pontusson De la Gardie”, SBL 10, Stockholm, 1931, pp. 628 – 634. 29 For Fleming, see Bengt Hildebrand, “Klas (Larsson) Fleming”, SBL 16. Stockholm, 1964 – 1966, pp. 139 – 144; for Ryning, see Björn Asker, “Erik Ryning”, SBL 31, Stockholm, 2000 – 2002, pp. 141 – 145; for Banér, see B. Boëthius, “Axel Banér”, SBL 2, Stockholm, 1920, pp. 666 – 669. 30 E. g., Rodén, Drottning Christina, p. 81; Boëthius, “Jakob Pontusson De la Gardie”, p. 630; Hans Gillingstam, “Soop, släkt,” SBL 32. Stockholm, 2003 – 2006, pp. 668 – 675, here p. 671; Lars Ericson, “Åke Axelsson (Natt och Dag)”, SBL 26, Stockholm, 1987 – 1989, pp. 443 – 445, here p. 443; A. Anjou, Kongl. Svea Hofrätts presidenter samt Embets- och tjenstemän 1614 – 1898, Stockholm, 1899, pp. 32 – 33. 27

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Some of the inspectors had experience as judges as they held appointments as district court judges and as lagmän in the Swedish countryside. Some of them, such as Johan Skytte, even had lengthy experience in the Svea Court. Skytte, born Schroderus, was a burgher’s son who had spent many years on the Continent studying law and other disciplines. He was one of the most trusted men of first King Charles IX (r. 1599 – 1611) and then King Gustav II Adolf. For his services, he had been first ennobled in 1604, made Chancellor of the Realm in 1617, and elevated into the baronage in 1624. Skytte had a lengthy career as a judge: first as a district court judge, then as an assessor of the Svea Court of Appeal between 1615 and 1629, and also as a lagman, a superior provincial judge, before he was made president of the newlyfounded Göta Court of Appeal in 1634. Skytte belonged to the anti-Oxenstierna faction of the Council of the Realm.31 On the appointed day, 29 February 1636, a deputation from the Court of Appeal, led by its president, Count Gabriel Gustafsson Oxenstierna (1587 – 1640), who had first been an assessor of the Court since 1622 before being elected Lord High Justice in 1634, appeared in front of the inspectors. Oxenstierna was followed by his vice president Karl Kristersson Horn (1598 – 1638/9), who had studied at the University of Leiden,32 the assessors of the Court and “all those who pertained to the collegium”. They presented themselves at the chambers of the Council of the Realm. Oxenstierna solemnly declared “taking God as their witness that they had always had the [judge’s] oath they had taken in front of their eyes.” Thus, “in their best capacity and with all sincerity”, he requested that “if any errors be discovered in their acts that the Government (Regeringen) would inform him and his colleagues of it so that they could rectify and remedy that in the following years” to the full satisfaction of the Government.33 The crown prosecutor (fiscal) and secretary of the Court presented the extracts on all the criminal and civil cases that had been prepared for the inspection as well as all citations, letters and judgements the Court had issued in the two previous years (1634 – 1635). These were then inspected in detail during several days. The inspectors made queries and reproofs about the records. Moreover, they pointed out gaps and omissions in the Court’s records. A point of criticism that was repeated was the lack of reasoning for certain sentences. At the end of the inspection, a list of points to be remedied in the future was presented to the Court. The following sections cover these points of criticism in more detail.

31 Erland Sellberg, “Johan Skytte”, SBL 32, Stockholm, 2003 – 2006, pp. 502 – 515; Tor Berg, Johan Skytte, hans ungdom och verksamhet under Karl IX:s regering. Albert Bonniers Förlag, Stockholm, 1920. 32 On Horn, see Jully Ramsay, Frälsesläkter i Finland intill stora ofreden, Förlagsaktiebolaget Söderström & Co, Helsingfors, 1909 – 1916, p. 188; Anjou, Kongl. Svea Hofrätts presidenter, p. 45. 33 RPACR, pp. 155 – 185, here at p. 156.

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V. Laxity of Control: Improving Record-Keeping and Supervising the Execution of Sentences Even if the Court of Appeal officials had prepared for the inspection by presenting extracts on all the criminal and civil cases as well as all citations, letters, and judgements the Court had issued in the two previous years (1634 – 1635), these were found lacking in detail. The inspection pronounced that the quality and detail of the records of the Court needed to be improved and criminal cases were to be followed up until the execution of the sentence. There were some dozens of instances when the records of the Court of Appeal failed to show whether an offender had finally been tried, sentenced, pardoned, or punished, while on other occasions the information provided by the Svea Court was contradictory.34 Many lacunae were found in the Svea Court records regarding its supervision of lower courts. All lower court judges both in the towns and countryside were to send their court records annually to Stockholm for inspection. The inspectors insisted that the negligent judges be fined 13 dalers in accordance with the Court’s Procedural Rules of 1615.35 The inspectors of the Svea Court called for stricter control of the judges. In addition, the inspectors criticized the Svea Court for not knowing in many cases whether the condemned criminals had actually been executed or not. The inspectors had supposed that the correspondence with the provincial governors and castellans (stådthållare) would be found in a separate volume (een serdeles book på breff). The Court was exhorted to put pressure on these high provincial officials (stådthållare) found negligent in reporting back on the performance of their executive duties and, if necessary, have them brought to the Court.36 On the other hand, Klas Fleming put forward the view of the provincial governors that it took so long for the Court of Appeal to sentence the criminals kept in prison that they often died while waiting for the final decision.37 The final fate of cases referred to the government apparently remained occasionally unclear to the Court of Appeal. To improve the follow-up of such cases, Jacob De la Gardie, Lord High Constable, also suggested that it was to be indicated in the cause papers of the Court (hoffrättz acterne) which cases had been referred to the government so that they could be followed up as to their “final resolution and explanation” (dess endtlige resolution och förklaring).38 The inspectors also asked the actuary Karl (Carolus Johannis) Lundius about the accuracy of the fine register (saaköres Lengden) that he had kept. Lundius assured them that he was very knowledgeable as regards the sums he himself had collected, but he informed the inspectors that the collection of fines was extremely slow. Ac34

RPACR, pp. 157 – 171. RPACR, p. 175. For the norm, see 10, RP 1615, Kongl. stadgar, Schmedeman (ed.), pp. 148 – 149. 36 RPACR, p. 157. 37 RPACR, p. 158. 38 RPACR, p. 158. 35

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cording to his statement, on occasion, the Court of Appeal was able to collect the whole sum, on others only half or even nothing at all.39 Lundius had had considerable experience in the Court of Appeal, having served there as an actuary from 1627 on. However, in 1635 he had been appointed assessor at the new Göta Court of Appeal, probably as a reward for his service and legal knowledge, but he still worked for the Court of Appeal in 1635. He was present for the inspection in Stockholm in early 1636 before taking up his position as a judge.40 The concern for the revenues flowing in as collected fines must be seen against the background that the Swedish state was seriously overleveraged. In 1634, the budget deficiency was two million riksdalers, and this sum did not include the costs of the war with Germany.41 Nevertheless, the inspectors also observed that the crown prosecutor (fiscal) was negligent in controlling the noble assessors of the court – especially those who were members of the Council of the Realm. Matthias Soop had only signed one single judgement in the autumn session of 1635. Johan Skytte even thought that it could be doubted whether the judgements of the court were lawful when one class of assessors was absent. The crown prosecutor defended himself by observing that the absences were recorded and the absentee-judges fined. The inspectors reprimanded him and insisted on adhering to the Procedural Rules of the Svea Court of Appeal of 1615 which prescribed that the absentees be fined one mark per hour or five dalers for the whole day of absence. The sum was to go to the poor.42 However, it was discovered later at the inspection that on one occasion only six judges had been present when a case had been sentenced even if the presence of eight judges was required.43 The president of the Svea Court had also been absent because he had almost continuously to attend the meetings of the Council of the Realm – as he himself owned at the beginning of the inspection.44 Late or absent members were a recurring grievance even in the Council of the Realm itself, despite the fact that it had been decided in 1634 that anyone who came late to the council meetings would be fined five dalers. The number of absentees was similarly high even in the other collegia.45 Moreover, even later in the seventeenth-century, absentee Svea Court of Appeal judges provoked complaints. Both the president of the Court and King Charles XI expressed many times their severe displeasure with the number of absences and late arrivals of the judges.46 Other courts in different parts of the Swedish realm also experienced similar problems in reaching

39

RPACR, p. 159. On Lundius, see Anjou, Kongl. Svea Hofrätts presidenter, p. 213. 41 Wetterberg, Kanslern 2, p. 715. 42 RPACR, pp. 164 – 165; 5, RP 1615, Kongl. stadgar, Schmedeman (ed.), p. 146. 43 RPACR, p. 172. 44 RPACR, pp. 156 – 157, see also p. 180. 45 Odhner, Sveriges inre historia, pp. 58 – 59; Wetterberg, Kanslern 2, p. 697. 46 Petrén, Jägerskiöld & O:son Nordberg, Svea Hovrätt, pp. 243 – 249.

40

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a quorum because of absent judges.47 In the early decades of the Svea Court especially, trusted judges were frequently employed by the Crown in diplomacy and various other administrative tasks. This multitasking contributed to some extent to the high absence rates especially among the Councillors of the Realm as Marianne VasaraAaltonen has recently demonstrated in her article. In addition to official duties, the judges had personal matters to attend to, and the issue was further exacerbated by illness and other legitimate excuses.48 Despite the criticism, the salaries of the second and third class assessors were increased as a result of the inspection.49 The King and the Council of the Realm themselves contributed to the problem of absentee and multitasking assessors by appointing them to many important and lucrative offices simultaneously. The example of the above-mentioned assessor Matthias Soop demonstrates this point. He had been appointed judge at the Svea Court of Appeal in 1626, while also holding the task of Councillor of the Treasury (kammarråd) 1626 – 1630. As he was appointed Councillor of the Realm in 1627, he rose from a judge of the second class to one of the first class. In 1630, Soop was appointed governor (ståthållare) of Kalmar on the island of Öland, but because of his lack of military skills he was dismissed in 1633. Obviously, he was given the positions as lagman in Ingria and district judge of the province of Kexholm (Finn. Käkisalmi) as compensation. Despite all these other offices, he continued as appellate court judge until his death in 1653.50 Although in practice positions were often managed by substitute-judges, the multitasking of the Councillors of the Realm prevented them from concentrating on any office properly. The professionalisation and juridification of the careers of the Svea Court of Appeal judges was a slow process, and it was only in its very incipient stages in 1636.51 As a result of the 1636 inspection of the collegia, the Council of the Realm, which in 1634 came to have 26 members, also obtained a more collegial function and role, the duties of the collegia and their presidents were more clearly defined, and internal instructions were given.52 47 For town courts, see, e. g., Marko Lamberg, Dannemännen i stadens råd: Rådmanskretsen i nordiska köpstäder under senmedeltiden. Monografier utgivna av Stockholms stad 155. Kommitén för stockholmsforskning: Stockholm, 2001, pp. 11, 201 – 203; Juhani Kostet, Turun raadista käräjäoikeuteen: Oikeuslaitoksen turkulaisia vaiheita keskiajalta toisen vuosituhannen lopulle. Turun kaupunki, Turku, 1998, pp. 63 – 64, 90, 113 – 114. For other courts of appeal, see, e. g., Rudolf Thunander, Hovrätt i funktion: Göta hovrätt och brottmålen 1635 – 1699. Rättshistoriskt Bibliotek 49. Institutet för rättshistorisk forskning: Lund 1993, pp. 28 – 29, 36 – 37; Blomstedt, “Kuninkaallisen Majesteetin Oikeus Suomessa”, pp. 74, 76 – 80, 84. 48 Marianne Vasara-Aaltonen, From Well-travelled “Jacks-of-all-trades” to Domestic Lawyers: The Educational and Career Backgrounds of Svea Court of Appeal Judges 1614 – 1809, in: Mia Korpiola (ed.), The Svea Court of Appeal in the Early Modern Period: Historical Reinterpretations and New Perspectives. Rättshistoriska studier 26. The Olin Foundation, Stockholm, 2014, pp. 301 – 354 at pp. 340 – 342. 49 RPACR, p. 177. 50 Gillingstam, “Soop, släkt,” pp. 668 – 671. 51 Vasara-Aaltonen, From Well-travelled “Jacks-of-all-trades” to Domestic Lawyers, pp. 340 – 348. 52 Odhner, Sveriges inre historia, pp. 39, 137 – 138.

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VI. Blind Justice or Class Justice? Criticism of the Unequality Before the Law In the 1636 inspection of the Court, the Court of Appeal was criticised for its practice of mitigating the death penalties of criminals – occasionally without listing the mitigating circumstances or who actually had authorised this.53 In one case, the fiscal defended the verdict by referring to similar punishments and the late King Gustav II Adolf’s resolution “in pari casu”. Yet, the Court was reminded by the Court Chancellor (hovkansler), Doctor Johan Adler Salvius (1590 – 1652)54, that it was against the law that the Court of Appeal pardoned any criminals sentenced to death that “merited dying, [b]ecause no judex had the jus to pardon someone’s life as this belonged to the Majesty.”55 These cases were to be referred to the Regency Government acting in the child Queen’s stead. In a decision referring directly to the practices of the other appellate courts (Göta, Turku and Dorpat), it was considered unsuitable that the Court of Appeal mitigate the death penalty in a case that the Court itself had pronounced upon; even such cases were to be referred to the Regency Government.56 The limits of the authority of the appellate courts to mitigate sentences were not clear-cut matters, and there were recurring discussions and royal decisions about these.57 Furthermore, the inspectors also addressed and reprimanded the Svea Court of Appeal for not treating criminals equally regardless of their status in cases of incest – more precisely the treatment of sexual relationships within the third degree of kinship, i. e., between second cousins. Persons belonging to the lower estates (nidrige Ståndz Personer) were severely punished for such incestuous relationships – partly for the incest and partly for any adultery involved. By contrast, the nobility and other members of the non-noble elite (Adelen; högre Ståndz personer) were, in fact, allowed to marry their second cousins escaping all punishment (impune).58 This criticism seems partly justified since at least in certain cases involving the nobility, the Svea Court had reached surprisingly lenient and liberal verdicts. An example of this is a case from the early 1620s in which the legitimacy and inheritance rights of noble bastards were upheld. The case involved a nobleman who had married 53

E. g., RPACR, pp. 169, 171. Johan Salvius (ennob. Adler Salvius) was one of the few Swedes of his age who had a doctorate of law in a foreign university (Valence) after pursuing studies in Germany, Leiden, and Montpellier. He had also been an assessor of the Court of Appeal 1621 – 1624. On him, see B. Boëthius, “Anteckningar om Johan Adler-Salvius’ släktförhållanden och studier”, Personhistorisk Tidskrift 17 (1915), pp. 205 – 228; B. Boëthius, “Johan Adler Salvius”, SBL 1, Stockholm, 1918, pp. 143 – 156. 55 RPACR, p. 167. 56 RPACR, pp. 177 – 178. 57 E. g., Petrén/Jägerskiöld/O:son Nordberg, Svea Hovrätt, pp. 36 – 43, 274 – 284; Gunnar Bendz, “Om hovrätterna från deras uppkomst till 1734 års lag”, Minnesskrift ägnad 1734 års lag av jurister i Sverige och Finland den 13 december 1934 200-årsdagen av Riksens ständers beslut 1. Stockholm, 1934, pp. 938 – 957, here at pp. 945 – 947. 58 RPACR, pp. 159, 171, 184. 54

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his mistress, an illegitimate relative of his wife, with whom he had already had several adulterine and incestuous children during his first marriage. The noble family had been outraged by this iniquitous connection, and the Church had several times refused to grant him dispensation for these impediments. Despite this, the illicit wedding took place. The Court of Appeal finally confirmed the inheritance rights of the illegitimate children but the reasoning is unclear. Legitimation by subsequent marriage would not seem to apply to the circumstances.59 Equality before the law was an important ideal. In fact, the oath of the appellate court judges stipulated that the judges were not to take the person of the parties into consideration when adjudicating – even if each estate naturally had its own privileges and liberties.60 Even judges in the lower courts took an oath in which they swore “to help each and every one receive their due, the poor as well as the rich, the noble as well as the commoner, the foreigner as well as the native.”61 Equality in the eyes of the law was the ideal, and here the inspectors considered that the Svea Court of Appeal had fallen short. Even later, the government paid attention to the equal treatment of criminals for the same crimes. For example, in 1661 two Swedish noblemen, Gustav Adolf Skytte (1637 – 1663) and Gustav Drake (1634 – 1684), committed a blatant case of piracy with their fifteen-man crew.62 They boarded a Dutch merchant ship, shot all five men on board, and plundered and sunk the vessel. This caused a diplomatic crisis. Skytte was caught together with some of the other men and the case was investigated locally, before the matter was sent to the Göta Court of Appeal. The Göta Court sentenced Skytte and three other men to death for their crime while also mentioning some mitigating circumstances in favour of Skytte, the grandson of the first president of the Göta Court of Appeal. Yet, this leniency was probably misplaced, as Skytte seems to have been a quite disreputable character. Apparently, he had already in 1657 boarded a Dutch vessel at sea, murdered the crew and claimed ownership by forging a deed of sale. After this, he continued with acts of piracy in the waters around the island of Öland, close to his estate. Yet, the Regency Government of King Charles XI confirmed these death sentences, despite the attempts of the Skytte family to have mercy shown to him. However, very exceptionally Skytte was executed by shooting enabling him “to die like a soldier” unlike his four partners in crime who were then 59

RA, SH, HA, E VI a 2 aa:19, decision 15 Nov. 1622. RA, SH, HA, A I a 1:1, fol. 2r: “vthan något anseende till Personen vptagha, skärskodha, ransaka och döma alle the saker som för Rätta komma kunna, och egentligen thenne Konungzlige doomen wedhkomma; doch huart och ett ståndz wällfångne frijheeter, rättigheeter och privilegier vthi alla motte oförkränckte och förbeholdne […].” 61 E. g., Kungliga Biblioteket [hereafter KB, National Library of Sweden], Stockholm, Sweden, Legal manuscript B 130, fol. 107r: “hielpa huar och en till Rätta, så wäll then fattige som then Rijke, Then ädle som then oädle så wäll then vtländska som then Jnländska.” 62 On Skytte and Drake, see Matthias Andersson, “Skytte, släkt”, SBL 32, Stockholm, 2003 – 2006, pp. 496 – 502, here p. 499 – 500; G. Jacobson, “Gustaf Drake,” SBL 11, Stockholm, 1945, pp. 409 – 412, here esp. p. 410. 60

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beheaded after him in the market place of Jönköping. In the meantime, Drake and some of the other culprits had fled the country and been outlawed by the Göta Court. When Drake returned to Sweden some years later, he was apprehended and sentenced by the Göta Court. However, he only had to pay a compensation of 4,000 silver dalers for the plunder and a fine of 1,000 silver dalers to be used for salaries of the judges.63 This caused the Regency Council to issue a sharp reprimand to the Göta Court of Appeal in 1665. This has been called “one of the most acrimonious scoldings ever to be a given to a governmental office during the Era of Great Power”, i. e., between 1611 and 1718.64 Observing that the Court’s judgment entailed such “a negligence and thoughtlessness that could not be defended,” it amounted to an unequal treatment of criminals. While the revision procedure did not alter the judgment, Drake was declared persona non grata in the eyes of the king and forbidden to stay in any locality where the King resided. Those judges of the Court of Appeal that had been involved in sentencing Drake were to restore the sum of 1,000 silver dalers and pay it to the Cathedral of Linköping. The unjust sentence was stated to “burden the consciences of the judges who would have to explain their actions to God and defend themselves in face of Him.”65 However, only three years later in 1668 the Council was ready to pardon Drake for his crimes.66 As supreme judge, young King Charles XII (r. 1697 – 1718) is also reputed to have emphasised equality before the law and been loath to take noble status or special privileges into consideration as reasons for mitigating the law, at least in the early years of his reign.67 Thus, it can be observed that the legitimacy of the Swedish justice system depended on maintaining an image in which aristocrats were not allowed to rampage, rob, and murder with impunity, while they were to be punished even for lesser crimes. According to noble ideology, aristocrats were to be virtuous and serve the crown according their best abilities, while profiteering was perceived as bourgeois.68 In fact, even notions that the ruling classes were to be exemplary and serve as good role models for the ordinary people were sometimes expressed. In the 1570s, Archbishop Laurentius Petri (archep. 1531 – 1573) had explained on Biblical authority that the mag-

63

Rudolf Thunander, Hovrätt i funktion: Göta hovrätt och brottmålen 1635 – 1699. Rättshistoriskt Bibliotek, 49. Institutet för rättshistorisk forskning, Stockholm, 1993, pp. 212 – 215; Gunnar Bendz, Göta hovrätt genom seklerna, Stockholm, 1935, pp. 140 – 142; Andersson, “Skytte, släkt”, p. 499; Jacobson, “Gustaf Drake,” pp. 410 – 411. 64 Andersson, “Skytte, släkt”, p. 499. 65 G. Jacobson, “Gustaf Drake,” pp. 410 – 411; Bendz, Göta hovrätt, pp. 142 – 143. 66 Jacobson, “Gustaf Drake,” p. 411. 67 Birger Wedberg, Karl XII på justitietronen. P.A. Norstedt & Söners Förlag, Stockholm 1944, pp. 39 – 44. 68 Peter Englund, Det hotade huset: Adliga föreställningar om samhället under stormaktstiden. Atlantis, Stockholm, 1989, pp. 86 – 89, 154 – 155, 161 – 176.

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nates and nobles were to be disciplined more severely for their infractions as their bad example was more detrimental to general mores than that of common people.69 Without conflicting with the notion of “suum cuique”, that all the estates were to be judged by their peers, many leading aristocrats of the government had obtained a reputation of men of justice. While governor of the castle and province of Turku, Baron Johan De la Gardie had declared in a letter to Axel Oxenstierna in 1612 that he would rather resign his office than lack the power to provide justice to everybody so that they “here as there in Sweden shall enjoy the rights granted by the Law of Sweden”.70 Axel Gustafsson Banér is also mentioned as criticising abuses of privileges and rights, such as demanding obligatory hospitality and transport duties of the peasantry. Abuses of these benefits that royal officials – and the Royal Councillors themselves – enjoyed, caused constant complaints from the peasant estate even if attempts were made to remedy the situation by new norms.71 The government did not wish to convey an image to the Swedish people that following the law and legal norms was only required of commoners, while the elite could rely on a more privileged and lenient class justice. This was necessary for societal peace as the burden of financing Sweden’s wars fell most heavily on the peasants and non-noble classes who criticised the nobility for enriching themselves at the expense of the common people. Justice was perceived as one of the cornerstones of societal peace and the legitimacy of the regime in early modern Sweden.

VII. Practices of the Court: Deficiencies and Their Permanent Remedies The day-to-day practices of the Court were scrutinized by the inspectors who examined the Procedural Rules for the Court of Appeal (Rättegångs Process) of 1615, perhaps the most important norm regulating its routines. The Rules were discovered to have some defects (fauter) that needed to be remedied.72 69

KB, Manuscript F b 2, Collectio et connectio, Martini L:tij Aschanej […] in communem usum reservata 1629, Contra Conjugium in Secundo Gradu Consanguinitatis æqualis Lineæ 1571, fol. 127: “Ja ther mann will frijtt sey¨ia sanningena, Så är Magnatibus och Nobilibus mindre i slicka förargeliga sacker effterlåtidt, änn ringa personer, Ty¨ theras Exempel gör fast storre[!] skadha in moribus, änn the ringas. Ty¨ hootar och schrifftenn them förfärligare, änn the ringa, Såsom vthi Salomons wijshettz book ståår.” See also Mia Korpiola, “Kyrkotukt för hela folket: Hertig Gustafs av Saxen ‘horerij’ och luthersk kyrkodisciplin i Sverige på 1590talet”, Norden, rätten, historia: Festskrift till Lars Björne, eds. Jukka Kekkonen, Pia LettoVanamo, Päivi Paasto and Heikki Pihlajamäki. Suomalaisen lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja, E series, 11. 2004: Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys, Helsinki, pp. 65 – 99, here pp. 91 – 96. 70 Boëthius, “Jakob Pontusson De la Gardie”, p. 632. 71 Boëthius, “Axel Banér”, pp. 667 – 668; Wetterberg, Kanslern 2, p. 693. On statutes forbidding the abuse of hospitality and transportation duties, see Toomas Kotkas, Royal Police Ordinances in Early Modern Sweden: The Emergence of Voluntaristic Understanding of Law. The Northern World 64. Leiden: Brill, 2014, pp. 51 – 52, 115. 72 RPACR, p. 176.

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One of the main points of criticism levelled at the Court of Appeal was that the inspectors could not necessarily understand why the Court had made a certain decision as no reasoning was given in civil cases. Particularly in one inheritance dispute, the inheritance case of Dorothea, wife of Olof Grelsson from 1634, the sentence of the Court of Appeal was perceived to differ from how the late king had decided a similar case in 1621. The inspectors looked in vain for the reasoning why the SCA had confirmed the sentence of the town court, altogether excluding certain relatives from the inheritance. In fact, it was even considered that the Court of Appeal had given a wrong verdict in the case, based on an erroneous interpretation of the law (errorem in interpretatione legum). The president of the Court attempted to defend the verdict referring to the particular circumstances, but had to admit that he did not know the case sufficiently well to summarise it for the inspectors.73 In another case concerning debt, the reasoning of the Svea Court for altering the sentence of the lower courts was presented to the inspectors orally when requested. These “rationes were acknowledged as sufficient and good”.74 After the inspection, the secretary and actuary of the Court were required to keep a particular account of the individual votes of each assessor and their pro et contra reasoning of the cases.75 As a consequence of this criticism, the Court of Appeal started, in the summer of 1636, a new series known as the Codex Rationum (Ivdicii Civilis). This contained the internal argumentation of law and fact and possible voting of the Court in civil cases. The series started on 15 June 1636. It recorded the date, the judges that participated in the sentencing, the presenting judge, and the parties. Possible voting or unanimity was observed, while the factual and legal reasons for the decision(s) were given.76 As the litigants themselves did not have access to the reasoning and voting of the Court of Appeal, it seems clear that the necessity to follow the intra-tribunal discussions and votes derived first and foremost from the necessity of the government to control the activity of the Court of Appeal. However, the insistence on knowing the reasoning may also partly be caused by the activity of the Council of the Realm as granting the beneficium revisionis during the minority of Queen Christina. There were other, even more indirect consequences of the inspection. Probably in anticipation of the inspection, the actuary Karl Lundius had prepared what he called a “short and rather useful manual” (Een kortt och ganska ny¨ttigh handbook) for the use of the Court. This register of all the civil causes since 1614, known as Janus Regius (Ianus Regius sive Manuale Causarum Civilium) was finished on 8 September 163577 73

RPACR, pp. 172, 174 – 175. RPACR, p. 173. 75 RPACR, pp. 175 – 177, 180, 184: “(p. 175) anteckna och flijtig annotera huars och eens assessoris votum och voti rationes pro et contra”; “(p. 184) huars och eens assessoris votum och voti rationes flijtigt att annotera, och der öffuer hålla een serdeles book.” 76 E. g., RA, SH, HA, A II a:1, Codex Rationum 1636 – 1638, fols. 1r–1v. 77 Anjou has interpreted the date as “8:7Feb:” (Kongl. Svea Hofrätts presidenter, p. 212) while my reading is “8 Septemb:”. 74

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– when Lundius apparently had already been appointed assessor for the Göta Court of Appeal. The aim of the register was to show how all civil cases had been dealt with by the Court and enabling them to be “found quickly, indeed, in a blink of an eye”.78 The register lists all civil cases alphabetically, based on the names of the actor/ actrix of the case. It also provides information on the reus/rea and the nature of the cause. Furthermore, it lists what steps had been taken in the case in the Svea Court of Appeal: when the case had been initiated, argued, concluded or referred to the king. In addition, it gives the dates of interlocutory and definitive sentences in the cases, while providing information on which volume of the Liber Causarum series the cause papers could be found. The Janus Regius register was a practical tool created to help the Court to keep track of its archive, and therefore indirectly on its practice in the future. It is equally possible that the book on criminal cases known as the Index rerum criminalium or Promptuarium in rebus criminalibus, a “repository” containing examples of the Court’s practice in criminal cases, was initiated as a result of this inspection. The Index rerum criminalium was written by the crown prosecutor (advokatfiskal) Andreas Bergius on the orders of president Gabriel Gustafsson Oxenstierna.79 Therefore, its terminus post quem is 29 July 1634, when Oxenstierna was appointed president of the Svea Court of Appeal. Bergius had been crown prosecutor from 1624 onwards and before that the deputy prosecutor (vicefiskal) of the Court since 1619. Therefore, having been in charge of criminal cases for about two decades, he was the paramount expert on assessing the practice of the Court of Appeal in criminal cases. Apparently, Bergius held the office of crown prosecutor until 1638, and the work may have been finished before that. However, its definite terminus ante quem is November 1640 as president Oxenstierna died on 27 November 1640.80 In fact, in the years around 1640, the Council of the Realm seems to have given out a collection of precedents that could have been published and adhered to in legal practice.81 The writing of the Index rerum criminalium may have been an answer to the criticism levelled by the inspectors in 1636 of the necessity of the court to provide them with reasonings when precedents were not followed. The Index rerum criminalium would have helped the Court to keep track of leading cases and past practice in various crimes and under different circumstances.82 This would have facilitated the Court in creating a more unified praxis in criminal cases depending on the circum78 RA, SH, HA, D I:1, Janus Regius: “alle Protocoll, Acter och dommer vthj hastigheet, Ja i ett ögnableck igenfinna.” 79 RA, SH, HA, D IV:1. 80 Had Oxenstierna already been deceased when the preface was written, this would have been indicated by attaching an epithet salig (late) to his name. On Bergius, see Anjou, Kongl. Svea Hofrätts presidenter, p. 226. 81 Odhner, Sveriges inre historia, pp. 139 – 140. 82 RA, SH, HA, D IV:1.

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stances. Bergius wrote that he had put together the sentences in the most important and unusual examples (märckeligeste exempel). The index of the book, arranged according to the type of crimes, starts with offences against the divine and secular majesties and moves on to more common crimes such as adultery or assault. The Index rerum criminalium even contains delicts that Swedish law did not mention such as blasphemy and sodomy (homosexuality) that were punished in accordance with the principle “ne crimina maneant impunita”.83 In addition, Andreas Bergius had had a separate book bound with statements from the bishops and cathedral chapters on various criminal cases.84 Thus, it is beyond doubt that the inspection of the Svea Court of Appeal in 1636 left a lasting imprint on the Svea Court of Appeal in the form of changed practices: its Codex rationum series was definitely prompted by the reprimand of the inspectors and the series was started in the summer of 1636. However, its collection of precedents and important criminal cases in the Promptuarium possibly also postdates the inspection, while it seems that the Janus Regius register was compiled in anticipation of the inspection. However, the records of the Court of Appeal sessions, even as early as 1614, reveal that the Court of Appeal was taking into consideration and listing mitigating circumstances in criminal cases. The same can be observed of the Council of the Realm when exercising the royal authority to mitigate death sentences; the minutes of the Council sessions demonstrate that the Councillors discussed and listed the mitigating circumstances in the cases. However, the argumentation and reasoning was not so overt outside the criminal cases, i. e. in civil sentences.

VIII. Conclusion: Exceptional Event with Lasting Results While the question of who should guard the guardians of law – paraphrasing Juvenal’s famous “Quis custodiet ipsos custodies” – can always legitimately be raised, the seventeenth-century Swedes attempted to ensure that even the activity of the courts of appeal was monitored. Thus, the Swedish courts of appeal monitored annually the court records of the lower courts by reading and scrutinising them. In turn, they were to be submitted to similar controls by the government. The accountability of governance was considered necessary even if annual inspections were not to be performed in practice.

83 The Swedish word “märklig” can mean significant, unusual and rare. On the principle ne crimina maneant impunita, see, e. g., Peter Landau, “‘Ne crimina maneant impunita’: Zur Entstehung des öffentlichen Strafanspruchs in der Rechtswissenschaft des 12. Jahrhunderts”, Der Einfluss der Kanonistik auf die europäische Rechtskultur, 3: Straf- und Strafverfahrensrecht, Mathias Schmoeckel/Orazio Condorelli/Franck Roumy, eds., Norm und Struktur, 37:3. Cologne, Böhlau Verlag, 2012, pp. 23 – 35. 84 RA, SH, HA, D IV:1, unpaginated: “Hafue och Bisperna och Capitulares vti någre saker gifuit sin betenkiande, dem hafuer iag inbundit i särdelis bok […].”

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In the 1636 inspection, in comparison to the other collegia, the Svea Court of Appeal fared quite well. Even if some critical remarks were made, the work of the Court was on a relatively sound and regular basis. Its verdicts were generally based on law, its finances did not indicate mismanagement, and no serious miscarriages of justice were discovered. However, the military and naval tribunals received more serious criticism. The Military Court had occasionally exceeded its jurisdiction, and its records and registers were not kept in sufficient detail, nor were its voting and reasoning recorded. The inspectors also worried whether the armed forces in the countryside were effectively subjected to military discipline lest people be harassed by soldiers. Any offenders were to be adequately punished. The Court of Appeal was to send the military judges a formula to be used for its verdicts.85 By contrast, the judicial activities of the Admiralty did not pass muster. The Admiralty (naval) courts had, for example, acted against the formal legal procedure, exceeded its jurisdiction, adjudicated against the law of Sweden and the Articles of Sea, laws were cited incorrectly, and the prosecutor sometimes also acted as the judge. There was no information on the voting or reasoning of the Court, criminals were pardoned even if this authority only belonged to the Sovereign. The records of the court were generally badly and imprecisely kept.86 The accounts of the Admiralty were in such disarray that they could not even be inspected, there were no inventories, staff rolls or pay rolls. Consequently, consideration was even given to the proposal that the whole collegium should be tried for misconduct.87 There were several reasons why the Svea Court of Appeal compares favourably to its sister institutions. Gabriel (Gustavsson) Oxenstierna has been identified as one of the most conscientious of the Councillors of the Realm. Unlike certain other collegia such as the recently established Admiralty or the Krigscollegium, both gaining de facto collegium status only in 1630, the Court of Appeal had less administrative tasks and had had a relatively larger staff since 1614.88 Moreover, the Court of Appeal had been provided with an internal regulation system in its first years of office, in practice already by 1614, and an official version in 1615. It had had two decades to form its internal culture and legal practices.89 The workload of the Svea Court had also been reduced by the establishment of the Turku and Göta courts. Many of its assessors had had experience as judges or of foreign studies when appointed to their office. Moreover, the normative basis of the administration of justice was basically clear, being constituted by the Law of Sweden.

85

RPACR, pp. 207 – 215, 223 – 224, 230 – 233. RPACR, pp. 275 – 282. 87 E. g., RPACR, pp. 269 – 276; Odhner, Sveriges inre historia, p. 59; Wetterberg, Kanslern 2, pp. 697 – 698. 88 Odhner, Sveriges inre historia, p. 59. On the Admiralty and the Krigscollegium, see, e. g., Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus 1, pp. 276 – 277. 89 Odhner, Sveriges inre historia, pp. 59, 138; Wetterberg, Kanslern 2, p. 697. 86

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Despite this, the inspection of the Svea Court of Appeal together with the other government Boards or Collegia, testifies to the intention that the governance of the country was to be efficient, open to scrutiny and based on the norms regulating it. The sovereign, i. e., the king – or during the so-called Age of Liberty (1718 – 1772), the Estates of Sweden – monitored the work of the courts of appeal.90 For example during the Swedish Absolutism, the Göta Court of Appeal received occasional admonishing letters from the King, and the judges could be summoned to Stockholm in person. For example, King Charles XI had observed that if the explanation required of him by the Göta Court of Appeal did not prove satisfactory, they would “have to walk up” to the capital and explain themselves.91 In a case from 1683, the Göta Court of Appeal was understood in its second sentence in the same case to have encroached upon the royal authority. Namely, Charles XI had refused to grant the beneficium revisionis to a dissatisfied party after which the Court of Appeal had issued its second sentence in the same case, apparently aiming at pleasing more the dissatisfied party. As a result, three Göta judges were dismissed from office.92 However, even representatives of the Svea Court of Appeal were summoned to the royal presence to explain their proceedings in individual cases.93 Moreover, the monarch could authorize an inquiry into a certain court of appeal if this was considered necessary even if the Svea Court of Appeal and its judges seem never to have been subjects to such an inquisition. Nevertheless, its sister court in Jönköping was examined in 1773, after suspicions of venality were raised against some of the Göta Court of Appeal judges. King Gustav III (r. 1771 – 1792) authorised an investigation led by the Attorney General (justitiekansler). A special revision of the Court’s records took place over several months. As a result, the King and his Justice Revision condemned four assessors of the Göta Court to be deposed and the vicepresident as well as three judges suspended from office for their many misdemeanours.94 Obviously, the court culture had become lax, and the credibility of the King’s Justice as meted out by the appellate courts in the eyes of the public had to be restored. However, the investigation improved the practices of the Göta Court and made them more effective. The Court was divided into two divisions, and was to sit throughout the year instead of holding two sessions. In addition, the investigation led to a reduction in its number of judges, while improving the salaries of the officials and guar90 Petrén, Jägerskiöld/O:son Nordberg, Svea Hovrätt, p. 127. The so-called Swedish Age of Liberty was a period when the four Estates of Sweden had the highest power in the country during a monarchical reign. This era started with the death of King Charles XII during the Great Northern War in 1718 and ended with the coup of King Gustav III in 1772. 91 Thunander, Hovrätt i funktion, pp. 210 – 212; Wedberg, Karl XII på justitietronen, p. 356. 92 Thunander, Hovrätt i funktion, pp. 211 – 212. 93 Wedberg, Karl XII på justitietronen, pp. 356 – 357. 94 Kenneth Awebro, Gustaf III:s räfst med ämbetsmännen 1772 – 1779 – aktionerna mot landshövdingarna och Göta hovrätt, Studia Historica Upsaliensia 96. Uppsala University, Uppsala, 1977, esp. 93 – 172; Bendz, Göta hovrätt, pp. 212 – 214.

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anteeing that everyone would be remunerated. Some minor practical reforms were also introduced.95 The inspection of 1636 seems not to have become a permanent annual event as the Instrument of Governance of 1634 had presupposed, nor were the other appellate courts inspected, even if the Göta Court of Appeal several times reminded the government of this omission.96 At the end of the inspection of the Svea Court, its President, the Lord High Justice, thanked the inspectors and promised to remedy the points of criticism in the future.97 The diligent and punctual attendance of judges at the court sessions was not something that could be remedied so easily as the court officials seem to have been reluctant to prosecute their superiors for non-observance of the courts internal rules.98 The inspection of the Svea Court of 1636 produced very tangible and long-lasting results by initiating the Codex Rationum series and probably also the Index rerum criminalium, a precedence book of criminal cases.

95

Awebro, Gustaf III:s räfst, pp. 157 – 160. Odhner, Sveriges inre historia, p. 139. During the examination of the Svea Court, some matters regarding the Göta Court of Appeal were resolved, RPACR, p. 178: “Resolverades opå någre puncta, som Her Johan Skytte öffuerantwardade Regeringen, angående Götharijkes hoffrätt”. 97 RPACR, pp. 180 – 181. 98 Petrén, Jägerskiöld/O:son Nordberg, Svea Hovrätt, pp. 243 – 249. 96

Control and the Constitutional Accountability of the College of Justice in Scotland, 1532 – 1626 By Mark Godfrey* How is “control” of supreme courts in the early modern period exemplified by developments in Scotland? Although recent research supports the argument that the foundation of the College of Justice in 1532 had the effect of recasting the judicial element of the King’s Council known as “the Session” into a supreme civil court (in time referred to as the Court of Session), far less attention has been given to the wider constitutional position of the College of Justice once the authority of the Session over inferior jurisdictions had been established. From this perspective, it may be asked what constitutional control was exercised over the College of Justice and the operation of the Session after 1532. To whom and in what ways was the Session itself answerable? The Session had gradually evolved from a process of experimentation in central justice which saw various expedients and contrasting models adopted in turn between 1426 and 1532.1 This process had reached a relatively settled form by 1500, though the Session was still embedded within the general operation of the King’s Council. However, notwithstanding the political instability of the minority which began in 1513 after the death of James IV at the Battle of Flodden, change intensified further by the later 1520s, especially during the personal rule of James V from 1528, and the result was the foundation of the College of Justice in 1532. From this point civil judicial business no longer formed a staple of the work of the King’s Council, which by the 1540s had evolved into a form which was referred to more specifically as the Privy Council. This body exercised a parallel and complementary rather than a concurrent jurisdiction with the Session, which operated separately within the College of Justice. These developments set the seal upon an underlying longer-term shift in the Scottish legal order. Until the sixteenth century, Scotland had no distinctive supreme central court as such. The judicial system was highly decentralised, though unified around the provision of royal justice applying a common law. The only central forum in which to seek justice was Parliament, sitting as an assembly of wide competence with a variety of functions ranging from political forum to legislature and * I am very grateful to Professor John Ford, Dr. Athol Murray and Dr. Andrew Simpson for reading and commenting on a draft of this paper. 1 For this and the following paragraph see A. M. Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland: the Origins of a Central Court (Leiden, 2009), ch. 2.

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court of law. But the range of judicial matters which could be raised in Parliament, the procedures for doing so, and the way its jurisdiction could be exercised were restricted. The fifteenth century saw new developments. It seems that pressure on Parliament to provide enhanced forms of justice increased, for reasons which remain unclear and open to debate. Such a development may have reflected a loss of confidence in justice and judicial process as administered in local courts. It may have been that new forms of redress were desired which the local courts were unable to develop, because of the procedural rigidity of the medieval common law. The traditional forms of remedy provided by the common law at a local level may have come to be perceived as inadequate to encompass the range of legal disputes which were arising. Various expedients followed, but by the 1490s the result was that the King’s Council had come to exercise an ever wider jurisdiction as a judicial tribunal of superior jurisdiction, even to the extent of absorbing the judicial business previously reserved to Parliament. By the early 1500s, the way that the Council held its judicial sittings had also become more organised. The sittings themselves were frequent, regular and accounted for most of the Council’s recorded business. This position continued after 1513 into the new reign and minority of the infant James V, and provided the framework for the further changes which subsequently led to the foundation of the College of Justice in 1532. By the end of the fifteenth century, the Council had become known as “the Session” when sitting for its extended sessions to transact judicial business, inheriting the nomenclature which had arisen earlier in the fifteenth century in relation to a differently constituted form of statutory tribunal which had fallen into abeyance. This earlier form of tribunal had been introduced by Parliament in 1426 to supplement the provision of central justice as administered at that time in Parliament and Council. It gave way by the 1470s to a growing role for the King’s Council. By the later 1520s we can trace further reforms whose purpose seems to have been to isolate the judicial work of the Session from the Council in its general role. These reforms tended towards the exclusion of Lords of Council from participation in ordinary judicial business unless specifically nominated to the Session. This attempt to separate the judicial aspect of Council’s work was arguably the main underlying policy informing the foundation of the College of Justice in 1532. With this step the Session was incorporated to operate autonomously as a court with a defined membership of fifteen named judges. The Lords of Session were in effect delegated to exercise, as senators of the College of Justice, the ordinary “civil” jurisdiction of the Council. In terms of their legal status they remained Lords of Council and could continue to serve in the Council as well as in the Session. Other Lords of Council, however, could no longer sit as Lords of Session without specific appointment as senators of the College of Justice (or exceptionally through a very limited right of royal co-option2). Thus, the foundation of the College of Justice in 1532 marks the first moment of clear institutional separation through which we can identify the distinct institution of a supreme 2

Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland, pp. 132 – 134.

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civil court in Scotland. This is notwithstanding the fact that some of the necessary prerequisites were in place as early as the 1490s, or that further adaptation followed after 1532 as the role of a supreme court was subsequently integrated into the contemporary understanding of the legal system. To set Scotland within a comparative framework for discussion of “control”, it is necessary to address two questions. First, what forms of control was the Session or College of Justice subject to, and did this equate to what is meant by “control” in a comparative European context? Second, in what sense could the College of Justice be considered a supreme court from a constitutional point of view, and how did its constitutional status condition the nature of any control to which it was subject? It must be acknowledged at the outset that the meaning of “control” is hard to address in a Scottish context. Studies of continental courts suggest that from a comparative perspective it may commonly be understood to involve the existence of external mechanisms to provide scrutiny of the operation of a court. Such mechanisms might investigate how the court is functioning, and inspect its constitution, business and general conduct, typically with the purpose of making the court accountable to a ruler or political assembly. Ignacio Czeguhn and Antonio Sánchez Aranda have described how, following important reforms of 1480 in Castile, for example, ordinances of 1486 and 1489 “reorganised the audiencias in detail” with one consequence being that “[c]ontrol procedures were introduced and, from 1492 onwards, visitations were set in place to inform the king of dysfunctional occurrences in the workings of the court.”3 In the context of the Holy Roman Empire, Anette Baumann has discussed the sixteenth-century Reichskammergericht from a similar perspective, noting that visitations took place under commissions and that: [t]he purpose of the commissions was to supervise the whole organisation and functioning of the court: the spending and use of its budget and of the court’s fees, the payment of salaries and the work effected by the judges. The commissions also had powers for investigating complaints about bias, corruption, or gross violation of the due process of law, usually submitted to the emperor or to the assembled Diet by litigants requesting a revision of a judgment.4

Similarly, Nils Jörn has observed of the Visitation Commission of 1688 – 90 to the Court of Wismar (established after the Thirty Years War as a supreme appellate court for Swedish territories within the Holy Roman Empire) that it “confirmed by and large the rules of the court and its practice”, and resulted in a proposal “to appoint two additional judges [which] was accepted and implemented”.5 3 Ignacio Czeguhn/Antonio Sánchez Aranda, “Spain and Portugal until the 18th Century”, in: A. A. Wijffels/C. H. van Rhee (eds.), European Supreme Courts: A Portrait through History (London, 2013), ch. 11, p. 145. 4 Anette Baumann, “The Holy Roman Empire: the Reichskammergericht”, in: Wijffels/van Rhee (eds.), European Supreme Courts, ch. 6, p. 102. 5 Nils Jörn, “The Holy Roman Empire: the Court of Wismar”, in: Wijffels/van Rhee (eds.), European Supreme Courts, ch. 7, p. 110.

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The problem for comparative purposes is that in Scotland there were no such standing visitations or similar mechanisms of control, though exceptionally Parliament did legislate to appoint a commission in May 1584 with a view to “spedie and guid reformatioun” after “being informit of the plaintis and lamentationis of syndrie his guid subjectis, of sic enormiteis, corruptionis and delayis usit in the sessioun and college of justice”.6 However, this commission was appointed merely as an ad hoc body which was required to conclude its business by December 1584, and it neither followed nor established any regular pattern of oversight through visitation or standing commission. Although its members were empowered to make recommendations, in particular “to prescrive and appoint sic guid rewllis and constitutionis as they sall think maist requisit for reformatioun of sic enormiteis, corruptionis and delayis”, its main thrust was to review membership of the court, not least on political grounds in the light of a change of regime in 1583.7 From this perspective, it seems little was achieved in relation to reforming the process for new appointments,8 though particular individuals were replaced.9 Little seems to have resulted from the work of the commission, though it is worth noting Professor Ford’s suggestion that it may have indirectly inspired several statutory reforms in 1587.10 Therefore, in a Scottish context, the question of mechanisms of control has to be approached at a more general level, asking what the purposes served by such mechanisms were, and whether these were – or could have been considered – relevant or applicable to the operation of the Session in Scotland following the foundation of the College of Justice. Were such formal visitation mechanisms generally unnecessary because of the institutional understanding of the nature of the Session and its judicial authority, and how it should be regulated? Or were they absent because other informal structures and practices created an alternative framework in which the Session remained accountable or subject to review or oversight by other means? In this regard, the purposes served by the control mechanisms referred to above seem to cover at least three areas: (i) constitutional acountability mechanisms to connect judicial with political institutions (ii) legal accountability mechanisms to address complaints from litigants about judicial process, including corruption (iii) institutional audit mechanisms to review institutional functions and capacity. Establishing an external control mechanism such as a periodic visitation would be one way of promoting these purposes. Since this was not done

6 The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707 [RPS], K. M. Brown et al. (eds.), St. Andrews, 2007 – 2016), 1584/5/33. Date accessed: 18 July 2016. 7 Maurice Lee Jr., John Maitland of Thirlestane and the Foundation of the Stewart Despotism in Scotland (Princeton, 1959), p. 60. 8 R. K. Hannay, The College of Justice: essays on the institution and development of the Court of Session (Edinburgh, 1933), p. 113. 9 Lee, John Maitland, p. 60; Maurice Lee Jr., “Sir Richard Maitland of Lethington: A Christian Laird in the Age of Reformation”, in: Maurice Lee, Jr., The ‘Inevitable’ Union and Other Essays on Early Modern Scotland (East Linton, 2003), ch. 2, p. 27. 10 J. D. Ford, “Control of the Procedure of the College of Justice in Scotland”, elsewhere in this volume, p. 231.

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in Scotland, were there other ways in which the interests of accountability and review were achieved or promoted? In so far as the questions relating to “control” have been discussed in a Scottish context before, the analysis has focused strongly but narrowly on questions of the tenure of the judges appointed to the court, and their constitutional “independence” from the Crown, from the royal prerogative and from the personal will of the King. This is largely because these matters became a specific issue of controversy after Charles I succeeded to the throne in 1625. Scholarly attention has therefore focused traditionally on the ability of the court to withstand constitutionally improper royal pressure, rather than on contemporary understanding of the necessity for constitutional mechanisms to make the court itself subject to review or control. The main view of the College of Justice in this analysis has been that of Dr Peter McNeill, who argued that “… the relative weakness of the Scottish Crown had allowed the court to arrogate a position of independence not usual among the royal servants of the Renaissance monarchies”.11 But at the same time McNeill did not regard this independence to be of special constitutional consequence, at least until the reign of Charles I, because “[i]n Scotland the King had little need to pack the Bench or to overawe the judges or to resort to judicial legislation in favour of the royal prerogative, because most of the royal wishes could be forced through the Estates [i. e. Parliament] or enacted by the Privy Council” – and here it must be remembered that the Privy Council retained not only an extraordinary judicial role but also in the sixteenth century a legislative role.12 McNeill’s argument seems to be that royal influence over legislative process meant that the adjudicative role of the College of Justice was not a cause of anxiety to the King sufficient to require its operational independence to be constrained by formal mechanisms of external control. Whether or not this is plausible as an overall interpretation, in the context of investigating control mechanisms, it draws attention to the question of constitutional independence – or perhaps autonomy would be a more neutral term – as a central characteristic of the College of Justice in a way which may help explain the absence of express control mechanisms. In trying better to understand why such autonomy could be accepted without express control mechanisms, we can now turn to consider in more depth the second question set out above, namely the constitutional status of the College of Justice. In this context, the original basis upon which the College was established can be examined alongside the nature of its relations with the King, Parliament, and Privy Council (as noted above, this last being the successor body to the King’s Council of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries). Such practical interactions may reveal something of how contemporaries understood the way the College of Justice was situated within the overall scheme of central governance, and how questions of oversight may have been addressed. Insights gleaned from such analysis may also 11 Peter G. B. McNeill, “The Independence of the Scottish Judiciary”, Juridical Review (1958), pp. 134 – 147 at 140. 12 Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland, p. 32.

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helpfully complement recent discussions of sixteenth-century juristic commentary on the constitutional nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Session. Professor Ford, for example, has summarised the critical view of the sixteenth century humanist scholar, George Buchanan, as being that “[t]he lords of session … failed to administer justice according to law and were in effect quindecim tyranni”.13 Some sixteenth-century contemporaries therefore perceived at least the judicial power of the College of Justice to be dangerously unconstrained and lacking in clear limits. Such overt criticisms in contemporary commentary can be helpfully contextualised by reference to the wider underlying perceptions of the institutional position of the College of Justice which this article seeks to explore. The potential role of the Privy Council in relation to exercising functions of oversight is of particular relevance. McNeill observed, for example, that it “was treated by contemporaries as being just one in the hierarchy of judicatories along with parliament, session, justice and the like; but the council was sui generis to the extent that it was the most immediate instrument of royal authority”.14 More recently, Julian Goodare has echoed this in stating that “[b]elow the crown, the council was the supreme executive authority”, while in his analysis of the seventeenth-century constitution Gordon Donaldson suggested that the Privy Council, “with its wide residual powers in legislation and justice, was the real heir of the old undifferentiated council”.15 However, its role in oversight of the Session has not been traced in detail, and little research has been done on the Privy Council jurisdiction apart from McNeill’s unpublished doctoral thesis, and the important treatment by Julian Goodare within his more recent study of government in Scotland from 1560 to 1625.16 One difficulty is that the Privy Council was itself evolving as an institution, and only assumed a settled form as an administratively defined body in 1545.17 Even at this point responsibility for its record-keeping was not necessarily administratively distinct.18 What has been referred to earlier in this chapter somewhat reductively as the King’s Council as it operated prior to the foundation of the College of Justice in 1532 – and which became the Privy Council in the 1540s – was itself an institution 13 J. D. Ford, “Conciliar authority and equitable jurisdiction in early-modern Scotland”, in: Mark Godfrey (ed.), Law and Authority in British Legal History, 1200 – 1900 (Cambridge, 2016), p. 141. 14 Peter G. B. McNeill, “The Jurisdiction of the Scottish Privy Council 1532 – 1708” (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 1960), p. 4. 15 Goodare, The Government of Scotland 1560 – 1625 (Oxford, 2004), p. 128; Gordon Donaldson, Scotland. James V – James VII (Edinburgh, 1965), p. 289. Donaldson’s survey of the Privy Council at pp. 287 – 91 is the best short account in the secondary literature. 16 Goodare, Government of Scotland, ch. 6. 17 Goodare, Government of Scotland, pp. 128, 130. 18 Analysis of the relations between the position of clerk of council, clerk of the privy council, the secretary and the clerk register would help illuminate this point, which I owe to Dr. Athol Murray. Limitations of space prevent me from developing it here in relation to evidence drawn to my attention by Dr. Murray.

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subject to development whose complexities are not easily captured by such simple labelling. The development of the Session in the early sixteenth century, in Goodare’s view, meant that “[t]he old, undifferentiated ‘lords of council’ were now a residual group with few functions of their own”, and after 1532 even the existence of a smaller, informal “secret” council “faded away” during James V’s personal rule.19 It was only during the regency which followed James’ death in 1542 that there was “the creation of a small, efficient working council with a stable, defined membership”.20 The foundation of the College of Justice was therefore made against an institutional background in which there was not yet a distinct Privy Council in which a regular group of Lords of Council exercised collectively a parallel governmental responsibility to the judicial responsibility exercised by the Session. Indeed, in relation to such governmental business, Hannay noted long ago the lack of clarity in how “[d]uring the decade after 1532 the record continues to present privy council business intermingled with civil decreets”.21 For quite some years, in Hannay’s eyes, “the jurisdiction of the privy council was not yet distinguished by a clear differentiation”.22 In the years immediately following 1532, therefore, any oversight of the Session would be in the hands of the King and particular chosen counsellors rather than a parallel institutional body such as the Privy Council became in the 1540s in a new period of regency. But although Goodare’s study includes analysis of both Session and Privy Council, it is not concerned with the particular question of relations between the two in the sense of “control”, and this topic remains to be explored in future research. A systematic treatment of relations between the Privy Council and the Session thus lies beyond the scope of this article. Similarly, Parliament played little immediate role in terms of oversight other than legislating to establish the College in 1532, and ratifying the process of institution in 1540. Indeed, Parliament reserved to itself no particular role in future regulation of the College. The legislation of 1532 did envisage justice being administered under inaugural rules of procedure and order which had to be approved formally by the King in 1532 (who was “to mak and geif to thaim for ordouring of the samin”), but by the time of the 1540 legislation the College of Justice was liberated from even this control by being directly empowered itself “to mak sic actis, statutis and ordinancis as thai sall think expedient for ordouring of processes and haisty expeditioune of justice”.23 Apart from the 1584 commission already discussed, Parliament did thereafter legislate on occasion to regulate the conduct of the College of Justice

19

Goodare, Government of Scotland, p.129. See also the analysis of James V’s council after 1532 by Jamie Cameron, James V: The Personal Rule 1528 – 1542 (East Linton, 1998), pp. 292 – 93. 20 Julian Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford, 1999), p. 73. 21 Hannay, College of Justice, p. 129. 22 Hannay, College of Justice, p. 130. 23 RPS 1532/6; RPS 1540/12/64.

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and this activity is surveyed elsewhere in this volume.24 Like the Privy Council, the jurisdiction of Parliament in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is relatively understudied, apart from the particular question of whether an appeal lay to Parliament from the College of Justice, and whether this differed from the procedure known as protesting for remeid of law. Even here, the focus is largely on the period after 1660, rather than on the decades following the foundation of the College of Justice.25 For these reasons, as well as the fact that procedural relations between Parliament and College of Justice in this particular context have been extensively discussed elsewhere in recent published work, they will not be considered further here. However, alongside Parliament and Privy Council, the question also arises as to what role was played independently of them by the King, personally or through particular officers of state appointed by him such as the Chancellor, in exercising oversight of the Session, given that his involvement was not restricted to reliance on the agency of any one particular governmental institution. This provides a relevant starting point for an analysis of constitutional relations which may help contextualise ways in which oversight of the Session might have functioned so as to provide “control”. The discussion which follows is divided into three sections. In the first and second sections, two defining episodes in the history of relations between the Session and the King will be considered in turn – first, their relations at the time of the foundation of the College of Justice in 1532; second, at the time of the major reform of the relationship between the Session and the Privy Council and the rules of membership of the College of Justice introduced by Charles I nearly a century later in 1626. In the 1626 reform Charles effectively imposed a new principle regulating membership of the Session and the Privy Council by making it impossible to serve in both, so as to increase the separation of the two bodies. Finally, in the third section, arguments which contested, affirmed or otherwise explored the constitutional status of the College of Justice in the century between these two important episodes of constitutional change will be examined with reference to situations in which the 1532 statutes were ascribed a normative character in legal argument – in particular, in cases heard in the Privy Council.

I. The Foundation of the College of Justice: The Relationship Between the Session and the King Although the College of Justice (as opposed to the Session itself) was a new institution established by the formality of a parliamentary statute in 1532, and con24

See the chapter elsewhere in this volume by J. D. Ford, “Control of the Procedure of the College of Justice in Scotland”. 25 See Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland, pp. 33 – 39; J. D. Ford, “Protestations to Parliament for Remeid of Law”, Scottish Historical Review LXXXVIII (2009), pp. 57 – 107; Clare Jackson/Patricia Glennie, “Restoration Politics and the Advocates’ Secession 1674 – 1676”, Scottish Historical Review XCI (2012), pp. 76 – 105.

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firmed by papal bull in 1535, the new institution’s source of authority was not rooted exclusively in statute. It was also inherited and derived from the existing jurisdiction of the King’s Council. Its authority was constituted by a transfer, or channelling, of the Council’s ordinary judicial competence to the newly established College of Justice, on the basis of whose authority to administer justice in all civil actions the Session continued to function after 1532. There was therefore a strong degree of institutional continuity but also a complex ongoing relationship between the new supreme court and the other institutions of royal justice exercising central jurisdiction, namely Parliament and Council. This relationship was based around a shared history of the exercise of authority by the King in Council, whether in the smaller “secret” or Privy Council, the larger gathering of a General Council, or at its most formal in the full sitting of the King and Council in Parliament. The continuity is seen specifically in nomenclature, since the pre-1532 practice of referring to Council’s judicial sittings as “the Session” carried on after 1532 within the College of Justice framework. It is also seen in the express regard for the technical source of the judges’ jurisdiction in administering justice being that of the King’s Council, rather than any newly conceived authority deriving from the statutory powers of the College of Justice. Indeed, the judges of the Session, though acquiring an additional designation after 1532 as “senators” of the College of Justice, nevertheless remained technically Lords of Council and Session, and continued to give decree simply as “Lords of Council”. This is not to say that over time the roots of the authority of the Session in the jurisdiction of Council were not supplemented by arguments suggesting that the act of parliament of 1532 itself provided a statutory basis for analysing the authority of the court. However, according status and effect to the statute of 1532 could add to but not easily displace the way the underlying authority of the College was understood to derive ultimately from the jurisdiction of the King’s Council. In practice the older framework of conciliar authority linking the new court with the King in Council continued to operate throughout the sixteenth century, supported until 1626 by a significant overlap in personnel. This may help explain why the parallel jurisdictions of the Session and the Privy Council could normally operate alongside each other without apparent difficulty, and without jurisdictional competition, let alone the “internecine struggle for business between the common-law courts” which marked relations between the Common Pleas and the King’s Bench in later sixteenth-century England.26 The implications for governance of this older framework in Scotland have been analysed by Athol Murray, with special reference to the Exchequer function of Council. Murray emphasised that “[t]he council’s original province was the general administration of the realm, with no real differentiation between its sittings for justice, for finance or for state affairs, except that a special commission was necessary for auditing accounts in exchequer.” The important consequence of this was that “although those commissioned [for the Exchequer] united in their persons the dual functions of lords of council and auditors of exchequer, 26

J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (4th edn., London, 2002), p. 40.

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they did not keep those functions separate. Just as the full council could deal with administrative and judicial business affecting the revenue, so the smaller councilin-exchequer could do the work of the whole council if necessary.”27 Murray’s study of Exchequer activity after 1532 suggests that although the creation of the College of Justice made “the lords of session a permanent paid body of judges”, it did not immediately bring to an end the pre-1532 pattern of institutional flexibility based on status as a Lord of Council. Indeed, after 1532 the judges of the Session did not necessarily need to be regular members of the residual Council, whose identity crystallised in an administrative sense only by 1545, when a separate register began to be kept for Privy Council business. Authority as a Lord of Council therefore continued to be capable of transcending the particular department of council activity in which an individual Lord of Council was active, even once that department was transferred to an autonomous institution such as the College of Justice, as was the Session in 1532. But in what sense was the College of Justice a supreme court from a constitutional point of view, given its close relationship to this older framework of governance based on the Council? Was its autonomy meant to be conditioned by any form of oversight? The statute establishing the College is unrevealing from this point of view. It was enacted on 17 May 1532 in Parliament. It narrated that “our soverane is maist desyrous to have ane permanent ordour of justice for the universale wele of all his liegis and, tharefor, tendis to institute ane college of cunning and wise men, baith of spirituale and temporale estate, for the doing and administracioune of justice in all civile actiounes.”28 The continuity with the jurisdiction of the pre1532 Session is made explicit, the statute stating that the judges’ “processes, sentencis and decretis sall have the samin strenthe, force and effecte as the decretis of the lordis of sessioune had in all tymes bigane”. But nothing else is said to explain how the College fitted in with the pre-existing framework of central governance beyond this one reference to the authority of decrees of the Session. However, although the essence of the foundation of the College was to set up an autonomous court separate from the Council, it is significant that this intention was partially compromised from the very beginning by the scheme actually adopted, and in ways which underscore the continuing relevance of the connection to this wider governmental framework. It was decided that in addition to the fifteen judges the Chancellor would retain a right to attend the Session, as well as “sic uther lordis as sall pleise the kingis grace to enjone to thaim of his gret counsell to have voit siclik to the nomer of thre or foure” (this is the limited right of royal co-option referred to earlier). The Chancellor and these additional lords were given places in the Session to perform a judicial role, however, rather than to act as external auditors or commissioners with additional powers of oversight or control. They also gained only a right to attend and participate rather 27 Athol Murray, “Exchequer, Council and Session 1513 – 1542”, in: Janet Hadley Williams (ed.), Stewart Style 1513 – 1542: Essays on the Court of James V (East Linton, 1996), p. 108. 28 RPS, 1532/6.

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than full status as members of the College of Justice itself.29 But the King thus retained a direct right of nomination which allowed him to supplement the bench with his appointees, albeit limited in extent to the Chancellor and the fixed number of supernumerary or – as they have became known – “extraordinary” lords.30 In referring to the Chancellor’s right not only to attend but to preside, the statute tellingly provided that on such occasions he would “be principale of the said counsell” and displace the president of the court in the chair. Describing a sitting of the Session in its new form as the College of Justice as a meeting of “counsell” makes it very clear from where its judicial authority derived, though it also blurred institutional distinctions which were otherwise implicit in the legislation establishing the College. Furthermore, the precise arrangements for nomination and appointment of extraordinary lords remained ill-defined, as well as some aspects of their participation in the business of the Session, such as the establishment of a quorum. The role of the Chancellor was also represented slightly inconsistently. In the statute passed by Parliament in 1540, confirming the foundation of the College as part of the general ratification of deeds carried out by James V before reaching his majority,31 there was passing reference to powers belonging to “the president, vicepresident and senatouris”, but no mention was made of the Chancellor, or indeed of the supernumerary lords.32 The modification to the scheme of 1532 therefore introduced at least a degree of ambiguity in relation to the constitutional autonomy of the College of Justice, which inevitably affected the operation of the Session, and consequently required further clarification over time. Examples of this will be considered below. Until 1532, the King himself had sometimes participated personally in the judicial business of the Session. James IV was unusually active, being present, it has been calculated, at 84 hearings over 67 days between August 1503 and April 1505, for example.33 James Valso sat in the Session, though much more rarely. However, it would seem to follow from the terms of the statute of 1532 that the King would no longer sit in the Session in person in any judicial capacity – though further systematic investigation is required about whether monarchs or regents did play a part in any decisions of the Session after 1532. In relation to the regency of the earl of Morton in the 1570s, for example, it was stated in one contemporary text concerning a question brought before the senators of the College of Justice that “the Regent himself sat in jugement for this caus as he did for many uthers”.34 Did Regent Morton therefore routinely sit as 29

Hannay, College of Justice, p. 103 – 4. Hannay, College of Justice, p. 128. 31 John W. Cairns, “Revisiting the Foundation of the College of Justice”, in: Hector L. MacQueen, Miscellany V, Stair Society vol. 52 (Edinburgh, 2006), pp. 27 – 50 at 36 – 37. 32 RPS 1540/12/64; Hannay, College of Justice, p. 103. 33 Leslie J. Macfarlane, William Elphinstone and the Kingdom of Scotland 1431 – 1514: the Struggle for Order (Aberdeen, 1985), p. 423. 34 T. Thomson (ed.), The historie and life of King James the Sext: being an account of the affairs of Scotland, from the year 1566, to the year 1596; with a short contribution to the year 1617, Bannatyne Club vol. 13 (1825), p. 161, quoted in Amy Blakeway, Regency in Sixteenth30

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a judge on the Session, and, if so, on what technical basis? He had recently served as Chancellor more than once, but this was prior to his appointment as Regent.35 Further research is required to establish whether evidence of the operation of the Session supports this contemporary account. But apart from the question of the King not himself being a member of the College of Justice and therefore not entitled to sit as one of its judges, the change brought about in 1532 did not mean the King was never present during its proceedings, at least prior to the union of the crowns and James VI’s departure to England in 1603. Indeed, in the 1590s James VI was in the habit of attending the Session as many as twenty-five times a year on average, not as a judge, but rather as an observer with an interest in nominations to vacancies on the bench and the general conduct of business.36 Professor Ford has noted how James VI “instructed his son and heir ‘to haunt your Session, and spie carefully their proceedings’, believing that his own presence in the supreme civil court of Scotland had served to prevent partiality and to encourage expedition in the handling of cases”.37 There is also evidence that James VI would seek to exploit such attendance to exert influence on the court in making its decisions.38 Notably, however, an account of the notorious case of Bruce v Hamilton in 1599 suggests that the Session judges would not necessarily be cowed into agreeing with the King on such occasions – in this particular instance the judges resisted the wishes of the King in his own presence, with the result that “the King raged marvellously and is in great anger with the Lords of Session”.39 If this account can be believed, it may confirm that the King was limited to attempting to influence the court, rather than overriding its decisions or being able to take a lead by casting a vote as a judge himself. More light is cast on the structure of relations between the King and the Session by the further steps which followed the passage of the parliamentary statute on 17 May 1532. The first meeting of the new College of Justice occurred on 27 May, and James V was present for the inauguration of the new body. The formalities included the King’s instruction that the “chancelar, president and lordis of the sessioun [are] to avise, counsell and conclude upon sic rewlis, statutis and ordinancis as sall be thocht be thame expedient to be observit and kepit in thar manner and ordour of proceding … and his grace sall ratify and appreve the samin.”40 The King ordained that these Century Scotland, Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 2015, p. 162, citing an earlier edition edited by Malcolm Laing, The historie and life of King James the Sext written towards the latter part of the Sixteenth Century (Edinburgh, 1804), p. 259. For further context see George R. Hewitt, Scotland under Morton, 1572 – 80 (Edinburgh, 1982), pp. 141 – 42. 35 Hewitt, Scotland under Morton, pp. 5, 11. 36 Hannay, College of Justice, p. 119. 37 J. D. Ford, “Conciliar authority and equitable jurisdiction in early-modern Scotland”, p. 140. 38 Hannay, College of Justice, pp. 109, 119. 39 Lord Cooper of Culross, Selected Papers 1922 – 1954 (Edinburgh, 1957), p. 118. 40 R. K. Hannay (ed.), Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs 1501 – 1554. Selections from the Acta Dominorum Concilii introductory to the Register of the Privy Council of

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rules and statutes should be “for the ordour of justice” and that the judges should administer the business of the Session “eftir the form of the samin.” A series of statutes and ordinances were then quickly drafted and subsequently ratified by the King in a letter of 10 June 1532. Although the King was stepping back from active participation in the ordinary business of the Session in 1532, he therefore still retained an interest at this stage in the making of ordinances regulating the Session, and in ratifying them. Otherwise, his formal interest extended only to the choice of judges when vacancies arose. In turn, the Session was made subject to the observance of those rules and statutes ratified by the King in 1532. By 1540 the Lords of Session were granted authority in their own right to enact further statutes governing their proceedings. The parliamentary statute of 1540, which ratified the establishment of the College, “gevis and grantis to the president, vicepresident and senatouris power to mak sic actis, statutis and ordinancis as thai sall think expedient for ordouring of processes and haisty expeditioune of justice”, though now without any requirement for royal approval.41 It is unclear what significance might attach to the absence of a requirement for the King to ratify such “actis, statutis and ordinancis” such as had been included in 1532. However, as will be discussed further below, this did not seem to affect the continued importance accorded to the original parliamentary statute of 1532, albeit supplemented by the provisions of the statute of 1540. In effect, therefore, the constitutional position accorded to the Session in its new form as the College of Justice meant that it was at least indirectly accountable to and subject to oversight by the King, even to the extent that the King might attend to observe it, and be actively involved in the formulation of new ordinances, as was certainly the case up to 1540. In some particular situations involving wrongdoing by individual judges the accountability was more direct, as discussed below. But, it may also be asked, what were the normative rules or principles which governed or regulated the way this accountability should function? Great emphasis was put in 1532 on the Session being regulated by “the statutis maid be thame at our command”, and these seem to have assumed a constitutional force from the very beginning. However, the fact that the King commanded the making of the statutes did not mean that the status of the Session was subordinate to him in any simple sense. The King also bound himself by these statutes. He “promitt to our saidis lordis that we sall nocht be any privat writing, charge or command … desir thame to do uthervis … bot as justice requiris, or to do ony thing that may brek the statutis maid be thaim at our command … Als we sall auctoris, manteyine and defend all the saidis lordis, thair personis, landis and gudis fra all wrang.”42 Such interference through private writings was in fact a chronic problem in the sixteenth century, leading to periodic attempts to reg-

Scotland [ADCP] (Edinburgh, 1932), p. 374. See also the chapter on “Control of the Procedure of the College of Justice in Scotland” by J. D. Ford, elsewhere in this volume. 41 RPS 1540/12/64. 42 ADCP 378.

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ulate and prevent it.43 However, the fact that the King had become bound by the statutes of 1532 was not subsequently forgotten. When Parliament legislated against interference by means of private writings in 1579, for example, it was expressly narrated in the statute by way of preamble that: King James the Fyft, of worthie memorie, institutar of the said college, promittit in the said institutioun thairof that he sould not be ony privat writting, charge or command at the instance of ony personis, desire thame to do utherwise in ony mater that sould cum befoir thame, bot as justice requirit, or to do ony thing that may brek the statutis maid be thair predicessouris …44

The statutes did permit royal intervention in certain circumstances, and the one specific matter in relation to which the King was expressly entitled to take action was wrongdoing on the part of the judges. Such action was structured through a procedure allowing for the intervention of the King upon receiving any complaint about the judges “be doing of wrang or with unhoneste”, in which case “thai salbe callit befor us and giff thai be fundin culpable to be punist tharfor eftir the qualite of thar falt and demerite”.45 But there was no special process of visitation or inspection established to monitor the conduct of the judges. Ad hoc complaint was required to trigger such action. Correspondingly, the King’s response was envisaged as being guided by the provision in the statutes. The right of the Chancellor to attend and preside was also potentially a significant way in which the King’s authority was embodied representatively within the Session. Indeed, when a new Chancellor was appointed in 1605, he was acknowledged by the senators of the College “as now being the heid and cheif of thar court and senat under his majestie”, although this high-flown rhetoric had no real basis in the legislation of 1532, since the Chancellor was not technically a permanent member of the College of Justice.46 Furthermore, he too could only participate after promising to observe the statutes, and to that extent was subject to the same obligations as ordinary senators. For example, when the earl of Morton was first appointed Chancellor by Queen Mary in January 1563, he was “acceptit” to the bench by the Lords of Session after he swore to “manteyne the college of justice and haill senatouris and memberis tharof in all tymes cuming, and sall observe and keip the statutis of sessioun in all points conform to the tenour of the samin”.47 43 See the chapter on “Epistolary Control of the College of Justice in Scotland” by J. D. Ford, elsewhere in this volume; the problem of private writings is also touched on in A. M. Godfrey, “Civil Procedure, Delay and the Court of Session in Sixteenth Century Scotland”, in: C. H. van Rhee, The Law’s Delay. Essays on Undue Delay in Civil Litigation (Antwerp, 2004), pp. 107 – 119, at p. 116. 44 RPS, 1579/10/54. For evidence of the same issue arising in the 1520s and 1530s see Godfrey, “Civil Procedure, Delay and the Court of Session in Sixteenth Century Scotland”, p. 116. 45 ADCP 378. 46 Hannay, College of Justice, p. 105. 47 Hannay, College of Justice, p. 104.

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Nevertheless, in this regard and more generally, the connection of the College of Justice with the King and his “gret counsell”, reinforced by the considerable overlap in personnel between College and Lords of Council, emphasises again the extent to which it remained inside the late medieval constitutional framework of accountability governing the different forms of royal conciliar authority from King in Parliament through General Council to Privy Council, Session and (from 1532) College of Justice. The fact that the College of Justice regulated its own business did not thereby exclude oversight. Its autonomy was conditioned implicitly by its accountability to King, Council and Parliament, and this did not require to be embodied in special oversight mechanisms as such. New ordinances or statutes could be made by the Session itself, but also on the intiative of the King, Council or even Parliament in order to implement changes to the College. Accountability was also expressly guaranteed through the right to intervene granted to the King in case of “doing of wrang or with unhoneste” by the judges, and ultimately could be enforced more intrusively by an ad hoc commission such as that established in 1584. But otherwise no external mechanism was put in place or considered necessary to scrutinise the operations of the Session to provide this oversight. Therefore the statutes of 1532 themselves assumed a special constitutional status in providing the basis for self-regulation and defining standards by which to be held accountable.

II. Charles I’s Reform of 1626 and Relations Between the King and the Session The second aspect of relations between the King and the Session to be considered concerns the episode from 1626 in which the interests of all central institutions of governance were directly involved and which led to the first major structural reform of the membership of the Session since the inception of the College of Justice in 1532. This reform was designed to separate the College of Justice and the Privy Council far more categorically than before, not in terms of institutional form or jurisdiction, where separation was already established, but in terms of personnel, where Session and Privy Council were still very intimately connected in the early seventeenth century.48 Goodare has noted, for example, how all 46 Lords of Session between 1603 and 1625 were also Privy Counsellors, as well as twelve being officers of state.49 When James VI reduced the size of the Council to 35 in 1610, around 16 of its members were officials or Lords of Session.50 The role of Lords of Session was also more significant than the numbers suggest, given that “the strength of the council lay … in 48 Hannay, College of Justice, p. 125 – 127; David Masson, “Introduction”, in: David Masson (ed.), The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 2nd series vol. i, A.D. 1625 – 27 (Edinburgh, 1899) [RPC], pp. xxxiii – xxxviii, lii – liii; Masson offers further helpful analysis in the footnotes to the main text on pp. 221 – 22, 236 – 37. 49 Goodare, Government of Scotland, p. 57, n 68. 50 Gordon Donaldson, Scotland. James V – James VII (Edinburgh, 1965), p. 290.

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state officials like the chancellor, comptroller, treasurer, secretary, lord president and justice clerk and in senators of the college of justice”.51 The aim of the reform was to stop members of the Privy Council also serving as judges of the College of Justice, and thereby to exclude nobles from the Session (in some senses a logical development of the policy informing the original scheme of 1532). The reform would have the effect that “no Nobleman nor Officer of Estate salbe admitted for a judge thairin”,52 and entail “no Sessioner being a Counsellour nor no Previe Counsellour being upoun the Sessioun”.53 The outcome was to remodel the personnel of the court, and indirectly to redefine how the institutional relationship between the College of Justice and the Privy Council was to be understood. The reform was initiated by the King and its motivation was political, but the process of imposing the reform also illustrates again the way that ad hoc action could be taken on the King’s initiative in a system without a formal mechanism of control or visitation. However, it also illustrates the lack of accepted mechanisms to achieve the purpose of such initiatives by the King – for example, it does not seem that changes desired by the King could be embedded permanently simply by prerogative action, without parliamentary approval or legislation of some kind. The King’s authority appears to have been legally constrained, especially given the status of the College of Justice as a body established by parliamentary statute. If Charles wished to remove nobles from the Session it was hard to see how his objective could be achieved if they simply refused to resign from the College of Justice, if at the same time they were of sufficient status that they could not be denied the independent right to attend the Privy Council. Even the King could not remove a judge of the Session once appointed, given the understanding that their tenure was for life – ad vitam aut culpam.54 The self-serving suggestion made by Charles himself that such offices lapsed on demise of the crown was a novelty. Ultimately the question did not have to be addressed in 1626, since the judges in question succumbed to the political pressure to resign. But despite this political victory, Charles still compromised in the end on some technical details in ways which undermined his purpose. For example, despite the avowed aim of “avoyding that formar confounding of the Counsell and Sessioun togither, whiche of thameselffis ar distinct judicatures”, he abandoned his initial intention that the four extraordinary lords, who were ultimately retained “to assist and remarke the proceidingis of the rest”, should never be nobles.55 The reform to the Session in 1626 flowed from considerations connected to Charles I’s revocation in 1625 of historic crown and ecclesiastical land grants, the 51

Donaldson, Scotland. James V – James VII, p. 290. RPC 2nd ser. vol. i, p. 220. 53 RPC 2nd ser. vol. i, p. 231. 54 McNeill, “Independence of the Scottish Judiciary”, p. 135. 55 RPC 2nd ser. vol. i, p. 231; Maurice Lee Jr., “Charles I and the End of Conciliar Government in Scotland”, in: Lee, The ‘Inevitable’ Union and Other Essays on Early Modern Scotland, ch. 12, p. 181. 52

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redistribution of teinds (i. e. tithes) to provide clerical stipends which the revocation would enable, and a wider “restructuring of Scottish government”.56 After succeeding to the throne in 1625 Charles had formulated plans to “revoke all gifts of land which had belonged to either the crown or the kirk made since 1540, whether or not the gift had been made during a royal minority”,57 along with associated reforms to the College of Justice. Jenny Wormald has summarised the implications of the Revocation as amounting to “a shattering destruction of the security of the landed classes, plunged into the nightmare of uncertainty about their titles to their property”.58 Unsurprisingly, Charles experienced strong opposition in the Privy Council and Parliament. In relation to the Session, the proposals also caused a wider debate about the respective roles of the central judicial institutions, including the question whether the College of Justice or the Privy Council had greater authority than the other. In an extraordinary discussion in 1626 with his Scottish counsellors about the right of the King to choose the judges of the College of Justice, Charles himself is recorded as having posed the question “qhither the judicatory of the secret counsell or that of the session was most supreme”. The majority of counsellors replied that “they were both equall”, whilst Sir John Scot, the author of the account of this discussion, argued the contrary from the King’s perspective, stating that “the counsell was farre above the other as treating and judging of the highest matter of estate and haill bussines concerning the croune, government, coyne, peace & warre, qheras that of the session treated only of debates of Law betwixt parties”.59 Membership of the Privy Council was in the King’s gift, whereas since 1532 membership of the College of Justice as a senator and judge on the Session had been regulated by the statute establishing the College, and as a result was regulated primarily by the court itself. Parliament might intervene by statute, as it had done in 1579 in removing the requirement that the president of the College of Justice be a churchman,60 but the King’s role was limited to proposing senators whose appointment depended on being accepted and admitted by the court. That modifications to these arrangements should properly be made by parliamentary statute was a view which seems to have come to be widely held. This was apparent in a meeting in 1625 of the Convention of Estates, an assembly of similar breadth to a parliament, which petitioned the King “that his majestie sould be humblie intreated that if he intendit ony alteratioun in the sessioun from that whilk wes established in parliament, that his majestie wald be graciouslie pleasit to follow oute the same be the advise of the estaittis

56 Allan Macinnes, Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement 1625 – 1641 (Edinburgh, 1991), p. 50. 57 Lee, “Charles I and the End of Conciliar Government in Scotland”, p. 176. 58 Jenny Wormald, “Confidence and Perplexity: The Seventeenth Century”, in: Jenny Wormald (ed.), Scotland. A History (Oxford, 2005), p. 155. 59 G. Neilson (ed.), “Scotstarvet’s ‘Trew Relation’”, vol. xi (1914) Scottish Historical Review, p. 185. 60 RPS 1579/10/55.

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of this kingdome in parliament”.61 As one constituent group put it in their supplication to the Estates: thay wer informed that his majestie intendit to mak some alteratioun in the sessioun whiche wes a soverane and heigh court, whairof the fundatioun wes with grite wisdome and judgement built by his majesties grite grandfather of happie memorie with the consent of the estaittis of parliament, and that the auctoritie of this court hes bene sensyne illustratt with mony priveledgeis flowing from succeiding princes, and speciallie from his majesties darrest father of blissed memorie, and thairfore desyreing that the estaittis wald joyne with thame in thair humble petitioun to his majestie that his majestie wald be pleasit not to mak ony alteratioun thairof without the advise of the estaittis of this kingdome.62

However, the King in effect asserted a right to treat membership of the College of Justice on the same footing as that of the Privy Council and to appoint new judges in the same way as he could new counsellors. Although such an approach raised profound constitutional questions, it has been suggested that it was less a sign of royal absolutism than reflective of a particular policy agenda concerning the revocation. Maurice Lee Jr has argued that Charles’ goal was “to break the grip of the great landowners on the court of session” so as to lessen the prospect of a successful challenge to the legality of the proposed revocation before a court which would otherwise include judges with a very direct interest in the outcome.63 Forbidding privy counsellors, especially nobles, from sitting on the Session was the method of reform intended to achieve this. However, the King stopped short of asserting any general power to choose the judges of the court; his argument was the more limited one that on a change of monarch the judges’ offices fell vacant, and the new King had the right to fill them as he pleased. As Charles put it in a letter to three of the royal officials on the Council whom he wished to remove from the Session: Haveing resolved after goode consideratioun to reduce our Judicatorie of the Sessioun, as neir as it can convenientlie be done, to that estait wherein it wes satled at the first institutioun, we have determined that no Nobleman nor Officer of Estate salbe admitted for a judge thairin… In regaird of your officeis … we desyre yow to leave your plaices in the Sessioun, because we do conceave thame to be voyde by the death of our deare late father, that we may provide other personis for the same; and, yf yow willinglie do not condiscend unto this, do not complene heirefter yf, finding by a lawfull course bothe your officeis in the State and plaiceis in Sessioun at our guift, we dispose of thame otherwayes.64

Even this was little more than a threat without explicit legal authority, designed to pressurise the royal officials and nobles in question to resign from the Session. Nevertheless, all of the fifteen judges of the court proceeded to resign their offices, eight

61

RPS A1625/10/47. RPS A1625/10/47. 63 Lee, “Charles I and the End of Conciliar Government in Scotland”, p. 178. 64 RPC 2nd series, i, pp. 220 – 221. 62

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then being re-admitted by the King, supplemented by seven new appointments.65 Lee has noted that, after the King made the necessary reappointments to the Session, “[o] ddly enough, their letters of renewal, and the commissions of the new appointees, made no mention of the question of tenure”.66 This might point to the short-term expediency of the measure, as opposed to any more profound concern by the King to return the Session “to that estait wherein it wes satled at the first institutioun”. Indeed, the change, lacking any statutory foundation, was not lasting, and the overlap between judges of the Session and membership of the Privy Council later returned. McNeill concluded that “Charles’ victory was neither decisive nor permanent. In the future, nobles and officers of State … reappeared on the Bench.”67 This suggests that even when the authority of the court was ultimately derived from that of the King in Council, as was historically the case for the Session, its constitutional status meant, by the early seventeenth century if not before, that control or oversight could be ineffective in achieving enduring reforms unless implemented by legislation with the authority of Parliament. This reform of Charles I could be seen to touch on more than one of the purposes of control mechanisms outlined earlier. In relation to the first, namely the existence of constitutional accountability mechanisms which connected judicial with political institutions, Charles’ reform sought to create a new separation between the Privy Council and the College of Justice which might have raised the question whether some more formal control mechanism would come to be needed in the future, given that the overlapping personnel between the College of Justice and the Privy Council up until 1626 might have been one reason why formal control mechanisms were not considered necessary prior to this point. At the same time, the absence of formal control mechanisms left the rights of the Crown ill-defined in the unlikely event of a conflict, and the dispute of 1625 – 26 revealed that when conflict occurred the adequacy of the royal prerogative was contestable as an effective means of regulating membership of the Session. The old conciliar framework of government did not operate smoothly in these unusual circumstances, the special constitutional status of the Session (embedded in the College of Justice) having introduced the possibility of friction into that framework after 1532. Charles achieved his objectives in 1626 through political pressure rather than the exercise of legally enforcable or constitutionally accepted rights to regulate the Session. The contestability of intervention by prerogative powers, even if not actually put to the test in this instance, seems to imply that the constitutional status of the College of Justice was perceived by the early seventeenth century to rest at least as much if not more on its parliamentary legislative founda-

65

RPC 1st series, i, p. 234 – 36; see also Goodare, Government of Scotland, p. 160. Lee, “Charles I and the End of Conciliar Government in Scotland”, p. 181. 67 McNeill, “Independence of the Scottish Judiciary”, p. 143; elsewhere McNeill commented that “the old confusion of membership reappeared later and frequently the lord president and other lords of session appeared as councillors” – see McNeill, “The Jurisdiction of the Scottish Privy Council 1532 – 1708”, pp. 10, 20. 66

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tions as on the older derivation of its authority from the jurisdiction of the King and Council. The difficulty for the King in trying to exercise control over the Session is brought home by a further episode in June 1626, after Charles sent a list of twelve articles to the Lords of Session containing demands such as “8. That the praesident make a note of all praeuilidges of the Sessione, and members therof, that his Majesty may ratifie such of them as he thinkes expedient”.68 The response from the Chancellor and Lords of Session was less than respectful to the King’s instructions. Sir James Balfour of Denmiln, whose patron was the Chancellor Sir George Hay, recorded that “Thir tuelffe artickells wer crushte in peices by the Lord Chancelar Hay and wthers, whosse places they trinched one [i. e. encroached upon], and Sir James Skenne, President of the Sessione, wes brought in some disgrace with his Maiesty, for procuring of suche, wich as then was affirmed to the King, wer nothing ells bot matters of mooneshyne to his Maiesty”.69 Indirectly the outcome of Charles’ reform had implications for the second purpose of control mechanisms – legal accountability mechanisms to address complaints from litigants about judicial process and corruption – since the aim was to change the composition of the court so that it was even more clearly insulated from political and noble interests. In relation to the third possible purpose of control mechanisms, namely institutional audit mechanisms to review institutional functions and capacity, it can be seen that, whilst the number of judges remained the same, at an individual level a new filter was introduced controlling who could act as a Session judge, by excluding anyone who sat on the Privy Council. The foundation of the College in 1532 had merely removed the automatic right of future Privy Counsellors to attend the Session, but conversely it did not prohibit a Lord of Session from actively participating in the Privy Council. Concurrent membership had therefore always remained possible until 1626. Although the lack of a new statutory control meant that the change would not necessarily be permanent, Charles achieved his main objective in 1626, and thereby at least set a precedent.

III. Perceptions of the Constitutional Status of the College of Justice 1532 – 1626 Having identified the express importance of perceptions about the constitutional status of the Session in 1625 – 26, as well as having analysed that status in 1532 when the College of Justice was created, a further question may be raised about how such perceptions may have developed in the century or so in between. Did such perceptions change as the role of a supreme court became embedded in contemporary un68 Sir James Balfour, The Historical Works of Sir James Balfour, vol. II, in: J. Haig (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1824), p. 137. 69 Balfour, Historical Works Vol. II, p. 138.

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derstanding of the legal system? Arguments raised after 1532 in both the College of Justice and the Privy Council will now be examined to the extent that they shed light on contemporary understanding of the authority, independence and supreme judicial status of the new College of Justice within the constitutional framework already described, and the ways in which this framework may have developed in the sixteenth century. Whatever constitutional development occurred by 1626, there was no sudden discontinuity or sharp change of direction. Therefore, any perceived change is likely to have been of the order of a reshaping rather than a replacement of the late medieval constitutional framework of accountability described above. The tendency was rather to clarify institutional relationships and competences in relation to the terms of the foundation of the College of Justice 1532, for example in relation to the appointment of senators, and to do so in a manner which sought to acknowledge the functions of the Session as a court of law within the broader framework of central governance. By 1560 an informed commentator could naturally refer to the Lords of Session (i. e. the senators of the College of Justice) as “the final and supreme judges in this kingdom in civil matters”.70 By 1605 a later commentator could still maintain that Parliament itself was “the supreame court of all others”, whilst also recognising the College of Justice as “the cheife ordinarie Court”.71 But, as we have seen, by 1625 a supplication made to the Convention of Estates meeting in that year could plausibly state that its authors “wer informed that his majestie intendit to mak some alteratioun in the sessioun whiche wes a soverane and heigh court … [and] that his majestie wald be pleasit not to mak ony alteratioun thairof without the advise of the estaittis of this kingdome.” 72 These formulations do suggest a sense of development in the century after the foundation of the College. The original parliamentary statute of 1532 did not talk about a “sovereign and high court” but merely referred to the creation of “ane college of cunning and wise men, baith of spirituale and temporale estate, for the doing and administracioune of justice in all civile actiounes”. So how might developments between 1532 and 1625 have led to the status of the College coming to be articulated as that of “a soverane and heigh court” whose operation should only be changed with the consent of Parliament? Such a shift accorded the Session a status which would once surely have been reserved to Parliament alone, and thus constitutes a significant aspect of the evolution of the Session after 1532. We have already noted, alongside the provisions of the primary parliamentary statute of 1532 and the conditions this imposed, how arrangements for the constitutional accountability of the Session rested essentially on a policy of legislative regulation through the statutes made by the judges at the King’s command in 1532, and 70

P. G. B. McNeill, “Discours Particulier d’Ecosse 1559/60”, in: W. D. H. Sellar (ed.), Stair Society Miscellany II (Edinburgh, 1984), p. 113, para 31 (“Lords of Session”). 71 “Relation of the Manner of Judicatores of Scotland”, Scottish Historical Review (1922) pp. 254 – 272 at pp. 262, 265. 72 RPS A1625/10/47.

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by which the King was also bound.73 So in terms of further developments after 1532, an obvious focus is to examine how this relatively unelaborated statutory framework for regulating the College and its relations with the King was perceived and applied, or indeed whether it was respected at all. In terms of existing research on developments after 1532, a detailed picture of the development of the College of Justice during the remainder of the sixteenth century is lacking beyond the authoritative but selective older account given by R.K. Hannay.74 In seeking to uncover evidence of the broader change in question, however, we might expect to find some traces of this process in the records not only of the College of Justice but also of the Privy Council, given the residual judicial competence of the Privy Council after 1532, and its potential role in oversight of the operation of the College as “the most immediate instrument of royal authority” in McNeill’s words.75 One particular aspect will provide a focus for this discussion, namely the extent to which the parliamentary statute of 1532 or the statutes of the court ratified soon afterwards, came to be accorded a normative status regulating how the College of Justice ought to operate in the period 1532 – 1626. The primary focus will concern records of the College of Justice between 1532 and 1554 (after which research depends on archival sources) and of the Privy Council from 1545 to 1604 (i. e. up to the union of the crowns). Given the relatively formal and elaborate inauguration of the College of Justice, it might be expected that the parliamentary statute and the statutes of the court would be regarded as important points of reference for the future conduct of the Session.76 However, there is very limited evidence of any such development. In practice, litigants still tended to refer simply to the customary body of procedural rules constituted through practice in the Session, the stilus curiae or “practick”, pointing to breaches of rules of court being “nocht conforme to daily practik consuetude and use of court”.77 The relevance of the 1532 legislation and broader questions of the authority of the College of Justice and its implications for the competence of the Session only seems to have been appreciated gradually over time. In the years immediately following 1532, in fact, we find no evidence of the legislation of 1532 becoming a formal point of reference which was cited in court on any regular basis. Insofar as the detailed rules of procedure simply codified existing practice in the pre-1532 Session, this is perhaps not surprising.78 Moreover, the parliamentary statute of 1532 contained very little detailed provision which could ever have been relevant to formulating procedure for the conduct of routine court business. And in terms of understanding the relationship between the College of Justice and other jurisdictions, this was something which the legislation of 1532 itself was silent upon. 73

ADCP 378. Hannay, College of Justice. 75 McNeill, “The Jurisdiction of the Scottish Privy Council 1532 – 1708”, p. 4. 76 RPS 1532/6; ADCP 373 – 378. 77 Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland, p. 203. 78 Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland, p. 171. 74

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However, evidence traceable during the period 1532 – 1604 helps identify several situations in which the 1532 statutes did become reference points possessed of a normative character. Two situations will be considered here: (i) arguments about the quorum necessary for the court to be constituted, including the status of supernumerary judges for this purpose (ii) arguments about the required balance of representation between temporal and spiritual judges on the court for decisions to be competent. These two categories of argument will be examined in order to outline how the status of the College of Justice was perceived during the sixteenth century in terms of its regulation through reference to the terms of its foundation. Other categories of argument may exist, and be uncovered in future research, but lie outside the scope of the present analysis.

1. Quorum The first category relates to the quorum necessary to constitute the court. The King himself is recorded on 16 November 1532, some six months after the foundation of the College, as deciding to make additional nominations of judges to sit on the Session. The reason given was because “thar is divers deid, sum seik and sum away of the saidis lordis of session, quharthrow thar is nocht sufficient nomer conforme to the act maid tharupoun of befor to decyde on all materis and to minister justice to all his liegis …” (emphasis supplied).79 The reference to “the act maid tharupoun of befor” might seem to imply a reference to the parliamentary statute of May 1532, which listed by name the judges who constituted the Session upon the creation of the College of Justice. However, that statute did not specify a quorum but merely the overall number of judges, narrating how there had been “chosin certane persounes maist convenient and qualifyit therfore, to the nowmere of xiiij persounes, half spirituale half temporall, with ane president”. The fifteen judges could be supplemented by up to another five persons, since as noted earlier the act went on to provide “that my lord chancelare, being present in this toune or uther place, he sall have voit and be principale of the said counsell, and sic uther lordis as sall pleise the kingis grace to enjone to thaim of his gret counsell to have voit siclik to the nomer of thre or foure.”80 But there is no statement of a minimum number required, i. e. the quorum to make a decision valid. For the quorum we must instead consult the statutes of the court ratified on 10 June 1532. These state that “in the avising and gevin of all sentence and decretis thair be tene of the lordis at the lest with the chancellar or president”, which entailed that in effect there should be a minimum of eleven judges in total.81 In relation to the regulation of a quorum, we can therefore see that the statutes of 1532 were subsequently regarded as laying down authoritative rules for the future conduct of the court and thus retaining authority to regulate the court after 1532. 79

ADCP 389. RPS 1532/6. 81 ADCP 376. 80

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In November 1532, the King had acted to prevent the numbers on the bench falling below the level prescribed for competent decisions. As it happens, difficulties in securing a quorum in the Session continued to persist over the next few years, to the extent that it came to seem desirable to modify the quorum itself in 1536. However, it is again significant that it was considered necessary to address this problem through the formality of a royal ordinance, which both declared the quorum to be modified and stated that this modification superseded the relevant provision of the 1532 statutes. It implies that an important degree of constitutional authority was accorded to the rules adopted in 1532, such that their amendment should be promulgated in these terms. The King himself seems to have shared in that perception, appearing careful to acknowledge that the modification required authorisation by way of what was acknowledged to be an “expres dirogatioun” from the earlier rules. The change in January 1536 took the form of registration of a letter from the King in the Books of Council, lowering the number required for a quorum to nine judges in total, and stating that the King “dispensit and be the tenour herof dispensis with your nomer in that behalf, that it is say that ony viii of yow with our chancelar or president sall be sufficient nomer for the geving of all decretis and sentencis, nochtwithstanding ony actis, constitutionis, or ordinancis maid tharupon in the contrar of befor, to the quhilk we mak expres dirogatioun …”.82 The method of modifying the 1532 legislation establishing the College therefore sheds light on the degree of status ascribed to that legislation as the primary instrument of regulation governing the College. Although in relation to the statutes of the court, James V proceeded to make modifications by royal ordinance communicated by the simple registration of a royal letter in the Books of Council, later amendments to the scheme envisaged in the parliamentary statute of 1532 itself seem to have been implemented by the formality of a corresponding parliamentary statute. This was done, for example, when the requirement that the president of the College of Justice be a churchman was removed in 1579, a parliamentary statute declaring that the new method of selection should “dispense with that part of the first institutioun of the college of justice beirand that the president sould be of the spirituall estate and ane prelat constitut in dignitie”.83 And as noted earlier, by 1625 there is some reason to suggest that this might even have crystallised into a normative requirement in the eyes of some, creating an expectation that a change to the scheme envisaged in the statute of 1532 should be made by parliamentary legislation, not merely through royal command. Indeed, by the middle of the sixteenth century it is already evident that the constitutional status of the College of Justice was seen to be governed and protected by the statutes of 1532. The Lords of Session made an ordinance in 1555 which imposed greater controls over which members of the Council were entitled to sit as “extraordinary” supernumerary lords, requesting the Regent “to name, schaw and declair, qu82 83

ADCP 448. RPS 1579/10/55.

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hilk thre or four of the greit counsale sall haif voce and be adionit to the saidis Senatouris, and to discharge the remanent, conforme to the erectioun, actis, and statutes foirsaidis”.84 The statutes of 1532 which instituted the College of Justice were allegedly being breached,85 the act of sederunt seeming to found expressly on the parliamentary statutes in narrating that “[t]he Lordis of the College of Justice findis and considderis that the multitude of supernumerare Lordis adionit to the President and fourtene ordinar Senatouris is aganis the erectioun of the College of Justice actis and statutis maid be umquhile oure Soverane Lord that last deceissit, King James the Fyft, quhome God assoilye, in Parliament, be the advyise of the thre staittis of the samyn” (emphasis added). This is reminiscent of one of the very complaints which had led to the creation of the College in the first place, and had inspired reforms to the pre-1532 Session which prefigured the foundation of the College in 1532.86 In 1531, for example, an ordinance had been made “anentis the ordouring of the sessioun” which had created a defined list of those lords of council who could attend the Session, “[f]orsamekle as be multitude of lordis ingyrand thaim indifferently in tymes bigane to have voit in the sessioun and in decisioun of civile materis thar has bene baith gret confusioun and stop in the doing of justice and na ordour kepit tharin”.87 The amendment to the scheme of 1532 which allowed the Chancellor and up to four supernumerary lords to attend the Session had prevented this problem from being comprehensively addressed, and in 1555 it is clear that the Lords of Session wished to impose further controls on how the supernumerary lords were assigned, and also to subject them to the same duties of performance as applied to the ordinary judges – those who were the senators of the College of Justice. The act of sederunt went on to define these requirements, insisting that “the saidis supernumerare Lordis remane continewalie, and mak personale residence with the President and the uther Lordis numerares ordinaris, in discussing of all causses, and administratioun of iustice to the lieges of this realme”, threatening them with the sanction of being removed and prevented from exercising a vote if they failed to oblige. The mischief to be prevented was also very clearly stated, namely “that thai cum allanerlie for particular actionis of thair awin, or concerning freindis, and to have expeditioun thairof, and than to depart as thai pleis.” The statutes of the court of June 1532 had clearly forbidden selective attendance of this kind, at least for ordinary senators, stating that “nane of the lordis chosin and admittit on the sessioun depart or byid away without licence askit and optenit fra the chancellar or president in presence of the haill counsale for ressonable causis”.88 In complaining in 1555 that this was “aganis the erectioun of the College of Justice actis and statutis maid be umquhile oure Soverane Lord that last deceissit, King James the Fyft”, the Lords of Session 84 Acts of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session 1532 – 1555 (Edinburgh, 1811), p. 55. 85 Hannay, College of Justice, p. 131. 86 Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland, pp. 107 – 118. 87 ADCP p. 349. 88 ADCP p. 376.

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clearly accorded normative status in 1555 to the legislation establishing the College, bracketing the parliamentary legislation of 1532 with the statutes of the court, as well as presumably the subsequent ratifying statute of 1540. 2. The Balance of Spiritual and Temporal Representation in Decision-Making The second example of the 1532 legislation coming to be regarded as a normative reference point is its citation to argue that it also required a particular balance of constitution in relation to temporal and spiritual judges, and that for some important decisions the minimum quorum was insufficient and a larger number of judges was necessary. In particular it was argued that the College was constrained to act consistently with provisions in the 1532 parliamentary legislation regulating the balance of representation between ecclesiastical and lay members. The parliamentary statute of 1532 had specified by category the respective numbers of churchmen and laymen who should constitute the ordinary judges of the Session. There were seven of each, but since in addition the president was to be a churchman this meant that a full bench would normally have a majority of eight churchmen, except of course when this balance was disturbed by the additional presence of the Chancellor or any supernumerary lords the King appointed (as noted earlier, this was up to four in total). The question therefore arose whether the respective balance between spiritual and temporal judges was a criterion not only for filling vacancies on the bench, but also for the valid constitution of the bench at particular hearings, and for the competence of making any particular decision or decree. Arguments to this effect were indeed made from time to time. In 1553, for example, we find a set of submissions by way of a protest in the case of barratry brought against Robert Crichton, provost of St Giles Collegiate Church in Edinburgh, in relation to the process of his appointment to the bishopric of Dunkeld.89 The protest had three aspects: (i) the role of “supernumerary” lords (ii) the appropriate numbers of judges for competently deciding “sic gret caussis”, and (iii) the necessary balance of representation of spiritual and lay judges. Although not entirely intelligible from the very compressed account recorded in the manuscript source, it seems to have been argued that the parliamentary statute establishing the College of Justice contained binding provisions requiring a certain balance between “spiritual” and “temporale” judges for decisions to be valid. The issue on this occasion seems to have arisen specifically from a disturbance to that balance caused by the inclusion 89 See useful background on the appointment of Crichton to Dunkeld in Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae Medii Aevi Ad Annum 1638, Revised Edition, D. E. R. Watt/A. L. Murray (eds.), Scottish Record Society New Series vol. 25 (Edinburgh, 2003), p. 130. On barratry, the procuring of a benefice by petition to Rome without royal license, see Ian B. Cowan, “Patronage, Provision and Reservation: Pre-Reformation Appointments to Scottish benefices”, in: Ian B. Cowan/Duncan Shaw (eds.), The Renaissance and Reformation in Scotland: Essays in honour of Gordon Donaldson (Edinburgh, 1983), pp. 75 – 92 at 82 – 83.

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of additional judges who were supernumerary as opposed to being from the fifteen ordinary Lords of Session (i. e. senators of the College of Justice) provided for in 1532 (including the president). Crichton’s procurator, Thomas McCalzeane “askit instrumentis and protestit […] in cais ony of the supernumerar lordis voted and gif furth decrete in the mater dependand befor thame”.90 He argued that according to the foundation of the College of Justice there required to be one more spiritual judge than temporal for a valid decree, i. e. a spiritual majority on the bench. He “askit instrumentis that he allegit that tharupoun be the erectioun of the college of justice thir suld be ane ma of spirituale nor [i. e. than] temporale at the geving of the said decrete.” He argued that this condition had not been satisfied in the present case.91 The submission is repeated with a different emphasis five days later when it was again protested by Crichton’s procurators that: thai on na wis admittit the saidis lordis [as] jugeis competent to this actioun be ressoun that conforme to the erectioun of the college of justice and statutis maid tharupoun thair aucht to be present at the disputatioun of all materis the president and viii utheris spirituale men with the haill temporale men that is to say uther vii temporale men with the four lordis of the privy counsale quhilkis ar declarit be my lord governouris grace to be adionit to the lordis of sessioun of befor and tharfor desyrit the lordis answer gif thai wald proceid in the said actioun of the nowmer that thai ar now of. And in cais the saidis lordis thocht thai Juges competent of the said nowmer thai protestit for remeid of law and for thir remanent defences in the said actioun.92

This seems to assert that the whole bench had to be present before a valid decision could be made, at least for important cases. It was alleged that the judges were “of our sobir noumer” (i. e. too few) regarding “all sic gret caussis”, that this was not “conform to the institution of the college of justice”, and “that the lordis of counsale now being of the nowmer forsaid wer not juges competent to the said Maister Robert to decyde upon the summondis of barratrie”.93 Unhelpfully for this argument, the legislation of 1532 made no mention of a special quorum for “sic gret caussis”, though perhaps the argument was simply that this was implicit and should now be explicitly recognised, or else had already come to be part of the “practick” of the court since 1532. The ventilation of these difficulties seemed to lead some months later to a tightening up of the procedure of admitting lords in terms of their status as extraordinary or ordinary judges.94 What is most striking of all is the way that these procurators accepted the relevance of looking back two decades to the legislation of 1532 in an attempt to con90 The word “voted” is lost at the folio margin and difficult to read because of the modern binding of the record. 91 Noted in Hannay, College of Justice, p. 130. 92 NRS CS 7/8, f.311r. (30 August 1553). Summarised in ADCP 625. The reference to 8 other spiritual men would seem mistaken, and the submission ought to have referred to 7 other such judges alongside the president as a spiritual man too. 93 NRS CS 7/8, f.311r. (31 August 1553). Summarised in ADCP 625. 94 Hannay, College of Justice, p. 131.

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struct arguments about the proper constitution and competence of the Session in 1553. It seems curious that such a fundamental matter as was raised in the Crichton case could still be the subject of ambiguity or dispute. The procurators’ knowledge of the “practick” of the court as it had developed in those two decades must have been extensive. Henry Lauder, the Queen’s Advocate in this case, was in legal practice long before 1532, and had also been one of the original specially nominated general procurators of the new College of Justice in 1532.95 The submissions made for Crichton on this occasion are not completely intelligible from the recorded minutes, and seem somewhat convoluted and strained, not least because they have so little express basis in the statutes of 1532. These only imposed a quorum, initially of 11, as we have seen, but did not lay down any further requirements for “gret caussis”. However, the submissions in 1553 demonstrate an understanding that, regardless of the correctness of the argument in question, the operation of the Session should be seen as governed by the rules adopted at the constitution of the College of Justice in 1532, and that an argument would be strengthened if it could be demonstrated that something was indeed not “conform to the institution of the college of justice and statutis maid tharupoun”. This concern with the way the balance of votes in the Session might have been affected by the presence of additional supernumerary lords arose in part from the power the King retained under the 1532 parliamentary statute to nominate up to four supernumerary lords to the Session, alongside the residual right of the Chancellor to attend. As touched on above, this is recognised in modern scholarship as likely to have been an amendment to the original scheme for a bench of exactly fifteen judges with a spiritual majority,96 but it may be significant that no special allowance was introduced as a consequence of the amendment to regulate the difference this might make to decision-making if it were to remove the spiritual majority. This perhaps opened the way to potential uncertainty about the composition and balance of the bench in controversial cases or “gret caussis” especially. There is no mention of the role of supernumerary lords in the account of 1560 referred to earlier, but in the later account of 1605 we do find a description which does distinguish them in relation to establishing a quorum. There it is stated that: The first institucion appointeth one President and ffowerteene Senatours, seaven Churchmen and seaven Laye men in the whole nomber beinge xvteene. There are now adioned unto them The Channcellour whoe ys the Cheifest of the whole assemblie, and five extraordinarye [lords] betwixt whome and the other Senatours there is noe difference except that in anye matter that ys to be debayted before them, there is required the presence of nyne at least of these ordinarie Senatours, and albeyt there be eight of them and all the five extraordinarie present yet they supplie not the absence of the nynth. Neverthelesse otherwise their

95

ADCP 377. See also John Finlay, Men of Law in Pre-Reformation Scotland (East Linton, 2000), pp. 174 – 5. 96 Hannay, College of Justice, p. 103; Cairns, “Revisiting the Foundation of the College of Justice”, p. 34; Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland, p. 133.

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voice is to the concludinge of any matter ys of as greate force as the voice of anie other in the howse.97

This is entirely consistent with the legislation of 1532 (apart from the reference to five instead of four extraordinary lords), and also accurate in reflecting the “expres dirogatioun” made by the King in 1536 to reduce the quorum to nine. It also seems to reflect a resolution at some earlier stage of the question debated in 1553 about the role of supernumerary lords, confirming that their votes had equal weight with ordinary lords apart from establishing a quorum. The clarification – that the quorum must be satisfied exclusively from the regular fifteen senators of the College – is not articulated in the earlier sources discussed, and so it is not possible to say without further research when this was authoritatively determined. If accurate, however, this is an interesting additional provision which may have been implicit ever since 1532 or may have been clarified in subsequent decades, but certainly the 1605 account seems to be the first reference to it. In terms of the constitutional status of the College of Justice, it reflects another safeguard attached to the settlement of 1532 which helped insulate the judicial function of the College from untoward external interference. If the matter had been unclear in 1553, it would appear to have been resolved sometime during the subsequent decades. And the way the matter was approached was by reference back to a perceived difference in status between ordinary senators and extraordinary lords which was seemingly ascribed to or at least inferred from the parliamentary statute of 1532. However, the potential uncertainty had a further aspect. It could also extend to whether such additional lords, drawn perhaps from the wider council but potentially without regular judicial experience, would fulfill their judicial roles competently from a procedural point of view, and in conformity with the practick of the court. The constitutional status of the College of Justice dating back to its foundation in 1532 again seems to have meant that its judges saw themselves as possessing a collective authority to regulate the involvement of supernumerary lords in order to safeguard the proper discharge of its judicial role. In 1546, for example, the Lords of Session intervened when the earl of Arran as Governor (i. e. Regent) joined additional lords to the Session in a case concerning spoliation of goods and which was described as “grete and wechty and ane novelty”. The concern was to ensure that any additional lords discharged their judicial duties consistently with full attendance and participation. The books of council record that “in presens of my lord governour my lord chancelar in name of all the lordis of session … protestit that my lord governour noblemen and lordis adoinit to thaim at this tyme … be all present at the examinatioun of the witnesses in thair presens or ellis als mony adionit to thaim in thair places as hapins to be away to that effect”.98 By what right the Governor sent as many as six additional lords to the Session in this case is unclear, and is a departure from the scheme of 1532. 97 “Relation of the manner of judicatores of Scotland”, p. 265, para. 6 (“The College of Justice: constitution”). 98 NRS CS 6/28, f. 59v. (31 July 1546); ADCP 555.

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However, other proceedings in the same case suggest that the ad hoc procedure was regarded as necessary because proving the case as a civil matter would have entailed the proof of facts also demonstrating treason. Treason was criminal and still within the judicial competence of Parliament itself. As one procurator put it, “gret men” should therefore be adjoined to the Session since the summons “concludis in ane maner tresoun, for, ane decret gevin civily herin, the criminale actioun cumis tharupon”.99 Indeed, at an earlier stage the defender’s procurator had argued that because of the suggestion of treason he should be called “be ane ordour of law” and not by civil summons at all.100 This illustrates that for an important decision there might be reasons why the normal bench could be expanded, perhaps to give a decision sufficient authority, but that the Lords of Session would still seek to regulate the procedure of the expanded bench in such cases. It seems likely that the regular judges of the Session regarded the imposition of additional supernumerary lords as increasing the risk of procedural irregularity, for example voting without having attended relevant parts of the hearings, and therefore sought to regulate their participation in judicial decision-making and to set standards defining their conduct and attendance. Three years later the case in question had still not proceeded. To address difficulties in procuring the attendance of the supernumerary lords in question in March 1549 it is recorded that the Governor, with the advice of the lords of the College of Justice, abandoned the list of named extra lords and substituted any four of the lords of the Privy Council to be joined to the Lords of Session for determination of this case. Interestingly, it was felt necessary to make it explicit that in future this should not be regarded as an ordinary manner of proceeding in the College of Justice, it being stated that the procedure was adopted “providing alwayis that this be na preparative [i. e. precedent], and that na adiunctioun be maid in ony actioun persewit befor the saidis lordis fra this day furth in tyme tocum, bot that the saidis lordis of session allanerly determe and decyde in all actiouns cumand befor thaim and minister justice as accordis”.101 It seems probable that the way the arguments were ventilated in 1549 must also have reflected longer-term concerns about the role of supernumerary lords which were subsequently addressed in the act of sederunt of 1555 discussed above, in which it was provided that supernumerary lords should “remane continewalie, and mak personale residence with the President and the uther Lordis numerares ordinaris, in discussing of all causses”.102

99

ADCP 587 (1 April 1549). ADCP 550 (1 June 1546). 101 ADCP 586 – 7 (30 March 1549). 102 Acts of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session 1532 – 1555 (Edinburgh, 1811), p. 55. 100

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IV. Conclusion The examples surveyed in the previous section suggest that the legislative framework established in 1532 was seen to provide a lasting constitutional basis after 1532 for regulating the operation of the College of Justice. This framework played a dynamic role even without the agency of routine external mechanisms of control. It provided a normative point of reference for all incidental debates about the conduct of the court, and how it should be controlled, whether in the context of statutory or prerogative interventions to reform the College of Justice, or in legal submissions within private litigation which alleged contraventions of and demanded adherence to the framework. The close relationship of the College of Justice to the King, Privy Council and Parliament meant that interventions in the operation of the College of Justice by those bodies were conditioned and constrained but also guided by that framework. Although the purpose driving the subsequent change in 1626 possessed an essentially political character, it also draws attention to features of the College of Justice which help explain the absence of external control mechanisms. The close proximity and connectedness through personnel of the College of Justice to other institutions of governance, such as the Privy Council, meant that its operation was open to constant scrutiny and any problems were likely to command attention as they arose, and meet with a response from within the Session itself, if any were necessary, or ultimately from the Privy Council or the King, if perceived to be more efficacious or requiring the formality of a new ordinance or statute. There was no other comparable institution of government which could take any routine interest in imposing some form of “control” on the Session, and we have seen how Parliament’s attempt to do so on an ad hoc basis in 1584 was short-lived and ineffective. Further, the way that the College of Justice seems to have been conceived by the early seventeenth century as “a soverane and heigh court, whairof the fundatioun wes … built by [King James V] with the consent of the estaittis of parliament” suggests that “the auctoritie of this court” had come to be seen as constitutionally autonomous, and that this view was based on its being seen to have been founded by the King and Parliament back in 1532. Indeed, as we have seen, Charles I himself had sought to legitimate his proposals for the Session by arguing that they were consistent with “that estait wherein it wes satled at the first institutioun”. This form of authority gave the College an independent status which legitimated self-regulation by the court, and addressed the needs of constitutional accountability and institutional audit without special external measures of control. Self-regulation was indeed the practice of the court beyond 1532, making its own statutes or “acts of sederunt” from its foundation onwards, and with express statutory authority to do so from 1540. Though in 1532 the King was necessarily involved in ratifying such statutes, it is significant that by the seventeenth century the view could be put forward in the context of the 1626 dispute that changes to such a “soverane and heigh court” should require the approval not just of the King, but of Parliament itself.

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A Scottish approach to “control” therefore did exist, but it involved an alternative framework to methods of formal visitation and audit, and even this self-regulatory approach evolved over time as the wider framework of governance itself changed. The longer-term consequence of creating the College of Justice by parliamentary statute was to make it autonomous and subordinate to no other element of central governance, excepting further statutory regulation by Parliament itself. The outcome was a supreme court which possessed a strong degree of independence and authority and which became permanently embedded in the constitution of the kingdom of Scotland. Its preservation was expressly guaranteed under the articles of union which constituted the terms of union between Scotland and England in 1707 and became a foundation stone and permanent feature of the legal order of Scotland within the United Kingdom.103

103 RPS 1706/10/257, 19th article; for some more detailed analysis of aspects of article 19 see J. D. Ford, “Control of the Procedure of the College of Justice in Scotland”, elsewhere in this volume, pp. 235 – 236.

The Visitatio Generalis Magistratuum in the Decisiones of Juan Bautista Larrea (1639) By José Antonio López Nevot 1. In the Castilian Law of the Old Regime there co-existed three methods of controlling and demanding accountability from public officials and in particular officials of justice, namely, the judges: the pesquisa (or investigation), the trial of residencia and the visita. The pesquisa or inquisitio1 was an extraordinary procedure that originated in the lower middle ages, inspired by the inquisitorial principle, ordered ex officio by the king, who appointed special judges – pesquisidores –, and that was used as a means of controlling and demanded accountability of judges to the king. Conversely, residencia or syndicado2 was a regular procedure, based on the adversarial principle, which responded to private purposes and was primarily oriented to

1 See Joaquín Cerdá Ruiz-Funes, “En torno a la pesquisa y procedimiento inquisitivo en el Derecho castellano-leonés de la Edad Media”, Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español (= AHDE), 32 (1962), pp. 483 – 517; Luis García de Valdeavellano, “La pesquisa como medio de prueba en el Derecho procesal del reino astur-leonés (dos documentos para su estudio)”, Moneda y Crédito. Homenaje a Emilio Gómez Orbaneja (1977), pp. 221 – 241; Evelyn S. Procter, El uso judicial de la pesquisa en León y Castilla (1157 – 1369), Translation and Notes of Francisco Ramos Bossini, Granada, 1978; Benjamín González Alonso, “Control y responsabilidad de los oficiales reales: notas en torno a una pesquisa del siglo XVIII”, in Sobre el Estado y la Administración de la Corona de Castilla en el Antiguo Régimen. Las Comunidades de Castilla y otros estudios, Madrid, 1981, pp. 140 – 202, and “Los procedimientos de control y exigencia de responsabilidad de los oficiales regios en el Antiguo Régimen (Corona de Castilla, siglos XIII – XVIII)”, in La responsabilidad en el Derecho. Edition of Fernando Pantaleón, Anuario de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 4 (2000), pp. 249 – 271. 2 On the issue of residencia in Castile, see Luis García de Valdeavellano, “Las Partidas y los orígenes medievales del juicio de residencia”, Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia, 153, volume II (October – December 1963), pp. 205 – 229; Rafael Serra Ruiz, “Notas sobre sobre el juicio de residencia en la época de los Reyes Católicos”, Anuario de Estudios Medievales, 5 (1968), pp. 531 – 548; Benjamín González Alonso, “El juicio de residencia en Castilla. I: Origen y evolución hasta 1480”, AHDE, 48 (1978), pp. 193 – 247; María José Collantes de Terán de la Hera, “El juicio de residencia en Castilla a través de la doctrina jurídica de la Edad Moderna”, Historia. Instituciones. Documentos, 25 (1998), pp. 151 – 184; José Manuel de Bernardo Ares, “Los juicios de residencia como fuente para la historia urbana”, in El poder municipal y la organización política de la sociedad. Algunas lecciones del pasado, Córdoba, 1998, pp. 69 – 100; Carmen González Peinado, “El juicio de residencia a don Alonso Granada Venegas (Ocaña, Toledo, 1597): algunas notas sobre su procedimiento”, Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, 23 (2010), pp. 41 – 57. On the sindicado in italian territories, José

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establish the liability of judges by individuals harmed by their performance in the execution of their office. Moreover, the residencia was implemented only when the judge had ceased to occupy his function (post dimisso officio), while the pesquisa operated constante officio. Over time, the residencia of the judges was preferably applied to the individual and temporary judges, and in particular to the corregidores3, and was carried out, either by special judges appointed by the king, so-called judges of residencia, or by his successor in office. As for the visita4, originally it was simply the result of applying the traditional general pesquisa to the control and accountability of senior judges5. In the words of González Alonso, it was necessary “alumbrar una fórmula que permitiese fiscalizar también la actuación de aquellos órganos colegiados cuyos integrantes representaban a la persona del rey y ejercían sus cargos por tiempo indefinido; se requería la conformación de un mecanismo ajeno al régimen común de los jueces ordinarios,

María García Marín, Monarquía Católica en Italia. Burocracia imperial y privilegios constitucionales, Madrid, 1992, pp.188 and ff. 3 González Alonso, “Los procedimientos” cit., p. 267. 4 On the visit, see González Alonso, “Los procedimientos” cit., pp. 268 and ff.; Carlos Garriga, Génesis y formación histórica de las visitas a las Chancillerías castellanas (1484 – 1554), doctoral thesis, Salamanca, 1989, “Control y disciplina de los oficiales públicos en Castilla: la ‘visita’ del Ordenamiento de Toledo de 1480”, AHDE, 61 (1991), pp. 216 – 390, La Audiencia y las Chancillerías castellanas (1371 – 1525). Historia política, régimen jurídico y práctica institucional, Madrid, 1994, particularly pp. 200 – 203, and 425 – 428, “La expansión de la visita castellana a Indias: presupuestos, alcance y significado”, in XI Congreso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano. Actas y estudios, Buenos Aires, 1997, III, pp. 51 – 79, “Los capítulos de la visita de Don Francisco Sarmiento a la Chancillería de Valladolid”, Initium. Revista Catalana d’Història del Dret, 7 (2002), pp. 963 – 995, “La Real Audiencia y Chancillería de Granada”, in Javier Moya Morales, Eduardo Quesada Dorador and David Torres Ibáñez (eds.), Real Chancillería de Granada. V Centenario 1505 2005, Granada, MMVI, pp. 149 – 219, particularly pp. 204 – 211, “Las Ordenanzas de la Real Audiencia y Chancillería de Valladolid. Estudio preliminar a la Recopilación de 1566”, in Recopilación de las Ordenanzas de la Real Audiencia y Chancillería de Valladolid, Madrid, 2007, pp. 7 – 128, particularly pp. 63 – 80; Ignacio Ezquerra Revilla, “Rehabilitación de la justicia cortesana: la visita de Diego de Córdoba (1553 – 1554)”, in Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa (1530 – 1558): Congreso internacional, Madrid 3 – 6 July 2000, II, Madrid, 2001, pp. 199 – 320; José Antonio Pérez Juan, “La visita de Ramírez Fariña a la Audiencia de Sevilla”, Historia. Instituciones. Documentos, 29 (2002), pp. 357 – 405; Ricardo Gómez Rivero, “El juicio al Secretario de Estado Pedro Franqueza, conde de Villalonga”, Ivs fvgit. Revista de Estudios Histórico-Jurídicos de la Corona de Aragón, 10 – 11 (2001 – 2002), pp. 401 – 531, and Inés Gómez González, “Las visitas según un magistrado del Seiscientos. El ‘Manifiesto al mundo’ de don Francisco Marín de Rodezno”, in Miguel Luis López-Guadalupe and Juan José Iglesias Rodríguez (coords.), Realidades conflictivas. Andalucía y América en la España del Barroco, Seville, 2012, pp. 409 – 428, and “Las visitas a los tribunales reales: fuentes para el estudio de la conflictividad y la violencia”, Les Cahiers de Framespa. Nouveaux champs de l’histoire sociale [On Line], 12 (2013), consulted 17 March 2015. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, 23 (2010), pp. 41 – 57. 5 Garriga, La Audiencia cit., p. 426.

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aplicable a quienes, dada su condición de jueces superiores, se hallaban radicalmente identificados con el monarca y ejercitaban su misma jurisdicción”6. It was during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Catholic Monarchs, and was yet another manifestation of the reform programme they promoted, when they launched, by way of fact, the deployment of the visit, as an extraordinary procedure for external control of the Audiencia y Chancillería (the Court and Chancellery). The visit was first tested in 1484, to review the operation of the single Court and Chancellery then existing in Valladolid. It was again put into practice in the early sixteenth century, reaching the fullness of the learning process in the middle of the century. Then it led “en la rutina que preludia su agotamiento y declive, perceptible en el siglo XVII e irreversible en el XVIII”7. From the splitting of the Court and Chancellery, with the creation in 1494 of the Court and Chancellery, in Ciudad Real8, moved to Granada in 1505, both courts were subject to the visit, often simultaneously. The Chancellery of Valladolid was visited on fifteen occasions: two in the fifteenth century; ten in the sixteenth century, and three in the seventeenth. Table 1 Visits to the Chancellery of Valladolid Year

Visitor

1484 1490

Juan Daza, dean of Jaén

1503

Martín de Córdoba, royal chaplain

1508

Diego de Ribera

1513 – 1515

Juan de Tavera, bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo

1522 – 1525

Francisco de Mendoza, bishop of Zamora

1530 – 1534

Pedro Pacheco, bishop of Mondoñedo

1539 – 1542

Juan de Córdoba, dean of the church of Córdoba

1550 – 1554

Jurist Diego de Córdoba, a member of Council of the Inquisition

1559 – 1566

Pedro Ponce de León, bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo continued next page

6 [It was necessary to] “light a formula which also monitored the activities of those corporate bodies whose members represented the person of the king and were in office indefinitely; it required the creation of a mechanism outside the common system of ordinary judges applicable to those who, given their status as senior judges, were radically identified with the monarch and exercised the same jurisdiction” (González Alonso, “Los procedimientos” cit., p. 268). 7 [Then it led] “in the routine that preludes depletion and decline, perceptible in the seventeenth century and irreversible in the eighteenth” (ibid.). 8 The Chancillería of Ciudad Real was visited only once, in 1501, by Martín de Córdoba, royal chaplain. The report of the visita can be seen in: Santos Manuel Coronas González, “La Audiencia y Chancillería de Ciudad Real (1494 – 1505)”, Cuadernos de Estudios Manchegos, 11 (August 1981), pp. 47 – 139, particularly pp. 110 – 139.

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Table 1 continued 1573 – 1577

Francisco Sarmiento, bishop of Astorga

1589 – 1591

Jerónimo Manrique de Lara, bishop of Cartagena

1618 – 1624

Jurist Fernando Ramírez Fariña, assistant of Sevilla

1662 1684

For its part, the Chancillería of Granada was visited thirteen times, eight in the sixteenth century, four in the seventeenth, and once in the eighteenth. Table 2 Visits to the Chancellery of Granada Year

Visitor

1514

Fernando Vázquez de Arce, Canary bishop

1522 – 1523

Francisco de Herrera, chaplain mayor de Toledo

1534 – 1536

Pedro Pacheco, bishop of Mondoñedo

1542

Martín Tristán Calvete, bishop of Oviedo

1549

Miguel Muñoz, bishop of Cuenca

1559 – 1563

Diego de Castilla, dean of the Church of Toledo

1574 – 1577

Doctor Juan Redín, president of the Chancellery of Granada

1590 – 1594

Jurist Juan de Acuña, counsellor of Castile

1619

Juan Zapata Osorio, bishop of Zamora

1628 – 1629

Juan de Torres Osorio, bishop of Valladolid

1654 1660 – 1661

Licenciado Juan de Arce y Otálora, counsellor of Castile

1785

Juan Mariño de la Barrera, president of the Chancellery of Granada

The visit never occurred on an ordinary and regular basis, in so far as it depended exclusively on the royal will. Although the Cortes (Parliament) requested that the visits should take place regularly, once every two or three years, their requests did not receive a satisfactory response from the monarch9. Moreover, and in contrast to the residencia, the visit lacked a legal term that would limit its duration10. Hence the holding of the visits could by delayed for long periods. The appointment of the visitor usuallly rested with a jurist of experience and trust, often a cleric – a bishop, dean –, or a royal counsellor, presumably apart from the 9

María Paz Alonso Romero, “Las Cortes y la Administración de la Justicia”, in Las Cortes de Castilla y León en la Edad Moderna. Actas de la segunda etapa del Congreso Científico sobre la historia de las Cortes de Castilla y León, Salamanca, 7 – 10 April 1987, Valladolid, 1989, pp. 503 – 562, particularly p. 538, and Garriga, La Audiencia cit., pp. 157 – 158 and 191, and “Las Ordenanzas” cit., p. 64. 10 Garriga, La Audiencia cit., p. 426.

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Chancillería and its social environment11. The visitor received a royal command in which he was entrusted with the visit, in order to find out how each and every one of the court officials had exercised their offices, inquiring whether they had complied with the laws of the kingdom, the ordinances and chapters from previous visits, or had contravened them, committing excesses, causing grievances, or acting negligently, and whether they had observed tariffs under which should receive their rights; once the truth was ascertained, the visitor should transfer the charges to those proved guilty and receive their discharges; once received, he should forward them, together with a general pesquisa, to the king, so that having heard the report of the visitor12, and after consulting the Royal Council, ordered to provide about it. The letter of commission empowered the visitor to impose sanctions on those who did not appeaer to answer their call as witnesses13. In a separate provision, the monarch authorized the visitor to be present at the voting and determination of lawsuits in the Real Agreement of the Chancillería, but also in the various courtrooms, the latter possibility that could not cease to be answered by the judges. The witnesses examined by the visitor were forced under oath to state the truth and to observe secrecy. This was the cornerstone of the visit which was precisely the strictest secrecy, which protected the identity and statements of prosecution witnesses14. As Juan Martínez Lozano wrote in his Práctica de la Real Chancillería de Granada (Practice of the Royal Chancellery of Granada), written in the mid-seventeenth century, “en guardar secreto consiste el buen aciertto de la vissita”15. However, this principle has been criticized and condemned, as visiting judges lacked the opportunity to learn the names and statements of witnesses and, consequently, to contradict or remove them as such witnesses. To find the truth, the visitor could seek information by any means, including anonymous libels and secret memorials, whose admission was, as we shall see, opposed by legal doctrine.

11

Garriga, “Las Ordenanzas” cit., p. 66. The Ordinances of the Royal Council of 1554 had authorised the visitors to attend the voting and determination of the visit carried out, provided that they belonged to one of the Councils and swore the oath of secrecy; on the other hand, and simply for information, the councillors had to request any visitor, orally or in writing, his opinion on the results of the visita. See Recopilacion de las Leyes destos Reynos, hecha por mandado de la Magestad Catolica del Rey don Felipe Segundo nuestro señor (= NR), 2.4.36. 13 See the commission given to Pedro Ponce de León, bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo, to visit the Chancillería of Valladolid, dated 14 December 1558, apud Garriga, “Las Ordenanzas” cit., p. 67, n. 264. 14 Garriga, “La Real Audiencia y Chancillería” cit., p. 205, and “Las Ordenanzas” cit., pp. 68 – 69. 15 “Keeping secret is a good act of the visita” (José Antonio López Nevot, Práctica de la Real Chancillería de Granada. Estudio preliminar y edición del manuscrito 309 de la Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, Granada, 2005, p. 572). 12

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The visit did not follow the form of the ordinary trial. Hence, it was defined as a “sumario y anómalo, fuera del orden y reglas del derecho comun”16, and considered as a procedure that threatened the authority and freedom of judges, because it led to the practice constante officio. Note that Audiencias y Chancillerías hearings were granted for an unlimited period, ad beneplacitum principis, and were considered perpetual. As Garriga has shown, the visit served in the first place to demand disciplinary responsibility that officials had incurred for the use of their posts. At the same time, it was a preparatory procedure requiring shared responsibility of the officials who were blamed in the visit. But the visit also served to reward those who had rightly exercised the duties of their post, becoming the benchmark of the royal policy for promoting judicial officials. Finally, the visit also had a normative aspect. As a result of the information obtained, and once it had been received and reviewed in the Royal Council, the monarchs dictated the corresponding chapters of the visit, which were available as necessary to correct or reform the government of the Chancillería and the administration of justice17 We should remember that the visit carried out in 1590 – 1594 by Juan de Acuña to the Chancillería of Granada led to the drafting of the recompilation of the Ordinances of 1601. 2. We have alluded to the decline of the visit during the seventeenth century. However, the beginning of the reign of Philip IV (1621 – 1665) is singled out by a policy of general reformation of the monarchy that also affected the administration of justice. In 1624, three years after the accession to the throne of Philip IV, Gaspar de Guzmán, Count of Olivares, addressed the young monarch in a famous writing interchangeably known as the Secret Instruction or the Great Memorial; in its pages he refers the valido of the visit which by then had turned to the Chancellery of Valladolid, hoping that “los grandes castigos della causase escarmiento de aquí adelante”18. The visit, which began in 1618, under Philip III, was completed in 1624 by the jurist, Fernando Ramírez Fariña, assistant of Sevile and who confided in the valido19. The punishments 16 [A] “summary and anomalous judgment, out of order and the rules of the common law” ([Jerónimo] Castillo de Bovadilla, Politica para Corregidores, y Señores de Vasallos, en tiempo de paz, y de guerra. Y para Juezes Eclesiasticos y seglares, y de Sacas, Aduanas, y de Residencias, y sus Oficiales: y para Regidores, y Abogados, y del valor de los Corregimientos, y Gobiernos Realengos, y de las Ordenes. Autor el Licenciado…, del Consejo del Rey Don Felipe III, nuestro Señor, y su Fiscal en la Real Chancilleria de Valladolid, Amberes [Antwerp], 1704 (1st ed., Madrid, 1597), facsimile edition, with Estudio preliminar of Benjamín González Alonso, Madrid, 1978, II, Lib. V., Cap. I, n8. 129, p. 449). 17 Garriga, La Audiencia cit., p. 428, “La Real Audiencia y Chancillería” cit., pp. 204 – 205, and “Las Ordenanzas” cit., p. 64. 18 [Hoping that] “the great punishments of it does cause great chastisement henceforth” (John H. Elliott and José F. de la Peña, Memoriales y cartas del Conde Duque de Olivares. Tomo I. Política interior: 1621 a 1627, Madrid, 1978, p. 72). 19 On Fernando Ramírez Fariña, see Elliott and de la Peña, Memoriales cit, pp. 66 – 67, n. 39; Bartolomé Clavero, Sevilla, Concejo y Audiencia: Invitación a sus Ordenanzas de

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were doubtless exemplary: several judges were deprived of their offices, and others temporarily suspended from their duties20. However, shortly after, the convicted officers rushed to the monarch, obtaining mitigation of sentences by royal clemency21. Moreover, from 1624 until the end of the reign of Philip IV, there was only one more visit to the Valladolid Chancillería, in 166222. During the seventeenth century, the Chancillería of Granada was visited on at least three occasions, once in the reign of Philip III, and twice in that of Philip IV. In 1619 Juan Zapata Osorio, bishop of Zamora, visited the court; in 1628 – 1629 Juan de Torres Osorio, bishop of Valladolid did so and in 1660 – 1661, jurist Juan de Arce y Otálora, counsellor of Castile23. It is likely that there was a fourth visit, whose chapters would have been published in 165424. In a certain Relaçion de las çedulas que se despacharon de las condenaciones que se hiçieron a diferentes ministros de aquella Chançilleria (la de Granada) que hauian sido y eran della (Report of the documents which were sent of the condemnations remitted to various ministers of that Chancilleria [that of Granada] which had been and were of it] setting out the particular charges against those judges (of Granada). They have been and are and were preserved in the Archivo Histórico Nacional, including individual charges of the 1619 visit. Seven oidores (judges) were found guilty, together with a alcalde del crimen (judge of the crime) and a alcalde de hijosdalgo (judge of noblemen)25. Among the charges appear offences committed by the judges in the performance of their posts, such as unjust convictions, receiving quantities of money and excessive or improper salaries, letting themselves be bribed, or interceding in other lawsuits, as well as with conduct that affected the private life of judges, such as marrying without royal licence, gambling or concubinage, but in justicia, introductory study to the facsimilar edition of Ordenancas de la Real Avdiencia de Seuilla. Printed in Seville by Bartolome Gomez año 1603, Seville, 1995, pp. 7 – 95, particularly p. 93, n. 81, and María del Mar Tizón Ferrer, “Audiencias Reales al sur del Tajo: Compilaciones de Ordenanzas en el siglo XVII”, AHDE, 69 (1999), pp. 519 – 528, particularly p. 520. 20 Elliott and de la Peña, Memoriales cit., pp. 66 – 67, n. 39, and p. 72, n. 40, and Richard L. Kagan, “Pleitos y poder real. La Chancillería de Valladolid (1500 – 1700)”, Cuadernos de investigación histórica, 2 (1978), pp. 291 – 316, particularly p. 297. 21 See Richard L. Kagan, Pleitos y pleiteantes en Castilla, 1500 – 1700, trans. by Margarita Moreno, Salamanca, 1991, pp. 191 – 192. 22 According to Kagan, “los documentos de esta inspección se han perdido, pero parece que careció de rigor y no tuvo más consecuencia que el traslado a la Chancillería de Granada de un oidor que supuestamente se había casado con una mujer de la localidad sin el permiso real”. (Pleitos y pleiteantes cit., p. 193). 23 The reports of these visits can be seen in Ordenanças de la Real Avdiençia y Chançilleria de Granada, Printed in Granada by Sebastian de Mena in 1601, facsimilar edition, Granada, 1997, in fine. 24 Inés Gómez González, La justicia, el gobierno y sus hacedores. La Real Chancillería de Granada en el Antiguo Régimen, Granada, 2003, p. 82. 25 Archivo Histórico Nacional, Consejos, leg. 13.527. The text is reproduced in the Documental Appendix.

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some cases they had been able to influence the resolution of a lawsuit. It also included a case of seduction, allegedly committed by a magistrate abusing his status. As regards the punitive consequences of the visit, in most cases financial penalties were imposed and, in only one case, the suspension from office of judge and in another a judicial official, together with the penalty of banishment from Granada and of the Court. When the convictions were passed, one of the seven convicted judges had been transferred to the Chancellery of Valladolid, and four were promoted to the Councils26. As for the visit of 1661, it caused the dismissal of the president of the Chancellery of Granada himself, Francisco Marín de Rodezno. Along with the deprivation of this post he was disqualified from holding the office of justice, exiled and various fines were imposed; however, seven years later, Rodezno obtained from Charles II authorization to return to the offices of justice27. Gradually, the monarchy gave up regularly and rigorously monitoring the performance of the higher courts by means of the visit. According to Kagan, the abandonment of the visit in the seventeenth century was favoured by the concurrence of several causes: the nature of the institution itself, a slow and expensive process, its diminishing practical efficiency, and corporate resistance from senior judges28. However, it was then that the visit, free from any legal regulation, received a profiled doctrinal treatment in the work of one of the most qualified jurists of his time: Juan Bautista Larrea29. 3. The oldest bio-bibliographical information about Juan Bautista Larrea comes from the works of Nicolás Antonio30, José Antonio Álvarez y Baena31 and José de

26

See Documental Appendix. See Manifiesto ivridico, politico, historico y moral que haze al mvndo el Doctor D. Francisco Marin de Rodezno, Cauallero del Orden de Calatraua, señor de la Villa de Rodezno, Colegial que fue en el mayor del Arçobispo de Salamanca, del Consejo de su Mag. y su Presidente once años de la Real Chancilleria de Granada, despues de Canonigo de Toledo, è Inquisidor Fiscal, y Consejero en la Suprema General Inquisicion. Y de lo qve sv inocencia ha padecido en la mayor demonstracion, y sin exemplo, que se hizo con èl, ni se ha visto con otro Ministro, aun de mucho menor puesto, por resulta de la visita que se hizo de la dicha Chancilleria, por el señor Don Iuan de Arce y Otalora, Cauallero del Orden de Santiago, del Consejo Supremo de Castilla. Y sentencia qve sobre ella se dio por el dicho Consejo, por la qual se le priuò del puesto de Presidente, y de otro qualquier oficio de administracion de justicia, y en diferentes cantidades que importauan treze mil ducados, y que saliesse de Granada dentro de ocho dias, y no entrasse en Madrid, ni quince leguas en contorno, sin licencia de su Magestad, s. l., s. f., ff. 1v. – 2r. 28 Kagan, Pleitos y pleiteantes cit., pp. 195 – 196. 29 See Garriga, “La Real Audiencia y Chancillería” cit., p. 210, and “Las Ordenanzas” cit., p. 72, n. 286. 30 Nicolás Antonio, Bibliotheca Hispana Nova, sive Hispanorum Scriptorum, qui ab anno MD. Ad MDCLXXXIV. floruere notitia. Auctore … Tomus Primus, Matriti, MDCCLXXXIII, ristampa anastatica, Presentazione de Mario Ruffini, Torino, 1963, p. 648. 27

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Rezábal y Ugarte32. In modern times the life and work of the lawyer have been dealt with by Larrea Manuel Pérez-Victoria de Benavides33 and, above all, by Paola Volpini, author of several articles and a monograph on the lawyer34. To summarize the biography of Larrea, Juan Bautista Larrea y Tablares was born in Madrid35 in 1589, the eldest son of Pedro Larrea, a merchant, a native of Agromaniz in the province of Alava, and Catalina Tablares, a native of Madrid, although the family had ties in Amusco36. Larrea studied civil and canon law at Salamanca, where he was a schoolboy at the Colegio Mayor de Cuenca and successively served as chairs cursatorias of Instituta (1613 – 1615), Código (1615 – 1616) and Volumen (1616 – 1620), until obtaining the prestigious chair of Vísperas de Leyes (1620 – 1621)37. 31 José Antonio Álvarez y Baena, Hijos de Madrid, ilustres en santidad, dignidades, armas, ciencias y artes. Diccionario Histórico por el orden alfabético de sus nombres, III, (J – L), Madrid, 1790, pp. 167 – 168. 32 José de Rezábal y Ugarte, Biblioteca de los escritores que han sido individuos de los seis Colegios Mayores: de San Ildefonso de la Universidad de Alcalá, de Santa Cruz de la de Valladolid, de San Bartolomé, de Cuenca, San Salvador de Oviedo y del Arzobispo de la de Salamanca, Madrid, 1805, pp. 180 – 183. 33 Manuel M. Pérez-Victoria de Benavides, “La teoría estatutaria como solución al conflicto entre el Derecho histórico de los distints reinos. (A propósito de una sentencia de la Chancillería de Granada en el s. XVII)”, Initium. Revista Catalana d’Història del Dret, 6 (2001), pp. 445 – 468. 34 Paola Volpini, “Las Allegationes Fiscales (1642 – 1645) de Juan Bautista Larrea”, Revista de Historia Moderna. Anales de la Universidad de Alicante, 15 (1996), pp. 465 – 502, “‘Por la autoridad de los ministros’: observaciones sobre los letrados en una alegación de Juan Bautista Larrea (primera mitad del siglo XVII)”, Cuadernos de Historia Moderna, 30 (2005), pp. 63 – 84, and Lo spazio politico del ‘letrado’. Juan Bautista Larrea magistrato e giurista nella monarchia di Filippo IV, Bologna, 2004, now in spanish: El espacio político del letrado. Juan Bautista Larrea magistrado y jurista en la monarquía de Felipe IV, trans. by Jesús Villanueva, Madrid, 2010. See also Javier Alvarado Planas, voz Larrea, Juan Bautista de, in: Manuel J. Peláez (ed. and coord.), Diccionario crítico de Juristas Españoles, Portugueses y Latinoamericanos (Hispánicos, Brasileños, Quebequenses y restantes francófonos), vol. I (A – L), Zaragoza-Barcelona, 2005, p. 459, and Antonio García y García, “Juristas salmantinos, siglos XVI – XVII: impresos y manuscritos”, in Luis E. Rodríguez-San Pedro Bezares (coord.), Historia de la Universidad de Salamanca, vol. III, Saberes y confluencias, 1 (“Acta Salmaticense. Historia de la Universidad”, 63), Salamanca, 2006, pp. 139 – 170, particularly p. 153. 35 Erronously, Nicolás Antonio gives his birthplace in Vitoria: “D. Ioannes Baptista de Larrea, Cantaber, Victoriensis”. (Antonio, Bibliotheca cit., p. 648). It was Álvarez y Baena who warned of the mistake, skating that Larrea “nació en Madrid, como consta de la informacion que presentó en el consejo de las Ordenes, para ponerse el Hábito de Santiago; y no de Victoria, como dice el erudito D. Nicolas Antonio” ([Larrea] “was born in Madrid asproved in the information that he presented in the Council of the Orders, to put on the Habit of Santiago; no of Victoria, as said the learned D. Nicolas Antonio”) (Álvarez y Baena, Hijos de Madrid cit., p. 167). 36 Álvarez y Baena, Hijos de Madrid cit., p. 167, de Rezábal y Ugarte, Biblioteca cit., p. 180, and Volpini, El espacio político cit., p. 23. 37 Antonio, Bibliotheca cit., p. 648, García y García, “Juristas salmantinos”, cit., p. 153, and Volpini, El espacio político cit., p. 25. In Salamanca, at that time, the academic course

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In 1621, after seeking in vain for several years a plaza de asiento, he was appointed oidor of the Chancillería of Granada – where he had already obtained his doctorate38 –, in place of the lawyer Francisco Morales Salazar39. Larrea’s appointment as a judge in Granada coincided with the beginning of the reign of Philip IV, a circumstance that leads our jurist Volpini to surmise that he belonged to the circle close to the group of emerging government lawyers40. We know that during his tenure, Larrea presided over one of the four civil courts and the criminal court of Chancillería41. After the visit that Juan de Torres Osorio, bishop of Valladolid, paid to the court in 1628 – 1629, Larrea was convicted on six counts. The unsavory character of the judge was proved as was the questionable morality of his private conduct, characterized by frequent sexual disorders. Among the charges against Larrea figures first the seduction of a maiden named Ana María, daughter of Domingo Hernández, a baker, a resident of Granada42. We should not forget that fact for as the reader will see later, the “recorría un orden escalonado – Instituta, Código, Volumen y Digesto viejo –, que marcaba la secuencia de puestos docentes a desempeñar antes de alcanzar alguna de las cátedras de propiedad, hasta las de Prima que gozaban del mayor prestigio y remuneración. No era una escala rígida, y no todos la seguían, pero en ese orden pasaron entonces por la mayoría de las cátedras cursatorias los más insignes catedráticos, como Antonio Gómez, Pedro Peralta, Gabriel Enríquez, Antonio Pichardo de Vinuesa, Juan de Solórzano Pereira, Juan Bautista Larrea, Francisco Ramos del Manzano o José Fernández de Retes, en su camino hacia las cumbres de Vísperas o Prima” ([In Salamanca, at that time, the academic course] “followed a scaled order – Institute, Code, Volume and old Digest –, that marked the sequence of teaching posts to fulfil before reaching any of the chairs in title, until that of the Prima that enjoyed the greatest prestige and remuneration. It was not a rigid scale and not everyone followed it nor in that order but most of the cursatorias professors passed it such as the most reputed professors such as Antonio Gómez, Pedro Peralta, Gabriel Enríquez, Antonio Pichardo de Vinuesa, Juan de Solórzano Pereira, Juan Bautista Larrea, Francisco Ramos del Manzano or José Fernández de Retes, on their way towards the heights of Vísperas or Prima”) (Mariano Peset and M.a Paz Alonso Romero, “Las Facultades de Leyes”, in: Rodríguez-San Pedro Bezares (coord.), Historia de la Universidad de Salamanca cit., pp. 21 – 74, particularly p. 24). 38 He was appointed judge on 11 May 1621, taking possession of the office on 25 May. (Volpini, El espacio político cit., pp. 27 – 28). On the payroll of officials of the officials of the Chancillería of Granada for the year 1622 (Madrid, 22 January 1622), which included those who had served in their offices the previous year, Larrea figures among the judges in the sixteenth and last place. (Archivo Histórico Nacional, Sección Consejos Suprimidos, Nóminas de la Chancillería de Granada, Libro de Plazas n8 725, f. 24v.). 39 Pedro Gan Giménez, La Real Chancillería de Granada (1505 – 1834), Granada, 1988, pp. 266 and 290. 40 Volpini, El espacio político cit., p. 28. 41 Ibid., pp. 28 – 29. 42 “Cargos contra Don Joan Baptista de la Rea son 6. 18 Cargo. Que teniendo en su cassa Domingo Hernandez Hornero Vezino de Granada a Ana Maria su hija doncella el dicho don Joan de la Rea que vivia en frente empeço a soliçitarla desde sus ventanas y a persuadirla que condeçendiese con su voluntad dando lugar para cumplir con ella sus desseos como lo alcanço y consiguio quitandola su virginidad devajo de promesas que le hiço de que tomaba a cargo su remedio y aviendo succedido esto un mes antes de sant Joan del año passado de 625 despues conçerto con ella que se saliese de la cassa del dicho su padre que tenia un criado esperandola y assi la noche del dicho san Joan la suso dicha se hecho por una ventana y siendo sentida de

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court decision from which our author starts to treat the visit is precisely about an alleged case of seduction committed by a magistrate. Larrea was sentenced to pay a very high fine (400,000 maravedis), and to receive a rebuke. It seems, however, that the sentence had no major consequences43. Thanks to the probable influence of Fernando Valdés y Llano, Larrea was promoted to the office of fiscal prosecutor, first in the Council of Finance (1634) and then in that of Castile (1638)44. The cursus honorum of Larrea culminated with the award, in 1642, of a supernumerary place in the Council of Castile, with the same emoluments as other councillors, and quality that in his place the first vacancy would be conceded45. We should note that on 20 June 20, 1636, he had sufficiently consolidated his position in society to gain the hábito of knight of the Order of Santiago46. He died in Madrid in January 164547. Larrea published his Novae Decisiones Sacri Regii Senatvs Granatensis in Lyons in 163648, with individual dedications addressed to Philip IV and the Count-Duke of Olivares, dated in Madrid on 2 April 1635. Then followed two censorships, signed by the jurist Juan Pérez de Lara, lawyer of the Chancillería of Granada, and Juan Solórzano Pereyra, then councillor of the Indies, respectively. Pérez de Lara endorsed his censorship in Granada on 24 March 1632. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that Larrea had completed writing the book at least four years before it was printed, when Guillen françes moço del orno la quiso retirar y recoger a su cassa y Joan de Guevara criado del dicho don Joan que ya conforme al conçierto la estava esperando se lo ressistio hechando mano a la espada y se la llevo al dicho don Joan el qual se la tubo consigo aquella noche y aunque luego por la mañana la embio al monasterio de monjas de Sant Spiritus de Granada al cabo de tres meses la puso en casa de Joan Thomas de La Rea su deudo [?] donde tubola por su quenta por espacio de 12 o 13 meses alimentandola y dandola de vestir y vissitandola algunas noches de todo lo qual por la publicidad que se siguio a este casso a resultado grave escandalo. Culpa grave y al final”. (Apud Volpini, El espacio político cit., Anexo III. Documentos, 1. Cargos contra Juan Bautista Larrea, 1 – 2). 43 Volpini, El espacio político cit., pp. 29 – 32. 44 Ibid., pp. 44 – 45. The appointment as fiscal prosecutor of the Council of Finance took place on the 7 of March 1634; that of the fiscal of the Council of Castile on 26 September 1638, substituting the jurist Cristóbal de Moscoso y Córdova. (Discursos leídos ante la Real Academia de la Historia en la recepción pública del Excmo. Sr. D. José María Huet, el día 30 de junio de 1867, Madrid, 1867, Apéndice Segundo, Noticia de algunos fiscales del Consejo Real y de Castilla, p. 67). 45 4 January 1642. (Janine Fayard, Los miembros del Consejo de Castilla (1621 – 1746), trans. by Rufina Rodríguez Sanz, technical review by Vicente Pérez Moreda, Madrid, 1982, p. 509, and Volpini, El espacio político cit., p. 63). 46 Álvarez y Baena, Hijos de Madrid cit., p. 167, and Volpini, El espacio político cit., p. 53. 47 Álvarez y Baena, Hijos de Madrid cit., p. 168. 48 This is the complete title of the editio princeps: Novae Decisiones Sacri Regii Senatvs Granatensis Regni Castellae. Avthore Dre. D. Ioanne Baptista Larrea, Ivrisconsvlto hispano, Olim apvd Salmaticenses Collegii Maioris Conchensis Alumno, et Vespertinae legum Cathedrae proprietario Interprete, Cancellariae Granatensis Senatore; Nunc a Consiliis Potentissimi Hispaniarvm Regis Philippi IV. in Svpremo Regalis Patrimonii Senatv, Tomvs Primvs, Lugduni, Sumptibus Iacobi et Petri Prost, M.DC.XXXVI.

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he was judge of the Granada Chancillería. Moreover, in the censure of Lara, the work is cited under a title – Disputationum decisiuarum Granatensium – that does not match the final one. The editorial success of the publication of the book prompted Larrea to print a second volume in 1639, in the same french city, under a slightly different title: Novarvm Decisionvm Granatensivm. On the book cover Larrea is represented already as a knight of the Order of Santiago, a clear indication of the importance that our lawyer gave to obtaining this title49. Now the dedication is addressed to Fernando Valdés y Llano, president of the Council of Castile and archbishop of Granada. The volume includes another work of Larrea as an appendix, Tractatvs et Decisio de Revelationibvs. De Revelationibvs, an verae, vel falsae? decisiua S. Inquisitionis consultatio. According to Antonio Pérez Martín and Johannes-Michael Scholz, Larrea’s Decisiones was reprinted up to ten times in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, becoming one of the most widely reprinted hispanic jurisprudential texts, just a little less than the works of Jaime Cáncer and Juan Pedro Fontanella50. The book was hyperbolically praised by the editor Pedro Coello, in the dedication to Larrea of Svma de las Leyes penales of Francisco de la Pradilla51, quoted in Sacra Themidis Hispanae Arcana52 and referred to by numerous jurists from Juan de Solórzano Per49 Novarvm Decisionvm Granatensivm Pars Secvnda, Centvria Absolvta. Accessit Tractatus De Revelationibvs, cum Decisione consultiua S. Inquisitionis, Avthore Dre. D. Ioanne Baptista Larrea, Eqvite Ordinis D. Iacobi, IC. Hispano, Olim apud Salmaticenses Collegii Maioris Conchensis Alumno, et Vespertinae Legum Cathedrae proprietario Interprete, Cancellariae Granatensis Senatore, Nunc à Consiliis Potentissimi Hispaniarum Regis Philippi IV. in supremo Castellae Iustitiae Senatu. Cum Indice Jurium quae explicantur, et Rerum verborúmque locupletissimo, Lugduni, Sumptibus Iacobi et Petri Prost, M.DC.XXXIX. In 1642 and 1645, also in Lyons, Larrea gave to the press two volumes of his masterpiece: Allegationvm Fiscalivm. See Rafael Gibert, Historia General del Derecho español, Madrid, 1981, p. 254, and Ciencia jurídica española, Granada, 1983, p. 61, and Volpini, “Las Allegationes Fiscales” cit., passim, and El espacio político cit., pp. 67 – 73. 50 Antonio Pérez Martín and Johannes-Michael Scholz, Legislación y jurisprudencia en la España del Antiguo Régimen, Prologue by Mariano Peset, Valencia, 1978, pp. 287 – 288. 51 Svma de las Leyes penales por el Doctor Francisco de la Pradilla. Y adicionado por el Licenciado don Francisco de la Barreda. Y ahora de nueuo añadido por el Licenciado don Iuan Calderon, Abogado de los Reales Consejos. Dirigido: Al Doctor Don Ivan Bavtista de Larrea Cauallero de la Orden de Santiago, y del Consejo de su Magestad, Madrid, 1639, facsimile edition, Valladolid, 1996. See Volpini, El espacio político cit., pp. 36 – 37. 52 “Decisiones etiam Granatensis hujus illustris senatus II voll. edidit celeberrimus JCtus jo. Bapt. de Larrea (…). Prodiere illae typis Lugd. anno 1636. in fol. et iterum Turnonii in Gallia 1648. in fol.” (Gerardus Ernestus de Franckenau, Sacra Themidis Hispanae Arcana, jurium legumque ortus, progressus, varietates et observantias, cum praecipuis glossarum commentariorumque, quibus ilustrantur, auctoribus, et Fori Hispani praxi hodierna, publicae luci exponit D …, S.R.M. Daniae et Novergiae Secretarius. Editio Secunda novis accesionibus locupletata a Francisco Cerdano et Rico, Matriti, Anno M. DCC. LXXX, Sectio XIII, § XI, p. 348). There is a spanish translation: Gerardo Ernesto DE FRANKENAU, Sagrados Misterios de la Justicia Hispana, trans. and edition by María Ángeles Durán Ramas and Presentación by Bartolomé Clavero, Madrid, 1993.

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eyra – censor, remember, of the first volume – in his Política Indiana53 to Sancho de Llamas y Molina in his Commentaries on the Leyes de Toro54. Moreover, it has shown the spread of Decisiones in Italy55 and the Indies56. Pérez Martín and Scholz inserted Larrea’s Decisiones in the group of Questiones forenses, works “cuyas secciones partían de una cuestión vivamente discutida en la práctica y que aducían en este marco las correspondientes decisiones judiciales”57. In that sense, Larrea belonged to the group of decisionists, jurists who compiled or commented on the decisions or judgments of higher courts58. The relevance of the decisiones can hardly be overstated, since they “constituyen (…) una valiosísima fuente de información para conocer el cómo y el porqué de la aplicación del derecho por los tribunales”59. This was especially so in the kingdom of Castile, where the courts did not give reasons for their decisions and judges did not make their votes public60. According to Tomás y Valiente, the genre of decisionists, usual in Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia, was almost nonexistent in Castile, “con la excepción de Juan Bautista Larrea, que estudia las Decisiones de la Chancillería de Granada”61. 53 Marta Milagros del Vas Mingo and Miguel Luque Talaván, “Juan de Solórzano Pereyra y la cuestión de los Justos Títulos: Fuentes del libro I (capítulos IX – XII) de la Política Indiana”, in Antonio Gutiérrez Cuadrado and María Luisa Laviana Cuetos (coords.), Estudios sobre América: siglos XVI – XX, Seville, 2005, pp. 123 – 195, particularly p. 171. 54 Sancho de Llamas y Molina, Comentario crítico-jurídico-literal á las ochenta y tres Leyes de Toro; su autor … Colegial en el Mayor de San Ildefonso, Universidad de Alcalá, Doctor en ambos Derechos en la misma, y Consejero Togado en el Real y Supremo Consejo de Hacienda, 2 vols., Madrid, 1827, II, Comentarios a las leyes 63 and 74. 55 Volpini, El espacio político cit., p. 38. 56 Miguel Luque Talaván, “De los libros surgen las leyes. Aproximación a los fondos jurídicos de las bibliotecas particulares y públicas novohispanas”, in Idalia García Aguilar (comp.), Complejidad y materialidad: reflexiones del Seminario del Libro Antiguo, Cuadernos de Investigación, 10, México, 2009, pp. 65 – 191, particularly p. 95, and Javier Barrientos Grandón, “Librería de Don Sebastián Calvo de la Puerta (1717 – 1767) oidor de la Real Audiencia de Guatemala”, Revista de Estudios Histórico-Jurídicos, 21 (1999), pp. 373 – 337, particularly pp. 349 and 363. 57 [Works] “whose sections started from a keenly debated issue in practice and the relevant court decisions argued in this context” (Pérez Martín and Scholz, Legislación y jurisprudencia cit., p. 312). 58 See Ana María Barrero García, voz Decisionistas, in Enciclopedia de Historia de España dirigida por Miguel Artola. V. Diccionario temático, Madrid, 1995, pp. 389 – 390. 59 [They] “are (…) an invaluable source of information to know the how and why the law was applied by the courts” (Pérez-Victoria de Benavides, “La teoría estatutaria” cit., p. 447). 60 Carlos Garriga and Marta Lorente, “El juez y la ley: la motivación de las sentencias (Castilla, 1489-España, 1855)”, in Cádiz, 1812. La Constitución jurisdiccional, Epilogue by Bartolomé Clavero, Madrid, 2007, pp. 261 – 312. 61 “With the exception of Juan Bautista Larrea, who studies the decisions of the Chancillería of Granada” (Francisco Tomás y Valiente, “El pensamiento jurídico”, in Enciclopedia cit., III. Iglesia. Pensamiento. Cultura, Madrid, 1988, pp. 327 – 408, particularly p. 364). Nevertheless, together with Larrea one should cite as a spanish decisionist José Vela de Oreña. See José Antonio López Nevot, “Literatura jurídica y tribunales superiores en la Andalucía del

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The first volume consists of fifty Disputationes and the second of as many Decisiones. Each disputatio or decisio opens with a quaestio, which are numbered consecutively, the arguments, pro and con, include a brief summary of the judgment of the Senatvs Granatensis on the controversial issue (Senatvs in hac controuersia iudicauit, Senatvs in hoc casu decreuit), and its legal and doctrinal grounding. In some cases, Larrea expressly declares that he himself had taken part in the decision (me judice) and what the meaning of his vote was (in hac controuersia semper ego censui62, in quo articulo semper censui63, hac igitur quaestione in Senatu discussa, censui ego, et obtinuit64). Finally, in some cases he informs us that the judgment of Chancillería was appealed in the second degree appeal, adding what the decision of the Royal Council was65. Larrea’s Decisiones deal with very heterogeneous legal matters, hardly reducible to a single unified consideration. A list of singularly pithy substantial decisions address the serious consequences of the monarchy’s monetary policy on the castilian economy, in particular the alteration of copper coins introduced by the Pragmática of 7 August 1628, which reduced that currency by half its face value (disputationes XII – XXIV). Another extensive set of decisiones is dedicated to the institution of mayorazgo (primogeniture), which had already aroused in Castile the emergence of a literary genre (disputationes VIII, X and XXXI – XXXVIII and decisiones LI – LIX). Larrea also deals with other matters, such as the competence of the ecclesiastical judge to ask the help of the secular arm (disputatio I), dissolution of marriage due to impotence or entry into a religious body, income (disputatio II), restitution of dowry (disputatio VII) allocation of marital property (decisio LXII), natural affiliation (disputatio XLIII), hereditary improvement (disputatio XXXVI and decisio LXV) obligation of mantence between relatives (disputatio XLVII), capacity of clerics to convey their goods to stray children ( decisiones XCV – XCVI) conditional gifts (disputatio XL and decisio LXVII) censuses (disputatio XLII), prescribing the right to execute (disputatio XLIX), injury (decisiones LXVIII – LXXI), eviction (decisiones LXXII – LXXV), withdrawal from a convent (decisiones LXXIX – LXXVI and LXXX), freeing of slaves belonging to two people (decisio XC), pardons, including the general pardon granted by Philip IV on the birth of Prince Baltasar Carlos in October 1629 (disputationes XXV – XXX) of offences (disputatio L), distribution of offices of the republic between nobles and commoners (disputatio XLI), choice of parliamentary attorneys (disputatio XLV), recusation (disputatio XLVIII) application for appeals (decisiones LXXVII and C) and second appeals (decisio LXXVII), litigation costs (decisio LXXXVIII), judgment of residencia and visita (decisio XCVIII). Barroco”, in López-Guadalupe and Iglesias Rodríguez (coords.), Realidades conflictivas cit., pp. 429 – 456, particularly pp. 436 – 442. 62 Larrea, Novae Decisiones cit., disputatio VIII, n8. 83, p. 104. 63 Larrea, Novarvm Decisionvm cit., decisio LXXXIX, n8. 9, p. 300. 64 Ibid., decisio XCVIII, n8. 14, p. 351. 65 Larrea, Novae Decisiones cit., disputatio XXXIV, n8. 22, p. 436.

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Among the normative sources cited by Larrea there are passages of the Digest, Codex, Novellae, the Institutions, the Decretum Gratiani, the Decretals of Gregorio IX, the Partidas, the Leyes de Toro and the Nueva Recopilación. The sets include quotations, commentators, commentators, authors mos gallicus, decisionistas and hispanic writers66. As the reader has had the opportunity to check, Larrea dedicated decisio XCVIII to the residencia and to the visita: De syndicatu et visitatione Magistratuum, et quid in ea obseruandum. The substantial treatment given by Larrea to the subject transforms the decisio into a true monograph and at the same time a visitors’ manual where the origin of the visitatio is exposed, its procedure is described and criticism, warnings and recommendations are formulated, all interspersed with examples from historical experience67. Here is the quaestio: in the general visit of judges or the trial of the residencia, Larrea wonders whether before the accusation is formulated against the judge on matters that did not affect the exercise of his profession, the judge could be prosecuted in an irregular trial and secret pesquisa, or the case could be settled in a public and regular trial. Our author sums up the decisio thus: that question settled in the Chancillería in which he had voted and that in no way could the judge be punished by an irregular trial and secret pesquisa of residencia for those things that did not belong to the exercise of his profession, and where a public accusation had been made before the residencia had interposed, such as concubinage, or seduction (as was the case), but that the complaint should be referred to the ordinary trial68. Larrea begins by explaining the aims of the visit: to find out the excesses, correct those investigated, and reduce to enforcement of the obligation and the office69. Following a subject much discussed among the jurists of his time, Larrea traces the genealogy of the visit – and the trial of residencia – to the divine law, and for that purpose, invokes passages from the Gospel of Luke and the Book of Kings70. Although, according to our author, precedents could be found for the visit in the Castilian Law – laws 3.4.6 and 7.6 of the Partidas, law 135 of Estilo, and Title VIII of Book III of the

66

A detailed description of the critical apparatus of the Decisiones, in Pérez-Victoria de Benavides, “La teoría estatutaria” cit., pp. 456 – 459. 67 To a great extent, the decisio XCVIII was inspired by another Larrean text, Por la autoridad de los ministros a Su Magestad. The undated text but traceable to the decade of the 1630 s, has been studied and edited by por Paola Volpini. (Volpini, “Por la autoridad de los ministros” cit., and El espacio político cit, Anexo III. Documentos, 3, 4 – 29). 68 Larrea, Novarvm Decisionvm cit., decisio XCVIII, n8. 14, p. 351. See Volpini, El espacio político cit., pp. 113 – 114. 69 Larrea, Novarvm Decisionvm cit., decisio XCVIII, n8. 15, p. 351. 70 Ibid. Next and in the same paragraph, Larrea enumerates the authors who had preceded him in the doctrinal treatment of residencia and the visita. Among others, he refers to the names of Baldo, Amadeo, Dulceto, Cataldino, Paris de Puteo, Camilo Borrello, Raudense, Jerónimo Castillo de Bobadilla, Diego de Simancas, Gabriel Berart y Gassol, José Sessé, Francisco de Avilés, Pedro Núñez de Avendaño, García Mastrillo, Gabriel de Monterroso y Alvarado, Gonzalo Suárez de Paz, and Juan Bautista Valenzuela Velázquez.

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Nueva Recopilación 71 –, the institution found its nearest origin in the process of enquesta in the Aragonese Law, by which the excesses of senior judges would be discovered, and they proceded only from pesquisa, without a plenary investigation of the case72; later, Ferdinand the Catholic would have introduced the visits of the kingdom of Aragon into Castile73. Larrea then describes the procedure followed in the visit: the general visitors of Audiencias and Chancillerías could not judge, unless they were expressly permitted to do so, and only received evidence and successfully obtained information on the habits and actions of the officers, and remitted the process to the king and his Council, where he briefly looked and determined the visits without contradicting the judgments dictated and the appeal was then admitted; however, adds our author, the appeal was regularly allowed in the event of suspension or prohibition of office74. To weigh the severity of the secret that governed the procedure of the visit, Larrea did not hesitate to consider it as even more severe than the inquisitorial secret. In his view, the judgment of visit was more irregular than that established by the inquisidores for the causes of faith. Although the records of the process were not published in the court of the Holy See, but the copy of the testimony, without the names of witnesses, were given to the accused so that he could defend himself; however, the visit of judges proceeded more bitterly, since neither the names of the witnesses nor their statements were reported, but only the charges of which they were proven guilty, so that the visitado did not know the time, place and circumstances of the charges, and the form and manner in which the witnesses had deposed and therefore the defendant lacked the ordinary means of defence75. Given that the granting and removal of public offices depended on the royal will, the charges were attributed to judges provided they consented to be visited in that 71 None of the legal texts citeds here by Larrea refer to visit of magistrates properly socalled. The laws of the Partidas and Ley 135 of Estilo are concerned with what with time came to be called judgment of residencia; for its part, Title VIII of Book III of the Nueva Recopilación, De los Visitadores y Veedores que se embian por el Reyno, incorporated the law of the Cortes of Toro of 1371 (by which Henry II had agreed the appointment of good men who travelled the provinces of the kingdom to discover how the royal, municipal and senorial officials carried out their tasks), and Law 60 of the Ordinance of the Cortes of Toledo of 1480 (by which the Catholic Monarchs made the annual appointment of veedores entrusted with visiting lands and provinces, and of discovering how the officials of justice acted). See Garriga, “Control y disciplina” cit., passim. 72 Larrea, Novarvm Decisionvm cit., decisio XCVIII, n8. 16, p. 351. 73 Ibid., n8. 18, p. 353. 74 Ibid., n8. 19, p. 353. 75 Ibid., n8. 21, p. 354. See Volpini, El espacio político cit., p. 108. The comparison with the procedure of the Inquisition was not new. Already in 1523, the jurist León, alcalde of the Chancillería of Granada, complained of the secrecy of the visit, asserting that “aún en la inquysiçión dizen el tiempo y el lugar y spaçifican los delitos” (“even in the inquisition they tell you the time and the place and specify the charges”). (Apud Garriga, “Las Ordenanzas” cit., p. 69).

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way. But our author regrets that in his time the visits were based on defamation, as men of the lowest social status hated those who imposed the authority of the king and exercised his jurisdiction over them and always promoted disputes in the visits and sought to take vengeance on the judges, as experience showed76. As a commoner to discredit the claim that the visits of the Chancillerías were held regularly, Larrea remembered that that was precisely one of the claims made by the comuneros to Carlos I77. Our author adds that, according to Cabrera de Córdoba, Philip II rarely ordered visits to Chancillerias, and never to the Royal Council, unless the visitor was he himself78. Larrea argues that the general visit was often more harmful than helpful. Given that not all judges commit crimes, there was no sense to impose a visit on the whole body of the Chancillería, and it was preferable to order visits against suspected judges79. Hence visitors – qualified by Larrea as honourable men, wise and admirable, chosen to correct alien customs – should inquire into the facts of judges of prudent and pious inclination, and rely primarily on the office of judge which was difficult and risky80. The administration of justice was exposed to ambition, deceit, flattery and fraud, and most frighteningly, to litigants’ deceptive and greedy defence lawyers. It was safer for the judge to be negligent and ignorant, than to be plagued with slander and false complaints81. The visitor should sympathize with the dangers of the office of judge, and to bear in mind – as advised by Castillo de Bobadilla – what the two laws of the Partidas said about judges82, although they applied the laws justly, they could not be said to have delivered them out of malevolence83. As one would expect, Larrea pays special attention to the suitability of the prosecution witnesses. Prima facie, the visitor should not admit as witnesses against the magistrate those who had been convicted, punished or imprisoned by him, because according to general opinion, they should be excluded from the pesquisa as competent witnesses84. However, Larrea questions whether the visitors should interrogate as 76

Larrea, Novarvm Decisionvm cit., decisio XCVIII, n8. 23, p. 355. Ibid., n8. 24, p. 355. 78 Ibid., n8. 25, p. 356. 79 Ibid., n8. 27, p. 356. See Volpini, El espacio político cit., p. 110. 80 Larrea, Novarvm Decisionvm cit., decisio XCVIII, n8. 28, p. 356. 81 Ibid., n8. 27, p. 356. See Volpini, El espacio político cit., p. 110. 82 Partidas 7.1.11 and 18.2. Partidas 7.1.11: “Los officiales que han poderio del rey, de fazer justicia delos omes condenando los a muerte, o a perdimiento de miembro por los yerros que fazen, non pueden ser acusados de otro mientra durare su officio: fueras ende si alguno dellos fiziesse tuerto o yerro contra aquellos que ouiesse de juzgar. Ca si tal yerro fiziesse, o por razon de su officio agrauiasse alguno, bien lo podrian acusar: e si es de otro yerro que ouiesse fecho, non le podrian acusar fasta que dexasse aquel officio que tenia. Esto es porque los omes que officio tienen, maguer fagan derecho, non puede ser que non ganen mal querientes: (…)”. 83 Larrea, Novarvm Decisionvm cit., decisio XCVIII, n8. 32, p. 357. 84 Ibid., n8. 38, p. 360. 77

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witnesses those who had been convicted or imprisoned by the judge against whom they deposed. Given that this was an irregular trial, the witnesses must be of good repute and not suspected of crimes; however, and according to the provisions of the refounded law available in the event of bribery of the judge85, those guilty of the same offence could be admitted as witnesses so that their evidence could be fully tested. Generally, in the visit the witnesses must be free of any exception, since judges united the anger of close relatives, family and friends of the prisoners86. Any judge had in his favour the presumption of having administered justice righteously, so that whoever was skilled at their craft, it was understood that he acted so because it was permitted87. Malice was never presumed in the judge and evidence to prove it should be obvious88. Since judges endured irregular and rigorous visits, it was desirable that the visitor should investigate not only crimes but also the truth, without departing from the path of law. Since judges endured so irregular and rigorous visit, it was desirable that the indagase visitor, not as crimes, the truth, without departing from the path of law. Since it greatly suited the prince and the republic that their judges should be found free from all crime, it would be juster that lacking legitimate and perfect proof the judge should go unpunished, rather than the innocent be condemned by false insinuations and malicious witness. Following Castillo de Bobadilla, Larrea urges the need for the visitors to investigate the quality of witnesses, because as in the general visit many were admitted, usually interrogating all, nothing was discovered of the secret of the visit, especially when the witnesses, as happened in most cases, were examined outside the city where it took place89. The visitors were not to admit the testimonies of those who as prosecutors presented chapters against the judges – of which, warns Larrea, there were many – since it is repugnant to all Law, and to the order of many other trials. In that sense, our author quotes the opinion of García Mastrillo, for whom the visitor too should not admit secret libels, or throw out of the windows at night, unsigned; for anonymous whistleblowers, rather deserved to be punished. However, according to Gabriel Berart, in Catalonia the opposite was observed, as the visitors used to have a small, tightly closed ark, in the houses where they practiced the visit, so that any of the people, at a reasonable hour, could throw complaints and unsigned secret memorials; however, and recognized by Berart himself, that was used with extreme caution, only so that the judge could somehow discover crimes. But, in the opinion of Mastrillo, this practice was contrary to the provisions of the law, and therefore, the anonymous allegations made during the visit of the Duke of Osuna were torn up90. Larrea finds that, having regard to the laws, especially the Pragmática of 10 February 1623 – compre85

NR 3.9.6. Larrea, Novarvm Decisionvm cit., decisio XCVIII, n8. 39, p. 360. 87 Ibid., n8. 40, p. 360. 88 Ibid., n8. 41, p. 361. 89 Ibid., n8. 42, p. 361. 90 Ibid., n8. 43, p. 362. 86

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hensive of the chapters for reforming the government of the kingdom –, it seemed clear that anonymous accusations could not be admitted and should be excluded from all causes91. The visitor should not believe the statements of only one witness, even of a highly qualified person, but rather to indulgent with the authority and conscience of judges92. Recalling that the judge should reject the slanderous accusations officially, Larrea added that the visitor should inform the king not only of the judges’ abuses, but also of their merits, and, for this purpose, transcribed the answer of 3 December 1634 that Philip IV gave to the consulta on the increase and maintenance of the office of fiscal prosecutor to Counsil of Finance, which at the time concerned our author93. It was not necessary that the visitors should use caution and extraordinary methods outside the law to prove the offences or to reduce the defences of the accused; equally they should not request the ecclesiastical judges to issue monitoring letters so that on pain of excommunication, witnesses were forced to appear and testify against judges94. The visitor should not be negligent in admission and examination of the defences of judges, to prevent evidence of his innocence, but with right mind should seek by any means that the truth be made manifest. On the other hand, he should compel witnesses to swear on oath to what was deposed in the visit95. Larrea’s recommendations are also directed to members of the Royal Council, where the visits were seen and determined. Counsellors should note that according to the practice, introduced in visits outside all justice they should not proceed against false witnesses and slanderers with proportionate punishment, nor condemn them to pay the costs, arguing that by failing to publish the pesquisa, could not be form a criminal case against the witness or libellous complainant; however, slanderers in the the visit should be more severely punished. When willfull libel and fraud were alleged against a magistrate or legal official, and if they had news of them, they could bring a libel suit against the accuser96.

91 Ibid., n8. 44, p. 362. Larrea sets out the same opinion in Allegationvm Fiscalivm and in Por la autoridad de los ministros a Su Magestad. (Volpini, El espacio político, cit., pp. 108 – 109). 92 Larrea, Novarvm Decisionvm cit., decisio XCVIII, n8. 47, pp. 363 – 364. 93 “Exhibet piissimus noster Rex Philippus IV. nam cum visitationibus, quas aduersùs eius Senatus et ministros decernit, iubet optimis Magistratibus honores et gratias deferri, vt plura in id eius rescripta sæpiùs vidi, et cùm ego pro meo munere Patroni fiscalis patrimonii consulerem, aliqua quæ ad eius augmentum et conseruationem pertinerent, sua manu ad marginem consultationis, quæ apud me est, rescripsit die 3 Decembris 1634. Doyos las gracias de vuestro celo y haced vuestro officio, vt à me proposita amplecteretur, et iuberet exequi” (Larrea, Novarvm Decisionvm cit., decisio XCVIII, n8. 48, p. 364). See Volpini, El espacio político cit., pp. 109 – 110. 94 Larrea, Novarvm Decisionvm cit., decisio XCVIII, n8. 49, p. 364. 95 Ibid., n8. 50, p. 365. 96 Ibid., n. 51, pp. 365 – 366.

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Counsellors should not readily condemn the judge, but rather compensate the irregularity of the trial and the uneven judgment and rigor of the pesquisa with the fullness of the evidence; credit should not be given to the witnesses against the magistrate, unless large numbers concurred, and sound evidence was necessary against a magistrate or legal official. It was essential to warn that the magistrate should not be treated arbitrarily. In the same way as the faith of the scribe was only weakened by three witnesses, according to the presumption of law, two witnesses were not enough in criminal cases, but that three witnesses were required to answer97. He reminds us the visit was carried out constante officio. Well, Larrea showed himself contrary to that pending the visit, claiming that the tests were practiced freely, the judge against whom chapters were submitted were away from the city and the administration of the office since that would encourage false and slanderous accusations, arguing further that according to the constant tradition of law and the opinion of the interpreters during the pesquisa the administration could not be prevented from administering the officer who committed crimes in office98. Larrea’s views also seem to be based on his personal experience, because during the 1628 – 1629 visit to the Chancillería of Granada, he was forced to leave the city and his office99. According to Larrea, suspension from office could not be done by issues outside the administration of justice100. Our author argues that, generally, supreme magistrates could not be accused of having misjudged an issue in the visit because their consciences were charged by the king to dictate sentences according to the truth101. The visit should not extend beyond those things that concerned the exercise and administration of office, to the extent that they only dealt with the public person of the judge102. So when it came to matters outside his office, the judge should not be subjected to irregular judgment of the visit, but only to the ordinary trial103. However, greed and cruelty, the typical vices of the judge104, belonged to the visit as crimes of office because they offended justice105. However, the visitor was not to accuse the judges of dishonest amusements and relaxations because they did not offend the authority of the office106. The arguments expounded here served Larrea to justify the vote that he had issued in the decisio: that he could not proceed against the officer by secret pesquisa, nor the irregular form of the visit, but for what belonged to the exercise of the office, so that 97

Ibid., n8. 54, p. 367. Ibid., n8. 57, p. 368. 99 Volpini, El espacio político cit., pp. 31 and 111. 100 Larrea, Novarvm Decisionvm cit., decisio XCVIII, n8. 58, p. 368. 101 Ibid., n8. 59, p. 368. 102 Ibid., n8. 60, p. 368. 103 Ibid., n8. 61, p. 369. 104 Ibid., n8. 63, p.370. 105 Ibid., n8. 59, p. 368. 106 Ibid., n8. 66, p. 372. 98

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the complaint filed before the residencia had to be remitted to public enquiry; to do otherwise would be to confuse justice and introduce the absurd. Then the case should be remitted to regular trial, because the prosecution in no way seemed to mix anything concerning the office, since neither the maid, who was the complainant of seduction107, nor her father, nor relatives, were found legitimate. The secret pesquisa could not understand the actions taken by the judge as a private person; being indulgent with human frailty, the integrity of the judge is not violated, according to Jason of Mayno, the magistrates and officers were not charged for the light and tiny things that smelled of softness rather than malice108. As in the case in question, continues Larrea, of which the the judge was accused had proceeded, it was not of violence but of the desire of the woman, and only of a virgin without other qualities, was not a public offence, and according to the general practice of the kingdom, it was considered private, and the leniency of canon law was imposed in the forum and not the harsh penalties of civil law and the Partidas, so that whether the woman raped was married or provided with a dowry; given that nothing is mixed in that act that is understood as public vengeance, but everything only affected the individual interests of the complainant109. Such, very briefly, is the concept of visitatio generalis Magistratuum in the work of a Castilian jurist in the mid-seventeenth century, when that institution was beginning to decline. As can be seen, the application of the visit aroused the reserve and suspicion of senior judges such as Larrea, especially after he himself had suffered the rigors of that procedure. In his decisio XCVIII, Larrea advocates a restrictive interpretation of the visit, while irregular judgment against the general inspection, was considered more harmful than effective, he proposed the private visit of suspected judges; moreover, in his opinion, the visit should concern only the judge’s behaviour as a public person that had been observed in the course of his profession and not on any excesses or crimes – including concubinage and seduction – as a private individual, they should be subject to the regular trial, unless they had perpetrated the act as an abuse of authority of office. Judges enjoyed the presumption of exercising their office correctly, a presumption which could not be destroyed by the malevolence of false or 107 Volpini states that the decisio does not clarify whether the allegation was of estupro or of concubinage. (Volpini, El espacio político cit., p. 113, n. 103). But in paragraphs 65 and 68, Larrea refers to an allegation of estupro, which can be translated as seduction. 108 Larrea, Novarvm Decisionvm cit., decisio XCVIII, n8. 65, p. 371. 109 Ibid., n8. 68, p. 372. The opinion of Larrea contrasts here with that of Castillo de Bobadilla – whom he normally follows –, less complacent with judges’ sexual disorders/misbehaviour: “si el matrimonio que por todo Derecho es permitido, se prohibe al juez con la subdita, con mas razon se le prohibira el estupro, el robo [rapto], y el adulterio, que de su naturaleza son prohibidos; y siempre en estos casos se presume que ay violencia en el varon, y mucho mas en el juez, por la dignidad y poderio del Oficio” (“if marriage which is permitted by Law, it is prohibited to the judge with the subdita, with yet more reason is, robery [rape], and adultery, are by their nature forbidden; and always in those case where there is violencia in the man, and much more so in the judge, for the dignity and power of his office”) (Castillo de Bovadilla, Politica para Corregidores cit., II, Lib. V, Cap. III, n8. 120, p. 565).

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slanderous accusers, given the proverbial ill-will that the people of the lowest social status felt towards judges. Hence Larrea pay special attention to the qualities demanded of witnesses, who should be free from any exception, reputable and not suspected of guilt, and to those the visitors should administer the oath; the visitors should not admit as witnesses those who had been found guilty, punished or imprisoned by the judge in question; Nor should they admit libellous documentss and secret memorials, as the laws of the kingdom provided. Finally we advise that Larrea’s doctrine of the visit would be found, after reflection in such significant works as the Política Indiana of Juan de Solórzano Pereyra110 or Disputationum iuris variorum of Tomás Carlevalio Hispano111. Documental Appendix Visita de la Chançilleria de Granada (Archivo Histórico Nacional, Consejos, leg. 13.527) Visita de la Audiençia de Granada Relaçion de las çedulas que se despacharon de las condenaçiones que se hiçieron a diferentes ministros de aquella Chançilleria que hauian sido y eran della. Al liçençiado don Fernando Piçarro, oydor que fue dela dicha Audiençia que agora es del Consejo de Ordenes, por dos cargos que se le hizieron de condenaçiones, multas y acordados que probeyo, le mandaron guarde lo que çerca delo sobredicho esta proueydo y que de ninguna suerte haga las dichas aplicaçiones con aperçibimiento de castigo con mas rigor y le condenan en diez mill mrs. camara y gastos de justiçia por mitad. El doctor Busto de Bustamante, oydor que fue de aquella Chançilleria y agora del Consejo de Indias, por vn cargo de acordados y multas le condenan en diez mill mrs. camara y gastos de justiçia por mitad, y por otro en que nonbro vna persona con 500 mrs. de salario para benir en conpañia de vn relator a esta Corte a vna conpetençia con la Inquisiçion le condenan a que buelba la terçia parte de 65.000 mrs. que inporto el dicho salario no pagandolos el dicho relator. El liçençiado Don Luis Gudiel de Peralta, oydor que fue de aquella Chançilleria y agora fiscal del Consejo, se le hiçieron dos cargos que en el primero se le mando guarde las leyes / y en el segundo que fue por hauer nonbrado vna persona con 500 mrs. para benir a esta Corte con el dicho relator a la conpetençia referida en la partida del doctor Busto de Bustamente le condenan en esto pagado el dicho relator los 65.000 mrs. que inporto el salario pague el la terçia parte. El liçençiado Alonso Perez de Lara, oydor que fue dela dicha Audiençia y agora dela de Valladolid fue absuelto de vn cargo que se le hizo de acordados. El liçençiado don Juan de Castillo, oydor que fue dela dicha Audiençia y agora lo es del Consejo y Contaduria Mayor de Hazienda, se le hizo cargo de que en vnas bistas de ojos 110

Juan Solórzano Pereyra, Política Indiana, Prologue of Francisco Tomás y Valiente, Edition of Francisco Tomás y Valiente and Ana María Barrero, Madrid, 1996, III, Lib. V, Cap. X, n8s. 25, 29, 31, 34, 43, 46, 58 and 59, pp. 2072 – 2075, 2078, 2079, 2083 and 2084. 111 See García Marín, Monarquía Católica cit., p. 289.

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llebo diez ducados de salario al dia, le condenan en 20.000 mrs. camara y gastos por mitad y se manda que de aqui adelante no llebe mas de 3.000 mrs. sin liçençia de su magestad y se reserba el derecho a las partes, otro de que en la çiudad de Cordoua se aposento en casa de Benito Suarez de Herrera que trahia pleyto con sus hermanas, fue absuelto. Otros dos cargos que hizo aplicaçiones multas y probeydos en contrabençion dela ordenança, condenanle en 10.000 por mitad camara y gastos y se le manda que no haga las dichas aplicaçiones con aperçibimiento de castigo con mas rigor. / El liçençiado Bartolome Morquecho, oydor dela dicha Audiençia se le hizieron los cargos siguientes. Que estubo amançebado muchos años hasta que abra quatro años se aparto, pusosele culpa y al final. Que en materia de juegos a dado mucha nota jugando a las pintas y otros juegos cantidades considerables, pusosele culpa y al final. Que en nonbre de su criado Antonio de Borja carnicero a tenido taberna y bodega bendiendo a exçesiuos presios, pusosele culpa y al final. Que hauiendosele cometido vna comision contra dos criados del presidente de aquella Chançilleria yendo a darle quenta dello con ocasion de que estando a solas el dicho presidente le trato mal al tiempo de despedirse alço la voz y se desconpuso. Que hauiendose scrito por el Consejo al presidente de aquella Audiençia vna carta para que informase sobre el dicho negoçio y yendo encaminada para que por su mano se diese respeto dela dicha quistion no la dio sino que la encamino por el correo de Alcala la Real, por este y el anteçedente se le pone culpa y se manda se le scriua carta de reprehension y que se lea en el Acuerdo por el oydor mas antiguo. Que hauiendosele dado vna comision de moneda para la çiudad de Malaga nonbro por fiscal a Antonio Perez siendo / su criado consentia que scriuiese las informaçiones sumarias asi suyas como las delos reos pusosele culpa y al final. Que no pudiendo conforme a derecho executar condenaçiones de 3.000 mrs. arriua en la comision de moneda que tubo executo grandes cantidades que montaron 2 quentos 712.783 en grande daño delas partes y que aunque lo remitio a esta Corte a los reçeptores no por eso se escuso de culpa y tanto mas por el puesto que ocupa, y señalanse las personas y cantidades que cobro y en que monedas, le condenan en 30.000 mrs. por mitad camara y gastos de justiçia y reserban el derecho a las partes. Que en la dicha comision no se ocupo 50 dias por hauer buelto a Granada y cobro 150.000 mrs. a razon de 3.000 al dia y sus ofiçiales condenanle a que buelba los salarios que llebo de si y de los ofiçiales que nonbro. Que reçiuio doña Françisca de Sandobal su muger diez pilones de açucar de vna persona contra quien el proçedia absolbieronle por no saberlo el. Que en Baeza hizo vender çierto trigo y çebada del padre de vn reo por sus salarios, absuelbenle por no probado y reserban el derecho a las partes. Que no pudiendo hazer interçesiones por pleytos la hizo en muchos de hidalguia, pusosele culpa y al final. / Que respeto de tener la comision dela renta dela seda proçedio contra vno por deçir que en Guadix hauia conprado 80 libras en blanco y metidolas en Granada sin pagar derechos y sin estar bien probada la causa le condeno en 100 açotes y 6 años de galeras y executo los açotes y de-

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spues se reboco en el Consejo de Hazienda, no enbargante que tiene apartamiento, se le pone culpa y al final y reserban el derecho a las partes. Que hizo despachar en su sala çiertas prouisiones para que la villa de Tebar y sus pueblos pagasen a doña Maria de Bejar biuda de Alonso Nuñez Salguero çiertos salarios que deuian a su marido sin tocarle, absuelbenle deste cargo por no probado y reserbase el derecho a las partes. Que hauiendo salido a vna bista de ojos a la villa de Estepa taso çiertos salarios a sus ofiçiales y a el a razon de diez ducados, pusosele culpa y condenanle en 20.000 mrs. por mitad camara y gastos de justiçia y que de aqui adelante no lleve mas que 3.000 y reserban el derecho a las partes. Que hiço condenaçiones multas y probeydos en contrabençion delo que esta dispuesto, por tres cargos 15 16 y 17 que tratan desto le condenan en 10.000 mrs. camara y gastos y que no haga semejantes aplicaçiones con aperçibimiento que sera castigado con mas rigor. / Que en contabençion delo que esta proueido que no se den naguinaldos a benido en que se den algunos fue absuelto. Y por los remitidos al final le condenan en 400.000 mrs. camara y gastos de justiçia y adbiertesele que por los cargos pudiera ser condenado con mayor demostraçion y que de aqui adelante mire como procede atendiendo a la grabedad del ofiçio y al exenplo publico. El liçençiado don Luis de Villagutierre, oydor dela dicha Audiençia, se le hizieron los cargos siguientes. Que estubo amançebado nuebe años con doña Mariana de Trillo muger de don Lope de Soria y Camargo hauiendose hecho su amigo con estrecheza, y hauiendo ella presentado demanda de nulidad de matrimonio ayudo su causa y bino a salir con el intento por el poder del dicho don Luis respeto de su plaza, ponesele culpa grabe y al final. Que trayendo vn pleyto Françisco Gomez su muger le solicitaba y llebaba consigo a otra muger de Malaga con la qual trato amores carnalmente tres meses y fue causa que el dicho saliese con su pleyto y el trato con la moza fue publico y escandaloso pusosele culpa y al final. / Que scriuio a la çiudad de Andujar sobre que diesen el salario de agente a çierta persona, pusosele culpa y al final. Que tenia estrecha amistad con don Françisco Checa y se entendia que por su mano reçiuia delos pleiteantes y señalan personas de quien reçiuio el dicho don Françisco y a quien pidio, pusosele culpa y al final. Que reçiuio de Rolando Lebanto ocho arrobas de açucar, mandasele que le pague 560 rs. Que conpro vn caballo de don Alonso de Loaysa y fue por mano de don Geronimo su hermano que seruia el ofiçio de alguaçil mayor de aquella Chançilleria que pretendia se rebocase el nonbramiento que estaua hecho en otro para seruir el dicho ofiçio, absolbieronle. Que tubo en su casa cosa de vn año juego que era grande donde se jugaba a todos juegos, pusosele culpa y al final. Que aplico condenaçiones de probeydos y multas estando mandado que no se hiçiesen, le condenan en 10.000 mrs. camara y gastos de justiçia. Que dio naguinaldos estando mandado que no se den, que no lo haga de aqui adelante. / Que pendiendo en su sala pleytos dela yglesia y boto de Santiago con color de protector a llebado en cada vn año çient escudos de oro, que buelba la dicha cantidad ala dicha yglesia y que no se lleben los dichos salarios sin liçençia de su magestad.

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Que sin liçençia de su magestad se caso con doña Ynes de Castilla estandole negada por respetos particulares, por este cargo y los demas remitidos ael le condenan en ocho años de suspension de ofiçio de oydor y de otro qualquier ofiçio de justiçia y en ocho años de destierro dela dicha çiudad de Granada y de la Corte y çinco leguas y en 200.000 mrs. por mitad camara y gastos de justiçia y que no pueda ser condenado sin que se haga a su magestad particular relaçion delos dichos cargos y delo probeydo en ellos. El liçençiado don Françisco de Salbatierra alcalde del crimen dela dicha Audiençia, se hizieron los cargos siguientes. Que teniendo Catalina Martin biuda en su casa y con publica a Françisca Enrriquez su hija donzella onesta y recogida vna noche de Carnestollendas fue a su / casa y estando çerradas las puertas las hizo abrir con nonbre de justiçia y estando acostadas en vna cama anbas hizo bestir a la madre y quedo solo con la hija que estrupo avnque dieron bozes anbas y se resistieron y no tenia sino onze años, le absuelben del dicho cargo. Que en cotrabençion delo acordado bino en que se diesen algunas cantidades, mandase que no de estos naguinaldos. El doctor Christoual de Anguiano Sedano se le hizieron los cargos siguientes. Que estando en Alcaraz a vna comision, obligo alos reçeptores que le pagasen los salarios en plata probeyendo mandamientos pusosele culpa y le condenan en 100.000 mrs. que se traygan a esta Corte y dellos se buelban a los conçejos a quien lo saco las cantidades que montasen las reduçiones delo que cobro en plata y lo restante se aplica para camara y gastos de justiçia por mitad.

The Complex Relations Between the Executive and the Judiciary: Some Scenes of Dispute During the Mid-19th Century By Miguel Angel Morales Payàn Resumen: A lo largo del siglo XIX en España se intenta hacer realidad algunos de los principios defendidos en la Revolución francesa tales como el de la separación de poderes. Aunque recogido en distintos textos constitucionales, su plasmación en la práctica, sin embargo, no fue tarea fácil. Así se pone de manifiesto cuando se examina documentación de la época. En ese sentido, hacia la mitad de la centuria, las relaciones entre el poder ejecutivo y el judicial se tornaron especialmente tensas. En esta publicación nos hacemos eco de varios documentos que reflejan algunos de los numerosos puntos de conflicto que enfrentaron a ambos poderes. Abstract: Throughout the 19th century in Spain, there has been an attempt to apply some of the principles defended in the French Revolution, such as the separation of powers. Although included in different constitutional texts, in practice, however, it was not easy to implement. This becomes evident when examining the documents of the time. In this sense, towards the middle of the century, the relations between the executive and judicial power became particularly tense. In this paper, we present several documents that reflect some of the numerous points of conflict that led both powers to clash. “Señora Diputación1 Sepa V. que en mi lugar Tenemos por carambola, O sea fataliá Un alcarde que no estaba Acostumbrao a mandar, Ni denguno de su casta Estuvo en mando jamás, Le nombraron porque dieron Los suyos en devulgar Que tenía muchas letras Y trazas de libertad. Pero aquellas son muy gordas Y estas se componen mal, Porque sepa V. Señora Deputación provincial

Llega un probe que le sobra La razón, a demandar A otro que no la tiene, Pero que hay parcialiá Y el señor alcarde lleno De asoluta potestá Manda al primero que calle Y al segundo deja hablar. En seguida su mercé Falla con severiá Y si aquel alegar quiere, Le contesta ‘No ha lugar; Yo lo quiero; yo lo mando; Y cuenta con replicar Porque desde aquí a la cárcel Irá usted sin descansar

Se marcha el probe cuitao Renegando del Lugar De la elección del alcarde Y hasta de la libertá Que se deposita en manos De hombre tan necio y venal. Ya ve usté Señora Junta Que no es esto rigular Porque sobre la enjusticia Dará el alcarde lugar A que se atimulte el puebro Ya cansado de aguantar O a que vuelvan los Carlines Viendo que la libertá Con tan sindiestros manejos Nos viene a perjudicar

1 There are some texts that for the richness of its content I have preferred to respect its native language. For example this poetic composition collected in a newspaper of the time: Trueno y Centella Constitucional n8 21, 18th April 1837.

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Que el señor Alcalde tiene Un modo de conciliar Y de hacer justicia al puebro Contra toa libertad.

Y desde allí le pondré Si me llega a antojar, En un presidio perpetuo De donde no guelva más’.

Por lo que suplicamos A vusencia provincial Que con todo su poder Nos libre de tanto mal”.

I. The State of Justice at the End of the 18th Century and the Beginning of the 19th Century Spain starts the 19th century with a very complex political-institutional organization. The absolutist monarchic model had been fully established for several centuries. To be able to govern, the King, trustee of the sovereignty, relied on the collaboration of a large number of entities formed by either individuals or collegiate bodies. The complex organizational labyrinth (different types of Councils, different kinds of Secretaries, ‘Validos’, ‘Chancillerías’, Courts, etc.) led to a quagmire of dysfunctionality, especially in the area of justice. The fact that it was at the service of a political power that was purely absolutist, as pointed out by Alejandre, would result in some retrograde proposals conditioned by the apathy towards its improvement2. The fact that justice should be badly administered was the logical consequence of the considerable dysfunctions of both the organisational structure that gave it substance and in the human element that served it, within the legislative framework that protected it and in the procedural instruments employed. If we refer to both this author and González Alonso3 , perhaps it is possible to outline its main digressions in more detail: 1. It should be highlighted that the regulating provisions that had to be applied were outdated4, which meant that outdated medieval provisions were resorted to with surprising frequency, such as Las Partidas or Fuero Real (Spanish medieval Codes of Law) to quote a few. 2. What makes staff shine, as they used to say at that time, is the quality of their servants, especially of the judges5. What stands out most about them is their lack of aptitude or preparation and their greed. Without forgetting that they obtained a

2 Alejandre, J. A., “La crítica de los ilustrados a la administración de justicia” en Separata del Anuario Jurídico y Económico Escurialense XXVI (homenaje a Fr. José López Ortiz), vol. II, 1993, p. 428: “Before the eighteenth century there had been no lack of criticism from contemporaries towards the Administration of Justice of his time”. 3 González Alonso, B., “La justicia” en Artola, M., Enciclopedia de Historia de España, II, Madrid, 1988, p. 399. 4 Alejandre, “La crítica …”, ob. cit., p. 429: “The Law of the Old Regime propitiated dysfunctions, abuses and corruption which had deplorable effects on important field of the Administration of Justice”. 5 Alejandre, “La crítica …”, ob. cit., p. 436: “There was also criticism about the activities of the interpreters of law, lawyers and officials of the Administration of Justice – writers and bailiffs, especially”.

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part of their delayed and low payment from the financial penalties that they imposed as a sanction, which led to a constant temptation to abuse them6. 3. If we focus on procedure, its technification, its complexity, its slowness or the very broad discretion of the judge are points that most stand out7. Without ignoring the fact that the diversity of the ‘fueros procesales’ (procedural privileges) would mean that the social status and class of the participants would condition the treatment to be received. Likewise, it emphasises that in the criminal context the presumed delinquent always had an unfavourable situation. 4. Finally, as far as the organization is concerned, characteristics like its hypertrophy and asymmetry are evident8, the fact that the jurisdictional bodies frequently had a mixed character and were not, therefore, specialized9, the multiple jurisdictions and ordinary courts capacity to delegate, the unlimited power of the monarch to interfere with the development of supreme jurisdiction10 and, especially, the total lack of independence of the judges and the subordination of justice to the monarch’s policies. It is in this context that the tumultuous rule of Fernando VII began (1808 – 1833). During this time, there was a struggle between two completely opposing options: maintaining the inheritance received centuries before, this state of things described in the judicial context11, or its radical transformation into a model that would be the opposite throughout, at least formally12. 6

Alejandre, “La crítica …”, ob. cit., pp. 434 – 435. Alejandre, “La crítica …”, ob. cit., p. 439: “Ignorant, unscrupulous and greedy judges charged with implementing complex, outdated and incoherent legislation were the perfect combination to develop a sufficiently vicious procedure that would ensure an unsafe and disastrous outcome”. 8 González Alonso, “La justicia …”, ob. cit., p. 399, translated, among other things, “in the overabundance of judges and courts, in its irregular distribution and deficient hierarchical articulation, in the confusing delimitation of their respective competences”. 9 González Alonso, “La justicia …”, ob. cit., p. 399, what applied in practice meant: “to perform governmental and judicial functions simultaneously”. 10 González Alonso, “La justicia …”, ob. cit., p. 399, what it meant was that “The king can sue any matter, entrust his knowledge to the judge that pleases him, interfere with its procedure, order his dismissal, annul the actions takeb, revoke the judgment, neutralize the effect of res judicata”. 11 Vid., among others, Bermúdez Aznar, A., El corregidor en Castilla durante la Baja Edad Media (1348 – 1474), Murcia, 1974; Agúndez, A., Historia del poder judicial en España, Madrid, 1974; González Alonso, B., El corregidor castellano (1348 – 1808), Madrid, 1970; De Dios, S., El Consejo de Castilla, 1385 – 1522, Madrid, 1982; Roldán Verdejo, R., Los jueces de la Monarquía Absoluta. Su estatuto y actividad judicial. Corona de Castilla, siglos XIV-XVIII, La Laguna, 1989; Garriga, C., La Audiencia y Chancillerías castellanas (1371 – 1525). Historia política, régimen jurídico y práctica institucional, Madrid, 1994; id., “Justicia animada: dispositivos de la justicia en la monarquía católica” en De justicia de jueces a justicia de leyes: hacia la España de 1870, Madrid, 2007, pp. 59 – 104; Nieto, A., “Gobierno y justicia en las postrimerías del Antiguo Régimen” en Cuadernos de Historia del Derecho, vol. Extraordinario 7

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The six year absolutist period that began in 1814 after the monarch returned from his French exile and the so-called ‘Década ominosa’ (ominous Decade) are periods when the first option evolves. The second is developed in the framework that surrounds the preparations and implementation of the Constitution of 1812 while the monarch is imprisoned outside the kingdom, and during the so-called ‘Trienio Liberal’ (Liberal Triennium). Having outlined the first direction, we now focus on the second. For the most educated sector of society, with more intellectual concerns and contacts abroad, it was clear that the situation could not continue as it was. The dysfunctional state of affairs should not represent the prevailing norm. It was necessary to introduce certain guidelines for rationalization in the organization of the monarchy. The work of the ‘doceañistas’ (supporters of the 1812 Constitution) would be key to achieving this rationalization. With respect to judicial order, their decisions would be decisive to achieving a model of justice on a par with being at the service of citizens, applying new laws presented by the Cortes. Above all it would be independent from any other power. To achieve this, it was essential to institute a rational organizational structure, provided with suitable staff, and with appropriate legislative instruments and proce198 – 202 (2004), pp. 189 – 202; Bermejo Cabrero, J. L., Poder político y administración de justicia en la España de los Austrias, Madrid, 2005, especially, pp. 15 y ss. 12 Vid., among others, Bravo, E., De la administración de justicia, Madrid, 1864; Carretero, A., “La administración de justicia desde 1808 a 1833” en Revista de Derecho Judicial, 21 and 22 (1965), pp. 159 – 170 and 117 – 128, respectively; Muñoz de Bustillo Romero, C., “La organización de los tribunales españoles (1808 – 1812)” en Cano Bueso, J. (ed.), Materiales para el estudio de la Constitución de 1812, Madrid, 1989, pp. 545 – 561; Tomás y Valiente, F., “De la administración de justicia al poder judicial” en AAVV., Jornadas sobre el poder judicial en el bicentenario de la Revolución Francesa, Madrid, 1990, pp. 13 – 31; Paredes, J., La organización de la Justicia en la España liberal. Los orígenes de la carrera judicial (1834 – 1870), Madrid, 1991; Clavero, B., “La gran innovación: Justicia de Estado y derecho de Constitución” en Scholz, J. M. (ed.), El tercer poder. Hacia una comprensión histórica de la justicia contemporánea en España, Frankfurt am Main, 1992, pp. 169 – 188; Sáinz Guerra, J., La administración de justicia en España (1810 – 1870), Madrid, 1992; Aparicio, M. A., El status del Poder judicial en el constitucionalismo español (1808 – 1936), Barcelona, 1995; Delgado del Rincón, L. E., “La configuración de la administración de justicia como parte de la administración pública durante el siglo XIX español (Análisis de algunos aspectos que influyeron en el proceso de burocratización de la justicia)” en Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época) 98, octubre-diciembre 1997, pp. 221 – 238; Coronas González, S., “La justicia del Antiguo Régimen: su organización institucional” en Estudios de Historia del Derecho Público, Valencia, 1998, pp. 9 – 133; Martínez Pérez, F., Entre confianza y responsabilidad. La justicia del primer constitucionalismo español (1810 – 1823), Madrid, 1999; id., “Administración de justicia”, en Diccionario político y social del siglo XIX español, Madrid, 2002; id., “La constitucionalización de la justicia (1810 – 1823)” en Lorente Sariñena, M. (coord.), De justicia de jueces a justicia de leyes: hacia la España de 1870, Madrid, 2007, pp. 169 – 207; Álvarez Cora, E., La arquitectura de la justicia burguesa. Una introducción al enjuiciamiento civil en el siglo XIX, Madrid, 2002, especially, pp. 56 – 86; Gómez Rivero, R., Los jueces del Trienio Liberal, Madrid, 2006.

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dures13. The articles of the 1812 Constitution were designed to achieve this, as were the set of regulatory provisions. The innovative proposals for the structure of national territory and for the administration of justice, intrinsically linked, had to respond to a simple theoretical concept. A pyramid of three levels: local, supralocal and national. With respect to government, a municipal led by a ‘Alcalde’ (mayor) was established at the first level; ‘Diputación’ (provincial government) was the second level; and the state with a central executive power was at the top, indicating the general guidelines. In the judicial context: on the base level, the districts with their corresponding judges were configured (‘Jueces de primera instancia o de partido’); above them, covering a wider spectrum, a small number of courts comprising various magistrates (‘Audiencias’); and the top level, fully supervising the performance of the lower courts, was the Supreme Court (‘Tribunal Supremo’). The path that the Supreme Court would follow is curious. During the rule of Fernando VII, just as with the rest of the liberal proposals, it experiences many ups and downs. It is established in 1812, two years later its development is halted to be resumed in 1820, to be once again frustrated in 1823 and reappear in 1834, after the death of Fernando VII. To be exact when Queen María Cristina, in the name of her daughter Isabel II, abolishes the old Consejos de España e Indias (institutions of government with more than three hundred years old). From this time on the Supreme Court would undoubtedly continue to have a long and productive journey; as well as the demanding task of supervising the lower courts. From this moment, it would embody, or it would do so formally, the independence of judicial power as proclaimed in the different constitutional texts appearing throughout the 19th century.

II. The Year 1837 Lorente et alii14 point out that the period between 1834 and 1844 “was witness to an authentic ‘revolution’ with respect to the conceptualization, the setting-up and the functions of the justice institutions”. This was because despite attempts to renew them by the ‘doceañistas’, on the death of Fernando VII, the judicial institutions continued having their roots in the idiosyncrasy typical of the Old Regime. It would be necessary to wait until the disappearance of the political influence of the felon monarch before the bases for renewal could be set. As these authors remember15, in this period “it cannot be asserted that there was a closed circuit between (judicial) reforms and (constitutional) texts”. In other words, provisions directed at transforming the world of justice are “primarily of administrative origin” rather than “political-constitutional” origin. In this sense, we should point out that the ‘Estatuto Real’ 13

Clavero, B., “Códigos y jueces (las puertas y los porteros de la ley)” en AAVV., Jornadas sobre el poder judicial …, ob. cit., pp.69 – 89. 14 Lorente Sariñena, M., Martínez Pérez, F.; Solla Sastre, M. J., Historia legal de la justicia en España (1810 – 1978), Madrid, 2012, p. 115. 15 Ibid. p. 117.

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(Royal Statute) of 1834 does not dedicate any titles to establishing a model of judicial organization. However, under this constitutional (or pseudo-constitutional) umbrella, or perhaps it would be more correct to say outside it, other provisions of far-reaching importance in the area of justice appear, like: the R.D. of 21st April 1834 subdividiendo las provincias en partidos judiciales (subdividing the provinces into judicial districts), the R.D. of 15th July 1834 suprimiendo definitivamente el Tribunal de la Inquisición (permanently abolishing the Inquisition Tribunal), the R.D. of 26th September 1835 que contiene el Reglamento para la administración de justicia en lo respectivo a la jurisdicción ordinaria (contains the Regulations for the administration of justice regarding ordinary jurisdiction and dedicates chapter V to the Supreme Court of Spain and the Indies, arts. 90 – 98), the R.D. of 6th October 1835 mandando que para plazas de Jueces letrados y Ministros togados no se propongan más que sujetos que tengan las circunstancias que se expresan (ordering that more posts for professional Judges and Magistrates than the number of individuals who have the express circumstances required should not be proposed), the R.D. of 17th October 1835 que contiene el Reglamento del Tribunal Supremo de España e Indias (which contains Regulations of the Supreme Court of Spain and the Indies) and finally, the R.D. of 9th December 1835 que contiene las Ordenanzas para todas las Audiencias de la Península e islas adyacentes (which contains the Ordinances for all the Territorial Courts of the Peninsula and the adjacent islands). The two years following this maelstrom of regulations are especially significant in the context of justice. From a constitutional point of view, in August of 1836 (‘Motín de La Granja’) the text of 1812 is recuperated, although it is soon apparent that there are difficulties implement it and a need to substitute it for another which would attempt to save what it could form this one16. Before the end of the year, the Commission of the Constitution presents a report to the Cortes containing the foundations of the reform for ‘La Pepa’ (common name of 1812 Constitution) that they see as suitable. On 24th February 1837, the Project of the Constitution is read before the Cortes and a few days later it is discussed in its entirety. After several vicissitudes, the 18th June is the date decided on for the act of its formal proclamation17. And, as Colomer18 points out “as far as judicial organization is concerned, the shadow of the 1812 Constitution is clearly projected on the six articles of Title X 16 Tomás Villarroya, J., “Las reformas de la Constitución de 1812 en 1836” en Revista del Instituto de Ciencias Sociales 4 (1964), pp. 171 – 203. 17 Vid., among others, Tomás Villarroya, J., Breve historia del constitucionalismo español, Madrid, 1981; Farias García, P., Breve historia constitucional de España 1808 – 1978, Madrid, 1981; De Esteban, J., Las Constituciones de España, Madrid, 1983; Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, J., “La Constitución española de 1837: una constitución transaccional” en Revista del Departamento de Derecho Político 20 (1983 – 1984), pp. 95 – 106; Sánchez Agesta, L., Historia del constitucionalismo español (1808 – 1936), Madrid, 4a ed, 1984; Fernández Segado, F., Las constituciones históricas españolas, Madrid, 4aed., 1986; Colomer Viadel, A., El sistema político de la Constitución española de 1837, Madrid, 1989; Pro Ruiz, J., El Estatuto Real y la Constitución de 1837, Madrid, 2010. 18 Colomer Viadel, El sistema político …, ob. cit., p. 565.

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that the 1837 constitution dedicates to judicial Power. The separation and independence of its power regarding its functions and organization, the idea that the King does not judge, but Justice is administered in his name, the formula of relegating to ordinary laws the way the different institutions of ordinary jurisdiction are structured, and the determination of its specific faculties and the conditions demanded of its members, were already perfectly stipulated principles in the ‘doceañista’ text” (1812 Constitution). In the judicial area, no especially significant specific rules appear19. Provisions from 1835 remain in force, such as ‘Ordenanzas para las Audiencias’ (Ordinances for the Provincial Courts) and Regulations for both the administration of justice regarding ordinary jurisdiction and that of the Supreme Court of Spain and the Indies. They are, however, unsettled years because of the confusion generated especially in relation to the latter institution. We should not forget that in virtue of the Royal Decrees of 24th March 183420, the old ‘Consejos’ (Modern collegiate governing body) like those of ‘Castilla’ (Castile) and ‘Indias’ (Indies), ‘Guerra’ (War) and ‘Hacienda’ (Treasury) had been abolished and in their place Supreme Courts corresponding to their respective areas of action had been established. Nevertheless, the Regulations of the year 35, required that they should consist of a single court divided into three chambers21. The short-lived validity of ‘la Pepa’22 confirms the figure of a single Su19 There are no specific rules regarding organizational model change. They will have to do with the ideological component of its members. In this line, it should be noted, among others, provisions such as R.D. 22nd September 1836 (Gaceta de Madrid, n8 652, 24th September 1836) por la que se manda formar una Junta de calificación de jueces y magistrados de todos los tribunales, el R.D. 20th December 1836 (Gaceta de Madrid n8 748, 23rd December 1836) por el que se autoriza al Gobierno a nombrar en propiedad a los sujetos que destina a servir plazas de judicatura mientras se organizan otras instancias (Consejo de Estado) y el R.D. 22nd March 1837 (Gaceta de Madrid n8 842, 26th March 1837) por el que se restablecía la Orden 29th June 1822 sobre formación de causas a jueces y magistrados (y diputados a Cortes). Vid. Díaz Sampedro, B., La politización de la justicia: el Tribunal Supremo (1836 – 1881), memoria presentada para optar al grado de doctor, Madrid, 2004. 20 Gaceta de Madrid n8 37, 25th March 1834: “… Decreto II. Oído el Dictamen del Consejo de Gobierno y del de Ministros, he venido en decretar lo siguiente, en nombre de mi muy cara y augusta Hija: Artículo 18. Quedan suprimidos los actuales Consejos de Castilla y de Indias. Art. 28. En su lugar instituyo un Tribunal Supremo de España e Indias … Decreto III. Oído el Dictamen del Consejo de Gobierno y del de Ministros, he venido en decretar lo siguiente, en nombre de mi muy cara y augusta Hija Doña Isabel II: Artículo 18. Queda suprimido el Consejo supremo de la Guerra. Art. 28. En su lugar instituyo un Tribunal Supremo de Guerra y Marina … Decreto IV. Oído el Dictamen del Consejo de Gobierno y del de Ministros, he venido en decretar lo siguiente, en nombre de mi muy cara y augusta Hija: Artículo 18. Queda suprimido el actual Consejo supremo de Hacienda. Art. 28. En su lugar instituyo un Tribunal Supremo de Hacienda …”. 21 Reglamento de 26 de septiembre de 1835 para la administración de justicia en lo respectivo a la jurisdicción ordinaria, art. 91: “El tribunal Supremo continuará dividiéndose como actualmente en tres salas ordinarias, las dos para los negocios de la Península e Islas adyacentes, y la otra para los de Ultramar …”; Reglamento de 17 de octubre de 1835 del Tribunal Supremo de España e Indias, art. 1: “El Supremo Tribunal de España e Indias se compone, en conformidad al Real decreto de 24 de Marzo de 1834, de un Presidente, 15 Ministros y 3

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preme Court on a constitutional level, while that of 1837 left the courts and tribunals, including the Supreme Court, to later legislative development23. Without any subsequent development to the contrary, the single model would remain. The lack of any change in this model, the continued validity of the ‘doceañista’ text in everything that had not been expressly abolished by it, and the validity of the 1835 regulations would confirm this undivided existence24. Yet, the institution was on the point of collapsing, as indicated by Sariñena et alii25 “not only because of the inability to manage the high number of pending lawsuits, but above all because of the lack of definition of the procedural channels and of fundamental legislation which it is supposed to abide by”.

III. The Year 1837 in Granada Among the most important events of the year 1837 in Granada26 is the trouble between the different political and military authorities and news published in light of Fiscales, y se divide en tres Salas de 5 Ministros cada una; las dos para los negocios de España, y la otra para los de las provincias de Ultramar …”. 22 Art. 259: “Habrá en la Corte un Tribunal, que se llamará Supremo Tribunal de Justicia”. 23 Art. 64: “Las leyes determinarán los tribunales y juzgados que ha de haber; la organización de cada uno, sus facultades, el modo de ejercerlas y las calidades que han de tener sus individuos”. 24 Colomer Viadel, El sistema político …, ob. cit., p. 569: “… This raised the question of whether the provisions of the 1812 Constitution that had not been incorporated into the 1837 Constitution, especially those concerning the organization of the courts, and the administration of justice, should continue to be rejected. On June 21st of the last year referred to, the Ministry of Grace and Justice communicated to the Supreme Court by Royal Order that S.M. had resolved that all the courts and tribunals of the Kingdom ‘should continue in the same state as they had on the 18th of this month when the current Constitution was published and that the same laws, regulations and ordinances which had hitherto been observed, all this being understood insofar as it does not oppose said Constitution and without prejudice to what is resolved in agreement with the Cortes, to which I hereby acknowledge this provision’. Once this decision had been communicated to the Congress, the Commission who was to examine it said: ‘Considering that the administration of justice cannot be interrupted for a single moment, and that it would be interrupted, with serious public prejudice, if the existing one was destroyed without having prepared and arranged what has been to subscribe in its place, we are of the opinion that the Cortes may declare, in accordance with the Government’s proposal, that all provisions contained in Title V of the Constitution of 1812 remain in full force for now and until the laws determine otherwise’”. 25 Sariñena, M. et al., Historia de la …, ob. cit., p. 124. 26 According to the judicial statistics corresponding to the work carried out by the ‘Audiencia Territorial de Granada’ (Territorial Court of the city) during that year, among the criminal cases dispatched, for rebellion or conspiracy there were 84 while 7 were pending; for death there were 455 conducted and 112 pending; for theft, robbery or scam 534 and 119 respectively; for fire 15 and 2; for disturbances and satirical leaflets 24 and 2; for falsehoods and perjury 38 and 14; for immorality and scandal 255 and 61; and, finally, for injuries and abusive treatment 706 and 62. With respect to the “kinds of sentences and number of sen-

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the constitutionally recognized freedom of speech27. The limits to the press are still diffuse and this leads to constant clashes. Perhaps the most well-known are those led by Quiroga, a famous General in the city, and by Agustín Romero, Political Chief of the province. The general himself was carrying on an all-out war against a local publication, El Trueno y Centella Constitucional, a matter that is resolved in the courts. The highest representative of the Government in Granada, Agustín Romero, on the other hand, was in conflict with J. Celedonio Bada, authorized to publish the Official Bulletin of the Province (BOP). In the bulletin, Bada would include news about the lack of public safety that was destroying the province. So, in an article titled ‘También roban a la justicia’, he reported the burglary of the very house of the head of the Court. He takes advantage of this to condemn that “… personal safety is at the discretion of whoever under, the shadow of impunity, confirms theft in their homes, in the streets and in the busiest places, and when there is greatest security. We have said impunity, and we repeat it, because that is what the prostration of these types of lawsuits should be called, not because of the lack of judges, as happened to General Quiroga’s lawsuit, the lawsuits are admitted, they are filed and served, but because this ‘signo’ (protection) of the thieves, whose existence nobody sees and nobody denies, never abandons them until they achieve the postponement of the punishment, and when this is not the case complete freedom. This has led to the repeated and scandalous scaling of the prisons; as a result, those who are inside are in continual communication with those who are outside, and finally this leads to the chain of events that compromise the existence of householders and the entire fortune of a home…”28. But this was not the only article dedicated to the leniency that the scope of executive power in Granada had when dealing with the question of public safety. So, on 4th March another article is published titled ‘El pueblo no se engaña’29, where as well as denouncing several robberies, he insists on the frequency that they are committed without steps being taken against them: tenced” the following data were pointed out: to death 27; prison 901; to army, deprivation of job and other corrections 1208; finally, regarding reprieves, a total of 803. 27 Alejandre, J. A., La justicia popular en España. Análisis de una experiencia histórica: los tribunales de jurados, Madrid, 1981, p. 103: “The absolutist restoration of 1823 again put a brake on attempts to establish and expand the Jury … Nor was the provisional Rule for the administration of justice of 1835 concerned about the issue. The restoration in 1836 of the 1812 Constitution revived the freedom of the press and the possibility that the crimes committed in this way would be judged by jury courts, as foreseen in 1820 and 1822; and, echoing this tendency, the 1837 Constitution stated in its article 2 that ‘the qualification of printing offenses belongs exclusively to jurors’. This was an issue that had been debated and condoned for some time, and even if the results of the experience were not satisfactory at the time, there was at least hope for an amendment. On the other hand, increasing the functions of the jury to all crimes was viewed with greater suspicion and it seemed the time had not come yet …”. 28 BOP n8 84, 25th February 1837. 29 BOP n8 88, 4th March 1837.

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“… When we wrote our article in our Bulletin N8 84 about the constant robberies that are declared in this capital, we pointed out that one of the main causes was the freedom of some of prisoners and leaders, and we did so on the bases of public opinion, which is rarely or never deceived. At that time, we eliminated some facts because we were searching for a remedy to avoid further damage: but as they have been repeated and very recently, we will publish them so that the authorities can have no doubt about the justice with which the honourable and peaceful citizens of Granada complain …”

The Political Chief counterattacks by publishing a panegyric where he praises his work. So, in the supplement of the BOP on the same day you can read: “… His intentions, I repeat are honest, and the injustice that is made towards this establishment, has arisen from involuntary mistakes, which I propose to demonstrate not with eloquence, but with the truth that I believe I am accredited with ….”. The government authorities, through this and other channels, had communicated to the editor their anger regarding the publication of this type of information which criticises their work. But Celedonio Bada insisted that he would continue publishing this news. In fact, in the following issues he repeats the inclusion of different articles relating the frequency of the criminal acts (‘Continúan los robos’30 and ‘Los robos’31). The Political Chief, seeing the uselessness of his admonitions decides to act with a force, which is so rigorous that in the BOP of 8th April32 the editor reports the threats he has received from him (“We believe that these indications will be enough to persuade Sr. Romero Saavedra that we disregard his threats as much as we do his falsehoods”), and he is determined to go ahead with the publication of a new article: ‘Siguen los robos’33. In view of his persistence, the Political Chief officially demands the cessation of the publication of this type of news and condemnations34. But Bada decides to ignore him and publishes: ‘Siguen los robos y presidiarios’35. Having reached this point, the Political Chief decides to withdraw the administrative concession that Celedonio Bada enjoyed and a war of news pamphlets begins. Bada publishes a leaflet entitled: “The authority imposed by the current Political Chief of Granada”36. In the same leaflet he relates the “political and literary” debut by Romero at the end of 1833 through a proclamation entitled ‘Congloriaos’, where

30

BOP n8 89, 6th March. BOP n8 90, 8th March. 32 ‘Por última vez’ in BOP n8 108, 8th April. 33 BOP n8 121, 1st May. 34 BOP n8 127, 10th May 1837. 35 BOP n8 128, 12nd May. 36 Biblioteca del Hospital Real de Granada, C 001 060 (22). Bada, C., “Un golpe de autoridad del Sr. Romero actual gefe (sic) político de Granada”, 2a edición, junio de 1837, Granada, Imprenta de Puchol. 31

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among other things he asserts the preponderance of the law and the need to respect the freedom of press37. He also reveals that when the author became responsible for the periodical publication of the Bulletin he undertook “the sacred obligation to serve the country in the delicate task of public writers” and that “our ink never flowed but to serve the general interests of the country itself or to defend order and true freedom, in our eyes inseparable. Naturally friends of peace, our belief in respect for all opinions as long as they do not become acts against the law, and believing that in the circumstances we find ourselves in, honour is necessary for those that rule, we had turned deaf ears to a certain clamour, we watched certain acts of injustice in silence, and only now and again could one read in the Bulletin, without animosity, and rather with an excessive and reverent expression of diffidence, some extremely light and indirect allusion to the lack of vigilance or neglect of the Authorities. Unfortunately for us, the complaints became infinitely numerous last April and the beginnings of this month May … There is rarely a day when we are not charged with violating the law, or an administrative offence, or an act of immorality, or a misdemeanour, or improper intolerance, or negligence, error or reprehensible and detrimental offence in the interest of the State and individuals: be it civil servants or employees: and (regarding the latter) the higher Authorities themselves …”38. 37 “Lejos de mí lo que parezca precepto: yo no mando (¡para el pícaro que te crea!) la ley impera, y los fieles hijos de este país la guardan y respetan. Escusado sería encarecer los beneficios y fuerza que nacen del orden y la unión fraternal, a vosotros, cuyos lazos sociales no ha cortado la torba cuchilla del despotismo ni la desesperación (¡aprieta hijo!). Ocioso fuera señalar la línea divisoria entre la libertad y la licencia a quien no la ha traspasado en ocasiones peligrosas, y hablar de la circunspección y prudencia con que debe usarse la imprenta, a ciudadanos benéfico que invito, por lo que a mí toca, a que adviertan de mis errores y descuidos, me aconsegen (sic) e iluminen. Mi deber es hacer vuestra dicha, y las menores omisiones merecen Severa Censura. Solo para mi podéis permitiros una Libertad Ilimitada …”. 38 Como sucesos denunciados cabe señalar: la “… reunión de ladrones que había multitud de días estaban robando en cierto y determinado sitio de esta provincia llamado Cuesta Blanquilla, cuatro leguas de Granada, a cuantos pasageros (sic) por allí transitaban … Hablamos de un juez (el nunca bastantemente ponderado D. Antonio Fernández del Castillo, Juez de primera instancia de esta Capital), que presidiendo en estrados la vista de una causa criminal de importancia, había desconocido su deber, ultrajado los santos fueros de la defensa, y rebajado la dignidad del sitio que ocupaba, hasta el punto de interrumpir al abogado defensor del reo con palabras violentas y apasionadas agenas (sic) de su carácter impasible y severo. Lamentámonos del desorden que se observaba en el presidio; o por mejor decir, citamos desnudamente varios hechos de robos, fugas, delitos y espectáculos de indecencia, que tenían disgustada y temerosa a la población … Referimos también un caso de fuerza brutal contra ciudadanos pacíficos e inermes: el hecho de los soldados de África. Hablamos de abusos escandalosos en la parte eclesiástica de la diócesis: de jóvenes imberbes que acumulaban tres, cuatro, seis, ocho y más rentas, en contravención a los sagrados cánones, leyes del Reino, y disposiciones últimas de las Cortes, mientras que había infelices, ancianos, y dignos esclaustrados (sic) que se morían de hambre, o aumentaban innecesariamente las cargas del erario nacional. Bien sabíamos al escribir esta denuncia, que algunos de esos escandalosos cumularios (por egemplo (sic) el Sr. Tenorio) era amigo íntimo del Sr. Gefe (sic) Político … In-

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Celedonio Bada is answered in the BOP itself39 in an article titled: “Sobre el folleto publicado por D. Celedonio Bada bajo el epígrafe ‘Un golpe de Autoridad del Sr. Romero actual Gefe (sic) Político de Granada’ y acerca del que en 11 del propio mes dio a luz manifestado su reducción a cenizas”. It is signed by J.R.A and on several occasions highlights the need to take drastic measures to preserve freedom: “… lately we have been enthusiastic about real freedom, which we believe has been well-proven through the positive acts in our political career, and consequently, we are staunch enemies of everything that could limit it or put it in danger”. Bada continues with his attempts and includes a page in the BOP of 19th June 1837 (dated 15th June) in answer to this article40 to no avail. He is sued and forced to appear before the jury court41. But neither did the Political Chief come out of this fight unscathed, and at the end of August he retired from public life, mentioning illness. He was temporarily substituted by Pedro Lillo, ‘Intendente de la provincia’ (Superintendent of Granada), who would generate new problems. This time with members of the judiciary.

sertamos también una o dos denuncias relativas a multitud de personas que en esta ciudad y a vista de sus Autoridades llevan insignias de grados militares obtenidos durante la última escisión, sin haber alcanzado los oportunos Reales Despachos de ellos, y antes bien, contra la voluntad y determinación espresa (sic) del Gobierno … Y por fin (para no eternizarnos en esta odiosa numeración) referimos un hecho público y fresco del Resguardo que felizmente no tuvo más consecuencia que la de haberse registrado los dependientes de la Hacienda Nacional sin hacer el registro o cumplir la comisión del servicio, que llevaban, que no es corta consecuencia … haberse dejado fugar como Alcaide de la tercia eclesiástica dos frailes acusados de delito de conspiración … atraco al Sr. Blake, Diputado a Cortes por la provincia de Málaga, que caminaba para la Corte y le robaron el dinero que llevaba por los famosos ladrones de Cuesta Blanquilla … Casi al mismo tiempo, otros ladrones despojaban en el camino de Loja a esa capital, a unos pobres ingleses que venían a visitar las antigüedades de la Alhambra, quitándoles hasta los tirantes … Hace pocos días que a las puertas mismas de la ciudad ha sido sorprendido por cinco ladrones montados y armados el Presbítero D. Joaquín Enamorado … un furioso (y es ya el tercer caso semejante) daba puñaladas a su muger (sic); un infeliz obrero se despachurraba bajo las bóvedas de la Iglesia de San Francisco que se está tirando abajo; y otro compañero suyo quedaba mal herido por la misma causa …”. 39 BOP n8 147, 14th June. 40 “Tanto más podíamos haber llevado adelante este empeño, cuanto que vivimos en el reinado de la ley, y no nos hallamos declarados en estado de sitio. Pero temiendo (lo decimos francamente) al Señor Romero; teniéndole (¿por qué hemos de negarlo?) casi terror (esto va en genios); conociendo sus inmensas ventajas sobre nosotros, pobres y desvalidos periodistas, especialmente en el terreno judicial, pues se dice que S.S. ha sido Escribano muy famoso allá en Levante; nos contentamos con dirigirle la respuesta siguiente …”. 41 “El Sr. Romero nos ha citado ante un jurado de 9 o 12 hombres. Nosotros hemos intentado hacerle comparecer con este escrito, alta y solemne protesta que levantamos en favor de la prensa y de nuestros derechos ultrajados ante el gran jurado de toda la Nación …”.

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IV. Attacks on the Independence of Judicial Power The fact that the judicial order should be considered a power as well as independent was a chimera in this century. In the middle of the 19th century, there were a high number movements against the independence of judicial power, and not only in the constitutional context. Besides the rivalry, observed in the fundamental texts, between administration/judicial power, there is another series of unending interferences some of which have a marked substance. For example: a political body like the mayors participating in the administration of justice, the complex relations with the ‘Consejo de Estado’, the intervention of the government in the selection, appointment, promotions, transfers or cessation of judges and magistrates. Another two important examples involve a clear displacement of the Supreme Court: one is the Senate’s intervention regarding the court of justice and the other is the concession of reprieves by the executive42. On a more local level, to become aware of the battle that was taking place, we can refer to both the report the prosecutor of the ‘Audiencia Territorial de Granada’ (Territorial Court of Granada) presents to the ‘Tribunal Supremo’ (Supreme Court) in the year 1837 and the speech given by the senior judge of this court at its formal opening the following year43. Beginning with the latter, in his speech, which recapitulates what happened in the previous term, he underlines the predisposition of the executive power to meddle, or try to meddle, in judicial duties, emphasising in turn that it is the judiciary that “strictly observes the laws, abstains from invading the responsibilities of other powers, and maintains legal order, acts with circumspection that corresponds …”44. 42 Díaz Sampedro, La politización …, ob. cit., pp. 23 – 24: “The tension between the government and Supreme Court was manifest in preventing arbitrariness in the actions of the executive; Proof of this was the presentation in which on October 10, 1837, the Supreme Court defended the principle of immobility on the occasion of the dismissal of Manuel Antonio Caballero, a magistrate of the Supreme Court, and where interesting considerations were made to strengthen the administration of justice and to grant the high court the absolute power in the designations and dismissals”. 43 José López de Cózar serves as dean temporarily after twenty-five years in his post. He formed part of the old ‘Chancillería’ of Granada as ‘oídor’ on 2nd April 1813. The Magistrates that comprised the ‘Audiencia Territorial de Granada’ in the year of 1837 were: Gaspar de Ondovilla Íñigo as Regent; the First Chamber was formed by: José María Vecino, Manuel Seijas Lozano, Francisco José de Dosal and Francisco de la Blanca and Calvo; the Second Chamber by: Gregorio Barraycoa, Francisco de Paula de Soria, Martín de Pineda and Cosme Sagasti; the Third Chamber by: José López de Cózar, Felipe de Urbina and Daoiz, Benito Romero and José Vázquez de Quevedo. As Prosecutors were: Rafael de Almonací and Mora, Manuel Ortiz de Zúñiga. The latter, together with Felipe de Urbina and Daoiz, Gregorio Barraycoa Campos and Seijas Lozano, eventually became part of the Supreme Court. Moreover, the latter two were separated from their posts in the ‘Audiencia de Granada’ in the period 1835 – 36 and replaced after overcoming the corresponding lawsuit that had been initiated against them. 44 Biblioteca del Hospital Real C 001 006 (34), Discurso pronunciado el día dos de enero de 1838 por el Señor Don José López de Cózar ministro decano de la Audiencia Territorial de

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In the ‘Dictamen que el fiscal de la Audiencia de Granada, José María Ortiz de Zúñiga, elevó en el año 1837 al Tribunal Supremo (Report that the prosecutor of the Court of Granada, José María Ortiz de Zúñiga, presented to the Supreme Court in 1837)45, the disagreements with the civil authority in that year are listed more accurately below: “… disagreeable events occurring between the Judge of first instance of Santafé and the Mayor of Purchil, during which the Political Chief of this Province started his attacks against judicial power; the outrage of the councillors of that city, taking a prisoner out of jail; the meddling of the same political authority in the powers of the Courts, a Mayor tearing up an order from the hands of a judge of the first instance of Órgiva, dictating the execution of contentious proceedings; the Political Chief ‘s opposition to the continuation of judicial proGranada, y Regente interino de ella, en ausencia del propietario, el Señor D. José de Ondovilla Íñigo, senador, con motivo de la apertura solemne de dicho tribunal, Granada, Imprenta de Benavides, enero de 1838: “Señores, debiendo en este día dirigir mi voz a tan respetable reunión de ciudadanos, me veo en el mayor conflicto, por carecer de las dotes oratorias, que con tantas ventajas adornan a muchos de mis oyentes; pero la ley lo mando, y tengo que hacerlo: por ello espero de tan ilustre auditorio, tengo conmigo la indulgencia, que reclama su prudencia y mi ingenuidad. Siendo el objeto predilecto de todo Español la paz, el orden, y la justicia, pues de ellos depende la felicidad de la Nación, y por consiguiente la suya, consignados tenemos los medios de conseguirlos en la Constitución publicada en ocho de Junio de 1837, y todos debemos contribuir a su exacto cumplimiento. El poder judicial, de que esta corporación es una parte, no puede mirar con indiferencia asunto de tanta gravedad, y por inclinación, y deber será inexorable en hacer que se cumpla cuanto está prevenido en este código símbolo de paz, y reunión de todos los españoles, que se glorían de serlo. Los enemigos del orden de acuerdo con los partidarios del despotismo no omiten medio de entorpecer su cumplimiento. Afectando acatarla, procuran desacreditar a los verdaderos amantes de ella; porque no está conformes con sus planes revolucionarios: suponen que aquellos intentan restablecer el estatuto, o un despotismo ilustrado, seduciendo así al pueblo incauto: los presentan como atentadores a sus fueros, y libertades, para exasperarlo, e inducirle a la rebelión, y anarquía, y a su sombra hacer ellos su fortuna, de lo que hemos vistos más de un ejemplo en las ecsisiones (sic) de 1835 y 1836 … Quiera el cielo se desvanezcan cuanto antes, y recobremos la paz, y tranquilidad, y con ellas se tocarán (no lo dudemos) los beneficios del sistema representativo; de que es imposible disfrutar en tiempos tan calamitosos como alcanzamos. Entonces obrarán con la debida separación, y energía los tres poderes, que constituyen la fuerza, y nervio del Estado, y tendrán la independencia debida, que en el día es casi imposible … A la vez los encargados del poder egecutivo (sic) invaden las atribuciones del judicial, como se verifica, cuando los Generales, autorizados por un decreto de las cortes, y consultando la conveniencia pública, se ven obligados a declarar en estado de sitio algunas provincias, o distritos reasumiendo toda la autoridad … Sólo el poder judicial marchando por la senda, que le está marcada, se ciñe a la extricta (sic) observancia de las leyes, se abstiene de invadir las atribuciones de los otros poderes, y guardando el orden legal, obra con la circunspección, que corresponde …”. 45 Biblioteca del Hospital Real de Granada, C-001 061 (22). Dictamen que el Sr. D. Manuel Ortiz de Zúñiga, fiscal de S.M. en la Audiencia de Granada espuso (sic) en el espediente (sic) formado a consecuencia de la prisión y conducción a aquella ciudad de D. Vicente María Clemente, juez de primera instancia de Santafé, decretada por el Sr. D. Pedro Lillo, exintendente, gefe (sic) político interino que fue de la provincia el día 22 de setiembre de 1837, con motivo de las elecciones de diputados y senadores, Granada, Imprenta de Benavides, noviembre de 1837.

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ceedings against the Mayor of Lújar, against whom a complaint was filed by the Judge of Motril for the patronage he showed to a gang of crooks; the investigation carried out within Montefrío’s party because of a disturbance and obstructed by the Chief himself, who believes his legal authority to be absolute and superior to justice; the lawsuit started in the Court of Ugíjar for abuses towards a citizen, and hindered by an individual commissioned to do so by the Political Government; the fine imposed and made effective by the Superintendent and current temporary Chief of this province against the Judge of first instance of Santafé; the prevention of the lawsuit filed by the ‘Subdelegación de Rentas’ (Sub-delegation of Revenue) against the same person, and the order to imprison this authority, which would have been carried out if it had not been prevented through the competency of the Prosecutors of this Court, a matter known to the Supreme Court of Justice; the report addressed to the Cortes by some individuals (not the majority) from the ‘Diputación’, asking that the magistrates of this Court be held responsible, in the text they insult them with terrible slanders; the manifest that has circulated in all the towns of this province in the name of the ‘Diputación’, which the Prosecutor presents a copy of, where the printed text slanders the rectitude and patriotism of the magistrates of this ‘Audiencia’, claiming that it has repeatedly dissented due to the habit of absolute command they exercised over the towns in the ill-fated times of arbitrariness; and even tainted the behaviour of the Supreme Court of Justice, whose providence they qualified as illegal and extemporaneous”.

In fact the latter texts written from the ‘Diputación’ caused the ‘Audiencia’ to react all together undersigning a presentation46 addressing the Congress in which they condemn, among other things, that with this attitude this institution aims to “subvert order and unhinge the division of powers of the State.47 At the same time they ask: “What do you want? Do you want these Magistrates to violate the law, demean their dignity, and to bow down to the will of civil authority?”, to which they respond with remarkable conviction: “No, this will never be achieved from Ministers who esteem their honour, above all the goods that on earth”. They also proclaim that the ‘Audiencia’ “does not take jurisdiction over the affairs that are pending before the lower judges, nor do they want to get involved in the court of first instance, nor prevent the action that corresponds to them”. And they add that “the court does not separate judges from their posts, nor does it expect them to appear before it to defend themselves, or suspend them in their functions without reason or just because the Political Chief demands it. Such faculties are not considered by the regulations”. In the pamphlet, the accusation of interfering in the governmental functions of the mayors and the town councils is stressed as being “vague, inaccurate, uncertain and 46

Vid. attachment n8 1. In fact, in one of them, the disrespect to the independence of powers is attributed to judicial power: “… Con ello demostrará también que las disposiciones del Tribunal Supremo a que se acoje (sic) la Audiencia, han sido ilegales y estemporáneas (sic), y por lo mismo denunciadas por Diputación al Gobierno y a la Representación Nacional. Debe sí anticipar a las Corporaciones populares, que el origen de las disensiones probocadas (sic) por la Audiencia, es el hábito de mando absoluto con que en los funestos tiempos de la arbitrariedad ejercía su imperio sobre aquellas, y que, a pesar de la división de Poderes que establece el sistema Constitucional, se han repetido con frecuencia …”. Vid. apéndice núm. 2. 47

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absolutely without foundation, and it is certain that no proof of it will be presented”. It seems curious to them that as the jurisdiction of this court includes other provinces there are no complaints from their political leaders, since their actions are the same in all territories48. They understand that the civil authorities of Granada are convinced of their superiority and of the need for the judges and magistrates to submit to their decisions: “the principle that they profess is that of not acknowledging judicial authority, they deem themselves unjudgeable and exempt from the law”. And it is precisely this conviction of their supremacy that makes them ignore justice49 in the event of any conflict, although the justice system has offered ample proof that it is capable of acknowledging its own mistakes, as in the case of the mayor of Pinos, when the judge abused his privileges: “They are sure not to say that they do not do it because they distrust the justice of the sentences: many examples can be cited and recently that of D. Domingo Urquijo, Mayor of Pinos. He was prosecuted for a crime, and was abused, insulted and pursued by the judge that dealt with the suit without foundation. The lesson was exemplary and the reparation complete. The Prosecutor, the Notary and other civil servants and the Judge were sentenced with severity because the law speaks in favour of that person wrongly treated”. What is the origin of the report signed by José María Ortiz de Zúñiga addressed to the Supreme Court? We are going to put it into context. The constitution of 1837 had been formally proclaimed on 18th June. Consequently, the constituent Cortes had to be dissolved to make way for the ordinary Cortes. However, after drawn out discussions, it was agreed to prolong its activity until the constitution of the new Cortes50. On the 23rd July the call for the new Cortes was officially published51. The electoral 48 “… Extraño es que siendo cuatro Provincias las que componen el territorio de esta Audiencia, ni un solo encuentro, ni una cuestión de atribuciones se haya suscitado en alguna de ellas, más que en ésta, con sus autoridades políticas y gubernativas. Pueden asegurar estos Magistrados, que ignoran quiénes sean los Gefes (sic) Políticos de las otras …”. 49 “… mal podrían, pues, acudir a pedir justicia al tribunal que aquella señala”. 50 R.D. of 29th May 1837 (Gaceta de Madrid n8 909, 30th May 1837): “Doña Isabel II por la gracia de Dios y de la Constitución de la monarquía española, Reina de las Españas y en su nombre Doña María Cristina de Borbón, Reina Regente y Gobernadora del reino … Por Nos ha sido propuesto a las Cortes y aprobado por ellas lo siguiente: No terminar las funciones legislativas ordinarias de las presentes Cortes, hasta que se reúnan las próximas con arreglo a la presente Constitución …”. 51 R.D. of 20th July 1837 (Gaceta de Madrid n8 965, 23rd July 1837): “Doña Isabel I por la gracia de Dios y la Constitución de la monarquía española Reina de las Españas; y en su Real nombre y durante su menor edad la Reina Viuda, su Madre, Doña María Cristina de Borbón, Gobernadora del Reino, a todos los que las presentes vieren y entendieren, sabed: Que en nuestro ardiente deseo de que cuanto antes se discutan y aprueben las leyes importantes que espera la nación, como complemento necesario de las instituciones libres de que goza; usando de la facultad que nos compete por la sobredicha Constitución promulgada en 18 de Junio de este año, y oído el Consejo de Ministros, hemos resuelto convocar, como por la presente convocamos, Cortes ordinarias, con arreglo a la misma Constitución, para el 19 de Noviembre próximo venidero. Por tanto mandamos que el citado día 19 de Noviembre del presente año se hallen reunidos en la capital de España para celebrar Cortes ordinarias los Senadores y Diputados que fueren

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process was now open and it was in this context, in the month of September that the following manifest was published in SantaFé (Granada): “Tomorrow the most precious and important of your rights commences. Tomorrow you begin to write and deposit, in the sacred urn, your own sentence and that of your patria, who awaits it impatiently to revive or perish. Such is the transcendence of the act that awaits you. You are either going to stick the parricidal dagger in the heart of the ill-fated nations, or apply a healthy balsam to its deep wounds, which will close and heal them. And will you hesitate about which party you should choose? Well, for it to be the best, it is essential to fulfil the requirements that are precursors to a wise choice. That your wishes be pure and sincere; that you forget that you are men to be only citizens: that you have made a thorough study of the people you are going to choose, and of the circumstances the state finds itself in. In this way, you will choose wisely; and so that it will always be your responsibility alone; so that you can approach the urn with dignity and with a steady hand, in the election there will be freedom in suffrage and order. You are all interested in these two guarantees of your rights, and to offer them in conjunction with the President you name and your local Authorities, in fulfilment of my duties, I have come to witness your judgement and good sense during these days. I will be vigilant. Woe betide the man who dares to disturb the calm and majesty of such a solemn act! The execration of his fellow citizens will come over him, just as the sword of justice. Do not fear, then; walk with firm and serene steps to the electoral table, choose freely; that is what the law wants …”52.

This was not an apocryphal text. The complete opposite. It contained the name and signature of its author: Vicente María Clemente, judge of the first instance of this neighbourhood. This simple appeal for a responsible vote of his fellow citizens brought him some dramatic consequences, the most serious being the temporal loss of his freedom. The person responsible for such an illegal act was none other than the previously mentioned Pedro Lillo, at that time ‘Jefe Político interino de la provincia de Granada’ (temporary Political Chief of the province of Granada), who used the accusation of upsetting the normal development of the electoral process to commit such a blunder. It is undeniable that there were mandates, such as a circular on 15th July from the Ministry of Government53 or a Royal Order on 25th August54, where the ‘Jefes Ponombrados y elegidos en la forma que expresa la ley electoral de 20 del corriente mes. Tendréis lo entendido, y dispondréis lo necesario para su cumplimiento, haciéndolo imprimir, publicar y circular.= La Reina Gobernadora. En Palacio a 20 de Julio de 1837 = D. Pedro Antonio de Acuña”. 52 Biblioteca del Hospital Real de Granada, C-001 061 (22), Documento 1 del Dictamen que el Sr. D. Manuel Ortiz de Zúñiga, fiscal de S.M. en la Audiencia de Granada espuso (sic) en el espediente (sic) formado a consecuencia de la prisión y conducción a aquella ciudad de D. Vicente María Clemente, juez de primera instancia de Santafé, decretada por el Sr. D. Pedro Lillo, ex-intendente, gefe (sic) político interino que fue de la provincia el día 22 de setiembre de 1837, con motivo de las elecciones de diputados y senadores, Granada, Imprenta de Benavides, noviembre de 1837. 53 Gaceta de Madrid n8 957, 16th July 1837: “… El Gobierno no aprobará jamás, que V.S., llevado de un celo excesivo, se propase a designar o favorecer nombres o matices de la opinión liberal; pero sí aplaudirá que a la luz del día, con noble franqueza, y solo por medio de la

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líticos’ (Political Chiefs) were entrusted to watch over the complete freedom and absolute independence of the voters, avoiding any type of manipulation, fraud, deceit or coaction in the electoral process. It is true that a suit is filed by a citizen, Antonio José Carrillo, saying that the judge has tried to coerce the voters through his speech. But, curiously, this accusation is not presented before the court, which would have been the correct channel, but it is sent to a politician, to the provincial deputy Manuel Rosales, who is the one that urges the Political Chief to act. And it is evident that his actions are clearly excessive. He orders the immediate withdrawal of the pamphlets and enters the judge’s house by force, he has him arrested and taken from the court, confines him to a town far from his residence, bans him from presenting himself as head of the electoral district during the elections, which paradoxically makes it impossible for him to vote55. persuasión y de la verdad, destruya las intrigas e inutilice los esfuerzos de los enemigos del actual orden cosas … Bajo la responsabilidad de V.S. está la completa libertad, la absoluta independencia de los electores. A V.S. corresponde, no sólo respetarlas, si no protegerlas, garantizarlas y asegurar su acción. A este fin, hará V.S. que se observen puntualmente todas las disposiciones legales, que se verifiquen con escrupulosa pureza las operaciones electorales; que reine en todos los puntos el orden y el consecuente decoro, y perseguirá V.S. con mano vigorosa todo impulso ilegal que quiera darse a la elección en cualquier sentido que sea, por manejos, fraudes, amaños o coacciones …”. 54 Gaceta de Madrid n8 999, 26th August 1837: “Ministerio de la Gobernación. Subsecretaría. Circular: Deseando S.M. la Reina Gobernado que los electores que han de nombrar a los Diputados y proponer a los Senadores para las Cortes próximas tengan toda aquella libertad que la ley quiere dar a los que gozan de aquel derecho; y habiendo sido dolorosamente instruida de los medios de que algunos malintencionados se valen para seducir y violentar, no sólo a los ciudadanos sencillos e incautos, que no pueden graduar la perniciosa tendencia que se advierte en muchos de trastornar el orden, tan solemnemente establecido, y que han jurado con la nación sostener los poderes del Estado, sino que se han constituido en órganos de un Gobierno que ha fallecido, y que proclama como un porvenir cierto, y bajo cuyos auspicios intiman a las autoridades a una decisión conforme a sus criminales intentos, exigiéndoles actos positivos del día para que puedan tenerse por méritos en el venidero; me encarga S.M., como lo hago de su Real orden, que haga entender a todos los gefes (sic) políticos y autoridades que dependen de esta secretaría a mi cargo, que sería del desagrado de S.M. cualquier tolerancia o indulgencia que se tenga respecto a los culpables de esta naturaleza …”. 55 Committing abuses whenever there was an election date tended to become a habit. Thus, at the height of the year 1853, the editors of the Magazine ‘Revista General de Legislación y Jurisprudencia’ published an article entitled “Reforma de la Ley provisional sobre la prisión de los procesados”, en RGLJ, n8 1, 1853, pp. 665 – 668, in which they manifest: “Es de tal importancia el real decreto de 30 de setiembre sobre la prisión de los procesados, publicado en la Gaceta de 18 de octubre; son de tal trascendencia las reformas que introduce en la ley provisional para la aplicación del Código penal, que a pesar de tener compuesta y casi concluida la presente entrega, no hemos titubeado un retirar algunos materiales de interés para darle cabida desde luego en nuestra REVISTA. Deseamos que por nuestra parte tenga la mayor publicidad posible, no solo para que llegue cuanto antes el consuelo a mil y mil familias que gimen desoladas por el infortunio y abatidas por la prisión, sino para que no se demore ni por un momento el parabién que damos de todo corazón al digno ministro que ha sabido aconsejar a S.M… Todo el mundo sabe que los partidos políticos, en medio de su general desbordamiento, apelan a medios los más reprobados para conseguir sus fines. Nada más común en vísperas de elecciones o con ocasión de ellas, ver formar unas cuantas causas con

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That year, 1837, the disturbances between the civil authorities and the judicial authorities in Granada were numerous, and gradually they became more and more intense. This was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Understandably the judiciary, in the face of such outrage, could not remain unaffected. The prosecutor of the ‘Audiencia de Granada’ qualifies it as “an atrociously scandalous event”, “a huge crime”, “a serious offence” and “in need of an urgent and serious reparation” and “one of the greatest attacks on judicial power in this provinces, and counterpart to many others which have left their mark on the greatness of justice”. This excessive behaviour does not remain unpunished, or at least they have to try and stop it. From the prosecutor’s office of the ‘Audiencia de Granada’, Manuel Ortiz de Zúñiga presents a report before the Supreme Court to start legal proceedings against a public servant for an “infraction of art. 287 of the Constitution 1837, art. 28 of the 1st Decree of 17th April 1821, of the Law of 11th September 1820; of art. 7 of the Constitution of 1837; of the R.O. of 23th August 1837 and arts. 28 and 29 of the Decree of 17th April 1821”. Primarily, three arguments stand out in his report; the first is the absolute denial of possible crime; the second, before the remote possibility that something illegitimate may have been committed, he underlines the wrongful procedures of the authority; and finally, the comparative affront with respect to other authorities, to be exact those of a military character. The first argument is obvious. In the text by the judge from Santafé the prosecutor only sees “… a service that praises instead of repressing”. In this sense he understands that “… it is necessary to feel irrational passions, fed by the spirit of the party professing a despotic intolerance and taking control of an exclusive privilege regarding the respectable will of the voters in order to find reasons of bitter censorship in the speech that concerns us and to attack its author in such an illegal and unwise way …”. With regard to the second, he argues that in the hypothetical case that the judge’s actions were criminal, the civil authority can be found to have acted irregularly, asking aloud: “why did the Political Chief not execute what was established in this provisions of His Majesty? Why did he not hand over the prisoner to the competent court to be judged according to the laws?”. Finally he understands that if the action deserved such measures to be taken, why did they not act against the ‘Capitán General’ (Captain-General) of Granada who issued a public announcement56 addressing the militia and other inhabitants of the capital in similar terms57. There is such a similarity that the soldier warns that “tofalsas imputaciones por lo general, pero que apoyadas en un principio con las declaraciones de algunos testigos, dan lugar a auto de prisión, en la que va envuelta la suspensión de ejercer cargos públicos y derechos políticos …”. 56 Vid. attachment n8 3. 57 In this regard says the Prosecutor: “Si alguna disculpa mereciese el atentado cometido por el Gefe (sic) Político, sería necesario declararle autorizado para que procediese contra el Escelentísimo (sic) Sr. Capitán General, porque en el mismo día en que lo hizo el Juez de

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morrow is the first day marked by the law in force that the Voters exercise the biggest and most important act of citizens” and he comments, among other matters, that “they are going to give suffrage in favour of the men they consider most apt for directing the state in the difficult and critical circumstances that surround us; in serious matters that have to be examined and discussed; in a word in favour of those who they believe they should be representatives of the Spanish Nation”. He takes advantage of the occasion to warn that “each of you already knows the distinct qualities that those who you honour with your suffrage should grace” emphasising that “in this solemn and extremely important act there should be absolute freedom in all the Voters, and each respecting the law, they should allow the others to exercise their right with the same freedom, with the same independence that each one wishes for themselves” concluding that “whatever the result of the elections it should be respected as the expression of the majority of the Electoral body” without there being any “reason or pretext to disturb the peace”. The ‘Audiencia Territorial’ adheres to the prosecutor’s petition to address the Supreme Court, which effectively orders a complaint to be filed, asking the President of the Court to carry out the summary investigation. As provisional measures, while it is being investigated Pedro Lillo is forced to leave the city. At the same time, the executive decides to suspend him from his double post as ‘Jefe Político interino’ and as ‘Intendente de la provincia de Granada’58. primera instancia de Santafé, publicó también la adjunta alocución a la Milicia Nacional y habitantes de esta Capital (Núm. 28) en que propaló, aunque con diverso lenguaje, los mismos principios de orden, de libertad, y de seguridad a los electores; y si hubiera de hacerse cotejo entre un documento y otro, se encontraría en este último, es decir, en el del Gefe (sic) Militar, no principios que censurar, sino algunas alusiones a los desorganizadores y anarquistas, que aunque pocos en número (dice su Escelencia (sic) no dejan de ecsistir (sic) desgraciadamente entre nosotros, y para los cuales todo idea de orden y legalidad es una carga penosa e insufrible. Más moderación aún observo en sus palabras al Juez de primera instancia, que se contentó con esponer (sic) sus laudables deseos de que fueran puros y sinceros los electores, prometiéndoles que habría en la elección libertad y orden, y sólo recordó a aquellos que era autoridad para decirles ¡Ay de aquél que se atreva a turbar la quietud y majestad de tan solemne acto! Elegid, libremente; así lo quiere la ley, y para conseguirlo sacrificará su existencia misma vuestro Juez. Pero este lenguage (sic) noble y franco, propio de los profesan ideas de libertad bien entendida, no agradó …”. 58 The BOP n8 226, 30th October includes Circular Letter n8 134 by virtue of which Manuel Marco y Mora is appointed Mayor of the province of Granada. The BOP n8 227, 1st November includes Circular Letter n8 136 by which Pedro Lillo is dismissed as Superintendent of the province of Granada and orders that the secretary, Alfonso Escalante, to take over temporarily. On 18 November, José Pérez de Ribas was appointed as the new Political Chief of Granada (BOP n8 237, 18th November). He makes a curious addressing the people of Granada when he takesover his post: “Habitantes de la provincia de Granada. S.M. la augusta Reina Gobernadora ha tenido a bien nombrarme Gefe (sic) Político de esta Provincia, y principio hoy a desempeñar las funciones que están señaladas a este cargo. Confiado en vuestra ilustración, más que en mis escasos conocimientos y vuestro patriotismo, me prometo llenarlas en todo cuanto permitan las críticas circunstancias en que la desastrosa guerra civil ha puesto a la Nación. Protectores de las personas, sus bienes y derechos, a la par que conservadores del orden público y dirigidos a cuidar de la observación de las leyes, no omitiré diligencia alguna

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In spite of the huge effort made to achieve this, we do not know the outcome. We cannot affirm whether Pedro Lillo was finally condemned, although the offended Judge showed how happy he was: “…the town should congratulate themselves finally on seeing how they are governed by an immortal sovereignty, and by men who in the middle of this critical state of Spain still have time to polish the sword of the law outside the battle fields. Granada and Santafé, which have witnessed how a Judge was repressed and treated as a prisoner of state, and they had the right for some moments to doubt his innocence, have just become witnesses to the reparation, as they were to the scandal”59. Neither did he end up acquitted. However, we should note that given such complex political transformations of this period, even if the result were favourable to the prosecution’s aims, that is, sanctioning the executive representative for abuses committed against a member of the judicial power, the Government still had an ace up their sleeve to mitigate its effects. We are referring to issuing a reprieve60. Another resounding way of outwitting judicial independence61. para conseguir estos objetivos tan interesantes. Seré imparcial porque de otro modo no se puede ser justo, nunca olvidaré que la ley debe ser la única regla de mi conducta. Siempre estaré dispuesto a oír cuantas advertencias se me hagan para el acierto de mis resoluciones. Cuidaré escrupulosamente de guardar la más completa armonía con todas las autoridades, convencido que sin ella ninguno puede gobernar bien. Respetaré y haré cumplir sus providencias y determinaciones en la parte que me incumban … Granada, 18 de noviembre de 1837 = José Pérez de Ribas”. 59 Although Vicente Maria Clemente sang victory momentarily. Dictamen que el Sr. D. Manuel Ortiz de Zúñiga …, ob. cit., p. 17: “A la rectitud de la Escelentísima (sic) Audiencia Territorial no podían dejar de afectar las sólidas razones en que el Sr. Fiscal apoyaba su anterior ilustrado dictamen. Accedió a su petición, remitiendo testimonio del espediente (sic) al supremo tribunal de Justicia: éste en su vista ha decretado la formación de causa a D. Pedro Lillo, dando orden al Sr. Regente de la Audiencia para que instruya inmediatamente la sumaria, haciéndole salir durante ella, de la capital, y a seis leguas de distancia, cuya disposición se está ya ejecutando. Al mismo tiempo el Gobierno de S.M. a quien el Juez que subscribe dio cuenta por estenso (sic) del atentado cometido en su persona, se ha servido deponer al Sr. Lillo, de su destino de Intendente de esta provincia en que ya se halla posesionado su subcesor (sic), habiendo igualmente cesado su mando civil interino. Tales actos de Justicia hacen la apología más completa del Gobierno y del Supremo Tribunal, que se espera desplegará en el fallo de la causa su acostumbrada justificación. Sepan todos que las leyes no son una vana quimera. Sepan las autoridades que su responsabilidad no es un ilusión en las naciones libres. Felicítense, en fin, los pueblos de verse regidos por una soberanía inmortal, y por hombres, que en medio del estado crítico de España, aún les queda tiempo para hacer brillar la espada de la ley fuera de los campos de batalla. Granada y Santafé que han visto deprimido y tratado como reo de estado a un Juez, y que tuvieron derecho por algunos momentos a dudar de su inocencia, acaban de ser testigos de la reparación, como lo fueron del escándalo. Esta es la mejor sinceración que puede ofrecerlas, como también a las Provincias y a la nación entera el que publica estas líneas, y responde de la autenticidad del anterior dictamen Fiscal = Vicente María Clemente = Gavia la grande 28 de Octubre de 1837”. 60 Its denomination throughout the Hispanic legal history is very diverse: ‘perdón’, ‘gracia’, ‘piedad’, ‘merced’, ‘misericordia’, ‘abolición’, ‘indulgencia’, ‘remisión’, ‘condonatio’, ‘placet’, ‘habilitatio’, ‘restitutio’ … Vid., entre otros, Rodríguez Flores, I., El perdón real en

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Although the discussions between supporters and opponents about the right to a reprieve has a long history, throughout the 19th century they intensify, and there are many reasons for this. One of these is just to be able to reflect what is happening beyond Spanish borders. Authors like Grocio, Puffendorf, Montesquieu, Bentham, Beccaria, Kant and a long etcetera had already debated this question, and the troubled Spanish doctrine could not ignore it although their participation in this debate would come late62. But there were another two arguments that had more impact: the frequen-

Castilla (siglos XIII – XVIII), Salamanca, 1971, especially, pp. 21 – 44. Also, Tomás y Valiente, F., “El perdón de la parte ofendida en el derecho penal castellano (siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII)” en Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español 31 (1961), pp. 55 – 114; Bermejo Cabrero, J. L., Poder político y administración de justicia en la España de los Austrias, Madrid, 2005, especially, pp. 317 y ss.; Hespanha, A. M., “Da ‘Iustitia’ a ‘disciplina’. Textos, poder e politica penal no antigo Regime” en Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español 57 (1987), pp. 493 – 578; Dios, S. de, Merced y Patronazgo Real. La Cámara de Castilla entre 1474 – 1530, Madrid, 1993. 61 Según el Diccionario judicial que contiene la explicación y significación de las voces más en uso en los tribunales de justicia por D.J.F.A., Madrid, Imprenta de D. Miguel de Burgos, Setiembre de 1831, pp. 142 – 143, indulto es: “Gracia o privilegio concedido a alguno para que pueda hacer lo que sin él no podría. Gracia por la cual el superior remite la pena, o exceptúa y exime a alguno de la ley y de cualquier otra obligación”. Villalba, Hervás, L.M., “La gracia de indulto ‘Procede aplicarla por los Tribunales en causa pendiente en virtud del desistimiento del Ministerio fiscal, cuando se opone la parte querellante’” en Revista General de Legislación y Jurisprudencia 85 (1894), p. 281, lo define como: “la remisión de la pena que un delincuente hubiere merecido por su delito” mientras que para Martínez Alcubilla, M., Diccionario de la administración española, peninsular y ultramarina, 2a ed., Madrid, 1868, voz ‘indulto’, es la “Condonación o remisión de la pena que un delincuente merece por su delito. Entre las prerrogativas que nuestra Constitución señala al Rey se encuentra la de indultar a los delincuentes con arreglo a las leyes”. En la misma línea Langle, E., Código penal de 17 de junio de 1870, Madrid, 1915, p. 210, considera que se trata de “una institución mediante la cual se remite toda la condena, o toda la pena principal, o parte de ella, o alguna si son varias, o se conmuta la impuesta por otra de la misma escala. Corresponde concederlo al Rey, con arreglo a las leyes, según expresa el núm. 38 del artículo 54 de la Constitución”. 62 Pacheco, J. F., Estudios de Derecho penal. Lecciones pronunciadas en el Ateneo de Madrid, I, Madrid, 1842, p. 256: “Debemos observar aun para completar este hecho, que los escritores y filósofos políticos se han mostrado por lo general favorables al derecho de gracia, mientras que sus adversarios han nacido y se cuentan por lo común entre los que se ocupan sólo de la legislación penal …”. Vid. al respecto, entre otros, Diego Madrazo, S., De la gracia de indulto, Memoria leída por el Sr. D …, Madrid, Imprenta de Eduardo Martínez García, 1874; Arenal, C., “El derecho de gracia ante la justicia” en Revista General de Legislación y Jurisprudencia 54 (1879); Montes, J., La pena de muerte y el derecho de indulto, Madrid, 1897; Bravo, E., La gracia del indulto, Madrid, 1889; Marquina y Kindelán, C., Breves consideraciones sobre el derecho de gracia, Madrid, 1900; Dorado Montero, P., El derecho protector de los criminales, II, Madrid, 1915; Cadalso, F., La libertad condicional, el indulto y la amnistía, Madrid, 1921; Elorza Aristorena, J., “Consideraciones histórico doctrinales sobre la ley de indulto de 18 de junio de 1870”, conferencia pronunciada con motivo del curso monográfico sobre el Centenario de una obra legislativa, Valencia, 1972; Linde Paniagua, E., Amnistía e indulto en España, Madrid, 1976; Sobremonte Martínez, J. E., Indultos y amnistía, Valencia, 1980 y Requejo Pagés, J.L., “Amnistía e indulto en el constitucionalismo histórico español” en Historia Constitucional. Revista electrónica, 2 (2001), pp. 81 – 106.

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cy with which reprieves were granted in Spain and especially, the arbitrariness that was used. They had gone beyond the initial discussion between those who defended that reprieves had no place in a society with fair laws and those who understood that it was necessary to mitigate the rigour of legal mandates. The former did not give up hope to be able to indefinitely modify the provisions in force until any possible injustice were eradicated. The latter, more practical, acted on the premise that this was impossible to achieve, that a rule, as perfect as it may be, could never take into account all the potential cases, and therefore, there would always be the possibility of erring. This opinion was in the majority and is what led the renowned politician and jurist of the time, Pacheco63, to affirm categorically: “We believe that the very interest in it sometimes requires the use of this right; and not as a personal means, but as a governmental means, it can also produce great and happy results. It should be legitimate for us to think like Montesquieu, that in moderate monarchies it is a source of great value and unspeakable usefulness, as long as it is used with prudence and wisdom”64. But here lay the problem. There was a traditional practise that related reprieves to the changes in the monarchy. For example, a new King coming to the throne, his marriage or the birth of an heir were justified reasons for granting reprieves65. But voices began to be raised in disagreement with these practices, and they demanded that it should not be the monarch who has the last word, but it should be the Supreme Court as the embodiment of judicial independence. It was pure coherence. If the king granted the pardon and/or the government was really modifying a decision of the courts, they were interfering in its competencies. This did not happen in the case of the Supreme Court, since its tasks did involve revising the actions of any lower judge or court.

63

Pacheco, Estudios de Derecho …, ob. cit., p. 260. “… Cuando los abusos son irremediables, y ocurren todos los días, y causan de por sí mucho más daño que causa bien el uso regular, poca defensa tiene la institución en sí propia para resistir a objeción tan calificada …” pero “… ‘Quiérese saber, señores, lo que yo temería de veras en las circunstancias en que nos hallamos’ Pues precisamente sería el contrario mi temor: precisamente nacería y crecería mi recelo, si en unos tiempos como los actuales no tuviese el poder esa facultad política de agraciar y de conmutar, si entregados a la inflexibilidad de las leyes no fuera posible esperar misericordia contra la necesaria severidad de los tribunales. Yo hubiera defendido en todos tiempos el derecho de que tratamos, a pesar de los abusos a que pudiera dar ocasión; mas en el día, cuando por una parte esos abusos no tienen probabilidad, y cuando por otras nos encontramos en circunstancias como las que nos rigen, confieso que no puedo concebir una nación europea en la que el gobierno carezca de semejante prerrogativa”. 65 Martínez Alcubilla, Diccionario …, ‘indulto’, 6a edition: “… Creencia tan errónea está autorizada en nuestro país por la frecuencia con que se conceden indultos generales, verdaderas amnistías, que atajan la acción de los Tribunales y escarnecen la fuerza imperativa de sus fallos, y que se inspiran frecuentemente en el propósito de complacer a fuerzas políticas o sociales que exigen el perdón y no en el designio puro de dulcificar la situación de los que han de resultar favorecidos o de redimir la pena a los arrepentidos de su delito …”. 64

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On the other hand, there were complex regulations, which were extremely outdated and incomplete. They seemed disconnected from the multitude of different sources; going from the ‘Fuero Juzgo’ to the ‘Novísima Recopilación’, then the ‘Leyes del Estilo’, ‘Las Partidas’ and a long etcetera. This generated a dense labyrinth that had become worse and worse during the new liberal state with different decrees and ministerial orders that only patched up the issue. The different constitutional texts that were produced were restricted to recognizing its existence and laying the responsibility on the monarch66. And such a confusion made it easier to abuse, which in fact occurred constantly. An ideal framework that perhaps protected the case examined. It would be necessary to wait for the Ley provisional estableciendo reglas para el ejercicio de la gracia de indulto (Provisional law establishing rules for exercising the granting of reprieves) of 24th June 1870 to install some order.

Attachments 1. Escrito Dirigido por los Miembros de la Audiencia Territorial de Granada al Congreso en 13 de Agosto de 183767 Al Congreso Nacional. El Regente, Ministros y Fiscales de la Audiencia Territorial de Granada, con el mayor respeto hacen presente: Que en el Diario de Sesiones de Cortes han visto que en la del 4 del corriente se dio cuenta de la exposición que a las mismas ha elevado esta Diputación Provincial, pintando a estos magistrados con los más desfavorables coloridos, atribuyéndoles abusos, atentados y usurpación de autoridad; pidiendo se les exija la responsabilidad y que se gire una visita a este Tribunal Superior. Con sentimiento, y profundo, han entendido este acto de la Diputación, puesto que él no fue inesperado, si bien es altamente injusto. El fallo que en breve recaerá en esta contienda, de la que conoce ya el Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (después de formada esta exposición se ha recibido orden del Tribunal Supremo, en que se dice haber decretado formación de causa 66 Así, según el Estatuto de Bayona (art. 112) el derecho de perdonar “pertenecerá solamente al Rey y le ejercerá oyendo al ministro de Justicia …”. Para la Constitución de 1812 (art. 171): “… al Rey … le corresponde como principales las facultades siguientes: … Decimatercia. Indultar a los delincuentes, con arreglo a las leyes”. Esta fórmula se repite en la 1837 (art. 47), 1845 (art. 45) y 1876 (art. 54) donde entre las prerrogativas que la Constitución señala al Rey “le corresponde: … 3. Indultar a los delincuentes, con arreglo a las leyes”. Cambia, sin embargo, en la de 1869 (art. 74) pues el Rey “necesita estar autorizado por una ley especial: … 5. Para conceder amnistías e indultos generales” y en el proyecto de Constitución Federal de 1873 donde se le atribuye al Presidente de la República la facultad de conceder indultos (art. 82). En el ámbito de los códigos penales el Código Penal de 1822 le dedica quince artículos colocados en el Capítulo X (De los indultos) del Título Preliminar. Como recuerda Elorza Aristorena, Consideraciones …, ob. cit., pág. 197, aunque es minuciosamente regulado por esta disposición, siguiendo el dictado constitucional, la Comisión que preparó el Código “no pudo ocultar que veía con malos ojos el indulto, pues en la exposición que acompaña al proyecto presentado, reproduce los argumentos contrarios a la prerrogativa Real …”. Los códigos de 1848, 50 y 70 lo regularán de una manera dispersa y fragmentaria (habitualmente al tratar de los efectos de las penas). 67 Biblioteca del Hospital Real de Granada C-001 064 (61).

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contra este Gefe – sic – Político), justificará este aserto y la tranquilidad de conciencia con que estos Magistrados pueden y deben oír que se pida su responsabilidad, y que se reclame una visita. Una ni otra resolución puede afectarles ni instantáneamente. Empero la exposición henchida de inexactitudes y de hechos equivocados, produce otro efecto, tanto más temible, cuanto que ni aún en la ley hay poderío para evitarlo, y es la herida que puede causar en la opinión de personas que la han adquirido a cosa de sacrificios y de duras pruebas en su carrera pública y privada. Esta consideración es la única que mueve a los exponentes a defenderse delante del gran jurado de la Nación, elevando su voz a los representantes de ella. Permítaseles por esta vez traspasar su modestia y hacer patente su conducta, comprobada de un modo incontestable: así lo exige la dureza e injusticia de la acusación que se les hace. El comportamiento de estos Magistrados es tan público en la cuatro provincias de este territorio, que retan a todos sus habitantes a que descubran alguno de aquellos impuros manejos o defectos de otra especie, que pudieran manchar a un juez; pero sus habitantes que reciben a estos Ministros con la opinión que les deben, y la confianza que les inspiran, galardón de que se ufanan porque él es merecido. Reservado estaba a la Diputación Provincial de Granada y a su Gefe (sic) Político tocar a la opinión de estos Magistrados, denunciarles de infractores de la ley, de usurpadores de autoridad, y de atribuciones extrañas, de funcionarios, en fin, que pretender subvertir el orden y trastornar la división de los poderes del Estado. Fácil y aún frecuente por desgracia es atacar la opinión más merecida de funcionarios respetables, atribuir abusos, imputar escesos (sic) y aún crímenes; lo que sí es difícil es demostrarlos, convencerlos; y la Diputación, consultando su misma dignidad, debió ser más circunspecta, dejando para sus comunicaciones el lenguage (sic) de la pasión, que debió alejar de documentos que habían de tener tal publicidad como su exposición al Congreso. Difícil, y aún imposible será a estos Magistrados rebatir todas las expresiones que aquella puede contener, por no haberla leído íntegra, ni más que el estracto (sic) que el Diario de Cortes refiere; pero cuanto en él se afirma quedará rebatido cumplidamente. Táchase a estos Magistrados de que con quebrantamiento de la ley de 3 de febrero de 1823 y del reglamento provisional para la administración de justicia, se entrometen en las funciones gubernativas de los Alcaldes y Ayuntamientos de los pueblos. Acusación vaga, inexacta, incierta y absolutamente infundada, de la que es seguro que no se presentarán pruebas. Extraño es que siendo cuatro Provincias las que componen el territorio de esta Audiencia, ni un solo encuentro, ni una cuestión de atribuciones se haya suscitado en alguna de ellas, más que en ésta, con sus autoridades políticas y gubernativas. Pueden asegurar estos Magistrados, que ignoran quiénes sean los Gefes (sic) Políticos de las otras ¿Cuál podrá ser la causa de esta singularidad? Por ventura ¿juzgará el Tribunal por distintas reglas y principios los negocios de esta provincia? ¿Los jueces todos de ella estarán acordes en su opinión sobre el punto en cuestión, y de un modo diferente de todos los de las otras tres Provincias? Esto no es creíble, ni aún percibirse puede. Lo que se infiere sí, es, que esta Diputación, que este Gefe (sic) Político no opinan como los otros; y la acusación que en esta diferencia se funda no es sola para el Tribunal, sino para los otros Gefes (sic) Políticos, para las otras Diputaciones Provinciales. Podría aún abanzarse (sic) a más; ella inculpa a toso los Gefes (sic) y Diputaciones Provinciales de España, a todos los Tribunales, al Gobierno mismo ¿Cuál de estos cuerpos, de estas autoridades ha creído ni sostiene, que los negocios contenciosos no son del privativo conocimiento del poder judicial y sujetos a su acción? ¿Cuál es el que niega que los Alcaldes y Ayuntamientos son justiciables? Ninguno, sólo la Diputación de Granada ¿Cuál es el Tribunal,

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el Juez que se ha desistido del conocimiento de estos negocios, declarándolos fuera de la acción judicial? No se señalará uno. Y si lo están ¿por qué el Gobierno, a quién se ha dado cuenta justificada en todos los casos, no ha reprimido los que la Diputación califica de abusos y atentado? Mas ¿cómo podría hacerlo, cuando esas disposiciones que se invocan, esa ley de 3 de febrero de 1823, ese reglamento provisional y decreto de 22 de noviembre de 1836 previenen lo contrario de lo que esta Diputación y Gefe (sic) Político sostienen? Dícese por aquella corporación, que esta Audiencia quebranta el reglamento provisional. ¿Cuándo, cómo, en qué caso? No lo señalará la Diputación; ella misma conoce que no podría convencerlo. Se alude a las cuestiones que han provocado la denuncia; ellas contestan con su misma narración. El Tribunal sostiene que los negocios contenciosos pertenecen a la acción judicial: esto lo previene el art. 36 del reglamento, y el 58 del real decreto de 22 de noviembre de 1836. Esta Audiencia no se avoca el conocimiento de los negocios que penden ante los jueces inferiores, ni quiere entrometerse en un fondo en la primera instancia, ni impedir la acción que a aquellos les está cometida: así lo determinan las leyes. El tribunal no separa a los jueces de sus destinos, no los comparece, ni suspende en sus funciones sin causa y por la sola escitación (sic) del Gefe (sic) Político. Tales facultades no le están cometidas por el reglamento. Estas han sido las cuestiones hasta ahora suscitadas y sostenidas, éstas las que han producido ese acalorado e injusto ataque, esa acusación en que tanto se denigra a estos Magistrados. Los hechos son indudables, los documentos existe, los expedientes hablan. Tal era el conflicto en que el Tribunal se ponía frecuentemente, y tales las exigencias de la autoridad política para que el Tribunal atropellase el reglamento, y cediese a sus indicaciones coloradas con las circunstancias, que en 30 de mayo último se vio precisado el Tribunal a elevar a S.M. la exposición que incluye la certificación número 18 (los documentos que se citan obran en las Cortes, en el Ministerio y Tribunal Supremo de Justicia). Advertiráse (sic) en ella la mesura de estos Magistrados, la modestia que marca todos sus actos. Peritos en el derecho y órgano de la ley, no presumieron del acierto ni calificaron de infalible su juicio. ‘La opinión del Tribunal no es la del Gefe (sic) Político, dijeron. AV.M. toca resolver’. La decisión fue la que de esperar era: que el tribunal obrase con arreglo a las leyes. Y Magistrados que así someten sus actos a la censura del Gobierno; que resisten entrometerse en las funciones de sus subordinados; que no se prestan a invalidarlas por ningún género de temor; que poco avaros de facultades han expuesto al Gobierno en sus informes que aún deben cercenarse, ¿podrán fundadamente ser acusados de infractores de la ley, de abusivos de autoridad, de que quieren estenderla (sic) y deprimir las otras que las leyes reconocen …? No se contenta la Diputación con atribuir al Tribunal escesos (sic), abusos, atentados; quiere señalar la intención, el objeto, Píntale como instrumento de ciertas clases para oprimir las corporaciones populares, márcale con tendencias a desacreditar el actual orden de cosas. Estos Magistrados, por el respeto que deben al augusto Congreso de la Nación, y por el que se deben a sí mismos, contendrán su pluma, dispuesta a correrse en la acerbidad del sentimiento que esta imputación les produce; pero permítaseles preguntar ¿dónde están esos individuos que les esceden (sic) en patriotismo, en antecedentes honrosos, y en sacrificios por causa de la libertad? Sus nombres no son obscuros, ni sus hechos ambiguos, ni su proceder flexible a los acontecimientos, plegándose al que triunfa. Como particulares han ejercido siempre las virtudes de buenos ciudadanos, como Magistrados están escritos sus nombres con colores distinguidos, y se hallan enlazados en nuestra historia contemporánea con los hechos más honrosos y sublimes. La Diputación Provincial, queriendo cohonestar la vaguedad de sus asertos, señala dos hechos por su desgracia; hechos que no debiera haber citado. Uno de ellos es el procedimiento

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que se sigue en el juzgado de Órgiva contra D. Diego Giménez Alcalde del lugar de Murchas. Estos Magistrados no exigían otra cosa que la exactitud en la narración, en vez del lenguage (sic) apasionado de que la Diputación usa. Como aparece en la certificación núm. 28, el hecho ha sido el de haber el D. Diego Giménez reunido unos ocho o nueve hombres, pasando al lugar de Mondújar donde tiene una finca D. Agustín Riquelme, atropellado a éste y a sus sirvientes, talado unos árboles y sarmientos, y provocado un suceso de mayor trascendencia con sus insultos. El Alcalde de Mondújar previene las diligencias sumarias a solicitud del agraviado, las remite al Juez de Órgiva, que amplía el sumario, y en su caso decreta la prisión de los reos. El Alcalde se resiste, y aún intenta hacer armas contra el Juez comisionado; este Gefe (sic) Político y Diputación quieren sostener a aquél, mandan un Abogado en comisión a dichos lugares, recoge los despachos y diligencias del Juez, espresando (sic) en su recibo que lo hacía por orden del Gefe (sic) Político. Ninguna parte tomó, ni podía, el tribunal que ignoraba los sucesos, habiéndosele dado el primer parte en 22 de Julio, y en el 24 la Diputación Provincial le remitió el espediente (sic) estraído (sic), pintándose este atentado en los términos que aparece en la certificación núm. 38. Ahora bien; o la exposición hecha a las Cortes es anterior a este oficio, o posterior: Si lo primero, aquella corporación fue demasiado ligera, pues pide la responsabilidad, fundada en un hecho que en seguida tuvo que reconocer como sujeto a la acción judicial, y aún virtualmente el esceso (sic) que ella había cometido. Si lo segundo, las Cortes con su alta penetración podrán juzgar del fundamento de una acusación apoyada en un aserto, que la Diputación misma había destruido, ¿y a esto se llama deprimir la autoridad popular y desacreditar las instituciones…? No hará mérito el tribunal de que a la Diputación debería constar, porque resulta del espediente (sic), que ese Alcalde que defendía contra otro Alcalde y contra un Juez había sido oficial de Realistas, porque el tribunal en ninguno de sus actos ve más que la ley y los hechos y no considera personas. Otro de los que sirven de fundamento a la acusación, es el procedimiento del Juez de 1a instancia de Santafé contra el Alcalde de Purchil, que también se desfigura. Don José de Sierra acudió a dicho Juez, intentando un interdicto de despojo, por el que dijo le había causado D. Antonio de Sola, vecino y Alcalde de aquel lugar, privándole de las aguas que correspondían a sus tierras, y destruyéndoles una presa que las guiaba. Dada la justificación, recayó el auto restitutorio y para su ejecución se libró despacho cometido al Escribano actuario. Éste se presento en Purchil, pero no encontró individuo alguno de justicia que cumplimentara el despacho; antes si ayudaban a las intenciones del Sola de provocar una asonada. El Juez mandó instruir sumario sobre ello, y pasó personalmente a ejecutar sus providencias. El Sola opuso una resistencia abierta, faltó a la autoridad judicial, ésta le mandó arrestar, pero fue de nuevo insultada, y el Alcalde llegó al estremo (sic) de mandar tocar la campana. De todo dio cuenta el Juez al tribunal; que le previno procediese con arreglo a derecho, y necesitando auxilio para ejecutar sus providencias, lo pidiese a las autoridades que pudiesen franqueárselo, poniéndolo en conocimiento del Gefe (sic) Político. Este pasó al tribunal dos oficios provocando una conferencia, diciendo era preciso apartarse de rancios usos y privilegios, y que no accediéndose a esto indicaba la competencia. El tribunal, que ni conocía el negocio, ni podía entrometerse en él, se los trasladó al Juez, repitiéndole que obrara con arreglo a las leyes. Reiteró sus comunicaciones dicho Gefe (sic), no aquietándose ni conformándose con las resoluciones del Tribunal; no debiéndose hacer aquí mención del estilo desusado en que aquéllas están concebidas, ya porque los exponentes quieren rehuir toda personalidad, ya porque el negocio está sometido a la decisión del Supremo Tribunal de Justicia (se ha comunicado orden por dicho tribunal supremo para se continúen tanto el interdicto como la causa contra D. Antonio de Solís), pues que a esta Audiencia no le quedaba otro medio que

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ponerlo todo en conocimiento de S.M. y encargar al Juez de Santafé que continuara guardando la prudencia que hasta entonces había observado. Pudo el Juez lograr la prisión del Sola, y le colocó en la sala de Audiencia de la cárcel de Santafé, atendido el carácter de aquella persona; pero un nuevo suceso complicó el anterior. Algunos individuos del Ayuntamiento de Santafé, o todos ellos, estrageron (sic) de su prisión al procesado, quebrantaron su incomunicación, y atentaron abiertamente contra las disposiciones judiciales. Preciso era colorar este esceso (sic); pero aunque al parecer se han tocado todos los medios hasta el de figurar una alarma, todo ha sido inútil. Este Gefe (sic) Político también tomó parte en el nuevo suceso, quiso que el tribunal compareciera al Juez, a lo que no pudo accederse. Le quiso atacar a dicho funcionario, llevarlo como a un subalterno a las Casas Capitulares, suspenderle en su ejercicio, y se vio precisado a trasladar su residencia a otro pueblo del partido, lo que aprobó el tribunal y también S.M. (la orden citada del tribunal supremo ha sido estensiva (sic) a que se proceda a formación de causa contra dichos concejales, si ya no lo estuviese). Los exponentes no acompañan documentos para justificar este hecho, porque testimonio literal del espediente (sic) tiene el Gobierno de S.M. y también el Supremo Tribunal de Justicia, que ya entiende de estos acaecimientos por el orden que las leyes establecen. De lo expuesto se infiere que es inexacto, infundado y aún incierto lo que la Diputación Provincial manifiesta sobre los abusos del tribunal y sus atentados. El no ha llegado a conocer todavía de ninguno de estos negocios, como pendientes en 1a instancia: ellos son de naturaleza contenciosa, sujetos a acción judicial; y las comunicaciones mismas de la Diputación destruyen este aserto de que el tribunal quiere estender (sic) sus facultades, pues que en aquellas se queja porque el tribunal no usa de las que la Diputación se ha figurado que le asisten. Este contraste dice más que cuanto el Tribunal pudiera exponer… Y aún la apatía, la denegación de justicia es un delito, y el tribunal lo habría cometido, si debiendo obrar, se hubiera abstenido de hacerlo; pero ¿se ha verificado esto? No, de ningún modo. La Audiencia hasta hoy no ha ejercido, ni podría más que la facultad de la inspección: cual sea ésta y qué efectos produzca, sábenlo muy bien las Cortes. Ninguno de esos interesados en los expedientes ha acudido al tribunal en queja, en apelación o por otro medio legal: ni ¿cómo habían de hacerlo? El principio que profesan es el de desconocer la autoridad judicial, reputarse injusticiables y exentos de la ley: mal podrían, pues, acudir a pedir justicia al tribunal que aquella señala. No dirán, es seguro, que no lo hacen porque desconfíen de la justicia de los fallos: ejemplos muchos podrían citárseles, y reciente está el D. Domingo Urquijo, Alcalde de Pinos. Procesósele atribuyéndosele un delito e, infundadamente se le molestó, vejó y persiguió por el Juez que entendió de la causa. El escarmiento ha sido ejemplar, y la reparación completa. El Promotor, el Escribano y otros funcionarios han participado con el Juez de la severidad del fallo, porque la ley habla a favor de aquella persona. Esta es la conducta que observan estos Magistrados, y la que observarán constantemente. Lejos están de querer ocupar el lugar de denunciadores, ni de usar de una represalia, y la Diputación conoce que no es por falta de datos. La historia judicial de esta provincia en el presente año es una continuación de abusos de parte de las autoridades gubernativas respecto de los funcionarios judiciales. En Lújar un Alcalde protejía (sic) ya abrigaba una cuadrilla de malhechores, el Juez de Motril que conocía la causa contra aquellos, comprobado el delito, procede contra él; en el momento el Gefe (sic) Político se opone, obstruye la acción de la justicia, quiere que el tribunal tome parte en la suspensión del procedimiento, se niega a ello, y por desgracia no fue premiada la conducta de aquel Juez, aunque sus procedimientos no han podido tacharse. En Montefrío ocurre una asonada, el Juez instruye un sumario, pero al

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momento el Gefe (sic) Político se opone, manda un letrado para formar otro, y suspende también la acción de la justicia. En Válor se atacó y atropelló a un ciudadano, se querella ante el Juez de Ugíjar, resulta complicado el Alcalde de aquel pueblo; también el Gefe (sic) Político se opone al procedimiento, instruye expediente, dando comisión para ello al mismo procesado, y se intenta disputar al Juez sus facultades. En este mismo momento, recibe el Tribunal una comunicación del Gefe (sic) Político, exigiendo que se suspenda el procedimiento del Juez, y que se le dicten reglas. Interminable sería esta exposición si hubieran de referirse todos los sucesos y sus circunstancias ¿Qué es pues lo que se quiere? ¿Que estos Magistrados atropellen la ley, humillen su dignidad, y se pleguen (sic) a la voluntada de la autoridad civil? No, jamás se lograrán esto de Ministros que estiman su honra, sobre todos los bienes que la tierra contiene. La justicia, cuya administración se les ha encomendado, saldrá de sus manos pura y sin tacha, inflexible como la misma ley, sin consideraciones de ningún género de circunstancias, porque saben que no son dueños de ella, sino meros administradores. La Diputación Provincial y el Gefe (sic) Político conocen a los suplicantes, y su convicción debiera haberles servido para no intentar tales exigencias. Conocen que la reputación de estos Ministros está justamente asentada, y no saben que no soportarían un nombre de ignominia. Su honor mancillado exije (sic) una justa reparación; esta la reclaman con ardor que su justicia les inspira, y por ello. Suplican al Congreso Nacional se sirva mandar que la exposición de la Diputación Provincial pase a los antecedentes que obran en el Supremo Tribunal de Justicia para surta sus efectos, y, o se repare la ofensa hecha a estos Magistrados, o ellos sufran la pena que la ley les señale, si la acusación que se les hace fuera justa. Dios guarde la vida de los representantes de la Nación muchos años. Granada 13 de agosto de 1837. José Francisco de Morejón = José López Cózar = José María Vecino = Gregorio Barraycoa = Felipe de Urbina = Manuel de Seyjas Lozano = Francisco de Paula Soria = Benito Romero = José Dosal = Martín de Pineda = José Vázquez Quevedo = Cosme Sagasti = Miguel Moreno Barrera = Manuel Ortiz de Zúñiga

2. Suplemento al BOC del Lunes 18 de Septiembre de 183768 Esta Corporación ha visto en estos momentos un papel impreso, que parece ser copia de una representación dirijida (sic) por esta Audiencia Nacional a las Cortes en 13 de Agosto, impugnando otras elevadas a las mismas sobre abusos del poder judicial e infracción de las leyes. La Diputación duda de su certeza, por ser un papel anónimo, no conforme a las de la imprenta, y esto parece impropio de un Tribunal que pudiera conocerlas; sin embargo, por si en esta ocasión, como en otras, se ha prescindido de ellas, esta Corporación ha acordado que una Comisión de su seno reúna y estracte (sic) los espedientes (sic) en que fundó sus quejas al Congreso, para hacer un manifiesto a la provincia de los hechos que en dicho papel se desfiguran para sorprender a los Pueblos. Desconocida a la Diputación esta táctica, se recurrió a quien debía, con energía, pero con decoro, sin apelar a la prensa, porque, si es de su deber reclamar contra la inobservancia de las leyes, no se olvida de la necesidad de crear para los que las administran, el prestigio que perdieron cuando el despotismo guiaba los fallo. Mas

68 Hemeroteca, Museo Casa de los Tiros de Granada, Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Granada, año 1837.

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estimulada, a su pesar, a romper un silencio generosos, lo hará, no vaga y gratuitamente, si no con verdad y justificación. La Diputación entretanto, tiene un derecho a esperar de los pueblos que representa, por cuya voluntad eciste (sic), y a cuya felicidad consagra sus servicios, que suspendan su juicio hasta tanto presenta el manifiesto, que ofrece para muy luego. No será un anónimo; tampoco un tejido de inesactitudes (sic), que si alguna pudiera llamar falsedades desde ahora, lo omite hasta que los hechos las califiquen. Con ello demostrará también que las disposiciones del Tribunal Supremo a que se acoje (sic) la Audiencia, han sido ilegales y estemporáneas (sic), y por lo mismo denunciadas por Diputación al Gobierno y a la Representación Nacional. Debe sí anticipar a las Corporaciones populares, que el origen de las disensiones probocadas (sic) por la Audiencia, es el hábito de mando absoluto con que en los funestos tiempos de la arbitrariedad ejercía su imperio sobre aquellas, y que, a pesar de la división de Poderes que establece el sistema Constitucional, se han repetido con frecuencia, llegando al estremo (sic) de verse entrar por las calles de esta Capital, en medio del día y entre bayonetas, al Ayuntamiento pleno de un Ciudad vecina, cual no hubo ejemplo en los tiempos de los Morenos, Salelles y Pedrosas con foragidos (sic) pregonados; y todo por un supuesto esceso (sic) que, aun concedido, merecería a lo más una ligera corrección. Porque la Diputación Provincial clama contra estos y semejantes atropellamientos; porque pide la obserbancia (sic) de las leyes; porque denuncia, como debe, a sus infractores, y porque no abandona a los Pueblos que tiene bajo su tutela, se la critica y ataca en el papel a que se hace alusión. Habitantes de esta Provincia: esperad la contestación y caiga contra quien la merezca vuestra censura y reprobación. Granada 15 de Setiembre de 1837 = E.P.I. = Pedro Lillo = Por acuerdo de la Diputación = Fernando Andreo Benito, Secretario.

3. Proclama Que Dirige el Capitán General de Granada, Juan Palarea en 21 de Setiembre de 183769 Beneméritos Milicianos Nacionales y demás habitantes de esta capital. Creo de mi precisa obligación dirigiros la voz en estos días críticos. Poco más de dos meses hace que hemos jurado el nuevo Código fundamental de la Monarquía que las Cortes constituyentes han aprobado y sancionado y que la augusta Reina Gobernado ha aceptado y jurado en nombre de su escelsa (sic) hija nuestra legítima Reina Doña Isabel II. Esta obra de la sabiduría de los representantes de la Nación, en la cual se encuentran marcados nuestros derechos y nuestros deberes, y garantidas las prerrogativas del trono, debe ser el nuevo y estrecho lazo que reúna todos los partidos y matices de la opinión liberal de los Españoles; debe ser la enseña de unión de todos los patriotas, para que amalgamados y reunidos bajo su égida promovamos el bien y prosperidad de esta desgraciada Nación, y contrariemos los planes subversivos y miras tiránicas del ingrato y cruel Pretendiente, de sus hordas sanguinarias y feroces, y de sus ocultos y tenaces partidarios; y para que contengamos los estravíos (sic) de los desorganizadores y anarquistas, que aunque pocos en número no dejan de 69 Biblioteca del Hospital Real de Granada, C-001 061 (22). Dictamen que el Sr. D. Manuel Ortiz de Zúñiga, fiscal de S.M. en la Audiencia de Granada espuso (sic) en el espediente (sic) formado a consecuencia de la prisión y conducción a aquella ciudad de D. Vicente María Clemente, juez de primera instancia de Santafé, decretada por el Sr. D. Pedro Lillo, exintendente, gefe (sic) político interino que fue de la provincia el día 22 de setiembre de 1837, con motivo de las elecciones de diputados y senadores, Granada, Imprenta de Benavides, noviembre de 1837, pp. 20 – 22.

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ecsistir (sic) desgraciadamente entre nosotros y para los cuales toda idea de orden y legalidad es carga penosa e insufrible. Pero obedeciendo, respetando y defendiendo la Constitución, podemos muy bien diferenciarnos en el modo de pensar acerca de los medios de consolidarla, acerca de las personas que creamos convenientes para representarnos en las prócsimas (sic) Cortes, y acerca de otras mil y mil cuestiones secundarias que de ninguna manera se oponen a los principios establecidos en el nuevo Código fundamental. Mañana es el primer día marcado por la ley vigente para que los Electores egerzan (sic) el acto más grande y más importante de su ciudadanía; en él y en los siguientes van a dar su sufragio en favor de los hombres que consideren más aptos para dirigir la nave del Estado en las difíciles y críticas circunstancias que nos rodean; en las graves cuestiones que faltan que ecsaminar (sic) y discutir; en una palabra en favor de los que crean que deben ser los representantes de la Nación Española. Cada uno de vosotros sabe ya de las cualidades distinguidas que deben adornar a los que honréis con vuestro sufragio. En este acto solemne e importantísimo debe haber la más absoluta libertad en todos los Electores, y acatando cada uno la ley, debe dejar a los demás que egerzan (sic) su derecho con la misma libertad, con la misma independencia que desea cada uno para sí. Cualquiera que sea el resultado de las Elecciones debe respetarse como la espresión (sic) de la mayoría del cuerpo Electoral. Nada debe ser motivo ni pretesto (sic) para alterar el orden y la unión que debe ecsistir (sic) entre los leales defensores de la Constitución de 1837 y del trono de la inocente Isabel. Con la unión, nuestro triunfo es seguro e infalible; sin ella atraeremos sobre estas hermosas Provincias, sobre la Patria toda y sobre nosotros mismos los males que llevan consigo la dominación del Pretendiente y de sus crueles y vengativos secuaces. Antes que tal suceda, mil veces la muerte. Para impedir semejante desgracia, para conservar la unión, la tranquilidad y el orden en estas afortunadas provincias, yo no omitiré medio ni sacrificio de cuantos estén a mi alcance; y para conseguirlo cuento con la cooperación de vosotros todos los verdaderos y leales defensores de la libertad y de la Reina, de la propia manera que todos vosotros debéis contar con la buena voluntad, decisión y celo ardiente, y jamás desmentido a favor de objetos tan sagrados, de vuestro compañero y amigo. Granada 21 de Setiembre de 1837 = El Capitán General de estos Reynos y Gobernador de esta Plaza = Juan Palarea.

II. Meeting Granada

External and Internal Control of the Imperial Chamber Court By Anja Amend-Traut The following information is based on a broader meaning of the term control. A lot of the research carried out so far on imperial control has logically raised the question as to what extent the Imperial Chamber Court judges could administer justice independent from any interference in the course of justice by a sovereign.1 However, control can also be exercised otherwise, either by the litigants or internally by self-disciplining measures of the court itself. The principle of judicial independence embodied in Art. 97 I of the German Constitution is one of the core elements of the free democratic constitutional state, which is inextricably linked with the principle of the separation of powers. As self-evident as these two principles are nowadays, it quite naturally belonged to the sovereign’s premodern self-conception that he could control judges by virtue of his judicial sovereignty. The fiduciary relationship between the judges and the sovereign, not least manifested in the oath of service, was in any case diametrically opposed to any personal independence. Usually, the Emperor did not in personam (I.1.) supervise the judge, nor the content of the activities of the judicial panel, but delegated such supervision in the form of various measures secured by imperial law, which in the following will be referred to as ”external control”. In contrast to the court’s internal selfcontrol, where members of the judicial panel undergo specific self-disciplining quality-assuring governance mechanisms (II.), this first relates to the involvement of the Imperial Estates as an institution independent from the Imperial Court (I.2.). Furthermore, legal remedies lodged by the litigants can also be considered as external, albeit not authoritarian, control of judicial activities (I.3.) A personal or factual examination of a judge or judicial decision was then initiated by a litigant. The appeal, as the absolutely last instance remedy, was not taken into account in the following considerations, because through these the Imperial Chamber Court reviewed decisions of lower instances, thus acting itself as a controlling body, and was especially not itself controlled by the appeal.

1 Recently in this respect Wolfgang Sellert, Imperial Control of the Aulic Council and the Imperial Chambers Court. Law and reality, in this volume.

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I. External Control 1. By the Emperor Already at a preliminary stage of the Imperial Reform of 1495, the Imperial Estates formulated their ideas of an Imperial Chamber Court to be set up with the words that it should be solely subjected to specifically defined authority and not to supreme imperial authority (“ordentlichs Gewalts und nit Vollkommenheit Keyserlichs Gewalts”). No decision should depend on the Emperor’s mercy: (“Sein Gnade förder kein Sach an sich, heng keine an, nehme auch kein abe [sic]; Seine Gnade restituir auch niemand in integrum, dann aus Ursachen in Rechten erlaubt.”) According thereto, the Imperial Court judgments should be pronounced in the name of the Emperor, but an acceptance of the content of the decisions or any other influence and thus control by the Emperor was not provided for.2 It was no coincidence that the Imperial Estates successfully requested – quasi as outward signs of this independence – that the Imperial Chamber Court was set up far from the Imperial Court, and was thus beyond its direct sphere of influence, and that the court was not staffed by the Emperor.3 In line with its self-conception, the Imperial Chamber Court refused such interference. In a matter heard at the end of the 17th century, the Imperial Chamber Court found that a legal dispute which a sovereign decided in his favour and by resolution could not become into legal force.4 Theoretically, the Imperial Chamber Court was also by imperial laws protected against the Emperor’s interference in the course of justice: The Procedural Ordinance of the Imperial Chamber Court (RKGO) of 1555 ordered that the chamber judge and assessors remained undisturbed by his majesty the Emperor’s court or otherwise (“von der keiserlichen maiestat hoffe oder sunst unbelestigt bleyben”)5, that the Emperor was not allowed to stem proceed2 On the occasion of the negotiations of Frederick III with the Electors and Princes in Frankfurt in 1486, which among other things made any imperial support against Hungary inter alia dependent on a chamber court being installed, Johann Joachim Müller, Des Reich-TagsTheatri Zwey¨ter und Tritter Theil … Jn sich haltend Die vierdte/ fünffte und sechste Vorstellung …, Jena 1713, Cap. II. and III., 8 – 24, here in particular 22. See also Rudolf Smend, Das Reichskammergericht, 1. Teil: Geschichte und Verfassung (Quellen und Studien zur Verfassungsgeschichte des Deutschen Reiches in Mittelalter und Neuzeit, IV,3) Weimar 1911, 5 f., 22. In summary, from the point of view of judicial independence, see also Wolfgang Sellert, Richterliche Unabhängigkeit am Reichskammergericht und am Reichshofrat, in: Bernd Heidenreich (ed.), Recht und Verfassung in Hessen – Vom Reichskammergericht zur Landesverfassung (Kleine Schriften zur Hessischen Landeskultur, 3), Wiesbaden 1995, 39 – 47, here 41 f., ibid., Richterliche Unabhängigkeit am Reichskammergericht und am Reichshofrat, in: Okko Behrends/Ralf Dreier (ed.), Gerechtigkeit und Geschichte. Beiträge eines Symposions zum 65. Geburtstag von Malte Dießelhorst (Quellen und Forschungen zum Recht und seiner Geschichte, 6), Göttingen 1996, 118 – 132, here 121 – 123. 3 More details follow in section I.2.b) below. 4 Substantiation in Sellert, Unabhängigkeit (fn. 2), 40 f. 5 RKGO 1555 1/VI/§ 1, repeated for the assessors in 1/XIII/§ 5, according to Adolf Laufs (ed.), Die Reichskammergerichtsordnung von 1555 (Quellen und Forschungen zur höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, 3), Cologne/Vienna 1976, 80, 94.

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ings (“keinen Einhalt thun”)6 and that justice had to be allowed to freely and unimpededly take its course (“freier, stracker und ungehinderter Lauff”). The latter was repeated in the Latest Imperial Recess of 1654 (JRA),7 in the capitulatio perpetua of 17118 and in the concept for a RGKO of 17699. However, despite these rules and assurances, emperors repeatedly tried to interfere with the administration of justice by the Imperial Chamber Court. Especially by passing so-called promotorials (“Promotoriales”) to the Imperial Chamber Court, the Aulic Council as an imperial authority exercised legal supervision.10 These writings were formal orders to a court, notably in cases of denial of justice, to now grant the party concerned such right within a particular period of time.11 Whether such administrative supervision by the Aulic Council towards the Imperial Chamber Court had ever been intended under imperial laws has been called into question in recent research.12 In any case, capitulationes caesareae prohibited such interventions13 after repeated interferences. Within the course of a dispute between the mayor and the council of the city of Nördlingen and the Counts Wolfgang and Joachim of Oettingen about the jurisdiction of the Regional Court of Oettingen, the Emperor requested the submission of files in a letter to the Imperial Chamber Court. Due to the inactivity of the Imperial Chamber Court in this case, a deadlock of the administration of justice in Oettingen was threatening, “which is why not only the parties were clearly outraged and war and riots had arisen” (“zwischen den Partheyen merklich Empörung bege6

Kaiserliche Wahlkapitulation Art. XVI., in: Ernst August Koch, Neue und vollständigere Sammlung der Reichsabschiede, Vierter Theil derer Allgemeinen Reichs-Gesetze, bestehend in denen merckwürdigsten Reichs-Schlüssen Des Noch währenden Reichs-Tags, Reprint of the edition Frankfurt 1747, Osnabrück 1967, 243. 7 JRA sec. 7, in: Koch (fn. 6), Dritter Theil derer Reichs-Abschiede von dem Jahr 1552. bis 1654., 643. 8 See fn. 6. 9 Johann Heinrich Christian von Selchow, Concepte der Reichs-Cammergerichtsordnung auf Befehl der jüngsten Visitation entworfen, volume 1, Göttingen 1782, part 1, Tit. 29, sec. 13, 449. 10 Oswald von Gschließer, Der Reichshofrat, Bedeutung und Verfassung, Schicksal und Besetzung einer obersten Reichsbehörde von 1559 bis 1806 (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Neuere Geschichte des ehemaligen Österreich, 33), Vienna 1942, Reprint Nendeln/Liechtenstein 1970, 29, describes that the Aulic Council requested reports from the Imperial Chamber Court following objections and complaints of an Imperial Estate. 11 Peter Oestmann, Rechtsverweigerung im Alten Reich, in: ZRG.GA 127 (2010), 51 – 141, here 66 f. with individual substantiation and examples, 122 f. A further example at id., Geistliche und weltliche Gerichte im Alten Reich. Zuständigkeitsstreitigkeiten und Instanzenzüge (Quellen und Forschungen zur höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, 61), Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2012, 299. Lastly id., Streit um Anwaltskosten in der frühen Neuzeit. Teil 2: Gerichtszuständigkeit und Verfahrensarten, in: ZRG.GA 133 (2016), 191 – 295, here 241. 12 Oestmann, Rechtsverweigerung (fn. 11), 68, id., Geistliche und weltliche Gerichte (fn. 11), 299 f. 13 See ibid. fn. 6. Also in the capitulatio perpetua of Emperor Franz I. of 1745, Art. XVI., §§ 8, 17, Koch (fn. 6), Zugabe zu dem Vierten Theil, 20 f.

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ben, Krieg und Aufruhr erwachsen”), but the Emperor exercised his right to take over in the matter: To his understanding, he was entitled thereto (“dafür gefreyt”) in his capacity as chief justice, he had a right “to clarification and explanation” (“Erläuterung und Erklärung”).14 The Imperial Estates kept a jealous watch over protecting the Imperial Chamber Court against such influence by the Emperor. In a further case, the Imperial Estates notified upon the Emperor’s interference “that the unjustified presumption by the imperial court had not only violated the administration of justice in the entire German Empire, but also offended the independent judicial statutes of the Imperial Chamber Court” (“durch diese ungerechten Anmassungen des Kaiserlichen Hofes … nicht nur die Gerechtsame des gesammten teutschen Reichs verletzet, sondern auch die unabhängige … Justiz-Verfassung des Reichs-Cammergerichts gekränket worden”).15 2. By the Imperial Estates a) Visitations Visitations were provided for in many statutes of courts, churches and orders as a supervisory measure of superior bodies. The original task of the visitations of the Imperial Chamber Court was the auditing of accounts and, on this basis, the reassessment of the matriculation contribution to be paid by the Imperial Estates. The incoming monies should first be received and distributed by the imperial treasury, chamber judge and two assessors and the statement of accounts prepared on this basis was then to be inspected by a committee, which at least since 1526 had been designated as visitation.16 Only later did these visitations also serve to remedy deficiencies and af14

A transcription of the imperial document dated 29 September 1749 is printed by Johann Ulrich von Cramer, Wetzlarische Nebenstunden, worinnen auserlesene beym Höchstpreißlichen Cammergericht entschiedene Rechts-Händel zur Erweiter- und Erläuterung der Deutschen in Gerichten üblichen Rechts-Gelehrsamkeit angewendet werden, 102. Theil, Ulm 1770, 239 – 243. 15 The case was about a right of patronage disputed in the 1770s at the priory of the church called „zu Hansinne im Lüttichschen“, described by Heinrich Wilhelm von Bülow, Freimüthige und erläuternde Betrachtungen über die neue Kaiserliche Wahl-Capitulation, Regensburg 1791, 209 – 213, the quotation ibid., 212. See also the document based on the three protestant elector courts: Untersuchung der Frage: ob Kaiserliche Gebotbriefe, welche ohne Vorwissen und Bewilligung der Reichsstände an das Kammergericht erlassen werden, von Kraft und Wirkung sein können: in Beziehung auf die Abforderung der Akten und Protokolle in der Hansinnischen Präbendsache, und vom Kammergericht geschehene Folgeleistung, 1787. This procedure was also pointed out by Burkhard Wilhelm Pfeiffer, Practische Ausführungen aus Theilen der Rechtswissenschaft, vol. 3, Hannover 1831, 257 f., and Sellert, Richterliche Unabhängigkeit (fn. 2), 41 and 122. 16 Klaus Mencke, Die Visitationen am Reichskammergericht im 16. Jahrhundert. At the same time a contribution to the historical origin of the remedy of “Revision” (Quellen und Forschungen zur höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, 13), Cologne/Vienna 1984, 6 – 9 with further substantiation.

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flictions (“mengel[n] and gebrechen”)17 which were – apart from chronic understaffing of the judicial panel and the supposedly excessive length of the proceedings – primarily caused by suspected misconduct of the staff members of the Imperial Chamber Court, attributed to their lack of financial security. However, the court fees (“Sporteln”)18 first envisaged and the tax imposed for maintaining the court (“Kammerzieler”),19 were never sufficient to silence the complaints about insufficient funding over the more than 300 years of existence of the Imperial Chamber Court. Assessors regurlarly received no salary over several months or even years20, and merely stayed on because of the high esteem associated with the office. Further, the remuneration of the chancellery staff had been slightly increased at best since the 16th century, and contrary to their colleagues serving sovereigns, they only irregularly received payment – “at the court itself, their social standing corresponded to their financial misery” (“am Gericht selbst entsprach ihre soziale Lage ihrem finanziellen Elend”).21 Against this background it is not surprising that court and chancellery staff were generally suspected – whether rightly or wrongly – of being corrupt or of lining their own pockets: One possibility for doing so was provided – albeit only in the early phase of the Imperial Chamber Court – by the court fees (“Sporteln”). According to a contemporary definition, this was an unspecified income the public servant usually received from his fellow citizens and private subjects for his work, in addition to the salary paid by the state (“unbestimmte Einkünfte, welche der Staatsdiener nebst seinem vom Staate bestimmten Gehalte für seine zu leistenden Arbeiten gewöhnlich von seinen Mitbürgern und Privatunterthanen beziehet.”).22 The public servants mentioned here, which not least also included servants of the Imperial Chamber Court, were frequently said to abuse the possibilities provided by the fee regulations: Although these assessed individual cases at different fee rates and stipulated upper limits,23 the production of unnecessary pleadings and the scheduling of unnecessary 17

RKGO 1555 1/L/§ 2, according to Laufs (fn. 5), 146 – 148. For more details on their legitimisation and standardisation see Paul-Joachim Heinig, Sporteln, Kanzleitaxen und urkundliche Gebührenvermerke im europäischen Mittelalter, in: Peter Thorau/Sabine Penth/Rüdiger Fuchs (ed.), Regionen Europas – Europa der Regionen. Festschrift für Kurt-Ulrich Jäschke zum 65. Geburtstag, Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2003, 143 – 165. 19 More details in Anja Amend-Traut, Kammerzieler, in: HRG, II, 2nd edition, Berlin 2012, column 1567 – 1569. 20 Smend (fn. 2), 399. 21 Smend (fn. 2), 323. 22 Karl Ignatz Wedekind, Die Aufhebung der Sporteln, zugleich frohe Blicke in die verheissene Justiz-Organisation, 1800, 6. Their cancellation was already decided for the Imperial Chamber Court in 1497 on the occasion of the Lindau Imperial Assembly, and pronounced in the Imperial Recess of 1498 sec. 30, Koch (fn. 6), Zweyter Theil derer Reichs-Abschiede von dem Jahr 1495. bis auf das Jahr 1551. inclusive, 45. As to the “Sporteln” during the initial phase of the Imperial Chamber Court Mencke (fn. 16), 2 f. 23 As to the fee ordinance of the Imperial Chamber Court Smend (fn. 2), 334 – 337. 18

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hearings generated additional fees, and elaborations paid according to sheet counts resulted in “chronologically stretched facts” (“ganz chronologisch gedehnte Facta”).24 Even at the end of the Old Empire the reason for this procedure was attributed to the chronically dire economic situation of the officials: “By paying a meagre salary, the state somewhat rid itself of its duty; because it was not enough to feed a man, let alone his family, he was allowed to increase his income from his position … In respect of the latter, one thus relies on the conscience of the honest man, which probably was done not even then …” (“Durch eine magere Besoldung … entlediget sich der Staat einigermaßen seiner Pflicht; weil also diese nicht ausreicht, nur einen Mann, vielweniger seine Familie zu ernähren, so gestattet man ihm, das Weitere aus der ihm angewiesenen Stelle sich noch etwas dazu zu verdienen … Man compromittirt also, was diese letztere betrift, auf das Gewissen des ehrlichen Mannes, welches man wohl noch nicht einmal damals that …”).25 Visitations did not reveal isolated instances of such abuses of office:26 A visitation memorandum of 1556 addressed to the so-called ‘readers’ – archive clerks entrusted with keeping the files –27 ordered them to charge, beyond their ordinary salary, not more than a certain sum for one sheet in contradiction to traditional practice and equity (“über ihre ordentliche Besoldung … mehr als von einem Blatt einen halben Batzen wider alt Herkommen, und die Billichkeit niemanden [zu] beschwehren”).28 A visitation memorandum from the same year, addressed to the bookkeepers (“Ingrossisten”) and copyists (“Kopisten”) reprimanded that they claimed a whole taler for one page of a recurrent writing, although not more than 5 kreutzer should be given per sheet, and ordered remedial measures.29 Gratifications, or “gifts” of the litigants later claimed as an entitlement, were first very common and offered a good opportunity for the chancellery staff “to obtain special remuneration in their bleak situation” (“sich in ihrer trostlosen Lage … besondere Vergütungen zu verschaffen”).30 The acceptance of such benefits was prohibited by a further visitation memorandum to the pronotaries and notaries, after the Franconian district estates as usual devoted 30 imperial talers to the chancellery. This incident exposed the court to disrepute (“dem Gericht nicht wenige Nachreden gebührt”) so that gratifications should no longer be accepted to prevent reprimands and turmoil (“Verweiß und Geschrey zu vermei-

24

So, for example, the complaints by Wedekind (fn. 22), 14 f., 18. Wedekind (fn. 22), 14 f., 18. 26 Further details on the history of the visitations in Dietrich Heinrich Ludwig von Ompteda, Geschichte der vormaligen ordentlichen Cammergerichts-Visitationen und der zweyhundertjährigen fruchtlosen Bemühungen zu deren Wiederherstellung, Regensburg 1792. 27 Together with the pronotaries, the advocates and the procurators, they formed the subaltern classes, Smend (fn. 2), 319 f., 322, 326 – 328, 335. 28 Georg Melchior von Ludolf, Corpus Juris Cameralis, das ist/ des Kayserlichen CammerGerichts Gesetz-Buch, Franckfurt am Mayn 1724, Num. CII. sec. 2, 209. 29 Ludolf, Corpus Juris Cameralis (fn. 28), Num. CIII., 210. See also Smend (fn. 2), 335 f. 30 Smend (fn. 2), 337. 25

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den”).31 In 1719/20, the Regensburg Diet decided, following an Imperial Visitation Recess from 1713, to increase the salary of the Imperial Chamber Court staff.32 The salary of the assessors was then increased from 1,000 florins, as assessed since 1654, to 2,666 imperial talers and 60 krones.33 A particularly sensational case of acceptance of benefits probably is the causa Nettelbladt, who had been convicted of corruption together with the assessors Philipp Heinrich von Reuss and Johann Hermann Franz Freiherr von Pape during the last visitation in the middle of the 1770s.34 Christian Nettelbladt had been proposed as an assessor by the Swedish Crown in 1740, and was dishonourably discharged after 31 years of service in Wetzlar, including the forfeiture of all titles, rank, salary and privileges, after he had allegedly accepted thousands of florins from litigants whose lawsuits were presented to him for decision. In just one of a total of twelve reported violations, the case Jülich versus Kurköln, he had received 9,000 florins as a co-examiner.35 In consideration of the expenditure of personnel, time and money involved in the visitations, contemporaries did not characterise them as a right, but – because they were burdensome – as a dispensable performance by the Estates in the interest of the Empire, to which they were obliged.36 However, this point of view would fall short of mark: During the negotiations of the Konstanz Diet in 1507, the Estates rejected the King’s proposal to maintain the court from its own treasury (“aigenem chamergut [zu] … unterhalten”).37 However, recalling previous experiences, this obviously threatened to excessively increase the King’s influence on the administration of justice.38 Incidentally, the concerns did not show many parallels to staffing the posts of judges at the Imperial Chamber Court.39 The joint burden agreed to then – in the interest of the Estates – also entailed the joint right to accounting and auditing of proper 31

Ludolf, Corpus Juris Cameralis (fn. 28), Num. CI. sec. 2, 209. Materials collected on this subject in Ludolf, Corpus Juris Cameralis (fn. 28), appendix before the general register. 33 An overview of the development of the pay scales of the entire court and chancellery staff in Smend (fn. 2), 400 f. 34 Overall on this partial complex of the visitation Denzler, Über den Schriftalltag im 18. Jahrhundert. Die Visitation des Reichskammergerichts von 1767 bis 1776 (Norm und Struktur, 45), Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2016, 437 – 464. On Pape esp. Anette Baumann, Korruption und Visitation am Reichskammergericht im 18. Jahrhundert: eine vorläufige Bilanz (Schriftenreihe der Gesellschaft für Reichskammergerichtsforschung, 41), Wetzlar 2012. 35 More details thereon in Nils Jörn, Die Präsentationen der schwedischen Krone an das RKG, in: Anette Baumann/Peter Oestmann/Siegrid Westphal (ed.), Reichspersonal. Funktionsträger für Kaiser und Reich (Quellen und Forschungen zur höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, 43), Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2003, 209 – 245, here 240 f. 36 Johann Friedrich Kayser, Von des Kayserlichen Cammer-Gerichts Jurisdiction, 1748, 232. 37 Johann Heinrich von Harpprecht, Staatsarchiv des Kayserl. und des H. Röm. Reichs Cammergerichts oder Sammlung von actis publicis … Zu e. Erläuterung … des Kays. u. Reichscammergerichts zus. getragen, vol. 2, Ulm 1758, 443. 38 Mencke (fn. 16), 6. 39 In this respect see explanations in 1.b). 32

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business. The evaluation looks more positive, especially in hindsight. Thus, Rudolf Smend, in particular for the fifty-year period after the religious peace of Augsburg, particularly emphasises the efforts of the Imperial Estates regarding the preservation and functionality of the institutions of the Imperial Constitution – despite all otherwise existing reservations between them: “Thus, the forms newly created by the Imperial Constitution were provided a life, albeit not strong but in any event so regular as never reached before or afterwards” (“So kam in die neu geschaffenen Formen der Reichsverfassung ein zwar nicht starkes, aber jedenfalls so regelmäßiges Leben, wie es vorher und nachher nicht wieder erreicht”). This especially applied to “the activities of the Empire for the Court” (“Tätigkeit des Reichs für das Gericht”).40 Due to the lack of an administrative centre for the entire Empire, the visitations, as delegated judicial administration, were carried out by committees composed of representatives of the Emperor and individual Estates appointed by Recesses (Reichsabschiede). Thus, for example, the Regensburg Recess of 1532 ordered that apart from the administrators of the Emperor the Elector of Mainz and one further Elector, one religious and one secular sovereign, and one representative each of the prelates, counts and cities had to form a committee.41 However, an annual review could be carried out only for the years from 1557 to 1587.42 At least for the time prior thereto, the confessional turmoil prevented a regular performance of such reviews; in the time thereafter, reviews could be carried out only sporadically for political reasons. The last large visitation at the Imperial Chamber Court in Wetzlar took place between 1767 and 1776.43 In detail, an investigation at first provided for an interrogation of all court staff members down to the caretaker by means of a questionnaire, so-called “Fragstücke”. The committee then immediately remedied the identified deficiencies or reported them to the Emperor if it considered itself not authorised to do so. The previously mentioned visitation memoranda, which were delivered to individual groups of court servants, and the noted visitation recommendations for decisions addressed to the Emperor were meant to remedy the situation. Presumably, a lack of expertise of the committee members and also the stereotype form of the questionnaire contributed to the fact that the visitations were only modestly successful in controlling the Imperial Chamber Court; as follows from later visitations, either the cause of the 40

Smend (fn. 2), 181. Smend (fn. 2), 182 f. 42 With three delays in 1558, 1565 and 1582, more details thereon in Ompteda (fn. 26), 72, 79, 96. 43 On their history Arnold Winkler, Über die Visitationen des Reichskammergerichtes und die von 1713 bis auf Josef II. (1765) währenden Vorbereitungen zur letzten Visitation, Vienna 1907. Alexander Denzler, Sie haben sich totgearbeitet: Die Visitation des Reichskammergerichts von 1767 bis 1776 (Schriftenreihe der Gesellschaft für Reichskammergerichtsforschung, 42), Wetzlar 2014, esp. 17 – 23, talks of a total of only six ordinary visitations for the period from 1588 to 1806, 19 with further substantiation. More information on the last visitation ibid., Schriftalltag (fn. 34). 41

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deficiency could not be sufficiently clarified, or the fault was revealed, but not remedied.44 Primarily, however, the inadequacy of this controlling mechanisms was probably attributable to the fact that the Empire – different from the territorial level – did not have any permanent supervisory institution with executive bodies specifically installed for such purpose. b) Staffing of the Imperial Chamber Court As with the visitations of the Imperial Chamber Court, the Estates – within the scope of the district nominations – were less federatively involved in court procedures in the actual sense when proposing the assessors as might seem apparent. Political interests of the Imperial Estates were the primary motive for an active contribution to the allocation of the posts of judges, rather than any substantive legal interests. The proposition right (“Präsentationsrecht”) was merely an expression of a non-permanent, solely repetitive form of judicial administrative tasks45 which was intensively perceived and discussed by contemporaries as a political phenomenon.46 This was notably due to the dualist constitutional system of the Holy Roman Empire and the equal representation by assessors of various confessional groups. Especially this dualism and the ensuing lack of a central administrative body caused the allocation of the performance of these actually administrative tasks to the Estates at an imperial level. Particularly against this background, the propositions and the visitations were on an equal footing. In contrast, the political influence of the Imperial Estates in the propositions was deliberately far greater in comparison to the visitations. The Imperial Estates did naturally take good care that they were not outsmarted when staffing the assessor posts. A control of the staffing modalities, however, did not concern the Imperial Chamber Court “in corpore”, nor its passing of judgments. However, the presently relevant question of potential controlling mechanisms is a central aspect, namely at the stage following the propositions. After the so-called “Aufschwörung”, when the assessors were sworn in, they were obliged to loyalty and obedience to the Emperor and the Empire only, and no longer to the Imperial Estate by which they were proposed,47 and not to enable any other orientation of jurisprudence towards enforcement of particular interests. Thus, the ties to the propos44

More details Smend (fn. 2), 183 f. Thus also Smend (fn. 2), 182. 46 As to the proposition system as a whole, with further substantiation Sigrid Jahns, Das Reichskammergericht und seine Richter. Verfassung und Sozialstruktur eines höchsten Gerichts im Alten Reich. Teil I. Darstellung (Quellen und Forschungen zur Höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, 26, I), Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2011, 168 – 342. Furthermore on the proposition of the Swedish Crown Jörn (fn. 35). 47 The official oath was recorded in a draft for a RKGO 1613 Tit. LXXXV. sec. 1: “Weiter ist auch Kayserl. Majestät Befelch, daß ihr geloben und schwören solt, Ihrer Kayserl. Mjestät und dem Reich getreu und gehorsam zu seyn.”, Ludolf, Corpus Juris Cameralis (fn. 28), 662. 45

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ing parties were deliberately cut; in the so-called Kameralliteratur, that is the literary genre dealing specifically with the supreme jurisdiction of the Old Empire, the assessors were denied such “character repraesentativum”.48 This change of role “from servant and representative of a particular Imperial Sovereign or the Emperor to the servant of Emperor and Empire at a supreme court jointly maintained by the Emperor and the Estates” (“vom Diener und Präsentatus eines bestimmten Reichsfürsten bzw. des Kaisers zum Diener von Kaiser und Reich an einem von Kaiser und Ständen gemeinschaftlich getragenen obersten Gericht”)49 had repeatedly been reiterated under imperial law aspects: An Imperial Rescript from 1775 still issues the following order: “After it had been found in recent years that some chamber court assessors followed the interests of the party having proposed them, a circumstance which had already been reprimanded in the last visitation report, because it was in many respects detrimental to the impartial jurisprudence according to the principle of equality, we again order and instruct that you refrain from any such actions or you will be harshly punished. We order you and all our imperial chamber judges to supervise this diligently and strictly to stop this highly damaging fault of the assessors, and to strictly pursue any violation of the law and duty according to the rules.” (“Nachdem bei denen Kammergerichtsbeisitzern von neueren Jahren her wahrzunehmen gewesen, daß einige derselben von einem Repräsentationsgeiste sich hinwiederum haben einnehmen lassen; dieser aber allschon in dem jüngeren Visitationsabschied mißbilliget worden, und der Mittheilung einer unpartheiischen, gleich durchgehenden Justitz in mehrfältiger Art schädlich sey: so befehlen und ermahnen wir Euch hiemit wiederholter, daß Ihr solchen gänzlich mit allen darauf einen Bezug habenden Handlungen bei Vermeidung der ansonst zu erfolgen habenden schweresten Bestrafung ableget; Dir und jeglichem Unsern Kaiserl. Kammerrichter tragen Wir dabei ernstlich auf, daß Du und selbe hierauf eine genaue und scharfe Aufsicht nehmet, damit solches höchstschädlichste Gebrechen fürohin bei denen Beisitzern abgestellet, sonach gegen die hierunter wider Vermuthen ungehorsame, als wider Gesetze und Pflichten handelnde unnachsichtig, der Ordnung gemäß, verfahren werde.”).50 However, already this assessment indicates that the change of role frequently failed in practice. The quoted source shows that with regard to the safeguarding of judicial independence, control was exercised insofar as violations were reprimanded. According thereto, corresponding faults could be revealed by visitations or – theoreti-

48 Georg Gottlob Balemann, Beiträge zur Revision und Verbesserung der fünf ersten Titeln des Concepts der Kaiserlichen Kammergerichtsordnung Worinn die Besetzung des Höchstpreißlichen Kaiserlichen und des Reichskammergerichts aus den neuesten Reichsgesetzen und Visitationsverhandlungen erläutert worden, Lemgo 1778, 372. That was already pointed out by Jahns (fn. 46), 190, who from all angles examined the problematic issues involved in the assessors following the interests of the party having proposed them,190 – 199. 49 Jahns (fn. 46), 192. 50 Imperial Rescript of 30 November 1775, sec. 16, quoted from Balemann, Beiträge (fn. 48), 373. Older orders are also substantiated there and in Jahns (fn. 46), 192 f.

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cally – also objected to by litigants.51 Relevant partiality of assessors, for example in pending proceedings of their the parties having proposed them for office (“Präsentanten”), has so far been rarely evidenced.52 The grey area of imaginable influence, however, starting with delays or accelerations in favour of the corresponding parties up to “stir-ups” in debates among the assessors, and thus the unprovable cases of judicial dependency, should likely be much greater.53 3. By the Parties a) “Revision” Formally introduced with the Imperial Recess of 1532,54 and clearly distinguished from a syndicate action for the first time with the RKGO of 1555, an action against the judges based on fault or negligence (“Syndikatsklage”), the “revision” (“Revision”) was a legal remedy against the decisions of the Imperial Chamber Court if the contested decision was suspected of having been passed “solely due to oversight, lack of diligence or knowledge or error of the procurators or judges” (“alleyn auß ubersehen, unfleiß, unwissenheyt oder irrsall der procurator oder richter”).55 In this respect, however, a “Revision” always also implied that the court had made an error in its judgement.56 This has to be distinguished from the action for retrial (“Restitutionsklage”), by which this very accusation is not raised. Rather, similar to today’s retrial proceedings (“Wiederaufnahmeverfahren”), the party had to submit that at the time of passing judgement, facts decisive for the decision had not been available to the judge and that the judgment thus conflicted with objective law.57 Given that this type of procedure was initiated solely by the burdened party, it was an option for controlling the content of the Imperial Chamber Court’s activities. The quality-assuring function of this controlling mechanism becomes apparent in the de51

Due to misconduct of a judge, the syndicate action would probably have applied, see explanations in I.3.d); however, it was hardly relevant in practice. 52 Jahns (fn. 46), 194, with substantiation. 53 Jahns (fn. 46), 194 f., identifies a following of the interests of the proposing parties (“Repräsentationsgeist”) that can sensed in individual plenary protocols. 54 On possible precursors Mencke (fn. 16), 52. 55 RKGO 1555 3/LIII/§ 5, according to Laufs (fn. 5), 275 – 279, here 277. When following Georg Wilhelm Wetzell, System des ordentlichen Civilprocesses, 3rd edition., Leipzig 1878, sec. 59, here 776, the precursor of the “Revision” was probably the supplicatio originating from the Roman Empire, which was modified and further developed by the imperial legislation (“durch die Reichsgesetzgebung modificirt, beschränkt und weiter ausgebildet”). 56 Bernhard Diestelkamp, Ein Kampf um Freiheit und Recht. Die prozessualen Auseinandersetzungen der Gemeinde Freienseen mit den Grafen zu Solms-Laubach, Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2012, 80. 57 Bettina Dick, Die Entwicklung des Kameralprozesses nach den Ordnungen von 1495 bis 1555 (Quellen und Forschungen zur Höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, 10), Cologne/ Vienna 1981, 215.

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scription of the procedure by the RKGO, because the chamber judge and assessors were more diligent when they “had to fear that the files were inspected after the judgement had been rendered so that there is no injustice at the chamber court” (“besorgen müssen, daß die acta volgendts nach gesprochner urtheyl auch besichtigt und niemandt an dem cammergericht unrecht geschehe”).58 The “Revision” extended the scope of tasks of the visitation committees, which had to review the written complaints with the omission of any novelties.59 The committee could submit a statement only insofar as an appeal would have been permissible, the value of the complaint reached at least 2,000 imperial talers without consideration of interest, if any, and if the appellant himself or through his legal representative had given the oath for “Revision” (“juramentum revisorum”), and deposited the court fee.60 After compliance with these formalities, the respondent (“widerhteyl”) was permitted to respond to the complaint in writing.61 The visitators should then, together with the assessors involved in writing the judgement revised against, “diligently review, inspect and consider” (“mit allem fleiß revidirn, besichtigen und erwegen”), and the relevant judges should outline the reasons for their decision. Finally, the committee should “alone, without the assessors” (“alleyn, ausserhalb der assessorn”) either confirm or revise the judgement.62 Especially due to the exclusion of the judge previously involved in the decisionmaking it was theoretically ensured that a real review took place, and thus a true and impartial control of the content of the matter. In practice, however, the infrequency of the visitations and the possibilities of examining a lawsuit by means of an “Revision” were reprehended. In the middle of the 18th century, Jacob Friedrich Ludovici stated that “Revisionen” had been stuck since 1558, and that there was little hope for improvement (“schon seit An. 1558 die Revisiones stecken bleiben, auch zu einiger Besserung disfalls annoch schlechte Hoffnung vorhanden ist”).63 In fact, the number of “Revisionen” had increased to presumably 2,000 since the RKGO had entered into force in 155564, but only a small fraction of those were resolved, and the “Revisionen” 58

RKGO 1555 3/LIII/§ 1, according to Laufs (fn. 5), 275. RKGO 1555 3/LIII/§ 3, 5, according to Laufs (fn. 5), 276 f. On the “Revision” procedure and its development under normative aspects see also Mencke (fn. 16), 84 – 92. 60 JRA §§ 125 – 127, according to Koch (fn. 7), 663 f. As to admissibility requirements also Jacob Friedrich Ludovici, Einleitung zum Civil-Proceß, … 12th edition, Halle 1750, 31. Cap., sec. III–VIII, 351 – 353. 61 RKGO 1555 3/LIII/§ 3, according to Laufs (fn. 5), 276. 62 RKGO 1555 3/LIII/§ 4, according to Laufs (fn. 5), 276 f. 63 Ludovici (fn. 60), 353. 64 The “Revisionen” until 1600 are listed in Mencke (fn. 16), 127 – 132 with further substantiation, including various estimates on the total numbers which range from 2.000 (so Georg Gottlob Balemann, Visitations-Schlüsse die Verbesserung des Kaiserlichen ReichsKammergerichtlichen Justitzwesens betreffend, vol. 2, Lemgo 1779, 331) to 50.000 (Johann Jacob Moser, Ihro Römisch-Kayserlichen Majestät Carls des Siebenden Wahl-Capitulation, vol. 3, Franckfurt am Mayn 1744, 191). 59

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were thus “buried” (“zu Grabe getragen”).65 As shown by the recent thorough studies of Bernhard Diestelkamp on the legal disputes of the municipality of Freienseen, this legal remedy could be successfully used until the 1580s: In 1580, Freienseen, which for hundreds of years claimed the status of a free imperial village, brought “Revisionen” against the Counts of Solms, and in 1583 the Counts of Solms filed “Revisionen” against Freienseen, each of which resulted in judgements.66 However, the last “Revision” was already decided upon in 1589 so that this form of control of the Imperial Chamber Court has since then been an instrument existing on paper only. b) Declaratio Sententiae – Amendment of a Judgement If the content of a court decision was unclear to the parties, they could request explanations or a leuteratio or declaratio sententiae. The legal remedy, which did not challenge the judgment itself, originates from Saxon procedural law and at first merely sought explanations for an unclear ruling. Later, the judicial panel’s scope of action in case of an amendment was enhanced to enable a legal review of the judgment without repeated oral hearing or taking of evidence and, if necessary, facilitate revision.67 The repeated requests for amendment described by Bernhard Diestelkamp within the scope of the dispute between the village of Freienseen and the Counts of Solms indicate that amendment had also been established practice in Chamber Court proceedings, at the latest at the end of the 16th century, although it had not been mentioned in the RKGOs until and including 155568 and later: A judgment issued in June 1575 obliged the defending Counts to surrender the previously seized livestock or pay corresponding damages. However, the defendants thought they were merely obliged to do so after the claimants had sworn an oath of allegiance (“Erbhuldigung”), which the latter refused by pointing out that the judgment had just affirmed their view of not being subjected to the Counts’ rule. About three months later, the Imperial Chamber Court decided that before the redress the claimants had to subject themselves to the defending Counts as their rightful authority by swearing an

65

Ompteda (fn. 26), 152. Bernhard Diestelkamp, Die Privilegien Kaiser Karls V. für Freienseen vom 9. Januar 1555, in: Stephan Buchholz/Heiner Lück (ed.), Worte des Rechts – Wörter zur Rechtsgeschichte. Festschrift für Dieter Werkmüller zum 70. Geburtstag, Berlin 2007, 95 – 104, id., Freienseen und die Frösche. Von den Wandlungen einer verfassungsgeschichtlichen Legende, in: MOHG 94 (2009), 63 – 68, id., Freiheit und Recht (fn. 56), 76 – 84. On this already Ludolf, Corpus Juris Cameralis (fn. 28), Num. CCLIII., 382, Num. CCLXXIII., 408. 67 Peter Oestmann, Läuterung, in: HRG, 2nd. edition, 19th delivery, Berlin 2014, column 670 – 673. This, however, was still seen differently by Wilhelm August Friedrich Danz, Grundsätze des Reichsgerichts-Prozesses, Stuttgart 1795, 612. For the “Läuterung” recently Volker Unverfehrt, Die sächsische Läuterung. Entstehung, Wandel und Werdegang bis ins 17. Jahrhundert, Diss. expected 2018. 68 Dick (fn. 57). 66

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oath of allegiance. This ruling supplemented the first decision passed in this matter, which had initially not at all commented on the given scope of sovereignty.69 Even though the judge could not give explanations ex officio, but only upon the initiative of a party or an entitled third party, the assessment of whether his previous ruling had been “dark or ambiguous” (“Ausspruch dunkel, oder zweideutig”) was solely in his hands and could not again be reviewed.70 In consideration of the frequency of amendments it can thus be noted that it is a form of externally initiated selfcontrol.71 c) Recourse As an additional legal remedy apart from the “Revision”, the Imperial Recess of 1570 introduced the so-called recourse (“Rekurs”), as the former could be filed only against final judgments (“Definitivsentenzen”) and not against any other decisions of the court such as extra-judicial decisions,72 denial of justice73 or delays of justice.74 Insofar, Julius Friedrich von Malblanc considered the instrument to be an “irregular remedy” (“irregulaire[s] Hülfsmittel”) which would become “entirely redundant” (“ganz überflüssig”) as soon as the visitations and with them the “Revisionen” were again properly performed.75 In comparison to the “Revision”, the Kameralliteratur classified the recourse as a considerably less severe legal remedy, being less burdensome on the imperial judiciary constitution. The recourse “extended rather than reduced the jurisdiction of the Chamber Court” (“die kammergerichtliche Gerichtsbarkeit mehr erweitert als verkürzt”), because when recourses were successful, the final judgments of the Imperial Chamber Court remained unaffected, which in that regard did not question the court’s 69

On this and other amendments Diestelkamp, Freiheit und Recht (fn. 56), 72 – 76. Danz (fn. 67), 611. 71 In this respect see also section II. 72 Dick (fn. 57), 217, does not mention the recourse, but only talks of “complaint”. The extra-judicial appeal is also mentioned there, which was introduced by Imperial Recess of 1594. 73 Imperial Recess of 1570 sec. 79. See Danz (fn. 67), 649, Julius Friedrich von Malblanc, Anleitung zur Kenntniß der deutschen Reichs- und Provinzial-Gerichts- und Kanzleyverfassung und Praxis, vol. 2, Nuremberg/Altdorf 1791, 395, Johann Jacob Moser, Von dem Recurs an die Cammergerichts-Visitation; absonderlich in Parthie-Sachen. Nebst einem Anhang: 1. Ob die Visitation von dem Cammergericht Acten und Protocollen abforderen, auch 2. eine Jnhibition an Daßelbige ergehen laßen könne? Ulm/Frankfurt/Leipzig 1775, Mencke (fn. 16), 42, 125 f. with further substantiation. As to the remedy against denial of justice by the Imperial Chamber Court in particular Malblanc (fn. 73), 386 f., Balemann, Visitations-Schlüsse (fn. 64), 342 f. As to the remedy against extra-judicial decisions Balemann, Visitations-Schlüsse (fn. 64), 342. 74 Balemann, Visitations-Schlüsse (fn. 64), 342, Malblanc (fn. 73), 386, Danz (fn. 67), 649. 75 Malblanc (fn. 73), 395. 70

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authority.76 Accordingly, in the event of delays of justice, the visitation committee acted only insofar as it requested the Imperial Chamber Court in a so-called “Promotorial”, a letter intended to advance proceedings, to accelerate the matter long decided on (“solche lang beschlossene Sache vermöge der Ordnung fürderlich referirt und expedirt werden möge”)77 without ever anticipating a judgment in the matter.78 The same applied to denials of justice, where the visitation committee requested that the parties were granted their right (“daß angezogenen Partheyen der Rechten ReichsOrdnung und Abschieden gebührliche Justitz wiederfahren und administrirt werden möge”).79 d) “Syndicate Action” While a “Revision” sought a review of the decision of the Imperial Chamber Court, the subject matter of the “syndicate action” (“Syndikatsklage”) focused on the judge, or rather the judge’s deliberate misconduct. It is therefore not a legal remedy but needs to be classified as a claim for damages.80 The Imperial Recess of 1532 had already allocated this form of supervision to the visitations.81 But only the RKGO 1555 characterised the applicability of this procedural form for cases where the “judgment in one or several issues were found to be influenced by gifts, donations, [here in the sense of performance for obtaining unfair (financial) benefit, Author’s note]82solicitation, friendship, hostility, or other comparable reasons, or where the procurators were found to have accepted such donations or gifts from the adverse party or prevaricated [twisted the truth, Author’s note] or otherwise acted fraudulently”83 (“urtheyler einer oder mehr in solcher sachen von geschenck, miedt gab, bitt, freundtschaft, feindtschaft oder ander dergleichen ursache eyn urtheyl geben, oder daß die procuratores von der gegenpartey dergleichen miedt, schenck und gabe genommen oder in ander wege prevaricirt oder sunst in offnem betrug befunden würden”). As with the “Revision”, the councils of the Estates appointed for the visitations also had to meet for the syndicate action in order to examine the complaints and to remedy the matter, if applicable.84 Once it was proven that an unfair judgment had been passed based on such misconduct, the injured party could claim damages 76

Balemann, Visitations-Schlüsse (fn. 64), 349. Ludolf, Corpus Juris Cameralis (fn. 28), Decree of 10 May 1580, Num. CCLIV., 383. The causa of the heirs of Heinrich Bisping vs. Münstermann had already been decided on in 1574. Further examples with Decree of 15 May 1584 ibid. Num. CCLXXXIII., 413 f. 78 Moser, Recurs (fn. 73), sec. 38, 58, sec. 39, 60. 79 Ludolf, Corpus Juris Cameralis (fn. 28), Decree of 10 May 1580, Num. CCLIV., 382, in the matters Solms vs. Manderscheid and Hanß von Egen vs. Hieronymus Schnöder. 80 This had already been the prevailing opinion among contemporaries. Evidence of supporters of this opinion and of different views in Danz (fn. 67), 647 f., Mencke (fn. 16), 51. 81 Imperial Recess of 1532 Tit. 3, sec. 17, according to Koch (fn. 22), 359. 82 In this respect see DRW IX., column 615. 83 RKGO 1555 3/LIII/§ 6, according to Laufs (fn. 5), 277. 84 RKGO 1555 3/LIII/§ 10, according to Laufs (fn. 5), 278 f. 77

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and the judge who deliberately or grossly negligently passed the unfair judgment or who had been bribed, or any procurator acting so, had to expect an adequate punishment (“gebürliche straff”).85 With regard to the supervision intended with controlling the judicial panel, the syndicate action was at least theoretically an important instrument to ensure the independence of the judge, one of the core elements of a functioning judiciary, or even the judicial system itself. Due to the fact that the judges at the Imperial Chamber Court on the one hand represented the Emperor as the highest secular legal instance, and on the other hand the Imperial Estates as their delegating party, the flaw of unfairness in case of a violation of impartiality did not reflect badly on the judicial panel itself, but also upon the latter. The Kameralliteratur in this respect state that the syndicate action was an important instrument “to maintain the court’s honour and to prevent any disrespect” (“zu Erhaltung des Gerichts Ehr und Verhinderung allerley Verachtung”).86 The Aulic Council and the imperial fiscal prosecutor Dr. Hans Ulrich Hämmerlein also address this aspect in the sole so far recorded syndicate action brought by the latter before the Aulic Council in 1610. Thus, not only the parties to the underlying proceedings and the imperial fiscal prosecutor had suffered considerable damage, but in addition the Emperor’s reputation and the dignity and reputation of the Aulic Council had been violated.87 In view thereof it is obvious that already upon the installation of the supreme court in the Old Empire the RKGO of 1495 and all following imperial laws requested that judges were sworn in on their impartiality.88 In order to safeguard the reputation of the judicial panel with regard to proper performance of the judgeship, the syndicate action was – abstractly seen – an excellent instrument. However, even contemporaries such as Johann Jacob von Zwierlein found that the syndicate action was not only difficult to prove but also rarely, almost never brought before the chamber court and that apparently it never found a cause for reversing a chamber court judgment (“schwer zu erweisen, sondern auch am cammergerichte seltsam, ja fast unerhöret … und wohl niemahls ursache gefunden … die cammergerichtlichen urtheile umzustossen”).89 And, in fact, there is not a single 85

RKGO 1555 3/LIII/§ 6, according to Laufs (fn. 5), 277. Harpprecht (fn. 37), vol. 5, Ulm 1767, 379. 87 ÖStA HHStA, RHR, Antiqua, vol. 1, file 410, Sign. 29/19. 88 RKGO 1495 sec. 3, Koch (fn. 22), 7. To the judges conscience, which was not specifically named but implicated in their sworn commitment Heiner Lück, “Richtergewissen” im Kernland der lutherischen Reformation Beobachtungen zur kursächsischen Rechtspraxis und deren normativen Grundlagen im 16. Jahrhundert, in: Michael Germann/Wim Decock (Hg.), Das Gewissen in den Rechtslehren der protestantischen und katholischen Reformationen/ Conscience in the Legal Teachings of the Protestant and Catholic Reformations, (LeucoreaStudien zur Geschichte der Reformation und der Lutherischen Orthodoxie, 31), Leipzig 2017, 179 – 199, here 187 – 196. 89 Johann Jacob von Zwierlein, Concept der auf kayserlichen und des reichs befehl im jahr 1613. verbesserten cammergerichts-ordnung auf das sorgfältigste übersehen und so wohl mit seinen als auch mit denen besonders beigedruckten Ludolffischen anmerckungen vermehrt, Franckfurt am Mayn 1753, 388, 391. See also Georg Melchior Ludolf, Iuris Cameralis De86

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case recorded in which a syndicate action had been successfully concluded. Only three pending proceedings are on record: In 1538, Straßburg initiated proceedings, but the dispute at issue was settled amicably in 1545, thus ending the syndicate action.90 An action filed by Freiherr von Sturmfeder against Count von der Leihen was never heard.91 The Imperial Chamber Court had allowed the action in a matter relating to craftsmanship, even though Section 106 JRA in matters of public order (“Policeysachen”) had declared an appeal before the Imperial Chamber Court as inadmissible. After a decision had been issued in favour of the claimant in 1767, the adverse party filed a “Revision”, which was dismissed on the ground that it was a matter of public order against which a “Revision” would always be excluded according to Sections 125, 127 JRA if an appeal had been inadmissible in the matter. Thus dismissed, the adverse party filed a syndicate action for unfair treatment, which was never heard for reasons not on record.92 Contemporaries – for example Johann Heinrich von Harpprecht – especially found the conceptional weakness of the syndicate action to be the cause,93 because it was to be filed against the accused judge himself, and for that reason difficult to prove.94 Potential claimants could hardly address the accusation of deliberate judicial errors correctly, as due to the statutory secrecy obligation of all court members the claimants could not know who and how many of the assessors were involved in the judgment.95 This secrecy obligation applied to both the allocation of duties and the publication of the reasons for decisions; every judge was bound to keep all persons and opinions secret beyond the grave (“Persohnen und Voten biß in sein Gruben zu verschweigen”).96 Furthermore, the regulations on the syndicate action were much too short and unfair (“viel zu kurtz and unlauter”). In particular, even though they stipulated that the “Sindicat-Richter”, that is the judges, had to have sufficient experience and expertise, it was not specified how long they had to have studied, how they had practised and how experienced they had to be. Often someone was considered skilled and experienced who had never in his life followed the process of court action (“ausgetruckt, welchergestalt sie gelelhert, wie lang sie studirt, welcherlineatio brevis & perspicua ex Fontibus Legum Publicarum & Recessus Visitationis Novissimæ Concinnata, Francofurti ad Moenum 1714, Sect. II, sec. VI., 83 – 88. 90 The course of the investigations is elaborately described in Harpprecht (fn. 37), 383 – 386, and only briefly in Mencke (fn. 16), 127, more details mentioned in Robert Schelp, Die Reformationsprozesse der Stadt Strassburg am Reichskammergericht zur Zeit des Schmalkaldischen Bundes (1524)/1531 – 1541/(1555), Kaiserslautern 1965, 224 – 227, with further substantiation. 91 Balemann, Visitations-Schlüsse (fn. 64), vol. 1, Lemgo 1779, 23. 92 Balemann, Visitations-Schlüsse (fn. 64), 347 f. 93 Harpprecht (fn. 37), 380 f. 94 Zwierlein (fn. 89), 388. 95 RKGO 1500 Tit. 20, Koch (fn. 22), 71 f., Visitationsabschied 1531 sec. 28, ibid., 349, Visitationsmemoriale für Kammerrichter und Beisitzer von 1533 sec. 13, ibid., 406, RKGO 1555 1/XIII/§ 17, according to Laufs (fn. 5), 97 f. 96 Harpprecht (fn. 37), 381.

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maßen sie practiciret und erfarn seyn sollen. Offt wird einer für geschickt und erfarn geachtet, er ist sein lebenlang bey keinem gantzen process eines gerichtlichen Handels gewesen.”).97

II. Internal Control 1. Voluntary Self-Control a) Visitation Decrees On the occasion of visitations it also happened that servants of the Imperial Chamber Court on their own initiative presented questions to be decided on by the committee, which were then ruled on by so-called visitation decrees.98 Thus, the Imperial Committee was informed during a visitation in 1580 that the Fiscal at the Imperial Chamber Court delayed processing pending matters (“anhangenden Exemption Sachen fast langsam verfahre[n], und gantz verzüglich”). This was unlawful, because the Imperial Recess of Augsburg in 1548 had announced that the Fiscal had to efficiently process exemption cases and pass a decision without delay (“nun im ReichsAbschied, zu Augspurg Anno 1548. publicirt, … daß ermeldter Fiscal in allen und jeden Exemption-Sachen zum fürderlichsten & de plano procediren und zum Beschluß handlen soll”). Accordingly, his princely highness and the committee was asked to ensure that the Fiscal complied with the elaborate Recess by efficient procedure (“Ihro Fürstl. Gnaden und dem Collegio … aufferlegt, daran zu seyn, daß auch der Fiscalis solchen wohlbedachten Abschied mit schleunigem procediren nachsetze”).99 Given that in this case the initiative was taken not by committee as the controlling body, but by a part of the judicial panel itself, this is – although also a form of control – a voluntary self-control. Problematic issues could not be dealt with more expediently than in this manner, as the faults had been observed and then formulated by the public officials themselves. External examiners involved in controlling did inevitably not have the corresponding expertise and adequate knowledge of the internal affairs as the persons directly involved in the procedures. Moreover, the results of such requests could be implemented at least as successfully as was the case with visitation memoranda and the visitation relations, because the decisions were also almost completely chronologically included in the corpus iuris cameralis100 and thus had to be permanently observed not only as internal regulations, but the staff at the Imperial Chamber Court could be expected to know them as fundamental laws of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (“Grund-Gesetze des Röm. Teutschen 97

Harpprecht (fn. 37), 382. Smend (fn. 2), 183. 99 Ludolf, Corpus Juris Cameralis (fn. 28), Num. CCXLIX., 381. 100 This is also pointed out by Smend (fn. 2), 183. 98

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Reichs”).101 This was already indicated by the subtitles of the works of Friedrich Fabricius and Georg Melchior von Ludolfs with the same title, where in parallel to the chamber court orders the “Visitations-Recesse” were also named.102 Thus, it was selfdiscipline through self-control rather than externally initiated control which was capable of successfully remedying deficiencies in the activities of the Imperial Chamber Court. b) Senate Decisions At this point, the so-called senate decisions or Senatusconsulta shall again be mentioned, which regulated both procedural and legal issues, and which were solely addressed to the assessors themselves, and therefore did not have to be publicly announced.103 2. Common Orders (“Gemeine Bescheide”) – Delegated Self-Control Irrespective of the difficulties still existing today when classifying the common orders in the “grey area between legislation, administrative orders and court rulings” (“Grauzone zwischen Gesetzgebung, Verwaltungsanordnung und Rechtsprechung”),104 the regulations passed especially by the assessors served to improve everyday court procedure.105 Thus, the common orders structured the procedure during the audiences and were in this respect especially aimed at the procurators, they issued instructions for the preparation and submission of pleadings as decisive addresses to 101

So Ludolf, Corpus Juris Cameralis (fn. 28), Foreword. Friedrich Fabricius, Corpus iuris Cameralis, continens S. imperii Romani constitutiones, ordinationes, decreta, visitations, …, Helenopolis 1613, Ludolf, Corpus Juris Cameralis (fn. 28), … Darinnen alle Cammer-Gerichts-Ordnungen/ samt dem Anno 1613. verfertigten Concept Einer neuen Ordnung/ ; So dann die Visitations-Recesse und Memorialien, nicht weniger die gemeine Bescheide und Raths-Schlüsse/ auch was in denen Reichs-Satzungen und Friedens-Schlüssen von höchst-erwehntem Gericht oder dessen Personen, Sachen, und Process enthalten, nach der Jahr-Zahl wie jedes abgefasset worden/ mit dienlichen Marginalien und Randweisungen derer vor und nach ergangener Verordnungen vermehrt, und mit dienlichen Registern versehen ; Allen, so an bemeldtem Höchsten Gericht zuthun haben/ oder dessen gründlicher Wissenschafft begierig sind, zum besten/ samt einer ausführlichen Vorrede heraus gegeben. In the collections, individual regulations, if applicable, also refer to a visitation decree as source, bearing the note “… in Memor. visitat. Anno 72 …”, Fabricius, ibid., Obs. I at the end. 103 Danz (fn. 67), 132 f. See also Peter Oestmann, Gemeine Bescheide. Teil 1: Reichskammergericht 1497 – 1806 (Quellen und Forschungen zur höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, 63,1), Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2013, Oestmann, Gemeine Bescheide (fn. 103), 6. 104 An overview of various interpretations is provided in Oestmann, Gemeine Bescheide (fn. 103), 2 – 18. 105 Bernhard Diestelkamp, Die Gemeinen Bescheide des Reichskammergerichts. Unausgewertete Quellen zum Verfahrensalltag, in: id. (ed.), Liber Amicorum Kjell Å Modéer, Lund 2007, 143 – 148, here 144. 102

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advocates, they served to reform the messenger services of the chamber, regulated the simplification and acceleration of extrajudicial proceedings and the improvement of the judicial procedure.106 In terms of sources, they are to be distinguished from the imperial orders of the Aulic Council, even if their contents were frequently similar.107 The Imperial Chamber Court was at least de lege lata expressly protected against such imperial orders, so-called “Promotoriales”,108 but common orders are evidenced consistently, in great number and, in contrast to the imperial orders, initially structured as right to take own action, which the RKGO of 1495 granted to the Imperial Chamber Court in a not yet mandatory manner.109 Since the RKGO of 1555, the chamber judge and assessors had been obliged to submit proposals for improving judicial procedures to a visitation committee, if any, for review, but irrespective thereof they had the possibility to improve the processes at any time when necessary (“jederzeit, wann es die notturft erfordert, des proceß halb dise Ordnung ires besten verstendtnuß zu declariren, zu bessern, auch weitere notwendige fürsehung und Ordnung fürzunemen und zu machen”).110 According to the procedural conception of the common orders, a control by the court should in any case not be externally initiated, that is by involvement of third parties, but internally by members of the court. Thus, the examination of its functionality was by force of law delegated to the court itself by the superior bodies Imperial Diet or the Emperor. In general, the court had the sole task to suggest legislative measures. In fact, however, common orders were still included in the concept for a new RKGO of 1613 even though this draft was never formally resolved by the Imperial Diet and it gained a rank equal to a law only by actual use. Finally, for lack of marking it can also not be traced to what extent common orders were considered in the JRA, which contains the last legislative reform of the chamber procedures.111 A supervision of its own functionality as entrusted to the Imperial Chamber Court by imperial law was, however, no longer performed in the predefined manner at the latest since the middle of the 17th century. From then on, the improvement of everyday court procedure by means of common orders worked also without including them in legislative measures of the Imperial Diet. They were nonetheless incorporated in the corpus iuris camera106 Individual substantiation summarised in Diestelkamp, Gemeine Bescheide (fn. 105), 147 f., overall on this Oestmann, Gemeine Bescheide (fn. 104). 107 Oestmann, Gemeine Bescheide (fn. 104), 10 f. 108 For example by the capitulatio perpetua of Karl VII., in which he committed to not allow any “Promotoriales, Schreiben um Bericht, Instructiones oder Inhibitiones”, according to Sellert, Unabhängigkeit (fn. 2), 41. See also Oestmann, Rechtsverweigerung (fn. 11), 67 f., 123 f. 109 Sec. 32 RKGO 1495, Koch (fn. 22), 11. 110 RKGO 1555 3/XXXVI, according to Laufs (fn. 5), 217. 111 Diestelkamp, Gemeine Bescheide (fn. 105), 144.

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lis112 and used as legal fundamentals equal to the RKGO, the imperial decrees and imperial recesses.113

III. Conclusion All forms of control presented herein were covered by imperial laws and are to be distinguished from measures of an interference in the course of justice (“Kabinettsjustiz”), where the sovereign arbitrarily interfered with ongoing proceedings and sought to retain the decision-making. This negation of judicial independence exercised in the form of so-called power dictums (“Machtsprüche”) was the order of the day in early modern judiciary. However, especially the Imperial Chamber Court disapproved the role of the judge as iudex delegatus and in several cases decided against the interference in the course of justice exercised by individual Imperial Estates. Not all of the forms of control presented here turned out to be practicable or reached the pursued goals. Theoretically, the syndicate action was promising; in fact, however, it never gained significance. The self-disciplinary measures described under the term of self-control collectively all served to improve the external court procedures and the procedural course of the proceedings. Thus, the effect was achieved that the court was bound to the stylus curiae by its own acts. Especially the voluntary self-control expressed in the form of the common orders was probably motivated by the future-oriented idea of preserving the reputation and standing of the entire institution. Insofar, visitation decrees and common orders are also components of an ethic code of conduct drawn up by own initiative in response to deficiencies in court procedures that had already occurred, were consciously identified and voluntarily reported. Their incorporation in the corpus iuris cameralis, and consequently their publication and dissemination, created public transparency and had a trust-building effect. 112

See for example Ludolf, Corpus Juris Cameralis (fn. 28). Further substantiation in Diestelkamp, Gemeine Bescheide (fn. 105), 144, fn. 105. 113 Based on the Imperial Recess of 1570 sec. 77, the common orders had to be distinguished from the so-called conclusa pleni, i. e. “‘opinions adopted with the consent of the whole court’ on contentious legal issues which were recorded in a particular minute book and copies of which were sent to the Imperial Diet for ratification court” (“‘mit Approbation des ganzen Raths angenommene opiniones’ über streitige Rechtsfragen, welche in ein besonderes Protokollbuch geschrieben, und copeilich dem Reichstag zum Zweck der Ratifikation zugeschickt wurden”), Georg Wilhelm Wetzell, System des ordentlichen Civilprozesses, 3rd edition, Leipzig, 1878, 5 f. The same applied to the so-called dubia cameralia, which Wetzell described as “controversies on which the Imperial Chamber Court itself could not reach an agreement and which therefore had to be submitted to the Imperial Diet for a decision” (“Controversen, über welche man sich im R. K. G. selbst nicht einigen konnte, und die deshalb der Entscheidung des Reichstags vorzulegen waren”), ibid. 6.

Control of the Procedure of the College of Justice in Scotland By J. D. Ford* The United Kingdom of Great Britain was created in 1707 on certain conditions specified in a treaty between, and ratifying legislation passed by the parliaments of, Scotland and England.1 One of the conditions specified was that ‘the court of session, or colledge of justice, do after the union and notwithstanding thereof remain in all time coming within Scotland as it is now constituted by the laws of that kingdom’.2 The supreme civil court in Scotland was to remain in existence ‘with the same authority and priviledges as before the union’, though subject ‘to such regulations for the better administration of justice as shall be made by the parliament of Great Britain’.3 The insistence on the survival of the session was by no means a novelty. As early as 1543, just ten years after the foundation of the College of Justice, ambassadors sent south to negotiate a dynastic union were instructed to insist that the Scots must ‘haf ane continuale and perpetuale sete and college of justice sitand in the tolbuth of Edinburgh, siclik as it is statute and ordanit be the kingis grace’.4 In further negotiations following the accession of James VI of Scotland to the throne of England in 1603, the conquest of Scotland by Oliver Cromwell in 1651, and the recovery of the * The author is indebted to participants at a seminar in Bergen as well as at the Granada meeting, and particularly to Mark Godfrey, who also commented on a written version of this paper. 1 The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland (www.rps.ac.uk), 1706/10/257; Thomson, T./ Innes, C. (eds.), The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, 12 vols., Edinburgh, 1814 – 1875, vol. 11, pp. 406 – 13; The Statutes of the Realm, 11 vols., London, 1810 – 28, vol. 8, pp. 566 – 77. 2 The College of Justice, created by legislation of the Scottish parliament in 1532, was commonly known as ‘the session’, but it had very occasionally been referred to by, or for the benefit of, English observers as the ‘court of session’ or ‘court of sessions’ (e. g. Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 6(2), p. 804). In 1707 this barbaric usage received official approval for the first time, and the expression Court of Session now serves as a standard alternative to College of Justice. It remains an anachronism when applied to the court before the union, certainly if written with capital letters. 3 Scots lawyers tend to maintain that the parliament of Great Britain was a new institution brought into existence in 1707, in place of both the previous Scottish parliament and the previous English parliament. English lawyers, on the other hand, tend to maintain that the English parliament was merely enlarged in 1707 by the admission of additional representatives from Scotland. 4 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1543/3/12; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 2, pp. 411 – 12.

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thrones of Scotland and England by Charles II in 1660, it was insisted by the Scots that in any closer union between the two kingdoms they must retain their own laws and courts.5 There was nothing surprising, therefore, about the articles in the Treaty and Acts of Union implemented in 1707 providing for the preservation of the laws of Scotland (art. 18) and separate courts in Scotland (art. 19). Yet there was a novelty in the article concerned with the courts, for in none of the earlier negotiations had the proviso been added that although the existence, authority and privileges of the College of Justice were to be immune from statutory interference, the procedure of the court might be regulated by statute. For some reason, it had come to be considered sufficiently important for the court’s procedure to be open to external control for this to be expressly permitted. The aim of this essay is to explain why this proviso was introduced.

I. Foundation of the College of Justice When the creation of the College of Justice was authorised by legislation enacted by the king in parliament in 1532 it was expressly provided that the judges should have jurisdiction over all civil causes, that they should meet at specified times and that they should swear an oath to administer justice equally between the litigants who came before them.6 It was also provided that their handling of cases might be regulated by ‘sic utherir rewlis and statutis as sall pleise the kingis grace to mak and geif to thaim for ordouring of the samin’. The intention may have been for the king to enact further ‘rewlis and statutis’ in parliament, but the term ‘utherir’ was perhaps used to indicate that the king would ‘mak and geif’ rules in some other way. What in fact happened was that when the judges met to swear their oaths of office they were directed by the king ‘to avise, counsell and conclude apon sic rewlis, statutis and ordinancis as sall be thocht be thame expedient to be observit and kepit in thair maner and ordour of proceding at all tymes, and as thai divise, conforme to resoune, equitie and justice’.7 During the next week twenty-six ‘rewlis and statutis for the ordoure of justice’ were drafted. Although several were administrative in character – for instance, some regulated the conduct of clerks in the court – others were more procedural – for instance, some regulated the order in which causes were to be called, their continuation to later diets and so on. A fortnight after the judges first gathered to swear their oaths, the king declared his approval of these rules in 5 Levack, B. P., The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland and Union, 1603 – 1707, Oxford, 1987, pp. 68 – 101; Wijffels, A. A., A British Ius commune? A Debate on the Union of the Laws of Scotland and England during the First Years of James VI/I’s English Reign, in: Edinburgh Law Review, 6, 2002, pp. 315 – 55; Ford, J. D., Four Models of Union, in: MacQueen, H. L. (ed.), Stair Society: Miscellany Seven, Edinburgh, 2015, pp. 179 – 216. 6 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1532/6; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 2, pp. 335 – 6. 7 Campbell, I. (ed.), The Acts of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session, from the Institution of the College of Justice in May 1532 to January 1553, Edinburgh, 1811, pp. 1 – 7.

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the statement of his ‘gude mind anent the session’ mentioned in another essay in this collection.8 As was noted there, on the king’s instructions the judges’ rules and his own statement were recorded in the books of the court, though they came rather mysteriously to be regarded as an act of parliament. Eight years later, when James V reached ‘his perfite aige of xxv yeris’, another statute was enacted in parliament to ratify the creation of the College of Justice. In this act the judges were given authority ‘to mak sic actis, statutis and ordinancis as thai sall think expedient for ordouring of processes and haisty expeditioune of justice’.9 During the next century and a half the judges often did introduce further rules in exercise of the power conferred upon them. These instances of subordinate legislation – as we now regard them – were entered in books kept as a record of attendance in the court, which came to be separated from the registers of acts and decreets issued during litigation. Since the record of attendance was known as the ‘books of sederunt’, the legislative acts it contained were known as ‘acts of sederunt’.10 The procedure followed in pursuing cases through the court was governed largely by a combination of these acts and the customary usages or ‘practick’ of the court, generally conceived of in terms of the learning of the schools, though it was also affected by parliamentary legislation.11 The aim of this essay is not to examine in detail the procedure followed in the court or even to explore the various influences on its development. The aim is instead to explain how it came to be considered crucial for the parliament of the United Kingdom to have the power to regulate the court’s procedure, despite the determination to protect the established courts in Scotland against interference from south of the border. On one reading, the Scottish king and parliament accepted in 1532 and 1540 that the lords of session should be left to regulate their own procedure. The intention, after all, had been ‘to institute ane college of cunning and wise men’, and it was these men who were best placed to frame rules ‘conforme to resoune, equitie and justice’.12 On the other hand, the point of making express provision for the regulation of the court’s procedure in the acts of 1532 and 1540 could have been to stress that the authority to do so resided in, or must be delegated from, the estates in parliament, which would help to explain why the rules introduced in 1532 came to be regarded as a parliamen8 Ford, Epistolary Control of the College of Justice in Scotland, and for the broader context Godfrey, Control and the Constitutional Accountability of the College of Justice in Scotland, also in this volume. 9 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1540/12/64; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 2, p. 371. 10 Many of the procedural acts are printed in The Acts of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session, 1553 – 1790, Edinburgh, 1790. 11 Finlay, J., Men of Law in Pre-Reformation Scotland, East Linton, 2000, pp. 96 – 122; Ford, J. D., Law and Opinion in Scotland during the Seventeenth Century, Oxford, 2007, pp. 507 – 15; Godfrey, A.M. Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland: The Origins of a Central Court, Leiden, 2009, pp. 161 – 206. 12 In addition to Mark Godfrey’s book, just cited, see too Cairns, J. W., Revisiting the Foundation of the College of Justice, in: MacQueen, H. L. (ed.), Stair Society: Miscellany Five, Edinburgh, 2006, pp. 27 – 50.

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tary enactment. The estates in parliament certainly continued to legislate in relation to the session after 1540. They sometimes attempted to wrest from the crown control over the appointment or removal of the lords of session, and they frequently passed acts concerned with where and when the court should sit, how the judges should be remunerated, and similar matters.13 Moreover, the acts they passed quite often had a bearing on the procedure of the court. In 1621, for instance, a famous act passed ‘aganis unlauchfull dispositiones and alienationis made be dyvoures and banckruptis’ provided that the effect of fraudulent deeds could be challenged before the court ‘be way off actioun, exceptioun or reply, without farder declaratour’.14 Yet it seems unlikely that the draftsmen of the nineteenth article of the Treaty and Acts of Union had provisions of this variety in mind when they stipulated that the College of Justice should be subject ‘to such regulations for the better administration of justice as shall be made by the parliament of Great Britain’. More relevant than the passing of individual statutes affecting the court’s procedure were several moments between 1532 and 1707 when consideration was given more generally to parliamentary control of the court’s procedure.

II. Reformation of the College of Justice The first of these moments or periods began in the mid 1580s, fifty years after the College of Justice was founded, and was not clearly concluded until the mid 1590s. In 1584, in response to ‘plaintis and lamentationis’ received from his subjects about ‘enormiteis, corruptionis and delayis usit in the sessioun’, James VI granted his assent to an act of parliament establishing a commission to advise on ‘the reformatioun of the College of Justice’. The five statesmen who were appointed to serve on the commission were directed to investigate the complaints made, to identify any corrupt judges in need of replacement and ‘to prescrive and appoint sic guid rewllis and constitutionis as they sall think maist requisit for reformatioun of sic enormiteis, corruptionis and delayis as they sall try to have bene in the sessioun and College of Justice in tyme bygane’.15 As the stated intention was that the rules would be drafted ‘to the effect that his majestie and his said College of Justice may ratifie, approve and auctorize the same’, the expectation remained that the court would regulate its own business, yet the rules were not to be drafted by the lords of session themselves, and they were to be drafted if it was found that the lords of session were as corrupt and dilatory 13

Hannay, R. K., The College of Justice, Edinburgh, 1933, pp. 103 – 34. Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1621/6/30; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 4, pp. 615 – 16. This was actually a notorious example, for the lords of session declined to reduce deeds by way of ‘exception’, believing that the procedure would be inappropriate (Stair, James Dalrymple, Viscount, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1681, p. 13; Mackenzie, Sir George, Discours on the Four First Titles of the Digest, British Library [BL], Sloane MS 3828, f. 148v). 15 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1584/5/33; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, p. 310. 14

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as had been alleged. The conduct of business in the court was thus to be exposed to a degree of external scrutiny and regulation because it was suspected that the judges were failing to handle cases properly. Moreover, requiring any new rules to be enacted in the session did not preclude the possibility of direct regulation by parliament. In 1582 the lords of session, in the king’s presence, had passed an act of sederunt concerning the execution of decreets, expressly invoking the authority conferred upon them by the 1540 act of parliament.16 In 1584, at the same time as the commission was being set up to reform the session, another statute was passed to ratify the 1582 act of sederunt and provide it with the ‘strenth, force and effect of ane act of parliament’.17 It would have been a relatively short step from ratifying an act of sederunt, on the understanding that it had less strength than an act of parliament, to enacting new legislation to regulate the procedure of the court. Although there is no trace in the records of the session or elsewhere of rules presented by the reform commission to the court for ratification, the commission may nevertheless have met, and its deliberations may have had some effect. One member of the commission was the king’s secretary, Sir John Maitland of Thirlestane, who was soon to be promoted to the office of chancellor, which would entitle him to a seat in the session. Maitland was the driving force behind a more general movement towards reform of the kingdom in these years.18 He framed the unusually extensive legislative programmes implemented in the parliaments both of 1584 and of 1587, when there would have been an opportunity to take account of any findings the commission had made. One statute passed in 1587 ratified another act of sederunt, in which it had been provided that actions of molestation should be remitted to local courts because their unnecessary hearing in the session ‘impeschis greitlie the ordinair course of justice’.19 It was presumably expected that this statute would reduce ‘delayis’ in the court, and a second statute passed in 1587 was intended to relieve the pressure on the court further by inflicting penalties on ‘wilful, obstinate and malicious pleyaris’, meaning litigants who understood perfectly well that they had no right to resist claims made against them.20 A third statute passed in the 1587 parliament instructed the king’s advocate and one of his colleagues to draft ‘ane speciall act’ concerning the execution of decreets, which was to have ‘the strenth and effect of

16 In fact, neither this act of sederunt nor the one mentioned in the next paragraph is in the books of sederunt. 17 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1584/5/21; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, p. 300. 18 Lee, M., John Maitland of Thirlestane and the Foundations of the Stewart Despotism in Scotland, Princeton, 1959, pp. 215 – 21; Willson, D. H., King James VI and I, London, 1963, pp. 97 – 8; Goodare, J., State and Society in Early Modern Scotland, Oxford, 1999, pp. 73 – 5. 19 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1587/7/33; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, pp. 445 – 6. 20 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1587/7/34; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, p. 447.

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ane act of parliament’ if afterwards approved in the session.21 Several other proposals were remitted to the lords of session for consideration, some of which related to the procedure to be followed in their court.22 It could be that all these statutes were meant to address, directly or indirectly, the issues identified by the 1584 commission when it investigated the conduct of business in the court. Taken together, they at least confirm that the reformation of the College of Justice remained on the political agenda, and that it was believed to be appropriate for parliament to involve itself in the regulation of the court. Not everyone was satisfied, moreover, that reform of the session had been taken far enough. In 1590, when the king travelled with his chancellor to Denmark to collect his queen, rumours spread in Scotland of ‘many reformations to be maid, and new fourmes and fassions to be set fordwart, at his majesteis hamecommyng’.23 After his return the king did summon a convention of the estates (a lesser form of parliament), ‘for reformatioun of all inormeteis’.24 One item on its agenda was further scrutiny of the session, whose members started to accuse each other publicly of corruption or slander. After a few days the convention decided to leave ‘the reformation of the session to th’examynacione and order of them selves’, but during the next four years more statutes were passed in connection with the court’s procedure. A further statute was passed to discourage ‘wilfull and obstinat pleyaris’, another was passed to protect debtors who had redeemed securities from vexatious actions of reduction, and a third required parties suspected of raising specious defences to provide guarantees of their integrity.25 If the assumption behind these statutes was that delays in the court were mostly caused by litigants, two more acts were concerned with the integrity of the judges. The first provided that no lord of session should participate in the hearing of a case to which his father, son or brother was a party, and the second that no member of the College of Justice should purchase property that was the subject of an action pending before the court.26 These two statutes at last addressed not merely the ‘delayis usit in the sessioun’ but also perceived ‘enormiteis’ and ‘corruptionis’ among the members of the court. Whatever ‘reformation’ the judges may have contemplated, the estates in parliament had finally felt the need to intervene directly to regulate the handling of cases in the session. They had done so in piecemeal legislation designed to address specific issues, rather than by conducting a general review of the procedures followed in the court, but in doing so they had reaffirmed their au21 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1587/7/155; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, p. 520. 22 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1584/7/36 – 7; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, pp. 448 and 520. 23 Melville, Sir James, Memoirs of His Own Life, Edinburgh, 1827, p. 373. 24 Moysie, David, Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland, 1577 – 1603, Edinburgh, 1830, p. 84. 25 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1592/4/74 and 84, and 1594/4/38; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 3, pp. 569 – 70 and 573, and vol. 4, p. 68. 26 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1594/4/33 and 37; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 4, pp. 67 – 8.

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thority to regulate the judges’ activities, and in some instances without proposing rules to be ratified by the court itself.

III. Regulation of the College of Justice For several decades after the 1594 parliament the College of Justice was again left to develop its own procedures. Charles I, James VI’s son and heir, expressed an interest in reforming the court further, but he was more interested in how the judges were appointed than in how cases were heard, and less interested in encouraging parliamentary intervention than in establishing his own authority over the session as an independent institution.27 When his authority came to be challenged at the close of the 1630s, the estates made a point of reaffirming ‘the honnour, dignitie and authoritie of the supreme court of parliament over the counsell and sessioun, and over all other civil judicatories of this kingdome, which have thair originall, thair power and authoritie from the kingis majestie and the estates of parliament’.28 At the same time various statutes were passed in relation to the attendance of macers in the court, the fees imposed on litigants, and the advocation of causes from other courts, the last of which provoked a formal protest from the College of Justice.29 All this legislation was repealed in 1661, however, after the restoration of the monarchy, when the College of Justice was reinstated and again trusted to develop its own procedural rules.30 In retrospect at least, the 1660s came to be regarded as an exceptionally harmonious period in the court’s history, in which the judges and advocates worked together to have actions processed to the satisfaction of litigants.31 This is a point of some importance, for at other times it was observed by the judges that dissatisfaction among litigants was being caused by advocates who, in order to secure employment, told their clients they had stronger claims than they really had, and afterwards blamed their lack of success on the judges’ susceptibility to undue influence from their opponents.32 27 Lee, M., The Road to Revolution: Scotland under Charles I, 1625 – 37, Urbana, Ill., 1985, pp. 22 – 4; Donald, P., An Uncounselled King: Charles I and the Scottish Troubles, 1637 – 41, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 21 – 3; Macinnes, A. I., Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement, 1625 – 41, Edinburgh, 1991, pp. 49 – 51. 28 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1640/6/51; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 5, pp. 286 – 7. 29 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1640/8/38, 196 and 220 – 1; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 5, pp. 349, 412 and 420. 30 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1661/1/158; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 7, pp. 86 – 7. 31 Mackenzie, Sir George, Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland from the Restoration of King Charles II, Edinburgh, 1821, p. 216; [NRS], GD406/2/635/6. 32 Spotiswoode, Sir Robert, The Practicks of the Laws of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1706, p. vii; Stair, James Dalrymple, Viscount, The Decisions of the Lords of Council and Session, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1683 – 87, vol. 1, sig. A2r. Whether the judges were correct, or the advocates were right in complaining of undue influence, cannot be discovered from the records. What matters is that these claims were made at other times.

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The impression given is that advocates were less prone to this sort of activity in the 1660s, from which relatively little evidence survives of dissatisfaction with the administration of justice. It is consequently quite hard to explain why the most striking example of external regulation of the court’s procedure occurred at the end of that decade.33 In the summer of 1669 Charles II surprised his ministers by announcing his intention to set up a commission to examine the procedures followed in the supreme courts of Scotland, both civil and criminal.34 After an unpleasant experience of life in Scotland at the beginning of the 1650s, Charles had made a point of never returning to his northern kingdom, and nothing in the copious correspondence surviving from his reign suggests that he was reacting to written complaints he received from Scotland.35 The officer of state who might have been expected to keep him informed about difficulties arising in the administration of justice was the king’s advocate, but he appears to have been as surprised by the king’s announcement as everybody else.36 His response was to advise against the establishment of the commission and to propose instead that letters be directed to several senior judges ‘requiring them to meet by themselves, or to call to them such advocats or others they shal think fitt, and to advise what laws, acts or constitutions ar fitt to be moved in the enseuing parliament concerning the peopls rights, the administratione of justice, or regulation of proces and legal proceedings, and to draw them in acts to be presented to his majesties commissioner to be considered befor the parliament sitt’. The king, however, was determined to pursue a different course, and he granted commissions under the great seal to various statesmen and lawyers to draft new regulations for the courts.37 What set him on this course? One possibility is that he was mindful of the establishment of a similar commission by parliament in 1584 and aware that, despite the interventions outlined above, the procedure followed in the session had not been subjected to comprehensive review since 1532. This seems unlikely, however, since to know all this he would need to have taken advice from his Scottish ministers, which he clearly had not done. Another possibility is that he had heard about something

33 Mackay, A. J. G., A Memoir of Sir James Dalrymple, First Viscount Stair, Edinburgh, 1873, pp. 93 – 100; Omond, The Lord Advocates of Scotland, 3 vols., Edinburgh, 1883 – 1914, vol. 1, pp. 194 – 8; Ford, Law and Opinion in Scotland during the Seventeenth Century, pp. 336 – 42. 34 BL, Add. MS 23132, ff. 79 – 80 and 93; National Library of Scotland [NLS], MS 7003, f. 163, and MS 7023, f. 224. 35 Jones, J. R., Charles II: Royal Politician, Hemel Hempstead, 1987, pp. 11 – 32; Hutton, R., Charles the Second: King of England, Scotland and Ireland, Oxford, 1988, pp. 49 – 70; Miller, J., Charles II, London, 1991, pp. 9 – 10. 36 BL, Add. MS 23132, ff. 79 – 80. 37 Mackenzie, Sir George, Observations on the Acts of Parliament, Edinburgh, 1686, p. 445; Stair, James Dalrymple, Viscount, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1693, p. 542.

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happening at the time in France.38 Eager to emulate his cousin, Louis XIV, Charles was involved at the close of the 1660s in negotiations for a secret treaty with France, which would promise him the financial resources to rule without recourse to his parliaments, provided he converted to Catholicism.39 The ambassador he was dealing with was in fact the brother of the minister who had promoted and overseen a major reworking of civil procedure in France in 1667, and who was currently preparing a restatement of criminal procedure for enactment in 1670.40 The approach taken to producing what would come to be known as the Code Louis was to establish a commission of statesmen and lawyers who might seek advice from senior judges, rather than to instruct the judges themselves to report on their procedures. In other ways too, there are similarities between what was going on in France and Scotland, and while no direct evidence has been found to confirm that the king was intent on following the French example, given the secrecy of his negotiations this is not surprising.41 It may well be that Charles’ initiative was inspired by something the French ambassador told him. Although given an opportunity to become involved in the reform process towards the close of 1669, the estates were content to leave the matter to the commission appointed by the king. It is evident from the correspondence of some of the commissioners that they met fairly often, and they had a report ready by March 1670.42 Like the Code Louis, it was arranged in several series of numbered articles, with each series dealing separately with a different court, starting with the session.43 Within each series the method was to work through the stages of a typical court process, not providing a detailed and comprehensive restatement of every aspect of the established procedure but emphasising various aspects that had been found to require written regulation. To a large extent the report described and endorsed the existing procedures of the court, building on changes the judges had already made. For instance, several acts of sederunt had provided that actions must be called before the judges who heard them at first instance in the order in which the clerks entered them in the lists of ac-

38 Engelmann, A., A History of Continental Civil Procedure, Boston, 1927, pp. 708 – 47; Hamscher, A. N., The Parlement of Paris after the Fronde, 1653 – 73, Pittsburgh, 1976, pp. 155 – 95; Klimaszewska, A., The Ordinance of 1667: Ideology of Modern Codification as a Political Tool of Louis XIV, in: Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration and Economics, 5, 2015, pp. 128 – 40. 39 Lee, M., The Cabal, Urbana, Ill., 1965, pp. 101 – 12; Miller, J., After the Civil Wars: English Politics and Government in the Reign of Charles II, Harlow, 2000, pp. 200 – 1; Harris, T., Restoration: Charles II and His Kingdoms, 1660 – 85, London, 2005, pp. 71 – 2. 40 Picardi, N. (ed.), Code Louis, 2 vols., Milan, 1996. 41 Ford, Law and Opinion in Scotland during the Seventeenth Century, pp. 336 – 42. 42 Airy, O. (ed.), The Lauderdale Papers, 3 vols., London, 1884 – 85, vol. 2, pp. 177 – 8; BL, Add. MS 23133, ff. 20 and 24; NLS, MS 7023, ff. 236 and 238. 43 Articles for Regulating of the Judicatories, Edinburgh, 1670; Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1672/6/50; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 8, pp. 80 – 8.

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tions pending.44 Previously it had been the practice for the judges to hear actions in whatever order suited them, but this raised the suspicion that the order was being rigged to enable the judges to favour their ‘friends’.45 The thrust of these and other acts of sederunt was restated in the report, several provisions of which were designed to speed up the handling of cases. Small debt claims were to be remitted to lower courts, advocates were to produce written pleadings more promptly and deliver oral pleadings more briefly, and court terms were to be extended if business remained unfinished when they reached their prescribed end. The assumption evidently was that by regulating the session’s procedure it would be possible to control the way in which cases were handled and thus to ensure that justice was administered in the way it ought to be. It would be ensured that inordinate delays were avoided and that judges could not provide, or be accused of providing, preferential treatment to favoured litigants. As most of the provisions of the report were based on current court practice, it was only to be expected that lawyers would feel comfortable with its contents. Before the end of the year the report had been recorded on the king’s instructions in the books of sederunt of the College of Justice, whose members had been informed that their proceedings were now subject to the ‘rules sett downe by commissione from his majestie for regulating of the judicatures’.46 One part of the report was proving to be deeply controversial, however, since it provided for limits to be imposed on the fees advocates could demand from their clients.47 This part of the report was severely criticised, and the criticism gradually spilled over to undermine the reception of the report as a whole.48 Eventually it was decided that the report would need to be submitted for approval to a parliament that was held in 1672.49 When the estates gathered, an advocate who had been elected to attend complained: ‘Here is a volume of laws, to be past in one act, and such laws as, though they concern the forms of our procedure, and so can only be known to such as have experience, yet were invented and authorized by noblemen, whose birth and education cannot allow them to understand what was to be introduced or abrogated’.50 That a ‘volume of laws’ was to be passed in one act troubled the advocate, for there had never been an attempt to codify the procedure of the court before. That the laws proposed for enactment had been ‘invented and au44

Pinkerton, J. M. (ed.), The Minute Book of the Faculty of Advocates, 1661 – 1712, Edinburgh, 1976, pp. 5 – 6; Acts of Sederunt, 1553 – 1790, pp. 62 – 3 and 85 – 7; [NRS], CS1/6/ 1, p. 128. 45 Stair, Decisions of the Lords of Council and Session, vol. 1, sig. A1v; Mackenzie, Observations on the Acts of Parliament, p. 445. 46 NRS, CS1/6/1, pp. 320 – 31; Edinburgh University Library [EUL], La. III 354(1), f. 54. 47 NLS, MS 7004, ff. 91 and 121, and MS 7025, f. 30; Minute Book of the Faculty of Advocates, pp. 20 – 1; BL, Add. MS 23134, ff. 138 and 153; NRS, CS1/6/1, p. 334. 48 NLS, MS 7023, f. 253; BL, Add. MS 23134, f. 172; Mackenzie, Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland, pp. 213 – 16. 49 BL, Add. MS 23135, f. 168. 50 Mackenzie, Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland, pp. 234 – 8.

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thorized by noblemen’ troubled him even more. ‘Our old customs, here abrogated’, he warned, ‘were authorized by the lords of session, whom breeding enabled and whom only the law of our nation has intrusted with the regulation of forms’. He admitted elsewhere that he had exaggerated the extent to which existing laws were being abrogated on the advice of laymen as a way of making the whole report appear ‘ridiculous’.51 In reality, not only did most of the provisions the report contained reflect the current practice of the session, but in Scotland, unlike France, several judges had actually been appointed as members of the commission. Yet the advocate was striving to make a serious point in advancing the colourful contention that since ‘soldiers, salt and coal masters would think it impudence in such as are not bred up in their profession to prescribe orders for such as serve under it, it is strange why any, save learned lawyers, should adventure upon a task wherein even reason cannot discover what is fit’. As he recalled elsewhere: ‘It was thought strange how noblemen and gentlemen, who understood not form of process, could regulat incident diligences and the ordinary terms in reductions and improbation, which, with many other things specified in these regulations, were so much matter of form and were so little to be known by the strongest reason that the greatest lawyers did oft-times understand less of them than the ordinary leaders of processes’. Whether reproducing the terms of the speech he had delivered in parliament or restating its substance less rhetorically elsewhere, the advocate consistently claimed that procedural forms ‘can only be known by such as have experience’, as in this area ‘even reason cannot discover what is fit’, and there is ‘so little to be known by the strongest reason’. The ‘volume of laws’ that parliament was invited to enact was compared unfavourable with the ‘old customs’ that had emerged from the practice of the court. Clearly, one reason for the advocate’s opposition to the very idea of codifying the law was that he believed court procedure was best developed by trial and error, not by abstract reasoning. In remarking that the ‘greatest lawyers’ often had less understanding of procedural issues than ‘the ordinary leaders of processes’, he may have been thinking of the relationship between advocates like him, who presented legal arguments before the court, and the writers who prepared process papers and kept actions moving along. It appears that he was also thinking of the acknowledgement he had encountered in the works of university professors that court practitioners were the true masters of procedural law.52 Of course, it did not follow from the willingness of professors to trust practititioners that only the latter could be trusted to advise on court procedure, but the advocate was performing another sleight of hand here. As he made clear in another place, in speaking about the authorisation of procedural rules by the lords of session, ‘whom only the law of our nation has intrusted with the regulation of forms’, he was alluding to the act of parliament passed in 51 Mackenzie, Observations on the Acts of Parliament, p. 445. The term ‘breeding’ is used here in the sense of ‘upbringing’ or ‘training’, something in which noblemen who relied on ‘birth’ were lacking. 52 For instance, Mackenzie was familiar with Voet, Paulus, De statutis, eorumque concursu, liber singularis, Amsterdam, 1661, pp. 114 – 16.

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1540.53 ‘This same power’, he pointed out when commenting on that statute, ‘is almost allowed by all nations to their supream judicatures, Vin. Comment. ad §. 9 Inst. lib. 1. tit. 2, Christin. Vol. 2. Decis. 51. num. 8’.54 The truth is, however, that neither the wording of the 1540 act nor the practice of nations could have justified the claim that ‘only’ the lords of session had authority to regulate court procedure in Scotland. Despite the objections raised by the advocates, and even by one of the lords of session who had been a member of the commission, the new regulations were ratified by parliament.55 Parliament had for the first time passed a general act purporting to codify the regulation of the procedures followed in the College of Justice. Whatever the intention may have been when the College of Justice was founded in 1532, and whatever lawyers may have felt about this, it had been confirmed that the court’s procedures could be subjected to external regulation by the estates in parliament.

IV. Moderation of the College of Justice Far from increasing satisfaction with the administration of justice in the session, the effect of the 1672 act was to expose the lords of session to a relentless barrage of criticism throughout the remainder of the century.56 The advocates blamed the judges for the restrictions placed on their remuneration and in the next few decades lost no opportunity to complain about the way in which cases were handled. At one stage, indeed, after one of their number was condemned for attempting to appeal against a decision of the session to parliament, the advocates brought the proceedings of the court to a standstill for over a year by withdrawing their labour.57 One complaint was that there was frequently no discernible connection between the pleadings the advocates presented to the court and the decisions the judges delivered. The advocates would produce witnesses or other forms of evidence, and would present elaborate 53

Mackenzie, Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland, pp. 213 – 16. Mackenzie, Observations on the Acts of Parliament, p. 133. 55 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, M1672/6/16; Acts of the parliaments of Scotland, vol. 8, app., p. 19. 56 An Accompt of Scotlands Grievances by Reason of the Duke of Lauderdales Ministrie, n.p., 1674, pp. 20 – 1; Some Particular Matter of Fact Relating to the Administration of Affairs in Scotland, n.p., 1680, p. 4; Some Further Matter of Fact Relating to the Administration of Affairs in Scotland, n.p., 1680, p. 4; A Representation to the High Court of Parliament of Some of the Most Palpable Grievances in the Colledge of Justice, n.p., n.d; Maidment, J. (ed.), A Book of Scottish Pasquils, 1568 – 170, Edinburgh, 1868, pp. 218 – 21; NRS, GD406/2/635/3 and 14; NLS, MS 9375, ff. 7r – 10v. 57 Simpson, J. M., The Advocates as Scottish Trade Union Pioneers’, in: Barrow, G. W. S. (ed.), The Scottish Tradition, Edinburgh, 1974, p. 164; Jackson, C./Glennie, P., Restoration Politics and the Advocates’ Secession, 1674 – 76, in: Scottish Historical Review, 91, 2012, p. 76. If one reason for the attempt to introduce appeals against decisions of the session may have been the breakdown in relations between the bench and the bar of the court, another may have been the decline in ‘private writings’ described in Ford, Epistolary Control of the College of Justice in Scotland, elsewhere in this volume. 54

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legal arguments in relation to the issues raised, but all witnesses were examined in private, issues were discussed between the judges behind closed doors, and the outcome was a perfunctory statement of the decision reached, seldom more than a single sentence in length, from a clerk of the court.58 It was widely suspected that the decisions were based less on the factual evidence adduced and the legal arguments advanced than on the surreptitious influence parties were able to have on the judges. That the judges were not invariably appointed to the bench on the strength of their professional expertise added weight to the insinuation that their decisions were not invariably governed by the law.59 It was a recurring complaint that ‘persones are promoted to be lords of session who are no lawyers, or whose breeding and education did not in the least enable them for it’.60 From the exaggerated assertion that ‘the session is filled with most unfitt persones’, it was a short step to the more damaging assertion that ‘the members of it are either corrupt or ignorant’.61 In response to this line of criticism, two further attempts were made to reform the procedure of the court before the end of the century. In 1686, a year after James VII and II replaced his brother on the throne, the appointment of another ‘commission for regulation of judicatories’ was authorised by parliament.62 It was explained that the commissioners appointed by Charles II in 1669 had been unable, ‘through the shortness of tyme, fully to perfight and accomplish soe great and necessary a worke as the good and interest of the kingdome requires’. New commissioners were thus to be appointed, and were to be instructed ‘to take full and exact tryall of all abuses and other exorbitances or exactions which are practised in prejudice of his majesties lieges in any offices of judicature’. The commission was not actually put into effect, and it is conceivable that the intention was only to extend the reforms of 1669 to inferior courts, rather than to add further provisions in relation to the supreme courts. However, several other acts were passed in 1686 which show that reform of the session was back on the agenda. One provided that when a party to an action insisted on his opponent swearing to the veracity of an allegation under oath, a written statement of the allegation was to be promptly provided.63 A second act provided that when evidence was to be taken from witnesses, they were in future to be ‘examined in presence of the pairties or there advocats, they being present at the dyets of examination, and that their be publication of the testimonies of the witnesses in the clerks hands allowed to the parties gratis befor adviseing, to the effect pairties

58 That none of this was peculiar to the session as a learned court did not deprive the criticism of force before a lay audience. 59 NRS, 30/2126 and 157/1657; EUL, La. II 89, f. 139. 60 NRS, GD406/2/640/5. 61 NRS, GD406/2/635/6 and 16 – 17, and GD406/2/640/4; NLS, MS 7034, ff. 65 – 6. 62 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1686/4/47; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 8, pp. 599 – 600. 63 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1686/4/36; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 8, p. 595.

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may have copies thereof if they think fitt’.64 A third act required the statements of the court’s rulings issued to litigants by the clerks to be subscribed by the president.65 While the rulings would continue to be rather perfunctory, there would no longer be room for doubt about whether a clerk’s statement could be relied on as an accurate representation of what the court had decided. A fourth act made an alteration to the procedure for executing decreets, while two others dealt with the terms and vacations of the court.66 The last two acts were of a familar type, but on this occasion they formed part of a set of statutes aimed at further reform of the session. The acts about receiving testimony from witnesses and having rulings signed by the president addressed the complaints typically made by advocates. By requiring the judges to conduct their business more openly, and to commit themselves to written versions of their rulings, the estates exposed their practice to scrutiny and thus to the moderation of public opinion, as expressed especially by the advocates. The act about taking testimony from witnesses in open court brought about a major change in the procedure of the College of Justice after over a century and a half of contrary practice. The last attempt to reform the procedure of the session before the parliamentary union was made in 1693, after James VII was forcibly removed from his thrones and replaced jointly by his daughter Mary II and her husband William II and III. In a parliament held that year seven acts were passed in relation to the court’s procedure. One provided for the more expeditious summoning of defenders, and two others for the more expeditious delivering of decisions.67 It was stated explicitly that the concern behind these enactments was ‘the great delay of justice and expenses sustained by the lieges’. A fourth act reinforced the expectation that the judges would all spend time in hearing cases at first instance, which would expose the ignorance of those who knew no law as they would be on their own and unable simply to agree with what someone else had said.68 A fifth act required the clerks of the court to frame their minutes of each action in the presence of the advocates who had appeared, so that the advocates could be satisfied that their arguments were being recorded correctly.69 A sixth act provided that if any lords of session attempted to participate in votes of the whole court when they were supposed to be hearing cases at first instance, their absence from the first instance chamber of the court would be ‘a sufficient ground of decli64 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1686/4/46; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 8, p. 599. 65 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1686/4/19; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 8, pp. 585 – 6. 66 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1686/4/20-2; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 8, p. 586. 67 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1693/4/62 and 75-6; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 9, pp. 271 and 282 – 3. 68 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1693/4/77; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 9, p. 283. 69 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1693/4/78; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 9, p. 283.

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nator against them, competent to any of the parties that suspects them of partiality’.70 The seventh act brought about another major change. It began by declaring rather misleadingly that ‘the advising of causes with open doors is usuall in the soveraigne judicatories of other nations’, before adding that ‘the like practice here will be of advantage to the lieges’.71 On this understanding it was determined, subject to a few limited exceptions, that ‘in tyme comeing all bills, reports, debates, probations and others relating to processes shall be considered, reasoned, advised and voted by the lords of session with open doors, where parties, procurators and all others are hereby allowed to be present’. Although the president of the court predicted that in future ‘there will be much less reasoning amongst the lords than behoved to be formerly’, it became the standard practice for the deliberations of the court to be conducted publicly.72 If one result was that litigants and their professional representatives were able to see how the decisions delivered related to the pleadings they had presented, another was that the judges had to make sure that their decisions were related in a meaningful way to the pleadings they had received. Like the act on receiving testimony from witnesses in the presence of parties and lawyers, the act on deliberating about decisions with open doors exposed the court to the moderation of public opinion.

V. Preservation of the College of Justice When the commissioners appointed by the kingdoms of Scotland and England met to discuss terms for a closer union in 1706 they thus did so against the background of several significant interventions by the Scottish parliament in the development of the procedure of the College of Justice. When union commissioners had last met, in 1670, the traditional insistence on the preservation of the Scottish courts had been made without any need being felt to provide for the regulation of procedure by a British parliament.73 Although it was afterwards felt necessary for several acts to be passed in the late 1580s and early 1590s to deal with perceived ‘enormiteis, corruptionis and delayis usit in the sessioun’, it seems to have been accepted in 1670 that the lords of session could be relied on to regulate their own procedure. But it was at this moment that another attempt at external regulation gave rise to sustained criticism of the judges which did not ease up before the union commissioners met in 1706. Intent on making the traditional insistence on the preservation of their courts, the Scottish commissioners also considered that some form of external control of the session would need to be possible. It has been argued in another essay in this volume that 70

Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1693/4/79; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 9, p. 283. 71 Records of the Parliaments of Scotland, 1693/4/93; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 9, p. 305. 72 Stair, Institutions of the Law of Scotland (1693), p. 772. 73 Terry, C. S. (ed.), The Cromwellian Union, Edinburgh, 1902, p. 214.

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the use of private petitions to the monarch had largely been abandoned by this time in favour of the use of protestations to parliament for ‘remeid of law’.74 As the use of these protestations remained controversial, the commissioners deliberately left open the question of appeals being allowed from the session to the new British parliament. Mark Godfrey has argued elsewhere in this volume that the session was constantly subject to the scrutiny of the privy council, yet the Scottish privy council was not preserved by the Acts of Union, and was in fact dissolved within a year of their enactment.75 Rather than encourage a revival of private petitioning, or recommend the approval of an appeal process or insist on the preservation of their privy council, the Scottish commissioners instead added a qualification to the traditional insistence on the preservation of the session, providing that legislation could be enacted in the British parliament to regulate the procedure of the court.76 If interventions previously made by the Scottish parliament are any guide – and the thesis here is that they are – then the intention was for regulation of the court’s procedure to be engaged in as a means of ensuring that the judges administered justice in the way they were required to by their oaths of office.

74 Ford, Epistolary Control of the College of Justice in Scotland; see too Ford, J. D., Protestations to Parliament for Remeid of Law, in: Scottish Historical Review, 88, 2009, pp. 57 – 107. 75 Control and the Constitutional Accountability of the College of Justice in Scotland. 76 The Journal of the Proceedings of the Lords Commissioners of Both Nations in the Treaty of Union, Edinburgh, n.d., p. 26; Defoe, Daniel, The History of the Union of Great Britain, Edinburgh, 1709, pp. 56 – 7; Bruce, John, Report on the Events and Circumstances which Produced the Union of the Kingdoms of England and Scotland, 2 vols. London, 1799, pp. cccclxxiii – v; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol. 11, app., p. 175.

La Imagen de Fernando el Católico y la Justicia En la Literatura Histórica y Política (Siglos XVI – XVII) De Marina Rojo Gallego-Burín En este quasi divino oficio de Reyes, muchos uvo prudentes en España: (el contarlos, seria largo; el compararlos, odioso) però como el Rey Don Fernando el Catolico, ninguno. Felipe de Comines

El 23 de enero de 2016 se conmemoraba el quinto centenario de la muerte de Fernando II de Aragón, V de Castilla, rey de Sicilia, Nápoles, Cerdeña, Valencia, Mallorca y Navarra1. El Rey Católico es considerado como un monarca con “mala fortuna historiográfica”, tanto por parte de la literatura castellana como aragonesa. En Castilla se le subestimaba por su condición de aragonés, y en Aragón por la de castellano, al pertenecer a la dinastía de los Trastámara2.

I. La Justicia Durante el Reinado de los Reyes Católicos Cuando Isabel y Fernando llegaron al trono, encontraron una Castilla devastada por la guerra. Como afirmó Hernando del Pulgar, “no hay más Castilla, si no, más guerras habría”3. Son tiempos casi de anarquía. La unificación política sólo pudo alcanzarse imponiendo el orden, sometiendo a la nobleza, permitiendo el acceso de nuevos grupos sociales, regulando el comercio, codificando el idioma, asimilando o apartando a moros y judíos, y restituyendo la justicia4. Los Reyes Católicos fueron

1 Vid. Jaime Vicens Vives, Historia crítica de la vida y reinado de Fernando II de Aragón, edición de Miquel A. Marín Gelabert, Institución Fernando El Católico, Excma. Diputación de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, 2006. 2 Ricardo García Carcel, “Fernando el Católico y Cataluña”, en Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes, Alicante, 2006. Disponible digitalmente: http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obravisor/fernando-el-catlico-y-catalua-0/html/00ebc326-82b2-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_6.html. 3 Hernando del Pulgar, Epistolario español. Colección de cartas de españoles ilustres antiguos y modernos, por Eugenio de Ochoa, Imprenta de la Publicidad, Madrid, 1850, tomo I, p. 57. 4 Antonio Gallego y Burín, Isabel de Castilla, imprenta de Estades-Artes Gráficas, Madrid, 1957, p. 13.

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implacables contra todo aquel que atentara contra el Estado, al margen de su fe, estamento o jerarquía social5. En particular, vamos a referirnos a la administración de justicia, que bajo el reinado de los Reyes Católicos gozó del respeto de los súbditos6. La justicia fue precisamente una de sus prioridades. Así se advierte desde los inicios del reinado. Baste recordar la firma de la Concordia de Segovia en 1475 entre Fernando e Isabel, por medio de la cual regularon el gobierno, la justicia, el mando militar, la hacienda y el patronato eclesiástico7. En este pacto se comprometieron a que los asuntos judiciales fuesen resueltos de común acuerdo cuando estuviesen juntos, y por uno u otro si se hallasen separados. Es necesario también hacer referencia a otra fecha, 1480. Un año crucial en el reinado de los Reyes Católicos, pues a partir de entonces todo es organizado y reordenado. Un año en el que se celebran las Cortes de Toledo, donde “fueron ordenadas muchas buenas cosas; é comentadas, é declaradas muchas Leyes antiguas, y de ellas acrecentadas, é de ellas evacuadas; é fechas muchas pragmáticas provechosas al pró comun”8. Además se reforma el Consejo Real, por medio de las Ordenanzas de Toledo, convirtiéndose en el tribunal superior de justicia de la Corona de Castilla que asume unas competencias tan amplias como imprecisas. El gobierno de la justicia se deposita en manos de los letrados, pues en dichas Ordenanzas se dispone que el Consejo se compondría de: “vn perlado e tres caualleros e fasta ocho o nueue letrados, para que continuamente se junten los dias que fueren de facer consejo, e libren e despachen todos los negocios que en el dicho nuestro Consejo se ouieren de librar e despachar”9. Asimismo se disponía que los viernes de cada semana dos doctores o dos letrados del Consejo “vayan a las nuestras cárceles a entender e uer enlos fechos delos presos que enellas están e negocios que en ellas penden, assi ciuiles como creminales, juntamente con los nuestros alcaldes, e sepan dar razón de todo ello e fagan lo que fuere justicia breuemente”10. Por otra parte, la Audiencia y Chancillería se institucionaliza gracias a las Ordenanzas de Medina del Campo de 24 de marzo 1489, que constituyeron las normas esenciales de la justicia suprema en Castilla, y en 1494 se 5 Francisco Tomás y Valiente, El Derecho penal de la Monarquía absoluta (siglos XVI – XVIII), Tecnos, 1969, Madrid, pp. 28 – 30. 6 Benjamín González Alonso, “La justicia”, en Enciclopedia de Historia de España dirigida por Miguel Artola, Alianza Editorial, Barcelona, tomo II, pp. 343 – 420, maxime p. 379. 7 Manuel Pérez-Victoria de Benavides, Una Historia del Derecho, Gráficas Alhambra, Granada, 2003, p. 306. 8 Andrés Bernáldez, Historia de los Reyes Católicos D. Fernando y Da Isabel, imprenta que fue de J. M. Geofrin, Sevilla, 1870, tomo I, p. 121. 9 Ley 1 Ordenanzas de Toledo de 1480, en Salustiano de Dios de Dios, “Ordenanzas del Consejo Real de Castilla (1385 – 1490)”, Historia. Instituciones. Documentos, 7 (1980), pp. 269 – 320, maxime p. 306. 10 Ley 13 Ordenanzas de Toledo de 1480, en Salustiano de Dios de Dios, “Ordenanzas del Consejo Real de Castilla” cit., p. 308.

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crea la segunda Audiencia y Chancillería en Ciudad Real11, que por expreso deseo de Fernando e Isabel se traslada en 1505 a Granada, para que la ciudad “mas se ennoblesca e mejor se pueble”12. Al referirnos a Fernando el Católico es imprescindible aludir también a los reinos de la Corona de Aragón13, que en 1479 heredó de su padre, el rey Juan II. Las largas estancias de Fernando en tierras castellanas suscitaron la política que hubo de seguir en Aragón y justificaron las transformaciones operadas en la administración de justicia aragonesa. En ese sentido debe destacarse la creación de una Audiencia en cada uno de los reinos de la Corona: la de Cataluña, la de Aragón y la de Valencia.

II. Literatura Histórica Como afirmara Richard L. Kagan, “sólo la historia, la historia escrita, podía perdurar”14. En consecuencia, una fuente esencial para conocer el estado de la justicia durante el reinado de Fernando el Católico es la literatura cronística. No obstante, los testimonios aportados por los “evangelistas temporales”15 – como denomina su oficio uno de los cronistas anónimos de los Reyes Católicos – deben aceptarse con cautela, pues tienden a la hipérbole, cuando no a la hagiografía, aunque en ocasiones deslicen alguna crítica. La prevención hacia este tipo de literatura ya fue puesta de manifiesto por las Cortes de Valladolid de 1523, cuando los procuradores de las ciudades solicitan al Emperador que ordene corregir e imprimir una compilación de las crónicas de los reyes de Castilla: “Asy mismo somos informados que otro tanto se hizo de las ystorias y coronicas y grandes cosas y hazañas hechas por los rreyes de Castilla, de gloriosa memoria, y de las que hizieron en sus tiempos en guerra y en paz, y es bien que se sepa la verdad de las cosas pasadas, lo qual no se puede saber por otros libros privados que se lehen; por ende, suplicamos a vuestra Alteza mande saber la persona que tiene hecha la dicha copilaçion, y la mande corregir e ynprimir, porque será letura provechosa y apazible. A esto vos rrespondemos que está bien, y que asy se porná en obra”16. 11

Benjamín González Alonso, “La justicia” cit., p. 387. Vid. Carta Real de Merced a la Ciudad de Granada determinando la organización del Cabildo. Año de mil quinientos, Transcripción de Luis Moreno Garzón, Ayuntamiento de Granada, Granada, 2000, p. 6. 13 Vid. Jaime Vicens Vives, Política del Rey Católico en Cataluña, Destino, Barcelona, 1940. 14 Richard L. Kagan, Los cronistas y la Corona: La Política de la Historia en España en las Edades Media y Moderna, Centro de Estudio Europa Hispánica y Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2010, p. 73. 15 Crónica incompleta de los Reyes Católicos (1469 – 1476). Según un manuscrito anónimo de la época. Prólogo y notas de Julio Puyol, Real Academia de la Historia, Tipografía de Archivos, Madrid, 1934, p. 90. 16 Cortes de Valladolid de 1523, pet. 57, en Cortes de los Antiguos Reinos de Leon y de Castilla, publicadas por la Real Academia de la Historia, IV, impresores de la Real Casa, Madrid, 1882, pp. 382 – 383. 12

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Los cronistas presentan a los Reyes Católicos como descubridores de la faz de la justicia. El doctor Francisco Ortiz afirma que antes de su llegada al trono “la magestad venerable de las leyes había cubierto su faz”17. Las crónicas ponen de manifiesto la sombría situación que se vivía en los reinos de Castilla y León cuando los soberanos accedieron al trono: “ninguna justicia se guardava, los pueblos eran destruidos, los bienes de la corona enajenados, las rentas reales reducidas (…). Donde no solamente en los campos eran los hombres robados, mas en las çibdades e villas no podían seguros vivir: los religiosos y clérigos sin ningund acatamiento tractados. Eran viladas las iglesias, las mujeres forçadas, e a todos se dava suelta liçencia de pecar”18. Una constante de los cronistas es la insistencia en el carácter justiciero de Fernando el Católico. La figura del monarca siempre aparece vinculada a la justicia. Así, en la crónica del rey Enrique IV de Castilla, cuando se exponen las capitulaciones celebradas, hechas y juradas por los entonces príncipes Fernando e Isabel, se narra cómo el príncipe de Aragón juró obedecer al rey Enrique para “facer guardar la justicia é todos los buenos usos é costumbres de estos sus reynos é señoríos”19. Masuccio Salernitano escribe que cuando el monarca se hallaba en Valladolid, ordenó ejecutar a dos caballeros de su séquito por haber deshonrado a dos doncellas20. Y es que a tenor de las circunstancias arriba descritas, al decir de Hernando Pérez del Pulgar había que juzgar con dureza, severidad e igualitarismo. Los Reyes Católicos administraron una justa y serena justicia que “es aquella por dó los Reyes reinan”21. Pulgar describe a los Reyes Católicos como unos soberanos que por “su natural condición eran inclinados à facer justicia”22. Comenzaba este artículo con una aseveración de Felipe de Comines. Cuando el escritor francés de ascendencia flamenca describe los hechos y empresas de Luis XI y Carlos VIII de Francia, no duda en elogiar la figura del Rey Católico. Al referirse a la justicia, se cuestiona cuál es el número de jueces que precisa la República, reconociendo que se trata de una cuestión sobre la que no se atreve a pronunciarse, pues si son pocos, “no bastan al despacho” y si son muchos, resultan excesivos para 17

Antonio Gallego y Burín, Isabel de Castilla cit., p. 56. Mosén Diego de Valera, Crónica de los Reyes Católicos. Edición y Estudio por Juan de M. Carriazo, impresor José Molina, Madrid, 1927, p. 5. 19 Diego Enríquez Del Castillo, Crónica del Rey D. Enrique el Quarto de este nombre. Segunda edición, corregida por D. Josef Miguel de Flores, imprenta de D. Antonio de Sancha, Madrid, 1787, p. 260. 20 Álvaro Fernández de Córdoba Miralles, “La emergencia de Fernando el Católico en la Curia papal: identidad y propaganda de un príncipe aragonés en el espacio italiano (1469 – 1492)”, en Aurora EGIDO y José Enrique Laplana Gil (Coord.), La imagen de Fernando el Cató lico en la Historia, la Literatura y el Arte, Instituto Fernando El Católico, Zaragoza, 2014, pp.29 – 82, maxime p. 47. 21 Hernando del Pulgar, Epistolario español, cit., p. 44. 22 Hernando del Pulgar, Crónica de los señores Reyes Católicos Don Fernando y Doña Isabel de Castilla y de Aragón, en la imprenta de Benito Monfort, 1780, pp. 36 – 37. 18

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las Repúblicas, donde lo relevante es no tanto quien “se enriquezca, como quien la enriquezca” 23. Ello le induce a recomendar que los jueces conserven su autoridad con los grandes señores, tal y como hizo el rey Fernando, que “fue entre todos los de España el mas temido y respetado, no por los castigos grandes, sino con los Grandes”24. El jurista y cronista Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal pone de manifiesto la predilección que sentían Fernando e Isabel por la justicia: “amaron mucho la justicia y todo género de virtudes, honrando y favoreciendo con palabras y obras a los que las poseían”25. Por otra parte, Carvajal atribuye una personalidad magnánima a Fernando el Católico, pues alcanzó la victoria en la guerra civil, “una batalla pública y campal”26, que llevó a Isabel a alzarse con la corona de Castilla, y pese a ello otorgaron un “perdón general a los que fueron contrarios”27, aunque con ciertas condiciones. En opinión del cronista, fueron los Reyes Católicos quienes lograron el advenimiento de la justicia: “en poco tiempo allanaron y plantaron la justicia, andando por el reino de unas provincias en otras para que con su presencia temiesen los insolentes, y osasen pedir justicia los temerosos”28. Por su parte, el cronista Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo – paje del príncipe don Juan, que intervino en la conquista de Granada y se trasladó a las Indias en 1513 – asevera que el reinado de Fernando el Católico “fue un tiempo áureo de justicia e al que la tenía valíale”. El mismo autor describe el ceremonial de los juicios, recordando haber visto al rey y a la reina en el “Alcázar de Madrid (…), sentados públicamente por tribunal, dando audiencia a chicos e grandes cuantos querían pedir justicia, e a los lados, en el mismo estrado alto (…) estaba un banco de cada parte en que estaban sentados doce oidores del Consejo de la Justicia e el Presidente del dicho Consejo real e de pies estaba un escribano (…) que leía públicamente las peticiones e al pie estaba otro escribano (…) que en cada petición asentaba lo que se proveía. E, a los costados estaban de pies seis ballesteros de maza e a la puerta de la

23 Felipe de Comines, Las memorias de Felipe de Comines señor de Argenton de los hechos y empresas de Lvis Vndecimo y Carlos Octavo Reyes de Francia. Traducidas de frances con escolios propios por Don …, prior y provisor de Calatayud asesor del Sancto Officio y capellan a sv sobrino el Señor Don Ivan Vitrian presidente de la española, caballero del orden de Calatrava. Tomo segvndo, Amberes, en la Emprenta de Ivan Mevrsio, Año 1643, p. 108. 24 Ibid. 25 Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal, Anales breves del reinado de los Reyes Católicos D. Fernando y Doña Isabel, de gloriosa memoria, que dejó manuscritos el Dr. Galindez de Carvajal, de su Consejo y Cámara, y de la de los Reyes Doña Juana y D. Carlos, su hija y nieto, Correo mayor de los reinos del Perú etc., en Miguel Salvá/Pedro Sainz De Baranda, Colección de Documentos inéditos para la Historia de España, Madrid, imprenta de la viuda de Calero, tomo XVIII, pp. 227 – 237, maxime p. 229. 26 Ibid., p. 230. 27 Ibid., p. 235. 28 Ibid.

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Sala (…) los porteros que libremente dejaban entrar (…) a todos los que querían dar peticiones”29. Otro historiador que debe mencionarse es Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, quien se refirió a la predilección de los Reyes Católicos por los letrados para el gobierno de la justicia, definiéndolos críticamente como “gente media entre los grandes y pequeños (…) cuya profesión eran letras legales, comedimiento, secreto, verdad, vida llana y sin corrupción de costumbres; no visitar, no recibir dones, no profesar estrecheza de amistades; no vestir, ni gastar suntuosamente, blandura y humanidad en su trato, juntarse á horas señaladas para oir causas, ó para determinallas, y tratar del bien publico”30. Tiempo después, el Conde Duque de Olivares evocaría en el Gran Memorial las palabras de Hurtado de Mendoza, reafirmando cómo desde el reinado de los Reyes Católicos quedó el Consejo Real integrado principalmente por letrados, ejemplo que había seguido Felipe II y que debía continuar Felipe IV, pues para Olivares don Fernando había sido “Rey de Reyes”. Una crónica anónima – aunque atribuida por Galíndez de Carvajal al historiador Alonso Flórez31 – insiste en la inclinación a la justicia que demostraron los Reyes Católicos, sin parangón con ninguno de sus antecesores. De ahí que desde los comienzos de su reinado se rodeasen de los más ilustres letrados, tales como los doctores Rodrigo Maldonado de Talavera, Alonso de Paz, García López y Alcocer. Entre ellos sobresalía Rodrigo Maldonado, “grand letrado demasiadamente y ombre de muy alto consejo, grandísimo plático y retórico, grand orador en latin y romance”32. Por tan soberanas gracias y habilidades, tanto el rey como la reina confiaron en él el gobierno y los asuntos más relevantes del consejo secreto, del público y de la justicia. Escribe el anónimo cronista que era tal la confianza depositada en Talavera, que los Reyes sólo firmaban lo que les indicaba aquel letrado. Por otra parte, la crónica alude al perdón general concedido “a todos los malechores y omizianos”33, por todos los delitos cometidos con anterioridad a la llegada al trono de los monarcas: “para saneamiento de sus conçiençias y bien destos Reynos (…) fue determinado que se pregonase un perdón general hasta aquel dia excebto en ciertos casos”34. El autor expone por último cómo tras la guerra de sucesión que hizo posible que Isabel se convirtiera en reina de Castilla, los soberanos aplicaron una severa justicia: “el rey y la reyna non quesieron por 29 Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, Batallas y Quinquagenas, en Diego Clemencín, Elogio de la reina católica Doña Isabel, imprenta de Sancha, Madrid, 1820, quincuagena III, estancia II, p. 202. 30 Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Guerra de Granada, Maxtor, Valladolid, 2005, p. 8. 31 Crónica incompleta de los Reyes Católicos (1469 – 1476). Según un manuscrito anónimo de la época. Prólogo y notas de Julio Puyol, Real Academia de la Historia, Tipografía de Archivos, Madrid, 1934. 32 Ibid., pp. 139, 149. 33 Ibid., p. 179. 34 Ibid., p. 175.

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entonces que la execuçion de la justicia oviese floxura nin ningund caso criminal se perdonase avnque personas y Reynos perdiesen”35. Por contraste, la literatura aragonesa y catalana coetánea y posterior al reinado del Rey Católico no se singulariza por un espíritu fernandino36, siendo mucho menos profusa en elogios al soberano. Prueba de ello es la obra De origine ac rebus gestis regum Hispaniae, publicada en 1553 por el historiador y archivero de la catedral de Barcelona Francesc Tarafa, donde pergeña una breve semblanza del Fernando37. Por su parte, el cronista mayor del reino de Aragón Jerónimo de Zurita y Castro escribe que, tras la conquista del reino de Granada, los Reyes Católicos atendieron “con gran cuidado, a que se reformasen con vtilidad publica las leyes antiguas, y se estableciessen de nueuo las que entendian ser necessarias para la pacificacion, y buen gouierno de sus Reynos”38. Asimismo pone de manifiesto, como ya hicieran escritores anteriores, que “hazian elección de personas muy aprobadas para los cargos, y regimiento de los Pueblos, segun entendian, que en experiencia, y bondad merecian ser preferidos”39. En definitiva, tras la conquista de Granada, “las cosas del gouierno, y de la justicia se ordenaron con vna santa rectitud, è igualdad, y se puso freno a la soltura, y licencia, que duraua desde los tiempos que començaron a reinar”40.

III. Literatura Política Los Austrias se consideraron continuadores de la política de Fernando el Católico. Narra Baltasar Gracián cómo Felipe II, en el Escorial, ante el retrato de su bisabuelo se inclinaba reverencialmente y exclamaba: “A este lo debemos todo”41. El escritor aragonés añade que “cada uno de los dos [la reina Isabel y el rey Fernando] era para hazer un siglo de Oro, y un Reynado felicissimo; quanto mas entrambos juntos”42. De hecho, ambos monarcas, aunque más Fernando que Isabel, se convirtieron en un símbolo mitificado durante los siglos XVI y XVII. Fueron 35

Ibid., p. 142. Ricardo García Carcel, “Fernando el Católico y Cataluña” cit. 37 Francisci Taraphæ, De origine, ac rebus gestis Regum Hispaniæ liber, multarum rerum cognitione refertus, Antverpiæ, in Ædibus Ionnis Steelfii, cum priuilegio cæsareo, 1553, pp. 195 – 199. 38 Jerónimo Zurita, Historia del Rey Don Hernando El Catolico. De las empresas, y ligas de Italia: compvestos por …, chronista del Reyno de Aragon, impressos en C¸aragoça: por los Herederos de Pedro Lanaja, y Lamarca, Impressores del Reyno de Aragon, dela Vniversidad, año 1670, a costa del mismo Reyno, f. 8r. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Baltasar Gracián, El político D. Fernando el Catholico, de …, que publica Vincencio Ivan de Lastanosa, con licencia en Huesca, por Iuan Nogues, año 1646, en casas de Juan Blaeu, Amsterdam, 1659, p. 93. 42 Ibid., p. 90. 36

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venerados por ser los últimos reyes españoles de España, pues después advendría al trono la dinastía de los Habsburgo. Durante los llamados siglos áureos, vieron la luz algunas biografías de Fernando el Católico, como la de Juan Blázquez Mayoralgo43, un tratado donde resume la vida del rey: “viuio sesenta y quatro años que guerreò quarenta, que conquistó a Napoles, que se apoderó de Nabarra, que gano a Granada, que hizo obedientes los mayores Reyes de la Africa, que sujetò las Indias, que guardó las leyes, y defendió la Iglesia, entonces asombro de la fama por las vitorias y ahora escarmiento de las Coronas por las ceniças”44. La literatura de ficción también se hizo eco del halo sagrado que envolvía a Fernando el Católico. Así sucede en el teatro de Lope de Vega, en Garcilaso, o en Agustín de Tejada y Páez, cuya poesía heroica evoca cómo por su gran virtud el monarca alcanzó la inmortalidad de su nombre45. Lope presenta a Fernando como prototipo del rey justo46, que en Fuente Ovejuna toma la última palabra para resolver el conflicto47. A él se referirá también en El mejor mozo de España48. A Fernando el Católico se le atribuye la fundación de la monarquía y la creación del Estado. No será hasta el siglo XIX cuando su imagen se vea oscurecida por la de la reina Isabel. A lo largo de los siglos XVI y XVII una plétora de tratados ensalzan la figura del rey de Aragón, convirtiéndole en paradigma de héroe militar y buen gobernante. Recurriendo a los dicta et facta fernandinos, los tratadistas dibujan la imagen de un rey en quien habían confluido todas las virtudes: más piadoso que Eneas, más esforzado que Hércules, y más aguerrido que Alejando Magno49. La llegada al trono de los Reyes Católicos se entendió como el advenimiento de un tiempo nuevo, el comienzo de una Edad de Oro. Como afirmó Pedro Ciruelo, nunc igitur rediit aurea aetas. El Padre Mariana escribe que fueron ellos, tras la 43

Juan Blázquez Mayoralgo, Perfecta raçon de Estado. Dedvcida de los hechos de el señor Rey Don Fernando el Catholico Quinto de este nombre en Castilla, y Segundo en Aragón contra los políticos atheistas, Escribiola a la Magestad Avgusta de el Rey Don Phelipe Quarto nuestro Señor, Don …, su Contador de la Nueua Ciudad de Veracruz, en los Reynos de la Nueua España, y Veedor de su Real hazienda, con licencia del Excelellentisimo Señor Conde de Saluatierra Virrey desta Nueua España, por Francisco Robledo, impresor del Secreto del Santo Officio, Mexico, 1646. 44 Ibid., lib. XIV, f. 194r. 45 Agustín de Tejada y Páez, “A los Reyes Católicos Don Fernando y Doña Isabel”, en Poesías completas (El esplendor de la lírica antequerana). Estudio, edición y notas de Jesús M. Morota, Create Space Independent Publishing Platform, Granada, 2013, p. 198. 46 Vid. Manuel Gallego Morell, El proceso de Fuenteovejuna (En la Historia y en la Literatura), Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación de Granada, Granada, 1994. 47 Luis Sánchez Lailla, “La imagen de Fernando el Católico en las letras barrocas de Lope de Vega a Baltasar Gracián” en La imagen de Fernando el Católico cit., pp. 201 – 234, maxime p. 202. 48 Vid. Manuel Alvar, “El mejor mozo de España para una infanta de Castilla”, en Nebrija y estudios sobre la Edad de Oro, CSIC, Madrid, 1997, pp. 437 – 455. 49 Teresa Jiménez Calvante, “Fernando el Católico: un héroe épico con vocación mesiánica” en La imagen de Fernando el Católico cit., pp. 131 – 170, maxime p. 131.

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conquista del reino de Granada, quienes pusieron “en su punto” la justicia, hasta entonces “estragada y caída”50, y “publicaron leyes muy buenas para el gobierno de los pueblos y para sentenciar los pleitos”51. El rey Fernando es presentado como el protagonista de todas las obras del reinado52. Asimismo, Maquiavelo afirma de él que “de simple rey de un Estado débil este príncipe ha llegado a ser, a causa de todo cuanto ha hecho de grande, el primer rey de la cristiandad. (…). Si se examinan sus acciones, se las encontrará todas llenas de grandeza, y algunas incluso (…) extraordinarias”53. El mismo Francisco de Quevedo sucumbió también a la admiración por el rey Fernando. Cuando en 1621 escribe a Baltasar de Zúñiga, reproduce una carta dirigida por el soberano al conde de Ribagorza, virrey de Nápoles, sobre la jurisdicción del papa Julio II. Quevedo glosa la misiva, cuyo comentario se califica como “el acta de consagración del regalismo español”54. En palabras de Quevedo, “este gran rey (…) confesólo y diólo a entender, que la persona de don Fernando tiene hijos y hermanas y parientes; mas que el cargo de rey y la justicia son huérfanos en la tierra, y sin descendencia y sucesión de sangre”55. En la segunda parte de La primera parte de la Vida de Marco Bruto56, Quevedo reproduce diferentes epístolas del monarca referidas a cuestiones políticas, afirmando que ni Jerónimo Zurita, ni Jovio tuvieron noticia de ellas. Para el señor de la Torre de Juan Abad, Fernando el Católico es el mejor ejemplo de rey para Felipe IV, y modelo de soberano conocedor de traiciones y conjuras: “este Rey miraua, por si consigo mismo, quien via su letra juzgaua, que no sabia escriuir quien la leia, que el solo sabia leer, y merecia ser leído. Pensaua con tantos consejos, como potencias: no empereçaua las determinaciones con bachillerías estudiadas, o induzidas, lograualas con atencion toda real: sabia disumular lo que temia, y temer lo que disimulaua”57. Para Quevedo, dar crédito a los celos políticos es algo obligado en 50 Juan De Mariana, Historia de España, en Biblioteca de autores españoles. Obras del Padre Juan de Mariana, M. Rivadeneyra, Madrid, 1854, tomo II, lib. XXV, cap. XVIII, p. 239. 51 Ibid. 52 Joseph Pérez, “La memoria de los Reyes Católicos en los siglos XVI y XVII”, en La imagen de Fernando el Católico cit., pp. 119 – 130, maxime pp. 119 – 120. 53 Nicolás Maquiavelo, El príncipe, Ediciones Ibéricas, Madrid, 1971, p. 191. 54 Ángel Ferrari, Fernando el Católico en Baltasar Gracián, presentación de Gonzalo Anes/ Álvarez De Castrillón/Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, 2006, p. 43. 55 Francisco de Quevedo, “Carta del rey don Fernando el Católico al primer virrey de Nápoles; cuyo original está en el Archivo de Nápoles, comentada por Don Francisco de Quevedo Villegas”, en Obras serias de D. F. de Quevedo y Villegas, Librería de Garnier Hermanos, Paris, 1881, pp. 115 – 125, maxime p. 124. 56 Francisco de Quevedo, Primera parte de la vida de Marco Brvto. Escriuiola por el Texto de Plutarco, ponderada con Discursos, Don …, Cauallero de la Orden de Santiago, señor de la Villa de la Torre de Iuan Abad. Dedicada al excelentísimo Señor Duque del Infantado, por Diego Diaz de La Carrera, Madrid, 1644. 57 Ibid., f. 100v.

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el oficio de reinar. De ahí que el Rey Católico se trasladara a Italia para llevarse él mismo a tierras castellanas a Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, el Gran Capitán, por los rumores de que pretendía alzarse con el reino de Nápoles. Según Baltasar Gracián, Fernando “fue Rey Rey”. El autor de El Criticón dedica al monarca numerosos adjetivos elogiosos para describir su personalidad: “Catholico, Valeroso, Magno, Politico, Sabio, Amado, Iusticiero, Feliz, y universal Heroe”58. Para Gracián es el paradigma: “opongo un rey a todos los pasados; propongo un rey a todos los venideros: don Fernando el Catholico, aquel gran Maestro del arte de reinar, el Oráculo mayor de la razón de Estado”59. En la obra del jesuita aragonés, las alabanzas al monarca se suceden desde su primer tratado – escrito bajo el pseudónimo de Lorenzo – en el que construye el hombre perfecto, El Heroe, y se refiere a Fernando II de Aragón como “aquel gran Rey primero del Nuevo Mundo, ultimo de Aragon, sino el Non plus ultra de sus heroicos Reyes”60. El eclesiástico y político Juan de Palafox y Mendoza afirmaba que en el rey Fernando florecieron “la parsimonia, la reputación de las armas, su ejercicio disciplinado, escusar superfluidades, hacer buenas leyes, y egecutarlas con precisión. Finalmente, hacer la justicia temida en la paz, y la Nacion Española en la guerra. (…). El gran restaurador de la Monarquia Goda”61. Otro cronista mayor del reino de Aragón, Jerónimo Blancas, bosqueja la figura del vigésimo quinto rey de Aragón, de quien afirma puede y debe ser considerado como el padre de la patria: “Et possit et debeat pater patriæ, vigilantissimus benignissimus, prudens, optimus”62. Blancas resume la personalidad del monarca, apuntando una biografía, desde que el 22 de enero de 1479 sucediera en el trono a su padre y jurase un año más tarde en la catedral de Zaragoza, en poder del Justicia de Aragón, la observancia de los Fueros y libertades del reino. Por otra parte, destaca su generosidad, al no reclamar su derecho al trono de Castilla en beneficio del de Isabel, como le exigían algunos nobles. Destaca las empresas bélicas que impulsó, entre las que sobresalen la conquista de Granada, el descubrimiento de las Indias Occidentales, así como la defensa de la fe católica, pero sus logros sólo fueron el 58

Baltasar Gracián, El político cit., p. 100. Ibid., dedicatoria. 60 Lorenzo Gracián, El heroe. En esta impression nuevamente corregido, en casa de Juan Blaeu, Amsterdam, 1659, p. 9. 61 Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, Obras del ilustrissimo, excelentissimo, y venerable siervo de Dios Don Juan de Palafox y Mendoza. Tratados varios. Dictámenes espirituales, y políticos: Diálogo político del estado de Alemania: Sitio, y socorro de Fuente Rabia: De la Naturaleza del Indio: Conquista de la China y Ortografia, imprenta de Don Gabriel Ramirez, Madrid, 1762, tomo X, p. 37. 62 Jerónimo de Blancas, Inscripciones latinas a los retratos de los reyes de Sobrarbe, Condes antiguos, y Reyes de Aragón, puestos en la Sala Real de la Diputación de la Ciudad de Zaragoça. Contienen una breve noticia de las heroicas acciones de cada uno, tiempo en que florecieron, y cosas tocantes a sus Reynados, por los Herederos de Diego Dormer, Zaragoza, 1680, p. 386. 59

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fruto de anteponer la justicia y la honestidad a su propio beneficio, situando el fundamento de la justicia “en la constancia, y firmeza en las palabras, y mucho más en las obras”63. Otros autores, por su parte, resaltan la actuación de los Reyes Católicos como legisladores. Tal es el caso del jurista e historiador granadino Francisco Bermúdez de Pedraza (1576 – 1655)64, quien en el primer tratado para la enseñanza del Derecho escrito en castellano, destaca que fueron ellos quienes mandaron redactar al doctor Alonso Díaz de Montalvo el Ordenamiento Real, en opinión de Bermúdez de Pedraza, una recopilación oficial. Del mismo modo ordenaron las Leyes de Toro (promulgadas por su hija Juana)65. Sin embargo, el jurista e historiador granadino no hace alusión alguna al proyecto recopilador que Fernando el Católico, en cumplimiento del mandato recogido en el codicilo testamentario de la reina Isabel, encargó a Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal66.

IV. Literatura Emblemática y de Empresas La literatura emblemática se ocupó asimismo de la figura de Fernando el Católico. Paulo Giovio trazó la semblanza del rey en varios de sus tratados67, ensalzando su virtud, definiéndole como “amador vnico de justicia”68, y atribuyendo a sus buenas leyes y prudencia política haber logrado terminar con los males intrínsecos que padecía la Monarquía, hasta convertirla en el reino más primordial de la Cristiandad. En 1492, y a petición de los Reyes Católicos, el gran humanista Elio Antonio de Nebrija – que publicó, ese mismo año, su Arte de la lengua castellana – ideó los emblemas regios, el yugo y las flechas. Tales emblemas pueden interpretarse como una referencia a la virtud de la justicia. El yugo de Fernando es un signo del castigo para los súbditos rebeldes, como eran los nobles alzados contra Isabel en la guerra de sucesión castellana de 1474 – 1479; era un modo de advertir que quien no se 63

Ibid., p. 419. Vid., Marina Rojo Gallego-Burín, El pensamiento jurídico y politico de Francisco Bermúdez de Pedraza (1576 – 1655), Marcial Pons, 2018. 65 Francisco Bermúdez de Pedraza, Arte legal para el estvdio de la iurisprudencia. Nuevamente corregido y añadido en esta segvnda edición con la declaracion de las rubricas de los diez y seis libros del Emperador Iustiniano, por Francisco Martínez, Madrid, 1633, p. 70. 66 Vid. José Antonio López Nevot, “Los trabajos perdidos: el proyecto recopilador de Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal”, AHDE, 80 (2010), pp. 325 – 346, y María José MARÍA E IZQUIERDO, Los proyectos recopiladores castellanos del siglo XVI en los códices del Monasterio de El Escorial, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, 2014. 67 Paulo Giovio, Dialogo de las empresas militares y amorosas, traducción de Alonso de Vlloa, por Gabriel Givlito de Ferrarris, Venezia, 1558, p. 29. 68 Paulo Giovio, Elogios o vidas breues, de los Caualleros antiguos y modernos, Illuestres en valor de guerra, que están al biuo pintados en el Museo de Paulo Iouio. Traducción de Gaspar de Baeça, en casa de Hugo de Mena, Granada, 1568, f. 129r. 64

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sometiera por las buenas (bajo el yugo) recibiría las saetas por las malas69. Juan de Orozco, en sus Emblemas morales (1589), se refiere a este lema bajo la inscriptio Parcere subiectis et Debellare superbos (figura 1), perdonar a los vencidos y combatir a los soberbios. Pues la justicia y la paz se alcanzarán y mantendrán castigando a los insolentes y soberbios, y tratando con clemencia a los humildes70.

Figura 1: Juan de Orozco, Emblemas morales

Sin embargo, ya con anterioridad Fernando utilizaba como emblema el yunque con la divisa: “como yunque sufro y callo, por el tiempo en que me hallo”71. Juan de Solórzano en sus Emblemas centra su atención en el Rey Católico y en ese yunque, dedicándole el emblema 4472, Ceder al tiempo (figura 2), donde presenta al rey 69

Sagrario López Poza, “Fernando El Católico en la emblemática y en el pensamiento político del siglo XVII”, en La imagen de Fernando el Católico cit., pp. 235 – 278, maxime p. 237. 70 Juan de Horozco y Covarrubias, Emblemas morales, por Juan de la Cuesta, Segovia, 1589, libro II, f. 32v. 71 El cronicón de Valladolid relata cómo el 3 de abril de 1475 se celebró una justa en la ciudad de Valladolid en la que participaron el rey Fernando y, entre otros, los duques de Alba y Alburquerque y los condes de Benavente y de Salinas, y a la que asistió la propia reina. En dicha justa Fernando portaba en el yelmo una bigornia y “sacó (…) una letra” en que decía: como yunque sufro y callo, por el tiempo en que me hallo. Vid. El cronicón de Valladolid ilustrado con notas por el Dr. D. Pedro Sainz de Baranda, imprenta de la viuda de Calero, Madrid, 1848, pp. 92 – 94. 72 Juan de Solórzano Pereira, Decada Qvinta de los Emblemas de D…, Cavallero de la Orden de Santiago, del Consejo de su Magestad en el Real de Castilla, y Indias. Traducidos

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como quien restituyó la Monarquía. Y dibuja también el yunque como una alusión a la justicia, pues aunque el rey soportó los golpes de sus adversarios e incluso los de sus súbditos, sólo sería yunque a la espera de poder castigar a quienes le habían ofendido, para una vez convertido en martillo, devolver el golpe.

Figura 2: Juan de Solórzano, Emblemas

Esta interpretación fue objeto de crítica por parte de algunos autores como Juan de Orozco, quien afirmó que no “era tan propia a tan gran Principe”73. Considera que dicha conducta no es la más ajustada a un monarca titulado de católico. Aunque Solórzano discrepa de ese razonamiento, pues no es equiparable la justicia cuando la ejerce un rey o una persona particular. El emblema del yunque aparece también en la obra más importante de la literatura emblemática castellana74, los Emblemas morales de Sebastián de Covarrubias. En este tratado aparece con el lema Sustine et abstente, sufre y calla, pero sin hacer ninguna mención al Rey Católico, aunque declara que se trata de un mensaje por el Dotor Lorenço Mateu y Sanz, Cavallero de la Orden de Montesa, del Consejo de su Magestad en la Real Chancilleria de Valencia. De orden del Excelmo. Señor D. Luis Guillen de Moncada y Aragon, Principe, Duque de Montalto, y Bivona, Cavallero de la Orden de Tuson, &c. Virrey y Capitan General del Reino de Valencia, á quien se dedica, en Valencia, por Bernardo Nogues, junto al molino de Rovella, 1659, pp. 78 y ss. 73 Juan de Horozco y Covarrubias, Emblemas morales cit., libro I, f. 45r. 74 Juan de Dios Hernández Miñano, Los emblemas morales de Sebastián de Covarrubias. Iconografía y doctrina de la Contrarreforma, Universidad de Murcia, Murcia, 2015, p. 17.

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al que se refirió Aulio Gelio en sus Noches Áticas, y que es preciso interpretar como que en la “aduersidad hemos de tener tolerancia, y en la prosperidad moderacion y tolerancia”75. Los emblemas reales del yugo, las flechas y el yunque aparecen en diversos tratados barrocos. Así sucede, por ejemplo, en el primer libro de empresas políticas publicado en España, obra de Francisco Gómez de la Reguera76, quien dedicó a Fernando dos de sus empresas (figura 3)77.

Figura 3: Francisco Gómez de la Reguera, Empresas de los Reyes de Castilla y León

Emblemas dedicados al Rey Católico encontramos también en la obra del padre Andrés Mendo, quien destaca la preocupación que Fernando e Isabel compartían por la justicia. Su oficio implicaba hacer juicio y justicia, y por ello observaron la

75 Sebastián de Covarrubias y Orozco, Emblemas morales de D…, Capellan del Rey N. S., Maestrescuela, y Canonigo de Cuenca, Consultor del santo Oficio. Dirigidas a Don Francisco Gomez de Sandoual y Roxas, Duque de Lerma, Marques de Denia, Sumiller de Corps, Cauallerizo mayor del Rey N. S., Comendador mayor de Castilla, Capitan General de la caualleria de España, con privilegio, en Madrid, por Luis Sanchez, 1610, centvria III, emblema 78, f. 78. 76 Francisco Gómez de la Reguera, Empresas de los reyes de Castilla y de León, Edición crítica de César Hernández Alonso, Universidad de Valladolid, Valladolid, 1990, pp. 139 – 153. 77 El autor lo escribió en torno a 1629, por encargo del Cardenal Infante, don Fernando de Austria, aunque no se publicara hasta 1991. Vid. Nieves Pena Sueiro, “Las fuentes del primer libro de empresas políticas en España” en Studia Aurea: Revista de Literatura Española y Teoría Literaria del Renacimiento y Siglo de Oro, 2015, pp. 461 – 482.

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ley de Alfonso XI78 con la Audiencia de los Viernes. Mendo recomienda al rey que “no dexe de obrar, lo que conviene, por la murmuración del vulgo, que son sus ladridos de gozquezo”. El autor propone a Fernando como ejemplo para ello, pues tras dar fuerzas a la justicia y tribunales, consiguió ser “aplaudido dignamente por Principe digno de fama inmortal”79. Por último, aludiremos a uno de los escritores políticos más importantes del Barroco: Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, quien no deja de expresar su admiración por el Rey Católico. Así lo hace en dos de sus obras: Introducción a la Política y Razón de Estado del Rey Católico Don Fernando, texto que más tarde desarrollaría en Idea de un príncipe político christiano. Las referencias a Fernando El Católico se suceden a lo largo de la obra, pero su relación con la justicia se pone especialmente de manifiesto en dos de las empresas, la XXI y la XXII, Regit et corrigit y Præsidia maiestatis, respectivamente. En la primera de ellas se refiere al rey Fernando como legislador, pues junto a la reina Juana confirmaron la disposición del rey Alfonso XI que ordenaba que los jueces resolvieran los pleitos aplicando las leyes castellanas y no el Derecho romano80. Asimismo, Saavedra Fajardo incluye a los Reyes Católicos en una relación de soberanos – los emperadores romanos Tito y Vespasiano, Carlos V, el rey Pedro de Portugal, Jaime I de Aragón y Luis XI de Francia –81 que se preocuparon por el estilo de los tribunales y la duración de los pleitos. En la empresa XXII, el autor se refiere a la actuación del rey para castigar los delitos. Saavedra expone cómo el hecho de que los soberanos impartieran justicia servía de ejemplo al pueblo en tiempos turbulentos, cuando no se tenía temor ni a la ley ni a los tribunales. Narra el autor cómo Fernando, “hallándose en Medina del Campo, pasó secretamente a Salamanca y prendió a Rodrigo Maldonado, que en la fortaleza de Monleón hacía grandes tiranías”. Y se pregunta: “¿Quién se atrevería a quebrantar las leyes si siempre temiese que le podía suceder tal caso?”82. Para 78 “Que el rey tenga consulta ordinaria de justicia y mercedes. Porqve los negocios de nuestros súbditos, y naturales sean mejor y mas breuemente despachados, tenemos por bien de hazer consultas ordinarias, como los catholicos reyes nuestros padres y aguelos hizieron, y assi mesmo nos disponemos a hazer consulta de mercedes quando conuiniere, teniendo respecto a la buena expedición de los negocios, y que la nuestra silla real este aparejada en las dichas consultas”. (Recopilación de las Leyes destos Reynos, hecha por mandado de la Magestad Catolica del Rey don Felipe Segundo nuestro señor; que se he mandado imprimir, con las leyes que despues de la ultima impression se han publicado, por la Magestad Catolica del Rey don Felipe Quarto el Grande nuestro señor, Año 1640, En Madrid. Por Catalina de Barrio y Angulo. Y Diego Diaz de la Carrera (=NR) (2.2.3). 79 Andrés Mendo, Principe perfecto y ministros ajusticiados, docvmentos políticos, y morales, a costa de Horacio Boissat y George Revs, en Leon de Francia, 1662, p. 99. 80 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, Idea de un príncipe político christiano. Rapresentada en cien empresas. Dedicada al príncipe de las Españas Nuestro Señor por Don …, Cauallero del Orden de Santiago del Consejo de su Magestad en el supremo de las Indias i su Embajador Plenipotenciario en los Treze Cantones, en la Dieta Imperial de Ratisbona por el Circulo, i Casa de Borgona, i en el Consejo de Munster para la Paz General, Monaco 1640, Milán 1642, p. 140. 81 Ibid., p. 142. 82 Ibid., p. 147.

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Saavedra, Fernando es el arquetipo de rey. Concluye su obra con el siguiente elogio: “[Fernando el Católico] mezcló la liberalidad con la parsimonia, la benignidad con el respeto, la modestia con la gravedad y la clemencia con la justicia. Amenazó con el castigo de pocos a muchos, y con el premio de algunos cebó las esperanzas de todos. Perdonó las ofensas hechas a la persona, pero no a la dignidad real. Vengó como propias las injurias a sus vasallos, siendo padre de ellos. Antes aventuró el Estado que el decoro. (…). Se hizo amar y temer. Fue facil en las audiencias (…). Vivió para todos y murió para sí, quedando presente en la memoria de los hombres para ejemplo de los príncipes, y eterno en el deseo de sus reinos”83. Fuentes Históricas y Políticas Bermúdez de Pedraza, Francisco, Arte legal para el estvdio de la iurisprudencia. Nuevamente corregido y añadido en esta segvnda edición con la declaracion de las rubricas de los diez y seis libros del Emperador Iustiniano, por Francisco Martínez, Madrid, 1633. Bernaldez, Andrés, Historia de los Reyes Católicos D. Fernando y Da Isabel, imprenta que fue de J.M. Geofrin, Sevilla, 1870, tomo I. Blancas, Jerónimo, Inscripciones latinas a los retratos de los reyes de Sobrarbe, Condes antiguos, y Reyes de Aragón, puestos en la Sala Real de la Diputación de la Ciudad de Zaragoça. Contienen una breve noticia de las heroicas acciones de cada uno, tiempo en que florecieron, y cosas tocantes a sus Reynados, por los Herederos de Diego Dormer, Zaragoza, 1680. Blazquez Mayoralgo, Juan, Perfecta raçon de Estado. Dedvcida de los hechos de el señor Rey Don Fernando el Catholico Quinto de este nombre en Castilla, y Segundo en Aragón contra los políticos atheistas, Escribiola a la Magestad Avgusta de el Rey Don Phelipe Quarto nuestro Señor, Don …, su Contador de la Nueua Ciudad de Veracruz, en los Reynos de la Nueua España, y Veedor de su Real hazienda, con licencia del Excelellentisimo Señor Conde de Saluatierra Virrey desta Nueua España, por Francisco Robledo, impresor del Secreto del Santo Officio, Mexico, 1646. Comines, Felipe de, Las memorias de Felipe de Comines señor de Argenton de los hechos y empresas de Lvis Vndecimo y Carlos Octavo Reyes de Francia. Traducidas de frances con escolios propios por Don …, prior y provisor de Calatayud asesor del Sancto Officio y capellán a sv sobrino el Señor Don Ivan Vitrian presidente de la española, caballero del orden de Calatrava. Tomo segvndo, Amberes, en la Emprenta de Ivan Mevrsio, Año 1643. Covarrubias y Orozco, Sebastián de, Emblemas morales de D …, Capellan del Rey N.S. Maestrescuela, y Canonigo de Cuenca,Consultor del santo Oficio. Dirigidas a Don Francisco Gomez de Sandoual y Roxas, Duque de Lerma, Marques de Denia, Sumiller de Corps, Cauallerizo mayor del Rey N.S. Comendador mayor de Castilla, Capitan General de la caualleria de España, con privilegio, en Madrid, por Luis Sanchez, 1610. Crónica incompleta de los Reyes Católicos (1469 – 1476). Según un manuscrito anónimo de la época. Prólogo y notas de Julio PUYOL, Real Academia de la Historia, tipografía de Archivos, Madrid, 1934. 83

Ibid., pp. 990 – 993.

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El cronicón de Valladolid ilustrado con notas por el Dr. D. Pedro Sainz de Baranda, imprenta de la viuda de Calero, Madrid, 1848. Enriquez del Castillo, Diego, Crónica del Rey D. Enrique el Quarto de este nombre. Segunda edición, corregida por D. Josef Miguel de Flores, imprenta de D. Antonio de Sancha, Madrid, 1787. Fernández de Oviedo, Gonzalo, “Batallas y Quinquagenas”, en Diego Clemencín, Elogio de la reina católica Doña Isabel, imprenta de Sancha, Madrid, 1820. Galíndez de Carvajal, Lorenzo, “Anales breves del reinado de los Reyes Católicos D. Fernando y Doña Isabel, de gloriosa memoria, que dejó manuscritos el Dr. Galindez de Carvajal, de su Consejo y Cámara, y de la de los Reyes Doña Juana y D. Carlos, su hija y nieto, Correo mayor de los reinos del Perú etc.” en Miguel Salvá y Sainz de Baranda, Pedro, Colección de Documentos inéditos para la Historia de España, Madrid, imprenta de la viuda de Calero, tomo XVIII. Giovio, Paulo, Dialogo de las empresas militares y amorosas, traducción de Alonso de Vlloa, por Gabriel Givlito de Ferrarris, Venezia, 1558. – Elogios o vidas breues, de los Caualleros antiguos y modernos, Illuestres en valor de guerra, que están al biuo pintados en el Museo de Paulo Iouio. Traducción de Gaspar de Baeça, en casa de Hugo de Mena, Granada, 1568. Gómez de la Reguera, Francisco, Empresas de los reyes de Castilla y de León, Ed. crítica César Hernández Alonso, Ed. Universidad de Valladolid, Valladolid, 1990. Gracián, Baltasar, El político D. Fernando el Catholico, de …, que publica Vincencio Ivan de Lastanosa, con licencia en Huesca, por Iuan Nogues, año 1646, en casas de Juan Blaeu, Amsterdam, 1659. Gracián, Lorenzo, El heroe, En esta impression nuevamente corregido, en casa de Juan Blaeu, Amsterdam, 1659. Horozco y Covarrubias, Juan de, Emblemas morales, por Juan de la Cuesta, Segovia, 1589. Hurtado de Mendoza, Diego, Guerra de Granada, Ed. Maxtor, Valladolid, 2005. Maquiavelo, Nicolás, El príncipe, Ediciones Ibéricas, Madrid, 1971, p. 191. Mariana, Juan de, Historia de España, en Biblioteca de autores españoles. Obras del Padre Juan de Mariana, M. Rivadeneyra, Madrid, 1854, tomo II. Mendo, Andrés, Principe perfecto y ministros ajusticiados, docvmentos políticos, y morales, a costa de Horacio Boissat y George Revs, en Leon de Francia, 1662. Palafox y Mendoza, Juan de, Obras del ilustrissimo, excelentissimo, y venerable siervo de Dios Don … Tratados varios. Dictámenes espirituales, y políticos: Diálogo político del estado de Alemania: Sitio, y socorro de Fuente Rabia: De la Naturaleza del Indio: Conquista de la China y Ortografia, imprenta de Don Gabriel Ramirez, Madrid, 1762, tomo X. Pulgar, Hernando del, Crónica de los señores Reyes Católicos Don Fernando y Doña Isabel de Castilla y de Aragón, en la imprenta de Benito Monfort, 1780. – Epistolario español. Colección de cartas de españoles ilustres antiguos y modernos, por Eugenio DE OCHOA, imprenta de la publicidad, Madrid, 1850, tomo I.

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Quevedo, Francisco de, “Carta del rey don Fernando el Católico al primer virey de Nápoles; cuyo original está en el Archivo de Nápoles, comentada por Don Francisco de Quevedo Villegas”, en Obras serias de D. F. de Quevedo y Villegas, Librería de Garnier Hermanos, Paris, 1881. – Primera parte de la vida de Marco Brvto. Escriuiola por el Texto de Plutarco, ponderada con Discursos, Don …, Cauallero de la Orden de Santiago, señor de la Villa de la Torre de Iuan Abad. Dedicada al excelentísimo Señor Duque del Infantado por Diego Diaz de La Carrera, Madrid, 1644. Recopilación de las Leyes destos Reynos, heche por mandado de la Magestad Catolica del Rey don Felipe Segundo nuestro señor; que se he mendado imprimir, con las leyes que despues de la ultima impression se han publicado, par la Magestad Catolica del Rey don Felipe Quarto el Grande nuestro señor, Año 1640, En Madrid. Por Catalina de Barrio y Angulo. Y Diego Diaz de la Carrera. Saavedra Fajardo, Diego, Idea de un príncipe político christiano. Rapresentada en cien empresas. Dedicada al príncipe de las Españas Nuestro Señor por Don…, Cauallero del Orden de Santiago del Consejo de su Magestad en el supremo de las Indias i su Embajador Plenipotenciario en los Treze Cantones, en la Dieta Imperial de Ratisbona por el Circulo, i Casa de Borgona, i en el Consejo de Munster para la Paz General, Monaco 1640, Milán, 1642. Solórzano Pereira, Juan de, Decada Qvinta de los Emblemas de D …, Cavallero de la Orden de Santiago, del Consejo de su Magestad en el Real de Castilla, y Indias. Traducidos por el Dotor Lorenço Mateu y Sanz, Cavallero de la Orden de Montesa, del Consejo de su Magestad en la Real Chancilleria de Valencia. De orden del Excelmo. Señor D. Luis Guillen de Moncada y Aragon, Principe, Duque de Montalto, y Bivona, Cavallero de la Orden de Tuson, &c. Virrey y Capitan General del Reino de Valencia, á quien se dedica, en Valencia, por Bernardo Nogues, junto al molino de Rovella, 1659. Taraphæ, Francisci, De origine, ac rebus gestis Regum Hispaniæ liber, multarum rerum cognitione refertus, Antverpiæ, in Ædibus Ionnis Steelfii, cum priuilegio cæsareo, 1553. Tejada y Páez, Agustín de, “A los Reyes Católicos Don Fernando y Doña Isabel”, en Poesías completas (El esplendor de la lírica antequerana). Estudio, edición y notas de Jesús M. Morota, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, Granada, 2013. Valera, Mosén Diego de, Crónica de los Reyes Católicos. Edición y Estudio por Juan de M. Carriazo, impresor José Molina, Madrid, 1927. Zurita, Jerónimo, Historia del Rey Don Hernando El Catolico. De las empresas, y ligas de Italia: compvestos por …, chronista del Reyno de Aragon, impressos en C¸aragoça: por los Herederos de Pedro Lanaja, y Lamarca, Impressores del Reyno de Aragon, dela Vniversidad, año 1670, a costa del mismo Reyno.

Bibliografia Alvar, Manuel,“El mejor mozo de España para una infanta de Castilla”, en Nebrija y estudios sobre la Edad de Oro, CSIC, Madrid, 1997, pp. 437 – 455. Fernández de Córdoba Miralles, Álvaro, “La emergencia de Fernando el Católico en la Curia papal: identidad y propaganda de un príncipe aragonés en el espacio italiano (1469 – 1492)”,

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en Aurora EGIDO y José Enrique Laplana Gil (Coord.), La imagen de Fernando el Católico en la Historia, la Literatura y el Arte, coord. por Aurora Egido, José Enrique Laplana Gil, Instituto Fernando El Católico, Zaragoza, 2014, pp.29 – 82. Ferrari, Ángel, Fernando el Católico en Baltasar Gracián, presentación de Gonzalo Anes y Álvarez de Castrillón y Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, 2006. Gallego Morell, Manuel, El proceso de Fuenteovejuna (En la Historia y en la Literatura), Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación de Granada, Granada, 1994. Gallego y Burín, Antonio, Isabel de Castilla, imprenta de Estades-Artes Gráficas, Madrid, 1957. García Carcel, Ricardo, “Fernando el Católico y Cataluña”, en Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes, Alicante, 2006. Disponible digitalmente: http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obravisor/fernando-el-catlico-y-catalua-0/html/00ebc326 - 82b2 - 11df-acc7 - 002185ce6064_6. html. González Alonso, Benjamín, “La justicia”, en Enciclopedia de Historia de España dirigida por Miguel Artola, Alianza Editorial, Barcelona, tomo II, 1988, pp. 343 – 420. Jiménez Calvante, Teresa, “Fernando el Católico: un héroe épico con vocación mesiánica” en La imagen de Fernando el Católico cit., pp. 131 – 170. Kagan, Richard L., Los cronistas y la Corona: La Política de la Historia en España en las Edades Media y Moderna, Ed. Centro de Estudio Europa Hispánica y Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2010. López Nevot, José Antonio, “Los trabajos perdidos: el proyecto recopilador de Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal”, AHDE, 80 (2010), pp. 325 – 346. López Poza, Sagrario, “Fernando El Católico en la emblemática y en el pensamiento político del siglo XVII” en La imagen de Fernando el Católico cit., pp. 235 – 278. María e Izquierdo, María José, Los proyectos recopiladores castellanos del siglo XVI en los códices del Monasterio de El Escorial, Ed. Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, 2014. Pena Sueiro, Nieves, “Las fuentes del primer libro de empresas políticas en España” en Studia Aurea: Revista de Literatura Española y Teoría Literaria del Renacimiento y Siglo de Oro, 2015, pp. 461 – 482. Pérez, Joseph, “La memoria de los Reyes Católicos en los siglos XVI y XVII”, en La imagen de Fernando el Católico cit., pp. 119 – 130. Pérez-Victoria de Benavides, Manuel, Una Historia del Derecho, Gráficas Alhambra, Granada, 2003. Rojo Gallego-Burín, Marina, El pensemiento juricido y politica de Francisco Bermúdez de Pedraza (1576 – 1655), Marcial Pons, 2018. Sánchez Lailla, Luis, “La imagen de Fernando el Católico en las letras barrocas de Lope de Vega a Baltasar Gracián” en La imagen de Fernando el Católico cit., pp. 201 – 234. Tomás y Valiente, Francisco, El derecho penal de la monarquía absoluta (siglos XVI-XVIIXVIII), Ed. Tecnos, 1969, Madrid. Vicens Vives, Jaime, Política del Rey Católico en Cataluña, Ed. Destino, Barcelona, 1940.

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– Historia crítica de la vida y reinado de Fernando II de Aragón, edición de Miquel A. Marín Gelabert, Institución Fernando El Católico, Excma. Diputación de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, 2006.

Kontrolle gerichtlicher Entscheidungen durch Nichtigkeitsklagen und Nichtigkeitsbeschwerden – ihre Geschichte und ihr Missbrauch im Nationalsozialismus1 Von Wolfgang Sellert

I. Die Nichtigkeitsklage nach geltendem deutschen Prozessrecht und ihre historischen Wurzeln Jeder Bürger, der sich durch ein gerichtliches Zivil- oder Strafurteil ungerecht behandelt fühlt, kann in einem Rechtsstaat dagegen Rechtsmittel einlegen. Die üblichen Rechtsmittel sind die Appellation, die Berufung oder die Revision. Sie sind an gesetzliche Fristen gebunden, die aus Gründen der Rechtssicherheit nicht verlängert werden können. Mit dem Ablauf der Rechtsmittelfrist wird das Urteil formell und materiell rechtskräftig und kann grundsätzlich nicht mehr angefochten werden. Handelt es sich aber um rechtskräftige Urteile, die schwerste Mängel aufweisen und daher mit den Grundprinzipien der rechtsstaatlichen Ordnung im Widerspruch stehen, muss es einen Weg geben, um sie zu beseitigen. Andernfalls würde das Vertrauen der Parteien in die Rechtspflege gestört und das Ansehen der staatlichen Gerichtsbarkeit beschädigt.2 Solche Urteile sind nach geltendem deutschen Recht nicht 1 Über das Thema habe ich in Spanien (Granada) im Mai 2016 einen Vortrag in englischer Sprache gehalten und ihn mit den Worten eingeleitet: Dear colleagues and friends, it’s a great honour for me to give my lecture in memory of Jürgen Weitzel. For he was not only my good friend and collague and the teacher of Ignacio Czeguhn, but also one of the founders of these meetings, where we are engaged with the high courts of Europe. I remember very well our meeting in 2008 in Granada. At that time Jürgen Weitzel spoke about the subject “Legal appeals in and before the imperial chamber court.” Among the legal appeals he mentioned also the petition of annulment. Today I would like to deepen this subject with some more details. – Weil mit der englischen Übersetzung meines muttersprachlich-deutschen Vortragstextes nicht unerhebliche Differenzierungsverluste durch notwendige Vereinfachungen, unzulängliche Umschreibungen fachspezifischer Begriffe und durch mangelnde Nähe zu den Originalquellen verbunden waren, habe ich für die schriftliche Fassung die deutsche Sprache gewählt und mich am Ende meines Beitrages auf eine englische Zusammenfassung beschränkt. Zum Problem von Übersetzungen wissenschaftlicher Texte in eine fremde Sprache vgl. M. Stolleis, Wir Europäer lesen einander immer weniger, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), v. 1. Oktober 2014, Nr. 228, S. N 4. 2 Urt. d. Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (BGHZ) v. 28. Oktober 1971, Bd. 57, S. 214 f.

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per se nichtig, sondern verlieren ihre Wirkung erst, wenn ihre Nichtigkeit in einem gerichtlichen Verfahren festgestellt worden ist. Gegen derartige Zivilurteile gewährt das deutsche Verfahrensrecht die Nichtigkeits- und die Restitutionsklage. Mit beiden Klagen wird ein Wiederaufnahmeverfahren eröffnet, in dem die Nichtigkeitsgründe geprüft werden. Sie liegen vor, wenn das Urteil unter groben Verfahrensfehlern zustande gekommen ist. Das ist der Fall, wenn das Urteil von einem absolut unzuständigen Gericht gefällt wurde, wenn das Gericht nicht vorschriftsmäßig besetzt war oder wenn eine Partei im Prozess nicht ordnungsgemäß vertreten war.3 Nichtigkeitsgründe liegen außerdem vor, wenn für das Zustandekommen des Urteils eine Straftat wie beispielsweise Meineid oder Urkundenfälschung ursächlich gewesen ist.4 Wird die Nichtigkeit des Urteils festgestellt, muss der Rechtsstreit von neuem verhandelt und entschieden werden. Für rechtskräftige, aber fehlerhafte Strafurteile kann nach deutschem Prozessrecht zugunsten oder zuungunsten des Verurteilten ebenfalls ein Wiederaufnahmeverfahren eingeleitet werden.5 Auch hier hat der Gesetzgeber die Wiederaufnahmegründe abschließend und katalogartig festgelegt. Sie entsprechen im Kern den im Zivilprozess geltenden Nichtigkeitsgründen.6 1. Ursprünge im Römischen Recht Mit der Suche nach den rechtshistorischen Wurzeln der Nichtigkeitsklage begibt man sich auf ein in der neueren deutschen Prozessrechtsgeschichte noch wenig erforschtes Gebiet.7 Zum einen geht es um Verfahrensfragen und zum andern um Probleme, welche die Gründe der Nichtigkeit betreffen. 3

§ 579 ZPO. § 580 ZPO 5 §§ 359, 362 StPO 6 Eodem. 7 K. Nehlsen-von Stryk, Appellation und Nichtigkeitsklage aus der Sicht der frühen Kameralistik, in: L. Auer/E. Ortlieb (Hg.) unter Mitarbeit v. E. Franke, Appellation und Revision im Europa des Spätmittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit (= Beiträge zur Rechtsgeschichte Österreichs, 3. Jahrgang, Bd. 1), Wien 2013, S. 87 – 102; B. Schildt, Das Reichskammergericht als oberste Rechtsmittelinstanz im Reich, in: L. Auer/E. Ortlieb (Hg.) unter Mitarbeit v. E. Franke, Appellation und Revision im Europa des Spätmittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit aaO., S. 67 – 85, insbes. S. 72 f.; W. Sellert, Nichtigkeitsklage, Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde, in: Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (HRG), Bd. 3, 2. Auflage, hg. v. A. Cordes/ H.-P. Haferkamp/H. Lück/D. Werkmüller/Chr. Bertelsmeier-Kierst, Berlin 2016, Sp. 1959 – 1961; J. Weitzel, Rechtsmittel zum und am Reichskammergericht, in: I. Czeguhn/J. A. Lopez Nevot/A. Sanchez Aranda/J. Weitzel (Hg.), Die Höchstgerichtsbarkeit im Zeitalter Karls V. (= Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für rechtswissenschaftliche Grundlagenforschung, hg. v. J. Weitzel/E. Hilgendorf, Bd. 4, 2011, S. 9 – 29, insbes. S. 13 – 15. – Der vagen Vermutung, wonach es im Langobardischen Recht einschlägige Ansätze gegeben habe, soll hier nicht nachgegangen werden; vgl. dazu aber A. Skedl, Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Leipzig 1886, S. 32 f. 4

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Erste und wegweisende Regelungen zu den Gründen der Nichtigkeit finden sich im Kognitionsverfahren des klassischen römischen Rechts. Danach war ein Urteil nichtig (iudicium nullum), wenn die Gerichtszuständigkeit fehlte, wenn der Richter nicht die erforderliche Qualifikation hatte, wenn die Partei- oder Prozessfähigkeit nicht gegeben war, wenn der Anwalt keine Vollmacht hatte oder wenn sonstige schwere Verfahrensmängel vorlagen.8 Die Nichtigkeitsgründe konnten entweder incidenter im Rahmen einer Appellation oder principaliter mit einer separaten Restitutionsklage vor einer höheren Instanz geltend gemacht werden.9

2. Die Lehren des Gemeinen Rechts Die soeben nur grob skizzierten Grundsätze des römischen Rechts bestimmten die Weiterentwicklung der Nichtigkeitsklage.10 Sie wurden seit etwa dem 13. Jahrhundert kontrovers von den Gelehrten des römischen und kanonischen Rechts diskutiert.11 Dazu gehörten zum Beispiel Wilhelm Durantis (um 1230 – 1296),12 Johannes Andreae (um 1270 – 1348)13 und Alexander Tartagnus (gest. 1477).14 Anknüpfend an deren Arbeiten, denen ein „einheitlicher Grundgedanke“ fehlte,15 ist die Nichtigkeitsklage von Gelehrten des 16. Jahrhunderts, darunter insbesondere von S. Vantius (gest. 1570)16, Joachim Mynsinger v. Frundeck (1514 – 1588)17 und Andreas Gail (1526 – 1587)18 weiter vertieft und differenziert worden.19

8 M. Kaser, Das Römische Zivilprozessrecht, 2. Auflage, bearbeitet von K. Hackl, München 1996, S. 350 f. 9 So beispielsweise, wenn das Urteil durch gefälschte Beweismittel oder eine Straftat erstritten worden war; vgl. M. Kaser, Das Römische Zivilprozessrecht (wie Fn. 8), S. 497 f. In seinen Anfängen ging das römisch-kanonische Recht allerdings davon aus, dass es einer Beseitigung nichtiger Urteile durch ein Rechtsmittelverfahren nicht bedürfe; vgl. dazu H. Ewers, Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde in dem kanonischen Prozessrecht (= Münchner theologische Studien III. Kanonistische Abteilung, 2. Band), München 1952, S. 1 f. 10 Vgl. im Einzelnen dazu H. Ewers, Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde (wie Fn. 9), S. 2 – 12; ferner Leipziger Literatur-Zeitung für das Jahr 1833, 1. November 1833, Nr. 262, Sp. 2093. 11 Vgl dazu A. Skedl, Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde (wie Fn. 7), S. 139 – 171; G. W. Wetzell, System des ordentlichen Civilprocesses , 3. Auflage 1878, S. 782 – 798; ferner H. Ewers, Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde (wie Fn. 9), S. 1 – 12. 12 S. Lepsius, Durantis, Guilelmus, in: Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (HRG), Bd. 1, 2. Auflage, hg. v. A. Cordes/H. Lück/D. Werkmüller/R. Schmidt-Wiegand, Berlin 2008, Sp. 1168 – 1170. 13 Vgl. J. Andreae, in: Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon Aller Wissenschaften und Künste, Bd. 2, Leipzig 1732, Sp. 164 f. 14 F. C. v. Savigny, Geschichte des Römischen Rechts im Mittelalter, Heidelberg 1831, S. 273 – 277. 15 A. Skedl, Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde (wie Fn. 7), S. 139. 16 S. Vantius, Tractatus de nullitatibus processum ac sententiarum, Lugduni 1552; vgl. auch A. Skedl, Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde (wie Fn. 7), 143, 146 – 157.

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Im Kern dieser von B. Schildt als „verworren“ bezeichneten Lehren20 geht es um folgende Probleme, in deren Zentrum das Verhältnis von Nichtigkeitsklage und Appellation steht.21 War man anfangs der Meinung, dass die Nichtigkeit eines Urteils mit der Appellation geltend gemacht werden könne, so dass eine davon getrennte Nichtigkeitsklage entbehrlich sei, so setzte sich allmählich die Auffassung durch, dass Appellation und Nichtigkeitsklage ihrem Wesen nach zwei grundsätzlich verschiedene und daher selbstständige Rechtsmittel seien.22 Denn mit der Appellation werde von der beschwerten Partei keine nichtige Entscheidung (sententia nulla), sondern nur die Reformierung eines an sich gültigen, aber ungerechten Urteils (sententia iniqua) gerügt.23 Damit konnte eine Partei zunächst appellieren und, wenn die Appellation als unzulässig zurückgewiesen worden war, ihr Glück anschließend mit einer Nichtigkeitsklage versuchen. Um diese zeitaufwendige und für Prozessverschleppungen geeignete Zweispurigkeit auszuschalten, lag es nahe, die unterlegene Partei zu verpflichten, entweder beide Rechtsbehelfe kumulativ, also gemeinsam oder eventualiter in der Weise geltend zu machen, dass die mit der Nichtigkeitsklage eingelegte Appellation nur hilfsweise für den Fall zum Zuge kommen solle, dass die Appellation erfolglos geblieben war. A. Gail und J. Mynsinger waren der Ansicht, dass ein rechtskräftiges Urteil zwar nicht kumulativ, aber im Sinne des römischen Rechts sowohl incidenter mit der Appellation als auch principaliter mit einer selbstständigen Nichtigkeitsklage angefochten werden könne: principaliter oder incidenter agere de nullitate.24 Aus dem ersten Fall ergaben sich zwei Konsequenzen. War das Urteil unheilbar nichtig (defectus insanabilis), lief die Appellation völlig ins Leere, so dass man sich die Frage stellen musste, ob sie in einem solchen Falle überhaupt gerechtfertigt sei. Nur wenn der Nichtigkeitsmangel behebbar war (defectus sanabilis), konnte nach dessen Be-

17

W. Sellert, Mynsinger von Frundeck, Joachim (1414 – 1588), in: Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (HRG), Bd. 3, 2. Auflage, hg. v. A. Cordes/H.-P. Haferkamp/ H. Lück/D. Werkmüller/Chr. Bertelsmeier-Kierst, Berlin 2016, Sp. 1731 f. 18 A. Amend, Gail, Andreas (1526 – 1587), in: Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (HRG), Bd. 2, 2. Auflage, hg. v. A. Cordes/H. Lück/D. Werkmüller/R. SchmidtWiegand, Berlin 2012, Sp. 1913 f. 19 Vgl. dazu im Einzelnen den gründlichen Beitrag von K. Nehlsen-von Stryk, Appellation (wie Fn. 7). 20 B. Schildt, Das Reichskammergerichte (wie Fn. 7), S. 72. 21 A. Skedl, Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde (wie Fn. 7), 141 f. 22 K. Nehlsen-von Stryck, Appellation (wie Fn. 7), S. 93; H. Ewers, Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde (wie Fn. 9), S. 6, 8 f. 23 G. W. Wetzell, System (wie Fn. 11), S. 794; H. Ewers, Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde (wie Fn. 9), S. 7 – 9 f. 24 K. Nehlsen-von Stryck, Appellation (wie Fn. 7), S. 89 f.; A. Skedl, Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde (wie Fn. 7), S. 55 m. Nachw.

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seitigung das Gericht mit der Prüfung der Appellation beginnen.25 Zum anderen folgte aus der Dominanz der Appellation – die Nichtigkeitsklage spielte nur incidenter eine Rolle –, dass für das gesamte Verfahren die Grundsätze der Appellation maßgebend sein sollten. Damit war das Rechtsmittel auch in Bezug auf die Nichtigkeitsklage an die Appellationssumme, an die Appellationsprivilegien und vor allem an die zehntägige Notfrist zur Einlegung (decendium) gebunden.26 Vertreten wurde sogar die Ansicht, dass bei unzulässiger Appellation auch die incidenter erhobene Nichtigkeitsklage aus Gründen der Akzessorietät für desert zu erklären sei.27 J. Mynsinger sah später jedoch in dieser Konsequenz eine überholte Doktrin und vertrat die Ansicht, dass trotz deserter Appellation den Parteien der Weg zu einer principaliter erhobenen Nichtigkeitsklage nicht versperrt werden dürfe.28 Aus der selbstständig zugelassenen Nichtigkeitsklage ergaben sich weitere umstrittene Fragen, weil für diese die Grundsätze jeder „normalen Klage“ gelten sollten. Das bedeutete einerseits, dass sie beginnend mit der Rechtskraft des Urteils noch innerhalb einer Frist von 30 Jahren erhoben werden konnte, und andererseits, dass sie nicht an die Appellationsprivilegien gebunden war.29 Vor allem Letzteres war den Landesherren ein Dorn im Auge. Denn sie sahen darin eine Beeinträchtigung ihrer durch die Appellationsprivilegien gefestigtere Souveränität und Jurisdiktionsgewalt.30 Und schließlich barg die Zulassung selbstständiger Nichtigkeitsklagen wiederum die Gefahr von Prozessverschleppungen.31 3. Die Nichtigkeitsklage vor den höchsten Reichsgerichten Nach alldem durfte man gespannt sein, wie die Probleme von den höchsten Reichsgerichten gelöst werden würden, zumal vom Reichskammergericht (RKG) beklagt wurde, dass von den vndern gerichten immer wieder auß ainfeltigkait, vnfleiß oder […] geübten mißbreuchen nichtige Urteile gefällt würden.32 25

G. W. Wetzell, System (wie Fn. 11), S. 798. W. Endemann, Das deutsche Zivilprozessrecht, Heidelberg 1868 (Neudruck Aalen 1969), S. 943; W. Sellert, Prozessrechtliche Aspekte zur Appellation an den Reichshofrat, in: L. Auer/E. Ortlieb (Hg.), Appellation und Revision im Europa des Spätmittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit (= Beiträge zur Rechtsgeschichte Österreichs, 3. Jahrgang, Bd. 1), Wien 2013, S. 103 – 119, insbes. S. 108 f. 27 K. Nehlsen-von Stryck, Appellation (wie Fn. 7), S. 90. 28 Vgl. im Einzelnen dazu K. Nehlsen-von Stryck, Appellation (wie Fn. 7), S. 90 – 93. 29 R. Maranta, Tractatus de Ordine Iudiciorum, vulgo Speculum aureum et lumen Advocatorum, Köln 1569, Teil VI, Rdnr. 154 f., S. 550. 30 K. Nehlsen-von Stryck, Appellation (wie Fn. 7), S. 93. 31 C. L. Goldschmidt, Abhandlungen aus dem deutschen gemeinen Civilproceß, X. Ueber Nichtigkeiten, Frankfurt am Main 1818, S. 111 – 123 (S. 117 f.); G. W. Wetzell, System (wie Fn. 11), S. 801 f. 32 RKGO v. 1521, Tit. XXI, § 1, abgedruckt in: F. Bergmann, Corpus iuris iudiciarii civilis germanici academicum, Hannover 1819, S. 73 f. 26

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a) Das Reichskammergericht (RKG) Die wohl erste Regelung der Nichtigkeitsklage enthält die Reichskammergerichtsordnung (RKGO) von 1521.33 Diese war erforderlich geworden, weil nach Ansicht des RKG die bisher mögliche zweifache rechtfertigung, d. h. Nichtigkeitsklage und Appellation jeweils selbstständig erheben zu können, unnötige Prozessverlängerungen verursacht hatte. Die RKGO bestimmte daher, dass die Parteien schuldig seien, die Nichtigkeitsklage sampt der clag auff die iniquitet […] alternative vnd mit ainander gleich ein[zu]bringen.34 Dementsprechend sollte der vom Kläger zu stellende Antrag lauten: Herr Cammerrichter, ich bitte euch, über dise Nullitet zu erkennen, und ob die nit gegründt befunden, alßdann […] auff mein andere clag der iniquitet, ungerechtigkait des vorigen rechtspruchs zu urteilen.35 Die RKGO von 1555 hielt an dieser Regelung fest36 und bestimmte erwartungsgemäß, dass für solche alternativen Klagen die Grundsätze des Appellationsverfahrens maßgebend sein sollen.37 Daneben war es nach der RKGO v. 1555 aber auch zulässig, dass eine Partei ohne Appellation auf die nullität principaliter und alleyn klagt.38 In diesem Falle sollte nicht nach den Bestimmungen des Appellationsverfahrens, sondern wie in andern dergleichen sachen simplicis querela […] procediert werden.39 Damit blieben die oben geschilderten Probleme der Umgehung von Appellationsprivilegien und der Prozessverschleppung weiter bestehen. Warum die selbstständige Nichtigkeitsklage gleichwohl zugelassen worden war, mag damit zusammenhängen, dass das RKG als oberstes Justizorgan sowohl zum Wohle der Parteien als auch in favorem publicum, d. h. in einem allgemeinen öffentlichen Interesse darauf achten sollte, dass das Ansehen der Rechtspflege durch nich-

33

RKGO v. 1521, Tit. XXI, § 1, abgedruckt in: F. Bergmann (wie Fn. 32), S. 73 f.; vgl. auch A. Skedl, Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde (wie Fn. 7), 174 – 178. 34 RKGO (wie Fn. 33). 35 Eodem. 36 RKGO v. 1555, Teil III, Tit. 34 § 1, abgedruckt in: A. Laufs (Hg.), Die Reichskammergerichtsordnung von 1555 (= Quellen und Forschungen zur höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, hg. v. B. Diestelkamp/U. Eisenhardt/G. Gudian/A. Laufs/W. Sellert, Bd. 3), Köln/Wien 1976, S. 253 f. Die entsprechende Regelung enthielt bereits die RKGO v. 1527 § 23, abgedruckt in: Neue und vollständige Sammlung der Reichs-Abschiede, Frankfurt a.M. 1747, Teil 2, S. 291 f.: Item: Wann auch auf die Nullität gehandelt wird, sollen die Procuratores die Ursachen der Nullität, neben der Iniquität in der Klag specifice ausdrucken und bestimmen. 37 RKGO v. 1555, Teil III, Tit. 34 § 2, abgedruckt in: A. Laufs (Hg.), Die Reichskammergerichtsordnung (wie Fn. 36), S. 254; W. Endemann, Das deutsche Zivilprozeßrecht (wie Fn. 26), S. 942. 38 RKGO v. 1555 Teil III, Tit. 34, § 3, abgedruckt in: A. Laufs (Hg.), Die Reichskammergerichtsordnung (wie Fn. 36), S. 254. 39 Eodem.

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tige Urteile keinen Schaden nehme.40 Diese Tendenz wird sogar bei der eventualiter mit der Nichtigkeitsklage erhobenen Appellation sichtbar. Handelte es sich nämlich um eine nicht ratifizierbare, d. h. um eine unheilbare Nichtigkeit, weil sich auß den actis erster instantz eine öffentliche nullität ergab, so sollte das Gericht auch […] ex officio [… ] gewalt und macht haben, darüber zu entscheiden.41 Der Grundsatz, dass notorisch nichtige Urteile keinen Bestand haben sollten, betraf auch Strafurteile, gegen die Rechtsmittel grundsätzlich verboten waren.42 Eine Ausnahme galt jedoch, wenn gegen jemand unerfordert und unverhört und also nichtikglich oder sunst wider natürlich vernunft und billigkeyt […] procedirt worden war.43 Nach alledem blieben die selbstständigen Nichtigkeitsklagen wegen ihrer missbräuchlichen Verwendungsmöglichkeit weiterhin ein Stein des Anstoßes, zumal sie von Parteien und Anwälten dazu benutzt wurden, nicht nur die Unwirksamkeit, sondern auch die Ungerechtigkeit eines angefochtenen Urteils zu rügen. Nur in Einzelfällen waren die Nichtigkeitsklagen ausgeschlossen, nämlich dann, wenn sie das Appellationsprivileg entweder ausdrücklich verbot oder wenn es eine in diesem Sinne auslegungsfähige Formulierung enthielt; also etwa den Wortlaut: Es soll nicht appelliert, suppliciert noch reduciert bzw. provociert und queruliert werden oder wenn es hieß, dass die Urteile „ganz kräftig und mächtig seyn, stets bleiben und vollstreckt“ werden sollen.“44 Davon abgesehen wurden alsbald Maßnahmen getroffen, damit zum Wohle des Staates und der Parteien keine „geringfügigen Sachen unter dem Titel der Nullitätsklage an die höchsten Reichsgerichte kommen“, weil anderenfalls der „Prozeßsucht Tür und Tor geöffnet“ worden wäre.45 Folglich wurde die RKGO von 1555 durch den RA von 1570 (§§ 66, 69)46 und den Deputationsabschied von 1600 (§14)47 dahinge40 A. Gail, Practicarum Observationum, tam ad processum ivdiciarium, praesertim imperialis camerae, quam cavsarum decisiones pertinentium, .., 2. Auflage, Köln 1621, observatio XLII, 5. 41 RKGO v. 1555, Teil III, Tit. 34, § 2, abgedruckt in: A. Laufs (Hg.), Die Reichskammergerichtsordnung (wie Fn. 36), S. 254; ferner K. Nehlsen-von Stryck, Appellation (wie Fn. 7), S. 94. 42 W. Sellert, Über die Zuständigkeitsabgrenzung von Reichshofrat und Reichskammergericht (= Untersuchungen zur deutschen Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte, N.F., hg. v. A. Erler/W. Schlesinger/W. Wegener), Bd. 4, Aalen 1965, S. 73 – 89. 43 RKGO v. 1555, Teil II Tit. 28 § 5, abgedruckt in: A. Laufs (Hg.), Die Reichskammergerichtsordnung (wie Fn. 36), S. 206 f. Vgl. im Einzelnen dazu P. Oestmann, Hexenprozesse am Reichskammergericht (= Quellen und Forschungen zur höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, Bd. 31, hg. v. F. Battenberg/B. Diestelkamp/U. Eisenhardt/G. Gudian/A. Laufs/ W. Sellert), Köln/Weimar/Wien 1997, S. 63 – 73. 44 F. C. Häberlin, Repertorium des Teutschen Staats und Lehnrechts, 3. Teil, L-O, Leipzig 1793, S. 661. 45 F. C. Häberlin, Repertorium (wie Fn. 44), S. 660. 46 Abgedruckt in: F. Bergmann, Corpus (wie Fn. 32), S. 284 f. 47 Abgedruckt in: F. Bergmann, Corpus iuris (wie Fn. 32), S. 324 f.

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hend ergänzt, dass für die selbstständige Nichtigkeitsklage wenigstens die summa appellabilis gelten sollte.48 Gleichwohl war eine grundlegende generelle Neuregelung der Nichtigkeitsklage längst fällig geworden. Dazu kam es nach verschiedenen Auseinandersetzungen endlich im Jüngsten Reichsabschied von 1654 (JRA).49 Dieser sah zunächst einmal die auch für die Nichtigkeitsklage verbindliche Erhöhung der Appellationssumme vor.50 Sodann bestimmte er, dass auch für die Erhebung der selbstständigen Nichtigkeitsklage die Zehntagesfrist gelten soll. Nachdem, so heißt es dort, viele Jahre darüber disputiert worden ist, ob a sententia nulla in dreyßig Jahren die Klage prosequiert, a sententia iniqua aber intra decendium appellirt werden kann, soll nun dem unnöthigen Gezäncks ein Ende gesetzt und in allen beyden Fällen das zehntägige fatale interponendae observiert werden müssen.51 Die dreißigjährige Verjährungsfrist sollte jedoch weiterhin – offensichtlich wiederum im öffentlichen Interesse und zum Wohle der Parteien – für Nichtigkeitsklagen gelten, die einen insanabilem defectum haben.52 Damit knüpfte der JRA an eine Unterscheidung an, die der Sache nach bereits die RKGO v. 1555 mit den ratifizierbaren und nichtratifizierbaren Mängeln getroffen hatte.53 Mit der Unterscheidung von heilbaren und unheilbaren Mängeln der Nichtigkeitsklage entstanden neue Probleme. Denn im JRA war nur die unheilbare Nichtigkeit pauschal in Anlehnung an das römische Recht definiert worden war. Sie sollte folglich bei Nullitäten vorliegen, welche insanabilem defectum aus der Person des Richters, oder der Parthey, oder aus den Substantialibus des Processus nach sich führen.54 Was man unter diesen Grundsätzen im Einzelnen zu verstehen hatte, blieb daher der Rechtsprechung und der juristischen Lehre überlassen. Letztere hatte hierzu unter der Federführung der oben erwähnten Prozessualisten Durantis und Vantius bereits gute und weiterführende Vorarbeiten geleistet.55

48

Vgl. auch Teil II, Tit. 31 §§ 4,5 des nicht in Kraft getretenen Concepts der auf kayserlichen und des reichs befehl im Jahre 1613 verbesserten Cammergerichts-Ordnung (COC), hrg. v. J. J. Zwirlein, Frankfurt a. M. 1783, S. 256 f. 49 Maßgebend waren einschlägige Vorschläge auf dem Deputationstag von 1644 in Frankfurt am Main; vgl. C. L. Goldschmidt, Abhandlungen (wie Fn. 31), S. 118. 50 § 112 JRA, in: A. Buschmann (Hg.), Kaiser und Reich, München 1984, S. 503. F. C. Häberlin, Repertorioum (wie Fn. 44), S. 66. 51 § 121 JRA, abgedruckt in: A. Buschmann, Kaiser und Reich (wie Fn. 50), S.507. 52 Eodem; G. W. Wetzell, System (wie Fn. 11), S. 809 f. 53 Vgl. oben Fn. 41. 54 § 122 JRA, abgedruckt in: A. Buschmann, Kaiser und Reich (wie Fn. 50), S. 507. 55 Vgl. dazu H. Ewers, Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde (wie Fn. 9), S. 10 f.; ferner C. F. Häberlin, Repertorium (wie Fn. 44), S. 658 – 664 und die dort zitierten zahlreichen zeitgenössischen Schriften zur Nullitätsklage; ferner Leipziger Literatur-Zeitung für das Jahr 1833, 1. November 1833, Nr. 262, Sp. 2092. Speziell zum RKG vgl. G. M. Ludolf, De Jure Camerali Commentatio Systematica, Frankfurt a. M. 1722, S. 194 – 200. Eine zusammenfassende Dar-

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J. F. Cramer hat die Ergebnisse in seinem 1730 erschienenen „Manuale Processus Imperialis“ gut zusammengefasst.56 Demnach sollte eine unheilbare Nichtigkeit angenommen werden, wenn beispielsweise der erstinstanzliche Richter gebannt (bannitus), wahnsinnig (furiosus), rechtsunkundig (imperitus), unzuständig (jurisdictione destitutus) oder am Ausgang des Prozesses interessiert (in lite interessatus) ist.57 Sie sollte ferner vorliegen, wenn einer Partei, modern gesprochen, die Partei- oder Prozessfähigkeit fehlte, weil sie beispielsweise gebannt, exkommuniziert, unzurechnungsfähig (mente captus) oder durch einen Anwalt nicht ordnungsgemäß vertreten ist.58 Schwere Verfahrensfehler wie beispielsweise die nicht erfolgte Zitation einer Partei, die fehlende, aber notwendige Beweiserhebung (probatio), ein schwerer Rechtsirrtum (errore expresso),59 eine völlig unschlüssige Klageschrift (ineptitudo libelli)60 oder die fehlende Litiskontestation61 wurden ebenfalls zu den unheilbaren Nichtigkeitsmängeln gezählt.62 Trotz dieser hilfreichen Konkretisierungen gab es keine gesetzlich verbindlichen Nichtigkeitsgründe, so dass die Entscheidung darüber letztendlich im freien Ermessen des Richters stand.63 b) Der kaiserliche Reichshofrat (RHR) Man könnte annehmen, dass der RHR die Regelungen der RKGO zur Nichtigkeitsklage nur eingeschränkt beachtete, weil er zum Ärger der Reichsstände die Ansicht vertrat, dass er an diese Vorschriften nicht gebunden sei.64 Denn, so argumenstellung zu den Streitfragen über die Nichtigkeitsgründe bietet K. Nehlsen-von Stryck, Appellation (wie Fn. 7), S. 93 – 97. 56 J. F. Cramer, Manuale Processus Imperialis, sive Compendiosa introduction ad praxin Augustissimi Judicii Caesareo-Imperialis Aulici, Frankfurt 1730, S. 93 – 96. 57 J. F. Cramer, Manuale (wie Fn. 56), S. 94. 58 J. F. Cramer, Manuale (wie Fn. 56), S. 95. 59 A. Gail, Practicarum Observationum (wie Fn. 40), observatio CXXVII, 3; K. Nehlsenvon Stryck, Appellation und Nichtigkeitsklage (wie Fn. 7), S. 97. 60 J. F. Cramer, Manuale (wie Fn. 56), S. 95; ferner A. Gail, Practicarum Observationum (wie Fn. 40), observation LXVII, 1: Quando libellus plane & euidenter in forma & materia ineptus est, [… ]. 61 W. Sellert, Litis contestatio, in: Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (HRG), Bd. 3, 2. Auflage, hg. v. A. Cordes/H.-P. Haferkamp/H. Lück/D. Werkmüller/ Chr. Bertelsmeier-Kierst, Berlin 2016, Sp. 1018 – 1024. War die Litiskontestation an einem Untergericht nicht üblich, konnte ihr Fehlen folglich kein Nichtigkeitsgrund sein; vgl. K. Nehlsen-von Stryck, Appellation (wie Fn. 7), S. 95. 62 J. F. Cramer, Manuale (wie Fn. 56), S.95. 63 G. W. Wetzell, System (wie Fn. 11), S. 804 ff. Zur Frage, ob das Gericht nicht nur über die festgestellte Nullität, sondern danach auch über den Rechtsstreit in der Hauptsache entscheiden durfte, zumal wenn die Parteien Gründe zur iniquitet des Urteils vorgebracht hatten vgl. C. F. Häberlin, Repertorium (wie Fn. 44), S. 665. 64 Vgl. W. Sellert, Prozeß des Reichshofrats, in: Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (HRG), Bd. 4, 1. Auflage, hg. v. A. Erler/E. Kaufmann, Berlin 1990, Sp. 22 – 29.

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tierte der RHR, die Reichsstände hätten es mit ihren anderslautenden Forderungen nur darauf abgesehen, ihn unter ihre Direktion zu bringen, oder ihn doch in allem dem RKG zu conformieren, et sublate Principis auctoritate, in eine regul zu bringen.65 An diesem Standpunkt hielt der RHR auch noch fest, nachdem in Art. V § 55 des Westfälischen Friedensvertrags bestimmt worden war: Quoad Processum iudiciarium Ordinatio Camerae Imperialis etiam in Judicio Aulico servabitur per omnia.66 Dementsprechend sah die RHRO von 1654 vor, dass der RHR die RKGO nur in substantialibus zu beachten habe, im Übrigen aber an unnöttige gerichtssolennia, dadurch dem hauptwerkh und genuegsamen erkundigung der wahrheit nichts zue- oder abgehet, keineswegs verbunden, sondern vielmehr auff den gemeinen nuzen und fürderung der hailsamben justiz gewiesen und verpflichtet sein solle.67 Folglich wird in den RHRO zwar die Zuständigkeit des RHR für Nichtigkeitsklagen gegen Entscheidungen der ersten Instanz ausdrücklich festgestellt,68 prozessuale Einzelheiten für diese Klage werden aber nicht geregelt. Folgt man dem schon zitierten J. F. Cramer, der aus der Sicht des Anwalts mit zahlreichen Beispielen eine Compendiosa Introductio ad praxin Augustissimi Judicii Caesareo-Imperialis Aulici verfasst hat, so ist auch der RHR den für die Nichtigkeitsklage am RKG geltenden Grundsätzen gefolgt.69 Durch den mit der Praxis des RHR besonders vertrauten J. Chr. v. Uffenbach wird diese Annahme bestätigt.70

65 W. Sellert, Der Reichshofrat, in: B. Diestelkamp (Hg.), Oberste Gerichtsbarkeit und zentrale Gewalt im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit (= Quellen und Forschungen zur höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, hg. v. F. Battenberg/B. Diestelkamp/U. Eisenhardt/G. Gudian/A. Laufs/W. Sellert, Band 29), Köln/Weimar/Wien 1996, S. 41. 66 K. Zeumer (Hg.), Quellensammlung zur Geschichte der Deutschen Reichsverfassung in Mittelalter und Neuzeit, 2. Auflage, Tübingen 1913, S. 414. 67 W. Sellert (Hg.), Die Ordnungen des Reichshofrates 1550 – 1766, 2. Halbband 1626 – 1766 (= Quellen und Forschungen zur höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, hg. v. B. Diestelkamp/U. Eisenhardt/G. Gudian/A. Laufs/W. Sellert, Bd. 8/II), Köln/Wien 1990, S. 128; ders., Prozeß des Reichshofrats, in: Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (HRG), Bd. 4, hg. v. A. Erler/E. Kaufmann, Berlin 1990, Sp. 22 – 29. 68 Tit. II § 1 RHRO v. 1617, abgedruckt in: W. Sellert (Hg.), Die Ordnungen des Reichshofrates 1550 – 1766, 1. Halbband bis 1626 (= Quellen und Forschungen zur höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, hg. v. B. Diestelkamp/U. Eisenhardt/G. Gudian/A. Laufs/ W. Sellert, Band 8/I), Köln/Wien 1980, S. 171; Tit. II § 1 RHRO v. 1654, abgedruckt in: W. Sellert (Hg.), Die Ordnungen des Reichshofrates (wie Fn. 67), S. 100. 69 J. F. Cramer, Manuale (wie Fn. 56), S. 92 – 104. – Von den Nichtigkeitsklagen gegen vorinstanzliche Urteile sind diejenigen zu unterscheiden, die sich gegen die Entscheidungen des RHR und des RKG richteten; vgl. dazu W. Sellert, Prozeßgrundsätze und Stilus Curiae am Reichshofrat (= Untersuchungen zur deutschen Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte, Neue Folge, hg. v. A. Erler/W. Schlesinger/W. Wegener, Bd. 18), Aalen 1973, S. 395 – 398. 70 J. Chr. v. Uffenbach, Tractatus de excelsissimo consilio Caesareo-Imperiali Aulico. Vom Kayserlichen Reichshoff-Rath, Wien/Prag 1700, S. 110 Nr. 2.

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In der Rechtsprechung des RHR hat die Nichtigkeitsklage im Gegensatz zur Praxis des RKG allerdings nur eine marginale Rolle gespielt. Dementsprechend enthalten die von J. J. Moser in acht Bänden herausgegebenen „Merckwürdige[n] ReichsHof-Raths-Conclusa“ nur vier Fälle, wovon die Hälfte nichtige Strafurteile betrifft.71 Auch in den inzwischen erschlossenen und mehrere Tausend umfassende Akten des RHR finden sich nur 14 einschlägige Fälle, darunter zwei in Strafsachen.72 Ganz allgemein lässt sich sagen, dass der RHR im Großen und Ganzen die die einschlägigen Bestimmungen der RKGO und des JRA v. 1654 beachtet hat. Das gilt sowohl für die Möglichkeit zur Erhebung einer incidenter oder principaliter erhobenen Nichtigkeitsklage als auch für die Unterscheidung zwischen der nullitas sanabilis et insanabalis mit den entsprechenden Prozessfolgen. Wann im Einzelfall eine unheilbare Nichtigkeit anzunehmen war, lag jedoch letztlich ebenso wie am RKG im Ermessen der Richter, weil es dafür keine verbindlichen rechtlichen Regelungen gab. 4. Kontinuitäten der Nichtigkeitsklage Die weitere Entwicklung zeichnete sich zunächst dadurch aus, dass die Gesetzgeber im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts dazu übergingen, die unheilbaren und heilbaren 71 J. J. Moser, Merckwürdige Reichs-Hof-Raths Conclusa, Bd. 2, Frankfurt a. M. 1726, S. 671 f.: Conclusum 433 v. 10. Februar 1716 (Strafurteil); Bd. 3, Frankfurt a.M. 1727, S. 644 – 648: Conclusum 435 v. 7. September 1719 (Strafurteil); Bd. 6, Frankfurt a.M. 1730, S. 293: Conclusum 228 v. 23. Februar 1724 (Abweisung einer Nichtigkeitsklage); Bd. 7, Frankfurt a.M. 1731, S. 963 f.: Conclusum 816 v. 29. März 1729 (Der judex a quo soll sich wegen insanabiles nullitates et iniquitates vor dem RHR verantworten). 72 Serie I, Alte Prager Akten, hg. v. W. Sellert, Bd. 2, E–J, bearb. v. E. Ortlieb, Berlin 2011, Nr. 1051 (Nichtigkeit wegen Verletzung der Peinlichen Halsgerichtsordnung v. 1532); Nr. 2090 (Nichtigkeit eines Urteils des erzbischöflichen Hofgerichts Bremen wegen Unzuständigkeit); Nr. 2138 (Nichtigkeit zweier Strafurteile, nämlich des kaiserlichen Hofgerichts Rottweil und des gräflich-nassauischen Schöffengerichts wegen Unzuständigkeit). – Bd. 3, K–O, bearb. v. E. Ortlieb, Berlin 2012, Nr. 2429 (Nichtigkeitsklage gegen ein Urteil des Rates der Stadt Erfurt, weil Rechte des Klägers nicht beachtet wurden); Nr. 3068 (Nichtigkeitsklage gegen ein Urteil des Abts von Weingarten wegen Nichtbeachtung forideklinatorischer Einreden); Nr. 3114 (Klage wegen Nichtigkeit eines herzoglichen Dekrets); Nr. 3291 (Nichtigkeitsklage gegen eine Entscheidung der Niederösterreichischen Regierung über die Erhebung des Zehnten). – Bd. 4, P–R, bearb. v. T. Schenk, Berlin 2014, Nr. 3830 (Nichtigkeitsklage gegen ein Urteil des Hofmarschallgerichts). – Serie II, Antiqua, hg. v. W. Sellert, Bd. 1, Karton 1 – 43, bearb. v. U. Machoczek, Berlin 2010, Nr. 570 und 571 (Appellation und Nichtigkeitsklage gegen ein Urteil der Kurkölner Regierung des Hochstifts Hildesheim wegen Verletzung des Grundsatzes des rechtlichen Gehörs). – Bd. 2, Karton 44 – 135, bearb. v. U. Rasche, Berlin 2014, Nr. 164 (Appellation und Nichtigkeitsklage gegen ein Urteil des Regierungsgerichts des Herzogs von Pfalz-Neuburg); Nr. 348 (Appellation und Nichtigkeitsklage wegen einer nicht näher bezeichneten Sache); Nr. 1068 (Appellation, Nichtigkeitsklage und Gesuch um eine restitutio in integrum gegen eine Entscheidung des Lehensgerichts der Grafschaft WaldburgZeil); Bd. 3, Karton 135 – 277 f., bearb. v. U. Rasche, Berlin 2016, Nr. 570 (Nullitätsklage gegen eine Urteil des Stadt Regensburg). – Bd. 4 Karton 278 – 424, bearb. v. T. Schenk, Berlin 2017, Nr. 814 (Nichtigkeitsklage gegen ein Läuterungsurteil).

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Nichtigkeitsgründe detaillierter zu beschreiben. Das gilt zunächst für den Codex iuris Canonici von 1917.73 Dem ist die Neufassung des kirchlichen Gesetzbuches von 1983 gefolgt.74 Der deutsche Gesetzgeber ging einen Schritt weiter und gab die Unterscheidung zwischen defectus sanabilis et insanabilis auf. Stattdessen hat er, indem er sich die Vorentwicklungen der querela nullitatis zunutze machte, die Nichtigkeitstatbestände katalogartig und abschließend geregelt. Diesem Beispiel folgte die mit den Reichsjustizgesetzen von 187775 im Jahre 1879 in Kraft getretene deutsche Civilproceßordnung (CPO)76 und später, wie anfangs gezeigt, auch die heutige ZPO. Gesetzlich geregelt wurde auch die Möglichkeit, rechtkräftige Strafurteile wegen schwerwiegender Nichtigkeitsgründe anzufechten. Erwähnt sei beispielsweise § 139 der Preußischen Verordnung v. 3. 1. 1849 über die Einführung des mündlichen und öffentlichen Verfahrens mit Geschworenen in Untersuchungssachen. Danach war die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde gegen Urteile der Schwurgerichte „wegen Verletzung von Förmlichkeiten im Verfahren, deren Beachtung bei Strafe der Nichtigkeit vorgeschrieben ist“ und „wegen Verletzung eines Strafgesetzes“ vorgesehen.77 Detaillierter wurden die Nichtigkeitsgründe in § 156 StPO für das Herzogtum Braunschweig v. 22. 8. 1849 geregelt.78 Dort handelt es sich um die schon bekannten Tatbestände, nämlich Mängel „in Bezug auf die Personen der Parteien oder die Zusammensetzung des Gerichts oder dessen Competenz“ oder schwerwiegende Verfahrensverstöße oder die Verletzung des Strafgesetzes bei der Urteilsfällung.79 Ebenso wie in der CPO waren sodann in der mit den Reichsjustizgesetzen ergangenen und nach zahlreichen Reformen im Kern noch heute geltenden Strafprozessordnung von 1877 (StPO)80 die für eine Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens maßgebenden Nichtigkeitsgründe katalogartig aufgezählt und definiert worden.81 Im Mittelpunkt dieser gesamten Entwicklung stand nach wie vor der Gedanke, dass Urteile mit schweren Mängeln zum Wohle der Allgemeinheit und im Interesse einer redlichen Justiz keinen Bestand haben dürfen. Anders als erwartet ist jedoch im 73

Can. 1892 – 97; vgl. dazu H. Ewers, Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde (wie Fn. 9), S. 30 – 43. Codex iuris canonici in der Fassung v. 25. Januar 1983, Buch 7, Teil 2, Titel VIII, Kap. I, can. 1620, 1622; vgl. lateinisch-deutsche Fassung . 75 W. Sellert, Reichsjustizgesetze, in: Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (HRG), Bd. 4, hg. v. A. Erler/E. Kaufmann, Berlin 1990, Sp. 651 – 654. 76 §§ 541 – 554 CPO. 77 W. Sellert/H. Rüping, Studien- und Quellenbuch zur Geschichte der deutschen Strafrechtspflege, Band 2, H. Rüping, Von der Aufklärung bis zur doppelten Staatsgründung, Aalen 1994, S. 86. 78 Abgedruckt in: W. Sellert/H. Rüping, Studien- und Quellenbuch (wie Fn. 77), S. 74. 79 Eodem. 80 K. Marxen, Strafprozeßordnung, in: Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, Bd. 4, hg. v. A. Erler/E. Kaufmann, Berlin 1990, Sp. 2039 – 2046. 81 §§ 359, 362. 74

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Zivilprozess mit Rücksicht auf die dort geltende Parteimaxime82 eine Nichtigkeitsklage von Amts wegen nicht eingeführt worden. Demgegenüber kann im Strafprozessrecht der Staatsanwalt auf Grund seiner Stellung als Vertreter des öffentlichen Interesses und Organ der Rechtspflege nicht nur auf Betreiben des Verurteilten, sondern auch ex officio ein Wiederaufnahmeverfahren wegen bestehender Nichtigkeitsgründe nach der Strafprozessordnung (StPO) in Gang bringen.83 Eine Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens „zu dem Zweck, eine andere Strafbemessung auf Grund desselben Strafgesetzes“ oder „eine Milderung der Strafe wegen verminderter Schuldfähigkeit“ herbeizuführen, ist unzulässig.84

II. Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde im NS-Staat Sieht man einmal davon ab, dass die Parteien und ihre Anwälte in der Epoche des Heiligen Römischen Reichs die Nichtigkeitsklage wiederholt zur Umgehung landesherrlicher Appellationsprivilegien und versäumter Berufungsfristen ausgenutzt haben, so sind andere, darüber hinausgehende Missbräuche dieses Rechtsmittels nicht bekannt geworden. Das gilt auch für erstinstanzliche Urteile, welche die beiden höchsten Reichsgerichte ex officio aufheben konnten. Denn sie haben sich in diesen Fällen soweit ersichtlich an die Grundsätze gehalten, die für ein unheilbar nichtiges Urteil bestimmt waren. Das sollte sich im NS-Staat ändern. Um auf Strafurteile einwirken zu können, die den nationalsozialistischen Machthabern nicht passten, weil sie entweder einen Freispruch enthielten, zu milde waren oder einen Parteigenossen zu schwer belasteten, erfanden sie den außerordentlichen Einspruch85 und eine völlig neue Art der Nich82 Vgl. G. Wesener, Prozeßmaximen, in: Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (HRG), Bd. 4, hg. von A. Erler/E. Kaufmann/R. Schmidt-Wiegand, Berlin 1990, Sp. 53 – 62. 83 Der Staatsanwalt hat gem. § 365 i.V.m. § 296 StPO das Antragsrecht zur Wiederaufnahme unter den im Gesetz genannten Voraussetzungen sowohl zugunsten (§ 359 StPO) als auch zuungunsten des Verurteilten (§ 362 StPO); R. Hannich (Hg.), Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung. 6. Auflage. München 2008, § 359 Rdnr. 4 und § 362 Rdnr. 4. 84 § 363 StPO. 85 Vgl. im Einzelnen dazu H.-J. v. Dickhut-Harrach, „Gerechtigkeit statt Formalismus“. Die Rechtskraft in der nationalsozialistischen Privatrechtspraxis (= Prozeßrechtliche Abhandlungen, Heft 62, hg. v. G. Baumgärtel, Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München1986, S. 119; G. Werle, Justiz-Strafrecht und polizeiliche Verbrechensbekämpfung im Dritten Reich, Berlin/ New York 1989, S. 23. Dementsprechend wurde der Oberreichsanwalt auf Grund des Gesetzes zur Änderung von Vorschriften des allgemeinen Strafverfahrens […] v. 16. September 1939 ermächtigt, gegen Strafurteile bei einem dazu eigens gebildeten besonderen Senat des Reichsgerichts Einspruch einzulegen. Ein solcher Einspruch war beispielsweise in dem schon häufig in der Literatur erörterten Fall des Ewald Schlitt eingelegt worden. Schlitt hatte seine Frau derart misshandelt, dass sie an den Folgen verstorben war. Der Täter wurde deswegen am 14. März 1942 vom Landgericht Oldenburg zu fünf Jahren Zuchthaus verurteilt. Auf persönliches Betreiben Hitlers, der das Urteil für zu milde hielt, legte der Oberreichsanwalt Einspruch beim Sondersenat des Reichsgerichts ein. Dieser fällte ein Todesurteil, das am

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tigkeitsbeschwerde.86 Letztere konnte vom Oberreichsanwalt beim Reichsgericht innerhalb eines Jahres nach Eintritt der Rechtskraft erhoben werden,87 wenn ein Urteil „wegen eines Fehlers bei der Anwendung des Rechts auf die festgestellten Tatsachen ungerecht“ war.88 Ein derartiger Nichtigkeitsgrund fand sich in der weiterhin im NSStaat geltenden StPO89 nicht. In Wahrheit handelt es sich bei diesem Nichtigkeitsgrund um einen Rechtsanwendungsfehler,90 für den das Rechtsmittel der Revision hätte maßgebend sein müssen. Dementsprechend konnte damals wie heute dieses Rechtsmittel nach der StPO darauf gestützt werden, dass das „Urteil auf einer Verletzung des Gesetzes“ beruht, wenn also „eine Rechtsnorm nicht oder nicht richtig angewendet worden ist.“91 Das Perfide war, dass man mit dieser neuartigen Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde zum Nachteil eines politisch unerwünschten Täters oder zum Vorteil eines verurteilten Parteigenossen die in der StPO vorgesehenen engen Voraussetzungen zur Aufhebung oder Änderung eines rechtskräftigen Strafurteils92 erheblich erweitert hatte.93 Außerdem wurde dem Oberreichsanwalt ein immenser Ermessensspielraum dadurch eingeräumt, dass er eine Rechtsverletzung schon dann annehmen konnte, wenn er die 31. März 1942 in Dresden vollstreckt wurde; vgl. L. Gruchmann, Generalangriff gegen die Justiz, in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Jahrgang 51, 2003, S. 510; Th. Vormbaum, Einführung in die moderne Strafrechtsgeschichte, 3. Auflage, Berlin/Heidelberg 2016, S. 209, Rdnr. 3 – 5; vgl. zum Unterschied von Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde und außerordentlichem Einspruch C. Broichmann, Der außerordentliche Einspruch im Dritten Reich (= Quellen und Forschungen zur Strafrechtsgeschichte, hg. v. A. Koch/A. Roth/J. Zopft, Bd. 11), Berlin 2014, S. 321 – 327. 86 § 34 der Verordnung über die Zuständigkeit der Strafgerichte, die Sondergerichte und sonstige strafverfahrensrechtliche Vorschriften v. 21. Februar 1940; vgl. Th. Vormbaum, Einführung (wie Fn. 85), S. 209, Rdnr. 3 – 5; G. Werle, Justiz-Strafrecht (wie Fn. 85), S. 33; H.-J. v. Dickhuth-Harrach, „Gerechtigkeit …“ (wie Fn. 85), S. 119; zur Geschichte der Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde im Nationalsozialismus vgl. C. Broichmann, Der außerordentliche Einspruch (wie Fn. 85), S. 315 – 319. 87 Th. Vormbaum, Einführung (wie Fn. 85), S. 209, Rdnr. 3 – 5; H.-J. v. Dickhuth-Harrach, „Gerechtigkeit …“ (wie Fn. 85), S. 120; C. Broichmann, Der außerordentliche Einspruch (wie Fn. 85), S. 319. 88 Typisch ist, dass Urteile des Volksgerichtshofes von dieser Verordnung ausgenommen waren; Th. Vormbaum, Einführung (wie Fn. 85), S. 209. 89 W. Sellert, Nationalsozialistische Ideologie und der Versuch zu einer Reform des Strafprozeßrechts im Dritten Reich, in: Justiz und Nationalsozialismus, hg. v. der Niedersächsischen Landeszentrale für politische Bildung 1985, S. 59 – 96. 90 Mit der Verordnung vom 13. 8. 1942 wurde die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde „auf tatsächliche Fehler und Bedenken gegen den Strafausspruch erweitert“; H.-J. v. Dickhuth-Harrach, „Gerechtigkeit …“ (wie Fn. 85), S. 120; C. Broichmann, Der außerordentliche Einspruch (wie Fn. 85), S. 320. 91 § 337 StPO; C. Broichmann, Der außerordentliche Einspruch (wie Fn. 85), S. 326, bezeichnet daher zurecht die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde als „rechtskraftdurchbrechendes, revisionsähnliches Institut“. 92 §§ 362, 263 StPO in der Fassung vom 1. September 1935. 93 G. Werle, Justiz-Strafrecht (wie Fn. 85), S. 23.

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fehlerhafte Rechtsanwendung für „ungerecht“ hielt. Mit der Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde konnte daher „jedes der politischen Führung mißliebige Urteil über eine Weisung an die Oberreichsanwälte zu Fall gebracht werden.“94 Gefährdet waren folglich besonders Urteile, die den nationalsozialistischen Machthabern aus ideologischen Gründen nicht genehm waren, weil sie beispielsweise dem sog. gesunden Volksempfinden widersprachen. Es liegt nahe, dass diese Entwicklung den Wünschen Hitlers entgegenkam, der sich mehrfach persönlich in die Justiz eingemischt und ohne Rücksicht auf die bestehende Rechts- und Gesetzeslage ihm missliebige Gerichtsurteile gescholten hatte.95 Denn er war der Ansicht, dass die Justiz kein „formales Recht“ durchsetzen dürfe, wenn es um die Belange des Nationalsozialismus in Deutschland gehe.96 Wie in der Praxis mit den Nichtigkeitsbeschwerden verfahren worden ist, bedarf noch einer gründlichen Untersuchung.97 Typisch scheint jedoch eine Rundverfügung des kommissarischen Reichsjustizministers Schlegelberger v. 24. 7. 1941 an die Oberlandesgerichtspräsidenten und Generalstaatsanwälte zu sein. Dort wird beklagt, dass in Urteilen, „gegen Polen […] wegen Sittlichkeitsverbrechen oder anderer schwerer Straftaten […] völlig unzureichende Freiheitsstrafen erkannt worden“ seien.98 „Derartige Urteile“ so heißt es, „offenbarten eine unverständliche, nachsichtige Einstellung gegenüber dem uns unversöhnlich gegenüberstehenden polnischen Volkstum. Sie gefährdeten die Sicherheit des Deutschen Volkes und begründeten den Vorwurf, daß die Strafrechtspflege gegenüber den Notwendigkeiten des Krieges versage“.99 Denn, so der Reichsjustizminister: „kriminelle Elemente und Sittlichkeitsverbrecher polnischen Volkstums“ müsse „in aller Regel die Todesstrafe treffen.“100 Dem Runderlass hatte der Minister eine Liste von Urteilen gegen „polnische Verbrecher“ beigefügt, deren „Abänderung“ er im Wege des außerordentlichen Ein94

Eodem. Vgl. dazu L. Gruchmann, Generalangriff (wie Fn. 85), S. 509 – 520, insbes. S. 515 – 518. 96 Damit forderte Hitler die Richter zur Rechtsbeugung auf. Am 26. April 1942 hatte er im Reichstag sogar einen Beschluss erwirkt, der ihn ermächtigte, Richter, die nicht in seinem Sinne geurteilt hatten, zu entlassen; vgl. L. Gruchmann, Generalangriff (wie Fn. 85), S. 510; Th. Vormbaum, Einführung (wie Fn. 85), S. 209. 97 Sicher ist, dass in der Zeit von 1940 bis 1945 „vom Oberreichsanwalt allein beim III. Strafsenat des Reichsgerichts 437 Nichtigkeitsbeschwerden eingelegt“ worden sind. Davon waren 118 zugunsten und 319 zuungunsten der Angeklagten erhoben worden. Ob die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerden überwiegend zu günstigen oder ungünstigen Entscheidungen für die Angeklagten geführt haben, ist streitig. Nach wohl bisher herrschender Ansicht ist die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde überwiegend „zuungunsten der Angeklagten schwer mißbraucht worden“ ist; vgl. dazu U. Schumacher, Staatsanwaltschaft und Gericht im Dritten Reich. Zur Veränderung der Kompetenzverteilung im Strafverfahren unter Berücksichtigung der Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik, Köln 1985, S. 197; H.-J. v. Dickhuth-Harrach, „Gerechtigkeit …“ (wie Fn. 85), S. 120, Fn. 44. 98 W. Sellert/H. Rüping, Von der Aufklärung (wie Fn. 77), S. 286 f. 99 Eodem. 100 W. Sellert/H. Rüping, Von der Aufklärung (wie Fn. 77), S. 288. 95

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spruchs und der Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde habe veranlassen müssen.“ Darunter befand sich auch eine Entscheidung der Strafkammer des Landgerichts Lüneburg, die einen Polen wegen „Gewaltunzucht“ zu Gefängnis verurteilt hatte. Das Reichsgericht hat auf Grund einer Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde das Urteil aufgehoben und die Sache zurückverwiesen, weil die Strafkammer § 4 der Volksschädlingsverordnung v. 5. September 1939 (VVO) nicht angewendet hatte.101 Da die VVO auch für geringfügige Delikte die Todesstrafe vorsah, musste der Pole nunmehr um sein Leben fürchten.

III. Zusammenfassung Die Nichtigkeitsklage gehört mit ihrem Alter von mehr als 2000 Jahren zu den Prozessrechtsfiguren von erstaunlicher Kontinuität und Beständigkeit. Sie war und ist ein Rechtsbehelf, mit der die an sich unumstößliche formelle Rechtskraft eines Urteils durchbrochen werden kann. Sie musste daher an eng begrenzte Nichtigkeitsund Verfahrensgründe gebunden werden. Diese Gründe sind bereits ansatzweise im klassischen römischen Recht formuliert worden. Sie wurden im kanonischen und Gemeinen Recht weiterentwickelt und haben Eingang in die Praxis des RKG und des RHR gefunden. Von dort haben sie die Entwicklung der Nichtigkeitsklage bis heute nachhaltig bestimmt. Die Nichtigkeitsklage und ihr Verfahren dienten nicht nur dem Schutz des Verurteilten, sondern auch der Kontrolle von Urteilen der Gerichte, die, wie es in einer frühen Quelle heißt, übel, nichtiglich und widerrechtlich geurtheit hatten.102 Offenkundiges Unrecht durch staatliche Gerichtsbarkeit sollte keinen Bestand haben. Insoweit verkörpert die Nichtigkeitsklage eine mit rechtsstaatlichen Grundsätzen konforme Prozessinstitution. Sie ist nicht nur im deutschen, sondern in allen zivilisierten Rechtsordnungen der Welt in jeweils unterschiedlichen Ausgestaltungen zu finden. Auch das Europarecht ermöglicht es, die Rechtmäßigkeit von Handlungen der Unionsorgane und sonstigen Einrichtungen der Europäischen Union (EU) durch den Europäischen Gerichtshof (EuGH) mit der Nichtigkeitsklage überprüfen zu lassen.103 – Im NS-Staat ist die Nichtigkeitsklage zur Durchsetzung ideologischer Ziele in eine Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde für das Strafprozessrecht umgeformt worden. Summary The action for annulment, having existed for more than 2000 years, is one of the legal redresses with astonishing continuity and stability. It was, and is, a legal possibility to reopen an irrevocable and formal legal judgement. It therefore had to be bound striclty to grounds of in101

W. Sellert/H. Rüping, Von der Aufklärung (wie Fn. 77), S. 287. J. F. Cramer, Manuale (wie Fn. 56), S. 96. 103 Art. 263 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union (AEUV). 102

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validity and procedure. These grounds had already been rudimentarily formulated in classical Roman Law. They were further developed in Canonical and Common Law and found their way into the legislation and practice of both the Imperial Chamber Court and of the Aulic Council. These reasons determining the action for annulment were developed over a long period of time up to the present. The action for annulment and its procedure served not only as protection for the convicted person, but was also a control measure for court judgements. Blatant injustice due to state jurisdiction should not exist. In this respect the action for annulment embodied the principles of constitutional law corresponding to the institution of litigation. It is found not only in German law, but in the civilized legal systems of the world with varying instances. Even European Law enables the controlling of decisions of the executors and other institutions of the European Union (EU) with an action of annulment by the European Court of Justice (EuGH). In the NS State the action for annulment was transformed in order to establish criminal trial law for the purpose of enforcing idealogical aims.

Notes on ‘la Visita’1 to Castille By José Antonio Pérez Juan

I. Introduction The king has the authority to freely choose or oust his officials and, consequently, their supervision is also his responsibility2. It is not for us to go into the selection process of public servants3. It is evident that the mechanisms established by legislation will lead to the appointment of the most suitable person, although, as Torres Aguilar points out, doctrine itself will be responsible for warning the monarch of the need to be vigilant regarding his employees4. We should not forget that “la percepción de la eventualidad de que los agentes del poder público cometieran abusos e incurriesen, por ende, en actuaciones reprobables, en especial de que los jueces no administrasen justicia con la rectitud exigible, ha resultado cualquier cosa menos excepcional”5. In order to avoid these undesirable situations the monarch was under the obligation to control the acts of the officials. The traditional means for controlling staff serving the administration was ‘la residencia, la visita y la pesquisa’. What we have here, therefore, are instruments of supervision used by the Crown that, according to Roldán, provide a three way advantage: first, they allow the person wronged to denounce abuses committed by judges in a more convenient and regular way, thereby obtaining a more rapid solution; second, the inspectors are called on to give a periodical account of their conduct, which forces 1

‘La visita’ a mechanism used by the Crown to control public officials. J. M. Garcia Marín, El oficio público en Castilla durante la baja Edad Media, Madrid, 1987, p. 21. 3 Regarding the means of control that should be used when selecting public officials vid. The aforementioned work by García Marín, El oficio público …, pp. 192 et seq., and by the same author, “El dilema ciencia-experiencia en la selección del oficial público de la España de los Austrias”, in: Actas del IV Symposium de Historia de la Administración, 1983, pp. 261 – 280. 4 M. Torres Aguilar, about the control of public officials in early middle age Castile. The long and continued existence of Roman Law, p. 180, in Revista de Administración Pública, n8. 128, May–August 1992, p. 180. 5 B. González Alonso, “Los procedimientos de control y exigencia de responsabilidades de los oficiales en el Antiguo Régimen (Corona de Castilla, siglos XIII–XVIII)”, in: Anuario de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, n8. 4 (2000), issue dedicated to the responsibility of the Law, p. 251. 2

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them to be moderate when exercising their powers; and finally, through the results of the aforementioned processes, the Monarch and his Council would know about the problems in their administration, and be able to articulate measures aimed at solving them6. Historiography has paid special attention to the study of these institutions. Their analysis has been carried out in the Indies7, and more recently in Italy8 and Castile9. For our part we have had the opportunity to study the process instructed by Ramírez Fariña at the Seville Audience between 1623 and 1632. The analysis of this record has allowed us to deduce the general characteristics, determine the functions of ‘el visitador’10, as well as identifying the phases of the process including the drawing up of

6 R. Roldan Verdejo, pp. 167, Los Jueces de la Monarquía Absoluta, La Laguna, 1989, p. 375. 7 Among others, Cespedes Del Castillo, “La visita como institución indiana”, in: Anuario de Estudios Americanos, III (1946), pp 985 – 1025; C. MOLINA ARGÜELLO, “Visita y residencia en Indias”, in: III Congreso Internacional de Derecho Indiano, Madrid, 1973, 423 – 431; I. Rodriguez Flores, “Decisiones del Consejo de Indias en materia de visitas y residencia a través de la obra de Lorenzo Matheu i Sanz”, in: III Congreso Internacional de Derecho Indiano, Madrid, 1973, 433 – 474; I. Sanchez Bella, “Visitas a Indias (s.XVI y XVII)”, in: Memoria del II Congreso Venezolano de Historia, Vol III, Caracas, 1975, 208 and “Visitas a la Audiencia de México (siglos XVI y XVII)”, in: Anuario de Estudios Americanos, Sevilla, 1975, Tomo XXXII, pp. 375 – 403; L. Zumalacarrégui, “Visitas y residencias en el siglo XVI. Unos textos para su distinción”, in: Revista de Indias, 26 (1946), pp. 917 – 921. More recent works to be highlighted are those by Vallejo García-Hevia about ‘los juicios de residencia’ of Pedro de Alvarado in Mexico and in Guatemala, in: Actas del XV Congreso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano, vol. II, 2008, pp. 1487 – 1550. 8 M. Rivero Rodríguez, Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia, Madrid, 1998, pp. 76 – 83; 110 – 114 and 165 to 177; M. Peytavin, “Le calendair de l’administrateur. Périodisation de la domination en Italie suivant les Visites Génerales”, in: Mélanges de l’École Francaise de Rome, Tome 106-1994-1, pp. 263 – 332 and “Visites générales à Naples 16e–17e siècle”, in: Recherche sur l’historie de l’État dans le monde ibérique, Presses de l’École normale supérieure, París, 1993, pp.11 – 20. 9 Regarding this, among others, note the works by B. González Alonso about ‘la pesquisa realizada al Conde de Adanero’, in his work “Control y responsabilidad de los oficiales reales: Notas en torno a una pesquisa del s. XVIII”, in: Actas del II Symphosium de Historia de la Administración, Madrid, 1971, pp. 393 – 429; R. Gómez Rivero about the visit made by a judge from the Chancillería de Valladolid to the arms factory in Plasencia and Tolosa, in the book El gobierno y administración de las fábricas de armas (s. XVII). La familia Zavala, San Sebastián, 1999, pp. 107 – 130. Likewise, the work by M. Santos Coronas, “La Audiencia y Chancillería de Ciudad Real (1494 – 1505)”, in Cuadernos del Instituto de Estudios Manchegos, Ciudad Real, n8 11, July 1981, pp. 47 to 139, where the functions of the cited institution are analysed through records of the visit made by Martín de Córdova. The investigations by C. GARRIGA ACOSTA about the Castillian Audiencias and Chancillerías are of particular relevance, in general and more specifically in the article titled “Control y disciplina de los oficiales públicos en Castilla: la “visita” del Ordenamiento de Toledo (1480)”, in: Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español, n8. LXI (1991), pp. 215 – 390. 10 ‘El visitador’ the King’s representative sent to inspect the conduct of public officials while performing their duties.

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the outcomes by ‘el visitador’ and their presentation before the Council for their resolution11.

II. General Considerations We can define ‘la visita’, according to Rivero Rodríguez, as the method used by the Crown “para vigilar y corregir el comportamiento de sus servidores y oficiales”12. That is to say, it is a means of controlling public officials aimed at inspecting the activity they carry out while performing their duties. The similarity that exists between the ‘la visita, la residencia y la pesquisa’ has led authors to attempt to determine the general notes specific to each of the aforementioned institutions as a means of differentiating between them13. However, the characteristics outlined in different studies as belonging to ‘la visita’ can by no means be considered as definitive and absolute, since the changeable nature of law14 and the singular characteristics specific to each territory justify the fact that in certain cases there are exceptions to the notes of a general nature. In spite of this, in this study and in line with Céspedes del Castillo, we consider that the general characteristics of ‘la visita’ are15: 1. The initiation of the process does not imply the cessation of the civil servants being inspected. These officials will continue to perform their duties, except in cases where the seriousness of the accusations recommends that the inspector suspends some of them temporally. 2. The judicial inquiry must be carried out more or less in secrecy. There are two reasons that justify this circumstance: On the one hand, it facilitates the task of ‘el visitador’, so that “mejor pueda descubrir la verdad …”16. The aim is to stop the individuals whose conduct is being investigated from using their official capacity to threaten possible witnesses, so that the abuses or infractions they have committed do not become known to ‘el visitador’. On the other hand, the secrecy of their actions can prevent any harm to the 11 This work is a refined version of the article “La Visita de Ramírez Fariña a la Audiencia de Sevilla (1623 – 1632)”, published in: Historia, Instituciones y Documentos, n8. 29 (2002), pp. 357 – 405. 12 Rivero Rodríguez, Felipe II, p. 76. 13 Vid, among others, Céspedes del Castillo, “La visita”, 986 – 981; and the work by Rodríguez Flores, “Decisiones del Consejo de Indias”, pp. 445 – 446. 14 In this sense, Zumala Carregui, in his work “Visitas y residencias”, in his explanation of the differences and similarities between ‘la visita’ and ‘la residencia’ he understands that the former “pueden ser válidas para espacio y tiempo determinados e inaplicables en otras condiciones …”, p. 921. 15 Céspedes del Castillo, “La visita”, p. 991. 16 Sánchez Bella, “Visitas a la Audiencia de México”, p. 380.

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reputation of the public servant being inspected17, that is to say, the initiation of the first legal proceedings does not initially imply a judgement on the functions carried out by official being inspeced. However, the secrecy of the investigation presents serious drawbacks because the use of anonymous complaints could be exploited by ‘la visita’, using it as a means to vindicate old quarrels with members of the institution18. 3. It is not applied universally, that is to say it is carried out by the King’s agreement after numerous complaints have reached him about the functioning of a certain institution19. The inflexibility of the process and the scrupulousness of the procedure determined its use for serious and exceptional cases. Nevertheless, in their research, some historians have ascertained an evolution towards the generalization of ‘la visita’.20. 4. It is of a collective nature which aims to check the activity of a public entity or institution. This circumstance determines that the investigative procedure is not subject to spatial or chronological limitations. That is to say, the legal proceedings carried out by the inspector do not necessarily have to be limited to the city of residence of the institution but inquiries in other cities and places can be made. Furthermore, ‘el visitador’ need not undertake his task within a certain period of time, but his task will be understood as completed when he considers that he has obtained sufficient facts to be able to form a judgment so that the Council may resolve the charges that have been brought before them for their consideration. However, we should consider that the high financial cost of this mechanism compels the investigator to be prompt in carrying out procedures and prevents him from drawing out the process for an undetermined time21. This is an aspect which has remained unresolved by authors. That is to say, although the fact that it is directed at judging the conduct of all members of an institution is considered in general to be an essential note of ‘la visita’, and therefore, a 17 Regarding this, on speaking of ‘la visita’ to Mexico one sector of the doctrine manifests how the Vicerroy, whose conduct was being inspected, feels adversely affected by his being brought into disrepute because of the public nature of ‘la visita’., Sánchez Bella, “Visitas a la Audiencia de México”, p. 376. 18 Rivero Rodríguez considers the secrecy maintained in the proceedings of ‘la visita’ “permitía que la visita fuera instrumentalizada, usándose el sistema de denuncia con mala fe, haciendo que el procedimiento fuese tremendamente engorroso dado que, generalmente, resultaban encausados la práctica totalidad de los oficiales y ministros …”, Rivero Rodríguez, Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia …, p. 81. 19 Rodríguez Flores, “Decisiones del Consejo de Indias”, p. 445. 20 In the case of Italy, after affirming that ‘la visita’ was not carried out periodically and systematically, Rivero Rodríguez explains how in Naples in 1532, Carlos V ordered all permanent magi‘strates to be inspecyed “cada trienio”, Rivero Rodríguez, Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia …, p. 77. 21 In this sense, in his work “Visita a la Audiencia de México”, Sánchez Bella explains how the ‘visitador’ is urged from the Peninsula to finish his task due to the huge financial cost to the Crown’s coffers pp. 396 – 397.

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differentiating element with regards to ‘la residencia’, historians indicate how in certain cases it was executed with respect to one person or one office in particular. In this sense, on studying the controversies numbers 61 and 62 of the “Tractatus”, Rodríguez Flores explains how they contain an agreement for ‘la visita’ against a single civil servant and to prosecute one single action. This fact is explained, according to the same offer, by the very evolution of ‘las visitas’ in the indies, in which it can be observed how the so-called general ‘visitas’ are substituted but the introduction of individual ‘visitas’, aimed at analysing the specific conduct of certain royal offices or positions.22. 5. ‘El juez visitador’ lacks the authority to pass sentence. His function ends with the judicial investigation and charges are brought before the higher authority that appointed him to so that it can resolve the case23. In conclusion, it is of interest to point out a last point. According to Céspedes del Castillo, the sentence passed by the Council as a result of the visit is subject to appeal and supplication24. However, this view has been contested by Molina Argüello who believes that this assertion only confuses the terms of appeal and supplication. In the opinion of the latter, these types of resolutions can only be an object of supplication because they are passed by the Supreme Council, which is the highest hierarchical body with no other above it, and therefore it is only possible for the royal council itself to reconsider its decision.25.

III. Proceedings of ‘la Visita’ 1. Appointment As we have already noted, the authority for appointing ‘el juez visitador’ lies with the King. Generally, the office was attributed to trustworthy and mature attorneys, who as indicated by Céspedes, had to meet the conditions of honesty, discernment intelligence and skills26. In order to carry out his duties, the King endowed them 22 Regardimg this, Rodríguez Flores, “Decisiones del Consejo de Indias”, affirms, in accordance with Céspedes del Castillo, how the general ‘visitas’ were substituted by specific ‘visitas’, saying:“… que las llamadas visitas generales, tomadas a una comunidad conjuntamente, y a todo un distrito, etc. …, fueran sustituidas por visitas concretas, específicas y rápidas …”, p. 452. 23 Céspedes Del Castillo, “La visita”, 990; likewise, Rodríguez Flores, “Decisiones del Consejo de Indias” manifesting, “Todo lo recogido en su actuación ha de enviarlo al Consejo de Indias que es quien decide en último término …”, p. 446. 24 Céspedes Del Castillo, “La visita”, p. 990. 25 “En la visita (…), quien ve, determina y sentencia es el Juez Supremo, y en consecuencia, lo que por él se determina y sentencia no puede nunca ser apelado. Porque jamás cabe apelación del juez supremo. Solamente hay suplicación …”, Molina Argüello, “Visita y residencia”, p. 429. 26 Céspedes Del Castillo, “La visita”, p. 1018.

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with different responsibilities. On the one hand, he was authorized to consult the Audience archives27, and he was also authorized to consult the ‘agreement book’, and to attend audience sessions and voting28. Likewise, he was allowed to carry out any type of inquiries and ‘chief justice’ and judges of the Audience were required not to obstruct or hinder the task of ‘el visitador’. If this was not the case, any person who interfered with the investigation was expelled or taken to prison. Finally it was his responsibility to appoint clerks, bailiffs and other auxiliary staff that were required to accompany him in order to carry out his duties. With respect to the doctrine, the extent of the powers granted to ‘el visitador’ meet the purpose of facilitating and hastening his task29. The judge should possess enough prerogatives to allow him to prevent the officials whose actions are under examination from hindering the correct proceedings30. Nevertheless, the use of such powers constitutes an important danger given that they could cause serious conflicts between the inspected authorities and the inspector himself31. 2. The Process ‘La visita’ is carried out following a rigorous procedure32. Once the pertinent inquiries were made about how the institution had been functioning and about the conduct of its officials, ‘el visitador’ would notify them of the accusations that had been made against each of them, granting them a period of time, in which to present, where appropriate, the corresponding allegations. Once the defence was presented and all the witnesses examined and proof was provided by the defendant, the investigating judge presented his conclusions to the monarch for the resolution of the case. There are diverse means of proof used by the inspector to carry out his mission. The use of testimonial evidence was habitual, for which they would use templates or questionnaires33. On other occasions, if the witness resided outside the city where the 27

Pérez Juan, “La visita …”, p. 364. In the royal writ of appointment of the ‘visitador’ of the Audience of Seville, Ramírez Fariña, said “… conbiene que en el tiempo que durare la dicha visita bea el libro del acuerdo y este en los acuerdo que ay y se haçe y se halle presente al botar los pleitos …”, General archive of Simancas (frome hereon AGS), Cámara de Castilla, Legajo 2804, Pieza 1a, Quaderno de Autos, fol. 5. 29 Céspedes Del Castillo, “La visita”, p. 1006. 30 During the investigation of ‘la visita’ Ramírez Fariña confirmed that on occasions, the officials under investigation used their position to prevent witnesses from confessing their criminal conduct, For example, the’judge’, Méndez de Parada, was accused of hindering the investigative activity of the visiting judge, preventing numerous witnesses from telling this inspector anything, Pérez Juan, “La visita …”, p. 365. 31 Céspedes Del Castillo, “La visita”, p. 1020. 32 Céspedes Del Castillo, “La visita”, p. 1007. 33 To carry out interrogations ‘el visitador’ of the Seville Audience, Ramírez Fariña, used different questionnaire templates, which on occasions exceeded a hundred, in which after 28

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inspected institution had its headquarters, a bailiff or even trusted third persons were given the commission, so that they could travel to where the witness was to take down his statement. Generally, in the appointment of the commissioners the place they had to travel to, who a statement should be taken from and the questions that should be asked were specified exactly34. However, in certain cases, higher powers were granted the commissioner, authorising him to not only interrogate certain people, but also “otras cualquiera personas que convenga”35. Along with the witness statements, we should highlight the use of documental sources. That is to say, the accusation could be supported by the documents under safeguard in the same institution which a public official under investigation belongs to36. For this purpose, he could order the clerks to present “las cédulas y provisiones y cartas acordadas (…) para ver lo que por ellas esta probeydo y mandado y saber como se a cumplido y guardado”37. On other occasions, examinations were made of both the documents and the functioning of the different audiences or sections that constituted the corporation under investigation. To do so, the visiting Judge could go to the headquarters of the institution to consult their ‘book of votes’38, or simply gain access to their offices and check some of their provisions39. In view of all the proof obtained, the inspector drew up the general and individual charges against the institution’s staff. Each of the interested parties would be individasking the witnesses general questions, he would question them about the conduct of the judges from the Audience, Pérez Juan, “La visita …”, p. 369. 34 Among others, we find the commission sent to the town of Carmona to interrogate Doña María Cotina, widow of Ro de Quintanilla, where among other questions the following was established, “Si conoce a el licenciado luis pardo de lago alcalde que fue de la audiençia de sevilla y despues alcalde de la chanza de Vallid”, AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Legajo 2804, Pieza 3a, fol. 443. 35 In this sense, we can highlight the “Memorial para exsaminar en la villa de Tosina (…) en otras cualesquiera partes a un hixo de hernando (…) vecino de Tocina y a otras cualquiera personas que conbenga…”. Following this the questions were outlined in detail, “Primera, Si conocen al ldo Sancho Hurtado de la Puente oidor de esta real Audiencia y si es verdad que en su sala del dicho sancho hurtdo en la dicha audiençia passo un pleito de electiones en el offi8 de Pedro Cumeno scrviano dela dicha audiençia desde diciembre del año passado de mill y seiscientos y veinte y dos hasta diez y siete de junio de mill y seiscientos y veinte y tres que se sentencio en rrebista”, AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Legajo 2804, Pieza 3a, fol. 447. 36 Therefore, for example, in order to accuse the ‘judge’ Sancho Hurtado of receiving gifts and in exchange favour people with interests in the Audience, Ramírez Fariña used the different documents written by Sancho Hurtado himself in his own hand addressed to Antonio Cid where the actions carried outin favour of the aforementioned person in the Audience are described by the aforementioned ‘judge’, Pérez Juan, “La visita …”·, p. 370. 37 AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Legajo 2804, Pieza 1a, Quaderno de Autos, fol. 17. 38 On 24 July and 19 September 1626 Ramírez Fariña “fue aber el libro de los botoss y el que llaman de hordenas biexas …”, AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Legajo 2804, Pieza 1a, Quderno de Autos, fol. 25. 39 On Monday 19 October 1626 el señor visitador “fue a la auda rreal y estubo en la sala de el ldo don al8 de paradas y (…) su sa presidio estando en mejor lugar bieron algunas provissiones …”, AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Legajo 2804, Pieza 1a, Quaderno de Autos, fol. 25.

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ually notified of the prosecution’s report40. Once the charges were known, the defendants had a period of eight days to submit their defence to ‘el visitador’ to defend themselves of the accusations formed against them, accompanied by any means of proof they deemed opportune. Generally, the defence could be presented by the audience judge himself or a third person authorised to do so41. The structure of the statement of allegations was very simple, the defendant would analyse each of the charges formed against him while presenting the means of proof that he considered opportune to contest the cited accusation. Therefore, for example, in the defence studied in ‘la visita’ to the Seville Audience, it said: “Al primer cargo en que se le ynputa que es mal acondicionado y que trata mal a los ministros y negociantes. Este es cargo es general por que no se dice en el en que cassos particulares a tratado mal a los sussodichos y ussado de condicion con ellos, y asino tenia obligacion de responder pero a mayor abundamiento se responde …”42

After examining the allegations and evaluating the proof presented by the parties in their defence, ‘el visitador’ presented the final charges before the Castile Council, so that they could resolve the case. We cannot go into a detailed study of each of the accusations made, although it is of interest to indicate, by means of illustration, one of the most important, In the case studied of ‘la visita’ by Ramirez Fariña of the Seville Audience we find formal shortcomings that affect the procedures and resolution of the process, but we also find anomalies during ‘las visitas’ to prisons and accusations due to the obscure professional and family relations between the Audience officials themselves or parties external to the judicial institution. One of the main anomalies denounced by ‘el juez visitador’ directly affects the corresponding competences of the Seville Audience. There are numerous abuses committed by ‘the chief justice’ and the ‘judges’ who overreached their responsibilities and got involved in settling cases that did not correspond to them according to the law and orders of the Sevillian Judicial Institution. In this sense, Ramírez Fariña ascertains how “contra derecho y contra los dispuesto por la última visita desta audienzia”, it is familiar in first instance with civil cases43. In the same way, we should not forget that the correct administration of justice required public officials to live a well-ordered life and possess excellent moral and social considerations. In this respect, they should maintain a positive attitude during the development of judicial procedures, and abstain from any social life in the territorial jurisdiction of the Audience. This is clearly expressed by Prof. García Marín, on affirming “condición de persona pública imprime carácter en el sujeto, de modo que en todo momento está obligado a dejar a salvo su dignidad y el 40

Pérez Juan, “La visita …”, p. 370. Therefore, for example, on 17 December 1626, Sancho Hurtado de la Puente, empowered Juan García Ronquillo, procurator of the Audience, to apply for an extension of the term granted for presenting his defence AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Legajo 2806, Pieza 9a, fol. 11. 42 Pérez Juan, “La visita …”, p. 371. 43 AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Legajo 2807, “Cargos generales Regente y oidores” en Pérez Juan, “La visita …”, p. 375. 41

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honor a que se hace acreedor por razón del oficio que desempeña”44. In this same sense, on studying the regime of incompatibilities, Roldan Verdejo considers that the list of prohibitions “abarca muy variadas facetas de la vida del juez”45 from specific aspects that affect his carrying out his duty, like not being able to know about the lawsuits themselves, even general restrictions and especially those that affect the financial and business field. Despite the legal prohibitions, in our case, in his legal proceedings ‘el visitador’ confirms how ‘the chief justice’ and the ‘judges’ developed an intense social life during their stay in Seville to the point where they became godfathers to the neighbours children46. Nevertheless, the situation is much more serious if we analyse the financial activity of the ‘judges’. In the individual charges formed against each of these officials, it is ascertained that they committed fraudulent excesses on carrying out different financial activities both in their own names and through third parties47. 3. The Outcomes of ‘la Visita’ Once the case was received by the King, he appointed members of his Council to whom it corresponded to resolve it. It is here that data of special relevance arises. As we have already seen, the authors have affirmed that, unlike other instruments of control, ‘el visitador’ did not resolve cases, but he was limited to examining the case and submitting it to the Council for their resolution. However, this assertion shouldbe clarified. In the case studied from the Seville Audience ‘el visitador’ Ramírez Fariña, as well as being the investigator in the case, also intervened in the final resolution of the process.48. Furthermore, aware that it was impossible for all the commissioners to attend in order to know about and determine ‘la visita’, the royal writ for the appointment of judges commissioned for its resolution required the concurrence of at least four members to validate the agreements. Finally, we should indicate that the excessive duration of the process within the Council led to changes in the composition of the members of ‘la visita’, whether through the death of some of them or through promotion, new councillors had to familiarize themselves with ‘la visita’49. Likewise, we have 44

García Marín, La Burocracia castellana, p. 130. Roldan Verdejo, Los jueces, 127. 46 AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Legajo 2807, “Cargos generales …”, cargo 458. 47 In this regard, Pérez Juan, “La visita …”, pp. 382 – 385. 48 In this sense, on 3 May 1627, to resolve ‘la visita’ of Ramirez Fariña to the Seville Audience Melchor de Molina; Juan de Chaves y Mendoza; Gonzalo Pérez de Valenzuela; Francisco de Texada y Mendoza; Juan de Frias Mesia; Diego González de Cuenca y Contreras y Francisco de Alarcon, were apointed judges “demas del dicho don fernando Ramírez Fariña”, Pérez Juan, “La visita …”, p. 372. 49 “Comensose aber la bisita por los señores mor de molina: don juan de chaves y mendoça, don g balençuela: d juan de firas mesia: d diego de contreras franco de alarcon = en esto murio el señor don diego de contreras fuesse prosiguiendo sin el = en el llegando a Sancho Urtado se 45

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been able to ascertain how the supreme court was not restricted to resolving the case in view of the documents presented by ‘el juez visitador’, but also had powers, whenever it was considered appropriate, to carry out new inquiries, commissioning third parties to travel to the scene of events and confirm certain aspects of ‘la visita’. The outcomes of ‘la visita’ were defined in two types of measures. On the one hand, and to our understanding this is the most relevant issue, the general charges and accusations formed against the staff of the Institution would allow a new legislation or ordinance to be drawn up that would resolve the deficiencies observed by ‘el visitador’. In this point, ‘la visita’ that Ramírez Fariña carried out at the Audience of Seville and which we have referred to on other occasions is especially relevant. The thoroughness in the procedures and the seriousness in the presentation of the accusations led to the general charges presented for consideration by the Council of Castile to acquire the category of ordinances. In this sense, it said: “El Rey, Regente, y juezes de la nuestra Audiencia de la ciudad de Sevilla. Sabed, que aviendose mandado ver la visita, que de esta Audiencia hizo por nuestro madado el Licenciado D. Fernando Ramírez Fariña, del nuestro Consejo, y Cámara (…), se me consultó: y en lo que por ella pareció aver hecho, y administrado justicia, nos tenemos de vos por bie servido. Y porque resulta, que en algunas cosas no se à guardado lo preveìdo por otras visitas, y leyes destos Reynos, y Ordenanzas de esta Audiencia, y que se à excedido dellas: Mandamos, que de aqui adelante, para la buena y breve expedición de los negocios, y que por los oficiales della se cumpla, se guarde lo siguiente …”50.

This is a note of special relevance, which has scarcely been dealt with by authors. To date, the doctrine has restricted itself to indicating that the Council of Castile confirmed or denied the proposal by ‘el visitador’, but it was not affirmed that the charges, where appropriate, could be raised to the category of rules which the members of the Audience were obliged to fulfil. On the other hand, the outcomes usually confirmed the individual accusations formed by ‘el visitador’ against the staff inspected. In general terms, the staff were sentenced to pay large financial sums, exile and on occasions to prison sentences. Among others, we would like to look at the case of the judge Alonso Méndez de Parada, who, accused of irregularities in ‘las visitas’ to the prisons, was sentenced to three hundred and fifty thousand ‘maravedís’, along with suspension from his office ico sin el señor don fdo ramirez y su memorial se hizo sin atender al señor don fdo. Y antes qeu se acabasse lo de sancho urtado fue promovido el señor d juan de chaves por governador del q8 de ordenes y por decreto de su magestad bolbio (…) el señor don juan de chaves asta acabar lo que tocaba Sancho Urtado = luego se fue prosiguiendo con los demas señores murio el señor d juan de frias y se fue prosiguiendo la bisita asta acabar con los oidores = Comencosse la bisita con los alcaldes y salio el señor franco de alarcon y entro el señor don antonio de Contreras”, AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Legajo 2806, Pieza 9a, s/f. 50 “Ordenanzas del año de 1632, que resultaron de la visita que desta Audiencia hizo el Licenciado D. Fernando Ramírez Fariña”, en Clavero, Ordenanzas, 505 – 584. This data is even more significant when we verify the identity among the general charges by ‘el visitador’ brought before the Monarch and the general Ordinance published by the royal Council.

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for a year51. But what is undoubtedly more interesting is the case of Sancho Hurtado52. His conduct as ‘judge’ was the one most questioned by ‘el visitador’, and a total of twenty-two individual charges were brought against him. This official took advantage of the powers inherent to his office to develop a profitable financial activity for his own benefit. In this sense, the Council considered Sancho Hurtado’s participation in trafficking in goods as proved, sentencing him to pay a thousand ducats53. On other occasions, in order to carry out commercial transactions and to cover up their participation in them, they used third persons to carry out the commercial operations54. Sancho Hurtado received the most serious sentence passed by the Council for the charges presented against him, by their ordering his suspension from his office of “juez en qualquier manera y en dos años de destierro desta Corte con veynte leguas y de Sevilla en otras veynte, y en tres mill ds8 camara y gastos demas de las quantidades en que ya queda condenado”55.

IV. Conclusions In the first place, the broad scope of the competences granted to ‘el visitador’ gives rise to important controversies. On the one hand, the relevance of his function compels the Council to endow him with numerous powers to enable him to carry out his mission, while on the other hand, these very powers could bring about important conflicts between ‘el juez visitador’ and the authority under investigation. The creation of a general table of the characteristics of ‘la visita’, which would allow us to differentiate it from other means of control like ‘la pesquisa’ or ‘el juicio de residencia’ is extremely difficult and complicated. In this sense, we determine how ‘el juez visitador’ does not restrict himself to the investigation proceedings alone, but participated with the Royal Council in the examination of ‘la visita’ and the establishment of its outcomes. Likewise, on occasions the officials examined do not continue carrying out their duties, but in the interest of guaranteeing the objectivity of the

51

Pérez Juan, “La visita …”, pág. 386. Sancho Hurtado was received as ‘judge’ of the Seville Audience on 7 January 1617 substituting Tomás de Rivera who had been promoted to the Chancillería de Granada, AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Legajo 2805, fols. 899 – 902. 53 “Demas de tratar en trigo cevada y arina como queda dicho contra leyes y ordenanzas (…) trata en comprar y rebender puercos y en comprar y bender vino y meter lo aqui de mala entrada …”, AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Legajo 2807, “Cargos particulares …”, cargo 78. 54 Among others, Juan Adan is noted, his servant, who the litigants negotiated with to receive favours from the aforementioned ‘judge’; Gaspar Silba, landlord and innkeeper, who covered up Sancho Hurtado’s trade in pigs, wine and barley; and Cisclos Muñoz, apothecary, specially stands out, with whom Hurtado de la Puente was carrying out important transactions in wheat and oil with third parties, AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Legajo 2807, “Cargos particulares …”, cargo 58. 55 AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Legajo 2807, “Cargos particulares …”, cargo 228. 52

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investigation ‘el visitador’ determines the separation or arrest of some of the cited officials.. Finally, we should indicate that the relevance of ‘la visita’ derives from the fact that it not only serves as an instrument for correcting the staff in service to the administration, but also because the conclusions that can be drawn from it can be converted into rules which both the officials examined and all the staff of the Audience are obliged to meet.

La exigencia de responsabilidad del Justicia de Aragón: el proceso de Enquesta De José Antonio López Nevot

I. Introducción La finalidad de estas páginas es estudiar el proceso conocido indistintamente como inquisición o enquesta, alumbrado a fines del siglo XIV en el reino de Aragón para exigir la responsabilidad del Justicia y sus oficiales frente a los particulares agraviados por su actuación en el ejercicio del cargo. No vamos a ocuparnos de la inquisición o enquesta en virtud de la cual el monarca aragonés podía proceder contra los oficiales regios que delinquían en sus oficios, por tratarse de un procedimiento distinto. La inquisición contra el Justicia ha despertado desde antiguo el interés de los historiadores y juristas aragoneses. Así, Jerónimo de Blancas, cronista del reino, dedicó a la materia un amplio y pormenorizado capítulo de sus Aragonensivm rervm Commentarii, publicados en 15881, y Juan Ibando de Bardaxí, consejero de la Audiencia Real, hizo lo propio en sus Commentarii in qvatvor Aragonensivm Fororvm Libros, que vieron la luz en 15922. Modernamente han prestado atención a la institución autores como Lalinde Abadía3, González

1 Jerónimo Blancas, Aragonensiuvm rervm Commentari …, Cæsaraugustano, Historico Regni, auctore. Omnia S. R. E. animaduersioni subiecta sunto. Cæsaravgvstæ. Apud Laurentium Robles, et Didacum fratres, Aragonii Regni Typographos. MDXXCIIX, De Inquisitoribus Iustitiæ Aragonum, censorique Septemdecimvirorum iudicio, pp. 389 – 400. Existe traducción castellana: Comentarios de las Cosas de Aragon, obra escrita en latin por Jerónimo de Blancas, Cronista del Reino, y traducida al castellano por el P. Manuel Hernandez, de las Escuelas Pias, Biblioteca de Escritores Aragoneses publicada por la Excma. Diputacion Provincial de Zaragoza. Sección Histórico-Doctrinal, Tomo III, Zaragoza, Imprenta del Hospicio Provincial, 1878, edición facsimilar, con Introducción a cargo de Guillermo Redondo Veintemillas y Esteban Sarasa Sánchez, Cortes de Aragón, Zaragoza, 1995. 2 [Juan] Ibando de Bardaxí, Commentarii in qvatvor Aragonensivm Fororvm Libros … Domino Locorum de Bellestar et de la Selua, in Aragonensi Senatu Regio Consiliario, Auctore. Ad Illustrissimos Regni Aragonum Diputatos. Cum licentia, Cæsaraugustaæ Apud Laurentium Robles Regni Aragonum et Vniuersitatis Typographum Anno Domini MDLXXXXII, Forvs Inqvsitionis officii Iustitiæ Aragonum, ff. 461r-466r. 3 Jesús Lalinde Abadía, “Vida judicial y administrativa en el Aragón barroco”, Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español (= AHDE), 51 (1981), pp. 419 – 522.

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Antón4 y Fairén Guillén5. Pero antes de preguntarnos en qué consistió el juicio de enquesta, parece indispensable referirnos, siquiera sea brevemente, a la magistratura para la que fue concebido, el Justicia de Aragón6. Durante la Baja Edad Media, las tres instituciones fundamentales del reino de Aragón fueron la Monarquía, las Cortes y el Justicia. Si bien Juan Martín de Mezquita, que escribe en el siglo XVII, ubica al primer Justicia en 1115, bajo Alfonso I7, fue durante el reinado de Jaime I cuando la institución adquirió sus perfiles definitorios. En las Cortes de Ejea de 1265 se acordó que todas las causas entre el rey y los nobles, y las suscitadas entre los ricos hombres, caballeros e infanzones, se sometieran a la decisión del Justicia. El oficial se convirtió así en el juez competente para dirimir las controversias entre el rey y los nobles, y entre los propios nobles. El Justicia sería libremente designado y removido por el rey entre los caballeros8. Aunque para ejercer el oficio de Justicia no se requería la condición de letrado, determinados titulares de la magistratura sobresalieron por sus conocimientos jurídicos, actuando como consejeros o asesores del monarca, y desempeñando distintas comisiones regias, al margen de su actividad propiamente judicial. Un ejemplo elocuente es el de Jimeno Pérez de Salanova, Justicia de Aragón desde 1294 hasta 13309. Sin embargo, en la segunda mitad del siglo XIV, el reino 4 Luis González Antón, “El Justicia de Aragón en el siglo XVI (según los fueros del reino)”, AHDE, 62 (1992), pp. 565 – 585, y “Alfonso V, las Cortes aragonesas y la batalla en torno al Justiciazgo”, Aragón en la Edad Media, 14 – 15 (1999), volumen homenaje a la profesora Carmen Orcástegui Gros, I, pp. 709 – 720. 5 Víctor Fairén Guillén, “El proceso de enquesta y las firmas de derecho frente a él (Antonio Pérez)”, Segundo Encuentro de Estudios sobre el Justicia de Aragón: Zaragoza, 18 de mayo de 2001, El Justicia de Aragón, Zaragoza, 2002, pp. 105 – 127. 6 La bibliografía sobre el Justicia de Aragón es hoy tan extensa, que carece de sentido reproducirla aquí. Una exposición comentada de las aportaciones más significativas puede encontrarse en Esteban Sarasa Sánchez, “La historiografía sobre la institución del Justicia de Aragón en la Edad Media: un panorama retrospectivo”, en Sexto Encuentro de Estudios sobre el Justicia de Aragón: Zaragoza, 5 de mayo de 2005, El Justicia de Aragón, Zaragoza, 2005, pp. 53 – 63. 7 Vid. Esteban Sarasa Sánchez, “La historiografía” cit., p. 59. 8 Fueros, Observancias y Actos de Córte del Reino de Aragon. Nueva y completísima edicion, que comprende, además del texto oficial íntegro, las Ordinaciones de la Casa Real de Aragon, conforme á la traduccion castellana del Protonotario del Reino D. Miguel Clemente, un Glosario de las voces provinciales y anticuadas, y otro de las latinas bárbaras y exóticas que se encuentran en el cuerpo de la obra: precedida de un Discurso sobre la legislacion foral de Aragon, y seguida de un Apéndice, donde ván insertos la Union y concordia general del Reino, establecida el año de 1594, y algunos otros documentos importantes. Por el Dr. D. Pascual Savall y Dronda, y el Lic. D. Santiago Penen y Debesa, Zaragoza: Establecimiento Tipográfico de Francisco Castro y Bosque, 1866 (= Savall-Penén), I, Lib. I, ff. 37 y 36, p. 38. (Existe edición facsimilar, publicada en Zaragoza, en 1991). 9 Vid. Las Observancias de Jimeno Pérez de Salanova, Justicia de Aragón, Estudio introductorio y edición crítica de Antonio Pérez Martín, Catedrático de Historia del Derecho de la Universidad de Murcia, y Prólogo de Jesús Delgado Echeverría, Catedrático de Derecho civil

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pretendió que el oficial volviera a ser el juez de pleitos entre rey y nobleza configurado en 1265. En las Cortes de Cariñena de 1360, Pedro IV se comprometió a no encargarle oficios y comisiones ajenas al Justiciazgo, por los cuales hubiera de proceder contra aquellas mismas personas a quienes debía defender10. La jurisdicción del Justicia era muy amplia, casi universal. De ahí que autores como Rodrigo Estevan hayan puesto de relieve la indefinición de la magistratura en el entramado judicial aragonés. En principio, el Justicia actuaba como juez de apelación. Pero, con frecuencia, el monarca ordenaba al Justicia que se inhibiera en determinadas causas, procediese al sobreseimiento de otras, o ejecutase sin dilaciones sentencias dictadas por justicias menores. En ocasiones, las sentencias del Justicia eran revisadas por otras instancias de rango inferior. Todo ello cuestiona la concepción tradicional del Justicia de Aragón como la magistratura mayor del reino11. Con el tiempo, cinco procesos quedaron confiados principalmente a la jurisdicción del Justicia, de los cuales consignaremos aquí sólo dos, porque volverán a interesarnos: la firma de derecho, o iurisfirma, y la manifestación. Mediante la iurisfirma, todo particular agraviado o que temiera serlo en un procedimiento, comparecía ante el Justicia garantizando que estaría a derecho, es decir, que acataría la sentencia; bajo la denominación unitaria de firma de derecho cabían muy heterogéneas actuaciones procesales: apelación, entendida como nuevo juicio (en el supuesto de agravios cometidos), y fianzas, interdictos posesorios o excepciones dilatorias (en el caso de agravios hacederos o futuros). Por la manifestación, el Justicia amparaba a las personas que, habiendo sido acusadas de un delito, se temía fueran objeto de una actuación antijurídica (tormento, prisión arbitraria, malos tratos), custodiándolas en una cárcel especial, la cárcel de manifestados, y velando por su seguridad. Junto a la manifestación de personas, cabía también la de bienes muebles y la de escrituras, cuando se temía fueran objeto de trámite ilícito o corrieran riesgo de perderse. Ni la iurisfirma ni la manifestación podían otorgarse al vasallo frente a su señor12.

de la Universidad de Zaragoza, El Justicia de Aragón, con la colaboración de IberCaja, Zaragoza, 2000. 10 Savall-Penén, II, p. 201. Vid. Luis González Antón, “El Justicia de Aragón” cit. p. 567, y “Alfonso V” cit., p. 711. 11 María Luz Rodrigo Estevan, “Fondos documentales sobre el Justicia de Aragón en el Archivo Real de Barcelona (Archivo de la Corona de Aragón)”, en Sexto Encuentro de Estudios sobre el Justicia de Aragón: Zaragoza, 5 de mayo de 2005, El Justicia de Aragón, Zaragoza, 2005, pp.17 – 53, maxime 24, 26 – 28 y 30. 12 Vid. José Manuel Pérez-Prendes y Muñoz de Arracó, Los procesos forales aragoneses (Prelección 1977 – 78), Instituto de Historia del Derecho, Universidad de Granada, Granada, 1977, y Ángel Bonet Navarro, Procesos ante el Justicia de Aragón, Guara Editorial, Zaragoza, 1982, y “La actividad judicial del Justicia de Aragón”, en Sexto Encuentro de Estudios sobre el Justicia de Aragón: Zaragoza, 5 de mayo de 2005, El Justicia de Aragón, Zaragoza, 2005, pp. 65 – 77.

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El Justicia actuaba con el auxilio de lugartenientes, profesionales del Derecho que ejercían el oficio en ausencia o enfermedad de su titular. Hacia 1300, el Justicia disponía de un lugarteniente13. En las Cortes de Zaragoza de 1352, Pedro IV permitió que el Justicia nombrase dos auxiliares14. En las de Monzón de 1390, Juan I dispuso que, vacante por muerte u otra causa el oficio de Justicia, lo sirvieran sus lugartenientes con el título de regentes, hasta que el monarca proveyese el oficio, en un plazo de treinta días, computados desde aquél en que tuviese conocimiento de la vacancia15. Un Fuero de las Cortes de Alcañiz de 1436 añadió que, en el supuesto de que ambos regentes, o alguno de ellos, falleciera o fuese privado del cargo antes de que el rey proveyese el oficio de Justicia, el monarca o, en su ausencia, su primogénito o Lugarteniente, la Reina, el Gobernador general o los diputados del reino pudieran nombrar otro u otros regentes, en un plazo de quince días16. Según lo establecido en 1265, el Justicia era libremente designado y removido por el Rey. No obstante, un Fuero de las Cortes de Zaragoza de 1442, presididas por la reina María como Lugarteniente, ordenó que, en lo sucesivo, el Justicia de Aragón no pudiese ser removido ni privado del oficio por la sola voluntad del Rey, incluso con el consentimiento del oficial, sin que tampoco pudiera éste renunciar al cargo, declarando nulas ipso Foro la renuncia o privación del oficio. Asimismo, dispuso que la persona del Justicia, aún por causa civil, no pudiera ser presa ni detenida, sino por mandamiento del Rey y de las Cortes17. La disposición parece haber respondido a las acuciantes necesidades económicas de Alfonso V, ausente a la sazón en el reino de Nápoles18. En cualquier caso, ello determinó la vinculación del Justiciazgo en el linaje de los Lanuza. En 1442 ejercía el Justiciazgo Ferrer de Lanuza I, quien permanece en el cargo hasta 1479, fecha en que lo deja al tercero de sus hijos, Juan19. El Justiciazgo deviene así una magistratura hereditaria, lo que favorece la ausencia de formación técnico-jurídica de su titular.

13

En 1300 era lugarteniente del Justicia Juan de Abadía. (María Luz Rodrigo Estevan, “Fondos documentales” cit., p. 29). 14 Savall-Penén, II, Lib. X, f. 68, p. 117. 15 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. I, f. 82, p. 40. 16 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. I, f. 119, p. 40. 17 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. I, f. 145, p. 39. 18 Luis González Antón, “El Justicia de Aragón”, cit., p. 568, y “Alfonso V” cit., pp. 713 – 714. 19 Luis González Antón, “El Justicia de Aragón”, cit., pp. 568 y 572. Con el tiempo no dejaron de surgir contradicciones. En 1533, al fallecer Juan de Lanuza III dejando hijos menores de edad, asumió el Justiciazgo su sobrino Lorenzo Fernández de Heredia, quien ejerció el oficio hasta 1547, fecha en que lo renunció en manos del Rey para que proveyese la vacante en la persona del primogénito de su tío, Ferrer de Lanuza. Ante las dudas suscitadas sobre si la renuncia de Heredia y el nombramiento de Lanuza lesionaban el Fuero editado por la reina María en las Cortes de Zaragoza de 1442, el príncipe Felipe, que presidía las Cortes, reunidas en Monzón, se vio obligado a legitimar y habilitar la provisión del oficio. (SavallPenén, I, Lib. I, p. 39). Vid. Luis González Antón, “El Justicia de Aragón”, cit., pp. 572 – 573.

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Como contrapartida, desde las Cortes de Zaragoza-Calatayud de 1460 – 1461, el Justicia ya no designa a sus dos lugartenientes, que serán nombrados por el reino cada tres años previa insaculación en una “Bolsa de los Lugartenientes del justicia de Aragon” por los diputados de personas aptas y suficientes para ejercer el oficio20. En 1467 un Fuero de la reina Juana modifica el procedimiento de designación, que ahora es anual, y se llevará a cabo mediante insaculación en dos bolsas distintas: en la primera bolsa serían insaculadas “personas juristas é letradas”, aptas y suficientes y, en la segunda, “personas legos discretos, expertos”. No se extraerían nombres de la segunda bolsa mientras hubiese insaculados en la primera21. En las Cortes de Zaragoza de 1493 se dispuso que las sentencias dictadas por cualesquier jueces del reino, mayores o menores, en procesos y causas criminales, se pronunciasen con el consejo de cinco juristas expertos en Derecho y en los Fueros y prácticas del reino, naturales y domiciliados en Aragón, quienes debían residir en la ciudad de Zaragoza o en el lugar donde se instalase el Justicia de Aragón22. En 1519, y ante las protestas de los litigantes, que se quejaban de dilaciones en la expedición de las causas y procesos sustanciados en la Corte del Justicia, pues los cinco juristas expertos, en lugar de acudir los días ordinarios de consejo, habían puesto en práctica la celebración de consejos extraordinarios, con la intención de percibir tasas y salarios por sus votos, lo que redundaba en perjuicio de las partes, Carlos I procedió al reparo del Consejo del Justicia, disponiendo se eligiesen y nombrasen siete letrados de buena fama y reputación, mayores de treinta años, doctos y expertos en Fueros y observancias del reino, por tiempo de seis años continuos. Dichos letrados aconsejarían a los dos lugartenientes del Justicia en cualesquier causas – civiles y criminales –, provisiones, actos o pronunciaciones, ejerciendo el oficio durante diez años23. Los lugartenientes no podrían dictar sentencia definitiva sin el consejo de los siete letrados o de su mayor parte; en caso contrario, la sentencia sería nula, y los lugartenientes podrían ser denunciados24. Si quien dictaba la sentencia prescindiendo del consejo de los siete letrados era el propio Justicia25, se hallaría obligado a revocar aquélla, a petición de la parte contra la que se hubiese dictado26. Los consejeros del Justicia serían nombrados por el rey de entre dieciséis letrados propuestos por los brazos de las Cortes, cuatro por cada brazo. El monarca 20

Savall-Penén, II, f. 162, pp.161 – 162. Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 218, p. 143. 22 Savall-Penén, II, f. 228, pp. 173 – 174. 23 Savall-Penén, II, f. 246, p. 181. Al mismo tiempo se dispuso la suspensión del nombramiento y actuación de los anteriores cinco letrados, cuyas facultades fueron transferidas a los siete consejeros del Justicia de Aragón. (Savall-Penén, II, f. 253, p. 186). 24 Savall-Penén, II, f. 246, p. 182. 25 Lo que sugiere que el hecho era excepcional. 26 Savall-Penén, II, f. 253, p. 186. 21

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elegiría siete, seleccionando dos de cada brazo, excepto de un brazo, del cual nombraría sólo uno, quedando el otro en la bolsa de lugartenientes, y siendo preferido a los otros en el supuesto de vacancia de uno de los siete consejeros. Los demás candidatos no elegidos quedarían en la bolsa de los lugartenientes, para ejercer el oficio de lugartenientes del Justicia27. Se involucraba así la elección de los consejeros con la de los lugartenientes. La experiencia demostró que el Consejo del Justicia – vulgarmente conocido como Los siete de la Rota28 –, no había sido una innovación afortunada. De ahí que en las Cortes de Zaragoza de 1528 se adoptara una solución de compromiso, mediante el nombramiento de cinco letrados de buena fama y reputación, expertos y doctos en Fuero y en Derecho (es decir, en Derecho aragonés y en Derecho común), mayores de treinta años, con práctica al menos de cuatro años en el Reino, entre quienes habrían de repartirse las escribanías de la Corte del Justicia29. Los cinco letrados serían los nuevos lugartenientes del Justicia, y no podrían dictar sentencia definitiva sin el consejo de sus colegas, pudiendo ser denunciados en caso contrario30. La misma obligación incumbía al Justicia31. En las Cortes de Monzón de 1564 se estableció la exigencia de que los lugartenientes del Justicia fuesen graduados de doctores o licenciados en Leyes o Cánones (Derecho común), por las Universidades de Salamanca, Lérida y Huesca, u otras Universidades aprobadas32.

II. Las Cortes de Monzón de 1390 y el proceso de Enquesta ¿Quién o quiénes y cómo se exigía la responsabilidad en que hubiese podido incurrir el Justicia de Aragón en el ejercicio de sus funciones? En las Cortes de Zaragoza de 1348, Pedro IV había ordenado que en caso de que el Justicia procediera, o mandase proceder a ejecución real contra el Derecho del reino, contra la persona o bienes de alguno; o no certificara en el plazo de ocho días al oficial que le consultase, luego de haber sido requerido sobre duda acerca de lo que procedía y debía él hacer conforme al Derecho del reino; o si se negase a conocer de cuestión 27

Savall-Penén, II, f. 254, p. 187. Jerónimo de Blancas, Aragonensivm rervm Commentarii cit., p. 366. 29 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 259, pp. 130 – 131. 30 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 260, p. 132. Parafraseando a Lalinde, “la decisión unipersonal del juez se disuelve en la decisión consensual de un colegio de jueces”. (Jesús Lalinde Abadía, “Vida judicial” cit., p. 495). 31 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 264, p. 139. 32 El requisito tuvo un alcance general, pues se extendió a todos aquellos oficiales vinculados a la administración de justicia (Vicecanciller, Regente de la Cancillería, asesor del Regente el oficio de la general Gobernación, consejeros de la Audiencia Real, asesores del Zalmedina de Zaragoza y de otros jueces ordinarios del reino), y a los abogados que patrocinaran causas en Aragón. (Savall-Penén, I, p. 386). 28

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movida contra jueces, oficiales, o algunos de ellos, contra quien se hubiese propuesto se procediera a ejecución real contra la persona o bienes de alguno en contra del Derecho del reino; o que, no esperada la certificación del Justicia, de hecho se hubiese procedido contra ella, o fallado alguna cosa en los citados artículos contenidas y especificadas; o si el Justicia hubiera obedecido carta contra Fuero; o rehusado mandar que se ejecutase la sentencia dictada por él mismo contra algún juez u oficial; o no hubiese llevado a cabo o hecho todas y cada una de las cosas sobredichas, que él estaba obligado a completar y hacer: que en los casos citados en los que el Justicia hubiera hecho u omitido, si el hecho fuese criminal, y se hubiese seguido muerte, destierro, mutilación de miembros, pena corporal o prisión, el Justicia debía sufrir una pena semejante33. Si por razón de tal procedimiento o sobreseimiento no se hubiese seguido ninguna de las penas mencionadas, o el hecho fuera civil, y la parte hubiese sufrido gastos y daños, el Justicia se hallaría obligado a pagar los gastos a la parte perjudicada, y a indemnizar los daños con el duplo, y perdería el oficio, quedando inhabilitado para ejercer cargo público alguno, y para pertenecer a la casa o merced regias. Las penas impuestas al Justicia se llevarían a ejecución cuantas veces así lo pronunciasen o declarasen las Cortes generales. La ley concluía insistiendo en la obligación que, conforme al Fuero, incumbía al monarca de convocar Cortes de bienio en bienio34. Así pues, el Justicia sólo podía ser acusado ante el rey y las Cortes, sin que la ley llegase a regular el procedimiento. Ahora bien, el hecho de que las Cortes no se convocaran y reunieran con la periodicidad establecida, dilataba la eventual aplicación de las penas previstas en 1348. De ahí que en las Cortes de Monzón de 1390, y durante el Justiciazgo de Juan Ximénez Cerdán (1389 – 1420)35, Juan I introdujese la inquisición – llamada también enquesta – para exigir la responsabilidad en que hubiesen podido incurrir el Justicia y sus oficiales por abusos e irregularidades cometidos en el ejercicio del cargo. Aunque la inquisición se hallaba prohibida por las leyes del reino36, dicha regla conocía excepciones, pues el Rey podía proceder por vía de inquisición contra sus oficiales si delinquían en el

33 Así pues, el Justicia podía ser condenado a pena corporal, razón por la cual, según los foristas, el oficial debía ser caballero, pero no noble, pues los nobles, por fuero y costumbre del reino, no podían ser castigados con pena corporal. Vid. Miguel Del Molino, Repertorivm, Fororvm, et Observantiarvm Regni Aragonum, vnà pluribvs cum determinationibus consilii iustitiæ Aragonum practicis atque cautelis eisdem fideliter annexis. Authore … Jurisperito, Cæsaravgvstæ, Ex Officina Dominici à Portonariis S. C. R. M. Regni Aragoniæ Typographi, Anno 1585, voz Iustitia Aragonum, f. 200v. 34 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. I, f. 58, p. 46. 35 Sobre este Justicia, vid. Andrés Giménez Soler, “El Justicia de Aragón, Juan Giménez Cerdán”, Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos, Año I (Agosto y Septiembre, 1897), núms. 8 y 9, pp. 337 – 346. 36 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. IV, f. 12, p. 181, y Lib. IX, ff. 36 y 79, p. 341.

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oficio37. Es probable que antes de 1390 dicho procedimiento de control se pusiera en práctica contra el propio Justicia38. En el preámbulo de la ley, Juan I pone de manifiesto que el oficio de Justicia de Aragón era universal en el reino. De ahí que si el Justicia agraviaba a alguna persona, ésta no pudiera alcanzar convenientemente la debida justicia del magistrado, sobre todo en aquellos casos en que podía proceder contra los oficiales regios y otros, pues sus sentencias no eran susceptibles de apelación. Aunque el monarca reconoce que por Fuero – probable referencia a la citada disposición de Pedro IV – se había establecido que las penas impuestas contra el Justicia se ejecutaran, cuando así se declarase y pronunciase por las Cortes generales, ni aquel Fuero ni otro 37

Savall-Penén, II, Lib. VI, Observantiarum Regni Aragonum, p. 45. En palabras de Miguel del Molino, “Inquisitio regulariter est prohibita in Aragonia: quia de foro non habemus inquisitionem”. Sin embargo, “fallit dicta regula (…) in officialibus domini regis, siue rerum suarum administratoribus: vel contra procuradores, baiulos, iustitias, iudices, alcaydos, merinos, leuatores reddituum, quia in Aragonia non curant de officialibus, sed illos reliquerunt puniendos incuria domino regi ad suæ voluntatis”. (Miguel del Molino, Repertorivm cit., voz Inquisitio, ff. 181 v-182 r). Vid. Luis González Antón, “El Justicia de Aragón” cit., p. 578. En opinión de algunos juristas castellanos, como Juan Bautista Larrea y Francisco Bermúdez de Pedraza, en esta inquisición o enquesta se hallaba el origen de la visita, procedimiento de control y exigencia de responsabilidad de los oficiales reales, vigente en la Castilla moderna. Según Larrea, “hoc irregulare iudicium [visita], quo hodie vtimur, vt secretè de Magistratibus inquiratur, et sine copia testium capitula sola culparum exhibeantur syndicandis, vt ab eis possint exonerari, originem habuit à Regno Aragonum, vbi iudicium, enquesta dictum, quo maiorum Magistratuum excessus proceditur”. (Juan Bautista Larrea, Novarvm Decisionvm Granatensivm Pars Secvnda, Centvria Absolvta. Accessit Tractatus De Revelationibvs, cum Decisione consultiua S. Inquisitionis, Avthore Dre. D …, Eqvite Ordinis D. Iacobi, IC. Hispano, Olim apud Salmaticenses Collegii Maioris Conchensis Alumno, et Vespertinae Legum Cathedrae proprietario Interprete, Cancellariae Granatensis Senatore, Nunc à Consiliis Potentissimi Hispaniarum Regis Philippi IV. in supremo Castellae Iustitiae Senatu. Cum Indice Jurium quae explicantur, et Rerum verborúmque locupletissimo, Lugduni, Sumptibus Iacobi et Petri Prost, M.DC.XXXIX, decisio XCVIII, núm. 16, p. 351). Por su parte, Bermúdez de Pedraza afirma que “este juyzio de visita es extraordinario, no le conocieron las leyes Romanas, ni las de Castilla, fue vn juyzio nueuo que introduxo en ella el señor Rey don Fernando el Catolico, a imitación del juyzio de Encuestra (sic) del Reyno de Aragon, que refiere Geronimo Blancas”. (Por el Doctor Rodrigo Vazqvez de Rueda y Nauarrete, Capellan de su Magestad, y Administrador del Hospital Real desta ciudad, y Calificador del Santo Oficio de la Inquisicion. Sobre Los cargos hechos en la visita del dicho Hospital, como Administrador del. Por el Señor Doctor Don Pedro de Auila, Abad del Sacro Monte desta Ciudad, En Granada, en casa de Francisco Heylan, Impressor de la Real Chancilleria. Año de 1631, f. 1v, apud Marina Rojo Gallego-Burín, El pensamiento jurídico de Francisco Bermúdez de Pedraza. Una contribución al estudio de la jurisprudencia del Barroco, Tesis Doctoral, Granada, 2017, pp. 373 – 374). 38 Según el testimonio del Justicia Juan Ximénez Cerdán, su padre, el también Justicia Domingo Cerdán, fue sometido a proceso de inquisición por mandato de Pedro IV y a instancias del arzobispo de Zaragoza, por haber ocupado ciertos bienes eclesiásticos en defensa de la jurisdicción real, “yatsia que de fuero fuesse vedada [la inquisición] contra el dito Iusticia”. Las Cortes suplicaron al rey que revocase y anulase el proceso, por ser contra fuero. (Letra intimada por Mossen Ioan Ximenez Cerdan; a Mossen Martin Diez Daux, Iusticia de Aragon, en Savall-Penén, II, p. 83).

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alguno habían dispuesto la forma de proceder contra el magistrado, sus lugartenientes, notarios y vergueros39. En lo sucesivo, la inquisición sería llevada a cabo por cuatro personas idóneas, una por cada brazo o estamento, elegidas por el Rey entre ocho candidatos propuestos en las Cortes. Se afirmaba así la composición estamental, no técnica, del tribunal de los inquisidores: habría un inquisidor eclesiástico, otro noble, otro caballero o hidalgo y otro ciudadano. La primera vez formularían la propuesta los diputados del reino, en representación de las Cortes. Los inquisidores gozarían de suficiente y plena facultad para inquirir y hacer inquisición por sola denuncia de parte privada formulada verbalmente, y sin escritura, contra el Justicia y sus lugartenientes, notarios y vergueros40. Los inquisidores debían procurar que el notario registrase el nombre del denunciante y el contenido esencial de la denuncia en las actas del proceso de inquisición que se formase contra el Justicia y sus oficiales, de cualesquier crímenes, excesos, delitos, notables negligencias y grandes defectos que en lo sucesivo cometieran en el ejercicio de sus oficios, o con ocasión o color de los mismos41. La inquisición se llevaría a cabo tres veces al año, durante los meses de marzo, julio y noviembre. Los primeros inquisidores que se nombrasen, y su notario, se hallaban obligados a prestar juramento y homenaje en nombre del Rey y de las Cortes en poder de los diputados y de las mismas Cortes, de actuar bien y legalmente en la inquisición, apartando todo odio, favor, temor, amor o rencor, y guardando frente al Rey y cualesquier otras personas el secreto de las inquisiciones y lo en ellas contenido, hasta su publicación. Los sucesivos inquisidores debían prestar el mismo juramento y homenaje en poder del rey y de las Cortes al tiempo de su celebración; si no se hallasen reunidas las Cortes, el juramento y homenaje sería prestado en poder del Rey y de los diputados del reino. En caso de que el Rey se hallase ausente de Aragón, el juramento y homenaje se haría en poder del Gobernador y diputados, o de algunos de los mismos diputados, nombrados al efecto por sus propios compañeros de diputación42. Los inquisidores debían proceder a la publicación de la enquesta en las primeras Cortes generales o particulares celebradas en el reino, que se convocaban cada bienio, una vez concluidas las generales. En el supuesto de que no hubiesen concluido, la publicación debía hacerse antes de que se procediera a dictar otros actos de Cortes. Hecha la publicación, la inquisición debía llevarse a cabo durante los cuatro meses siguientes, plazo en que los inquisidores debían conceder al 39

Los vergueros eran oficiales encargados de ejecutar las decisiones del Justicia. Según Ibando de Bardaxí, “propriùs quàm de iure hæc denuntiatio assimilatur accusationi”. (Ibando De Bardaxí, Commentarii cit., f. 461v. 41 A contrario sensu, el Justicia y sus oficiales no podrían ser denunciados por actos cometidos extra officium. (Ibando De Bardaxí, Commentarii cit., f. 462v). Tampoco por defectos y excesos leves. (Ibidem, f. 463r). 42 Savall-Penén, II, Lib. XI, f. 81, p. 120. 40

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Justicia y a sus oficiales copia de los testimonios, actos y proceso contra ellos promovidos y actuados, para que cualquiera de ellos discerniera lo que convenía a su interés, y tiempo para contradecir y proponer y alegar sus defensas, y producir sus pruebas. Una vez concluidas, se le concedería del mismo modo copia de los testimonios presentados al procurador de las Cortes, al que los brazos debían nombrar en las primeras sesiones parlamentarias, para proseguir, instar y hacer determinar por sentencia las inquisiciones incoadas contra el Justicia y sus oficiales, otorgándole término para reprobar los testigos que por el Justicia y sus oficiales fuesen presentados. Los inquisidores debían proceder breviter, simpliciter, summariè, et de plano sine strepitu, et figura iudicii, sola facti veritate attenta. Una vez concluidas las inquisiciones, las Cortes no podrían proceder a otros actos hasta que fuesen terminadas por sentencia definitiva, la cual debía pronunciarse absolviendo o condenando, conforme a las penas establecidas en el Fuero, a excepción de las penas de daños duplicados, costas procesales, e interés del denunciante. La sentencia sería dictada por acuerdo del Rey y los cuatro brazos, o de su mayor parte, o de cualquiera de ellos que en aquello lícitamente pudiesen y debiesen intervenir conforme a Fuero y razón. Hallándose pendientes las inquisiciones, y no concluidas por sentencia definitiva, no podría procederse a suspensión de oficio alguno. Así pues, los inquisidores actuarían simplemente como jueces instructores, puesto que el proceso debía remitirse al Rey para que dictase sentencia, de acuerdo con los brazos. El mandato de los inquisidores se prolongaría hasta que las Cortes nombrasen a otros, del modo y forma prescritos. A su vez, los inquisidores debían ser sometidos a inquisición por sus sucesores en el cargo, para averiguar de qué modo y manera habían actuado en el desempeño del oficio. Si alguno de los inquisidores faltara en el ínterin por muerte, larga ausencia u otro legítimo impedimento, los demás inquisidores debían presentar ante el Rey o, hallándose ausente del reino, ante el Gobernador, dos personas del brazo correspondiente, para que el monarca o, en su caso, el Gobernador, eligiesen a una de ellas en un plazo de quince días computado desde que se presentara la propuesta43. Los inquisidores podrían ver e investigar todos los procesos originales y las actas de la Corte del Justicia y sus lugartenientes y notarios, quienes se hallaban obligados a exhibirlos cada vez que les fuesen requeridos, y a entregar copias, sin exigir precio a cambio. Por otra parte, se hallarían obligados a ejercer el oficio personalmente, sin delegarlo en ninguna otra persona, salvo en sus colegas y compañeros. De los cuatro inquisidores, al menos tres debían asistir personalmente al ejercicio y continuación de los procesos. Constante officio, los inquisidores no podrían abogar en la Corte del Justicia. Si lo hicieran, perderían las pensiones, e incurrirían en pena de trescientos florines. 43

Savall-Penén, II, Lib. XI, f. 82, p. 121.

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Los inquisidores percibirían un salario anual de trescientos florines, pagaderos de las generalidades del reino y, su notario, cien florines, devengados por tercios del año, al final de los meses de marzo, julio y noviembre44. ¿Cuál fue la actitud del Justicia ante la instauración del proceso de enquesta? En 1435, Juan Ximénez Cerdán, antiguo Justicia de Aragón, y autor de la traducción latina y de la ordenación por títulos de los Fueros de las Cortes de Monzón de 1390, emitía un juicio claramente desfavorable sobre la enquesta, por tratarse de un procedimiento costoso e inútil: Yatsia que por via de greuge pudiessen clamarse del Iusticia de Aragon, en las Cortes del Regno: é con muy poca espensa fizieron fer los Fueros de la enquesta del Iusticia de Aragon, de los quales se sigue al Regno expensas de treze mil sueldos, é no proveyto alguno. Los quales yatsia que por mi como Iusticia, sian ordenados é treslatados: pero antes que fuesse Iusticia fueron atorgados por la Cort45.

En las Cortes de Zaragoza de 1398, el hermano y sucesor de Juan I, Martín I el Humano, modificó algunos aspectos concretos de los Fueros de Monzón, disponiendo que la inquisición contra el Justicia y sus oficiales no se llevase a cabo durante tres meses interpolados (marzo, julio y noviembre), sino continuos, a saber, los de enero, febrero y marzo de cada año. Por otra parte, ordenó que si la calidad de los hechos y los méritos del proceso lo exigían, pudiera procederse por inquisición contra el Justicia y sus oficiales en la pena de los daños doblados y las costas46. En las Cortes de Maella de 1404, el mismo monarca – Martín I – prorrogó para las siguientes Cortes todos los procesos y actos que, según Fuero, debieran haberse practicado en el principio de las de aquel año, sobre la inquisición del Justicia, sus lugartenientes, notarios y vergueros, prorrogando asimismo el mandato de las personas elegidas como inquisidores, quienes, sin embargo, debían prestar nuevo juramento47. Un Fuero de las Cortes de Alcañiz de 1436, presididas como Lugarteniente general por el rey Juan de Navarra, insistió en la necesidad de que los notarios de la Corte del Justicia custodiasen bien los procesos tramitados en dicha Corte, “como sian subjectos á enquesta del Justicia de Aragon”48. Otro Fuero de las mismas Cortes recordó que según antigua y loable costumbre del reino, el Justicia, sus lugartenientes, notarios y vergueros no podían ser presos por oficial alguno, y los delitos de aquéllos, cometidos como personas privadas, sólo podían ser conocidos por el Rey y las Cortes, conjuntamente. No obstante, prosigue la ley, algunos oficiales del reino habían procedido indebidamente en sentido contrario. Por ende, se dispuso que la persona del Justicia no pudiera ser presa, citada, acusada, 44

Savall-Penén, II, Lib. XI, f. 83, pp. 121 – 122. Letra intimada cit., p. 85. 46 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. XII, f. 88, pp.124 – 125. 47 Savall-Penén, II, Lib. XII, f. 97, p. 126. 48 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. I, f. 120, p. 43. 45

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denunciada o vejada por el Rey, su Lugarteniente, el Gobernador general, ni por otro juez alguno, por los delitos que pudiera cometer como persona privada, por muy graves y enormes que fueran; la jurisdicción y conocimiento de los delitos, crímenes y excesos cometidos como particular por el Justicia quedarían reservados solum et insolidum al Rey y a las Cortes conjuntamente. Por lo que se refiere a la jurisdicción y conocimiento de los delitos cometidos como personas privadas por los lugartenientes, notarios principales (hasta número de seis) y dos vergueros del Justicia, quedaban reservados asimismo al Rey y las Cortes, o al propio Justicia49. Un Fuero de las Cortes de Zaragoza de 1442, presididas por la reina María como Lugarteniente general, ordenó que las relaciones de los procesos de inquisición no se encomendasen al procurador o procurador constituidos en Cortes para proseguir, instar y hacer determinar las inquisiciones, sino a aquél o aquéllos inquisidores que fuesen letrados, y si ninguno de los inquisidores lo fuese, o siéndolo, no pudiera o quisiera hacer las relaciones, las Cortes las encomendarían a uno de sus propios miembros letrados. Por otra parte, los inquisidores podrían hallarse presentes al examen y definición de los procesos, aunque sin derecho a voto, excepto si eran miembros las Cortes, actuando en calidad de tales50. Para disipar las dudas sobre la validez de las renuncias formuladas por los denunciantes ante los inquisidores, otro Fuero de las mismas Cortes de Zaragoza dispuso que si los denunciantes del Justicia, sus lugartenientes, notarios y vergueros, renunciaban a la denuncia antes de la conclusión de la causa, abonando al receptor de pecunias del reino las costas ocasionadas, no se proseguiría el proceso; en el supuesto de que la renuncia se formulase una vez concluida la causa, habría de determinarse, absolviendo o condenando en las penas contenidas en el Fuero, excepto el interés de la parte, al que podría renunciarse en todo caso y tiempo. Ahora bien, no se entenderían incluidos en las costas los salarios de los inquisidores, su notario y el procurador o procuradores nombrados por las Cortes51. Hay constancia de que el procedimiento fijado en 1390 para nombrar a los inquisidores no fue siempre observado. Un Acto de las Cortes de Zaragoza de 1446, celebradas por el rey Juan de Navarra como Lugarteniente general de Alfonso V, otorgó poder a Dalmau de Mur, arzobispo de Zaragoza, y al propio Justicia, Ferrer de Lanuza, para que nominasen a las personas que debían ejercer los oficios de inquisidores del Justiciazgo de Aragón, y notarios de dichos inquisidores, por tiempo de tres años. El arzobispo y el Justicia dispondrían de un plazo de siete

49

Savall-Penén, I, Lib. I, f. 119, pp. 38 – 39. Savall-Penén, II, f. 146, p. 156. Fundándose en esta ley, Jerónimo de Blancas sostiene que los inquisidores no se limitaban a instruir el proceso de inquisición: “Neque verò olim Inquisitores hi, tantummodò erant huiusmodi caussarum structores. Interdum enim, vt sua ferre suffragia possent”. (Jerónimo de Blancas, Aragonensivm rervm Commentarii cit., p. 394). 51 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 146, p. 156. 50

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meses para presentar a los candidatos52. Mur y Lanuza no sólo designaron a los ocho inquisidores, sino que también insacularon a quienes podían ser inquisidores en lo sucesivo53.

III. Las reformas de Juan II. El tribunal de los Diecisiete Judicantes En las Cortes de Zaragoza-Calatayud de 1460 – 1461, unas de las más significativas en la historia de nuestra institución, Juan II reguló minuciosamente el proceso de inquisición o enquesta, aduciendo que hasta entonces no había sido “plenament proveydo”54. En primer lugar, dispuso que, cada año, los inquisidores del Justicia residiesen en la ciudad de Zaragoza desde el primero de abril hasta el ocho de junio siguiente, ejerciendo su oficio en las casas de la Diputación del Reino55. Allí recibirían, durante los diez primeros días de abril56, las denuncias formuladas por cualesquier personas, colegios o universidades del reino57 – a excepción del Rey y su procurador fiscal –, presuntamente agraviados por la actuación del Justicia y sus oficiales. En defecto de los inquisidores, podrían recibir las denuncias sus notarios. Pasados los diez días, quienes pretendieran denunciar no serían oídos aquel año, quedando a salvo su derecho a denunciar en los años siguientes58. Presentada la denuncia en tiempo, la parte denunciante, o el procurador del reino, en un plazo de diez días computados desde el 10 de abril, debían proponer, producir y probar todo aquello que quisieran, y dentro de los tres días continuos siguientes se hallaban obligados a publicar todo lo probado y producido, citando no obstante al denunciado al tiempo de la publicación personalmente, o en su domicilio. En término de diez días continuos, contando desde el de la publicación en adelante, el notario debía entregar copia al denunciado de todo el proceso y actos hasta entonces practicados, bajo pena de privación de su oficio. En los veinticinco 52

Savall-Penén, II, pp. 304 – 305. Luis González Antón, “Alfonso V” cit., pp. 718 – 719. 54 Savall-Penén, II, f. 163, p. 162. 55 En la gran sala de las Cortes. (Jerónimo de Blancas, Aragonensivm rervm Commentarii cit., p. 396). 56 Por lo que se refiere a la hora de expiración del plazo, Bardaxí afirma que “in facto vidi dari denuntiationem in crepusculo noctis, et multoties Inquisitores persistebant in domo Diputationis dicto die decimo vsque ad decimam et vndecimam horas noctis, ita quod fuit habitum pro constanti, quòd potest dari vsque ad mediam noctem”. (Ibando de Bardaxí, Commentarii cit., f. 462r). 57 Así pues, a partir de entonces, podrían denunciar tanto los particulares como las corporaciones. Vid. Ibando de Bardaxí, Commentarii cit., f. 461v. 58 Si no se interponía ninguna denuncia en el plazo establecido, el oficio de los inquisidores cesaba el mismo día 10 de abril. (Jerónimo de Blancas, Aragonensivm rervm Commentarii cit., p. 396). 53

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días siguientes, el denunciado podría contradecir, alegar, probar y publicar todo aquello que estimase oportuno. Por lo que se refiere a la prueba testifical, aquellos testigos citados tanto por el denunciante como por el denunciado que no compareciesen a prestar testimonio, incurrirían ipso facto en la pena de mil sueldos, aplicados a la parte a instancia de la cual hubiesen sido citados. Durante la discusión de la causa, los inquisidores debían proceder a la ejecución de la pena, que no podría ser impedida por firma de derecho alguna, ni por apelación, ni por cualquier otra inhibición o defensa. Ahora bien, los testigos no comparecientes quedarían libres de pena si se excusaban legítimamente por justo impedimento, del que darían fe en un plazo de diez días, computados desde aquél en que debieran comparecer para testificar ante los inquisidores59. Recuérdese que, de acuerdo con los Fueros de Monzón de 1390, correspondía al Rey y a las Cortes dictar sentencia en el proceso de enquesta. Pues bien, en las Cortes de Zaragoza-Calatayud asumió esa potestad, en nombre del Rey y de las Cortes, el tribunal llamado de los Diecisiete Judicantes. Así pues, en lo sucesivo, los inquisidores prepararían la vía del proceso, y los Diecisiete pronunciarían la sentencia. Jerónimo de Blancas justifica la novedad afirmando que no siempre era fácil alcanzar el acuerdo de un concurso tan numeroso de personas como el de las Cortes, ni tampoco el acuerdo de la asamblea con los monarcas; de hecho, la gran confusión de votos determinaba con frecuencia que la decisión quedase aplazada para las siguientes Cortes60. En opinión de Lalinde Abadía, la creación del tribunal de los Diecisiete Judicantes refleja la decadencia política del Justicia61. Considerando que las sentencias dictadas en las causas de inquisición se habían dilatado y prorrogado muchas veces, en gran vilipendio de la justicia y perjuicio insoportable de los aragoneses, y con la intención de que se pudiera dictar recta sentencia en aquellas causas, Juan II dispuso que cada tres años fuesen designados por insaculación diecisiete judicantes o jueces, entre personas aptas y suficientes para juzgar, sentenciar y ejecutar las inquisiciones62. Los judicantes percibirían un salario de mil sueldos, satisfechos con cargo a las generalidades. La insaculación se llevaría a cabo en la sala mayor de las casas de la Diputación del Reino, en cuyo archivo debía custodiarse una caja especial para las bolsas de los Diecisiete Judicantes. La primera vez se extraerían de las correspondientes bolsas los nombres de tres prelados, dos capitulares, cuatro nobles, dos caballeros, dos 59

Savall-Penén, II, f. 163, pp.162 – 163. “Ceterùm non facile actu semper erat in tanto hominum concursu, vt et ipsi secum, et simul omnes cum Regibus, in sententiis ferendis conuenirent. Quinimmo ob magnam confusionem suffragiorum, in alia Comitia plerumque solebant iudicia hæc diferri”. (Jerónimo de Blancas, Aragonensivm rervm Commentarii cit., p. 395). 61 Jesús Lalinde Abadía, “Vida judicial” cit., p. 515. 62 En el supuesto de que expirase el plazo de diez días sin que se hubiese interpuesto denuncia alguna, aquel año no se sorteaban los Diecisiete. (Jerónimo de Blancas, Aragonensivm rervm Commentarii cit., p. 396). 60

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hidalgos o infanzones, dos ciudadanos de Zaragoza y dos de las demás ciudades, villas y comunidades del reino, de suerte que en total fuesen diecisiete personas. Para sucesivas insaculaciones se establecía un complicado orden, alterándose el número de nombres extraídos de cada bolsa, pero no el número de bolsas (siete). Si alguno o algunos de los judicantes así elegidos hubiesen interpuesto denuncia contra el Justicia o sus lugartenientes que los Diecisiete hubiesen de juzgar, no serían admitidos a la judicatura, debiendo insacularse a otras personas en su lugar63. A continuación, los judicantes debían prestar juramento y homenaje en poder de los diputados del reino y ante su notario, obligándose, entre otras cosas, a votar en las causas de inquisición por habas blancas y negras, según Dios y sus buenas conciencias, sin acepción de personas, apartando toda suerte de ruegos, precio, amor, temor, odio, soborno y favor; a no revelar ni descubrir su voto ni el voto de los demás judicantes y juristas que intervinieran junto a ellos, directa o indirectamente, a persona alguna, y a determinar las causas de inquisición por sentencia definitiva dentro de los dos meses posteriores a la fecha del juramento. El mismo día de la jura, los judicantes recibirían sentencia de excomunión del vicario general u oficial eclesiástico de la diócesis donde aquéllos debieran ejercer su oficio64. Una vez prestados el juramento y homenaje, y recibida la sentencia de excomunión, los judicantes se hallaban obligados a residir durante los veinte días siguientes en las casas de la Diputación, compareciendo todos los días, por la mañana y por la tarde, para conocer, sentenciar y ejecutar las causas de inquisición65. En primer lugar, los judicantes debían elegir por el procedimiento de habas blancas y negras a dos juristas, los menos sospechosos (a las partes) y más suficientes que hallasen. Una vez llamados y admitidos entre los judicantes, los juristas asesores debían oír en las causas a los abogados de las partes, y apuntar, discutir y examinar todas las dudas que en tales causas ocurrieran. Del mismo 63 Savall-Penén, II, f. 164, pp. 163 – 165. Para evitar que la judicatura y la extracción de los Diecisiete fuesen impedidas, perturbadas, suspendidas o dilatadas, se dispuso que, si al tiempo de la extracción, o después, durante el mandato de los judicantes, se declarase peste en la ciudad de Zaragoza, los diputados pudieran mandar y hacer evacuar la caja de las bolsas fuera de la ciudad, y proceder a la extracción allí donde les pareciese más cómodo dentro del reino. Asimismo, los Diecisiete podrían ejercer su oficio en el mismo lugar donde los diputados hicieran la extracción, o, en el supuesto de que una vez verificada la extracción en Zaragoza, sobreviniese la epidemia, allí donde decidieran los judicantes. (Savall-Penén, II, f. 167, pp. 167 – 168). Por otra parte, si la insaculación de los judicantes coincidiera con la celebración de Cortes generales del reino, y éstas se hubiesen convocado fuera de la ciudad de Zaragoza, los diputados procederían a la extracción de los Diecisiete en las casas de la Diputación, pero, una vez verificada la extracción, los diputados debían intimar a los judicantes para que, en un plazo de treinta días, computados desde aquél en que fuesen intimados, se personasen en la ciudad, villa o lugar donde se celebrasen las Cortes, para ejercer allí su oficio. (Savall-Penén, II, f. 167, p. 167). 64 Savall-Penén, II, f. 165, p. 165. 65 Savall-Penén, II, f. 165, p. 165.

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modo, emitirían su voto expresa y determinadamente sobre las causas y dudas, por las que serían consultados por los judicantes. Antes de ejercer sus oficios, debían prestar juramento y homenaje y recibir la correspondiente sentencia de excomunión66. Oídos los juristas y los abogados de las partes durante el tiempo asignado por los judicantes, y excluidos aquéllos, los Diecisiete debían discutir y conferir entre sí, para luego emitir sus votos, introduciendo secretamente cada judicante en un saco un haba blanca, si se pronunciaba por la absolución del denunciado, o un haba negra, si optaba por la condena. Las habas serían extraídas por el notario de los inquisidores, siendo necesarias nueve habas blancas – es decir, mayoría absoluta –, para dictar sentencia absolutoria, y nueve negras para dictar sentencia condenatoria. En este último caso, inmediatamente después debía votarse sobre la calidad de la pena, imponiéndose aquélla que obtuviera nueve habas; en la votación participarían todos los judicantes, incluso los favorables a la absolución del denunciado. Incontinenti, sería dictada la sentencia, haciendo constar que se había adoptado por unanimidad de los judicantes67. En cuanto a las penas, el Fuero empieza paradójicamente por determinar las que correspondían a los lugartenientes, para ocuparse después de las que podían imponerse al Justicia. En el supuesto de que el lugarteniente denunciado hubiese delinquido con dolo, si la causa era civil, se le impondría la pena de privación del oficio y la del daño doblado, y condena de costas en favor de la parte perjudicada; si la causa era criminal, se le impondría la pena establecida por Fuero, probable referencia a las sanciones previstas en 1348. El lugarteniente no podría excusar su conducta dolosa por haber actuado con consejo de otras cualesquier personas, aún siendo letradas. En el caso de que el lugarteniente no hubiese incurrido en dolo, sino en culpa por impericia o ignorancia, si la causa era civil, se le impondrían la pena de privación del oficio y las costas; si la causa era criminal, la penas establecidas por Fuero. Por lo que se refiere a la persona del Justicia, en los casos de provisión de apellidos de manifestaciones de personas y bienes, hallándose el magistrado en ciudad, villa o lugar donde no hubiese lugarteniente, y firmas de derecho sobre capciones de personas, si tácita o expresamente no proveyese debiendo proveer, o no debiendo proveer proveyese contra Fuero, se le impondrían las mismas penas previstas para los lugartenientes, excepto la de privación del oficio en el caso de impericia sin dolo, aunque se le condenaría en daños y costas en favor de la parte perjudicada68.

66

Savall-Penén, II, f. 165, p. 166. Según Blancas, estos asesores debían actuar, no como árbitros o jueces, sino como fieles observadores y testigos de cada uno de los oficios. (Jerónimo de Blancas, Aragonensivm rervm Commentarii cit., p. 399). 67 Savall-Penén, II, f. 166, p. 166. 68 Savall-Penén, II, f. 166, p. 167.

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Atendiendo al principio de personalidad de la pena, el Justicia de Aragón no respondería de los delitos cometidos por sus lugartenientes, ni éstos de los delitos perpetrados por el Justicia, ni un lugarteniente por los delitos de su colega69. En caso de sentencia de muerte o de mutilación de miembro, la obligada inhibición de los judicantes eclesiásticos debía suplirse con la insaculación de otra persona o personas, cuyos nombres serían extraídos la primera vez de la bolsa de nobles y, en lo sucesivo, de las otras bolsas graduadamente, siguiendo el orden previsto para la insaculación de los Diecisiete70. En cualquier fase del procedimiento, los denunciantes podrían desistir de la denuncia, aunque serían condenados por los Diecisiete en las costas ocasionadas hasta el momento de la renuncia. Ahora bien, si en la denuncia renunciada constara contrafuero, greuge, crimen o delito, el procurador o procuradores de las Cortes debían proseguir de oficio la causa a expensas del reino hasta sentencia definitiva, ejecución incluida. Por otra parte, en el supuesto de que llegara a noticia de los judicantes que el denunciante había denunciado calumniosamente, sería condenado a pagar todas las costas causadas por la denuncia71. Las sentencias se ejecutarían en un plazo de dos meses por las personas, jueces y oficiales que decidieran los Diecisiete, por mandamiento o requisitorias suyos y bajo las penas previstas para los oficiales que delinquían contra Fuero. Las sentencias, procesos y ejecuciones, con sus incidencias, dependencias y emergencias, no podrían ser impedidos por firmas de derecho de contrafuero cometido o futuro, ni por apelación, adjunción, avocación o inhibición, ni por manifestación de personas de poder de oficiales, ni por otra cualquier defensa justa y razonable, ni por alegaciones o excepciones de no haberse observado la forma del Fuero. La ejecución podría hacerse en los bienes del denunciado y condenado, si de tal naturaleza fuese la pena impuesta, no obstante cualquier enajenación de bienes llevada a cabo por aquél72. En el supuesto de que la judicatura de los Diecisiete coincidiera con la celebración de Cortes, se dispuso que las Cortes pudieran proceder a cualesquier actos, aunque las causas de inquisición no se hubiesen determinado, y que, a la inversa, los judicantes no fuesen impedidos en su actuación por las Cortes73. Seis años después, las Cortes, reunidas en Zaragoza bajo la presidencia de la reina Juana como Lugarteniente general, reiteraron los Fueros de 1460 – 1461 sobre 69

Savall-Penén, II, f. 167, p. 168. Savall-Penén, II, f. 166, p. 167. 71 Savall-Penén, II, f. 167, p. 168. La crítica de Jerónimo de Blancas al proceso de enquesta se centra precisamente en el hecho de que, una vez interpuesta la denuncia, aunque el acusador renunciara después a su derecho, los inquisidores debían manifestar el nombre del acusado a los Diecisiete Judicantes. (Vid. Jerónimo de Blancas, Aragonensivm rervm Commentarii cit., p. 396). 72 Savall-Penén, II, f. 167, p. 168. 73 Savall-Penén, II, f. 167, pp. 168 – 169. 70

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la enquesta del Justicia, introduciendo algunas modificaciones: la denuncia y el proceso subsiguiente debían ser redactados en romance y no en otra lengua, sin necesidad de que lo fueran por mano de abogado o procurador74. Por otra parte, los judicantes serían elegidos anualmente, y no cada tres años75. Los juristas quedaban excluidos del oficio de judicatura, salvo aquéllos que ya hubiesen sido insaculados en las Cortes de Zaragoza-Calatayud de 1460 – 146176. Asimismo, el plazo de dos meses para sentenciar las causas de inquisición se redujo a cuarenta días posteriores al juramento prestado por los judicantes77. En el supuesto de inhibición de los judicantes eclesiásticos, los demás judicantes podrían sentenciar y ejecutar las causas de enquesta, siempre que su número fuese impar; en caso contrario, los judicantes podrían elegir una o más personas de entre los inquisidores del Justicia de Aragón y sus lugartenientes78. El denunciado debía comparecer en la ciudad de Zaragoza, en las casas de la Diputación, o allí donde actuara la judicatura, ante los judicantes, cada vez que fuese citado personalmente o en su domicilio. En el supuesto de que no compareciese a la hora en que hubiese sido citado, sería habido por confeso y convicto en los cargos que contra él se hubiesen formulado, incurriendo en las penas previstas, y en la de destierro perpetuo del reino de Aragón. Si quebrantara el destierro, se procedería a su capción, permaneciendo detenido hasta que hubiese satisfecho a la parte denunciante79. Si algunos de los votantes o consejeros en la judicatura de los Diecisiete cometieran soborno o corrupción, incurrirían en las penas establecidas en el Fuero contra los oficiales que delinquían en sus oficios, quedando además privados de la judicatura80. Por último, en el supuesto de que surgieran dudas sobre la inteligencia de aquellos Fueros, éstos debían entenderse en sentido literal, excluyendo cualquier otra interpretación81. 74

Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 220, p. 147. Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 221, p. 148. 76 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, p. 151. Según Jerónimo de Blancas, la exclusión de los juristas de la judicatura de los Diecisiete respondió a la necesidad de que el tribunal sólo considerase delitos las cosas más claras y patentes: “Voluerunt namque nisi quasdam apertissimas res crimini dari non posse: repetundarum scilicet pecuniarum culpam; violatæ fidei; doli mali; aut summæ negligentiæ; Nouerant autem à Iurisperitis plerumque vno verbo, aut litera, ius omne torqueri. Ea propter prohibuerunt, eos in huiusmodi iudiciis interesse”. (Jerónimo de Blancas, Aragonensivm rervm Commentarii cit., pp. 398 – 399). 77 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 223, p. 152. 78 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 224, p. 154. Según Bardaxí, el Fuero se refiere a los inquisidores que habían instruido el proceso, no a inquisidores nuevamente insaculados. (Ibando de Bardaxí, Commentarii cit., f. 465r). 79 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 225, p. 157. 80 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 226, p. 158. Escribe Bardaxí que, aunque no cabía recurso contra la sentencia de los Diecisiete, porque su jurisdicción era absoluta, si se descubriese alguna concusión cometida por los judicantes, podía procederse contra ellos sumaria y privilegiadamente. (Ibando de Bardaxí, Commentarii cit., ff. 465v-466r). 81 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 226, p. 158. En opinión de Jerónimo de Blancas, el tribunal de los Diecisiete se convirtió en moderador de la magistratura del Justicia. Sin embargo, el 75

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En las Cortes de Tarazona de 1495, Fernando II dispuso que, en lo sucesivo, las denuncias contra los lugartenientes del Justicia – significativamente, no se menciona al propio Justicia – que contuvieran palabras latinas no fuesen anuladas, sino que fuesen tan válidas como si se hallasen redactadas en romance82. En las Cortes de Monzón de 1512, un fuero de la reina Germana, que presidía las Cortes como Lugarteniente general, dispuso que el plazo para interponer denuncias contra los lugartenientes del Justicia y otros oficiales de la Corte fuese fijo y perentorio, para evitar que los oficiales quedasen sometidos indefinidamente al arbitrio de los litigantes y pudieran ejercer sus oficios más libremente; dicho término quedó reducido a tres años, computados, respecto de los lugartenientes, desde el día en que hubiesen cesado en el cargo y, en cuanto a los demás oficiales, desde el día de la comisión del delito o contrafuero. Una vez transcurridos los tres años, sería denegada audiencia a cualquier persona, colegio o universidad que pretendiese denunciar83. Otro Fuero de las mismas Cortes dispuso que, para obviar calumnias de los litigantes, en lo sucesivo, si los denunciantes de los lugartenientes del Justicia – no se menciona al propio Justicia – u otros oficiales solicitaban suspensión o prórroga de la denuncia, tal suspensión obrara el efecto de renuncia expresa. Por otra parte, los lugartenientes y otros oficiales juzgados por los Diecisiete a instancia de parte legítima, no podrían volver a ser denunciados ni juzgados por el mismo hecho a instancia de los diputados u otra persona, ni a la inversa, “por quanto el contrario sería repugnar á leyes divinas y humanas”84. Por último, aquellos lugartenientes que hubiesen sido condenados o privados del oficio por los Diecisiete, no serían admitidos a votar ni a aconsejar en las causas y procesos de aquellas personas que les hubiesen juzgado, salvo si mediaba consentimiento expreso de quienes habían intervenido en la condenación o privación85. En las Cortes de Zaragoza de 1519, Carlos I declaró las dudas sobre las denunciaciones renunciadas, disponiendo que si la parte renunciaba a la denuncia cronista defendía la necesidad de reformar, no tanto la severidad del proceso, cuanto la corrompida fórmula de acusación usada por algunos. (Jerónimo de Blancas, Aragonensivm rervm Commentarii cit., p. 395). 82 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 232, p. 148. Bardaxí refiere que “similis lex est in Francia, vbi sententiæ debent vulgariter proferri, non tamen ex eo quòd aliquod verbum proferatur sermone latino”. (Ibando de Bardaxí, Commentarii cit., f, 463r). 83 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 247, p. 148. Según Bardaxí, en su época, tanto en el supuesto de los lugartenientes, como en el de los demás oficiales, el trienio se computaba a partir del día en que se hubiese cometido el delito, pues, por entonces, los lugartenientes habían dejado de ser anuales: “Et licèt verba fori sint in his expressa, et debent ad literam intelligi, tamen semper vidi haberi pro constanti, quòd tam in Locumtenentibus, quàm cæteris officialibus computari dictum triennium debeat à die conmissi delicti, postquam dicti Locumtenentes defierunt esse annales, prout erant tempore dicti fori 10 qui est editus à Regina Germana”. (Ibando de Bardaxí, Commentarii cit., f. 462r). 84 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 247, p. 156. 85 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. I, f. 247, pp. 43 – 44.

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después de la publicación, el procurador del reino debía actuar como parte ante los Diecisiete. Pero si las partes renunciaran en todos los procesos de inquisición, en tal caso no se procedería a la elección de judicantes. No obstante, aquellas causas se habrían de juzgar en el primer año en que hubiese elección de judicantes86. En las mismas Cortes, se estableció que los consejeros de la Corte del Justicia pudieran ser también acusados, inquiridos y denunciados ante los inquisidores, y fabeados y juzgados por los Diecisiete Judicantes, a instancia de parte interesada o del procurador del reino. En tanto en cuanto los consejeros percibían haberes públicos, expone el preámbulo del Fuero, parecía cosa justa que fuesen “muy rectos y limpios de macula ó corrupcion alguna en los Consejos”. Para que la denuncia pudiera formularse más libremente, el notario del Consejo del Justicia, una vez publicada la sentencia, se hallaría obligado, a requerimiento de las partes, en presencia de sus abogados o sin ella, a exhibir el libro del Consejo, donde se hallaban consignados los votos de los consejeros, aunque sólo podrían verse los votos de la causa en cuestión87. A contrario sensu, si los lugartenientes pronunciaban sentencia o actuaban con el consejo de todos o de la mayor parte de los consejeros, en tal caso no podrían ser acusados, denunciados, fabeados ni juzgados88. En 1528, y para evitar la dilación de los procesos de inquisición, Carlos I dispuso que la extracción de los judicantes se verificase el día 20 de mayo, y que prestasen juramento el día diez de junio89. Del mismo modo, ordenó que los Diecisiete eligieran como consultores a dos letrados, los más idóneos y suficientes, sabios y expertos en Fueros y Derecho, y de buena conciencia, que hubiese en la ciudad de Zaragoza90. En la misma ocasión, el Emperador estableció que si el denunciante acusara frívola, injusta o calumniosamente, y sucumbiera en la causa, o el calumniado fuese absuelto, aquél sería condenado en los daños y costas dobladas, 86 Savall-Penén, II, f. 251, p. 184. Ibando de Bardaxí se pregunta si la causa podía terminarse por renuncia del denunciante. A continuación expone los cuatro Fueros que versaban sobre la renuncia (24 – 27). El Fuero 24 permitía la renuncia, y si constaba contrafuero, el denunciante era condenado en las costas. El Fuero 27 condenaba al mismo denunciante, prosiguiendo la causa el procurador del reino. Sin embargo, de acuerdo con el Fuero 25, si la renuncia se hacía antes de la conclusión de la causa, debía ser admitida, satisfaciendo los gastos hechos por los diputados en la prosecución de la causa; si el denunciante renunciaba después de concluida la causa, en este caso debía dictarse sentencia, como si no se hubiese presentado renuncia, exceptuando el interés de la parte, al que podía renunciarse en cualquier tiempo. El Fuero 27 disponía que cualquier suspensión formulada por el denunciante se consideraba renuncia. Bardaxí resuelve que este Fuero cesa, porque “in omnem euentum, non obstante renuntiatione, prosequenda est denuntiatio per procuratorem regni: et si malitiose fuerit proposita, fideiussores dati ab ipso denuntiante, vnà cum eo tenebantur, non procurator regni, ex quo quò ad illum est actus necessarius dicta prosequtio denuntiationis”. (Ibando de Bardaxí, Commentarii cit., f. 465v). 87 Savall-Penén, II, f. 250, p. 183. 88 Savall-Penén, II, f. 250, p. 183. 89 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 265, p. 151. 90 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. 265, p. 153.

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ejecutados en sus bienes y fianzas; excepto si el denunciante fuese el procurador del reino, habiendo tenido justa causa de acusar, y prestado caución fideijusoria ante los inquisidores al tiempo de formular la denuncia91. Por último, del mismo modo que había sucedido en 1519 con los siete consejeros de la Corte del Justicia, y por idénticas razones, los cinco nuevos lugartenientes creados en 1528 quedaron sometidos al proceso de enquesta y al juicio de los Diecisiete Judicantes, a instancia de parte interesada o del procurador del reino, por “qualquiere sobornacion, corrupcion, dolo, y negligencia notable”. El procurador del reino se hallaría obligado a proseguir la denuncia interpuesta por la parte92. Ahora bien, si el lugarteniente hubiese dictado sentencia con el consejo de todos o la mayor parte de sus colegas, en tal caso sólo podría ser denunciado en lo referido a su voto y parecer, y los demás lugartenientes podrían ser denunciados por los votos y consejos emitidos en las causas y procesos93. En las Cortes de Monzón de 1533, Carlos I dispuso que si los judicantes fuesen parientes, hasta segundo grado inclusive, de las partes denunciantes y denunciadas, quedasen excluidos del proceso en cuestión, siendo reemplazados por otros conforme al Fuero. De otra parte, quienes hubiesen interpuesto denuncias aquel año no podrían ser elegidos judicantes94. Al parecer, una vez concluidos los procesos de enquesta, los judicantes solían abandonar Zaragoza, y quienes permanecían en la ciudad se despreocupaban de la ejecución de la sentencia. Para evitarlo, un Fuero de las Cortes de Monzón de 1585 obligó a los judicantes que se hallasen en la ciudad de Zaragoza y fuesen requeridos por la parte, a ordenar ejecutar y vender los bienes y fianzas del condenado, en los daños y costas, incurriendo en caso contrario en la pérdida de la mitad de su salario95.

IV. La Enquesta a Partir de las Cortes de Tarazona de 1592 Las llamadas Alteraciones de Aragón de 1591 tuvieron graves consecuencias en el reino, que afectaron, tanto al oficio de Justicia, como al proceso de enquesta. Los sucesos, aunque sobradamente conocidos, merecen ser evocados, porque explican el sentido de las reformas introducidas un año después96. 91

Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, f. pp. 156 – 157. Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, p. 143. 93 Savall-Penén, I, Lib. III, p. 136. 94 Savall-Penén, I, f. 280, p. 151. 95 Savall-Penén, I, p. 418. 96 Para lo que sigue, vid. Julián Zarco Cuevas, Antonio Pérez, Imprenta Helénica, Madrid, 1922, Gregorio Marañón, Los Procesos de Castilla contra Antonio Pérez, Madrid, 1947, y Antonio Pérez. El hombre, el drama, la época), Espasa-Calpe, Madrid, 1948, I-II (citamos por la edición de 1998), Gustav Ungerer, “La defensa de Antonio Pérez contra los cargos que se le imputaron en el proceso de visita (1584)”, Cuadernos de Historia Jerónimo Zurita, 27 – 28 92

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En abril de 1590, Antonio Pérez, ex secretario de Estado para Italia, huye a Aragón e, invocando su condición de regnícola, se acoge a la protección del Justicia, que le ampara en la cárcel de manifestados de Zaragoza. El 5 de septiembre de 1590, Felipe II (I de Aragón) ordena al doctor Micer Urbano Ximénez de Aragüés, regente de la Real Cancillería de Aragón, que forme proceso de enquesta contra Pérez97. El ex secretario protesta, alegando que “esta escrito y probeydo en los Fueros de Aragón y priuilegio General que la Inquisición esta prohiuida y no se puede haçer contra las personas privadas que no son officiales de su Magestad, contra los quales officiales está permitida, y como el dicho Antonio Perez sea como verdaderamente es persona pribada y no haya tenido ni tenga en este reino de Aragón officio alguno por su Magestad por el qual pueda ser inquirido […] por ende […] pide y suplica a V. md. dicho Señor Urbano Ximenez de Aragues que con titulo de Juez de enquestas de su Magestad ni de otra manera no proceda a interrogar al dicho Antonio Perez”98. Por otra parte, Pérez solicita ante la Corte del Justicia firma de derecho para embarazar el proceso de enquesta, argumentando que nunca había sido secretario de Felipe II como rey de Aragón, ni intervenido en negocios tocantes a aquel reino. Las peticiones de firma, más de nueve, serán denegadas, excepto una, aunque los fiscales del rey la impugnarán mediante proceso de revocación. Pérez reacciona denunciando ante los Diecisiete Judicantes a Micer Juan Francisco Torralba, lugarteniente del Justicia, quien había denegado una firma favorable al ex secretario. A partir de entonces, Torralba manifestó sus dudas al monarca sobre si Pérez podía ser sometido a enquesta como oficial de Aragón, añadiendo que “la Enquesta es odiosa y que, pudiendo ser castigado por otra vía, no lo ha de ser por la de la Enquesta”99. Las declaraciones de varios testigos en el proceso de enquesta, asegurando que Pérez pretendía escapar a Béarn, territorio gobernado por herejes, sirven de pretexto para la intervención del Tribunal del Santo Oficio de Aragón. El 24 de mayo de 1591, cuando se transfiere a Pérez desde la cárcel de manifestados a la de la Inquisición, estalla un motín, que frustra el traslado. Por otra parte, el 10 de julio, los Diecisiete Judicantes pronuncian sentencia, condenando a Juan Francisco Torralba a la privación perpetua del oficio de lugarteniente y de cualesquier otros oficios del reino, a tres años de destierro del reino y al pago de las costas dobladas. Un segundo intento de traslado de Pérez a la cárcel de la Inquisición provoca otra revuelta el 24 de septiembre. Como consecuencia, el antiguo secretario de Felipe II (1974 – 1975), pp. 63 – 149, Víctor Fairén Guillén, “El proceso de enquesta” cit., y Los procesos penales de Antonio Pérez, El Justicia de Aragón, Zaragoza, 2003, e Isabel Martínez Navas, “Proceso inquisitorial de Antonio Pérez”, Revista de la Inquisición, 1 (1991), pp. 141 – 200. 97 Con anterioridad, Pérez había sido sometido en Castilla a un proceso de visita, por el que fue condenado en 1585, entre otras penas, a la privación del oficio de secretario y a destierro de la Corte por espacio de diez años. 98 Apud Víctor Fairén Guillén, “El proceso de enquesta” cit., p. 112, n. 25. 99 Gregorio Marañón, Antonio Pérez cit., p. 578.

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se fuga de la cárcel de manifestados, pasando tiempo después a Francia. Todos estos sucesos desencadenan en noviembre la entrada del ejército regio, al que intenta resistir en vano el Justicia de Aragón, Juan V de Lanuza, el Mozo. El 20 de diciembre de 1591 es ejecutado sin juicio previo el Justicia. La crisis institucional se resolverá en las Cortes de Tarazona de 1592. Por lo que se refiere al Justicia, Felipe II recuperó en 1592 la competencia de nombrar y revocar libremente al oficial que habían ejercido sus antecesores hasta 1442, poniendo fin a ciento cincuenta años de vinculación en el linaje Lanuza. Habida cuenta de que “la perpetuidad de los officios preheminentes, y el no ser revocables á voluntad del Principe, ó Rey que los provee, suele traer consigo muy grandes abusos, é inconvinientes”, el monarca dispone que, en adelante, el oficio de Justicia de Aragón pueda proveerse por él y sus sucesores, por el tiempo que fuese su real servicio, y durante su beneplácito y mera y libre voluntad100. El Justiciazgo volvía así a ser un oficio proveído ad beneplacitum principis101. Otro Fuero de Tarazona dispuso que los votos emitidos en todas las causas tramitadas en la Corte del Justicia de Aragón fuesen secretos, de suerte que en ningún caso se pudiese dar vista, copia, ni noticia de aquéllos. La prohibición debía entenderse referida al nombre de los jueces, no al número de los votos, favorables o contrarios102. En cuanto a la designación de los lugartenientes del Justicia, el Rey nombraría en las Cortes a nueve personas, de las cuales ocho serían insaculadas, extrayéndose dos por cada brazo. En el plazo de un mes, después de licenciadas las Cortes, el monarca designaría a cinco de los extraídos como lugartenientes. Los tres restantes candidatos quedarían insaculados en la bolsa para suplir las vacantes que se pudieran producirse por vacación o recusación. Acabada dicha bolsa, el Justicia y sus lugartenientes debían proponer tres personas al monarca, quien elegiría a una 100

Savall-Penén, I, p. 437. A la muerte de Lanuza, Felipe II nombró Justicia al doctor Juan Campi, Regente de la Cancillería en el Supremo Consejo de Aragón. Escribe Blasco de Lanuza que “nombrò su Magestad [Felipe II] Justicia de Aragon, que despues de la muerte de don Iuan de Lanuza auia vacado el oficio algunos meses, y quiso que este oficio le tuuiessen Letrados Iuristas, como antiguamente lo fueron muchos dellos Cerdanes, Micer Belenguer de Bardaxi, y otros, para que por si mismos, y por sus letras entendiessen, y encaminassen los negocios de justicia; que se tratassen en sus Tribunales. Y fue nombrado el primero, el Doctor don Juan Campi, que era actualmente Regente del Supremo de Aragon, y que en aquel Consejo regia tambien la Chancilleria, y presidia en las Cortes de Taraçona”. (Vicencio Blasco de Lanuza, Historias Ecclesiasticas, y Secvlares de Aragon. En que se continvan los Annales de C¸urita, desde al Año 1556 hasta el de 1618. Tomo Segvndo. Dirigido a los Dipvtados del Reyno de Aragon. Por el Dotor …, Canonigo Penitenciario de la Santa Iglesia Metropolitana de C¸aragoça, y Calificador del Santo Oficio de la Inquisicion. Año 1622. Con licencia y privilegio. En C¸aragoça, por Ivan de Lanaia y Qvartanet, Impressor del Reyno de Aragon, y de la Vniuersidad, Lib. III, Cap. XXII, p. 315). Como ha puesto de manifiesto Lalinde, en los años siguientes a 1592 los nombramientos de Justicia recayeron en miembros de la Real Audiencia. (Jesús Lalinde Abadía, “Vida judicial” cit., p. 506). 102 Savall-Penén, I, p. 437. 101

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como lugarteniente. En caso de paridad de votos en la nominación de la terna, prevalecería el voto de calidad del Justicia, si se hallase presente; si se hallase ausente, sería preferido el voto del lugarteniente más antiguo. En las mismas Cortes de Tarazona se procedió a la nominación e insaculación de los candidatos a lugartenientes103. En Tarazona, Felipe II procedió también a reformar el estatuto de la enquesta. En lo sucesivo, el monarca o quien presidiera en su nombre la Real Audiencia, podrían nombrar directamente a dos de los cuatro inquisidores, al margen de que se hallasen insaculados o no, siendo los otros dos elegidos por extracción de las bolsas, conforme a la práctica anterior. La designación regia se llevaría a cabo el primero de marzo de cada año, entregándose el mismo día al diputado prelado, o al diputado que por entonces presidiera la Diputación. Dichos diputados debían convocar a las personas así designadas, para que acudieran a la ciudad de Zaragoza, o al lugar donde los demás inquisidores conforme al Fuero se hubiesen de reunir, el 15 de marzo, para prestar juramento y homenaje en poder de los diputados de ejercer bien y lealmente sus oficios, a fin de que a primero de abril inmediato siguiente pudiesen empezar a ejercer el cargo junto a los otros dos inquisidores elegidos por suerte. Si el monarca o el presidente de la Real Audiencia no procedían a la nominación de los inquisidores en el plazo previsto, deberían hacerla los diputados, extrayendo los nombres de las bolsas del reino. Los cuatro inquisidores debían en primer lugar hacer jurar a la parte que no interponía la denuncia por respeto, persuasión o dádiva de ninguna persona, sino tan sólo por agravio recibido en la causa. Si la parte no pudiese jurar por tener legítimo impedimento, lo haría su procurador con poder especial para el caso. Si en cualquier fase del proceso los inquisidores tuviesen conocimiento por legítima prueba de que el denunciante había tomado dinero o se lo habían ofrecido, u otra cosa para interponer la denuncia, debían declarar no perseguible la denuncia, y condenar a la parte denunciante en daños y costas dobladas, aplicadas al denunciado, y destierro de un año del reino. Del mismo modo, los inquisidores no debían admitir por ninguna vía artículos infamatorios, ni en la causa principal ni en

103 Savall-Penén, I, pp. 437 – 438. Escribe Jerónimo Martel, cronista del reino entre 1597 y 1608, que “esta manera de elegir los Lugartenientes se comenzò a guardar en las mismas Cortes de Taraçona donde se hizo el dicho Fuero, con no estar aun entonces confirmado por el Rey en el Solio, sin que huviesse quien hablasse en ello palabra con auer muchos que aduirtieron, que aunque los Braços estaban de acuerdo de hazer aquel Fuero por pidirlo el Rey nuestro Señor, mas que no era Fuero, ni ley hasta estar otorgado, y hecho acto, y Solio del”. (Jerónimo Martel, Forma de celebrar Cortes en Aragon. Escrita por…, Chronista del Reyno. Dedicada a los Ilvstrissimos Señores Diputados del Reyno. Pvblicala El Doctor Iuan Francisco Andres de Vstarroz, con algunas Notas. Con Licencia, y Privilegio. En C¸aragoça, por Diego Dormer, Año MDCXLI. A costa del Reyno, Edición facsímil realizada por las Cortes de Aragón, en el primer aniversario de su constitución (I Legislatura, año 1984, 1.er Período de Sesiones), con Introducción a cargo de Guillermo Redondo Veintemillas y Esteban Sarasa Sánchez, Zaragoza, 1984, p. 92).

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adiciones, que fuesen en infamia de la casa, persona y linaje del denunciado, sino sólo lo que directamente afectase a la causa104. Se dispuso asimismo que, en lo sucesivo, el procurador fiscal del rey tuviera la misma facultad de denunciar que cualquier otra persona105. Por lo que se refiere al tribunal de los judicantes, su número se redujo de diecisiete a nueve, correspondiendo al monarca la libre designación de cuatro o de cinco, alternativamente cada año, y con independencia de que se hallasen insaculados o no. La designación de los demás judicantes se seguiría verificando mediante extracción de las bolsas. El Rey o el presidente de la Audiencia debían tener preparada la nominación para el día de la jura de los diputados, siendo entregada, cerrada y sellada, al diputado prelado, o a quien presidiera en su nombre, para que el día 20 del mes de mayo siguiente, día de la extracción de los demás judicantes, se abriese y viese, y así alcanzar el número de nueve. Sólo se podría abrir la plica si había denunciación, debiendo devolverse en caso contrario al monarca o al presidente de la Audiencia, para que pudieran formular otra al año siguiente. En el supuesto de que alguno o algunos de los judicantes elegidos por suerte hubiesen sido ya nombrados por el monarca en la plica, los diputados procederían a extraer otros nombres en su lugar. Los judicantes nombrados por el rey debían prestar juramento y homenaje en poder de los diputados, y recibir sentencia de excomunión el mismo día y de la misma forma que los demás judicantes106. Para juzgar las denunciaciones era necesaria la concurrencia de los nueve judicantes, que empezarían a ejercer sus oficios el día 10 de junio. Si alguno de los nueve judicantes, tanto de los nombrados por el rey o el presidente de la Audiencia, como de los extractos por el reino, después de haber comenzado a ejercer el oficio, falleciese o tuviese algún impedimento para juzgar la causa, habría de ocupar su lugar el inquisidor de aquella bolsa o calidad de que faltara el dicho judicante, siempre que se tratara de los inquisidores que hubiesen entendido en el proceso de la denuncia, y que por entonces se hallasen en la ciudad de Zaragoza. Si el judicante fuese de nombramiento regio, entraría en su lugar el inquisidor designado por el monarca, si lo hubiese de aquella calidad y, en su defecto, un inquisidor elegido por extracción, siempre que fuese de la misma calidad. Los judicantes de nombramiento regio debían guardar los dos años de vacación en el cargo que regían para los judicantes por extracción, existiendo denuncias. En el supuesto de que sólo quedasen ocho judicantes, no habiéndose podido suplir la vacante, gozarían de voto decisivo los asesores, de suerte que si ambos se conformaban en un parecer, prevalecería la parte de los cuatro con quien se conformase su voto; si los votos de los asesores eran discordantes, el lugarteniente 104

Savall-Penén, I, pp. 432 – 434. Savall-Penén, I, p. 434. 106 Savall-Penén, I, p. 434. 105

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denunciado quedaría absuelto, prevaleciendo el número de las habas blancas, para que no se dejase de pronunciar sentencia107.

V. Consideraciones conclusivas A comienzos del siglo XVI, la inquisición o enquesta contra el Justicia y su Corte o tribunal, se había consolidado en el entramado judicial del reino de Aragón. La enquesta se orientaba prioritariamente a exigir la responsabilidad del Justicia y sus oficiales frente a los particulares perjudicados por su actuación en el ejercicio del cargo. Como enfatizan algunos de los textos legales arriba citados, haciendo referencia a los consejeros y a los lugartenientes del magistrado, los oficiales debían ser “muy rectos y limpios de macula y corrupción: y diligentes en todo lo que hazer son obligados en el ejercicio de los dichos sus oficios”. Desde el Justicia hasta el último de los vergueros, pasando por los lugartenientes, consejeros y notarios, todos los oficiales de la Corte del Justicia podían ser sometidos a enquesta. Ahora bien, la cognición de los delitos que el Justicia pudiera cometer, no como oficial público, dotado de jurisdicción, sino como persona privada, quedaba reservada en exclusiva al Rey y a las Cortes. Por lo que se refiere a la jurisdicción y conocimiento de los delitos cometidos como personas privadas por los lugartenientes, notarios principales (hasta número de seis) y dos vergueros del Justicia, quedaron reservados asimismo al Rey y las Cortes, o al propio Justicia. El procedimiento se incoaba a instancia de parte interesada (particular, colegio o universidad, a excepción del Rey y su procurador fiscal), mediante la interposición de la correspondiente denuncia – o acusación –, en un plazo de tres años, computados, respecto de los lugartenientes, desde el día en que hubiesen cesado en el cargo y, en cuanto a los demás oficiales, desde el día de la comisión del delito o contrafuero, sin que el legislador se pronunciara sobre el término para denunciar al propio Justicia, quien ejercía su oficio por tiempo indefinido, potencialmente vitalicio. Aunque regía el principio acusatorio, la eventual renuncia del denunciante no ponía fin al procedimiento, que debía ser proseguido de oficio por el procurador del reino si en la denuncia constase delito o contrafuero. A diferencia de lo sucedido con la Corte del Justicia, progresivamente convertida en un colegio de jueces técnicos, el tribunal encargado de juzgarles siguió respondiendo a la lógica de la representación estamental, pues sus miembros eran elegidos por insaculación a propuesta de los brazos de las Cortes. Cuatro inquisidores instruían el proceso de enquesta, y Diecisiete Judicantes legos en Derecho, con el asesoramiento técnico de dos juristas, en el término de cuarenta días pronunciaban sentencia definitiva, no susceptible de recurso alguno. Los judicantes se hallaban obligados bajo juramento y pena de excomunión a fallar las causas de enquesta “según Dios y sus buenas conciencias”, y a observar riguroso 107

Savall-Penén, I, p. 435.

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secreto, absteniéndose de revelar su voto, el de sus colegas y el de los juristas asesores a persona alguna. Cabían dos votaciones sucesivas: mediante la primera, se absolvía o condenaba al oficial encuestado; si la sentencia era condenatoria, se procedía a una segunda votación para determinar la calidad de la pena. En el supuesto de que la pena impuesta implicase derramamiento de sangre, lo que suponía la inhibición de los judicantes eclesiásticos, sus colegas podrían sentenciar y ejecutar la causa, siempre que su número fuese impar; en caso contrario, los judicantes podrían elegir sustitutos de entre los inquisidores. Aunque las decisiones se alcanzaban por mayoría absoluta, en la sentencia se hacía constar que se había adoptado por unanimidad de los judicantes. En el decurso de la centuria, sucesivas disposiciones fueron perfilando nuestra institución, hasta llegar a las Cortes de Tarazona de 1592, celebradas bajo Felipe II, que alteraron sustancialmente la forma de la enquesta. En lo sucesivo, el Rey se reservó el nombramiento directo de dos de los cuatro inquisidores. Por otra parte, el número de los judicantes se redujo a nueve, correspondiendo al monarca la libre designación de cuatro o de cinco, alternativamente cada año, y al margen de que se hallasen o no insaculados. La intervención del monarca se reforzó asimismo facultando al procurador fiscal del Rey para interponer denuncia contra el Justicia y sus oficiales. Para juzgar las denuncias sería necesaria la concurrencia de los nueve judicantes, supliéndose las eventuales vacantes con las personas de los inquisidores. En el supuesto de que sólo pudieran actuar ocho jueces, asumirían voto decisivo los dos asesores. De este modo se alteraba solapadamente la composición del tribunal de los Judicantes, introduciendo la intervención de los juristas, excluida en 1467.

List of Authors Prof. Dr. Anja Amend-Traut, Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg, Juristische Fakultät, Domerschulstr. 16, 97070 Würzburg Prof. Dr. Ignacio Czeguhn, Freie Universität Berlin, FB Rechtswissenschaft, Van’t-Hoff-Str. 8, 14195 Berlin Prof. Dr. John D. Ford, University of Aberdeen, King’s College, School of Law, Aberdeen, AB24 3FX, United Kingdom Dr. Marina Gallego-Burín, Universidad de Granada, Facultad de Derecho, Plaza de la Universidad, s/n, 18001 Granada, Spanien Prof. Dr. Mark Godfrey, University of Glasgow, School of Law, Stair Building, 5 – 9 The Square, Glasgow G12 8QQ, Scotland Prof. Dr. Mia Korpiola, University of Turku, Faculty of Law, 20014 University of Turku, Finnland Prof. Dr. Bertram Lomfeld, Freie Universität Berlin, FB Rechtswissenschaft, Van’t-Hoff-Str. 8, 14195 Berlin Prof. Dr. José Antonio López Nevot, Universidad de Granada, Facultad de Derecho, Plaza de la Universidad, s/n, 18001 Granada, Spanien Prof. Dr. Miguel Angel Morales Payan, Universidad de Almería, Edificio Departamental de Ciencias Jurídicas (Edif. D), Planta 2, Despacho 09, La Cañada de San Urbano, 04120 Almería, Spanien Prof. Dr. Ulrike Müßig, Universität Passau, Juristische Fakultät, Innstr. 39, 94032 Passau Prof. Dr. José Antonio Pérez Juan, Universidad Miguel Hernández, Dpto. Arte, Humanidades y Ciencias sociales y Juridicas, Edif. Torrevaillo, Avda. de la Universidad, s,n, 0302 Elche (Alicante), Spanien Prof. Antonio Sánchez Aranda, Universidad de Granada, Facultad de Derecho, Plaza de la Universidad, s/n, 18001 Granada, Spanien Prof. em. Dr. Wolfgang Sellert, Konrad-Adenauer-Str. 26, 37075 Göttingen