Contested Civic Spaces: A European Perspective 9783111070070, 9783111070469, 9783111070780

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Siri Hummel, Rupert Graf Strachwitz Contested Civic Spaces

Maecenata Schriften

Edited by Dr. phil. Rupert Graf Strachwitz, Dr. sc. Eckhard Priller and Dr. Siri Hummel

Band 22

Siri Hummel, Rupert Graf Strachwitz

Contested Civic Spaces A European Perspective

ISBN 978-3-11-107007-0 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-107046-9 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-107078-0 ISSN 1866-122X Library of Congress Control Number: 2023933699 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Druck und Bindung: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Content Siri Hummel and Rupert Graf Strachwitz Introduction  1

Developing the space Gojko Bežovan Shrinking Space for Civil Society development in Croatia  5 Asif Afridi Civil Society in England: Current challenges and future opportunities27 Gianluca Salvatori, Francesco Scarpat and Alessia Schiavone Third Sector as the most significant manifestation of Civil Society in Italy  49

The interplay with the state Nataliia Lomonosova Civil Society in Ukraine: Cooperation between Ukrainian CSOs and local and state authorities  71 Hélène Balazard French democracy under threat  87 Siri Hummel Civil Society in Germany: Contested spaces in times of rapid change  115

Fighting right-wing populism Ruth Simsa Civic spaces between turbulent politics and the pandemic – The civil society in Austria  133 Vasilios N. Makrides Civil Society in 21st Century Greece: Locating Challenges, Charting Opportunities, Assessing Developments  161 Boris Strečanský Dancing on a Thin Ice: Civil Society in Slovakia  193

VI  Content

New movements Ulla Pape From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands  241 Maria Medina-Vicent and Ramón A. Feenstra Spain: The evolution of Civil Society’s mobilisation since 15M  277 Anna Domaradzka and Magdalena Kołodziejczyk Polish Civil Society 2015–2022: Steered from the top, reclaimed from the grassroots  295 Rupert Graf Strachwitz The Civic Space: Growing – Shrinking – Closing – Changing? A Comparative Analysis  317 Contributors333

Siri Hummel and Rupert Graf Strachwitz

Introduction

“Civil society is often characterised as one of three spheres of action, along with government and the private sector. It has been defined as a sphere of uncoerced human association within which individuals implement collective action to address shared needs, ideas and interests that they have identified in common […] Civil society is thus considered to be the collection of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and other semior non-formal forms of people associating or of associations, as well as the sphere or space in which these interact with each other and with others. Reference is also made to the civil society or CSO sector, just as government is referred to as the public sector and business as the private sector” (OECD 2020). This is what the OECD offers as definition of civil society. In a paper published in 2014, Paul Lichterman and Nina Eliasoph argue that civic action, while usually seen in a neo-Tocquevillian approach, is not necessarily restricted to “a distinct social sector, defined in relation to other sectors” (800), but may also be taken to mean “a form of action in a scene, potentially located in different sectors”. (ibid.). They contend that while the “neo-Tocquevillian approach has helped researchers develop useful quantitative comparisons of civic life within or across societies” (801), the civic action perspective “asks what kinds of action can be called civic to begin with, what varied, identifiable patterns of civic action may exist, and what varied outcomes may result from them” (ibid.). Both approaches have their merits, and indeed one may propose to look at both in trying to define the scope and size of the civic space in any given geographical or virtual area, political order, or culture. Looking at the civic space in Europe in particular just over 30 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, this would seem an appropriate way to assess whether and if so to what extent a civic space exists, and whether it is expanding or closing, undisputed or contested, growing or shrinking. In this context, “it is important to point out that the civil society sectors in CEE [Central and Eastern Europe] were – contrary to the often implicit assumption – neither built “from scratch” after 1989, nor did they develop uniformly or similarly.” (Vandor 2017, 26). Therefore, answering the question whether the civic space is growing or shrinking, accepted or contested, or possibly closing, is not as straightforward as many publications suggest. While it has become common practice to talk about a shrinking civic space, and indeed a number of valid data and arguments may be put forward that lead to this conclusion (viz. Divjak and Forbici 2017, 32), a closer look reveals that the situation is less clear cut. “Despite the focus on the repressive mechanisms that authoritarian regimes employ to suppress the more political parts of civil society, many of these countries, including Russia and China, have embarked on modernization strategies that seek to involve civil society in partnerships with government to improve the often dismal provision of social, health or educational services.” (Toepler https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111070469-001

  Siri Hummel and Rupert Graf Strachwitz et al. 2020). We find that “in many countries (such as Hungary, Czechia, and Poland) state investment in civil society is growing from year to year. However, in Poland most public funding is distributed to NGOs promoting values aligned with government policy or affiliated with the Catholic Church.” (Novakova 2020, 5–6). On the other hand, “since January 2012, more than 100 laws have been proposed or enacted by governments aimed at restricting the registration, operation, and funding of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in a context where the majority of civil society organisations globally have little support from funders in their own countries. While such legislation usually applies to all non-profit organisations, the smear attacks accompanying legislative change target civil society in different ways. While human rights activists are accused of being foreign agents, environmental activists are finding themselves branded as anti-economic development and a threat to security, and development and humanitarian groups are facing accusations of corruption and a lack of accountability. The vilification of civil society actors leaves them even more vulnerable to attack.” (Joshi 2016, 8). Lichterman and Eliasoph also point to the fact that within a neo-Tocquevillian frame, the civic space may be understood to encompass huge professional providers of social services (viz. Hummel/Pfirter/Strachwitz 2022) that are unquestionably not-for-profit, but hardly part of civic action (807). Yet, in observing the civic space and the dangers to its existence, it is most commonly civil society, and organized civil society at that which is most in focus. There is a reason for this: “Civil society does its best to engage with any spaces available in international institutions and processes, but the pattern is inconsistent at best. In the UN, states often delay civil society reports and accreditation on flimsy grounds. Each institution offers a varying level of space for civil society. What spaces are available tend to privilege elite civil society groups. And in all cases civil society complains of being behind not only states but also the private sector when it comes to access.” (Firmin/Pousadela/Tiwana 2022, 45). This becomes particularly apparent when attempting to draw a European comparison, or perhaps even to present the theory of a European civic space. “Governments have shown little interest in measuring the CSO sector in such a way that might lead to comparability.” (Harvey et al. 2019, 13). Furthermore, “as the domain of civil society burgeoned in the 1990s and early 2000s—a crucial component of the global spread of democracy in the developing and postcommunist worlds—many transnational and domestic actors involved in building and supporting this expanding civil society assumed that the sector was naturally animated by organizations mobilizing for progressive causes. […] However, in the past ten years, this assumption and outlook are proving increasingly incorrect. In many countries in the developing and postcommunist worlds, as well as in long-established Western democracies, conservative forms of civic activism have been multiplying and gaining traction. In some cases, new conservative civic movements and groups are closely associated with illiberal political actors and appear to be an integral part of the well-chronicled global pushback against Western liberal democratic norms.” (Youngs 2018, 7).

Introduction  

As the associates involved in the project presented here clearly demonstrate, “we need an approach that examines actors’ own ways of balancing and rebalancing between civic, state, and market spheres” (Lichterman and Eliasoph, 852). Not least, of the four G-20 countries examined in this project (France, Germany, Italy, and United Kingdom), none were shown to be engaged in providing a state of the art frame for civil society in a fairly recent study (Anheier et al. 2017). Furthermore, there is a growing feeling, not so far supported by evidence that the reports on Western European countries presented in comparative surveys like the CIVICUS Monitor (Civicus 2022) or the European Civic Forum’s Civic Space Report, while assembled in the best of faith and with the best of intentions by contributors in the various countries, may not actually present an accurate picture of the situation, and overlook deficiencies that do not meet the eye. So what we as editors have requested associates from 12 European countries to do was to look into the issues connected with a potentially shrinking space and write reports relating to what they believed to be the most pressing problems in this context. They were purposely not given guidelines as to how to construct their contributions, as we were driven by a wish to show what was seen as the most important narrative. In a final comparative chapter, we as editors will attempt to pull what has been related in these countries together and contrast it with other publications on the subject. In a final comparative chapter, an attempt will be made to highlight one strong argument (obviously among many others) in each of the contributions. To this end, they are grouped into four sections according to the emphasis the authors gave certain aspects of the issue, while of course other aspects are necessarily also dealt with in each of the country reports. These sections are: 1. Developing the space: Croatia, England, Italy; 2. The interplay with the state: Ukraine, France, Germany; 3. Fighting right-wing populism: Austria, Greece, Slovakia; 4. New movements: The Netherlands, Spain, Poland. Needless to say, the reports also present a plethora of valuable contributions to the ongoing debate over definitions, scope, and political theory as well as other implications of assigning a specific role to civic action and civil society in the 21st century. While all researchers involved in the project would share a basic frame, some undissolved differences are obvious, and no attempt has been made to cover these up or to find a common ground on each and every detail. Thus, the country reports provide arguments for an continuing discussion over a European and potentially global civil society. On the other hand, the country reports provide fascinating insight into the differing historical and cultural traditions of an existing civic space in a variety of European countries. Furthermore, the country reports offer a large selction of data and sources, some of which hitherto little known at European level. This exercise is part of a larger project begun in 2019 that built on a number of previous studies conducted and papers published at the Maecenata Institute for Phi-

  Siri Hummel and Rupert Graf Strachwitz lanthropy and Civil Society. In the context of this project, conducted with generous support from the foundation consultancy Porticus, other publications included special reports from France, Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Turkey, much more extensive reports on Austria and Germany (both published in English and German) and a special edition of the journal “Nonprofit Policy Forum”, containing an introduction and reports from Austria, Germany, Greece, and Israel. The findings of the project have also been discussed at roundtables in the context of international conferences of the International Society for Third Sector Research. Furthermore, a European Civic Space database is being established at the Maecenata Institute in order to provide information and alert the general public as well as academia to the consequences of a shrinking civic space. Our sincere thanks are due to all associates and authors without whom this endeavour would not have been able to be realized. As always we depended on many colleagues for their insight, contributions, ideas, and criticism, and we are grateful that we got all of this in droves. Also, we wish to thank the team of the Maecenata Institute for their cooperation and much hard work that went into getting everything ready for publication.

References Civicus 2022: Civicus Monitor. Tracking Civic Space, Retrieved from https://monitor.civicus.org (13th December 2022). Joshi, Poonam (2016): Background; in: Ariadne/Funders Initiative for Civil Society (ed.): Challenging the closing space for civil societies, Retrieved from http://www.ariadne-network.eu/challenging-the-closing-space-for-civil-society/ (17th April 2022). Lichterman, Paul/Eliasoph, Nina (2014): Civic Action; in: American Journal of Sociology, vol. 120. No. 3, 798–863. Novakova, Nataliya (2020): Civil Society in Central Europe: Threats and Ways Forward. German Marshall Fund: Policy Paper no. 21 Harvey, Brian/Smolijaninovaitė, Kristina/Belokurova, Elena (2019): 2018 Report on the State of Civil Society in the EU and Russia. Berlin: EU-Russia Civil Society Forum e.V. Hummel, Siri/Pfirter, Laura/Strachwitz, Rupert Graf (2022): Civil Society in Germany: A Report on the General Conditions and Legal Framework. Berlin: Maecenata (Opusculum no. 169) OECD (2020): Social economy and The COVID-19 crisis: current and future roles, Retrieved from https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=135_135367-031kjiq7v4&title=Social-economy-andthe-COVID-19-crisis-current-and-future-roles (13th December 2022).

Gojko Bežovan

Shrinking Space for Civil Society development in Croatia  Introduction In Croatia, as a part of the post-communist world, the topic of civil society was not a priority in the early 1990s. The brutal war for the country’s independence, the war in neighbouring countries, refugee crisis and economic collapse with a very high unemployment level and high inflation in the circumstances of an undemocratic political regime were parts of public and private concern. In these complex circumstances, international humanitarian organisations came to provide relief to war victims at first. They also provided financial and technical support to local initiatives and organisations. For some of them, a high priority was to provide support to human rights organisations. Human rights issues became an important political question and since that period we have been witnessing conflicts between these civil society organisations and the government. Partly, criminalisation and stigmatisation of human rights activities was a policy of some of the media controlled by the government. Due to growing international support and having former members of the Communist Party who had found a new job in civil society as visible staff members, civil society as such has been faced with the problem of legitimacy for a long time. The development of a regulatory framework in these circumstances was a belated and controversial process. After the first funding programme from the national budget at the beginning of the 2000s, civil society got also support from the budget of cities and some larger companies also started with public calls for projects. Besides that, funding, more developed and more visible organisations were getting a bigger part of funds from abroad. Pre-accession EU funds, funds and technical assistance of national developmental organisations like USAID, SIDA, CIDA and others, as well as foreign private foundations helped organisational development. More organisations were providing social services to vulnerable social groups and ordinary people learned how to form an association to protect and advocate personal interest. Social enterprises and the concept of social economy, as a new concept, emerged as achievements of civil society organisations. From other side, indigenes philanthropy, with possibly, respective resources to be mobilised is less developed. Like in other post-communist countries The Open Society Institute Croatia was very important for CSOs funding and they were threatened by the government and frequently exposed to attacks by the media-controlled government (Bežovan 2005). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111070469-002

  Gojko Bežovan In general, trust is at a low level, people do not trust each other, and they do not trust the government, state institutions and media. But the level of trust in civil society organisations is not as low as in the mentioned institutions (Bežovan/Matančević 2017). Civil society organisations (CSOs) promoted European values, contributed to the Europeanisation of society, and paved the Croatian path to Brussels. With the country’s accession to the EU, civil society got the needed legitimacy, more funds are available and civil society organisations have a certain impact on public policy at different levels. However, during the whole period key institutions for civil society development have been under the control of the ruling political party. In some fields, civil society is emerging as a co-governor making inputs for the development of a new governance structure. Civil society produces social innovations and sustainable positive social changes for the benefit of different social groups and local communities. Recent developments with COVID-19 pandemic threaten civil society. Local funding from cities and donations from companies have been going down. Local organisations are in troubles, and they provide les services to vulnerable social groups.

 Historic and socio-economic framework The burdensome historical and socio-economic framework in Croatia in the last part of the previous century was not promising for the development of civil society as a concept which relies on an active interest and involvement of citizens in communities and society. Like in other communist countries, the activities of civil society were suspended during the authoritarian regimes established during and after World War II. Under the communist regime, the freedom of association was extremely restricted, and all interest groups involving recreation, sports, organisation for children and cultural organisations became part of the state-controlled system. In general, the communist regime had a profound and long-lasting impact on the development of civil society, the effects of what can still be seen today, and they are part of ongoing debates (Bežovan et al. 2019). This legacy manifests itself in the mindset of the citizens, who do not have experience with self-organisation or with taking on social responsibility, since they consider it the responsibility of the state to solve their problems. On the other hand, the Croatian government, from the very beginning in 1990s, has shown a paternalistic attitude toward citizens, and only the members of certain political parties gain access to employment in certain public services. As a result, citizens have a high level of mistrust in state institutions and in each other.

Shrinking Space for Civil Society development in Croatia  

As a part of global trends, in the late 1980s, independent initiatives of intellectuals, as well as ecological, human rights and women’s groups arose in Croatia. The rise of civil society in the late 1980s was linked to the creation of a multiparty political system, with some civil initiatives subsequently transforming into political parties. For example, the first registered political party in Croatia was originally a civic initiative launched by intellectuals and registered under the amendments of a law that regulated registration of associations (Bežovan 2005). Unlike other post-communist counties of Central Europe, the war for the country’s independence (1991–1995) impeded the development of a democratic and vibrant civil society. When considering the development of civil society in Croatia over the past 30 years, it should be noted that its development in the 1990s was influenced by a considerably unfavourable political and policy environment. During that period, monopolistic governments used the media to defame the civil society sector. The government’s accusations that such organisations are foreign hirelings and spies had a strong impact on the public’s attitude toward CSOs. Several studies reported on the citizens’ negative attitudes toward CSOs (B.a.B.e. 2002; Ledić/Mrnjaus 2000), and today these attitudes are still recognisable in certain parts of the population. During the Homeland War from 1991 to 1995, there were grave sufferings of the population, a drastic decline in economic activities, the privatisation of state own companies, and dramatic social problems. During the war, there was a drastic decline in the national income. Croatia’s GDP in 1993 fell to 59.5 % of the GDP in 1989. During the war, about a quarter of the country was occupied, and more than half of Croatian territory was affected by war operations. At the beginning of 1992, about 550,000 displaced persons from Croatia were taken care of, and Croatia received about 150,000 refugees from other post-Yugoslav states (Puljiz 2019). Political and economic situation in the country gradually stabilised by the end of the 1990s and reforms of the economic and social policy system began under the supervision of international financial institutions, the World Bank and the IMF. After 2000, with the advent of the coalition government, economic and social conditions improved, and reforms were implemented. During this period, the influence of global financial institutions declined, and the influence of the European Union gradually grew (Puljiz 2019). At the beginning of the 1990s, the growth and activities of civil society organisations were predominantly developed through humanitarian work in the context of the war and the subsequent humanitarian and social crisis, with significant financial and technical assistance from abroad. However, such incentives for development were often donor-driven, and such programs were not embedded in the local context. A significant part of Croatian civil society was described as “imported, virtual civil society” which was primarily funded by foreign donations. Such programs led to foreign donor dependency, and the later withdrawal of foreign funds led to an increased financial instability among CSOs. However, it has also been shown that foreign technical

  Gojko Bežovan and financial programs contributed to the development of some important social services (Bežovan/Zrinščak 2007; Bežovan 2008). During the 1990s, cooperation and dialogue between CSOs and the state were very limited and dominated by conflict. Under pressure from abroad, the government established the Government Office for Associations in 1998. The Office contributed considerably to increasing the transparency of funds allocated to associations from the state budget, and it organised several education programs that were attended by the representatives of CSOs, the state and, most importantly, local authorities. Two important initiatives of the Office were the establishment of the Council for Civil Society Development in 2002 and the National Foundation for Civil Society Development in 2003. In the late 1990s, CSOs played an important role in ousting the authoritarian regime and installing a truly democratic political system. In 2002, under the mandate of the new coalition government which was positively inclined toward the idea of civil society, a better cooperation was established between the state and CSOs, and the latter were frequently invited to cooperate in the implementation of various projects. However, several experts considered this cooperation merely declarative, as a part of proactive ideology, and not as a true contribution to establishing successful partnerships between the state and civil society (Bežovan 2005). There were also cases in which the government did not honour its commitments to their partners in the civil sector. While the government theoretically proclaimed the need to cooperate with civil society, little was done to foster such collaboration in practice. It is important to point out that, like in other post-communist counties, foreign influence contributed to the “NGO-isation” of civil society organisations and to a new type of activism which gained political relevance at the expense of grassroots and other dissident movements (Navrátil et al. 2015). Civil society is, with an inherited dissident culture, averse to the state and institutions and doubts any forms of collective action. This development increased the gap between citizens and CSOs and contributed to the rise of new channels of popular discontent that began to be driven by xenophobic, nationalist, or conservative actors. Against this background, it is not surprising that civil society has been perceived as weak regarding its ability to engage or mobilise citizens (Bežovan 2016).

 Regulation framework Legal regulations for civil society were passed rather late and by using “old legislation”, the government was controlling the process of registration and there were more cases of misuse where they have rejected registration of some important associations. It was a big fight during the process of the preparation of the Associations Act, which was passed in 1997 to regulate the establishment, registration, and activities of CSOs.

Shrinking Space for Civil Society development in Croatia  

While passing this act, the government was not willing to consider comments and proposals from independent experts or associations. After CSOs submitted proposals for a constitutional review, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia abrogated 16 provisions of the Associations Act, because they violated the constitutional right of association. This experience had negative impacts on civil society’s development and has undermined the trust of CSOs in institutions (Bežovan 2005). Also, in 1993 the minister of finance in stopped the tax incentives for citizens and for companies to provide donations. A more favourable policy and tax framework for civil society development has been created since the coalition government came to power in 2000 (Bežovan/Zrinščak 2007). With that reform citizens and companies could give up to 2 % of their income to non-profit organisations, and while using EU donations, they were not paying VAT on goods and services. The next right government was very hostile to the majority of CSOs, as they were involved in the 2000 elections on the side of the coalition government, so they stopped that incentive of not paying VAT for human rights, ecological and organisations dealing with democratisation. In that period there were several attempts to discredit prominent CSOs by making official financial audits of their activities and on that basis criminalising and stigmatising their missions. The new coalition government in cooperation with the CSO community prepared and passed the new Association Act in 2001. With that regulation three persons can register an association, while before it was ten persons. The process of registration is less bureaucratic and more transparent. Without any reliable reason, the left coalition government initiated a process of drafting the new Association Act in 2014. Being obsessed to control more CSOs, they imposed a bureaucratic concept of public benefit organisations with the request to existing associations for re-registration. They also passed very detailed and unnecessary instructions for the process of registration of new associations. The CSO community was sharply divided about this regulation and a larger part was supporting the idea to have more state control. A group of prominent organisations saw part of these provisions as a process against freedom of association 1 (Bežovan 2019a). With this legislation change they imposed very demanding criteria for funding of CSOs and small local organisations living on voluntary basis do not have administrative capacity to make a contract with certain funding programmes. As an expression of distrust towards CSOs, and even with a suspicion of money laundering, the left government in 2014 passed the Act on Financial Operations and Accounting of Non-profit Organisations (Bežovan 2019a). Again, provisions of this legislation might be used as a threat to CSOs as newly registered associations are obliged to keep accounting books without respect of the level of income as was the case before.  1 Since that, they have been waiting for a decision of the Constitutional Court.

  Gojko Bežovan The last change in the Act on Humanitarian Aid occurred in 2015 and the rules for collecting and distribution of donations for humanitarian aid were specified further in order to increase accountability, the transparency of monitoring of the money raised for humanitarian actions and reducing the possibility for misuse of funds (Baturina 2016). Another important legal person in CSOs is a foundation and the Act on Foundations and Funds from 1995 imposed a demanding process of registration. According to this legislation, a foundation is an endowment (universitas rerum) intended to itself, that is, the income it acquires permanently serves the realisation of some public good or charitable purposes. There is a relatively small number of foundations, they have limited endowment, and they are dominantly fund-raising foundations. Mostly foundations provide scholarships and social support (Bežovan 2019b). The new Act on Foundations from 2018 has made the process of registration less demanding. Part of cooperatives, separately social cooperatives might be CSOs. The Act on Cooperatives states that a cooperative is an appropriate legal person for different kinds of social enterprise. An example of a soft regulatory or better policy framework is the National Strategy for Creating a Stimulating Environment for Development Civil Society. The Strategy was made in intensive participatory process open to CSOs. In the period from 2006 to 2016 there were two strategies. The third Strategy was also in a consultation process and was then stopped in one ministry without any explanation. Civil society members see it as ignorance from the side of the government (Jašić 2020). Still there is a lack of policy regulation for the involvement of CSOs in the provision of social services on equal basis as state organisations, like in services for the elderly. It can be qualified as a policy neglected field with evident policy stagnating what contributes to shrinking space for civil society development (Anheier/Toepler 2019). Regulatory framework is fragmented with a lack of policy clarity and voids, like in policy to migrants. Migration as a global issue forced each country to make its own strategies to deal with that sensitive and complex issue. Again, CSOs were putting that issue on public agenda, developing their own programmes for migrants with critical observations of government repression policy at the country borders. Mainstream media under close to the government often stigmatise activities of these CSOs. From other side, CSOs play important role in integration of migrants (Lalić Novak/Giljević 2019).

Shrinking Space for Civil Society development in Croatia  

 Institutional framework, structure of civil society and funding . Institutional framework For a longer time, Croatia was a country with a negative image in the region related to civil society development. Since the end of the 1990s, Croatia has developed a very comprehensive institutional structure of support for civil society development (Figure 1). The Government Office for Associations from 1998 has a mission to provide a stimulating legal, institutional, and financial framework for the activities of associations and it supports the development of a strong and autonomous civil society as an indispensable partner of the state in the preparation and implementation of public policies. The goal of the Office is an effective and efficient coordination of state bodies in the implementation of cooperation with associations and other CSOs and in the preparation and implementation of public policies (cf. udruge n.d.). Respective bodies Office

Council

National Foundation

Development

Development

for Associations

for Civil Society

(1998)

(2002)

National Council

for Civil Society

for Development

(2003)

(2009)

of Volunteering

Ministries, Agencies, Counties, Cities and Municipalities

Figure 1: Institutional framework of support for civil society development in Croatia. Source: Own figure

The National Foundation for Civil Society Development from 2003 was founded with the basic aim of promoting and developing the civil society in Croatia. To fulfil its basic aim, the Foundation offers expert and financial support to programs which encourage the sustainability of the not-for-profit sector, inter-sector cooperation, civil initiatives, philanthropy, voluntary work, and which improve the democratic institutions of society and other programs (cf. National Foundation for Civil Society Development n.d.). With the open call for three years funding programme of CSOs, Foun-

  Gojko Bežovan dation made visible contribution to sustainable development of CSOs. But from the outside there are no reliable channels of communication with Foundation, and the ways to make certain impact on their programme are less known. The process of selection of Board members is not transparent and on the executive side, politics has a big influence. With more responsive and better-known persons as Board members the Foundation would be in a position to be more respected. The Council for Civil Society Development from 2002 is an advisory body to the government acting towards developing cooperation between the government and the civil society organisations in the implementation of the National Strategy for Creating an Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development, the development of philanthropy, social capital, partnership relations and cross sector cooperation (cf. Office for Cooperation with NGOs n.d.). The tasks of the Council are participation in constant monitoring and analysis of public policies referring to and/or affecting civil society development and cross-sector cooperation; cooperation in planning priorities of the national programmes for public funding of programmes and projects of CSOs, participation in programming and setting priorities for the use of EU funds that are available for Croatia, based on the efficient system of consultations with CSOs. The Council has 37 members out of which there are 17 representatives of relevant state administrative bodies and the government offices, 14 representatives of CSOs, 3 representatives of civil society from foundations, trade unions and employers’ associations and 3 representatives of national associations of local and regional authorities. President of the Council is a member representing civil society, while the vicepresident is representing the state institutions. The president and the members of the Council are elected for a mandate of three years and can be re-elected. From the very beginning Council has looked like a body without a real capacity to act and more like a decoration to show engaged government in civil society developmental issues. In 2016, the right government with a strong right wing, failing to respect the decision of the Council and violating the legal procedure, decided to reduce previously approved funds to CSOs, including funds for the associations of the blind and disabled and thus called into question their activities. It was a clear case of civil society capture (Simsa 2019). In protest, the president and members of the Council from the ranks of civil society resigned (Jašić 2020). The experience of the President of the Council speaks of isolating and ignoring of civil society by the government with which there was in fact no relationship. She says, “that recently civil society has been largely pushed to the margins, not only because its current contribution is not valued, but through public rhetoric the successes and all that has been done to democratise society and strengthen human rights in the last twenty years or more are being dismissed. Instead, civil society organisations have been stigmatised and criminalised in recent years, in fact accused of corruption. Various state administration bodies that should deal with corruption in their ranks are preparing increasingly rigid control policies and imposing increasingly rigid forms of

Shrinking Space for Civil Society development in Croatia  

administration of projects implemented by civil society, even at the cost of returning the money to European funds. This could be defined as rigor training so that their work can be controlled. Of course, civil society has heterogeneous management cultures and there are certainly those organisations with corrupt practices, which we ourselves are ready to condemn. But if we analyse state policies, those organisations that have a critical voice are regularly called out and they try to silence them” (Bužinkić 2020). Related to recent developments, Jašić (2020) has a strong statement: “The framework of support and cooperation between the state and civil society, which has been built for years, has almost completely collapsed, while the financial and administrative exhaustion and weakening of associations is carried out through EU funds.” 2 The government and state administration are responsible for the mentioned exhaustion. Jašić (2020) explains how the government, by illegally electing representatives of civil society from the ranks of foundations, elected the director of the foundation whose founder is the government, so that the foundation in question is not part of civil society, and then won a majority and elected its president. Several CSOs have filed a lawsuit against such a government decision. In addition, in a non-transparent and undemocratic procedure, Croatian members were elected to the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). It is important to know that the Office and the Foundation have an important role in implementing the EU projects. According to empirical insights (Jašić 2020), project administration, on the other hand, is too detailed and excessive to the extent that users call it irrational, inflexible, complicated, and inefficient. Many of CSOs suffer from burnout and exhaustion, have been dancing on the edge of existence for a long time and have less and less time for the most important part of the work for which they exist to solve social problems and create positive social changes. Moreover, under the priority axis Good Governance, part of European Social Fund for Croatia, in the past 6 years no tender has been announced regarding corruption, conflicts of interest and transparency (i.e., the very core of good governance), except for the tender at the end of 2018, which requires mandatory partnership of associations with local leaders, corruption and conflict of interest prevention projects (Jašić 2020). Delays in disbursement and illiquidity, combined with delays in the announcement of tenders, mean that associations can hardly define operational and financial plans for the next years, do not have any parameters to assess the possibilities and scope of their work in the future, and this, of course, affects retaining existing employees, who are in significant numbers highly specialised in the areas in which they work. There were no reactions on these public statements and a lack of dialogue means a gradual erosion of institutional framework for civil society development.  2 Suzana Jašić is a well known civil society person from the GONG association. The title of her report is “Coups against civil society supported by EU funds.”

  Gojko Bežovan The National Committee for the Development of Volunteering is an advisory body of the Government, established in 2009 in accordance with the Volunteering Act. The members of the Committee are representatives of the public sector, independent experts as well as representatives of civil society organisations dealing with volunteering, and they are appointed by the government. The Committee proposes measures to improve the position of volunteers in society, in cooperation with the competent authorities proposes regulations on benefits for volunteers, decides on the State Prize for Volunteering, initiates the adoption or amendment of regulations governing volunteering and adopts the Code of Ethics for volunteers. Table 1: Number of volunteers and number of voluntary hours from 2014 to 2020 in the Republic of Croatia  Number of volunteers Number of voluntary hours

,

 ,

 ,

 ,

 ,





,

,

,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,

,,

Data Source: Mrosp, 2022

According to the data (Table 1), the number of volunteers was growing from 2014 to 2019, while due to the COVID crisis, the number was decreasing in 2020. The number of volunteering hours is growing similarly. CSOs mostly reported involvement of volunteers, while only a few hospitals reported such practice. On average, about 65 % of volunteers are female.

. Structure of civil society The size of the civil sector has increased considerably in the last 30 years. The number of associations increased from 12,000 in 1990 to some 52,000 at the end of 2020. The majority of these associations are from the field of sport 33 % and culture 22 %. However, active membership in CSOs is still a challenge, as can be seen from the insufficient level of civil engagement and the considerably sparse actions in local communities. Croatian civil society is still a phenomenon concentrated in larger cities and in better developed parts of the country. In counties with more people with university education there are more CSOs. The low level of trust among the CSOs results in rather poor networking and insufficient cooperation, which reduces their development potential (Bežovan/Matančević 2017).

Shrinking Space for Civil Society development in Croatia  

In smaller cites there are limited number of associations with professionalised staff and needed skills to get respective funding and to implement projects with visible impacts. Foundations are a lesser part of CSOs, and in whole there are less than 200 active foundations.

. Funding of civil society In examining funding resources for civil society over the past decades, the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) 20082010 research on Croatia (Bežovan/Matančević 2011) found that more than two thirds of CSOs included in the research had stable financial resources, which indicated an improvement in comparison to the earlier wave of CSI research (Bežovan/Zrinščak 2007). However, the CSI already depicted the negative consequences of the beginning of the financial crisis 2008 on CSOs’ funding. According to the USAID CSO Sustainability Index, in the past few years there has been a decrease in funding for CSOs from public sources, including local government budgets. Representatives of CSOs also cited the problem that financing is often not timely (USAID 2018). According to the annual reports on public funding of CSOs for 2014, almost one third of all funding came from local governments (cities’ budgets), followed by the lottery (21 %) and the national budget (17 %). Research findings in longer line (Bežovan/Matančević 2017) regularly report that funding is the most important issue for sustainable development of CSOs. According to the data of the Ministry of Finance, in 2018, associations will receive HRK 2.3 billion (€307 mil) in two parts from public sources. About HRK 427 million (€57 mil) were allocated from gambling revenues, HRK 327 million (€44 mil) from the state budget and HRK 289 million (€38 mil) from EU funds. Local authorities gave the associations 1.1 billion HRK (€1,477 mil). Revenues of associations in 2018 amounted to 6.6 billion HRK (€880 mil), and in 2019 to 7 billion HRK (€934 mil). In 2019, 18,000 people were employed in the associations, and 52,000 of them volunteered (USAID 2020). Civil society organisations (or, more precisely, non-profit organisations) in Croatia enjoy certain tax benefits. In the past, civil society organisations did not enjoy public trust, and citizens and corporations did not receive tax benefits for donations to CSOs, which was explained by the political establishment’s suspicions regarding the non-transparent operations of CSOs. As it has been stated, citizens and corporations (natural and legal persons) can donate up to 2 % of their income for the common good and deduct that amount from their taxes. After the crisis in 2008, people and companies have been less willing to provide such donations. In 2013 2,899 persons and 736 companies declared such donations (Bežovan/Matančević 2017). CSOs and civic attitudes have been weakened by several socio-economic crises.

  Gojko Bežovan A part of the organisations close to the Catholic Church, led by Caritas, raise respective funds from domestic and foreign sources. Non-profit organisations do not pay tax on profits or on membership fees and they can receive tax-free donations in money or other type of property, like real estate. Donations, endowments, grants, membership fees and contributions from public funds are not subject to income tax. In cases of public campaign raising funds for certain public purposes, respective organisations can get more than they planned (Bežovan/Zrinščak 2007). Some organisations and initiatives using crowdfunding as a new fundraising tool also show how people trust good ideas and are willing to provide donations.

 Perception and trust According to the European Values Study, citizens trust institutions less and less. The military enjoys the greatest trust (61 % of citizens), followed by the education system (51 %) and the police (46 %). The church enjoys the trust of 38 % of the citizens and newspapers only of 10 %. At the bottom of the scale is Parliament, which is trusted by only 8 % of citizens and political parties are at the very bottom with 4 %. Even 87 % of citizens do not trust other citizens (Baloban et al. 2019). Croatia belongs to a group of new EU member states with low level of trust (Ágh 2015). High levels of mistrust reduce the effect of joint action, and the social climate of mistrust paralyzes social action and encourages passivity, cynicism, and conformism. Since the early 1990s, perceptions of CSOs have been dubious. At a time when they were mostly called non-governmental organisations in public, the average citizen perceived them as organisations paid from abroad, partly as foreign spies who were against the establishment of the Croatian state. Such a picture was largely presented by the state-controlled media. These organisations in the 1990s, with the strongest public voice, were closer to left-wing political parties and seemed like part of the political opposition. With the arrival of the government coalition in 2000, they did not maintain the same level of criticism as before (Bežovan 2005). Later, CSOs mature, which are louder, closer to the right-wing parties, and then a clear political division could have been seen on the civil society scene. Organisations closer to the right have sought greater funding from public funds because they were previously deprived, as well as positions in decision-making bodies such as the Council for Civil Society Development and the National Foundation for Civil Society Development. Those political engaged, left and right CSOs, on local and national level, often actively participate in elections with their lists of candidates. In such context, civil society is a very politicised topic. At the local levels, the authorities knew how to condition the funding of associations’ programs by employing their people as a staff of these organisations (Bežo-

Shrinking Space for Civil Society development in Croatia  

van/Matančević 2017). Funding dependent CSOs social services at the city levels are often faced with co-optation strategies (Toepler et. al. 2020). A relatively small number of CSOs remained politically correct in the public debates and activities and retained a nonpartisan position, without changing attitudes about problems and issues in society depending on who is in power. Another category of perception includes organisations that provide social and other services to citizens. Some of these important associations, member serving organisations, arose out of necessity, in order to provide families with the necessary services for their sick or needy members. Together with humanitarian organisations they are successful in fundraising campaigns, which means that they enjoy a decent level of trust. Given the large number of CSOs and the substantial resources for domestic economic opportunities set aside for them in public, associations are often, without evidence, suspected of money laundering. Attitudes that the government should take money from associations and give it to poor children are often prevalent. Associations, on the other hand, have a modest capacity to appear in public to defend themselves against these accusations. In Croatia citizens who are members of political party’s trust CSOs less than the citizens in Slovenia and Czech Republic (Bežovan/Matančević 2017). Trust is highly connected to perception. When simply asking an average citizen about their trust in NGOs, it will be low. When asking them about their trust in CSOs or associations, it will be higher. It means that wording matters and connotations are an important part of perception.

 Organisational development During the last 30 years the organisational landscape of Croatian civil society has been evolving and it reflects plurality of civil society. In the 1990s and in the first part of 2000s, in the circumstances of unstable political and economic circumstances, as well as problems with the financing, there were many attempts of setting up the new CSOs, conflicts within organisations, leadership problems and there was a syndrome of deserving founders. Many organisations, largely those funded from international sources and less routed in local landscape, did not survive. Thanks to international assistance programs, CSOs were able to use several different technical assistance programs, such as training and study stays abroad. Partnership projects with foreign organisations were also important for the development of capacities of organisations. Thanks to this, CSOs were the first to evaluate their programs, and they developed their strategic plans with the participation of relevant stakeholders, sought participation in the development of policy documents and initi-

  Gojko Bežovan ated discussions on relevant issues and publicly addressed needs for reforms in certain fields. Several organisations with needed capacities for different training topics provide services to CSOs, local authorities and to public institutions. In terms of organisational development or better to say typology of CSOs, there is empirical evidence (Bežovan/Matančević 2017; Bežovan/Zrinščak 2007) to differentiate such organisations: – Well-organised social welfare CSOs whose infrastructure originated during the socialist era. They can draw on relatively stable public financing and have certain property like offices but are characterised by a lack of new initiatives and social enterprise initiatives. – Professional associations devoted to various activities, which are becoming important in education and training, as well as initiatives for self-regulation are recognised as partners by other stakeholders and by the state. Moreover, they are important actors in mobilising support for new reforms and initiatives, e.g. around policy issues, legislation, etc. – Organisations established after 1990 with substantial foreign support and welleducated and skilled employees, functioning on principles of social entrepreneurship and developing innovative programs, mainly in social services, with missions and visions that are recognisable to potential partners. They are getting local, national and EU funding on constant basis. They also have board members prepared to use their personal networks and social capital for benefit of organisation. – A small number of better-developed organisations in terms of skilled staff and funding, including human rights groups, women’s organisations and organisations dealing with democratisation, development, or certain policy issues. These organisations are often linked to international networks and mostly financed from abroad. In the last 15 years they have been getting more national funding, and today they are very competitive in applications for EU funds. They frequently attract high media attention, and they also have strong persons as board members. – Young professionals, mostly after graduation from universities when they are faced with challenges of poor employment prospects, set up associations and gradually develop social entrepreneurship projects that seek to cope with sustainability using EU funds. It might be a new niche for CSOs to play the role of social integration and development. – Several social and ecological organisations which are frequently organised around the self-help principle and which promote innovative approaches, mobilise membership and local resources, and attract reputable figures from public life. Humanitarian organisations with broader support from all respective stakeholders are a very visible part of the development and they are managed on voluntary basis.

Shrinking Space for Civil Society development in Croatia  

–

The biggest share of CSOs belongs to local programmes, grass root organisations, which are less visible in public, without capacities to apply for funding or to report properly on project implementation.

A permanent panel on sustainability of CSOs recently stated 3: “Dependence on project-based funding continued to jeopardize CSOs’ ability to adhere to their missions in 2020, driving them to focus on the programmatic areas in which funding is available. CSOs are legally required to adopt 1 The Organizational Capacity score was recalibrated in 2018 to better reflect the situation in the country and to better align it with other scores in the region. The score does not reflect a deterioration in Organizational Capacity, which remained largely the same in 2018 as in 2017. 72 The 2020 CSO Sustainability Index for Croatia strategic plans, but as a rule only CSOs with greater organizational capacities and various sources of funding undertake intensive strategic planning efforts. There are not enough experts familiar with the specific characteristics of nonprofit work to facilitate this level of planning and thus enable quality longterm programs. However, some tenders, including one by the Active Citizens Fund in 2020, incorporate funds specifically for the purpose of strategic planning, and CSOs use them effectively where possible. Large CSOs have developed various tools and capacities to monitor the success of their work.” (USAID 2020:71–72). CSOs make a living from tender to tender, from project to project, are largely exhausted by the demanding project administration processes and have less time to devote to project implementation and work on social change. Related to this is unstable and short-term employment, related to project duration which makes civil society an area of precarious work. The exception, as previously mentioned, is three-year contracts for sustainable organisational development with the National Foundation for Civil Society Development.

 Capacities for innovations and social change The potential for innovations and positive changes in Croatia is rather dubious. Among the EU countries on the periphery, Croatia stands out as a country prone to neoliberal reforms and weak capacity to implement economic reforms, limited competitiveness of political parties and strong dependence on political patronage and corruption (Bohle/Greskovits 2012). Croatia belongs to post-communist countries with non-transparent and corrupt clientele networks between the political and economic spheres what undermined the big formal institutions and was thus responsible

 3 Panel members of USAID CSO Sustainability Index are well-known civil society people, researchers and representatives of governmental bodies and cities.

  Gojko Bežovan for declining democracy and state capture (Ágh 2015). Rising inequality, a divided society, an over-indebted state with over-indebted citizens is developing a strong sense of helplessness among younger citizens who are increasingly moving out of the country. The country is importing significant labour force, and urgent immigration plans need to be made (Bežovan 2019a). The role of CSOs and their contribution to social change is a new topic that CSOs or other stakeholders are not sufficiently aware of. Also, the topic of positive social change is not on the agenda. The average citizen thinks that it is the responsibility of the state, and on the other hand they do not trust the state. There are few citizens who feel strong enough and who are willing to associate with others to act together working hard, mostly on voluntary basis to produce positive social change. As a joint project of the Office for Associations and the group of CSOs, in 2009 the government accepted Code of Practice on Consultation with the interested public in the process of adopting laws, other regulations and policies, which makes the inclusion of CSOs and the public in the process of drafting and passing laws and other regulations obligatory. It was a kind of a policy innovation. Vidačak and Đurman (2017) show that there was no big interest in participation in this e-Consultation, especially in the beginning. Also, public bodies are not receptive to suggestions from civil society and the stakeholders what discourages them to follow this process. As it is pointed out (Baturina et al. 2019), there were some improvements in policy making through such public consultations, but more in terms of the number of participants interested in public things than in terms of the real impact. Empirical evidence in different parts of development says that a limited number of CSOs in better developed parts of the country have the capacity to produce innovations (Bežovan et al. 2016). 4 However, distrust of civil society is still present, which is a significant factor hindering new initiatives. The social innovations implemented by CSOs in the field of social policy can be explained with the theories of heterogeneity and theories of supply (Bežovan 2008). They appear in civil society because of unmet demand for public goods, which cannot be met by the market and the state. The state

 4 The research findings point to the existence of differences between the more developed countries of Western Europe and the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe in terms of drivers of social innovation and their receptivity in local social systems. In Croatia, the area of civil society, i.e. self-organised citizens, is proving to be crucial for social innovations, with high levels of social capital proving to be determinants of the success and impact of social innovations. Similar conclusions are indicated by the experiences from Poland, where the studied innovations predominantly arise from civic engagement, i.e. civil society initiatives (Siemieńska et al. 2014). In contrast, the examples of innovation from Münster, Germany, reflect the market logic of competitiveness and investment, but at the same time the traditions of solidarity and subsidiarity in social policy. These social innovations are often based on cross-sectoral cooperation between employers (profit sector), local authorities and the non-profit sector or, for example, employment innovations, which occur within local self-government (Boadu et al 2014).

Shrinking Space for Civil Society development in Croatia  

reacts belatedly and with questionable efficiency to new social risks and needs of vulnerable groups resulting from demographic changes, changes in the labour market and in the family structure. Traditional governance style and bureaucratic mindset present in governmental organisations providing services makes them places unsuitable for social innovations development. On the other hand, the market does not have a social logic of functioning, so a space for action opens for civil society. In civil society, enterprising people are more creative, with ideas that are ready to develop and be implemented as a social innovation, and to meet some social needs as a new part of development. However, social innovation in Croatian context comes because of unmet needs, not from developed good governance. Innovation-driven governance (Brandsen et al. 2015) is characterised by a general moderation to innovation with the main orientation being the continuous search for synergy between economic and social policy. It strongly encourages the cooperation of all stakeholders in finding solutions to social problems. Achieving this kind of synergy and openness to innovation in our context would mean respecting the principles of good governance, which with its requirements of participation, responsibility and transparency in policy making and implementation would be a guarantee for possible changes towards developing social innovation. Capacities of certain CSOs to make impact and to innovate in different fields such as: culture, social services, advocacy and social enterprises are on a decent level (Bežovan 2010). The key factors for the success, sustainability and dissemination of innovations identified in Croatian context relate to the quantity and quality of social capital, entrepreneurship, and professional competence of the bearer of the innovation idea and the support of other stakeholders. There are traces of the influence of the studied social innovations on the strengthening of social cohesion and incentives for social reforms from below. Volunteer work, trust, and commitment to dedicated cooperation are the cornerstones of social innovations in this context (Bežovan et al. 2016). Social innovations are close to a social enterprise model which came on the agenda as an EU supported concept. But social entrepreneurship is an example of policy neglect. Where should we look for support for sustainable social change? If the Polish experience is to be believed (Sztompka 1993), trust building is a key premise. The context of trust building is linked to the emergence of new generations who are particularly more involved in higher education, new middle classes who are increasingly becoming members of civil society organisations and who invest more in networking, are sensitive to giving for public purpose and to volunteer work and are closer to professional associations that strive for higher standards and ethics in doing business. The Europeanisation context has put institution building on the agenda. It is, along with a dedicated public dialogue, the foundation of the multiplication of social capital as a key resource for building sustainable social change and innovation in society.

  Gojko Bežovan This stake is a crucial resource and the country’s economic progress and construction civilisational competencies 5. Political will does not seem sufficient to build sustainable positive change, but it is a key partner in such affairs. This can be a desirable framework for good governance that would strengthen relevant stakeholders and strengthen the commitment to sustainable social change. The competencies and strengths of the community and society are crucial for solving problems that are beyond the reach of citizens, families, or civil society.

 Impact of COVID-19 The COVID-19 crisis has negatively affected civil society development in different aspects. In times of crisis, some funded programs for civil society organisations have been reduced or stopped, and tenders for EU funds have been slowed down or abandoned. The majority of cities and counties stopped funding programmes for CSOs. In such circumstances, the revenues of CSOs were reduced, and they began to lay off employees. Civil society organisations are not eligible for the state job preservation programme made for business sector. In April 2020, the “For a Strong Civil Society Initiative” 6 publicly announced these problems. The statement said that female victims of domestic violence, people with disabilities, people at risk of poverty, children and young people and the elderly will be left without services and other forms of assistance during the COVID crisis. In the context of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 virus pandemic, the representatives of the Coordination for the Preservation of the Dignity of Associations in the Republic of Croatia met in April with the representatives of the Government. The occasion of the meeting was a special COVID-19 tender that was proposed for announcing in response to the COVID crisis that hit the associations. According to the announcement from the meeting, the tender was supposed to cover topics such as growing domestic violence during the crisis, people with disabilities, the elderly, the sick and other groups at risk of social exclusion caused by the coronavirus pandemic. The tender was announced only in December 2020, with the application deadline in January 2021, according to the principle of the problematic model of project applications – “the fastest finger”, i.e. according to the order in which applications arrive.  5 Civilisational competence is a part of theory of P. Sztompka (1993) relevant for post-communist societies. 6 See https://www.civilnodrustvo.hr/inicijativa-za-snazno-civilno-drustvo-vlada-treba-donijeti-mjereza-ocuvanje-rada-civilnog-drustva (30th September 2022). From March to October 2020, 1.578 million of employed in the “real” sector were covered by this measure.

Shrinking Space for Civil Society development in Croatia  

During the first lockdown in the spring of 2020, CSOs were leading a process of voluntary support to elderly families in meeting their everyday needs. In addition to the COVID-19 crisis, Croatia was hit by two strong earthquakes, Zagreb and its surroundings in March and Sisacko-Moslavacka County in December 2020. Great material damage was caused. Again, CSOs were very efficient in providing help and collecting humanitarian aid for people who suffered in earthquakes. One part of the associations is left without an office for work, or they must look for new offices for rent on the market because of the disturbed statics of buildings. Despite the difficult financial situation, CSOs have shown an enviable ability and creativity in using IT and in the transition to online business. On the other hand, CSOs from rural areas do not have the appropriate equipment and IT literacy to meet the challenges of doing business in times of crisis. In general, civil society embedded in communities showed resilient capacities and readiness to act in the new demanding circumstances providing support to needy population (Baturina 2021).

 Conclusions From the very beginning civil society development in Croatia as post-communist country has been path dependent. Besides the legacy from the communist time, for proliferation of civil society in Croatia the important facts in the 1990s were: the war, a series of deep economic crises, and a political regime with democracy deficit. Inherent weaknesses of civil society in a low trust country are very complex. In the last 30 years, despite all weakness’s civil society has made a visible progress in terms of the number of organisations and its structure. Combining domestic, EU and other available sources of funding increased and only well developed CSOs have the capacity to apply on very demanding tenders. It implies professionalisation of CSOs prepared to cope with bureaucracy and with less orientation to civic engagement and participation. On the other side, grass root organisations run on voluntary basis, often at the community level, do not have a chance to get funding from these sources. In the process of confrontations and later, with a certain period of cooperation, regulatory and policy framework for civil society has been improved. The doors for consultations in policy making process have been open, but CSOs and other stakeholders did not make a visible impact. Consultation process was more like a decoration and there was no political will to evaluate its achievements. In these circumstances there is a respective number of organisations and initiatives which made a visible impact, producing social innovations and in limited cases sustainable social change. Also, networks set up by CSOs promote the new govern-

  Gojko Bežovan ance style. Unfortunately, in these efforts they could not count on a partnership with the state or the corporate sector. Currently divided society with state capture and corrupted clientele networks between the political and economic spheres make pressure to civic initiative and discourage citizens committed to civic engagement. The government pretends to control the institutions and bodies important for development and civil society funding. The evidence of captured civil society is increasingly becoming a public issue but is not being respected by the mainstream media. Having in mind a possible role of CSOs in the new challenging circumstances, such as migration, COVID-19 crisis, and consequences of the mentioned earthquakes, fragmented and neglected policy with many voids, is shrinking space for civil society development. Policy stagnation in the field of social services and the lack of reforms are eroding the capacity of civil society. It is too early to recognise all the negative effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the development of civil society. The economic crisis will affect the standard of living of citizens and thus their availability for civic engagement and the capacity for donations for public purposes. Existing organisations were forced to move to online business, available funds for their work were reduced, and they were stripped of face-toface contact with the users of their services. In such situation planned outcomes of projects under implementations are questionable and organisations lost momentum. More and more organisations are laying off employees and this is becoming a cause of conflict inside CSOs.

References Ágh, A. (2015): Bumpy Road of Civil Society in the New Member States: From State Capture to the Renewal of Civil Society, Politics in Central Europe 2, 7–21. Anheier, H. K./Toepler, S. (2019): Policy Neglect: The True Challenge to the Nonprofit Sector, Nonprofit Policy Forum, 10 (4), https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2648-6427. (B.a.B.e.) Percepcija nevladinih organizacija u Hrvatskoj (2002): Unpublished paper. Baloban, J./Črpić, G. & Ježovita, J. (2019): Vrednote u Hrvatskoj od 1999 do 2018, prema European Values Study, Zagreb. Baturina, D. (2016): Utjecaj trećeg sektora na socioekonomski razvoj Republike Hrvatske, PhD thesis, Zagreb: University of Zagreb. Baturina, D. (2021): Uvidi u djelovanje civilnog društva u Hrvatskoj u vrijeme COVID 19 pandemije, manuscript. Baturina, D./Bežovan, G. & Matančević, J. (2019): Challenges of third sector development in Croatia, In: Auferbauer, M./Berc, G./Heimgartner, A./Rihter, Lj. & Sundbay, R. (eds.), Social Development Today: Ways of Understanding & Practices, Zurich/Wien, 69–87. Bežovan, G. (2005): Civilno društvo, Zagreb. Bežovan, G. (2008): Civilno društvo i kombinirana socijalna politika, In: Puljiz, V. (eds.), Socijalna politika Hrvatske, Zagreb, 391–436.

Shrinking Space for Civil Society development in Croatia   Bežovan, G. (2019a): Hrvatska socijalna politika u vremenu globalizacije i europeizacije, In: Bežovan, G. (eds.), Socijalna politika Hrvatske, Zagreb, 59–108. Bežovan, G. (2019b): Zaklade i učinci suvremene filantropije i izazovi razvoja hrvatskih zaklada, In: Barbić, J. (eds.), Zakladništvo u Republici Hrvatskoj, Zagreb, 23–53. Bežovan, G./Matančević, J. & Baturina, D. (2016): Socijalne inovacije kao doprinos jačanju socijalne kohezije i ublažavanju socijalne krize u europskim urbanim socijalnim programima, Revija za socijalnu politiku 1, 61–80. Bežovan, G./Matančević, J. & Baturina, D. (2019): Croatia, In: More-Hollerweger, E./Bogorin, F. E./Litofcenko, J. & Meyer, M. (eds.), Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe: Monitoring 2019, Vienna, 51–60. Bežovan, G./Matančević, J. (2017): Civilno društvo i pozitivne promjene, Zagreb. Bežovan, G./Zrinščak, S. (2007): Civilno društvo u Hrvatskoj, Zagreb. Boadu, P./Gluns, D./Rentzsch, C./Walter, A. & Zimmer, A. (2014): Münster, In: Evers, A./Ewert, B. & Brandsen, T. (eds.), Social Innovations for Social Cohesion: Transnational patterns and approaches from 20 European cities, Liege, 131–156. Bohle, D./Greskovits, B. (2012): Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery, Ithaca. Brandsen, T./Cattacin, S./Evers, A. & Zimmer, A. (2015): Social Innovation: A Sympathetic and Critical Interpretation, In: Brandsen, T./Cattacin, S./Evers, A. & Zimmer, A. (eds.), Social Innovations in the Urban Context, London, 3–18. Bužinkić, E. (2020): Prema civilnom društvu vlada politika šutnje, potiskivanja i zanemarivanja, Nacional, 11th May. Jašić, S. (2020): Državni udari na civilno društvo- potpomognuti EU fondovima, Zagreb. Lalić Novak, G./Giljević, T. (2019): Pravno i institucionalno uređenje integracije migranata u Republici Hrvatskoj – prema europskom modelu, Godišnjak Akademije pravnih znanosti Hrvatske 1, 163–184. Ledić, J./Mrnjaus, K. (2000): Gangs, Mafia and Groups of Renegades, (Mis) conceptions about Civil Society and Third Sector in Croatia, ISTR 4th International Conference paper. Ministarstvo rada, mirovinskoga sustava, obitelji i socijalne politike (n.d.): Volonterstvo, Retrieved from https://mrosp.gov.hr/istaknute-teme/obitelj-i-socijalna-politika/socijalna-politika%2011977/udruge-humanitarni-rad-i-volonterstvo-12006/volonterstvo-12023/12023 (30th September 2022). National Foundation for Civil Society Development (n.d.): Foundation, Retrieved from https://zaklada.civilnodrustvo.hr/en/foundation (Inactive link). Navrátil, J./Lin, K. & Cox, L. (2015): Movements in Post-Socialisms, Interface: a journal for and about social movements, 2, 1–8. Office for Cooperation with NGOs (n.d.): The Council for the Civil Society Development, Retrieved from https://udruge.gov.hr/the-council-for-the-development-of-civil-society/163 (30th September 2022). Puljiz, V. (2019): Socijalna politika Hrvatske – korijeni, zadanosti, usmjerenja, In: Bežovan, G. (eds.), Socijalna politika Hrvatske, Zagreb, 1–58. Revija za socijalnu politiku 1, 61–80. Siemieńska, R./Domaradzka, A. & Matysiak, I. (2014): Warsaw, In: Evers, A./Ewert, B. & Brandsen, T. (eds.), Social Innovations for Social Cohesion: Transnational patterns and approaches from 20 European cities, Liege, 243–261. Simsa, R. (2019): Civil Society Capture by Early Stage Autocrats in Well-Developed Democracies – The Case of Austria, Nonprofit Policy Forum, 10 (3), Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1515/npf2019-0029 (30th September 2022). socijalne kohezije i ublažavanju socijalne krize u europskim urbanim socijalnim programima,

  Gojko Bežovan Sztompka, P. (1993): Civilizational Incompetence: The Trap of Post-Communist Societies, Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 2 (1993), 85–95. Toepler, S./Zimmer, A./Fröhlich, C. & Obuch, K. (2020): The Changing Space for NGOs: Civil Society in Authoritarian and Hybrid Regimes, Voluntas, 4 (2020), 649–662. Ured za udruge (n.d.): O Uredu, Retrieved from https://udruge.gov.hr/o-uredu/9 (30th September 2022). USAID (2017): CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, Washington. USAID (2020): CSO Sustainability Index – Croatia, Washington. Vidačak, I./Đurman, P. (2017): Savjetovanje s javnošću u donošenju propisa: kvaliteta javnog odlučivanja i sudjelovanje građana, In: Koprić, I./Musa, A. & Giljević, T. (eds.), Građani, javna uprava i lokalna samouprava: povjerenje, suradnja, potpora, Zagreb, 73–104.

Asif Afridi

Civil Society in England: Current challenges and future opportunities  Overview In the first half of this paper I provide an overview of the current state of civil society in England 7, providing context on the size, nature and regulatory environment of civil society in England. In the second half of the paper, I offer some views about challenges civil society is facing currently and ask what might be required to help ensure the health, sustainability and impact of civil society in England in the coming years. I draw on relevant literature, especially the published results of an independent inquiry into the future of civil society in England of which I was a panel member (Civil Society Futures 2018). This was a national conversation about how English civil society can flourish in a fast changing world and engaged 3,000+ people across the country through a range of interviews, conferences, focus groups and written submissions. I argue that whilst civil society is already finding ways to respond to some of the biggest challenges England is facing, there are a number of opportunities for civil society to strengthen its position. Indeed the recent Covid-19 pandemic and the growing recognition and amplification of economic and racial inequality in English society associated with this has only strengthened the case for protecting and bolstering a leadership role for civil society. One area of future focus – like in many other countries – is improved regulation and widening of the ‘space’ afforded to civil society by the State and other stakeholders. But there are also several opportunities for civil society to turn the mirror on itself and to question and challenge a range of internal dynamics that are likely to restrict its future impact too. A brief note on language I use the term ‘civil society’ in a wide sense to refer to forms of activity that are organised outside the market and the state and within a freedom of association (Edwards 2014; Walzer 1995). Civil society can act as a provider of services and community building, as well as act as an intermediary and advocate for citizens in relation to

 7 To avoid confusion, it should be pointed out that this chapter deals with England, not the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The reason is that data sources and regulatory environment vary considerably between England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The chapter also makes specific reference to the findings of an Inquiry into the Future of Civil Society in England. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111070469-003

  Asif Afridi government and private markets. This may include a range of more ‘formal’ ways of organising like charities, faith groups and trade unions as well as more ‘informal’ ways or organising like self-help groups, friendship networks and protesting.

 Civil Society in England: a contemporary snapshot Before offering some perspectives on the future of civil society in England I provide in this section a brief account of the current state of civil society in recent years to provide some context and insight into the shape of civil society.

. Sector size Established audits of the size and scope of civil society in England tend to focus on charities and voluntary sector organisations that are easily identifiable from charity registration or membership lists. One of the most well-established is the NCVO almanac that suggests there were 133,704 voluntary sector organisations in England between 2017 and 2018 (NCVO 2020a). This definition does not include some of the smaller and less formalised parts of civil society. Available evidence at the scale of small, un-registered civil society organisations in England is poor. A review by Kane (2015) using grant-making data estimates there to be at least 600,000 in the UK. The definition also doesn’t include non-departmental public bodies (e.g. independent watchdogs) and social housing associations. In June 2019, the voluntary sector employed approximately 750,000 people in England (NCVO). The majority of voluntary organisations in England (approximately 80 %) are classed as ‘micro’ with incomes of less than £10,000 per year (46 %) or ‘small’ with £10,000 to £100,000 per year (35 %) (NCVO 2020). Whilst the overall number of organisations has been stable in recent years, there is a wide disparity in the level of income received by a relatively small group of larger organisations. Voluntary organisations with an annual income over £1 million in the UK accounted for 82 % of the sector’s total income in 2017/18, yet they made up less than 4 % of the total number of voluntary organisations.

. Legal and Regulatory landscape Charities in England and Wales are mainly governed by the Charities Act 2011. This subjects charities to laws that apply to their individual structures (e.g. company or trust law) and to other laws in relation to topics like tax, employment, intellectual property and data protection. Some non-profit organisations that are not charities cannot claim beneficial tax treatment like charities can, but have greater flexibility in not

Civil Society in England: Current challenges and future opportunities  

having to comply with charity law. These include, for example, non-charitable social enterprises, community interest companies, community benefit societies and noncharitable housing associations. These types of organisation are subject to legal restrictions that apply to their specific legal structure and the types of activity they run. The Charity Commission is a state-run body that regulates charities. It produces guidance on how charities should act in fields like financial accounting and political activity. The Commission has a range of powers to intervene if a charity does not follow their guidance. The legal and regulatory framework that charities are subject to in England is relatively complex and can be challenging to navigate, particularly for those with less resources. Hogg (2016) notes the tendency for public sector funding to be accompanied by increased regulation and scrutiny in recent years too and indeed an increased interest in accounting for use of resources extends to those not in receipt of public funding too (Nunan 2010). Significant attention and scrutiny is also given to how charities operate in the media and public debate (particularly larger charities). The regulatory landscape is fast-moving and is subject to significant public debate. As an example, some in the voluntary sector have perceived the Commission to lack political independence and have questioned the Commission’s role in reprimanding charities for making statements that they deemed were demonstrating political bias (Taylor-Dawson 2018). The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act (2014) in particular has been criticised for restricting democratic engagement within civil society. The Act was introduced by Government to increase transparency in election campaigning periods and includes a number of restrictions governing what companies and non-governmental organisations can say in the 12 months leading up to a general election. The introduction of the Act has been criticised for its effects in reducing civil society’s ability to campaign effectively. A study by Sheila McKechnie Foundation (2018) found that people working in civil society felt that the administrative burden of the Act had reduced the capacity of voluntary organisations to represent issues affecting their beneficiaries. Half of the study’s participants felt it affected their ability to achieve their organisational mission. Participants felt it had restricted coalition building with other voluntary organisations in election periods and it had affected the tone and assertiveness of their campaigning (making communications less effective).

. Funding climate In the UK the Government support charities with a range of tax exemptions and reliefs. The amount of relief to charities has almost doubled over the last ten years – with approximately £3.6 billion in reliefs for charities recorded in 2017–18 (HM Government 2018). The principle income source for voluntary organisations in the UK in 2017–18 was donations from the public (47 %). Income from Government accounted

  Asif Afridi for 29 %. Income from the voluntary sector (11 %), investment (8 %) and private sector (5 %) accounted for the reminder (NCVO). Total levels donated to charities has remained largely static over recent years. Grant spending by the top 300 foundations (who represent 90 % of all giving by value in the UK) in 2017/18 was £2.6 billion (Pharoah/Walker 2019). Despite this, some studies suggest that the number of individuals giving to charity is declining in recent years. Charities Aid Foundation (2019) recorded a yearly drop in people saying they have given money to a charity or sponsored someone from 69 % in 2016 to 57 % in 2018 in the UK. There are also a number of signs that the voluntary sector will face a challenging funding environment in the coming years. Over the last two decades, many have noted the increased ‘marketisation’ of the voluntary sector and an increased reliance on state funding (Han 2017; Teasdale et al. 2013). Since 2004 income from Government has been mostly in the form of contracts rather than grants (NCVO). The sustainability and impact of voluntary organisations is, in many cases, intimately related to prospects for government spending on welfare services and contracting regulations. Yet the UK economy’s growth rate has also slowed in the last two years to levels only last seen after the 2008 global financial crisis. Competition for charitable giving income is likely to increase as overall spending on public services continues to be lower than previous years. Public service spending in 2020–21 in the UK is 16 % below 2010–11 levels when health and social care are not included in the calculation (Crawford/Zaranko 2019). In particular a reduced budget for local authority spending has put significant strain on many small local voluntary organisations who rely on this funding to deliver support (Clifford et al. 2013; Phillimore/McCabe 2015). The Covid-19 pandemic has also understandably had a significant impact on income generation for many in the voluntary sector. In particular, fundraising activity has been significantly reduced. Contractual income is likely to have been affected as voluntary organisations find it harder to deliver against contracted outcomes. Similarly, wider economic trends have impacted upon the investments of the voluntary sector – this will include a number of charitable trusts and foundations who will have less available in the coming years for grant-giving in wider civil society. Indeed, as a result of both increased demand for services and lower levels of income, the Chartered Institute of Fundraising estimated that the voluntary sector was facing a £10.1 billion funding gap over the six months from June 2020 as a result of Covid (Martin 2021). Some sub-sectors within the voluntary sector have predicted that Covid-19 is likely to result in a widespread closure of many organisations – particularly smaller ones with limited charitable reserves. As an example, a survey of youth charities found that 17 % said they may have to close permanently (UK Youth 2020). Charity So White (April 2020) similarly stressed that many black and minority ethnic (BME) focused charities and community groups were at significant risk of closure, lacking reserves due to years of under-funding and increased demand for services.

Civil Society in England: Current challenges and future opportunities  

 Civil Society in England: future challenges Despite some of the limitations in civil society’s current operating environment, as outlined above, it is important to emphasise that there are also many signs of civil society’s health and continued impact too. The pandemic for instance, has revealed the absolute level of dependence of Government on the activity and reach of civil society (Unwin 2020). Yet what challenges is civil society likely to face in the coming years? As England emerges from a pandemic, a period of slow economic growth and Brexit, in addition to some of the challenges associated with funding climate and regulatory environment outlined above, what are the other dynamics that are likely to pose particular barriers to the health and wider impact of civil society?

. Trust in civil society Trust in charities has improved between 2018 and 2020. People gave a trust score of 6.2 out of 10 in 2020 when asked how much trust and confidence they have in charities overall compared to a trust score of 5.5 out of 10 in 2018 (Charity Commission/Populus 2020). However, 2020 scores are still lower than those reported in 2012 and 2014 (6.7 out of 10). Lower levels of trust and in confidence in charities in survey results for 2016 and 2018 were seen to relate to scandals in the media involving major humanitarian charities that had occurred prior to polling both years in particular. Researchers found that when the public suspects that charities are not showing good financial stewardship, living their values and having a demonstrable impact, then their trust decreases (Charity Commission/Populus 2018). An alternative long-term survey run by Ipsos Mori found that in 2020 only 8 % of those surveyed trust Charity CEOs to tell the trust, compared, for example, to 80+ % that trust doctors and nurses to tell the truth (Ipsos Mori 2020). The independent inquiry into the future of civil society (Civil Society Futures 2018) found that large-scale charities can be seen as increasingly out of touch, out of reach and lacking significance for people in England. A rise in Government spending on the voluntary sector in the form of contracts has contributed to growing disparities in the size of some charities – with large proportions of income concentrated in a small proportion of charities nationwide. This has happened against a backdrop of Government austerity policy and persistent poverty and inequality in a number of areas of life in England. As the inquiry’s final report puts it “while charities are not blamed for these problems, neither are they understood as being significant to ordinary people’s lives or recognised as vital levers to social change” (Civil Society Futures 2018:60). Edwards (2018) describes how tighter monitoring of charity personnel alone is unlikely to be enough to address this crisis of trust. He argues ‘a cultural and

  Asif Afridi structural transformation is essential…charities must live their ethics in everything they do’. This is a challenge I return to later in this paper.

. Inequality within civil society In addition to growing inequalities in the size and income levels of voluntary organisations in England, there are also a number of long-standing inequalities faced by staff working within the voluntary sector along lines of race, gender, class, age and other aspects of people’s identity. A survey by Charity Jobs (2017) found that being older and a woman can raise particular barriers for those wanting to get a job in the voluntary sector or move up in their career. Breeze and Dale (2020) describe a range of gender inequalities within the charitable fundraising sector. They identify barriers faced by women in gaining access to flexible working as well as the damaging impact of stereotypes from board members and donors based on their gender. In a gender-based analysis of pay, NCVO (2019) found that two-thirds (64 %) of the 571 charities that shared data reported that they pay men more than women. On average women working in charities earn 7 % less than men working in charities, though this is less than the pay gap in private (12 %) and public sector (12 %) (NCVO 2019). Similarly, only 3 % of charity CEOs were from BME backgrounds in 2018 (ACEVO 2018) and only 9.6 % of trustees in the top 100 charities by income were from a BAME background (Green Park 2018). A subsequent survey of nearly 500 BME people working in the charity sector also found that some 68 % of BME charity staff had experienced, witnessed or heard stories of racism in the sector and 50 % reported feeling they needed to tone down their behaviour to ‘fit in’ within the sector. In addition, some 30 % of total respondents reported being treated as an intellectual inferior (V4CE/ACEVO 2020). Another area of inequality within civil society in England relates to the distribution of resources. An examination of funding distribution for BME focused voluntary organisations found that the average annual income of a BME-focused or BME-led charity was £78,960 compared to an average income of £142,439 for other charities (V4CE 2015). A survey in the early months of the Covid-19 pandemic found that 87 % of BME-led micro and small charities only had reserves for three months or less and were at risk of closure (Ubele Initiative 2020). A number of studies have identified historical geographical disparities in the allocation of funding from large charitable trusts too, with charities in London and some major urban areas receiving more funding than some rural areas for instance (Gripaios et al. 2010). Similarly, Government austerity policy has had an uneven impact on the voluntary and community sector in different parts of England influenced by uneven spending cuts at a local authority level and rising demand for voluntary sector services in a period of recession (Jones et al. 2015). This is compounded further by geographical disparities in access to local infrastructure support for civil society groups (Independent Commission on Local Infrastructure 2015) as well as inequalities in access to in-

Civil Society in England: Current challenges and future opportunities  

frastructure support along lines of race for instance with fewer BME voluntary organisations making use of infrastructure support bodies set up to help the sector (Afridi/Warmington 2009; brap 2007). As the disproportionate impact of Covid-19 on people from BME backgrounds has become clearer in England and the impact of the Black Lives Matter movement is felt globally, there has been increased activity and interest from charitable trusts and foundations in responding to racial inequalities in access to funding and support within the voluntary sector (see for example, the Phoenix Fund established by National Lottery Community Fund – NLCF 2020). Yet the systemic nature of race, class and disability inequalities in the wider charitable trust and foundation sector is a longer term challenge that is arguably only slowly garnering more attention (see Irfan 2018).

. The ongoing effects of social and economic inequality and reduced social welfare The UK has a very unequal distribution of income compared to other more developed countries, with the sixth largest level of income inequality in the OECD (OECD 2015) and even higher levels of wealth inequality, patterned along lines of gender, age, race and geography. As an example, the South East is the wealthiest of all regions with a median household total wealth of £445,900 compared to £172,900 in the North East (ONS 2019) and economic inequalities in different parts of England are likely to be exacerbated by the impact of Brexit too with some areas particularly affected by loss of EU funding. The impact of this inequality is compounded by recent reductions in the level of social welfare provision in the UK. As UN Special Rapporteur Philp Alston put it in a recent visit to the UK, the UK’s social safety net has been dismantled in a relatively short period of time with a focus on work as the solution to poverty. “The bottom line is that much of the glue that has held British society together since the Second World War has been deliberately removed and replaced with a harsh and uncaring ethos.” (UNHRC 2019). Civil society is already playing and will have an important role to play in the future in ensuring that those most affected by these inequalities are informing Government decisions about the future of social welfare and resource distribution. Yet, centring and elevating the voices of those affected by inequality and poverty is an ongoing challenge for some parts of civil society. As the Civil Society Future Inquiry (2018:28) notes “whilst some charities and foundations have made great strides in inclusive and equal structures of governance and decision-making…many more need to follow suit”.

  Asif Afridi

. The changing nature of work In recent years, despite increases in employment rates, levels of in-work poverty have risen in England as reductions in benefits levels have left low-income families with limited protection to deal with low growth in wages. Zero-hours and short term contracts have contributed to the development of a low-wage workforce too. Levels of ‘self-employment’ have risen as employers are keen to limit workers’ rights and many of these workers are earning less than minimum wage. The TUC (2018) estimate that 2 million self-employed adults earn less than the minimum wage. As the Civil Society Future Inquiry found, civil society is already responding and campaigning for better regulation and protection of workers’ rights from the creation of new trade unions to campaigning and advocacy. This is likely to be a topic that will require particular attention post-Brexit as the UK examines worker protections enshrined in EU law (Foster et al. 2021). The Inquiry also examined the risk of job losses in the future in England as automation and artificial intelligence technologies become more capable of performing tasks once thought to be the sole preserve of people (Lawrence et al. 2017). The Inquiry identified the growth of social enterprise and community business in England as a space for new forms of civic engagement. The Inquiry also examined civil society’s future role in imagining what a fairer future for work may look like. In particular, the Inquiry identified the potential role of volunteering in creating meaningful sources of belonging and work in the future as paid working weeks become shorter. A key challenge that civil society will face is responding to current inequalities in take-up of volunteering, particular by younger people and those with lower incomes. As an example, in 2015 50 % of women from high income households volunteered over the year compared to 38 % of women from low income households (ONS 2017).

. Social fracturing and reduced sense of control of democratic institutions A number of studies suggest that levels of social bonding remain high in the UK. The OECD Better Life Index suggests in the UK 94 % of people believe that they know someone they could rely on in time of need, more than the OECD average of 89 %. Yet there are also signs of increased social fracturing, particularly in areas with higher levels of deprivation (Swales/Tipping 2018). The Civil Society Futures Inquiry drew attention to growing polarisation between younger and older generations in wider society and how this can be mirrored in civil society: “Many of the civil society groups and organisations we spoke to had little engagement with young people. Almost all of them spoke of the urgent need to redress the age imbalance in their midst, yet few knew how to do it.” A parallel review on race equality found that civil society organisations often struggle to talk about issues of ‘race’ and ‘racism’ too and have faced

Civil Society in England: Current challenges and future opportunities  

significant barriers in including people from BME backgrounds in their leadership and decision-making processes (brap 2018). Growing income gaps within civil society too have arguably fuelled an ‘us and them’ culture, with larger charities facing restrictions in funding from contracts and using large industrial-scale fundraising methods that can make it harder to build relationships with the people they are set up to support. Much smaller community groups too can face challenges in achieving aspects of their mission due to restrictive and sometimes bureaucratic regulatory and governance requirements placed on charities and other organisational structures. Where people are organising outside of structures like this, those communities are often overlooked in terms of funding if they do not conform to established organisational models. Indeed, despite the effectiveness of many very small community groups to the pandemic in England through food distribution and be-friending, local areas in England are facing challenges in sustaining the – often informal – activity of this type in the longer term as it becomes incorporated into more established formal ways of organising voluntary action (TSRC, Sheffield Hallam University 2020). England faces the challenge of recognising and rewarding the diverse nature of civic action. The diversity of civil society in England is a strength. Civic action is much wider than the established charity sector, though often this is not recognised and the voices of those involved in more informal activities are not recognised and are not heard. In wider English society too, there is a growing sense that the institutions set up to represent people are not fit for purpose. A sense of disconnection is grown amongst marginalised groups in society. A sense of lack of control of democratic institutions has already had a number of significant impacts, not least the UK’s decision to leave the EU. Civil Society in England faces a significant challenge in helping to bridge the gap. Empowering people from traditionally marginalised backgrounds to have a say in determining their future and how civil society operates. Recognising and elevating the diversity of voices and activity within civil society and giving power to those that are best placed to improve the lives of those in their communities.

. Technology and the changing nature of civic space Finally, the rise of online activism has opened new opportunities for large numbers of people globally to support campaigns and to challenge inequalities in our society. Global movements like Black Lives Matter, #MeToo and Extinction Rebellion have been supported by effective use of technology to gather support and mobilise quickly. Yet, at the same time, online activism raises questions for the future of democratic engagement too. Algorithms used by social media can create ‘echo-chambers’ in the type of content people hear (Juan Torres et al. 2020). In England, this is compounded further by the increased concentration of ownership of mainstream media amongst a

  Asif Afridi smaller group of people and the de-regulation and commodification of news media which can incentivise the spread of low-quality over high-quality material. The role of civil society in holding power to account and using technology effectively is emerging as an important future challenge for civil society in England. Civil society will need access to big data for future development and will need to play a central role in influencing emerging developments (often led by big business and the state) to ensure the public are involved in setting ethical standards for new technologies. For instance, Civil Society Future Inquiry participants talked about the role of civil society in challenging the rise of mass digital surveillance and restrictions on privacy associated with online activism. Participants in the inquiry also talked about being wary of the limits of online activism and the importance of continuing to support ‘offline’ activism and ensuring that those involved have opportunities to form relationships of support and solidarity with others beyond their computers and their phones.

 Civil Society in England: future opportunities As I have suggested in the above sections, there are a number of challenges that civil society in England will face over the coming years. There are also many causes for optimism when discussing the health and impact of English civil society. Numbers of people volunteering have increased for instance. Between 2000 and 2015, volunteering participation rates increased from 39 % to 41 % for men and from 39 % to 42 % for women (ONS). Civil society organisations have played a critical role during the pandemic and will continue to do so as the country struggles back to its feet. A growth in civil activism on topics like environmental, gender and racial justice issues is forcing those in positions of power to show more accountability for their actions. Yet, there are still many opportunities to enable civil society to achieve greater impact and to enable it to play the role it will need to in supporting the country’s recovery from Covid-19 and the effects of economic recession in the coming years. In this final section I focus in particular on the findings of the Civil Society Futures Inquiry which offered a ‘roadmap’ created by civil society for civil society and focuses in particular on actions that civil society itself can take to improve its inclusiveness, sustainability and impact in the future. But before that, I also offer some thoughts on the role of Government and regulation in helping to address closing civic space and to create an environment in which civil society can thrive.

Civil Society in England: Current challenges and future opportunities  

. Responding to closing civic space .. Legal restrictions on campaigning and advocacy A key theme for the future will be supporting a full and active role for civil society in public and political debate. This is a central sign of democratic health, but remains an area of tension and missed opportunity in England. Whilst much of civil society’s work is focused on supporting people and communities to respond directly to disadvantage and inequity, it plays an important role, using on the ground experience to advise on the impact of public policy behind the scenes too. Civil society will also, when necessary, play an active role in challenging Government publicly, campaigning, building political pressure and calling out infringements of rights and abuses of power that it hears about through its work. In short, civil society is political. ‘Service delivery’ and political activism and campaigning are not mutually exclusive. Whilst the motivation to increase transparency in charitable use of public funds is an important one, the impact of recent legal changes on campaigning activity has been significant. In particular, the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act (‘the Lobbying Act’) (2014) has significantly affected civil society’s campaigning activity in recent years). Early guidance on the Act led to a degree of confusion amongst charities (e.g. ambiguity in terms of what types of lobbying activity fall under the regulations and can be deemed as intending to influence voters). A review by SMK (2018) of 92 campaigners and managers in the charity sector found that the Act had stopped some charities’ activity completely, including public comment on politically sensitive issues. A third of respondents reported they had to change their language or tone in campaigns or public comment. A third of survey respondents also reported the Act had a negative effect on coalition building for campaigns between charities and reported slower decision-making as a result of the Act. Another briefing by INGO network body Bond (2018) found that members experienced the Act as bureaucratic and costly. As one member, Christian Aid put it: As the Lobbying Act swung into force, it created a red tape nightmare to cover our largest fundraiser of the year. We had to create a huge amount of additional bureaucracy to monitor activities, to make sure Christian Aid Week was not seen as political. We spent a huge amount of staff time managing and recording all of this, just in case there was an accusation of being party political. Our supporters and staff were filled with fear and worry about the consequences of accidentally breaking the rules – there was a definite chilling effect. When even personal tweets are potentially liable, they were very nervous about what they could and couldn’t do and how that might accidentally get the charity into trouble.

Similarly, the introduction of new standards for grant agreements has restricted the ability of charities to use their resources for political lobbying. This has led to a situation in which the UK has joined a list of 12 European countries in which civic space is rated as ‘narrowed’ (Civicus 2018). A widened civic space will require government

  Asif Afridi to revise legislation that restricts criticism of the State during election periods and that restricts challenging government policy publicly using resources from grants and contracts. It is important to note too that in recent months during the Covid-19 pandemic, restrictions to organising and attending protests have also been criticised. For example, Liberty has criticised current health regulation rules as they appear to create a blanket ban on organising and attending protests which they see as a disproportionate restriction of Article 10 and 11 rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (Liberty 2021), .. Relationship with Government and unequal access to decision-making In addition to legal reform, there are opportunities to strengthen day-to-day relationships between the Government and civil society in England in order to improve involvement of civil society in the democratic process. In the mid-1990s, the Deakin review offered a framework that would help to codify and improve relations between the State and the Voluntary Sector. The resulting Voluntary Sector ‘Compact’ and Guidance offered a series of rules of engagement that would help to protect the voluntary sector’s role in civic life and its independence. However, evaluations of the impact of the Compact have noted that Government can be too instrumentalist in the way it uses the Compact. Using it in particular to organise Government engagement with charities in their role delivering public services rather than in their other roles like campaigning and community action (Zimmer et al. 2011). The Compact has also been challenged on the grounds of poor implementation (Carrington 2002; Craig et al. 2005) It is testament to the Deakin Review and subsequent work on the Compact that twenty years later, the role of voluntary organisations in democracy is much more accepted and common place. Yet the relationship between Government and civil society in opening access to the democratic process is often stunted and inconsistent. The Civil Society Futures Inquiry found that many of the issues that have prevented growth and maturity in the relationship are behavioural and attitudinal. Lack of trust, lack of recognition of the diversity of the sector, favouritism towards some charities and preferred forms of lobbying and communication, lack of honesty about where power lies within the relationship has stymied progress. Whilst some parts of civil society are able to access decision-makers, others find it much harder. The Inquiry found that a more collaborative, equitable relationship between Government and civil society is required in which power dynamics between Government and civil society are discussed more openly and power is shared. There are opportunities to strengthen the application of any renewed or revised Voluntary sector compact in the future, focusing in particular on ensuring civil society and Government are both accountable to each other, but are accountable first and foremost to the public (see Afridi 2019).

Civil Society in England: Current challenges and future opportunities  

.. Charity regulation With a trend of relatively low levels of trust and a number of high profile scandals involving charities in recent years, it is understandable that regulation and scrutiny of the charity sector has been under the spotlight. Yet, the Charity Commission has been criticised for failure to maintain a strategic role in promoting, monitoring and maintaining independence of charities. As an example, the Charity Commission has been accused of failing to protect charities – especially Muslim led ones – in recent years from political interference (Civil Exchange 2016). As an example, the Charity Commission has been criticised for its role as a ‘partner agency’ in the government’s preventing violent extremism strategy. A report by the Muslim Council of Britain (2016) identifies a disproportionate focus on Muslim Charities when undertaking formal investigations and a number of burdensome financial requirements linked to counter-terrorism legislation. In addition, a number of critics have described a trend for the Charity Commission to focus particularly on the public’s perceptions of charities, on topics like salary levels and overheads, rather than providing an objective interpretation of charity law and the regulatory framework (Kennedy 2019). Whilst the Charity Commission can play an important role in setting standards and sanctioning non-compliance, it is relatively ill-suited and under-resourced to provide sufficient oversight on issues such as charities’ internal governance, risk management and poor organisational culture (Phillips 2019). Phillips argues for greater integration between state regulation and self-regulation in the future – with increased focus on certification systems, organisational learning and leadership development (such as the model adopted by the Canadian Standards Programme). At the same time, there is also a growing recognition that established organisational models and regulatory disclosure can be particularly burdensome for small charities who are required to follow disproportionate reporting and governance procedures to enjoy concessions on tax and enjoy access to charitable funding. Some critics have argued that traditional approaches to charity organisation are outdated and don’t respond sufficiently to increased interest in the impact of charitable work amongst a younger generation and the rise of social movements too. Social movements – some of which are global in nature and focused on systems change- and new approaches to thinking about ‘impact’ are taking the place of charitable bodies who have traditionally mediated the relationship between ‘donor’ and ‘beneficiary’. Increased interest in approaches like ‘collective impact reporting’ for instance, seek to challenge the narrowing and fragmentation of social change efforts associated with separate charities who compete to demonstrate their impact on what are often quite similar social goals (see Henig et al. 2015 for evidence of impact of this approach in the US).

  Asif Afridi .. Populism and closing civic space In recent years, England has seen the growing influence of populist and nationalist ideas in mainstream political activity. As an example, the Conservative party have been ready to draw on the divisionary messaging associated with the ‘culture wars’, as the following excerpt from Boris Johnson’s 2020 party conference speech suggests: We are proud of this country’s culture and history and traditions; they literally want to pull statues down, to rewrite the history of our country, to edit our national CV to make it look more politically correct. We aren’t embarrassed to sing old songs about how Britannia rules the waves.

In practical terms, attempts to polarise society along identity rather than policy lines can influence the breadth of activity that is valued and sanctioned within civil society. Some civil society organisations have even experienced attempts to restrict the range and focus of campaigning work for instance – particularly on issues of anti-racism. As an example, a formal investigation of the race equality charity The Runnymede Trust was undertaken by the Charity Commission in relation to its criticism of a Governmentsanctioned Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities (Charity Commission 2021). .. Funding and increased focus on public sector contracts Finally, Government can do more to respond to the challenging funding environment that civil society faces. Following a significant increase in the use of public sector contracts in the voluntary sector, the profile and activity of some parts of the voluntary sector have changed considerably. Government income has driven the expansion of bigger organisations within civil society. The increase of ‘super-major charities’ in England has increased in recent years with charities with incomes over £100 million rising from 25 to 45 between 2008/9 and 2015/16) (NCVO 2018). A key challenge is that charities and private sector organisations are required to tender in the same way for public sector contracts. Despite the significant historical differences in operation and ethos between the private and voluntary sectors, charities are having to adopt commercial models that require economies of scale and favour larger organisations. The unique role of civil society in building relationships, empowering communities and engendering social capital are not always valued in a culture of public sector contracts and ‘payment by results’. In particular, the role played by smaller-scale and more informal parts of civil society are at risk of diminishing as the level of grant funding for the sector has rapidly declined. This is placing significant pressure on parts of civil society associated with activities that are less-connected to public ‘service delivery’ (such as campaigning and democratic action). Greater investment in grant funding, tax breaks, paying for overheads to support good governance and stronger and investment in more equitable access to civic infrastructure is required. During the pan-

Civil Society in England: Current challenges and future opportunities  

demic, the level of investment in sustaining civil society paled in comparison to investment in the private sector. Yet, in the early months of lockdown it was civil society that led much of the community response when the State was unable to do so. It was community spirit and social capital that has sustained some through an extremely difficult period. Greater recognition of the contribution of civic activity of this kind to England’s wellbeing and future success is required. This needs to be valued in the same way as other more traditional measures of economic measures of success. Though the ‘gross value added’ contribution of the charity sector to the economy is estimated at £17 billion (approximately 1 % of GDP) (NCVO 2020), the true value of the sector (including contribution of volunteering and fiscal benefits in reduced costs for Government) is much higher than that. As Julia Unwin puts it in a recent article when talking about the news of charities closing down during the Covid19 pandemic: Such outcomes are deeply damaging to the whole fabric of our society, and yet they seem largely ignored other than by those most closely affected. Clearly, the political and public understanding of the role of civil society is limited. This has long term implications for how we live together and how we achieve any social and economic recovery (p.65).

. Creating a more inclusive and sustainable civil society In a follow-up publication to the Panel on the Independence of the Voluntary Sector (Panel on the Independence of the Voluntary Sector 2015), Civil Exchange (2016) outlined the development of a ‘strong collective voice’ as critical to civil society’s future independence and impact. Taking a collective stance across civil society to threats to independence is key and this will need to be supported by greater connection between civil society organisations at a local and national level. With so many pressures on civil society, inevitably we must look to Government, to regulators, to funders for answers. Some of the ideas offered above around Government intervention would help to support that type of collaboration. As an example, funding models that reduce competition and place more value on relationship building and the work of diverse people active in civil society (not just large charities) would enable greater collaboration. Yet, as the subsequent Inquiry into the Future of Civil Society in England (2018) found, some of the barriers to collective action and impact for civil society stem from closer to home too. Civil society in England will also need to turn the mirror on itself and to think about its own practices and behaviours if it is to build a strong, collective voice that values diversity and is trusted by those most marginalised in a society that is losing faith in its democratic institutions. As the Inquiry report argues: A strong civil society is urgently needed to shape the future. But civil society can’t do it in its current form. We must change to be fit for the future. The big role for civil society in the coming years is to generate a radical and creative shift – one that puts power in the hands of people and communities, preventing an ‘us and them’ future, connecting us better and humanising the way we do things.

  Asif Afridi In the remainder of this paper, I outline a behavioural framework or ‘roadmap’ that was developed by civil society for civil society through engagement with 3,000+ people across England. It invites all in civil society – people, organisations and institutions – to commit to action in four areas: power, accountability, connection and trust (see Civil Society Futures 2018 for more info). I outline each theme briefly below: .. Power The Inquiry found that across England – and in civil society too – many people feel unheard, ignored, frustrated. Imbalances in power are often at the heart of the issue, with people feeling they are not listened to, with little access to decision-making. Inequalities in access to power run along gender lines, along race lines, along lines of class, organisational size and geographical location. Participants in the Inquiry described the need for greater awareness of how power is distributed in civil society and more equitable use of power to ensure those who are best placed to support and speak for communities are heard. More shared and distributed models of decision-making control (such as citizen juries, community ownership and participatory grant-making) will help to involve a range of people in decisions that affect them. Addressing inequalities and conflict within civil society, understanding the impact of racism and abuse of power and elevating the voices of marginalised groups within civil society will help to build solidarity and collective action in the future. .. Accountability The Inquiry found that for too long civil society organisations in England have focused on accountability to funders and to government. Yet, in the future civil society needs to hold itself accountable first and foremost to the communities and people it exists to serve. In a competitive, market-driven environment, civil society organisations fear the reputational damage of being blamed for failure. Some seek to distance themselves from blame by completing paperwork – but poor practice, abuse and inequality can still continue despite ‘ticking the boxes’ of regulation and form-filling for funders. There needs to be greater willingness to be held accountable by those communities and citizens civil society serves. Accountability needs to be shared more widely too, with civil society co-designing accountability systems and practices and adhering to common public standards developed in partnership with funders, regulators and communities that benefit from civil society’s work.

Civil Society in England: Current challenges and future opportunities  

.. Connection A stronger collective voice that champions the independence of civil society and acts at a system-wide level will require greater connection and collaboration. The Inquiry stressed that building deep connections is civil society’s historic role. England is deeply divided between urban and rural, north and south, young and old and along lines of race and class. Civil society has an important role in connecting across these divides and driving lasting change. Yet, civil society does not operate in a bubble from wider society and in some cases may reflect the divisions and inequalities it seeks to address. There is a need to address bias, stereotypes and discrimination within civil society that can perpetuate divides across people from different backgrounds and different parts of the country. There is also a need to improve the reach and accessibility of voluntary sector infrastructure in England. Supporting the creation of infrastructure and networks – both online and physical – that can sustain connection and collaboration across diverse communities in civil society will be an important component of civil society’s future success. .. Trust Finally, the Inquiry emphasised that trust is the most important asset that civil society has but that trust is often seen narrowly or it is under-valued. Trust is seen as important in securing donations for instance, but is not always seen as a currency fundamental to much of civil society’s work with communities. A contract culture of delivering large-scale public contracts has often led to an increasing focus on project delivery and less focus on core aims of social change (Henman/Sriskandarajah 2014). In the future, civil society organisations face the challenge of building trust consciously – both with those they serve and with others in civil society with whom they will need to collaborate to achieve their social missions. Staying true to values. Being honest about failures and successes and learning from them. Acknowledging and crediting others for their contribution. Defending rights and calling out injustice – even if it involves challenging those who fund civil society. Devoting time and resources to relationships and evaluating the impact of civil society’s actions on levels of trust. All of these practices will be required if civil society is to maintain its core currency of trust in the future.

  Asif Afridi

 Conclusion In this paper I have provided an overview of the current state of civil society in England. I have offered views about closing civic space and challenges civil society is facing in relation to its independence and health. I have also described what might be required to help ensure the health, sustainability and impact of civil society in the coming years – with a particular focus on the role of Government and civil society. I have argued that during the recent Covid-19 pandemic, like in many other national crises previously, civil society has risen to the challenge and taken a leadership role as it has many times before. Yet, civil society’s potential is restricted by State wariness about the power and potential impact of civil society on England’s current democratic settlement –a system which many people feel is not giving them a voice in the decisions that affect their lives. Government intervention and regulatory practice is restricting civil society space in a number of ways. Lobbying legislation has created ambiguity and significant hurdles for some parts of civil society involved in campaigning. Regulatory requirements can prove burdensome for some forms of organising in civil society. Market-driven funding models fuel competition and inequality within civil society and a lack of investment in the core activities and overheads of charities can take them away from their core mission. This trend has made it harder for charities to tend to governance and relationship issues that – as I have suggested in this paper – are important in engendering trust and achieving outcomes for the communities civil society is set up to serve. Finally, drawing on the results of the Inquiry into the Future of Civil Society in England, I have stressed that civil society will need to examine and improve its own practices and behaviours too if it is to sustain itself and stand with a powerful, collective voice. In particular, tending consciously to imbalances of power within civil society and sharing power with marginalised and diverse voices. Building accountability first and foremost to the communities that civil society serves. Bridging divides and strengthening connections between different parts of civil society in all its forms. And actively seeking to engender trust by staying true to values and speaking up for those who are marginalised and most disadvantaged. During the Covid-19 pandemic, many parts of the voluntary and community sector have faced increasing pressure on resources and increased demand for their support. At the same time, England is facing a likely economic recession and the economic and social consequences of Brexit are proving to be far-reaching for civil society, not least in the withdrawal of EU funding for charities (currently estimated to be at least £250 million per year). Inequalities and divisions that were already present within civil society and wider society are becoming more visible in this environment. As English civil society repositions itself in this new social, political and economic landscape, it’s ability to speak with a collective voice and its capacity to elevate the voices of those who are marginalised will be central to recovery. Responding with

Civil Society in England: Current challenges and future opportunities  

purpose to the topics identified in this paper – addressing imbalances of power within civil society and bridging divides between civil society in all its forms – is likely to be critical to civil society’s future impact and sustainability.

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Gianluca Salvatori, Francesco Scarpat and Alessia Schiavone

Third Sector as the most significant manifestation of Civil Society in Italy  Introduction

According to the OECD’s definition “civil society is often characterised as one of three spheres of action, along with government and the private sector. It has been defined as a sphere of uncoerced human association within which individuals implement collective action to address shared needs, ideas and interests that they have identified in common […] Civil society is thus considered to be the collection of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and other semi- or non-formal forms of people associating or of associations, as well as the sphere or space in which these interact with each other and with others. Reference is also made to the civil society or CSO sector, just as government is referred to as the public sector and business as the private sector”. This report will consider nonprofit organisations as the most significant Civil Society organisations (CSOs) in Italy, due to them being the most prevalent and widespread expression of civil society. This assumption comes from the consideration that political and social evolution has led political parties, trade unions and political movements to lose their role in being the main channel of civil society representation. The result has been a generalised citizens’ disaffection with the traditional political party system and a process of individualisation of Italian society, which has been reflected in an increasing fragility of social participation and its conversion into “singleissue movements” with strong volatility (even when individual formal and informal movements were able to hold a significant impact on society). As a matter of fact, in the last decades, although some of the more active social movements have attempted to challenge and modify traditional political dynamics, and seldom have been able to mobilize individual masses, these expressions of civil society have been often short-lived, due to the lack of long-term strategic capacity. This was an effect, inter alia, of the metamorphosis of traditional forms of collective action, resulting in the individualistic fragmentation of civic involvement, increasingly focused on specific missions. On account of this, the grassroots movements have often failed to affect political decision-makers and, conversely, civic engagement has increasingly focused on associations and volunteering, often as “singletopic” activities directly targeted to face social and welfare needs at local level and addressed to specific groups of disadvantaged beneficiaries. This attitude consists of practical solutions to fill areas of need to which the traditional institutional actors are no longer able to fulfill alone. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111070469-004

  Gianluca Salvatori, Francesco Scarpat and Alessia Schiavone Therefore, the main scope of analysis of this report will focus specifically on the organisations belonging to the so-called Third Sector, on account of representing that part of civil society organisations that carry out activities of social interest. Given this perspective, over the years, the Italian State has had to respond to a growing phenomenon that has required legal recognition and regulation. So, as for the Italian context, the main issue is not related to the shrinking of civic spaces, but rather of a resistance in the recognition of the Third Sector as a fundamental player in the economic and social fabric, alongside the public administration and the industrial sector. With the recent introduction of the Third Sector reform in 2016, the lawmaker recognised the need to fill this gap, defining those nonprofit organisations engaged in activities of general interest as Third Sector Entities (Enti del Terzo Settore, ETS in short). At the end of this process, not yet concluded, Civil society organisations, included in the definition of Third Sector, are supposed to have an adequate institutional representation to affect either their operating field of action or national political strategies.

 Historical and social context: from parties to Third Sector organisations . Civil society from Italian unification until today Civil society in Italy has gone through a gradual process of consolidation, characterised by several phases which have contributed to its current state. An early form of civil society has its roots after Italian unification, in the last decades of the 19th century, when civil movements developed to meet the needs of the working class and poor people. These initiatives gave rise to modern political parties, trade unions, cooperatives, mutual benefit societies and charitable organisations. They consisted of autonomous forces often in opposition to the new national state, which was established in 1861 and looked with suspicion on these social and political actors (Moro et al. 2010). In the meanwhile, the Catholic Church, playing a central role in the social and political sphere, gave rise to several organisations and initiatives to provide social aid and assistance to disadvantaged individuals and families. At the beginning of the 20th century and before the rise of fascism, CSOs gradually became powerful in the country and political parties (linked to both socialist and catholic movements) gained a significant space in parliament and a stronger role in society. With the aid of their action, a large part of the population had the opportunity to take part in political decisions, especially after the introduction of universal suffrage in 1912 for men, and to affect the economic and social life of the country. Under the Fascist regime, on one hand, essential freedoms and political rights were deleted and civil society associations, trade unions and parties were persecuted and forced to close down, on the other hand, the regime promoted corporatist repre-

Third Sector as the most significant manifestation of Civil Society in Italy  

sentations (e.g. Camera dei fasci e delle corporazioni and L’Opera Nazionale Balilla), which gave space to civil society organisations linked to youth, professions, businesses and employees, but without any autonomy (Moro et al. 2010). After the end of the Second World War, in 1946 Italy became a democratic Republic and CSOs and the main political parties assumed a primary role in the reconstruction of the country and in the development of the new Republic. In this regard, the promulgation of the Italian Constitution in 1947 represented a turning point: Civil Society Organisations started to be acknowledged by the state through the recognition of a series of rights. Specifically, the Italian Constitution guarantees the fundamental freedoms of peaceful assembly (art. 17), association (art. 18), religion (art. 19), expression (art. 21), establishment of trade unions (art. 39) and establishment of parties (art. 49). From the 1970s onwards, several new community-based organisations came to the fore, trying to contribute directly to public life and general interest issues. CSOs became more and more autonomous from traditional parties and public institutions, broadening the distance between the political establishment and those organisations and civic initiatives that came to the fore after 1968. The main purpose of these associations was to introduce new relevant issues (e.g. peace, feminism, environment, disability, gay rights, anti-racism) and, at the same time, to provide services to those growing and differentiated social needs no longer (effectively) addressed by the State. For this reason, in the 80s and 90s, CSOs multiplied and specialised and went through a process of consolidation that transformed them into service delivery groups addressed to specific issues. Following this transition, the State saw possible benefits in contracting services to private nonprofit organisations mostly in the field of social welfare and healthcare, by enabling in 1991 two strategic laws on volunteering and social cooperation (for more details, see chapter 3). On the grounds of this, they became a pillar of welfare policies, establishing stable and structured forms of collaboration with local administrations. Within this framework, the 2001 reform of the Italian Constitution represented a point of arrival and development since the principle of “horizontal subsidiarity” (art. 118, par. 4.) was introduced after a precise CSOs’ proposal shared by the government and approved by parliament. The core idea was that the citizens (both as individuals and as members of associations) were primarily responsible for carrying out activities aimed at public-benefit goals (e.g., education, research, health, culture, arts, etc.) and the state and local administrations had a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks that could not be carried out effectively at a more immediate or local level by private entities. In other words, this reform represented a breaking point from the past, due to the formalisation of the role of a “Third part” in dealing with welfare needs, in place of the State and the market. Alongside these transformations, citizens have started to move away from politics, giving rise to a process of growing distancing from forms of political participation, including voting. As matter of fact, over the years there has been a drop in the number of political parties’ members and, additionally, a weakening of party identi-

  Gianluca Salvatori, Francesco Scarpat and Alessia Schiavone fication. As regards party identification, the negative trend began in the 1970s (the share of people’s identifications with parties dropped from 77.8 % in 1968 to 64.5 % in 1972 and 56.8 % in 1975), with another drop at end of the 1980s and the early 1990s (from 25.8 % in 1990 to 23.3 % in 2008) (Cerruto/Facelli 2014). Additionally, turnout rates in national elections increased from 1948 (92.23 %) to 1976 (93.39 %), whereas in the following years there was a steady decline reaching 73 % in 2018. The most recent findings on electoral participation deal with the municipal elections in September 2021, when the turnout rate stopped at 54.69 %. That means only one voter out of two went to the polls. In the meanwhile, various grassroots movements in Italy have attempted to challenge and modify traditional political dynamics. Even if some of them have mobilised considerable masses of individuals, these expressions have been short-lived due to being dissolved or reabsorbed into conventional political structures. V-day movement is an example of this transformation. It was promoted by the blog of former comedian Beppe Grillo in 2007 to collect signatures for the presentation of a popular initiative law. Only two years later, in 2009, the movement turned into the 5 Star Movement party, becoming the first governmental force in the 2018 political elections. Another example is the group of Sardine, a grassroots political movement that began in November 2019 in Bologna to protest against the right-wing leader Matteo Salvini. This movement has gradually weakened and its leader, Mattia Sartori, was elected in the city council of Bologna in 2021 as a representative of the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico). Even other civil society movements more advocated on specific social battles failed in becoming really influential political drivers. In this respect, the experience of the Italian Anti-globalisation movement was significant. The No Global, known also as the “people of Seattle”, was born in the late 90s as a protest movement against the liberal economy. In 2001, in opposition to the G8 in Genoa, the Genoa Social Forum was held and attended by representatives of left-wing political forces (Communist Refoundation, Greens, Italian Communist Party), environmental associations (Legambiente, WWF) and other associations such as Arci and Acli. After this event, during which clashes erupted between protesters and the police leaving dozens of demonstrators injured and arrested, the movement has weakened and the activists have radically reduced demonstrations. Other global movements came after without achieving their goals, due to being weak compared to other countries. For example, the Italian version of Fridays for Future, except for isolated occasions (e.g. youth climate protests of the last September 2021 in Milan) had little resonance in terms of media coverage and effective public awareness. Therefore, from what we summarised is evident the two-folded nature of the Italian experience of civil society. On one hand, the democratic longevity of the Italian Republic has guaranteed the structural conditions for the flourishing of civil society (freedom of opinion, a free press, the right of association), on the other hand grassroots initiatives struggle to affect political decision-making. For example, between 1979 and 2014, 260 popular initiative bills were submitted, but only 43 % were de-

Third Sector as the most significant manifestation of Civil Society in Italy  

bated in Parliament and only 4 popular initiatives were approved, becoming state law (cf. openpolis 2014). Recently, a change has happened and it could affect the future of popular initiatives: at the end of July an amendment was passed allowing a referendum request to be signed online, through certified identity systems. This possibility has allowed an unprecedented rise of participation, confirmed by the euthanasia referendum request that has quickly reached the required minimum of 500 thousand signatures and has encouraged the submission of a referendum on cannabis legalisation with the same results in a few weeks. To understand if this new methodology of signature will change the success or not of popular mobilisations, it is necessary to see first if these referendums will be held and whether this type of reawakening of civil society will have an effective impact on the political context. In any case, what is relevant to underline is that, facing the social movements’ difficulty in having a political impact and the gradual distrust in traditional political parties, civil society’s fervor and activism have focused on the action on the field, trying to respond to those needs left uncovered by the State and the market. This proposal has progressively developed and become more structured in several small and middle organisations, having different forms but falling under the umbrella of the nonprofit (or Third) sector. Therefore, on one hand, the Third Sector has taken upon itself the responsibility of facing the issues of society (e.g. elderly care, fighting poverty, scientific research, international cooperation etc.) by addressing them directly and delivering solutions to individual needs otherwise unmet. On the other hand, it has represented the place where individuals practice their citizenship and active role in society: through NGOs, individuals have been able to volunteer and be on the board with decision-making positions, succeeding in expressing their will to participate and producing a change in the society, away from political dynamics. As a consequence, over the last decades, the size and the role of the Italian nonprofit sector have undergone a relevant evolution, playing the function of representing the needs of civil society and mediating between government and citizens. In this framework, the last decade witnessed the commitment of political and institutional actors to update the legal status of Third Sector organisations, with specific laws intended to improve the recognition and support to consolidated experiences such as organised volunteerism and social cooperation. This overlapping of sectoral laws will reach a landing point with the full implementation of the “Reform of the Third Sector and social enterprises”, introduced in 2016 (the legal framework of nonprofit organisations will be deepened in chapter 3).

. Public perception and trust in Third Sector entities Despite of this recent approval of a new legal framework, the fragmentation of the nonprofit world continues to generate confusion for a large part of the population. For a long time, terms such as nonprofit organisations, voluntary organisations, NGOs,

  Gianluca Salvatori, Francesco Scarpat and Alessia Schiavone and Third Sector entities seemed to overlap. A qualitative survey by GFK, in collaboration with the Istituto Italiano della Donazione, indicated that in 2011 only 17 % of the interviewees knew what the Third Sector exactly was and how it was distinguished from the broader concept of nonprofit organisations. Additionally, in recent history, there were some moments of “mediatic” crisis involving Third Sector organisations. The first was related to the Rainbow Mission, a solidarity initiative promoted in 1999 by the Italian government to help Albanian refugees fleeing during the Kosovo war. The humanitarian mission, conducted by several non-governmental organisations and the Protezione Civile, recorded systematic episodes of waste of resources and theft of necessities for refugee camps, triggering public indignation. The second one broke out in 2018, due to some cases of corruption and fraud of public funds in the reception facilities for migrants. In charge of them, there was a network of cooperatives run by organised crime (the so-called Mafia Capitale). Even though NGOs have played a crucial role in conducting Search and Rescue (SAR) operations off the Libyan coast, assisting almost 120,000 migrants between 2014 and 2019, their activities have been increasingly criticised. There has been a denigrating campaign against them, to the point that they have been stigmatised as “sea taxis” and “vice smugglers” by some political forces (Cusumano/Villa 2020). As a consequence, the media widely reported on these events and the Italian government, represented by the Lega and the Five Star Movement, severely limited sea rescue NGOs as well as reduced funds for the organisations which were involved in the reception system of migrants 8. In 2018, the government approved the Immigration and Security Decree (Decree-law, 04/10/2018 n° 113), imposing restrictive criteria for humanitarian protection. Before the Decree, humanitarian protection permits were granted also to those individuals not eligible for refugee status or subsidiary protection, but who could not be expelled because of objective and serious personal situations. Arguing that this system for humanitarian protection was abused, the government abolished the humanitarian protection permit (European Commission 2021). Nevertheless, these sporadic events have not affected the development of trust in the Third Sector as a whole, especially thanks to its crucial role in providing social services and contributing to achieving social policy goals. In fact, after the decentralisation of health, welfare and social services and the increase in the number of those being contracted to these organisations by local authorities, people’s trust in Third Sector entities has been gradually strengthening. In this regard, according to SWG’s survey on perception and public trust in the Third Sector (cf. Bandera 2017), 56 % of the interviewees confirm a positive judgment,  8 See https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/migranti-salvini-contro-ong-macron-attacca-lebbra-populista-maio-ipocrita-AERgh69E (October 2021); https://www.corriere.it/politica/18_giugno_20/salvinialcune-ong-sono-come-avvoltoi-cerca-migranti-abb25cc2-74b5-11e8-993d-4e6099a1c06b.shtml (October 2021).

Third Sector as the most significant manifestation of Civil Society in Italy  

the share rises to 70 % in the youngest. Specifically, 53 % of respondents believe Third Sector entities have a pivotal role in social assistance, whereas the 43 % consider they are central in health assistance. Another matter of interest concerns the role of the Third Sector in the future: 42 % of the population thinks it is supposed to guarantee an extension of services to the person, 20 % believes it can help the community to adopt a different approach to its reality, and 11 % thinks it can be an alternative for the future of the economy. These results show also that The Third Sector is transforming itself from a simple provider of personal services to an expression of a new essential role for the individuals in society. The Covid-19 emergency, as it will be seen in chapter 5, has confirmed this trend. According to a research of Walden Lab (2021), public trust towards the sector has increased since 65 % of respondents said that the Third Sector did a lot during the pandemic.

 Legal evolution and fiscal framework of nonprofit organisations Until the recent approval of the Third Sector Reform (and related Code of the Third Sector), in 2017, Italian law did not provide a clear definition of nonprofit organisations, except for saying they operate to criteria that are substantially different from those that govern commercial companies or from those of the public institutions. Since the 1980s, Italian legislation has issued a series of laws aimed at regulating specific types of organisations, without providing a single common regulatory framework. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the Italian Constitution allows anyone the opportunity to establish an association or a foundation (art. 18) and recognizes the primary role of single or associated citizens in carrying out activities of general interest (principle of horizontal subsidiarity, art. 118, paragraph 4). Nonprofit organisations can take on different legal forms and structures, depending on the role they assign to volunteers, workers and assets. They can be created with a wide variety of purposes and interests, some more social (relating to solidarity and welfare issues) or mutual (with services primarily aimed at members) and other more cultural (including sporting, professional, student, food and wine, etc.) and political (trade unions). Associations and foundations are the most common legal form for charitable organisations and are regulated by the Civil Code (Book I, Title II, Chapter I and II), which distinguishes private legal persons in recognised associations and foundations and unrecognised associations and committees. An association is a person-based nonprofit organisations characterised by a plurality of members and made of at least three associated persons who pursue a shared goal. The Italian Civil Code foresees that associations are formed to pursue only noneconomic goals and to not distribute profits to their members. Associations are freely

  Gianluca Salvatori, Francesco Scarpat and Alessia Schiavone established and can have or not a legal recognition 9, which allows the separation of the assets of the organisation from those of the individual members and board members. On the other hand, a foundation is a property based nonprofit organisation (the fundamental requirement is represented by assets dedicated to specific purposes), established by one or more parties (individuals and/or entities) to allocate specific assets (for example, money or property) for a defined purpose. According to Italian law, a foundation must be recognised by a public authority and must, therefore, have a legal status that requires a minimum amount of assets (generally between €35.000 and €50.000). The development of nonprofit organisations in managing several services and interventions of public utility led the legislator to provide special regulations for certain types of organisations. As a consequence, there were gradual reforms aimed at implementing a governance model that recognizes the social value of nonprofit organisations and subsequently grants them several tax benefits and supporting measures. In this respect, the approval of the law on voluntary organisations (law no. 266/1991) was the first important intervention. It states that voluntary organisations (the so-called VOs) run activities that must be spontaneous, gratuitous, without intended remunerative aims and should be undertaken exclusively for solidarity purposes. Voluntary Organisations are required to have a democratic structure where elections are held to choose the governing positions. Volunteering activities must be mainly carried out by volunteers, whereas both the members of the Board and both shareholders’ meetings are not allowed to be paid. Given these requirements, the VOs benefit from important tax concessions. In 1991, the Act on Social Cooperatives (Law no. 381/1991) was passed too, introducing a new form of cooperatives in contrast to traditional cooperatives who are primarily oriented towards serving the interest of their members through commercial activities. Within Europe, Italy is the only country to pass a specific law to deal with and regulate social cooperatives and social enterprises. The law distinguishes between social cooperatives providing social, health and educational services (defined by law as type A social cooperatives) and social cooperatives integrating disadvantaged persons into jobs (type B social cooperatives). One of the most important amendments was the introduction of the fiscal category of the non-lucrative organisation (ONLUS) in 1997, which allows nonprofit organisations pursuing social purposes to benefit from a variety of tax exemptions. To qualify as an ONLUS, an entity must be registered and obtain official authorisation  9 Concerning recognition by the state of private legal entities, a turning point is represented by the Presidential Decree No. 361 of 10 February 2000, under which any association, foundation and private institution pursuing a lawful and possible purpose and equipped with adequate assets can acquire legal personality through registration in the register of Private Legal Persons that is kept by the Prefectures or Regions. The registration authority must decide upon registration by 120 days; in case of denial for lack of legal conditions, the entity has the right to appeal.

Third Sector as the most significant manifestation of Civil Society in Italy  

from the Revenue Agency, performing one or more of the following activities: social assistance and social healthcare, charity, protection and promotion of historic and art property, protection and promotion of nature and environment, protection of culture and art (to the extent public funds are used), scientific research of particular social interest conducted by foundations, universities or research centers. In general, ONLUS activities must be addressed to disadvantaged people. An ONLUS cannot distribute, even indirectly, profits and surpluses, as well as funds or capital during its whole life. Furthermore, in the following years, other several special laws were approved (e.g. social promotion associations law 383/2000, social enterprises decree no. 155/2006, NGOs law 125/2014 regarding international development cooperation) and some of them progressively expand the possibility for organisations to run economic activities that are consistent with their institutional activities. As it is for associations, legislation on foundations has changed significantly since the early 1990s. Several special laws that regulate peculiar philanthropic entities have been created by the law (e.g. lyric foundations, cultural foundations, university foundations, etc.). In this respect, the creation of banking foundations has been particularly relevant. They are the result of the separation and privatisation of the grant-making, social and mutual part of numerous saving and public banks. Implemented by Law No. 218 of 1990, today banking foundations represent the main important type of private grant-making entities in Italy. This law requires banking foundations to focus their activities on philanthropic and social objectives, especially in the fields of scientific research, education, art, and healthcare and support and protection of disadvantaged social groups. Due to the fragmented nonprofit landscape including different entities with different structures, a more comprehensive reform was necessary to simplify and harmonize the set of specific and often overlapping laws. The enactment of the Third Sector Reform, certainly, represents a turning point within the legislative evolution of the Italian nonprofit sector, since it introduced a common regulatory framework with specific features and gave a precise legal identity to the Third Sector. The first step was to define formally Third Sector as “the complex of private entities constituted for the pursuit of nonprofit, civic, solidarity and social utility purposes and which, in pursuance of the principle of subsidiarity and under their respective statutes or constitutive acts, promote and carry out activities of general interest employing voluntary and free forms of action, mutuality or production/exchange of goods or services” (cf. Enabling law no. 106/2016). The Reform was initiated with the enabling law no. 106/2016 and implemented with Legislative Decree no. 117/2017 (Code of the Third Sector) and Legislative Decree no. 112/2017 (new discipline of social enterprise), but other several decrees are still needed to make it fully operational. Under the newly enacted Third Sector Code, any private entity (except for corporations/companies not registered as a social enterprise) pursuing public-benefit purposes in the sectors listed by the law and having

  Gianluca Salvatori, Francesco Scarpat and Alessia Schiavone the non-distribution constraint rule, can register with the Third Sector national Register (RUNTS), obtaining the “Third Sector entity” status for tax purposes. The Third Sector includes six main sets of civil society organisations: voluntary organisations, social cooperatives, NGOs, associations of social promotion, foundations, and social enterprises. On the contrary, public administrations, political associations, labor unions, professional associations and employers’ associations are not eligible for the “Third Sector entity” status. Concerning social enterprises, legislative Decree 112/2017 repealed the preview decree of 2006 and introduced a new discipline, which provides for partial distribution constraint, more inclusive governance, enlargement of the sectors of activity and exemption from corporate tax on retained profits. Additionally, it states that all social cooperatives are considered social enterprises by law. A central point of the reform deals with the shift from beneficiaries to general interest activities, expanding the fields that are granted benefits (e.g. healthcare, education and vocational training, social housing, social agriculture, fair trade, microloans, humanitarian reception of migrants, etc.) (cf. Legislative Decree no. 117/2017 (Code of the Third Sector)). This development has represented a cultural change, recognizing the Third Sector as a crucial player for the entire society and not only for those most in need. In other words, Third Sector organisations support not only the most disadvantaged groups of the population, with a wide range of interventions in the socio-assistance, socio-health and educational fields, but they play a cross-cutting and functional role in delivering services to the entire society: from urban regeneration to environmental education, from cultural activities to territorial public health services. Another key innovation is the recognition of the social value of Third Sector organisations, as entities that promote solidarity and pluralism in a context of autonomy and cooperation with governmental authorities for programming and implementing public welfare policies. Concepts like co-planning and co-programming represent a significant change, due to them formalizing the possibility of a more equal collaboration between public administration and the Third Sector in the planning of social interventions. Moreover, a monitoring system is administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policies and an advisory function for policymaking is employed by the National Council for the Third Sector, a representative body of Third Sector organisations established by the Third Sector Code. Currently, the reform process has not been yet completed. The Italian government is still working to issue the required implementing decrees. In particular, implementation is still awaiting the European Commission’s authorisation and the National Register has not yet been established.

Third Sector as the most significant manifestation of Civil Society in Italy  

 Nonprofit organisations at a glance To get a picture of the size and scope of the nonprofit sector in Italy, the official source of information is the Permanent Census of nonprofit institutions conducted by Istat, the Italian National Statistics Center. The data covers the entire nonprofit sector, of which the Third Sector is only a part. To have a specific outline of this subset, it will be necessary to wait for the Third Sector Reform to be fully implemented and the Register of Third Sector entities to be operational. However, the findings set out below are highly relevant, since the nonprofit sector includes also those CSOs representing places of aggregation for citizens (not necessarily organisations having a charitable purpose), such as amateur sports organisations, cultural organisations, trade unions and political organisations.

. Size and features The available data (updated to 2018) confirm the upward trend in the sector since 2001 (the year of the first census) in terms of the number of organisations and in terms of the number of employees. This is significant, considering that, since 2008, the rest of the economy has undergone a severe contraction even worsened by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the national census conducted by Istat, from 2001 to 2018, the number of nonprofit institutions operating in Italy increased from 235,232 to 359,574 with a 53 % rise in seventeen years. Growth was steady throughout the period, unaffected by the crisis years. In 2018, NPOs were made up of 305,868 associations (85 %), 15,751 social cooperatives (4.4 %), 7,913 foundations (2.2 %) and 30,042 other legal forms (mainly religious entities, 8.4 %). As a result, even though other legal forms have become more common (especially foundations and social cooperatives), associations are still the main legal form adopted by nonprofit institutions. The sector’s growth seems to be even more significant in terms of employees, considering that it demonstrates organisations’ level of structuring. Furthermore, the Third Sector promotes forms of quality work (contracts tend to be stable and durable), a high share of women’s employment, a high level of education and job placement of disadvantaged people. From 2001 to 2018, the number of employees increased from 488,523 to 853,476, with a 75 % employment growth in seventeen years. Social enterprises (especially social cooperatives) have significantly contributed to this trend. In 2018, social cooperatives employed 53.0 % of workers over the total number of occupied persons in the sector, even if, as already mentioned, they represented only 4.5 % of the total amount of nonprofit institutions. Social cooperatives

  Gianluca Salvatori, Francesco Scarpat and Alessia Schiavone are followed by associations, which employed 19.2 % of the entire sector’s employees, other legal forms with 15.6 %, and foundations with 12.2 %. 12%

social cooperatives 53%

16%

associations other legal forms

19%

foundations

Figure 1: Precent employees by legal form Source: Istat 2018

Similarly, the number of volunteers registered a significant increase, with a 70 % growth from 2001 to 2015. In 2018, volunteers working in the nonprofit sector were over 5.5 million and they were equally represented by women and men. Most of them were between 45 and 50 years old, lived in small towns and northern Italy (55.8 %) and were employed (50 %). As regards the fields of activity, in 2018 the majority of nonprofit organisations delivered cultural, sport and recreational activities (64.4 %), followed by social and health services (12.8 %). More than half of employees were involved in the social welfare and health sectors, followed by education and research and economic development and social cohesion. Table 1: Number of institutions and employees by areas of activity areas of activity culture, sport and recreation

social assistance and civil protection labor relations and rights religion

education and research healthcare

economic development and social cohesion

N° NPOs ,

, , ,

N° employees ,

,

, ,

,

,

,

,

,

,

Third Sector as the most significant manifestation of Civil Society in Italy  

areas of activity

N° NPOs

N° employees

environment

,

,

international cooperation

,

,

protection of rights and political activity

,

philanthropy and promotion of volunteering

,

other activities

,

total

,

, , ,

,

Source: Istat 2018

. Economic dimensions In terms of revenues, in the period 2011–2015, there was a relevant growth with an increase of about €6.5 billion (+ 10.1 %). In 2015, the total income of the Italian nonprofit sector exceeded €70 billion (about 4 % of national GDP), of which around 65 % was from private funding. Again as regards the sources of funding, between 2011 and 2015, there was a decline of €1.8 billion in public contributions, whereas there was an increase in the sale of goods and services (+ €4 billion) and in contributions from members (+ €2.4 billion). Additionally, it is necessary to highlight that 82 % of NPOs had revenues below €100,000. members´annual contributions

6% 7%

3% 27%

revenues from agreements an contracts with public institutions

revenues from the sale of goods and services

8%

revenues from financial management an assets private donations (contributions, offers, bequests etc.)

23%

other private-source revenues

25%

subsidies and contributions (free of charge) from public institutions

Figure 2: Nonprofit organisations’ sources of funding Source: Istat 2015

  Gianluca Salvatori, Francesco Scarpat and Alessia Schiavone As well as for revenues, there was an improvement in terms of expenses too, due to changes in NPO’s structure. The highest increase, expressed in absolute values, had to do with the expenses for employees, which rose by over €2.2 billion (+13.0 %) and expenses for collaborators (+ €473 million, which is equal to +25.7 %). Taxes and duties also increased sharply, from around €1.3 billion to €1.8 billion, representing a percentage increase of over 43 %. Therefore, revenues and expenses contribute to outlining the role of the nonprofit sector at the economic level. In addition to the function of supporting the most disadvantaged of the population, NPOs have performed a steady improvement in quality job creation, economic growth, gradual independence of public funding and increasing contributions to government revenues by means of taxes.

 Philanthropy and trends in charitable giving and financing Philanthropy plays an essential role in shaping civil society since, through philanthropic action, individuals act together to give substance to a vision of the common good. In Italy, even if philanthropy has a longstanding history, it has been developing especially in recent decades (as of the early 1990s) with the rise of donations. Giving has emerged as a socially worthy activity and gradually the idea of philanthropy is gaining a renewed and widespread legitimacy. In the last century, the ideology of an all-embracing role for the State overshadowed the concept of philanthropy. These structural obstacles had their origin in the 1860s and the 1890s when the conflict between the secular political institutions and the Catholic Church hindered large portions of Italian civil society which were mainly religiously based (Rametta 2018). Currently, Italy is experiencing a rediscovery of philanthropy, trying to follow the trends developed in countries like the US and UK having a stronger giving tradition. Individuals, corporations and foundations are contributing to drawing the culture of giving in Italy which has been gaining momentum over the last decades. As for the total amount of charitable giving and the number of donors, although there are several extensive types of research on philanthropy, unfortunately, a systematic and efficient approach is still lacking. The current data are insufficient and incomplete and there is no official national survey to precisely measure the overall flow of philanthropic giving. Nevertheless, by consulting different sources, it is possible to estimate the extent of the phenomenon and outline several trends. As for individual donors, Italy is 33rd in the World Giving Index ranking in terms of donors percentage after 10 European countries (CAF 2020). Compared to other countries, in percentage terms, the number of Italian donors is almost half of Dutch,

Third Sector as the most significant manifestation of Civil Society in Italy  

British and Americans and two-thirds of Germans. Taken together, these findings suggest that philanthropic giving in Italy has plenty of room for improvement. According to Global Trends in Giving Report (2020) 10, Italian women donate more than men (65 % vs 34 %), as do those who belong to the more mature age group (67 % of over 40 years vs 33 % of under 40 years). The propensity to donate is also greater in people who have a higher level of education and who are already engaged in voluntary activities and solidarity actions. The main recipients of the donations are the areas of medical and scientific research (39 %), humanitarian emergencies (23 %) and help to poor people (21 %). In terms of the amount of private giving, individuals are the main source of funding. Every year, Italian citizens donate to nonprofit organisations an amount of about €5 billion, showing a positive trend over time. This sum does not take into account parish donations. Banking Foundations are another relevant source of philanthropic funding, since they allocate about €900 million yearly. As philanthropic entities, they represent a fundamental force shaping Italian philanthropy, by developing highly professionalised grant-making management tools, formulating mid-term action strategies and promoting innovative and strategic approaches to philanthropy. Besides the universe of foundations of banking origins, there are other types of philanthropic grant-making organisations (such as family foundations, community foundations, fundraising associations, etc.) providing for an amount of about €500/600 million. Attention has to be given also to the contribution offered by companies and their foundations through donations that express social responsibility on the part of businesses. According to some estimates, corporate giving amounts to about €800 million (Fondazione Italia Sociale 2019). Moreover, another important piece of the Italian philanthropic scenario is giving by bequest which is equal to a range between €800 million and €1 billion (Fondazione Italia Sociale 2020), according to a research of Fondazione Italia Sociale. Another important source for the examination of individual donations in Italy is made up of data on the so-called five thousandths (5x1000 11), that part of taxes that every citizen-taxpayer may annually decide to allocate, when completing their tax returns, to entities carrying out activities with a social objective. It amounts to €520 million and a large part is addressed to nonprofit organisations, even if it is only partially an indicator of individual propensity to give due to being only a preference indication not resulting in an additional outlay for the individuals.

 10 It is an international research project sponsored by Funraise and directed by Nonprofit Tech for Good. See https://italianonprofit.it/risorse/guide/global-trends-in-giving-2020/?utm_source=all& utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=GTGS20-risultati (October 2021). 11 It indicates a share of the tax on the income of individuals, which the Italian State divides among organisations that carry out socially relevant activities (e.g. nonprofit, scientific research). The payment depends on the citizen-taxpayer, together with the tax return.

  Gianluca Salvatori, Francesco Scarpat and Alessia Schiavone Table 2: Giving to nonprofit organisations individuals

over €. billion

Banking foundations + Grant-making institutions

€. billion

companies legacies total

 x 

€. billion

€.– billion €. billion €. billion

Source: Own figure

Therefore, it is possible to estimate partially the annual flow of donations in Italy to be almost €9 billion. To this sum, it is necessary to add a number of informal donations, such as almsgiving, parish donations, parents’ collections for schools. Since the use of cash in these circumstances, it is extremely difficult to estimate the total giving and the number of donors referred to this type of donations. Some surveys reveal that informal donors are equal to 33 % of the population for a total amount of about €3 billion. The Covid-19 pandemic affected also giving trends and behaviors: it triggered a virtuous circle of donations addressed to health organisations and hospitals, from individuals, tycoons and small and medium-sized businesses. However, there was not an increase in fundraising for all civil society organisations, especially for those not directly involved in facing the emergency. The so-called “crowding out” effect, occurring after humanitarian emergencies, affected Italian organisations too: most donors, who used to give to a specific nonprofit organisation, after the break out of the emergency decided to address all their donations to organisations who were most involved in the cause of the moment at the expense of the other ones (Zamagni 2020). Nevertheless, the pandemic has shown the high potential of philanthropy in Italy, and even if it is not possible to identify specific amounts, during the first three months of the pandemic it was estimated that companies and individuals donated almost one billion euros, including cash disbursements and donations of goods and services. Contrary to the Italian tradition, in these circumstances corporates and community foundations played a fundamental role. The first accounted for two-thirds of all donations, the latter, only in Lombardy, collected and donated over €50 million, employing rapid and specific interventions.

Third Sector as the most significant manifestation of Civil Society in Italy  

 Civil Society organisations during the Covid-19 pandemic Crises often represent a fertile ground for the emergence of new forms of civic activism and social mobilisations and the Covid-19 pandemic has been no exception, since it has affected all segments of the population and has been particularly harmful to those social groups in the most vulnerable situations. Thus, if on one hand the emergency has severely affected the country from an economic and health point of view, on the other hand it has tested the maintenance of the Italian social system and has reawakened a civic engagement that seemed quiescent for a long time. During the first phase of the emergency, an underestimated aspect was the behavior of Italian citizens who dealt with one of the tightest lockdowns in the world. Especially between March and May 2020, compliance with the severe restrictions was almost total (Istat 2020). This surprising reaction of the Italian citizens revealed a strong sense of civic duty, which has been expressed through other different manifestations too (beCivic 2020). Several individual or collective actions came out: hundreds of citizens got together, willing to help those most affected by the pandemic consequences. In some cases, they fostered a supportive network with public administrations and other territorial realities, in other cases they collaborated with CSOs to increase the good outcomes of their initiatives. In this context, it is of importance to stress that CSOs fulfilled a key social role in acting as collectors and catalyzers of these solidarity mobilisations. As it has been seen, most of them were associations born from spontaneous and resilient forms of aggregation, capable of bringing together volunteers and employees around a range of activities and boosting active civic participation and values of solidarity and social cohesion. As a result, it is not surprising that people who were already active in the social field (through work, activation and volunteering) rolled up their sleeves and started to support initiatives directly or indirectly linked to the Covid-19 emergency. To face the extraordinary circumstances caused by the pandemic, many organisations made human and material resources available, showing their capacity to provide innovative solutions that were aimed at strengthening public services to complement government action. Even though they faced several constraints on their capacities to carry out their activities, they contributed both in the more strictly health and welfare fields both in their own areas of intervention (e.g. education, sport, etc.). In this regard, some organisations changed and adapted their interventions to continue providing their services while respecting social distancing (European Economic and Social Committee 2021). For instance, several soup kitchens supplied takeaway meals and deliveries for the homeless and the people in most need (e.g. Caritas Italiana, Banco Alimentare). Most of the educational and socio-psychological services,

  Gianluca Salvatori, Francesco Scarpat and Alessia Schiavone previously running in a physical modality, shifted to online mode and launched family aid initiatives for distance learning (e.g. providing the beneficiaries with digital devices). Many other organisations, unable to carry out ordinary activities, showed a fast capacity to shift priorities and adapt to the rapidly worsening situation, even introducing new services. As a result, some social cooperatives working with disabilities, provide free delivery services for the seniors in remote areas, as well as associations involved in the job placement of disadvantaged people, transformed their operations into the production of reusable face masks or in the supply of personal protective equipment and sanitizing devices (e.g. Progetto Quid’s activities) (OECD 2020). Many of these initiatives have been fundamental to support the government by providing essential services and have played an important role in sustaining the beneficiaries at a psychological and a social level. In addition, the Third Sector will play a crucial function in addressing and mitigating the long-term impacts of the COVID19 crisis on the economy and society. As expected, after the first period of national restrictions and the interruption of essential services during the lockdown, there were a number of societal challenges that the members and groups targeted by the CSOs had to face. Just to mention some examples: the sharp increase of people in vulnerable socio-economic situations due to job loss, the lack of protection against domestic violence, the worsened conditions of people suffering from intellectual, mental, physical and learning disabilities, the effects of the digital divide, digital illiteracy and correlated inequalities. All the issues and threats posed by the pandemic boosted an increase in demand for nonprofit services. Consequently, the COVID-19 pandemic has driven numerous changes to economic activities and the way societies function, bringing the role of the CSOs to the fore. As of today, the challenge consists of supporting these organisations showcasing their positive contributions in empowering people, reinforcing place-based dynamics and reshaping enterprises and territories, even if they have also been affected by the economic crisis.

Third Sector as the most significant manifestation of Civil Society in Italy  

Conclusion This report has highlighted that Third Sector organisations are the most concrete and developed expression of civil society in Italy, because of their widespread presence across the nation, their capability to involve a large part of the population, and their steady growth in the number of employees, volunteers, institutions and turnover. But, notwithstanding the impressive growth, a Third Sector’s adequate recognition by the State is still lacking. Too often, Public institutions perceive Third Sector entities as secondary counterpart and as mere service providers, not equal to other key stakeholders. The enactment of the Third Sector Reform, aiming at filling these gaps, proceeds slowly, with a scant implementation process. As a consequence, for five years now, organisations have been experiencing a state of uncertainty, inhibiting further development of the sector as well as generating difficulties in organisations’ daily operations. Moreover, beyond declarations, the drafting of the Recovery and Resilience Plan, that the Italian government presented to Europe to obtain Next Generation EU funds, did not foresee a satisfactory space for the sector. Even if the plan deals with numerous areas of intervention in which the Third Sector can already play a leading role (e.g. circular economy, urban regeneration, training, and job placement) in the description of the interventions it is mentioned only marginally and not as a preferential implementer, contrary to what France or Spain included in their plans, where the social economy holds a priority role. To sum up, in Italy, the issue of shrinking spaces when referring to the conditions in which civil society operates is not a major priority, also considering the comprehensive regulatory system introduced by the 2017 Reform. On the contrary, the sector’s main challenge lays in getting a more effective acknowledgment and support, also from a political point of view, that is long overdue and no longer seems deferrable. This further step requires the full completion of the Third Sector Reform and a more effective State’s commitment in dealing with CSOs organisations. However, the complex and variegated world of the Third Sector cannot be considered only as an innocent victim of this situation. It needs to make an effort to overcome the limited areas of its interventions, create operational networks, overcome fragmentation, and be capable of a common voice and representation as a whole. Only with these combined actions that imply an active role of the organisations at a political level, the Third Sector could aspire to become a primary interlocutor of the other institutional players.

  Gianluca Salvatori, Francesco Scarpat and Alessia Schiavone

References Bandera, L. (2017): Terzo Settore: c’è fiducia, soprattutto tra i giovani, ma bisogna saper spiegare la transizione, secondo welfare, 14th October, Retrieved from https://www.secondowelfare.it/ terzo-settore/terzo-settore-giovani-fiduciosi-ma-bisogna-saper-spiegare-la-transizione/ (6th October 2022). Bassi, A. (2011): Interview with Stefano Zamagni: The Italian Third Sector, Nonprofit Policy Forum: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 8, Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 272933615_Interview_with_Stefano_Zamagni_The_Italian_Third_Sector (October 2021). Becivic (2020): Civic Action – Storie di (stra)ordinario civismo, Retrieved from https://becivic.it/ scarica-lebook/ (October 2021). Borzaga, C./Poledrini, S. & Galera, G. (2017): Social Enterprise in Italy: Typology, Diffusion and Characteristics, Euricse Working Papers, 96 |17, Retrieved from https://www.euricse.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/WP-96_17-ICSEM.pdf (October 2021). BVA Doxa (2019): Lo scenario dei donatori informali in Italia prima e durante l’emergenza Covid-19, Retrieved from https://www.bva-doxa.com/lo-scenario-dei-donatori-informali-in-italia-primae-durante-lemergenza-covid-19/ (October 2021). CAF (2019): 10th edition of CAF world giving index: Ten years of giving trends, Retrieved from https://www.cafonline.org/docs/default-source/about-us-publications/caf_wgi_10th_edition _report_2712a_web_101019.pdf (October 2021). Cerruto, M./Facello, C. (2014): Il cambiamento dei partiti tradizionali al tempo dell’antipolitica, Quaderni di Sociologia, 65 | 2014, Retrieved from http://journals.openedition.org/qds/371 (October 2021). Cusumano, E./Villa, M. (2020): From “Angels” to “Vice Smugglers”: the Criminalization of Sea Rescue NGOs in Italy, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-020-09464-1. (December 2021). DEMOS & PI (2020): Rapporto gli italiani e lo Stato – XXIII edizione, Retrieved from http: //www.demos.it/rapporto.php (October 2021). ERNOP (2017): Giving in Europe, The state of research on giving in 20 European countries, Retrieved from http://ernop.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Giving-in-Europe-Executive-SummaryWEBSITE.pdf (October 2021). EUROFOUND (2021): Towards the future of Europe: Social factors shaping optimism and pessimism among citizens, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, Retrieved from https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2021/towards-the-future-of-europesocial-factors-shaping-optimism-and-pessimism-among-citizens (October 2021). European Commission (2020): Social enterprises and their ecosystems in Europe, Updated country report: Italy, Author: Borzaga, C., Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, Retrieved from https://europa.eu/!Qq64ny (October 2021). European Economic and Social Committee (2021): The response of civil society organisations to face the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent restrictive measures adopted in Europe, Diversity Europe Group, Authors: Tageo, V./Dantas, C./Corsello, A. & Dias, L., Retrieved from https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/publications-other-work/publications/responsecivil-society-organisations-face-covid-19-pandemic-and-consequent-restrictive-measuresadopted-europe-study (October 2021). FONDAZIONE ITALIA SOCIALE (2019): La filantropia in Italia nel confronto internazionale, Retrieved from https://fondazioneitaliasociale.org/analisi-e-studi/ (October 2021). FONDAZIONE ITALIA SOCIALE (2020): I lasciti solidati in Italia, Retrieved from https://fondazioneitaliasociale.org/analisi-e-studi/ (October 2021).

Third Sector as the most significant manifestation of Civil Society in Italy   FONDAZIONE ITALIA SOCIALE (2020): I sostegni al non profit nell’emergenza Covid-19: 20 casi emblematici della filantropia istituzionale, Retrieved from https://fondazioneitaliasociale.org/ analisi-e-studi/ (October 2021). GHK (2010): Study on Volunteering in the European Union – Country Report Italy, Study on behalf of the European Commission (Directorate-General for Education and Culture), Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/doc1018_en.pdf (October 2021). ISTITUTO ITALIANO DELLA DONAZIONE (2021): Osservatorio sul dono, Noi doniamo, Edizione 2021, Retrieved from https://www.istitutoitalianodonazione.it/it/news-eventi/dd_121_4093/ indagini/indagini-osservatorio-iid (October 2021). LILLY FAMILY SCHOOL OF PHILANTHROPY (2018): Country Report 2018: Italy, Author: Rametta, R., University of Teramo, Retrieved from https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/16745 (October 2021). Moro, G./Vannini, I. (2006): Italian Civil Society facing new challenges, Civicus Civil Society Index Report for Italy, Retrieved from http://www.civicus.org/media/CSI_Italy_Country_Report.pdf (October 2021). Moro, G./Ranucci, R. & Ruffa, M. (2010): Italian Civil Society facing new challenges, Second Edition, Civicus Civil Society Index Report for Italy, Retrieved from https://www.civicus.org/downloads/ CSI/Italy.pdf (October 2021). OECD (2020): Social economy and The COVID-19 crisis: current and future roles, Retrieved from https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=135_135367-031kjiq7v4&title=Social-economy-andthe-COVID-19-crisis-current-and-future-roles (October 2021). openpolis (2014): Leggi di iniziative popolare, dimenticate dalla nostra politica, 31st October, Retrieved from https://blog.openpolis.it/2014/10/31/leggi-iniziative-popolare-dimenticatedalla-nostra-politica (October 2021). Putnam, R. D. (1993): Making Democracy Work, Civic Tradition in Modern Italy, Princeton: Princenton Paperbacks, Retrieved from https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/408189/mod_resource/ content/1/Uvod %20Robert %20D %20Putnam_ %20-Making %20democracy %20work % 20_ %20civic %20traditions %20in %20modern %20Italy.pdf (October 2021). Ruzza, C. (2010): Italy: the political right and concepts of civil society, Journal of Political Ideologies, 15: 3, 259—27, Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569317. 2010.513862 (October 2021).

Online Resources Charitable organisations in Italy: overview by Francesco Facchini, Giacomo Ficai and Sara Maimone, Facchini Rossi & Soci, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/Cosi/SignOn?redirectTo= %2f7-633-2622 %3ftransitionType %3dDefault %26contextData %3d(sc.Default) %26firstPage %3dtrue (October 2021). Istat: Documenti con tag: Censimento permanente non profit, https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/ censimento+permanente+non+profit (October 2021). OECD: https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/en/ (October 2021).

Nataliia Lomonosova

Civil Society in Ukraine: Cooperation between Ukrainian CSOs and local and state authorities  Introduction In Ukraine`s country profile, the Freedom House Research Institute defines the state of Ukrainian civil society as “flourishing” which, following the post-Maidan reforms and rapid development of the media landscape, shows “Ukraine’s promise as an open and pluralistic democracy” (Freedom House n.d.). Indeed, various civil society actors — from established NGOs and foundations to grassroot activists and local initiatives – played an important role not only in the Maidan protests throughout the country but also in a post-Maidan Ukraine. This is in a country currently contending with the Russian annexation of some of its eastern territory in 2014, followed by the invasion in 2022, political tensions, economic downturn, and intense reforms, especially in the area of public goods. Participation in civil society has improved, and the level of engagement in activism has been growing too (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022). However, the ability of civil society organisations (henceforth CSOs) to reach their goals not only depends on internal factors but also on the willingness of public institutions to cooperate with them, and on the nature of this cooperation. Since 2014, Ukrainian authorities have been publicly declaring their willingness to work towards more transparent governance, as well as to ensure the further development of civil society’s potential and wider civic involvement in decision-making. The promises to strengthen respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of citizens to contribute to consolidating domestic political reforms, were also expressed in the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine (Article 4), signed in 2014. These promises were embodied inter alia in introducing participatory budgeting initiatives (for example in the “Public budget”) and other digital mechanisms for public engagement, including some possibilities for CSOs to get grant funding for their projects from the state and local budgets. Moreover, the legal registration procedure for NGOs was considerably simplified. Since 2019, it has been possible to register an NGO online and free of charge via the governmental portal. A number of civil society activists who have been involved in the Maidan protests and those who were later involved in volunteer initiatives that supported Ukrainian Armed Forces during the armed conflict in the Eastern Ukraine in 2014–2015 were later appointed to state positions in cities and regional public institutions. Some of them https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111070469-005

  Nataliia Lomonosova were elected to the national and local governments. At that time, many people perceived this development as public institutions becoming more open to collaborating with civil society activists and to implementing a greater transparency in their work 12. One of the most comprehensive post-Maidan reforms – the administrative-territorial reform – aimed at giving the newly formed administrative units (amalgamated territorial communities hromadas) greater autonomy It included the idea of creating more favourable legal conditions for a wider involvement of the population in decision-making and of giving more tools for public control under the local budget and its redistribution (Kavunetsʹ/Dorokh 2016). As decentralisation not only increased the hromadas’ level of economic and tax independence but also fixed many responsibilities for the local governments, this in turn, made the local decision-making process more important than ever before. Therefore, in light of decentralisation, CSOs got the chance to strengthen their watchdog role and to participate in decision-making at the local level. On the other hand, this role became more important for local communities, because local authorities were given greater decision-making powers for public goods and services. This report on Ukraine is focused on the cooperation between Ukrainian CSOs and local and state authorities: it reviews the existing opportunities for civil society participation in decision-making as well the obstacles that stand in the way. This chapter starts with an overview of some of the major features of Ukrainian civil society and society’s attitude towards it. It then describes the main features and trends of the cooperation between the CSOs and authorities in Ukraine after the Maidan uprisings in general and on a local level. This chapter is based on the literature review and analysis of secondary data.

 Ukrainian civil society at a glance: spontaneity, high expectations, medium support As indicated by Svitlana Kuts, the author of the CIVICUS (2006) Civil Society Index Report for Ukraine, the concept of civil society remained vague in Ukrainian academic discourse for quite a long time. Kuts analysed the definitions of civil society or the “third sector” offered by various Ukrainian scholars at the time. The majority of them concluded that the understanding of civil society cannot be limited to the officially registered organisations or only to NGOs. Among other definitions analysed by Kuts,  12 See an excellent analysis by Romanova (2017) on how appointing a civil society activist to the position of regional executive affects the distribution of political power. Analysing the appointment of an Army Forces support activist to a high position in a regional state administration in the Luhansk oblast in 2015, the author assesses whether it contributed to the greater inclusiveness of political institutions.

Civil Society in Ukraine: Cooperation between Ukrainian CSOs and local and state authorities  

this vagueness particularly features in a definition proposed by Shevchenko, who defines the third sector as a specific framework for spontaneous self-expression of free citizens and their voluntary formed associations working in different fields to protect their interests, and as a certain system of relationships, protected from direct intrusion and obstinate regulation of state and business (cited in Kuts 2006:19)

This feature of “spontaneity” is important to consider because Ukrainian civil society has historically followed a different path to liberal democracies in the West. For instance, as argued by Udovyk (2017), since the activities of associations during the Soviet period were subject to state control, this created limited incentives for participation in civil activities. On the contrary, it contributed both to the avoidance of such participation and to low levels of trust in CSOs and their activities. Membership in these organisations was quite often also almost obligatory to assess certain benefits or services. For example, this was the case with trade unions and other professional associations, which were basically responsible for the administration and distribution of welfare provision. This in turn has also contributed to a distorted vision of the role of such organisations. Characterising the nature of civil society and public participation in Ukraine in 2006 — five years after Shevchenko — Kuts (2006:12) insists that “more activity is generated by initiative groups, movements and [ordinary] citizens”. Following this discussion, the CIVICUS Civil Society Project framed civil society as “the arena between family, government, and market where people voluntarily associate to advance common interests” (Kuts 2006:20) and not only analysed activities of NGOs and other officially registered organisations (such as charitable foundations, trade unions etc.), but also unregistered clubs, movements, and citizen’s activity in initiative groups. As stated by Burlyuk et al. (2017:13): While Ukrainian civil society has been known for its weak institutionalization and organization as compared to Western civil societies, grassroots initiatives, donating and volunteering appear to be new and important forms of civil society for Ukraine born out of Euromaidan values.

Indeed, the prominent role of spontaneous grassroot initiatives and groups of people brought together by rapid mobilisation was an important characteristic of civic participation during the Maidan protests. This was also somewhat the case for previous mass political protests, such as the Orange Revolution in 2004 and to some extent for “Ukraine without Kuchma” in 2000–2001. As stressed by Kostyuk (2019), while the main driving force of the Maidan protests was students from different regions, the “political palette” of the latter was shaped by the number of opposition parties and civil movements. The Maidan demonstrated a qualitative shift in the character of civil society participation, whose role in the protests became more prominent. For instance, Collison (2017) argues there were two competing driving forces in the Maidan:

  Nataliia Lomonosova opposition political party leaders and grassroots activists or the public. As Clearly rightly notes, what all these cases have in common is that civil society has been mobilised “in the face of what it deems to be excessive abuse from the ruling elites” (Clearly 2016:10). Indeed, the same mobilising factor played a crucial role in several of the most prominent mass protests on the regional level against the abuse of power by the local authorities and/or police representatives 13. However, as observed by Worschech (2017), although Maidan made civil society more confident in its capabilities, it was not enough for ensuring the long-term transformations in political and economic spheres after the protest. While referring to the various examples from the history of Ukrainian civil society, the scholar characterises the latter as an “ambivalent phenomenon” (Worschech 2017:28). The reason behind this is that civil society actors demonstrate incredible capacities of campaigning and mobilising but are continuously unsuccessful in influencing new policies and decision-making processes after the protest, due to the difficulties in developing strong and sustainable organisational structures. Clearly (2016) also writes that existing CSOs were unsuccessful in influencing legislation and policies in the long term because many activists were acting “as individuals rather than as members of organizations” (Clearly 2016:13). They essentially volunteered in different departments of the governmental bodies in order to improve the system from the inside, and as Clearly underlines, since these acts were quite often uncoordinated, they were quite often isolated and ineffective. At the same time, successful examples of the influence of civic organisations on policies and reforms after Maidan are represented by those cases where individual civic activists and CSOs united their efforts to achieve common goals and communicated with the authorities as one coalition. The most prominent example of such cooperation was the Reanimation Reform Package (RPR), a coalition of civic activists who have united around similar visions of the reforms needed in Ukraine. This coalition successfully participated in drafting laws for many reforms and later gained a high level of public trust, enabling it to monitor the political implementation of these laws. Another important point made by Worschech (2017) is that the experience of Maidan made civil society become “more interconnected with society at large” (Worschech 2017:29). The same conclusion is presented in Ukraine Civil Society Assessment conducted by NORC (University of Chicago), that thanks to the Maidan protests, civil sector has gained a greater legitimacy in Ukraine and a high level of citizens’ trust (cf. NORC n.d.).

 13 One example of this could be mass actions of civil disobedience in the city of Vradiivka (Mykolaiv region) that included the mass storming of the city police station in July 2013. The mass protests by local residents, which had originally aimed to get justice for Iryna Krashkova, who was raped by two police officers, quickly transformed into protests against corruption in law enforcement agencies and unfair criminal investigations.

Civil Society in Ukraine: Cooperation between Ukrainian CSOs and local and state authorities  

Two Ukrainian public opinion polls 14 regarding the level of trust in various social institutions and parties conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) during December 2020 showed that among different types of civil society actors, the Ukrainian population has the greatest trust in volunteers: 15 those who help the national army 16 (74 % respondents have trust in them) and those who help internally displaced people (66 % respectively) (Fond “Demokratychni initsiatyvy” 2021). At the same time, significantly fewer people show trust in NGOs, just 39 %. This number, however, corresponds with the amount of people ready to support NGOs financially. According to the data from the opinion poll conducted by Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) together with the Razumkov Center in May 2018, 42 % of Ukrainians would take advantage of the opportunity to direct part of their taxes to support NGOs, if possible (Fond “Demokratychni initsiatyvy” 2018). It is also significant that when asked “What are the main activities that civil organizations should be engaged in in the first place?” over half of respondents (57 %) said it should be protecting vulnerable people. The more traditional function of civil society as a “control over the activities of the authorities” got 55 % support (a multiple choice answer was possible). Among other options, 27 % also chose “helping the army and volunteers in the armed conflict in Donbas”. Therefore, it can be seen that civil society actors are largely expected to perform the functions that are in fact the responsibility of the state in the first place (such as taking care of and providing services to vulnerable people and supporting the armed forces) and are also perceived as more trustworthy if they perform these tasks. This is also interesting in light of the fact that during the first five years after the Maidan uprising, the level of trust in CSOs had been slowly increasing, while the level of trust in authorities and public institutions remained low and had been even falling (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022). However, the level of public trust in Ukrainian authorities has been declining throughout the whole post-Soviet period, and since the mid-2000s the share of those who do not trust the government has come to represent many Ukrainians (Protsenko 2018). Based on the data of Razumkov Centre in 2019, while 50 % of the population trust NGOs and 70 per cent trust volunteer organisations, 44 % trust in the Parliament and in the Government of Ukraine and only 19.8 % of people  14 All regions of Ukraine except the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea and occupied territories of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. 15 The notion of volunteers in this case requires some explanation. It may refer both to the registered volunteer organiations (majority of which are registered under the legal status of public association or charitable organisation) and to the self-organised, sometimes spontaneous activities of single individuals or groups that do not have any legal status as an organisation. Also, as stated by Romanova (2017) in Ukraine after the Maidan uprising, the label volonteer is most often used for a civil society activist. 16 This implies support of the combat units of the Ukrainian Army Forces with military and medical equipment, protective gear, and other supplies. A significant volunteer movement in this sphere started with the beginning of the war in Eastern Ukraine in Spring 2014.

  Nataliia Lomonosova trust public servants (Razumkov Centre 2019). As stated by Khomei (2019), such imbalance in the level of trust in CSOs and in authorities makes it difficult for state bodies to adopt decisions without civil society’s legitimisation. Furthermore, as underlined by Stewart and Dollbaum (2017), the growing trust of Ukrainians in CSOs strengthen their mandate to monitor the authorities. It is also worth looking at at these expectations from CSOs in light of the level of engagement in civil activism. While the percentage of the population that believes that СSOs are needed in their cities and villages is high, only 7 % take part in any civil activities themselves. As noted by Ukrainian sociologist Iryna Bekeshkina, there may be “a formation of a new type of paternalism” in Ukraine, one that has been developed for CSOs (cited in Tolokolnikova 2018). If we consider the high level of paternalism of Ukrainians in its classical understanding, namely in relation to the role of the state in providing public goods and social protection 17, it is not surprising that the transfer of such expectations to CSOs is accompanied by a certain amount of paternalism. If, of course, such expectations from СSOs are combined with the low level of one’s own civil activism (so, a passive role), this can be viewed as paternalism 18. In the beginning of 2022, Ukraine was rated as a “partly free democracy” in the Global Freedom Score, getting 61 out of 100 in the annual evaluation of political rights and civil liberties in the country in 2021 (Freedom House 2022). The overall score for civil liberties (that includes evaluation of freedom of expression and belief, the rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights and associational and organisational rights) in Ukraine was just 35 out of 60. But the state of associational and organisational rights was evaluated quite highly, with 3 out of 4 given for the freedom of assembly and the same score for the freedom for trade unions and other professional or labor organisations. The freedom for NGOs, particularly those that are engaged in human rights– and governance-related work, got 2 points out of 4, as there are cases where civil society activists faced intimidation and threats.

 17 The Ukrainian population expects a very high level of responsibility from the state for social protection in general, such as support for families, elderly people etc. As demonstrated by the European Social Survey 2008, Ukrainians expect the greatest responsibility from the state in the area of social protection for the elderly and healthcare, with the average indicators of support reaching 9.22 and 9.18 (out of 10) respectively. 18 The expectation of a high level of state involvement in the provision of basic goods is quite strongly linked to the historical experience of the Soviet Union, which had its own specific regime of welfare state. This made extensive commitments regarding the provision of employment, broad and universal social protection as well as developed system of social services for the population. At the same time, an important feature of this regime was the failure of the population to articulate their needs and expectations of the state “from below”. As Deacon (1993) writes, citizens were objects of social protection, but never active subjects influencing the definition of its scope and content. This somehow could be seen in high expectations towards the social protection role of the CSOs and at the same time in the low level of involvement of the population in activities of the latter.

Civil Society in Ukraine: Cooperation between Ukrainian CSOs and local and state authorities  

Considering the discussion on the nature of civil society in Ukraine that was presented above, this chapter is focused on the cooperation between local and state authorities and Ukrainian CSOs in broad terms, so the coverage is not limited to those CSOs that are legally registered organisations. As I am disinclined to agree with any kind of artificial dichotomy in which some actors would be seen as legitimate representatives of civil society while other forms of activism are not, I provide official statistics on the number of officially registered CSOs, to give the reader an insight into the scope of legally recognised civil society actors. According to the Ukrainian State Statistic Service, as of 1 January 2021, there were 92,470 registered public associations, 1,875 unions of public associations, 26,651 religious organisations, 28,713 trade unions, 317 creative unions, 19,812 charitable organisations, and 1,649 self-organised bodies in Ukraine.

. After Maidan: existing opportunities for civil society participation in decision-making In the 8 years following the Maidan protests, there have been significant developments in Ukraine’s civil society landscape. As stated in the EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Ukraine: CSOs are perceived to play an important role in the development of a new political and administrative culture in post-Maidan Ukraine, in particular as regards promoting transparency and accountability in public life” (The European External Action Service 2019).

This happened both at the national and the local level. As argued by Channell-Justice, the experience of Maidan led to “people seeing themselves as legitimate political participants” and boosted their interest in local politics and in issues in their cities or communities (Channell-Justice 2019:465). Many state and local officials declared their readiness to engage in wider civil involvement into decision-making. A lot of practical tools and possibilities, such as the participative budget initiative and new information channels about the decisions of the local governments, were established to ensure this involvement. Although I am not disputing the significant improvement in cooperation between CSOs and the authorities in Ukraine, I will summarise some critical remarks on the areas of action that require improvement. Khomei (2019) makes an important remark by stressing that, although in recent years we can observe an increase in the number of interactions between the authorities and representatives of civil society in Ukraine, one should question the quality of this cooperation. Indeed, CSOs actors have certain goals behind this cooperation, and it is important to evaluate whether these cooperation efforts ended up in reaching these goals.

  Nataliia Lomonosova First of all, there are unequal opportunities for cooperation with government bodies at different levels. As declared in the Bertelmann Stiftung’s BTI 2022 Country Report on Ukraine, while civil society had good working relations with some parliamentary committees, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and some ministers, but not with the Office of the President, which largely ignored civil society. As the Office of the President has been de facto the central decision-making authority in Ukraine, civil society’s expertise has had a somewhat reduced impact (2022:40).

Another point is that civil society representatives are often actively involved in supporting and advocating for a specific reform or legislative change, but at the same time, there is a lack of more systematic involvement in policy making in general. Talking about the level of national authorities, Khomei (2019) also argues that existing public relations departments in the bodies of national authorities work mostly with the media but not CSOs and see their goals in “presenting a positive image of the respective government institution,” rather than in informing the public about the activities and decisions of the institutions. The situation at the local level is better, however, as it has been shown in UNDP research on the integrity and inclusiveness of the democratic process in Ukraine, conducted in 24 oblasts, that local authorities are willing to cooperate with CSOs and to consider their advocacy and policy proposition, unless it threatens useful schemes of funding allocation and regional business group’s interests 19 (UNDP’s Democratic Governance Programme 2019). This is largely due to the fact that in Ukraine, both in political life in general and in the policy process in particular, the interests of business representatives, who largely control the formal institutions of local government, continue to play an important role. As the business elites perform their economic and political power to influence the decision-making for protection or promotion of their interests (which is possible not least because of the lack of transparency in the decision-making process), it eventually narrows the possibilities for the general public to engage into this process. This is an especially acute problem in industrial regions, where the large enterprises have influence not only in the decisions of local authorities, but also in who works in these authorities. The same is true for the regions where there are large agricultural holdings. One of the most widespread problems of the cooperation between state and local authorities and CSOs is the formal nature of this cooperation from the authorities’ side. For example, a common critique voiced by CSOs would be that many of the democratic mechanisms of a dialogue between authorities and CSOs and the involvement of the  19 Stewart and Dollbaum similarly describe the situation before Maidan, during the “era” of Yanukovich’s presidency, stating that “the state was ready to support constructive legal acts concerning the incorporation of civil society in politics, presumably since these did not impinge on core elite interests” (2017:7).

Civil Society in Ukraine: Cooperation between Ukrainian CSOs and local and state authorities  

latter in decisions-making are often formal and selective and mainly serve to legitimise certain actions and decisions of the city government (Hryshchenko 2021). Khomei (2019) describes this communication as a one-way street, because while CSOs can submit their recommendations and policy proposals to state bodies, there is no clear mechanism that will ensure that authorities will consider this appeal and give any feedback. For instance, the authors of the study on the mechanisms of citizens’ involvement in the decision-making process by Kyiv city authorities conclude that although there are various mechanisms of citizens’ involvement, in all of them, public opinion has an exclusively advisory nature: From the experience of representatives of civil society, decisions about whether or not to take a public opinion into account are made depending on the particular circumstances and public resonance (Verbytskyi et al. 2018:10).

This formal perception of cooperation with CSOs sometimes goes even further in cases of feigned civil society involvement in decision-making on the local level. For example, civil society activists from 5 Ukrainian cities that participated in the Cedos research in 2019 commented on the existence of “pocket” or at least “comfortable” CSOs for local authorities in their cities (Kudeliia et al. 2020). Such CSOs often have greater access to official procedures of participation in local self-government bodies` decision-making, and either demonstrate “civil society support” for the local government’s decisions when needed or voice the recommendations that have already been agreed upon with the authorities. This statement is also supported by the UNDP report (UNDP’s Democratic Governance Programme 2019:11): Many include representatives of the “alternative civil society” groups that are linked with representatives of government structures. Representatives of such groups often serve to provide a “window dressing” of public consultation, while in fact neutering civic engagement in decisionmaking, legitimizing decisions of the authorities, participating in tendering committees, extinguishing initiatives by independent civil-society bodies and marginalizing such independent bodies in the region.

Another problem is that authorities at the local level tend to communicate with the leaders of NGOs and charitable foundations that they know personally. For example, as a series of focus group discussions with civil society activists in Kharkiv showed, personal connections are the key to successful cooperation between NGOs and local self-government bodies (Pyrogova 2019). Another study on the cooperation between state authorities and CSOs in the field of climate protection made by Cedos (Kudeliia at al. 2022) showed that while the most influential and effective format for presenting recommendations from activists to the authorities is written recommendations, the success of their consideration by the authorities can be influenced by the establishment of personal contacts with their representatives. Online petitions are quite a popular tool, especially at the local level. They are quite often used by activists in cities to draw the attention of local authorities to cer-

  Nataliia Lomonosova tain problems or issues. For example, for the last three years 20, the activists from Ukrainian CSOs that deal with the problems of ecology and climate change have been mentioning online petitions among their main means of communication with the authorities. However, this mechanism of interaction with the authorities is often purposefully misused, especially at the local level. As explained in the UNDP report (2019), competing petitions supporting conflicting positions are sometimes created in order to “quash” those proposals made by local civil activists.

. Funding of СSOs activities from national and local budgets A separate area of interaction between the authorities and CSOs is the cooperation associated with the receipt of funding for CSOs from national or local authorities. Indeed, there are various mechanisms for CSOs to get financial support from the state and local funds on a competitive basis. Such support is mostly project-based, but also institutional support and the possibility of receiving income for executing a public procurement contract for certain services. Competitions for receiving financial support for projects or the institution itself exist in many governmental bodies at the national level — for instance grants funding is supported by the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Culture (through the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation), the Ministry for Veterans Affairs and so on. But many more grants’ options are also proposed at the local level, in cities and hromadas. It has been 5 years since many Ukrainian cities introduced participatory budget initiatives that aimed to democratise the decision-making process regarding the use of funds from local budgets and to make the budget process more transparent. The “Budget for city initiatives” (Бюджет міських ініціатив) offers an online platform for each city 21 that allows every citizen to propose projects aiming to improve something in their city or hromada and to vote for other initiatives. These projects can be suggested both by individual citizens or groups, grassroots initiatives and by CSOs that have a legal status (registered as NGOs etc.). The projects that win the voting are financed or co-financed from the local budget. The authors of the UNDP report on Integrity and Inclusiveness of the Democratic Process in Ukraine (2019) note the positive role of participatory budgets in supporting important civic initiatives and in the formation of the new leaders, especially in newly amalgamated hromadas.

 20 This was shown by the three waves of a survey on cooperation between the civil climate movement and authorities in Ukraine in the period of 2019–2021 by the Cedos think tank with the support of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. 21 A map of the cities that introduced this mechanism can be found on the platform website: https://lviv.pb.org.ua/about (13th October 2022).

Civil Society in Ukraine: Cooperation between Ukrainian CSOs and local and state authorities  

However, as the report demonstrates, instead of supporting civic initiatives selected on a competitive basis as envisioned by the concept of participatory budgeting, local authorities can sometimes abuse administrative resources and use participatory budgets to finance expenses that should be financed from other budgets (for example, a renovation of a local school). Besides the “Budget for city initiatives” there are also targeted programmes aimed specifically at promoting the development of civil society in some cities. The largest programme in terms of the scale of financing and the number of competing participants, is a programme in Kyiv, which is called “Public Perspective: Transparent Government and Active Community”. Within the framework of this programme, CSOs projects, which are designed inter alia to promote the further development of local civil society, are selected annually on a competitive basis to be financially supported from the city budget. Since competitions for getting funding from the national or local budgets are open to all kinds of CSO representatives, CSOs associated with right-wing movements can also participate. Various researchers have expressed concerns about the possible consequences. For instance, as the Bellingcat`s investigation found 22, in 2019, out of the 8 million UAH that were allocated to the grant programme “national-patriotic education of Ukrainian youth” of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, almost 1 million UAH went to projects from organisations affiliated with far-right groups (Kuzmenko/Colborne 2019). Researchers underline that such support allows these groups to grow and attract new members to their ranks. The authors of the report on the far-right violence in Ukraine also emphasise this danger: We could observe a gradual infiltration of the far right into civil society institutions, their mimicking into human rights defenders and their legitimization, in particular because of financial support they are getting from the state and local budgets (Monitoring group of far-right violence MARKER 2021:18)

Another important remark about the distribution of support from public funds should be made regarding the scope of this support. As stated by Khomei (2019), Ukrainian local authorities tend to support NGOs that provide direct support to various vulnerable groups (such as disabled people, the poor etc.) and have more interest in cooperation with them than those that are more engaged in advocacy. Analysing civil society development in Ukraine after Maidan, Stewart and Dollbaum also underline that, since 2014, CSOs have been actively involved in dealing with the problems of internally displaced people, while the state was “unprepared to deal with both the  22 As stated by the Bellingcat, this investigation was based on the analysis of the “public records, official statements, and reports of the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine and other branches of the government of Ukraine, as well as social media posts and public statements by leaders and members of the organizations”.

  Nataliia Lomonosova Russian aggression and its consequences”, and this in turn made civil society a “substitute for the state to a significant extent in some areas” (Stewart/Dollbaum 2017:11). As it has been shown by the Cedos research, many civil society activists themselves see the current role of CSOs as replacing state organisations in those areas or processes where the state cannot cope with its functions (Kudelia et al. 2020). Situations where civil society actors are heavily involved in performing the tasks of the state bodies give CSOs more possibilities for gaining state financial support. As stated in the beginning of this chapter, CSOs are expected to perform these tasks by society, which, in the end, can become the norm. However, if NGOs would indeed be perceived as “an addition” to the state/local authorities’ institutions and facilities rather than as independent players able to have a critical stance towards state and local policies and their implementation, it could seriously undermine the watchdog function of civil society in Ukraine. CSOs can also participate in authorities` tenders for public procurement of services if they meet certain legal criteria. According to Ukrainian legislation, CSOs are allowed to carry out entrepreneurial activities directly, if this is stipulated in their charters, or via created legal entities (limited liability companies, enterprises), and if such activity meets the CSO’s aims and contributes to realising these goals (Article 21 of the Law of Ukraine “On Public Associations”). After the Maidan uprising, the system of public procurements in Ukraine generally became more transparent. Since April 2016, all central executive authorities of Ukraine (ministries, state and national services, state and national agencies, state inspections and some others) and all other public institutions are obliged to conduct public procurements via a single digital platform, Prozorro. This platform was developed by CSOs themselves. The design of Prozorro aims to make the whole process of publishing the tender announcements, submitting the applications from those who are willing to participate in the tender competitions and the selection process transparent and visible to the general public and to reduce the possibilities of opaque schemes. For decades, the sphere of public procurements in Ukraine was rather untransparent and had high risks of corruption, which means that public institutions might still come up with new workarounds in order to maintain their decisive influence on the results of the procurement. However, CSOs also have tools for the public control of public procurements, regulated by the Law of Ukraine On Public Procurements (Article 7). Since the data on the public procurements became open to the public, both any legally registered CSOs and grassroot activists have a right to analyse this data. If any violations of the legislation regarding the public procurement procedure are detected, they have a right to inform the public financial control bodies. Such an appeal may be grounds for initiating the monitoring of a public procurement. There is also one budgetary mechanism in Ukraine that has been repeatedly criticised by the public for its lack of transparency and often inefficient use of funds. These are state subventions for regional and socio-economic development available to the national deputies. As noted in the UNDP report

Civil Society in Ukraine: Cooperation between Ukrainian CSOs and local and state authorities   while the subventions are allocated for specific projects, the criteria for approving them are opaque […] No objective, formula-based and transparent criteria have been officially stated or are detectable in practice. The allocations across different types of local contexts vary widely. In practice, MPs themselves play a key role in selecting them. Many of the subventions fund the type of activities that provide MPs with a PR opportunity, such as renovations of school or hospital buildings or local sports events (UNDP’s Democratic Governance Programme 2019:9).

The authors of the report call the existing schemes into question when national deputies in practice use the public procurement to give the funds for realisation of these projects to the enterprises, CSOs and media outlets that are connected to them.

. Conclusion Most researchers of contemporary civil society in Ukraine emphasise its qualitative transformation during the Maidan protests in 2014 and the following years. The level of public trust in CSOs and activists has significantly increased, which reinforces the latter’s ability to fulfill its watchdog function. This is also facilitated by a number of mechanisms designed to expand and improve opportunities for communication and cooperation of civil society actors with national and local authorities that were implemented after Maidan. Besides that, there is the expectation for greater transparency and democratisation of political processes and decisions from authorities, in connection with the aspirations of Ukrainian society for European integration. At the same time, civic activists who want to have a real impact on essential reforms and local policies still face numerous obstacles, including those connected to the establishment of effective communication with the authorities. In this respect, we can observe significant differences between the regions, between the territorial communities, and between the spheres in which civic organisations operate. For instance, while in some hromadas the innovative mechanisms of CSO involvement in political life show good results, in others, the powerful connections of local political and business elites still significantly limit the activities of civic activists to topics and issues that do not align with their interests and exclude activists with diverging views from political and public life. Due to these reasons and due to the severe challenges facing Ukrainian society that result from armed conflict in the east of the country and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, CSOs in Ukraine tend to engage more in providing assistance and services to vulnerable people. At times, they directly support state facilities where the former lack resources, while advocacy activities often take a back seat. Still, in the case of the positive outcome of anti-corruption and decentralisation reforms from a long-term perspective and if civic activists manage to achieve a greater cohesion and form strong coalitions, the existing positive trends in cooperation between the authorities and CSOs will be strengthened, as well as the position of the CSOs in the political life of Ukrainian society as a whole.

  Nataliia Lomonosova

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Civil Society in Ukraine: Cooperation between Ukrainian CSOs and local and state authorities   Kuts, S. (2006): Civil Society in Ukraine: “Driving Engine or Spare Wheel for Change?”, CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Ukraine, Kyiv: Center for Philanthropy & Counterpart Creative Center, Retrieved from https://www.civicus.org/media/CSI_Ukraine_Country_Report.pdf (13th October 2022). Kuzmenko, O./Colborne, M. (2019): Ukrainian Far-Right Extremists Receive State Funds to Teach “Patriotism”, Retrieved from https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/07/16/ ukrainian-far-right-extremists-receive-state-funds-to-teach-patriotism/ (13th October 2022). Monitoring group of far-right violence MARKER (2021): Far-right Confrontations and Violence: 2020 Monitoring Results, Retrieved from https://violence-marker.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/ 2021/UA-2021-WEB.pdf (13th October 2022). NORC (n.d.): Ukraine Civil Society Assessment, Retrieved from https://www.norc.org/Research/Projects/Pages/ukraine-civil-society-assessment.aspx (13th October 2022). Protsenko, V. (2018): Ekonomika strazhdan i nespravedlyvosti: yak ukraintsi peretvorylysia na “livu” natsiiu. VoxUkraine, Retrieved from https://voxukraine.org/uk/ekonomika-strazhdan-inespravedlivosti-yak-ukrayintsi-peretvorilisya-na-livu-natsiyu/ (13th October 2022). Razumkov Centre (2019): Otsinka hromadianamy sytuatsii v kraini ta diialnosti vlady, riven doviry do sotsialnykh instytutiv ta politykiv, Retrieved from https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/ sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-gromadianamy-sytuatsii-v-kraini-ta-diialnosti-vladyriven-doviry-do-sotsialnykh-instytutiv-ta-politykiv-2 (13th October 2022). Romanova, V. (2017): The Comparative Analysis of Regional Governors’ Approaches to Fostering Inclusive Political Institutions in Post-Euromaidan Donbas, Kyiv-Mohyla Law And Politics Journal, (3), 71–89. Stewart, S./Dollbaum, J. (2017): Civil society development in Russia and Ukraine: Diverging paths. Communist And Post-Communist Studies, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.08.001 (13th October 2022). The European External Action Service (2019): EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Ukraine, Retrieved from: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/roadmap_for_cs.pdf (13th October 2022). Tolokolnikova, K. (2018): Dovira, paternalizm i pasyvnist: yak ukraintsi stavliatsia do hromadskykh orhanizatsii, Retrieved from https://cs.detector.media/infospace/texts/139870/2018-08-03dovira-paternalizm-i-pasyvnist-yak-ukraintsi-stavlyatsya-do-gromadskykh-organizatsiy/ (13th October 2022). Udovyk, O. (2017): Beyond the Conflict and Weak Civil Society; Stories from Ukraine: Cases of Grassroots Initiatives for Sustainable Development, East/West: Journal Of Ukrainian Studies, IV (2), 187–210. UNDP’s Democratic Governance Programme (2019): Integrity and Inclusiveness of the Democratic Process in Ukraine, Retrieved from https://www.undp.org/ukraine/publications/integrity-andinclusiveness-democratic-process-ukraine (13th October 2022). Verbytskyi, I./Pyrogova, D. & Gryschenko, M. (2018): Mekhanizmy uchasti hromadyan u protsesi pryynyattya rishenʹ orhanamy misʹkoyi vlady u Kyievi, Cedos, Retrieved from https://cedos.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/re_cedos_web.pdf (13th October 2022). Worschech, S. (2017): New Civic Activism in Ukraine: Building Society from Scratch?, Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal, (3), 23–45.

Hélène Balazard Translation: Isis Olivier

French democracy under threat  Introduction. A democracy under threat France 23 was once heralded for its human rights values and democratic principles. Yet, the reality in France today falls short of the democratic ideal of an independent egalitarian society. Contradictory movements have opened and closed democratic spaces. ‘Classic’ forms of democratic action are declining (voting, political party and trade union membership), while independent civic participation has inspired diverse collective actions. France’s democratic vitality has been jeopardised by several changes: the growing mistrust of democracy and its institutions, increasingly frequent violations of the right to protest, threats against the independence of the press, the prolonged state of emergency and the COVID-19 health crisis. Indeed, France has been indicted on several counts by the European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations for failing to respect international commitments to human rights and fundamental freedoms. The repeated violations, including police practices, institutional discrimination and inhuman conditions of detention, are a genuine threat to French democracy. France has seen a shift in political opinions and behaviour with a rise in the extreme right-wing. In April 2017, the National Front candidate, Marine Le Pen, won 33.9 % of the votes in the second round of the presidential elections, almost double the NF’s score in 2002. In the French regional and departmental elections in June 2021, there was a record low turnout (66.3 % abstention rate). According to Jessica Sainty, a politics lecturer at Avignon University, this is “the culmination of a disconnection between voters and the political class”. According to the European Values Survey 24, almost 90 % of the French are in favour of a democratic government. While the importance of living in a democratically governed country scores 8 on a scale of 1 to 10, the French are disenchanted with the political system, particularly the European institutions (score 4.7 out of 10). Their confidence in Parliament (National Assembly and Senate) fell from 49 % to 36 % between 1990 and 2018. Six out of 10 people do not think France is governed democratically.  23 An updated and shortened version of the full report published in September 2020 in English and French: http://www.chaire-unesco-lyon.entpe.fr/fr/node/166 (22nd September 2022). Translation in English and final editing of this 2021 paper: Isis Olivier and Hélène Balazard. 24 An association of twenty social scientists, which researches value systems (ARVAL), conducted the French component of the European Values Survey. The full results were published in a book edited by Pierre Bréchon, Frédéric Gonthier and Sandrine Astor (2019). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111070469-006

  Hélène Balazard The political scientist, Bruno Cautrès, suggests that the democratic political system still has majority support. A 2018 survey shows that 89 % of people thought it was a “very good” or “quite good” way to govern the country. Almost 50 % thought that handing the government to experts is a “good” solution, while a quarter declared that a “strong man, who does not have to worry about parliament or elections” would be good for France. In 1999, only 4 % of the French were in favour of the army governing the country, but the figure has risen to 13 % (only 55 % think it is a “very bad” option). In general, the distrust of democracy is most acute among the most disadvantaged people (Collectif 2019). This lack of trust in democracy is reflected in the repertoire of actions used by social movements. There has been a recent shift away from traditional and ‘legitimate’ channels of political participation (Sommier 2019). Dissent is now expressed by rioting, occupying sites to protect them from development, civil disobedience, online petitions etc. This shift is not new. In the mid-1980s, there was a higher level of abstention among young people and growing disillusion with political parties and unions. Research revealed that younger generations’ interest in the public sphere (Percheron 1987) was shifting to focus on CSOs, humanitarian causes and solidarity and involved more partial, intermittent and revocable forms of engagement. The political sociology of youth shows the current preference for ‘unconventional’ forms of engagement (street demonstrations, one-off/project-based commitments etc.), a disaffection with traditional forms of participation, a distrust of politicians and a critical view of the political system (Muxel 2010). The shift is more acute among the urban working classes, largely due to the collapse of traditional forms of political leadership previously assumed by the French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français, PCF) and affiliated organisations. The PCF’s decline left the working classes politically orphaned, with no voice and no representation (Beaud/Pialoux 1999; Dubet 1987). Record levels of abstention and a withdrawal from all forms of institutionalised political participation became widespread among the working class (Braconnier/Dormagen 2007). Their relationship with politics shifted to other arenas, e.g. local involvement in CSOs (Kokoreff 2003; Masclet 2003). Social conflict broke out in working class areas, often at the limits of legality. This so-called ‘expressive’ delinquency (Mucchielli 2001) was about revolt and injustice, not a desire for material gain 25. A repertoire of rioting developed with direct confrontation, culminating in November and December 2005, marking a clear break with political language and representation (Cortesero/Marliere 2015). The yellow vest movement in 2018 adopted a repertoire of action strikingly similar to the riots in the Paris suburbs 26. The sociology of riots stems from the rural and “peri-urban” working class, the blind spots of political representation (Coquard 2019).  25 Cf. for example, the study by D. Merklen (2013) on the degradation of public libraries and media libraries. 26 These parallels do not necessarily imply “convergences” (Marlière 2019).

French democracy under threat  

Other contemporary social movements have shifted to illegalism, e.g. computer hackers (Anonymous), whistle-blowers, activists who removed portraits of the French President to denounce his inaction on climate change, zones to defend (ZADs), involving the illegal occupation of land threatened by major infrastructure projects, and civil disobedience, e.g. helping foreigners despite their irregular status. Illegalism has a significant history and has helped advance different causes, as illustrated by the mobilisation of vulnerable groups (Mouchard 2002). The use of public force is being increasingly challenged with the growing criticism of the maintenance of law and order and the handling of public security. The yellow vest movement is a case in point. The intensity and duration of the movement was unprecedented, as was the police use of force, the physical injuries they inflicted and the charges brought against protesters. The Lancet published an investigation revealing the high number of physical injuries (La Croix avec AFP 2019). Le Monde (8 November 2019) reported record numbers of detentions and convictions. “10 000 detentions, 3 100 convictions… an unprecedented criminal justice response” (Vincent 2019). Indeed, the criminal justice response against demonstrators was swift and severe, but it failed demonstrators seeking justice for deliberate police violence. Many were banned from demonstrating, a measure seldom used by judges until now. The president of the lawyers’ union alludes to “political sentences that pose a genuine democratic problem.” (Weiler/Gouin 2019). The French approach to maintaining law and order was once a reference in Europe. It was the outcome of a process, whereby “demonstrators and the forces of law and order, alike, were disciplined” (Poisson 2018). However, the United Nations, the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights severely criticised the crowd control tactics used by the French police during the yellow vest movement. The French ‘anti-rioter’ bill further restricted the exercise of public freedoms and the right to protest. François Sureau, an attorney at the Council of State and the Court of Cassation, argues that this dynamic has been undermining the foundations of the rule of law for 20 years. It grants the state the “means to control everyone’s individual participation in a demonstration” and, thus, to “choose its opponents.” (Sureau 2019). The reform of “police in charge of everyday security”, an attempt to bring citizens closer to their local police, has made matters worse (Villaines 2020). The sense of injustice crystallised after George Floyd’s death in the United States in May 2020, triggering a wave of protests across the world. In France, the affair echoed the case of Adama Traoré. The Truth For Adama collective initiated the 20,000 strong gathering in Paris to denounce racism and police violence, despite the ban on demonstrations. It drew many young people of diverse social and ethnic origins. The CSO SOS-Racisme, several political parties and trade unions also called for an assembly. In November 2020, despite growing criticism of police violence, the French National Assembly voted in favour of the Global Security Bill, which threatens press freedom. UN experts have urged France to revise the new bill because it is “incompatible” with international law and human rights.

  Hélène Balazard In France, the recent financial, economic and social crises, and the state of emergency declared in the wake of the terrorist attacks have caused major upheavals, undermining democracy, human rights and freedom. The Covid-19 health emergency declared on the 23rd March 2020 made matters worse, by giving the authorities the right to: limit people’s movements; make wearing masks compulsory; control access to establishments open to the public; and “order the requisition of any person or all goods and services necessary to combat the health disaster” 27. Special measures were adopted in working class areas. They worsened stigmatisation and pre-existing tensions, intensifying feelings of injustice and suspicion with regard to the state and its institutions. The health emergency led to an unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of the executive. The National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (CNCDH) issued a notice (28th April 2020) advising an examination of the executive’s introduction of a new exceptional provision. It states that the provision “was not inevitable given the tools that the government already had at its disposal for managing the health crisis”. The “concentration of the power to restrict rights and freedoms in the hands of the executive” is one “that the Republic has never known in times of peace”. The Council of State underlined the need for vigilance regarding “the measures taken, particularly, the duration of their application”. Its impact study presents the health emergency as draft legislation for a “common law state of emergency”, which is alarming 28. Perpetuating the state of emergency undermines the balance of power in a democracy. The Covid-19 epidemic triggered a health crisis without precedent in modern societies. It exposed and exacerbated the existing economic, social, ecological and democratic crisis and increased inequalities of wealth, gender and race (Berkhout et al. 2021). Here, we discuss some of the major impacts of the crisis and health emergency with regard to education, data privacy, civil liberties, the balance of power and knowledge etc. This report examines the different mechanisms that contribute to closing democratic spaces 29 and presents possible solutions to reverse this trend. Which fields are affected by breaches of civil liberties? Are restrictions short-term or is there a more general underlying trend threatening rights and democracy? What mechanisms are involved? How can democratic and civic spaces be guaranteed or broadened? We examine the hypothesis that democracy, rights and freedoms are shrinking. This is apparent in the tension between the demand for less conventional political practices, a governance model that bans conflict and a situation where protests primarily target  27 Draft bill of 4th May 2020 extending the health emergency. 28 Impact study of the emergency draft bill for the Covid-19 epidemic, NOR: PRMX2007883LBleue, available at http://www.senat.fr/leg/etudes-impact/pjl19-376-ei/pjl19-376-ei.html (22nd September 2022). 29 It also explores new less visible configurations, like the digital boom, as well as their impact on democratic vitality.

French democracy under threat  

the state and state institutions. Our analysis is based on a survey conducted by experts in participatory democracy, CSOs, the political sociology of youth, state modernisation and public security policy.

 “Citizenship” and “democracy”: political theory Here, the notions of “citizenship” and “democracy” should be understood in relation to the notions of “public sphere” and “civil society”. The first refers to the sphere for public debate and actions (speeches, engagement practices etc.). The second identifies all the stakeholders, institutions and regulatory bodies that coordinate and organise the public sphere. Both are linked to distinct historical and political frameworks and to issues of citizenship in France.

. The public sphere: coercion and consent In the contractualist tradition (Rousseau, Rawls etc.), social organisation and social institutions stem from an informed understanding between citizens, whereby they agree on how best to share responsibilities, resources, rights, obligations, freedoms and taboos. The “social contract” sets out the conditions for social association that are acceptable to everybody. The German thinker, Jürgen Habermas, describes the public sphere as being where consultation and rational debate provide the basis for the “production of society”. However, consent is never absolute. There are at least three ways to limit the degree of consent in democratic societies in order to maintain and defend the “social contract”. The first is oligarchic. As the French philosopher, Bernard Manin shows, the founding fathers of representative democracy saw it as a “republic” with an aristocratic essence, not an Athenian model of direct democracy. A nation cannot be trusted because people are slaves to immediate passions and interests. This assumption justifies the delegation of power to a professional body of representatives, “chosen by citizens, whose wisdom can best discern the country’s genuine interests 30”. Representative regimes distinguish between who is “fit” to take part in the democratic arena and who is not. Limiting the right to vote (excluding women, children) is one method. More insidious sociological mechanisms of self-exclusion is another, which particularly affects working class categories alienated from school. In contemporary France, the democratic process is still tarnished by deep inequalities linked to the level of education. Some people feel illegitimate because of their inadequate “cultural capital”, which leads to self-exclusion from the political  30 James Madison, fourth President of the United States (1809–1817), quoted in (Manin 1995).

  Hélène Balazard sphere. The fragility of “social citizenship” affects all marginalised populations, who are gradually losing the protection that wage earners once enjoyed. According to the French sociologist, Robert Castel, the exercise of political citizenship presupposes access to “a minimum of resources and rights necessary to provide a degree of social independence” (Castel 2008). “Social citizenship” is a prerequisite for political citizenship, but it has been eroded with the decline of the welfare state. Economic inequalities are inextricably linked with political inequalities. The institutional operations governing democratic representation are increasingly selective, which makes matters worse. The state is becoming more oligarchic. Therefore, when citizens consent to the social and political system that representative democracy is supposed to guarantee, their consent is partial because only a limited share of the population is represented and consulted. The second involves more discreet regulations and controls. In Habermas’ view, the “bourgeois” public sphere is aware that its principles and modus operandi are being distorted in the interests of the elite, whose priority is to stay in power (Habermas 1991). This paradox permeates a significant amount of research on “participation” in democratic societies; instead of strengthening the power of citizens, participatory mechanisms tend to channel it, control it and diffuse conflicts to preserve social peace and the assumptions underpinning state institutions (Cf. for example Gourgues et al. 2013). In this way, consent is somehow extorted by multiple participatory mechanisms. The third is the manufacture of consent, which is more “positive” than restrictive (see Michel Foucault’s notion of “governmentality” and Antonio Gramsci’s research on how the joint action of the state and civil society aims to manufacture consent among subaltern classes). Civil society is seen as a sphere, where learning and civic and political socialisation occur. It can mould a certain type of political subject and shape ordinary citizenship, opinions and dissent in a controlled and regulated fashion. Hegemony corresponds to the control that the ruling classes exercise over the movements and organs of civil society. During the Covid-19 pandemic, for example, nudging was used to make people accept the emergency health measures without public debate (Stiegler 2021). Manufacturing “compliant” political subjectivity is linked to “education in citizenship”. The boundary between consent and coercion becomes porous, which means that consent is also a form of interiorised coercion.

. The languages of citizenship in France All consultative spheres are regulated because they are enshrined in social relationships and systems of domination. Sets of principles, constraints, forms of authorisation and restriction establish the operational rules and the scope of freedoms that they control. They define citizens’ rights and prerogatives and mould a certain type of citizen. In France, four distinct “languages” regulate legitimate forms of citizen-

French democracy under threat  

ship. They result from France’s political and social history and of a changing international context. “Republican ideology” is the “DNA” of the French concept of the public sphere and how it is regulated. It is the product of the French Revolution and is close to the ideal of the contractualist and liberal public sphere that emerged with the Age of Enlightenment. The social pact alludes to the general interest, which should transcend all specific, individual or corporatist interests. Consequently, the French Republic was initially hostile to “intermediary bodies”. In 1791, Le Chapelier’s Law and Allarde’s Decree restricted the freedom of association and banned corporations because of the fear that local influence and interests would affect citizens’ faculties of judgement. As a result, public education became the cornerstone of the Republican nationbuilding policy to homogenise national citizenship. The aim was to overcome local influences, the “environment” and its protagonists (families, local sociability and traditions, religious influences etc.), to make the population “fit” for the purpose of universal suffrage. Supervising CSOs followed the same logic with the nation-state as teacher. The 1901 bill created a space that renewed freedom of association with built-in control mechanisms. CSOs were recognised as being of public utility. Their legal capacity was extended in return for state “control over statutes, functioning, management and activities” (Barthélémy 2020). The Republican state encourages a CSO model, which endorses the state in its task to enlighten citizens and promote the general interest. This model recognises the freedom of opinion, but not its intrinsic value. The general desire does not necessarily reflect the will of the majority, rather it corresponds to the most acceptable line of argument, which can be carried by a minority. The French socialist politician, Louis Blanc (1811–1882), declared “freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, the right to assembly and association [are] inviolable”, not because of the intrinsic value of the principle of freedom, but to ensure that the Republic had “all the guarantees to allow a minority to become a majority provided that it is right and proves it” (Louis Blanc, quoted in Nicolet 1982). Another frame of reference or language gained a foothold in the mid-1970s. Society’s unity is no longer seen as the precursor for individual action, but as the product of individual action (Dubet 2009). Major international bodies, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank can campaign and diffuse new principles of governance on a global scale. This reflects a neo-liberal concept of the “responsible” individual and an “entrepreneurial” vision of politics, which calls on each society to develop using its own resources (Helly 2002; Palier/Provost 2007; Thomas 2010).

  Hélène Balazard Political and civil society participation enhances individuals’ social capital 31. It gives people confidence, responsibility and a sense of the common good. The renewed vision of education in citizenship encourages more active citizenship. State teaching has become less transmissive and is now based on a project idea of volunteerism, rather than constraint. It adopts a more top-down approach to active citizenship, underpinned by the idea of “civic duty”, drawn from the Republican model of national integration. With this frame of reference, social cohesion creates a space for civic participation and civil society. However, social cohesion is limited and there is little room to voice criticism, unless it can be silenced during consultation or engagement procedures. The baseline for cohesion, just like the Republican frame of reference, allows the use of legitimate violence to tackle protests. This is now backed by a legal arsenal, which impacts activist practices and the right to protest. Many researchers agree that this “security” arsenal goes far beyond the protection against terrorism argument. Dissent in the late 1960s was characterised by the growing demand for individual sovereignty in counter-culture, the arts and social criticism (Donzekot 1984). Boltanski and Chiapello qualified it as “artistic”. In their view, individual achievement prevails over maintaining “social order” (Boltanski/Chiapello 1999). In the 1960s and 1970s, civil society networks started calling for more direct political involvement. Individuals wanted to control their destiny, instead of leaving it in the hands of a modernising “enlightened” technocracy (Esprit 1978). Protest movements emerged as people aspired to “greater participatory democracy” because of “a crisis of confidence in the representative institutions” (Sommier 2003). Civil disobedience is an important feature of these movements, for example, the “zones to defend” (ZAD) or the action of hackers, voluntary reapers, whistle-blowers etc. It affirms individual sovereignty in the political field, by challenging the very essence of legality and placing radical democratic requirements above the law (Cervera-Mazal 2016). This individualistic frame of reference set the basis for extending the democratic sphere and engaging in political practice. It also set tight restrictions on the democratic sphere within the narrow framework of an ultra-liberal/libertarian interpretation of individual sovereignty 32. Here, although social protest and demands for justice are legitimate, they are restricted by a principle of individual responsibility, whereby everyone is responsible for their own destiny. In comparison to the Republican baseline and social cohesion, the agonistic frame of reference underlines social disputes and divisions, rather than unity. It al-

 31 In Robert Putnam’s view, “social capital” determines “the characteristics of social organisation, such as networks, norms and confidence, which facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995). 32 See, in particular, the power of this model as a form of “government” in contemporary society, see (Dardot/Laval 2009).

French democracy under threat  

lows more room for criticism and protest because conflicts of interest and class antagonism are considered “normal” in society. In the French political imagination, this image blends with the antagonism between “capital” and “labour”, expressed by the labour movement in the mid-19th century. In the post-war context, this antagonism was gradually institutionalised and became a mode of social control. As a result, the resistance movements were able to agree on the creation of a vast social security scheme. “Normal” social and political life is conceived as a regulated conflict, where society’s central antagonisms are “represented” by the main political parties in parliament and the political decision-making sphere. The government is organised into a “party democracy”. The frame of reference for social cohesion prevailed in the 1980s and 1990s. Later, conflict became a feature of new protests (feminist struggles, “civil disobedience” etc.) and developed with the upsurge in “critical” popular education (see Augusto Boal or Paulo Freire). In this way, France is quietly importing practices of mobilisation and apprehension, like Anglo-Saxon community organising (Balazard 2015). The “return” of this frame of reference can be seen in the expression of political movements, like Podemos in Spain or La France Insoumise. Here, conflict is not a threat to democracy but a prerequisite. This reflects the work by the Belgian philosopher, Chantal Mouffe. Social forces and institutions are expected to encourage the expression of antagonisms within a framework, where every point of view is considered legitimate. Society “functions” when conflicts of interest and orientation can be expressed and organised confrontation finds a balance between opposing forces (Mouffe 2010). This synopsis reveals a paradox. On the one hand, French society sees its institutions promoting a model of citizenship in line with the Republican tradition, which prioritises stability and consensus. Active citizens help preserve social cohesion by voluntarily engaging in dialogue within the framework of designated participatory bodies. In parallel, following the labour movement’s decline and the lethargy of social movements in the early 1990s, social conflict has reappeared. While the Fordist post-war compromise set conflict in social regulation mode, contemporary institutions and the prevailing governance model appear to be averse to conflict. It is seen as a threat to social cohesion and stability. In France, the failure to include new forms of conflict in politico-institutional mechanisms could be linked to the historical weakness of environmental movements. In other countries, e.g. Germany, environmental movements have helped modernise democratic life (Jacquiot 2007). This aversion to conflict is problematic for emerging protest movements. The current governance model of social cohesion delegitimises social conflict, while simultaneously legitimising intransigent repressive conflict management. The clash between these two approaches appears to confirm the hypothesis on the dynamics of democratic closure. The situation should be examined in the light of recent changes that have affected the exercise of citizenship and CSOs.

  Hélène Balazard

 Mobilise, engage, challenge: a shrinking civic space How can citizens express themselves and become genuine political players given the limitations of representative and participatory democracy? In France, non-profit organisations have developed since 1901 in response to the changing social, economic and political context. After World War II, the introduction of paid holidays encouraged the creation of associations linked to sport and leisure activities. Then with changes in legislation relating to disability, CSOs developed in the health and welfare sectors. In the 1970s, CSOs were founded to defend rights and causes, like feminism, the environment and the fight against social exclusion, which reflect the concerns of social movements (Archambault/Prouteau 2020). CSOs are also involved in education and training, the arts and culture. There are now 1.5 million CSOs in France. They play an essential role, as a means for social expression and as an opposition force. For years, conflict was perceived as a driving force for social change (Cf. Coser 1982). Now, the public authorities seek to avoid dialogue and implement security measures to deal with social conflict. How can dialogue be restored to allow for conflict and democratic debate? How can citizens’ power be boosted to enhance democracy? Traditionally, the principles of maintaining law and order in France were professionalisation, proportionality and avoiding physical contact with the crowd. The aim was to “show one’s power so as not to have to exercise it” (National Assembly 2015) in order to avoid situations where “law enforcement makes matters worse when attempting to control a disturbance” (ACAT 2019). These principles are being undermined by budget cutbacks and the use of private security forces. The political scientist, Olivier Fillieule, describes the “brutalisation of the maintenance of law and order”, a familiar pattern in most European countries. The French ombudsman has called on the Minister of the Interior to end “practices that fail to respect citizens’ rights” (Chapuis 2020). The danger is that “certain activist movements [will be seen] as terrorist movements”. As in the expression “‘a good Indian is a dead Indian’, a good demonstration is a demonstration that will not take place (…). The new arsenal for maintaining law and order ends up violating the constitutional right to protest”. 33 It was deployed for the yellow vest movement and has been criticised by the United Nations, the European Union and the European Court for Human Rights. The right to peaceful assembly was seriously impacted by the Covid-19 health emergency. Despite the relaxation of health restrictions in May 2020, the ban on demonstrations was maintained (decree of 11th May 2020 banning gatherings of more

 33 5th seminar of the Independent Police Complaints Authorities’ Network (IPCAN), organised by the Defender of Rights on the theme of police-population relations, 18th October 2019, Paris.

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than ten people in public spaces). After an appeal by the Human Rights League and several trade unions, the Council of State suspended the decree. The state of emergency, declared after the Paris and Nice attacks in 2015 and 2016, has been repeatedly extended despite severe criticism from legal and academic experts who describe it as ineffective and as an infringement of democracy: “votes are subject to fast-track procedures, which reduce the parliamentary debate to a minimum; the misuse of extension laws aims to reinforce the means for the lasting surveillance and control of citizens; the judicial judge’s constitutional role as guardian of individual freedom is negated; opposition forces are denigrated, particularly judicial powers, whose role has been reduced to blocking and barricading” 34. The general climate of suspicion triggered by Emmanuel Macron’s appeal for a “vigilant society” is likely to further stigmatise some social groups and incite denunciation. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also expressed concern that the state of emergency is not simply being used to fight terrorism, but to curb action by environmental campaigners. Furthermore, despite the warnings and criticisms, draft legislation to tighten national security and counter terrorism (30th October 2017) included four emergency mechanisms in the common law governing police powers. This law turned previous specific “state of emergency” powers into permanent powers. These are: the closure of places of worship; the so-called perimeters of “protection”; house arrest; and administrative searches. In a statement (31st October 2017), the Human Rights League condemned a “misleading exit from the state of emergency” and a “real setback for the rule of law”, paving the way for the greater stigmatisation of Muslims, discriminatory identity checks and widespread surveillance. This concern is shared by legal experts, including Paul Cassia, public law professor at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. He describes the law as “the most detrimental to individual liberties in the history of the Fifth Republic, apart from the period when Charles de Gaulle applied article 16 of the Constitution” (Cassia 2017). An in-depth review by the Observatory of Associative Freedoms 35 revealed the emergence of practices of “quiet” repression that target CSOs’ collective action (Talpin 2016). The phenomenon has not been publicised by civil society actors and public authorities, nor has it been widely documented by social scientists. In September 2018, for example, the penal administration ended the decades-old agreement binding it to Genepi 36, a CSO that works with prisoners. The charity’s sub 34 Twenty celebrities, including Etienne Balibar and Thomas Piketty (Le Monde 2017). 35 The Observatory of Associative Freedoms, which comprises CSOs and researchers, documents numerous cases of public authority obstruction of associations’ freedom of action or speech. Its first report (autumn 2020) analyses 100 cases of repression and proposes courses of action to break the democratic deadlock. https://www.lacoalition.fr/Une-citoyennete-reprimee-un-etat-des-lieux-desentraves-aux-actions (28th September 2022). 36 Genepi is a students’ association that campaigns to break down the barriers in penal institutions, by sharing knowledge and testimonies between inmates, volunteers and the civil society.

  Hélène Balazard sidies were cut and its access to prisons was restricted. “Subsidising an association that attacks the very foundations of our institution is incoherent”, the Ministry of Justice explained to Libération. The decision sparked an outcry and the ministry ended up reviewing its position (Brafman 2018). In Bure, in the Meuse department, opponents to the underground nuclear waste disposal site are being investigated for “criminal association”. The judicial inquiry began in 2017. It has already cost over 1 million euros and the collective’s premises are now under surveillance. Local and national CSOs have condemned the harassment and criminalisation that objectors have been exposed to (Lingaard/Barbier 2020). Simultaneously, the prefecture in Toulouse cut funding for a community health centre in a working class area, accusing it of being “too militant” and too involved in contentious court proceedings relating to the state’s refusal to cover patients’ medical costs under the healthcare system. Civicus, a civil society watchdog has raised concerns about the French government’s anti-separatist bill (passed on 16th February 2021). The bill was criticised for being contrary to international and human rights law. In a statement, Jean-François Dubost from the French Amnesty International office said it was particularly contrary to “the principle of non-discrimination.” These different situations raise the same question: what public authority recognition and respect is there for CSOs’ freedom of action and freedom of expression? In most cases, criticism or collective actions that challenge the public authorities (speeches, petitions, public protests, non-violent civil disobedience) are met with repression. Actions are linked to diverse issues, e.g. environmental protection, the fight against discrimination, sport, culture, housing rights and solidarity. CSOs operate all over the country, in city centres, working class districts, as well as suburban and rural areas. The state institutions, including decentralised services, regional authorities and semi-public bodies are found at all territorial levels. This pattern of shrinking democratic space is a global phenomenon (see Carother/Brechenmacher 2014; Hayes et al. 2017). The Observatory of Associative Freedoms identified four forms of repression. – Verbal obstruction and disqualifications: defamatory attacks or the proscription of spaces for dialogue. – Material and financial obstruction: subsidy cuts or “sanctions” and limited access to premises for meetings. – Legal and regulatory obstruction: complaints, fines and court proceedings against activists from CSOs and administrative barriers, such as refusing accreditation. – Physical and police obstruction: forms of physical repression of collective action, raids and arrests, which generally involve law enforcement agencies. The emergency common law measures in France were extended and reinforced during the Covid-19 pandemic, providing the legal basis for new violations of freedom of association. Education was also heavily impacted, with prolonged school and univer-

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sity closures, which reduced the possibility for discussion and advances in knowledge, both essential features of a healthy democracy (Stiegler 2021). Despite playing a vital role to tackle the health and social repercussions of the Covid-19 crisis, many CSOs were exposed to new violations of associative freedoms during lockdown. Utopia56, a CSO that helps people in exile, revealed that in just three weeks, 37 fines were issued when its volunteers were distributing tents, sleeping bags and food to migrants. A video shows a police officer clearly stating his intention to “wear out” activists, by increasing the number of controls and fines. On 24th April, the mayor of Cholet (mixed right wing) accused the local Human Rights League on Twitter for being “politicised, with totalitarian ideas” because it had persuaded the administrative tribunal to suspend the “curfew” imposed by municipal decree. On 1st May, when solidarity brigades in Montreuil were distributing free food in an act of solidarity and to express their anger about the handling of the epidemic, thirty police officers disrupted the action and issued fines for “assertive” action. In an interview in May 2020, Éric Dacheux, professor at the University of Clermont II, explained that political rhetoric has always been a battle of words to build common interest and disqualify outsiders. “The politician’s goal has never been about truth, which is science’s concern. However, this begs the question: if the politician defends a public debate ethic, which moral values does he defend, how willing is he to build common ground?” 37 The notion of “barbaric” in antiquity and the word “terrorism” today are “elements of language” used by the authorities to label their enemies when they want to create a media impact. Dacheux suggests that the main problem lies in the collusion between the institutional public sphere, which generates “elements of language”, and the public media sphere, which uses the terms per se, without challenging them or putting them in context 38. Any kind of industrial or CSO dispute in the public sphere is seen as wrong: a demonstration or strike systematically becomes “hostage taking” or “overreacting” 39. The media sphere has a special definition for the term “activist” (militant), insinuating leftist or extreme left activism. Amandine Gay, filmmaker and activist, asks: “Why should Rokhaya Diallo be described as an activist before she is described as a journalist? No one would say to Laurent Joffrin that he was an activist. “Activist” is a qualification used to (…) disqualify us” (Amsellem-Mainguy et al. 2018). Associating ideas or elements of language can be very effective. A recent example is the case of  37 Interview with Éric Dacheux, conducted in May 2020. 38 After Pierre Bourdieu (Sur la télévision, Liber-raisons d’agir, 1996), Serge Halimi, in Les Nouveaux Chiens de Garde (1997 then 2005), actually revealed the closeness between journalists officiating in the main media and political power. The problem is not so much that these journalists obey orders, but the fact that they share the same vision of the world as the ruling elite. Their training (Sciences Po, schools of journalism), their proximity to Paris and their shared economic interests (business shareholders, select elite clubs) are highlighted as factors that make journalism more normative than critical. 39 Interview with Éric Dacheux, conducted in May 2020.

  Hélène Balazard the journalist, Taha Bouhafs, who was held in police custody after tweeting that he was in the same theatre as Emmanuel Macron on 21st November 2019, during a period of social unrest. In response, people gathered outside the theatre and the French President and his wife were exfiltrated. Taha Bouhafs’ career was scrutinised by all the editorial boards. He was systematically labelled a “militant journalist” and accused of “communitarianism” by some of the media (Lefebvre 2020). This calls into question the collusion between economic actors, public actors and the media and the danger of curbing freedom of opinion. Éric Dacheux mentions two major changes in the government’s rhetoric since the late 1990s, which are a setback for public democratic debate: the omnipresent warlike vocabulary used when politicians are faced with a crisis. “We are at war” (c.f. Emmanuel Macron’s speech on 16th March 2020), announcing the lockdown and the drastic restriction of individual freedoms that were to follow; the more widespread use of business and management vocabulary in reference to the political management of the country. Anglicisms like “governance”, “project”, “management”, euphemisms or oxymorons are a form of “newspeak”, which changes our perception of reality and of how our democracies are generalising mercantile capitalism. These terms are devised by liberal think tanks. In France, the OECD has the most clout (Dixon 2008). Collective action encompasses different types of civic action that seek to advance diverse issues (e.g. collective problems or interests), which the public authorities seldom understand and often disregard, e.g. the fight against police violence or discrimination. Collective action involving “mobilisation” is characterised by protest. Social movements use different “repertoires of action”: meetings, petitions, demonstrations, strikes, meetings with the authorities, diverse pressure etc. For years, these practices were described as “unconventional” forms of political participation, distinct from “conventional” forms (political party membership, voting, trade union militancy etc.). “Repertoires of collective action” vary depending on the environment and the period (Tilly 1984). The sociologist, Michel Wieviorka, has identified three main periods: – The mobilisation of the working class movement, which first developed in the framework of the nation state and is opposed to the employer’s domination in the workplace. – The new social movements in post-industrial society, which accept the framework of the nation state and bear strong cultural and anti-authoritarian messages. – The current mobilisation against globalisation, which appears to express the desire for social recognition and identity, rather than direct opposition to classic forms of domination. Actions are organised in a context of declining state sovereignty and often strive to develop new forms of regulation (Wierviorka 2003). The Nuit Debout protest movement in France attempted to use democratic means to challenge the long-term enforcement of the state of emergency. Protestors occupied

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public spaces – condemning their increasing privatisation – which made it highly visible. They demanded “real democracy now”, echoing the Occupy and the Spanish Indignados movements. Nuit Debout criticised representative democracy, institutions and the elites for not being representative. Its supporters experimented with deliberative democracy (Sourice 2017). This democratic ideal was partially adopted by the yellow vest movement, which emerged in France at the end of 2018 in response to a fuel price hike and a new carbon tax. It soon became a protest against Emmanuel Macron’s policies: wealth tax reform, housing benefit cuts, reducing the national speed limit to 80 km/h on secondary roads etc., in a context of public spending cuts and growing regional inequalities (Boyer et al. 2019). The protest prolonged the political crisis apparent during the 2017 presidential elections. “The yellow vests express a deep mistrust of the state and intermediary bodies, indeed any form of representation” (Algan 2018). It differed from other recent protests on several counts. Mobilisation was fast, intense and widespread, both locally and nationally. It mobilised people not used to expressing their discontent, i.e. peri-urban France and its so-called intermediary professionals, who have stable incomes, but are “sensitive to fiscal policies and economic effects”, like fluctuating fuel prices (Delpirou 2018). It adopted a specific and disruptive repertoire of action, e.g. occupying roundabouts, blockages, damaging motorway toll booths, destroying speed cameras and demonstrations in Paris. The decentralised movement owes much of its success to social media.

 Possible courses of action to enhance democracy . Protecting the freedom of association Different courses of action can be taken to address the issue of shrinking freedom of association. For example, two joint initiatives are now documenting and responding to the different forms of repression affecting CSO activities: the Observatory of Associative Freedoms and L.A. Coalition 40. They are working with existing national collectives and federations (Collectif des Actions Citoyennes, Le Mouvement Associatif) 41. Similar initiatives are developing across Europe. In 2018, sixteen European foundations joined forces to re-examine their role regarding issues linked to the freedom of association. They launched the programme CIVITATES and helped set up national coalitions of actors from CSOs. L.A. Coalition, the French branch of CIVITATES, aims  40 See their guide “Faire face et riposter face aux attaques contre les libertés associatives” published in June 2020: https://www.lacoalition.fr/ (29th September 2022). 41 See https://lemouvementassociatif.org (29th September 2022).

  Hélène Balazard to “propose response strategies to counter repression”. The Alinsky Institute and L.A. Coalition were behind the initiative to set up the Observatory of Associative Freedoms. It has identified 12 recommendations for the recognition and protection of the freedom of association and for extending collective citizenship: – Guarantee institutional recognition to provide better protection for CSOs : Expressing criticism and upholding rights is a democratic function that can be qualified as being of public interest. A registration procedure could help protect CSOs engaged in collective citizenship, in the event of abusive retaliatory action (recommendation 1). – Set up vetting and complaints procedures: The French ombudsman (recommendation 2), the National Public Debate Commission (recommendation 3) and existing mechanisms, such as legal aid for legal entities (recommendation 4) can be adapted and improved to help CSOs launch an appeal in the event of an abuse. When trials deliberately intimidate activists, abusive charges could be dismissed rapidly to protect the freedom of collective expression (recommendation 5). An independent policing oversight body could improve protection of collective and individual freedoms (recommendation 6). – Extend CSOs’ democratic freedoms, by building an environment to promote the exercise of collective citizenship: Public funding mechanisms, e.g. tax credits, tax relief (recommendation 8) could provide greater support for human rights protection and involvement in the public debate (recommendation 9). Multi-year funding (recommendation 10) and joint commissions for allocation (recommendation 11) could limit arbitrary cuts and strengthen CSOs democratic activities. A parliamentary fact-finding mission (recommendation 12) could issue an annual situational analysis of freedom of association to ensure that measures effectively allow CSOs to flourish.

. Civic Technology: a tool to revitalise democracy ? According to recent theoretical works, social networks have tremendous potential when it comes to the emergence of mass protest movements (Barberà/Jackson 2018). The sociologist, François Dubet, suggests that anger and outrage are freely expressed on social media, but not genuinely expressed publicly. This leads to resentment in a social movement rather than coalescence (Dubet 2018). Yet, digital tools are presented as a solution for “modernising” democracy. The culture of public expression on the Web is bubbling, plural and inclusive. It is being watched closely by the participatory world, which often struggles to mobilise citizens. Could it be an opportunity to promote democratic pluralism and bring about inclusive large-scale changes? Are other interesting forms of citizen-led discussion developing in parallel? Civic Technology includes all digital technology that helps improve the inclusion of citizens in political life. It is based on a system of checks and balances. By fostering

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civic discussion, it constitutes a sort of citizens’ lobby to exert pressure on institutions. It involves working with public authorities and strives to make the government more accessible, efficient and effective (Mabi 2017). Public authorities use Civic Tech for institutional participatory procedures, but we focus on how citizens use it. Civic Tech that relies on digital social media is used for different actions: to develop citizens’ networks according to the principle of reliance 42 (e.g. 350.org, a forum that targets collective mobilisation linked to energy transition); local community involvement in public decision-making (e.g. demodyne.org); crowdfunding (e.g. kisskissbankbank.com); sharing citizens’ data (e.g. nosdeputes.fr). Online petitions are the most commonly used online participatory technology in the world. They put social problems on the media agenda. Change.org is a certified social firm and global Web platform for online petitions. It is difficult to measure the real impact of digitalisation in terms of public action. The Civic Tech community is a politically divided opposition force, split between those who are willing to combat inequalities, in the sense of emancipation, and those who want to avoid conflict. This creates tension between institutional and independent initiatives, a familiar feature of social movements and classic participatory mechanisms. The danger is that Civic Tech is tolerated by the authorities as a platform for criticism because it cannot seriously transform the role of citizens in democracy. Another issue is: how representative and legitimate are digital tool users when it comes to expressing demands in the general interest? The first observations show that user communities are young, urban and white, like the digital designers. The inequalities that characterise the digital technology gap are still apparent. To sustain democracy during the state of emergency, CSOs and citizens used online petitions to express demands about local and national issues. One petition collected as many as 579,000 signatures. Some petitions criticised the national lockdown policy, calling on the government to relax measures, e.g. demanding greater access to natural spaces. Although most petitions were ignored, a few achieved their goal, e.g. the case of the Montpellier restaurateurs. However, this reflects economic concerns, not civil society recognition.

. Local and regional authorities as spaces for democratic innovations France is a decentralised state with very diverse local and regional authorities (54,000 subnational political bodies). Its diversity is unique in Europe and guarantees good management, i.e. public authorities must cooperate and monitor each other

 42 Reliance is “the action of linking and interlinking, as well as its outcome” (Lehmans 2015).

  Hélène Balazard (Thoenig 2005). Citizens who do not understand how the system works may think the public policy apparatus is opaque. At the local political level, alternatives and citizens’ movements can be developed 43. In an interview 44, Karine Lancement, head of the citizen participation and transitions project at the CEREMA Research Centre, draws attention to the plethora of locally-based movements that focus on issues of transition relating to ecology, energy, economics and organic agriculture. Cities in transition, local currencies, citizens’ lists (for local elections), exchange networks, cooperative housing and new municipalism are examples of citizens’ movements that have developed on the fringes of institutions or aim to change them. Some more radical movements challenge the institutions, e.g. ZAD (zones to defend) or those opposing “pointless major projects”. This activist world is rooted in different territories and has adopted the notion of “commons, which calls for the co-existence of a defined resource, a specific community and a mode of collective governance, [and] reflects an awareness of the limitations of public or market regulation” (Utopia 2017). Some movements want to develop networks to transform an unfavourable environment and spread ideas based on degrowth, energy savings, poverty reduction or climate change, e.g. Climate Action Network, citizens’ collectives for transition and the site transiscope.org. Lancement examines some of the obstacles to a more widespread adoption of this type of initiative. Local and regional authorities have a concentrated top-down power system, based on the Fifth Republic’s model: the mayor or the president of the council has a hegemonic role and their functions allow them to spend a long time in office compared to other democratic countries. A proliferation of technical mechanisms is piling up. A few are participatory, but most are compartmentalised and are more likely to overwhelm citizens than mobilise them. Therefore, federating this type of movement is difficult. To overcome these difficulties, different courses of action can be adopted. For example, the right to experiment, which was made part of the constitution in 2003, may help develop the innovative role played by CSOs and local institutional bodies. Experimenting is “a vector of adhesion: in fact, it dispels fears and overcomes resistance caused by any prospect of change”. It gives local and regional authorities new power to encourage innovation and modernise public action. So far, this power has hardly been used, apart from isolated ambitious initiatives, like the project “zero unemployment territories”.

 43 Some refer to contributive democracy. See for example: https://fonda.asso.fr/ressources/ democratie-contributive-de-quoi-parle-t (Inactive link). 44 Interview with Karine Lancement, conducted in May 2020.

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. Enhancing resources for Civil Society Organisations In parallel to local experiments, CSOs are striving to advance certain causes and make their voices heard. However, as their technical capacity and resources are limited, it is hard for them to hold the authorities to account. In addition, their participation in decision-making is still limited. This is reiterated by the sociologist, Sylvain Laurens, who explains that one of the major factors limiting the impact of CSO opposition forces is their lack of resources, which is reflected in the asymmetry of influence between private business and civil society. Laurens compares Greenpeace, a large NGO in Brussels that has “a budget of almost 4 million euros and 15 employees”, with the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC), which “is 10 times bigger and employs 150 people.” 45 The lobbying power of interest groups and big business was brought to the public eye with glyphosate (Sénécat 2019). When running for president, Emmanuel Macron promised to ban it if he took office. He ended up backing down under industrial pressure. In February 2020, Le Monde (Horel 2020) and the Brussels NGO, Corporate Europe Observatory, revealed how corporate pressure and international diplomatic support (United States, Canada) helped achieve this outcome. NGOs can make themselves heard by “bypassing regulatory spheres”. As Laurens explains, “lobbyists from multinational companies […] tell me that ecologists have a lot of weight. But what power does Greenpeace have? It has the power to raise the alarm about certain substances. The NGO organises campaigns and advocacy, which target journalists. These campaigns generally focus on a substance and they can put the topic on the agenda. It is a genuine power. Because the firms concerned will have to adapt. But in reality, this influence is tiny. Power in Brussels is producing norms and this regulation occurs in technical spheres. NGOs have very limited influence over that”. On a national and European level, Laurens states that CSOs have little influence because they cannot afford the high technical costs of effective lobbying. However, in the case of the NGO protest against glyphosate in Brussels, NGOs “pooled their resources to get a senior person, an expert capable of presenting technical and scientific arguments and not just a moral or political line of judgement.” According to Cyrille Cormier, former director of the energy and climate campaigns for Greenpeace France, “the financial and human resources invested by businesses (like EDF), the business unions (like AFEP, MEDEF) represent colossal sums of money” 46. He argues that the imbalance is exacerbated because the same people, who are dealing with these issues at top government and top business levels, graduated from the Corps des Mines. He agrees with the former Minister of Ecology, Corinne Lepage, and the nuclear physician, Bernard Laponche: “there is no nuclear lobby, it is not a lobby, because it is inside the state and not outside” (Cottin-Marx/Binctin 2018).  45 Interview with Sylvain Laurens, conducted in February 2020. 46 Interview with Cyrille Cormier, conducted in March 2020.

  Hélène Balazard The nuclear industry is a case in point. It has a corporate monopoly of the state administration, which means there is no democratic debate on these issues. This imbalance is also illustrated by the fight to improve poor housing. In France, 4 million people live in substandard housing and 12 million are vulnerable because of the housing crisis. According to Manuel Domergue, expert in public housing policies and director of studies for the Abbé Pierre Foundation “the poorly housed do not seem to constitute a social force, capable of imposing its agenda [...] In contrast, organisations representing private financiers, developers, estate agents, insurers or the construction sector know how to make themselves heard” (Domergue 2018). He explains that there are two major influential stakeholders: developers, the building and public works sector, with the French Building Federation, on the one hand; and the Social Housing Union, responsible for rented accommodation for 12 million people, on the other hand. The economic actors have more influence on public action than the housing associations. Domergue states that their “advocacy is focused on MPs […] we know that intelligent lobbying should target the administration. We don’t go there very often because we don’t have the time and the resources.” 47 Despite being one of the major campaign groups for better housing for the poor, the Abbé Pierre Foundation lacks human resources: “we only have four staff working on the issue and one of them is responsible at the European level. We also draft the report on substandard housing, so we have very little time to go and see the services in Bercy...” 48 A decline in state funding is a second major obstacle to CSOs’ capacities for action. Viviane Tchernonog and Lionel Prouteau (Tchernonog/Prouteau 2019) highlight a disturbing trend: CSOs receive less and less funding in the form of subsidies and indirect aid (state-aided contracts have been withdrawn) and depend increasingly on procurement contracts. When CSOs do still receive subsidies, funding is tied to projects and cannot be used for running costs. This limits their independence, their capacity to take initiatives and even their continuity. Charlotte Debray, the director of FONDA, one of the main think tanks in the CSO world, argues that these mechanisms are not neutral. “The development of financing through calls for projects, procurement contracts, instead of multi-annual grants, is the same as putting actors in direct competition. The need is defined by the elected representatives, the financiers. And that restricts the spheres where associations can make proposals.” 49 Debray suggests that public funding schemes can limit CSOs’ diversity and their capacity to support a cause: “the risk is that small associations are excluded from public funding and social innovation disappears as a result. The danger, for example with [issues of] social integration, is that associations abandon the

 47 Interview with Manuel Domergue, conducted in March 2020. 48 Ibid. 49 Interview with Charlotte Debray, conducted in February 2020.

French democracy under threat  

most difficult populations.” 50 CSOs may become more “bureaucratic” to the detriment of their public interest assignments (Cottin-Marx 2020). The sociologist, Michel Chauvière, explains: “CSOs are basically forced into being like businesses, but are penalised for it. That kills the function of counter-power. What worries me is that the spheres of relative independence… CSOs are shrinking”. The development of public sector contracts “leaches” the sector. “It cuts back, sorts out, sweeps away. The CSO world is taking a battering. And that is a setback for democracy.” Mathilde Pette’s work on one stop shops for immigration shows how the relationship with public authorities may make CSOs more conformist. “Geared towards influencing migratory policies and supporting and defending foreigners, activist work is simultaneously shaped and conditioned by migratory policies. CSOs adapt their activities according to the framework established by the political context. That’s how the nature of activism changes: it becomes routine, more legalised, more individualistic and more formal.” (Pette 2014). Here, forming partnerships with the public authorities often prevents CSOs from organising protest actions because they play by the “state’s rules” (Ibid). During the Covid-19 health emergency, the democratic sphere was reduced by measures that sometimes exceeded strict health issues. Trade unions and CSOs tried using legal means to protect freedoms, but over 90 % of the appeals were rejected and most were dismissed after “screening”, i.e. with no debate and no hearing (Mucchielli 2020). However, some challenges to the public authorities’ position were successful. The Quadrature du Net and the Human Rights League persuaded the Council of State to stop the use of drones in Paris to monitor compliance with lockdown rules because it is a “serious and evidently illegal breach of the right to privacy”. A parents’ association in the Drôme (FCPE) challenged the mayors’ “unilateral decision” not to reopen schools because it was detrimental to parents and children and was taken without prior consultation. Renaloo, a CSO representing kidney patients, requested measures to limit the risk of intra-household contamination and received ministerial approval. With the closure of cycling facilities and a sharp rise in the number of cyclists who were unfairly fined (Livois 2020), the French Bicycle Users’ Federation (FUB) launched a petition to protect fundamental liberties and the Council of State ordered the government “to make clear publicly and widely that the bicycle can be used for authorised travel during lockdown” (Bonnet 2020). Several courses of action could improve the situation, for example: – Recognising and funding democratic discussion would enhance its role and independence. In July 2013, Marie-Hélène Bacqué and Mohamed Mechmache submitted a report to the Minister Delegate for Urban Affairs promoting democratic discussion and calling for a radical reform of urban policies. It reveals that representative democracy and institutional participatory mechanisms are insuf 50 Interview with Michel Chauvière, conducted in February 2020.

  Hélène Balazard

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ficient per se to erase inequalities in terms of access to political decision-making. It recommends making “a right to civic discussion […] an integral part of the French Republic’s democratic system” and calls for “the human and financial resources” to promote democratic discussion. This would help create “the conditions for a more inclusive approach to constructing public interest”. The proposal was not included in the Act on Town Planning and Urban Cohesion in February 2014. In September 2014, residents and CSOs in working class areas set up a national coordination group, “Not without us”, demanding the right to civic consultation. They launched an appeal and a petition to create a fund for a citizens’ democracy to guarantee the long-term vision and independence of citizens’ initiatives. Institutionalising mechanisms to ensure that civil society’s concerns are taken into account – Municipalities, such as Grenoble, Paris, Saint-Nazaire, Villeurbanne and Strasbourg are testing mechanisms to ensure that public action takes different issues into account. Promoting cooperation between CSOs – The citizens’ collective, Collectif des Actions Citoyennes (member of L.A. Coalition) promotes cooperation between CSOs working on the same issues in the same region to reduce competition between CSOs, particularly for funding. Financing CSOs and their multi-year operations, rather than occasional projects – Philanthropic foundations could help finance multi-year operations, instead of projects, to compensate for the lack of public funding. Developing a harmonised European framework for CSOs – Developing more powerful transnational organisations might make it easier for French NGOs and CSOs to obtain funding. Procedures and options for donating or making a bequest to CSOs could be simplified, as in other European countries.

 Conclusion. How can democracy be cured? This report attempts to shed light on the dynamics and tensions affecting democracy in France today. The situation is not new, “but today, the institutions of representative democracy are confronted with global mechanisms that are beyond them, like the staggering rise in power of transnational economic actors (…), the digital and Internet giants, which have a significant impact on public debates, opinions and lifestyles. (…) At the same time, the population’s level of education is improving and the increasingly diverse sources of information [now available] have enhanced critical thinking with regard to governments. Therefore, institutions and governments in representative democracies are being challenged on two levels, from above (…) and below, with citizens who no longer accept delegating their power and their voice without having the chance to express themselves.” (Blondiaux/Châteauneuf-Malclès 2018).

French democracy under threat  

Since March 2020, the Covid-19 health crisis has further undermined democracy and caused greater citizen mistrust of the government and political elites. The French executive’s top-down approach to handling the crisis, the marginalisation of local actors and the lack of transparency in decision-making have revealed flaws in the French democratic system. These can be summed up with a paradox: participatory democracy is being tested nationally, even at top government level (Great National Debate, Citizens’ Climate Convention, the current reform of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council), yet the actors that have an essential role in counterbalancing the authorities are being undermined. Their very existence is negated when they try to speak out, challenge the authorities or contribute to the public debate. The Citizens’ Climate Convention is a case in point. More than half of its proposals were dropped from the French climate law, which means that France will fail to meet its commitments under the Paris Climate Accord. CSOs play an important counterbalancing role in democracy when they have the capacity to hold different actors to account, i.e. institutions, public decision-makers and the private actors who shape citizens’ lives. Yet, the number of breaches of rights and freedoms is high and rising. The powerful increase in the security rationale, which has been reinforced by the Global Security Bill, is stifling the expression of political and social conflicts. As CSOs have less and less room for manoeuvre, they are using tougher repertoires of action. There is a huge imbalance between the lobbying capacity of CSOs and large corporations. The close relationship between the state’s Grand Corps, some elected representatives and big business makes matters worse. These mechanisms block the chance of constructive dialogue between public and private institutions and CSOs. However, new spaces are emerging on a local level and institutions are increasingly open to democratic discussion. As we have seen in this chapter, different actions can help protect the freedom of CSOs. By supporting the financial and institutional independence of the non-profit world, CSOs will have a greater capacity to counterbalance, defend rights and take part in the public debate. Initiatives involving feedback loops could improve mechanisms to stimulate discussions to enhance public action.

  Hélène Balazard

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Siri Hummel

Civil Society in Germany: Contested spaces in times of rapid change How are the framework conditions for the German civil society and how is it affected by the so-called shrinking civic space? After a brief introduction in the topic of the shrinking civic space and a short recall about the framework conditions for civil society this paper will give an overview on the recent developments and cases in this matter, also under the consideration of the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. We will then show that the theoretical background of these developments can be captured by a model of contestation, that is caused by social cleavages, the upcoming of right-wing populists and a rendered understanding of democracy in the population, which evidently leads to an ongoing melange of shrinking and expanding of civil society in Germany.

 Introduction The civic space and the sphere of action of civil society are globally contested and threatened. The debate is labelled as the shrinking space for civil society (Hummel 2019) and is filled by examples of increasing controls, restrictions, and repressions for CSO, its employees and volunteers, caused by governments, right wring activists and global companies. In particular, the following instruments of restriction are of note (Alscher et al. 2017; Ayvazyan 2019; Hayes et al. 2017, Strachwitz et al. 2020: 249ff.): 1. restrictive administrative action (e.g. through the introduction of authorisation regulation such as foreign-agent-policies); 2. the withdrawal of the financial basis (e.g. by restricting or abolishing the tax exemption); 3. obstructions by police forces under the pretext of combating terrorism or money laundering; 4. the reconfiguration and redistribution of stately funded activities to CSOs loyal to the state; 5. philanthropic protectionism (e.g. the obstruction of transnational donations); 6. restrictions on freedom of assembly and association (e.g. through bans or restrictions on demonstrations); 7. restrictions on the right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press (e.g. through censorship, selective media coverage or the withdrawal of advertising revenue); 8. criminalisation, intimidation and stigmatisation of civil society activists; 9. discrediting civil society as a whole through scapegoating and bogeymaning. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111070469-007

  Siri Hummel Assessments of the extent to which Germany’s civil society is affected by these phenomena differ. While Anheier and Toepler rather assume a (negligent) backlog of reforms in Germany’s engagement policy and see it as responsible for restrictions (Anheier/Toepler 2019), the revocation of the non-profit status of ATTAC is classified by many CSOs as intended political intimidation, and seen as an example of Shrinking Space (Hummel 2019). Furthermore, different areas of engagement/activism are affected to varying degrees by attempts at restriction (Hummel 2021), e.g. in the area of sea rescue in the Mediterranean or refugee aid (Hövelmann/Strachwitz 2021).

 Framework Conditions for Civil Society Overall the political and social systemic framework conditions for civil society in Germany are good. With its democratic, federal system of government and its political culture, Germany offers good conditions for an active civil society. The rule of law and respect for human and civil rights, in particular the freedom of association and assembly, are in place. The obligation for the government to inform the governed is ensured but often shaped by a mentality of goodwill. The media system with its mix of public and private providers allows independent journalism. Civil Society has developed well over the past decades, given that the number of registered associations, foundations, non-profit limited liability companies and cooperatives has been rising steadily for several years. The number of associations being founded is slightly higher than the number being deleted, and the foundation sector, in particular, has experienced a boom in recent years. With around 608,000 registered associations, the association is the most frequently used legal form in Germany (Krimmer et al. 2019). The number of foundations currently stands at around 23,000, albeit in these figures some forms of foundation (such as church foundations) are not being included, which somewhat rebutes the official figures (Strachwitz et al. 2020). Civil society is a big job market: the number of people subject to social insurance contributions and those in marginal employment has risen significantly there, growing from 2.9 to 3.7 million over the past decade, making up around 9 % of all those in employment (WZB 2018 Data Report; Zimmer/Priller 2022). The financial situation of the sector, although precarious for many organisations, does also not support the shrinking space argument. The financing structure of the third sector is formed, in addition to the resources provided by volunteer work, primarily from membership fees and donations, as well as from generated funds, and there has been no overall decline here. Projections of the volume of donations depend heavily on the survey method and therefore fluctuate between €3.7 and €8.0 billion annually, but no substantial decline has been observed (Krimmer et al. 2019; Zimmer/Priller 2022).

Civil Society in Germany: Contested spaces in times of rapid change  

According to the Volunteer Survey, the rate of volunteerism in Germany is around 40 % and is changing to more informal forms, but not decreasing (ibid.). Regarding the political participation of CSOs, the sector is in a process of change from the old corporatist inclusion, which gave the unions and the churches a very dominant role in the negotiations of politics, to a more governmental system that involves a plurality of public, non-profit and private actors in policymaking. That also caused more CSOs to become advocates and more politically active. While the influence of the former is still high, the latter brings a more diverse sets of agenda and actors and more diverse competition of non-profit interest with it.

 Examples of restrictions and attacks Incidents that are discussed and considered as examples of shrinking spaces in Germany touch on several points of the above-mentioned list, ranging from restrictions on freedom of assembly to the implementation of parallel structures, but mainly revolve around the legal compatibility of political activism and the non-profit status on the one hand and attacks from right-wing populists on the other.

. Restrictions on protest and freedom of assembly Political protest is based essentially on its capacity to mobilise the public in the media but also “on the streets”. Local street protest mobilisation has a strong tradition in Germany that extends from the peace movements since the 1950s and the feministic and environment protection movements in the 1980s (Lahusen/Bleckmann 2015; Neidhardt/Rucht 1993). Nowadays climate- and migration-related protests from left and right dominate (Hutter/Schäfer 2020). In regard to the right to protest and the freedom of assembly, there were some incidents and regulations in recent years which were seen as restricting and as signs of shrinking spaces. During the G-20 protests in Hamburg in 2017, considerable infringements on freedom of assembly by courts and police authorities were reported (Edlefsen/Strachwitz 2017). Civicus 51 assessed this as a considerable restriction of the right to peaceful assembly, not least through the establishment of so-called “security zones” granting police forces extensive powers of intervention, and the prohibition of several protest events. The lack of legality has also been criticised by the European Court of Human Rights. Various surveillance measures were applied to the protesters and data of peaceful protest participants were unlawfully stored, although video surveillance of  51 Civicus is a global monitor for civil societies’ conditions established in 1993.

  Siri Hummel assembly events is only permitted in the context of criminal offences (Reuter 2017). Moreover, foreign protesters were treated unlawfully. An Italian demonstrator, for example, spent four months in pre-trial detention. The basis was merely his participation in a demonstration and the accusation of violence and the deprivation of liberty was retroactively declared unlawful (dka Rechtsanwälte 2018). Hybrid forms of protest, “in which the private and the public cannot be clearly separated from each other”, where subject of restrictions (Thurn et al. 2018). It is still unclear whether protest camps are considered (parts of) assemblies. In a first ruling, the BVerfG confirmed this and approved the anti-capitalist protest camp as part of the G-20 protests after the Hamburg Constitutional Court and the Higher Administrative Court did not reach an agreement on it (Thurn et al. 2018). Another area that currently opens spaces for state authorities to restrict protest comes with necessary adjustments in the regulations regarding the digitalisation of protest. There are several legal loopholes and uncertainties regarding the handling of new forms of protest, which leads to very different handling in practice, for example questions of which forms of online protest are covered under the protection of freedom of assembly (Pany 2012). The increasing mix of traditional and digital engagement creates a dubious sphere of lagging jurisprudence and enforcement. This also brings forth a dilemma where CSOs on the one hand face threats of state surveillance, but, on the other hand, require protection against digital violence, hate speech and data abuse, which has to be regulated by the state. The dual dilemma here is obvious and accompanied by a massive legal uncertainty that is often caused by the rapid change of digital processes and the slow process of lawmaking. Even though the federal constitutional court had coined the principle of data economy in 1983, the measure of digital surveillance currently has massive potential to restrict civil societies activism. The Spyware Pegasus, which, when secretly installed on the phones of those affected, can give full access to the device’s messages, emails, media, microphone, camera, calls and contacts, was presumably bought by the Federal Criminal Police Office in 2019 and formerly used to spy on journalist and civil society activists around the globe (Tagesschau 2021). Following a decision by the Federal Constitutional Court, security authorities are only allowed to infiltrate suspects’ mobile phones and computers in special cases and may only initiate certain surveillance procedures, but parliament’s control of these activities is often restricted or impeded under the label of secrecy.

. Nudged and steered? Public and non-Profit partnerships under the auspices of shrinking spaces in Germany Due to its long tradition of corporatist and subsidiary model of politics, Germany’s civil society can be divided into two large subsectionor of public-funded organisations and a rather state-independent one. In particular, associations from the social

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services or sports clubs are often contracted and subsidised by the government, the federal states or the municipalities meaning that public-nonprofit partnerships are not uncommon. But for a civil society organisation that relies on the principle of self-organisation, these relations always came with questions of independence from political influence and pressure. In recent years the establishment of a policy area of volunteering, as well as the increasing efforts of public authorities to establish so-called Gongos (Government-operated non-governmental organisation or government-organised nongovernmental organisation) raised the question of whether there is too much influence from the state on civil society. This debate was fueled by the observation that, from a global perspective, authoritarian regimes nowadays tend to shrink their civic space by fostering a network of loyal and cooperative civil society organisations that excludes the critical ones (Toepler/Zimmer et al. 2020), and brings forth the question of whether this could become a problem in Germany as well. The Parliamentary Commission on the Future of Civic Engagement, set up by the German Bundestag in 1999, represents the starting point of the policy area of volunteering in the sense of a state-initiated area of regulations and programmes, as they are normally fall under the auspices of the ministeries (Pappi/König 1995). Its development is embedded in the reformulation and negotiation of the social expectations for welfare state responsibility and individual civic responsibility (Neumann 2012; Van Dyk/Haubner 2021). As a result of the commission, a subcommittee on civic engagement and civil society was established in the Bundestag, which thus represents the institutionalised integration of engagement policy at the federal level. In addition, departments for engagement were created in several ministries. The government is required to submit a report on the developments of volunteering in each legislative period and the commitment of citizens is now empirically assessed in a five-year interval in a volunteer survey (FWS 2019). The Federal Office for Family and Civil Society Tasks, a subordinate federal authority within the remit of the Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women, and Youth, is set as a central organ of state-civil society dialogue. In addition to the Federal Voluntary Service, the Federal Office coordinates various programs of the European Social Fund, support services in the field of care or promotion of democracy. The Federal Office for Family has been working for some time on a draft for a law to promote democracy, which should enable firm support for established civil society structures. We cannot yet assess whether the stronger interdependence between state and civil society creates problems for civil society`s independent and critical voice. Steering, as it can be observed in Hungary for example (Toepler/Zimmer et al. 2020), is not discernible, but dialogue structures that go beyond the classical corporatist formats are established. However, it is clear that the state has the upper hand. Many CSOs believe there is a power imbalance in state-non-profit relationships due to insufficient

  Siri Hummel funding, excessive bureaucracy, a policy of patronage and reports of attempts to influence the governance (Hummel et al. 2022). Within the debate of state influence on civil society there is also the question of whether there are too many foundations established by the state and if this “civil society-labelled” state action could be a problem because of a misuse of bottom-up legitimacy (ibid.). Lately, there has been an increase of state-initiated civil society organisations. During the 19th legislative period (2017 – 2021) the federal government initiated, among others, the German Foundation for Volunteering, a federal foundation for history of democracy), a federal foundation for gender equality and the federal foundation of data protection (ibid.). The German Foundation of Volunteering is set to receive around €30 million per annum. This significant sum is expected to have a substantial influence of civil society structures (Allenberg/Meyer 2021).

. Shrinking Spaces due to Non-profit status and political activism Non-profit law is of considerable importance for German civil society and its financing. If a CSO receives the status of a charity, there are considerable tax advantages, and non-profit organisations also enjoy a higher social reputation. In recent years, the implementation of non-profit law has also been negotiated under the aspect of shrinking space, especially concerning the question of the extent to which CSOs may engage politically (Allenberg/Meyer 2021; Hummel 2020). Both the Tax Code (AO), which defines the purposes and content of the non-profit status, and the AO Application Decree (AEAO) about political activism are carefully formulated and were written in a tradition of political theory that saw the mandate of the political decision-making of the people in the constitution solely with the parties and not with civil society. Paragraph 52 of the AO states that political activity is only permitted in individual cases and that it must take a detailed look at “the background” of the charitable activity. The regulation’s phrasing is vague and open to interpretation, for example when it states: “If the purpose of the corporation is political education, which is concerned with the creation and promotion of political perception and political responsibility on the basis of the norms and ideas of a democracy based on the rule of law, there is [rightful] political education. (...) On the other hand, one-sided agitation, uncritical indoctrination or party-politically motivated influence is not political education” (o.T., BFH judgment 1999, XI R 63/98; BStBl 2000 II:200). There were hardly any practical effects until the tax office in Frankfurt am Main used it as a justification to withdraw ATTAC Germany’s non-profit status in 2014. But there are more examples besides ATTAC, where associations were deprived of their non-profit status or withdrawn from it, some of them at the initiative of political parties: A 2018 motion from the liberal party (FDP) pursued the withdrawal of the non-

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profit status of organisations if they violate applicable law or call for violations of the law, due to alleged misdemeanours by the animal rights organisation PETA. The Bundestag’s Finance Committee dealt with the case during a public hearing but saw no concrete need for action. Accordingly, incitement to or participation in criminal offences, unless they are in the statutes, are not yet a reason for the withdrawal of nonprofit status (German Bundestag 2018/2021). The withdrawal of the non-profit status of Campact, a campaigning platform, was initiated by the right-wing party AfD party. They also sought the closure of the anti-racist CSO Miteinander e. V. and the Amadeu Antonio Foundation. In a motion members called on the party to extend the fundamental ruling on ATTAC to other organisations (German Bundestag 2021b). Since the beginning of 2019, the CDU and FDP have repeatedly questioned the non-profit status of the German Environmental Aid (Deutsche Umwelthilfe – DUH), which sued car companies for exhausting gas values and municipal entities for dust pollution. This caused a CDU member of the Bundestag to proclaim at the party congress in 2018: “We have to look closely if there are institutions that act under the guise of non-profit status” (o.T., Bolz et al. 2019). These incidents were perceived as threats by CSOs who work in political activism, as well as major insecurity caused by the ambiguous legal situation. The tax offices, which are responsible for the recognition and supervision of non-profit status, have a great deal of room for interpretation when assessing the lawful compatibility of political activism and non-profit status. A study in which the researcher sent identical applications to different tax offices revealed considerable differences in the acceptance of political activism (Diefenbach-Trommer 2018). The authors proclaim that selfless political commitment, such as defending human rights or promoting democracy is often not recognised as non-profit and that the cause of the problems is not an application error, but a systemic issue arising from the regulation’s vagueness (ibid.). Additionally, important charitable objectives such as the commitment to human rights are not listed as charitable aims in the AO. Thus, the Bundestag’s Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid comes to the conclusion that affected CSOs “are forced to identify further purposes in their statutes or to inadequately subsume human rights under other categories (...)” (o.T., Krennerich 2016) The legal uncertainty for CSOs could have further effects, not only for prosecuted CSOs but also for those who might step back from their engagement in human rights defence in order to not endanger their non-profit status. This so-called Chilling effect, i.e. a deterrent effect due to the accusations and pending legal proceedings against other CSOs that are involved in similar fields of activity, is to be feared and has already been reported (Hummel et al. 2022 ). The ruling of the tax authorities and tax courts have also led to uncertainty among many fundraising organisations (DZI 2019). The association “Bürgerbewegung Finanzwende” (movement for a change in the financial system) announced in spring 2021 that it would renounce its non-profit status to gain scope for action (ibid. 2021).

  Siri Hummel Nonetheless, there have been attempts from the Green Party to create better framework conditions and more legal certainty against government restrictions. In the last government, these ideas did not find a parliamentary majority, although the social democrats later committed themselves to the principle that CSOs may be politically active (Kreutzfeldt 2020). How the federal government formed in 2021 will position itself on this issue remains to be seen (German Bundestag 2019). The Annual Tax Act 2020, as well as a clarification in the AEAO in January 2022, brought some changes for political activism: New charitable purposes were added, such as climate protection and equality efforts for sexual minorities, although the promotion of human rights is still missing. The decree further states that it is not detrimental to an organisation’s non-profit status, if there are occasional statements on day-to-day political issues within the framework of the tax-privileged statutory purposes like an appeal of a sports club for climate protection or against racism (Bundesfinanzministerium 2022). But CSOs, such as AfRs, claim: “Unfortunately, the details of political activities for charitable purposes are still unclear. The decree introduces new unclear terms such as “party-politically neutral”. Some of the new directives do not result from the law nor are they covered by uniform case law of the Federal Fiscal Court.” (o.T., Allianz 2022). While the problem appears to have been solved, there still does not seem to be a viable solution. These examples show that the non-profit status can be considered as an instrument of political contestation. Questioning the integrity of CSOs that are perceived as political opponents in public became a more and more established way of political behaviour and there is an ongoing debate about the questions of which CSOs are legitimate political stakeholders and why and and how political civil society should be. Parties are concerned that these players, which, in their eyes have no democratic and constitutional legitimacy to form a political will, have gained more influence and can create public pressure, interfering in their power of action and therefore having to be taken into account. At the same time, they have to acknowledge the shift from government to governance (Lo 2018) and the changing of democratic requirements from a mere representative set to a more participative one. While CSOs claim their right to participate and to engage as political players, this contestation about their legitimate place at the table will go on for the foreseeable future.

. Civil Society and right-wing populism One aspect of shrinking space occurrences all over the globe are the attacks by rightwing politicians and movements, which try to push back liberal civil society and their norms of diverse tolerance and plurality. This is also the case in Germany, as the Civicus Monitor and a recent FRA report see the rise of right-wing populists as an increasing threat to the country’s civil society (Allenberg/Meyer 2021; Civicus 2020). The danger is twofold: On the one hand, organised civil society may be attacked and

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discredited by right-wing populist actors and parties. On the other hand, the danger may come from within the sphere, as extremist actors organise themselves and try to build up a “counter” civil society. Although a right-wing populist party is not in government at the federal level, and thus cannot implement regulations in a stage of capture like in many other countries like Poland (Simsa 2019), the effects of their aggression on (civil) society are clear to see. One can see that right-wing populists started to frame civil society as an enemy in Germany as well, painting them as elitist and of the “left cosmopolitan camp”. There are two main defamatory topoi against civil society actors in populists’ rhetoric: The accusation of them being neo-corporatist organisations, in particular welfare associations, but also the church, trade unions, and the state-subsidised cultural sector and being part of the “establishment” and of embezzling taxpayers’ money (Schroeder et al. 2020). So, as Schroeder et al show, it is not just the usual suspects such as advocacy organisations like Amnesty International or anti-right-wing extremist organisations that are targeted by populists, but all sorts of organisations. They conclude that all fields of civil society can become “politically charged”, may it be sport, education or even chorus associations (ibid.). Moreover, there is also the reproach of the naïve “do-gooders”, especially in connection with migrant movements and climate protection, that, according to the accusation, will ruin the welfare state as well as law and order. Smear campaigns by populists are often conducted against individual activists on a personal level, who are subsequently exposed to massive insults, threats of violence, and intimidation, especially on social media (Hummel 2021). Questioning the non-profit status of CSOs is also part of these strategies. Civil society, as one could observe in the speech of AfD member Björn Höcke in February 2020, becomes a trope of a cosmopolitan enemy, that acts against the will and good of the “real” people. Right-wing actors threaten civil society through the dissemination of hate speech on the internet (Pfirter 2022), for which many CSOs lack adequate counter-strategies and the necessary media competence to counter (Mulhall/Khan-Ruf 2021). Futhermore, casting doubt on non-profit status is often part of discrediting strategies (see below). Certain areas of engagement, such as refugee aid or gender equality, tend to come under attack (ibid.) Many verbal and physical attacks on migrant organisations, refugee aid, left-wing groups, especially racism prevention groups, and also on humanitarian aid, women or LGBTQ rights activists, and even environment protectionists have been reported in Germany (Amadeu Antonio Foundation 2020). In reaction to this, CSOs have started to implement security protocols in their daily work routines, such as non-personalised email addresses or security locks and alarm systems. Some need police protection at events and pre-select participants via closed registration lists (Sommer/Ratzmann 2021). In a survey, CSOs working on anti-racism and democratic participation in Germany also reported difficulties in recruiting staff due to the chilled/hostile social climate and they fear further harassment and financial cuts if the AfD should come (or stay) in political power (ibid.).

  Siri Hummel The traditional, corporatist CSOs are often attacked with accusations of tax fraud (Schroeder et al. 2020). However, in unions and churches, there are also known attempts of anti-civil society actors installing their own staff in the organisation. This strategy of hijacking existing civil society structures is clearly formulated in an AfD strategy paper from 2019, which states: “An AfD that wants to be a people’s party must rely more than before on anchoring itself more strongly in civil society in order to exert its influence there. Just as the ’68 movement was concerned with the ‘march through the institutions’, the AfD must also be concerned with the ‘march through the organizations’.” (o.T., AfD 2019). Right-wing movements try to hijack different areas of activism with several strategies and narratives. Sport is often the area where such actors first attempt to establish contact with younger people, using narratives of competition and camaraderie to disseminate right wring content (Schroeder et al. 2020). In church organisations, conservative values on family policy, same-sex marriages or abortion are connecting points for right-wing activists and the environmental protection movement struggles to contend with right-wing efforts to monopolise the topic of conservation with an ethnic exclusive note of homeland (Heinrich Böll Foundation 2012). The demonstrations against the COVID-19 regulations are another example of hijacking, in light of the increasing takeover of the “Querdenken” initiative by rightwing activists (Nachtwey et al. 2020). The Covid pandemic constituted a paradox for civil society street protest. On the one hand, many social movements like Fridays for Future were forced to suspend their in-person activities and turn to digital protest, which diminished their capacity for public impact immensely. Even after two years of the pandemic, they have not regained their previous momentum for protest. On the other hand, a new type of protester, the so-called Querdenker, has emerged during the pandemic and pushed forward the conflict within civil society itself, given that non-liberal, partly even non-democratic movements, like Pegida did previously during the refugee crisis in 2015/16, are increasing turning to street protests. These “Querdenker” protests, starting in 2019 with a wide array of participants, soon became dominated by right wing populists (s.b). State authorities reacted in different ways to this protest, sometimes trying to cancel the demonstrations, sometimes reacting with a more laisse faire attitude. Meanwhile, most parts of the movement are under surveillance by the German state security. Right-wring populism also comes in civil societies clothing, meaning them being organised in a civil society legal form, such as associations or foundations. These legal forms, partly even with non-profit status, offer the actors the basis for operation (e.g. through legal capacity) on the one hand, and they can use the reputation and trust that CSO enjoys in society in a “wolf-in-sheep’s manner”, pretending deradicalisation and middle-class proximity (Hummel 2021). “After its actions have long been marked by the struggle for parliamentary seats on the one hand and acts of violence on the other, the radical right […] has rediscovered grassroots work” (o.T., Teune 2008) und increasingly using forms of street protest or petitions.

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The entry of the right wring party into the federal parliament for the first time since 1945 for two periods in a row also enabled the establishment of a right-wring party-affiliated foundation, based on models such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (SPD), which is entitled to big federal funds. The Desiderius Erasmus Foundation, which is expected to receive around €60–70 million per year, was founded in 2017 (Semsrott/Jakubowski 2021). Its programme contains topics like antimigration, Eucritical talks or anti-feminist events with titles like: “The rape of the German language tough gender” (Desiderius-Erasmus-Stiftung 2022). What is also very concerning is the wide of right-wring activism in the digital space; studies indicate a rapid growth and strong inner group network, while the extent and reach of this movement is not clear (Fuchs/Middlehof 2019) Groups like “Indentitäre Bewegung” or “Ein Prozent” could create a big online follower community, meanwhile also appearing with analogous local actions (Speit 2018). Other right-wing actors, such as Reconquista Germanica, coordinate their actions via chats or use bots to specifically attack opponents online (Beckedahl 2018). In “right-wing extremist troll factories” (Kreißel et al. 2018), they coordinate hate campaigns such as #Kikagate, #Kandelistueberall and #120dB. The far-right Discord group #Infokrieg, for example, tried to influence the Bundestag election in 2017 with the help of targeted misinformation. These groups are often embedded in a bigger network and receive support from political and media actors by picking up and sharing for example by AfD accounts or Russian media such as RT and Sputnik. (Kreißel et al. 2018). Far-right and populist actors use the internet to spread their attitudes “in the middle of society and give the impression that [these] (...) would correspond to the attitude of the average user” (o.T., ebd). They push the boundaries of the speakable and try to achieve a normalisation of extremist positions. At the same time, they intimidate their victims and confront them with digital violence and hate speech to force their silence (strategy of silencing). The field of digital violence, i.e. violent acts and statements on the Internet such as cyberbullying, stalking and various forms of discrimination, group-related misanthropy, sexualised violence and, in a broader sense, the spread of misinformation and conspiracy theories on the internet, is a growing problem in Germany (Pfirter 2022). A study by the Institute for Democracy and Civil Society (IDZ) 2019 shows that of the 7,349 respondents, 40 % had already encountered hatred and incitement on the Internet and three-quarters noticed an increase in aggressive and derogatory comments on the internet (Geschke et al. 2019). Although an estimated very small fraction of the users of digital platforms spread digital violence – on Facebook about 0.02 % of monthly users – they can cause severe social damage. A very small minority of less than 5 % of hate-spreading users are responsible for over 50 % of hate post likes, also by using several accounts and use software to simultaneously post. In the IDZ survey, 54 % of the respondents commented online less often because of feared or already experienced digital violence (Geschke et al. 2019). Activists in particular censor themselves, pull themselves out of action or act only under aliases (Höhn 2018). So, besides

  Siri Hummel left and liberal politicians, civil society Activists in particular are victims, and attacks on CSO in the fields of human rights protection, equality, refugee protection, but also increasingly environmental protection are becoming more frequent. Several new regulations and acts were implemented in the last years to prevent digital violence, by creating new legit offences, installing higher penalties and trying to force the platform providers to a better content observation (Pfirter 2022). For civil society and its organisations and activists, however, this results in a dilemma: On the one hand, they are in need of a sphere of strong liberal rights with the freedom to speak and act, where the state should not have much of surveillance agenda, but at the same time it needs protection from right-wing agitators, fake news and false discourse shaping misdemeanours.

 Politisation and polarisation as a driver of contestation Looking at it in a more theoretical way these different aspects show that the shrinking space in its feature can be considered mainly as a product of a contestation driven by the politicisation and polarisation of society. In this approach the politicisation of civil society can be connected to a shift in recent social conflict structures and the rise of populism. Several diagnoses recently see a new line of conflict between globalisation winners and globalisation losers, that has emerged in late modernity and forms an antagonism between “cosmopolitans” on the one hand and “communitarians” on the other (Grande/Kriesi 2013; Merkel/Zürn 2019; Reckwitz 2019). This results in an intensifying confrontation the upcoming of an a cross-class protest movement, who fell devaluated in different ways by globalisation, which currently challenges society in its social cohesion by pointing out their institutional distrust; in parliamentarian and democracy structures, but also in the media and scientific system (Merkel/Zürn 2019). This cleavage is accompanied by the rise of populistic movements, as it can be observed in several liberal democracies in the last years (Müller 2016). This increase in the intensity and scope of political conflicts affects not only the party system but civil society as well, forcing many CSO to take a political position and react to the aggression from right-wring populist actors. with the emergence of new civil society associations with socio-political objectives, the emergence of right-wing social movements, the politicisation of existing civil society associations, and the counter-mobilisation against radical right-wing populism are currently too underestimated factors for the transformation of civil society in Germany. To understand the contestation of civil societies’ role in society it is necessary to take these developments more into account, to monitor and evaluate it (Grande 2021; Hummel 2019).

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But also institutional changes constitute alteration in the space for civil society. The increasing delegating of political decision planning and -making towards experts and advisory institutions may bring forward new spaces for CSO, but also leads to a contestation of legit participation. New institutions bring new political opportunity structures but also come with ground fights due to defensive reactions from established political players. Citizen petitions and assembly, granted and expanded by all state constitutions in the last decades, but also the increasing delegation of political decisions towards “non-elective institutions”, create new opportunity structures for CSO to be heard and to be influential. But the growing recognition as political stakeholder also comes with the contestation about the democratic legitimation of CSO. Their right to participate in policymaking is subject to justification, often raised by the established political parties. At the same time traditional partners of corporatist representation of interests, such as unions, are in danger of losing their claim of presentation by losing too many members and becoming insignificant, (Strünck/Sack 2017) which create a dynamic situation of power division and influence. On the other hand, there is a noticeable approach coming from the political system to influence and coordinate the civil society system by creating a policy area and steering strategies for volunteering and civil society. Thus the mutual influence of the two systems becomes stronger with the consequence of increased politicisation of civil society and contestation about roles and independence.

 Conclusion So, are there shrinking civic spaces in Germany? The picture is mixed: One can see the change from old corporatists patterns to a more governmental system that involves a plurality of public and private actors in the policy-making, and that also change civil society inclusion from established players like the unions or the churches to more diverse set of actors. This paradigm shift comes with a kind of representative crisis for CSO, seeing the old corporatist partner losing increasingly members and hence support and their societally right of representation and seeing new actors step in claiming advocacy for minority groups and the common good. This triggers questions about who is entitled to speak for whom, which also comes with incidents of aggression and rejection against these new players by the parties. And this contestation about acknowledgement and legitimacy cannot be wiped away by the reference to vote legitimation because on the other hand we also see a massive crisis in representative democracy and parliamentarism. The increasingly diverse postmodern society is in need of civil society to express its wills and CSO intermediaries to bridge the growing gap between citizens and institutions. But there are less fixed standards of procedure to attend in this process, which brings up the question of who is entitled to a place at the table and who is excluded.

  Siri Hummel There is also a noticeable shift in the implementation of new political opportunity structures for CSO which created the policy area of volunteering and civil society which could lead to more cooperation between state and civil society actors, but that also entails the danger of too much dependency. While there are minor restrictions on protest and freedom of assembly in general it is the fast development of the digital sphere in particular or of rapid incidents like the covid-pandemic that challenges the legal system and brings forward new dangers for civil societies’ stable conditions. One of the foreseen bigger challenges for society will be to keep the balance between state surveillance and hence the intrusion of the public spaces for civil action and the protection of this area. So, also for civil society, the dilemma of the balance between freedom and security is a very present one. There is evidence of reform backlog and an obvious reluctance to accept the political role of civil society by public authority, while its capacity for community building, welfare services and social capital are widely acknowledged. So the relationship in policy-making needs to be strengthened by trust and acknowledgement, but also with a stable, reliable and transparent opportunity structure for participation. The legal framework of the non-profit status could not keep up with the development of political activism beyond voting in the last decades and needs to be further reformed, creating more legal certainty and a safe space for citizen participation. A rather new and growing phenomena are the attacks and the framing of civil society as an enemy by right-wing populists, which also pushes the polarisation in civil society itself and is a severe danger for the civic space. The emergence of rightwing social movements, the politicisation of existing civil society associations, and the counter-mobilisation against right-wing populism by civil society, as well as the framing of the (liberal) civil society as an enemy by right-wing populists, are currently one of the most pressing conflict situations, that needs to be observed and handled. All in all, there is a strong civil society in Germany that is exposed to a lot of social changes and also has to fight back attempts of harassment, demotion and lacking acknowledgement for its important social functions and should never stop to protect its spaces but can lean on a rich tradition of volunteering, civil activism and democratic value set to further strengthen it.

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Ruth Simsa

Civic spaces between turbulent politics and the pandemic – The civil society in Austria  Introduction and overview The model of liberal, representative democracy is in crisis worldwide (Ágh 2015; Levitsky/Ziblatt 2018; Mounk 2018; Schmitter 2015; Urbinati 2016). Numerous indicators of democracy and democratisation have been declining for about a decade. The influential “Freedom in the World” Index of the US organisation Freedom House, for example, reported in 2019 for the twelfth year in a row a deterioration of the global democratic situation (Freedom House 2008, 2019). Even in the consolidated democracies of Western Europe and North America, a marked decline in confidence in political institutions and political participation is being observed (IDEA 2018). In the following, developments of framework conditions for the Austrian civil society will be analysed with the focus of whether shrinking civic spaces can be observed. After a brief introduction of the underlying empirical studies, we give an overview on the traditional role of civil society organisations (CSOs) and recent political developments in the country. The theoretical background consists of the model of civil society capture and analyses of the effects of right-wing populist, authoritarian politics on civil society. Regarding empirical findings, we distinguish between the effects of a clearly right-wing populist government between 2017 and 2019 and recent developments, which are characterised between a new government of Conservatives and the Green party on the one hand and the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the other hand. The chapter concludes with a summary of developments that lead to restricted civic spaces.

 Methods Besides literature research, this chapter is based on three empirical studies. In 2014, a Civil Society Index-Rapid Assessment (CSI-RA) of framework conditions for civil society was performed in line with CIVICUS – World Alliance for Citizen Participation (More-Hollerweger et al. 2014). Between 2018 and 2019, an update of this study was performed, specifically focusing on effects of a right-wing populist government on civil society (Simsa et al. 2019). Between December 2020 and February 2021, we performed a third study with 27 interviews with representatives of CSOs (Simsa et al. 2021), mainly in the fields of social services, advocacy, arts and culture and environhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9783111070469-008

  Ruth Simsa mental protection. In this recent study, the focus was both on changes due to a new government and on effects of the Covid-19 crisis on the civil society.

 The traditional role of civil society organisations in Austria In Austria, the socio-economic and historic framework is quite stable. In recent decades, Austria has had a relatively strong economy, a developed welfare system and a stable democracy. Traditionally, CSOs and civil society have been a vital part of Austria´s society and welfare state. More than 124,000 CSOs provide welfare services, engage in advocacy and strengthen community building (Statistik Austria 2019). CSOs are valued in welfare state arrangements there is a high degree of social stability and quite good relations between government and CSOs (More-Hollerweger et al. 2014). Public funding of social services accounts for the largest share of revenue for CSOs. Many CSOs receive a large share of their income from public sources and provide social services in return. The sector of nonprofit organisations derives almost 50 % of its income from service contracts with public authorities, while another 17 % comes from public subsidies. The remaining sources of CSOs’ income are revenues from sales to private organisations and individuals (22 %), private donations (9 %), membership fees (2 %) and sponsorships (1 %) (Pennerstorfer et al. 2015). The total production value of CSOs was around €7 billion (1.9 % of GDP) and €4.7 billion value added in 2005 (Haider et al. 2008; Pennerstorfer et al. 2013). Unfortunately, this is most recent data available, CSOs are so far no category in official statistics. CSOs in Austria have been deeply involved in political decision-making. They have engaged in dialogue and negotiations with the government in many areas and have often been involved in legislative processes. Further, they provide social services, and, in return, they receive large shares of their funding from public sources. The public sector thus plays an important role for CSOs, influencing their organisational and financial structures. CSOs are particularly active in social services, health care and education. Furthermore, federalism and self-governance of the nine federal provinces are reflected in civil society and there are both strong local and umbrella organisations at the federal level. Social movements, particularly workers’, women’s and environmental movements have long traditions, yet, in the last decades they did not act very provocatively – generally the country may be characterised as a consensus democracy (Dolezal/Hutter 2007). In the years prior to the pandemic, the climate movement has gained considerable importance. Civic engagement is quite high in Austria. Almost half of the population (46 %) does some kind of volunteer work (Neumayr et al. 2017). Further, about 5 % of the population works based on paid employment in the sector.

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The Austrian legislative framework is quite favorable for CSOs. In the Rule of Law Index, Austria ranks at number 8 out of 113 countries in the overall score (World Justice Project 2018). However, this was one place lower than in the previous assessment in 2016 (Bogorin et al. 2019). The essential legal basis for civic engagement in Austria includes the right of free assembly and the freedom of association, both going back to the Constitution of 1867. Furthermore, citizens have the right to voice their opinions in demonstrations. Other forms of direct democracy play a minor role. Nevertheless, in recent years, conditions for CSOs had deteriorated. Over the last decade, there has been a shift towards more neoliberal ideologies including privatisation of social tasks and to an economisation of political governance (Zimmer/Simsa 2014). Alongside these changes there has been a decrease in public funding, especially after the global financial crisis in the late 2000s (Pape et al. 2019). A study of the financial situation of Austrian CSOs in 2015 showed that public funding had become more unstable leading to more challenges for these organisations (Simsa 2015). With its more recent developments, Austria offers a good illustration of the interplay between civil society and politics because the country has experienced disruptive changes in the political landscape. After decades of relatively good cooperation of politics with many CSOs especially in welfare state arrangements and a high level of civil society participation, a right-wing populist government brought about massive changes in the social climate, in the possibilities of civil society participation and in the economic situation of critical organisations within a short period of time.

 Political developments affecting civil society In recent years, there has been some turbulence in politics and civil society in Austria. Civil society involvement increased dramatically in the so-called refugee crisis of 2015/2016. Civil society actors played an important role in maintaining humanitarian standards and in crisis management (Simsa 2017). Yet, this went along with increasing political polarisation around the issue of immigration. The 2017 National Council election led to a coalition between the Conservatives (ÖVP) and the right-wing National Conservatives (FPÖ), both of which had run a polarising election campaign strongly focused on the refugee issue. Although the country has a strong social-democratic tradition, this is also true for right-wing populism, with the FPÖ party clearly having right-wing extremist roots (Pelinka 2019). The Social Democratic Party had supported neoliberal policies for decades but it lost its core electorate as the refugee crisis created a clear shift to right-wing populist parties. This culminated in the coalition of the ÖVP and the FPÖ in 2017. This government presented simple solutions to all kinds of social and economic problems and represented exclusive concepts of solidarity (Hofmann et al. 2019). Further, it also espoused what might be described as “anti-elite rhetoric” (Pelinka 2019; cf. Fallend et al. 2018; cf. Ötsch, cited in Das Gupta

  Ruth Simsa 2017). An analysis of the impact on civil society clearly showed that this government also developed clear authoritarian strategies (Simsa 2019). The impact of these changes was visible in the public discourse, where CSOs faced attempts to undermine and delegitimise them and with increased polarisation across society. Furthermore, communication between political actors and CSOs decreased, which limited the possibilities for CSOs to participate in the legislative processes. It also affected access to financial resources, especially for CSOs working in fields that conflicted with the government’s agenda. Due to severe political scandals, the coalition of 2017 was dissolved. After a transitional government, a coalition between the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Greens was formed in January 2020. This new federal government was associated with great expectations on the part of civil society representatives in Austria, there are traditionally good personal contacts and similar political positions between civil society and the Green Party. However, the Covid pandemic, which dominated society, economy and the public discourse, overshadowed these changes of the government. On 2 November 2020, Austria was shaken by a terrorist attack that briefly pushed the pandemic into the background and shook many people. There was much critique regarding political failures in the fight against terrorism. Apparently, the authorities had had information on the assassin but did not use them due to a lack of coordination. Nevertheless, a newly proposed legislative initiative to protect against terrorism has been criticised because of the planned restriction of fundamental rights (cf. Simoner 2021). Currently, the political situation is very unstable, due to diverse affairs of supposed corruption. The minister of finance is under investigation for bribery, another close confidant of the chancellor is the subject of a post-fixing scandal, and a top man from the Ministry of Justice close to the ÖVP has been suspended and is suspected of having acted as a quasi-agent for the party. Because of these and other scandals, motions of no confidence were brought against the Ministers of Finance, of the Interior and of the Economy by the entire opposition. In addition to fundamental controversies over policies, this increased tensions in the coalition. The conservative party reacted to the juristic accusations with increased criticism and attacks on legal institutions, especially on the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Economic Affairs and Corruption (cf. Mittelstaedt/Nimmervoll 2021). It is also trying to abolish the truth requirement in investigative committees. Reputable experts in law reacted very critically and alarmed to accusations and derogatory statements by representatives of the federal government against the judiciary. They criticised condemnations of authorities by government representatives, especially the “exaggerated and inappropriate” criticism of the economic and corruption prosecutor by the ÖVP, after the Minister of Finance had become the subject of their investigations. Party spokespersons and the chancellor accused the public prosecutor’s office of fatal errors, false assumptions and decisions based on “faulty facts”, all accusations that were rejected or refuted by lawyers. On several occasions, ex-

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perts, such as the former Minister of Justice, have expressed surprise and criticism about the Chancellor’s understanding of the rule of law and the organs of the judiciary. These sweeping and mostly untenable attempts to delegitimise a legal authority bear the danger of weakening the population’s trust in the rule of law. In the Ibiza Committee of Inquiry, commissioned by Parliament to investigate the biggest political scandal of the Second Republic, the minister of finance and the chancellor both did not contribute to the clarification of investigated cases of corruption. The opposition parties denounced the minister of finance for false testimony in the investigation committee on the basis of various chat messages that proved his statements wrong. Further, he only made requested files available to the Ibiza investigation committee after the Federal President followed a request of the Constitutional Court and threatened to execute him. This was a unique occurrence in the country’s history. It clearly shows a disrespect of the constitution by leading government-representatives. Still, satisfaction with democracy is comparatively high in Austria and ranks among the best in an international comparison (European Social Survey 2018). 52 However, since the beginning of the Corona crisis, a decline can be observed. Since March 2020, trust in satisfaction with democracy and trust in the federal government has been declining, with trust in the government declining more than trust in democracy (cf. Plescia et al. 2020). Trust in democratic institutions, such as parliament or media, has also fallen slightly (cf. Rathkolb/Aichholzer n.d.). Thus, in 2021, the country faced many changes, such as the new coalition of Conservatives and the Green party, the terrorist attack, and the unprecedented level of corruption and suspicions of corruption, and attempts to delegitimise democratic institutions by the government. Nevertheless, the topic that dominated the public discourse, political decisions and the development of society and civil society was the Covid-19 pandemic and its consequences.

 Theoretical background The model of liberal, representative democracy is in crisis worldwide (Ágh 2015; Levitsky/Ziblatt 2018; Mounk 2018; Schmitter 2015; Urbinati 2016). Numerous indicators of democracy and democratisation have been declining for about a decade. The influential “Freedom in the World” Index of the US organisation Freedom House, for example, reported in 2019 for the twelfth year in a row a deterioration of the global democratic situation (Freedom House 2008, 2019). Even in the consolidated democracies of Western Europe and North America, a marked decline in confidence in political institutions and political participation is being observed (IDEA 2018).  52 See https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ (14th February 2021).

  Ruth Simsa One aspect of the crisis is the rise of (right-wing) populist parties and increasingly authoritarian governments that undermine democratic institutions and try to restrict civil rights. Populism is defined as politics that appeal to simple, archaic forms of identification such as “the people” (Mouffe 2005) by rhetorically dividing society between the people and its other, suggesting simplified solutions (Panizza 2005). The term “rightwing populism” refers to populism that is ethically, religiously or nationally exclusive (Pelinka 2013). Authoritarianism is understood as anti-democratic, illiberal politics with a substantial de-facto decline of core institutional requirements for electoral democracy, with fewer opportunities for opposition (Lührmann/Lindberg 2018), and with a dominance of the government over most segments of society (Bozóki 2015). There is systematic evidence that contemporary autocracies are typically electoral autocracies (Cassani 2017); they come to power legally by democratic elections and “mainly use legal and gradual strategies to undermine democracies” (Lührmann/Lindberg 2018). Right-wing populism and authoritarianism are related. Many authors stress the anti-pluralistic character of right-wing populism (Mudde 2004; Müller 2017; Urbinati 2016) and thus its proximity to autocratic procedures (Weyland 2018). Levitsky argues that populism is a major catalyst for the emergence of authoritarian politics (Levitsky/Loxton 2013). Yet, many empirical studies refer to instable democracies, for instance, in Latin America. Although global comparative data show a strong empirical link between the rise of populism and an increase in democratic backsliding (Kyle/Mounk 2018), the relationship of populism and authoritarianism in established democracies with strong institutions remains blurry. Common features of right-wing populist parties are not only nationalism and racism (Loch/Norocel 2015), they also combine ethno-nationalist xenophobia with anti‐ political‐establishment populism (Rydgren 2005). Problematic aspects are attempts to destabilize institutions, the adoption of aggressive narratives and attitudes, and attempts to weaken all forms of protest and critique. Often, they go along with distinct anti-welfare social policies (Bozóki 2015). Regarding the relationship between authoritarianism and civil society, there is evidence that modern forms of authoritarianism not only secure their power through censoring and harassing the media, restricting political opponents and undermining the autonomy of election administration bodies, but also by restricting civil society (Lührmann/Lindberg 2018). Scholarly work shows that authoritarian regimes use complex methods to strategically influence, control and incorporate civil society (Froissart 2014; Gilbert/Mohseni 2018; Greskovits 2015), arguing that they try to usurp the autonomy of the civil sphere (Gerő/Kopper 2013) or to capture it (Kover 2015). In the development of authoritarian regimes, civil society is usually one of the first targets. Restrictions of political rights and civil liberties are often among the first actions of populist-autocratic governments (Cassani/Tomini 2019). In the development process of authoritarian regimes, strategies towards civil society usually take

Civic spaces between turbulent politics and the pandemic – The civil society in Austria  

place in different steps. First, discourse and narratives attempt to delegitimise those parts of civil society that are critical of the government. To do this, right-wing populist parties do not need to be in government already. The popularisation of polarising and delegitimising narratives serves as an essential contribution to the preparation of a political turnaround in their favour. The discourse of “us” and “them”, followed by systematic attacks is a clear symptom for polarisation that characterises populist strategies. Besides restrictions for critical organisations, autocratic governments often establish and support networks of CSOs, which share their basic values (Kover 2015). Second, participation in legislation and political debates is restricted, which is the first manifestation of the implementation of authoritarian practices. Third, this is followed by changes at policy level, in the course of which public funds are channelled along a polarisation line from “good” to “bad” civil society, and away from politically independent to dependent CSOs. Civil society is highly vulnerable especially in countries where CSOs are financially dependent on government funding (Van Til 2015). Fourth, the legal framework conditions are changed, in particular, civic rights are restricted. This process is described as civil society capture. Populists and early stage autocrats thus limit public contestation by restricting liberal and pluralist CSO’s activities, on the one hand, while simultaneously fostering CSOs that represent the populists’ understanding of a loyal civil society (Moder/Pranzl 2019). Research shows that the relationship of authoritarian regimes and contestation is complex. In part, illiberal regimes do not only repress critique, sometimes they adopt to protest with strategically set frameworks: “Authoritarian governments set the rules of the game, which are — consciously or not — accepted by activists who are not aiming at radical regime change anymore” (Froissart 2014). Certainly, a common and inherent feature of populist strategies is the polarisation of civil society, i.e. the construction of two antagonistic (civil) social groups, aimed at delegitimising political opponents and strengthening one’s own claim to power as the “true representatives” of the people (Mudde 2004; Müller 2017). There is evidence that polarisation plays an important role in justifying authoritarian measures (Levitsky 2017).

 Effects of right-wing populism between 2017 and 2019 on civil society During the period of the coalition of ÖVP and FPÖ, between the end of 2017 and May 2019, the conditions for the critical parts of civil society deteriorated.

  Ruth Simsa

. Effects regarding the general climate and the public discourse First, there was a clear polarisation of the discourse, with attempts of intimidation, as well as an increasing delegitimisation of civil society activities in the media and by politicians. Delegitimisation of civil society activities took place, for example, through the insinuation of profit interests, devaluation of their work, and also the increase of a generally negative, exclusionary rhetoric. These expressions are used like NGO-madness in the Mediterranean, (...) asylum industry (...). A certain enemy image of civil society organisations is being built up. (R07)

Official politics constantly devaluated certain CSOs, especially those that deal with vulnerable target groups. In addition, their clientele was deprecated as “cheaters”, “asylum fraudsters” etc. The concept of public benefit organisations seemed to be under pressure. “Helping isn't at all cool anymore” (R17). This went hand in hand with the polarisation of civil society into a desirable and an undesirable part: “There are suddenly the good and the bad in civil society” (R07). The devaluation of civil society is systematically carried out by representatives of the two coalition parties and is taken up and reinforced by a large part of the media. Further, CSOs and their representatives are more frequently attacked directly by the government. The nature and severity of these attacks is new and is perceived as a breach of taboo: The verbal attacks have already become harsher (...) when Kurz (the Chancellor) moves Doctors Without Frontiers in the direction of illegal refugee helpers. This was unthinkable in the Second Republic (...). And this is really a taboo break, I think, because (...) this is the Federal Chancellor who legitimizes this (...) the attacks on the non-profit sector or some of the organisations are getting harder. (R38)

. Effects on democracy and participation Second, with regard to democracy and participation, CSOs were largely and systematically excluded from legislative processes. One interview partner summarised this trend: “We are at the beginning of a massive shift towards a democracy without participation, without inclusion.” (R10) Even in the past, participation was not satisfactory for the CSOs, but with the new government, there was a clear deterioration in the relationship between civil society and politics. All respondents noticed a reduction in opportunities for participation in political decision-making processes:

Civic spaces between turbulent politics and the pandemic – The civil society in Austria   So the government is now not interested in participation, cooperation or exchange. (...) it is a completely different style, where a small group makes the central decisions and everything else is completely insignificant. (E38)

CSOs are largely and systematically excluded from legislative processes, there is hardly any dialogue between CSOs and the federal government or individual ministries: “No participation, no involvement, we only learn many things from the media.” (R05) CSOs describe politics as increasingly authoritarian. Review periods were shortened to prevent comments etc. Politics had become more intransparent and hardly communicated with civil society actors. In our empirical study in this period, a large number of feedbacks from civil society revealed a systematic strategy to exclude civil society from political decisions. Further, the lack of contact persons in politics was often criticised. In the past, CSOs often had direct contacts with ministries, appointments with ministers were possible and public hearings took place. Currently, representatives of politics avoid any direct exchange with civil society. Politics has become less transparent and it hardly communicates with civil society actors any more. Almost all respondents report something similar on this point: “They don’t talk to us. They won’t talk to us. That’s the new thing. Until now, I’ve always had the feeling you can still talk to someone.” (R03) The large number of similar feedbacks reveals a systematic strategy to exclude civil society from political decisions. Most respondents report that CSOs are rarely given attention anymore, that it is often extremely difficult to maintain a dialogue. They simply do not get answers. Often “there are actually no reactions” (R04), you have to “call for months” (R20) or you get answers “which are incorrect” (R29). And this happens “across the sector, whether it’s the environment, or culture” (R07).

. Effects on civic rights Generally, fundamental rights are well developed in Austria by international standards (Freedom House 2014; More-Hollerweger et al. 2014). However, the freedom of assembly has been restricted in the years before 2019, particularly by the extension of the notification period for assemblies and the establishment of so-called protected zones. The indirect effects in practice on the exercise of fundamental rights are increased bureaucracy and restricted legal certainty: Regarding the freedom of assembly (...) that the fact that you now have to register earlier. (...) you can tell it’s getting tighter. (...) with it we are much better verifiable or handy. Or it’s easier to intervene and say you can’t. (I 18/16)

Overall, the legal framework did not change significantly between 2017 and 2019. However, interviewees reported a tendency towards a more unfavourable application

  Ruth Simsa of current laws. In addition, the possibility of prohibiting assemblies that serve other countries has been extended. There is a lot of room for interpretation here, which increases the possibility of arbitrary state action (cf. Amnesty International 2017). Furthermore, CSOs were also indirectly affected by the stricter legislation applicable to their clients, for example, in immigration and social law.

. Changes in public funding Regarding public funding, the total expenditures for CSOs had not much changed between 2014 and 2019. However, a detailed look shows that there were changes in funding that obviously affected critical CSOs. Especially in the areas of migration, arts, women’s, labour market and development policy, these CSOs experienced severe restrictions on public funding. They posed an existential threat to many critical organisations and created general fear in the sector (Simsa 2019). A representative of labour market organisations describes this: “This is already the second year of cuts. (...) now you can see how the organisations are starting to close down.” (R04) Massive cuts in the women’s sector, which primarily affect autonomous, critical and feminist institutions, are described as an “ideological reconstruction” (R14) and as brutal: “This is something new. Well, I don’t think we’ve ever experienced such brutality before.” (R23) Dramatic, existentially threatening cuts also affect critical CSOs in the field of development education: There are cuts (...) that affect some organisations (...) that simply can no longer continue. (...) many cuts are in the so-called development education sector, i.e. in domestic work. It is traditionally rather critical and the cuts are not erratic there. (R21)

Another representative of CSOs explained: “This is, so to speak, a lever, so how do I take the money from them, how do I cut it, so that I silence these voices (...) either because I cut them completely off or they no longer exist, or because, under threat of cuts, I silence them.” (R09) Although there was no clear evidence for systematic quantitative changes in public funding, the qualitative analysis showed systematic cuts in those areas that belong to the parts of civil society that are characterised as “evil” in the polarising narratives of the populist parties. These are actors, which are critical to government or active in disliked fields of activity, such as immigration, feminism, critical art, and that overall do not fit into the dominant ideology. The strong ideological orientation of funding cuts was new. With regard to funding from the public sector, the 2014 survey found that financial conditions were made more difficult, such as a lack of index adjustments, a lack of planning security or excessive bureaucracy, but no systematic discrimination against critical organisations (More-Hollerweger et al. 2014). Thus, ideologically motivated funding cuts were a new phenomenon. Although some of the cuts

Civic spaces between turbulent politics and the pandemic – The civil society in Austria  

were not so dramatic in quantitative terms, for the affected CSOs they were critical for their survival.

. The clear pattern of civil society capture The changes as a whole showed a clear pattern: They corresponded to the processes of the development of authoritarian governments known from the literature (Moder/Pranzl 2019). The model postulates four basic steps in the development of authoritarian governments in relatively developed democracies. The first step is the deliberate change of narratives, followed by financial restrictions for critical parts of civil society, by financial restrictions for critical CSOs and by changes to the legal framework. Although Austria is a liberal democracy with well-developed human rights, there were clearly observable tendencies to limit the critical potential of civil society as well as its participation in political decision-making processes. Politically motivated funding decisions have always existed, as have different views on desired participation and conflicts over content between politics and civil society. However, the policy of systematically restricting dissent, protest and diversity through a wide variety of interlocking measures contradicts the Austrian tradition. It was an expression of an increasingly authoritarian, right-wing populist policy.

 Recent developments – A new government and the Covid-19 pandemic The right-wing populist coalition resigned in 2019. Since beginning of 2020, a coalition of Conservatives and the Green party is in power. Since March 2020, the Corona pandemic has had massive impacts on the social and economic development in Austria. In order to limit the spread of the disease, three lockdowns were decided between March 2020 and February 2021, i.e. restrictions on the movement of the population as well as on economic and cultural life through the closure of large parts of trade, gastronomy, cultural and sports organisations. This had a massive impact on social life and thus also on civil society. The health effects of the pandemic were drastic. By February 2021, there had been over 454,000 cases of illness, and 8,386 people had died from or with the disease. In 2020, the excess mortality rate was around 10 %, with men being more affected (plus 13.7 %) than women (plus 8.2 %). Life expectancy has thus fallen by around half a year in the Corona year 2020 compared to 2019 (cf. Statistik Austria 2021). The socio-economic effects of the crisis are directly relevant for many of the CSOs, as well as indirectly, through changes in the living conditions of their clients. For ex-

  Ruth Simsa ample, the daily life of people in residential institutions was massively restricted by measures taken in the wake of the Corona pandemic. CSOs had to adapt their care and support services accordingly. In April 2020, more than 570,000 people were unemployed, more than ever before. The number declined slightly in succession, but remained consistently far above the pre-crisis level and rose again in winter. In January 2021, 535,470 were out of work, the unemployment rate was 11.4 %. Compared to the same month of the previous year, this was an increase of 31.8 %. 53 In 2020, the average unemployment rate was around 10 % (BMSGPK 2020). In addition, a high number of employees were on short-time work (June 2020: 1.37 million, beginning of January 2021: 417,000 persons). Short-time work means that employees’ working hours are reduced, they receive between 80 and 90 % of their income, and the additional costs compared to the actual working hours are covered by the public sector. In the following, we will describe recent developments regarding the conditions for civil society. Some of them are related to the new government of Conservatives and the Green Party, some of them are effects of the pandemic.

. The general climate and public discourse At present, the general climate regarding civil society has clearly improved. Therefore, defamation, which was still common in 2019 on the part of the governing parties, is hardly present anymore. This systematic discrediting of civil society is longer found in the media or in other arenas of public discourse. (…) what is no longer the case in comparison to the previous government is definitely that these direct attacks no longer exist. So this delegitimisation, this criminalisation of civil society. (I 4)

On the one hand, this is associated with the Covid crisis. Poverty and the risk of poverty have moved more into the centre of society’s attention. Thus, people increasingly see social services and other activities of CSOs as important. On the other hand, the better climate is also attributed to a change in political conditions, i.e. the participation of the Greens in government, who are positive towards democratic-civil society activities and organisations. In addition, there are also many personal contacts and acquaintances. Many members of the Greens have worked in CSOs or have been active in various movements. Many respondents have problems with representatives of the Conservatives. (...) there are still many people in the Peoples Party, who do not want to have anything to do with civil society. They actually think: “We don’t need them. They are a nuisance. (I 5)  53 https://de.statista.com/themen/6436/auswirkungen-des-coronavirus-covid-19-auf-diewirtschaft-in-oesterreich/ (7th May 2021).

Civic spaces between turbulent politics and the pandemic – The civil society in Austria  

. Democracy and Participation of civil society – some improvements but limited structural conditions for civil society involvement The interviewees largely agree that communication between politics and civil society has improved significantly in the last year. In general, many perceive the collapse of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition as a “great relief” (I 20). As a result, the relationship between politics and civil society has improved for many respondents, the tone of communication has changed and there has been a clear improvement in communication. Well, it has changed insofar as conversations simply take place. That didn’t happen before at that time. (...) So you can communicate. And then, of course, you also find out more quickly about the limits. (...) It is somehow more democratic. (I 6) This access and the ability of dialogue with the government, I think that is already here again. Especially, I would say, with the Green-led ministerial posts or cabinets. (I 4)

However, it was mentioned that particularly the services provided by CSOs are appreciated, while their political work is rather less perceived. The improved climate has also tended to benefit the large service organisations, which are considered as particularly relevant to the system. Because critical infrastructure are primarily those who always operate facilities, who operate some kind of service. That’s what I mean. And these tend to be the big ones. (I 5)

Nevertheless, some of the increased appreciation also goes beyond social service CSOs and includes advocacy organisations as well. What I already hear from organisations (…) that are not considered critical infrastructure (…), is that they nevertheless notice that they are perceived differently again. Because then the whole sector is perceived differently. (I 5)

In connection with Covid-19, there were strong and media-effective cooperations between public institutions and the larger CSOs in the social sector. A much-discussed topic in this context is the possible appropriation of civil society by politics. Like “greenwashing”, there are attempts at “social washing”. However, the improvement of relations between politics and civil society does not always lead to more participation. Experiences differ largely, partly depending on the respective political partners. Again, with “Green” ministries, partly better participation seems to be possible. The core message of many statements is that political involvement only takes place to a very limited degree. On the one hand, this is attributed to the Covid-19 crisis, but on the other hand also to fundamental structures. The negative thing is that we have the impression that we don’t really get any influence and that the dialogue is much less developed, in purely quantitative terms, than I thought it would be. (I 22)

  Ruth Simsa There is too little involvement of civil society in environmental legislation, care regulations, in addition to pandemic containment regulations. Another example is the current establishment of an authority concerning complaints about police brutality. This was included in the current government programme after long advocacy work by CSOs but is currently being processed entirely without civil society involvement. The extent of involvement is also described as depending on the topic and the agents. In the climate sector, for example, it is mainly the younger organisations that are heard, especially Fridays for Future. A fundamental problem of participation in Austria, in contrast to other European countries (such as Germany, Norway, Spain, Ireland), is that there is no established framework that ensures, regulates, and supports continuous, structured and mandatory interaction with existing platforms of civil society agents.

. Democracy and Participation of civil society – the pandemic as a barrier to civil society participation The pandemic has limited political participation by civil society in several aspects. First, the strong thematic focus on Covid is described as a major obstacle to participation. One of the key tools of civil society influence is public attention. However, apart from climate, which is also experiencing a (relative) thematic boom, it is very difficult to get attention with other issues. That was quite fierce competition for topics, of course. Especially in the initial phase of the lockdown, the first lockdown of the first Corona crisis. (...) Corona and the crisis are the dominant themes. (I 16)

Secondly, some programs were shortened due to the pandemic. General planning uncertainties and the need to react quickly to pressing developments further limited opportunities for participation. (...) these democratic processes are still very shortened. Very quickly, with very little time to give feedback. Now especially everything that has to do with the COVID crisis and the COVID measures around it. (I 5)

However, the high speed in issuing various measures, which was presumably necessary at the beginning, was maintained in the further course of the pandemic without any objective necessity. For the update of the regulations in March 2021, after one year of the pandemic, the deadline for inspection and comment was set at about 4 days. It has to be fast (...) and that of course massively affects the quality of this process. And I think you could say now: Okay, with the first lockdown you can still somehow understand that, because that was a new situation, nobody had a clue. But I think with the second phase now, one

Civic spaces between turbulent politics and the pandemic – The civil society in Austria   could have expected something different, also a different form of involving others, that didn’t happen. (I 5)

Thirdly, there was a lot of reticence on the part of the CSOs, especially at the beginning of the pandemic. During this time, protests were limited and many CSOs voluntarily put their concerns on the back burner. Apart from that, I think the strong impression of a health risk led to people saying at the beginning, “Let’s swallow everything and maybe not criticise too loudly. It’s difficult for everyone.” That people were a bit (…) more cautious about how critically they judged certain things, which then changed later on. (I 7)

The pandemic makes informal contacts at conferences or other meetings more difficult, which before could compensate for non-transparent structures to a certain extent. (...) that this is also true for Austria, but up to the EU level, I believe that Corona has simply made many processes much less transparent. (...) Because you are in a zoom conference, (...) you aren’t standing together over a cup of coffee while chatting about this and that (...) that is totally missing. (I 4)

. Digital participation and digital civic spaces On the one hand, measures regarding the Covid pandemic resulted in severe restrictions of civil society activism and participation, but on the other hand, as a side effect, strengthened digital activities. This complicated for some organisations internal networking and the recruitment of new activists as it required both personal affinity to social media and communication technologies and high internal cohesion to uphold a high degree of communication. However, one positive aspect of the use of online media was the possibility of transnational exchange, which is easier and cheaper with digital means. That has already changed a lot, that one suddenly does not (…) only have to invite people from Vienna, but can also invite the one person from Berlin for 10 minutes, who could provide the best input. This change has already happened a lot and I think it is irreversible for the future. (I 7)

The need for digitalisation has also led to the implementation of new services, which have also created new opportunities for participation. We have created digital volunteer programs. (...) The willingness to show solidarity was definitely there. And a lot of people really got involved. We founded a platform that now includes, I think, 14,000 people who participate. (…) It’s not just getting a newsletter, but people who are really committed. (I 5)

  Ruth Simsa In general, this form of participation works well. Especially the better-known CSOs are registering a high number of visitors, a lot of interest and a willingness to get involved. In this context, some respondents reported a higher level of participation and more enquiries (I 9) than in the period before the pandemic. However, other CSOs, including large and well-known ones, point to a limited mobilisation strength. There was a need to adapt the form of advocacy and protest activities to achieve visibility in the digital space. Some new forms of protest activities were emerging as well as new forms of presence. Well, for example (...) there was always a single person (...) standing in front of the Federal Chancellery at that time, also with reference to Moria, and they always photographed themselves individually there, but then put their photos together and played them on Instagram and Facebook. (...) To show “I am personally affected, and I show my face”. You don’t have to have all 50 of them there together, but you can experiment with the possibilities. (I 12)

In general, however, the effectiveness of advocacy suffers from the distance required during the pandemic. A limiting factor is that the potential of digital work can only be realised by those CSOs that have a good digital infrastructure in general, advocacy work suffers from distance, as face-to-face events create a better sense of responsibility as well as a better forum for networking. (I 17) Even younger climate organisations had difficulties in maintaining their activities during the pandemic to the same extent as before. Their structures were not yet as consolidated as those of more traditional CSOs, and the shift of many meetings to online spaces tended to reduce participation. (…) the biggest limitation is (...) that we (...) can only mobilise online. Especially the civil society youth movement Fridays for Future, as well as the whole climate protests, are suffering from this in particular. (I 16)

. Human and civic rights Fundamental rights in Austria are guaranteed in the Constitution. Human and civil rights are generally protected (More-Hollerweger et al. 2014). Nevertheless, in its report “Human Rights Challenges Persist”, Amnesty International criticises the human rights policy of the Austrian government. The recommendations of the United Nations have hardly been implemented. Amnesty International (cf. 2021) therefore calls on the government in Austria to implement progress for people and their rights. There have been no significant changes with regard to freedom of association. It is well established in law and implemented in practice. A bureaucratic but neither obstructive nor restrictive legal framework exists. Developments in human rights since 2019 have been influenced mainly by the Covid-19 crisis. There have been measures affecting various aspects of human rights, such as curfews and other restrictions of movement. They affected the freedom of re-

Civic spaces between turbulent politics and the pandemic – The civil society in Austria  

ligion, of assembly, of access to education and employment, the rights of immigrants and others. In general, the state is obliged to contain the pandemic; it must protect the right to life and health. Measures to this end must be necessary and appropriate. In order to protect human rights in the process, the measures must be clearly regulated by law, i.e. they must not – as has happened in some cases – be imposed by decree (Amnesty International 2020). According to a report by Amnesty International Austria, drastic measures at the beginning of the pandemic were justified due to a lack of information, but later decrees restricting freedom of movement and contact are often described as non-transparent. Some of them could not be upheld by the Constitutional Court, and some were formulated in a way that was misleading, so that there was insufficient legal certainty. The high discretionary powers of the police in this context were also criticised. In fact, many measures and specifications to restrict the pandemic were overturned by the Constitutional Court. Some were therefore too vague (cf. RIV 2021) or for other reasons unlawful. 54 A sensitive issue in the face of contact restrictions due to Covid regulations are demonstrations. On the one hand, it is important that people can express their opinions or protest publicly. On the other hand, large gatherings of people can pose risks of infection. The handling of demonstrations during the pandemic in Austria was very multifaceted and also strongly criticised. During the pandemic, several demonstrations were banned, but in some cases, they did take place without permission. In some cases, very restrictive measures were taken: In April 2020, for example, a demonstration by the Austrian Students’ Union with four people was banned, although they had agreed to keep a minimum distance of two metres and to wear mouth and nose protection. In general, there were high hurdles to organising pandemiccompliant assemblies. Taking to the streets with thousands of people has become extremely difficult. (I 16)

Later, a number of assemblies took place, initially usually without major problems. Examples were the solidarity action with Black Lives Matter, environmental rallies or demonstrations for the right to asylum or the evacuation of asylum camps on the Greek islands. They all took place in strict compliance with Covid measures. Regarding the freedom of expression, there were some unusual incidences in 2021. Several members of the government had been accused of corruption; a prominent example was the court-ordered police search of the home of the Minister of Fi-

 54 See https://www.vfgh.gv.at/rechtsprechung/Ausgewaehlte_Entscheidungen.de.html March 2021).

(10th

  Ruth Simsa nance. In this regard, the government announced multiple and general charges against those persons who talked about this in social media and accused the Minister of Finance of accepting donations or corruption. Further, the Minister of the Interior considered legal action against a private person because of a tweet insulting the police. This was related to the deportation of teenagers who were born in the country but had not been granted asylum. This was notable not only because the Ministry published the announcement on its official website, but also because the person was named there by full name. Legal experts assured that the citizen’s statement in question had no relevance under criminal or administrative law. They argued that it was a clear political intimidation attempt, which could have “chilling effects”, namely that people start to censor themselves out of fear (cf. Hagen 2021). Article 10 of the Human Rights Convention on freedom of expression explicitly states that statements can also offend, shock or disturb. Amnesty International Austria accordingly described the announcement in a tweet as an attempt of intimidation.

. Public Funding of CSOs In the last year, the respondents of our sample did not tell about cuts of public funding for critical CSOs as in the period before, they reported no political strategies to “starve” specific areas of funding. However, the cuts made in 2018/2019 had hardly been reversed. The overall picture was more divers, some organisations reported better funding, others fought with uncertainties or inadequate funding. Others, however, say that under the new government, commitments were made earlier and liquidity problems could thus be avoided. A decisive factor regarding the public funding of CSOs was the “Non-Profit Organisation Support Fund” of €700 million decided in June, which had contributed significantly to providing financial security for many of the CSOs. Many CSOs were massively affected financially by the pandemic measures, as key revenue areas were lost during the lockdowns, for example due to the cancellation of cultural festivals or fundraising events. This was partly compensated by the fund. The support fund was extended again in 2021 and includes a so-called “NPO lockdown grant” which is intended to support non-profit associations that are additionally burdened by the lockdown measures (e.g. hospitality industry and accommodation, closure of sports facilities) (BMLRT 2020). Further, this emergency fund was unique in the history of the country. For the first time, CSOs were treated officially as an economically and socially relevant group of organisations by the government. Moreover, there has been close cooperation between politics and CSOs, as associations and networks of civil society have been involved in the planning of the fund itself. There has also been great interest from other countries in how the fund is structured and how the allocation of funds works. This shows that a certain pioneering role is being taken here, which meets with international recognition.

Civic spaces between turbulent politics and the pandemic – The civil society in Austria   (…) that it was set up, that’s extraordinary. So that, to a certain extent, we are pioneers (...) (I 14) It would probably have been a (...) bad year if we hadn’t had this NPO support fund. (I 21)

Most of the criticism was directed at the bureaucracy associated with the fund. For example, an almost unmanageable amount of payment receipts had to be submitted (I 3), which made the general act of applying very time-consuming and lengthy. However, most of the grants were paid out afterwards without any further problems (I 21).

. Developments of volunteering Many of civil society’s proposals are reflected in the current government programme. This programme also dedicates a separate subchapter to voluntary work and civil society engagement. Projects include the creation of a seal of approval for voluntary work, the establishment of a service centre for volunteers and volunteer organisations, the evaluation of the Volunteer Act, recognition of non-profit status in the awarding of public contracts and an improvement in the provision of services for the common good (cf. Die neue Volkspartei/Die Grünen n.d.). These plans are judged very positively by CSO-representatives. It is expected that the Green Party will change the image that is widespread among the government partner that there are no costs involved in voluntary work. This starts with the assumption that where it is non-profit, everything is done on a voluntary basis anyway. This simply ignores the fact that there is just as much professional work going on, but personnel costs are still not recognised anywhere in the non-profit sector. (I 18)

However, due to the pandemic, this issue was also pushed into the background. The government postponed the implementation of its plans regarding volunteering. So there are many things in there that would be good and important, but they simply don’t have priority at the moment (...) now it’s about dealing with the crisis. (I 14)

The pandemic also had a strong impact on the extent and types of volunteering carried out. Many activities were not possible due to contact restrictions. Formal volunteering in the context of NPOs therefore tended to decline (Meyer/Terzieva 2020; Ramos et al. 2020). However, informal volunteering in the form of neighbourhood assistance increased by mid-2020 (Ramos et al. 2020). As the pandemic progressed, this engagement tended to decline again. Quantitative surveys show a tendency for society to become less solidary as the pandemic progressed (Kittel 2020). In our sample, NPOs were affected very differently. The closures of cultural and recreational facilities, which are heavily supported by volunteerism, led to a reduction in voluntary work in the affected CSOs. Some shifted their activities to the digital space.

  Ruth Simsa That is, everything that concerns personal engagement or also that concerns working with volunteers (...) has almost come to a standstill. (I 12)

Some respondents fear that participation through volunteering will be more difficult in the future, as many volunteers have been lost due to the Corona pandemic. There is the fear that we have lost the volunteers in the long run and that it will take a lot of energy to bring them back. (I 18)

In other organisations, interest in volunteering increased at the onset of the pandemic, even allowing them to recruit new volunteers. We always have people coming forward to volunteer, but some of the rush was almost unmanageable. We even created digital volunteer programs then. (I 16)

. The uprisings and new significance of “bad civil society” From 2021 onwards, an increase in civil society activities that did not meet the requirements of plurality, tolerance and discursivity took place. Specifically, the socalled anti-Corona demonstrations against the government’s measures increased the significance and visibility of exclusive, illiberal, civil-society protest. Many of them had been banned for health reasons, but took place, with several thousand participants. Right-wing radicals and hooligans were also present, including for example Gottfried Küssel, who was convicted of National Socialist Wiederbetätigung in 2011. They spread conspiracy theories and fight against what they perceive as the Corona dictatorship. For Germany, there are findings that the protests against the Covid-19 ordinances were infiltrated or “hijacked” by right-wing groups, which subsequently led to an increasing radicalisation of the movement (cf. Hummel 2022). It can be assumed that in Austria similar processes were going on. Many participants violated the obligation to wear masks and keep their distance, and there were frequent violent riots. Between the end of December 2020 and March 2021, a total of 673 Corona-related assemblies have been registered across Austria, according to statistics from the Ministry of the Interior. Of these, 113 were not registered, 75 were prohibited. During the demonstrations, 7,175 charges were filed under administrative law. In total, around 85,000 people took part (cf. Holzer/Oezelt 2021). This relatively new social movement shows a high degree of individual and collective proximity to nationalist, populist and right-wing extremist elites and groups. At the same time, it is characterised by a particularly high heterogeneity of supporters and political positions. They are highly polarising, dividing society into two antagonistic spheres. Alternative beliefs and attitudes, for example with regard to medicine or the perception of authority, play an important role (cf. Nachtwey et al. 2020). Despite the diversity of individual situations of concern, which are often related to socio-

Civic spaces between turbulent politics and the pandemic – The civil society in Austria  

economic causes, there is a unification of the fundamental opposition, which is in principle opposed to liberal democracy. A unifying element is thus the scepticism towards parliamentary democracy, the media and social and political-economic institutions (cf. Nachtwey et al. 2020). Interestingly, apart from these common features, political preferences of activists are very divers. Regarding human rights and the question of civic spaces, these protests pose severe challenges. Many of their views are not democratic and often participants did not comply with Covid-measures and thus threatened others. The situation often got out of control and thus, civil society activism in fact reduced the civic space for many people. In March, for example, when about 10,000 people demonstrated in Vienna despite a ban on the event, the atmosphere was described as aggressive and dangerous. In addition to anti-Semitic slogans, activists denounced the propaganda of the “fake news press”. The police recommended families to stay away from the inner city and the Jewish Association advised their members to stay at home. There was widespread criticism that the police acted with too much restraint during the violent demonstrations of the Corona deniers. According to video sequences published on Twitter, police officers allegedly let the sometimes aggressive demonstrators go ahead and right-wing extremists marched side by side with the police (cf. DER STANDARD 2021; Salzburg24 2021). During the same period, for example, a demonstration against deportations of asylum seekers took place, where the police had been disproportionately harsh against peaceful demonstrators, serious allegations of violations of the protesters’ fundamental and human rights accumulated, through tear gas, detentions without the possibility of telephone calls and the right to contact lawyers. Demonstrators had to undress in front of – not always same-sex – officers (cf. Schmidt 2021). The police’s harsh handling of protests by students against the deportation of two Georgian girls who had grown up in Austria was also criticised. The police used dogs and sharp weapons. The impression was widely shared that double standards were applied here, among others by the Secretary General of Amnesty International Austria (cf. Stuhlpfarrer 2021). The cancellations of the demonstrations of the so-called Corona deniers also affected other demonstrations, as demonstrations that accept the measures were also regularly banned. (…) it is frightening how the right to demonstrate is now being dealt with (...) they have forbidden us (...) because of (...) these Corona deniers’ demonstrations. (...) Now, of course, it’s pandemic, we have to be careful, at the same time it’s a deep cut into freedom of assembly. (I 22)

  Ruth Simsa

 Summary: Aspects of changing civic spaces Austria is a stable democracy with comparatively well granted human rights, a developed welfare system and relatively good relations between civil society and the government. Nevertheless, in recent years the country experienced tendencies towards authoritarian politics and populist modifications of civil society. Thus, it is in line with increasing semi-authoritarian politics not only in post-socialist countries (Kover 2015; Krasztev/van Til 2015), but increasingly also in Western democracies such as France, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland (Meyer 2016). The clarity of this trend has prompted researchers to speak of a “democratic rollback” (Diamond 2008), “democratic backsliding” (Bermeo 2016), or even a “third wave of autocratization” (Lührmann/Lindberg 2018). The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law report “Closing Civic Space” on shrinking civic space gives a good overview of the legal restrictions on civil society and shows that an increasing number of CSOs are faced with restrictions to fully exercising their internationally protected rights (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 2016). In the following, I will summarise aspects that show a tendency of shrinking civic spaces.

. Restrictions regarding funding Due to neoliberal policies of the privatisation of social tasks and an economisation of political governance, CSOs experienced a decrease in public funding in relation to demand, putting pressure on CSOs to diversify and to engage in new income-generating activities (Neumayr et al. 2017). In an online survey with 251 CSOs in 2019, 41 % reported a decrease of government funding (Simsa et al. 2019). Sometimes financial cuts are “hidden”, when funding is not increased with respect to inflation. With the shift towards new public management, CSOs have lost their privileged position in welfare state arrangements. Quasi-markets have increased controlling and accountability mechanisms. Politics has opened up competitive tendering procedures to commercial providers and their share of the market has been rising in the last decade. In the period of a right-wing populist governmental coalition, critical CSOs experienced harsh financial cuts. Many respondents reported a systematic starvation of institutions. During the Covid-19 pandemic, this development was counteracted by a NPOemergency fund, which was vital for many organisations.

. Domestic laws regulating the operation of CSOs These laws are generally sensible and enable free activities. Nevertheless, in the last years, CSOs report a trend to increasing bureaucratic requirements specifically in re-

Civic spaces between turbulent politics and the pandemic – The civil society in Austria  

lation to funding. CSOs face different national and regional laws and therefore need to apply a range of action strategies.

. Policies and practices affecting the rights of freedom of assembly and association While the freedom of assembly is generally given, it has been restricted in the years before 2019, particularly by the extension of the notification period for assemblies and the establishment of so-called protected zones. Due to openness to interpretation, there was restricted legal certainty. During the pandemic, governmental measures affected the freedom of religion, of assembly, of access to education and employment, the rights of immigrants and others to protect the right to life and health. As large gatherings posed health risks, they were very restricted. Nevertheless, in many cases legal certainty and transparency were insufficient, and sometimes measures were not clearly regulated by law. Further, there is reason to assume that the police applied double standards: They treated violent and often even unauthorized demonstrations of the so-called Corona-deniers comparatively friendly, while peaceful protesters for the right to asylum (in one case even school children) were treated disproportionately harshly.

. Criminalisation and attempts to discredit civil society activities Specifically with regard to CSOs working with refugees, the right-wing populist government of 2017/2018 polarised the discourse. Further, there was constant devaluation and stigmatisation of CSOs working with other vulnerable target groups, the government frequently attacked CSOs and their representatives directly. There were also attempts to intimidate CSO representatives personally by the government and the administration by threatening telephone calls, but also of legal action against CSO representatives.

. Attacks on democratic institutions by the government A worrying development are recent attacks on legal institutions, especially on the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Economic Affairs and Corruption by the leading conservative party. They are related to serious suspicions of corruption against the Minister of Finance, a close confidant of the Chancellor, and other severe scandals that involve the conservative party and shake the republic.

  Ruth Simsa

 Conclusion In Austria, like in many other stable democracies, there are tendencies of restricted civic spaces. Some of them reflect long-term developments, some are the clear impact of right-wing populist politics specifically between 2017 and 2019 and some are connected with the Covid-19 pandemic. Recent attempts by the government to undermine democratic institutions complete the picture.

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  Ruth Simsa Stuhlpfarrer, M. (2021): Corona-Demo am Sonntag: “Unschöner Eindruck” der Polizei, Die Presse, 3rd February, Retrieved from https://www.diepresse.com/5931847/corona-demo-am-sonntagunschoner-eindruck-der-polizei (5th February 2021). Urbinati, N. (2016): Reflections on the Meaning of the “Crisis of Democracy”, Democratic Theory, 31, 6–31. Van Til, J. (2015): Democratic Resurgence in Hungary: Challenges to Oppositional Movements (An Open-Ended Conclusion), In: Krasztev, P./van Til, J. (eds.), The Hungarian Patient, Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy, Budapest/New York: CEU Press, 367–384. Weyland, K. (2018): Populism and Authoritarianism, In: La Torre, C. (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Global Populism, Milton Park/Abingdon/Oxon/New York: Routledge. World Justice Project (2018): Rule of Law Index® 2017–2018, Retrieved from https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2018-June-Online-Edition_0.pdf (20th September 2022). Zimmer, A./Simsa, R. (eds.) (2014): Forschung zu Zivilgesellschaft, NPOs und Engagement, Quo vadis? Wiesbaden: Springer.

Vasilios N. Makrides

Civil Society in 21st Century Greece: Locating Challenges, Charting Opportunities, Assessing Developments  Introduction Civil society is commonly connected to the so-called “third sector”, which is supposed to be differentiated from the state and the private, profit-oriented domain/market and is mainly associated with the existence and activities of various professional, welfare and religious non-profit organisations as well as with both formal and informal networks and groups of citizens or even broader social movements. Based on voluntary or semi-voluntary initiatives for the advancement of common interests, these are not only meant to provide an array of important services, to apply specific programmes of solidarity and to advocate for vulnerable groups (from the poor and the voiceless to immigrants/refugees and marginalised social groups), but also to contribute to good governance, democratisation, pluralism, tolerance, social cohesion, climate protection, and sustainability—to mention but a few. Hence, the civil sector is considered to be the cornerstone of the “social capital” of a given society and a vehicle to implement individual and collective plans in the private pursuit of the public good through a huge variety of civic spaces, ranging from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to various volunteer-run solidarity initiatives. All this became far more imperative at the beginning of the 21st century, which saw unprecedented changes taking place within the framework of ongoing globalisation (e.g. through the new social media platforms), as well as various global crises that have triggered intense discussions and debates about justice, solidarity and civic engagement—not least in the context of the European Union (EU). This often happened due to the lack of unified policies towards pressing issues (e.g. the continuous immigrant/refugee waves), but also due to the rise of illiberal regimes and authoritarian policies in certain countries that categorically denied civic solidarity actions and came to enjoy wide popularity among various social strata—all this connected to the alarming rise of xenophobic, intolerant and chauvinistic currents. It goes without saying that all this is closely related to the functioning of a civil society, its diverse limitations and its legitimacy, a fact that raises the question of its potential shrinking or its enhancement. The case of contemporary Greece is particularly relevant for discussing the issue of contestation and even restriction of civic spaces due to various developments and severe crises during the last decades including foreign immigration and a massive refugee crisis. In fact, the Greek case can be used as a testing ground for examining https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111070469-009

  Vasilios N. Makrides and understanding the complex interplay between establishing viable civic structures and becoming aware of local sensitivities pertaining to security and other issues. Being a liberal democratic country, a European Union member state (since 1981) with a stable political system and a close ally to the Western world, Greece would theoretically be a prime host of a firmly established civil society. However, although there exist many informal, less visible civic aspects and activities including loose groups and spontaneous networks of collective actors without a respective legal personality, the situation on the formal level is a different one, given that this country exhibits various particularities. It still has a rather weak und underdeveloped tradition of civil society in comparison to West European countries for a number of sometimes interrelated reasons. This is not due to the rise of illiberal governance and authoritarian trends, as is the case in other parts of the world (Alscher/Priller/Ratka/ Strachwitz 2017; Hummel 2019; Ayvazyan 2019), but rather to structural aspects of modern Greek society. There are, for example, low levels of associational membership, volunteering and social trust, which are vital indicators of a well-established and -functioning civil society. In addition, the country’s non-profit sector is also relatively limited and small in comparison to West European countries (especially the northern ones). Greece, contrastingly, is a country with a less institutionalised arena of civil society groups and initiatives including NGOs—often subsumed under the broader category of “civil society organisations” (CSOs). Solely specific sectors representing the interests of liberal professions and those of the employees in the public domain are considered to be a little more developed in terms of civil society and civic awareness (Sotiropoulos 2004 and 2005; Huliaras 2020). Various reasons have been advanced to explain this situation. These relate, for instance, to the power and influence of political parties, which have their own organised representations in labour or student unions, whereas various NGOs are funded or subsidised directly by the state or specific ministries (including with EU funds). In addition, there is a long tradition favouring a narrow communitarian spirit of trust (e.g. among extended family members) without much interest in the common good, trust of non-family members, activist groups, the welfare state, and civil society at large. Historically speaking, the whole situation was also connected to the legacy of clientelism and patronage stemming from long Ottoman rule (1453–1830). On a more philosophical level, the whole issue has been brought into connection with notions of the self in modern Greece, their ontological underpinnings, and the resulting political attitudes. Here the potential influence of the Orthodox Christian tradition— with its emphasis on a non-rational, contemplative, mystical, sentimental and otherworldly religiosity and collective experience, the lack of a strict legal framework and bureaucratic structure, and the less developed notions of individuality, historicity and secularisation—has been considered to be of paramount importance (Marangudakis/Rontos/Xenitidou 2013). The theory of a contemporary popular Greek philosopher and cultural analyst Stelios Ramfos about a deficient Greek self, nurtured by the Orthodox tradition, should also be mentioned (Schwaderer 2018). In general,

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there are differences in the civic engagement between Eastern Orthodox and Western Christians (Makrides 2020). This is not unrelated to the close church-state relations in Greece, the nationalisation of the Orthodox Church, and the lack of a greater religious diversification and heterogeneity in the country—the latter is considered a prerequisite for mobilising greater civic societal action due to the ensuing inter-religious antagonism and competition (Bailer/Bodenstein/Finn Heinrich 2013). However, all this hardly means that Orthodox actors are altogether absent from the NGO sector and civic activism (Molokotos-Liederman 2007), as we shall see later on in this chapter. Furthermore, Greece’s overall development after the fall of the junta in 1974 was quite positive in terms of democratisation, civil rights and modernisation, yet it did not support conditions that would weaken statism and enable a stronger civil society (Sotiropoulos 2014; Huliaras 2015). Aside from the aforementioned historical-culturalist explanations, the weakness of the Greek civic sector has been attributed to prevailing neoliberal policies of the state, which aim at continuously creating new profit-oriented opportunities for companies and individuals and hence impinge upon the non-profit civic sector. The tradition of volunteerism in the country is also considered to have been rather weak—a noteworthy exception being that of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, whose organisational committee managed to develop an infrastructure in order to attract as many volunteers as possible (Sotiropoulos/Karamagioli 2006). However, the flourishing of free and informal solidarity initiatives at the grassroots level and outside neoliberal frameworks aiming at the reconfiguration of social life can also be amply observed (Rozakou 2016a). The latter situation sheds light on an otherwise unexpected civil society potential in Greece. From the 2000s onwards, the number of NGOs and networks (regarding immigrants and refugees, environmental issues etc.) did rise considerably in the country, yet their continuing state-dependence due to strong politicisation and the patronage system remained a major hindrance to their autonomy, transparency and freedom of expression (e.g. in controlling or denouncing political corruption and narrow party interests). Cases of fraud and malpractice exploiting various funding possibilities were also not out of the ordinary (Rozakou 2016a: 87). Despite their occasional commonalities and overlaps, it is vital to make a distinction here between the formal NGO sector and the numerous voluntary civic networks, collectivities and solidarity groups, which often emerged spontaneously in order to cope with specific problems and challenges. Aside from those affiliated with well-known and internationally operating NGOs (e.g. Amnesty International, GreenPeace, WWF, Doctors without Borders), various national NGOs had a limited scope and kept the rather informal, loose character of a voluntary association without always acquiring a formal structure, legal entity, management, communication skills, and detailed records. This attests to the often fluid boundaries between the above two categories of civic activities in the country, which experienced a gradual rise during the last decades due to various socio-political changes.

  Vasilios N. Makrides Specifically with regard to humanitarian relief for immigrants, the related widespread activism was deployed in various ways, namely through formal NGOs, in a quasi-NGO form or in a totally independent manner. The fact that such networks, collectivities and solidarity groups and even several NGOs were not officially registered with state authorities proved to be a source of problems in the long run, especially in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis. If we were to classify the relations between the state and the above broad NGO sector in Greece following Young’s conceptual framework (2006), we would characterise them as lying somehow between the “complementary” and the “supplementary” mode. This is because in some cases the state or specific political parties collaborated with such NGOs in a partnership relation or even supported and controlled them (e.g. through financing). But there were also cases in which the state did not interfere with their work and allowed them to operate, also given the fact that many of them were not registered at all. Despite occasional problems and matters of friction, this particular situation generally appeared to function well, yet not so much concerning the issue of foreign immigration, which shed a negative light on the broad NGO sector, especially in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis (Makrides 2022). Be that as it may, the above deficits apply more to the formal level of the functioning of a civil society and not to the grassroots level, where social solidarity groups of diverse provenance emerged and have been active on an informal level. The present chapter aims to sketch the current civil society situation in Greece in light of recent developments and challenges and to assess whether its space has been reduced or enhanced.

 The Deep Economic Crisis and its Effects on Civil Society The severe economic crisis that hit Greece in late 2009, which lasted throughout the 2010s on various levels, was not only significant in terms of restructuring the whole country, given that its repercussions were not only financial, but also political, social and cultural. It can also be used as a testing ground for examining the issue of civil society amidst an economic calamity and the strict austerity measures imposed by the state under the instructions of the international creditors, who supported the country through a series of rescue packages (Fiscal Adjustments Programmes alias Memoranda), namely the European Community, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (Sotiropoulos 2014; Clarke/Huliaras/Sotiropoulos 2015; Simiti 2017). This is because this crisis did not only cause a major political upheaval, but also a considerable collapse of the welfare system, giving rise to reactionary street protests and illiberal trends and movements (Petmesidou/Guillén 2014). The political system, which was held responsible for the bankruptcy of the country, was profoundly shaken and was unable to provide the basic needs for many citizens for a

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long time. The numerous protests of a populist nature against the austerity measures imposed by the government and against international creditors supposedly exploiting Greek public resources and wealth offered a fertile ground for the rise of conspiracy theories about foreign centres of power and influence that were targeting the country as a whole. Protesters usually tended to oversimplify the problems according to a binary mode of thinking that led, among other things, to xenophobic attitudes and public intolerance towards foreigners. In this highly polarised context, foreign immigration to Greece was also implicated in the cluster of key causes that had led to the eruption of the economic crisis in the first place. On this level, we can clearly discern the emergence of cases of informal, spontaneous civic engagement, despite Greece’s aforementioned lack of a strong historical civil society background. This can be observed in the rise of social solidarity or selfhelp groups in various major cities, usually without official registration, that undertook multiple functions to assist the needy people in various categories (Pantazidou 2013). The same holds true for various loose networks of solidarity. Given that the official political parties had come under serious criticism and attack for being mainly responsible for the bankruptcy of the country, there was a vacuum left in society. This was filled to a large extent by civil society activists of varied provenance and orientation, who provided all kinds of humanitarian assistance. This civic activism mostly drew positive reactions from the general public, but only partially on the part of the state. This is because protests during this harsh period did not always take place in a peaceful and purely democratic manner; for example, due to the excess of verbal and physical violence, destruction of public property, disruption of urban life, as well as public dissatisfaction with and intolerance towards foreigners. Even so, many aspects of this informal civil society emergence showed that there is a potential for such a civic mobilisation in the Greek context, regardless of its long-term outcome. It should not be forgotten that all this took place in times of a serious economic adversity, given that the state annulled tax-exemptions and cut down state subsidies for NGOs as a means of reducing public expenses and raising its revenues. Consequently, the overall work of NGOs was seriously hampered by such bureaucratic, fiscal and other problems. This led the NGOs that survived this grave situation to seek other forms of financial assistance; for example, from private sponsors and donations. Consequently, there were numerous new initiatives that were undertaken on the basis of the concrete needs of Greek society under crisis, whereas some older NGOs also adapted their activities accordingly. The civil society activities, both formal and informal, during this difficult period included the distribution and exchange of food (from food packages to soup-kitchens) (Rakopoulos 2014) and clothes; in addition, the provision of services to specific groups of persons in need, at times in cooperation with municipal authorities (e.g. through the so-called “social grocery stores”). Another area was the provision of medical and health services (e.g. through “social infirmaries”) as well as free tutorials for students. Other activities focused on finding new employment for people that had lost

  Vasilios N. Makrides their jobs, offering alternative training to the unemployed, and supporting them and their families psychologically. This was because related frustration was quite widespread during this period, creating serious family problems and leading some of the unemployed to depression and even to suicide. As previously mentioned, there were also completely new and unexpected forms of voluntary associations performing various initiatives, such as improving the quality of life in big cities; for example, the “Atenistas” in Athens since 2010, who, among other things, did recycling and cleaning work and provided a model for similar associations in other cities. Another case relates to various initiatives to fight corruption, which was perceived as a key cause of the entire crisis. This led, among other things, to public events discussing and criticising corruption and to web initiatives collecting information and revealing such cases to the wider public (Tzifakis/Petropoulos/Huliaras 2017). One major institution that emerged as a provider of various welfare activities through its official NGO “Mission” (Apostoli), founded in 2010, was the Orthodox Church of Greece, led by Archbishop Hieronymos II since 2008, who has always put emphasis on such activities during his ecclesiastical career. No doubt, the church had the necessary infrastructure and network capacities to undertake such a major task voluntarily, not least in order to polish its public profile, given that it had been often criticised in the past for neglecting social issues. All in all, this was a development that earned broadly positive responses from politics and society at a time when the state especially had largely failed as a provider of social services (Makris/Bekridakis 2013; Makris/Meichanetsidis 2018; Molokotos-Liederman 2019). The church is not an NGO in the classical sense, given its close relations to the state in Greece. However, it managed to show another humanitarian profile during the crisis for a wide variety of people (including Muslim immigrants/refugees) and by cooperating with secular organisations for the common good. Similar initiatives were also undertaken on a local basis by various dioceses throughout the country. Aside from this, voluntary civic activities included numerous protests against the austerity measures imposed by the government, a development that marked a new phase of popular politicisation of the Greek public. The phenomenon of people gathering in public squares and places to protest—mostly peacefully, although the danger of escalation was always present—was thus not unusual. The most prominent case was that of the so-called “Indignant People” or the “The Indignated” (Aganaktismenoi). Thousands of people protested daily at the Syntagma Square in central Athens opposite the Greek Parliament in 2011 and even settled there permanently for a long time. In this context, some forms of direct democracy and decision taking were practiced (e.g. through local assemblies and informal referenda). It was a mobilisation that grew out of the widespread dissatisfaction with the measures taken to overcome the economic crisis, but also with the entire political party system and its longstanding mistakes and pathologies that had led to the crisis in the first place. Such protests often took on a populist character that tended to oversimplify the problems and their causes according to a binary mode of thinking; for example, the “suffering”

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Greek people vs. the “cold-hearted” international creditors. In this way, there were strong protests against specific socio-economic reforms aimed at increasing the competiveness of the Greek economy (e.g. by abolishing patronage-based privileges of the so-called “closed professions” and “market niches”). Such steps were deemed necessary for a viable reform, yet they impinged directly upon the interests of specific social groups, which orchestrated massive protests and intended to keep their long-established rights and privileges without curtailment. Policing or controlling such protest movements proved to be ineffective in many cases, and the results thereof were sometimes destructive, given that some participants lost their lives, especially when protests went out of control and became “anarchist” in character, a development that clearly reveals the Janus face of such spontaneous civic actions. Such phenomena also included the “I Do Not Pay” (Den plirono) movement, in which people refused to pay necessary fees for public transportation and tolls as a reaction against the state- or privately owned companies that run them. The same was occasionally done for new taxes imposed by the government. Consequently, the civic meaning of such actions was seriously questioned and debated. The same holds true for the attempted occupation of government buildings (ministries etc.), the violent destruction of historical buildings in central Athens, and the uncritical opposition towards foreign investors who were portrayed as simply exploiting Greek public resources and wealth. Such outbursts of violence fuelled the already polarised general climate and the fierce party divisions during this period, thus they cannot be subsumed under the civil society umbrella. However, they can be explained and understood, considering the huge scale of the crisis under consideration and its tremendous social impact, which radically turned the usual, conventional and long-established coordinates of the entire Greek society upside down and in a very short space of time. What is more important is that the civil society actions in general during this period were not completely separated from political interests, as they were usually supported by the opposition parties. In addition, several of these protest movements, lacking an organised base, lost momentum after an initial period of effervescence, publicity and promotion, whereas their influence waned significantly later on, leading to their complete disappearance. Hence, the remaining question is whether such actions have left a lasting legacy of civil society as an autonomous engagement for the common good on Greek consciousness. This largely holds true, despite numerous deficits and problematic situations. In fact, the crisis period was an opportunity to develop further civil society initiatives, which, however, were undertaken to a large extent by informal groups and voluntary networks rather than by NGOs. In addition, all this took place in the first years of the crisis, especially between 2011 and 2014. The subsequent rise of the leftwing Syriza party to power in January 2015 curbed the overall protest potential of such movements, as the new government tried to show its radical face towards the international creditors and to satisfy the wishes of the Greek protestors in the first months. However, Syriza’s policies in the later period of its government (2015–2019), which

  Vasilios N. Makrides were necessary compromises, were considered as a betrayal of its original promises and pledges, especially when it completely ignored the result of the June 2015 referendum about Greece leaving the Eurozone. It is worth mentioning that the austerity measures imposed by Syriza, which were much harsher than the previous ones, did not cause any significant protests within Greek society and in many cases went almost unnoticed. This concerns especially the capital controls imposed in June 2015, which lasted for many years and constrained economic activities to a considerable degree in the country. This situation has two probable explanations: Either Greek society got tired because of the first intense period of reactions and protests or it was basically the political Left that had been orchestrating this wide protest mobilisation in the first place. All this signifies in the end that, despite some positive signs regarding the civic engagement of Greek citizens, civil society in the country is still constrained by a number of decisive factors inhibiting its autonomous evolution—the most prominent being its dependence on political party interests. It is also characteristic that according to statistical data the number of Greeks participating in such voluntary activities and solidarity networks did experience a rise (Kalogeraki 2018), yet it was limited and certainly lower to the ones observed in other countries facing similar financial problems during the same period within the Eurozone (e.g. Italy, Spain, Portugal) (Sotiropoulos 2014; Cristancho/Loukakis 2018). This situation can be attributed to various reasons, such as to the weak tradition of volunteerism and civic engagement that has characterised the country for a long time. Another reason is the immense role played by the family (in its extended forms) in our context to which Greeks normally turn in periods of need, a phenomenon that underlines the still communitarian character of Greek social life. This kind of family is thus the one that is more trusted than the welfare state or civil society organisations. Despite these constraints, there were still signs of an enhanced civic engagement during this period, especially on the informal level. Even when state funds for supporting NGOs and similar initiatives were radically cut down, the latter still tried to fulfil various tasks and mobilise people accordingly in the civil society terrain.

 The Rise of the Political Far Right Challenging Civil Society What is particularly interesting in the Greek case and reveals at the same time its idiosyncrasies is another reaction in the period of the aforementioned crisis, which took on a completely another direction. It is about the rise of the Far or Extreme Right in the Greek political scene. This took place in the form of the Neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn (Chrysi Αvgi) that grew exponentially and challenged civic spaces as a whole by heavily criticising and even forcibly attacking NGO initiatives towards pluralism,

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non-discrimination, multi-culturalism, diversity, tolerance, as well as broader social cohesion and solidarity (Vasilopoulou/Halikiopoulou 2015). It thus succeeded in entering the Greek Parliament in 2012 and remained there after repeated elections until 2019, always winning 6–7 percent of the vote. It also managed to get into the European Parliament in the elections of 2014 and 2019 with 3 and 2 deputies respectively. This shows that its socio-political programme appealed to part of the Greek electorate, while its general sympathisers must have reached higher numbers within various echelons of Greek society, including the overall right-wing political spectrum, the church, and the army (Koronaiou/Sakellariou 2013). During this period, the Golden Dawn party developed its own “civil society” activities and social services (e.g. soup-kitchens, food distribution, blood donations), parallel to those of the NGOs and informal associations/networks, yet with an exclusive focus on the “pure”, “native” and “autochthonous” Greek citizens, whom it claimed to protect from all evil (cf. its popular slogan “Greeks first”). After all, a significant part of its racist discourse (including hate speech and culture of fear) and at times violent actions (of the “vigilante” type) were against pluralism, diversity, globalisation, and multi-culturalism. All this was mainly directed against the immigrants/refugees, who were supposed to demographically alter Greek society, which had to remain ethnically, nationally and religiously homogeneous at any price. By extension, it targeted further groups that were considered as dangerous for the future of Hellenism, such as Jews in an anti-Semitic, conspiracy-driven context and members of the LGBTQ+ community. In fact, it turned against the classical values of civil society by creating its own “uncivil canopy”. It thus posed a serious challenge to the development of a civil society in Greece (Dalakoglou 2013; Lazaridis/Veikou 2017; Roumanias/Skouras/Christodoulakis 2018). In turn, the overall activities of Golden Dawn and especially the violent actions triggered similar reactions, particularly from the Left and the broader anarchist-autonomous milieu. This escalation sometimes reached extreme proportions and polarised the Greek public, which had been greatly perturbed by the economic crisis and other political developments. Such issues included the murder of a Greek hip-hop singer in September 2013 by a member of Golden Dawn, which resulted in the cold-blooded shooting of two of its members in retaliation. Without a doubt, such incidents and the general resurgence of racism have no place in civil society activities, yet they are relevant for our main issue and clearly signified a regression in the consolidation of civil society in the country. From a historical perspective, the Far Right in Greece did not play a role in the post-1974 period after the fall of the junta, and its influence was marginal. It was represented by various small organisations, which went mostly unnoticed in the public sphere without electoral success. However, there were attempts to reorganise this entire spectrum in the 1990s, particularly because the country started to become a host place for immigrants, first from the ex-communist countries, and second from Asian and African countries (Galariotis/Georgiadou/Kafe/Lialiouti 2017). In the latter case, many immigrants were Muslims, which caused widespread fears in Greek society

  Vasilios N. Makrides about an upcoming Islamisation, which would result in the de-Hellenisation and the de-Christianisation of the country. This prompted widespread criticism of the political establishment, especially in terms of applying “law and order” in Greek society and reacting against migration and multi-culturalism, two prominent issues during that period. After all, the strong national and Orthodox Christian identification of modern Greeks as a demarcation mechanism and its detrimental effects on minority issues have been confirmed by recent surveys (Pew Research Center 2018). These reactions were also connected to problems of rising criminality and public security in major urban centres (Athens, Thessaloniki), and at times to national security due to Greece’s long-standing problems with neighbouring Turkey and its growing expansionism. The resurgence of contentious issues at that time (e.g. the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, the dispute over the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia/FYROM, the deeper EU-integration process) triggered ultranationalist jingoism and chauvinistic ethnocentric reactions, including those from the far-right political spectrum, which especially stirred up xenophobic elements in its public agenda. For example, the building of an official mosque in Athens (Roussos 2010–11; Makrides 2021), a highly controversial topic for several decades, received vehement reactions, and not only from the far-right political domain. Aside from this, the construction of the Greek political system and especially the form of bipartisanship that dominated and monopolised the elected governments for several decades were also considered a cause for the sudden and meteoric rise of the Golden Dawn party in the 2010s. In fact, the eruption of the economic crisis directed the rage of people towards this model of bipartisanship. This also allowed other political forces to come to the surface, to criticise the established political system, and to promise to steer the country towards a better future of absolute national sovereignty and glory without external control (Ellinas 2013; Georgiadou 2013; Vasilopoulou/Halikiopoulou 2015a). All this and especially the authoritarianism of the party centred around the premise of a strong leader was quite appealing to a number of disappointed and outraged Greek citizens, which also accounts for the sudden increase in the Golden Dawn’s electoral power. It is also important to note that there were other right-wing political forces with a populist anti-European agenda at that time, which also capitalised on the crisis and increased their political power by getting into Parliament. However, one of them, the “Independent Greeks” (Anexartitoi Ellines/ANEL), established in 2012, managed to form a peculiar coalition with of the left-wing Syriza party and govern the country between 2015 and 2019 before disappearing completely afterwards. This attests to the numerous peculiarities that the economic crisis rendered possible during this highly turbulent period. Aside from its initial electoral success, there has also been an ongoing judicial investigation into Golden Dawn and its activities since 2013, on the charge on forming a criminal organisation. In October 2020, the Greek courts indicted its leader and a large number of its prominent members, despite the fact that in the meantime many of them had already become independent and had founded their own respective political or-

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ganisations. This highly significant development also goes back to the parliamentary elections of July 2019. A majority Right government came to power and normalised Greece’s political and public life by stabilising the country’s democratic institutions. In these last elections, Golden Dawn failed to win any seats in Parliament, which clearly signifies that it had lost most of its appeal after its meteoric rise several years previously. It should not be forgotten that many Golden Dawn voters in the past were not convinced by its ideology as such, but voted for it to protest against the weaknesses of the entire previous political system that had led to the eruption of the economic crisis. Hence, after a heated period of protests and reactions, voters turned their back on Golden Dawn and returned to more conventional political solutions. From this perspective, the rise of the Golden Dawn party only caused temporary difficulties for Greek civil society within the context of the country’s broader issues. After all, Golden Dawn’s ideology was clearly against civil society postulates and was inherently anti-democratic. In its electoral programme, it had promised to establish a “dynamic” democracy instead of the existing “static representative” parliamentarian democracy, a pledge that would actually have amounted to the abolition of democratic structures in the country. However, some of the problems that Golden Dawn intended to solve still persist within broader Greek society and are a “burden” for a considerable number of its citizens, which directly links to civil society issues. This largely concerns the growing number of immigrants and refugees as well as their integration and assimilation within Greek society, as we shall see later on in this chapter. In any case, such a rise of political authoritarianism in Greece should not be considered as an isolated case. In fact, it fits well in the international scene, which has witnessed various forms of populism, authoritarianism and illiberalism in recent years, both within the EU (especially in Hungary and Poland) (Melzer/Serafin 2013) and beyond, such as in the USA under Donald Trump or in Brazil under Jair Bolsonaro. The clear, anti-democratic leanings of such movements as well as their broad appeal in their respective countries were in fact alarming developments, not least within the context of a future viable civil society on the global stage. As a result, the Greek case should not be considered as an exception and an isolated incident outside global trends, but should be contextualised in an appropriate way and especially invite a broader reflection and discussion on the conditions that are to become potential challenges and threats to civil society in the future. Greece’s political system and society were able to surmount the usual party fragmentation existing in numerous European countries in the long term, which was in fact the main cause for the rise of such populist and authoritarian parties to political prominence, if not to power. What is perhaps interesting in the Greek case in terms of civil society are the counter-reactions to the aforementioned rise of the political Far-Right. These prompted a huge array of both organised and informal anti-racist, pro-migrant and anti-discrimination initiatives and actions. This is still a promising sign that can be interpreted as the further embedding of a vocal and active civil society in Greece.

  Vasilios N. Makrides

 Foreign Immigration, the Refugee Crisis of 2015, and their Repercussions on Civic Spaces The influx of numerous immigrants (including refugees), both legal and illegal, over the last three decades has been a seminal development that seriously affected Greek society in various ways (Lazaridis/Wickens 1999; Antonopoulos/Winterdyk 2006; Triandafyllidou 2009). This also included its attempted transformation from a monocultural to a relatively multi-cultural one—a difficult, complicated and controversial process. It is worth mentioning that at least ten percent of the current population of the country has an immigrant background, and there are “ghettos” in major urban centres (in central Athens, aside from its greater metropolitan area). Greece’s rather homogeneous population was traditionally Christian Orthodox (at least nominally and culturally), while only a sizeable and varied Muslim minority existed (mostly in Western Thrace). This radical change took place in various waves from the early 1990s after the fall of Communism in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Initially, this large number of immigrants included many Albanians, due to the geographical proximity between the two countries. In addition, many immigrants from various ex-Soviet Republics were of Greek descent and had fewer problems with integration, although they did not speak any Greek when they first arrived. Due to warfare and other sociopolitical problems in the Middle East (cf. the two Iraq wars), in northern or sub-Saharan Africa and in Asia, numerous immigrants (overwhelmingly Muslims) also sought asylum in Greece (and by extension in the EU). All this alarmed state authorities, who began implementing stricter controls and creating detention facilities across the land and maritime borders to Turkey in the 1990s. The ambiguous attitude of countries with a key role in this entire constellation, namely of Turkey (sheltering more than 3 million refugees within its borders), and its ambivalent policy vis-à-vis the EU and the West have also complicated the whole situation. In fact, in February/March 2020, Turkey encouraged refugees to forcibly cross the Greek border in Thrace. On the other hand, smugglers and traffickers of refugees operated continuously, at times under the “protection” or with the “permission” of Turkish authorities. Some of the NGOs active in this domain also fell victim to such an instrumentalisation of the refugee issue. For instance, in August 2022, 38 refugees (including a child that had allegedly died) were stranded on an islet in the Evros River on Greece’s natural border with Turkey. The incident was portrayed by the Greek-led NGO “HumanRights360” and international media (e.g. Channel 4, Der Spiegel) as taking place on Greek territory, thus criticising Greek authorities and tarnishing their reputation with regard to the “inhuman” migration policy of the country. This NGO had been founded in 2017 by Epaminondas Farmakis and represented these refugees at the European Court of Human Rights. However, it was later proven that the islet actually belonged to Turkey and that the refugees had probably been pushed there purposely by Turkish authorities in the first place. In fact, Greek authorities had

Civil Society in 21st Century Greece: Locating Challenges, Charting Opportunities & Developments  

pointed this out from the very beginning and even the aforementioned NGO finally acknowledged it to be true (Ekathimerini 2022a). Thus, Greece officially asked for an apology and threatened media that had spread such “fake news” with legal action, while the German magazine Der Spiegel removed several posts on this issue from its website due to doubts about what had actually happened. Meanwhile, the above NGO was accused by the state Authority for Money Laundering of fraud, infidelity, embezzlement and financial malpractice as well as of forming a criminal organisation (Hellas Posts 2022), while the former portrayed these measures as a blind attack and a witch-hunt against NGOs and civil society at large. This is just one incident from the many that are continuously taking place across the land and maritime borders between Greece and Turkey. In October 2022, 92 naked refugees, mainly from Syria and Afghanistan, were found on Greece’s land border with Turkey, with Greece claiming a provocation from the Turkish side, an incident that prompted an urgent investigation by the UN refugee agency (The Guardian 2022). In general, Greece is repeatedly criticised by international organisations (e.g. the European Council on Refugees and Exiles: ECRE 2022) for pushing back immigrants from Turkey, while the country itself claims that it follows a strict but fair migration policy in accordance with EU and United Nations (UN) regulations and directives. Various NGOs were also criticised for simply endorsing and uncritically echoing the Turkish version of events, which has constantly targeted Greece. The Greek side also insinuated that Turkey has financed some NGOs itself. In any case, one should note that what has happened between Turkey and Greece in recent years is a “hybrid war”, in which Turkey weaponises the immigration issue against Greece, expecting to gain benefits in various domains—not least territorially, as it openly questions Greek sovereign rights over numerous Aegean islands and the Eastern Mediterranean. Given that the Turkish claims are sometimes repeated by NGOs active in the area (e.g. the Norway-based “Aegean Boat Report” about the de-militarisation of Greek islands: Daily Sabah 2022), this tarnishes the overall image of NGOs among the general Greek public, as we shall see later on in this chapter. It goes without saying that this issue is highly relevant for civil society, and this is how it has been perceived by Greek actors in the civic sector from the very beginning. It is not accidental, after all, that a significant number of NGOs and other humanitarian initiatives in Greece were directed towards this grave immigration issue from the outset. Even the Orthodox Church showed great interest in it, most notably in the 2015 refugee crisis (Makrides 2018). Aside from this, there are several other NGOs active in this domain. These range from splinter organisations of large international NGOs, such as “Doctors without Borders” and “Doctors of the World”, to various local ones, such as “Hope” (Elpida) and “The Children’s Smile” (To Hamogelo tou Paidiou) for the protection of children or the “Hellenic League of Human Rights” and the “Minority Groups Research Centre” for the prevention of human trafficking and the support of immigrants and other socially excluded groups. In this respect, the range of humanitarian activities is quite impressive in comparison to other areas of

  Vasilios N. Makrides civil society activities, especially in cases where official state authorities underestimate the severity of the situation and do not take immediate action. From a historical perspective, the continuous immigration process became gradually more complicated, especially in the 2010s in connection with the aforementioned economic crisis (McDonough/Tsourdi 2013). It goes without saying that the NGO sector and especially various informal solidarity networks were quite active in providing humanitarian aid and both legal and medical support for the immigrants from the beginning (Rozakou 2012). This broad spectrum also included self-organised “immigrant associations” of the migrant communities themselves that stood in solidarity with the new arrivals (Papadopoulos/Chalkias/Fratsea 2013). All of them criticised the problematic treatment of immigrants either by state authorities, specific societal groups, and the international community at large (e.g. the EU border agency “Frontex”, originally founded in 2004), especially when these immigrants intended to cross the borders to other European countries. Numerous immigrants were detained in overcrowded temporary facilities in border areas, which lacked vital infrastructure. There were also special police operations that implemented Law 3907/2011 aimed at systematically controlling immigrant flows and returning those undocumented or illegal to their home countries. More specifically, starting in 2012, the operation “Xenios Zeus” (Xenios Dias), alluding to Zeus as the patron deity of hospitality and protector of travellers and foreigners, aimed to control, arrest and detain illegal immigrants in large urban centres. Even if it complied with general EU directives, Greece’s immigration policy was deemed as repressive by many NGO activists, because it intimidated immigrants and violated their rights. Moreover, the state was often accused of prioritising profit over meeting humanitarian needs. The state policy of creating special “detention or pre-departure centres” for immigrants was also condemned as a cover-up, given that NGOs usually had no access to such centres to provide their own services. In fact, in terms of humanitarian and other aid for immigrants, the state was absent in many cases, while the gap was filled to a large degree, either formally or informally, by NGOs and volunteer-run initiatives, which often did not enjoy support from the state or the general public. The question is how all this has affected Greece, a country located at the EU borderland, and its civil society tradition, especially in the context of the simultaneous economic crisis, which had forced Greek governments to prioritise other matters over immigration. Even if many migrants mostly saw and used Greece as a gateway to another EU country in recent years, many of them were in fact forced to remain in the country for long periods of time or even permanently. One issue was the distinction between legal and illegal or between registered and unregistered immigrants, especially when identifying those who had legitimate asylum rights. Another challenge was their successful integration and assimilation or their potential segregation. Following the first immigrant waves in the 1990s, Albanian immigrants were largely integrated into their host society after three decades and have reached a degree of social acceptance (e.g. Albanian boys born in Greece can acquire Greek or dual citizenship

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and serve in the Greek army). In the case of Muslim immigrants from various Asian and African countries and especially in the years following the 2015 refugee crisis, things tended to be more complicated. This was not only due to religious differences, but also to cultural, social and political aspects arising from the traditional GreekTurkish cleavage, the distinction between Europe and the rest of the world, or the historical Christian-Muslim opposition. In any case, immigration to Greece was multifaceted. On the one hand, it provided cheap labour forces and varied the country’s demographic, but on the other hand, it was associated with various social problems, such as criminality and ghettoisation. It also contributed to the rise of xenophobic attitudes among the general public, albeit unintentionally, a development that affected the NGO sector in general. Political responses to this challenge were traditionally ambiguous, both trying to respect international standards and to protect Greek national interests (Skleparis 2015). The left-wing Syriza government was the only one to endorse a clear pro-migrant and open-border strategy after 2015, due to its anti-discriminatory and internationalist ideology. However, this polarised Greek society even further amidst the severe economic crisis. At that time, migrants arrived daily from Turkey through maritime or land passages, while Greek society started to react, at times in extreme ways, against this enforced and radical change of its structure. Despite the stricter immigration policy of the current right-wing government and the fact that the 2015 refugee crisis seems to belong to a distant past, Greek society still remains polarised over the sensitive issue of immigration. The state intends to render the immigrant problem somehow “invisible” by dispersing immigrants to various camps and opening new ones throughout the country, although the presence of immigrants is still quite visible in large urban centres. Even so, this state policy remains quite contentious on a local basis, as organised or spontaneous groups of citizens protest against the transportation of immigrants by blockading streets and occupying public spaces. Although a considerable part of the Greek population had started worrying about the growing immigration flows and their potential effects on society and culture in the 1900s, coupled with the rise in xenophobic attitudes, the situation experienced an unexpected twist in 2015 when the refugee crisis broke out with over 900,000 irregular migrants arriving in Greece. This was Europe’s largest migrant crisis since the end of the Second World War. It reached a peak in the Greek Aegean islands neighbouring Turkey, with the name of the significantly overcrowded refugee camp “Moria” on the island of Lesvos, which has been the epicentre of the crisis, making international headlines. The same also applied to the thousands of immigrants that were stranded in Eidomeni on Greece’s border with North Macedonia between August 2015 and May 2016, herded together in the open air under miserable conditions and expecting in vain to eventually make it to Western Europe (Anastasiadou/Marvakis/ Mezidou/Speer 2017). This crisis was mainly due to the prolonged civil war in Syria, but immigrants from many other countries used the opportunity to attempt to reach Europe. The issue was fiercely debated at the EU level as well, especially because

  Vasilios N. Makrides other southern European countries were also seriously affected by such developments (e.g. Italy and Spain). While some other countries were ready to accept large numbers of immigrants (e.g. Germany), several followed an ambiguous policy on the matter, while some other countries refused to accept them altogether (e.g. Hungary and Poland) (Rea/Martiniello/Mazzola/Meuleman 2019). As expected, this humanitarian emergency had an immediate impact on civic activities towards immigrants, especially on the NGO sector. This is because the refugee crisis led to an exponential growth of domestic and international activists (mostly from Western Europe), who started organising various initiatives to support immigrants in both formal and informal ways, especially during the early phase of the crisis until the summer of 2015. Later on, humanitarian aid became more “professionalised” as national and international NGOs took the lead. All this also took place under the aegis of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, which was officially active in Greece and administered various aid programmes, as well as under the auspices of other international institutions including the EU. The whole situation was largely facilitated by Greece’s first left-wing government, in power since 2015, whose political agenda had a clear pro-migrant policy supporting “open borders” both for Greece and for Europe at large. When in power, Syriza was, however, forced to make various compromises to its liberal immigration policy and consider other parameters for the country’s sake, as it was the first which attempted to place the broad NGO sector under state surveillance in January 2016. Even so, the result was the huge increase of immigrants in the country. The latter found itself totally unprepared to face this challenge. This also pertained to the state authorities, who often followed ambiguous, improvised strategies of border control and non-recording of immigrants, a fact that attests to forms of “irregular bureaucracy” (Rozakou 2017a). The state started taking more responsibilities on the matter in early 2016, while in March that year an agreement was reached between the EU and Turkey to control and stop immigrant flows. Although this formally ended the crisis, various waves of migration to Greece have continued until today. Humanitarian assistance and related activities for the immigrants’ sake were not questioned as such, and the work of recognised NGOs (such as that of the aforementioned “Apostoli” of the Orthodox Church of Greece) was especially praised. The “socialities of solidarity”, produced through the opening of social spaces that resulted from local residents helping immigrants, should also not be ignored (Rozakou 2016b). In this context, various forms of vernacular humanitarianisms (termed as “solidarity humanitarianisms”) were deployed by grassroots organisations and independent volunteers challenging or transforming established schemata of humanitarian action (Rozakou 2017b). However, the activities of such informal solidarity groups and volunteering networks of domestic and foreign provenance (including tourists on the Aegean islands during the early phase of the refugee crisis), which were mostly unregulated, often combined with an “anarchic humanitarianism” in the absence of the state or of an official coordination mechanism for the numerous actors on the ground,

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did create a lot of problems. The state was largely unprepared, which led to NGOs stepping in to provide crucial services. Initially, the state also had serious difficulties in managing funding streams from the UN and the EU. Other issues included tensions between NGOs and other volunteers and independent activists (Anastasiadou/Marvakis/Mezidou/Speer 2017: 33–70; Papatzani/Leivaditi/Ilias/Petracou 2020: 59–63). This became evident through the creation of two separate “camps” at Moria, one run by the state and professional NGOs, and the other by volunteers and independent activists, a development that resulted in tensions. As the latter were often transferred to the local host society, the mayor of Mytilini (Lesvos) stated in January 2016 that the presence of unregistered and informal civic activists was a disruption rather than a help. This led to enhanced police investigations and subsequent arrests of various independent volunteers charged with the violation of immigration and other laws. Law 4368 of February 2016 also attempted to minimise the role of such informal networks and actors in refugee camps (Skleparis/Armakolas 2016: 176–179). These dramatic developments sparked numerous debates in the country and were often met with disapproval by opposition political parties and a considerable part of the Greek population. These developments also had a detrimental effect on the image of the NGO sector as a whole, as there was growing distrust in such organisations. For instance, surveys have shown that 62 percent of Greeks believed that several NGOs were just profiting financially without helping immigrants, while only 19 percent believed that NGOs should be given more responsibilities on immigration matters. Moreover, just 18 percent trusted the media coverage of the refugee crisis (Dixon/Hawkins/Juan-Torres/Kimaram 2019). NGOs and activists in favour of open borders across Europe were especially criticised. They were blamed for neglecting or even purposely bypassing the current Greek social, political and cultural scene. In fact, the attempted transformation of Greek society into a multi-cultural one, which had started since the early 1990s, was gradually perceived by many to pose a serious threat to the preservation of the diachronic Greek identity. This was despite the fact that some people with migrant background that had become naturalised Greek citizens rose to fame and were somewhat accepted by the public, such as the NBA superstar Giannis Antetokounmpo, born in Athens in 1994 to Nigerian parents. Most importantly, the enhanced significance of the NGO sector during the aforementioned crisis was marred by an array of intertwined problems in Greece. Civil society literature describes this situation as a variety of factors either inhibiting related activities or minimising their effects (Domaradzka/Kavelashvili/Markus/Sälhoff/ Skóra 2016). In our case, these difficulties concern, on the one hand, the tenuous relations between the state and the broad NGO sector regarding immigrants, which led to suspicions and even the “criminalisation” of NGOs without distinction among a large part of the Greek public. On the other hand, these complications relate to a situation that may be termed a “multiple crises constellation”; namely, when a country is simultaneously challenged by a variety of different emergencies and general turmoil that create an overall negative and pessimistic environment, which, among other things,

  Vasilios N. Makrides does not facilitate the proper development of viable civic activities and structures. The NGO sector on an international level has undoubtedly been instrumental in managing crises of all sorts (including the recent Covid-19 global pandemic: Kövér 2021) and alleviating their harmful social consequences, yet it all depends on the particular contours of civic activities within a given geographical and temporal setting. In the Greek case, these general difficulties initially related to the aforementioned deep economic crisis, which was also connected to waves of immigration over the last decades and, as previously outlined, had a partially detrimental impact upon certain civil society activities. Moreover, the rise of the Far Right contributed significantly to the general crisis that affected civil society. Immigration and especially the refuge crisis of 2015 were often cited as clear evidence of the erosion of Greece’s cultural and religious identity. After all, there was evidence that immigration posed several challenges to the country. For example, a report from the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs showed that between 2015 and 2020 there were 2,339 incidents of desecration of the country’s Orthodox church buildings, making them the main target among the various religious groups in the country, accounting for approximately 92,57 percent of the cases. A correlation between the increase in immigration and these desecration incidents appeared quite plausible, given that many of them happened to be close to reception facilities for immigrants (Papadopoulos 2022). Despite the demise of the Golden Dawn party, anti-migrant and xenophobic feelings are still widespread among a large section of the Greek population, a situation that impacted on the broad NGO sector and its public image as well as on civil society at large. Another key issue connected with immigration is that of national security. This is especially due to the long-standing, cross-border disputes between Greece and Turkey over maritime zones, energy resources and sovereignty rights of the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean (Heraclides/Çakmak 2019). Although both countries are allies as NATO member states, Greek-Turkish relations deteriorated in 2022 when channels of mutual communication closed, and Turkey repeatedly threatened Greece with a sudden invasion “one night” (Fiedler 2022). At the same time, there were serious security concerns at the EU and NATO levels, given the potential presence of terrorists or ex-Islamic State fighters among the immigrants coming from Turkey. This situation led to all kinds of suspicions, such as against foreign-led NGOs and especially against unregistered solidarity networks, activists and volunteers of foreign provenance in the humanitarian sector, who lacked formal qualifications. Hence, the harassment and intimidation of NGOs and disruptions of their work by local actors were not uncommon on some Aegean islands. Security issues are usually prone to exploitation, and this was also carried out especially by members of the Far Right (Lazaridis/Skleparis 2016). This situation often resulted in general distrust in the NGO sector as a whole. The sector was painted as belonging to an international conspiracy to abolish borders and undermine Greece’s national interests and security. Restriction measures from the state were often aimed at unregistered volunteers and aid workers, who were banned

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from operating in such border areas or were accused of violating or disregarding Greek legislation. Accusations were also directed at several NGOs that “cooperated” with traffickers to enable the passage of immigrants from Turkey to Greece. In September 2020, for example, the state filed charges against 33 foreign members of four foreign NGOs (and against two foreign nationals working on migration issues) on the island of Lesvos for assisting human traffickers, forming and joining a criminal organisation, espionage, violation of state secrets, as well as violations of the Immigration Code under the pretext of humanitarian action (Keep Talking Greece 2020). However, such measures did not seem to impact upon the work of major national or international NGOs. Although there were often false generalisations, such incidents affected the overall reputation of NGOs in the public eye, leading to their defamation as organisations undermining Greece’s national security. The ambiguous attitude of Turkey towards immigration, a country home to millions of refugees, has also complicated the situation. In fact, from February-March 2020, Turkey tried to instrumentalise thousands of migrants, albeit unsuccessfully, to forcibly and illegally cross the Greek borders in Thrace and thus enter EU territory. Turkey may have intended thereby to gain geopolitical and other advantages in bilateral negotiations with Greece and with EU institutions at large. However, this forced Greece to strengthen its border defence mechanisms (also with EU funds), including a kilometre-long steel fence, a highly developed surveillance system, and an increased border guard force (Tagle 2022). Ongoing tensions between Greece and Turkey peaked in 2020, which had a negative effect on the issue of immigration. At the same time, such flows were largely stopped by the right-wing conservative government’s stricter immigration policy, a government that had been in power since July 2019. This was exemplified by stricter controls of both land and maritime passages. Within this context, NGOs and other actors often criticised Greece for inhumanely pushing back migrants attempting to cross its borders. Such accusations frequently came from the Turkish side, but often had limited consequences for the Greek side, which is generally supported by the EU and its “Frontex” scheme. After all, on the global stage, Turkey has the reputation of instrumentalising the refugee crisis for its own benefit. In August 2022, Greece purposefully announced its plan to fully fence off its Evros land border with Turkey and expand surveillance efforts even further. Bearing all this in mind, it becomes obvious that the aforementioned “multiple crises constellation” created a serious contestation of civic spaces in the country, particularly with reference to the work of the broad NGO sector. Consequently, one can argue that the latest relations between the state and NGOs in the domain of immigration remain tenuous, given that they have failed to agree on cooperation and the division of responsibilities. NGOs continue to criticise specific aspects of Greece’s immigration policy that are exploitative and oppressive for migrants. For example, NGOs protested against suspending cash assistance for asylum seekers in October 2021, which, however, was restored a few months later. In November 2021, there were further protests regarding the denial of food support to recognised refugees and re-

  Vasilios N. Makrides jected asylum seekers. Such petitions were signed by numerous national and international NGOs. They also included recommendations for the improvement of the country’s reception and integration system, in collaboration with international institutions, to ensure a collective migration management system that respects human rights and international law. The fact that the NGO sector is no longer (for the most part) defined by informal spontaneous networks and volunteer-run initiatives, as during the 2015 crisis, shows that this sector is being gradually more “professionalised” and seeks official acceptance from the Greek state. However, this does not seem to automatically normalise their relations or to lead to a viable framework for future cooperation. Today, migration is not as critical as it was in 2015. Hence, many NGOs and other activists have already withdrawn, while the state has started taking over the management of related activities and responsibilities. The current Ministry of Migration and Asylum, which had been founded in 2016 due to the country’s growing sensitisation to this serious issue, attempts to cooperate with various organisations in accordance with national and international legislation. It appears to be particularly interested in stopping the trafficking of immigrants and the illegal crossings over the Greek (and by extension over the EU) borders without endorsing or promoting the ideology of a “Fortress Europe”, which keeps refugees outside the EU external borders. This is, however, hardly satisfactory for the NGO sector (Schauseil 2022), as the state has also obliged all national and international NGOs operating in the country to go through an official evaluation and registration process, due to concerns about transparency and accountability. Such new measures aim to monitor and eventually control the entire sector, as immigration is such a prominent topic in Greece. Several NGOs have gone successfully through this process, and their names are officially listed on the Ministry’s website (https://ngo.migration.gov.gr/registered.php). Nevertheless, this was not the case with numerous NGOs (e.g. the “Refugee Support Aegean”), which failed to meet the criteria set by the state and were ordered to suspend operations. In turn, such NGOs complained about being stigmatised, discriminated against and constrained in their civic work, which should be free from state intervention. Many also claimed to fulfil the requirements for registration and that permission to operate was not granted to them for other reasons. News of the issue has reached the EU institutions. Among others, the Expert Council on NGO Law of the Council of Europe called on Greece to withdraw restrictions on the registration and certification of Greek and foreign NGOs active in immigration issues in two documents from July and November 2020. In particular, the last Joint Ministerial Decision 10616 of the Greek government (9 September 2020) was criticised for impeding civic spaces in the country and contravening European standards and the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 2020). For example, this is due to the vague reasons for refusing NGO authorisation, the unrestrained discretion of state authorities to deny registration for an NGO, the excessive requirements and complex procedures for NGO registration, and the arbitrary, disproportional and inflexible related state deci-

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sions. Nevertheless, the current right-wing government has remained adamant in its position regarding the official registration and control of the NGO sector, given that the immigration issue will continue to be a sensitive one in the years to come. However, there have been appeals to the Greek Council of State to judicially review the above Ministerial Decision. The hearing is still pending. In general, it is necessary for NGOs and similar civil society activists and initiatives to understand that they do not operate beyond space, time, geography, and history and to show respect for the national, regional and other sensitivities a local population or country might have. After all, their intention is not to create deeper cleavages, but to work for the common good and enable greater societal integration and cohesion. It is thus not accidental that various foreign diplomatic representations in Greece (e.g. the German Embassy) have created lists of NGOs helping immigrants that legally operate in the country as a means to better monitor the field and to provide information to those intending to undertake such activities. In another case, the same awareness should concern international volunteers and experienced aid workers, who in 2015 voluntarily flew to the Aegean islands to assist arriving immigrants. However, this often led to tensions between professional NGOs and volunteers administering separate refugee camps as well as to the lack of adequate coordination and mutual assistance. This development shows that civil society actions require better systematisation to become more effective in the long run.

 Concluding Remarks It is perhaps difficult to draw final conclusions about the Greek case of civil society, given that both the Covid-19 pandemic (since January 2020 in Europe) and the war in Ukraine (since February 2022) have had a multilateral and damaging impact on the country—and not only economic effects. This also included the immigrants in the country, who have been seriously affected by the pandemic (Fouskas 2020). Considering the difficult period that Greece went through in the 2010s, this was certainly not the most promising way to enter the third decade of the 21st century. These additional crises are of enormous global importance and have created new and unprecedented challenges. The pandemic threw the entire EU into an unparalleled public health crisis, which caused a lot of imbalances that hindered civil society initiatives. The “war over vaccines” was a case in point, showing the situation’s “high stakes” that led specific states to endorse an aggressive, nationally-defined strategy of survival against the others and to neglect ideals of solidarity and mutual assistance. However, Greek civic actors supported the development of a vaccine as a global public good against neoliberal policies of privatisation and commercialisation. Furthermore, before the EU could agree on a common foundation for migration and asylum policy, the serious issue of Ukrainian migrants, sparked by Russia’s invasion to Ukraine, rendered the

  Vasilios N. Makrides immigration issue far more complicated. It is therefore difficult to predict how this will affect Greece and its civil society in the long run. Being a small country and part of a broader globalised environment, it will certainly remain dependent on specific global trends as well as on geopolitical and economic rivalries that will be articulated and crystallised in the near future. Among other things, this may also affect civil society initiatives, given the power and the appeal of various populist, conspiracydriven discourses, which in fact have already become more widespread, especially during the pandemic. It is well known that this whole situation had a serious and multifaceted impact on civic spaces in general (Schrader/Roth/Strachwitz 2020; Schrader 2021). All in all, despite various deficits and particularities, the emergence of civil society in the context and the wake of the aforementioned multiple crises in Greece should be evaluated in positive terms. Compared to the pre-crisis period, we can safely argue that larger numbers of Greek citizens have participated in various collective efforts that fall under the broader category of civil society. Civil society responses to the economic crisis became manifest, not only through protest movements, but also through a plethora of informal groups and networks with collective efforts to assist various groups of afflicted people. In the period before the crisis, the presence of NGOs in the country was generally weak compared to that of political parties and the government, except for well-organised ones. Government-funded organisations were not independent und also suffered internal divisions because of political party competitions. Such an antagonistic and polarised political culture did not allow for the emergence of an autonomous and strong civil society. Strong family life and related ties among close relatives were also an impediment to the spread of civil society. Nonetheless, things started to change with the economic crisis and also with the following refugee crisis. In any event, these crises also revealed the other side of the coin, namely specific mobilisations, reactions and polarising ideological conflicts (e.g. the rise of the political Far Right with its “uncivil agenda”) undermining civil society as such. Taking a closer look at the broad NGO sector in light of these complications, its overall situation in the country appears to have been ambivalent in recent years, as it was constrained by various interrelated parameters. This implies, on the one hand, greater state intervention in registering and overseeing NGOs operating in the country through various mechanisms. Such an intervention is undoubtedly connected to greater state control of NGOs and an eventual restriction of their civic autonomy in operating independently as non-state, non-market and non-profit organisations (Smith/Lipsky 1993). On the other hand, the recent developments in Greece have shown the imperative need to rectify the image of the NGO sector (especially of its informal aspects) in public perception and discourse, given that this sector was mostly portrayed negatively as a factor that poses serious threats to the national security of the country and intends to alter its historical religious and cultural identity.

Civil Society in 21st Century Greece: Locating Challenges, Charting Opportunities & Developments  

To mention just the most recent example: A serious scandal regarding a Greek NGO erupted in November 2022, which threatens to leave a very bad imprint on the whole NGO sector in the country. It concerns the charitable non-profit organisation “Ark of the World” (Kivotos tou Kosmou), which provided protection and special care (housing, food, clothes, medical support, education, sport activities, vacation etc.) to unprotected, orphaned, unaccompanied, poor, destitute, abandoned or abused children of different backgrounds including immigrant ones and by extension to their parents (through training, counselling etc.), especially to single-parent families. It was established in 1998 in Athens by the young and charismatic Orthodox priest Antonios Papanikolaou, supported by his wife Stamatia. It promoted human dignity, solidarity, anti-racism, respect for diversity and equality in the framework of Christian love and philanthropy in a difficult neighbourhood of Athens. Although initially a moderate project of a local character, the NGO grew immensely in subsequent years until today, acquired a legal basis and a tax-exempt status from the state. It also enjoyed an unprecedented fame and media attention, being the most prominent and respectable NGO in the whole country, drawing wide national and international acclamations from all sides, sectors and ages, even from the purely secular ones. This resulted in a huge amount of donations of all kinds, ranging from real estate to jewellery and money. Thus, the NGO constantly expanded its activities and managed to create a large number of facilities (e.g. a “Mother and Child Care and Protection Centre”, summer camps and training centres for children) and utilise accordingly large premises both in Athens and in other places around the country. As was to be expected, the NGO and its founder have received numerous national and international awards, such as by the President of the Hellenic Republic, the Academy of Athens, the European Monitoring Centre against racism and xenophobia, the UNESCO, the European Parliament, political parties, universities, and by many other organisations and foundations—Father Antonios was also awarded the annual European Citizen’s Prize in 2018. As a result, one can imagine what a huge surprise and a shock it was to everyone when revelations and accusations were officially made about sexual and physical abuse of minors (even against the founder of the NGO himself) as well as about financial malpractice, fraud, and various other irregularities. In fact, Father Antonios and his wife were suspected of misappropriating millions of euros in donations, given that the finances of the NGO lacked transparency and independent control by certified public accountants and state authorities. Given that this NGO enjoyed a special status of immunity due to its high and uncontested reputation, there has been no independent control of the NGO and its activities over the years, which was solely controlled by Father Antonios and a special internal board with his wife as CEO and three male adults who had been previously hosted at the charity as minors. All this led to immediate state intervention at the highest level involving the Prime Minister, which stopped any state aid to the NGO. This also led to a judicial investigation of the allegations, the demise of the charity head Father Antonios and the old board, and the

  Vasilios N. Makrides appointment of a new, experienced administrative board of directors to manage its affairs and to ensure the smooth operation of the NGO during this critical transition period. The official church under Archbishop Hieronymos II, which had no connection to the NGO, also reacted severely, banning Father Antonios from his priestly duties and asking for a full clarification of the complaints (The National Herald 2022). Although the investigation is still in progress, the whole incident had already serious detrimental effects on the public image of the entire NGO sector, given that, as already noted, there has always been a suspicion among the average Greek public about NGO activities in general. This scandal led many institutional and individual actors in the related domain to react against such dangerous generalisations. They also requested that the very concept of philanthropy should not be tarnished from such isolated scandalous revelations. Even so, it remains to be seen, once the investigations are over, what effect this scandal that keeps shaking and shocking the Greek public will have on the NGO sector, the very ideal of donations, and philanthropic activities at large. The above problems are normally common to NGOs, which first started as small private initiatives, but then grew and found themselves facing situations for which they were unprepared. At this higher level, such NGOs need serious and organised management, administration, planning and systematic monitoring. This cannot be achieved alone by the original founders of such NGOs, who consider them more or less as a private domain of their own exclusive responsibility or even as a family affair. Recently, in early 2022, the Deputy Labour and Social Affairs Minister has tried to create a viable and legal framework for the legitimate operation of children protection NGOs under specific terms and conditions. However, there was a lot of opposition from their side, accusing the state of wanting to control or even close them down (Ekathimerini 2022b). Despite all this, it would be amiss to argue that the state-NGOs relations in Greece have significantly changed and that they have taken on an “adversarial” mode, following Young’s typology (2006), although his three categories of government–nonprofit relations are not mutually exclusive. The same holds true if we were to use similar or more detailed typologies of government–non-profit relations (Najam 2000). Even if the Greek state hindered the operation of certain NGOs and side-lined them for specific reasons, it generally does not consider them to be a burden or a threat and does not intend to curtail their activities on a large scale. This goes in line with the overall state perception about civil society in general, which is unequivocally evaluated in positive terms and is also supported through various means. In this respect, the initial Gramscian perception of civil society in a conflictual relationship with the state in the battle for societal hegemony does not seem to apply. A better functioning and mutually beneficial relationship (‟the partnership paradigm”) came to prevail in recent theories conceptualising the various government–non-profit engagements (Salamon 1995), a perspective that continues to be elaborated in more detail even further (Grønbjerg/Smith 2021). In any event, the above difficulties do not render the Greek case idiosyncratic in comparison to other countries, given that similar prob-

Civil Society in 21st Century Greece: Locating Challenges, Charting Opportunities & Developments  

lems have appeared not only in ex-communist countries in the course of their democratisation (Ayvazyan 2020), but also in Western liberal democracies (Bouchet/Wachsmann 2019; Anheier/Lang/Toepler 2019; Swiney 2019; Strachwitz/Toepler 2022). Furthermore, the above discussion and analysis clearly point to the various caveats that NGOs as well as international policy makers (especially those drafting charters for migration and asylum) need to consider when referring to or operating in each socio-political setting in order to avoid hindrances, constraints and restrictions in implementing their activities. Generally, NGOs as non-profit organisations claim a priori an independence vis-à-vis the state and the market in developing their activities without external constraints. However, the situation in specific local contexts may be completely different, as NGOs activities cannot be deployed beyond space, time, geography, and history. The ideal scenario would be to develop humanitarian and other civic activities by simultaneously respecting national, religious, regional and other sensitivities a local population or country might have. Regarding immigration, humanitarian and other aid have been often and certainly unduly “criminalised” in recent years across the Mediterranean (Strachwitz 2019), yet this was mostly due to imbalances between all involved parties, especially between state authorities, the host society, the local population, and NGO activists. It goes without saying that such operations are not risk-free. During the 2015 refugee crisis, this concerned international activists and experienced aid workers, who voluntarily flew to various Aegean islands in order to assist arriving immigrants in numerous relief operations. However, this sometimes created unintended rifts between professional NGOs and such volunteers, leading to the erection of separate camps. This development shows that civic actions need better coordination and systematisation to become acceptable and more effective in the long run. Many issues are at stake in such a precarious context, including legal responsibility, liability, and accountability, especially when the state supervision of the NGO sector and informal networks is not organised, regular, continuous and real. The thorough professionalisation of humanitarian responses at all levels within the legal framework of a given country is thus a prerequisite, both for their uncomplicated local acceptance and the success of their various initiatives. In this regard, the specific Greek case, which aligns well with broader developments, can shed additional light on larger issues at hand. Finally, the particular focus on the narrow NGO sector does not intend to draw general conclusions about the overall status of civil society in Greece, given that civil society predates by far the recent proliferation of NGOs and should be conceptualised on a much broader canvas. Despite the aforementioned problems, there is varied evidence at multiple levels that the country has made considerable progress in the overall civic sector during the last three decades, both from bottom-up and top-down processes. This happened despite the broader “multiple crises constellation” that the country faced in recent years, which had a negative impact on civic spaces (especially concerning the operation of the broad NGO sector). In fact, the aggregation of overlapping, unforeseen and uncontrollable crises may poison the overall climate in a given

  Vasilios N. Makrides setting and thus obstruct such civic initiatives. However, it is more appropriate to speak in the Greek case of a “contested” (Hummel 2020) and perhaps of a partially “constrained” civic space due to various reasons and factors rather than of a “shrinking” one. This contestation did not originate from the government or any other central state policy, but was mainly due to the interrelated and multilateral crises of recent years that had a direct or collateral negative impact upon certain civic activities and actors, especially regarding the humanitarian and other aid provided by formal NGOs and informal voluntary networks to immigrants. Even so, here it is about a contingent aspect that is not expected to have a permanent detrimental effect on civil society perceptions and activities at large. Hence, the situation in Greece also reflects the paradox of both growing and dwindling civic space and engagement (Hummel/Kreutzer 2017). Therefore, considering the ever-changing face of civil society globally, its features and its contexts respectively, the Greek case, once more, cannot be considered as exceptional. One could safely argue that the overall prospects of civil society in the country now look a bit brighter than before. Greek people have become more sensitive to civil society issues and want their opinions to be heard and considered by the government and other leading societal strata. Their civil society initiatives are not meant to replace the welfare system of the state, but to assist it and provide specific correctives. It remains to be seen whether the overall positive spirit vis-à-vis civil society will be further embedded within Greece in the future with tangible results. In fact, the different crises, despite their detrimental effects, have proven to be catalysts for changes within Greek society, not least in the sensitive area of civic engagement. Hopefully, it is about a strong legacy with a lasting impact on Greek civil society in the future.

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  Vasilios N. Makrides Roumanias, C,/Skouras, S./Christodoulakis, N. (2018): Crisis and Extremism: Can a Powerful Extreme Right Emerge in a Modern Democracy? Evidence from Greece’s Golden Dawn (GreeSE – Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, 126), London: Hellenic Observatory, LSE, Retrieved from URL https://www.lse.ac.uk/Hellenic-Observatory/Assets/Documents/Publications/GreeSE-Papers/GreeSE-No126.pdf (11th December 2022). Roussos, S. (2010–11): The Athens Mosque: From a Foreign Policy Tool to the Formation of Public Islam in Greece, Journal of Modern Hellenism, 28, 153–165. Rozakou, K. (2012): The Biopolitics of Hospitality in Greece: Humanitarianism and the Management of Refugees, American Ethnologist, 39, 562–577. Rozakou, K. (2016a): Crafting the Volunteer: Voluntary Associations and the Reformation of Sociality, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 34, 79–102. Rozakou, K. (2016b): Socialities of Solidarity: Revisiting the Gift Taboo in Times of Crises, Social Anthropology, 24: 185–199. Rozakou, K. (2017a): Nonrecording the “European Refugee Crisis” in Greece: Navigating through Irregular Bureaucracy, Focaal – Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology, 77: 36–49. Rozakou, K. (2017b): Solidarity # Humanitarianism: The Blurred Boundaries of Humanitarianism in Greece, Etnofoor, 29: 99–104. Salamon, L. (1995): Partners in Public Service: Government and the Nonprofit Sector in the American Welfare State, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Schauseil, W. (2022): On the radar – How civil society work is under threat in Greece. 1 February, Retrieved from URL https://eu.boell.org/en/2022/02/01/radar-how-civil-society-work-underthreat-greece (11th December 2022). Schrader, M./Roth, J./Strachwitz, R. (2020): Ein Rettungsschirm für die Zivilgesellschaft? Eine explorative Studie zu Potenzialen, Bedarfen und Angeboten in und nach der COVID-19 Krise (Opuscula, 144). Berlin: Maecenata Institut für Philanthropie und Zivilgesellschaft. Schrader, M. (2021): Zivilgesellschaft in und nach der Pandemie: Bedarfe – Angebote – Potenziale (Opuscula, 149), Berlin: Maecenata Institut für Philanthropie und Zivilgesellschaft. Schwaderer, I. (2018): Platonisches Erbe, Byzanz, Orthodoxie und die Modernisierung Griechenlands. Schwerpunkte des kulturphilosophischen Werkes von Stelios Ramfos, Berlin: Peter Lang. Simiti, M. (2017): Civil Society and the Economy: Greek Civil Society during the Economic Crisis, Journal of Civil Society, 13, 357–373. Skleparis, D. (2015): Towards a Hybrid “Shadow State”? The Case of Migrant-/Refugee-Serving NGOs in Greece, In: Clarke, J./Huliaras, A./Sotiropoulos, D. A. (eds.), Austerity and the Third Sector: Civil Society at the European Frontline, London/New York: Routledge, 147–166. Skleparis, D./Armakolas, I. (2016): The Refugee Crisis and the Role of NGOs, Civil Society and Media in Greece, In: Phillips, D. (ed.), Balkan Human Corridor: Essays on the Refugee and Migrant Crisis from Scholars and Opinion Leaders in Southeast Europe, New York: Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University, 171–184. Smith, S./Lipsky, M. (1993): Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sotiropoulos, D.A. (2004): Formal Weakness and Informal Strength: Civil Society in Contemporary Greece (Discussion Paper No. 16), London: The Hellenic Observatory/The European Institute/LSE, Retrieved from URL https://www.lse.ac.uk/Hellenic-Observatory/Assets/Documents/Publications/Past-Discussion-Papers/DiscussionPaper16.pdf (11th December 2022). Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2005): Positive and Negative Social Capital and the Uneven Development of Civil Society in Southeastern Europe, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 5: 243–256.

Civil Society in 21st Century Greece: Locating Challenges, Charting Opportunities & Developments   Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2014): Civil Society in Greece in the Wake of the Economic Crisis. A Report Submitted to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) Office in Athens, Retrieved from URL https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/253252/7_dokument_dok_pdf_38533_2.pdf/ c52fb5b5-ccc8-fb00-984a-357a3354ebd4?version=1.0&t=1539653827455 (11th December 2022). Sotiropoulos, D.A./Karamagioli, E. (2006): Civil Society in Greece: The Road to Maturity (2005), Athens: Civicus Civil Society Index Shortened Assessment Tool Report for the Case of Greece, Retrieved from URL https://europe.cidem.org/documents/CSI-SAT_Greece_Report. pdf (11th December 2022). Strachwitz, V. (2019): “Wir retten Menschen”. Die Kriminalisierung der humanitären Hilfe auf dem Mittelmeer (Observatorium, 35), Berlin: Maecenata Institut für Philanthropie und Zivilgesellschaft. Strachwitz, R./Toepler, S. (2022): Contested Civic Spaces in Liberal Democracies, Nonprofit Policy Forum, 13, 179–193. Swiney, C. F. (2019): The Counter-Associational Revolution: The Rise, Spread, and Contagion of Restrictive Civil Society Laws in the World’s Strongest Democratic States, Fordham International Law Journal, 43, 399–456. Tagle, S. (2022): Greek locals are helping fortify their country’s borders, 25 March, Retrieved from URL https://www.icwa.org/greece-fortify-borders/ (11th December 2022). The Guardian (2022): UN urges investigation after 92 naked migrants “sent” from Turkey into Greece, 17 October, Retrieved from URL https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/17/unurges-investigation-after-92-naked-migrants-sent-from-turkey-into-greece (11th December 2022). The National Herald (2022): Archbishop Ieronymos: Inquiry Launched into Charges Regarding “Kivotos tou Kosmou”, 20 November, Retrieved from URL https://www.thenationalherald.com/archbishop-ieronymos-inquiry-launched-into-charges-regarding-kivotos-tou-kosmou/ (11th December 2022). Triandafyllidou, A. (2009): Greek Immigration Policy at the Turn of the 21st Century: Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement?, European Journal of Migration and Law, 11, 159–177. Tzifakis, N./Petropoulos, S./Huliaras, A. (2017): The Impact of Economic Crises on NGOs: The Case of Greece, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organization, 28: 2176– 2199. Vasilopoulou, S./Halikiopoulou, D. (eds.) (2015): The Golden Dawn’s “Nationalist Solution”: Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Greece, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Vasilopoulou, S./Halikiopoulou, D. (2015a): Who Supports the Golden Dawn? An Analysis of the Disillusioned Voter, In: Vasilopoulou, S./Halikiopoulou, D. (eds.), The Golden Dawn’s “Nationalist Solution”: Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Greece, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 31–49. Young, D. R. (2006): Complementary, Supplementary, or Adversarial? Nonprofit-Government Relations, In: Boris, E. T./Steuerle, C. E. (eds.), Nonprofits & Governments: Collaboration & Conflict, Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press, 37–79.

Boris Strečanský

Dancing on a Thin Ice: Civil Society in Slovakia  Introduction Civil society played an essential democratising and freedom-enhancing role in political and social life in pivotal moments in the recent history of Slovakia. It played its part in the Velvet Revolution in 1989. Its voice was present in the public sphere during the nineties when Slovakia struggled with authoritarian tendencies. It mobilised the public in critical moments of social and political life in defense of the rule of law principles, human and civil rights, and social justice. More recently, it responded to the growing state capture by oligarchic interest groups, corruption in the public sector, and penetration of organised crime with the public administration that peaked in the 2018 murder of an investigative journalist. 55 It also showed its power of compassion and horizontal solidarity in two recent crises – the Covid pandemic and the War in Ukraine. On the organisational level, recent research commissioned by the Governmental Office for CSOs on a representative sample of CSOs showed that civil society is primarily a space for recreation and cultural expression. Secondarily, it is a space for education or social support. According to this research, the critical function of civic space in Slovakia is community building and strengthening binding social capital through self-expression and services. The largest populations of civic organisations operate as mutual-benefit organisations in sports, recreation, culture, religious, or youth areas. The second largest group is social service provision CSOs, and the smallest group is new social change and advocacy CSOs. Visible is a generational exchange – older leaders from the civic space perceive civil society as a supplementary to the state. The younger generation is more assertive, expects a genuine partnership relationship, and is frustrated by the lack of cooperation with the public sector (Brozmanová-Gregorová/Murray Svidroňová 2020). 56 For several reasons, the story of civil society development in Slovakia is more ambivalent than the abovementioned examples suggest. The first reason is epistemological. As Kopecký and Mudde (Kopecký/Mudde 2003) remind us, the relationship between both the uncivil and civil faces of civil society is an often overlooked aspect in the study of civil society.  55 Investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová were murdered in February 2018. That event sparked nationwide public protests forcing the change of the cabinet and sweeping changes in the state’s judicial system and power structures. 56 The research is based on data collected from 600 CSOs representing the CSO population according to the legal form and site. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111070469-010

  Boris Strečanský The second reason is empirical. At crucial moments of the social and political life of the polity, civil society in Slovakia showed resilience and vitality in mobilising the civic public and pushing for a democratic policy change or nurturing vital moral dialogues. On the other hand, the intolerance, even hostility to the otherness (Bútorová/Mesežníkov 2017) coupled with the popularity of ethno-nationalists in partisan politics from the early 1990s reveals the uncivil face of Slovak civil society that is not new. Today, it is enhanced by the emergence of neo-Nazi, fascist, and proto-fascist movements that proliferate online and offline civic space and enter the official political arena by winning enough votes to gain seats in parliament. The third reason for the ambiguity of civil society is its weak socioeconomic standing. The expected role of civil society in fixing state and market failures and offering alternatives to the country’s problems has been limited by its organisational and resource fragility. In the welfare provision, civil society has shown its vitality primarily through its soft power in volunteer mobilisation and micro-level solidarity and support at the community level during crises, also partly in supplementing the government in satisfying demand for niche goods and services in education (alternative kindergartens), care (autistic children daycare or mental health hotline for youth), or cultural production fields. Its delivery capacity, resource base, and human capital to provide robust delivery of well-being and public services are nevertheless limited (Strečanský et al. 2017). Furthermore, the institutional attitude of the state to civil society can be characterised as uncrystallised and having an element of contestation over the public sphere. On the one hand, civil society perceives itself as a legitimate actor that engages in the public sphere but keeps out of partisan politics. It reminds the political realm that the state is to serve the public, aka civil society, and not the other versa. On the other hand, there are fictitious owners of the state, politicians, and traditional public administration officials. They are with a Hegelian mindset about the state. Some of them sometimes follow relatively shallow motifs of rent extraction or just enjoy status and parochial power. Through them, the state demonstrates centralising, competitive, disinteresting, indifferent, or adversarial behavior to civil society. In response to exogenous normative pressures, such as the EU or international community expectations, on some occasions, the state declares willingness to cooperate with non-state actors and signs up for policy engagement mechanisms as the Open Government Partnership (Žuffová 2019). The above factors have conditioned civil society in Slovakia to a shape in which it emerged in the pandemic context of 2020–2021 and the Russian war against Ukraine in 2022. Both crises tested the resilience and endurance of civil society as a “good” society while struggling for social change in a context of public policy neglect and continuing erosion of cognitive space. Also, both crises tested how far and deep the uncivil society can grow in the associational and cognitive space (social media) and how much the value incongruence in the population can stretch on fundamental issues such as democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, and tolerance.

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The chapter addresses several dimensions through which the contested and contesting spaces of civil society in Slovakia emerge. These dimensions connect structural factors such as the historical, socio-political, regulatory, and resource framework with the factors of agency of civil society and public opinion.

 Socioeconomic/historical framework After the fall of communism, Slovakia experienced the influx of values and norms of the developed world, dominated by neoliberal thinking with so-called “turbo-capitalism” (Luttwak 1999). Parallel with the region’s broader political and macroeconomic transformation, Slovakia also developed institutions and practices of democratic political and social behavior, partly emulating its Western models and somewhat evolving in its unique way. However, it is not only the communist past that matters. The experience of the last 30 years matters as well. It has been a period of rapid changes, not always for the better. Economic and social hardships accompanied the regained freedom. Especially in the early years after 1989, people had to adjust to the radical social-economic downturn. The younger generation embraced the freedoms and new opportunities. The older generation suffered the most and was nostalgic for the social security of socialism. The image of prosperous Europe fueled energy in catching up with the developed world economically, but also politically, and institutionally. A significant role played the conditionality of the accession into the European Union, without which many of the reform steps that had to be taken in Slovakia would not have happened. Moreover, when finally catching up with the West was being felt in the late 2000s, the financial crisis crept in, and the dynamic growth ended. The subjective perception of the socioeconomic situation of the population has been worse than the objective reality. Slovakia is a member of the OECD and belongs to the top fifth of the world’s most developed countries. The disposable income of the population since its entry into the EU in 2004 more than doubled. (Tradingeconomics 2022) In international comparison, Slovakia is one of the most equal countries among the OECD members regarding household income or share of wealth among different income groups. However, despite this, in terms of perception of life satisfaction scores of the top 20 % relative to the bottom 20 %, it appears to be one of the most unequal countries in the OECD. It is a paradox that despite an undoubtful economic uplift, many grievances and negative feelings exist (OECD 2020). Besides the socioeconomic factors, there are two additional structural factors in shaping the contestation of civic spaces in Slovakia that are explored in greater detail: One is the political tradition, the late-state-building process, and the late creation of a national society. Second are the sociocultural determinants, such as the rural and Christian tradition and the survivalist orientation of the society (Bútora et al. 2012).

  Boris Strečanský The examination of structural factors can be complemented with a genealogical (or historical) approach to this question by exploring the evolution of the relationship between state and civil society pre and after 1989. Using the genealogical perspective in the second part of this section can shed a different light through which other aspects of civic agency and civic space contestation may become visible.

. Nature of the state and the late state-building as the structural factor The state-building processes in Central Europe were primarily defined by the German legal and ideological tradition (Hegel) that postulated the state-centered view of civil society (Pérez-Díaz 1993) and elevated the state above other actors, recognising its supremacy (Strachwitz 2010). This tradition attributes to states’ more substantial roles than in the (continental) West, and the state becomes more dominant in politics and economics (Schöpflin 1990). This trait can be well identified in the case of Slovakia. Slovakia came to the statebuilding process relatively late, in the 20th century, compared to its neighbors. Also, Slovakia inherited a tradition of state from its multiple experiences. From its existence in the Hungarian kingdom in the Austria-Hungarian monarchy from the middle ages until the 20th century. As a region in unitary but still democratic Czechoslovakia (1918–1938) with some autonomy. And then, after 1948, as a part of unitary communist Czechoslovakia, and later, after 1968, as a federal (socialist) republic in the same state. The desire for independent statehood materialised at the end of the 20th century and was ideologically fueled by the newly revived ethnonationalist exclusionary sentiment. It was not built on the “societé civile”, a political community of free citizens as the 1989 éthos would imply. Slovakia’s discrepancy and lack of basic consensus about its values, roots, and nature marked the state-building process and remained an important factor in political and social life. For example, the Constitution of the Slovak Republic was adopted in September 1992 by the Slovak National Council in a vote where prominent politicians, including Christian Democrats, voted against it or did not vote at all (Cohen 1999). The split of Czechoslovakia was arranged by top politicians from both sides without any public voting on the matter. That left the Slovak state-building experience with a grain of salt. Reputable personalities and significant political leaders did not join the celebration of a new state because it was formed in a non-transparent and pragmatic way with exclusionary and narrow-minded sentiment. The attitude of the new state towards civil society after the establishment of Slovakia as a democratic republic in 1993 could be considered respectful but distanced. Despite the dynamic quantitative growth and diversification of civil society organisations in that period, civil society did not become a topic of broader reflection among political and economic elites in public policy. Exceptions have been the period after

Dancing on a Thin Ice: Civil Society in Slovakia  

an intensive civic mobilisation in 1998 and during the cabinet of Iveta Radičová in 2010–2012. When civil society pushed for a policy change in the last two decades, it challenged the statist attitudes. For example, in social service provision or education, there were ongoing demands from the civil sector to equalise and level the treatment of clients of public institutions and non-profit organisations in funding their service (Brozmanová-Gregorová/Murray Svidroňová 2020; Bútora et al. 2011; Woleková 2004). There was an implicit and inherited belief from the previous regime that only the state can act in public space in service delivery or development compared to CSOs. The understanding and reflection of strengthening the autonomy and capacity of civic space were missing from the public debate in stark contrast with the Czech Republic or Hungary, which pursued innovative legal initiatives – each different and relevant. 57 The partnership between the state and civil society as a potentially pragmatic concept of a modern, functional, and symmetrical relationship remained more of a verbal proclamation than a lived reality (Strečanský 2020). So how can this be interpreted in retrospect? One perspective is that the state’s relationship with civil society until now oscillates between parochial statism on the one hand, and liberal indifference, as its modern antithesis, on the other. Parochial statism has been sourced from the abovementioned embedded understanding of the state as a hegemonic entity and a self-focused purpose emanating from the Central European political traditions. It was visible during the governments of nationalist and socialist populists in 1994–1998 and 2006–2020, but also it permeated various levels of public administration. Using the typologies of Najam (2000) and Young (2000), the policies by the state toward civil society in Slovakia can be characterised as pragmatic and supplementary. The civil sector functions were tolerated only in niche areas, supplementing the state systems in the niche needs of particular groups for whom the state could not offer good enough service. Or they were drawing attention to issues that were on the margins of the mainstream policy attention – such as the marginalised groups, rights of the vulnerable, or corruption. In heated moments, the statist attitude turned confrontational or adversarial. It was the case in 1996 (Mečiar’s attempt to constrain the freedom of foundations’ establishment and operations legislatively) but also in 2018 when the spontaneous nonviolent protests against the corruption in high echelons of power were labeled by then

 57 The Czech Republic adopted the concept of Tomáš Ježek, which was based on the accelerated development of foundations through endowment development using the share of privatisation revenues. On the other hand, Hungary got inspired by tax legislation that worked in Italy and Spain that allowed taxpayers to allocate a portion of their individual income tax to churches and civil society organisations. (Bullain 2004)

  Boris Strečanský prime minister Fico in media as efforts to violently overthrow the government with the help of Soros. (Mihočková 2018; Teraz.sk 2018). In other periods with reformist political elites, the attitude of liberal indifference mirrored the statist attitude not in its activism but its neglect. It has been informed by the neoliberal political mindset of the generation of reformist politicians. In the early 1990s and again in the early 2000s, in the final push before the EU accession, they pursued market-based reforms with limited involvement of the intervention of the state. They created a liberal framework for civil society with little public sector intervention. Policies by the state towards civil society can be characterised in these periods as complementary and cooperative. They include, for example, the frequent changes and modifications of basic laws on non-profit organisations and foundations and amendments of the tax code that provided for the tax designation mechanism between 2000–2004. However, these advances were not permanent. Civil society and its development issues have not been on the radar of liberal and reformist governments due to other development priorities they choose to focus on. The exception was the short period of 2010–2012 during the cabinet of Iveta Radičová, which led to the development of the first strategic policy documents concerned with civil society development in Slovakia (Office of the Governmental Plenipotentiary for the Development of Civil Society 2011). The lack of interest, political will, and awareness of political leaders and the public administration, as well as institutional underdevelopment of the civil society – or the third sector – combined with its low economic performance are barriers to utilising the human and social capital of a civil society in democratic governance, social innovation, and cohesion. This characterisation partly corroborates the public’s sentiment. The representative public opinion survey in 2019 revealed that 70 % of the population supports the statement that “the state should more support civic initiatives and non-governmental organizations” (Bútorová et al. 2020:79).

. Sociocultural determinants Sociocultural determinants shape different individual and institutional actors’ values, beliefs, interactions, attitudes, actions, and behavior. They are in a mutual interaction with human agency, and both are mutually constitutive and continuously coconstruct each other through social interaction (Chirkov 2020:120). Many studies look at the sociocultural determinants and their influence on social capital, civic engagement, or political participation (Li 2005; Piatak 2020). Therefore, it is important to include them in considering factors shaping the nature of civil society In the case of Slovakia, these include the rural and peasant culture, society separated along ethnic lines, strong community linkages, confusion in geopolitical orientation, in-group cohesion and solidarity, pragmatism, and marginally post-materialistic and secular orientation.

Dancing on a Thin Ice: Civil Society in Slovakia  

The rural and peasant culture prevails in Slovakia, although half of the population lives in cities. Socially conservative values and perspectives in addressing themes in public debates have a strong standing. The conservative social and political attitudes are embedded in the reification of traditions, stability, and resistance to change. Indirectly connected with this orientation is the practice of mutual help. It is visible in informal helping in the broader circle of family, neighbors, and friends. The in-group collectivities and the bonding social capital tend to be more significant in Slovakia culture than the bridging social capital. The preference for group homogeneity is visible in measurements of social distancing to people with diverse ethnic or gender backgrounds. 72 % would object if Roma moved to their neighborhood, 66 % in case of Muslims, and 42 % in case of refugees fleeing their home country due to war or famine (Bútorová 2022:46). These numbers have declined gradually since their peak levels during the migration crisis in 2016. However, they have not yet reached standard levels from 2008. The in-group preference is also visible indirectly in the orientation of prevailing functions of civil society organisations. Recent research on the representative sample of non-profit, non-governmental organisations (n=515) showed that in their self-perception, their overall function is the development of communities in the sense of bonding social capital. For example, connecting people with similar interests, building friendly relations inside an organisation or creating a space for regular meetings, or building a community (Gemeinschaft) that acts independently and implements its goals and ambitions. The second most weighted function of CSOs is the service provision and improving the well-being of people via services according to the needs of those served (Brozmanová-Gregorová/Murray Svidroňová 2020:422). Original multi-ethnic (prevailingly Jewish, German, Hungarian) urban culture and its phenomena have been muted after WWII by ethnic homogenisation. The continuity with the pre-War era in growing philanthropy and associational life has been interrupted. Despite these changes, Slovakia emerged from communism as the most multi-ethnic country in Central Europe, with 9 % Hungarians and 5 % Roma. However, they continue to live in separate silos. Civil society is also divided along ethnic lines. There are separate civic spaces for Slovak, Hungarian, and Romani civic activists, with only limited interaction among them. It raises questions about the values of diversity, openness, and inclusion within civil society’s organisational realm. There is an ongoing clash of secular liberal-democratic values with traditional, socially conservative, and authoritarian values. There are some alarming findings in recent opinion poll surveys of Globsec. Between 2021 and 2022 increased, the percentage of Slovaks who believe that having a strong leader who does not need to bother with any parliament and elections is good for Slovakia from 35 to 49 %. Only 37 % of the population is satisfied with how democracy works in Slovakia, one of the lowest scores among the CEE countries. The country’s identity is split between the Western and Eastern civilisation vectors. Half of the population perceives Slovakia to be between East and West, and only 34 % perceive it as part of the West. Slovakia also re-

  Boris Strečanský mains among the most vulnerable countries to conspiracy theories in the region, with 54 % subscribing to various conspiracy theories (Hajdu et al. 2022). Slovak society can be characterised by value syncretism and pragmatism (Lipták 1996). Ideological or principled behavior in the public sphere at the local or national level is less visible than interest-based action, short-term bargaining, and profit-seeking. The lack of basic consensus on the critical aspects of Slovak history, politics, and identity contributes to the relativisation of values. Hence, the role of civil society in initiating and maintaining moral dialogues gains importance (Strecansky 2017). On the level of life strategies, the rejection of the old system in 1989 supported the paradigm of individualism. It was natural – liberal democracy and market economy were the new ideals that praised and rewarded individualistic values. This resulted unintentionally in a suppressed concern of people about the “community” or “common good”. Much energy has been invested in pursuing individual economic interests to respond to the needs of economic survival in the austerity periods caused by structural transformation, but also to respond to selfish and greedy motifs, which is well documented by corruption and clientelism in the region. On the other hand, there is a gradual value shift from material values to post-materialist values. The material values of economic and physical security are no longer so dominant as in the past, and the post-materialistic values of self-expression and autonomy have gained significance (World Values Survey 2022). The consequences of the above factors contribute to the volatile ground that is receptive to value confrontation along the identity conflict lines (Roma, LGBTI, migrants, and refugees, gender and women rights) or good governance (clientelism, corruption, capture of the state institutions). These issues, as shown in this text, have been the main venues of contestation of civil space.

. Evolution of civil society until 1989 The evolution of Slovak society in the period until 1989 and after 1989 and the collective experiences of these two distinct periods embody the late modernisation of the country under the communist regime, discontinuities in the social fabric caused by frequent and rapid regime changes, formation, and destruction of classes and institutions, and many other socioeconomic and institutional ruptures that the country experienced in the 20th century. During the communist period, civil society as a community of free citizens advancing their interests and meeting their autonomous needs could not be tolerated in the communist parlance, nor the lived reality of real socialism. To a totalitarian state, it represented a dangerous element eroding the unity of the state, party, and ideological obedience of their members. The communist regime was well aware that it needed to subjugate all various institutional forms of bourgeois society present in the Czech and Slovak society from

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the 19th century until the end of interwar Czechoslovakia. These included clubs, associations, foundations, and charities. The regime needed their merger into the umbrella body of a “National Front”. Since the 1950s and 1960s, new spaces emerged – underground church, environmental activists, alternative theatre communities, artists, and performers. All represented latent, hidden, or openly manifested forms of what was, after 1989, denoted as a civil society. In the eighties, this included small, dispersed, but influential dissident groups, independent environmentalists, cultural organisers, and activists advocating for freedom of expression, freedom of consciousness, and for religious freedom. Actors from all these areas played a crucial role in the political changes during the Velvet revolution in Slovakia and shaped the newly emerging CSO sector in the 1990s (Bútora et al. 2012; Foa/Ekiert 2017). 1989 was seen as a rebirth of civil society that attempted to reconnect to its predecessors before the communist regime and WWII. Metaphorically speaking, the political citizen in Slovakia was born in November 1989. A case in point of this rebirth can be considered the title of the first manifesto of the People Against Violence (Verejnosť proti násiliu – VPN), the civic movement leading the Velvet Revolution in Slovakia, which was called: “Citizens, let us take the public affairs into our hands!” (Antalová 1996).

. Evolution of civil society after 1989 The 1989 events meant a unique situation that has not been repeated since – civil society has become, for a while, the dominant power in the political space and the key organiser of societal change. However, this lasted only for a few weeks. Soon after, the civil society movement (VPN) dissipated into partisan factions, its representatives became coopted into various public functions and parliament and joined the space of political party competition in a pluralistic context. The associative explosion that followed revealed the differentiation in the civic space into new and old organisations, but also in creating a space for the expression of a plurality of views and perspectives, including those that do not fit the civil values – ethno-nationalist movements with radical agendas and antagonising rhetorics. Unions and organisations the previous regime had suppressed began to reappear, including Christian associations and church-based organisations working in social services and charity. In the environment protection field, which was very strong, independent groups were formed by members of a nationwide Union of Landscape Protectors, which gradually disintegrated. New educational, free-time, and self-help organisations were formed. Organisations that had existed in the previous regime under the so-called national Front (e.g., the Slovak Union of Women or the Slovak Union of Disabled Per-

  Boris Strečanský sons) continued their work as well. Unlike the new ones, most old ones were wellconnected to various state funds and subsidies and could secure funding for their operations. They also had an extensive membership base. Newly founded organisations searched for funds from multiple sources, including foreign ones. “Older” organisations often held onto their traditional activities, while the “newer” ones introduced innovative concepts for solving problems (Bútora et al. 2012:18). The new ones started to develop a distinct identity. They began to dominate the public sphere, which marked the beginning of contesting “new” civil society with the political class. The “new” civil society organised into thematic platforms and held so-called Stupava conferences – national gatherings of CSOs, with the first one held in 1991 in Stupava (Strečanský 2004). The period from 1994 to 1998 was a formative time for the identity of the CSO sector in Slovakia and its learning on protests and organising because of domestic political developments that jeopardised the country’s future democratic development. This period was characterised by the adversarial policies of Mečiar’s government (1994–1998) towards independently acting CSOs. Those policies aimed to limit the freedom of foundation operations and impose bureaucratic burdens while offering a narrative that labeled the civil sector as a “fifth column”, an enemy to young Slovak nationhood that needed to be controlled. Many CSOs engaged in protests against the government’s policies (e.g., the 1996 “Foundations SOS” campaign) (Strečanský 2004). The period culminated with the voter mobilisation campaign known as “OK 98”, in which CSOs played a significant role and contributed to the outcome of the elections that confirmed Slovakia’s democratic and western orientation. The OK 98 campaign is considered to be the CSO sector’s key contribution to the democratisation of Slovakia and its European integration (Demeš 2014).

. State and civil society from 2004 until 2016 The period after the EU enlargement in 2004 until 2016 was marked by the growing administrative complexity in connection to EU funding, continuing “ngoisation” of organised civil society, and its gradual disconnection from its constituencies. Civil engagement for social change CSOs in the political realm remained present. Still, with the decreasing external support, especially the social change agenda CSOs, human rights, and watchdog groups faced the sustainability problem (ECNL 2012). In this period, political parties grew stronger and, via clientelistic networks, penetrated the public sector in attempts for rent extraction. The politicisation of public administration was growing stronger. In the statist pattern of state relationship to civil society, the state administration is the dominant force that maintains control, centralises its power, and acts as a hierarchical network. That is a problem of political leadership, the traditions in political culture, and the state formation in East Central Europe, as well as a characteristic of the public administration in Slovakia. The politi-

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cisation and centralisation of public administration led to expanded rent-seeking (Grzymala-Busse 2003). They worked against the innovation in the governance of welfare provision advocated by civil society organisations. With economic development, state bureaucracy’s size increased, but that did not mean its capacity increased. A good example illustrating this is that Slovak public institutions working with EU cohesion funds are known for their formalism, excessive administrative requirements, and inflexible bureaucracy (European Commission 2020). The activities of watchdog CSOs and independent media proved to be vital but insufficient in stopping stealing and mismanagement. As a result, political parties were trying to push out the CSOs and citizens from the decision-making by blocking legislation that would open decision-making processes to public oversight or attempting to scandalise journalists. 2004 onwards was a period of party financing scandals, growing white-collar corruption, and gradual capture of the state by illicit networks of politicians, business people, police, prosecutors, and judges. However, some contestations between the civic movements and the political class have ended with significant advancement in freedom of information legislation (2001) and anticorruption laws, such as the mandatory publication of any commercial contracts of the state with private entities (2011), while other civil society-led contestations with the state over significant issues of public interest remained unresolved – so-called Gorilla anti-corruption protests (2012) or protests of school teachers (2012) calling for decent economic conditions as one of the most underpaid public sector groups. The period after 2010 also experienced the first expressions of value-based conflicts along the lines of so-called family values, adoptions of children by same-sex couples, and an open expression of intolerance and distance against Muslim migrants from the Middle East during the migration crises 2014–2016. Another value split, which became more salient in the period after the events in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, is the split of the country’s identity between the Western and Eastern civilisation vectors (Globsec 2019). Slovakia’s democratic modernisation after 1990, including the exposure to globalisation influences and integration into the EU and NATO, revealed the clash of secular liberal-democratic values with traditional, socially conservative, and authoritarian values. It became fertile soil for the contestation of civic space by emerging anti-systemic, extremist populist movements. Many of these have been organised as traditional civic associations, educational institutions, card-playing clubs, or obscure political parties with more or less hidden neo-Nazi ideology and behavior. The anonymity of the Internet contributed to the spread of “uncivil” expressions online and offline. Antigypsy, xenophobic, ethno-nationalist, or otherwise extremist movements and polarising views have gained popularity thanks to the algorithmic logic of Facebook and other social media. Dozens of alternative media outlets and channels flooded the online space in 2013–2016, offering conspiracy theories, fake news, and disinformation content aimed at eroding the trust in institutions and instigating mistrust and hatred, many having diverse business models (Michal Mintal 2019).

  Boris Strečanský However, the roots of the rise of uncivil expressions lie not only in the international context (refugee crisis, debt crisis, EU institutional crisis) but in internal feelings of insecurity, the influence of Russian-sponsored hybrid warfare and disinformation, and persistent myths about history (Krekó 2020). For example, after the financial and economic crisis in 2009, Slovakia witnessed protest movements that mobilised various societal groups around the issues of corruption, misuse of public funds, and overall disappointment with the political class, nepotism, and clientelism. Ignoring or pushing them away from the public eye has further catalysed the discontent from which the political leaders of fringe groups benefited.

. The period of permanent crises (2016–2022) The third Fico government (2016–2020) led by the SMER-SD party meant a shift in the civil society narrative. The public discourse on the value and role of civil society deteriorated over the years of the Fico government (2006–2010, 2012–2016, 2016–2018) with the emergence of an explicitly anti-NGO narrative, especially from the very beginning of his third term as prime minister (Demeš 2020). The emergence of alternative media outlets supported the shift in the public mood leading to the entry of the Neo-Nazi party People’s Party Our Slovakia into the parliament in 2016. SMER-SD, as the ruling party gradually adopted the contentious populist rhetoric, uttered xenophobic parlance and could not dissociate with corruption-linked oligarchs. The party aspiring to meet the European social democratic standards moved to the socially conservative spectrum and demarcated itself away from the rights-based, urban, and socially liberal-leaning voters. Its positions, in some cases, blurred with the positions of extreme right populists and national conservatives. For example, prime minister Fico said after the 2016 elections: “These were not standard elections. We did not compete with the political opposition. We fought with the non-governmental sector, which was often subsidized and financed from abroad. Furthermore, we fought with the media, some of whom were against the government”.

The political elites’ ongoing cleptocratisation and state capture sparked a series of mass anti-corruption protests in March, June, and September 2017 initiated by an informal group of students and young activists, “For a Decent Slovakia”. Prime Minister Fico, after returning from the EU Summit in Brussels (and the first Anti-Corruption March in Bratislava, 19th April 2017), said: I do think that NGOs, wherever they will appear and act, will have to state what country they receive funding and who stands behind them so that we know who is who because then we find out that there are organized various gatherings on the streets and behind them stand foreign NGOs.

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Anti-corruption protests led to an unsuccessful process of recalling the Minister of Interior in December 2017 in parliament (initiated by the opposition). The murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fianceé Martina Kušnírová in February 2018 sparked nationwide mass public protests largest since 1989 initiated by civil society, forcing the change of the cabinet, and sweeping changes in the state’s judicial system and power structures. These protests can be interpreted as the agile and vital face of Slovak civil society that pushed back against crossing a red line. Sweeping investigations uncovered illicit networks of organised crime that permeated the highest government levels. Commentary of the prime minister on mass demonstrations that called for the proper investigation included: On 9th March 2018, he said: There is a high probability of attacks on governmental institutions during today’s planned demonstration. We have identified cobblestones piled in bushes in front of the Government office. We have not established yet by whom, and when they were brought to this location (HNonline.sk 2018b).

Then on 27th March 2018: This was an attempt of a coup d’etat (HNonline.sk 2018a).

Soon after the shock of Kuciak’s murder, in the summer of 2018, erupted the protests of farmers who organised against pervasive corruption in relevant state agencies distributing financial aid to farm industries (Kelloová/Debnár 2018). These protests continued until 2019. None of these efforts involved traditional NGOs but were an expression of authentic civic engagement arising from the discontent on poor governance of public affairs. All these events led to the government’s change due to the parliamentary elections in February 2020 and to the breakup of the ruling party SMER-SD, which led the government for 12 out of the last 14 years since 2006. In 2016–2020 have been recorded “only” verbal attacks of top government officials such as the prime minister, minister of interior, and senior MPs of the ruling party SMER-SD against the civil society through the typical narrative blaming NGOs as being instigators of mass protests aimed at the destabilisation of the country with support coming from outside of Slovakia. This delegitimisation narrative targeted the spontaneously emerged civic engagement that has been critical to government and reacted to mounting injustice and corruption. No radically restrictive legislation was adopted. Nevertheless, intensive debates were held in parliament and the media about amendments to the freedom of information act, the Law on Registry of nonprofit, non-governmental organisations, on the Open Government Partnership. After the parliamentary elections in February 2020, the new government led by proEuropean anti-corruption populist Igor Matovič entered the office in mid-March 2020

  Boris Strečanský with hopes of normalising the situation and correcting the previous government’s wrongdoings, especially in the areas of the rule of law, judiciary, corruption, and abuse of state institutions. However, a coherent program of reforms was not prepared. In midApril 2020, the new government adopted its manifesto for 2020–2024, which featured civil society’s support in several sections (Programové Vyhlásenie Vlády SR 2020). The government committed itself to the principles of active citizenship, open government, and public participation in policymaking. It also expressed a wish to support mechanisms allowing access to information, volunteering, and private giving. It declared its commitment to maintaining the existing spaces for dialogue between civil society and the state – which includes the Governmental Council for Non-profit Non-governmental Organisations and the Office of the Governmental Plenipotentiary for the Development of Civil Society. Before the new government was fully formed, Slovakia entered the Covid-19 pandemic period and not long after, the period marked by the war of Russia against Ukraine.

 Regulation framework . CSO legal framework The Constitution guarantees the “right to associate with others in clubs, societies, or other associations” in Article 29 (1) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, and in general, individuals can form a CSO without any barriers. Organisations are required to obtain legal personality. Registration of CSOs is not difficult. State authorities must register them when necessary conditions are met and have little discretion or possibility to delay the registration process. There are only a few restrictions regarding the purposes an organisation can pursue. Associations are only banned in cases when their purpose is aimed at violating and infringing personal, political or other rights of citizens due to their nationality, gender, race, origin, political or other convictions, religious beliefs, and social standing, or they instigate hatred. Another restriction is that they cannot form armed groups and cannot perform functions assigned to state bodies. The legal framework for civil society functioning – establishment and operation – is currently considered by civil society actors and external assessments such as the Civil Society Sustainability Index of USAID stable and enabling. Each legal form – foundations, nonprofit organisations providing general benefit services, or nonprofit investment funds – has its registration process, which is pretty simple and can be completed quickly (USAID 2020). In the past, the legal framework for CSOs underwent two significant changes. The first wave occurred soon after 1989 when a new legal setup was needed to respond to a wave of civic and political freedoms. A straightforward and flexible regulation of civic associations has been adopted, followed by additional laws regulating other

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nonprofit legal forms such as foundations. Civil society regulatory issues became a subject of dedicated policy attention only in the early period after 1989. Since then, civil society-related legislation emerged on the political agenda only in a short period of 1998 after the victory of the pro-democratic coalition and in 2010–2012 during the cabinet led by Iveta Radičová. In most of the other periods, legal agenda related to civic space was either ignored or had been part of initiative efforts of civil society representative bodies or efforts to constrain the enabling civic space by nationalist-populist or neo-Nazi, anti-systemic political groups. After the Velvet Revolution of 1989, Slovakia experienced an explosion in civil associating. The most important legal norm related to CSOs was the Law on Associations adopted in the Spring of 1990 (in Czechoslovakia), which is one of the key laws that facilitated the “associational revolution” in Slovakia after 1989. The law governs the formation of professional organisations, housing associations, mutual benefit associations, trade unions, and civil associations (Strecansky 2017) has been only lightly amended since then. The liberal framework of that law is facilitative, which is evidenced by the ongoing rise of associations. An empirical confirmation of the enabling nature of the law is that the number of civil associations makes up 95 % of all legal entities of civil society organisations, and the number of associations is still growing (Brozmanová-Gregorová/Murray Svidroňová 2020). However, after a short period of liberal development, the semi-authoritarian government of Vladimir Mečiar in 1996 pushed for more restrictive policies over the civil sector. It adopted more restrictive legislation on foundations with the intent to constrain the funding flows to independent civic activity, which the political leaders considered as anti-establishment and antagonistic against the young Slovak state. That effort provoked a strong reaction from civil society in the form of a public advocacy campaign, “Foundations SOS”. The campaign’s unintended result was that it sensitised the third sector to adversarial conditions that were still yet to emerge globally as a part of the shrinking civic space phenomenon. The second wave of legal and regulatory changes related to civil society’s legal framework was visible after the parliamentary elections in the fall of 1998. The 1998 elections marked a significant change in Slovakia towards the EU integration, sweeping economic reforms, and departure from the democratic backsliding of the nineties. The new political leadership rectified the distortions in the civil society legislation enacted by the nationalist government of Vladimir Mečiar in the mid-nineties. In 2001, adopted new legislation on the foundations and the percentage tax designation that defined the resource landscape for civil society for the next two decades. At the same time, since 2016, there have been numerous efforts by extremist antisystemic and neo-Nazi parties, which were sometimes openly, sometimes less openly endorsed by mainstream political representatives, to propose and enact legislation leading to the stigmatisation of foreign-funded CSOs. (Mikušovič 2020; National Council of Slovak Republic 2016; Teraz.sk 2018).

  Boris Strečanský The government formed after Spring 2020 elections led by anticorruption populist Igor Matovič has adopted its manifesto for 2020–2024, which featured civil society’s support in several sections and committed to pursuing policies improving the legal and fiscal framework for civil society (Programové Vyhlásenie Vlády SR 2020). Still, the domestic political landscape volatility may turn the tide towards the calls for shrinking civic space again. Thus, one of the main priorities of organised civil society towards public policy has been to maintain the status quo in the regulatory framework. It can be documented by the draft Strategy for the Development of Civil Society for 2021–2030 adopted by the Governmental Council for NGOs in June 2022 (Advisory Council of Government on Non-Governmental Non-Profit Organizations 2022; BrozmanováGregorová et al. 2022).

. Citizen participation Besides the basic legal framework for the operations of civil society organisations, the next important group of legal regulation relates to procedural laws enabling civic and political participation. Participation in decision-making, access to justice, information, and resources have become gradually put forward on lawmakers’ agenda, with a significant contribution to European conditionality in the pre-accession process and alignment with the acquis communitaire in the post-accession period.

Figure 1: Civil society articipation index

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In the period after 2004, which marks the Slovak entry to the EU, the legal framework encouraging citizen participation in the above sense has also been gradually improving. In an overall assessment of the Civil society participation index, which focuses on assessing the environment conducive to civic participation, CSOs in Slovakia actively shape the policy dialogue. 58 In regional comparison of this index, Slovakia scores (0.8) after Austria (0.94) and slightly before the Czech Republic (0.78), Slovenia (0.77), Poland (0.68) and Hungary (0.61) (Coppedge et al. 2015). However, despite significant progress, there is a prevailing perception in civil society that the public administration is not sufficiently open to citizen participation and that the procedures enabling civic participation need to be further enhanced. The fundamental pillar facilitating public participation in decision-making is the law on access to information (Freedom of Information Act). It was adopted in 2001 due to pressure generated mainly by civil society in the reform period after 1998 (Strečanský 2004). Since then, there have been several attempts at its infringement by various interest groups, but the key elements of the law remained relatively intact, making it very easy for active citizens to obtain any information from the public administration that is not classified. Participatory practices in public administration towards including diverse stakeholders in designing, planning, and implementing policies and projects is a growing but still not common practice in Slovakia. Also, in public management, participatory practices and methods are a subject of learning among public administration officials, leading to their gradual adoption. The lack of participatory practices and procedures in public administration tends to be criticised by civil society for being insufficiently open and accessible. The recent case is the Recovery Plan for Slovakia, which defined the priorities for the EU Partnership Agreement with Slovakia for 2021–2030. However, there are other examples where the participation of various stakeholders, including civil society, has been facilitated, and decisions were made after a thorough consultation and engagement.

. Civil liberties, basic rights, and freedoms The third element of the regulatory framework related to civic space is the framework of civil liberties, fundamental rights, and freedoms (of assembly, association, and expression). The Freedom in the World index, which measures political rights and civil liberties, considers Slovakia a free country with an index value of 90 out of 100, preceded  58 Indicators that are measured include the level of active participation of citizens in the activities of CSOs, the level of openness and centralisation of the selection process of candidates for party lists in elections, the level of routine participation of civic organisations in consultations on legal norms relevant for their members and the level of participation of women on activities of CSOs.

  Boris Strečanský by the Czech Republic (91/100) and followed by Poland (82/100) and Hungary (69/100) (Freedom House 2021). Fundamental freedoms have been codified in the Constitution of Slovakia, which was adopted in 1992 and amended multiple times since then. It follows the standard human rights doctrine as one of the basic constitutional principles of Slovakia in the second head of the Constitution and other instruments and covenants of international law to which Slovakia is a signatory. That framework has been enhanced as a part of the EU accession process and included anti-discrimination, economic and social rights, access to information, decreasing of inequities in gender-related issues, ethnic or socially marginalised groups, access to legal aid, independence of supervisory and regulatory bodies and some other areas. The implementation of these statutory principles and regulations has been far from perfect, as is documented by numerous reports in the media or international observatories of the Council of Europe, the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU, or the US State Department. Many issues stand out and represent major societal and policy problems, such as institutional and systemic antigypsism, hate speech, antiLGBTQI attitudes and rhetorics, deprecation of gender issues, violence against women, Roma, and foreigners, and discrimination against migrants (Council of Europe 2020; U.S. State Department 2021). Freedom of expression is maintained in media. Market plurality, political independence, and social inclusion are medium-risk (Urbániková 2022). Similarly, external monitoring has not flagged the freedoms of assembly and the association. During the Covid periods in 2020 and 2021, the government imposed Covid-related lockdowns. Also, a state of emergency was declared in October 2021, allowing the state to control public gatherings, and the Constitutional Court ruled that such restrictions are constitutional. Various antigovernment and anti-lockdown demonstrations took place in 2021, often initiated or attended by prominent opposition politicians. Several demonstrations featured violent clashes between protesters and police forces; in July, antivaccine protesters attempted to break into the National Parliament and were forcibly dispersed by police (Freedom House 2022). Overall, fundamental freedoms and rights in Slovakia have not deteriorated or backslid as much as in neighboring Hungary or Poland, but there is some stagnation (Cloet 2020).

 Resource Framework In Slovakia, the resource dimension of nonprofit organisations is an ongoing topic of organised civil society in its policy debate and interaction with the state. It has been raised in various statements and declarations of civil society coalitions and umbrella organisations toward policymakers. It also appears as a prominent issue in various

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qualitative studies and research of the nonprofit sector (Bútora et al. 2011; Čavojská et al. 2020; Strečanský et al. 2017). In the post-1989 period, there were two cases when the government attempted to change the legal framework with a direct negative and restricting impact on civil society. The first one was the attempt of Mečiar’s government to restrict the operations of foundations with the ambition to provide the state with more extraordinary supervision powers and tools to suppress their autonomy. The second attempt took place in 2006 by the first government of Robert Fico, which tried to restrict the tax designation mechanism by not allowing it to corporations. Both attempts sparked a loud reaction from the civic space, and both attempts remained unsuccessful. In purely economic terms, the weakness of Slovak nonprofit sector can be seen in relatively low levels of CSO added value as percent of GDP compared to its Visegrad neighbors: 0.98 % (SK) vs. 1.40 % (PL), 1.55 % (HU) and 1.77 % (CZ) or in terms of employment – 1.45% vs. 3.70 % (HU), 2.09 % (CZ), but more than in Poland 0.90 % (PL) (Meyer et al. 2019). The regional lagging behind is also noticeable in the employment figures. In relative terms, Slovak nonprofits employ only 39 % of the labor force compared to what does Hungary and 69 % of the Czech Republic (Meyer et al. 2019). The current economic conditions that have deteriorated due to the Covid pandemic and the war in Ukraine may also impact the government’s willingness to support the civil sector. The economy shrunk by 5 % of GDP in 2020, and the effects of the lockdown on the economy in 2021 had a spillover effect. The rise of public debt in the last few years, combined with the uncertain outlook in energy prices in 2022, poses a challenge to the stability of public finances.

. Public funding of CSOs The government funding of CSOs is an essential parameter in the state–civil society relationship. Public funding plays a vital role in the income structure of the nonprofit sector. In Slovakia, public funding to CSOs consists primarily of funds that include the current and capital transfers (from central, regional, and municipal levels), subsidies, and indirect public funding in the form of tax designation funds to the four selected nonprofit organisation forms (associations, foundations, nonprofit public benefit service organisations, and non-investment funds) 59. The direct and indirect funding from the mentioned sources from 2009 through 2018 grew by 50.8 % in current prices.  59 The four legal forms of nonprofit organisations included in the analysis make up the substantial part of the nonprofit sector serving households in terms of the number of units (approximately 75 % of all nonprofit legal forms in 2018) as well as in terms of employment (approximately 80 % of all employees, 2018). Professional chambers, housing associations, church organisations, political parties, and public-law nonprofit organisations are not included.

  Boris Strečanský The state subsidies to nonprofit organisations from the central state budget in 2018 were around €100 mils., which is not a lot. Of this amount, the majority flows to sports, professional associations, and chambers, and only a small share to the volunteer-based, educational, cultural or social, or helping civil space. The funding from local and regional governments can be estimated at €60–€70 mils. annually. The problem of funding is also confirmed at the level of organisational research. In 2019 the study among CSOs documented that the lack of resources is a barrier to achieving goals for almost 80 % of CSOs in Slovakia (Čavojská et al. 2020:479). Besides the lack of resources, the inflexible conditions and high administrative burden associated with using public, primarily European funding. In this context, CSOs have called for solutions. The communiqué from the national conference of civic organisations Orbis Civitates in October 2019 proposed establishing a cross-sectoral financial mechanism from the public budget supporting civil society with the engagement of credible and capable regranting organisations (Open Society Foundation 2019). In September 2020, the civil society chamber in the governmental advisory body on CSOs recommended the government apply the arms’ length approach to ensure the autonomy of the civic space in any considered funding schemes of CSOs in future (Komora MNO pri Rade vlády pre mimovládne neziskové organizácie 2020).

. Tax Designation System – An Indirect Public Funding A particular case of public funding is the tax designation system, established in 2001 in the wave of supportive legislation after the crucial political change in 1998. The plan was politically acceptable and attractive to reform-minded politicians due to its indirect, decentralised, and market-based setup. The tax designation system allows any taxpayer – individual or corporate – to designate 1 % or 2 % (in the case of corporations) and 2 % or 3 % (individuals). The system cannot be considered private philanthropy as it redirects the already paid income taxes, and the funds are wired to CSOs from the tax administration office. It is a low-barrier mechanism as it requires a simple registration at the notary office with a small fee. It also requires on the side of CSOs to run campaigns and approach taxpayers with their value proposition, and compete for their allocation with other CSOs. Only in Slovakia, besides individual taxpayers (physical persons), also corporations are entitled to designate a percentage (1 % or 2 %) of corporate income tax (Svidroňová/Kuvíková 2014:16). If a corporation donates at least 0.5 %, the total contribution to a CSO can be 2 % of its paid tax. Without a donation, it can provide only 1 %. The ideal type of “homo economicus” in corporations’ behavior plays out in contrast to individuals. The effective percentage coefficient of corporate designations (calculated as a percentage of actual designated volume over the overall potential

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volume of tax designation) is close to 90 %, which is higher than among individual taxpayers (Blaščák 2016). The tax designation system is highly popular. The percentage tax designation counts as one of the sources of income for 52 % of active C.S.O.s. (Vaceková/Murray Svidroňová 2016). In 2019, 15 483 registered C.S.O.s received €73 mils. The average income for a CSO from the system is around 3,300 €. However, the distribution is somewhat skewed. The first 20 recipients who received the highest individual amounts collected almost 25 % of the total designated amount. This is due to their connection to large corporations who designate bulk amounts to organisations (foundations) that they found and continue regranting the funds to smaller recipients. With the fall in economic activity in 2020 and 2021, the tax revenues – used as the base for the tax designation, which is an important source for POs – have decreased already during 2020 due to delays in tax statements and returns (financnasprava.sk 2021). 60

. Private funding The private sector contributions to the income of nonprofit organisations also increased substantially in the given period. Gifts and contributions from individuals and corporations, excluding foreign donations to the four types of nonprofit organisations included in the analysis in 2009 (civic associations, foundations, nonprofit organisations, and non-investment funds), reached €98 mil. In 2018, it was €182 mil., and in 2020 it reached €251 mil. Significant growth is observed in foreign (most likely EU) gifts and contributions, which increased from €16 mil. in 2009 to €62.9 mil. in 2018 and €183 mil. in 2020 (DATAcube 2021). The stigmatising legislation calling up to labeling CSOs receiving funding from abroad as foreign agents has not had a chance so far in Slovakia (see Section 3.1.). A positive side of the recent development is that Slovak civil society builds connections with the citizens via funding. Private individuals contributed €48 million to nonprofit organisations in 2009. In 2018 it was already €109 mil., and in 2020 €153 mil. (Datacube, Slovak Statistical Office). Raising funds from the general public has significantly increased in the last decade. Online giving increased along with digital fundraising skills and competencies, as is documented by several well-functioning online giving systems (Darujme.sk) and crowdfunding portals (Startlab.sk; ludialudom.sk; donio.sk). The share of the population that declared making a financial gift  60 The tax designation revenue compared to 2019 (tax designation revenue was €73 mil in 2019) dropped by 24 % to €55.9 mil in 2020. Compared to the prognosis of the Institute of Financial Policy for 2020 conducted in 2019, it is a drop out of almost 20 mil (projected for 2020 was €77 mil) (Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic n.d.).

  Boris Strečanský or contribution toward a public benefit purpose (outside of family, church collections, and tax designation) in the last twelve months is 55 %. The most frequent gifts were reported as 10€ (23 %) or between 11–50€ (22 %). Higher contributions than 50 € are reported by 10 % of the population (Bútorová et al. 2020:160). A unique aspect of private giving to civil society in Slovakia is that there are no tax breaks or tax incentives for physical persons or corporations to stimulate giving for public benefit. Also, all nonprofit organisations are eligible for full tax exemptions on donations received and revenue derived from their primary activity. However, income from unrelated activities is fully taxed. There is no specific process for obtaining tax-exempt status – so no barriers exist in this area. Nonprofit organisations qualify for this status automatically by being created as an association, foundation, or nonprofit organisation providing generally beneficial services and non-investment funds. They can raise funds from private resources, which happens more frequently, especially via digital means. However, many rely on public funding and apply for grants from public sources, which is more effective than making a tedious effort to approach many private individuals or corporations. At the same time, as we showed above, the amounts raised from private sources have been increasing. When public funding is abundant, incentives for generating private funding decrease because securing private funding is more labor-intensive and less cost-effective for CSOs than securing public funding. This seems to be telling us about the experience from Hungary. However, the crowding out hypotheses, as it is called, is being studied in academic space, but the jury is still on (Hladká 2019). When public funding is limited, as suggested here, more efforts toward private funding can be expected. Perhaps this is the case in Slovakia.

. Contesting Civic Spaces in Resource Dimension The contestation of civic spaces in the resource dimension in Slovakia does not take the form of philanthropic protectionism or restrictions on access to funding from abroad or from domestic sources. Also, the reporting requirements are not onerous. However, there are elements of the contestation identifiable in the state funding for public services that CSOs provide along with other public sector providers (see Section 2.1.). Contestation is also recognizable in policies related to the distribution of subsidies. One of the recent cases that attracted public attention relates to the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and Family. Specifically, it concerned subsidies earmarked in support of gender equality. Most of the funds were allocated to two pro-life CSOs while twelve other CSOs, among which many were feminist and women advocacy groups, were left without support. The debate that emerged around the issues revealed that pro-life organisations have not been successful in the past in this program. With the change of leadership after the 2020 elections, the Ministry shifted the course towards a more conservative line and abandoned previous EU mainstream

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policies, and the decision on subsidies reflected that. The case illustrates the salience of current value contestation between the proponents of pro-life and traditional values in allocating subsidies to CSOs. However, before 2020, there were many cases of clientelism and cronyism, and large subsidies to “friendly” organisations, such as the rescue service in the Danube region operated by a civic association or football clubs, were provided under the coverage of political patronage (Burčík 2011; Folentová 2013; Kubišová/Sabo 2021). However, besides the possible political corruption or value bias in the allocation of subsidies, there are other problematic aspects in the subsidy provision process that have not been addressed so far and represent a barrier to access to funding for CSOs. These include a lack of transparency and a lack of advance notice about funding opportunities in subsidy programs which limits CSOs’ planning of their activities and resource needs. Often, subsidies are provided too late in the budgetary period. Often there is an extremely short time available for CSOs for project implementation. CSOs often criticise the lack of transparency and the quality of the assessment process of proposals. CSOs also call for the possibility of multi-year funding and impact evaluation instead of formal reporting on project outputs. The contesting civic spaces thus transform into the risk of distortions in public funding allocations by either defunding “inconvenient” topics on the grounds of “culture wars” or on the grounds of taking control over the public funding allocation.

 Social trust and perceptions of civil society . Interpersonal (general) trust and trust in CSOs Different researches since the 1990s show that the levels of interpersonal trust in postcommunist countries, including Slovakia, are low. In 2019 only 33 % of adults agreed with the statement that people can always be or often trusted. 43 % believe that people cannot be typically sure whether to trust in social interaction. NGOs are trusted by 42 % of the population. Higher levels of trust have trade unions (55 %), the army (63 %), and local government (70 %). Government enjoys traditionally low trust (23 %), followed by parliament (27 %and the judicial system, including courts (31 %) (Bútorová 2022:48). Those with higher interpersonal trust (horizontal) also apply it to social and political institutions. 64 % of those who have higher interpersonal trust consider NGOs as credible. 44 % of those who believe that people cannot be trusted as a matter of principle do not consider NGOs credible. A similar difference is evident in the perception of the credibility of civic initiatives (65 % vs. 50 %). Higher levels of trust are associated with higher attained education levels, liberal-minded and right-leaning politically, speaking multiple languages, and rela-

  Boris Strečanský tively good economic standing. Those who trust NGOs and civic initiatives also have a lower social distance from various minorities – ethnic, religious, or sexual. They also have a more positive attitude to same-sex partnerships and ethnic and religious heterogeneity (Bútorová et al. 2020:154) People who trust CSOs and civic initiatives are more vigorous supporters of liberal democracy and less support the principle of strong leader deciding regardless of considering the voice of parliament or civil society. They also are less likely to sacrifice civic freedoms for higher living standards and are interested in a higher level than average in politics on a local and national level. They feel confident about their ability to influence the state of affairs and show lower levels of civic helplessness. On the other hand, those who mistrust CSOs consider health care provision unsatisfying, are sensitive to social inequalities, suffer from low income, the weak social standing of seniors, regional socioeconomic differences, and employment of foreigners in the Slovak labor market (Bútorová et al. 2020:154).

. Perception of CSOs The image of NGOs is in the majority of the population (61 %), positive or neutral. The open question yields associations to service functions of CSOs – most often (18 %) their charitable orientation, support, and help to people in need or helping a fellow neighbor. Traditional social solidarity is where the public and CSOs can communicate more easily with the general public. 6 % of the people find CSOs positive in solving environmental problems, human rights, and advancement of education, culture, and arts. That means that the expressive functions of CSOs are less appreciated but still recognised. 10 % consider their independence from the state and political parties as an important positive characteristic of CSOs. Only 3 % attribute to CSOs as positive watchdog functions to address the problems of wasting public resources, corruption, and pushing for improvements in general management (Bútorová et al. 2020:157). Negative associations connected with the image of CSOs were less frequent (9 %). Most frequently were used accusations of untransparent financial management, misleading the public trust (4 %) or serving to anti-Slovak interests (2 %) and connectedness with the opposition (1 %). Among the most recognizable CSOs belong Greenpeace, League against Cancer, Freedom of Animals, Slovak Red Cross, Good Angel charity, and UNICEF. However, 57 % of the respondents could not remember the name of any CSO (Bútorová et al. 2020:89–91). Most people consider civic initiatives and NGOs part of a democratic society (81 %). 74 % believe they satisfy the needs of people in areas where the state cannot deliver, and 72% believe that majority of CSOs serve to the benefit of the people living in Slovakia. The majority (70 %) believe that the state should support civil society more (Bútorová et al. 2020:156).

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However, the views on the economic aspects of CSOs are less favorable. More than half (56 %) believe that CSOs act transparently and that their finances are clean and correct. 44 % have either expressed a critical view (31 %) or avoided answering (13 %). 44 % believe that most civic initiatives and NGOs advance foreign sponsors’ goals and serve foreign interests. 43 % rejected such a view, and 13 % avoided answering (Bútorová et al. 2020:83). These views represent a fertile ground used by the political spectrum’s uncivil segment in advancing the stigmatisation and accusation of civil organisations as the untrustworthy and subversive element. Those who see merit in civil society in engaging in political issues are a minority in Slovakia. 57 % believe that civil initiatives and CSOs shall not be involved in politics because that is reserved for political parties. 38 % did not agree with such a statement (Bútorová et al. 2020:80). This reflects an embedded belief that democracy is perceived as a representative electoral system dominated by political parties where civil society’s participatory engagement in public affairs is less accepted. These views provide social support to those public leaders who act against social change in civil society that enters the political realm on issues of general interest. Another recent research on CSO credibility showed that one problem contributing to the credibility of CSOs is the rare personal experience of the general public with CSOs. In this research, 78 % of respondents (online population) could not recall a personal experience with a CSO, and even when they had such an experience, they were unaware that it was a CSO entity. For example, half of the people – taxpayers who designated its income tax for CSOs- were unaware that they support a CSO. The authors of this study recommend that to increase the credibility of CSOs, they must communicate more intensively outcomes of their work and their outcomes (Sklenář/Chovancová 2020:6, 19–20). It is equally important to refute the lies and misrepresentations uttered in online space and ensure transparent and prudent financial management practices (Bútorová et al. 2020:83).

 Organisational development . CSO population In Slovakia, the number of nonprofit organisations has constantly been rising since the early nineties, and this trend continues. There are 54,937 civil associations, 470 foundations, 509 non-investment funds, 1,673 nonprofit organisations providing general benefit services, and 116 foreign organisations registered in the database of the Ministry of Interior. Regarding primary thematic orientation, the most numerous area is sports – where one-third of all organisations claim a primary activity. 18.5 % consider as primary activity culture and spiritual values, 13 % education, and 12.7 % social services (Brozmanová-Gregorová/Murray Svidroňová 2020:358).

  Boris Strečanský

. Functions of CSOs Recent research on the representative sample of nonprofit, non-governmental organisations (n=515) showed that in their self-perception, the prevailing function is the development of communities in the sense of bonding social capital. It means connecting people with similar interests, building friendly relations inside an organisation or creating a space for regular meetings, or building a community that acts independently and implements its goals and ambitions. The second most weighted function of CSOs is the service provision and improving the well-being of people via services according to the needs of those served (Brozmanová-Gregorová/Murray Svidroňová 2020: 422). The least developed function of CSOs, as seen by CSOs themselves, is the advocacy function of drawing the public attention to particular topics or acting as a public voice of a specific group or interest. 47 % of studied CSOs could identify with such activity. On the other hand of the advocacy spectrum, only 9.3 % of studied CSOs could identify with a function of attempting to achieve a change in the political realm and influence political and legal issues in responding to interest groups. So CSOs seem to be least identified with the public policy advocacy functions and somewhat more with interest/group advocacy. Service functions have been identified most strongly in social service CSOs, humanitarian and development CSOs, and health and education CSOs. Advocacy function prevails in rights-based organisations, human rights, and environmental CSOs. The bridging function is present primarily in social service and development CSOs. Bonding is typical for CSOs in sports, culture, and spiritual values promotion (Brozmanová-Gregorová/Murray Svidroňová 2020:425).

. Old and new civil society After 1989 so-called social organisations that were tolerated and supported by the regime continued their existence and adapted to the new situation. Many operated in recreation and mutual interest (free time activities). Some of them dissolved, others disintegrated into smaller organisations (for example, the Slovak Society of Nature and Landscape Protection), and others continued in the new context (for example, the Slovak Union of Women) and utilised their institutional connections and secured mostly public resources for their operations. New CSOs were representing a new civic culture. They were smaller, driven by the energy of their founders, often acting on a community level, without any secured income streams. International donor support was an important formative factor of the post-1989 CSO development as the local funding sources were non-existent. At the beginning of the 1990s, several thousands of new associations and foundations were already established. They organised into thematic platforms through national CSO conferences (Stupava Conferences) informal umbrella platform – the Gremium of the

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Third Sector (1993), that embodied the new CSO culture. Overall, a new identity of the civil sector was formed that was distinct from but co-existed with the old. The ethos of civic activism and public advocacy in the nineties was formative to the civil space in Slovakia because it left a trace of collective experience in civic organising and public advocacy, which lasted in the years after the entry to the EU. A strong generation of leaders and organisations influenced public policies and maintained the voice of independent civic space in public policy (ECNL 2012). Also, civil society in Slovakia has been changing. There is visible growth of another generation of new informal groups, initiatives, and collectives. Social media and digital activism accelerated this process. New initiatives emerge in cities and urban centers on neighborhood levels and address new social change issues such as radicalisation or push for transparency and proper management of public funds. New civic initiatives emerge without formal organisational structures and use digital and online communication channels as flexible tools. Online activism has played an essential role in allowing for instant communication and networking and using technology for positive social change. There are many initiatives in online space, such as Young Against Fascism (Mladí proti fašizmu), Self-Consciouss Slovakia (Sebavedomé Slovensko), and Demagog.sk, Konspiratori.sk, Infosecurity.sk can mobilise specific groups, organise petitions, investigate hoaxes and uncover conspiracy sites. Some of these initiatives have a limited lifespan, and others manage to develop into sustainable organisations. Many of these new initiatives are agile and innovative and tap social and financial support from society. The COVID crisis has shown the strength of these new ways of working with civil society. Online and offline engagement work in unique symbiosis with the emergence of new organisational forms and informality. The new ways of civic activism are also apparent in the uncivil side of the spectrum, which challenges European values, fundamental rights, and freedoms and organises to discredit the liberal democratic order. New movements and organisations, such as the Slovak conscripts movement that operates as a voluntary paramilitary nativist group, are just one of the examples (Kupková/Milo 2019). Many uncivil groups and media outlets share extremist, xenophobic, racist, or other propaganda online (Rizman 2019).

. Orientation of CSOs If we look at the composition of the CSOs according to their focus (using the 2019 research on CSOs) – the sector’s major group (61 %) are mutual benefit organisations that provide services to their members and internally. The second group (27 %) provides services to clients outside their organisation to improve their quality of life and satisfy needs that neither the state nor the market offers. The third group (9 %) is the new advocacy organisations engaged in advocacy activities for the public interest and not only for the interest of their members. They are often performing volunteering and

  Boris Strečanský philanthropic actions and act in fields of environment, human rights, and anticorruption (Brozmanová-Gregorová/Murray Svidroňová 2020:416–422).

. Membership in CSOs Data show that membership in CSOs is increasing. The share of citizens who are members of one or more CSOs has risen from 34 % in 2003 to 37 % in 2017 and 45 % in 2019. A representative public opinion survey conducted in 2019 indicated that 45% of the Slovak population has a membership in a club or an association. The most extensive membership base is in housing associations (19 % reported membership), sports clubs (12 %), religious associations (11 %), parent associations (10 %), and clubs of retirees and seniors (9 %) (Bútorová et al. 2020:137).

. CSO connectedness with society As many critics of the civil society development in post-communist space point out, the disconnect between citizens and CSOs can be considered a significant barrier to the political socialisation function of CSOs, and the dependency on foreign or public funding disconnects CSOs from their grassroots or disincentivises them from maintaining such connections (Fagan 2006). One explanation for this is that post-communist countries developed a specific form of so-called transaction activism, typical of its ability to network and build connections with key stakeholders and use these strategies to substitute traditional civic organising (Petrova/Tarrow 2007). The problem of disconnection is indicated in the research of CSOs in 2019, according to which the CSOs that are active in citizen advocacy and education about human rights report minor membership numbers, despite that in the last 16 years, the membership of citizens in CSOs is continuously growing (Bútorová et al. 2020:134). There is another barrier – the adult population considers political rights and civic freedoms relatively unimportant issues, and this attitude has not changed much since 1994 (Bútorová/Gyarfášová 2010: 148). In the last years, Slovakia may be seeing a wind of change. Also, the 2019 CSO research indicated that CSOs in Slovakia engage more in public mobilisation than in influencing politics through direct interventions (Čavojská et al. 2020). Visible examples are mass mobilisations in recent years, such as the initiative Za slušné Slovensko (For a Decent Slovakia), anticorruption marches or initiatives of environmental coalitions My sme les (We are the Forest) or Mladí za klímu (Youth for the Climate), who mobilised tens of thousands of citizens. Also, the engagement of sympathisers of watchdog organisations such as the Foundation Let’s Stop the Corruption or Transparency International Slovakia.

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Bridging the disconnect may be possible by intensifying communication and constituency-building efforts, including building networks of supporters and sympathisers because it creates a more complex relationship between the organisation and its environment (Mazák/Strečanský 2019). This is already happening to some extent. Many groups and initiatives already run successful fundraising campaigns.

 Missions/Capacity for social change As Calhoun noted, the idea of civil society is the expression of the “capacity of a political community to organize itself, independent of the specific direction of state power.” (Calhoun 1993:270). Previous sections on the socioeconomic and historic framework indicated that the statist tendencies attempted to mute the civil society in Slovakia, which has, on the other hand, kept asserting itself in the public sphere. The idea of the public sphere sees civil society as a new autonomous societal actor who, with other traditional actors, seeks to settle differences on issues of shared societal concerns. According to Habermas, that happens only in such a public sphere that allows seeking these settlements in a rational-critical way. Calhoun added that the mere existence of social institutions – such as civil society organisations – is not enough to keep society integrated. Furthermore, a public sphere that does not provide opportunities for a substantial discourse on important issues cannot facilitate social change by voluntary action, aka civil society. Therefore, civil society’s capacity for social change is mediated by an adequately shaped public sphere. Let us leave the question of the quality of the public sphere aside and focus on the civil society capacity per se. The civil society capacity can be defined as the organisational, political, and economic ability of civil society to enact change. In other words, it is suggested that the capacity of civil society can be understood as its power to successfully engage in the public sphere, applying a repertoire of organisational, resource mobilisation, and political strategies. The resource framework and organisational aspects of Slovak civil society are discussed in sections 4 and 6 above. In this section, we look at the political dimensions of the capacity of civil society for social change – in both directions, the civil and the uncivil. First, the main challenges in the political climate as a component of a functioning public sphere are reviewed. Next are presented several examples of the agency of “good” civil society in the public sphere in their response to the contestation phenomenon to document the self-organising capacity of civil society. The future potential of civil society capacity is reviewed through the concept of social innovation. The last part examines the uncivil society expressions as evidence of a capacity for an inverse development in the social change continuum.

  Boris Strečanský We can see that the intent for social change provokes certain contestation in civic spaces, including restrictions on freedom of expression, stigmatisation of human rights defenders and anti-corruption activists, and attempts to discredit CSOs.

. Political climate as a critical contextual factor According to Bútorová, there are seven characteristics of the political climate in current Slovakia: 1) Deep mistrust of key political institutions and their representatives, 2) Inability of political parties to cooperate, 3) Unreconcilable differences between different actors having opposing opinions, 4) Overall high political polarisation, 5) Increased social tension, 6) Feelings of civic helplessness and 7) Discontent of majority with the functioning of the liberal democratic system (Bútorová 2022:69) In such a political climate, rational-critical public discourse suffers. Decisions on significant issues of public concern – such as those related to public health during the Covid pandemic or those related to social policy (social protection measures) are often taken in a rhapsodic and unprepared manner. The pluralism of media and their diversity provides for some rectification of the deteriorated political climate. However, the pluralism of media itself cannot mend the effects of polarisation in a media space and the debilitating role of social media in spreading controversial narratives. The conversation between various views suffers. That adds momentum to the discourse pushed by right-wing extremists who have been in parliament since 2016. Their narrative of strong-hand, anti-European sentiment, and contempt of democratic institutions also appeal to the mainstream population. The destructive influence of extremists in the parliament has become particularly salient during the Covid crisis and after the Russian aggression against Ukraine (Bútorová 2022:69) when elements of their narrative became normalised via their adoption by mainstream or former politicians, civic activists and individuals seeking to present themselves as “public intellectuals”, the “alternative” periodicals and media platforms, discussion groups and individual social media contributors (Mesežnikov 2022). These changes in the cognitive landscape have influenced the shift in attitudes regarding feelings of democracy. Slovakia, as the only country in the CEE region, showed a concerning trend of rising support for autocracy and dropping support for democracy. In three years since Covid, the openness toward strong leader almost doubled (25 % in 2020, 38 % in 2021, and 49 % in 2022) (Hajdu et al. 2022:80).

. The social presence of civil and uncivil society The social presence and public reach of conspiracy narratives and fake news are facilitated by a burgeoning ecosystem of websites and media outlets that have built their audience over time. For example, the most prominent misinformation site,

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Hlavnespravy.sk, dominated Slovakia with 7.5 mil. monthly visits in February-April 2019. An analysis of the misinformation outlets in 2019 showed that health and lifestyle websites account for the majority of the ten most popular misinformation portals in Slovakia; news-focused websites dominate when it comes to aggregated monthly visits (Michal Mintal 2019). However, a comparison of Facebook likes and followers in 2019 between prodemocratic civil society entities and entities promoting conspiracy and extremist views showed that the democratic civil society spectrum did not lag much behind (Rizman 2019). The sample was constructed using the following criteria: largest recipients of the tax designation, CSOs with the greatest visibility in anti-corruption, human rights, environmental, social service, youth, educational, health protection, and humanitarian fields, well-known conspiracy initiatives, extremist organisations and movements, and nationalist organisations. The comparison of likes has not shown a significant difference. Of the top 20 selected entities, 12 included the standard civil society groups, and 8 were the Facebook pages of alternative, conspiracy, and extremist initiatives.

. Civil society public advocacy The strand of civil society that can be broadly characterised as aligned with the existing democratic system and broadly understood liberal democratic values is active in many different areas, as shown in Section 6. New advocacy organisations make up 10 % of the overall CSO population in the organised CSO world. These include new citizen advocacy groups, think tanks, social movements (anti-corruption, environment), collectives, and rights-based organisations (Brozmanová-Gregorová/Murray Svidroňová 2020:418). In the last decade, it is possible to observe in this subfield a repertoire of different tactics on how some societal problems have been raised to the public forum. These include anti-corruption marches (2012, 2013, 2017, 2018), annual Pride marches, and frequent petitions campaigns with tens and hundreds of thousands of signatures on environmental 61 or social protection 62 issues, mass demonstrations, and protests 63 after the murder of an investigative journalist, gatherings in solidarity with Ukraine after the Russian invasion (Pravda 2022) and many others.

 61 “The Forest is Us”, “Petition for a Better Environmental Protection”, “Stop Extraction of Uranium Ore.” 62 “Also Seniors Want to Live in Dignity” (see https://jednotadochodcov.sk/?p=7940 (17th October 2022)). 63 “For a Decent Slovakia”. (McLaughlin 2019)

  Boris Strečanský

. CSOs’ responses to contestation Some advocacy activities have responded directly to the pressure in the civic space arising from the deteriorated political climate. These can be clustered into three groups based on their focus: 1. Public sphere. Activities and initiatives directly address elements that contribute to worsening the quality of the public sphere, such as developing media content 64, combating disinformation 65, fact-checking 66, flagging out misinformation outlets 67, and bringing relevant data to inform the public debate 68. 2. Resilience capacity. Activities and initiatives that focus on strengthening the resilience capacity of civic space by creating networking and information-sharing spaces of CSOs 69, civil society leaders, and activists on topics of civil society defense, anti-propaganda, and combating disinformation. Activities of these initiatives include educational events such as workshops, meetings, and training providing awareness raising and skills development on resilience development or information security for civic organisations. 70. Some of these initiatives address issues that have a broader impact on fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the right to privacy 71. 3. Enabling framework for civic space. Initiatives and platforms focused on securing the enabling environment for civil society. They perform activities fo-

 64 Web portal Sebavedome.sk – “a collective of proud Slovaks who believe in civil society....we build space where those can meet who do not want to be cornered, despite the prevailing skepsis...”. 65 Web portal Infosecurity.sk directly addresses disinformation activities, aspires to repair ills in information space and builds awareness on important topics in public discourse. (Infosecurity.Sk n.d.) 66 Checkbot.sk – Facebook Messenger Bot debunking fake news. (see https://www.checkbot.sk/ (17th October 2022)). 67 Konspiratori.sk – Web portal listing websites with questionable content. The website does not recommend working with them for advertisement purposes or making referrals. The list is updated based on specific criteria by a reputable panel. 68 Databezpatosu.sk – Web-based project of “an independent civic initiative associating experts on data analysis, crisis management, and data visualization. Its purpose is to offer the public reliable and digestible information and illustrate it on simple examples from everyday life that are comprehensible to all”. 69 These include private Facebook pages on topics such as CS Defense or informal communities connected via a common platform. 70 Academy of Civic Resilience – a training program for civic leaders prepared by the Partners for Democratic Change – Slovakia (see https://www.pdcs.sk/blog/post/akademia-obcianskej-odolnostiprogram-budovania-reziliencie-pre-lidrov-neziskovych-organizacii (17th October 2022)). 71 An initiative of two NGOS – Slovensko.digital and Nadácia Zastavme korupciu – asking the parliament to withdraw the law on cybersecurity in March 2021 that provided the National Security Agency excessive rights and prerogatives. (Nadácia zastavme korupciu 2021)

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cused on monitoring the regulatory framework as related to resource issues 72 or bring their voice to processes related to public policies affecting the civic space 73.

. Potential of social innovations The research on the socioeconomic contribution of the non-profit sector showed that 37.5 % of all Slovakia CSOs perform service providing in the social, educational, or health protection field as their primary role, and this share has grown in the last 15 years of the Slovak non-profit sector. The research further confirmed that over 60 % of all CSOs provide services primarily inside their organisations to satisfy the interests of their members. An essential part of all CSOs intends to work to improve the lives of their clients, expand services and respond to needs that arise and that neither the state nor the market address (Brozmanová-Gregorová/Murray Svidroňová 2020:416–422). The social innovation function is connected with the service function because innovations in service provision respond to clients’ changing needs or changing regulatory frameworks. However, social innovations are focused not only on searching for new, more effective, and fair solutions to significant societal problems in services but also via bottom-up cooperation in pluralistic networks. (Osborne 2006). The civil society space in Slovakia is also a space for testing and experimentation of new ideas. In the last two decades, CSOs initiated pilot projects in community development, community centers, street work, volunteering centers, services to youth and children with special needs, Roma community centers, micro-lending schemes, low-cost housing construction, mentoring and psycho-social support programs, and others (Strečanský 2021). A specific area of CSO’s contribution to Slovakia’s social innovation field can also be found in the production and utilisation of social and intellectual capital in developing new creative products, contributing to a subset of the “creative industry”. This is closely related to the digitisation of the economy and society and the gradual decline of traditional industries. Reconciling the tensions caused by the accelerated tempo of technological advancement and a slower tempo of adjustment by the social

 72 The civic platform Nahlas raised a critical voice about the way how the Slovak government prepared the Plan for Recovery and Resilience (Multiannual EU Funding Program) and what are some issues with its priorities (see https://www.platformahlas.sk/v-navrhu-zakona-k-planu-obnovychyba-zapojenie-klucovych-partnerov/ (17th October 2022)). 73 The civic platform – Nahlas is an informal platform gathering civic initiatives and NGOs interested in active participation in protecting and developing civil society in Slovakia. It addresses various issues that emerge on the agenda in public policy that have an effect on civil space. (See https://www.platformahlas.sk/ministerstvo-prace-socialnych-veci-rozdeluje-obciansky-sektor/ (17th October 2022)).

  Boris Strečanský and institutional world will create demand for creative solutions and social innovations (Bútorová et al. 2019).

. Uncivil society, extremism and populism The radicalisation, growth of extremism, and political populism are not specific to Slovakia but are visible across Europe. Feelings of defeat, unsuccess, and grievances of people who experienced unsuccess, felt direct consequences of rising economic and social inequalities, and perceived overall insecurity and uncertainty stand behind the rise of these phenomena. Slovakia, like other countries of the CEE region, is riddled with tensions caused by value conflicts related to migration, gender issues and LGBTI minorities, ethnic and religious minorities, environment preservation vs. economic development, liberal democracy vs. authoritarian governance, and geopolitical orientation (Ondrušek et al. 2018). These value conflicts contribute to the confusion around Slovakia’s geopolitical standing and the growth of affinity towards the “hard hand” authoritarian semi-liberal and semi-democratic approach, contempt for the West, and admiration of Russia. The expressions of anti-systemic and right-wing extremism (hate speech, xenophobia, anti-refugee rhetoric) have grown more robust in the last decade. There are competing narratives on the past (Slovakia during World War II), present, and future. Malicious actors and alternative media outlets nurture these antidemocratic and false narratives. The decreasing quality of public education, lack of critical thinking in the population, the degradation of the public sphere by the normalisation of vulgarity and aggressive rhetoric, contempt of the rule of law and decency in public leadership, the amplifying role of social media echo chambers, the anonymity in the internet space, they all contribute to the deterioration of political discourse and spreading of uncivil values – by anti-Roma, xenophobic, nationalistic, or otherwise extremist movements. 74 Slovakia is known for its higher xenophobia and negative attitudes toward otherness. For example, considering the refugee crisis in 2016, Slovakia witnessed two demonstrations against refugees and Islam. Expressions of uncivil action (racism, hate crimes, the rise of extremism but also institutional segregation) were not uncommon. At the same time, these expressions were contradicted and opposed by expressions of solidarity from the other spectrum of civil society, traditional NGOs and ad

 74 Slovenské hnutie obrody (SHO) – Slovak Movement of Revival, Slovenská pospolitosť (Slovak Community), Slovenskí branci (Slovak Conscripts), Slovensko-ruská spoločnosť (Slovak-Russian Society) and others.

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hoc initiatives, and groups of volunteers that provided extensive humanitarian aid. 75, legal aid 76, public collections, and petitioned government 77 in advocacy 78. The disturbing trend is that the current wave of populistic and radical politics is moving from the fringes to the political mainstream, especially since the parliamentary elections in 2016 when the neo-Nazi Kotleba party entered the parliament with 8 % of support, and that support has risen since. Recorded were cases of intimidation of civil society activists by public figures from the disinformation and extremist scene 79 and by prominent opposition politicians 80. Extremist movements have a hybrid nature. Like other movements, they are fluid and diffuse from the non-partisan civic space to partisan politics and back. They use the standard repertoire and community organising tools typical for social movements and CSOs – crowdfunding, fundraising, supporters’ network development, and presenting political positions on issues. Traditional civic organisations prefer a more transactional form of activism and often are characterised by professionalisation and expertise (Císař 2013). Extremist movements offer alternative views and solutions focused mainly on mobilising citizens based on discontent with the status quo and building a social presence in online and offline communities (Strečanský 2021). The activism of extremist movements searches for conflict and confrontation, which draws media attention and makes an impression of dynamism. In communica 75 Človek v ohrození (People in Peril) – Extensive humanitarian aid provided along various points of the Balkan Road, public collection of goods and finances, mobilising Slovak volunteers. 76 Liga za ľudské práva (Human Rights League). 77 Výzva k ľudskosti (Appeal for Humanity) – Initiative of personalities of public life (led by Martin Dubéci) that started as a petition (signed by approximately 12,000 citizens) and continued by some advocacy activities towards the government. For more, see the website http://osf.sk/financnyprispevok-vyzvy-k-ludskosti/ (17th October 2022). 78 CVEK (Centre for Research of Ethnicity and Culture) – A research and advocacy organisation in the area of the integration of migrants. 79 In 2019 a Bratislava district court ordered former presidential candidate Martin Dano to withdraw his online videos targeting investigative journalist and anti-corruption NGO director Zuzana Petkova. The court ruled Dano’s videos incited hatred and defamed Petkova and other investigative journalists. Petkova informed media outlets that Dano had not complied with the court decision to withdraw his videos and social media posts, an enforcement procedure also failed, and he rejected a settlement. Dano went on to publicly share Petkova’s personal data and incited his fans to share the disputed social media content. This prompted Petkova to file a criminal complaint, and in October, the prosecutor indicted Dano for unauthorised manipulation of personal data, publicly inciting a criminal offense, and making a public appeal to large-scale noncompliance with an important duty prescribed by law. (U.S. State Department 2021:20) 80 In May 2020, Robert Fico, a member of parliament and chair of the opposition Smer-SD party, criticised the justice minister during a parliamentary session for awarding grants to NGOs working on LGBTQI+ issues, accusing her of giving priority to the ‚physical needs of homosexuals’ over the spiritual needs of the Slovak nation. (U.S. State Department 2021:20)

  Boris Strečanský tion, it uses radical expressions and simple language. The repertoire of mobilisation includes public meetings, voluntary help, outdoor experiential programs with military culture (self-defense and security training), and active communication in social media. A typical feature of uncivil civil society is an unwillingness to admit extremist attitudes, antisemitism, racism, autocratic inclination, and the development of closed networks. It is attractive to young people. Political extremism is not a matter of objection for 28 % of young people (15–35 years old) (Čavojská et al. 2020). Extremist movements influence the public discourse that normalises intolerance, aggressive behavior, and hate in direct contradiction to the standard interpretation of civil society’s political socialisation role as a school of democracy. These movements are dangerous to social cohesion and constitutionalism because they spread propaganda and disinformation and may also become direct actors of hybrid threats (Kupková/Milo 2019; Mesežnikov 2017). Together with aligned alternative media outlets and anti-systemic political parties, they delegitimise traditional civil society and attempt to dismantle the democratic constitutional order. Possible responses in this area require a combination of strategies. On the one hand, it is decent and competent behavior of political representatives and good governance of public affairs that can increase the public’s trust in institutions. On the other hand, it is necessary to continue strengthening cognitive security by fighting and debunking the disinformation 81 strengthening the systemic resilience of civil society, monitoring of legal framework, and supporting and encouraging the ability of civil actors to present a credible and more attractive offer in the public sphere. It is recommended to support informal education and civic education programs that would support a healthy civic mind and awareness, pro-social values, and values of respect and dignity (Čavojská et al. 2020). Extremism grows from a socio-cultural grounding typical to low respect for scientific facts, abundant with stereotypes, lack of orientation in international affairs, or distorted perception of history. It was apparent in the absence of willingness on the part of society to respect and be guided by expert recommendations during the Covid period of 2020–21 or in the inclination of part of society to pro-Kremlin narratives and questioning of the support of Ukraine in its defense against the aggression of Russian Federation in 2022.

 Impact of Crises: Covid 19 and War in Ukraine Both crises served as a backdrop to contestation in freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and stigmatisation and pro-social elements of civil society.  81 See https://disi.stratpol.sk/ (17th October 2022).

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. Covid-19 and civil society The Covid-19-related public health measures were imposed first in March 2020 and continued in various intensities copying the amplitudes of three major Covid-19 infection waves until the end of 2021. The lockdown measures included restrictions on public gatherings, movement of people between counties, closed schools and kindergartens, canceled cultural, sports, and social events, including religious ones, closed services such as restaurants, cafés, and special regimes for human services. The Covid-19 crisis became a significant challenge for the new cabinet that took office in March 2020. Since the pandemic’s beginning, the government had quickly adopted stringent measures even when the uptake of infections was mild. With some luck, the country has navigated through the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic with a low incidence of cases and related fatalities. Still, the pandemic took its toll in later waves, facilitated by controversial actions or inactions. The first signs of a continuation of the centralised statist approach started to emerge in a verbal exchange between the government and human rights organisations. Some new cabinet members criticised human rights organisations for their criticism of how the government implemented the lockdown of several Roma settlements. 82 These altercations continued (Strecansky 2020:135). The low level of importance attributed to human rights and civil liberties issues can be illustrated by the fact that the parliament refused to consider the 2019 report of the Office of an Ombudswoman due to the inappropriateness of values (of minority rights) she promoted in her report. The response from civil society and the corporate sector in alleviating the effects of the pandemic has been remarkable (Batková et al. 2020; Hlas 2020). There were dozens of initiatives producing and distributing face masks, crowdfunding, and fundraising initiatives 83 (for protective equipment to support health and social care facilities (with a total value of over €6 mil.), volunteer coordination and organisation of support of lonely and vulnerable people (helping with food supplies, etc.), infor 82 “Based on results of COVID-19 testing, regional public health offices ordered a mandatory fullarea quarantine in one settlement in December 2020 and two in February 2021, with armed police and military guards stationed at the entrances to the settlements. Quarantines lasted up to several weeks, and NGOs reported that residents complained of uncertainty due to the absence of clear guidance on the duration and conditions of the quarantine. Authorities reportedly did not isolate persons who tested positive for COVID-19 from other persons in the community. Local authorities provided food and medical supplies to the sealed-off settlements, but the Plenipotentiary for Roma Communities reported a lack of firewood and access to general and specialized health care while under quarantine. Human rights NGOs reported the quarantines contributed to further stigmatization and anti-Romani prejudice and that there were reports of increased hate speech against Roma on social media. The ombudsperson continued criticizing the blanket quarantines in Romani communities”. (U.S. State Department 2021:30) 83 For example, https://ktopomozeslovensku.sk/ (17th October 2022).

  Boris Strečanský mation and awareness-raising in marginalised communities (in Roma settlements, homeless, drug-users). Civil society’s efforts were also present in activities beyond the direct assistance provision: organising spaces to identify solutions, hackathons, app development initiatives for the prevention of spreading the disease, informing the general public, and preventing hoaxes and disinformation. IT companies offered support, corporate foundations have announced programs supporting urgent needs in diagnosing and preventing COVID-19, donations of respirators and ventilation devices to hospitals, etc. Several corporate foundations established a crisis fund (Support fund to those who help at the Pontis Foundation) to support the core costs of CSOs impacted by the corona crisis (Pontis Foundation n.d.). The experience of philanthropic institutions in serving and connecting various needs, mobilising, and ensuring the flow of resources can be considered significant. In the Slovak context, several independent intermediary grant-making foundations, private venture philanthropies, corporate foundations, and community foundations – have utilised their experience and grant-making systems to deliver assistance where needed. Many individuals contributed to fundraising calls during the lockdown almost exclusively in an online space or joined volunteering activities. Existing online fundraising tools, such as the giving system darujme.sk has been utilised by many organisations for the first time, and they were highly successful. 84 As the Covid crisis continued, it prompted contestation in the cognitive space. Extremist and disinformation actors disseminated narratives on the effectiveness of authoritarian regimes such as in Russia or China and deficiency of democracy in handling the crisis, the incapability of the West, and failing the EU to protect its citizens from Covid-19 as a U.S. biological weapon, as a result of a conspiracy of globalists led by Bill Gates (Mesežnikov/Bartoš 2020:18–23). The freedom of assembly in the state of emergency had been constrained. A national state of emergency was declared in October 2021, allowing the state to regulate public gatherings due to “a threat to the lives and health of people” in Slovakia. The same month, the Constitutional Court ruled that such restrictions were permitted by constitutional law. Lockdown measures were partially lifted in early December, but the state of emergency was extended through the end of the year (Freedom House 2022). Several unapproved protests and anti-lockdown demonstrations took place in 2021 during the peak phase of infections by antivaccination communities that partly  84 Darujme.sk is a non-commercial project established in 2012 by the Center for Philanthropy to help non-profit organisations to raise funds for public benefits purposes from individual donors through online channels. During the peak of the crisis, donors showed higher than usual levels of willingness to contribute to charitable calls of CSOs. For example, in 2 months, from March until May 2020, Darujme. sk, facilitated 29,943 contributions from 17,448 individual donors in the total amount of 702,443 €. However, after Covid’s first wave, the willingness to provide charitable contributions fell to standard levels.

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overlapped with the disinformation and extremist actors and nurtured by the presence of some opposition politicians. These protests were typical of aggressive rhetoric, violence, trying to break into the parliament building, and required police interventions (Bútorová 2022:62). The Covid crisis showed that coordinated and robust support from the state institutions in mitigating the spread of the infection was necessary but not a sufficient effort. The public’s cooperative and pro-social attitude played an essential role in an almost immediate change of behavior of the population en masse by adopting wearing face masks and complying with social distancing. These factors were crucial in not allowing the pandemic to spread broadly. Besides these “material” aspects, the Covid crisis also showed the significance and, at the same time, the vulnerability of a cognitive space as a significant factor in public trust in institutions and social cohesion.

. War in Ukraine and civil society in Slovakia When the pandemic crisis was already waning, the war in Ukraine fueled new energy to the polarisation process, even when public opinion has shifted significantly in its attitudes toward acceptance of refugees and its geopolitical orientation. In January 2022, the social distance to refugees was felt by 42 % of the population. A month later, these attitudes changed significantly after the Russian attack on Ukraine. A clear majority (86 %) of respondents in a representative survey expressed positive attitudes towards accepting refugees. The social distance has dramatically decreased due to the immediacy of the situation (Gehrerová/Koník 2022). In comparison to the last major refugee wave in 2015, when 62 % of respondents called for the non-acceptance of refugees, the result is surprising. However, the significant difference in the shift of attitudes of the public is due to the differences in refugees themselves (cultural, religious) and due to the position of the government in 2012, which strongly opposed the acceptance of refugees then (Bútorová 2022:53). The wave of solidarity with Ukraine and refugees was similar to civil society’s response to the Covid pandemic’s first wave in 2020. The majority of Slovaks were willing to support refugees, even if they felt concerns about their coming. Many have provided food, shelter, accommodation, in-kind material gifts or pro-bono services, and financial support. The wave of support lasted for a few months, and before summer, it began to fall. Several demonstrations and marches in support of and solidarity with Ukraine were organised in various cities by various informal initiatives and active CSOs from the beginning of the war. It can be said that the civil society space has contributed to the public discourse through communicative action – public communication, declarations, and calls supporting Ukraine (Občianska platforma za demokraciu 2022) Organised civil society organisations also significantly contributed to the response to the crisis. Research conducted in April 2022 among CSOs by the Civic Plat-

  Boris Strečanský form for Democracy found that 130 CSOs worked in four directions: in humanitarian support on the border with Ukraine, in humanitarian aid to refugees inside Slovakia, and the inclusion of refugees and Ukraine. Over 6.6 thousand volunteers were engaged, and over €11 mil. were mobilised for material, humanitarian, and health support to Ukraine from the public via various collections and fundraising drives. CSOs also offered policy suggestions on improving and facilitating refugees’ integration into society (Teraz.sk 2022). The war in Ukraine shifted the geopolitical orientation of the Slovak public slightly more to the West. In comparison to 2014, when only 26 % believed that Slovakia should be geopolitically oriented towards the West, in April 2022, it was 39 % (seesame 2022). However, the socio-political orientations are still quite controversial. Compared to other CEE countries, Slovaks, Hungarians, and Bulgarians show the highest acceptance levels of the pro-Kremlin narrative 34 % of Slovaks believe that the responsibility for the war is in the West, which provoked Russia and Ukraine that oppressed the Russian-speaking population (Hajdu et al. 2022). Similar findings from the Flash Eurobarometer showed that only 55 % of the Slovak population attributes the responsibility for the war to Russia compared to 78 % in the EU-27 average. After the initial shock, the extremist and disinformation activists revived their activities and started to promote the pro-Kremlin propaganda and narrative. It included traditional geopolitical disinformation and spreading fake news about the influx of refugees from Africa through the Ukrainian Slovak border or portraying refugees and Ukraine as ungrateful and willing to cut off Slovak energy supplies when the energy crisis started to emerge as a critical issue of public concern (Dinič 2022). However, this time, it has provoked a response from the National Security Agency, which, using the provisions of a new law adopted during the war in 2022, has blocked several fake news outlets on the territory of Slovakia. The blocking did not mean removing the content from them. The measure was effective from March until June 2022 and was justified officially due to their “malicious” contents that may cause a security incident, severe disinformation, or other forms of hybrid threat. It resulted from the growing recognition of the salience of information space in the context of hybrid threats. This step has stirred some controversy on whether it was a justified measure. The prevailing view is that it needs to be carefully measured in each case whether the restriction of freedom of expression is proportionate to the potential risk to internal security.

Dancing on a Thin Ice: Civil Society in Slovakia  

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Ulla Pape

From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands  Introduction Around the world, civil society organisations (CSOs) and activists have come under increasing pressure. In authoritarian regimes, such as in China, Russia or Turkey, governments have limited civic space through regulatory action (Diamond et al. 2016; Rutzen 2015; Sidel 2016; Walker 2015). In particular, governments have restricted the ability of CSOs to obtain foreign funding, which has often been justified as a necessary means of controlling external influence on state affairs (Rutzen 2015). Authoritarian governments have introduced stricter laws that hinder the activities of potentially critical CSOs, especially in the field of human rights and environmental protection, while at the same time co-opting those organisations that align with government priorities in social welfare or other areas, which is important for maintaining support for the regime. In the literature, this widespread trend has become known as “closing” or “shrinking spaces for civil society” (Ayvazyan 2019; Green/Pandya 2016; Poppe/Wolff 2017). However, not only in authoritarian regimes, but also in developed democracies, CSOs and individual activists have been reporting on deteriorating working environments, particularly in their relations with the state. These changes have been less drastic than the actively repressive policies and laws which have curtailed the space for CSOs in authoritarian regimes, but nevertheless have led to a weakening of civil society as an arena of policy deliberation and interest representation. Anheier and Toepler (2019) coined the term “policy neglect” to describe this slow erosion of civic spaces in democratic regimes. Policy neglect may show itself in different ways, such as in increasing regulatory complexity and bureaucracy in statecivil society relations, in the erosion of support policies, in reducing opportunities for open dialogue and policy participation or in a growing lack of transparency which undermines public trust (Anheier/Toepler 2019). Policy neglect might emerge as unintended effects of government policies or can stem from a changing attitude or lack of awareness from the side of political decision-makers. In both instances, it ensures that CSOs cannot fulfil their full potential and become marginalised in the political landscape. Despite accounts of this being a widespread trend, Anheier and Toepler argue that the phenomenon of policy neglect is still poorly understood. Some scholars have observed changes in the civic space in various established democracies and described them in relation to the shrinking spaces debate (Hummel 2019; Simsa 2019). Although https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111070469-011

  Ulla Pape one can assume that the observed regulatory changes have affected CSOs in democratic regimes, it is difficult to assess the underlying causal mechanisms. In particular, we do not know much about how policy neglect relates to broader societal changes, how it plays out in different policy contexts and under which conditions civil society actors may succeed in addressing and potentially overcoming the limitations which result from policy neglect. This paper aims to address this research gap by exploring the effects of policy neglect on civil society in the Netherlands. This country is a particularly interesting case, as Dutch civil society has traditionally played an important role in public policymaking and is believed to be strong in size, scope and public support (Burger/Dekker 1997; Burger/Veldheer 2001). Despite its relevance and visibility in public policy, however, Dutch CSOs have faced profound challenges over the past decade, including the restructuring of co-financing mechanisms and a general decrease in public funding, tightened requirements for project management, accountability and transparency, stagnating levels of private donations as well as difficulties in reaching out for public support (Brandsen/Pape 2015; Pape et al. 2016). An ongoing debate about CSOs in the Netherlands concerns their declining ability to engage in policy advocacy and their weakened connections to broader society (Arvidson et al. 2018; Habraken et al. 2013). Some critics argue that due to their close cooperation with state agencies, many Dutch CSOs lack the capacity to formulate meaningful criticism regarding public policies and thus fall short in their function of defending the rights and interests of their constituencies (Habraken et al. 2013; Uitermark 2013). This paper is of explorative nature. It investigates the changes in civil society policies and regulations and their effect on organisations and activists in the Netherlands. A key aim is to ascertain whether and how the trend of bureaucratisation in public policy-making has affected the work of Dutch CSOs. In particular, this study addresses two research questions: (1) What have been the main regulatory and societal challenges for CSOs in the Netherlands, and (2) how have Dutch CSOs coped with the challenges they face? The paper is structured as follows: First, a brief overview of civil society in the Netherlands will be presented, which includes information on its size and scope, an overview of legal regulations and main sources of income. Second, the main challenges for Dutch CSOs are discussed, which include civil society marketisation and polarisation. The next section discusses the responses of Dutch CSOs, consisting of general development and a presentation of two case studies which showcase innovative responses from civic initiatives. The study concludes with a discussion and conclusion that highlights the most relevant aspects of civil society development in the Netherlands and emphasises its resilience and capacity to shape the future.

From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands  

 Background: Dutch civil society at a glance Before turning to the discussion of relevant changes in the attitude towards civil society in the Netherlands over the past years, let us begin with an overview of the general state of and legal context for CSOs in the Netherlands. In this section, the organisational landscape and the regulatory framework of Dutch civil society will be presented.

. Organisational landscape Traditionally, civil society in the Netherlands is described as maatschappelijk middenveld (“societal midfield”), a notion that was coined by Dutch sociologist Van Doorn in the 1970s and stresses the intermediary position of CSOs between the state and its citizens (Van Doorn 1978). In this view, CSOs are thus regarded as representing public interests and communicating them to political decision-makers. Interestingly, the Dutch language does not have a coherent and generally accepted terminology for the organisations and groups that populate the arena of civil society. The terms non-profit organisatie (“non-profit organisation”), niet-gouvernementele organisatie (“nongovernmental organisation”) or derde-sector organisatie (“third sector organisation”) are perceived as rather technical and are rarely used in colloquial language (also see Dekker 2001). Most Dutch CSOs describe themselves as maatschappelijke organisatie (‟societal organisations”) vrijwilligersorganisatie (‟voluntary organisations”) or goededoelenorganisatie (‟charitable organisation”). Even more often, Dutch CSOs refer to specific field of activity, mensenrechtenorganisatie (‟human rights organisation”) or erfgoedorganisatie (‟cultural heritage organisation”) without emphasising a common civil society or non-profit identity. This lack of joint identity among CSOs is particularly striking, as comparative research has shown that the Dutch non-profit sector is traditionally very strong. When the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project started its first international study on the private non-profit sector around the world, the Dutch non-profit sector emerged as one of the largest in the world (Burger/Veldheer 2001). This organisational strength was particularly visible in employment. Overall, non-profit employment in the Netherlands accounted for 12.9 % of non-agricultural employment; most non-profit jobs were found in social welfare services, particularly in health care, education and research, social care and social housing (Burger/Veldheer 2001). The organisational landscape of Dutch civil society has always been diverse, both in terms its activity, size, income sources and legal forms. Charity organisations form an important, but not an exclusive part of it. 225 organisations are member of the umbrella network Goede Doelen (‟Charities”), 30 % of which are active in international cooperation and human rights, 25 % in social welfare and 22 % in health care (Goede

  Ulla Pape Doelen 2020). The overall income of its member organisations was €3.2 billion in 2020 (Goede Doelen 2020). Charity organisations are important employers in the Netherlands. In 2020, the organisations provided 12,660 paid full-time jobs, which is a slight increase of 2 % compared to 2019. Half of these paid jobs were found in social services and about a quarter at international aid organisations (Goede Doelen 2020). In addition, many Dutch citizens volunteer for charity organisations. The most important income sources for charity organisations are private donations and membership fees (34 %) as well as subsidies (38 %) (Goede Doelen 2020).

. Regulatory Framework The legal and regulatory environment for CSOs in the Netherlands can generally be described as favourable and stable. The two main legal forms for CSOs include associations (verenigingen) and foundations (stichtingen). Both organisational forms have a non-profit character. Associations are membership-based organisations and are prohibited from distributing profits to its members. The only legal restriction for associations is that they are not allowed to disrupt the public order, incite hatred against certain groups of people or promote views that go against human dignity (Article 2:20 BW). Apart from these basic stipulations, associations are free to define their purpose and activities. In contrast to associations, foundations are asset-based organisations. According to Dutch law, a foundation is defined as “a legal person created by a legal act which has no members and whose purpose is to realize an object stated in its articles using capital allocated to such purpose” (Article 2:285 BW). Although the use of capital is mentioned in the legal definition of a foundation, there is no minimum requirement for the capital of a foundation in the Netherlands (Voordelen van de stichting s.a.). Often the founders become members of the board and make regular financial contributions to the foundations (Burger/Dekker 1997) which can be freely determined. A foundation can be established by one or more persons. Like associations, foundations need to be established by a notarial deed that contains the statutes of the organisation. The statutes define the name, purpose and the basic features of its internal organisation. Associations and foundations need to be registered in the Trade Register of the Chambers of Commerce. The non-profit distribution clause also applies to foundations (Hamers et al. 2013). This means that foundations, just like associations, are prohibited from distributing profit among its founders or board members. The much-discussed trend of organisational hybridity has also occurred in the Netherlands. In recent years, there has been a growing tendency towards establishing hybrid organisations that combine different organisational logics. As a result, cooperatives and social enterprises have gained a new popularity in the Netherlands. Under Dutch law, cooperatives are legally defined as a sub-category of associations but exempted from the non-profit distribution clause. New cooperatives have been par-

From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands  

ticularly popular in the fields of energy, health care, social services and (ecological) food production. Today, about 7,500 cooperatives exist in the Netherlands (Hamers et al. 2013: 317). Social enterprises, in turn, can be characterised as companies with a social mission. They do not have a separate legal form in the Netherlands. Most existing social enterprises are private, for-profit organisations (thus companies) but are defined by their social mission. According to their branch umbrella organisation, “the social mission must be central; profit distribution among shareholders is possible, but reasonable in relation to the social mission” (Social Enterprise NL s.a.). As this definition of social enterprises is vague and does not include any strict legal conditions, companies can in fact decide for themselves whether they want to follow a social mission and declare themselves to be a “social enterprise”. As of 2015, more than 300 social enterprises from more than 16 economic sectors had joined the umbrella organisations “socialenterprise.nl” that advocates for the promotion of social enterprises in the Netherlands (Social Enterprise NL s.a.). There are numerous instances where tax regulations have a formative influence on CSOs. In the Netherlands, non-profit associations and foundations are exempt from company tax. If associations and foundations pursue profitable activities that are in direct competition with business, they pay company tax only on the net profits of their commercial activities. Income from donations, contributions and investments are not subject to taxation (Burger/Dekker 1997). If non-profit organisations offer goods and services and request remuneration, they are subject to value-added tax. However, many activities such as social assistance, health care services and education are exempt from value-added tax, if the services do not substantially compete with businesses (Burger/Dekker 1997). In addition, charitable organisations with a so-called ANBI status (equivalent to a charitable status) benefit from certain tax advantages. The ANBI status is reserved for organisations that serve the interest of the public in general (Dutch: ANBI’s: algemeen nut beogende instellingen, translated as “charitable institutions”). Organisations that fall into this category are subject to a more favourable rate of 11 % for gifts and death duties as compared to the general rate, ranging from 41 to 68 % (Burger/Dekker 1997). Organisations that serve a specific social purpose (Dutch: SBBIs: sociaal belang behartigende instelling) qualify for even more generous tax advantages. Organisations with this status do not pay any taxes on gifts and death duties (Belastingdienst s.a.). Since 2022, foundations without an ANBI status are obliged to submit a UBO report to the Chamber of Commerce. UBO stands for the Ultimate Beneficial Owner, that is the ultimate stakeholder of a legal organisation (De Stichting 2022). The UBO register was introduced to prevent financial and economic crimes such as money laundering, financing terrorism, tax fraud and corruption. For foundations, however, the UBO register comes with additional reporting requirements. Moreover, some foundations find it problematic to publish addresses of their board members in their financial reporting, especially if these are private addresses.

  Ulla Pape Dutch tax law allows deductions of gifts to domestic institutions such as churches, charitable, cultural and scientific institutions as well as those that serve the public interest (Burger/Dekker 1997). To be eligible for deductions from personal income taxes, individuals must contribute at least 1 % of their gross income to such organisations. The maximum deductible amount is 10 % of gross income (Burger/ Dekker 1997). Donations that can be regarded as expenses related to a profession or business of the taxpayer are subject to tax deductions without a limit (Burger/Dekker 1997). Overall, the Dutch tax regulations can be described as favourable to the development of CSOs in the Netherlands. However, it is important to note that the beneficial regulation of the ANBI status has become stricter in recent years, as the accountability standards for donations have become more stringent, due to a perceived increase in tax evasion and fraud (Halters 2020). Moreover, the requirements of the ANBI status are sometimes perceive to be in conflict with privacy considerations. Especially family foundations, for example, do not wish to publish the private addresses of one of their board members in the public financial reports, as required by the ANBI status. Consequently, Dutch nonprofit associations and foundations have seen stricter tax regulations and have the tax office conduct more frequent checks on their revenue statements. Recently, a pressure group called “Tax justice” has been established to monitor the development of civil society tax regulations in the Netherlands (Interview #21).

. Historical development of civil society in the Netherlands Dutch civil society is comprised of a wide variety of different organisations: associations, foundations, cooperatives and more recently social enterprises as well. Many CSOs have a long history. Philanthropic engagement and private welfare activities date back to the period between 1600 and 1700, which is known as the Golden Age of Dutch history. In the 19th century, the first modern associations and foundations were established in the Netherlands. Some of today’s CSOs were founded in the late 19th or early 20th century, but the majority emerged after the end of the Second World War, together with the broadening of the Dutch welfare state. The development of Dutch CSOs is closely tied to the evolution of the Dutch welfare state. Some scholars even argue that social CSOs have been so neatly incorporated into governmental service delivery that they have lost links with society at large and are not sufficiently independent from the state (Habraken et al. 2013; Kendall/Anheier 2001). In the 19th century, Dutch society was deeply divided along religious and economic lines. The first voluntary organisations emerged as forces for emancipation and demanded state support for their specific constituencies (Habraken et al. 2013). The so-called education battle (schoolstrijd) at the end of the 19th century is a good example of this emancipatory struggle, as different denominations in the Netherlands fought for the right to establish religious primary schools (Habraken et al. 2013). The

From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands  

consequences of this conflict can be felt to date, and many of the resulting societal fault lines still persist. The most formative choices, however, were made in the early 20th century, when the foundations for the Dutch welfare state were laid. Private organisations became the foremost vehicles for welfare state programmes. Dutch society at that time was a plural society with discrete “vertical” segments that had their own separate social and political organisations that were only connected at the top through elite cooperation. As a result of this pillarisation, the Protestant, Catholic, liberal and socialist societal milieus lived next to each other with limited interaction. Within the so-called pillarised system, religious and political groups were accommodated with public funding channelled through their own private organisations (Lijphart 1968). This led to a steady growth of social organisations, as the welfare state expanded and all pillars of society had to be accommodated. Even after a relatively swift process of secularisation and the collapse of the pillarised system in the 1950s, many traditional Dutch CSOs maintained a prominent role in public service provision. As a result, Dutch civil society traditionally has had few cross-cutting links in the shape of umbrella organisations or other cross-cutting representative bodies. Under the system of pillarisation, the links were maintained mostly among the political elites, with strong ties to mainstream political parties (especially the Christian-Democrats). When the system of pillarisation faded and the Christian-Democratic party lost political clout, Dutch civil society remained fragmented to the point where it is primarily a statistical, as opposed to a social category (Dekker 2001). Organisations tend to identify most with their field of activity (such as education or health care), regardless of whether they are civil society or not. Consequently, there is little sense of shared identity among Dutch CSOs (Brandsen/Van de Donk 2009), and inter-organisational collaboration tends to be within rather than across policy fields.

 The Changing Space for Civil Society in the Netherlands Although Dutch civil society is generally regarded as strong, the situation for CSOs has been far from ideal. Since the 1990s, civil society policies have been changing in the Netherlands, and Dutch CSOs have not always been able to mitigate the effects of these policy changes. The legislative and regulatory framework for civil society in the Netherlands can still be described as stable and favourable, in comparison to other countries. Legal restrictions such as anti-NGO laws like in Hungary or Poland have not been introduced in the Netherlands. The public debate has been critical at times, especially with regard to the income of top-managers in public and societal organisations, but there have not been any large, targeted campaigns to libel civil society or individual activists, as have been observed in Poland, Hungary or Austria (Pazderski

  Ulla Pape 2019; Simsa 2019). In contrast, many Dutch decision-makers from the public and civil society sectors have turned to the idea of civil society as a source of social cohesion. Policy makers have argued for the strengthening of the position of civil society in its intermediary function between citizens and the state, coined as “societal midfield” (see Christenunie 2019). Still, many civil society activists and organisations in the Netherlands have reported increasing challenges in their working environment (Brandsen/Pape 2015; Wiepking 2018). Moreover, the political climate has intensified since the 1990s with the emergence of populist and right-wing political groups, which often polarise civil society and portray individual groups and activists as political enemies. This polarisation has also affected the space for Dutch civil society at large. In 2017, for instance, the CIVICUS Monitor downgraded the Netherlands in its evaluation of the civic space from “open” to “narrow,” due to documented threats to and violations of civic freedoms (CIVICUS 2017; see also Wiepking 2018). This part addresses the first research questions and examines the major changes that have taken place regarding civil society in the Netherlands. The section focuses on the question of whether these changes have meant a restriction for Dutch CSOs. Special attention will be paid to the concept of policy neglect, which may lead to a slow erosion of the civic space as well as to broader societal changes affecting the political climate and the political context for Dutch CSOs.

. Policy Changes: Civil Society Marketisation The first major trend affecting Dutch CSOs is closely related to the development of public policies in the Netherlands and can broadly be described as the marketisation of civil society. This trend refers to the growing adoption of market logics in the functioning of CSOs as a result of neoliberal public sector reforms. Various scholars have observed that marketisation may undermine democracy and citizenship because of its effect on the organisations’ ability to create and maintain a strong civil society (Eikenberry/Drapal Kluver 2004; Feltenius/Wide 2019; Maier et al. 2016; Mankell/Hvenmark 2020). The phenomenon that CSOs in their internal operations increasingly resemble for-profit organisations and become more business-like is a general trend that has been observed in many countries. In the Netherlands, the global marketisation trend has been particularly visible, as a majority of CSOs are tightly integrated in public service delivery and are thus directly affected by public sector reforms. With the adoption of neoliberal reforms since the 1980s, market logics have been increasingly applied for the cooperation in so-called welfare partnerships (Green-Pedersen et al. 2001). This has led to growing pressures for organisational professionalisation and specifically for the implementation of business management techniques in Dutch welfare organisations (Brandsen/Pape 2015; Habraken et al. 2013).

From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands  

To deal with the demands for professionalisation and contend with the increasing competition for rare governmental grants, many Dutch organisations have scaledup their operations or merged into umbrella networks, representing different CSOs from one policy field. These large branch organisations are hybrid in their organisational form and institutional logics (Brandsen et al. 2005). Hybridisation allows organisations to respond to multiple demands and has been especially common for Dutch CSOs, active in social assistance, housing and health care. However, organisational adaptation also has disadvantages. Due to scaling-up and hybridisation, many Dutch CSOs have increasingly become detached from their civil society origins and lost the links to their constituencies (Habraken et al. 2013). This long-term process has intensified in recent years with the introduction of government austerity policies in the aftermath of the European debt crisis in 2008 (Pape et al. 2016). Many Dutch welfare organisations have faced cutbacks and either had to scale back services or access new sources of funding. While individual organisations have been challenged by financial instability, the general position of welfare organisations as service providers has not changed. They continue to play an important role in the Dutch welfare state (Brandsen/Pape 2015). Furthermore, recent decentralisation policies have provided opportunities for growth and development to local welfare providers, as the new policies have put a greater emphasis on local social innovation and community building. This had a positive impact on the funding opportunities for Dutch welfare organisations at the local level. Overall, however, the policy environment has become more demanding for Dutch CSOs. In general, organisations need to activate more resources to comply with increasingly stricter reporting standards, leading to a selection process among CSOs. While large, professionalised service providers can adapt to new pressures, smaller organisations find it difficult to survive in the changing environment. .. Civil Society Marketisation in different policy fields The effects of public policy changes on Dutch CSOs play out differently in diverse policy fields. To understand these differential effects, we will take a closer look at three policy fields that traditionally have been important for Dutch civil society: social welfare, culture and international cooperation. In the social sector, traditional welfare organisations (welzijnsorganisaties) have commonly maintained a strong position in the Netherlands, which has not radically changed due public sector reforms and cutbacks in public funding. The most prominent changes concern the afore-mentioned professionalisation pressures, which include the need to adopt for-profit management techniques. With new regulations in co-funding mechanisms, Dutch welfare organisations are required to adhere to increased transparency and accountability standards. This increases the requirements for project managers, but it does not endanger the strong position for Dutch CSOs in the social services and health care.

  Ulla Pape Although a majority of welfare organisations have a non-profit legal form (mostly foundations) and for account for around 70 % of employment in the healthcare sector (Burger et al. 1999), these organisations are not visible as part of civil society. They are dominated by professionals and operate within the same conditions as their public and commercial counterparts. Several studies suggest that welfare organisations operate similarly than other service providers with a public or for-profit legal form (Brandsen et al. 2005; Brandsen/Pape 2015). As a result, Dutch welfare organisations are often not perceived as implementing agencies of public sector policies and not as part of civil society (Habraken et al. 2013). The lack of social anchorage is thus clearly visible in these organisations. Another effect of marketisation on welfare CSOs in the Netherlands is scaling up. Because of the need to adopt for-profit management techniques and adhere to stricter regulations and accountability standards many Dutch welfare CSOs have merged into larger organisations or networks, as larger organisations are better equipped to deal with these organisational demands. An example for scaling up in the social sector is Ieder(in) (in English: Everyone in), an umbrella organisation for people with a physical disability, mental disability or chronic illness in the Netherlands, which was established in 2014 as a merger of two specialised patient organisations Platform VG and CG-Raad. The merger was initiated by Dutch decision-makers who preferred to negotiate with one large organisation who could represent the interests of the constituency instead of a variety of smaller patient organisations. Today, Ieder(in) unites 250 member organisations, which makes it the largest network for people with disabilities in the Netherlands. According to its own estimation, the organisation represents the interests of more than two million people in the Netherlands (Brandsen/Pape 2015). Scaling up has many organisational advantages, as organisations can centralise their procedures and economise costs. In terms of the organisations’ societal embeddedness, scaling up has its downsides, as larger organisations or networks find it more difficult to maintain contacts with their constituencies. A large network such as Ieder(in) can organise interest representation more professionally and efficiently. On the other hand, it might be more difficult for smaller patient groups within the umbrella to draw attention to their needs and to assert their interests against those of many other groups. Whereas the public policy environment for Dutch welfare CSOs has remained relatively stable, CSOs in the cultural sector have experienced more drastic changes, including a decrease in government funding, the privatisation of cultural organisations and the strengthening of cultural entrepreneurship. In line with government priorities, Dutch cultural CSOs have adopted more business-like strategies and transformed themselves into “cultural entrepreneurs”. In January 2013, the Dutch government adopted a new subsidy framework for the cultural sector, called “cultural basis infrastructure” which sets out the regulations for public funding in the cultural sector. It is the declared goal of public policy “to make the cultural sector less dependent

From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands  

on government support” (Rijksoverheid Kunst/Cultuur s.a.). Among the different sources of government funding, the national government is most important: 69.9 % of government subsidies come from the national government, 25.1 % from municipalities, 4.7 % provinces and 0.4 % from other sources (OCW in cijfers s.a.). In addition, municipalities provide local project funding and scholarships for individual artists. Cultural organisations that do not receive structural funding from the national government, can apply for funding from six large cultural funds (cultuurfondsen). Alongside these governmental funds, there are a number of private funds that finance cultural initiatives in the Netherlands. The cutbacks in government funding seriously affected the cultural sector. Between 2010 and 2012, the number of jobs in the cultural sector decreased, most significantly in the creative industry (OCW in cijfers s.a.). Whereas 53,330 people were employed in the creative industry in 2010, this number reduced to 48,400 jobs in 2012 (OCW in cijfers s.a.). Because of the decrease in structural funding, Dutch cultural organisations have been forced to diversify their funding resources and develop new forms of fundraising. In line with the focus on cultural entrepreneurship, promoted by the Dutch government, cultural CSOs have increasingly focused on developing alternative forms of income, such as sponsoring and commercial income such as tickets sale, products, services and paid activities. In addition, more emphasis has been placed on transparent structures of internal governance and on marketing techniques that are meant to make cultural organisations more economically robust. The trend for cultural entrepreneurship also includes a focus on new marketing techniques in the cultural sector. Some cultural organisations have also changed their organisational form. The cooperative Cultural Heritage Gelderland was founded in 2010 as the first new cooperative in the cultural sector. The cuts in public funding for culture went hand in hand with decreasing public support for cultural initiatives. In Dutch media, culture is often depicted as a “luxury,” but not as a public good (Interview #14). Consequently, public support for the cultural sector has been decreasing in recent years. A representative of a cultural initiative described the situation as follows: “If we look on Maslow’s pyramid of needs, culture can be seen as a luxury product. When it comes to cutbacks in government funding, cultural organisations are thus more vulnerable.” (Interview #14). Some cultural CSOs attributed the cuts in in public expenditure for cultural initiatives to a general political climate which is not supportive to culture and arts: “In the government declaration of 2010 culture is described as a luxury people can pay for themselves” (Interview #14). As a result of diversity and fragmentation, cultural organisations have thus been more vulnerable to changes in the policy environment than CSOs in other policy fields. Furthermore, the market for culture and free-time activities in general has become more diverse, and cultural organisations compete with a wide variety of leisure activities. One representative described this as a shift in the supply of cultural goods: “An important trend is that the market is becoming more diverse. Cultural organisa-

  Ulla Pape tions need to sell their products for people to spend in their free time. These people have a limited budget to spend. Consequently, cultural organisations compete with all kinds of different leisure activities. The more diverse the market becomes, the harder it is for cultural organisations to compete.” (Interview #14). Like culture, the policy field of international cooperation has been severely affected by the changes in the policy environment. Since 2011, the Dutch government reduced international development aid from 0.81 % of gross national income (GNI) in 2010 to 0.64 % in 2014. The cut back in Dutch development aid took place in several stages. In 2010, the government (cabinet Rutte I) decided to reduce the governmental budget for development aid from 0.8 % of the GDP to 0.7 % of GNP. This decline was intensified due to the unfavourable growth rate of the GDP in the years following 2010. The new government (cabinet Rutte II) decided to reduce the budget for development aid with €750 million annually from 2014 onwards and structurally with €1 billion from 2017. These austerity measures are on top of the cutbacks adopted by the previous government. The decrease in governmental funding has had a direct impact on Dutch development organisations which had been receiving government funding through a cofinancing system (medefinancieringsstelsel). A large part of Dutch development aid is channelled through development CSOs, which, on their part, cooperate with local partner organisations in development countries. The decrease in public funding for international cooperation has had a huge impact on development organisations. Although many organisations also have sources of income, they have not been able to compensate the decrease in public funds by private donations. As a result, many organisations have had reduced income and were forced to cut down operational and personnel costs. Some organisations were forced to reduce the paid staff members by one third to one half. Others reduced personnel costs by transferring jobs from their headquarters in the Netherlands to partner organisations in developing countries. Furthermore, development organisations have increasingly sought to develop more entrepreneurial models. The aid organisation Cordaid has transformed itself from a non-profit organisation to a social enterprise. Another Dutch organisation ICCO, “Interchurch organisation for development cooperation”, transformed from a foundation to a cooperative in November 2012. According to the organisation, this step emphasises its “cooperation with entrepreneurs, companies, research organisations and other stakeholders” (ICCO s.a.). Overall, development CSOs have been forced to adjust to decreasing levels of public funding and find alternative sources of financing. Many organisations apply more business-like management methods. Some respond to the developments by transforming themselves into social enterprises or cooperatives instead of traditional forms of non-profit institutions.

From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands   Table 1: The Effects of Marketisation on Dutch CSOs in Different Policy Fields Effects of Civil Society Marketisation Policy field

Social sector

Culture

Impact on CSOs

– Stable funding and cooperation framework – Professionalisation pressures – Increased accountability requirements

– Cutbacks in public fund- – Cutbacks in public funding ing – Stronger dependence – Altered cooperation on private donations mechanism between state and CSOs – Decrease in number of cultural CSOs

CSO responses

– Organisational hybridity – Scaling up

– Privatisation of cultural initiatives – Strengthening of cultural entrepreneurship – Focus on fundraising and cultural marketing

Development aid

– Economisation of internal processes and delegation of tasks to partner organisations – Adoption of new entrepreneurial models, e.g. social enterprises

Source: Own figure

.. The Impact of Civil Society Marketisation The effects of civil society marketisation on the roles and functioning of Dutch CSOs is controversial. Whereas some scholars argue that marketisation leads to a decrease in the participation of CSOs in decision-making processes over public policies as this goes against NPM principles, such as efficiency and the citizen as the customer in a market, other scholars claim that civil society participation does not necessarily go down (Feltenius/Wide 2019). In the case of the Swedish welfare state, Feltenius and Wide (2019) show that marketisation has not caused any major crowding-out effect on CSOs from the decision-making processes. In the Netherlands one can observe a strong impact of civil society marketisation on the capabilities of individual CSOs. Marketisation intensified the vertical fragmentation of Dutch civil society which was first identified by Kendall and Anheier (2001) and Habraken et al. (2013). Dutch CSOs have been oriented towards their specific policy field, such as social assistance, health care or culture, and not towards a broader civil society that unites organisations from different policy fields (Habraken et al. 2013). This vertical fragmentation is also reflected in the Dutch language, which does not have a generally accepted terminology for civil society but provides many competing notions. Most CSOs do not describe themselves as part of civil society, but rather refer to their policy field or area of activity as social, health care or cultural organisations. The Dutch terms for civil society, such as maatschappelijk middenveld (‟societal midfield”), maatschappelijke organisatie (‟societal organisation”) or “non-

  Ulla Pape profit sector”, on the contrary, are rather technical and rarely used in everyday language. Many scholars consider these terms as academic classifications rather than self-descriptions of societal actors. As a result, Dutch CSOs do not share a common identity as civil society (Habraken et al. 2013). The weak civil society identity also affects the organisations’ embeddedness in the broader public, as one interviewee explained: “Civil society organisations in the Netherlands are strongly linked to the government. For citizens, the difference between government agencies and civil society organisations is not clear. People are confused” (Interview #22). This blurring of boundaries between the public and the private sector is a problem for many Dutch CSOs, as they experience difficulties in communicating their activities to a broader audience, as one CSO representative explained: “In general, the average citizen does not understand anything about how the non-profit sector works. You have so many different organisations. There is a lot of overlap and contradiction. […] I do not think that people in the Netherlands really have an understanding how the field works” (Interview #11). As many scholars have observed, marketisation also had an impact on the advocacy function of Dutch CSOs. Arvidson et al. (2018) show that CSOs tend to hold back their criticism of public authorities, when they depend on government funding. This effect can also be observed in the Netherlands. According to Habraken et al. (2013), the advocacy function of many Dutch CSOs is compromised, as they are closely integrated in public policy funding mechanisms. CSOs thus need to revitalise their links with their constituencies and thereby gain more credibility (Habraken et al. 2013). The blurring of boundaries between the public sector and civil society has created tensions between the service and advocacy functions of Dutch CSOs. One well-documented example of the limitation of the advocacy function concerns the Dutch Refugee Council (Vluchtelingenwerk), which is the main organisation for refugee support and integration in the Netherlands. The council closely collaborates with state institutions and receives a large part of its funding from public subsidies. In 2005, then-minister Rita Verdonk demanded that the council abstain from a controversial campaign for non-recognised asylum seekers, which the minister viewed as contrary to state policies. The minister finally threatened to impose funding cuts, and the question was discussed in Parliament (Interview #21). The Dutch Refugee Council argued that it did not use public subsidies for the campaign but financed it with its own resources (Interview #21). The ministry finally accepted this argumentation. Although the organisation won this case, the development, according to observers, is still worrisome, as it has created a climate of self-censorship among Dutch CSOs that depend on public subsidies (Interview #21). Recent trends therefore aim to re-establish a more independent and voluntary civil society in the Netherlands (Habraken et al. 2013). These concerns are also reflected in the political debate. In 2021, the Dutch parliamentarian Pieter Omtzigt published a manifesto for public sector reform in which he called for Dutch decision-makers to listen to “real, rooted social organisations” (Omtzigt 2021). In addition, he

From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands  

recommended that Dutch CSOs strengthen their ties to society, for example by adopting an associational structure which allows for a greater participation of the members (Omtzigt 2021) Despite these observations of a compromised advocacy function within Dutch civil society, many CSOs describe advocacy as an important activity of their organisation (Brandsen/Pape 2015). It is important to note that most Dutch CSOs engage in advocacy in their respective policy fields, meaning that they advocate improvements in social assistance, healthcare or culture. As the cross-sectoral identity is weak, Dutch CSOs do not advocate larger changes affecting organisations from different areas. In their policy fields, most CSOs conduct advocacy through personal contacts with decision-makers. As a result, advocacy often happens informally, outside of formal consultations, which makes it notoriously hard to track (Brandsen/Van de Donk 2009). CSOs are often part of networks with policy makers and other organisations in their field (Focus group discussion 2014). As mentioned above, marketisation does not only affect civil society advocacy, but also has an impact on the relations with society at large. Many CSO representatives in the Netherlands note that finding public support has become more difficult in recent years. The overwhelming majority of civil society representatives describe the societal environment in the Netherlands as favourable for CSOs. However, many organisations mentioned that there is increasing demand to explain the added value the organisations aim to create in society. Whereas in the past it was often sufficient to have a good reputation, organisations are now required to show the effectiveness of their work, as one civil society representative explained: “It is not enough anymore to be a charitable organisation. You have to prove that you in fact achieve your objectives and created impact” (Interview #5). In general, the public in the Netherlands has become more critical towards civil society and demands more accountability and transparency: “It is a general trend in society that non-profits are watched much more critically nowadays. […] You can also see this in the criticism about grievances in some organisations. They also have an effect on us. The whole sector is treated more sceptically” (Interview #5). Public and private donors want to see how the organisation works and how the money is spent. As a result, CSOs need to invest more in strategic planning and public relations. They do their work successfully, but also communicate their results to the public. For many third sector organisations, it is becoming more important to work with the media and to use social media channels to present their results.

. Societal Changes: Civil Society Polarisation In addition to policy changes, societal transformations have had an impact on the space for civil society in the Netherlands. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the country has witnessed a gradual turn to the right and a polarisation of the societal climate

  Ulla Pape (Interview #21). Polarisation is understood here as the presence of different groups in society with opposing attitudes (Albada et al. 2021). The assassination of the controversial politician Pim Fortuyn in May 2002 marked a turning point in the recent history of the Netherlands. Fortuyn was a populist right-wing politician with an antiIslam and anti-immigration agenda. He made a successful career by starting his own political movement and was on its way to win the Parliamentary elections when shot by a left-wing environmentalist and animal rights activist who later declared that “he saw in Fortuyn an increasing danger to, in particular, vulnerable sections of society” (BBC 2003). The murder of Pim Fortuyn was a great shock for the Dutch population and changed the political landscape and culture dramatically. In the following years, there continued to be incidents of violence in the political sphere. The issues of migration and integration sparked bitter debates in Dutch society. In 2005, the Dutch director and television producer Theo van Gogh was murdered by second-generation Moroccan-Dutchman who had joined a terrorist group. Van Gogh became the target of Islamic terrorism as he had produced the short film Submission, written by Dutch parliamentarian Ayaan Hirsi Ali who aimed to draw attention to the hidden violence against Muslim women (BBC 2004). After the murder of the filmmaker, many other Dutch politicians and public figures, including Ayaan Hirsi Ali, received death threats and needed to be placed under police protection. In 2005, Ayaan Hirsi Ali was drawn into controversy over her citizenship when integration minister Rita Verdonk accused her of providing false information in her asylum procedure and revoked her Dutch passport. In 2006, Geert Wilders founded the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV), which has since dominated the anti-Islam and anti-immigration debate in the Netherlands. The party’s ideology centres on anti-immigration positions – most specifically against Islamic immigration – arguing that Islam is incompatible with the secular and liberal values of Dutch society (Vossen 2010). In organisational terms, the Party for Freedom is an association with an associated foundation, consisting of only one member, the founder Geert Wilders. It does not have a regular party structure and does not publish its finances, which is possible in the Netherlands due to the lack of a party law. Over the years, the PVV secured between 5 and 15 % of the votes in national elections. While not being a member of a government coalition, the party has managed to dominate the public debate. Since 2002, the rise of populist radical right parties intensified the polarisation in Dutch society (Castanho Silva 2018). Election researchers have observed an increasing polarisation of election results in the 2000s. According to Castanho Silva (2018), elite polarisation has thus led to mass polarisation. With the establishment of the Forum for Democracy (Forum voor Democratie) as a new right-wing populist party in 2016, the political struggle further intensified. The party’s founder Thierry Baudet became the voice of the alt-right movement in the Netherlands. As in the previous decade, migration and integration are the dominant issues in the political debate. Societal polarisation in Dutch society is particularly evident in attitudes towards refugees

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and immigrants, in which researchers observe two opposing groups, those in favour of versus those against migration (Albada et al. 2021). Researchers are very concerned about societal polarisation in the Netherlands, fearing that it might lead to further conflicts and undermine social cohesion (Albada et al. 2021). .. The Impact of Civil Society Polarisation Societal polarisation pervades Dutch civil society, with deep dividing lines emerging. One effect of societal polarisation is the emergence of opposed social movements on the political left and right. In the increasingly polarised political discourse, civil society groups and activists have been demonised by populist groups. Right-wing politicians, such as Fortuyn and later Wilders and Baudet, have positioned themselves as an anti-establishment and anti-elite movement (Interview #21). These politicians see politics through the lens of an anti-left discourse, with the goal of ending the leftist paradigm, which, in their opinion, has dominated Dutch politics for a long time (Interview #21). This logic of exclusion also extends to civil society. As a result, Dutch CSOs have been portrayed as part of this “old” paradigm and are often negatively described by right-wing politicians and activists. One example of the increasingly heated debate is the populist blog Geen Stijl (‟No Style”), which has become very influential as a critical voice against politicians and the political elite. Geen Stijl can be understood as the expression of an aggressive antielite discourse. The blog uses provocative language and publicly exposes people who hold different political opinions. The writers of this blog target civil society groups by characterising them as “grant eaters” (Interview #21). According to some observers, right-wing activists are overrepresented on social media and particularly on Twitter (Interview #21). This creates a hostile environment for many Dutch CSOs that belong to the left political spectrum. According to an expert who was interviewed for this study, the current societal changes in the Netherlands are comparable to the 1960s but run in the opposite direction: “In the 1960s, the younger generation rebelled against the older generation whom they perceived as conservative and outdated. Today, right-wing activists rebel against the elite” (Interview #21). Another consequence of societal polarisation is the emergence of new movements and counter-movements who advocate for opposing political positions and radicalise each other in this struggle. Identity politics have become a preferred area for highly symbolic struggles. One striking example of contentious mobilisation is the controversy over the celebration of Sinterklaas and the figure of Zwarte Piet (Black Pete). In Dutch folklore, the character of Zwarte Piet is the helper of Saint Nicholas and plays an important role in the traditional celebration of the Feast of Saint Nicholas on 5 December. In the 2010s, the character of Zwarte Piet gave rise to a fierce debate that increasingly divides Dutch society (Hilhorst/Hermes 2016). One group calls for a change in Zwarte Piet’s appearance, because blackface and the character’s ste-

  Ulla Pape reotypical attributes are perceived as implicit racism. The other group, in contrast, seeks to keep the traditional appearance of Zwarte Piet as part of the Netherlands’ national heritage. Contentious mobilisation on Zwarte Piet started with an art project “Black Pete is racism” in 2011. Soon after, the successful human rights campaign “Kick out Zwarte Piet” was started by a group of activists (Interview #21). As a response, the defenders of Zwarte Piet set up an online petition Verbied Kick Out Zwarte Piet (“Ban ‘Kick Out Zwarte Piet’”) which gained one million supporters in a single day (Interview #21). The political struggle illustrates the deep polarisation of Dutch society. Whereas the members of the movement “Kick out Zwarte Piet” describe the practice of blackface as racist and hurtful, supporters of the countermovement instead argue that Dutch society is wrongfully accused of being racist (Interview #21). Although several compromises have been suggested, to change the tradition and to keep the celebration – for example in the form of a colourful (red, blue and green) Pete or Soot Pete, symbolising him climbing down the chimney – the controversy continues to create tension in Dutch society. .. The Gentrification of Civil Society Societal polarisation is often associated with opposing political positions, as demonstrated by the controversy over Zwarte Piet. The processes of social change, however, also indicate deeper-lying fault lines in Dutch society. These contradictions have an impact on civil society as well, as they affect the way CSOs are perceived and how people organise themselves as part of civil society. A broader trend that has affected CSOs in the Netherlands can be described with the term “gentrification of civil society.” The term was first introduced by political sociologist Justus Uitermark (2012), who described the uneven power relations between different civil society groups in urban development projects in Amsterdam. In a broader perspective, civil society gentrification refers to a civil society that is solely geared to the wealthy middle class and thus lacks the ability to provide a space for broader deliberation across social classes. In his study on urban development in Amsterdam, Uitermark showed that the city’s districts selectively supported some privileged associations while at the same time discontinuing the support for other associations that did not meet the district’s requirements (Uitermark 2012). This particular case shows how public policies have shaped oppositions between advantaged and disadvantaged groups, or civil society insiders and outsiders: Associations that catered to deprived groups were pushed out of what had now become a market. This also meant that the government only maintained ties with elite actors. While consultants and experts were seen as valuable citizens, they could not create bridges to the problem youths that featured so prominently in media reports and culturalist discourses. (Uitermark 2012:199)

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This example shows that associations were mainly geared towards the recommendations of external consultants and lacked the ability to “create bridges” to the local populations, in this case the youth in a city district. Uitermark characterises this inability as gentrification, meaning that not all citizens have been successfully integrated in civil society. As a result of gentrification, Dutch civil society became somewhat divided and lost its ability to build social cohesion across individual groups. This development can be arguably observed in many areas. Typical Dutch CSOs primarily appeal to the relatively well-to-do middle class but hardly reach out to socially disadvantaged groups in the Netherlands. Self-organisation in CSOs has thus become increasingly gentrified and geared towards Dutch citizens with a relatively high income and cultural capital. Consequently, researchers have noticed a growing horizontal segregation within Dutch society based on socio-economic status and class (Interview #23). This societal division overlaps with the separation between mainstream Dutch society and newcomers. Many traditional Dutch CSOs have members and supporters in mainstream society and less among newcomers or people with a migration background. In turn, associations of ethnic minorities are often marginalised and do not have strong links with the bureaucracy or with mainstream society. Another dividing line concerns the geographical position within the Netherlands. CSOs are often associated with the political elite in the Western part of the country, the Randstad, or more specifically in the political centre The Hague where most of the headquarters of large organisations are situated. The political interests of the population in other regions are therefore less well represented. The gentrification of civil society has far-reaching consequences for its democratic qualities. CSOs were a place where people could come together regardless of income and socio-economic status (Interview #23). By narrowing its membership base, CSOs lose their ability to promote social cohesion within society (Interview #23). .. Political Crisis and Crisis of Confidence In 2020 and 2021, the Netherlands experienced a severe political crisis that also affected civil society. The cause of the political crisis was the childcare benefits scandal (in Dutch: kinderopvangtoeslagaffaire) that forced the Dutch government under Prime Minister Rutte to resign in January 2021. The childcare benefits scandal has exposed a dramatic damage in trust in the Dutch state and its institutions. The history of the political crisis is complex. Between 2013 and 2019, the Dutch tax service accused an estimated 26,000 parents of making fraudulent benefit claims and required them to pay back the allowances they had received over the previous years. In many cases, this sum amounted to tens of thousands of euros, driving families into severe financial hardship. The accusations of the tax authorities later in the majority of cases proved to be wrong. In 2020, a parliamentary interrogation commit-

  Ulla Pape tee was installed which published a report entitled “Unprecedented Injustice” (Tweede Kamer 2020). The committee concluded that “in the implementation of the childcare allowance fundamental principles of the rule of law have been violated” (Tweede Kamer 2020). According to the committee, the accusations do not only relate to the implementing agencies, specifically the tax authorities, but also to the legislator and the jurisdiction. Observers described the scandal as a failure of the Dutch state which has considerable implications for the state’s relationship with its citizens. The scandal also revealed that Dutch civil society has been too weak to prevent or overcome the political crisis. In the course of the child benefits scandal, no relevant CSOs took up for the rights of the affected families. Even after the resignation of the government in January 2020, CSOs did not play any substantial role in addressing the social conflict and mitigating its negative consequences for society at large. A critical discussion of the policy of the tax authorities remained limited to the parliament, where a group of oppositional politicians during the year of 2020 increased the pressure on the outgoing government. Dutch civil society has thus largely failed to protect the interest of the affected families and fulfil its watchdog function with regard to government policies. The childcare benefits scandal has also deepened social divisions in Dutch society. A contributing factor was that the wrongful accusations by the tax authorities mainly affected families from ethnic minorities and/or with a double nationality. This increased distrust of the state and of mainstream society among these citizens. Despite promises to the contrary, the affected families have not yet been fully compensated. There has been criticism that the process of compensations has been taking too much time and thus not resolving the difficult financial situation of many affected families. In May 2020, the Dutch tax authorities set up a special institution, the so-called Implementing Organisation for Recovery Allowances, to determine compensation payments to families that had been wrongly forced to pay back child benefit allowances. This institution has a parents’ committee to guarantee the rights of these families during the recovery process. The Association of Dutch Municipalities VNG provided legal support. Overall, however, the duped families were not content with the official support mechanisms, as compensation payments have been slow. In February 2022, as a response to hesitant state policies, a group of families set up a group for exchanging experiences and assisting other victims under the name Lotgenotencontact (‟contact for fellow sufferers”), which has been supported by one of the large umbrella CSOs for child welfare (BMK 2022). The childcare benefits scandal exposed a deep political crisis in the Netherlands, which is far from being resolved at the present moment. The scandal can be understood as a form of policy neglect, as the Dutch government and the responsible state institutions failed to guarantee fairness and transparency in basic social services. It is striking that the role of civil society in dealing with this conflict has remained fairly limited. The weakness of civil society here casts a shadow over future developments.

From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands  

 Civil Society Responses As we have seen above, Dutch civil society has seen great social and political changes that affect its composition and functioning. However, CSOs are not merely an object of external pressures, but have agency as well. This section explores the responses of Dutch CSOs to the changes in their policy environment. It first looks into general developments of informalisation, the growing diversity of societal mobilisation as well as civil society fragmentation. Second, we are going to take a closer look at a number of civic initiatives that have the potential to strengthen the space for civil society in the Netherlands.

. General trends The space for civil society in the Netherlands has seen many changes over the past years. These changes in policy and overall societal context have fundamentally altered the ways in which Dutch citizens organise themselves in civic initiatives and organisations. Researchers observe a growing trend towards informalisation and fragmentation (Interview #22 and #23). Traditional Dutch CSOs have adopted more entrepreneurial, business-like forms of organisation and management to respond to growing professionalization pressures and strengthen their organisational sustainability. At the same time, new societal initiatives have been emerging at the grassroots level. These new forms of initiatives often position themselves as alternatives to the established CSOs in the Netherlands. .. Trend towards informalisation A major trend in civil society development is the rise of new informal initiatives as opposed to formal associations and foundations. At present, many Dutch citizens, especially among the younger generations, become less inclined to become members of non-profit organisations, but rather seek to support social initiatives on a more flexible basis (Brandsen/Pape 2015). One example for a successful grassroots initiative is the food banks (Interview #22). The first food bank was established in Rotterdam. As of today, they have become a widespread initiative in all parts of the Netherlands (Interview #22). At first, municipalities were reluctant to subsidise private food banks, as they were convinced that basic welfare services such as food security should be delivered by the Dutch state and by established welfare providers. Later, municipalities have started to accept the food banks as a new social organisation (Interview #22). Today, many food banks now receive public subsidies; the work however is mainly carried out by volunteers.

  Ulla Pape The trend towards informalisation goes hand in hand with the development of new communication channels among civil society actors. The general expansion of the internet and social media allow for new forms of activism in the digital space (Interview #22 and #23). Digital volunteering has emerged as a new form of activism whereby volunteers support civic initiatives remotely and flexible in time. Digitalisation also enables civic initiatives to raise private donations more effectively, for example through crowdfunding. However, these new opportunities also lead to new competition among civil society actors (Brandsen/Pape 2015). Digitalisation means that CSOs need resources and skills to make use of the new channels of communication. Some organisations and initiatives are better equipped for this than others. In response to these developments, large and professionalised CSOs in the Netherlands have created new positions for digital communication and fundraising. But thanks to digitalisation, even small local initiatives have the opportunity to reach out to larger audiences than they would have had in the past, given that the initiatives in question have effective communication skills and a cause that attracts supporters in the digital space. Overall, it is evident that the informalisation of civil society creates both opportunities and challenges. The new opportunities of informal organisation make it easier for some CSOs to secure support, but also create growing competition among civil society actors. .. New forms of societal mobilisation The trend towards informalisation is closely linked to the emergence of new forms of societal mobilisation. Some of the new organisations have been established in response to a retreating welfare state and the perceived failure of markets to deal with pressing problems. In recent years, the Netherlands has seen the rise of new civil society actors, including social enterprises, mutuals and cooperatives. Social enterprises are usually small- to medium-sized companies with a social mission. In some cases, social enterprises were founded by non-profit organisations that decided to use this legal form to diversify income sources and make the organisation more sustainable in a situation of increased competition for public funding. Mutuals provide support for groups for groups that are not sufficiently covered by existing welfare arrangements (Evers et al. 2014). Examples for new initiatives include the so-called “bread funds” (broodfondsen) that became popular among the many small entrepreneurs in the Netherlands. Bread funds are small collectives that allow independent entrepreneurs to provide each other with temporary sick leave (Interview #12). This form of mutual support is particularly attractive for freelancers such as writers, journalists and cultural entrepreneurs, as bread funds are a much more cost-efficient support mechanism than private insurances (Interview #12), and thus are a classic example of a non-profit response to

From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands  

a market failure. Consequently, bread funds have become popular in the Netherlands where a significant part of the workforce consists of small, independent entrepreneurs (so-called ZZPer, an acronym that translates as “independent without personnel”). At present, the network that unites local groups at the national level counts 28,415 entrepreneurs, united in 625 groups in 195 places throughout the country (BroodfondsMakers n.d.). Other examples for new forms of social mobilisation are the emergence of new cooperatives (Bosma/de Jonge 2014) and social enterprises in the Netherlands (Colenbrander et al. 2017; Dahles et al. 2020; Karré 2021). These new social organisations “strive to solve social problems through economic activity” (Karré 2021:293). Although the Netherlands lack a specific legal form for new cooperatives and social enterprises, their number has grown significantly over the past years. Cooperatives mainly emerged in the fields of care, energy and local economic development (Bosma/de Jonge 2014). Between 2000 and 2021, the number of cooperatives has grown by 430 % (Bosma/de Jonge 2014). To describe the cooperatives that have been founded by citizens at the grassroots level the term “civic cooperative” (burgercoöperatie) has been introduced (Bokhorst et al. 2015; Dutch Council for Cooperatives 2013). Civic cooperatives are believed to alter the cooperation between the state and its citizens. Social enterprises, too, have seen a remarkable rise in the Netherlands. The umbrella organisation Social Enterprise NL is the main promoter of this new form of social entrepreneurship and unites 419 members in 2021 (Social Enterprise NL 2021). Social enterprises are particularly active in work participation, social cohesion, food transition, environmental protection and sustainable production. Both cooperatives and social enterprises are promoted by local governments as they are regarded as a more sustainable financial alternative to traditional non-profit organisations that often depends on public subsidies. In contrast, cooperatives and social enterprises can open up new sources of income through entrepreneurial activities (Bokhorst et al. 2015). Experts describe cooperatives as new forms of societal selforganisation that allow citizens to find answers to social and environmental problems (Bokhorst et al. 2015). At present, it is difficult to assess the quantitative impact of these new initiatives since they do not show up in the official non-profit statistics (Brandsen et al. 2015). Even if they did, it would be difficult at this point to assess their impact on civil society at large: whether they constitute a marginal add-on or a game changer. Although these organisations are new in the context of the traditional civil society, in many ways they mirror past initiatives that have since been institutionalised. New mutuals, cooperatives and social enterprises are comparable to 19th century welfare initiatives that were subsequently merged and integrated in the Dutch public sector. The new initiatives are in a way a repetition of societal renewals by offering up-to-date solutions to social problems. It is important to note that the focus is shifting from the non-profit sphere to the sphere of social entrepreneurship.

  Ulla Pape .. Fragmentation of civil society As a result of informalisation and the emergence of new societal initiatives, one can observe a fragmentation of civil society in the Netherlands. Next to traditional nonprofit organisations, new initiatives, including social enterprises, mutuals and cooperatives, have emerged. Moreover, new forms of social organisations in the digital space have emerged. The organisational landscape of Dutch civil society has thus become more colourful and diverse. On the one hand, this can be seen as a positive development, as it enables Dutch citizens to get involved in a variety of ways. However, the increasing variety of civic organisations and forms of social mobilisation also has a flip side, as it increases the organisational differences among civil society actors. As we have seen above, community identity within Dutch civil society is weak. When Dutch CSOs describe themselves, they primarily refer to their activities and not to their membership in civil society. The result is that there is hardly any joint representation of interests for Dutch civil society that goes beyond cooperation in individual policy areas. This fragmentation is reinforced by the inherent contrast between traditional non-profit organisations and new initiatives that include elements of entrepreneurship. The fragmentation of Dutch civil society also makes it difficult, if not impossible to make general statements about the development of civil society in the Netherlands. The phenomena summarised by the term “shrinking spaces of civil society” only affect a part of Dutch civil society. Whereas established non-profit organisations feel the effects of increasing civil society marketisation and bureaucratisation and might describe these as a form of shrinking space, new informal initiatives do not share these experiences (Interview #12). They are not limited in their development. Social enterprises and cooperatives in turn are supported by the state, as these forms are regarded to be favourable for economic development at the local level (Bokhorst et al. 2015). Dutch civil society experts therefore emphasise that it is important not to speak of a uniform development, but to take a close look at different organisational forms (Interview #12).

. Stories of resilience Looking at the development of civil society in the Netherlands, a multi-faceted picture emerges. Dutch citizens have found new ways of organising themselves, be it in new forms of civic organisations and initiatives or by using new communication and fundraising tools. At the same time, established non-profit organisations in the Netherlands have adjusted to the challenges of a changing environment. The situation of Dutch civil society has become more complex. Two examples of organisations and initiatives are presented here to demonstrate the power and resources of Dutch civil society to renew itself and to respond to soci-

From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands  

etal challenges. Both examples illustrate the resilience of Dutch civil society and how it brings citizens together to develop solutions to urgent societal issues. .. Civil Rights Protection Platform The Civil Rights Protection Platform (Platform Bescherming Burgerrechten) is a forum for the defence of civil rights in the Netherlands. It was founded in 2009 by a group of human rights defenders and activists who were concerned about the creeping restrictions on civil liberties (Interviews #21 and #24). An important campaign of the platform was the so-called SyRI case which has become a key example of defending civil and privacy rights in the Netherlands. The acronym SyRI stands for “System Risk Indication”. It is a data system that was designed by the Dutch government to process large amounts of data collected by various Dutch public authorities to identify those citizens most likely to commit benefits fraud. According to one of the organisation’s campaigners, SyRI was an important reason for setting up the Civil Rights Protection Platform (Interview #24). The law providing the legal basis for SyRI was adopted by the Dutch Parliament in 2014: “We found the law so dangerous and so damaging that we decided to take legal action against the government and to launch a public campaign” (Interview #24). The platform’s campaign was successful. In February 2020, a district court in the city of The Hague ruled that the right to privacy prevailed over the hunt against alleged benefits fraudsters (The SyRI case n.d.). The judges therefore concluded that the use of SyRI is unlawful as it violates the right to privacy. Success in this legal battle was made possible by a coalition of various Dutch non-profit organisations. In addition to Civil Rights Protection Platform, welfare and digital rights organisations, including the Public Interest Litigation Project and Privacy First, also joined the campaign (Interview #24). At present, the topics of the Civil Rights Protection Platform are now broader than the successful campaign against state surveillance. The network strives for an open dialogue about the protection of civil rights in the Netherlands between organisations, individuals, and the state. This also included a critical monitoring of the state’s pandemic measures. Other topics include the protection of civil liberties in the health care system. The Civil Rights Protection Platform can be regarded as an initiative that focuses on the advocacy function of civil society and reassures its relevance in societal interest representation. .. Citizens’ Council Climate & Environment Another example for an innovative civil society initiative is the Citizens’ Council Climate & Environment (Burgerberaad Klimaat & Milieu). The main objective of this initiative is to involve Dutch citizens in policy debates on climate change adaptation and

  Ulla Pape to jointly develop recommendations for policy makers. In 2021, a coalition of more than 60 Dutch CSOs, including Urgenda, Oxfam Novib, SDG Netherlands, MVO Nederland and the Landelijk Samenwerkingsverband Actieve Bewoners, united to advocate for greater citizens’ participation in climate change and environmental policies. The network mainly operates through outside advocacy strategies such as organising public events, open debates and petitions. In an open letter to the newly appointed Minister of Economic Development on 19 January 2022, the non-profit coalition wrote that “we urge the new government to allow Dutch people to participate in the discussion and decision-making about the approach to the climate and ecological crisis” (Burgerberaad Klimaat & Milieu 2022). The objectives and campaigns of the Citizens’ Council Climate & Environment are widely distributed through social media and public debates. The main ideas of the initiative are summarised in the Manifesto published on 22 June 2021 (Burgerberaad Klimaat & Milieu 2021). On this day, the activists organised a symbolic citizens’ council in front of the Dutch Parliament and demanded that the new government, which at that moment was in the process of formation, include the establishment of a citizens’ council in the coalition agreement. With the idea of a citizens’ council, the activists took up an idea of representative democracy whereby a group of randomly appointed citizens assists policy-makers in dealing with topical issues that concern everyone. Citizens’ councils are seen to bring civic expertise to political decision-making, increase the responsiveness of public institutions and strengthen the trust between the state and its citizens. Despite its advocacy efforts, the network did not succeed in convincing the parties to include the idea of a nation-wide citizens’ council in the coalition agreement that was finally reached in December 2021 (Coalitieakkoord 2021). However, a struggle had not been in vain. A first step towards greater responsiveness and citizen’s participation in public policy-making had been taken. Furthermore, thanks to civic initiatives, the new centre-right government, made up of the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), Democrats 66 (D66), Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), and Christian Union (CU) has understood that citizens demanded a change in the governance culture towards more openness and responsiveness. Consequently, the coalition agreement included a reference to the civic initiatives and pledged that the government “stimulate[s] opportunities for citizen participation and citizen initiatives at the local level” (Coalitieakkoord 2021). Moreover, climate change adaptation, energy transition and environmental protection are described as central policy topics for the coming legislature. Furthermore, the Dutch government has established a coordination procedure to discuss its climate policies which include consultations with nonprofit organisations (Klimaatakkoord n.d.). The future will show to what extent these objectives are actually implemented by the government. Civic initiatives such as the Citizens’ Council Climate & Environment are necessary for maintaining constant pressure and keeping the government on course.

From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands  

 Conclusion: What Future for Dutch Civil Society? The analysis of civil society development in the Netherlands reveals a complex picture. Generally, the space for civil society as a whole has not been shrinking to the same extent as in some other European countries, such as Poland and Hungary, where stricter laws for CSOs have been introduced and the space for civil society has been curtailed. On the contrary, in the Netherlands, the legal framework for CSOs has remained supportive. Societal discourses, too, have been reassuring, as Dutch policymakers frequently emphasise the need to support CSOs and strengthen social cohesion. However, this does not mean that Dutch CSOs have no restrictions. Increasing bureaucratisation of public policies and collaboration mechanisms has led to greater reporting and accountability requirements that affect many Dutch CSOs, particularly in the welfare sector. Whereas larger professional organisations make use of financial and organisational resources to adjust to the requirements, smaller organisations find it increasingly difficult to meet the more stringent project management standards necessary for working in collaboration with public institutions. Consequently, Dutch civil society has witnessed a general trend towards larger organisations that use more business-like management techniques. Moreover, growing competition for public subsidies makes it more difficult for smaller and less professionally equipped organisations to compete and survive financially. The stricter implementation of the tax exemption rules (the so-called ANBI status) mean that tax privileges for civil society are less accessible to newcomers that might find it more difficult to conform to the requirements and qualify for tax exemptions. Especially smaller organizations or family foundations criticize the requirement to publish private addresses in public financial reports. Overall, however, the majority of Dutch CSOs successfully navigate through the regulatory environment and are not subject to any severe legal restrictions. Nevertheless, the effects of policy neglect, as defined by Anheier and Toepler (2019), have an impact on civil society in the Netherlands. Policy-makers no longer make their decisions based off societal changes and do not adequately respond to demands from the public. A growing divide between the government and large parts of the population weakens civil society actors, too. The result of this policy neglect is a limited understanding of the democratic function of civil society. Dutch CSOs are valued as service providers, but less understood as civic representation. This development increases the pressure on CSOs to divert from their original purpose and fully orientate themselves to the requirements and priorities of public agencies, phenomenon known as “mission drift.” The divide between policies and public is not only limited to requirements for CSOs. As civil society experts note, government policies have become increasingly technocratic and lose the link to public values. This can be understood as a form of policy neglect. As political decision-makers have lost touch with society. As a conse-

  Ulla Pape quence, poor communication of policy objectives and a lack of true deliberation with societal actors have played an important role in this development which some observers describe as a crisis of political trust. In 2021, a study concluded that confidence of Dutch citizens in politics had plummeted (NOS 2021). Political crises, such as the child benefits scandal and most recently the farmers’ protests against the nitrogen legislation, have revealed a growing divide between the political elite and “ordinary people”, a trend that gives new impetus to populist movements. Notably, established civil society organisations in the Netherlands have generally remained weak in responding to these new social conflicts that move, and increasingly divide Dutch society. Consequently, traditional CSOs are generally not trusted to overcome the existing barriers in Dutch society. Many decision-makers instead call for new civic organizations that better represent citizens. However, new civic initiatives such as the Citizens’ Council Climate & Environment show the unbroken potential of Dutch civil society to renew itself and find solutions to public issues. The study on the effects of the changing policy environment also showed that changes differentially affected CSOs in the Netherlands. Not all policy fields have been influenced to the same degree. Cultural and development organisations have disproportionally been faced with difficulties arising from public funding cuts, as the liberal government has gradually scaled back financing mechanisms in these policy fields. While some organisations have been suffering quite heavily from a decrease in donations, new initiatives were established that succeeded in tapping on new financial resources. In terms of organisational forms, one can see differences as well. Established non-profit organisations have been affected by the changes in public welfare arrangements which had provided them with a privileged position for a long time. New civic initiatives, by contrast, are not limited by regulatory changes. To a certain degree, the changes within civil society result from broader societal processes in the Netherlands. The younger generations prefer more flexible forms of self-organisation are more in tune with digital possibilities and have a greater interest in environmental topics. As a result, the landscape of Dutch civil society has become more diverse, both in terms of organisational forms and issues. A general concern across policy and organisational forms is the capacity of civil society actors to voice civic interests and act as advocate for societal and political changes. Some observers fear that Dutch CSOs have lost their advocacy strength and are increasingly side-lined or silenced in relevant policy debates. Although there are cases of compromised advocacy among Dutch CSOs that closely collaborate with state institutions and depend on public funding, there are also many counterexamples. Many new civic initiatives and successful advocacy campaigns have been set up recently, particularly in the fields of human rights and environmental protection. The two case studies – the Civil Rights Protection Platform and the Citizens’ Council Climate & Environment – provide information on these new forms of advocacy and point to the resilience of Dutch civil society.

From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands  

However, the growing diversity among Dutch CSOs has also led to more fragmentation. The differentiation within civil society has become greater, which has further limited its already weak identity. Fragmentation has thus led to a decrease of joint civil society identity and solidarity. Furthermore, growing societal polarisation endangers social cohesion in the Netherlands. These problems even seem to be more pronounced in the Netherlands than in other European countries. Observers point to an increasing divide between the political elite and the relatively wealthy middle class on the one hand and the socially disadvantaged on the other hand. This dividing line extends across politics, the geographical distribution of opportunities (urban centres vs. periphery), culture and, of course, civil society. The concerns of socially disadvantaged groups, or those who feel socially disadvantaged, are increasingly being addressed by new movements rather than by traditional civil society. Societal polarisation also means that some established CSOs have been attacked by new right-wing movements and activists. Some civic initiatives contribute to societal polarisation, others strive to overcome polarisation and instead strengthen social cohesion in Dutch society. The farmers’ protest movement which hit the national headlines in June 2022 is experiencing increasing radicalisation and does not shy away from road blockades, damaging property and violent action, thereby decreasing its support from mainstream society. Other new social movements are more interested in reaching mainstream society. The two aforementioned case studies exemplify stories of resilience that show that Dutch civil society has the potential to find new ways of dealing with problems that affect everyone. They illustrate that in changing circumstances Dutch citizens take up topical issues, such as climate change and environmental protection, and find ways to organize around joint concerns. The future of civil society in the Netherlands will depend on this potential and the readiness of policy-makers and citizens to find common ground.

Overview of Interviews First phase of data collection Twenty interviews with representatives of Dutch CSOs and civil society experts were conducted between July 2014 and April 2015 in the framework of the Third Sector Impact Project. These interviews were used for this report with the consent of the project leader Taco Brandsen (Radboud University Nijmegen).

  Ulla Pape Table 2: Overview Interviews – First phase of data collection No

Organisation

Interviewee/position in the organisation

Date of the interview



NOV

Director

-- Voluntary effort



Stichting LOS (Landelijk Coordinator Ongedocumenteerden Steunpunt)



     

    

Movisie

-- International aid

Senior programme manager

-- International aid

Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau

Head of department

-- Policy expert

Policy expert

Policy expert

-- Voluntary effort

Vereniging Humanitas

Advisor to the Board

-- Voluntary effort

Amnesty International

Policy expert

Stichting Present Nederland IederIn

Cluster manager “Human rights policy”

Policy expert Director Director

-- International aid

-- Voluntary effort -- Voluntary effort

-- Health and social services

Coöperatie De BroodfondsMakers

Founder and project manager

-- Cooperative, Well-being

Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds

Adjunct-director, secretary of -- Culture and arts the board

KNKV (Koninklijk Nederlands Programme manager “Partic- -- Sport Korfbalverbond) ipation”

Museumvereniging



MuZIEum Nijmegen



Atletiekunie



Thuiszorg Dichtbij, Groningen



-- Voluntary effort

Vluchtelingenwerk





Programme manager

Policy field

Coöperatie Erfgoed Gelderland

Senior Policy Advisor “Public -- Culture and arts Affairs” Director

-- Culture and arts

Director

-- Sport

Chairman of the board and head of the department “Care”

-- Health and social services

Board member cooperative and director of Gelders Erfgoed

KLVO (Koninklijke Vereniging Director voor Lichamelijke Opvoeding)

-- Culture and arts

-- Sport

From a privileged partnership to policy neglect: Civil Society in the Netherlands  

Second phase of data collection A second set of interviews with civil society experts was conducted between May and December 2021. The objective of these interviews was to examine the latest developments with regard to the civic space in the Netherlands. In contrast to the first round, these interviews were conducted online. Table 3: Overview Interviews – Second phase of data collection No

Organisation

Interviewee

Date of the interview

Policy field



Netherlands Helsinki Committee

Senior Policy Advisor

--

Human rights

Radboud University Nijmegen

--

Development cooperation

Erasmus University Rotterdam

Researcher and Assistant Professor Professor

--

Philanthropy

Platform Bescherming Burgerrechten

Campaigner and website -- editor

Human rights

   

Wageningen University Assistant Professor

--

Development cooperation

In the text, the interviews are referred to by number.

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Online Resources Bureau Burgerberaad, https://bureauburgerberaad.nl Burgerberaad Klimaat & Milieu, www.burgerberaadklimaat.nu De Transitiemotor, www.detransitiemotor.nl ECNL in the NL, https://ecnl.org/ecnl-nl Extinction Rebellion Goede Dolen, https://goededoelen.nl/ Nederland Filantropieland, https://nlfl.nl/ NL voor elkaar, https://www.nlvoorelkaar.nl/ Platform Bescherming Burgerrechten, https://platformburgerrechten.nl Social Enterprise NL, https://www.social-enterprise.nl/ Sociale Vraagstukken, https://www.socialevraagstukken.nl/ Vereniging Nederlandse Organisaties Vrijwilligerswerk (NOV), https://www.nov.nl Wellbeing Economy Alliance Nederland, www.weallnederlande.org

Maria Medina-Vicent and Ramón A. Feenstra

Spain: The evolution of Civil Society’s mobilisation since 15M  Introduction A well-known Spanish saying reads “After a storm comes a calm”, which is used to describe marine cycles, and also to popularly define going from very intense (and sometimes complex) times to other calmer ones. In this case, we can employ the above-cited saying to define a change in the social mobilisation context in Spain, and to describe going from a period of civil society’s frenetic and frenzied activity to one of calm and certain paralysis (but not the disappearance) of mobilisation. The Spanish political context is marked by being a relatively young democracy. After a 36-year dictatorship (1939–1975) and a period of transition (1975–1978), Spain has witnessed a period of stability with a representative democracy system analogous to other European countries. In this young democracy, it has been considered, at least until recently, that there was still some room for improvement as far as the mobilisation of civil society was concerned, with the presence of a “strong” and rooted civil society (García 1997; Subirats 1999). However, in 2011, Spain witnessed civil society’s intensive political activity process after the appearance of the so-called Indignados movement or 15-M. This movement spread after the mobilisations held on May 15, 2011 to demand a “real democracy” and to call for a more participatory democracy. In initial phases, occupations known as acampadas became a well-established form of permanent protest in dozens of Spanish cities (Della Porta/Mattoni 2014; Feenstra 2020; Glasius/Ishkanian 2018; Kaldor/Selchow 2013; Simsa/Totter 2017). These camping occupations were not only set up as a method to place pressure on the Spanish Government, but also as a place to self-organise, where democratic experiences were put into practice in the public space. They were also a source of inspiration for mobilisations like Occupy Movement or the Hong Kong Umbrella Revolution (Hopke 2015; Romanos 2016). As a result of this initial phase of protests in Spain, the movement remained active for a long period, and showed a high level of experimentation. All this led to the proliferation of numerous citizen initiatives, demonstrations, actions to halt home evictions, monitory bodies, self-management initiatives, hacktivism, boycotts, peaceful sieges on Parliament and citizen legislative initiatives and, finally, to the formation of new political parties (Flesher Fominaya 2020; Postill 2014; Romanos 2014; Simsa/Totter 2017). In 2013, activists linked with 15M began to participate in forming political parties. Of these, the participation in the 2014 European elections of political parties like Podemos or the Partido X stood out. For the forthcoming 2015 Local Elechttps://doi.org/10.1515/9783111070469-012

  Maria Medina-Vicent and Ramón A. Feenstra tions, many municipalist political parties were formed and obtained electoral victories in important cities like Barcelona, Madrid, A Coruña, Cádiz and Zaragoza (Font/García-Espín 2019; Marzolf/Ganuza 2016; Ordoñez et al. 2018; Romanos/Sádaba 2016; Subirats 2015a, 2015b). These initiatives came to be known as “cities of change” in the hope to provide new space for further political experimentation by encouraging greater participation locally (Martínez/Wissink 2021). Nonetheless, this intense frenetic mobilisation moved from civil society spaces to representative structures and gave way to a very different scenario from 2020. The present period can be defined as a calm one, at least in terms of mobilisations. Indeed civil society activity in this context is passing through phases which Tarrow’s classic work (1989) defines as protest cycles. That is, alternating between the rise and fall in social mobilisation by now passing through a certain demobilisation process. This is happening after a very long participation period that has led this context to be defined as civil society’s political laboratory (Feenstra et al. 2017; Flesher Fominaya 2020; Gerbaudo 2016; Postill 2014). The reasons to explain this trend are complex and varied. On the one hand, we find some activists’ electioneering option and the leap from mobilisation to institutions, which contributed to civil society to demobilise. On the other hand, repression is another of the dynamics that has conditioned civil society’s mobilisation. We must not forget that both institutionalisation and repression aspects are considered in Tarrow’s Theory of Protest Cycles to be key aspects in demobilisation (Tarrow 1989). Finally, apart from these phenomena, there is another unexpected and complex event that impacts coexistence: today’s pandemic. We go on to analyse the impact that all this has on mobilisation in the Spanish context (2015–2020).

 From streets to institutions. The electoral leap The political 2011–2013 period was marked by civil society’s strong mobilisation. Protest actions and self-organisation initiatives took place during this period when civil society demonstrated a constant reinvention capacity (Calle Collado 2016; Feenstra et al. 2017; Monterde et al. 2015). Nevertheless, some activists believed that political and institutional changes in certain matters were too slow, such as housing policies, the marked fight against inequality, reforms in the electoral system or promoting participative processes. This explained the qualitative leap in the adopted strategy as many electoral initiatives began to be launched, particularly from 2014. Paradoxically (or perhaps not), those people who reported limits of representative democracy and deficits in the system participated in them (Flesher-Fominaya 2014; Simsa/Totter 2017; Tormey 2015). One of the arguments used to take this leap from mobilisation to institutionalisation was based on a “glass ceiling” which citizens hit every time they saw how their demands became real policies.

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From this point, 15M activists came together to create new political parties to participate in the electoral process (Flesher Fominaya 2020; Ibarra-Güell et al. 2018; Lobera 2019; Prentoulis/Thomassen 2019). The first party to be set up in 2013 was Partido X, which was clearly inspired by technopolitics. However, it was Podemos that appeared early in 2014 to be the first party to enjoy European and national electoral success (Torreblanca 2015). This populist political party’s electoral success proved to be the definitive drive to the electoral option and encouraged many local political parties to form in 2015. Hence the so-called citizen platforms appeared with various denominations that became popularly known as “cities of change” (Rubio-Pueyo 2017). Of these, we find the very well-known Platform of Ada Colau, a former spokesperson of the PAH (Platform for People Affected by Mortgages), who was elected as Mayoress of Barcelona with the platform Barcelona en Comú (BeC) in 2015 and 2019. Another very known platform was the Ahora Madrid, which led former judge Manuela Carmena to become Mayoress. Other electorally successful “cities of change”, included Cádiz, Zaragoza and La Coruña, among others (Font/García-Espín 2019; Marzolf/Ganuza 2016; Ordóñez et al. 2018; Romanos/Sádaba 2016; Subirats 2015a). This period was generally a time when the number of new registered political parties was significant. In fact, if we look at the data of newly registered parties corresponding to the Spanish Ministry of Internal Affairs, we can see a phase of exponential growth of new parties. Between 2009 and 2010, 295 new political parties were registered. This figure more than doubled in 2014 and 2015 (coinciding with European, National, Regional and Local elections) because 618 new parties registered (Tormey/Feenstra 2015) 85. This institutional leap led to electoral successes and new opportunities for some civil society groups to take their claims from streets to institutions. However, in turn, this brought about a certain debate about the effects that this would have on civil society and on the potential shrinking of the public space, a debate that tends to appear when civil society groups decide to opt for an electoral way. Sceptical visions of parties’ transforming possibilities certainly do not lack political thinking. Some thinkers consider, for instance, that the dynamics of both social movements and civil society are not transferable to political parties and representative institutions because they are defined by different logics and dynamics (Cohen/Arato 1994; Habermas 1996; Keane 1998). For decades, others have contemplated that political parties present a natural trend towards not only hierarchical organisation, but also the consolidation of aristocratic and oligarchical tendencies, as a result of their consolidation as “methodical organisation of electoral masses” (Michels, 1st 1911, 1998). In short, by means of logics that tends to be moved away from the concerns which normally characterise transforming social mobilisations.  85 See Registro de Partidos: https://sede.mir.gob.es/nfrontal/webpartido_politico.html (10th October 2022).

  Maria Medina-Vicent and Ramón A. Feenstra Several works also point out institutionalisation as one of the main causes that drives civil society’s demobilisation (Jung 2010; Przeworski/Sprague 1986; Tarrow 1989). The classic work by Tarrow indicates institutionalisation as an essential factor in the decline of protest cycles. Moreover, there is the work by Przeworski and Sprague (1986) with their study about the History of Electoral Socialism, in which this trend is seen. According to these authors, the pact culture and representative logics frustrate transforming politics, while they “demobilised those potential efforts —cooperatives, councils, and commons— that could not be channelled through elections” (Przeworski/Sprague 1986:183). It should not be forgotten that some studies show how institutionalisation is not irremediably linked with fragmentation and decay of social movements. When focusing on the German Environmental Movement, it observes a contrary trend and a positive maturation process (Rucht/Roose 2001). Obviously, this is a complex phenomenon and one with many consequences. In the Spanish case there is the initial electoral success of these new political parties, which has dwindled with time, but not without obtaining excellent results. Podemos, for example, managed to form part of the Spanish Government in January 2020 despite its growing loss of votes (from 20.68 % in December 2015 to 12.84 % in November 2019) (see epdata 2019). In the 2019 local elections, BComú managed to hold the office of mayoress (as the second political force and thanks to a policy of pacts). This was different for places like Santiago de Compostela, Ferrol, A Coruña, Zaragoza, and even Madrid which lost the office (see El País 2019). Many electoral initiatives have led to diverse results and made it possible to observe certain progress during the 2015–2019 period (as well as some disappointments) 86. The “cities of change”, for instance, have made progress in aspects like promoting citizen participation and transparency, commitment to environmental policies, curbing of lobbies or prioritising citizens’ basic material needs, which have been expanded. The institutional leap has also made it possible to take civil society agendas to the representative space. Accordingly, we can interpret this advance as a maturation process that resulted from a leap “from ‘occupying squares’ to ‘occupying institutions’ as a new strategy” (Thomson 2021:321). That said, we should also bear in mind the fact that the institutional leap had a certain effect on mobilisations and civil society cannot be denied. In human terms, after this leap, many people have focused on institutional politics. The actors engaged in mobilisation are expected to show strong commitment to, and spend plenty of time on, it. So it is logical that time will influence the succession of decisive moments and other calmer ones in protest cycles.

 86 Several empirical studies on the impact of these initiatives have been recently published. See, for example, Blanco et al. 2020; Feenstra/Tormey 2021; Martínez/Wissink 2021; Mota Consejero/Janoschka 2022.

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During the present acceleration of calm in the mobilisations lived in Spain, other factors have had an impact that we should stop and think about. Matters, such as the so-called “Gag Law” passed in 2015 and today’s world pandemic, have shaped a time in which going to the streets to protest has become almost exceptional action. We now reflect on these matters.

 Gagged citizenship The growing institutionalisation process of social movements, especially those about 15M, were accompanied in parallel by Spanish Organic Law on Protecting Citizen Security (known as “Gag Law”), which came into force on 1 July 2015 after being presented in 2013 with the Government of Mariano Rajoy. In general terms, this law was taken as a clearly repressive reaction to the citizen mobilisations taking place in Spain due to 15M of 2011, and as an attempt to control the possibilities of the public expressing its social discontent and the reappropriation of public spaces, basically as an attack against Spanish citizen’s individual liberties 87. In fact, 15M protests, which acted as an emerging source of collective disgust with the economic crisis that began in 2008, appeared to be the very framework for this law being set up (Martínez 2018). The typification of the crimes deriving from this law as being minor, serious and very serious directly corresponded to the actions that had become the leading acts of 15M; for example, strikes, pickets, meetings not being communicated, escraches performed on politicians, etc. (Olmo/Lozano 2015). To date, the “Gag Law” has been directly questioned by the Spanish civil society, the mass media and NGOs, and not only in its own state, but also by international organisations and media. Most agree that this law reverses citizen liberties associated with a Rule of Law like the Spanish one (Bilbao Ubillos 2015; Garrido 2019), and also point out the impossibility of a European Union Member State allowing penalisations of this type in the Criminal Code (CC). The fear of this law hiding an attempt to undermine the right to expression and meeting in the interests of a specific ideological objective is felt by civil society and the mass media alike. Hence with the arrest of Spanish rapper Pablo Hasél in February 2021, debate about freedom of expression was

 87 It is worth pointing out that this law made the so-called “hot returns” practice legal. This practice refers to the possibility of the Spanish Civil Guard denying immigrants being identified on the border, rejecting their request for asylum and them being immediately returned to their country of origin. On 20 July 2015, the UN Committee of Human Rights approved some Final Observations on this law, which urged the Spanish Government to revise these dispositions, and voiced its fear of this organisation leaving the concepts employed in it as ambiguous. This could result in the complete reversal of Human Rights in Spain, and also in police actions that would be most difficult to supervise and restrain. Moreover, they stated that the “hot returns” practice breached the right to asylum.

  Maria Medina-Vicent and Ramón A. Feenstra rekindled with thousands of citizens taking different protests to streets throughout Spain, which has, in turn, reactivated debate about police violence and abusive conducts by the police force. By examining the main crimes which people have been fined for or charged with based on this law while it has been in force provides us with some clues as to the current state of social rights in Spain. These crimes have particularly been for “extolling terrorism” (Art. 578 of the CC), “Slandering the crown or State institutions” (Arts. 490.3 and 491 of the CC) and “Offending religious sentiments” (included mainly in Articles 524 and 525 of the CC). As we can see, these are crimes in which the conception of the honour and image of certain State institutions is considered more important than citizen’s individual freedom. Indeed, the situation of lack of protection which this law leaves citizens in is worth highlighting, where the novelty lies in “ignoring the judicial process in penalising «anti-establishment attitudes», suppressing the human factor that a trial implies and substituting it for an immediate fine that cannot be appealed” (Peinador Pérez 2017:221), to which the pleadings period for the statements made by authorised officers is added. The report Spain: social activists and the right to information: in the spotlight. An analysis of the Spanish Organic Law on Protecting Citizen Security (Amnesty International 2017) warns about the disproportionate restriction to freedom that this law represents for Spain because it regulates freedom of expression, meeting and information. It also points out that it reduces mechanisms to control possible abuse by the State police force, which is another of the strong social criticisms about the Gag Law. Since it came into being on 31 December 2017, 80 fines a day have been placed by applying the two most influential articles of this law, which is the equivalent to almost €25 million (Amnistia Internacional 2018). Until 2020, 19.5 of all imposed sanctions refer to matters like: holding public spectacles or recreational activities prohibited by the authority for public security reasons; disobeying or resisting the authority; denying to identify oneself; not showing the police force and security corps respect and consideration (see Reviejo 2020). Since this law was passed, it has led to the population’s discontent and many civil society organisations and associations have constantly campaigned to demonstrate its disproportional application. The various cases that have come about since it was passed, some of which have been widely covered by the mass media, demonstrate a central objective of citizen demobilisation by means of fear and reinforcing self-censorship, and cutting the right to social activism and to express ideas and information 88.

 88 The documentary Scissors vs. Paper (Gerard Escuder 2018) closely examines the effects of the Gag Law and censorship on contemporary Spain by presenting different cases relating to the world of theatre, music, art, twitters, journalists, among others.

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. Civil society against the Gag Law During the gradual shrinkage of the space in which civil society has recently acted in Spain (2015–2020), many actors have made the effort to put forward a tireless framework of citizen’s responses and reactions to the Gag Law. Even before this law was passed, organisations like the Third Sector Platform assumed the task of reporting this repressive law by presenting a document of the contributions made to the Citizen Security Law (2014) so that civil society and citizens’ voices would be heard in this law (see Plataforma Tercer Sector 2014). They pointed out that the text could be improved in juridicial and technical terms, and it abused inconclusive legal terms, which could lead to arbitrariness and an ample margin to interpret this law’s application. In the Law domain, organisations like Judges for Democracy and the Free Association of Lawyers previously warned about the risk of this law converting those citizens who protest into State enemies. In fact, civil society also emphasises the law’s lack of foundation because it is not based on either a citizen insecurity context or a high criminality risk, which the government contended at the time, rather on fear discourse as an excuse to shape repressive legislation “and to disguise the real intention of perpetuating the stigmatisation of the vulnerable groups that already suffered social exclusion (poverty, immigration, mental disorders) in parallel to criminalising political dissidence increasing” (Comisión Legal Sol 2015:109). It was a clear political intention to promote the social demobilisation that had taken place in Spain with 15M, a movement that had already endured political and state repression at that time by converting fear into a repressive strategy (Camps/Vergés 2015), which this law now attempts to reinforce. In 2017, the No somos delito/We are no crime 89 platform, made up of more than 100 organisations, activists, jurists and social movements against reforming the CC, the Law on Protecting Citizen Security and the Law on Private Security, launched a Draft bill with 10 basic principles backed by 15 jurists and more than 20 associations. The 10 claimed principles included the effectiveness of the presumption of innocence, transparency and guarantees when applying the law, the equality principle and that of non-discrimination, personal data protection, eliminating crimes registers, establishing effective and independent investigation mechanisms, eliminating any type of physical punishment by civil servants and banning hot returns, which has been vehemently reported by SOS Racismo/SOS Racism 90 and ratified by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Generally speaking, these 10 points clearly reflect the social concerns that stem from the strategies developed by the Spanish State, especially blaming, punishing watching and expelling the most excluded people (Camps/García 2015). Consequently, protests have shrunk in Spain, which is something that Green 89 See: http://nosomosdelito.net/ (10th October 2022). 90 See: https://sosracismo.eu/17m-2018-ley-mordaza/ (10th October 2022).

  Maria Medina-Vicent and Ramón A. Feenstra peace has assumed the task of reporting with its well-acclaimed ironic campaign launched in 2018 against the Gag Law 91. It came in the form of “Protest Box” in an attempt to reveal that “protesting” in today’s Spain is a “luxury” that very few can afford. With the fifth anniversary of this law (2020), more than 200 organisations that fight for rights and fundamental freedom in Spain were included in the manifesto driven by Amnesty International 92. Some were the Platform that Defends Freedom of Information (PDLI) 93, Defending Those Who Defend, as well as the Avaaz civil organisation that continues to fight this law ever since the Government announced its intention to pass it by also assigning constant supervisors to particular cases that have appeared in accordance with its application. Moreover, organisations that are closely linked with 15M, such as PAH (Platform for People Affected by Mortgages), have also and frequently voiced their explicit rejection of the Gag Law, and have had to face sanctions resulting from applying this law in different cities. As we have seen, the gradual institutionalisation of citizen movements, along with the shrinking public space for civil society’s protests in Spain as a result of increased repression, means that “Spain is immersed in a political cycle in which the legal architecture has allowed any form of political dissidence to be criminalised by means of reforming the Criminal Code and passing repressive laws” (Bonilla 2019:45). These organisations’ role reflects the dangerous effects of repression in Spain, which is weakening civil society. Moreover, with today’s pandemic, many of these organisations warn that the Gag Law has acted as a framework to assert repressive measures against citizenship (Defender a quien defiende 2020), which we look at later on. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out one specific case in this social repression context that stands out from the other events included as part of this law to allow us to move towards a turning point. We refer to the case of rapper Pablo Hasél, accused of slander and calumnies against the crown, and also extolling terrorism. He was arrested in February 2021 by the Police Force of Catalonia while he was at the Rectorate of the Universitat de Lleida surrounded by demonstrators. With this arrest, a series of concentrations and protests took place all over Spain, most of which were announced by Llibertat Pablo Hásel/Freedom for Pablo Hásel (@LlibertatHasel). This initiative was promoted for the rap cause, and by other anti-capitalist and anti-fascist organisations. Some of these concentrations ended up in altercations and police charges, and such action is being studied. Upon his arrest, the Unidas Podemos political party requested the Spanish Ministry of Justice his reprieve, while the governing PSOE  91 See: https://es.greenpeace.org/es/sala-de-prensa/comunicados/greenpeace-lanza-una-ironicacampana-contra-la-ley-mordaza-para-denunciar-que-el-gobierno-ha-convertido-la-protesta-en-unlujo/ (10th October 2022). 92 See Manifesto: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSc2W1frcOCr_ZDPWTDmA-HRpwg VJrvPqBAewtq3qmrMrnTXuQ/viewform (10th October 2022). 93 See: http://libertadinformacion.cc/5-anos-de-leyes-de-mordaza/ (10th October 2022).

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party announced a reform of the CC to avoid such cases. On 18 February 2021, PDLI registered a manifesto to defend free expression at the Spanish Parliament. Perhaps the social impact of all this might even act as an indicator of change in Spanish civil society’s response to the repression it has lived in recent years because, despite the restrictions set up due to today’s pandemic, it has protested in the streets. Indeed, we must consider how this exceptional pandemic situation is affecting citizen mobilisation by taking a general photograph of today’s context.

 Citizen mobilisation during the pandemic The COVID-19 pandemic has been a shock for both the population and governments worldwide because it has absolutely affected different social spheres (Žižek 2020). In this context, it is worth analysing the conditions that stem from the pandemic affect citizens and their organisational capacity; namely in a confinement context: restricted mobility, fewer social interchanges and human contact; many empty streets; curfews. What is the social mobilisation status in Spain? In general terms, it is a novel context in which different challenges and problems can be contemplated. We believe it is key to consider if a rearticulation potential appears with social movements or, otherwise, if the present conditions in Spain further weaken the possibility of citizen mobilisation apart from the aforementioned repression background. We find an ambivalent situation. On the one hand, during the first months of today’s pandemic (and confinement), civil society links were reinforced and began to respond to arising social needs, especially those of more vulnerable groups. Here we refer to certain practices like soup kitchens, support from neighbours, and different groups with matters like health care. Many of these practices have continued as the months have passed, and State support and care networks have been set up. On the other hand, we observe how the State of Alarm considerably increased police street vigilance, and how not being able to meet and restricted mobility have resulted in social street protests disappearing (especially during the first months of the pandemic at the start of 2020). Later however, all kinds of reactions from extreme right-wing groups were voiced, which oppose the Spanish Government’s pandemic management. These groups were encouraged by political parties, like Vox, among others, and they occupied the streets of Madrid and other Spanish cities on different occasions to protest about face masks, and to ask sectors like the hotel trade and the economic sector to reopen, which were the worst hit by the pandemic. To better understand these two phenomena, we now go on to contextualise the social situation of the pandemic in Spain. Ever since the pandemic began, the Institute of Advanced Social Studies (IESA) of the CSIC (Spanish National Research Council) has published two reports to study the effects of COVID-19 on Spain. These reports are called ESPACOV-I and ESPACOV-

  Maria Medina-Vicent and Ramón A. Feenstra II (Estudio Social sobre la Pandemia de la COVID-19/Social Study about the COVID-19 Pandemic), 94 which were published in May 2020 and February 2021, respectively. With the results obtained in the second report, the IESA-CSIC highlights three keys that lead us to think about the situation that citizen mobilisation is in today: loss of public confidence, pandemic fatigue and its particular incidence in youths; a healthcare crisis being politically lived. The population’s clearly worsened emotional state is stressed as one of the immediate consequences of the pandemic because despondency affects youths the most. In fact 78.7 % of those surveyed clearly indicated being concerned about catching COVID-19. We can interpret this concern as a reason why fewer social meetings are organised, which evidently affects organisations and associations. This fear of catching COVID-19 implies fewer physical meetings with other people, a situation that inevitably reduces street protests. We find one example of such when the 2021 8M (International Women’s Day on 8 March) strike was being organised in Spain. It sparked a whole series of debates by the mass media and political parties as to whether it was advisable to prohibit, or not, meetings on this date. Finally, the Spanish Autonomous Community of Madrid cancelled the concentrations communicated for this date. The nationwide feminist movement organised different alternatives to mass concentrations, and those that went ahead attempted to meet healthcare indications. Another matter to arise from this report is the fact that the Spanish Government has progressively lost citizen’s trust from the time when the data in the first report phase were recorded (April 2020) to the second report (February 2021). Moreover, it would appear that trust in Spanish Autonomous Communities increased compared to the Spanish Government. The mean scores applied to assess the Spanish Government’s management dropped in all the ideological groups. Trust in citizens also dropped because a collective failure to control the third pandemic wave of infection (January-February 2021) was perceived. Citizens considered that some groups which did not respect measures were on the increase and harmed the rest of society. The indicators employed in ESPACOV II allow a marked ideological component to be defined in citizens’ views about the different pandemic dimensions. Those surveyed on the right-wing ideological spectrum believe that the time to achieve economic recovery and the time needed to get back to a similar lifestyle to that known before the pandemic would be longer. A general reading of these data allows us to deduce a difficult context for the life of the different kinds of social movements, organisations and associations. On the extreme right-wing’s greater social mobilisation, we deduce that these ideological positions trusting less scientific community prescriptions means that occupying streets to protest is not conceived as a real health  94 Both reports can be consulted via this link: https://digital.csic.es/handle/10261/211271 https://www.iesa.csic.es/espacov-ii/ (10th October 2022).

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risk, unlike those closer to the left-wing ideology who perceive it is a real risk. Although more mistrust in political institutions apparently appears, which could imply discontent prior to mobilisations, both restrictive measures and the generalised fear of catching COVID-19 act as repellents of meetings and encounters, which could favour the rearticulation of such movements. Nonetheless, we move on to look closely at two aspects: the strength of neighbourhood movements as care networks; the extreme right-wing occupying streets to protest about government measures.

. Neighbourhood movements and mutual support networks The COVID-19 confinement period in Spain started on 15 March 2020 and ended with the initial opening phase from lockdown until the “new normality” was achieved in June 2020. The State of Alarm outlined a new scenario of uncertainties, when many social problems dating back years ago became worse. Such problems are related to housing quality, rental rates, precarious job contracts, some social groups’ vulnerability (e.g. the elderly), and even problems accessing online education or telework, to name just a few. Many families lost their source of income, while lots of groups were no longer cared for and awaited the State to react, which it did eventually, but took too long. At a time of forced halt, the social links between neighbours were essential for managing this new situation. This allowed the care networks in districts to be reinforced, including individual initiatives to setting up groups of neighbours to attend to people in their area by maximising prevention measures while awaiting institutions to respond 95. It can be generally stated that the pandemic has led the forms that sustain life in today’s system to be questioned (García-Petit 2020). The very philosophy of these networks, which is linked with self-management and reaching out to those affected, led to a quicker and more efficient response than that given by social services. This reflects the fragile basis of the Spanish social and health systems. Changes in districts’ consumption patterns, like using small nearby shops having apparently increased, clearly demonstrate the return to group awareness. As Della Porta points out: “Faced with the State’s evident shortages and, what is more, with those of the market, social movement organisations are set up (which also occurs in all the countries affected by the pandemic) as mutual support groups by promoting direct social action to help those most in need. This brings about resistance to respond to the solidarity need” (DellaPorta 2020). Solidarity and support from neighbourhood and social groups’ self-management have flooded Spanish cities, and those areas with the most significant initiatives are  95 See: https://www.elsaltodiario.com/coronavirus/mapa-ola-iniciativas-apoyo-cuidado-mutuo-barrios-autogestion-desborda-inaccion-institucional (10th October 2022).

  Maria Medina-Vicent and Ramón A. Feenstra Madrid, Catalonia and the Basque Country. Most of the actions that these neighbourhood associations perform centre on distributing food, as well as material like face masks and sanitisers. They also accompany vulnerable groups like the elderly who live alone. However, these are not their only actions. For example, the Regional Federation of Neighbourhood Assocations of Madrid (FRAVM) offers information about job and housing offers in its Neighbourhood Guide of Coronavirus Crisis. It has also shown its support to the public health sector ever since the pandemic began by demanding more investment and rejecting its privatisation. Madrid is also stressed with the 2020 First European Citizen Award going to the neighbourhood network called Somos Tribu Vallecas, the first space of district solidarity and mutual support set up in Madrid to face COVID-19. In Barcelona, Xarxes de Suport Mutu were set up and reinforced, and these mutual support initiatives emerged from districts’ organisational fabric. Many of them were already operating, and were joined by lots of people interested in collaborating when the pandemic began 96. Not only legal counselling, private classes, handing out school materials and food, but also gender violence problems have been dealt with by these associations, which generally report lack of public services’ efficiency. Other cases to appear in the Basque Country are the resistance box BiziHotsa, an initiative involving the alliance of feminist groups, women’s associations, antiracist and anticapitalist groups, Basque Country cooperative networks, Trade Unions and citizen networks. The intention was to raise €60,000 to cover the most vulnerable population’s urgent needs as part of today’s healthcare crisis, including legal advice for women victims of chauvinist violence, and those who must fight with the papers and bureaucracy expected by the social aid proposed by different regional governments. Basically, the pandemic has outlined a scenario in which social problems and inequalities have worsened, whose key reaction has appeared from civil society and neighbourhoods’ self-management. These neighbourhood actions have been essential for cushioning the negative effects of the pandemic on many vulnerable people, particularly during its first months (and confinement). These networks’ efficiency has highlighted not only the gradual dismantling of public sectors like health care or education, but also the abandonment situation that the most vulnerable groups face. This situation has reinforced citizen self-management forms based on solidarity and mutual support and, at the same time, as previously mentioned, has also led to the extreme right reacting on streets. In other words, it would appear that at a common point at which public powers’ slowness to react is noted, many people have organised self-managed social networks and jointly worked from their districts, whereas other sectors have occupied streets to report the Spanish Government’s bad management and to doubt scientific community guidelines.  96 A map of the mutual support initiatives in Catalonia can be consulted via this link: https://suportpopular.org/mapa-de-xarxes/ (10th October 2022).

Spain: The evolution of Civil Society’s mobilisation since 15M  

. Citizen’s reaction to the pandemic As mentioned in the first section of this report, citizen mobilisation has undergone a marked institutionalisation process in recent years in Spain (2015–2020). This has been accompanied by the repression cycle brought about by the Gag Law being passed, which has had clear effects on the articulation possibilities of street protests. In short, the public space being conquered by citizen movements has been interrupted by the global pandemic state since the beginning of 2020. Although this context promotes reinforcing neighbourhood support networks, it makes citizen mobilisation in the public space difficult. So, it can be deduced from these three factors converging that social citizen protest has diminished, which has partly been the case. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that, given a pandemic context which conditions street protests, the Spanish right-wing reaction to the pandemic management measures taken by the Spanish Government has been voiced on the streets. Indeed today, the vast majority of the organised protests and calls mostly covered by the mass media stem from more right-wing ideological positions that are against how the Spanish Government has managed the pandemic. If we look again at the ESPACOVII results, which indicate more right-wing people’s mistrust of the scientific community and the government to manage today’s pandemic, as well as the perception that socio-economic recovery will take a very long time, we logically understand that the more Spanish right-wing mobilisation on streets during the pandemic comes from these perceptions. It is worth stressing the role that political parties like Vox or PP have played to incite public opinion about discontent with such management. One study that analysed the toxicity of messages from Spanish parliament members on Twitter during the State of Alarm points out that significant differences were noted in the tone of the messages sent by political parties during this period. For example, the most toxic political party was the extreme right-wing Vox, followed by right-ring PP (GuerreroSolé/Philippe 2020), which sent messages in a more “inflammatory” tone. This can be interpreted from the opposition objective to the PSOE-Unidas Podemos coalition government, and as an attempt to get the citizens who think like they do to occupy streets. The time when this type of inflammatory messages started being sent was when feminist strikes 2020 8M were announced nationwide. Indeed, protests were organised as usual in different places on the Spanish map despite the first signs of COVID-19 being present in Spain. A few days after the 8M protest marches, the State of Alarm and confinement were officially declared. Political parties like Vox accused the Spanish Government of not avoiding the virus from spreading by forbidding 8M protest marches. This is a matter of debate which has been repeated with the 2021 8M call. Right-wing parties advised banning such meetings, whereas left-wing ones took a more moderate stance. To a great extent, the criticisms of the opposition’s stance actually masked strategies to detract from the feminist movement (Juárez et al. 2021),

  Maria Medina-Vicent and Ramón A. Feenstra which adapted very well to the healthcare requirements required of the 8M protest marches in 2021. It seems paradoxical that the political party in charge of mobilising people to streets in Spain, and which also defies healthcare measures and confinement by making various demonstrations, is also the party that urges to criminalise the feminist movement. Indeed, on 23 May 2020, Vox called for mobilisations in different Spanish cities so that citizens could protest in their cars about the way the Spanish Government was managing the crisis due to the coronavirus pandemic, and stated that the same government was using the crisis to promote a “socialist-communist” agenda. The platform Stop Confinamiento. Plataforma de Afectados por el Estado de Alarma/Stop confinement. Platform for People Affected by the State of Alarm 97 joined these mobilisations. Overall, more cases involving the right-wing have indicated a scepticism stance about the expert scientific community; for example, the governments of Donald Trump in the USA and of Bolsonaro in Brazil. With the former, Trump’s voters also rejected wearing face masks and occupied public places, such as the storming of the US Capitol in January 2021 in Washington. Similarly, to the toxic inflammatory messages sent by parties like Vox in Spain over social networks, Trump has actively retweeted and shared blatantly false information about COVID-19 which, up to a point, led right-wing voters to occupy streets on different occasions. Misinformation, discrediting the scientific community and inventing conspiracy-like theories have enabled the right-wing to make progress with its political agenda worldwide (deCook 2020). In these contexts, the measures taken by the Spanish Government based on healthcare scientific community recommendations have been interpreted by the right-wing as impositions that restrict Rule of Law’s liberties. With such argumentbased logic about social rights being cut, such as the right to meetings or mobility, the Spanish right-wing has rearticulated its presence on streets and in the mass media. In today’s context, even wearing a face mask, or not, seems to be political and ideological action. In short, if the progressive institutionalisation context of the citizen movement that originated from 15M, along with the repression deriving from the Gag Law, have both helped to keep social protest away from streets, then the pandemic and the restrictive measures from scientific community recommendations have helped the right-wing to rearticulate its discourse to oppose the Spanish Government and to encourage its voters to participate in street protests.

 97 See: https://www.stopconfinamiento.es/ (10th October 2022).

Spain: The evolution of Civil Society’s mobilisation since 15M  

 Conclusion The Theory of Protest Cycles offers a framework that allows us to understand evolution from an intense social mobilisation phase in Spain, one decade ago, to another somewhat demobilisation phase, in which civil society’s forms of organisation have been transformed (2015–2020). The leap from the street to the institution has undoubtedly been accompanied by opportunities. Civil society’s political agenda is being transferred to that of institutions, and the movement is also going through a maturing phase. At the same time, and logically, the energy of the street protest is also affected. Ten years ago, civil society mobilisation evolved both institutionalisation and repression phenomena allow part of this evolution to be understood, to which the logical depletion that comes with mobilisation processes can be added. Moreover, the pandemic emerging transforms all social life, and evidently alters the way civil society acts with it; its main concerns, the ways it coordinates, its challenges. By way of conclusion, citizen movements conquering the public space have been interrupted and have, to a certain point, been made worse by the world pandemic that we have been immersed in since the start of 2020. Although this context promotes neighbourhood support networks’ reinforcement, it also makes citizen mobilisation in the public space difficult. It can, thus, be deduced that fewer social protests by citizens derived from the convergence of these three factors, and that the Spanish political laboratory from 2011 to 2014, marked by creativity, experimentation and constant action, has witnessed a new phase appearing in which the public space has been transformed. We still have to wait and see if the traces left by 15M will leave their mark in the long run, with which Spanish democracy will be reinforced and improved. The long and short of it is that we will have to wait and see if mobilisation will allow at least some steps towards “real democracy” demands to be taken in the future.

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Anna Domaradzka and Magdalena Kołodziejczyk

Polish Civil Society 2015–2022: Steered from the top, reclaimed from the grassroots  Introduction After several years of EU-dependent growth of civil society sector in Poland (see also Domaradzka 2015), the 2015 marked a new stage of its development. That year, Law and Justice (PiS in Polish abbreviation) party took power and quickly rolled out the series of reforms, which met with support from more conservative actors and nationwide protests from the other side. As a result of the last seven years’ developments, the ecosystem of Polish civil society has changed on several levels. New governing and funding bodies emerged, street protests become daily life for urban centres, new nationwide networks and local organisations have been formed. As Korolczuk points out: (…) these mobilizations have emerged in the context of a shrinking civic society space, characterized by closing communication channels between power holders and society, tightening state control over financial resources for NGOs, as well as privileging civil society actors that cooperate closely with right-wing populists and establishing new organisations and institutions closely connected to the state. (Korolczuk 2019)

This important shift in government approach to the civil society was marked by the new legislation, notably the introduction of the National Freedom Institute-Centre for the Development of Civil Society (NIW) – a new administrative body, responsible for distributing public funds among CSOs. The reasoning behind new regulation was to “equalize access” to funding for smaller organisations with different ideological background than the “liberal and left-oriented NGOs from large cities”. This approach marks a new opening in the government-civil society relations, with the NIW – a centralized and politically dependent operator of public funds – as a main actor. This development is very much in line with the logic of other reforms, oriented towards establishing new social elites (Korolczuk 2022), that could compete with more liberal (and internationally funded) civil society “establishment”. As Korolczuk points out: In the sphere of civil society this process includes withholding support for any organisations considered liberal, or left-leaning, and co-opting civil society actors by channelling the funding to civic activities that meet PiS policy objectives. (Korolczuk 2019)

Although it would be tempting to say that those two processes – of exclusion and cooptation – are what shapes the environment of civil society today, we cannot neglect https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111070469-013

  Anna Domaradzka, Magdalena Kołodziejczyk the parallel developments within informal civil society, that accompanied this table turning. This chapter starts with a short glace at Polish most recent civil society statistics and changes related to COVID-19 pandemics. It later describes two key processes shaping Polish civil society in the last seven years: the ongoing top-down regulation of the non-governmental ecosystem, and the bottom-up protests in response to government policies.

 Polish civil society at a glance According to the newest Klon/Jawor reports on the condition of the non-governmental organisations (2022a, 2022b), around 31,000 foundations and 107,000 associations are registered in Poland. Klon/Jawor estimates that about 50 % of the organisations recorded in the national register actually conducted their activities in 2021. This means that currently there are about 70,000 active associations and foundations in Poland (Klon/Jawor Association 2022a). In 2021 about 5,000 new CSOs were registered. When talking about the size of the formal third sector in Poland, we take into account only two legal forms: associations and foundations, using the narrow definition of the non-governmental sector. However, in Poland there are about 50,000 other entities that can be included in the broadly understood civil society sphere. These include hunting clubs, trade unions, social cooperatives, employers’ organisations, rural housewives’ circles, agricultural clubs, craft guilds, church institutions and political parties. In case of newly established organisations, we observe the increasing dynamics of growth of new foundations. In 2007, seven times more associations were established than foundations, in 2011 three times more, while in 2017 only twice and in 2021 only 1,5 as many associations than foundations were registered. In the light of the law, it can be said that while associations implement community activities based on democratic management, the foundations finance activities serving the social good, and their purpose is determined by the founder(s). Therefore, the key difference between these legal forms is that associations are defined by people, while foundations are defined by assets, which results in different goals and objectives. In Poland, however, this legal distinction is not that visible – differences in the practical functioning of associations and foundations are blurring, against the spirit of the law. On the other hand, other dimensions differentiate the discussed legal forms, not directly resulting from the regulations, e.g. the level of involvement of volunteers, sources of financing, and the size of the budget. One can say that a “Polish model of foundations” has emerged, different from the model of foundations operating in the USA or Western Europe (ngo.pl 2020).

Polish Civil Society 2015–2022: Steered from the top, reclaimed from the grassroots  

According to the law, the association is a voluntary and permanent union with non-profit purposes, established by at least 7 people (these provisions changed in 2015 – earlier as many as 15 people were needed). Voluntary associations are an embodiment of freedom of association, so they can be established or dismantled based on the founders’ will. They independently determine their goals and programs, organisational activities, structures and internal acts concerning their operations. The association is also permanent, which means that some of its members may leave, while others may join it throughout its lifetime. To the contrary, establishing a foundation only requires the expression of will by founder and setting up of the initial fund. The size of the fund is not specified, with the exception of foundations conducting economic activity. Foundations Act only indicates the foundation is created for implementation of socially or economically useful purposes, in particular such as health protection, economic development and sciences, education and upbringing, culture and art, care and social assistance, environmental protection and the care for monuments. Founder can indicate any other purpose, such as conducting research and analyses, activities for the protection of human rights or the development of specific sport discipline. Both associations and foundations are registered in the National Court Register, which is a centralised database kept by the court. The Polish law regulating the foundation’s activities is simpler than in case of associations, which may encourage the choice of this legal form. The management of a foundation is not as democratic as in the case of an association. The only obligatory body of the foundation is the board (according to the current regulations, it can be one-person) and it is she who makes all the important decisions. In 2015, changes were made to the Law on associations, supported by the desire to facilitate their registration. It is currently difficult to verify whether the result has been achieved – not much time has passed since the new regulations entered into force. However, perhaps the aforementioned amendment will affect the proportion between the numbers of newly established associations and foundations. While as much as 42 % of the foundations employ permanent employees (regardless of the form of employment), this applies to only 28 % of associations. Voluntary work is much more often used by associations (37 %) than foundations (28 %). Importantly, foundations more often use sources of financing that ensure greater independence of the organisation, i.e. donations from individuals and companies, own economic activity and 1 % tax 98. On the other hand, associations more often reach for public funds and regularly struggle to secure means for covering institutional costs like rent and accounting services.

 98 Under Polish fiscal law, each taxpayer can donate 1 % of their tax to a charity or cause of their choice, as long as the organisation has the status of public benefit organisation.

  Anna Domaradzka, Magdalena Kołodziejczyk Apart from the differences in the length of operation and type of employment, associations and foundations also differ in terms of location. Associations much more often operate in rural areas and small towns, while foundations are located in cities with more than 200,000 residents. This means that the sector is gradually shifting towards large-city, nationwide foundations and more local associations operating in rural areas and smaller centres (cf. Charycka et al. 2019). Bottom-up social initiatives, usually with very small budgets, are operating largely on the basis of voluntary work and community involvement and are very sensitive to changes in their environment. According to recent Klon/Jawor study (2022b), the average CSO in Poland has a budget of PLN 26,000 (€5,500) per year. If you look at the entire non-governmental sector, it turns out that in 2020 43 % of the sector’s budget came from domestic public money, 12 % from foreign public money, 17 % from economic activity, and 13 % from individual and institutional philanthropy. Undoubtedly, both the size of budgets and the proportions between individual sources of income will undergo significant changes due to COVID-19 pandemic. Out of about 100,000 active organisations, every fourth is in the countryside, and half of all associations and foundations are sports and cultural organisations. As the results of “NGOs during pandemic” study show, it was rural, sports and cultural organisations that were the first to experience the effects of the pandemic, as most of them had to suspend their activities (cf. Klon/Jawor Association 2020). Due to prolonged period of lockdown of sport, educational and cultural facilities, it is hard to predict how many of such organisations will resume activities in the coming years and how many will dissolve or go bankrupt. Those that conduct economic activities were eligible for government support, to cover some of the costs of closing down. Others could count on bank loans to keep financial fluidity or small grants from Batory Foundation 99. However, available help was far from sufficient to keep organisations afloat. While some social economy entities developed digital forms of economic activity during pandemic, most civil society organisations were unable to transfer their current activities to the internet. Both due to lack of resources or competences, but mainly because their activity is based on face-to-face relationships with people and local communities. Despite challenges civil society organisations encounter, including lack of resources, uncertainty, interruption of service provision, there are many examples of CSOs stepping up to help those most severely affected by the pandemic. According to latest study, 49 % of CSOs were taking new actions in response to the pandemic crisis, in form of direct help for people from vulnerable groups or those in  99 The Stefan Batory Foundation (Polish: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego) is an independent Polish non-government organisation established by George Soros, along with a group of Polish opposition leaders of 1980s. The Foundation’s mission is to support the development of an open, democratic society in Poland along with other Central and East European countries. Foundation’s activity is financed from income on endowment and grants from foreign institutions, from gifts of individual donors and 1 % personal income tax designations.

Polish Civil Society 2015–2022: Steered from the top, reclaimed from the grassroots  

quarantine, support for health care, sewing masks, as well as providing information or organizing social campaigns.

 Steering from the top As already mentioned in the introduction, since its coming to power in 2015, the Law and Justice government strived to implement important changes in the civil society sector. This was being done by introducing new financial as well as legal boundaries, to chisel a new face of the civil society sector, more in line with government conservative goals. Until 2017, the Ministries had their own departments or teams responsible for the cooperation with the CSOs, and related funding programs. There also existed the Public Benefit Works Council (Rada Działalności Pożytku Publicznego) – an advisory and consultative body composed of representatives of CSOs. The legislation of 2017 changed that system (starting from 2018), subordinating all governmental bodies responsible for cooperation and financing of CSOs to the one central institution. The Public Benefit Committee (Komitet do Spraw Pożytku Publicznego) was established as a supervisory body under the leadership of the Minister of Culture 100 with ministries’ representants as members. The paradox – or even the contradiction – of this policy, is that one governmental body (under the Ministry of Culture) is now solely responsible for steering the development of civil society. Even more – the current Minister of Culture is both the head of the National Freedom Institute (NIW, an executive body of the Public Benefit Committee) and of the Public Benefit Works Council, which has an advisory role to NIW. It is not the first time in Polish history that the state sets the leading priorities in specific directions of CSOs activities, to address the most important challenges and goals for the coming years. This cannot be avoided, because of the public funding rules, and the fact that in Poland CSOs have an important substituting and complementing role. They often fill the gaps in goods and services distribution that the public institutions are not able or willing to deal with, and as such are important subcontractors of the state and the municipalities. However, new regulations significantly increased government control over civil society funding, leaving the decisions in the hands of the few government officials. NIW funds were made available due to the transfer of unused funds within “1 %” and resources resulting from the Act on gambling prevention. Public funds for nongovernmental organisations’ subsidies, provided by the Act on the National Freedom

 100 Professor Piotr Gliński, a sociologist from the Polish Academy of Science, a long-time expert in the field of third sector studies (see Gliński et al. 2002, 2004).

  Anna Domaradzka, Magdalena Kołodziejczyk Institute of 2018 (Article 46.1) defined the maximum limit of state budget expenditures for the period between 2017 and 2026 at PLN 387,380,000, divided by year as follows: – 2017 – PLN 1,580,000; – 2018 – PLN 39,400,000; – 2019 – PLN 60,800,000; – 2020–2026 – PLN 40,800,000 annually; The significant increase of funds between 2017 and 2019, may be connected with the fact that on October 13th, 2019 the parliamentary election took place, due to which Law and Justice stayed in power for the second term. It can be argued that party success was possible also thanks to different conservative initiatives that emerged during that period. Organisations that have so far received grants from the National Freedom Institute are mostly catholic, right-wing, and conservative (Bill 2022) 101. Most of them have been openly supporting Law and Justice, and some are directly linked to the current ruling party (cf. Baczyński 2020a). Also, many of these organisations were established in 2018 and 2019, just in time to benefit from NIW financing programs. Nationalist organisations, such as the Podlasie Institute of the Sovereign Republic, the Polish Victory Foundation 1920–2020 or the Being Poles Foundation, can also count on money from the National Freedom Institute. Organisations that have openly supported PiS for years (The Sobieski Institute, the Ronin Club, the Good Name Redoubt – Polish League Against Defamation, and the Election Control Movement) are now generously funded. Grants were also received by the Republican Foundation, and the KoLiber Association, with personal connections to Law and Justice politicians (cf. Baczyński 2020b). In August 2019 NIW published the list of organisations that received funding under the Civic Organisations Development program, which it is to serve the statutory activities of the organisation and their institutional development, and not to finance specific programs. This type of transfer was postulated by CSOs for many years, as they often struggle to find resources for the institutional costs like rent or accounting. According to the estimates by OKO.press (cf. Sitnicka 2019), among 154 organisations that received funding, there were 59 organisations with clearly local scope of activity (39 %) and 53 organisations that conduct various types of activities on a larger-than 101 According to Stanley Bill, who examined the results of grant competitions in recent years:” […] there is […] a disproportionate presence of beneficiaries that are ideologically, politically, or personally linked to the ruling party and its allies. […] at least 20 organisations with direct links to ruling coalition politicians and activists received funding. A further 14 successful applicants are linked with PiS allies, right-wing ideology, or with politicians from the right-wing populist Kukiz15’ parliamentary grouping. Twenty-four successful applicants are affiliated with the Church or with Catholic values. I found no evidence of analogous support for organisations strongly linked to other opposition parties or to non-conservative values.” (Bill 2022: 12)

Polish Civil Society 2015–2022: Steered from the top, reclaimed from the grassroots  

local scale (34 %). Among those organisations, are examples of independent CSOs that do not necessarily fit into the government’s narrative, like Childbirth with Dignity Foundation, Civic Education Centre, or the Congress of Urban Movements. However, in the other group of selected organisations 24 were church organisations and/or conducting activities described as catholic (16 %) and 18 had a clear nationalright profile (12 %). Interestingly, Caritas Polska itself was placed on the reserve list. While Mrozek (2019) points out that the money was given to dozens of organisations not related to power and doing important work like the Polish Centre for International Aid or the Centre for Civic Education, he calls NIW “a confused solution to a significant problem”. As a result of Law and Justice reforms, he concludes, a paradoxical “Government Centre for Non-Governmental Organisations” divides money in an arbitrary, non-transparent, centralized manner, and is subject primarily to the political will of the ruling party. In the already façade NIW Council, the majority belongs to politicians, not social activists, and the director alone has an overwhelming advantage. Setting up a brand-new governmental body with a power to redistribute grants for civil society organisations, consequently allowed for redefining goals, priorities and exclusion/inclusion criteria on the national level. In the Polish context, all changes in terms of public financing for CSOs have a direct impact on the majority of organisations. This is due to high dependence on public funds among both associations and foundations, and the fact that also in case of EU and other foreign funds, the public administration has a decisive role as funds operator. According to the latest report (Klon/Jawor 2022b), the structure of financing of Polish CSOs remained strongly depended on public funds, membership fees and donors. Among all examined organisations, 59 % used public funds, 56 % – membership fees and 57 % – resources from individual and institutional philanthropy. Only one fourth (26 %) benefited from 1 % tax or from commercial services and business activity (27 %). Only 11 % of organisations draw funding from their own assets, 17 % from other non-governmental organisations and 13 % from foreign public funds. However, it has to be said, that in the recent years, some of the public funding available for CSOs was transferred from EU structural funds, under the umbrella of Operating Programs like Human Capital (coordinated by the government) or Regional Development Funds coordinated by regional municipalities. When the NIW Act was being prepared, the government organized open social consultations with non-governmental organisations. However, according to their participants, most of the CSOs postulates were ignored, when six months later a new bill was drafted. It was pointed out that according to the regulation, NIW will be very much exposed to political conditions. The activist argued that the politization of such bodies always takes place, but new regulations were considered much greater threat in that regard (cf. Dąbrowska 2018). This is visible in NIW orientation towards values and culture as drivers of cooperation and the minimalization of the Public Benefit Works Council role. Of course, the anxiety concerned mostly liberal, libertarian or “leftist”

  Anna Domaradzka, Magdalena Kołodziejczyk organisations, while centrist and rightist circles were less critical. However, the disadvantages of the NIW Act were voiced by many different organisations, including Caritas which indicated that it raised doubts as to the application of “the principles of subsidiarity, fair competition, efficiency and transparency.” (cf. Mrozek 2019). Some organisations alarmed that the meetings, although called “consultations”, were merely informative. As many as 32 out of 48 written comments submitted to the project by participating organisations questioned the sense of establishing the Centre. This reform was by definition an attempt to centralize the state budget for CSOs, to manage it from the government level and create a comprehensive development policy concerning desired civil society activities. The reform aims at creating one program, in a place of often disconnected approaches of different Ministries. Also, more funds for NGO activities were secured, because instead of several Ministries, only one unit has it all. However, new bodies required dozens new employees, at least partly financed from the civil society funds, which also raised concerns. As a result, there are fewer managers of said funds and policies, which means a narrower scope of competences, e.g. instead of specialists from the Ministry of Administration and Digitization or from the Ministry of Social Policy, only the Ministry of Culture took the lead. Importantly, the leadership of the Public Benefit Committee and NIW is closely related to the party in power, and also to the Ministry of Culture (through the person of Minister Piotr Gliński himself). This centralization of competences and power under one umbrella allows for easy transfer of political (or party) priorities, both at the management and decision-making level. According to the activists from the Batory Foundation, the Shipyard Foundation 102 and similar organisations, this undermines the open collaborative aspect that those bodies should have by definition. Government did not yield to the appeals of civil society organisations that postulated the rejection of the Act on the National Freedom Institute. A draft law was therefore adopted on June 27, 2017, establishing an umbrella institution to administer public money to non-governmental organisations. Law and Justice party upholds the message that NIW is not a control tool, but “an expression of the government’s responsible concern for the development of all social initiatives serving the common good, increasing the involvement of citizens and civic organisations in public life, and improving the institutional capacity of civic organisations to implement their mission” (Ambroziak 2017). It is also stated that the specific ministries – the Ministry of Culture or Development – will distribute funds for targeted activities, e.g. financing of the cultural projects. However, the transfer of money to NIW concerns the largest fund supporting active citizenship – the Civic Initiatives Fund – previously financed from social security funds by the Ministry of Family, based on the evaluation of ex 102 Shipyard Foundation was established in 2009 and aims at creating and supporting effective solutions to social challenges, involving citizens in deciding on public matters and helping organisations and local governments to plan and implement social activities.

Polish Civil Society 2015–2022: Steered from the top, reclaimed from the grassroots  

perts sitting on the Public Benefit Council. Law and Justice transferred these powers to NIW. The NIW Act is written in such a way as to leave freedom in the interpretation of the provisions. The rules of the competitions are established from scratch each time, and the document does not specify who should evaluate the competition applications. Before 2017, the applications submitted to the Civic Initiative Fund have been assessed by independent external experts. Now the NIW staff can handle the evaluation internally. As a result, the governing party gained the ability to grant subsidies at political discretion. Some well-known organisations, like Schuman Foundation, lost public funding, despite the good assessment of experts. The funding for anti-violence activities of the Autonomia Foundation was also withdrawn, because it deals with discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. The funding of the Women’s Rights Centre was similarly cut off, because the organisation “limits its aid only to women” (comment by Minister of Justice, Mr Ziobro). Since governing party revealed its plans to “revolutionalise” civil society funding mechanism, non-governmental organisations have pointed out that the idea of establishing a central institution has never been a postulate of the civil society sector in Poland. However, Law and Justice used the real problems to antagonize the sector as it divided non-governmental organisations according to the following criteria: a) small and undervalued vs. large and overrated; b) right-wing vs. liberal-left; c) Polish vs. under foreign influence. On each of those dimensions, former are defined as worthy of public support, and the past inequal distribution of funds is recalled to justify the changes: It is necessary to strengthen the role of the state in building a civil society – both in the territorial and thematic dimensions, special protection should be given to small organisations promoting the social ethos and fostering local heritage. This will be done by the newly created National Freedom Institute, which will ensure the effective spending of public funds allocated to the development of civil society, will enable the development of already functioning organisations and will provide support to grassroots civic initiatives (to ensure equal opportunities in access to public funds). (Justification of the NIW Act)

According to many non-governmental organisations, the Justification of the Act does not match the solution. Although the document laid out some accurate diagnoses, the answer proposed by the government is not adequate to the problems faced by the third sector. Moreover, the project completely buries the long-term achievements of cooperation between the public administration and the social side, which allowed for the development of a transparent and accessible subsidy award system (Ambroziak 2017). On top of centralising the public civil society funding under one umbrella, Law and Justice government strives to control other external resources. For example, the government wanted the National Centre to take over the distribution of the so-called Norwegian funds (€37 million for civil society), but the Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg blocked this process. During the lengthy negotiations, it was underlined

  Anna Domaradzka, Magdalena Kołodziejczyk that there aren’t any real alternatives to EEA funding for watchdogs in Poland, which lacks a broader tradition of supporting such CSOs, with EU funding being too cumbersome for such small organisations. As a result, the Active Citizens Fund – National programme 103, which aims to “strengthen the civic society and civic activity, and empower vulnerable groups” (cf. Active Citizens National Fund 2020) is operated by a consortium of three organisations, the Stefan Batory Foundation (leader), the “Shipyard” Centre for Social Innovation and Research Foundation, and the Academy of Civic Organisations Foundation. The Active Citizens Fund – Regional programme, with a budget of €23 million is operated by a consortium of the Local Democracy Development Foundation, Information Society Development Foundation, and Education for Democracy Foundation. Civil society organisations can apply for funding for activities in the areas as follows: 1) Increased citizen participation in civic activities, 2) Increased support for human rights and antidiscrimination practices, 3) Increased empowerment of vulnerable groups, 4) Enhanced capacity and sustainability of civil society organisations and the sector. Organisations that apply for grants will be able to ask for an additional grant for capacity building. Particular attention is paid to activities of less experienced organisations based outside large conurbations and in areas where access to aid programmes and infrastructure support is limited, and organisations whose activities are directed towards vulnerable groups. In all of the activities, young people are a major target group. At the official launch of the programme in Warsaw, Adam Bodnar, Polish Commissioner for Human Rights, said: I would like to congratulate you for showing such determination and strength. It is due to that determination and strength, and the action taken to overcome a range of different obstacles, that the Fund is able to operate in a spirit of independence, with due regard for the values set out in the Polish Constitution, international treaties to which Poland is party, and European values. (Bodnar 2020, cited in Active Citizens National Fund, 2020)

 New values- and culture-driven approach The analysis of 2017 NIW Act preamble shows an evident focus on traditional values, Christian organisations, and patriotic activities. Its contents indicate the direction of NIW’s programs and as such is worth quoting here:

 103 Planned for 2019–2025, with a budget of EUR 30 million. One of eleven programmes run in Poland using funds from the European Economic Area Financial Mechanism and the Norwegian Financial Mechanism (known as the Norwegian and EEA funds) 2014–2021, and one of two programmes designated to provide support for activities of social organisations.

Polish Civil Society 2015–2022: Steered from the top, reclaimed from the grassroots   The activity of citizens, engaging bottom-up and on a voluntary basis, in organized activities for the common good, providing help and support to those in need, and shaping the foundations of national and local culture through work, refers to the great heritage of Polish freedom and expresses the ideals of civil society. Civil society is a common space for practicing civic virtues, such as responsibility for the nation and local communities, solidarity, and involvement in building grassroots civic institutions. Without the ability to perceive and multiply the common good, there will be a lack of civic social bonds, which are the foundation of social capital. The Polish state supports the libertarian and Christian ideals of citizens and local communities, including the tradition of the Polish intelligentsia, independence, national, religious, socialist traditions and the tradition of the people’s movement, recognizing in them the continuation of the centuries-old traditions of the Republic of Poland and thus protecting the rich heritage of the community of its free citizens. The Polish state strives for the sustainable development of civil society both in the territorial and thematic dimensions, with special protection surrounding small organisations promoting the activist ethos and fostering local heritage. To this end, by contributing to the fulfilment of the ideals of freedom underlying pro-social motivations and pro-state attitudes, as well as to shaping mature patriotism, the Polish state will actively work to increase the involvement of citizens and civic organisations in public life, increase the number of grassroots and local initiatives and improve the institutional capacity of civic organisations to carry out their missions. (Act of 15 September 2017 on the National Freedom Institute – Centre for Civil Society Development, Journal of Laws 2017 item 1909)

Another interesting reflection comes from the analysis of two Social Capital Development Strategies: one from 2013 and another from 2020. In the table below, we listed the main goal and objectives of both strategies. We also highlighted the key words describing the values standing behind both documents. In case of 2013 Strategy, key words include cooperation, creativity, communication, citizens’ influence, and cultural potential. In turn, the 2020 Strategy, focuses on different aspects of culture (listed out 8 times, see below) as a vehicle for increasing citizens involvement, building identity and civic attitudes. Strengthening of organisational forms of activity and building competences are often mentioned.

  Anna Domaradzka, Magdalena Kołodziejczyk Table 1: The 2020 Strategy, focuses on different aspects of culture Social Capital Development Strategy  (in force –)

Social Capital Development Strategy  (creativity, cooperation, culture) – currently in force (Resolution No.  of //)

Main goal: Strengthening the share of social capital in the socio-economic development of Poland

Main goal: Increase in the quality of social and cultural life of Poles.

Objective . Shaping attitudes conducive to cooperation, creativity and communication

Objective . Improving the mechanisms of social participation and citizens’ influence on public life

Objective . Improving the processes of social communication and knowledge exchange

Objective . Development and effective use of the cultural and creative potential

Objective . Increasing citizens’ involvement in public life .. Improvement of mechanisms of support and cooperation of public institutions with citizens .. Development and strengthening of organized forms of civic activity

Objective . Strengthening the role of culture in building civil identity and attitude .. Creating conditions and building competences to strengthen participation in culture .. Protection of cultural heritage as well as collection and preservation of cultural goods .. Digitization, digital reconstruction and sharing of cultural goods .. Strengthening identity and civic attitudes through culture .. Strengthening the promotion of Polish culture abroad Objective . Strengthening the socio-economic development of the country by cultural and creative sectors .. Increase in the share of creative sectors in the economic development of the country .. Development of professional competences for the needs of creative industries .. Strengthening the creative potential of the society

 Grassroots struggles and reclaiming of public sphere Along with the government effort to reshape third sector, several controversial legal acts or government programs were rolled out that mobilised wide groups of citizens and activist alike. As a result, recent years have abounded with protest events and disruptive occurrences. Even though the pandemic weakened the stability and financial situation of many organisations, some remained were strongly involved in political events, reacting to negative campaign against the sector in public media, or a

Polish Civil Society 2015–2022: Steered from the top, reclaimed from the grassroots  

hostile narrative towards refugees and LGBT+ rights. Street protests, as part of the international climate strike, in defence of the judiciary independence or supporting women’s rights, enabled the civic initiation of the young generation of Poles. In her recent analysis, Dobler (2020) points out to “civil society awakening” in the context of “populist turn” in Poland. While the European Union bodies commented on the dangers to the rule of law and other possible negative implications of Law and Justice populist policies, Poles voted once again for Law and Justice in 2019 parliamentary elections and re-elected the conservative president Andrzej Duda in 2020. EU media focused on worrisome changes in the public institutions and the political elite, and only recently have they written about flourishing protest movements emerging all over the country since 2015. Especially the women protest against antiabortion law, received media attention worldwide. Dobler links recent protests to a long tradition of revolutionary movements in Poland, embodied by several insurgences and a Solidarity movement (see also Domaradzka 2016). As described by many authors, present liberal civil society was predeceased by the communist era “illegal civil society” (Kubik 2000), which enabled the quick revival of associational culture after 1989. Resulting “explosion of citizen mobilisation” (Dobler 2020) not only enabled the collapse of the communism, but also stimulated the institutionalization of renewed civil energy. Both the Solidarity movement and the Catholic Church played an important role in the democratisation process, leading to strong position of those both actors in the years to come (Domaradzka 2016). However, the liberal shift and economic reforms brought new priorities and certain disillusionment. In terms of values, Poles focused on (denied for so many years) consumption and gaining economic stability, while civic activism became less attractive and even suspicious as a potential form of gaining financial or political benefits. The decline in civic activism can be also explained in terms of the backlash against forced social engagement during communism, and the retreat to the private sphere. Further, the professionalisation of CSOs made them less attractive in terms of values or message. While analysing the statistical data concerning organisational activism, many describe Polish civil society as passive and small, “an empty shell of untrustworthy NGOs without social grassroots activism.” (Piotrowski 2020). However, as Dobler points out “Since PiS came into power in 2015, this pattern of civic apathy has dissipated, and every passing year adds to a growing kaleidoscope of civic engagement.”, In other words, Law and Justice rule became the mobilizing factor for a wide variety of protest movements, as well as an important factor in the reshaping of civil society elites (Korolczuk 2022). At the very beginning of the Law and Justice rule, in 2015, a grassroot movement of Committee for the Defence of Democracy (KOD – Komitet Obrony Demokracji) emerged from the street protests in reaction to reforms restricting the independence of the judiciary (both the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court). Importantly, this name is a direct reference to Committee for the Defence of Workers (KOR – Komitet Obrony Robotników), a movement founded in the 70s, in opposition

  Anna Domaradzka, Magdalena Kołodziejczyk to the communist rule. Although KOD gathered thousands of people on the streets of Polish cities, the organisation – while trying to involve in party politics – quickly lost its direction and legitimacy. Soon enough, another protest movement emerged and took to the streets. This time Polish women were standing up against the new bill proposal that would have criminalised having an abortion. The series of so-called Black Protests (Czarny Protest) took place in 2016 and (allegedly) inspired similar protests in South America 104. The nation-wide black protests took the Law and Justice government by surprise, while turning many Polish women into open feminists. Unusually, also smaller towns and cities inhabitants, who tend to be more conservative, joined the protests. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic and social distancing, the Women Strike have sustained the engagement of thousands of citizens – young and old, female and male – but haven’t managed to successfully overturn the conservative policies. Another important movement emerged due to anti-LGBT regulations and hateful narratives towards sexual minorities. The LGBT rights group Campaign Against Homophobia (Kampania Przeciw Homofobii) launched in 2016 and gained visibility due to the annual Rainbow Friday initiative, supporting the LGBT+ youth in the school environment. In 2019, after the intense government-inspired backlash to the event, a grassroot protest movement emerged that took the resistance out of schools and the LGBT+ community to the streets and public spaces nation-wide. Recent years have also seen many spontaneous grassroots mobilisations around environmental issues, including Youth Climate Strike in 2019 and 2020 as well as mobilisation of environmentalists against tree harvesting in the Białowieża Primeval Forest in 2017. The years 2016 and 2019 were also marked by large protests of teachers and parents against education reform, including the nationwide teachers strike in 2019. Sadly, none of the strikes brought postulated changes to the shamefully underfinanced education sector, as the government launched a hate campaign to discredit teachers refusing to work for several days. For each of the described protests, the Internet became an important source of information and mobilization enabler, allowing to coordinate events and press conferences around the country. New grassroots movements used crowdfunding platforms and social media for online mobilisation and connecting to the transnational networks of activists. Dobler (2020) summarizes that: These new movements build on strong collective identities shared amongst their members, and with sister organisations beyond Polish borders, while their claims are politicised and grounded in ideological and/or cultural aspirations. This means a significant change from the previous pattern of political neutrality and the withdrawal of civic engagement to the private sphere that has long characterised Polish civil society. (Dobler 2020, cited in Active Citizens Fund)  104 https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/how-a-harsh-polish-abortion-bill-sparked-womensstrikes-around-the-world/

Polish Civil Society 2015–2022: Steered from the top, reclaimed from the grassroots  

The mobilisation of grassroots progressive movements did not yet manage to bring any meaningful change to the existing direction. It remains to be seen if it has the potential to weaken Law and Justice firm grasp on power since 2015. With public media strongly depended on government orders and the centralisation of CSOs funding under a new governmental agency, Polish civil society struggles with internal divisions, deficit of social trust and financial stability. This division is widened by the fact that many new pro-government organisations emerged and benefited from government grants. The populist turn was accompanied by the radicalisation of far-right, nationalist youth and anti-LGBT groups, as well as the smear campaign targeting pro-choice or anti-racist campaigns. Batory Foundation remains a favourite subject of such actions, which was clearly visible during 2016 “heads and arrows campaign” propagated by the nationalised public television news programs Wiadomości TVP and Panorama (Siedlecka 2016). In reaction to a series of reportages insinuating suspicious links between street protests’ organizers, known foundations and foreign founders or previous government (while ignoring their links to existing government), nearly two thousand activists and supporters signed a protest letter against this campaign to defame the civic sector. Also, thirteen people resigned from working in expert teams of Minister Adam Lipiński, the government’s plenipotentiary for civil society. The signatories emphasized that the national media use innuendo, half-truths and one-sided, biased comments, which is a violation of the obligations of public media: “We find it shameful to insinuate that the organisations under attack received public funding in an unclear manner, due to family ties, political acquaintances or sympathies of their members or members of their families.” However, such insinuations that some organisations received and spent money dishonestly, taking advantage of family affinities and social ties, harm not only the good name and image of the organisations under attack, but also the entire movement of active citizens who engage in activities for the public good. Dobler (2020) writes about the growing polarization of the public sphere: Images of Polish ethnonationalism during the 2018 Independence March in Warsaw, attended by President Duda and some of Solidarnosc members, are still on everyone’s minds. Pride and feminist marches are increasingly disrupted by intimidation, mocking and even violence. On Krakow’s famous market square, a few steps away from the centuries-old Jagiellonian University, banners showing anti-abortion images are a common sight, while trucks spitting homophobic messages from loudspeakers drive freely across town. (Dobler 2020)

Płatek and Płucienniczak (2016) present an interesting analysis of the landscape of social protests in Poland since 1989. They point out that aggressive homophobic rhetoric has escalated, accompanied with the growing number of attacks on ethnic minorities, LGBT communities and leftists in media and beyond. In 2011, the Nigdy Więcej [Never Again] association, CSO working against racism and xenophobia, registered over 300 cases of such attacks (including hate speech, attacks on ethnic and

  Anna Domaradzka, Magdalena Kołodziejczyk sexual minorities, vandalism against religious minorities, targeting leftist or liberal activists). Since 2015, the state elites, represented by the Law and Justice party, are very close, both on the organisational as well as ideological level, to those radical-right actors. Płatek and Płucienniczak results covering the period of 1990–2013 suggest that the presence of the extreme-right party in parliament reduces the level of violent (confrontational) action. However, the events of the last years (most notably the growing radicalization of the Independence March), after Law and Justice ascend to power, shows that the number of episodes involving violence, particularly against ethnic minorities, increased significantly. In other words, there is some support for the argument that when the right-wing party with the help of the extreme right dominate the political arena, the acceptance of violent action increases (Płatek, Płucienniczak 2016).

 Protests and beyond Since the Law and Justice ascend to power, we could observe the politicization of collective actions, in the form of street marches, social media campaigns, lobbying and watchdog actions towards the authorities, higher participation in local elections, and different forms of social protests conducted jointly with parties. However, as Korolczuk points out, in order for citizens to actually strengthen their agency, social organisations must democratize their activity, go beyond the service-providing, and open up to citizens’ voices and co-decision processes, as well as diversify their sources of financing (Korolczuk 2017). On the positive note, we can say that these developments are proof of growing potence of Polish civil society and an intensification of innovative forms of civic engagement. According to Rosanvallon (Rosanvallon and Goldhammer 2008), this is the sign of counter-democracy – not the opposite of democracy, but the democracy of an active civil society, struggling to counter-balance failures of electoral and representative democracy. One could even say that we witness a new stage of citizenship awareness in Poland – at least in some groups of the society – going beyond casting ballots, but focused on the politicians’ accountability between elections, monitoring new legal initiatives, and exerting continuous civil pressure on those in power. The current policy of the state, aimed at limiting the autonomy of civil society, creates threats, but also opportunities for new forms of engagement and wider mobilization. Despite the stereotypical vision of Poles as passive and civil society as “an empty shell”, we are often witnessing thousands of people from larger and smaller towns and villages taking to the streets. Korolczyk (2019) point out its high time to revise the diagnoses describing Polish society as an apathetic victim of the homo sovieticus syndrome. As mentioned in some of my previous work, we have been witnessing a wide variety of social activism around the country for some years now, es-

Polish Civil Society 2015–2022: Steered from the top, reclaimed from the grassroots  

pecially in the form of urban movements, grassroots initiatives, neighbourhood groups and informal engagement for the common good (Domaradzka 2015, 2016, 2018, 2021). The dominant definition of civil society, based on the western concepts of third sector and NGOs, did not help to recognize those ad hoc, on-the-ground forms of engagement as valid part of civil society. This energy, however, is now more visible in the form of new social resistance and both grassroots and online activism of diverse group of citizens, including teenagers. The mobilization of women and teenagers against the introduction of abortion restrictions and massive participation in the “chains of light” marches organized in response to the judiciary reform showed the mobilization potential of younger generation of Polish society. Often criticized for lack of interest in politics and social engagement, today 16, 17 and 19 years old were also the main force behind Women Strike protests between 2016 and 2020. This is clearly visible in the preferred repertories of actions – including street dancing, hip hop protest songs, costumes and posters inspired by internet mems, cartoons and satirical narratives. In general, protest actions of recent years 105, involved many innovative repertoires, combining professional social activism, spontaneous demonstrations and organized protests of the party opposition. During the demonstration in defence of the independence of the judiciary, a fairly traditional rally of opposition parties was held in Warsaw, while another demonstration was organized as Chain of Light, when candles were lit for “free courts”. Participants of both demonstrations came together at some point. The innovative form, combined with the nation-wide scale of the protests, sparked a media discussion about the political turn in Polish civil society. Those protests, however, did not manage to inspire any significant changes on the political level.

 Need for “political turn” in Polish civil society? Some publicists (Mencwel ngo.pl, Wiśniewska Krytyka Polityczna) started to urge the civil society actors to step out of the role of apolitical providers of public services and become full-fledged political actors, engaging in protests against laws undermining the foundations of the democratic order. Mencwel from the Warsaw association City is Ours argued that apoliticality of Polish civil society organisations was formulated at a special historical moment, after the turn of 1989, when the foundations of the  105 Demonstrations against the tightening of the abortion law started on “Black Monday”, October 3, 2016, and gathered around 100,000 people throughout Poland – the police informed about 143 public assemblies related to this protest action (Chmielewska, Druciarek, Przybysz 2017). On July 24, 2017, mass protests in defense of the independence of the judiciary took place; the number of participants across Poland was also estimated at around 100,000. According to the data of the Warsaw City Hall, the largest demonstration in Warsaw gathered nearly 50,000 people (Szczęśniak 2017).

  Anna Domaradzka, Magdalena Kołodziejczyk democratic order were being built. It was assumed then that the political involvement of the organisation could make this effort even more difficult and undermine its legitimacy. With time, however, argued Mencel, the organisations “entrenched” in antipolitics, adapted to it and turned the self-limitation of their public role into a virtue. It has to be recognized, that 30 years later, we have a completely different historical moment, and unprecedented political pressure makes the virtue of apoliticality a vice and serves to demobilize civil society actors (Marczewski 2019). Majority of civil society sector is not interested in political involvement. Recent research (Klon/Jawor 2022b) shows that the vast majority of civil society organisations are focusing on providing services in the field of sport, culture or education. More than half of them is active in the areas of sport and recreation (54 %) and education and upbringing (51 %). Approximately 17 % of organisations deals with social services and social assistance or local development (17 %). Only around 3% of the sector engage in the field of law and human rights. Up to now, apoliticality has led to the self-limitation of social organisations and the resignation from more determined public involvement. However, organisations focusing on new forms of political activity – including the inspiration and co-creation of new social movements – may lead to a new, parallel political world. While the nucleus of this involvement is highly visible in street demonstrations and in social media, it is still not able to achieve real changes in the law. In his recent analysis, Marczewski (2019) points out that expanding and consolidating democracy requires cooperation between civil society actors with more traditional political institutions, such as political parties, the parliamentary opposition, the European Commission and its national representation or local governments. He also observes that by merely caring for their own undisturbed political credibility, and by neglecting communication and cooperation with other less trusted public actors, social organisations risk falling victim to a new kind of self-marginalization. While they used to be locked up in a bubble of anti-politics, today, they risk isolation in the alternative world of new politics, both ideological and ineffective. Moreover, Pazderski (2019) noted that civil society organisations’ level of development and stability deteriorated slightly in 2018, as their work continued to be influenced by political polarization in the country. Organisations that addressed issues contradicting the conservative government’s agenda, including human rights, antidiscrimination, women’s rights and environmental protection, had limited access to public funding. They were also presented in a negative light by the media controlled by the government and those closely related to the ruling party. In addition, the quality of civil dialogue has deteriorated, and public consultation has rarely been used in a constructive way. Some local authorities and businesses also showed negative attitudes towards community organisations (Domaradzka 2022). The occurrence of such tensions at the local level was exacerbated by the local government elections held in October 2018.

Polish Civil Society 2015–2022: Steered from the top, reclaimed from the grassroots  

 Trusted but not necessary? Poles’ perspective on civil society sector In November 2020, a research on how much Poles trust social organisations and how they evaluate their activities was conducted (Klon/Jawor and 4P Group 2020). According to the report, social organisations enjoy a high level of social trust (56 % of respondents declared that they trust social organisations), although a smaller number had personal contact with them (54 % of Poles came into contact with specific activities of social organisations in the last year, and 16 % participated in them personally). However, 74 % of people who had personal contact with NGOs activities, declared trust in social organisations. Still, about half of Poles did not give a positive answer to the questions of whether CSOs are needed in Poland, whether they play an important role looking at the hands of the authorities, and whether they work towards the future desired by the respondents. This can be explained by the perceived ineffectiveness, unprofessionalism, or incompetence of voluntary work, but also doubts concerning their honesty, transparency and openness. Despite the indicated increase in the belief in the integrity of the organisation, the level of trust has not changed significantly over the years, while there was a significant increase in trust in small companies, and a small increase in trust in local authorities. In 2020, 43 % of respondents trusted social movements and informal initiatives, 56 % community organisations, 49 % local authorities, 34 % the Church and only 26 % declared trust in the government. In this context, one could pose a question about the shifts of trust in Polish society – from the one hand we observe the decline in trust in the Catholic Church and public media, one the other small businesses and local municipalities gain in terms of social trust. It seems that from the citizens point of view, civil society organisations most important function is to look at the hands of those in power (49 %). According to the research, the most visible are social activities concerning animal rights (49 %), and gender equality (45 %). Interestingly, in many areas the activities of civil society organisations are assessed better than the activities of the government or local government, in particular in the area of animal rights, gender equality and LGBT+ rights. Marczewski (2019) describes slightly more optimistic results of 2018 Edelman Trust Barometer global study showing that trust in social organisations is growing in Poland (54 %, 6 % more than a year earlier). Among the sources of legitimization of civil society organisations – apart from the strictly charitable function, i.e. supporting those in need – the respondents indicated that CSOs credibility comes from engagement in building a sense of community and controlling the authorities’ actions. Social organisations are also perceived as institutions that counteract social polarization and control the actions of those in power. This contradicts the thesis about citizens supporting only those organisations that they consider close to their own political preferences, as a way to build identity. Civic organisations are trusted because citi-

  Anna Domaradzka, Magdalena Kołodziejczyk zens believe they condemn abuses by government – any government – and contribute to greater social cohesion. In Poland, we are certainly going through an interesting and active time in the formation of new attitudes and beliefs, including those concerning civil society. In the near future, due to the post-COVID crisis and government conservative reforms, further changes in political stand and engagement can be expected. In times of pandemic, climate crisis, and accelerated technological revolution, CSOs face fundamental questions and challenges. When trying to responsibly diagnose the needs of local communities, perform watchdog activities and raise to protect sector's right to public funding, they may need to become more pro-active and work on new strategies and communication with citizens. Moreover, some important developments in the civil society sphere in Poland can be expected as a reaction to Russian attack on Ukraine and the unfolding humanitarian crisis. The wave of citizens’ involvement in direct support to the refugees, is now followed by the emergence of organizational structures coordinating long-term aid. Mass volunteerism and foreign donors’ activity led to a certain clash between “hot” grassroots engagement and “cold” and often politicised interventions of public institutions. Now, several months into the crisis, we can observe how Ukrainian refugees’ presence shapes both the institutional and civil society structures, dedicated to support and integrate newcomers. We can also expect more Ukrainian civil society structures emerging in Poland, creating a new layer of complexity within the sector and highlighting the diversity of engagement within Polish society. As remarked by Kuba Wygnański in his recent “900 days” essay, modern Poland is really wealthy when it comes to civic circles (organisations, think-tanks, expert groups, editorial offices, networks, or platforms) with significant social capital, expertise and experience in almost all areas of public affairs. For years, those huge resources were ignored by decision-makers. Activists and local leaders often burn out, after years of fighting to be heard or recognized. It is high time to use this energy in a more systematic and strategic way, with or without the government support.

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Rupert Graf Strachwitz

The Civic Space: Growing – Shrinking – Closing – Changing? A Comparative Analysis “In recent years, the European Union has suffered from democratic backsliding and the erosion of the rule of law as well as from a weakening of other fundamental values, particularly in the Central and Eastern European member states. At the same time, the EU has been doing more and is better equipped in term of funding, capacity, and tools to respond to the shrinking space for civil society outside of its territory than inside. This discrepancy is above all caused by a general lack of political will and resistance to intervention by the EU institutions within member states.” (Havlícek 2020, 2). This harsh criticism is supported by other authors: “[…] some democracies may at least not actively seek to develop civil society space through reform efforts. Instead, they more or less passively let civil society space slowly erode either through the impact of other policies (mostly anti-terrorist, anti-corruption, and national security related legislations and measures) or lack of reform. It also suggests that hybrid and authoritarian regimes are the clearest case of a shrinking (e.g., Turkey) and shrunk (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Russia, China) civil society space, whereas for flawed democracies, it would be better to speak of a slow process of erosion.” (Anheier, Lang and Toepler 2019, 4). This erosion comes after three decades or more of growth. Since the 1980s, most visibly but by no means exclusively in Central and Eastern Europe, civic action has become an important feature of the public sphere (Bouchet and Pishchikova 2020, 7– 8; Strachwitz 2022b, 47). At the same time, “the EaP [Eastern Partnership] countries continue to be affected by considerable civic apathy and disengagement. Occasional mass protests (or even revolutions) show the mobilization potential in their societies, but do not necessarily indicate sustained civic activism. Without the latter, these critical events are more likely to fizzle out without generating much substantive change.” (Anheier, Lang and Toepler 2019, 8–9). “Civic apathy remains prevalent in the EaP countries because most citizens do not believe that their engagement in civil society is likely to change anything.” (Ibid. 10). Furthermore, “it is evident that the concentration of CSOs is uneven, both by location and field of work” (Harvey et al. 2019, 11). In a general sense, as Asif Afridi explains in his chapter, “the term ‘civil society’ [is used] in a wide sense to refer to forms of activity that are organised outside the market and the state and within a freedom of association (Edwards 2014 and Walzer 1995). Civil society can act as a provider of services and community building, as well as act as an intermediary and advocate for citizens in relation to government and private markets. This may include a range of more ‘formal’ ways of organising like charities, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111070469-014

  Rupert Graf Strachwitz faith groups and trade unions as well as more ‘informal’ ways or organising like selfhelp groups, friendship networks and protesting.” The purpose of the project as described in the introduction was to see whether and to what extent European countries, all members of the Council of Europe but not in all cases members of the European Union, and both long-term stable democracies and countries only released from the grip of Soviet dictatorship one generation ago, fit this sweeping and deeply troubling verdict. In particular, while research on this subject in CEE and the EaP countries abounds, comparatively few studies have looked at Western Europe or attempted to compare different situations across Europe. “The picture painted here is one of unevenness and contradiction. In several countries, governments deliver positive policy documents (e.g. the Irish white paper) and even structures that bring CSOs close to government (e.g Czech Republic, Romania), but then restrictive laws appear and what could have been a positive relationship goes into reverse. Logic suggests that if supportive laws and structures are put in place, they should create a virtuous circle in the relationship between civil society and the state, but this is not the case.” (Harvey et al. 2019, 15). On the contrary, what may be found in virtually all European countries is an atmosphere of mistrust, antagonism, and efforts to belittle and downgrade the contribution that civil society makes to the public sphere. “…Governments have become increasingly hostile toward independent voices and critics, and they have launched policies favoring particular segments of civil society and alienating others.” (Novakova 2020, 3). Quite regularly, security and public order arguments are put forward to contain civic action when in actual fact it is attempt to crowd out an unwelcome competitor for attention. “The notion of ‘barbaric’ in antiquity and the use of the word ‘terrorism’ today are ‘elements of language’ that the authorities use to designate their enemies, when they want to create a media impact.” (Balazard/Purenne 2020, 57). The country reports presented here show that while the stories told differ quite widely, the conclusions do so to a lesser degree. This chapter will analyse the country reports in a comparative fashion, bearing in mind that the authors were requested to highlight what they saw as important aspects of the problem in their respective countries rather than submitting to a rigid uniform methodology. Furthermore, given the authors represent different academic disciplines and their research concentrates on differing subjects, the overall picture contains variations in terms both of focus and detail and echoes different experiences both nationally and personally. Most of these experiences share the notion of mistrust accorded to civic action by governments, regardless of their attitude towards an open and liberal society and their public stance on civil society. “Governments across Europe are notoriously sensitive to criticism in the areas of corruption and access to information, which may explain the strength of their counter-reaction to campaigning CSOs. This may tell us that concepts of accountability and ethics in government are not as well embedded in democratic government as they are often assumed.” (Harvey et al. 2019, 15). Nevertheless, while “public attacks on NGOs are mostly carried out by populist governments in an attempt

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to delegitimize critical voices” (Novakova 2020, 4), it remains true that some governments react to civic action and non-state actors in the public sphere differently from others (viz. e.g. Cibian 2022). Furthermore, as explained by Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990), modern societies may be clustered as liberal, corporatist-statist, or social democratic, with great implications for the formation, resilience of a civic space, namely in that corporatist societist contain a larger percentage of service-providing civil society organisations, while others primarily see democratic protest movements as core civic space activities. Therefore, it seemed important to present a number of country reports and then see whether grouping them not in west vs. east as is usually done, but by the points their authors chose to highlight, might add to the insight wished for in assessing the civic space and determining whether it is in fact shrinking or just changing. In so doing, it should not be overlooked however, that there are a number of similarities in the changing space that may be observed all over Europe, and that some developments resemble each other quite closely, even if for some other reason, the comparative remarks have been allotted to different sections of this chapter.

 Developing the space: Croatia, England, Italy The case of Croatia as described by Gojko Bežovan is a history of trying to develop a civic space against heavy odds. Having been part of communist Yugoslavia, Croatia only became an independent country in 1991 and subsequently fought a fierce battle to uphold its independence. Nationalism dominated politics, and non-state actors were judged on their contribution to the national struggle. As foreign donors attempted to promote European values and the concept of an independent civil society, this was not embedded in Croatian society and regarded as foreign. Nascent CSOs developed into political parties. As a result, the attitude towards CSOs was not generally favourable; there was little trust, CSOS were suspected of money-laundering, there were marked divisions between right-wing CSOs and others. Matters improved slightly in the course of Croatia’s EU accession process, but the value of a vibrant civic space for the resilience of democracy has never been fully realised in the country. A Council for Civil Society Development was formed with representatives of government, CSOs, trade unions etc., but made little headway. A legal framework was late in coming and not overly effective. The growing but as yet comparatively small number of CSOs either relies on foreign assistance or lives from tender to tender without the means to develop, and continues to exist in an atmosphere of mistrust. The covid19 pandemic, during which CSOs were never included in governmental relief programmes offered to the business community, and two earth-quakes in 2020 added to the unstable situation. Yet, civil space is fighting the uphill battle against mismanagement, rampant corruption and clientele politics as well as against the obstruction

  Rupert Graf Strachwitz of independent civic engagement. The state of the art and governance are steadily improving, and ever-closer contact with civil society in Europe is bearing fruit. Asif Afridi, reporting on the state of civil society in England (N.B. not the United Kingdom), obviously looks at a part of society with a particularly rich history that goes back centuries and has resulted in a large number of organisations developing and steadily growing. Yet, as large-scale NGOs are increasingly perceived as out of touch, he foresees challenges and opportunities in the future, most particularly as CSOs – or charities as they are usually known in the UK – go beyond clamouring for improving regulation and widening the civic space and face the need to turn the mirror upon themselves and question and challenge the dynamics of their work. “Researchers found that when the public suspects that charities are not showing good financial stewardship, living their values and having a demonstrable impact, then their trust decreases (Charity Commission and Populus 2018). An alternative longterm survey run by Ipsos Mori found that in 2020 only 8% of those surveyed trust Charity CEOs to tell the truth, compared, for example, to 80+% that trust doctors and nurses to tell the truth (Ipsos Mori 2020).” Most recently, trust in civil society has improved, but it is not back to the level of 2012. “Lack of trust, lack of recognition of the diversity of the sector, favouritism towards some charities and preferred forms of lobbying and communication, lack of honesty about where power lies within the relationship has stymied progress. Whilst some parts of civil society are able to access decision-makers, others find it much harder.” (Afridi 2023). Inequalities within the sector may be observed at all levels, including inequalities regarding gender, geography, and income. Furthermore, an increasing polarisation by age is undermining the cohesion of individual organisations. Rewarding the diverse nature and recognising the changing nature of society at large and of civil society, is as yet poorly developed. The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act of 2014 (commonly referred to as the Lobbying Act), seriously impedes exercising civil society’s political role and has led to CIVICUS downgrading the UK from “open” to “narrow”. This shows that while the role of civil society in and for democracy is more readily agreed with today than it was some years ago, the battle for acceptance is not yet won. Also, an ever stronger interference by the Charity Commission, the governmental regulatory agency, may be observed, with a disproportionate surveillance of Muslim charities being all too apparent. Admittedly however, civil society could do more for its own development by improving accountability and directing it to its communities and stakeholders rather than only to funders and government. The situation in Italy, as described by Gianluca Salvatori, Francesco Scarpat and Alessia Schiavone, is in some ways widely different, in others surprisingly similar. Organized civil society has developed a strong interplay with the state, which has resulted in a series of constitutional and legal changes over the past 30 years. Lawmakers have frequently reacted to new thoughts and initiatives put forward in the civic space. While the 2001 constitutional reform took aboard the principle of horizontal subsidiarity, thus giving second place to governmental action when civil society ac-

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tion is available, the 2017 legal reform which established the Code of the Third Sector, recognizes that civil society is the place for active citizenship to unfold. It thus responded positively to demands from the sector, the fact that the sector has faced a number of scandals and had been in fierce opposition on the issue of SAR (Search and Rescue) operations in the Mediterranean directed at rescuing refugees from Africa notwithstanding. General disaffection with party politics, increasing individualisation of society, and a stable and positive public opinion have necessarily led lawmakers to attempt to win public consent and approval by giving in to demands from the sector and adapt the necessary legal framework fairly continually, but has also resulted in the emergence of new political parties by way of civil society movements, the Cinque Stelle party being the most obvious case in point. Recent changes have had to do with increasing participatory elements in public governance and have recognized that the sector is not only an indispensable pillar of public welfare production but also the place where societal challenges are faced much earlier than in the arena of the state. All in all, while Italy for a long time was suspected of preserving family ties (“communities of fate”) over voluntary alliances (“communities of choice”), it seems that a particularly vibrant, influential, liberal, and modern civic space has emerged.

 The interplay with the state: Ukraine, France, Germany While the civic space in France to this day is rooted in political events that took place in the late 18th century, and political changes have had a surprisingly small effect on the civic space in Germany, thus underpinning Ralf Dahrendorf’s famous quip whereby administrative law prevails while constitutions fade away, the turning point around which the whole concept of a civic space in Ukraine revolves is the political events of 2014. Not only did the protests, generally known as Euromaidan, lead to an awakening of a civic spirit, and what the author describes as a “qualitative transformation”, but the ensuing reorganization of the Ukranian state also gave civil society a new watchdog role at regional and local level. As Nataliia Lomonosova makes very clear in her country report, civic action rather than an organized and traditional third sector approach is at the heart of the Ukranian civic space – little wonder, since Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union until 1991. Individual spirited citizens influencing developments as public officials or law makers were perceived as dominating civic action. In this way, the case of Ukraine supports the theory that civic action may also be seen as “a form of action in a scene, potentially located in different sectors” (Lichterman and Eliasoph 2014, 800). At the same time, Maidan helped Ukrainian civil society gain legitimacy and recognition with the citizenry. As elsewhere, they are expected and trusted to perform services for the people that in a state-orientated so-

  Rupert Graf Strachwitz ciety one might expect the state to perform. Consequently, the service providing and state-funded subsector is growing, not least due to current developments in the wake of the Russian invasion. What the report from Ukraine certainly tells us is that while circumstances are in many ways dramatically different from other European countries, Ukraine may certainly be perceived as a European country. Civic action is in place as in other countries, and extensive research, quoted by the author, demonstrates more similarities than differences. The report concentrates on the interaction between the state (at different levels) and civil society, and argues that significant developments may be observed. Unlike the authors of the French and German reports, Nataliia Lomonosova relies on non-Ukrainian sources to a large degree, thus providing her arguments with added legitimacy in the face of criticism that Ukrainian sources describe the situation rather too uncritically. Deficiencies such as poor communication between state authorities and civil society players, are clearly labelled as such, as are conflict areas. Nevertheless, developing the country together rather than fighting for hegemony in the public space, apparently is universally seen as a prime objective. It is for this reason that the authors see the civic space less endangered in Ukraine than in France or Germany. However, with all the ambivalences of the interplay with the state, none of them would envisage a closure of the civic space. “At one level, [CSOs] become parallel actors that may substitute, even counteract, state activities. At another, the state and CSOs are part of ever more complex and elaborate public-private partnerships and typically work in complementary fashion with other agencies, public and private. Civil society harbors significant potential in terms of social innovations, resilience, service-delivery and giving voice to diverse interests and communities otherwise excluded. However, CSOs operating locally, national and across borders have also experienced many changes in recent decades.” (Anheier, Lang and Toepler 2019, 3). This general observation is particularly valid when looking at countries where the interplay with the state seems of overruling importance for civil society. ”[…] There are also successes in mobilising common fronts to kick out political leaders who foster polarisation and stoke hatred. This was seen in the Czech Republic in 2021 and Slovenia in 2022. More of these victories are possible if pro-democracy voices unite, organise and offer people looking for new ideas plausible alternatives.” (Firmin/ Pousadela/Tiwana 2022, 5). While obviously widely different in many aspects, observing France and Germany on the one hand, and Ukraine on the other, has lead the authors of the chapters to focus on the interplay between the state and civil society. In discussing France, Isis Olivier and Hélène Balazard put the threat to democracy at the very centre of their argument. They discuss the changes in France’s political culture, the rise of rightwing extremists in the political arena, the predominance of security arguments over those connected to the freedom of expression, and the surge of executive power in the course of the pandemic crisis. Also, they highlight the inequalities that continue to determine – and tarnish – the ongoing democratic process, and insist that France’s

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republican spirit is still imbued with the spirit of the French Revolution that banned all intermediaries that might obstruct the citizens’ direct loyalty to the nation. As they establish in a different publication, “twenty-five rulings, seventy decrees and as many ministerial orders, were adopted, creating a massive judicial arsenal that affects numerous domains and reduces the democratic sphere beyond the strict health question. Between 10th March and 20th April, 125 appeals were referred to the Justice of the Supreme Administrative Court against the regulatory measures linked to Covid19 and 15 appeals were launched against the means employed to implement them. Trade unions and civil society organisations mobilised to no avail in an attempt to use legal measures to protect freedoms. Over 90% of the appeals were rejected.” (Balazard/Purenne 2020, 65). Fundamentally, from the point of view of the state, the contribution civic action may make is judged by its value to the state, not to society at large. “An in-depth review by the Observatory of Associative Freedoms [has] revealed the emergence of practices of ‘quiet’ repression that target CSOs’ collective action.” “The general climate of suspicion triggered by Emmanuel Macron’s appeal for a ‘vigilant society’ is likely to further stigmatise some social groups and incite denunciation.” The authors conclude with a question: “How can democracy be cured?” Given “the number of breaches of rights and freedoms is high and rising”, this seems an uphill battle. Yet, new spaces are seen as emerging on a local level so that eventually changes may come about in a bottom-up procedure. Siri Hummel, writing about Germany, describes the empirical evidence and analyses the legal framework within which CSOs may operate under the heading of “rapid change”. She looks at a special feature of German civil society, neo-corporatism, which demands particular attention in the light of the very large service providing subsector grounded in the principle of subsidiarity that accords CSOs, namely the five big social welfare umbrella organiations, priority in providing social services (interestingly not others like education) over government agencies while tying them to the government system through a complex funding arrangement. Somewhat strangely, the neo-corporatism argument is used against the service-providing CSOs on the grounds that this renders them part of the political establishment alongside the trade unions, Churches, and the state-subsidized cultural sector and that they embezzle and waste the taxpayers’s money. Right wing populists also attack whom they describe as “naïve do-gooders” in connection with migration and climate protection issues. Extremists are prone to serve hate-speech and personal harassement upon activists. Unfortunately, some conservative politicians join in this game. Generally speaking however, unlike France with its clear emphasis on democracy and human and civil rights, and the ensuing political battles, and contrary to what might be expected given how historically decisive the fledgling civic action in East Germany was in bringing about the transformation process in East Germany and the country’s unification, Germany is seen as a place where legal and administrative constrictions reign absolute. It is not so much the battles for the ideals of democracy and freedom, but against petty harassement that the average CSO is seen to fight. E.g.,

  Rupert Graf Strachwitz “[…] the list of eligible public benefit purposes is excessively narrow. Many organizations find it difficult to assign their goals to one of the 25 points listed in the Fiscal Code – especially those engaged in advocacy. While, for example, dog sports, aeromodelling or youth clubs are listed and find it easy to justify their charitable purpose, CSOs involved in the defence of human rights, the protection of children’s rights, gender equality or the pro- motion of peace and social justice, will have difficulties assigning their cause to one of the 25 listed public benefit purposes.” (Civil Liberties Union for Europe 2020, 7). There has not been a drive for substantially rewriting the legal franework for civil society in over a century. “[…] the administrative instructions provided to tax office clerks are unclear and can result in arbitrary and diverging interpretations of the law. This creates legal uncertainty for CSOs.” (Civil Liberties Union for Europe 2020, 7). A recent study commissioned by an NGO devoted to human and civil rights showed that German tax law regarding CSOs political activities is not compatible with the European Human Rights Convention (Wiater 2022). “It is also a matter of concern that there seem to be extensive limits in some countries on ‘political’ activities being undertaken by NGOs, especially as there can be a broad approach to the way such activities are defined.” (McBride 2021, 39). An added difficulty CSOs have to cope with is that “[…]the legislation does not sufficiently protect the role of CSOs in representing the public interest towards decision-makers or facilitating public participation on matters that part of current political debate. When CSOs participate in public debate or represent public interests towards decision-makers, they necessarily enter a realm where political parties are advancing their own partisan positions.” (Civil Liberties Union for Europe 2020, 8). In practice, German civil society virtually never find allies in the national media. While politicians’ misgivings about civil society are widely reported on, arguments and counter-arguments developed within civil society are not. A recent study revealed that only 2.7% of the panelists in the Public TV channels regular chat shows came from civil society (Fröhlich & Hillje 2020).

 Fighting right-wing populism: Austria, Greece, Slovakia Ruth Simsa who also contributed a far more extensive report on the situation of civil society in Austria to the project, concentrates on the role of populism and the effect its emergence has had on civil society in Austria. She defines populism as politics that appeal to simple, archaic forms of identification such as “the people” (Mouffe, 2005) by rhetorically dividing society between the people the elites, suggesting simplified solutions (Panizza, 2005). The term “right-wing populism” refers to populism that is ethically, religiously or nationally exclusive (Pelinka, 2013). The discourse of “us”

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and “them”, followed by systematic attacks on “them” is a clear symptom for polarization that characterizes populist strategies. In Austria, civil society organisations have traditionally played a decisive role in service provision and an influential one in decision making processes. While more often than not dependent on government funding, CSOs have enjoyed an ongoing active interplay with government at different levels. It was the 2015 refugee crisis with its implications on public opinion that changed this hitherto stable relationship. There was a political shift to right wing populism, and working conditions for CSOs deteriorated. With populist forces in government, civil society was devaluated, and civil society found itself excluded from participation in legislative processes. This has since improved due to a change of government, but the fact remains that popular sentiment has a strong influence on government attitudes which remain to some degree populist and do not accept civil society as an ally in fighting undemocratic tendencies. Also, civil society actors who either fundamentally oppose government measures (most particularly during the initial stages of the covid-19 pandemic) or support populist and illiberal government action have increasingly come to the fore and add to the confusion over the role of civil society and the loss of trust in civil society action. The report on Greece by Vasilios Makrides, while offering a similarly wide range of data and analyses on general aspects of the civic space as do other country reports included in this volume, also puts particular emphasis on the issue of right-wing populism and its effect on the civic space. Makrides points out that civil society in Greece is to be considered comparatively weak and underdeveloped due to a narrow communitarian attitude, and a low level of association, volunteering and trust. Also, it is all to closely associated with political parties that entertain numerous affiliated organisations. A spirit of “clientelism” inherited from centuries of Ottoman supremacy, prevails, and a mythical concept of an entrenched “Greek self” is still promoted by parts of the Orthodox Church. This said, Greece has seen the development of a formal and informal civil society, including protest movements comparable to those in other countries. “Although the latter did not always take place in a peaceful and purely democratic manner (e.g., excess of verbal and physical violence, destruction of public property, disruption of urban life, public dissatisfaction with and intolerance towards foreigners), many aspects of this informal civil society emergence showed that there is a potential for such mobilization in the Greek context, regardless of its long-term outcome.” (Makrides 2023). Right wing populism gained considerable support in Greece due to immigration and the influx of refugees across the Mediterranean. Due to Greece’s particular geography, it was hard-hit. National and cultural issues became increasingly contentious, as issues of multiculturalism came to the fore. Both the political supporters of nationalist populism and their opponents formed civil society movements, and new alliances emerged, not least the sudden rise of the Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή) party. This led to considerable changes in the overall structure of civil society that may be contextu-

  Rupert Graf Strachwitz alized in a European frame. The civic space has seemingly changed, but not for the worse. Correctives of state policies by non-state actors have become more acceptable. Slovakia, although different in many respects, also provides an example of a spirit of xenophobia and otherness which at times gains dominance in the public sphere. A fascist as well as a communist history, late nation-building and frequent changes of government and subsequent reversals of policies and remodelling of frameworks have let state-orientated and subservient traditions of civil society action remain influential. Furthermore, as Boris Strečanský highlights, while Slovakia has a multiethnical population with sizeable Hungarian and Roma minorities, ethnic groups continue to live in different “silos”. Social capital is developed there as strictly bonding rather than bridging. There exists an ongoing clash between widely different value sets, and most particularly an ongoing clash with authoritarian values. This is not helped by a split between citizens’ “Western” or “Eastern” orientation, nor by a disquieting following of misinformation sites in the social media, and a general downslide in the quality of public discourse. Though recent events in Ukraine have certainly contributed to a reassessment of many people’s beliefs, Slovak civil society is still divided, and liberal, democratic organisations still face the challenge of overcoming set beliefs.

 New movements: The Netherlands, Spain, Poland Dutch civil society is traditionally associated with what is described as the system of pillarization. Both in the social services and in education, where a strong involvement of non-state actors was successfully fought for in the 19th century, catholic, protestant, liberal, and socialist “pillars” of civil society dominated the civil society landscape up to the 1950s and in some respect even longer. Civil society was fragmented and lacked a joint identity. Furthermore, the organisations were not considered independent, as the welfare state provided a large part of the funding and exercised considerable control. All in all, the author Ulla Pape tells us, the sector was large and very diverse. Over the last decades, a dual development has had great influence. On one hand, clamouring more and more efficiency and cost-consciousness resulted in a general marketisation, i.e. the adoption of market sector governance and operating mechanisms to the detriment of ideals, while on the other hand, bureaucratisation in administrating public policy curbed volunteerism and initiative. Furthermore, the public became more critical, which led to a crisis of confidence. To all of this and to a more demanding environment in general, the traditional organisations did not respond well. New challenges, such as right wing populism and extremism were not met. As a result, new and different organisations emerged. These were more informal, smaller, bottom-up and relied on grass-roots solidarity rather than an incorporation into a government-led and -funded system. This in turn was viewed by the government with some suspicion and

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caused administrative measures to be taken. As a result, the Netherlands were downgraded from “open” to “narrow” in the CIVICUS monitor. This however may also have been prompted by Dutch contributors to the CIVICUS monitor viewing the situation more critically than they had done in the years before. Maria Medina-Vicent and Ramón A. Feenstra use the theory of protest cycles to explain what they describe as a period of calm following “a period of civil society’s frenetic and frenzied activity” in Spain. This resulted in demobilisation and an increasing institutionalisation. New political parties emerged, and civil society activists entered the arena of the state. Consequently, a shrinking public space is effectively being occupied by civil society actors. Also, a “gag law”, passed in 2015, gives extensive powers to police to ensure public order and tends to intimidate potential protesters, not least because it gives discretionary powers to the authorities whose actions are anything but transparent, and thus entails disproportionate restrictions of civil liberties. Opposing this law in fact reinvigorated the concept of independent movements of citizens. Since 2020, the Covid pandemic has reinforced this trend but has also led to the emergence of a hotchpotch of differing value sets and goals. Rightwing opponents of measures against the spread of the pandemic appeared on the scene as did new solidarity and local care groups. As Donatella Della Porta points out: “Faced with the State’s evident shortages and, what is more, with those of the market, social movement organisations are set up (which also occurs in all the countries affected by the pandemic) as mutual support groups by promoting direct social action to help those most in need. This brings about resistance to respond to the solidarity need” (Della Porta, 2020, quoted in the chapter on Spain). Anna Domaradzka and Magdalena Kołodziejczak, in their report on Poland, suggest that the change of government in 2015 brought about a change of ecosystem for civil society. New legislation was brought in, and communication channels between civil society and the government were closed. Support shifted to the associaties and political allies of the party in power; personal connections became important to secure funding that was determined by the political will of the government. Given the large degree of dependence on public funds, this had enormous consequences for the sector as a whole, so much so, that even traditional organisations like Caritas voiced misgivings despite the fact of being in an important substituting and complementing role and a permanent contractor to the government. Government measures aimed at a values-driven approach (values to mean traditional conservative values like nation, family etc.) and at clamping down on civil society’s independence.While this policy was certainly effective in parts, and although the government also attempted to create a new civil society subservient to government policy, the sector in general increasingly moved away from traditional attitudes and service provision and adopted an increasingly independent political role, aptly described as an “awakening”, which resulted in a growing kaleidoscope of civic engagement for goals like, i.a., anti-LGBTI regulation, for environmental protection and fighting climate change and for im-

  Rupert Graf Strachwitz provements in education. What may be seen is a new paradigm of civic initiation through protest against restrictive and illiberal government policies. As remarked by Kuba Wygnański in his recent essay “900 days”, modern Poland is really wealthy when it comes to civic circles (organizations, think tanks, expert groups, editorial offices, networks, platforms) with significant social capital, expertise and experience in almost all public affairs. For years, those huge resources were ignored by decision-makers. Activists and local leaders often burn out, after years of fighting to be heard or recognized. It is high time to use this energy in a more systematic and strategic way, with or without the government support (Domaradzka/ Kołodziejczak 2023).

 Conclusions Turning the mirror on oneself remains an issue with civic space actors throughout Europe. Public accountability does not always match the claim to be on a level playing field with other actors in the public sphere. Large NGOs have moved closer to the market than might be compatible with their alleged lack of self-interest. Trust has occasionally waned, sometimes in the wake of scandals and misbehaviour. New players have come to the fore whose interest is in issues like democracy, diversity, inequality, climate change, freedom, and the rule of law, rather than service provision and immediate support of the needy. Yet, as the reports clearly demonstrate, the urge to associate in communities of choice, increasingly across national borders, is very much alive and is not deterred by attempts to curb activities or to pilot, restrict or indeed close down organisations. It seems that this pattern prevails throughout Europe: As large traditional CSOs struggle to survive ever-increasing government supervision and withstand the lure of the market, a new generation of civil society is making itself heard. What is clearly visible throughout Europe is a shift towards smaller, more informal CSOs that rely on solidarity more than on public funding, on trust more than on rules and regulations, on shorter-term change agendas more than on long term institutional stability, and on volunteerism and active citizenship more than on functioning not-for-profit service provision. This may or may not be a way forward in the light of increasing supervision and the eyes of the defenders of traditional government. In many cases, and all across Europe, these new civil society players face particular oppression by governmental authorities and the judiciary, and are not in all cases supported by the general public and the media. However, as events in countries everywhere on this planet, most recently in Belarus, China, and Iran, continually demonstrate, oppression will not silence civic action. The civic space may shrink for a while, but is destined to reemerge and grow in times of crisis. It creates new spaces for action and for debate, and may determine the course of history. Patterns of this are clearly recognizable

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throughout Europe, while substantial differences remain in the choice of participants. While in some countries, established players have assumed a new role and act as protagonists of a new universal civil society, this is entirely left to new players in others. In Central Europe, the environment for civil society—particularly liberal-oriented organizations— has substantially changed during the last decade, influencing the overall sustainability of NGOs. In this period, civil society survived two external shocks that seriously impacted its sustainability. The first was related to the accession of the countries of the region to the European Union and went almost unnoticed beyond narrow professional circles. Accession brought about a drastic change in the funding landscape for NGOs. In the 1990s, the growth of civil society in the region was facilitated by generous international development assistance from the United States and the EU as well as from private international philanthropic institutions. After EU enlargement, these funding streams changed drastically with development assistance being phased out and most of the private foundations scaling back their support. (Novakova 2020, 4).

The simple and well-documented fact that an active civic space is a precondition for a functioning and resilient democracy yet needs to be taken on by law makers and holders of offices of state who while incessantly talking about democracy, freedom, and the rule of law, are more concerned about retaining as much power as possible than about acting responsibly towards the citizens.

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The Civic Space: Growing – Shrinking – Closing – Changing? A Comparative Analysis   Vandor, Peter/Traxler, Nicole/Millner, Reinhard/Meyer, Michael (2017 ): Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenges and Opportunities. ERSTE Foundation: Erste Stiftung Studies Wiater, Patricia (2022): Political Participation of Civil Society. A human rights framework for the treatment of non-profit organisations. Berlin: Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte e.V. (first published in German on 19 October 2021) Youngs, Richard (2018): Overview: Conservative Civil Society on the Rise; in: Richard Youngs (ed.): The Mobilization of Conservative Civil Society. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Youngs, Richard/Milanese, Niccolo/Nicolaidis, Kalypso (2022): Informal Civil Society: A Booster for European Democracy?, Retrieved from https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/03/23/informal-civilsociety-booster-for-european-democracy-pub-86665 (13th December 2022).

Contributors Asif Afridi is Deputy CEO at brap, a UK-based national equality and human rights charity that is transforming the way we think about and do equality (www.brap.org.uk). Asif is trustee of various charitable trusts and foundations in the UK and was a panel member of the Independent Inquiry into the Future of Civil Society. He is a published researcher focused on issues of civil society, racism, poverty and human rights and previously worked in the field of international human rights protection. Hélène Balazard is a researcher in political science at the EVS laboratory in Lyon. After positions at CEREMA, CNRS and Queen Mary University of London, she works at ENTPE, a Graduate School of Civil, Environmental and Urban Engineering. She develops research and courses in interaction with civil society on citizen participation and comunity organizing. Gojko Bežovan is professor of Social Policy at Faculty of Law, Department of Social Policy, University of Zagreb. He is active in education and research in the fields of social policy, civil society, housing and housing policy, philanthropic studies, Europeanisation of social policy, regional development and welfare mix development. He is head of two interdisciplinary postgraduate programmes Urban Management & Preparation and Implementation of EU Projects at University of Zagreb. Also, he is cochairing PhD programme in Social Policy and Social Work. He published more article and books from mentioned field. He is founder and president of CERANEO- Centre for Development of Non-profit Organisations as think tank organization dealing with research of social policy and civil society. Anna Domaradzka is a sociologist, an Assistant Professor and Director at the Robert Zajonc Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw. She leads a Civil City Lab, an interdisciplinary research team focused on co-creation of better, more democratic and wisely managed cities. Her research examines urban cohesion and mobilization, civil society, and social entrepreneurship, as well as gender and social equality. She’s a board member of ISTR and ISA Research Committee 48 on Social Movements, Collective Action, and Social Change. Ramón A. Feenstra is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Sociology at the Universitat Jaume I of Castellón (Spain). The fields he writes about are linked primarily to democracy theory and communication and research ethics. He is author of Kidnapped democracy (Rowman and Littlefield, 2019) and Refiguring Democracy. The Spanish Political Laboratory (co-authored with Simon Tormey, Andreu Casero and John Keane, Routledge, 2017). Siri Hummel is Deputy Director of the Maecenata Institute for Philanthropy and Civil Society and is a political scientist and communications expert. Her research focuses are democracy and civil society, as well as equality in civil society and foundation research. She is also a lecturer for the programme “Nonprofit Management and Public Governance” at the Berlin School of Economics and Law. Magda Kołodziejczyk is an experienced project manager, trainer and facilitator of participatory processes. For several years she was cooperating with different CSOs, including School for Leaders Foundation, which mission is to support the development of civil society through training of local leaders. She was also engaged in “Your vote, your choice” campaign, which main goal was to develop

  Contributors citizen participation in Poland. She now works in several European research and implementation projects at the Robert Zajonc Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw. Nataliia Lomonosova is a Guest Researcher from Ukraine and a fellow in the frame of Young Ukrainian Scholar Fellowship of the Maecenata Stiftung. She holds a master’s degree in Sociology and currently conducts a PhD-research focuses on the work mediated by digital platforms and possibilities of workers` association and the cooperation between the state and civil society actors. For the last ten years she has been working for several NGOs in Kyiv in the spheres of social development, civil participation, culture and media. Vasilios N. Makrides studied theology at the University of Athens (1979–83), as well as religious studies, history of religions and sociology of religion at Harvard University (1984–86) and at the University of Tübingen (1986–91), from where he obtained his doctorate. He has taught at the University of Thessaly in Volos, Greece (1995–98), and since 1999 is Professor of Religious Studies (specializing in Orthodox Christianity) at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Erfurt, Germany. Main research interests: Comparative religious and cultural history and sociology of Orthodox Christianity; religious and cultural relations between Eastern and Western Europe; Orthodox Christianity, modernity and science. Maria Medina-Vicent is a lecturer in the Departament de Filosofia i Sociologia (Universitat Jaume I). She received her PhD in philosophy with a dissertation titled “Género y management en el marco neoliberal. Un análisis crítico para la emergencia de liderazgos feministas”. She was granted the Premio de la Real Academia de Doctores de España 2018 in the humanities category. Her research interests include feminist political theory, economic and business ethics, applied ethics and theories of management. Isis Olivier is a free-lance translator, specialising in agricultural research and development, environmental issues and the social sciences. She has translated several books, in addition to numerous reports and articles for researchers and academics internationally. She translates subtitles for documentary films. Ulla Pape is lecturer at Freie Universität Berlin and post-doc researcher at Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences. Prior to that, she was researcher at Freie Universität Berlin, lecturer in European Studies at the University of Bremen, senior researcher at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and post-doc researcher in the Third Sector Impact Project at Radboud University Nijmegen. Her main research interests are social policy, health and civil society development in Russia, Europe and Central Asia. Her publications include a book, The Politics of HIV/AIDS in Russia, and several articles in international journals such as Europe-Asia Studies, International Journal for Sociology and Social Policy, Journal of Civil Society Gianluca Salvatori (Rome, 1959) is secretary general of Fondazione Italia Sociale and EURICSE (European Research Institute on Cooperatives and Sociale Enterprises). Member of the GECES and observer of the UN task force on social and solidarity economy.

Contributors   Francesco Scarpat is an Expert of monitoring & evaluation in the Italian non profit sector, former Project Manager and Research Coordinator for Fondazione Italia Sociale, is now Senior Project Manager in Community Foundation of Milano. Alessia Schiavone is a Former researcher and project analyst for Fondazione Italia Sociale, she is now a public sector consultant in Intellera Consulting where she is involved in policy innovation and managing funds projects. Ruth Simsa is Professor for Sociology at the Department for Socioeconomics and was for many years director of the Competence Center for Nonprofit Organizations and Social Entrepreneurship, both at the Vienna University of Economics and Business. She is board member of ISTR, International Society for Third Sector Research. Rupert Graf Strachwitz, born in 1947, is a political scientist, lecturer at several universities, chairman of the Maecenata Foundation’s board and Director of the Maecenata Institute. He studied political science, history and the history of art at the Colgate University (USA) and at the University of Munich. He completed his PHD at the University of Münster. After various jobs in Germany and abroad, he founded the Maecenata Management GmbH in Munich in 1989 as a specialist advisory and service provider for the non-profit sector and was head of the organisation until 2011. Boris Strečanský is a Ph.D. student at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations at Comenius University in Bratislava. He studies organizational responses to legitimacy challenges of civil society organizations in the context of the shrinking civic space. He holds MPP degree from Princeton University (2019). Since 2022 he is with East-West Management Institute in Tbilisi, Georgia as a domestic resource mobilization specialist for USAID Civil Society Engagement Program.

Maecenata Schriften Previous publications: Volume 21 Al Waqf - Philanthropy, Endowments and Sustainable Social Development in Egypt Marwa El Daly, 2022 ISBN 978-3-11-069696-7, e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-069703-2, e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-069708-7 Volume 20 Die gemeinnützige Aktiengesellschaft als Akteurin der Zivilgesellschaft - Eine empirische Untersuchung Iris Rozwora, 2021 ISBN 978-3-11-073749-3, e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-073262-7, e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-073272-6 Volume 19 The House is in a State - Christian Wolff‘s Oeconomica in the context of public welfare Antonia Karaisl von Karais, 2021 ISBN 978-3-11-071392-3, e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-071409-8, e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-071419-7

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