Contemporary Trends in Local Governance : Reform, Cooperation and Citizen Participation [1st ed.] 9783030525156, 9783030525163

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Local and Urban Governance

Carlos Nunes Silva Editor

Contemporary Trends in Local Governance Reform, Cooperation and Citizen Participation

Local and Urban Governance Series Editor Carlos Nunes Silva, Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

This series contains research studies with policy relevance in the field of sub-­ national territorial governance, at the micro, local and regional levels, as well as on its connections with national and supranational tiers. The series is multidisciplinary and brings together innovative research from different areas within the Social Sciences and Humanities. The series is open for theoretical, methodological and empirical ground breaking contributions. Books included in this series explore the new modes of territorial governance, new perspectives and new research methodologies. The aim is to present advances in Governance Studies to scholars and researchers in universities and research organizations, and to policy makers worldwide. The series includes monographs, edited volumes and textbooks. Book proposals and final manuscripts are peer-reviewed. The areas covered in the series include but are not limited to the following subjects: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Local and regional government Urban and metropolitan governance Multi-level territorial governance Post-colonial local governance Municipal merger reforms Inter-municipal cooperation Decentralized cooperation Governance of spatial planning Strategic spatial planning Citizen participation in local policies Local governance, spatial justice and the right to the city Local public services Local economic development policies Entrepreneurialism and municipal public enterprises Local government finance Local government and sustainable development Anthropocene and green local governance Climate change and local governance Smart local governance

The series is intended for geographers, planners, political scientists, sociologists, lawyers, historians, urban anthropologists and economists. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16129

Carlos Nunes Silva Editor

Contemporary Trends in Local Governance Reform, Cooperation and Citizen Participation

Editor Carlos Nunes Silva Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning University of Lisbon Lisbon, Portugal

ISSN 2524-5449     ISSN 2524-5457 (electronic) Local and Urban Governance ISBN 978-3-030-52515-6    ISBN 978-3-030-52516-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52516-3 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Local governments across the world have been confronted in recent decades, in different ways, with four main global demographic trends – growth, ageing, migration, and urbanization. In addition, economic globalization, democratization, decentralization, digitalization, climate change, and ecological transition, to mention just few of the other global mega trends, also raise new conditions, challenges, and opportunities for sub-national tiers of public administration. Whatever the relative influence of each of these pressures, local government continues to show the value of public action at the local level and how important this is to solve some of the problems and challenges associated with these global changes. These global trends have major impact on central–local relations; on local government organization; on its powers, competences, and resources; and on its overall capacity to formulate and implement local policies. The responses to these new conditions – growth or de-growth, in or out migration, fast or shrinking urbanization, decentralization or centralization, increasing or decreasing demand for services, transition to democracy or return to authoritarian forms of government, increased citizen engagement in the local policy process, rapid technology change, and move to e-government, among others – vary from country to country as a result of specific historical processes. If the global trend is towards fast urban population growth, there are numerous cases of shrinking cities, in which the reduction of population and decay of physical infrastructure create different conditions and challenges to local government and to other tiers of government as well. Similar differing trends also happen with migration, with the scale of the urbanization process, and the respective impacts on local government responses. The Internet and other digital technologies continuously modify our daily lives, jobs, and the way we interact with others and our local government. These changes, including the increasingly extensive use of mobile digital tools in local e-­government, are taking place at different rhythms and speed, affecting the relationship between citizens and their local government bodies and the level of citizen engagement in local policy affairs, reinforcing or creating new social divides within society and between countries. v

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In the most developed European countries, democratization and decentralization took place in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century; however, this pattern was never uniform in the Continent. While most European countries had democratic regimes in the twentieth century, with significant levels of administrative de-concentration and decentralization, Southern European countries experienced long authoritarian and centralized political regimes in the same period, which lasted from 1926 until 1974  in the case of Portugal, and Central and Eastern European countries experienced the transition to democracy and decentralization, after World War II, only in the early 1990s. This political history and the prevailing administrative culture  – Napoleonic, Anglo-Saxon, German, and Scandinavian  – conditioned the current local government’s institutional reforms and are responsible to some extent for the mosaic of institutional models of local government that can be observed in Europe. In America there is a huge contrast between the North, USA and Canada, which are democratic and decentralized political regimes, and Latin America, marked as it is by a long tradition of political and administrative centralization, in both unitary and in the federal states, and authoritarian political regimes, in particular in the 1970s and 1980s. These political singularities and the high degree of diversity in the sub-national tiers of public administration affect the way each of those global trends shape the specific local government reforms in these countries and their respective policies. The colonization of Africa until the second half of the twentieth century is largely responsible for the differences found between local government in the continent and developed countries. The administrative culture of each major colonial power  – Britain, France, Portugal – and to some extent also elements of the administrative culture of other colonizers – Belgium, Spain, Italy, Germany – was reflected in the administrative organization of each European colony in Africa since at least the Conference of Berlin in 1884–1885. The independence of most African countries after the Second World War, and those such as the five Portuguese colonies that reached independence in the mid 1970s, lead these countries to forms of administrative centralization. The political shifts in the 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, opened the door for democratization and decentralization not only in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America but also in Africa. Here, if in most cases there was a transition to democracy at the national level, the decentralization and the implementation of a true form of local self-government is taking longer. Where it has been implemented formally, the degree of autonomy, in particular financial autonomy, is still too low compared to developed countries. The changes in local government in Asia also suggest the existence of an overall trend towards democratization and decentralization, since the 1990s, in part associated with the fall of authoritarian political regimes and to the rapid economic growth and urbanization, two processes that require specific and differentiated responses at the local level. Similarly to what has been described for other regions of the world, the reforms of local government in Asia in recent decades seem to follow, within these overall trends, specific paths in each country.

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It is, therefore, difficult to portray in a single volume the multitude of the ongoing changes in this highly differentiated world in which local government is embedded. Despite that, decentralization from central to local government emerges as the condition for the existence of good governance at all levels, including the existence of a true local democracy, and for ‘localization’ of the goals of global agendas – Paris Agreement, Agenda 2030 and SDGs, and the New Urban Agenda. The book Contemporary Trends in Local Governance: Reform, Cooperation, and Citizen Participation is not intended to provide a comprehensive view of all these trends in local government institutional models and even less on the impacts due to novel digital technologies. The book has a more restricted aim. It explores, through selected case studies in Europe, Australia, and Japan, a sample of these changes in the institutional model of local government, in its forms of cooperation and in citizen participation, which have impacted on local government in recent decades, and the determinants behind these institutional changes. The evidence provided by these cases studies add new data and new critical insights to the global library being built in recent years focused on the changes taking place in local government worldwide. The book comprises 12 chapters that add new empirical evidence and critical insights on local government institutional reforms, on inter-municipal cooperation, and on citizen participation in local governance. The book has four main parts. The first part, with two chapters, provides an overview of the main contemporary trends in local government worldwide and an outline of the main theories and concepts of local governance that prevailed in Europe in the last decades. This is followed by the second part of the book  – Local Government Institutional Reforms  – containing four chapters that deal with centralization-decentralization reforms, of which two discuss Europe and one is dedicated to Japan and a fourth chapter discusses municipal reform through amalgamation in Austria and Australia. The third part of the book – Cooperation – has four chapters, one on municipal cooperation and the other three dealing with the influence of the European Union in forms of cooperation at the local level. The fourth and final part  – Citizen Participation  – comprises two chapters. Chapter 1 – ‘Global Trends in Local Governance’ – introduces and discusses the trends, challenges, and opportunities confronting local government in major world regions. Paweł Swianiewicz in Chap. 2  – ‘Recent and Contemporary Trends in European Studies of Local Government and Local Politics’ – offers a critical overview of the main theories and concepts on local governance that prevailed in Europe in recent decades and how they changed over the years – New Public Management, shift from government to governance, multi-level governance, Europeanization, and re-scaling – and discusses some of its shortcomings and the lack of true alternative paradigms. In addition to this, the chapter also provides a review of the most important trends identified in contemporary empirical studies of local governments in Europe. These trends identified by Paweł Swianiewicz include the renaissance of cross-national comparative research, local reactions to economic crisis, studies of territorial reforms and economies of scale, management of metropolitan areas, and research on coping with deficit of local democracy.

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In Chap. 3 – ‘Governance Without Power? The Fight of the Hungarian Counties for Survival’ – Ilona Pálné Kovács examines the processes that lead to the reinforcement of centralization, which in part was a solution the national political majority found to face the new challenges associated with the economic crisis, climate change, terrorism, and migration among other factors. As the author shows, local government can have some room of manoeuvre to challenge this centralization trend, acting in cooperation with other local stakeholders. The lesson from this Hungarian case to other national contexts in Europe and in other regions of the world affected by similar trends towards centralization is that local government can resist and act locally even without the formal legal competences. In the following chapter  – ‘From Financial Centralization to Political Centralization: The Focal Points of the Municipal Reforms from the Transition Until Present-Day Hungary’ – László Kákai focuses in particular on the initial move towards fiscal centralization which was later followed by the move towards political centralization after the short-lived period of decentralization, after the transition to democracy in the early 1990s. László Kákai shows, through a sample survey, how the common citizen perceives the provision and access to local public services and how important it is for the citizen the tier of government that provides it. These are some of the findings that are also useful for the debate on the effects of centralization trends in other countries and regions of the world. Yosuke Maeda, in Chap. 5 – ‘Development of Intra-municipality Decentralisation Systems in Japan’, the third on the theme centralization-decentralization – examines and discusses the process of intra-municipality decentralization in Japan, a process that despite being idiosyncratic to the Japanese local government system offers clear lessons for other countries in other regions of the world confronted with the need to expand decentralization to lower tiers of public administration and to the local communities. In Chap. 6 – ‘The “Big-Bang Politics” and Process of Council Amalgamations: A Comparative Study of the State in Australia and Austria’  – Khandakar Farid Uddin and Werner Pleschberger examine, compare, and discuss two cases of council amalgamation in two different national, political, and institutional contexts, Austria and Australia, offering lessons on the reasons that may lead two very different local government polities to adopt and implement the same type of local government merger reform. In Chap. 7 ‘Regional Administrative Boundaries and the Building of Internal Borders in Decentralised States: The Case of Two Spanish Interregional Borders’ – Ramon Galindo Caldés, Albert Santasusagna Riu, and Joan Tort Donada examine and discuss an important challenge experienced in processes of decentralization when different regional legal systems are created, as is the case in Spain with the Autonomous Regions. The evidence, insights, and lessons provided by this chapter are certainly useful for other countries and regions of the world where internal borders are created as a side effect of regional decentralization, thus requiring adequate forms of inter-regional cooperation and inter-municipal cooperation as well. Ľudmila Malíková and Martin Daško in Chap. 8  – ‘The Impact of European Regional Policy and Local Action Groups on Inter-municipal Cooperation in Slovakia’  – explore a particular form of inter-municipal cooperation, the Local

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Action Groups, implemented to take advantage of European Union subsidies for the development of municipalities and regions, highlighting some of the constraints with which municipalities are confronted due to the rules adopted, namely in the case of the smaller municipalities, a case study from which it is possible to extract lessons for numerous other countries in which this trend in inter-municipal cooperation has been present in the last decades. In Chap. 9 – ‘The Rise and Limits of Local Governance: LEADER/Community-­ Led Local Development in the Czech Republic’ – Ondřej Konečný, Jan Binek, and Hana Svobodová examine the implementation of the LEADER programme and its local governance concepts and instruments in countries which joined the European Union in 2004, as is the case of the Czech Republic on which the chapter is focused, and had no experience with the application of local governance concepts. The positive effect on the strength of local governance institutions found in this chapter on the Czech Republic case can certainly be taken as a reference for local government reforms in other countries in Europe and in other regions of the world as well. Judit Keller in Chap. 10 – ‘Lost in Transformation: Place-Based Projects in the EU’s Multi-level System’ – examines and discusses how place-based approach, one of the guiding principles of the EU’s Cohesion Policy, has been treated in the context of the centralization trends in Hungary in recent years, focusing on the particular case of the Give Kids a Chance programme. As Judith Keller shows, recent policies towards centralization, selective decentralization in the form of outsourcing policy delivery, and disinvestment in social policy were largely responsible for the loss of the elements of a place-based approach and the coordination mechanisms that were defining characteristics of the EU-funded Give Kids a Chance programme, a lesson that EU and other countries should be aware in contexts of political re-­ centralization as is the case in Hungary. In Chap. 11 – ‘European Standards in Regulating Public Participation on Sub-­ national Levels: The Case of Croatia’ – Dana Dobrić Jambrović explores the instruments available for citizen participation at the local government level, starting with the European legal documents on citizen participation, and does this in particular for the case of Croatia. Also in this chapter, the evidence, insights, and lessons from a particular case study shed new light, which will certainly prove useful for other contexts in Europe and in other regions of the world. The final chapter –‘Citizen Participation in Spatial Planning in Portugal 1920–2020: Non-Participation, Tokenism and Citizen Power in Local Governance’ – explores the role given to citizen participation in the spatial planning system in Portugal in the last century, bringing to light current trends and challenges in the way citizens get engaged in local governance processes. In conclusion, the book Contemporary Trends in Local Governance: Reform, Cooperation, and Citizen Participation provides an informed perspective of some of the current trends and changes that are taking place in the field of local governance. It offers new empirical evidence, collected in three continents, and new insights on current and emerging trends in local governance. However, numerous other questions have not been addressed and remain unanswered. There is thus need of further empirical research on the impact these contemporary global trends have

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on local governance, on case studies within different local government cultures, and in other regions of the world. The book benefited from critical insights provided by Ján Buček, from Comenius University, Slovakia, on an earlier version of the manuscript, to whom I wish to express my appreciation. All considered, I trust the book Contemporary Trends in Local Governance: Reform, Cooperation, and Citizen Participation will assist students, researchers, and policy makers in the multi-disciplinary field of local and urban governance and will contribute to make local government policies more responsive to citizens’ needs and aspirations. Carlos Nunes Silva Lisbon, Portugal

Contents

1 Global Trends in Local Governance������������������������������������������������������    1 Carlos Nunes Silva 2 Recent and Contemporary Trends in European Studies of Local Government and Local Politics������������������������������������������������   21 Paweł Swianiewicz 3 Governance Without Power? The Fight of the Hungarian Counties for Survival ������������������������������������������������������������������������������   45 Ilona Pálné Kovács 4 From Financial Centralisation to Political Centralisation. The Focal Points of the Municipal Reforms from the Transition Until Present Day Hungary��������������������������������������������������������������������   67 László Kákai 5 Development of Intra-municipality Decentralisation Systems in Japan��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   87 Yosuke Maeda 6 The ‘Big-Bang Politics’ and Process of Council Amalgamations: A Comparative Study of the State in Australia and Austria����������������  111 Khandakar Farid Uddin and Werner Pleschberger 7 Regional Administrative Boundaries and the Building of Internal Borders in Decentralised States. The Case of Two Spanish Interregional Borders������������������������������������������������������������������������������  131 Ramon Galindo Caldés, Albert Santasusagna Riu, and Joan Tort Donada 8 The Impact of European Regional Policy and Local Action Groups on Inter-­municipal Cooperation in Slovakia ��������������������������  151 Ľudmila Malíková and Martin Daško

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9 The Rise and Limits of Local Governance: LEADER/Community-Led Local Development in the Czech Republic ����������������������������������������������������������������������������  173 Ondřej Konečný, Jan Binek, and Hana Svobodová 10 Lost in Transformation: Place-Based Projects in the EU’s Multi-Level System��������������������������������������������������������������  195 Judit Keller 11 European Standards in Regulating Public Participation on Subnational Levels: The Case of Croatia ����������������������������������������  217 Dana Dobrić Jambrović 12 Citizen Participation in Spatial Planning in Portugal 1920–2020 Non-participation, Tokenism and Citizen Power in Local Governance��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  241 Carlos Nunes Silva ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 277

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2

Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5 Fig. 4.6 Fig. 4.7 Fig. 4.8

Fig. 4.9

Have you heard that a new law on local government was passed in 2011? (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)..................... 77 Have you heard that a new law on local government was passed in 2011? In your opinion, how has the role played by the local government changed as a result of the new law? (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)..................... 78 Local government or state? (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)..................... 79 Local government or state? (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)..................... 79 Local government or state? (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)..................... 80 Municipality or state? – groups created by means of factor and cluster analysis. (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)..................... 81 Municipality or state? – groups created by means of factor and cluster analysis. (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)..................... 82 Since 1 January, 2013, …have been operated by the state. Have you experienced any changes in everyday life? (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019).............................................................. 82 The transformation of the role of local governments is a popular topic these days. In your opinion, if local governments did not play any role in the fields listed below, would their quality be better, worse or the same as it is today? (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019).............................................................. 83 xiii

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List of Figures

Fig. 5.1

Development of intra-municipality decentralisation systems in Japan. (Source: Questionnaire survey by the author. Note: Status of intra-municipality decentralisation systems is shown only for local governments for which valid responses (n = 908) were obtained)....................... 95

Fig. 7.1

Borderland between Catalonia, Aragon and Valencian Community. (Source: Authors)........................................................ 136 Conflict and cooperation dynamics in interregional areas. (Source: Authors).................................................................. 146

Fig. 7.2 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2 Fig. 8.3 Fig. 8.4 Fig. 8.5 Fig. 9.1

Fig. 9.2

Fig. 9.3 Fig. 9.4 Fig. 9.5

Map of NUTS 3 and NUTS 2 regions in Slovakia. (Source: Authors by: NSRV.sk 2018. [online])................................ 159 NUTS 3 regions in Slovakia with the number of LAGs in the programme period 2007–2013. (Source: Authors by: NSRV.sk 2018. [online])................................ 164 NUTS 3 regions in Slovakia with the number of LAGs in the programme period 2014–2020. (Source: Authors by: NSRV.sk 2018. [online]).................................................................. 165 LAGs in the Trnava region (NUTS 3). (Source: Authors by: NSRV.sk 2018. [online])............................................................ 167 LAGs in the Nitra region (NUTS 3). (Source: Authors by: NSRV.sk 2018. [online])............................................................ 168 Number of newly established LAGs in the Czech Republic since 2002. (Source: Own data processing; National Network of Local Action Groups in the Czech Republic (NN LAG), database (2017)).............................................................................. 179 Number of inhabitants in LAGs since the establishment of the first LAG until 2016. (Source: Own data processing; NN LAG, database (2017) and Czech Statistical Office, database (2019)).............................................................................. 180 Time scheme of CLLD implementation in the Czech Republic in 2010–2017. (Source: Own elaboration)....................... 182 Perception of the preferred ways of LEADER method application (n = 92); question- Describe how you wish to apply the Leader method in your LAG. (Source: Authors)......... 183 Perception of the significance of barriers to the application of the LEADER method (n = 128); Question – Indicate what most prevents you from applying the Leader method. Note: Scores given to individual barriers were calculated as a share of the sum of the responses in individual categories multiplied by different scales (5 – very strong, 4 - strong, 3 – medium, 2- weak, 1 – very weak, 0 – does not prevent) to the total number of respondents. (Source: Authors).................... 185

List of Figures

Fig. 9.6

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Perception of the preferred setting of external conditions/framework for the implementation of the Leader method in the future (n = 69); question – How should the external conditions/framework for the implementation of the Leader method be set up in the following programming period? (Source: Authors)......... 186

Fig. 10.1 Proportion of disadvantaged children in kindergartens at the district/micro-regional level 2016/17. (Source: Hungarian Statistical Office, 2016/17 http://www.ksh.hu/interaktiv/terkepek/mo/oktat.html? mapid=ZOI017&layer=dist&color=7&meth= sug&catnum=6)............................................................................... 203 Fig. 10.2 Micro-regions participating in Give Kids a Chance program. (Source: www.teir.hu by Gergely Tagai).......................... 206 Fig. 12.1 Types of Spatial Planning System according to level of Sub-national Autonomy. (Source: Author 2020)............ 244 Fig. 12.2 The Structure of the Spatial Planning System: Components and Political-Administrative Tiers. (Source: Author 2020)..................................................................... 244 Fig. 12.3 National elections for Parliament, 1975–2019: percentage of abstention. (Source: Author 2020).............................................. 259 Fig. 12.4 Municipal elections, 1976–2017: percentage of abstention. (Source: Author 2020).............................................. 259 Fig. 12.5 National referendums in Portugal: percentage of abstention. (Source: Author 2020)..................................................................... 260

List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4

Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 5.5 Table 5.6 Table 5.7 Table 5.8

Table 6.1

Territorial administrative structure in European Union member states, 2012, 2016............................................... 49 Number of members in the general assemblies of the counties and the breakdown by nominating organisations, 2014–2018................................................................................... 53 Operational expenses of the county self-governments in 2010 and 2018 (in thousand HUF).......................................... 56 Number of members in the general assemblies of the counties and the breakdown by nominating organisations, 2019–2024................................................................................... 62 Introduction of intra-municipality decentralisation systems in Japan.......................................................................... 94 Legal bases of each intra-municipality decentralisation system (n = 379).......................................................................... 96 Geographical units for decentralised organisations (n = 393)...................................................................................... 96 Members of decentralised organisations (n = 392)...................... 97 Types of powers, roles, and functions of decentralised organisations (n = 397)................................................................ 97 Roles played by local governments in decentralised organisations (n = 372)................................................................ 98 Local governments’ recognition regarding geographical differences in the extent of activities of decentralised organisations (n = 382)................................................................ 99 Local governments’ recognition regarding the background of the geographical differences in the extent of activities of decentralised organisations (n = 186)...................................... 99 Radical council amalgamation in some developed countriesa.................................................................... 113 xvii

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List of Tables

Table 7.1 Table 7.2

Focus groups (January–June 2017)............................................. 137 Opinions expressed as to whether legal mechanisms should be introduced to reduce in some way the “negative” effects of the existence of the border........................................... 143

Table 8.1.

Budgets of all EU funds for regional development in selected programming periods................................................. 154 Budget of EU funds for Regional Development Support in the 2014–2020 programming period in a total of 274 NUTS 2 EU regionsa.................................................................... 155 Statistical territorial units called “NUTS” by population............ 157 Individual NUTS and LAU statistical units in the Slovak Republic in 2018.......................................................................... 158 NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 Areas in the Slovak Republic................... 158 Number of municipalities in every region (NUTS 3) in Slovakia by population............................................................ 160 Number of LAGs in the programme period 2007–2013  in the Slovak Republic................................................................. 163 Number of LAGs in the programme period 2014–2020  in the Slovak Republic................................................................. 165

Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 8.5 Table 8.6 Table 8.7 Table 8.8 Table 9.1

Number of respondents (LAG managers) in the survey conducted according to the selected characteristics of LAGs..... 177

Table 10.1 Overview of Give Kids a Chance 2006–2013............................. 212 Table 11.1 Catalogue of European standards for participatory governance.............................................................. 230 Table 11.2 Standards for participatory governance in Croatian legal framework........................................................................... 233 Table 12.1 Arnstein’ ladder of citizen participation (‘Eight rangs on a ladder of citizen participation’)............................................ 248 Table 12.2 Main political periods and planning system, 1933–2020............ 252 Table 12.3 Spatial planning system 1998/1999: plans and other planning tools............................................................................... 255 Table 12.4 Spatial planning system 2014/2015: plans and other planning tools............................................................................... 257 Table 12.5 Public participation in urban planning during the Estado Novo........................................................................... 262 Table 12.6 Citizen participation in municipal spatial planning (1974–1990)................................................................................. 264 Table 12.7 Citizen participation in spatial planning (1990–1995)................ 265 Table 12.8 Citizen participation in the 1998 spatial planning system (Law 48/98)..................................................................... 267 Table 12.9 Citizen participation in the 2014 spatial planning system (Law 31/2014)................................................................. 270

Chapter 1

Global Trends in Local Governance Carlos Nunes Silva

Abstract  The chapter provides an overview of the impacts on local government due to the demographic, urban, environmental and digital transitions taking place in different regions of the world in the last decades. It addresses two research questions: What is the impact of current and expected urban, environmental and digital transitions on local governance? and How is decentralization and local autonomy related to sustainable development? The chapter is based on a review of the literature, on the main findings from research and policy reports, namely from multilateral organizations devoted to sustainable development, as the United Nations and its agencies, among others. The central hypothesis is that the degree of decentralization and the level of local autonomy correlates positively with the level of development. The more decentralized the easier it is to ‘localize’ the global sustainable development goals and targets and therefore the more likely they will be achieved. This overview concludes by asserting that with demographic growth and urbanization rate higher in developing countries, which tend to be more centralized than its developed counterparts, there is a real need to concentrate efforts in the reform of local government systems in developing countries, as a condition to achieve the sustainable development targets and the goals of the global urban agendas. Keywords  Decentralization · Local government · Local autonomy · Urbanization · Digital revolution · Localization · Sustainable development

1.1  Introduction Looking to local government in the past 50 years, continuity, incremental change, and rupture emerge as defining characteristics of what happened to local government systems around the world. In all continents, local government has been

C. Nunes Silva (*) Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Nunes Silva (ed.), Contemporary Trends in Local Governance, Local and Urban Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52516-3_1

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confronted with demographic and economic shifts, political transitions, and more recently also with important environmental issues, and with the challenges introduced by the digital transition. Population growth, urbanization, migration, and ageing of the population; economic globalization; political transition to democracy and to forms of decentralized administration; environmental shifts, including climate change; and the extensive use of information and communication technologies in all spheres of life and in local government, are some of the forces responsible for the new challenges and opportunities with which sub-national tiers of government and local public administration are confronted across the world, even if in different ways in each country. Not only did these forces impact on local government organization, on its powers, competences and resources, on central-local relations, on citizen engagement in public policy, as it influenced its overall capacity to formulate and implement local policies. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of global trends in local government and of how they relate to recent demographic and digital transitions taking place in different regions of the world in the last decades. For that, this introductory outline addresses two research questions: What is the impact of current and expected urban, environmental and digital transitions on local governance? and How is the level of decentralization and local autonomy that resulted from the processes examined in the previous question related to sustainable development? The central hypothesis is that the degree of decentralization and the level of local autonomy correlates positively with the level of development. The more decentralized the easier it is to ‘localize’ the global sustainable development goals and targets and therefore the more likely they will be achieved. The chapter is based on a review of the main findings from research and policy reports, namely a review of the evidence provided by multilateral organizations devoted to development.1 Without stronger local government institutions, the sustainable development goals of Agenda 2030 (United Nations 2015) or the principles of the New Urban Agenda (UN-Habitat 2017a) will not be met in most developing countries, and in that case, considering the proportion of the world urban population living in those countries around 2050, it will be the achievement of the aims of these global strategies for sustainable urban development that will be put at risk. The probability of this to happen is high, as the evidence available, at the time of writing (United Nations 2019a), reveals that most African countries are not on course to meet most of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as reported for the case of Africa in United Nations  – Economic Commission for Africa (2019). Besides that there is also evidence of continuous resistance from central government to decentralize, as the case of Angola exemplify, a country without a true system of local self-­ government implemented on the ground, 45 years after the independence, despite being established in the Constitution since the early 1990s (Silva 2016, 2020a, b). This resistance of central government to decentralize is also evident in the case of 1  - In the following chapter ‘Recent and Contemporary Trends in European Studies of Local Government and Local Politics’, Paweł Swianiewicz presents and discusses the main trends in studies of local government in Europe.

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the ‘African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralization, Local Governance and Local Development’, adopted in 27 June 2014 (African Union 2014). The charter points the way for decentralization in Africa but it has been signed only by 17 countries and ratified by 6 out of the 55 African countries until January 2020 (African Union 2020), which means it will not be used as a reference for the real reforms of local government systems in Africa in the near future. Despite this there are signs that efforts have been made and continue to be made to reverse the situation in countries with weak local government systems as the reforms announced or already being implemented in some of the Lusophone African countries confirm (Silva 2016, 2020a, b). The next sections provide an outline of some of the relations between urban, digital and environmental transitions trends and local governance and of how decentralization and local autonomy relate to sustainable development. The concluding section presents the main findings.

1.2  Demographic, Urban and Digital Transition Trends Population growth, ageing, migration and urbanization, the four main global demographic trends, as evidenced in the successive demographic yearbooks, and reaffirmed in the most recent (United Nations 2019c), have all important impacts in the economy, on society, in the environment and on the political and administrative systems. For the United Nations most recent World Population Prospects (United Nations 2019b), the most probable scenario is that the world’s population will continue to grow during the next decades although unevenly and at a slowing rate in most regions. The United Nations estimates a global population between 8.5 and 8.6  billion in 2030, between 9.4 and 10.1  billion in 2050, and between 9.4 and 12.7 billion in 2100. Nonetheless it is also admitted that it could stabilize or even begin to shrink before 2100 (United Nations 2019b). While most of the growth of the world’s population in the coming decades will take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the United Nations estimates an increase of 1.1 billion inhabitants between 2020 and 2050, which represents more than half of the total global population growth, in other regions of the world the population is expected to decrease due to low fertility and/or emigration. These contrasting growth trends will probably raise different kinds of pressures on sub-national tiers of government in developed countries, where population will stabilize or decrease, or in developing countries where the population will continue to experience rapid growth in the coming decades until 2050 and beyond. The extending of longevity and the ageing of the population at un-precedent proportion are also global trends in the next decades in all regions, according to the United Nations (United Nations 2019b, c). However, like growth rates, the United Nations also estimates differences in age groups. The proportion of people with 65 or more years will increase in all regions but the number of young people will remain relatively high in regions with still high fertility. By 2050, the number of people with 65

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or more will surpass those with age between 15 and 24, according to these United Nations estimates. This will place pressures on local government different from the current ones. International migration trends are also geographically different, with net migration increasing in developed countries in recent years, while developing countries continue to be the origin of most of these international migrants, being migration in some countries a key component of the demographic change. The proportion of the working-age population is also changing, growing rapidly in some developing countries, which may constitute new opportunities for new policies at the level of local government. Ageing and international migration are two other facets of the current and expected global demographic shifts likely to affect local government systems and policies in the coming decades, in all regions of the world, namely by requiring that greater importance is assigned to social policy in the already highly complex organizational and functional structures of local government. Simultaneously with these broad demographic trends there is a rapid urbanization of society, even if this pattern is also highly heterogeneous across the various regions of the world, being faster and stronger in Africa and Asia and slower in the already highly urbanized regions of the world, as is the case of Europe and North America (United Nations 2019a, b). In a century the world population will experience a shift from around 70% rural and 30% urban population in 1950 to nearly 70% urban and 30% rural in 2050. According to the United Nations urbanization prospects (United Nations 2019b), urban areas are expected to absorb almost all of the growth of the world’s population in the coming decades. And 80% of the urban population growth will take place in Asia and Africa. This growth is thus an opportunity for developing countries, since it is where it will mostly take place. But it also raises challenges, namely to local government in those countries. And since urbanization is shaped by urban planning and this is typically a competence of local government, decentralization and consolidation of local autonomy in these countries is undoubtedly an important and decisive policy issue. The achievement of the global sustainable development goals and the application of the principles of the New Urban Agenda (UN-Habitat 2017a) depend largely on the capacity of local government in each country to plan and manage successfully the expected urban population growth. The population growth estimated for the next decades will take place in cities increasingly larger according to the UN (United Nations 2018a, 2019b). The most recent world population and urbanization prospect suggests that the number of megacities in the world, urban areas with ten million inhabitants or more, will increase from the current 33 to 43 in 2030, concentrated in 20 countries, most of them in the Global South, in countries where local government is weak, with low degree of autonomy and restricted financial capacity. Metropolitan areas will also grow and expand, as will intermediate cities, those with population between 500,000 and one million, hosting around 36% of the world population. Traditional institutional models of local government are no longer responsive in these increasingly large polycentric urban population agglomerations and, for that reason, new institutional models of local government in these increasingly large metropolitan or

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conurbation areas have to be found and experimented. Also necessary is good quality data on urbanization and city growth namely in developing countries with weaker statistical systems. As this growth is estimated to take place mostly in less developed countries, the challenges confronting local government in the coming decades in these countries call for deep institutional reforms. That is the case of Africa, which will be in 2050 one of the most populated continents in the world, and where the urban population will increase faster than anywhere else in the next decades (UN-Habitat 2014). In a continent in which local government has always been institutionally weak, under resourced, and largely if not completely dependent on central government, in both colonial and post-colonial periods, as the case of the Lusophone African countries exemplify (Silva 2016, 2020a, b), these demographic and urbanization prospects confront local government with vast and complex challenges and with the need to be reinvented in several of its traditional dimensions. In sum, these demographic shifts  – growth, ageing, migration, urbanization  – confront local government in the different regions of the world with critical challenges that it has to address, as well as opportunities to provide more and better services to the respective communities. Without an autonomous and empowered local government it will be difficult to manage the expected urban growth, in particular in the less developed countries. Decentralization from central to local government, with a significant reinforcement of local fiscal autonomy, besides organizational and functional autonomy, is therefore one of the most important reforms that most countries have to implement. The speed and extension of urbanization in the last decades impacted in all main areas of activity in which local government has been present. It places new and increasingly more complex challenges in the provision of basic urban services, in housing, local economic development, in the environment, and in urban planning. This unprecedented urban growth raises new issues to local democracy, including the representation of strangers and minorities in cities increasingly diverse and multicultural, and also issues of transparency and accountability in the decision-making process, thus requiring new and deeper forms of citizen engagement in the local policy process and in urban planning in particular, as argued in Chap. 12 of this book. Besides population growth, ageing, migration, and urbanization, the other major shift affecting local government is the increasingly extensive use of information and communication technologies inside the organization and in the relationship with citizens. The Internet and other digital technologies continuously modify our daily lives and the way we interact with local government. Big data, data science, artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies raise new challenges to local government. All these changes in digital technologies, including the increasingly extensive use of mobile e-tools in local e-government, and in urban e-planning more specifically (Silva 2010), are taking place at different rhythms and speed, affecting the relationship between citizens and their local government bodies, and the level of citizen engagement in local policy affairs (Silva 2013, 2020c), reinforcing or creating new social divides within the society and between countries (United Nations 2018b).

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The successive surveys of e-government conducted by the United Nations since 2001 (United Nations 2018b) provide an analysis of the progress in the use of e-government worldwide in the last two decades, revealing a consistent trend towards higher levels of e-government maturity, an indication of which is the fact that since 2014 all United Nations member states have some sort of online presence, as well as the fact that the average global Index of e-government development, the EGDI (E-Government Development Index), increased gradually over the years since the survey started. Nonetheless, there are huge differences between countries, with the less developed lying behind in these rankings, where local government benefits less from e-government due to differences in access, bandwidth and speed, among other characteristics (United Nations 2018b). This underdevelopment of e-government is another factor that, if not addressed adequately, will enlarge the gap between local government in developing countries and the relatively stronger local government in the more developed countries. In sum, the development of local e-government and the technological innovation associated with it, as well as the potential it offers to citizen participation in local government affairs, is one of the other main trends that is already impacting on local government systems worldwide.

1.3  Decentralization and the Global Development Agendas Administrative decentralization is the transference of competences, functions, and resources from central government to sub-national tiers of government, as separated legal entities, elected by universal suffrage and with relevant organizational, functional and financial autonomy (Amaral 2018). In recent decades there has been an overall move towards more advanced forms of administrative decentralization in developed countries, although with differences (Ladner et  al. 2016; Swianiewicz 2014; Silva and Bucek 2017), and increasingly also in developing countries (UCLG 2010, 2019), besides other types of reform (Swianiewicz 2010).2 The relative weight of local government in the public administration sector, in the most developed countries, increased consistently over the last half century, with ups and downs associated with the development of the welfare state (Bennett 1993; Barlow and Wastl-Walter 2004; Silva and Bucek 2014; UN-Habitat 2017f). A similar shift can be observed in developing countries in the Global South (Bahl and Linn 1992) and in transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Bucek and Ryder 2  As several chapters in this book show. For instance, Chap. 5 ‘Development of intra-municipality decentralisation systems in Japan’ by Yosuke Maeda; Chap. 6 ‘The ‘big-bang politics’ and process of council amalgamations: a comparative study of the state in Australia and Austria’, by Khandakar Farid Uddin and Werner Pleschberger; Chap. 7  - ‘Regional administrative boundaries and the building of internal borders in decentralised states. The case of two Spanish interregional borders’, by Ramon Galindo Caldés, Albert Santasusagna Riu, and Joan Tort Donada.

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2015) since the early 1990s, also with ups and downs associated with the need to improve the local democracy and the efficient provision of public services, among other determinants.3 Nonetheless, according to UCLG (2019, p. 378) only around 2/3 of the countries included in the sample survey have, in the respective Constitutions, local government as a tier of government or public administration and the proportion of countries with a true form of local self-government is even lower than this. Notwithstanding the existence of an overall trend towards decentralization, there has been in some countries an inversion and a return to forms of centralized administration. It is the case of Hungary since 2012, marked as it is by functional and financial recentralization (Kovács 2020). In other cases, the reform resulted somehow in the creation of institutions weaker than what was expected, as recent reforms in Italy suggest (Trono 2020). There is thus a gap between formal decentralization and decentralization on the ground in numerous countries, despite the apparent global trend towards decentralization, namely in developing and in less developed countries. The evidence available on recent changes in central-local relations shows consequently contradictory trends, oscillating between reforms towards increased formal decentralization in most countries and recentralization in others (Silva and Trono 2020). Despite an overall positive perception of decentralization as an effective tool for good governance, the empirical evidence available point to different outcomes in developed and in developing countries, as shown for instance by Kwon (2013) among others. The centralization trends referred before, removing powers and resources, contrary to the subsidiarity principle, according to which public competences and functions should be assigned to the elected authorities closest to citizens, with higher tiers of public administration holding the competences and functions which could not be exercised at a more local tier, places in risk the role of local government in proactively achieving the SDGs, and is therefore contrary to what is needed to address the challenges raised by the urban, environmental and digital transitions referred before in this chapter. The global economic crisis of 2008–2009 and the related fiscal austerity measures adopted in numerous countries, in developed and in developing ones, had impact on local government systems (Silva and Bucek 2014), first in their financial capacity (Fisher 2010), but also in its formal autonomy, with numerous competences being hold back to the central state, specifically financial ones, as well as a whole series of constraints and controls on what before were areas of clear local autonomy. Limits on loans, restructuration of municipal debt, restrictions on organizational, functional and financial decisions were part of the austerity measures that have impacted on local government reducing their autonomy and capacity to act even in the most developed and decentralized countries. However, as Bel et  al. 3  As several chapters in this book show. For instance, for the case of Hungary, Chap. 3 ‘Governance without power? The fight of the Hungarian counties for survival’ by Ilona Pálné Kovács; Chap. 4 ‘From Financial Centralization to Political Centralization. The Focal Points of the Municipal Reforms from the Transition until present day Hungary’ by László Kákai; and Chap. 10 ‘Lost in Transformation: Place-based projects in the EU’s multi-level system’ by Judit Keller.

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(2018) shows there were other alternatives that can also be adopted, in the reform of local government, instead of the mainstream type of approaches associated with privatization and with the idea of costs savings. A variety of local government reforms have thus been implemented in numerous countries around the world. In some cases, the reform introduced, for the first time, a true system of local government, as is the case of numerous countries in Africa after the 1990s, in which, for the first time after the political independence in the second half of the twentieth century, forms of mere administrative de-concentration, inherited from the colonial period, were replaced by forms of local self-government through gradual decentralization reforms. These new local authorities, distinct from the state and with boards directly elected, have been in some countries established gradually due to the lack of institutional conditions to implement them at the same time in all parts of the country. Lack of qualified political actors, of technical and administrative staff, and of financial resources have prevented in some cases the full and simultaneous establishment of local self-government, as Silva (2020a) shows for some Lusophone African countries, namely in Mozambique and as has been proposed in Angola.4 In other cases, decentralization reforms introduced or stimulated the establishment of a meso tier, besides the lower level of local government, as well as new modes of governance in the metropolitan areas, ranging from mere forms of administrative de-concentration, to inter-municipal associations or even forms of metropolitan self-government. In other cases, as happened in Europe (Wollmann 2004, 2012, 2016; Kuhlmann 2010), the reforms intended to strength a local government system already well developed when compared to what is in place in other continents. In practice, the overall trend towards decentralization, although more organizational and functional than financial, is geographically uneven. Local government remained in most countries dependent on conditional transfers from central government budget, frequently discretionarily. In other words, the trend towards decentralization has been accompanied by a tendency for diversity in the decentralized systems adopted in the different countries. The level of disaggregation and the quality of data on local government, in particular financial data, is quite uneven across countries. Even so, it is accepted, according to the OECD and ULCG, based on a sample of a little over 100 countries, that local government, or sub-national tiers of government, represents currently around a quarter of total public revenue and of total public expenditure too (UCLG 2019, pp.  378). This overall trend is accompanied by diversity in the systems of local government and by differences in the degree of local autonomy as well, as the case of Europe and Africa illustrate well. Europe and North American countries have a long tradition of local self-­ government, that goes back to the nineteenth century in numerous countries, and whose importance increased with the development of the welfare state in the post

4  In the context of the local government institutionalization process initiated by the new President of the Republic of Angola elected in 2017. Not yet implemented at the time of writing.

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World War II, reaching a level of development and complexity well evident in the regional report on Europe and North America for the Habitat III Conference (UN-Habitat 2017f). But even in Europe there are huge differences, with Nordic countries reaching values above 50%, while in Southern Europe some countries had less than 15% not long ago. In the case of Portugal this figure was well below 10% at the end of the authoritarian and highly centralized political regime in the mid 1970s (Silva 1995). Ladner et al. (2016) show, based on the Local Autonomy Index, that Northern and Western European countries are the most decentralized countries in Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe, and in South-Eastern Europe the transition to democracy and the decentralization process are more recent, and if formal decentralization is already achieved in these countries, in practice the degree of local financial autonomy is lower. Southern European countries whose transition to democracy, decentralization, and integration in the European Union took place earlier, the pattern is somehow in between. In Central and Eastern Europe, the political changes that followed the end of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s opened the way to an extensive and complex process of reforms, in some of these countries under the influence of the European Union territorial policy.5 If in some countries local democracy and decentralization are a distinctive outcome of the transition to multi-party democracy, in some others the level of fiscal centralization did not really change significantly and in other cases there has even been somehow a reversal of the initial decentralization (Bucek and Ryder 2015). A first group, according to UCLG (2019), comprise Georgia and Armenia which have introduced a relatively autonomous local government system together with Russia and its two tier system, Ukraine and Azerbaijan. A second group of highly centralized countries includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia. In these countries local self-government coexists with forms of administrative de-concentration, and has, in most of them, very limited financial autonomy. Most Latin American countries have experienced decentralization reforms in the last decades, as shown in UCLG (2019), in particular since the 1980s, although the process has been irregular, marked by advances and reversals, as Valenzuela et al. (2019) explain in the analysis of decentralization in South America in the last 50 years, or as UN-Habitat (2012b) confirms, namely on issues of democratic consolidation, fiscal and administrative decentralization, and new forms of Urban Governance in Latin American and Caribbean cities, a region with more than 16,000 local government units (UN-Habitat 2012b). A similar perspective emerges from the evidence on urbanization, governance and institutional capacities provided in UN-Habitat (2017c), a report prepared for the Habitat III Conference. Among other 5  Two chapters in the book offer evidence of that influence in the local government systems in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic. It is the case of Chap. 8 ‘The impact of European regional policy and Local Action Groups on inter-municipal cooperation in Slovakia’ by Ľudmila Malíková and Martin Daško; and Chap. 9 ‘The Rise and Limits of Local Governance: LEADER/Communityled Local Development in the Czech Republic’, by Ondřej Konečný, Jan Binek and Hana Svobodová.

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aspects, it is important to note that in most of these countries local government have now democratically elected boards but low financial autonomy (Brosio and Jiménez 2012; UN-Habitat 2012b) thus continuing dependent from central government, a pattern also noted in other regions of the world. Brazil and Colombia are, according to the UCLG (2019), the most decentralized in Latin America, along with Mexico and Argentina, two federal states, although in these two cases decentralization has been more to the meso level, states of the federation or provinces, than to the municipalities. This is followed, according to the same source, by a second group that comprises Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. A third group constituted by Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay is less decentralized, a pattern that gets worse in Central America and in the Caribbean sub-region, in which local government has a much lower degree of functional and financial autonomy, compared to the other parts of Latin America. In the case of Africa the evidence available shows both the existence of commitment at the national level towards decentralization in numerous countries, as is the case of some of the Lusophone African countries (Silva 2016, 2020a), but at the same time shows the existence, as in other regions of the world, of resistance to decentralization, namely fiscal decentralization, by central government, as this same group of African countries also exemplify. Whatever the case, local government systems remain in most African countries still largely dependent from central government (Brosio 2000; Olowu 2003), namely on financial issues, as Smoke (2001) shows for developing countries in general. While in the OECD countries, in the late 1980s, local government represented on average 11% of public employment, reaching 25% in some countries, in developing countries6 this value was 4.5%, being in Africa 2.5% and 8% in Asia (Smoke 2001). Fiscal decentralization in Africa is confronted with two other important constraints. First, the prevailing informality in the local economy and the proportion of the informal urbanization, both setting limits to the capacity of local government to raise local taxes, reinforcing therefore its fiscal dependence from central government. Second, the organizational weakness of local government means that it is not able to get loans from banks, as it does not meet the standard criteria set up by the banking system. These institutional weakness of local government, both organizational and financial, limits largely its capacity to fulfil the role it is expected to have in the current global sustainable development strategies (Ndegwa and Levy 2004). Besides financial capacity and autonomy, local government also requires organizational capacity and autonomy (Ribot 2002). Without this, the capacity to raise its own resources – fiscal, loans, and from own activities – is largely diminished. This means competent local councillors as well as skilled administrative and technical staff. This is not yet the case in most African countries. Therefore, all considered, local government in most African countries do not seem to have yet the organizational, functional and financial autonomy and the level of resources needed to deliver the sustainable development goals of the 2030 Agenda 6  Fiscal data in some developing countries is difficult to obtain for long time periods. Besides that, contextual differences turns the interpretation and comparison of fiscal data between countries more difficult than is the case in studies focused on more developed countries. For that reason, these statistical figures must be seen as broadly indicative.

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as well as those of the Africa 2063 Agenda (African Union 2015). In addition, the political conflicts that affected and continue to affect numerous African countries, and the natural disasters, increasingly more frequent due to climate change, undermine the capacity of local government to fulfil the role expected from sub-national tiers of government in the implementation of these global development agendas, as the case of the city of Beira, the second largest city in Mozambique, largely destroyed by the Idai cyclone, in March 2019, exemplifies. The successive reports on the state of local government published by UCLG show that decentralization varies significantly among countries in Africa, and that all of them have been affected by successive waves of local government reforms, in some cases in opposed directions. A similar view of local government is also found in the evidence provided for each of the five regions of Africa, in the report on the state of the African cities (UN-Habitat 2014), or in the evidence on urbanization and governance in the regional report on Africa for the Habitat III Conference (UN-Habitat 2017d). According to UCLG (2019), South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania and Morocco have a relatively stable sub-national institutional system of government, to which I add the case of Cape Verde with a stable local government system since the transition to multi-party democracy in the early 1990s, with seven democratic local elections already held in the country since then,7 and which has been accompanied continuously by decentralization measures, which makes Cape Verde the most decentralized of the five new African countries that became independent from Portugal in the mid 1970s, the others being Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe. Notwithstanding this overall positive view of this group of African countries, from the point of view of the level of decentralization reached, more detailed evidence do suggest the persistence of old challenges, as those described in Beall (2005) for the case of South Africa and related to the exclusion of women by interests that remain gathered around local government institutions. A second group of countries, according to UCLG (2019), comprise Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Eswatini, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, Zambia and Zimbabwe with evidence of decentralization from the state to local government. However, the other 33 African countries examined by UCLG (2019) have very low local autonomy, most of them mere forms of de-concentrated local administration, which will require deep reforms of the current local government system. In all of them, poverty and informality affect the revenue base of local government, which is a major constraint for further decentralization and, at the same time, an important restriction to the capacity of local government, which combined with the low and insufficient fiscal transfer from central government, reduces substantially the capacity of local government to fulfil the role it is expected to have in the implementation of the global development agendas. The centralization trend that marked most African countries after the independence, which led to an increase of state control

7  The 8th local government election in Cape Verde (municipal election) will take place in 2020. Cape Verde has 22 municipalities.

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in order to build the national unity, is being replaced since the early 1990s by decentralization reforms associated with the introduction of multiparty political systems, at both national and local levels, as the case of the Lusophone African countries exemplify well. Most countries in the Middle East have highly centralized administrative systems, as the evidence provided in UCLG (2019) on the local government systems in the region shows. A similar picture emerges from UN-Habitat (2012a), regarding the urban governance systems in the Arab cities, and in UN-Habitat (2017b), a report prepared for the Habitat-III Conference, which provides evidence on decentralization and central-local relations, on metropolitan governance, citizen participation, local finances, and on national urban policies and spatial planning in the Arab region. A similar perspective is provided by UN-Habitat (2020) in relation to the financing of sustainable urbanization in the Arab region. One exception is, to some extent, Turkey. In the other countries in the region, such as Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and the Gulf countries, the sub-national tier of public administration is highly dependent from central government and are best described as mere forms of de-concentrated local administration. This raises critical issues regarding the capacity of these countries to ‘localize’ the goals of the global sustainable development agendas and Agenda 2030 in particular. The case of Israel, even if slightly more decentralized than the average in the region, do show also problems and challenges similar to those found in more developed regions of the world, such as the existence of barriers to local government reform, as shown in Razin (2004) or the risk of increased fiscal disparities due to decentralization, as Razin (1998) shows in his analysis of the period 1972–1995 in Israel. In Asia and in the Oceania, the most decentralized countries – Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea – are also the most developed. According to UCLG (2019), countries in East and South East Asia continue to present different degrees of decentralization and can be classed in four main groups, with China sitting in a place apart with its highly centralized political regime and high level of development. The most decentralized are Japan and South Korea followed by Indonesia and the Philippines. In a second group are Thailand, Vietnam, and India. All of them have low fiscal autonomy. The third group includes countries without true forms of local self-government, as is the case of Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. In these countries sub-national tiers are mere forms of administrative de-­ concentration or are in the early stages of implementation of local self-­ government reforms. The fourth group of countries, which includes for instance Bangladesh and Pakistan, have experienced stagnation in the decentralization process in the last years or even a reversal towards re-centralization, as the evidence provided by UCLG (2019) suggests. For the UN-Habitat (2015) the governance of cities in Asia and in the Pacific region requires, in most of its countries, more government intervention and not less, a perspective that, if embraced by national governments, may lead to the reinforcement of local government in these countries. A similar view on the need of more effective local government institutions is offered by the evidence provided on urbanization, institutions and governance in the regional report on Asia and the Pacific for

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the Habitat III Conference (UN-Habitat 2017e). In Oceania, as in other continents, in the twentieth century, namely in Africa, the newly independent countries tended to centralize the power in the state. An example of that is the case of the Solomon Islands that became independent in 1978, as Premdas (1982) describes. In New Zealand local government reforms have been implemented in the last decades seeking new forms of collaboration between the state and local government as well as new forms of community engagement (Thomas and Ali Memon 2007). Experiments in  local government reform have also been carried out in Australia over the last decades as the cases described in Dollery et al. (2011) on de-amalgamation or on amalgamation (Dollery et al. 2013) illustrate. Besides these more direct trends towards decentralization, the last decades witnessed the introduction of key principles in the public administration sector that affected directly inter-governmental relations and the role and importance of local government. Subsidiarity is one of these principles. Important in the European Union countries it has been applied also in many other countries across the world. It is undoubtedly one of the drivers of the gradual transference of competences from central to local government. The more recent principle of ‘localization’ of the global development agendas is also producing a similar effect on the growth of the overall capacity of local government, which received important roles in the global development agendas and in the global urban agendas adopted since the 1990s. It was so in Agenda 21, issued in the Rio Conference in 1992, in particular through the Local Agenda 21, implemented by local authorities all over the world, and reaffirmed in the Johannesburg Conference in 2002, and in the 2012 Conference in Rio again. It was also so in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which assigned a relevant role to local government in its implementation. This trend towards an ever greater role handed over to local government, expressed in the movement for the ‘localization’ of the goals of these agendas, is well expressed in the global agreements established in 2015 and 2016, as is the case of Agenda 2030, and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, and the New Urban Agenda adopted in 2016 in the Habitat-III Conference (UN-Habitat 2017a), in this case clearly more than in the previous Habitat I and Habitat II agendas, adopted in 1976 and in 1996 respectively. The role of local government in Agenda 2030 (United Nations 2019a) is clearly central. Around two thirds of the SDGs targets are typically within the competences of local government. This means that a proper and successful implementation of SDGs targets requires appropriate decentralization laws. Thus, the increasing contribution of local governments to these global agendas is one of the main trends in the last 50 years. From a minor importance in the 1970s and 1980s, as in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration or in the Vancouver Declaration in 1976, local government moved gradually to an increasingly central role in the new Millennium.

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There is therefore the conviction that the move towards the ‘localization’ of development goals, if well-resourced, can be a decisive instrument to change the current inequalities around the world. In fact, the interconnectedness of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) requires significant changes in the policy process, from formulation to implementation, including a deeper engagement of sub-national tiers of government. Not only does the full realization of the SDGs require that no one and no place is left behind, as formally proclaimed, as it also requires that no level of government is marginalized. This need of a truly comprehensive multi-level approach has been an opportunity for enhancing the importance of local government in key public policy fields. The need of an effective spatial planning system to deal with the challenges confronting most cities calls for a more empowered local government, namely in Africa and in other developing regions in the world. The same can be said of citizen participation in local public policy, and in spatial planning in particular, one of the most important conditions for a more citizen responsive local government.8 However, there are important differences from region to region and even within the same continent, as is the case in Europe (UN-Habitat 2017f). The localization of the goals of these global agendas is stronger in some parts of Europe than in other parts, existing a clear contrast between North and Western Europe and Southern and Central and Eastern Europe for instance. Dissimilarity among countries is also present in South and Central America (UCLG 2019). Therefore, the stronger the local government is the more likely it is that the sustainable development goals and the respective targets will be met. However, the evidence available shows that the action of local government within the action plans of these global development agendas has been constrained, in numerous places and on several occasions, by the lack of an enabling legal and financial context, one that could help local governments in each country to fulfil the responsibilities assigned to them in these Agendas. Closely associated with this trend is the need to reinforce multilevel and collaborative governance between central and local government. This requires adequate coordination and participation mechanisms to ensure that local government take part effectively in the entire policy process, from policy design to implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This increasingly complex multilevel coordination between all tiers of government is another major trend that has consolidated in recent decades, more in some regions of the world, as is the case of most countries in the European Union, and less so in developing countries, as the evidence available on African countries shows. On the other side, this increased complexity and interconnectedness in the public policy process called for new and stronger forms of citizen participation. The 8  Citizen participation in  local government is addressed in two chapters of this book: Chap. 11 ‘European Standards in Regulating Public Participation on Sub-national Levels: The Case of Croatia’ by Dana Dobrić Jambrović; and in Chap. 12 ‘Citizen Participation in Spatial Planning in Portugal 1920–2020. Non-Participation, Tokenism and Citizen Power in Local Governance’ by Carlos Nunes Silva.

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long-­term sustainability of the SDGs requires the engagement since the early stages of its implementation of all key stakeholders. The appropriation of these processes by citizens and local communities is the best guarantee for its sustainability in the post-­agenda period. And local government is certainly the best political arena for citizen participation to take place and to be effective, as argued in the last two chapters of the book.

1.4  Conclusion Confronted with these trends and challenges the current models of local governance need to be incrementally reformed or radically changed in some of its components. This is required for the implementation of the new development strategies associated with the new urban reality, with the demographic and environmental challenges, and with the ongoing digital revolution. Urbanization and the digital transition raise new challenges to local governance but they are also drivers to achieving sustainable development and a more resilient territory. It is now consensual and accepted that the global goals related to sustainable development can only be achieved through policies and actions designed and implemented locally by local government. This requires local institutions and spatial planning systems adjusted to the specificities of each place, capable to define, implement and monitor strategies and policies at the local level in order to achieve national and global sustainable goals. In other words, these global goals and the policies to address them must be ‘localized’. Local Government is thus a central piece in the implementation of the global development agendas. Nonetheless, numerous other challenges with which local government have been confronted in the past still remain. This includes the weak or partial implementation of decentralization reforms; weak or inexistent organizational, functional and fiscal autonomy; the reversal of decentralization processes as soon as a financial crisis emerges, highlighting the fact that local government continues to be as before the weak link within the national political systems; excessive fragmentation and resistance to inter-jurisdiction cooperation; under resourced local government; prevailing local economic informality in most developing countries; insufficient transparency and accountability; and political instability. It is also the case of the lack of reliable disaggregated data on the activities of local government and its impacts, in particular in less developed countries. Despite the current efforts to build indicators in the context of the current global development agendas this remains as an important limitation to an even greater decentralization in most countries. Without reliable disaggregated data, monitoring and evaluation of local government activities will remain limited as indicators cannot be tracked properly. In sum, the multi-dimensionality of the challenges raised by the ongoing processes of urbanization, environmental change, and digitalization call, in most places, for a revision of the prevailing local governance culture through the reinforcement

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of powers and resources of local self-government. However, if this need is clearly recognized by all relevant global institutions, the evidence available suggests the persistence of a gap between this rhetoric on decentralization and autonomy of local government and the practice on the ground, despite all the efforts and notwithstanding the multiple global development and urban agendas adopted so far. The lower the degree of local autonomy and the lower the capacity of local government to act autonomously less likely the 2030 Agenda sustainable development targets will be met. And since local government autonomy and own financial capacity is lower or inexistent in most developing countries, and as population growth and urbanization expansion will take place mainly in these same countries, unless the centralization pattern is reversed, which looks highly unlikely in the short or medium term, the goals of the 2030 Agenda and other similar agendas will not be met. Local government reform in most countries across the world is thus an emergency. This is particularly so in Africa, Middle East, and in large parts of Asia, both Central and East. In the following chapters, the book contributes with new empirical evidence and new insights to the ongoing debate on the contemporary trends in the local governance culture. Based on the evidence provided, it is obvious that decentralization reforms, from central to local self-government, based on the principle of subsidiarity, need to be effectively implemented. Local democracy, organizational, functional and financial local autonomy, multi-level governance, inter-municipal cooperation and coordination, digitalization of local government, and citizen (e-)participation are some of the key dimensions that ought to be taken into account in these debates on the reform of local governance systems, in developed and in developing countries as well.

References African Union (2014) African charter on values and principles of decentralization, local governance and local development. African Union, Addis Ababa African Union (2015) Agenda 2063. The Africa we want. African Union, Addis Ababa African Union (2020) List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the African charter on the values and principles of decentralisation, local governance and local development. African Union, Addis Ababa Amaral DF (2018) Curso de Direito Administrativo – Vol. 1. Almedina, Coimbra Bahl RW, Linn JF (1992) Urban public finance in developing countries. Oxford University Press, Oxford Barlow M, Wastl-Walter D (eds) (2004) New challenges in  local and regional administration. Ashgate, Aldershot Beall J (2005) Decentralizing government and decentering gender: lessons from local government reform in South Africa. Polit Soc 33(2):253–276 Bel G, Hebdon R, Warner M (2018) Beyond privatisation and cost savings: alternatives for local government reform. Local Gov Stud 44(2):173–182 Bennett R (ed) (1993) Local government in the new Europe. Belhaven Press, London/New York Brosio G (2000) Decentralization in Africa. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC

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Brosio G, Jiménez JP (2012) Decentralization and reform in Latin America: improving intergovernmental relations. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago-Chile Bucek J, Ryder A (eds) (2015) Governance in transition. Springer, Dordrecht Dollery B, Kortt M, Grant B (2011) A normative model for local government De-amalgamation in Australia. Aust J Polit Sci 46(4):601–615 Dollery B, Grant B, Kortt M (2013) An evaluation of amalgamation and financial viability in Australian local government. Public Finance and Management, Volume 13(3):215–238 Fisher RC (2010) The state of state and local government finance. Regional Economic Development, 2010 6(1):4–22 Kovács IP (2020) Changing patterns and general dilemmas in Hungarian territorial governance. In: Silva CN, Trono A (eds) Local governance in the new urban agenda. Springer, Cham Kuhlmann S (2010) Between the state and the market: assessing impacts of local government reforms in Western Europe. Lex Localis – Journal of Local Self-Government 8(1):1–21 Kwon O (2013) Fiscal decentralization: an effective tool for government reform? Public Adm 91(3):544–560 Ladner A, Keuffer N, Baldersheim H (2016) Measuring local autonomy in 39 countries (1990–2014). Regional & Federal Studies 26(3):321–357 Ndegwa SN, Levy B (2004) The politics of decentralization in Africa: a comparative analysis. In: Levy B, Kpundeh S (eds) Building state capacity in Africa. New approaches, emerging lessons. World Bank, Washington, DC, pp 283–322 Olowu D (2003) Local institutional and political structures and processes: recent experience in Africa. Public Adm Dev 23:41–52 Premdas RR (1982) The Solomon Islands: the experiment in decentralization. Public Administration and Development 2:239–251 Razin E (1998) The impact of decentralisation on fiscal disparities among local authorities in Israel. Space and Polity 2(1):49–69 Razin E (2004) Needs and impediments for local government reform: lessons from Israel. J Urban Aff 26(5):623–640 Ribot JC (2002) African decentralization. Local actors, powers and accountability. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneve Silva CN (1995) Poder Local e Território. Análise geográfica das políticas municipais 1974–1994. Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa Silva CN (ed) (2010) Handbook of research on E-planning: ICTs for urban development and monitoring. IGI Global, Hershey/New York Silva CN (ed) (2013) Citizen E-participation in urban governance. Crowdsourcing and collaborative creativity. IGI-Global, Hershey/New York Silva CN (ed) (2016) Governing urban Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke Silva CN (2020a) Routledge handbook of urban planning in Africa. Routledge, London/New York Silva CN (2020b) Decentralization and the new urban agenda: The case of Angola. In: Silva CN, Trono A (eds) Local governance in the new urban agenda. Springer, Cham Silva CN (ed) (2020c) Citizen-responsive urban E-planning: Recent developments and critical perspectives. IGI-Global, Hershey/New York Silva CN, Bucek J (2014) Fiscal austerity and innovation in  local governance in Europe. Ashgate, Farnham Silva CN, Bucek J (2017) Local government and urban governance in Europe. Springer, Cham Silva CN, Trono A (eds) (2020) Local governance in the new urban agenda. Springer, Cham Smoke P (2001) Fiscal decentralization in developing countries. A review of current concepts and practice. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneve Swianiewicz P (2010) If territorial fragmentation is a problem, is amalgamation a solution? East European perspective. Local Gov Stud 36(2):183–203 Swianiewicz P (2014) An empirical typology of local government systems in Eastern Europe. Local Gov Stud 40(2):292–311

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Thomas S, Ali Memon P (2007) New Zealand local government at the crossroads? Reflections on the recent local government reforms. Urban Policy Res 25(2):171–185 Trono A (2020) Regional reorganisation in Italy: challenges and changes. In: Silva CN, Trono A (eds) Local governance in the new urban agenda. Springer, Cham UCLG (2010) Local government finance: the challenges of the 21st century. Second global report on decentralization and local democracy. United Cities and Local Governments, Barcelona UCLG (2019) The localization of the global agendas. How local action is transforming territories and communities. Fifth global report on decentralization and local democracy. United Cities and Local Governments, Barcelona UN-Habitat (2012a) The state of Arab cities 2012. Challenges of urban transition. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Nairobi UN-Habitat (2012b) The state of Latin American and Caribbean cities 2012. Towards a new urban transition. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Nairobi UN-Habitat (2014) State of African cities 2014  – re-imagining sustainable urban transitions. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Nairobi UN-Habitat (2015) The state of Asian and Pacific cities 2015. Urban transformations: shifting from quantity to quality. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Nairobi UN-Habitat (2017a) New urban agenda. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Nairobi UN-Habitat (2017b) HABITAT III – regional report Arab region. Towards inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable Arab cities. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Nairobi UN-Habitat (2017c) HABITAT III regional report Latin America and the Caribbean. Sustainable cities with equality. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Nairobi UN-Habitat (2017d) HABITAT III. Regional report Africa. Transformational housing and sustainable urban development in Africa. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Nairobi UN-Habitat (2017e) HABITAT III. Regional report Asia and the Pacific. Transformative urbanization for a resilient Asia-Pacific. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Nairobi UN-Habitat (2017f) HABITAT III. Regional report Europe, North America and commonwealth of independent states. Towards a city-focused, people-centred and integrated approach to the new urban agenda. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Nairobi UN-Habitat (2020) The state of Arab cities 2020. Financing sustainable urbanization in the Arab region. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Nairobi United Nations (2015) Transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. Resolution adopted by the general assembly on 25 September 2015. United Nations, New York United Nations (2018a) The world’s cities in 2018—data booklet. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, New York United Nations (2018b) E-government survey 2018. Gearing E-government to support transformation towards sustainable and resilient societies. United Nations, New York United Nations (2019a) The sustainable development goals report 2019. United Nations, New York United Nations (2019b) World urbanization prospects. The 2019 revision. United Nations, New York United Nations (2019c) Demographic yearbook – 2018. United Nations, New York United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa (2019) Economic report on Africa 2019: fiscal policy for financing sustainable development in Africa. UNECA, Addis Ababa Valenzuela E, Henriquez O, Cienfuegos I (2019) Los tres tipos de distribución competencial que estructuran la descentralización en América del Sur. Revista de Administração Pública 53(3):592–609 Wollmann H (2004) Local government reforms in Great Britain, Sweden, Germany and France: between multi-function and single-purpose organisations. Local Gov Stud 30(4):639–665 Wollmann H (2012) Local government reforms in seven European countries: between convergent and divergent, conflicting and complementary developments. Local Gov Stud 38(1):41–70 Wollmann H (2016) Local government reforms: between multifunction and single-purpose organisations. Local Gov Stud 42(3):376–384

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Carlos Nunes Silva,  Geographer, PhD, is Professor Auxiliar at the Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Lisbon, Portugal. His research interests focus mainly on urban and metropolitan governance, the history and theory of urban planning, urban planning in Africa, urban e-planning, urban planning ethics, local government policies, local e-government, and research methods. His publications include: ‘Local Governance in the New Urban Agenda’ (co-edited); ‘Citizen-­ Responsive Urban E-Planning: Recent Developments and Critical Perspectives’; ‘Routledge Handbook of Urban Planning in Africa’; ‘New Approaches, Methods, and Tools in Urban e-Planning’; ‘Governing Urban Africa’; ‘Local Government and Urban Governance in Europe’ (co-edited); ‘Urban Planning in North Africa’; ‘Urban Planning in Lusophone African Countries’; ‘Emerging Issues, Challenges, and Opportunities in Urban E-Planning’; ‘Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa: Colonial and Postcolonial Planning Cultures’; ‘Fiscal Austerity and Innovation in Local Governance in Europe’ (co-edited); ‘Citizen e-Participation in Urban Governance: Crowdsourcing and Collaborative Creativity’; ‘Online Research Methods in Urban and Planning Studies: Design and Outcomes’; ‘Handbook of Research on E-Planning: ICT for Urban Development and Monitoring’; ‘Portugal: Sistema de Govern Local’; and ‘Política Urbana em Lisboa, 1926-1974’. He is the founding editor-in-chief of the ‘International Journal of E-Planning Research’, and Chair of the International Geographical Union Commission on ‘Geography of Governance’.

Chapter 2

Recent and Contemporary Trends in European Studies of Local Government and Local Politics Paweł Swianiewicz

Abstract  The chapter reviews changing attitudes towards important theoretical concepts of local governance, such as New Public Management, shift from government to governance, multi-level governance, Europeanization and re-scaling. It shows shortcomings related to application of those theories, but also a lack of dominant alternative paradigms which could replace the older concepts. The rapidly growing number of valuable, empirical studies together with development of new methodological approaches (e.g. quasi-experimental designs) allow to expect emergence of theoretical conclusions in the near future. At the same time difficulty to follow results of numerous new published articles brings popularity of various type of meta-analysis or systematic reviews of literature, as a new type of empirical articles. In the second part the chapter reviews the most important trends in contemporary empirical studies of local governments in Europe. The selection of topics is a subjective choice of the Author and includes: renaissance of cross-national comparative research, local reactions to economic crisis, studies of territorial reforms and economies of scale, management of metropolitan areas and research on coping with deficit of local democracy. Keywords  Local government · Public services · Local politics · Territorial reforms · Inter-municipal cooperation · Comparative research

P. Swianiewicz (*) Department for Local Development and Policy, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Nunes Silva (ed.), Contemporary Trends in Local Governance, Local and Urban Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52516-3_2

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2.1  Introduction In 2005, the Polish academic journal Studia Regionalne i Lokalne published my article entitled “New theoretical interpretations of urban policy” (Swianiewicz 2005). The concepts discussed there can be hardly considered “new” from today’s perspective – they were developed at the end of 20th and first years of twenty-first century. In 2010, in the same journal, Marta Lackowska published an article on “New theoretical interpretations of (large cities) urban policy” (Lackowska 2010), discussing inter alia re-scaling, the importance of globalization for cities and Europeanization as a concept useful for understanding contemporary processes in the policies of European cities. These two articles are the starting point for this chapter, which asks what happened in the studies of local government and local politics during the last dozen years or so? Are the concepts discussed then still popular? Are there any new, groundbreaking theories? What questions are currently attracting the most attention from researchers undertaking empirical studies? Finally, how does the research and practice of Polish local governments look like against this wider, European background? This chapter is an essay in which I present my subjective reflection resulting from the perception of trends observed in European local government studies and practice of local governance. Moreover, the substantial part of this observations is being made through the Polish (or more widely speaking: Central-East European) glasses. I have no ambition to present a comprehensive picture covering all major trends. Such a goal could be implemented as a result of a very time-consuming study, the effect of which would be a complete volume rather than a single chapter. Instead I focus on the topics which have attracted my attention to the greatest extent, stressing again the subjective nature of this selection. I suggest to start from looking at the concepts described in my text published over a decade ago.

2.2  New Public Management in Contemporary Perspective Local government studies are not conducted in isolation from wider trends of debates relating to social, economic and political phenomena. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that skepticism towards the New Public Management (NPM) in local governments have intensified together with the wider phenomenon of the growing criticism of the neo-liberal doctrine. After all, the NPM was to a large extent an attempt to apply and operationalize neoliberal ideas to the public sector: limiting the state, adoring market mechanisms and striving to include the assessment of the operation of public institutions in measurable performance indicators. Nowadays, critical approaches dominate in the debates on NPM (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014; Hood 2012; Hambleton 2015; Hood and Dixon 2015). On the one hand, it is claimed that the impact of NPM on administrative practice has until

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recently been heavily overestimated. In fact, when using rhetoric derived from the NPM, its ideas were rarely really consistently implemented. At the same time, serious doubts concerning the actual effects of using ideas originating from NPM are formulated. First, contrary to the hopes and ideological promises of the reformers, the introduction of competition, privatization or performance indicators to public services did not lead to lowering costs and improving the quality of these services (see reviews by Bel et al. 2018; Bel and Fageda 2017). Private companies quickly began to reduce quality when they felt more confident in their new markets and when they got rid of potential competitors. A recent systematic review of studies of effects of outsourcing prepared by Peterson et al. (2018) suggests a careful approach to potential gains being result of NPM-inspired reforms. Authors of the review note that savings are quite common in technical services but doubtful in case of social services. Moreover, savings appear in the first years after reform, but gradually disappear in following years. Last but not least, most of empirical studies do not control cost change by quality of services, so the final conclusions are somehow half-finished. Also management through objectives, based on performance indicators, resulted in focusing on some aspects of effectiveness (emphasized by indicators), leading to ignoring other socially important dimensions. With regard to some services, especially social ones (education, culture, social assistance, health care), there is a doubt if the construction of a satisfying set of measurable performance indicators is possible at all. And the use of imperfect indicators sometimes brings more harm than benefits. Popular local government rankings based on performance indicators (half official in some countries, as in the case of indicators published by the Audit Commission in England, this also applies to the rankings of various public institutions, such as schools) provokes actions aimed at improving the position in the ranking, which does not necessarily mean concentration on the problems which are the most important for local communities. Some NPM assumptions have also been rejected at the normative level. In particular, the ideological slogan “city as a company” was very popular. Attention was drawn to the inaccuracy and even the harmfulness of this comparison. It was emphasized that the city’s goals must be different, including social, and not only focused on the economic dimension (including profit). Resistance from the employees of municipal units subject to transformation was also important. In particular, the reforms inspired by the NPM were opposed by French or slightly earlier by British trade unions. The economic crisis, which began in 2008, has also played a significant role. The ideas of the free market were in retreat, and the expectation of rebuilding the proper role of the public sector in providing services was growing. Psychology was also important – the crisis has led to fear and increasing sense of uncertainty. Under such conditions, there was a reluctance to reforms which would lead to the reduction of the care provided by the government. Thus, while the privatization of local public services was widely discussed a dozen or so years ago, Wollmann’s (2011, 2016, discussed also in Steen et al. 2017) claim of the re-municipalization (re-communalisation) has been gaining more and

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more popularity. The author cites examples (German, French, but also from other European countries) that the local government regains control of previously privatized local services. It takes various forms – not renewing expiring concessions for private companies to provide services (e.g., water supply – Paris, Grenoble), buying back shares of privatized municipal companies (German examples in energy and waste management) or abandoning previously prepared privatization plans (e.g., rejection the privatization plan for the water and sewage sector in the Italian referendum). However, as Clifton et al. (2019: 5) warn while some scholars claim the re-municipalization trend is increasing, these are based almost completely on case study approaches to research. In some countries multi-sector municipal companies, which had been heavily criticized before, return to favour. And they come back for the same reasons that they were criticized earlier. The internal cross-subsidizing of one sector by the profits from another one was for a long time condemned for the lack of transparency of the economic calculation, which was to contribute to the weakening of pro-­efficiency stimuli (in Polish literature – see, for example Aziewicz 1998). Now, however, some local governments (e.g., in Germany) come to the conclusion that this is a desirable phenomenon, bringing social benefits. There is nothing wrong seen in, for example, the fact that the profits from energy supply are used to subsidize operation of public transport provided within the same company. As a result, the praise of the NPM is definitely unfashionable at international academic meetings today, and it is less and less appearing in official strategies or government documents (although such appeals were quite common in previous years). But since this approach has been largely rejected, have there been any alternatives? Quite numerous alternative approaches to managing public services (e,g, public value, whole of government, new public governance) were, however, much weaker theoretical concepts (Lodge and Gill 2010). They also did not get even similar popularity. As a result, after a period of NPM domination, at the moment there is no dominant paradigm in the management of public services theory. Swianiewicz (2017) using results of the survey of mayors in 27 European countries illustrates the confusion in this respect – exactly the same arguments are often used by proponents and opponents of privatisation of public services. How do the studies and practice of local governments in Poland look like against this wider background? First of all, we may observe certain “time gap”. There is no doubt that Polish academic research are in a semi-peripheral position1 in relation to European science (although the degree of this peripherality is slowly decreasing). No wonder that new ideas arrive and become popular with a certain delay. Until a few years ago, when uncritical admiration for NPM was already in many European countries passé, references to this trend still appeared directly in some Polish government documents, and they were also clearly promoted by academics researching and advising Polish local governments. At the same time, however, many NPM ideas were adopted in a rather epidermal manner. In fact, the traditional

 The term used in Wallernstein (1974) meaning

1

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administrative culture and the dominance of direct political control over the organization and performance of services in many places were held very strongly. Nevertheless, one can notice in Poland both some of the difficulties described above as well as trends that mark the possible withdrawal from the application of NPM ​​ originated ideas. A good example here is the idea of the ​​ so-called task-oriented budgeting, which in many circles of Polish experts and policy makers has become almost a religion, a panacea for all problems of the financial planning. You can find many local authorities proud about using this technique. For some time, there have also been suggestions for a legal commitment to this budgeting method. Meanwhile, if we look closely at the most advertised cases, we may notice that so far none has been able to fully implement the assumptions behind this method. The basic problem is the development and then consistent application of measurable performance indicators, especially in social services. Observation of the difficulties faced by local governments leads to the hypothesis that the task-oriented budgeting is a beautiful but utopian concept that can never be fully implemented. Although efforts in this direction may translate into positive changes in management (it is therefore a kind of “bunny”, which must be chased, although it can never be caught). Moreover, much of the disappointment and criticism related to the operation of the health care system after 1998 reform in Poland, in fact originates from the attempts of including all health care activities in the framework of clear and measurable indicators and disappointment with the results of this process. Polish local governments also provide examples for the re-municipalization claim. I will quote only two examples of such processes. The first relates to the management of the municipal housing stock. In some cases, this task may be outsourced to private companies. In 2009, three of the 66 largest cities were using such a form. In 2014, only one of them continued to use this management method (Politowska 2015). Two other cities decided to establish own budgetary units dealing with management of communal housing stock, in both cases arguing this change with the expected savings, which was a reversal of the arguments used “traditionally” by NPM supporters. The second case concerns the water and sewage provision. Gdańsk (in early 1990) was the first big city in Poland which decided to offer concession to private company operating in this sector of water supply and sewage system. In its time it was a loud transaction, quoted on the banners of supporters of the privatization of communal services. The current agreement in this area expires in a couple of years, and it is more and more clear that it will not be extended. The city is intensively preparing to take over responsibility for the current operation of the network. Those two examples do not prove that this is a current trend, but the fact that cases of reversing the privatization of the local services’ delivery appear, is very telling and supports observation of Wollmann (2011) from other European countries.

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2.3  T  he Concept of Turn from Local government to Local Governance The second concept discussed in the article from 10 years ago was the concept of local governance. This concept is still present in academic studies as well as in numerous documents produced on a European or national governments’ level. This does not mean, however, that it does not raise various doubts. The first objection is somewhat the result of its enormous popularity. As it happens with fashionable academic concepts, its popularization was accompanied by frequent over-simplifying of its meaning. As a result the term has become blurry and sometimes it is difficult to say what it means. At least in Poland, in a large part of official documents prepared at the government or local government level, the term governance (mostly used in untranslated form) is not used in a quite specific sense, which was defined by authors such as Rhodes (1996) or John (2001), who contributed the most to popularizing it in local government studies. In a conversation between officials of the Polish Ministry of Regional Development, I once heard that the phrase “it is such a governance” was used to describe any not entirely clear, softly outlined concepts of modern management. Several academic studies, not only Polish, are not free from such over-simplifying or trivializing use of the term. The second caveat refers to a more rigorous understanding of the concept, and more specifically to the empirical verification of the theses formulated in it. Laffin (2009), Laffin et al. (2014) analyzed how far the diagnosis and predictions formulated by Rhodes (1996), John (2001) or Sørensen and Torfing (2007) can actually be seen in the contemporary reality of British local governments. His answer is largely skeptical. Proofs to strengthen the role of new actors in local politics, e.g., social organizations, are quite weak, especially taking into account the dependence of the NGO sector on public subsidies. If the significance of some non-public actors has increased, then this applies more to the business community than to societal organizations. The hierarchy of relations between the actors of the local political scene decreased in the rhetorical dimension, but in reality many new policies are still implemented in the top-down manner, and numerous local partnerships only seemingly ensure the equal position of actors from different sectors, while in fact they are dominated by the government representatives. Perhaps the concept of governance is not at all an empirical reflection of a significant change in modes of public management. It is more a normative concept than an empirical one. Similar doubts can be found by examining the practice of local politics also in other European countries. In 2004, I was a co-author of a study referring to the management of Polish cities, the title and main message of which referred to “uneven coalitions” (Swianiewicz et  al. 2006). We wrote there about attempts to build various types of partnerships for development, noting that only at a first glance they were horizontal coalitions of various actors cooperating on an equal basis. In practice, they were mostly dominated by politicians and local government administration, while business and other social partners played relatively minor role only. It seemed to us that the nature of network agreements distinguishes reality of the post-­ communist cities we were studying from that encountered in many Western

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European countries. A similar example is provided by a study of East German cities with the dominant character of pro-development coalitions, referred to by the author as a grant machines,2 aimed primarily at acquiring external funds in the form of subsidies (Bernt 2009). It seems that the concepts of “unequal coalitions” or grant coalitions have a much more universal application than the authors who invented those terms seemed to think.

2.4  C  oncepts of Re-scaling, Europeanization and Multi-level Governance The concepts mentioned in this section are more recent than those discussed above. Interestingly, quite sophisticated, rooted in complex philosophical considerations (e.g. Brenner 2004), the concept of re-scaling has become almost as popular among European urban scholars as governance theory. It has become referred to at nearly all academic conferences devoted to local governments and decentralization, especially if any aspect of territorial reforms is discussed. But similarly to what has happened to the concept of governance, it is equally often simplified or presented as a blurred concept. The terms down-scaling or up-scaling happen to be used to describe almost any changes having the character of changing administrative boundaries or shifting competences between the tiers of public authority. The concept completely lost its original meaning and  – I am afraid  – it became almost useless in explaining the observed reality. To some extent, the concept of multi-level governance (MLG) has met similar fate, which – in many applications – has lost its connection to European policy context. Critical comments are also formulated in relation to the concept of Europeanization, which originally has been related to the MLG. Sometimes academic usefulness of the Europeanization concept is questioned. The critics question the precision of the definitions of the basic concepts as well as their contribution to better understanding of the real policy processes. This criticism is perhaps exaggerated, but at least it indicates the need for further work on the development of the theory.

2.5  C  ontemporary Trends in European Studies of Local Governments In the review of contemporary research, due to my own competences as well as the size limits of this chapter, I impose explicit thematic restrictions. I focus on research related to local political institutions. Even with this limitation, the selection of the research trends presented in this chapter is subjective. To a large extent, it focuses on topics of researches I was at least to some extent involved during the last decade.  The term clearly referring to the classic concept of growth machine (Logan and Molotch 1987).

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My basic observation regarding contemporary local government studies refers to the lack of new “paradigm shifts”,3 opening completely new research areas, or providing new, revolutionary theoretical interpretations. A good example may be provided by studies of local power structures, which still refer mainly to the regime theory, developed by Clarence Stone (1989) in the 1980s, even if still evolving and developing (Stone 2015). But all this does not mean that nothing interesting has happened in the studies of local politics recently. On the contrary, there have been many interesting studies in the last decade which has formed a clear trends. Their selection is briefly discussed in further part of this chapter.

2.5.1  The Renaissance of Comparative Research Recent years has brought unprecedented advancement of international comparative research of local governments in Europe. Previously, researchers in individual countries dealt mainly with “their own backyards”, and the exchange of experience and results during academic conferences had a rather basic character. The comparative studies were mostly limited to comparisons of two or three countries. The groundbreaking typologies of the European local government systems proposed by Page and Goldsmith (1987), and later Hesse and Sharpe (1991) are of a rather basic nature from today’s point of view4 (although it is difficult to overestimate their impact on the development of comparative research). But in the last dozen or so years there has been an explosion of joint international research. It is possible to enumerate several consecutive empirical studies, each of which focused on a different group of local government respondents, each covering at least a dozen countries and was devoted to gathering information on the opinions of important local actors on the tasks and daily functioning of local governments: • “UDITE study” of the heads of municipal administrations (Mouritzen and Svara 2002)  – this research has also resulted in the creation of the most commonly referred concept of types of local leadership; • POLLEADER – a survey of mayors of towns 10,000 inhabitants, first completed in 2003 and repeated as POLLEADER-2 study in an even larger group of countries in 2015 (see Bäck et al. 2005a, b; Heinelt et al. 2018a); • MAELG (Municipal Assemblies in European Local Governments)  – study of municipal councilors conducted in 2006/2007 – the project resulted in several special issues of academic journals, including Lex Localis in 2012 and Local Government Studies in 2013; • “Second tier” – study of local governments of the “upper tier” (above municipal) (Heinelt and Bertrana, 2011).

 In the meaning of scientific revolutions defined by Kuhn (1962).  See also discussion in Ladner et al. (2018).

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Recent years have also brought very significant collective works, attempting to analyze  – according to a uniform methodological frame  – changes taking place in local government systems of various European countries. One can mention here (in order of their publication) the collections edited by Vetter and Kersting (2003), Denters and Rose (2005), Loughlin et al. (2010) or Loughlin et al. (2013). The special reference should be made to the most recent study of Local Autonomy Index, devoted to the attempt to measure the level of decentralization and autonomy of local authorities at the municipal level. The project has covered 39 European countries and has described evolution of local government systems between 1990 and 2014 (Ladner et  al. 2018). The LAI project has led to the creation of a publicly available, fascinating comparative database that can be used for further analysis. Until recently, from the point of view of comprehensive coverage of all countries of the continent, the problem was ignoring Central and Eastern Europe in the comparative syntheses of European local government systems. The eastern part of the continent was either completely neglected (Page and Goldsmith 1987; Hesse and Sharpe 1991; Loughlin 2003), or classified as one, uniform and poorly understood separate type (Loughlin et al. 2010; Heinelt and Hlepas 2006). Only recently has the situation started to change very slowly and there are more and more attempts of integrating empirical observations from Central and Eastern Europe into a single typology covering all European countries. The article published few years ago (Swianiewicz 2014) had some significance in raising the awareness of this need, proving that the local government systems of Central and Eastern Europe were strongly diversified and could not easily be reduced to one separate type. But only very recently those debates concluded in the suggestions of alternative typologies covering more complete set of European countries (Heinelt et al. 2018b; Steyvers and Swianiewicz 2017).

2.5.2  D  ecentralization and Local policies in Front of 2008 Economic Crisis The financial and economic crisis, which began in 2008 and touched all European countries with varying strength, had very painful consequences for several local governments (Davey 2010). The depth of problems experienced by many cities and regions at least matched the financial crisis that was felt by local governments of many countries of Western Europe (and the USA) at the turn of the seventies and eighties of the twentieth century. That earlier wave of “financial stress” resulted in an explosion of innovative policies that helped in the survival of “lean years” (see e,g, Sharpe 1981; Clark and Fergusson 1983; Mouritzen 1993). A significant part of that intellectual revival was in a more or less loose form related with the New Public Management concept, which was discussed earlier in this chapter. One can get the impression that the latest wave of the crisis did not lead to a similar ferment resulting in new theoretical concepts or political recommendations. One possible explanation is that perhaps it might be still too early to formulate such syntheses and their theoretical conceptualizations.

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Nevertheless, the subject of the crisis is quite popular among researchers (e.g., Silva and Buček 2014; Hlepas 2016; Ladner 2017). Hlepas (2016) presented a very interesting attempt to generalize, referring to the concept of path-dependency. He suggests that in countries with a long tradition of strongly centralized systems (even if they have undergone radical decentralization in recent years), the natural response to the crisis is to try to reduce the sense of uncertainty by strengthening control and centralization of the local government system. Hlepas indicates here the example of Greece, but his reasoning can be easily applied to most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland. In turn, in countries with a long tradition of decentralization, the crisis triggers the desire to allow experiments at the local level (which requires deregulation) in the hope that this will lead to innovations that help to save significant resources. Several examples may be found to support this claim of Hlepas. Cameron’s government in the United Kingdom has set a goal of 15% reduction in local government spending by 2015. The reforms introduced by him fall within the ideological framework of the “Big Society” program calling for sharing responsibility for public tasks with the broadly understood sector of social organizations (or with the private sector). With a further deregulation it is inevitable that the level of access to services would vary depending on the place of residence (the issue sometimes referred to as the “postal code lottery” – the quality of services received depends on the address of residence). For many years, such diversity has been perceived as clearly negative. Now, however, there are questions about how much such differentiation has to be accepted? To what extent it is an inseparable part of the ideology of localism? Travers (2010) cites – sometimes surprising – examples of solutions tested by individual British local governments. Some boroughs of London form joint departments within their administrative structures, to jointly perform certain services, or even employ one Executive Director (Chief Executive Officer) for neighbouring local governments. London borough of Barnet adopted the “easy council” programme, which in its assumptions refers to the name of the airline “Easy Jet” and – more generally – to the idea of ​​low-cost airlines. Similarly to the “new generation” airlines, it is proposed to provide very cheap services at a very basic level, while introducing the possibility of access to services at a higher level, but at an additional price. Under this approach, care services for the elderly are based on the principle of vouchers of a certain value that the beneficiaries of this care have to use. Also Denmark decided to deregulate local governments in the face of economic crisis by introducing the Right to Challenge program (Hansen 2010), which is essentially a continuation of the well-known free commune experiment carried out in the Scandinavian countries at the end of the year eighties of the twentieth century.5 Generally speaking, local governments have the right to report regulations (standards or norms relating to the performance of locally provided services) which, in their opinion, excessively restrict their organizational flexibility and reduce the efficiency of management. If their application is found justified, they can get

 See Baldersheim and Stahlberg 1994.

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permission not to comply with the questioned regulation. A similar solution was introduced in Germany, establishing the parliamentary Gemeindefinanzkommission, whose main task was to review the regulations regarding the performance of tasks by local governments in order to repeal all those that may impede the ability to take innovative methods of service management. However it should be noted that the Local Autonomy Index has not noted any spectacular cases of increasing local discretion after 2008, while identified several cases of tightening central control, especially in respect to the rules related to the financial management, local borrowing in particular (Ladner et al. 2018).

2.5.3  T  he Renaissance of Territorial reforms and Discussions on the Issue of Economies of Scale Discussions on the benefits and dis-economies of scale in territorial organization may be traced back many years ago, one can even refer to the opinions expressed by ancient philosophers (especially Plato). But the beginning of the twenty-first century is the time to revive both academic discussions and political decisions relating to territorial consolidation reforms. Two items seem to be the most important in the academic debate. There are several publications worth mentioning in this context. In 2010, Baldersheim and Rose (2010) presented a synthesis of discussions on the conditions for implementing territorial reforms. In 2014 the volume based on empirical research conducted in four West European countries (Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland) and discussing relationship between size of local government and local democracy has been published (Denters et  al. 2014). Theoretical depth and methodological sophistication make this work perhaps the most fundamental achievement in this respect since the publication of the classic study of Dahl and Tufte in 1973. More recently a review of several empirical studies focusing on relationship between size and local democracy has been provided by Van Houwelingen (2017) who illustrated negative impact of territorial amalgamation on political activeness of citizens as well as McDonnell (2019) who claims that mergers of municipalities result in drop of both internal and external efficacy. Similar conclusions are brought by the review of studies performed by Ebinger et al. (2018). Worth remembering is also the attempt to operationalize (along with the empirical verification of the theory) factors affecting the probability of territorial reform, undertaken by Askim et al. (2017). The increase in the interest of politicians in the topic of territorial reforms is best seen if we look at the list of countries that have undergone such changes in the current century. This list includes Macedonia (2002), Georgia (2006), Denmark (2007), Latvia (2009), Greece (two waves of reforms, the second one in 2011), Ireland (2013/2014), Albania (2015), Northern Ireland (2015), and most recently Estonia (2017). One may add to the list parts of federal countries (e.g. Styria in Austria, at least 3 cantons of Switzerland and five lands of Germany) as well as countries in

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which the “silent revolution of creeping territorial consolidation” takes place as a result of several communal mergers taking place almost every year (England, the Netherlands, Iceland and Finland – although in the latter case the change process was recently stopped – Moisio 2017). There are also countries currently undergoing territorial reforms, which final result is not clear yet (Armenia, Cyprus, Norway, and Ukraine). Last but not least, we may mention Portugal with the recent parish amalgamation reform, concerning sub-municipal rather than municipal units. Of course, in each of these cases, one can point to specific conditions and factors leading to reform. But the common feature of reformers is the belief in economies of scale that give hope for significant savings in the conditions of the financial crisis. It is characteristic how many of these reforms have been carried out in the last few years, i.e. after the outbreak of the crisis in 2008. The reforms were carried out both in countries where at the starting point the average municipalities were very small (Greece, Latvia, Georgia, Ukraine), and in countries that were already significant degree of territorial consolidation at the beginning of the process of territorial consolidation (Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland). To put it in a nutshell, for a long time the most widely-held view has been the conviction of the positive impact of territorial amalgamation on the costs of services and the ability to provide a wide range of services while at the same time losing the quality of local democracy (falling interest in public affairs, lower trust in local authorities, and so on). These opinions had been occasionally undermined by some researchers, but recently cases of disagreement with those dominant opinions seemed to be more frequent than before. Questioning the “sacred belief” in economies of scale has appeared also in reports of the World Bank, which for many years was a frequent advocate of territorial consolidation reforms. In one such study, we read that: the number of inhabitants is not a factor determining the cost and quality of public services. Where the population density is small, the potential economies of scale resulting from the creation of a larger local government unit are small (Fox and Gurley 2005).

Recent decades has brought also methodological innovations, allowing for more certain assessment of casual relationships in territorial reforms. This new wave of research tries to treat territorial reforms as quasi-natural experiments and apply relevant methodological designs based usually on Difference-in-Differences, or less often on similar methods such as Synthetic Control or Propensity Score Matching. The recent review (Gendźwiłł et al. 2020) identified over 30 such studies researching various economic impacts of the reforms, and not much lower number of studies analysing the impact of amalgamations (more rarely also splits or municipal secessions) on local democracy. First articles using such methodological designs have been published at the beginning of twenty-first century, but most of them has been published during the last 10 years. Interestingly enough, the quasi-experimental designs have been used much more often in Europe (especially in Nordic countries) than elsewhere. In spite of that methodological progress, scholars are still far from unanimous conclusions on the potential impacts of territorial reform. This claim may be confirmed both by earlier reviews of the academic literature (e.g. Byrnes and Dollery 2002) and most recent meta-analysis of the existing research (Tavares 2018;

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Gendźwiłł et al. 2020). To be on a safe side we may say that saving on administrative spending is perhaps the only clearly confirmed gain of the territorial amalgamation reforms. For most of other dependent variables the results are either diverging or there are still problems with agreed operationalization of the test (e.g., in case of the impact on quality of services) or a few existing studies do not give solid ground for final generalizations. At the same time, there is an univocal conclusion on the existence of common pool effect in a period before the amalgamation. This phenomenon is commonly interpreted as a cost of merger reforms. The available researches suggest that the common pool effect appears both in compulsory and semi-voluntary mergers. All of these suggests that the economic gains usually promised by the proponents of the amalgamation reforms are very far from being obvious, and most likely they are over-estimated. At the same time it is clear that those conclusions have not been so far disseminated and absorbed by policy makers, who still pursue their policies on the basis of very simplistic assumptions, which find little evidence in empirical data. Tavares (2018: 12) conclusion based on general overview of articles in academic journals is that: the survey of the literature recommends caution regarding the expectations of amalgamation reforms and not the unbridled optimism we often see in consultancy and governmental reports. But a lesson for the academic community is also that there is still much to be researched, especially in relation to impacts going beyond simple cost measures. A separate stream of studies on territorial reforms which have substantially developed during the last two decades in Europe has been related to inter-municipal cooperation, sometimes seen as an alternative to amalgamation reforms (Hertzog 2010), and sometimes discussed in comparison with other forms of service delivery reforms (e.g. Bel and Gradus 2018). Bel and Sebő (2019) recently provided formal metaanalysis of several empirical studies conducted in US and in eight European countries, trying to determine under which circumstances inter-municipal cooperation brings costs gains for participating local governments. Their meta-regression model suggests that savings are more likely if: (i) cooperating local governments are very small, (ii) cooperation is based on voluntary arrangements rather than on compulsion or very strong external incentives (iii) cooperation is rather single-­service oriented instead of complex multi-task structures. The full review of relevant studies (often including international comparative dimension – see e.g., Hulst and Van Montfort 2007, 2012; Teles 2015; Teles and Swianiewicz 2018) would go far beyond the limits of this chapter, but the importance of that direction of studies deserves at least a brief mention.

2.5.4  Management of Metropolitan Areas The publication of Heinelt and Kübler (2005) volume, containing a discussion of cases from several European countries, undoubtedly contributed to the revival of European discussions on the management of metropolitan areas. The debate on this

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issue obviously has had a very long history and goes back to the 1930s, and the US debate between reformists demanding establishment of metropolitan government institution and proponents of public choice approach relying on competition and voluntary cooperation of territorially fragmented local jurisdictions. But the study of of Heinelt and Kübler (and later European publications on this subject) brought this debate into realm of the paradigm of governance (in American literature, the term “new regionalism” has been often used in this context). The main conclusion of academic research on the practice of metropolitan management in Europe is that there are no perfect solutions. Referring to two model (essentially different) solutions: French experiences of quasi-voluntary cooperation within metropolitan communities are criticized on the grounds of both organizational efficiency and democratic legitimacy. In turn, “hard institutional solutions” used in some German agglomerations (e.g., Stuttgart, Hannover) are also identified as not free from weaknesses and conflicts around them (Lackowska and Zimmermann 2011). And what is more, these two apparently extremely different solutions (French and German) have much more in common with each other than it might seem at first glance (Swianiewicz and Lackowska 2013). Among the new approaches to the metropolitan issue, one can also mention attempts to answer the question of how specific environment of the agglomeration (blurring the territorial identity of residents, freely migrating among individual municipalities with the place of residence separate from work-place and place of consumption of several public services, which all leads to the weakening identity with a single suburban municipality) on the functioning of local democracy. Worth mentioning in this respect is a multi-year research programme of the International Metropolitan Observatory (covering several countries, not only European ones) initiated by Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers (2005, see also Sellers et al. 2013; Sellers et al. 2017). More recently, Anders Lidström (2013) made a very interesting attempt to gather around him a group of scientists conducting research based on common theoretical framework on the impact of metropolitan environment on local democracy (see also e.g. Lackowska and Mikuła 2018).

2.5.5  Deficit of Democracy Another important stream of research concerns the state of local democracy and debates about its possible improvements. As in the case of the debate on New Public Management, local governments cannot be viewed in isolation from the wider context. In this case it is related to the decreasing trust in representative democracy, and observations regarding the decrease in the legitimacy of elected representatives as a result of drop of electoral turn-out and the wider phenomenon of the collapse of mass political parties. Reflections on the need to revive local democracy have been going on for a long time and are still an important trend of local government research. Related publications cover a wide variety of topics, but I will risk their (simplifying) summary in the following trends:

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• the importance of “participatory democracy” (social participation) to improve democracy and manageability. It is also important to consider the effective deliberation in this field. In recent years, research on the institution of local referenda, and more recently in participatory (civic) budgets has become an important trend6 (eg. Kersting et al. 2016; Sintomer et al. 2008); • creation of “sub-municipal units” (their counterparts in Poland are auxiliary units – district councils, ), especially in big cities, but also in rural areas. Promoters of those reforms usually assume that sub-municipal units would contribute to the revival of local civic activity, improve political processes in cities and improve the efficiency of local service provision by local governments. Although some researchers also see the risks of such inner-city decentralization. Those risks are discussed e.g. by Lowndes and Sullivan (2008), who refer the title of their article to the well-known children’s play “how low can we go?”. The cited article provides perhaps the most comprehensive and most frequently quoted discussion of the arguments for and against the functioning of sub-municipal units. However, there is still a lack of international comparative research in this area (apart from case studies covering individual cities from two countries, or reviews concerning one region of Europe – e.g. Bäck et al. 2005a, b about Scandinavian countries), although that gap has been recently at least partially filled by the volume reviewing experiences of several European countries (Hlepas et al. 2018). • Political response to the crisis of political parties. In this trend, we should mention the studies of the wide-spreading phenomenon of independent (not associated with national political parties) mayors and councilors. A pioneering work in this area has been the book by Reiser and Holtman (2008), and a summary of existing empirical studies has been included in the work of Copus et al. (2011). From this point of view, Poland is a very interesting research laboratory – a country with by far the smallest in Europe penetration of local governments by all national political parties (Fallend et al. 2006; Egner et al. 2018) throughout Europe. The issue has been extensively discussed by publications of Adam Gendźwiłł (2012), Gendźwiłł and Żółtak (2014). • Very close to the previous topic is the research on a spreading wave of introduction of direct mayoral elections that has been evident for over 10 years in Europe and, more generally, the spread of local leadership based on strong individual leadership (as opposed to more popular before collective models and more involvement of councilors in the most important decision-making). One of the first authors trying to analyze that phenomenon was Helge Larsen (2002), but the issue has been picked-up by several other authors, including recent study by Angelika Vetter et al. (2016).

6  The idea of participatory budgeting originates from Porto Alegre, where it was implemented already in 1989. At the beginning of twenty-first century it has gained wider popularity in Europe. Rome, Paris or Sevilla have already implemented this idea in the middle of the first decade of the century (Sintomer et al. 2008). In England the first participatory budget was implemented in 2008 (Moir and Leyshon 2013). A few years later it was adopted by the first Polish city of Sopot. It has soon become a common instrument in most of major Polish cities, and starting from 2018 the amendment to local government law has made it compulsory in all Polish big cities.

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All of the above-mentioned trends are interrelated. All of them are also connected with the at least partial disappointment with the effects of applied innovations. For example, attention is drawn to the dangers of naive use of social consultations and more generally – community involvement in local governance. Contrary to the intentions of the proponents of the reforms, this sometimes leads to greater inequality in the impact on the decisions made and increases the exclusion of some social groups. It is enough to refer to classical theories of collective action or pressure group theory of Manur Olson (1965) in order to realize that some groups will be able to better use the opportunities created by these new solutions than others. Moir and Leyshon (2013) draw attention to similar danger by discussing the use of participatory budgets in England. They also draw attention to the sometimes used techniques of nudging – manipulating citizens in order to make the desired decisions. Sintomer et al. (2008) and Kersting et al. (2016) point out that, contrary to the assumptions of the participatory budget, which was expected to lead to development of public debate on the use of resources, in practice the deliberation is not in the heart of practical implementation of this technique. Decision making is often reduced almost exclusively to the survey method (often an online poll). Similar (and perhaps even greater) disappointment is associated with intra-city decentralization (creation of sub-municipal units). It turns out that the activation of residents in connection with sub-municipal councils activities is questionable. What is worse, they often do not introduce the expected fresh style into the local political life. As Ringeling et al. (2012: 199–200) wrote: [sub-municipal councils] tend to duplicate the problematic game of local council politics for which they were meant to be a solution. At the same time, politicians and municipal administration do not allow sub-municipal councils to become too strong in relation to city-wide institutions. This generates the negative feedback7 – city politicians asked about the reasons for their reluctance to more radical inner-city decentralization, indicate the poor embedding of sub-municipal councils in local communities. The interest of the citizens in the activity of sub-municipal units is minimal, few people go to elections, the legitimacy of the sub-municipal councils to represent the whole community is often questionable. In turn, residents asked about the reasons for their lack of interest indicate the minimal competencies of sub-municipal units and their minimal impact on matters of everyday life. However, in no city, neither in Poland nor in other European countries, the risk has been undertaken to break this “vicious circle” (Swianiewicz 2015; Bäck et al. 2005a, b). We do not know what would happen if the inner-city decentralization was really deep. Some research results suggest a cautious hypothesis that the effects could be more positive than can be drawn from the superficial observation of the existing sub-municipal units.

7  In one of my earlier publications I use the term „vicious round-about” in this respect (Swianiewicz 2015).

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2.6  Conclusion In the first decades of the twenty-first century, local government studies in Europe lacked the paradigmatic turn-overs, which would dramatically change the theoretical foundations of empirical studies. But this does not mean that we have not witnessed any interesting developments. First of all we note the multitude of international comparative studies that have never been so common before. This applies both to the attempts to synthesize the diversity of local government systems in Europe and to international studies of various detailed issues presented in the subsequent parts of this chapter. It can be expected that this richness of empirical material will allow for future generalizations which may be translated into new theoretical concepts. In the conceptual dimension, we have observed the emergence of interesting collective studies synthesizing the state of the current knowledge. First dimension of those synthesis is related to the rapidly growing in last decades number of valuable, empirical studies. Several of them are based on new, more sophisticated, methodologies, such as increasingly popular quasi-experimental designs giving more certainty in conclusions concerning causal relationships. But the side-effect is increasing difficulty in following results of those numerous new studies, which in turn has brought growing popularity of various types of meta-analysis or systematic reviews of literature, which has become a new type of empirical articles published in several journals. Some of such reviews have been quoted above in this chapter. The second stream of such synthesis is related to collected volumes covering the wide range of urban and local government studies. Two works seem particularly worth mentioning. The first of them is a collective work Theories of urban politics (Davies and Imbroscio 2009), comprising 16 chapters. It is a kind of sequel to a very popular book of the same title, which appeared in 1995 (on the editorial page we can even see the annotation that this is the “second edition”). But both the set of authors and the topics discussed do not coincide with the first edition. Therefore it is rather a supplement, or a second volume, and not a simple repetition or update of that study. The Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics (Mossberger et al. 2012) is the second fundamental study published during the analyzed period. It consists of 34 chapters, each of which on a dozen or so pages summarizes the current theoretical and empirical state of art referring to particular detail topics and indicates examples of the most interesting recent studies. From the point of view of this chapter, Part Five, entitled “Emerging research agendas”, seems to be particularly interesting. Within its framework the following issues are discussed: • • • • •

Justice, urban politics and policy, Cities and politics in the developing world, The wired city: a new face of power? A citizen perspective Suburban politics, Building metropolitan institutions.

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One may conclude, that according to the editors of this monumental study, these are the new areas in which the most interesting new studies have appeared in recent years. A significant part of the list of those issues is also discussed in this chapter. Finally, it should be emphasized once again that the selection of detailed research directions and specific studies illustrating the observed trends is very subjective, and at the same time very limited taking into account a huge number of new academic studies. Equivalent selection prepared by another author would probably bring a different set of topics and cited studies. However, this subjective selection can be defended by the list of four most frequently cited (according to SCOPUS data base) articles published in the Local Government Studies during last dozen of years. This list includes: • Lowndes and Pratchet (2012) article discussing impact of austerity policies on local governance; • Bel and Fageda (2007) and Hefetz and Warner (2007) articles on impacts of privatization of local services. • Michels and De Graaf (2010) article discussing democratic deficit and citizens participation in local governance. All of those topics have been included in the review offered in this chapter.

References Askim J, Klausen JE, Vabo SI, Bjurstrom K (2017) Territorial upscaling of local governments: a variable-oriented approach to explaining variance among Western Europen countries. Local Gov Stud 43(4) Aziewicz T (1998) Gospodarka rynkowa w usługach komunalnych. Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką Rynkową, Gdańsk Bäck H, Heinelt H, Magnier A (eds) (2005a) The European mayor: political leaders in the changing context of local democracy. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden Bäck H, Gjelstrup G, Helgessen M, Johansson F, Klausen JE (2005b) Urban political decentralization: six Scandinavian cities. Verlag fur sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden Baldersheim H, Rose L (2010) Territorial choice: the politics of boundaries and Borders. Palgrave Macmillan, London Baldersheim H, Stahlberg K (1994) Towards the self-regulating municipality: free commune and administrative modernization in Scandinavia. Dartmouth, Aldershot/Singapore/Sydney Bel G, Fageda X (2007) Why do local governments privatise public services? A survey of empirical studies. Local Gov Stud 33(4):517–534 Bel G, Fageda X (2017) What have we learned from the last three decades of empirical studies on factors driving local privatisation. Local Gov Stud 43(4):503–511 Bel G, Gradus (2018) Privatization, contracting-out and inter-municipal cooperation: new developments in local public service delivery. Local Gov Stud 44(1):11–21 Bel G, Sebő M (2019) Does inter-municipal cooperation really reduce delivery costs? An empirical evaluation of the role of scale economies, transaction costs, and governance arrangements. Urban Aff Rev 55(1):1–19 Bel G, Hebdon R, Warner M (2018) Beyond privatization and cost savings: alternatives for local government reform. Local Gov Stud 44(2):173–182

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Lodge M, Gill D (2010) Toward a new era of administrative reform? The myth of post-NPM in New Zealand. Governance 24(1):141–166 Logan J, Molotch H (1987) Urban fortune: the political economy of place. University of California Press, Berkeley Loughlin J (ed) (2003) Subnational democracy in the European Union. Oxford University Press, Oxford Loughlin J, Hendriks F, Lidström A (eds) (2010) The Oxford handbook of local and regional democracy in Europe. Oxford University Press, Oxford Loughlin J, Kincaid J, Swenden W (eds) (2013) Routledge handbook of regionalism and federalism. Routledge, Milton Park/New York Lowndes V, Pratchet L (2012) Local governance under the coalition government: austerity, localism and the ‘Big Society’. Local Gov Stud 38(1):21–40 Lowndes V, Sullivan H (2008) How low can you go? Rationales and challenges for Neighbourhood governance. Public Adm 86(1):s. 53–s. 74 McDonnell J (2019) Municipality size, political efficacy and political participation: a systematic review. Local Gov Stud. https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2019.1600510 Michels A, De Graaf L (2010) Examining citizen participation: local participatory policy making and democracy. Local Gov Stud 36(4):477–491 Moir E, Leyshon M (2013) The design of decision making: participatory budgeting and the production of localism. Local Environ 18(9):1002–1023 Moisio A (2017) Less regulation, or more? Recent trends in guidance of Finnish local government. In: Kim J, Mau NJ (eds) Decentralization of education, health and social protection: issues and challenges. The Korea Institute of Public Finance and The Ministry for Economic Affairs and Interir, Copenhagen, pp 201–224 Mossberger K, Clarke S, John P (eds) (2012) Oxford handbook of urban politics. Oxford University Press, Oxford Mouritzen PE (ed) (1993) Managing cities in austerity. Sage, London/Newbury Park/New Delhi Mouritzen PE, Svara J (2002) Leadership in the apex. Politicians and administrators in Western local governments. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh Olson M (1965) The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Page EC, Goldsmith M (eds) (1987) Central-local government relations: a comparative analysis of west European unitary states. Sage, London Peterson OH, Hjelmar U, Vrangbæk K (2018) Is contracting out public services still a great panacea? Soc Policy Adm 52(1):130–157 Politowska M (2015) Mieszkaniowy zasób gminy w polityce miast na prawach powiatu, MA dissertation, WGiSR University of Warsaw Reiser M, Holtman E (2008) Farewell to the party model? Independent local lists in East and West European countries. Verlag fur sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden Rhodes R (1996) The new governance: governing without government. Political Stud 44:652–667 Ringeling A, Daemen H, Schaap L (2012) The dynamics of democratic learning. In: Schaap L, Daemen H (eds) Renewal in European local democracies. Springer, Wiesbaden Sellers J, Kubler D, Walter-Rogg M, Walks RA (eds) (2013) The political ecology of the Metropolis. University of Essex, ECPR Press, Colchester Sellers J, Arretche M, Kubler D, Razin E (2017) Inequality and governance in the metropolis: regimes of place equality and fiscal choices in eleven countries. Palgrave Macmillan, London Sharpe LJ (ed) (1981) The local fiscal crisis in Western Europe. Sage, London/Beverly Hills Silva CN, Buček J (2014) Fiscal austerity and innovation in local governance in Europe. Ashgate, Basingstoke Sintomer Y, Herzberg C, Rocke A (2008) Participatory budgeting in Europe: potentials and challenges. Int J Urban Reg Res 32:164–178 Sørensen E, Torfing J (eds) (2007) Theories of democratic network governance. Palgrave, Basingstoke

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Steen T, Teles F, Torsteinsen H (2017) Improving local service delivery: increasing performance through reforms. In: Schwab C, Bouckaert G, Kuhlmann S (eds) The future of local government in Europe: lessons from research and practice in 31 countries. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, pp 53–78 Steyvers K, Swianiewicz P (2017) Configurations of local autonomy in Europe. Towards an empirical typology of countries, paper presented at annual ECPR conference, Oslo, September 2017 Stone C (1989) Regime politics: governing Atlanta 1946–1988. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence Stone C (2015) Reflections on regime politics: from governing coalition to urban political order. Urban Aff Rev 51(1):101–137 Swianiewicz P (2005) Nowe interpretacje teoretyczne polityki miejskiej. Studia Regionalne i Lokalne 4:6–26 Swianiewicz P (2014) An empirical typology of local government systems in Eastern Europe. Local Gov Stud 40(2):292–311 Swianiewicz P (2015) Intra-municipal units in urban political Systems in Poland: vicious roundabout of marginalization or dead-end street? J Public Adm Policy 7(2):173–198 Swianiewicz P (2017) Urynkowienie, prywatyzacja i rekomunalizacja. Formy dostarczanie lokalnych usług publicznych w opiniach burmistrzów krajów europejskich. Samorząd Terytorialny 5:11–26 Swianiewicz P, Lackowska M (2013) Dwuszczeblowe struktury zarządzania obszarami metropolitalnymi w Europie. Samorząd Terytorialny 4 Swianiewicz P, Mielczarek A, Klimska U (2006) Uneven partnerships: Polish City leaders in search of local governance. In: Heinelt H, Sweeting D, Getimis P (eds) Legitimacy and urban governance. Routledge, London/New York, pp 114–130 Tavares AF (2018) Municipal amalgamations and their effects: a literature review. Misc Geograph Reg Stud Dev 22(1):5–15 Teles F (2015) Local governance and inter-municipal cooperation. Palgrave Macmillan, London Teles F, Swianiewicz P (2018) Inter-municipal cooperation in Europe: institutions and governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London Travers T (2010) „The UK Experience”, presentation ion the Council of Europe seminar Local Government: Responses to Recession Across Europe, Strasbourg, 11–12.10.2010 Van Houwelingen P (2017) Political participation and municipal population size: a meta-study. Local Gov Stud 43(3):408–428 Vetter A, Kersting N (eds) (2003) Reforming local government in Europe: closing gap between democracy and efficiency. Leske & Budrich, Opladen Vetter A, Klimovský D, Denters B, Kersting N (2016) Citizens’ involvement in local government: comparative analyses of change across Europe in times of crisis. In: Kuhlmann S, Bouckaert G (eds) Local public sector reforms in Times of Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, pp 273–286 Wallernstein IM (1974) The modern world-system. Academic, New York Wollmann H (2011) Provision of public services in European countries: from public/municipal to private and reverse? Croat Comp Public Admin 11(4):889–910 Wollmann H (2016) Provision of public and social services in European countries: from public sector to marketization and reverse – or what next? In: Kuhlmann S, Bouckaert G (eds) Local public sector reforms in Times of Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, pp 187–204 Paweł Swianiewicz,  professor of economics, Head of the Department of Local Development and Policy at the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, and Director of the Doctoral School of Social Sciences at University of Warsaw. Between 2005 and 2010  - President of the European Urban Research Association (EURA). Currently he is a member of the Steering Committee of the Standing Group on Local Government and Politics of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). His teaching and research focus on local politics, local government finance and

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territorial administrative reforms in Europe. His empirical research concentrates on Poland, but also on comparative studies of decentralization and local autonomy in Central and Eastern Europe. His recent publications include: ‘The impact of municipal territorial reforms on economic performance of local governments. A systematic review of quasi-experimental studies’ (Space and Polity, 2020), ‘The political budget cycle in earmarked taxes for local public services: a comparison of Poland and Bulgaria’ (Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 2019), ‘Is small beautiful? The quasi-experimental analysis of the impact of territorial fragmentation on costs in Polish local governments (Urban Affairs Review, 2019), ‘An Empirical Typology of Local Government systems in Eastern Europe’ (Local Government Studies, 2014).

Chapter 3

Governance Without Power? The Fight of the Hungarian Counties for Survival Ilona Pálné Kovács

Abstract  Nowadays it is not easy to ask how much decentralisation we need which was regarded as almost a miracle in the nineties. Especially in the last decade, territorial governance or the territoriality of governance has been neglected in many countries, and centralisation generally strengthened in the pressure of new challenges of governance (economic crisis, climate change, terrorism, migration and so on). The chapter is basically a Hungarian case study based on empirical researches, focusing on meso-level territorial governance. At the same time the study provides general lessons also, proving that the actual role of self-governments does not only depend on the reforms intended by the central governments but upon the activity of local and territorial actors as well. Legal competences, instruments are, of course, crucial, but local and meso-level governments are able to act “without legal empowerment” also. The meso-level government has an “in between” position where the real transmission role up or bottom, depends on the real needs of public and societal actors. Keywords  Centralisation · Decentralisation · Meso-level governance · Territorial reforms · Hungarian counties

3.1  Introduction Although the local governance is always in motion, we could observe that the last decades have brought fundamental changes in territorial governance. While the local level has generally (politically) agreed stable position, contrary the meso-level is floating between the central and local levels having not strong support from both central and local directions. For example, the significant loss of the positions of the

I. P. Kovács (*) Centre for Economic and Regional Studies & University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Nunes Silva (ed.), Contemporary Trends in Local Governance, Local and Urban Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52516-3_3

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Hungarian self-governments around 2010 did not lead to stronger political protest or dissatisfaction in society (Pálné et al. 2016). Local autonomy and self-­governance as a political values have been popular in political and academic circles all over the world but the power positions of the local and meso-level governance sectors are not carved in stone, changes in the extent of centralisation and decentralisation are regular. The position of territorial governance is strongly dependent on the given context, parallel to the changes in the expectations against the state, the positions of the territorial actors change. Recently we have witnessed the shock in academic and political circles that the general acceptance and support of decentralisation has been questioned and it is real dilemma whether decentralisation strengthens or weakens the performance of a state (Faguet et  al. 2015: 132–133)? Especially in the last decade, territorial governance or the territoriality of governance has been declined, centralisation strengthened in the pressure of fundamental issues of governance (management of the economic crisis, climate change, terrorism, migration and so on). Answers can no longer be given on the basis of choices of political values only. We need ever more and ever deeper information to find the optimum proportions of centralisation and decentralisation, and balanced relationships between the levels. The word “optimum” can have different meanings in international comparisons (Loughlin et al. 2011; Hooghe et al. 2016a, b). There are countries where the task is still the construction or consolidation of central, meso and local power structure, in other places the challenge is the further improvement of the quality of public services, or the increase of economic competitiveness – on the ground of unchanged power positions and structures. And there are places where it is not efficiency and quality but the democracy dimension of territorial governance that is in the foreground, experimenting with new forms of participation. This chapter is basically a Hungarian case study based on empirical research, focusing in the first place on the changing situation and recent functioning of meso-­ level (county) governance. The topic selection aimed not only to introduce the hectic process of designing of the meso but also to contribute to the broadening literature of territorial reforms. The chapter is focusing on the phenomenon when territorial self-governments are looking for their place and role in the whole governance system without strong competences and resources. In Hungary, territoriality and local self-governance were strongly appreciated at the time of the regime change. Thirty years after, however, the governance system made a strong turn towards centralisation after 2010. Reforms concerned both levels of territorial governance (local and county), but to different degrees. The meso-level (county) self-governments were in underprivileged position since the regime change (1990), but their real nadir started in 2010 that basically deprived them of the previous competences. The study can give evidence however that the actual role of self-governments even at meso-level does not only depend on the reforms decided by the central governments but on the activity, relationships, demand and space of movement of central, local and meso-level actors as well. The division of territorial power is influenced by both bottom-up and top-down forces, the legal competences designated by the reforms can be narrower and broader in reality depending on very

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difficult and conflicting actor arena. The Hungarian counties are fighting for more power, looking for a transmitting role in the power structure which is constructed by contradictory interests of central and local actors. The chance is not promising because of the very firm efforts of central government to expand territorially trough expansion of state administration offices. We need unfortunately more time to realise that the role and quality of the meso-level elected governance does matter for the whole public sector; excluding them is not only a sin but also a mistake.

3.2  International Trends in Territorial Governance In the eighties and nineties it was a general expectation and effort to achieve the convergence of the national governance systems, especially in the forms of following neoliberal principles and models typical of the advanced Western democracies, supporting among other things decentralisation. This was also the case in Europe, connected to the concept of so-called Europeanisation (Bache et al. 2011). In the formation of the standards of good governance systems in Europe it was the older, advanced member states that naturally had a dominant role. Following the western examples was not easy, however, for the new democracies, especially because the “prescription” of these neglected aspects of national, member state context and of suitability (Junjan 2012). Social sciences also neglected for a long time the conceptual and methodological frameworks necessary for the international convergence of public administration (Bauer et al. 2018). The often contradictory and schematic opinions about decentralisation approached the issue as a political value in the first place, and the objective assessment of advantages and disadvantages was not built on credible information and a full-fledged methodology for a long time (Prud’homme 1995; Litvack et  al. 1998). In the last decade, however, theoretical and methodological achievements have been made on the basis of which the frameworks for the evaluation of local and territorial self-governments, enjoying the consensus of professional circles, have been created. It takes a long time and a lot of research experiences for us to ask the unbiased question of what governance is needed in general for the achievement of the desired objectives (Harbers 2018). The structure of governance is becoming more and more complicated, it is ever more difficult to strictly separate competencies, and it is more and more typical that governance tiers and different sectors rather share the tasks. The reforms of territorial governance, no matter how much common ideology and value system they were made on (John 2001), did not eliminate the differences and similarities of the models used by the respective countries (Loughlin et al. 2011; Bertrana and Heinelt 2013; Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014). It is especially in the case of meso-level (regional, county, and so on) self-governments that we can see a slower change of the organisational and competency model rather than in other geographical scales. For the evaluation and measurement, and ranking of the transitions taking place at the meso-level, an academic achievement of special importance

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was the elaboration of regional authority index (RAI) (Hooghe et al. 2010, 2016a, b), which is suitable for the monitoring of the trend of changes. The analyses built on enormous databases had general lessons too, demonstrating that over a decade it is the strengthening of the meso-level self-governments that is typical, especially where regional identity is strong. It also seems to be automatic that dictatorial regimes do not regionalise, and that the competition among the regions of countries strongly embedded in the world economy generates economic growth. At the same time, the activity and significance of meso-levels and metropolitan networks, agglomerations often go beyond national borders, and it is especially the adjustment of the “giant” metropolises into the system of governance that is a serious challenge (Faguet et al. 2015: 152), which also concerns the future role of meso-level self-­ governments. Global processes generate issues that might seem utopistic for the time being, when e.g. Barber asks “if mayors ruled the world?” (Barber 2014), but actually in several fields (especially in environmental protection, regional and metropolitan development policy) we can witness the global collaboration of territorial, especially metropolitan and regional governments (Curtis 2016). The public policy document approved by CEMR in 2016 and the book containing the studies of approximately 100 local and regional leaders also reflect the conviction that Europe will be the continent of local and territorial governments in the future (Vallier et al. 2018). Despite the general trend of decentralisation, it is hard to describe the latest 10-year period in a single manner. Neither decentralisation nor integration at local level or regionalisation can be seen as the exclusive trend of reform. It was especially the economic crisis of 2008 that triggered centralisation reflexes (Göymen and Sazak 2014). The trend of fiscal centralisation, however, was usually only transitory and in several countries the share of local governments has been increased again both from revenues and expenditures. The structural reforms, municipal integrations and regionalisation were also primarily in favour of the process of decentralisation (Halásková and Halásková 2015). The spatial, geographical structure and scales of local and territorial governance are rather diverse, which indicates that experimenting with territorial scales has remained typical even after the reforms resulting in rescaling that culminated in the last decades of the twentieth century (Table  3.1). There is a strong correlation between the position and the size of the respective levels. The position of the meso-­ level is incomprehensible without its relation to the levels above and below it. The “hybrid” approach to territorial reforms is becoming more and more widespread, as the changes are hard to describe with the opposite concepts of centralisation and decentralisation (Askim et  al. 2017) and rescaling, only. More flexible solutions, not with the depth of reforms, are gaining popularity, using different public policy tools instead of the structural tools, like the differentiated location of competences, more rigorous quality requirements, and so on. It is especially important not to identify reforms with the transformation of the territorial, geographical scales. Keating too makes a difference between functional and institutional rescaling, refuting the assumption that only the bigger territorial scale is suitable for “optimising”. Moving over the climax of Western European

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Table 3.1  Territorial administrative structure in European Union member states, 2012, 2016 Country Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark United Kingdom Estonia Finland France Greece Holland Croatia Ireland Poland Latvia Lithuania Luxemburg Hungary Malta Germany Italy Portugal Romania Spain Sweden Slovakia Slovenia

Population, in million 8.5 11.2 7.2 0.9 10.5 5.6 64.3 1.3 5.5 65.9 11.0 16.8 4.2 4.6 38.5 2.0 2.9 0.5 9.9 0.4 80.8 60.8 10.4 19.9 46.5 9.6 5.4 2.1

Regional 2012 9 3

14 5 4 2 27 12 21 0 16 0

16 20 2 41 19 20 8

↗ ↘

↗ ↗

Meso-level Local 2016 2012 2016 2012 9 2357 3 10 10 589 264 380 14 6250 5 98 4 433 226 18 336 16 101 ↘ 99 36,700 13 13 325 12 418 21 556 3 34 ↘ 0 80 16 379 ↗ 380 2479 5 119 60 106 19 19 3177 68 16 295 295 11,481 20 110 110 8094 2 4567 41 3181 19 8169 20 290 8 2930 211

↘ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘ ↘ ↘ ↘ ↘ ↗

↘

↘ ↘ ↘ ↗

2016 2100 589 265 380 6258 98 419 213 313 36,658 325 390 555 126 2479 119 60 105 3201 68 11,313 8006 3400 3181 8176 290 2930 212

Source: Based on CEMR (2012 and 2016), is own elaboration

regionalisation he emphasised that regionalism is a process and it is rarely capable of reaching a new power structure overnight. This is why the concepts of region and regionalism must be differentiated, as regions can be born without regionalism (Keating 2014). The reason why it is important to identify the different groups of stakeholders interested in regional transformation is the fact that their influence basically determines the outcome of reforms concerning regions, meso-level governments. The role of the external driving forces of regionalisation, the European Union is expected to weaken. In the recent decade the once fashionable buzzwords of regional competitiveness, new regionalism and regional cohesion policy have lost much of their attraction. The cohesion reports of the Union and the analyses made for them, on the other hand, still and ever more determinedly suggest that regions matter, what is more, regional governance matters (Charron et al. 2013; Charron

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2016; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2010; Rodríguez-Pose and Courty 2018). At the same time, during the retailed regulation of cohesion policy and its implementation at Union and national level we can no longer feel this attitude (Piattoni and Polverari 2016), and it is feared that a contradiction will still exist in the next programming period between the announced and basically hardly changing Union principles and during their national implementations (Bachtler et al. 2017). It is becoming more and more imperative then to understand what is going on in the respective countries during the shaping of the territorial structure of governance.

3.2.1  T  he Rise and Fall of Hungarian Counties in the History of Territorial Governance In several of my previous papers I analysed the positions of Hungarian counties as meso-level governments (Pálné Kovács 2009a, b, 2015), but Western European academics also wrote a lot about regionalisation in Eastern Europe and Hungary (Tatur 2004; Brusis 2014; Bache et al. 2011; Scott 2009; Bachtler and McMaster 2008). The common message of the analyses covering different periods was that the situation of counties was closely linked to the cycles of centralisation and decentralisation. It was typically, however, the relationship system and intermediary role of the counties to the central governance that was determinant and not their alliances made with the municipal self-governments. The relationship to the towns was especially ambivalent, but small villages too saw the counties not so much as support, rather as a superior power. The first real shock to the power positions of counties came with the regime change of 1990, founded by the political appreciation of the local levels that had always been considered as subordinates in Hungarian history. The 30 years following the regime change was the time of experimenting with meso-level governance, searching for the optimum model for the role of the meso-level and its best geographical size, scale. In this modelling the primary motivations were the accession to the EU and the absorption of the cohesion funds of the Union, similarly to the other new democracies of Eastern Europe. Regionalisation launched for the sake of resource absorption, however, pointed out that the construction of regions can be the tool not only for decentralisation and the increase of competitiveness but also for centralisation (Brusis 2014). The Hungarian political elite, the legislator actually always had an ambivalent approach to the meso-level, and even the seemingly most dedicated regionalisation efforts had no real decentralisation intentions in the background. After 30 years we can also see now that the strengthening of the meso-level lacked the support of not only the central power but also of municipal self-­ governments, as cities saw their competitors and villages saw their bosses in county self-governments (Pálné Kovács et al. 2016). The model of territorial local level governance was thus a victim to the continuous changes of directions, territorial reform concepts concerned either state

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administration or spatial development, but the structure of the system of municipal self-governments was basically left unchanged. The geographical or scale focus typical of territorial reform programmes dominated the discourse, slightly diverting attention from the real power correlations. Academic and political debates too were focused primarily on development policy, economic geography or public service and economies of scale issues, while politicians justified the necessity  – or the negligence  – of reforms either with the millennium-­old Hungarian traditions or the modernisation challenges of the accession to the European Union. Could more complex sociological and power correlations have answered the question of actually whose interest is regionalisation? The governments in power in the decades before 2010 contributed with their inconsistent or neglected reforms to the centralisation turn. The very first steps after the change of government in 2010 indicated that a fundamental turn was coming. Even before the enactment of the new Constitution and the Act on Local Governments, the government “tidied up” the county level. The supra-county regional institutions that had been created by the former reforms ceased to exist both in public administration and spatial development. The reorganisation of the county government offices was also the start of the concentration of the power of central government, not only by the integration of sectoral state administrative offices, formerly belonging to the ministries, to the single county government office but also by the gradual displacement of the county self-governments. In the last decade the county state administration gained much more power and competences at the fields of healthcare, education, elderly homes, cultural institutions than the elected county governments. The comprehensive reform of the system of territorial government system was continued by the transformation of the electoral system. The abolition of county lists in the act on parliamentary elections fundamentally rearranged the relationship between the central and the territorial level. The annihilation of the county list meant that parties did not have to run campaigns at county level, make county level programmes, have county level party apparatuses, and party politicians did not have to do lobbying activity at county level, so counties were abolished in the party political sense. Political influence was further narrowed by the amendment of the rules of municipal/county elections, as a result of which the number of representatives in the local and county government bodies was halved. The Constitution approved in 2011 favours a strong state, marked hierarchy and centralisation, subordinating territorial actors. The government offices of the capital city and the counties are now in the Constitution; this meant a constitutional protection for the county level, including the government offices, which indicates that the government wants to rely on de-concentrated state administration to a large extent. The new act on local self-governments continued the change of governmental model by the radical decrease of the responsibilities of local self-governments, diverting formerly municipal public services to the circle of state administrative institutions subordinate to the government. The new act completely eliminated formerly significant public service functions of county self-governments (hospitals, cultural institutions, social services, public education, and so on), “giving”

52

I. P. Kovács

participation in spatial development and the so-called coordination role in return – the content of the latter has not been identified since then. Unfortunately, the declining of the other institutional frames of civil society, corporations, partnership institutions contributed to the hollowing out of the whole meso governance system. On the whole, the county self-governments are the weakest links in the present system of territorial governance. Their political inference was seriously weakened by the transformation of the electoral system, their constitutional role is negligible compared to those of the county level state administration, the government offices; their real competencies and functions are peripheral in comparison to the previous ones, and in accordance with these their budgets, institutional and administrative capacities were also drastically decreased. It is a question what county self-­ government can do with their authorisation, legitimised by elections, in this knock out position. The answer to this question was sought by the research that I carried out in the framework of a research programme with European financing, in organisation frame of the National University of Public Service (KÖFOP 2016–2018). The research was based on the assumption that the narrow public legal authorisation also allows counties to find a place for themselves, to fill out vacuums in governance, despite the fact that they hardly have any compulsory tasks and regulated financial resources. The essence of the political challenge after the new regulation was whether the meso-level succeeded in “surviving and finding a stable place in the middle”; whether county politicians were able to fulfil a balancing, supporting and mediating role, addressed to them by law, between the local and the central level of governance, and, in general, where they fit in the system of multi-level governance, with more links upwards or downwards. The lack or scarcity of authorisation is a serious disadvantage, of course, but it does not totally annihilate the competencies if the voluntarily accepted functions and roles satisfy existing demands.

3.3  G  overnance Without Power and Own Resources – Findings of an Empirical Survey 3.3.1  Methodological Characteristics The empirical research did not seem to be difficult, given that there are only 19 county self-governments in Hungary. The collection of the information still proved to be difficult, for two reasons. On the one hand, the websites of the county self-­ governments turned out not to be informative enough and up to date, so we were often forced for the in situ collection of the background information, original documents (plans, minutes, statistics, and so on), in the case of practically all county self-governments; on the other hand, the county leaders and the civil servants of the offices were not really talkative, either, but we have to add that most interviews were made in the finish of the parliamentary elections, which necessitated lengthy negotiations on the dates of the interviews. It was the interviews (there were 15 of them) that pointed out the very diverse activities, attitudes about their roles, and operational methods of the county self-governments, which is not a surprise in the

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self-­governmental sector, of course. This phenomenon, however, is even more stressed in the circle of county self-governments, as their tasks are much less precisely defined and standard, the range of their obligatory tasks is narrow, but, as we will see, they are responsible for a large number of voluntary tasks. On the whole the research was built on a partial information system, and it looks at a relatively short initial period (2014–2018), so it was only a blurred snapshot that could be made about county self-governments in motion trying to find their paths.

3.3.2  Organisational Features County self-governments have directly elected bodies, which makes it imperative to analyse the compositions of these bodies. Members of the general assemblies are elected from party lists, although it is also possible for non-party organisations to set up their lists. Due to the changed rules of the elections, however, after 2010 it was only possible to vote for 72 lists, as opposed to the formerly approximately 500 nominating organisations (Dobos 2011:72). It is evident from the results of the elections (Table 3.2) that the elections were dominated by the parties, and it can also be Table 3.2  Number of members in the general assemblies of the counties and the breakdown by nominating organisations, 2014–2018

County Pest Fejér Komárom-E. Veszprém Győr-M.-S. Vas Zala Baranya Somogy Tolna Borsod-A.-Z. Heves Nógrád Hajdú-B. Jász-N.-Sz. Szabolcs-­ Sz.-B. Bács-K. Békés Csongrád

Number of members in the General Assembly 43 20 15 17 21 15 15 19 16 15 29 15 15 24 19 25

Parties, nominating organisations Fidesz-­ KDNP Jobbik MSZP DK 23 8 5 4 13 4 2 1 9 3 2 1 10 3 3 1 14 4 2 1 10 2 2 – 9 4 1 1 11 3 3 – 9 3 1 1 8 3 2 1 15 8 5 1 8 4 2 1 9 3 2 1 14 6 3 1 11 5 2 1 16 5 3 –

LMP 3 – – – – – – 1 – – – – – – – –

Other – – – – – 1 – 1 2 1 – – – – – 1

24 18 20

14 11 11

1 – –

– – –

Source: Edited by the author, using www.valasztas.hu

5 4 4

3 2 5

1 1 –

54

I. P. Kovács

seen that the governing parties (with joint lists) had a strong majority in all of the counties. Possessing the majority also means that there was no political obstacle to the “peaceful”, cooperative character of the relationship to the central government. Our research findings to be demonstrated later, however, pointed out that the peaceful, uniform party context was not enough by far for the reinforcement of the political influence and the role of the county self-governments. This was also due to the fact that majority of county leaders and county representatives are new members in the county self-governments, although many of them had previous experiences in municipal self-governments. The replacement of the actors was of course related to the fact that the parties in power were more and more able to take over the self-­ governmental sector as well, and also to the fact that Parliament declared the mayor (county president) position and the position of representative in the Parliament as conflicting, and so many of the formerly embedded county politicians chose the mandate in the Parliament. Besides the bodies with smaller number of members than before, there are relatively few operating committees, which is understandable, as the set of “obligatory” tasks can be represented by a few types of committees from sectoral and functional aspects (finance, spatial development, legal and procedural committees). The few non-obligatory committees, however, give some information concerning what ambitions the county self-governments have about their roles, and about the fields in which they strive for so-called voluntary acceptance of tasks: environmental protection, cultural affairs, international relations, civil society. An interesting appendix to the operation and the relationship system is to what organisations the respective counties give a standing invitee status, or right of consultation (but of course no right of vote), according to their internal regulations. The list is very diverse, indicating again that the counties can choose different policies in positioning themselves. Mayors of municipalities, big cities are often invited, as are the leaders of different county level state offices and members of the Parliament; it is much less typical, however, that non-governmental organisations or bodies engaged with the assertion of minority rights are invited. There are counties which in their own regulation authorise the president to decide whom to invite to each meeting of the organisation. These features suggest that the civil embeddedness of county self-governments is weak; efforts to build out personal relationships to the central government are much more typical. In addition to, and especially in the absence of political resources and relationship systems the capacity of the administrative organisations and professional background are evidently important. Our analyses covered the organisational conditions, human resources for administrative purposes and financial coverage that each county self-government had in the examined period. As in 2010 self-governments were deprived of almost all their previous tasks, including e.g. the maintenance of different public service institutions (hospitals, schools, and so on), it was expected that the staff and size of the official apparatuses would drastically decrease, making only a small fraction of the former apparatuses with 100–150 staff. The non-­ formalised and nom-stabilised set of tasks led to the large deviations in the number of office staff in the different counties, but the size of a potent management

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organisation is nowhere reached (the number of staff ranges from 40 to 150 persons). It is true that the actually only specified task, spatial development is not necessarily carried out in the frameworks of the official organisation, because different for-profit or non-for-profit agencies can also be set up, especially for the management concerning the resources coming from the European Union. Our researches revealed, however, that the formerly very diverse and complex composition of organisations had become significantly simpler. The reason for this is the complete centralisation of the management of Union resources by the government, despite the fact that the county self-governments were given legal authorisation for participation in development policy. Even the managing authority of the so-called Territorial Operational Programme (TOP), with definite spatial equalisation objective, is now in the central government, and in this body the county self-governments were not even given the intermediary body function, all they can do is give assistance to planning, calls for tenders and preliminary evaluation of applications. This auxiliary role does not necessary require skilled and professional management, not to mention the lack of guarantees for the availability of financial resources necessary for the administration. As it can be read in minutes of the National Association of Counties, county leaders were unable for years to achieve a guaranteed resource for their role done in the management of TOP tenders. Unfortunately this also projects that, although the performance of the administrative organisations managing cohesion resources were basically positively evaluated, especially due to the multi-level, complex institutional system (Bachtler et al. 2014), this advantage is no more likely to exist in the period starting with 2014. Table 3.3 demonstrates the budgetary expenditures of counties before the reform and in the year 2018, clearly showing the magnitude of the losses after 2010, as the former budgets contained the expenditures of the institutions run by the counties, as well, while the budget of 2018 is actually the administrative costs of the present activities. The significant disparities in them show the differences across the counties in the county management of the TOP tenders, largely in the function of what supports counties were given from the programme budget.

3.3.3  C  haracteristics of the Operation of the County Self-Governments It is clear that county self-governments suffered a very serious loss, and the organisational and financial capacities and political resources in their possession do not allow them to acquire considerable influence and power. The basic reason for this is of course the authorisation for competencies itself, as fewer tasks require less resources and organisational capacities. If you like, county self-governments can surrender to the nationalised meso-level organisational sector, as they have hardly any chance for rivalry with the de-concentrated state apparatuses multiplied in size

56

I. P. Kovács

Table 3.3 Operational expenses of the county self-governments in 2010 and 2018 (in thousand HUF) County Bács-Kiskun Baranya Békés Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén Csongrád Fejér Győr-Moson-Sopron Hajdú-Bihar Heves Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Komárom-Esztergom Nógrád Pest Somogy Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg Tolna Vas Veszprém Zala

Operational budget, 2010 n. a. n. a. 20,568,789 35,906,783 18,227,818 20,420,088 18,097,077 12,070,216 8,100,000 15,862,449 12,156,427 10,883,895 n. a. n. a. n. a. 13,609,973 6,227,569 11,567,877 15,964,230

Operational budget, 2018 796,583 1,515,029 507,828 931,163 589,306 446,952 652,476 717,057 516,052 328,157 432,536 410,389 417,689 1,670,582 581,919 571,419 773,264 909,676 613,722

Source: Decrees on the budgets of the counties, 2010 and 2018

and power (more exactly: with the county government offices with many arms, resembling a giant octopus). The situation is nevertheless not so clear-cut, as some latitude remained that county self-governments theoretically could (have) use(d). One possible tool was offered by the legal regulation itself, actually not intentionally, rather coming from “legislative negligence”. The general regulations in the cardinal law concerning the self-governments only define the basic functions of the respective types of self-governments, but further (mostly previously approved) legal regulations define further tasks for self-governments. This is how dozens of tasks related for example to spatial planning, environmental protection, employment, rural development, culture and defence were “left forgotten” in the competency of county self-governments; these are tasks that usually offer no decision-making rights but opportunities for cooperation and action for county self-governments. The other tool that allows responsibilities initiated by the counties is the scheme of voluntarily accepted tasks. The public law regulation concerning self-­governments must generally contain the authorisation of self-governments to take up tasks on the basis of their own decisions and preferences, of course if these can be financed from their own resources. This is actually where the real operational logic of county self-­ governments can be found. Will they be able to stop sliding down and gain power

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positions in the stead of their mutilated role in public law? This question can be relevant not only for the Hungarian meso-level, county self-governments, as the public law regulation allows a lot of models and systems to operate, still we can sense a common trend that meso-level self-governments mediate, facilitate, represent interests and coordinate among different tiers in space, and also participate in economic development and the implementation of tasks that require not so much legal authorisation and public service institutions but knowledge and relationship system: e.g. international relations, environmental protection and employment policy. Our research, on the basis of the assumption above, was looking for these non-­ executive but assisting and coordinating functions among the actual activities of county self-governments, which do require spatial dimensions and can be solved neither at upper or lower level. It was also our research question what reactions are triggered at central and local level by the vacuum situation created with the switching off of meso-level governance. Typical fields of activity should be understandably started with planning, which can be justified by the legal regulations, on the one hand, and own initiatives, on the other hand. In the planning activity of the Hungarian counties it is the cohesion policy of the Union that plays an especially important role, despite the theoretical obligation of the counties to make plans and development concepts also on the basis of the national level regulation of territorial development. In practice, Union programming is the real need, as no own, national resources are available for the financing of own, national plans. The Territorial Operational Programme (TOP) is part of the partnership agreement made with the Union, and therefore means a clear-cut determination against all “own” priorities coming from local initiatives. The “own” county development concept thus still exist in theory, and the real development activity is generated by the Union’s TOP. The other contradiction in the planning process comes from the strongly hierarchic planning mechanism of the TOP, as formally it is the national government and the European institutions that approve it in the system of multi-level governance. The planning hierarchy would not necessarily be an obstacle to bottom-up building, but in reality county self-governments had no chance at all to assert local (municipal, regional) priorities and characteristics in the planning process of the TOP. The hectic, top-down controlled, time-­deficient process of the harmonisation of plans was the first disappointment for the county selfgovernments in their new function, before the 2014–2020 programming period. It soon became evident that the TOP was unsuitable for the handling of the characteristic features of 19 counties; it was more convenient to uniform priorities, which of course reflected the administrative interests of centralised resource allocation as well. The county self-governments theoretically do not only have to make development plan but also environmental protection, in fact, public education plan on the basis of previous regulations, also, in the websites of county self-governments we can see different plans created in order to meet (non-legal) expectations from above, or maybe on own initiative. In order to meet expectations from above and

58

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gain additional resources, in many counties employment pacts were made, as were climate strategies, sport and youth concepts, so-called catching up programmes, in fact, health and social care concepts. These plans, however, do not have a real impact on the public policy of the respective sectors and in the distribution of the resources, for several reasons. A significant part of the plans are related to fields in which counties have no other competencies and tools than planning. Still we could assume some coordinating, soft planning, harmonising role if the stakeholders in the plans had been real actors in the making of plans, or if the cooperation among stakeholders had been achieved during the implementation of the plans. This expectation may have been met only in the case of the so-called employment pacts, but mainly because this formalised cooperation was one of the conditions for the allocation of central resources for employment purposes. However, in cases where the implementation of the plans was left to the local actors, or where there was no systematic central financial support, the plans were more typically forgotten than initiating long-term cooperation. Nevertheless, the findings of the interviews and the minutes of the forums discussing the different types of plans reveal that planning is a key element in the so-called meso-level, or territorial coordination, it does integrate different actors, but in the present system of resource allocation only those plans have a real chance of implementation that are accompanied by central (more exactly: European Union) support, the rest of the plans remain in the papers. There is no doubt that in the examined period county self-governments showed the most intensive activity in the operation of the tendering system related to the TOP, but this did not mean real decision-making power. Although the interviewees and the minutes of the bodies revealed that the recommendations of the counties or the allocation of resources among the applicants (self-governments) were taken into consideration by the managing authority of the ministry, the formal right of decision-­ making, i.e. right of veto lay with the central level. This is a model, definitely conflicting subsidiarity and decentralisation expectations of the Union, but it was evidently legal that the European Union actually accepted. It should also be remarked that the TOP resources with slightly decentralised distribution only make one-fifth of all resources from the Union. In the distribution of the major part of the Union resources county self-governments were not involved, not even as partners expressing their opinions. The above functions were typically applied in the field addressed to the counties by law, in development policy, with a low efficiency, as we could see. As we have mentioned, our research also involved those activities that are not required by law but can be voluntarily implemented by the county self-governments, depending on their own priorities and of course tools. Our job was alleviated by the obligation of the self-governments to list in their own organisational and operational rules (statutes) those activities that they do voluntarily. In addition, minutes and decisions of the general assemblies, and also the interviews contained hints to those activities

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that are not in the competency area of county self-governments if we strictly interpret the law. The collected information shows that counties are active in a very broad range of topics: environmental protection, economic development, culture, international relations, interest representation, sport, tourism. The picture is even more complex if we look at the forms of participation: organisation of events, meetings and forums; making different plans, concepts and statements; support of different municipal and non-governmental organisations, less typically businesses; editing promotional publications; creation of databases; making cooperation agreements, and so on. The common feature of these activities is that they are non-­ binding, and of course offer no real legal and financial guarantee, either, for the palpable impact of the respective activity. These are activities and roles that should be taken as contributions, assistance, harmonisations, the success of which always depends upon whether partners need and accept them. This is one of the reasons why we were interested in the relationship systems constructed by the county self-governments. We mapped for example formalised international relations that are just as intensive as in the period when counties were responsible for important public service functions, among other things. We can draw the conclusion from this, and different documents also prove that the relations are quite formal: it is rare that joint actions, tasks and projects are implemented. Exceptions from this are transborder and cross-­ border cooperation projects, which, however, are also generated by Union resources for the duration of the respective project cycles. The relationship system of the county self-governments to the municipal self-­ governments is strikingly unbalanced, although this relationship system would be vitally important for the stabilisation of the county functions. Several factors contribute to this. It is evident that the attitude and political orientation of county leaders can result in open and closed county policy. The intensity, form and content of relations also depend on the settlement structure of counties: in areas with a lot of small municipalities (there are counties with hundreds of small villages), building out direct relations is problematic, although it might be the most important need. Where the counties are made by viable large settlements, towns and cities, mayors of the municipalities do not need “paternalistic parenting”, in fact, it is more frequent that county self-governments are rivals for the county centre big cities than cooperative partners. It is part of the truth that the relationship system to municipal mayors, the condition of county networks is rather weak both in political and legal sense. The historical role of the counties was the mediation of the central interests, and the still existing prejudices make it difficult to gain popularity among municipal leaders. Another reason for the lack of attention to county self-governments is the deficiency of their tools and functions. Of course, this situation can be further exacerbated if the operation of the county self-governments is not absolutely transparent and if they show indifference to participation, organisation of local associations.

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The relationship system is more homogeneous and less conflict-laden between county self-governments and the central government, and in the area of party politics. This is not accidental. As we have mentioned, the governing parties have a majority in the county bodies, and there is a general recognition, anyway, that it is worth having good relationships to the actors of the government, as in the allocation of the resources clientilism is clearly seen. Now we have analyses operating with facts and figures (Balogh 2015) supporting that resources are not allocated by far where they are the most needed, primarily due to informal lobbying mechanisms. An interesting appendix to the context of the political distribution of resources is that although there are regulated spatial frameworks for the allocation of cohesion resources among municipalities and regions, especially in the case of TOP also within the counties, in practice the districts of the members of the Parliament are prioritised in resource allocation, evidently built on the lobbying activity of representatives. The presidents of the general assemblies of the counties, on the other hand, are not in the narrower circle in power, probably also because their strongly decreased competencies and their worsening local embeddedness makes them politicians of “secondary” rank, similarly to the secondary role of municipal elections (Jérome and Lewis-Beck 1999; Rodden and Wibbels 2010). Anyway, the counties are unable, even with joint efforts, to gain a significance in politics, as their national association usually proves to be unsuccessful in inviting important politicians to their meetings, which was a complaint mentioned by the chairman of the association during the interview made with him. Compared to them, the county seat cities and their national association proved to be much more influential in interest assertion, which is proven by their shares of resources given from the TOP and maybe also in the long run by the announcement of the government programme named Modern Cities. As regards the relationship system of the counties to their inhabitants, it would naturally be an illusion to have any major expectation. The population survey conducted in the framework of the research mentioned, with a representative sample of 1500 respondents (Kákai 2019) was only meant to detect how much inhabitants knew the county and if they had any idea about the functions of the county self-­ governments. The findings were disappointing, although not unexpected. In total, 715 respondents replied “do not know” and another 58 refused to answer.

3.4  Conclusion As a summary we can say that the trends of local governance are more visible than before. The nature, advantages, disadvantages, driving forces and obstacles of decentralised governance are more and more known, processed theoretically and academically, and measurable, owing to the findings of comparative international social- and economic sciences and public policy surveys in recent decades. This

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knowledge, however, does not give enough orientation for the creation of the national models, and territorial reforms. Besides comparative studies, national case studies are still needed. The public policy reforms, including the territorial reforms, followed the same trend for a long time. Strong convergence characterised the European governance systems in the aegis of Europeanisation – at the same time, in recent years the European impacts seems to weaken, it is especially the new member states that joined in 2004 that are looking for their “own” ways. Hungary too was gradually released from strict European control after the pre-­ accession period characterised by so called “conditionalism” (Hughes et al. 2004), not only as regards the criteria of constitutional states and public policy standards but also in matters of territorial governance. The management requirements of cohesion policy towards the cohesion countries, as it was found, can be fulfilled not only in regionalised and decentralised models but also in strongly centralised decision-­ making mechanisms. Centralisation was also strengthened by the general decline in the popularity and chances of European new regionalism (Keating 2014; Elias 2008). Although the Council of Europe expresses its worries about the Hungarian local governmental reform (EC 2014), the internal political motivations still seem to be much stronger than the external “European” expectations. As regards the European’ impact we have to note that the new directions and accents in cohesional policy are approaching to the stronger focus on urban networks instead of regions and also we have to admit the centralisation in many member states (like in Hungary) has been forgiven by the EU. We can say that the Hungarian counties are left “alone”, in absence of external supporters. Our chapter and the empirical case study that serves as its basis demonstrate that it is extremely difficult to get governance role if the necessary competencies and tools are absent. Thus, own initiatives, “bottom up” activity is not enough to counterbalance the intentions of the power for centralisation. The meso-level of governance will be able to implement the mostly transmitting meso-level functions (coordination, cooperation, planning, and so on) if it is accompanied by either strong political authorisation or partners (at lower or upper levels, or horizontally). Hungarian counties have no support in either respect for the time being, they are “floating”, having no tools and authorisation. The lack of meso-level, however, may have detrimental effects in the long run both as regards democratic legitimacy and the efficiency of operation. In the time of the finalising the manuscript we know already the results of the local and county elections in 2019 (Table 3.4). Not surprisingly the county bodies are controlled by two-third majority of the ruling parties (Fidesz-KDNP) although there are several larger cities where the opposition has won. The stronger ties of county politicians to the central government is a chance to be strengthened but it is also a danger of being more centrally dependent at the same time, contributing to the further centralisation.1

1  Thanks to the support provided from the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund of Hungary (Project no. 132294), we can continue our research in the next years.

18

17

29

19

20

21

24

15

18

15

14

44

15

25

15

15

17

15

Baranya

Békés

Borsod-­Abaúj-­Zemplén

Csongrád

Fejér

Győr-­Moson-­Sopron

Hajdú-­Bihar

Heves

Jász-­Nagykun-­Szolnok

Komárom-Esztergom

Nógrád

Pest

Somogy

Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg

Tolna

Vas

Veszprém

Zala

Source: Edited by the author, using www.valasztas.hu

23

Bács-­Kiskun

11

10

11

10

18

9

24

10

9

11

9

16

15

14

12

18

10

12

16

Number of members in the FIDESZgeneral assembly KDNP

County

1

2

1

2

1

1

7

1

–

1

–

2

2

2

1

3

2

2

2

DK

2

2

1

1

3

2

4

1

–

3

–

3

2

–

2

–

2

2

2

Jobbik

–

1

1

1

2

–

–

1

–

1

–

1

–

–

2

–

1

1

–

MSZP

1

1

1

1

–

1

9

–

–

1

–

2

2

2

1

–

1

1

2

Momentum

–

1

–

–

–

–

–

1

–

1

–

–

–

1

1

–

1

1

6

6

8

1

2

1

League of the parties Mi Hazánk in opposition Other local organisation

Table 3.4  Number of members in the general assemblies of the counties and the breakdown by nominating organisations, 2019–2024

62 I. P. Kovács

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References Askim J, Klausen JE, Yabo SI, Bjurstrøm KH (2017) Territorial upscaling of local governments: a variable-oriented approach to explaining variance among Western European countries. Local Gov Stud 43(4):555–576. London, Routledge. https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2017.131010 2 Bache J, Andreou G, Atanasova G, Tmosic D (2011) Europeanization and multi-level governance in south-east Europe: the domestic impact of EU cohesion policy and pre-accession aid. J Eur Publ Policy 18(1):122–141 Bachtler J, McMaster I (2008) EU cohesion policy and the role of the regions: investigating the influence of Structural Funds in the new member states. Gov Policy 26(2):398–428 Bachtler J, Mendez C, Oraze H (2014) From conditionality to Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe. Eur Plan Stud 22(4):735–757. https://doi.org/10.1080/09654313.2013.772744 Bachtler J, Martins JO, Wostner P, Zuber P (2017) Towards cohesion policy 4.0. Structural transformation and inclusive growth. RSA Europe, Brussels Balogh P (2015) Development trap? Unequal territorial patterns of EU-funds allocation in Hungary. Belvedere Meridionale 27(1):86–102 Barber B (2014) If Mayors ruled the world: Dysfunctional nations, rising cities. Yale University Press, London Bauer MW, Ege J, Schomaker R (2018) The challenge of administrative internationalization: taking stock and looking ahead. Int J Public Adm. https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2018.152264 2 Bertrana, X, Heinelt, H (2013) The second tier of local government in the context of European multi-level government systems: institutional setting and prospects for reform. Revista Catalana de dret Públic 46(2013):73–89. https://doi.org/10.2436/20.8030.01.4 Brusis M (2014) Paths and constrains of subnational government mobilization in East-Central Europe. Federal Reg Stud 24(3):301–321 CEMR (2012 and 2016) Local and regional governments in Europe – structures and competences. CCRE-CEMR, Brussels Charron N (2016) Quality of government, regional autonomy and cohesion policy allocations to EU regions. In: Piattoni S, Polverari L (eds) Handbook on cohesion policy in the EU. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 92–104 Charron N, Dijkstra L, Lapuente V (2013) Regional governance matters. A study on regional variation in quality of government within the European Union Member States. Reg Stud. https://doi. org/10.1080/00343404.2013.770141 Council of Europe Congress of Local and regional Authorities (2014) Helyi és regionális demokrácia Magyarországon (Local and regional democracy in Hungary). Új Magyar Közigazgatás 1:6–23 Curtis S (2016) Cities and global governance. State failure or new global order? Millennium J Int Stud:1–23 Dobos G (2011) Elmozdulás középszinten: A 2010-es önkormányzati választási reform hatásai a megyei önkormányzatokra (Shift at meso-level. The impacts of election reform in 2010 on the county self-governments). Politikatudományi Szemle 4:61–83 Elias A (2008) Introduction: whatever happened to the Europe of the regions? Revisiting the regional dimension of European politics. Reg Federal Stud 18:483–492. https://doi. org/10.1080/13597560802351655 Faguet JP, Fox AM, Pöschl C (2015) Does decentralization strengthen or weaken the state? Authority and social learning in a Supple state. In: Faguet, Pöschl (eds) Is decentralization good for development? Perspectives from academics and policy makers. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp 129–159 Göymen K, Sazak O (eds) (2014) Centralization decentralization debate revisited. Istanbul Policy Center, Istanbul Halásková M, Halásková R (2015) The structure and financial dimensions of public administration in EU countries. Transylvanian Rev Adm Sci 45:41–57

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Harbers I (2018) Contribution of the postfunctionalist theory of governance to subnational research in comparative politics. In: Eaton K, Faguet J-P, Harbers I, Schakel AH, Hooghe L (eds) Measuring and theorizing regional governance. Territory, Politics, Governance, pp  10–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2017.1310102 Hooghe, L, Marks, G, Schakel, A (2010) The rise of regional authority: a comparative study of 42 democracies. The Rise of Regional Authority: A Comparative Study of 42 Democracies. Routledge, London. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203852170 Hooghe L, Marks G, Schakel A, Niedzwiecki S, Chapman Osterkatz S, Shair-Rosenfield S (2016a) Measuring regional authority, vol I. Oxford University Press, Oxford Hooghe L, Marks G, Schakel A, Niedzwiecki S, Chapman Osterkatz S, Shair-Rosenfield S (2016b) Community, scale and regional governance. A postfunctionalist theory of governance. Vol. II. Oxford University Press, Oxford Hughes J, Sasse G, Gordon CE (2004) Europeanization and regionalization in the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan John, P (2001) Sage politics texts: local governance in Western Europe. SAGE Publications, London. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446217788 Jérome B, Lewis-Beck MS (1999) Is local politics, local? French evidence. Eur J Polit Res 35:181–197 Junjan V (2012) Introduction to public administrative reforms in CEE and CA countries. In: Nemec, de Vries (eds) Public sector dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe. NISPAcee, Bratislava, pp 21–25 Kákai L (2019) Útkereső Önkormányzatok Magyarországon, Budapest, Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, under printing Keating M (2014) Introduction. Rescaling interests. Territory Politics Gov 3:239–248 KÖFOP (2016–2018) KÖFOP-2.1.2.-VEKOP-15-2016-0001. „A jó kormányzást megalapozó közszolgálat-fejlesztés” (Public service development for good governance). Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, Budapest Kuhlmann, S, Wollmann, H (2014) Introduction to comparative public administration: administrative systems and reforms in Europe. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Litvack J, Ahmad J, Bird R (1998) Rethinking decentralization in developing countries. The World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, Washington, DC Loughlin J, Hendriks F, Lidström A (eds) (2011) Oxford Handbook of local and regional democracy in Europe. Oxford University Press, Oxford Pálné Kovács I (2009a) Regionalization in Hungary: options and scenarios on the ‘road to Europe’. In: Scott JW (ed) De-coding new regionalism. Shifting socio-political contexts in Central Europe and Latin America. Ashgate, Farnham, pp 199–215 Pálné Kovács I (2009b) Europeanisation of territorial governance in three Eastern/Central European countries. Halduskultuur 10:40–58 Pálné Kovács I (2015) Regional elites, networks and the beauty of regionalism in Hungary. In: Bucek J, Ryder A (eds) Governance in transition. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 109–133 Pálné Kovács I, Bodor Á, Finta I, Grünhut Z, Kacziba P, Zongor G (2016) Farewell to decentralization: the Hungarian story and its general implications. Croatian and comparative. Public Adm 4:789–817 Piattoni S, Polverari L (eds) (2016) Handbook on cohesion policy in the EU.  Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. Prud’homme R (1995) The dangers of decentralization. World Bank Res Obs 10(2):201–220. https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/10.2.201 Rodden J, Wibbels E (2010) Dual accountability and nationalisation of party competition: Evidence from four federations. Party Polit 17(5):629–653 Rodríguez-Pose A, Courty J (2018) Regional lobbying and structural funds: do regional representation offices in Brussels deliver? Reg Federal Stud 2:199–229 Rodríguez-Pose A, Ezcurra R (2010) Does decentralization matter for regional disparities? A cross-country analysis. J Econ Geogr 10(5):619–644. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbp049

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Scott JW (ed) (2009) De-coding new regionalism. Ashgate, Aldershot Tatur M (ed) (2004) The making of regions in post-socialist Europe – the impact of culture, economic structure and institutions. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden Vallier F, Poth-Mögele A, Noupadja N (eds) (2018) Europe 2030. Les territories prennent la parole. Local leaders speak out. CEMR Editions Autrement, Paris Ilona Pálné Kovács  is a reserach professor of Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of Hungarian Academy of Science, and full time professor at the Department for Political Science and International Studies of University of Pécs. She is graduated as a lawyer (1978), PhD (1988), doctor of Hungarian Academy of Sciences (2000), habilitation (University of Pécs, 2003). She deals with the management of regional policy, regional governance and local governments, leader of doctoral school at University of Pécs. She led many domestic and international projects, participated in several FP, ESF, INTERREG, TEMPUS, ESPON, UNESCO, OECD, CoR, DG Regio programmes. She was member of some think tanks of the national government and Council of Europe, Soros Foundation preparing legislation and other documents on local government, and regional development. She is a full member of Hungarian Academy of Sciences and elected member of the Academia Europaea.

Chapter 4

From Financial Centralisation to Political Centralisation. The Focal Points of the Municipal Reforms from the Transition Until Present Day Hungary László Kákai

Abstract  After the transition in 1990, Hungary copied Western European examples in the political sense. As a result, the traditions of German and French public administration exerted a considerable impact on the Hungarian municipal system. However, Hungary has recently turned away from this trend and developed its public administration structure in a state-centred way. The structure, which was decentralised at the beginning, displayed signs of fiscal centralisation at first, with elements of political centralisation becoming more and more dominant. From the aspect of our examination, the course that the municipality system has run within the relation system of central power since the transition era is a core issue. For independent research, we examined how the population perceived access to local public services and what subjective population expectancies were associated with the objective conditions of the public services system. How important is it for them whether the given service is provided by the state, the local authority, a non-profit or a for-profit organisation? Keywords  Local government · Centralisation · Decentralisation · Hungary

L. Kákai (*) Faculty of Humanities, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Nunes Silva (ed.), Contemporary Trends in Local Governance, Local and Urban Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52516-3_4

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4.1  Introduction1 The bounds of responsibility of local government and the state, the distribution of roles and tasks between the two stakeholders and the question of centralisation and decentralisation are issues that have regularly been debated during recent years and are still debated today. These topics are not merely administrative or state organisational issues; through public services, these are decisions influencing citizens’everyday lives (Kákai and Vető 2019). Public administration and local government reforms in Europe over the last decades are basically focused on the often conflicting questions of the redefinition of the role of the state and the economy of public services. Thus, in the organisation of public services, we can detect new types of changes in paradigm that are also closely connected to new types of governing methods.2 Many expected the advance of the so-called ‘manager principle’ and the adoption of network governance3 as they thought it was not possible to avoid vindication of the performance principle; for this reason, a stronger prevalence of public procurement rules, quality assurance systems, the measurement of performance and impact analyses could be expected. In opposition to this, others engaged themselves with the‘good governance’ and ‘New Public Management’4 paradigms that are of neoliberal origins and promulgate the dominance of market over state/local government.5 The ‘good government-paradigm’ appeared as an opposition to the neoliberal trend; it is a state-focused (developer state) model of responsibility and accountability principles where the function of governance is to manage economic and social resources, maintain the economy of public affairs with no discrimination and to transparently promote well-being, solidarity, equity and cooperation.6 Last but not least, we can mention how the European Union can be considered a political scope where the symbiosis of the supra-national, inter-governmental and sub-national levels prevails. During the latest 30 years, several theories have been developed to interpret and analyse the operation of this specific integration. One of these is ‘multi-level governance’. In this approach, we can understand the current dominance of the nation state level since it does not query the competences of the 1  Research for this paper was supported by the following grant: EFOP-3.6.3-VEKOP-16-2017-00007 Young researchers from talented students – Fostering scientific careers in higher education. 2  Le Galés 2011: 143. 3  In this form, the municipal formal-legal institutions are mixed with complementary social systems. The citizen in this case is not only the market consumer of the common wealth and services but also an active agent in consuming them – while (s)he practices these roles not only as a voter or as a “citizen”. 4  Osborne 2010. 5  Both the governance paradigm and new public management, that dominated the Anglo-Saxon and Western European public administration for a long time, are part of the same neo-liberal economic philosophy that tried to harmonize private interest and public good, drawing a parallel by this between “political” and “private” market, as well (Johnson 1999). 6  G. Fodor and Stumpf 2007, 2009.

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member state governments. At the same time, it renders both the changing role of states and their mutual dependence on other stakeholders of the world economy and sub-national and non-governmental organisations apprehensible.7 In 2001, the European Union issued the so-called Prodi’s White Paper on European governance (European governance – A white paper). Therein, it was proposed that the state should be “competitive” and, in this sense, “good governance” should mean a demand for “better regulation”. The governance thought also indicates a transformation of the content of governance. On one hand, this means that state functions are changing, i.e. a new requirement arises, according to which the rule of law should likewise be effective; on the other hand, the practising of public power intertwines with the provision of public services, which means that political governance is in effect completed with the functions of managing public administration and public institutions.8 Despite the fact that the state still remains the strongest society organising power, a more and more intense relation with the stakeholders of the private sector comes to life, owing to which the operational9 methods of the state are also transformed.10 International public administration efforts took on a new direction at the beginning of the 2000s. The reason for this was the series of the appearance of mainly financial crises that finally culminated in the global financial crisis of 2008. The reason for the change of attitudes was that smaller and cheaper states that had come to life were unable to provide effective solutions for the problems. In this case, a small and cheap state also meant a weak one. As for governance-like,‘hybrid’ state systems, the main trend of criticism applied to the lack of transparency and democratic legitimacy.11 Consequently, the so-called neo-Weberian state concept stressed: the enhancement of state functions as compared to the past, the requirement of providing quality services in a professional way, the extension of citizen and public administration consultations and the spread of result-based attitudes. ‘Returning’ to Weberian heritage practically emphasised the re-strengthening of state functions and the importance of regulative and control functions of public administration, as well as of public service itself. Although the model cannot be taken as a new paradigm of governance, in many countries, it has brought about significant shifts, pushing the prestige and field of prevalence of New Public Management into the background.12 Perhaps it is for this reason that almost all governments coming to power in the consecutive parliamentary cycles felt it was their duty to transform or modify public administration. During this process, very similar questions and directions of change

 Kákai 2013.  Kákai 2013. 9  This means that the state offers possibilities, outsources, involves, bargains, and builds partnerships and networks by which it saves or mobilizes public sources. 10  Peters and Pierre 2006. 11  Peters and Pierre 2006. 12  Dreschler and Kattel 2009. 7 8

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appeared, such as the requirement of effectiveness, cost-efficiency and success of public administration or the promise of implementing a welfare state.13 In Central Europe, so also in Hungary, after the collapse of state socialism and during the formation of the democratic structures, decentralisation primarily meant the distribution of public service provision in terms of locality and organisational levels and the adequate arrangement of financial relations. In Hungary, there were two options in order to permit durable maintenance of the balanced regulatory result (Weingast 2009).14 The first was the option of the economies of scale which emphasises the differentiation of tasks between units of local governments of different sizes. The other solution was that smaller municipalities provide the service functions exceeding their order of magnitude within the frameworks of consciously organised integration entities. Practically, these were the two ways by which the municipal structure, which was apt to give a framework to the domestic financial, historical and settlement structure challenges and endowments, had to be found. From our perspective, the course that the municipality system has run within the relation system of central power since the transition era is a core issue. How did the relationships of the centre and the municipalities change from the transition until 2010, when the government considerably transformed this system of relations and even the municipality level itself (in a historical way and at a scale similar to that implemented at the dawn of the transition?) Thus, in this study, the interrelation of centralisation and decentralisation is basically determined by the question of which public services were provided at the central or governmental level and which ones were implemented at the regional or local level? Through independent research, we examined how the population perceived access to local public services and what subjective population expectancies were associated with the objective conditions of the public services system. How important is it for them whether the given service is provided by the state, the local authority, a non-profit or a for-profit organisation?

4.2  Frameworks of Public Administration Structures It is very difficult to categorise countries and governmental systems according to the level of decentralisation or the model they adopt in the geographical distribution of power. Geographical division highly depends on the size of the states and their population but first and foremost, on the political-ideological objectives and system of conditions of social organisation and direction (Hajdú 1994).  The main issues and content of the reform cycles are properly summarised by Krisztián Kádár’s paper, introducing the main public administration ideas and output of certain governmental eras. (Kádár 2006) 14  Integration of the exercise of functions, both from the point of view of the organisation of public administration and in terms of the politics of public administration. 13

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Concerning their constitutional legal status, tasks, authority and organisational system, municipal systems show a very diverse picture in Europe. In terms of the constitutional position and role of the local-territorial municipality and the central-­ local relation systems, international literature distinguishes three big country groups (Hesse 1991) of developed democracies:15 the French or Napoleonic, the Anglo-­ Saxon and the mixed or continental model. John Loughlin (2001) provides further precision of this methodological framework by dividing and distinguishing between the systems built on German and Scandinavian traditions. According to this classification, Hungary created her state structure by mixing French and German traditions. The creation of the Hungarian constitution and governmental structure was highly influenced by the public administration and legal structure of the German Federal Republic. At the same time, concerning the structure of the public administration-­ organisational system, Hungary’s constitution and governmental system was not federal; rather, it was uniform or Unitarian16 (Loughlin 2001). Nevertheless, the act on self-governance, passed in 1990, established a strong and decentralised system of territorial municipalities17 that had the following main features (Soós and Kákai 2010: 530): • Decentralisation without enforcing subsidiarity; • Despite the constitutional status, maintaining a strongly centralised system through the allocation of state-controlled resources; • Adopting Napoleonic traditions, i.e., one settlement, one local government principle, which resulted in a fragmented system of local governments. Asserting the above characteristics seemed easier because in Hungary municipal decentralisation had no strong traditions. Forceful centralisation was dominant not only in the state socialist era between 1950 and 1990 but in most of the earlier periods of state development as well. Between 1990 and 2011, in a practically unique way, the Hungarian municipal system assured a very wide range of rights for local governments and the institution of local governance was entrenched by a so-called ‘cardinal’ act (demanding qualified majority), along with legal regulations put down in the constitution. These laws strengthened the autonomy and sovereignty of local authorities (within domestic legal frameworks). The only supremacy above their activities was legal supervision but even that was enforceable only with juridical approval. In terms of the legal conditions determined by the constitution and the act on local governments passed in 1990, the local municipalities (that were either settlement or regional authorities)  It is important to emphasise the fact that this distribution is not only apt to describe territorial structures. 16  This means that the constitution acknowledges the right of self-governance of the settlements, however, it does not give any content details, not even in terms of municipal tasks. This model assures a narrower scope for local authorities (e.g. the operation of municipalities can only be regulated by act, thus the charging of taxes, the method of collecting it as well as the authority and income resources of local governance). 17  Perhaps the term decentralised Unitarian is more precise. 15

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had a wide range of obligations in service provision (obligatory tasks), many possibilities (voluntarily undertaken tasks and entrepreneurial activities) and a high level of financial independence (possibilities of having own incomes, normative central financing, being provided with properties or the possibility of starting business activities). I wish to present the operation of the system and the strengthening of its internal contradictions, as well as the issue of centralisation and decentralisation by introducing the changes in two particular fields. One is the financial environment of the municipal system and the other is the direct contribution of the local authorities in public service provision. The latter is a substantial issue because, in terms of municipal capacities, it is important to present the scope left by the sectoral regulations for the local (settlement) decision makers and the extent to which they can determine the conditions of providing local public services.

4.3  Changes in the Financial Environment After the transition, the budgetary regulation of Hungarian municipalities was built on the so-called resource regulation principle, i.e., central influence was basically asserted on the income side. Local government resources available to finance own expenditure is basically furnished by three sources: (1) revenues shared with central government (personal income tax (PIT), motor vehicle tax, duty tax, and so on) (2) own revenues (basically local taxes), (3) credits and the issuance of municipal bonds. The legislator has always tried to limit the use of the issuance of municipal bonds which is explained by the practical fact that local governments cannot go bankrupt. Since mandatory tasks (street lighting, basic health services, primary school instruction and education, and so on) must be supplied, if their level of debt makes it impossible for a local government to supply them, the state’s central budget should financially substitute the local government. Until recently, loan amounts were limited to 70% of the sum of the principal own source revenues of the local government. However, this restriction was not a real limitation for local governments. In recent years, until 2010, the measure of normative sponsoring has shown itself to be decreasing. While the measure of normative state contribution in 1991, the proportion calculated in the GFS18 system, was nearly 43% of the complete income of governments, by 2008, it had amounted to only 16%, together with normative support of defined application.19

 Government Financial Statistics.  The proportion of the income of governments amounted to 16% of the complete income of the governments with a view of GFS; this proportion exceeded 31% by 2008. The greatest part within this (the proportion exceeded 54% of the incomes in the given year) is represented by local taxes (this proportion was only 15% in 1991).

18 19

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The share of government expenses shows a continuous decrease in GDP,20 even though a decrease in tasks has not taken place. Moreover, different professional (sectorial) laws were created after the Act of Government (AG) came into force and these ascertained further obligatory tasks. These laws partly include professional standards whose financing is not included in normative state contributions. The number of obligatory tasks of government has not decreased but grown. At the same time, governments are not provided with central sources proportionally to growing tasks. This has resulted in the following: the real value of government expenses has decreased by 10% in the last 13 years21 (Vígvári 2006: 26). The deterioration of the conditions of governments is well indicated by the fact that the sources of governments in real value in 2000 constituted only 49% of the sources in the year 1991 (Lóránt et al. 2002). All in all, the data make it clear that Hungarian settlements possessed only partial autonomy since they lacked its main condition: financial independence. The above data indicate the fact that budgetary restrictions were successfully implemented in the municipal sub-system. However, the structural reforms intended to be connected to these restrictions failed again and again, owing to political resistance (Kákai 2015: 209). This process is clearly indicated by the financing system of local governments trying to apply the techniques of welfare systems. In addition, the whole economic policy was restrictive, especially during the government periods of 1994–1997, 1998–2000 and 2003–2004, as well as after 2006.

4.4  R  elations Between Financial and Municipal (Public) Tasks Concerning municipal tasks, the Hungarian municipal system belonged to those with a wide range of responsibilities and general authority. The act on local governance passed in 1990 regulated the issues of tasks, competences and functions in its very first chapters. By local public affairs charged on the local authorities, the legislator referred to the provision of public services for the population and to the practising of power in a municipal way. Thus, the function of local authorities is clear: organising public services and practising public power (regulatory and authority) rights. The general range of the substantial public services provided by local authorities are laid down in the act on local governance to this day. Until 2011, institution-­ focused public task provision was typical at Hungarian municipalities. Some of these were stipulated as obligatory tasks (although not acknowledged as civic rights), while others were described as optional or voluntary tasks. The other part of

 It was approximately 18% after the change of the political system. Today (2013), it has decreased to 8%. 21  Ending in 2003. 20

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public services includes the organisational system of human public services. This set covers the institutions of public education, culture (museums, archives, cultural centres and so on), healthcare and social care. The set of municipal tasks has in fact permanently been extended during the last 20 years22 and the prime reason for this is that the sectoral laws have the right to burden obligatory tasks on local governments and to extend the content of the functions specified in the act on local governance.23 As a consequence of competence regulation, the municipalities had become overloaded with obligatory tasks by 2010, while normative supports had also been permanently changing, automatically following the changes in the regulations on task provision. Meanwhile, duties could also be placed from the municipal side to the governmental sector without any restraint. This happened several times in terms of mid-­ level functions where, instead of county municipalities, decentralised state organs and institutions were given authority. Tasks were continuously transferred, several functions were moved from the municipality to the state sector (like public transport, nature and environmental protection, sports, the protection of built heritage, trade and market control, consumer protection, agricultural and land administration, and so on). In human public services, functions developed in parallel within municipal and state organs (e.g. education, pedagogical services, family care, guardian affairs or the central hospitals in healthcare, and so on) The role of the county development commissions became formal and most of their competencies in decision making ‘shinned up’ to the regional commissions. This meant that the counties were ousted from tender calls and had no possibility to maintain infrastructure (water, sewage or waste). The processes presented above make it clear that one of the problems of the municipal system having operated between 1990 and 2010 was system level and caused by the fact that a compound of the Northern European and the Southern European models tried to be implemented (Torma 2002). Namely, a fragmented settlement system was burdened with too many tasks and too high a level of service quality criteria. Our domestic municipalities were responsible for a wide range of tasks, similarly to the Northern European model which, in principle, meant that the cities with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants had almost the same rights as tiny villages with some hundreds of people. At the same time, most of the Hungarian local authorities had a low population24 like those in Southern Europe but contrary

 According to the Report no. 0012 of 2000 of the State Audit Office of Hungary, the central government burdened 3464 functions and responsibilities on the municipalities between 1195 and 1999, which were regulated in 351 legal measures (including 133 acts). (www.asz.hu/ASZ/jeltar.usf). 23  This practically meant that 23–27% of state expenditure was used at the local level, which meant 12–13% of the GDP (Horváth et al. 2014b: 337). By international comparison, this was a strong expenditure decentralisation (the average in the 27 EU countries was 17 percent). 24  According to the data of 2012 by the Central Statistical Office, in 54% of the local municipalities, the population was below 1000 and was less than 5000 at 37% (1152). All this means that in 90 percent of the settlements, the population was under 5000. 22

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to them, our domestic municipalities were in charge of a wide range of public services and the mid-level municipalities  – small regions and counties  – were only given the ‘rest’of the tasks and a continuously decreasing amount of state support. The Act on local governments, which was passed in 2011,25 made considerable changes to local public service structures and municipal responsibilities. After the decentralisation experiment, the new central approach showed token strong centralisation in the spirit of a neo-Weberian26 philosophy.27 The process started with the appointment of government commissioners at county level and was later completed with the creation of the new constitution, the new act on local governments, the re-tailoring of the central and local governments’ task system and the reform of the finance system. The transformation of the municipal system can be taken as a local public task centralisation process implemented within a decentralised structure. The new regulatory system bringing about a strong centralisation of public service provision was closely connected to the financial consolidation of the local authorities. After 2010, one of the elements of the changes in local governments’ subsidies received from public finances was the introduction of so-called earmarked financing. This means that local governments received a part of central budgetary financing as a difference of average planned expenditure and expected revenue (Horváth et al. 2014b: 339). Although the shift over to labelled financing was not 100%, the process meant a switch from the earlier normative financing system built mainly on unrestricted spending to a cost-oriented system of restricted spending. In 2013, general support adjusted to the obligatory tasks of local governments was provided in the fields of municipal administration, settlement operations (street-­ lighting, public cemeteries, maintenance of public roads and green area management), specialist social care (institutional care) and public education (Tállai 2014). In the cases of social, children’s welfare and cultural functions, task financing was not applied. From 2014 onwards, the system of task financing was extended to children’s catering as well. Owing to the changes in the legal regulations, larger settlements have greater authority.28 The new category of ‘district tow’ appeared; these settlements fulfil (mainly small regional public service) tasks for the whole district.  Act. No. CLXXXIX. on the local governments of Hungary (Mötv.).  The core of this and its difference from New Public Management (NPM) is that while NPM strives to make the state switch over to market operation principles, the neo-Weberian model focuses on reconsidering the role of the state in terms of making it stronger. 27  In this spirit, the requirement of qualitative services and their professional provision, the extension of citizen and public administration consultations and the dissemination of result-based attitudes were given a stronger emphasis than in the previous governmental periods. 28  The model calculations made by Ilona Pálné Kovács et al. (2014) proved “the bigger the settlement, the more services provided” connection that shows bigger leaps in the population categories of 2000 and 10,000 people; this picture is in line with the rules of the obligatory responsibilities allotted to local governments (Mezei 2014: 5). http://docplayer.hu/5950391-Zarotanulmany-a-hazai-onkormanyzatok-finanszirozasi-helyzeterol.html (downloaded: 2 July, 2018.) 25 26

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The circle of mandatory tasks of local governments in Hungary was spectacularly cut following 2010 and especially after 2014, in connection with the transformation of large public utilities and infrastructures.29 To sum up the changes, in the fields of energy, water and public sewer supply, waste and settlement management, the operation of public roads and local public transport, state contribution has become dominant. As a result of competence re-organisation, the range of tasks that local governments are obliged to fulfil has considerably narrowed. This phenomenon can clearly be seen at both municipal county and settlement levels. County municipalities were deprived of all their public service functions (cultural centres, libraries, museums, archives, and so on), except for the task of regional development, which was strengthened. Except for nursery school education, the basic tasks of public education were taken out of the set of local public affairs. In the field of cultural services, the maintenance of museums was moved from county responsibility to the settlements. Similar processes were implemented in the case of public libraries. Essential changes were made in terms of social and healthcare institutions of human public services. Except for basic social and healthcare services, all the tasks were moved under state responsibility. Previously, secondary grammar and technical schools, hostels, museums, libraries, archives, institutions providing special healthcare and elderly care homes were transferred to central authority and the belonging properties were nationalised. As for the settlements, from January 1, 2013, the main expenditure group of local government, the total system of primary and secondary education, was drawn into central organisation. The specialist healthcare units, i.e., the hospitals and the institutions offering integrated outpatient specialist healthcare, were also centralised. The centralisation of the schools and the hospitals substantially decreased the financial rate of the locally implemented functions. In 2012, the amount of municipal expenditure was only 9.3% of the GDP, while it was 12.8% in 2010 (Horváth et al. 2014a: 125). As a result of the changes, the bases of the general power giving the ground of the responsibility and authority of the municipalities weakened and the principle of decentralisation and subsidiarity was strongly restricted as compared to the years before 2010. The centralisation process resulted in very deep changes in the provision of public services for the local population – they affected much of the local public affairs.

 Since the year 2010, in the course of the fundamental transformation of the decentralised system, the amount of tasks performed at the locality decreased by 29%.

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4.5  The Relation of the Population to Change The act on local governance passed in 2011 transformed the local public service structures and municipal tasks considerably. The question is how the population recognised all this. What perceptions of the municipal system did they preserve? This becomes interesting, especially in light of the fact that, according to the value surveys made from the transitional era until recently, the Hungarian population tends to underestimate the costs (tax expenditure) of state intervention and expects/ hopes/demands state intervention and redistribution also in terms of issues where (Csontos et al. 1996), in general, it would be more effective, cheaper and perhaps fairer to involve private or business resources (Tóth 2010). In order to research this, a population survey was ordered by the National University of Public Service.30 The program concerned the spatial optimisation of the Hungarian municipal system, the differentiation of the functions of the settlements according to their sizes, the role of the medium level and the harmonisation of governmental and municipal contribution. The survey was based on a sample of 1500 inhabitants that was representative in terms of settlement size, level of education, gender and age group (Kákai 2019). Only a minor part (31%) of the citizens has heard about the enactment of the law on local governments in 2011 (see Fig. 4.1). With the increase in the level of education, the number of those informed in this issue grows: amongst people with an eighth grade primary level education as a maximum, this rate is 19% and in the case of those with a degree, it is 54%. In terms of the settlement type, the knowledge of

Fig. 4.1  Have you heard that a new law on local government was passed in 2011? (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)  The research was implemented within the framework of the flagship project no. KÖFOP-2.12.VEKOP-15-2016-00001, entitled “Public service development basing good governance”. 30

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the people living in villages lags behind the average; far less (26%) of them has heard about the legal changes than of those living in larger settlements. A generational difference is also perceivable in the level of being informed: it is the middle generations (40–49 and 50–59) that are most likely to have heard of the changes. Most of the people who have heard about the modifications, definitely remember that these have lessened the authority of local governments in relation to local services (see Fig. 4.2). One quarter of them, however, are convinced that the possibilities of the municipalities have grown in this field. The people with secondary or higher education are better informed; most of them say that the range of services provided by local governments has narrowed as a result of the changes in 2011. This also applies to the inhabitants of the capital. The reason for this is clear: it was the effects influencing the capital and its district municipalities that were given the most publicity. Currently, it is the role of district municipalities that generates the most debates between the government, legislature and the municipalities. However, the lack of information does not mean that people lack opinions and definite ideas formed according to their daily experiences and the life situations they face in relation to the limits of the contribution of local governments and the state. When we ask them what role local governments play in public services or whether tasks can be fulfilled better by the state or the municipality, in most cases, they vote for local governments (see Fig. 4.3). Most of them think that municipalities play an important role in providing public services. They are better at fulfilling these tasks since they are aware of local needs.

Fig. 4.2  Have you heard that a new law on local government was passed in 2011? In your opinion, how has the role played by the local government changed as a result of the new law? (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)

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Fig. 4.3  Local government or state? (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)

Fig. 4.4  Local government or state? (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)

Nevertheless, the respondents acknowledge that some tasks must be performed by the state and that responsibilities must be carefully distributed between the two agents (see Fig.  4.4). Also, they have definite negative opinions about the over-­ extension of the state and the centralisation of municipal tasks. These phenomena show two clearly noticeable socio-demographical patterns (see Fig. 4.5). In the group of people with degree-level education, pro-municipality opinions have a strong majority (62%) but the number of those preferring

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Fig. 4.5  Local government or state? (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)

municipalities and of those hesitating is balanced in the rest of the educational groups. There is no considerable or clear pro-state opinion in any of the groups. The pattern, in terms of settlement type, shows a similar picture: while in the main county cities and villages, pro-municipality opinions have a clear predominance; in the capital and the smaller towns, the rate of those supporting local solutions and those hesitating is balanced. Centralisation has no significant support in any of the settlement types. If we consider the opinions included in the questions as statements on a Likert scale and simply summarise them,31 we will find that centralisation, the explicit and strong presence of state contribution, has a very small support base (2%) in terms of public service provision. Half of the respondents (49%) would definitely assign the tasks connected with everyday public services to local government. The number of those hesitating over the question, i.e. being for the local governments and for centralisation at the same time, is nearly as great. Regarding quality and efficiency aspects, those explicitly voting for decentralisation clearly prefer local municipalities in terms of public service provision. These make up 39% of the people asked (see Fig. 4.6).  This analysis method treats the 11 statements as having equal importance, showing the primary atmosphere in connection with the examined topic. However, because of the high number of hesitant persons, it is worth investigating the finer opinion structures and interconnections hiding in the background. Doing a factor analysis, we have discovered two, clearly separated opinion dimensions behind the 11 attitude questions. The first one includes the statements examined from a quality and efficiency perspective whether it is the local government or the state that should provide local services. The second group includes the questions concerning task division from the financial and cost efficiency aspects. With the help of the two factors created this way, we were able to do a cluster analysis and examine the patterns appearing along these opinion dimensions in Hungarian society, along with the type and size of the groups characterised by these patterns.

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Fig. 4.6  Municipality or state? – groups created by means of factor and cluster analysis. (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)

The method of analysis divided the originally very large group of hesitant persons into several parts. One of these groups was all for decentralisation in service provision but preferred the state in terms of the financial issues of public services. This constituted 25% of those asked. The other group was a pro-centralisation group that trusted the state more than any other entity in terms of the financial issues of public services and that, albeit not very strongly, also favoured the state in terms of quality and efficiency aspects. This type of thinking characterised 20% of those interviewed. The answers of 16% were incomplete and thus impossible to categorise explicitly or did not match clearly the opinion structures of any of the groups. Behind these opinion groups, we can find the same socio-demographic patterns as we did with the summary scale analysis (see Fig. 4.7). Within the circle of people with a diploma, the majority (52%) is explicitly for decentralisation. The rate of this opinion group decreases in parallel with the level of education but does not turn into a relative minority at any of the levels, so it is clear that no major preference for centralisation is present in any of the groups. A similar pattern shows in terms of the settlement type: in the main county cities and villages, the relative dominance of the preference for decentralisation is rather clear (45–43%) but this opinion group also bears the greatest share in the capital and the towns. One of the reasons for rejecting strong state contribution may be bad experiences. Since the law on local governments was passed in 2011 and the state withdrew tasks from the local governments, both education and healthcare have been

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Fig. 4.7  Municipality or state? – groups created by means of factor and cluster analysis. (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)

Fig. 4.8  Since 1 January, 2013, …have been operated by the state. Have you experienced any changes in everyday life? (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)

seen in a negative light (see Fig.  4.8): 21% think that the circumstances have declined since the organisation of primary and secondary level education were taken over by the state and the majority thinks conditions have remained the same (which, with regard to the long-lasting negative judgement of education, is also problematic). Only 13% think there has been any improvement. The changes having taken place in the operation of hospitals have been judged even worse. Here, 40% think

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that conditions have definitely declined since 2011. Forty three percent think that there have been no changes, which is also problematic regarding the fact that healthcare had already long been judged as rather poor. The only field where the balance of changes is somewhat positive is public administration. Here, 35% see improvements but the absolute majority of respondents (54%) still see unchanged conditions in this field (see Fig. 4.8). The negative experiences from the past give a clear explanation of why people reject further extensions of the state withdrawing functions from local governments (see Fig. 4.9). When we asked people how the quality of the given service would change if local governments had no authority in public services, we were met overwhelmingly with negative opinions. Those envisioning decline had absolute majority in each field. Only an insignificant portion thought improvement was possible. Further centralisation is definitely seen in a bad light; the majority of the respondents thought that if the state took over the management of a certain field, the quality of related services would decline. By means of factor analysis, we also tried to identify some latent structure in the attitudes concerning the 12 opinions in terms of this question. This, however, was not possible since all 12 aspects appeared in the analysis as belonging to the same dimension. All in all, this means that these citizens do not distinguish between these issues. Cluster analysis proved this as well: those being pessimistic about such changes (50% of the people asked) are pessimistic in terms of each field. Those not expecting any changes (27%) also think the same about the other fields. Respondents

Fig. 4.9  The transformation of the role of local governments is a popular topic these days. In your opinion, if local governments did not play any role in the fields listed below, would their quality be better, worse or the same as it is today? (Source: Based on KÖFOP-2.12.-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 calculation by Kakai 2019)

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predicting improvement (9%) expect the same in all the fields. Concerning the socio-demographic background of these groups, there is practically no difference, the only interconnection can be revealed in terms of the place of residence. Within the group living in the main county cities and villages, the rate of those with a pessimistic approach is significantly higher (55% and 70% respectively).

4.6  Conclusion It is difficult to give a proper answer to the question of what the optimal ratio of centralisation and decentralisation would be (Pálné 2008: 34) since the state provides some control over the economy, intervenes in the economy to some extent, provides free services and implements some redistribution in each field (Kornai 2017: 71). Therefore, disagreements and conflicts evolve at each of the ‘contact points’ of the various sub-systems within the state. Centralisation tendency was a tried and tested practice of managing the economic crisis of 2008 across Europe. In several countries, considerable restrictions and the reorganisation of competences took place. In this respect, Hungary does not differ from other European countries. Thus, concerning the issue of centralization vs. decentralisation, no clear standpoint can be taken. The successfulness of one or another governmental structures depends on several factors, ranging from the economic, social, political and cultural context of the given country to the interpretation of the two governmental structures in that country (Litvack et al. 1998). However, we have to point out the fact that the deep and very rapid transformation of the municipal system was not only a manifestation of the constraints caused by the economic crisis in Hungary but a process carefully prepared by the government in line with international regulations. The basic law passed by a majority of two-thirds and the new act on local governments are both parts of a consequent political process in which the state takes the municipalities as the executors of the government’s policy. Thus, their scope of activity, budget and public service functions are connected to the state more tightly. The government gave a specific response to the problems having pressed the municipal system since 1990. The response was undoubtedly the significant reduction of municipal autonomy and the strengthening of state competences. With these changes, the government also gave an answer to the question of centralisation and decentralisation that had been present since the transition, to the advantage of the previous one. It also weakened the possibility of the awakening of a possible municipal ‘counterbalance’ by ordering a great part of the municipal responsibilities under the central government’s authority and by strengthening control over the economic operation of local governments. The municipal reform directed from above was implemented basically without any considerable opposition from society or municipal associations. The data of the survey introduced in the study make it clear that local population had little information about the changes and their directions and impacts on local life circumstances. Therefore, we cannot undoubtedly state that

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local people are not affected by the transformation of the municipal system and that it is of no importance to them who the local service provider is since, as we can see, they think the presence of local authority is important in many fields. That said, we also cannot say with certainty that local population takes municipal autonomy “under its wings”. At the same time, it is clear that the population is sceptical in terms of governmental centralisation and the philosophy of the strong state willing to solve everything. According to the surveys, they do not think that the state can manage the tasks and services withdrawn from the local level any better than municipalities can. So far, we have no proof of the presumption that the centralisation of the financing and management of a wide range of public services has resulted in more effective and higher quality services (Kákai and Vető 2019). In the light of the results it cannot be proven that transformation brings about a higher standard of services or higher level of content (the data rather show a general decline). At the same time, we cannot conclude that the centralizer itself can be declared “impetuous” or, in terms of its objectives, “irrational” or “mistaken” (Bordás et al. 2020: 93). We can only state that during centralization, the prevalence of community consumer aspects did not at all strengthen, we can rather speak of stagnation or an explicit decline.

References Bordás P, Bartha I, Horváth MT (2020) Jobban teljesít. Centralizáció és minőség. Politikatudományi Szemle 29:1, 73–1, 96 Csontos L, Kornai J, Tóth I Gy (1996) Adótudatosság és fiskális illúziók. In: Andorka R, Kolosi T, Vukovich Gy (szerk) Társadalmi Riport 1996. TÁRKI, Budapest, pp 238–271 Dreschler W, Kattel R (2008/2009) Towards the neo-Weberian state? Perhaps, but certainly adieu, NPM! – the NISPAcee. J Public Adm Policy 1(2):95–101 Fodor G, Stumpf I (2007) A „jókormányzás” két értelme. Avagy a demokratikus kormányzás programja és feltételei. Nemzeti Érdek 3:76–95 Fodor G, Stumpf I (2009) (V)álságkormányzás. A 2. Gyurcsány-kormány harmadik éve. Századvég Kiadó, Budapest Hajdú Z (1994) A magyar megyerendszer történeti, területi fejlődésének sajátosságai. In: Agg Z, Pálné KI (szerk) A rendszerváltás és a megyék. Comitatus, Veszprém, pp. 7–29 Hesse JJ (ed) (1991) Local government and urban affairs in international perspective. Nomos Verlaggesellschaft, Baden-Baden Horváth MT, Péteri G, Vécsei P (2014a) A helyi forrásszabályozási rendszer magyarországi példája, 1990–2012. Közgazdasági Szemle 61(2):121–147 Horváth MT, Péteri G, Vécsei P (2014b) Iskolapélda a pénzügyi decentralizációról. A magyarországi helyi forrásszabályozási rendszer (1990–2012) esete. In: Horváth M.  T (szerk.) Külön utak. Közfeladatok megoldásai. Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest-Pécs, pp 331–353 Johnson DB (1999) Közösségi döntések elmélete. Osiris, Budapest Kádár K (2006) Reformkonyha a magyar közigazgatásban. In: Ágh A, Somogyvári I (szerk) A közigazgatási reform új perspektívái. Új Mandátum Kiadó, Budapest, pp 296–319 Kákai L (2013) Önkormányzat és lakosság viszonya, avagy bizalom vagy bizalmatlanság. In: Csefkó F (szerk) Közigazgatás és az emberek. Pécsi Közigazgatás-Tudományi Közlemények 5. A Jövő Közigazgatásáért Alapítvány, Pécs, pp 153–170

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Kákai L (2015) Helyi és területi önkormányzatok, helyi politika. In: Körösényi A (szerk) Magyar politikai rendszer – negyedszázad után. Osiris – MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont Politikatudományi Intézet, Budapest, pp 203–229 Kákai L (2019) Útkereső Önkormányzatok Magyarországon. Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, Budapest Kákai L, Vető B (2019) Állam vagy/és önkormányzat? Adalékok az önkormányzati rendszer átalakításához. Politikatudományi Szemle 28(1):17–41 Kornai J (2017) Látlelet. Tanulmányok a magyar állapotokról. HVG Könyvek, Budapest Le Galés P (2011) Policy instruments and governance. In: Bevir M (ed) The Sage handbook of governance. Sage, London, pp 142–159 Litvack J, Ahmad J, Bird R (1998) Rethinking decentralization in developing countries. Word Bank. Sector Studies Series, Washington, DC Lóránt Z, Somogyiné LM, Bukova A (2002) Az önkormányzatok költségvetési kapcsolatai 1991–2001 között az Állami Számvevőszék ellenőrzései tükrében. Magyar Közigazgatás 52(6):360–370 Loughlin J (2001) Subnational democracy in the European Union. Challenges and opportunities. Oxford University Press, Oxford. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199562978.001.0001 Mezei C (szerk) (2014) Zárótanulmány a hazai önkormányzatok finanszírozási helyzetéről. MTA Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont Regionális Intézete, Pécs. http://docplayer.hu/5950391-Zarotanulmany-a-hazai-onkormanyzatok-finanszirozasi-helyzeterol.html Osborne SP (ed) (2010) The new public governance? Emerging perspectives on the theory and practice of public governance. Routledge, Abingdon Pálné K. I (2008) Helyi kormányzás Magyarországon. Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest-Pécs Peters GB, Pierre J (eds) (2006) Handbook of public policy. Sage, London Soós G, Kákai L (2010) Remarkable success and costly failures. An evaluation of subnational democracy in Hungary. In: Loughlin J, Hendricks F, Lindstrom A (eds) The handbook of subnational democracy in the European Union. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp  528–551. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199562978.003.0023 Tállai A (2014) Egy év tükrében  – Önkormányzati feladatfinanszírozás 2014  – Országos Önkormányzati és Közigazgatási Konferencia. Előadás. (Budapest, 2014. január 16) Torma A (2002) Önkormányzati reformok Nyugat-Európában és tanulságaik. Magyar Közigazgatás 52(9):513–521 Tóth I Gy (2010) A társadalmi kohézió elemei: bizalom, normakövetés, igazságosság és felelősségérzet – lennének…. In: Kolosi T, Tóth IGy (szerk) Társadalmi Riport 2010. TÁRKI, Budapest, pp 254–287 Vígvári A (2006) Politika, gazdaság és reformkényszer a helyi önkormányzati szektorban, 1990–2004. In: Bőhm A (szerk) A helyi hatalom és az önkormányzati választások Magyarországon 1990–2002. MTA Politikatudományi Intézet, Budapest, pp 19–65 Weingast BR (2009) Second generation fiscal federalism: implications for decentralised democratic governance and economic development. Discussion draft. Hoover Institution, Stanford. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1153440 László Kákai  obtained a degree in sociology on 1994, and in politology in 1995 at the Eötvös Lorand University of Budapest. He is Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Studies, Faculty of Humanities, University of Pécs. He is the Head of the Department Political Science and International Studies at the University of Pécs since 2012. He is a member of Board of Trustees of Civil Review since 2009, as a curator and Vice-president of the Mobility and adaptation College of the National Cooperation Fund.

Chapter 5

Development of Intra-municipality Decentralisation Systems in Japan Yosuke Maeda

Abstract  While globalisation and welfare state restructuring progress, the means and institutions by which government and the ‘public’ interact are dramatically changing. This chapter will concentrate on recent local government efforts for intra-­ municipality decentralisation systems in Japan, in order to contemplate the various rationales, institutions, and practices of governance at community level. Such systems have been introduced at the community level in Japan since the 2000s. However, we currently do not fully understand when, where, and in what form each mechanism, regarding intra-municipality decentralisation systems, has been introduced. Therefore, this chapter aims to clarify the status of the introduction of intra-­ municipality decentralisation systems and its characteristics. Data used in the chapter is based on questionnaire and interview surveys by the author. The questionnaire survey was conducted for all (1741) lowest-tier local governments in Japan. The interview survey was conducted for three local governments. While it was found that decentralisation systems have been widespread in both urban and rural areas, and that there are various systems for decentralisation within local governments, the following three characteristics of the systems were also observed. First, intra-municipality decentralisation systems work to complement existing communities’ functions. Second, the systems provide a place for citizen participation in local governments. Third, the systems contribute to building a framework for community governance. This is the movement of forming an organisation that voluntarily addresses and resolves local issues. There are cases in which even the colour of a business entity has emerged, such as providing more specialised social and welfare services than typical community organisations. However, regarding Japan’s decentralised organisations, it seems that the means of citizen participation is one of the problems. This study offers further discussion for meta-governance, and democracy and legitimacy of governance at the community level. Keywords  Intra-municipality decentralisation · Governance at the community level · Local government · Municipality consolidation · Japan

Y. Maeda (*) Faculty of Education, Niigata University, Niigata, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Nunes Silva (ed.), Contemporary Trends in Local Governance, Local and Urban Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52516-3_5

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5.1  Introduction As globalisation and welfare state restructuring progresses, the means and institutions by which government and the ‘public’ interact are dramatically changing. One of the salient changes is that public roles, which the government dominantly took over through the years, have come to be assumed by horizontal networks between various actors, such as voluntary organisations and private companies. For example, Newman (Newman 2005) states that the role of government in public services is changing from providing services to regulating and coordinating functions for various actors responsible for providing services. Such new means of assuming ‘public’ have been discussed, in social sciences, including geography, as issues of governance. In the early debate over governance, research studies were conducted on the background of emerging horizontal networks and how they differ from the traditional and government-led vertical way (Sørensen and Torfing 2007). Later, as governance-type ‘public’ methods became more widespread, research interest deepened regarding the process of creating networks for governance, success and failure of governance, meta-governance, and democracy in governance (Sørensen and Torfing 2007: 14). While various actors have become involved in the ‘public’, the changing level of governance or emerging multi-level governance have also been noted (Bache et al. 2016; Brenner 2004). On the one hand, the functions and powers that national and local governments have been operating on are on a higher level than before due to the expansion of the authority of super-national organisations, such as the European Union. On the other hand, the promotion of decentralisation has enabled governance to operate at lower levels, such as communities or neighbourhoods within cities and municipalities. As there has been an institutional and spatial reorganisation of the government and the public, governance has evolved at various levels or at multiple levels. This chapter is focused, in particular, on governance at the community level. In parallel with the aforementioned movements, communities are gaining the attention of policy makers as a new subject responsible for public services. Taylor (2011) explains the background of the growing interest in communities as follows: (1) increasing demands for welfare, (2) a declining sense of community and morals, (3) fluctuating representative democracy, (4) increasing uncertainty, and (5) increasing interest in local efforts to address global environmental issues. Under such circumstances, local communities are expected to play various roles as a service provider, as space for cultivating social relations, and as space for establishing governance to discuss, address, and make decisions regarding public issues at local or neighbourhood levels (Lowndes and Sullivan 2008; Maeda 2017; Somerville 2011). Regarding researches on emerging governance at the community or neighbourhood level, Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) state that it is focused on various aspects, such as citizen participation, political participation, and economic rationality. In addition, they attempted to classify governance at lower levels, based on the United Kingdom (UK) case, as follows: there is an empowerment type emphasising the role

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of citizens, a partnership type emphasising citizen welfare, a government type emphasising democratic decision-making, and a management type emphasising economic rationality. Subsequent studies have also shown different developments of community-level governance and devolving power to communities (Bailey and Pill 2015; Durose and Lowndes 2010; Pill and Bailey 2012). This chapter attempts to explore various rationales, institutions and practices of governance at the community level in Japan through recent local governments’ efforts on an ‘intra-municipality decentralisation system’ such as ‘devolving power to the local community’ or ‘institutionalisation of the local community’. In other words, there are systems or schemes for local communities or residents to make decisions, have discussions, complete proposals, collect opinions, coordinate communications, and so on regarding local issues and local government projects and budgets. These systems have various names, such as neighbourhood partnerships, neighbourhood councils, and community management. There are also various names and types for such systems in Japan; cover systems have been implemented under names such as chiiki-kyogikai or –iinkai [community committee], jyumin-­ jichi-­kyogikai [residents’ autonomy committee], chiiki-keiei-kaigi [community management committee], gakku-renraku-kyogikai [school district liaison committee], and machidukuri-kyogikai [community development committee]. Since the 2000s in Japan, such systems have been introduced at the community or neighbourhood level. Through these systems, local governments promote the participation of residents in public issues and, in some cases, attempt to devolve powers to local communities for encouraging independence. The development of such a mechanism is not limited to Japan. For example, in the case of the UK, policies have been implemented with an emphasis on the role of local communities in various policy fields, such as welfare and poverty, as the trend of ‘government to governance’ progresses (Lepine et al. 2007). During recent years, as has been symbolised by the ‘double devolution of power from central government to local government, and from local government to citizens and communities’ (Miliband 2006), it can be said that there has been a movement towards strengthening decision-­ making functions at the local community level, that is, decentralisation within local government. Regarding these schemes, Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) states that while the expansion of the scale of governance is linked to efficiency and fairness, as in the case of the consolidation of a municipality, the introduction of small-scale governance, such as decentralisation within the municipality, is often linked to participation and responsibility. However, according to Griggs and Roberts (2012), these local-level movements suggest that attention has been focused on strengthening the ability to practice local management rooted in efficiency, rather than strengthening community or residents’ participation and accountability. There are various systems of intra-municipality decentralisation, even if limited to Japan. Moreover, it can be said that we currently do not fully understand when, where, and in what form each mechanism is introduced regarding intra-­municipality decentralisation systems. To deepen the aforementioned discussion, it is necessary to determine the current status of the systems.

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In the remainder, this chapter proceeds as follows: (i) In the next section, a brief background of intra-municipality decentralisation systems in Japan is introduced and previous research is examined to clarify the aim of the chapter; (ii) in the third section, the status of the introduction and characteristics of intra-municipality decentralisation systems across the country is examined by using the results of the questionnaire survey sent to all lowest-tier  local governments in Japan and conducted by the author; (iii) in the fourth section, the development of systems in Kushiro City in Hokkaido, Shinjuku Ward in Tokyo, and Unnan City in Shimane are examined by using the author’s interview survey to clarify additional details regarding the variety of intra-municipality decentralisation systems; (iv) in the fifth section, the characteristics of Japan’s intra-municipality decentralisation systems is discussed; and (v) finally, discussion points regarding future research directions are considered in the last section. Data used in the chapter is based on a questionnaire and interview surveys completed by the author. The questionnaire survey was conducted in all (1741) lowest-­ tier local governments (city, wards, town, and villages) in Japan. In the questionnaire, we surveyed the status of the introduction of intra-municipality decentralisation systems and the means by which they were implemented. The questionnaire was mailed in February 2015 and the responses were collected using the enclosed reply envelope or e-mail. The collection rate was 52.6% (n = 916). The interview survey was conducted in Unnan City in February 2016, Kushiro City in September 2017, and Shinjuku Ward in February 2018.

5.2  Intra-municipality Decentralisation Systems in Japan 5.2.1  B  rief Background of Intra-municipality Decentralisation Systems in Japan Recent ‘development of intra-municipality decentralisation’ such as ‘institutionalisation of the local community’ or ‘devolving power to the local community’ in Japan has been discussed by Nawata (2006). In general, regarding the background and spread of the systems throughout the country, three processes can be noted: (1) institutionalisation of community autonomous organisations, (2) promotion of resident participation, and (3) regeneration of residents’ organisations. First, we examine the (1) institutionalisation of community autonomous organisations. Community autonomous organisations are established in a particular geographical area of a local government. There are two contexts in recent institutionalisation of these organisations (Nishio 2005: 275). One is related to consolidation of municipalities termed Heisei-no-daigappei (the great merger in Heisei) during the 2000s, which was encouraged using financial incentives by the central government targeted at local governments, such as cities, towns, and villages (see Rausch 2012). Regarding this merger, there were concerns that the distance between

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residents and local government would increase with the expanding scale of local governments, and that the voices of the districts with a small population would be more difficult to reach than before. Therefore, to promote the merger, the introduction of a system to bridge the distance between the residents and local governments in the new municipality was aimed to reflect the voice of each former municipality in the new municipality (Ishizaki 2006; Okada 2006). The other context is, without relation to the consolidation of municipalities, associated with the establishment of a neighbourhood government within the local government, and is symbolised by the report ‘Building a Self-governing Community and Choosing of Neighbourhood Governments [Jichiteki-komyuniti no kochiku to kinrinseihu no sentaku] (Japan Municipal Research Center 2002)’ by the Japan Municipal Research Center (Nishio 2005: 275). These two movements were reflected in the report of the 27th Local System Investigation Council in the Cabinet Office in 2003. Based on the report, the central government law in 2004 institutionalised two systems for establishing autonomous organisations in particular areas of a local government. One is intended for municipalities that have merged, and it is allowed to set up community autonomous organisations only in some areas within the municipalities. The other is a more general system. However, when establishing a local autonomous organisation, it is required to uniformly install it throughout the municipality. Second, we will look at the movement of the residents’ participation, which in local government management has a long history in Japan. Indeed, during the 1970s, resident participation in decision-making processes within local governments was advocated (Hayami 2014; Nawata 2009). However, participation has gradually become more prominent in administrative and financial reforms, and it can be said that the ‘collaboration’ type of resident participation provides services with the government that have become mainstream during recent times (Nawata 2009). There are many examples of institutionalising the mechanism of resident participation by local governments’ laws. There are increasing cases of establishing autonomous organisations for local residents to discuss and address local issues, while using existing local resident organisations such a residents’ association1 [chonaikai] as the core. Finally, we review the revitalisation of residents’ organisations. It has been a long time since the weakening of residents’ organisations based on territorial bounds has been noted. In response to this, we can see many cases of the establishment of these organisations, which integrate a variety of resident organisations or groups such as residents’ associations, parent-teacher associations, women’s associations, crime prevention groups, and so on, at multiple neighbourhood levels such as elementary school districts, that revitalise activities that cannot be addressed by individual residents’ associations at a one neighbourhood level. Amid these movements, 1  In Japan, long-standing community organisations, such as residents’ associations, have assumed that all households in the area have joined the community. Because these organisations had feudal aspects and functioned as terminal organisations of the local administration, there were many discussions that critically considered residents’ associations (see Maeda 2012).

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intra-municipality decentralisation systems in local governments are becoming widespread nationwide.

5.2.2  Previous Studies Research on Japan’s intra-municipality decentralisation systems has also occurred in parallel with the spread of the systems. Among various research completed on intra-municipality decentralisation systems, we first focused on the studies that capture the overall picture of the systems in local governments in Japan. Ushiyama (2011) conducted a survey of large cities that had experienced a consolidation of municipalities and clarified the situation in which intra-municipality decentralisation systems were widely accepted across the country. Mitani (2007, 2008) shows that the main reason for establishing decentralisation systems is the broadening of municipality areas and the decreases in the number of local government staff in charge of particular areas of the municipalities by using data collected from his questionnaire survey for local governments, which also experienced the merger of municipalities. However, there are also local governments that have not been established to foster a sense of unity in new local governments. Moreover, the Urban Policy Institute, Yokosuka City (2012) is concerned with the legitimacy of the use of subsidies by local self-governing bodies and issues regarding democratic procedures through its survey of the core cities. Japan Municipal Research Center (2014) examines, regarding cities and wards across country, the relationship between decentralised organisations based on the system and branch offices of local governments. These studies partly showed trends of development of decentralisation systems in local governments in Japan. However, in all cases, the scope of the survey was limited by the experience of the municipal merger and size of the local government. There is also a large number of works completed regarding intra-municipality decentralisation systems based on case studies. Among them, many researchers have focused on the system based on the aforementioned national law (Fukushima 2006; Ikeda 2011; Maruyama 2013; Miura 2009; Miyairi 2011; Suzuki 2006, 2011). For example, Fukushima (2006), Ikeda (2011) and Maruyama (2013) examined the case of Joetsu City in Niigata, which established a Regional Autonomous District System [Chiiki-jichi-ku] after the consolidation of municipalities. Joetsu City has introduced public recruitment and public election systems for the selection of members of the District Committee as set up in each district. Maruyama (2013: 497) noted that, in order for the District System to function, the existing residents’ association needs to be involved. Miura (2009) also examined the Regional Autonomous District System of Koshu City in Yamanashi, which was introduced after the consolidation of municipalities. However, the system was abolished a few years after its establishment because there were problems related to inadequate system design and the complicated relationship with the existing residents’ association (Miura 2009).

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Cases not based on national law have been discussed. Yamamoto (2010) examined the intra-municipality decentralisation systems established in Tamba City in Hyogo, termed the Autonomous Committee [Jichi-kyogikai] system. This was based on the city’s guideline for a lump grant allocated towards each committee’s set up in units of elementary school districts after the consolidation of municipalities. According to Yamamoto (2010), there was a problem concerning representativeness of communities with existing joint associations of residents’ association. In addition, Niigata City in Niigata has established an Autonomous Committee [Jichi-­ kyogikai] in each administrative district and Local Community Committees [Chiku-­ jichi-­kyogikai] in smaller areas, such as each elementary or secondary school district, when the city moved to government-designated cities2 due to the consolidation of municipalities (see Ishizaki 2009, 2015; Ogawa 2011). Furthermore, as a pilot project in some areas of Nagoya City in Aichi, the city introduced Community Committees [Chiiki-iinkai] on a trial basis in which members are elected (see Nakata 2011). Notably, there are many examples of local governments that have introduced intra-municipality decentralisation systems without using a system based on the national laws. Additionally, many local governments have established a system without experiencing the consolidation of municipalities. While many researchers have mainly reported cases of local governments that have introduced systems based on the national law, there are still many unclear points regarding nationwide trends of the system. Therefore, this chapter aims to clarify the status of the introduction of intra-municipality decentralisation systems, which has recently become more popular in Japan, and its characteristics, to contribute to recent research regarding governance especially at community level.

5.3  Results of the Questionnaire Survey 5.3.1  S  tatus of the Introduction of Intra-municipality Decentralisation Systems Table 5.1 summarises the current status of the system according to the population size of all local governments and those that have experienced recent consolidation of municipalities. Here, we review and analyse local governments that answered ‘there are intra-municipality decentralisation systems’ and ‘there are systems like intra-municipality decentralisation systems’ as local governments that have established a decentralised system.

2  Government-designated cities are one of Japan’s urban municipal systems. Cities with a population of 500,000 or more can be designated, and authority is strengthened. Twenty cities are designated as of 2019.

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Table 5.1  Introduction of intra-municipality decentralisation systems in Japan There are intra-­ municipality decentralisation Size of systems (%) population All (n = 908) Government-­ 53.8 designated cities 10,000 13.9 Sum 25.8 Government-­ 83.3 Municipalities designated that have cities experienced consolidation of 10,000 42.9 Sum 38.6

There are systems like intra-­ municipality decentralisation systems (%) 30.8

There are not intra-­ municipality decentralisation systems (%) 15.4

Other (%) 0.0

21.6 20.9

41.9 49.5

2.7 1.1

13.3

47.5

2.5

14.3

56.5

0.7

9.2

68.1

1.7

8.0 13.0 0.0

77.5 59.8 16.7

0.5 1.4 0.0

23.5 22.2

35.3 42.2

0.0 0.0

11.5

37.2

2.6

15.6

49.4

0.0

11.0

57.1

2.2

0.0 14.2

57.1 46.1

0.0 1.2

Source: Questionnaire survey by the author

As can be seen from Table  5.1, 38.8% of local governments have introduced intra-municipality decentralisation systems, including ‘systems like intra-­ municipality decentralisation systems’, although there are some regional differences (Fig. 5.1). As mentioned in Sect. 5.2.2, one of the causes for the spread of a decentralisation system is the consolidation of municipalities. For local governments that experienced a merger, the introduction status of the system increases to 52.8% and these municipalities have a higher introduction rate. Given the population size, with the exception of government-designated cities, introduction is progressing in municipalities that have experienced a merger, and this tendency is strong, especially in municipalities with smaller populations.

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Fig. 5.1 Development of intra-municipality decentralisation systems in Japan. (Source: Questionnaire survey by the author. Note: Status of intra-municipality decentralisation systems is shown only for local governments for which valid responses (n = 908) were obtained)

5.3.2  Characteristics of Intra-municipality Decentralisation Systems Next, we review how the decentralisation system is implemented. In the following analysis, only local governments that answered that ‘there are intra-municipality decentralisation systems’ and ‘there are systems like intra-municipality decentralisation systems’ are analysed. And for local governments that have introduced multiple systems, up to two systems are analysed. There are 398 cases in 352 lowest-tier local governments overall. First, we see installation of the decentralisation system introduced by each local government. Table 5.2 displays whether each case is based on national laws, a local government ordinance, or a local government guideline. Focusing on the higher legislation that underpins the system, 11.1% of all cases are based on national law, 23.5% of all cases are based on local government ordinance, and 25.1% of all cases are based on local government guidelines. Others include rules, regulations, comprehensive plans of local governments, and those operated as arbitrary organisations. Systems based on national law are for local governments that have experienced

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Answer National law Local government ordinance Local government guideline Others

% of the total 11.1 23.5 25.1 40.4

Source: Questionnaire survey by the author Notes: (1) Multiple answers are allowed. (2) In the case of systems that relied on multiple laws, the higher legislation that underpins the system is counted

Table 5.3  Geographical units for decentralised organisations (n = 393) Answer Smaller area than primary school district Primary school district Secondary school district Area of former municipality before the consolidation of municipalities Others

% of the total 7.9 39.9 5.6 17.8 28.8

Source: Questionnaire survey by the author

a merger except for one case. They often have formal functions for completing suggestions to the mayors or governors. Next, we see the geographical characteristics of the decentralisation systems. The decentralised systems have some decentralised organisations, committees, or councils within the area of the municipalities. The geographical area that each organisation covers is varied. Table 5.3 shows the set up in geographical units for these organisations. Accordingly, nearly one-half of the decentralisation systems set up decentralised organisations, committees, or councils geographically based on elementary school districts or smaller areas. Similar to previous research, many cases use elementary school districts as a geographical unit. There are approximately 20,000 primary schools and 127 million people in Japan. Estimating, one school covers a population of approximately 6000 people. Districts for elementary schools are often a unit of a joint association of residents, neighbourhood groups, or organisations. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that the size and area of elementary schools vary across the country. Finally, we discuss the members and memberships of the decentralised organisations, committees, or councils. Table 5.4 summarises the members that comprise the decentralised organisations. The most cases are ‘individuals/organisations that are expected to participate in the guidelines’, accounting for 32.1% of all cases. In many cases, representatives of existing residents’ groups such as residents’ associations, parent-teacher associations, and so on, are involved in the decentralised organisation as representatives of local communities. Therefore, not  all residents

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Table 5.4  Members of decentralised organisations (n = 392) Answer Residents through public recruitment (with an election) Residents through public recruitment (without an election) Recommended residents General residents (open) Municipal councillors Organisations through public recruitment Recommended organisations Individuals/organisations that are expected to participate in the guidelines Others

% of the total 1.5 23.0 21.2 30.9 2.3 1.5 7.7 32.1 33.4

Source: Questionnaire survey by the author Notes: Multiple answers are allowed Table 5.5  Types of powers, roles, and functions of decentralised organisations (n = 397) Answer Implementation of community activities and events Communication and coordination between residents or community groups Summarising issues at the community level Suggestions towards local governments on issues at the community level Policy proposals regarding issues at the community level Development of plans regarding the area Summarising opinions on a local government’s project or plans regarding the area Decision making on a local government’ project or plans regarding the area Suggestions towards a local governments’ spending regarding the area Decision making on a local governments’ spending regarding the area Recipients of comprehensive grants Others

% of the total 72.5 65.2 78.3 68.5 40.8 39.5 31.2 10.1 6.5 3.5 27.5 7.3

Source: Questionnaire survey by the author Notes: Multiple answers are allowed

have routes to become a member of the decentralised organisation via public recruitment or without any condition in some cases.

5.3.3  Roles of the Decentralised Organisations Next, we will examine the roles of the decentralised organisation through the intra-­ municipality decentralisation systems. Table 5.5 shows the types of powers, roles, and functions the decentralised organisations can have. In more than 65% of cases, the decentralised organisations assume roles of ‘implementation of community activities and events’, ‘communication and coordination between residents or

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community’, ‘summarising issues at the community level’, and suggestions towards local governments on issues at the community level’. These roles have generally been taken by long-standing residents’ association in geographically smaller areas, such as neighbourhoods. Many decentralised organisations are considered to play similar roles to residents’ associations. Additionally, we should also pay attention to the roles of ‘policy proposals regarding issues at the community level’, ‘developments of plans regarding the area’, and ‘summarising opinions on local government’ projects or plans regarding the area’. These three accounts for more than 30% of all cases. It can be seen that they function as an involved organisation in local governments’ policies and plans. In addition, some organisations with 27.5% are ‘the recipients of comprehensive grants’. There are cases where decentralised organisations take influential initiatives with considerable subsidies or grants amounting to more than 10 million yen3 per year. When the scale of the decentralised organisations becomes large or the organisations take on multiple roles, the function of the secretariat becomes important. Particularly when the budget is large, when subsidies from local governments are used, or when meetings are frequently held, it is not easy to carry out office work by resident volunteers because of the complexity of document preparation. Table 5.6 illustrates the roles played by local governments in decentralised organisations. Subsidising administrative costs is the most common method, accounting for approximately 56.5%. There are also cases where labour costs are provided for hiring staff who are responsible for the office work of the decentralised organisations. Assuming roles of the secretariat of the decentralised organisations accounts for 48.9%, and the administration of meetings, such as taking minutes, is 39.0%. In this manner, there are many cases where the municipality plays a part in the administrative function.

Table 5.6  Roles played by local governments in decentralised organisations (n = 372) Answer Administrative roles of decentralised organisations Administrative roles for meetings of the decentralised organisation such as taking minutes Conducting a meeting of the decentralised organisation Subsidies for administration of the decentralised organisations Providing a manual of the administration of the decentralised organisation No direct relationships with administration of the decentralised organisation Others

% of the total 48.9 39.0 23.9 56.5 7.5 16.4 26.9

Source: Questionnaire survey by the author Notes: Multiple answers are allowed

 At the end of 2019, one US dollar was approximately 109 Yen and one euro was 122 Yen.

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Table 5.7  Local governments’ recognition regarding geographical differences in the extent of activities of decentralised organisations (n = 382) Answer There are geographical differences in the extent of the activities of each decentralised organisation There are not geographical differences in the extent of the activities of each decentralised organisation Do not know

% of the total 49.5 31.2 19.4

Source: Questionnaire survey by the author

Table 5.8 Local governments’ recognition regarding the background of the geographical differences in the extent of activities of decentralised organisations (n = 186) Answer Existence of people who have leadership in the communities Smooth communication among residents Existence of active residents’ association Existence of active community activities such as street cleaning Existence of active NPOs and voluntary groups Active community events such as festivals Existence of clear issues at the community level Others Do not know

% of the total 82.3 66.7 55.9 34.4 21.0 41.9 44.1 44.6 1.1

Source: Questionnaire survey by the author Notes: Multiple answers are allowed

There are many cases in which such decentralised organisations are recognised as having geographical differences regarding the extent of their efforts or activities within municipalities. Table 5.7 shows approximately one-half of the local governments recognise that there are geographical differences in the extent of their activities. In addition, Table 5.8 shows the background of the geographical differences and the extent of their activities, where the most common reply is ‘existence of people who have leadership in the  communities’ (82.3%). Additionally, ‘smooth communication among residents’ is 66.7% and ‘existence of active residents’ association’ is 55.9% in the questionnaire. Reviewing these results, it is thought that both personal factors, such as the existence of people who organise their communities, and organisational factors, such as the existence of organisations and systems that can take action, influence the extent of activities of decentralised organisations. In other words, it can be said that active efforts for decentralised organisations are developed in areas where the residents have enthusiastically addressed issues at the community level until now.

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5.4  Case Studies To understand in more detail intra-municipality decentralisation systems and their diverse forms, this section focuses on three cases in different cities, as shown in Fig. 5.1. The first case is the Community Committee [Chiiki-kyogikai] of Kushiro City in Hokkaido. Kushiro City experienced consolidation of municipalities in 2005 and the system is based on national law. The second case is the District Committee [Chiku-kyogikai] of Shinjuku Ward in Inner Tokyo. Unlike Kushiro City, Shinjuku Ward has not experienced a municipality merger and the system is based on the guideline of each decentralised organisation. The third case is the Community Autonomy Organisation [Chiiki-jishu-soshiki] of Unnan City in the rural part of Shimane. Unnan City was established via the consolidation of five towns and one village in 2004, and the system relies on the city’s guideline. In the following, the backgrounds of the introduction, characteristics, and roles of each system are discussed. Kushiro is politically and economically a central city in eastern Hokkaido Island (Fig.  5.1). The population is 174,432 and its area is 1362.92  km2 as of 2015. In 2005, the new Kushiro City was established by consolidation of the former Kushiro City, Akan Town, and Otobetsu Town. This municipality merger was a main trigger for setting up the Community Committee in Kushiro City. Although it was an equal merger between municipalities, there was a concern that the voice of residents in  Akan Town and Otobetsu Town would be difficult to hear because of the economic and demographical unbalance between Kushiro City and the two towns. Indeed, this is clear reviewing the population differences: the population of Kushiro City is 167,925, the Akan District (former Akan Town area) is 4,882, and the Otobetsu District (former Otobetsu Town) is 1,935. Therefore, the system was introduced for filling the estimated gap between the local government and local communities. Initially, the system was only introduced in the Akan and Otobetsu districts, but it was later implemented in the entire area. The Community Committee at Kushiro City was introduced in 2005 ‘to foster a sense of unity among citizens by reflecting the residents’ opinion in municipal administration and by promoting citizen collaboration’ (Kushiro City4 website). The system has three decentralised organisations that are set up by the former city and towns. Each organisation consists of 10 members who have a term of 3 years, are recommended from community organisations, and selected by public offering. Regarding the latter, candidates are required to write an essay. The organisation can be characterised as a means to participate in local governments. Indeed, the organisations are positioned as an affiliated organisation of the mayor’s office. The city’s ordinance also indicates that the organisation responds to the mayor’s consultation as follows: ‘(Article 4) each committee shall discuss the following matters pertaining to its jurisdiction according to the mayor’s  See https://www.city.kushiro.lg.jp/machi/kyoudou/tiikikyougikai/page00008.html, seen on 27 August 2019. 4

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consultation: (1) regarding implementation of policies based on basic design prescribed in Kushiro town development basic ordinance Article 2 Clause 2, (2) regarding area-­specific office work business, and (3) regarding promotion of citizen collaboration’. Meetings for each district are held three times per year and a city-wide meeting is held once per year as of 2017, in which a city officer takes administrative roles. There is no specific announcement of the meetings to residents, but anyone can observe. In the meetings, although the district organisations basically have the same agenda, there are many local issues in the meetings in Akan and Otobetsu. According to a city officer, local requests and opinions have become the main points of meetings and the nature of the meetings has changed, particularly in Akan and Otobetsu (19 September 2017). Meanwhile, because the meetings aim to foster a sense of unity in the city, a joint meeting once per year is held. Next, we will look at the case of the District Committee at Shinjuku Ward. Shinjuku is one of the cores of politics and economy in Tokyo, including the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and one of Japan’s best city centre areas. The population is 333,560 and its area is 18.22 km2 as of 2015. Establishment of the District Committee was related to the activity of the formerly elected Mayor (2002–2012). The mayor advocated collaboration and wanted to solve local issues not only with administration but also with NPOs and communities. Under such circumstances, the mayor tried resident participation meetings for developing a ward plan and the establishment of the District Committee. The system was established in 2005 for the purpose of networking various community groups, collecting voices, and making proposals to the ward. Ten decentralised organisations have been established in units of administrative branches. Some organisations have subcommittees for different activities. Although branch offices have taken administrative roles for each organisation, part-time staff for the organisations were also assigned to each organisation. Then, this staff take administrative roles not only for particular organisations but also for all organisations. According to the guidelines of the system, the ward proposes a membership plan composed of approximately 36 to 70 members by recommendations from existing residents’ associations, community groups, and public recruitment. The term for each member is 2 years. Unlike the Community Committee in Kushiro City, the District Committee is expected to take a role not only of discussion but also action. To support their community activities, such as graffiti removal and greening, a subsidy of 2.0 million yen was provided to each organisation from 2007 to 2012. The subsidies became 1.8 million yen in 2013. However, this subsidy system was changed in 2018 so that the community organisations other than the decentralised organisations can apply for subsidies. The last case is the Community Autonomy Organisation in Unnan City in Shimane. Unnan is a rural city in Shimane in western Japan. The population is 39,032 and its area is 553.18 km2 as of 2015. In 2004, Unnan City was established by the consolidation of Daito Towon, Kamo Town, Kisuki Town, Mitoya Town, Kakeya Town, and Yoshida Village under the central government’s encouragement.

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While the consolidation was underway, at consolidation-related meetings the way for citizens’ participation in community development and management was discussed, as the distance between local government and residents was thought to be increasing. In 2005, the Community Autonomy Organisation was established to promote activities to address population decline, birth-rate decline, an ageing population, and community development based on collaboration between the local governments and communities. First, a few decentralised organisations were established in select areas of the newly consolidated city and by 2006, with the support of a consultant, organisations were set up throughout the remainder of Unnan City. There are 30 decentralisation organisations in Unnan that function in all areas of the City. Each organisation has been basically established in the unit of the primary school districts. Each organisation covers a population ranging from 200 to 3000 and receives grants of approximately 8 million yen per organisation, depending on the population and area. The organisations have been expected to develop mutual help for disaster prevention, daily life, welfare, transport services provisions, community management, social business, and so on. Basically, the decentralised organisations are composed of a steering body and some working groups within the existing community groups. Active members of organisations tend to be appointed based on previous local involvement and the process is not necessarily open. Compared to the cases in Kushiro and Shinjuku, the Community Autonomy Organisation can be characterised as a much more management- or business-­ focused body than a committee. For example, a decentralised organisation is running a community grocery shop at a former primary school that was closed in 2008 because of a shrinking population of children aged between 6 and 12. The last local grocery shop in the community had been closed, so the organisation attempted to run a new shop to maintain the quality of daily life. The primary school has also served as a community centre in this area. In another case, an organisation provides a socialising space for communities with a small market and light diet services in the space of a vacant store. It is thought that in this way these spaces can contribute to the well-being of residents, particularly elderly residents. While such activities are being developed, Unnan City regularly launches competitions for activities or businesses of different organisations. This stimulates the organisations to make increasingly meaningful services available. Regarding Unnan City, we should also mention its contribution to the country-­ wide network of intra-municipality decentralisation systems. Some local government officials from three different cities, including Unnan City, set up the Committee for the Network of Promotion of Multi-Functioned Small Autonomy (CNP, Shokibo-­ takino-­jichi-suishin-nettowaaku) in 2015. The CNP consists of approximately 300 local governments and voluntary groups across the country in both urban and rural areas as of 2019. Additionally, the CNP holds cross-country or regional workshops to learn how to encourage and establish community governance. These workshops are not for community residents; rather, they are for local public officials or voluntary group staff members. Moreover, the city plays a role to disseminate the significance of the decentralised organisations, such as holding seminars for overnight stays to learn about the activities of Unnan City.

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5.5  Discussion Based on the results of Sects. 5.3 and 5.4, here we examine the characteristics of the development of decentralised organisations in Japan. As we have seen thus far, it has become clear that the intra-municipality decentralisation system has become widespread in Japan, regardless of whether it is urban or rural. As mentioned in previous studies, while it can be said that the recent consolidation of municipalities encouraged by central government has become a major driving force for the spread of the decentralisation system in local governments, it is important to state that approximately 30% have introduced the system even in local governments that have not experienced merging of municipalities. The systems introduced are also diverse. Focusing on the role played by decentralised organisations, ‘implementation of community activities and events’, ‘communication and coordination between residents or a community’, ‘summarising issues at the community level’, and ‘suggestions towards local governments on issues at the community level’ were conspicuous as mentioned in Sect. 5.3.3. These roles have been traditionally held by residents’ associations and community groups. However, some organisations play a role of advocacy for local government, similar to Kushiro City. Moreover, there are also organisations that play a role as a steady framework of community governance that voluntarily addresses local issues as ‘the recipient of comprehensive grants for the area from local government’. Particularly in the latter case, there are some organisations such as in Unnan City that play a role as a business entity beyond community activities. Of course, each organisation does not have only one of these functions and often has multiple functions. For example, Unnan City’s decentralised organisations also have a complementary function to the existing community as previously mentioned. Notably, in developing a decentralised organisation in Japan, in addition to (1) complementing existing communities and (2) participating in  local government policy making, a direction of (3) building a framework for steadier autonomous community governance is observed. Previous research imply that decentralised organisations have emphasised participation and responsibility with a focus on efficiency (Lowndes and Sullivan 2008; Griggs and Roberts 2012). Based on this study results, it can be noted that the emphasis is different depending on the characteristics of the decentralised organisation, but in particular, it seems that the participation in (2) is emphasised. Additionally, the emphasis is placed on the responsibility or independence in (1) and (3). However, because it is also thought that, in the case of Unnan City, a sufficient support of the introduced system contributes to the decentralised organisation working well; it seems that further research is expected to examine how the system links to fiscal efficiency. While the system is expanding in this manner, the means of a citizen’s participation is one of the problems in decentralised organisations. As the number of people who participate freely is approximately 30.9% and 24.5% including residents from open recruitment, it cannot be said that many residents participate freely. In addition, there is not necessarily numerous applicants for public recruitment. For

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example, according to the staff of Kushiro City, the City encourages some residents to apply for membership in decentralised organisations (17 September 2017). In Shinjuku City, there are many people who have trouble gathering members for the organisations, including recommendations. Additionally, the cases in which becoming a member in a form that is not open recruitment is also conspicuous. Indeed, ‘recommended residents’ was 21.2%, ‘recommended organisations’ was 7.7%, and ‘individuals/organisations that are expected to participate in the guidelines’ was 32.1%. As confirmed in Sect. 5.3.3., considering that there is a base of existing community activities, such as the activity of residents’ associations as a factor affecting the activity of decentralised organisations, in order for a decentralised organisation to function, open participation is not necessarily the best choice. The spread of the ‘the intra-municipality decentralisation system’ can be regarded as one of the emergences of governance at the community level in Japan. Reviewing the classification of governance by Lowndes and Sullivan (2008), although it varies from municipality to municipality, the rationale of the Japanese system reviewed in this chapter is characterised by empowerment types that inspire the citizens’ involvement but also features other elements. As such systems are being established by various means by local governments, the aforementioned participation issues will need to be carefully considered as meta-governance issues. Thus, an argument for democracy and legitimacy is raised. Other forms of democracy apart from representative ones, such as a deliberate or direct democracy, have been discussed in recent years. If developing a decentralisation system in local governments is considered to create a new tier of governments under the local governments, then providing a platform where more residents can freely participate is necessary. Furthermore, considering the relationship between the system and municipal councillors is important. In other countries, geographical units for some decentralised organisations are tied to electoral wards, and democratic legitimacy via participation of municipal councillors is endured. In contrast, the majority of local councils in Japan are based on its large constituency system. Thus, the system and each organisation are extremely weakly linked to local council elections geographically and institutionally, although municipal councillors may participate in such organisations. From the perspective of representative democracy, a system problem seems to exist in terms of how members of the organisation are assembled and their relationship with municipal councillors. However, if the system is intended for the governance of an autonomous and active community, then identifying a complementary democracy is also important.

5.6  Conclusion This chapter has reviewed the intra-municipality decentralisation system in Japan based on a questionnaire survey targeting all local governments across the country and case studies on the systems of Kushiro City, Shinjuku Ward, and Unnan City, to contemplate various rationales, institutions, and practices of governance at the community level in Japan. As a result, the spread of the mechanism was confirmed

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by the consolidation of municipalities particularly during the 2000s by the encouragement of central government to improve fiscal efficiency. Consolidation of municipalities was rarely implemented in metropolitan areas such as Tokyo and Osaka, but decentralisation mechanisms have been widespread in both urban and rural areas, including areas where municipal mergers were not experienced. There are various systems for decentralisation within local governments. To summarise, this chapter noted the following three trends as characteristics. (1) Complementing existing communities’ functions. In other words, this is the establishment of new organisations that work in a wider area to complement the functions of existing community organisations, while the weakening of long-standing community organisations, such as residents’ associations and problems associated with them, are observed. (2) Participating in local government policies. There has been a movement of citizens’ participation in local governments beginning a few decades ago. Comparatively, it seems that participating in an intra-municipality decentralisation system is more targeted in particular geographical area and is regarding more concrete topics rather than general planning. As mentioned in Sect. 5.2.1., the central government also supported this by creating national laws to introduce such mechanisms. (3) Building a framework for steadier community governance. This is the movement of forming an organisation that voluntarily addresses and resolves local issues. Traditional community organisations have also faced local issues, but there are cases in which even the colour of a business entity has emerged, such as providing more specialised social and welfare services than those of community organisations. It seems that the establishment of such an organisation is a relatively new movement since the 2000s. As in the case of Unnan City, there are cases where not only businesses are developed based on subsidies from local governments but also their own projects or business are implemented. Of course, each decentralised system does not have just one characteristic, rather it can be said to have various characteristics including those other than the aforementioned. Additionally, issues of participation in decentralised organisations were noted. This implies that further discussion regarding meta-governance, and democracy and legitimacy regarding governance at the community level is needed. As decentralised systems develop, including those in Japan, a careful examination of their influence on the level of welfare services, daily lives and subjectivities of people is important. Particularly in the rural areas of Japan, decentralised or community organisations are advocated as capable of discovering and solving problems independently. In addition, considering service level evaluation criteria and democratic issues is crucial for achieving a sustainable system. Moreover, this type of effort by the community is inferred to be deeply related to the people’s daily life because it requires active movement within the community. In so doing, considering whether the community-level efforts of decentralised organisations are an extension of community activities or part of the activities of the local governments is important. Furthermore, the study implies that these organisations are undergoing trial and error nationwide and that various relationships exist between such organisations and the local governments, such as public funding mechanisms, paid staff employment mechanisms, and treatment of proposals. Distinguishing between the

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community activities and the part of governmental activities is difficult because of their diverse forms. However, if these organisations are regarded as part of the official system, the deepening of the issues of democracy and legitimacy as cited in the previous session is necessary. Conversely, if they are taken as a voluntary initiative of the residents, then a critical examination, such as using Neo-Foucauldian approach is necessary to clarify the concept of neo-liberal subjectivities or its alternatives (see Larner 2005; Rose 1999), or of how the residents are responsible for public welfare and their degree of voluntariness. A careful examination of the aforementioned point warrants attention when considering the essence of the development of the decentralisation system. Acknowledgements  I would like to first gratefully acknowledge the support of Mr. Kei-ichiro Ishikawa (graduate student of Nagoya University), Mr. Taiki Watanabe (former student of Niigata University) and Mr. Takumi Hayakawa (former student of Niigata University). They helped me very much in organising the questionnaire survey result. I presented parts of this chapter at a study meeting of the Academic Meeting of the Association of Japanese Geographers Spring 2016 at Waseda University in Tokyo, Japan, and in The World Social Science Forum 2018 at Fukuoka Convention Center in Fukuoka, Japan. Finally, I would like to acknowledge support from JSPS KAKENHI grants (No.25770296 and No.16K16953) for this work.

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Yosuke Maeda  is an associate professor of Human Geography at Niigata University, Japan. He received his BA degree from International Christian University and MA and PhD degrees from Nagoya University. He is a social and political geographer interested in the voluntary and community sectors, local and community governance and our daily lives under the current political– economic context. He is currently studying government-led community and neighbourhood governance and devolving power to neighbourhoods and local communities in Japan and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, he is exploring how spaces of the contemporary Japanese voluntary sector are formed in connection with changes in cities, families, working styles and political economy. He recently edited Local Governance and Region [rokaru gabanansu to chiiki] (Nakanishiya, 2017; in Japanese) with Masashi Sato.

Chapter 6

The ‘Big-Bang Politics’ and Process of Council Amalgamations: A Comparative Study of the State in Australia and Austria Khandakar Farid Uddin and Werner Pleschberger

Abstract  Structural reforms as a nationally or regionally initiated political project to promote territorial change can be found worldwide. While council amalgamation is identified as an essential issue of research, there is a shortage of contemporary comparative studies on the politics of massive and instant council amalgamations. Council amalgamation has been the predominant local government reform mechanism in Australia for a long time. Very recently, the Australian federal state of New South Wales (NSW) Government implemented a reform program between 2014 and 2017 to create stronger and bigger councils. Conversely, municipal amalgamations in Austria have been rare, signifying institutional conservatism. However, very recently between 2011 and 2014, a new massive amalgamation episode happened when the Austrian federal state of Styria reduced the number of mainly rural and small municipalities by about half. This study is interested in why NSW and Styria choose the same type of reform in the context of very different local government polities. This chapter investigates these two cases, as earnest representations of the big-­ bang-­type of politics and the process of amalgamation. The chapter is divided into four parts. The initial section briefly provides contextual understanding, theoretical background, methodological concepts and hypotheses; and the second section analyses the institutional context and political process of mergers in NSW and Styria. The third section designates the comparative discussion of amalgamations politics and policy process of NSW and Styria. Finally, the chapter ends with the conclusion. Keywords  Council amalgamation · NSW · Styria · Local government · Reform · Process · Politics

K. Farid Uddin Western Sydney University, Sydney, NSW, Australia e-mail: [email protected] W. Pleschberger (*) University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences Vienna, Vienna, Austria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Nunes Silva (ed.), Contemporary Trends in Local Governance, Local and Urban Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52516-3_6

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6.1  Introduction Local government is a basic level of government in a country’s governance and administration systems comparable to other levels of government, which assure facilities for and provide services to residents (Farid Uddin 2018). The functions of local government in a multi-level governmental system are fundamentally determined by the upper tiers, i.e. central, state/provincial government. Local government boundary restructurings, as a means of municipal or council amalgamation, is an accessible reform policy tool and have been recurrently used in various countries. Their use is a prevalent trend of local governance (De Ceuninck et al. 2010). In some countries, e.g., Albania, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Turkey, UK, the number of local authorities have ‘dramatically’ (p. 110) decreased, though for varied reasons and having followed different strategies of amalgamation (Schwab et al. 2017). In some developed countries, the reduction of councils through amalgamation has been drastic (Table 6.1). In comparison, very few countries (as in the ideal case of Switzerland) demonstrate a slow step-by-­ step process of voluntary amalgamation, with relatively few municipalities involved at a time (Kaiser and Steiner 2012; Kaiser 2015). The dominant mode of structural reform in many countries across the world is forced or compulsory amalgamations, which is frequently imposed by higher levels of government for a large number of mostly small local governments (de Souza et al. 2015). The political influence of governments constructs motivations to boost municipal amalgamations (Farid Uddin 2019). Looking on the many and widespread real-­ world episodes of local governance trends, the types and processes of amalgamation cannot always be purely identified as voluntary or compulsory, but more often in real political life are mixed and fall between such extremes categorisations (Steiner et al. 2016). They thus can be better called, in some instances, semi-voluntary or semi-compulsory (Cobban 2019). In general, council amalgamation is justified with the ‘bigger is better’ or ‘bigger is cheaper’ argument (Dollery and Fleming 2006). Council amalgamation is the method of forced or voluntary unification of one or more local government units into a new body or shrinkage of local government units numbers (Belley 2012; Bish 2001; Tavares 2018). Various strategies are used in implementing council amalgamation. Steiner et al. (2016) described two strategies of municipal amalgamation: bottom-up to top-down policies. In the initial dimension of bottom-up amalgamation strategy, a voluntary proposal for territorial reform is generated at the local tier of government; and in a second dimension, a top-down amalgamation strategy as an effective reform program is imposed on local governments by the superior level government. Thus, Ebinger et al. (2019) claimed two types of local administrative reform, one is a relatively ‘soft’ type, which focuses on predominantly organisational assistance and resource amalgamation and the other is a ‘hard’ type which comprises of a territorial and municipal amalgamation. Conferring to the level of initiation of mergers, we can discern top-down strategies with the decisive intervention of a superior regional or federal government, which are sometimes called the command approach (Vanags and Vilka 2006).

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Table 6.1  Radical council amalgamation in some developed countriesa

Country Estoniab

Reduction of local governments 213 to 79 (−63%)

Denmarkc

271 to 98 (−64%)

Flanders (Belgium)d,e

906 to 308 (−66%)

Irelandf

114 to 31 (−73%)

Ontario (Canada)g

850 to 444 (−47%)

Greeceh

1034 to 325 (−69%)

Political style Top-down (Central Government) Top-down (Central Government) Top-down (Central Government) Top-down (Central Government)

Scope Timeline Massive 2 years (2015– 2017) Massive 5 years (2002– 2007) Massive 4 years (1971– 75) Massive 2 years (2012– 2014)

Top-down (Provincial Government) Top-down (Central Government)

Massive 5 years (1995– 2000) Massive 1 year (2010– 2011)

Main rationales Criterion of 5000 residents, better services, regional coordination Criterion of 30,000 residents; reallocation of functions Stimulating intermunicipal cooperation More efficient and excellent value services, economies of scale; fiscal savings; and strengthening local democracy More efficient and less costly local governments; and fiscal savings State efficiency, economies of scale, and professional quality services

The information is partly based on Callanan et al. (2014, table 1, pp. 381–383) Pärnalaas (2018) c Blom-Hansen (2012) and Blom-Hansen et al. (2016) d De Ceuninck et al. (2016) and De Ceuninck and Reynaert (2016) e In Belgium the number decreased from 2379 to 589. meaning a 75% down f Callanan (2016) and Callanan et al. (2014) g Miljan and Spicer (2015) and Miljan (2019) h Kalimeri (2018) a

b

Schaap and Karsten (2016) claimed two types of municipal amalgamation: ‘big bang’ and ‘gradual’ (p. 3). The big-bang process is radical, and most municipalities are affected. On the other hand, the gradual process affects only a few municipalities at a time leading to a step-by-step process. In a gradual approach, only some of all possible municipalities are involved in mergers through a step-by-step process and with commonly a seeking of consent (Schaap and Karsten 2016; Callanan et al. 2014). Referring to related political processes, we can call the first type, in other words, a ‘big bang’ approach, when it takes place instantly, suddenly, surprisingly, featuring radical, massive and instant territorial consolidation. As Eyþórsson (2018) further explains, the reform is set up, planned and implemented by the national authorities, and it is comprehensive. National decision-makers make decisions, and they are imposed on local governments. It is for the most, forced upon the municipalities. This we can call a comprehensive trend in local governance reform, and the strategy is top-down oriented.

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Dollery et al. (2008), Bell et al. (2016) and Drew and Dollery (2014b) claimed that the politics of forced amalgamation episodes follow a particular step by step formulation and implementation model. In the first phase, the superior state politicians argue that in different aspects that the local authorities are inefficient, and thus create grounds for restructuring. After that, in a second phase an independent commission is established to analyse the circumstances and is asked to provide recommendations. In phase three, the preliminary report is constructed and published for public comments. Though there may be other proposals, the superior political government invariably calls for compulsory council consolidation. In the final phase, the proposed mergers proceed and are implemented quickly, in the face of local opposition. Albacete and Joan (2017) and De Vries and Sobis (2014), describe amalgamation via three phases and five phases respectively, in a transition process of amalgamation. They argued that processes towards council amalgamation are throughout the phases primarily political processes. They included, for illustrative purposes, a list of political aspects, relying on different evidence of several cases of amalgamation. We argue, that the politics of amalgamation is rooted deeply in itself, in politics, ideally, and like other sectors, is following its own logic and codes (Luhmann 1990). Sancton (2004), for instance, applies a statist approach to explain the policy-making of amalgamation, where the state is the unified actor of policy formulation. Based on Nordlinger’s (1982) assumption, it can be argued that law-making state politicians often, not always, follow their preferences, and they are relatively autonomous in doing so and endorse their preferences in the face of fierce opposition which they do not pay regard to. Accordingly, amalgamations take place because superior political leaders consider them as under any circumstances the ‘right policy’ (p. 126) (Sancton 2004); thus ignoring: the genuine motives; the lack of societal demand or support; the nonexistence of existing understandings; or the financial issues. It can be argued that superior politicians too often call explicitly for reinforcement of the local administrative efficiency, wherein they are determined by genuine, deep-­ rooted old political ideas about local governments; like the advantages of the bureaucratic central government over different models (Bish 2001). Politics looks for and uses evidence in strategic and instrumental ways to achieve a political goal, and this is the indispensable story of the politics of evidence (Parkhurst 2017). Policymakers interpret available evidence in many ways, primarily how it is conducive to their political considerations, norms or goals (Sohn 2018). Parkhurst (2017), emphasized different strategies: politics may make a rhetorical appeal and gather evidence to legitimate aims (p. 73), manipulate evidence to promote a policy decision (p. 66), use and publish evidence in a biased way to show good results (called cherry-picking) (p. 68), and may hide or not release evidence to sidestep political thoughtfulness (p. 69). Also, public policy agencies commission reports by commercial consultants instead of in-house (government) intelligence, make (applying questionable methodological) evidence desired by their political “paymasters” (Dollery and Drew 2017). Perhaps in this way, public managers perceive their public policymaking, and the following model is helpful for them, to start with gathering data, to describe the issue at stake, examine outcomes of

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possible alternatives and their effects and financial costs or savings. And finally, to make a decision on what seems the best policy, and to publicly justify and legitimise their proposed action. Though, municipal mergers seem to attract policymakers, like moths are drawn to a candle flame, dominating the local government reform strategy and the political agenda (De Ceuninck 2016; Vojnovic and Poel 2000; Dollery et al. 2007; Schaap and Karsten 2016; Steiner et al. 2016) they can be hot to handle. Municipal or council amalgamations are extremely disputed and surrounded by manifold aspects (Broekema et al. 2016; Ebinger et al. 2019), and are thus justly labelled as ‘the talk of the town’ (p. 3) (Schaap and Karsten 2016). Indeed, instead of improving the cities facilities, the government has robust attention to change municipal structures (Sancton 2004). Perhaps, the most crucial argument against the merger is to point to the lack of supportive data for positive effects from territorial consolidation (de Souza et al. 2015; Dollery et al. 2012). While council amalgamation is identified as an important issue of research, there is a shortage of contemporary comparative studies of massive and instant council amalgamations on the regional level. The empirical part of this chapter investigates two cases, NSW and Styria, which experienced similar political council amalgamation episodes as mentioned above. We are in particular interested why NSW, a state of Australia and Styria, a Country state of Austria, made them choose the same ‘solution’ of a big bang politics of amalgamation, but in the context of very different local government polities. They are described in detail when and how they occurred and processed over time and compared. Extensive research is available on the territorial upscaling in many countries, mainly focused on the evaluation and empiricanalytic explanation of such consolidation. Various scholars have illuminated the dominant style of local governance trends in many countries across the world; however, they did not classify evidentially the political forms and practices of council amalgamation. However, studies of local governance reform and the politics of amalgamation are only partially available. There is a shortage of contemporary comparative studies on political aspects and processes of massive and instant council amalgamations. Thus, this study is interested in political aspects of a particular type of public policy-making, obviously distinct from the rationalistic understanding of politics. The key research question of this study is, how are the politics of evidence used in strategic and instrumental ways to achieve a local government reform goal? This research is also interested in as to why NSW, a state of Australia and Styria, a federal state of Austria, chose the same type of political reform. The study mostly used qualitative research methods and utilised a few exploratory stakeholder interviews (Styria only); and analysed various secondary sources of textual materials such as newspapers and published scholarly articles, books, official reports and planning documents. The comparative study on municipal amalgamation is exceptionally significant within the context of government and governance studies. The study unveils the municipal amalgamation objectives and process myths and contributes to transforming the existing policy reform process.

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The NSW and Styria municipal amalgamations analyses are in the context of politics and process, as earnest representations of the big-bang-type of politics and process of amalgamation. They are described in detail when and how they occurred and processed over time and compared. The chapter is divided into four parts. This initial section briefly provides contextual understanding, theoretical background, methodological concepts and hypotheses; and the second section of the chapter analyses, the institutional context and political process of mergers in NSW and Styria. The third section designates the comparative discussion of amalgamations politics and policy process of NSW and Styria. Finally, the chapter ends with the conclusion.

6.2  C  ase Studies, Politics and the Process of Council Amalgamation 6.2.1  New South Wales (NSW), Australia Australia has a three-tiered structure of government: federal, state, and local. The federal and state governments supremacy and obligations are recognised in the constitution; however, local government is not recognised in the constitution. Local government, the third tier of government is considered as a “creature” of the state government, whose regulation govern its role and state government thus has the authority to initiate and implement reforms (Farid Uddin 2019). As the local government in Australia is characterised by a series of tensions, structural reform through enforced council amalgamation has been the critical policy reform tool in most Australian states (Ryan and Woods 2015; Farid Uddin 2019). Almost every state has experienced forced amalgamation (Bell et  al. 2016). Subsequently, the number of local governments have been reduced from 1067 in 1910 to 565 in 2013. The local government of NSW is directed by the Local Government Act 1993, which explains the means and scope of its responsibilities and authorities. In NSW, there were 327 councils in the year 1906, 324 councils in 1910, 176 councils in 1991, 177 councils in 1992 and 152 councils in 2003 (Tiley and Dollery 2010). Recently, NSW experienced a top-down approach of forced amalgamation from 2014 to 2017 and the number of councils reduced from 152 to 129. The reform plan was encircled by disputes and discrepancies in terms of its aims and processes; and thus faced substantial opposition from residents, community groups, councils and politicians (Farid Uddin 2018). According to the NSW Local Government Act 1993 (2016), in a proposal for council amalgamation, the Boundaries Commission or Departmental Chief Executive must ensure that the electors’ views are addressed through various means, such as meetings, submissions, mail surveys, or official polls (Act No. 218F, p.  103). However, the state government considered limited community hearings and submissions along with a four-year administrative consultation process, whereas the residents and councils were in great measure agitating

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for official polls or referenda (Farid Uddin 2019). Like in the Danish, Finnish, Greek, Swedish, Belgian and the Dutch reform strategies (Ebinger et al. 2019), the NSW government initiated the top-down process of a centrally decided reformation which forced changes on the local government tier (Steiner et al. 2016). In 2011, the NSW State Government hosted “Destination 2036”, a two-day local government reform conference, to make the councils economically stronger, save expenses, and provided more services to residents (Local Government Division 2011). Then, the state government designated the NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp) in December 2011, the role of assessing the financial sustainability of 152 councils. TCorp then found most councils were financially not viable (TCorp 2013). Thus, the Destination 2036 Action Plan placed council amalgamation as an aim and suggested to form a review panel to elucidate the objective of local government reform (Farid Uddin 2019). Thus, in April 2012, the “Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP)” was formed to recommend options for reform. Therefore, the ILGRP recruited Jeff Tate Consulting Pty Ltd. to assess the previous round (2004) council amalgamation processes and outcomes of some councils. In April 2013, ILGRP published “Future Directions for NSW Local Government”, a roadmap for NSW local government reforms, and recommended for compulsory amalgamation (Dollery 2014; Drew and Dollery 2014a). As part of the ongoing top-down process, in March 2012, the Minister for NSW Local Government likewise appointed a four-­ member task force to analyse the Local Government Act 1993. In October 2013, ILGRP released its final report ‘Revitalizing Local Government’, where council amalgamation was amongst 65 recommendations. However, various studies critiqued the assessment of TCorp, Jeff Tate and the ILGRP for being not applying any experimental study (Bell et al. 2016). In September 2014, the NSW Government finally announced their council amalgamation reforms program “Fit For the Future”, expected to decrease 152 local government areas to 112. To progress the reforms, the NSW State Government in April 2015, evaluated council submissions as either ‘Fit’ or ‘Not Fit’ by the ‘Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART)’. It assessed 52 council proposals as being ‘Fit’ and 87 as being ‘Not Fit’ (IPART 2015). Nevertheless, the IPART method was also criticised by its opponents for being dictated by the government as it was shown to be plagiaristic of the government’s language (Gerathy 2015). By following the previous managerial top-down technique, the state government in 2015 appointed KPMG (a network of independent member firms which provide audit, tax, and advisory services as consultancies to businesses and governments) to appraise the financial benefits of council amalgamation. The state government highly emphasised that their decisions were based on the KPMG report, yet did not make the report accessible, and thus, this bias became the base of legal challenges (Sansom 2017). In December 2015, 35 proposals for new amalgamated councils had been put forward in both metropolitan and regional areas of NSW. However, the amalgamation recommendations, associated assessments and proposals were rejected by the local governments (Vogel et  al. 2020). Individual local governments applied their strategy in facing merger proposals. Some councils

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were very active in opposing the merger and lodged legal actions; however, some councils remained less active. The government had the plan to amalgamate council before 2015; however, amalgamation was delayed in the face of opposition and procedural backlash (Farid Uddin 2018). Thus, in September 2016, 20 new councils were created in NSW. However, the formation of some councils was behind schedule due to the legal challenges. According to the government, reform ‘would create new, stronger councils, improve council performance and strengthen the system of local government’ (OLG 2016); however, various studies (Drew et al. 2016b; Farid Uddin 2019) found the claims dubious. It was also projected that the amalgamation would deliver more than $61 million in net financial savings over 20 years (Council Boundary Review 2016); however, the opponents questioned the prediction as unattainable (Farid Uddin 2018). The NSW State Government fixed the ‘scale and capacity’ benchmark at 150,000 people or more (Sansom 2015). It was contended that very few councils, before the merger process, had a population near 150,000 people. The large scale was a tool merely to justify council amalgamation. Amalgamating smaller ‘unfit’ councils may just lead to a larger, financially ‘unfit’ council (Farid Uddin 2018). On the other hand, opponents including council staff, councillors, residents’ groups and opposition political parties claimed the objectives as unattainable and argued amalgamation would lessen existing facilities, increase rates and deteriorate the local democratic progression (Byrne 2016; Davies 2015). The electoral politics also emerged in forming a new council, for example, in restructuring Parramatta Council’s boundaries. In 2016, Auburn and Holroyd councils were amalgamated with the southern parts of Parramatta and thus formed the new Cumberland Council. On the other hand, the restructured Parramatta Council was founded from the Olympic Park area from Auburn Council and a portion of the Hills Shire and Hornsby Councils. It was claimed in Munro (2017) that the formation of the new Parramatta Council would create a safe majority for a political party. However, political considerations likewise reconciled the size and scale criteria. A local council of a powerful politician’s (the then Deputy Prime Minister) area Walcha had been allowed to stand alone with a population of 3000 people, whereas bigger council like Bankstown with a population of 194,000 people was considered unfit (Byrne 2016). Besides, for the declared new councils, the elected representatives were removed and replaced by state-appointed administrators, who were mainly former public servants, council managers and mayors and former Coalition politicians (Melanie and Jacob 2016). Some councils voted to take legal action against imposed amalgamation and amalgamations were delayed by legal action (Farid Uddin 2018). In September 2016, the court found faults in the reports of the delegates of some councils (Saulwick 2016). Thus, there was a delay in the amalgamation plan, and the replacement of NSW Premier happened. The new Premier announced in February 2017 that they would not be forcing council amalgamations of regional councils but that they would continue to pursue the amalgamation of the Sydney metropolitan councils (NSW Government 2017). Therefore, in March 2017 the NSW Supreme Court declared some councils amalgamation KPMG report was not following proper procedure (Visentin and Saulwick 2017) and finally, in July 2017, the NSW Court of

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Appeals declared some amalgamations illegal (Visentin 2017). Later on, in July 2017, the state government voided amalgamation plans for the remaining councils’ (Knaus 2017). The state government failed to fully implement their desired amalgamation plans, and this failure has caused inconsistencies in the size of councils in Greater Sydney. For example, the forced amalgamation of Canterbury and Bankstown councils created a mega-council of 360,000 people; and since the abandonment of the amalgamation policy, the Hunters Hill Council has been able to persist independently with 14,000 people with both being located within the Greater Sydney Metropolitan Areas.

6.2.2  Styria, Austria Austria is one of the few federalised countries in Europe and the European Union (EU). The national polity is composed of the central state (federation), and nine explicitly stated provinces (states). Both of which are defined by the constitution and their relationships are guided by the principle of partnership. In constitutional terms, the local government level cannot be classified as a third layer of the polity, but it instead is an ‘object’ of the federation-provinces-federalism, in respect to territorial, organisational and functional aspects (Pleschberger 2003). The actual municipality is a ‘creature’ of the will of provinces. They can abolish a local government, merge it with other entities or can create a new municipality through a legislative mandate. Consequently, the authority of a municipality is formulated dynamically, which allows openness for future tasks. The structural reforms of the local system of 1960–1970, carried out in four (of nine) provinces in Austria abolished 2665 (33% of) existing municipalities. The province of Styria experienced three waves of structural reforms after 1945. The preceding massive top-down-change of 1968/69 abolished 245 of 806 municipalities (−34%) in a short period of time. The changes stopped for more than 40 years until it started again at the very end of 2010 and resulted finally in the amalgamation of 382 communities and the creation of 128 new municipalities (160 remained unaffected) at the beginning of 2015. Overall the number was about halved (−47%). Wlattnig et al. (2016) also raised the popular proposition that the (small) size of municipalities or structure matters (Dollery et al. 2012; de Souza et al. 2015), and the size needs to be increased through consolidation in order to harvest positive impacts. However, the average size of the population remained inconsequently low in terms of international comparison, with 3586 persons in a municipality. Soon after the provincial elections of 2010 two parties formed a political alliance, called the ‘reform partnership’, which was adequately provisioned with the legislative and executive power to push and implement a massive structural politics of amalgamation. About two months after taking office, the new provincial government set up a municipality reform group mandated to steer the process. The group was composed in consideration of the party political situation – the provincial president and vice-president, representing their parties -, members of their political offices, and high administrative officials. The associations of municipalities and

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cities were nominated later. On December 2010 the government has announced to set up a reform group. On the 18th February 2011 constituent meeting, two working groups were set up. The composition of members of the two groups was not made public (Wlattnig et  al. 2016), as their mandates remained vague. One task force pleaded in their first unpublished interim report, submitted to the steering group on the 29th June 2011, for comprehensive structural reform – based on three criteria: the size of the population; topography; and level of inter-local cooperation, and added that the proposed change is to be preferably voluntary. In the follow-up, the steering group was entrusted with a project mandated by the government to initiate the implementation (Wlattnig et al. 2016). Further, the government organised three so-called conferences of the mayors during September 2011 (Wlattnig et  al. 2016). There have been widespread and controversial discussions, about practical details and potential future scenarios as much as about the democratic quality of the whole undertaking. A great deal of opposition to the provincial government and the resistance was made visible and seemed to escalate. The provincial government spoke about an inadequate understanding, taking the opportunity to point to the merits of the ongoing politics and present it in the best light. Until the end of January 2012, 114 municipalities submitted concrete ideas, 59 opposed the policy ideas, 132 asked for further information (Wlattnig et al. 2016). At this time, after approval in the steering group on the 2nd February 2012, the government officially approved a mission statement called, ‘stronger municipalities, more opportunities’ and it was instantly submitted to the mayors (Wlattnig et al. 2016). The government parties approved the document on 14th February 2012; however, three opposition parties strictly opposed it. The first time after the introduction of the new politics, the document contained a very programmatic description of the crucial implementation elements of the reform: e.g. the initial situation, objectives, criteria, impacts, measures, further actions. Two points in the document are particularly instructive. First, referring to municipality amalgamations in Switzerland and a federal state of Germany  – by withholding relevant information on the very different political process designs relative to Styria. Second, the territorial restructuring measures are expected to yield significant cost savings in the future and will help save more than 40 million euro annually (Wlattnig et al. 2016). In the official terminology (Wlattnig et al. 2016) the process ran as follows: the so-called proposal stage phase was followed by the negotiation phase (lasting until September 2012). Next, the decision-shape phase from October 2012 to January 2013 resulted in the drawing and presentation of a definitive municipality landscape on the 22nd of January. The provincial presidents spoke of a historic day, and how the new local governments will become economically and financially viable for the coming 50 to 70 years (!). The provincial parliament instantly approved a government draft bill on the 26th February 2013, with a clear majority of the representatives supporting the bill. For the first time, an official legal document announced a decrease in the number of municipalities from 542 to 285. Opposing municipalities had to expect to get merged forcibly by law. Many municipalities at this moment seemed entirely caught by surprise by the decision. On the other hand, the government continued the

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internal efforts to convince opposing mayors to agree voluntarily to the proposed amalgamations. While being faced with increased politicisation from the local level and media attention, 107 municipalities supported with identical council declarations a Community Initiative in September 2012. In 89 of 103 accessible local decisions, the citizens voted in different forms of local consultations against a merger of their local governments. The constitutional committee of the provincial parliament and later the whole plenary on the 2nd July 2013 voted against the adoption of the initiative. Under suspicion, to halt any change or intentionally to favour forced votes of the citizens (Wlattnig et al. 2016). Speaking again of a historic day, on the 3rd October 2013 the government submitted a bill for general consultation. Accordingly, as it was claimed, in a very democratic process, more than 80 per cent of consolidated municipalities had already accepted the new structure, voluntarily. The official consultation demonstrated the lack of democratic legitimisation, e.g. many municipalities to get consolidated missed conclusive and concrete justifications of their merger, failing to receive information from the administration. The parliamentary decision, on the 17th December 2013, was finally the ratification of the government bill submitted to the house. The debate showed the deep split between the parties supporting the government and the others, the so-called opponents of reform. The articulated quest, for the greater importance of direct citizen participation at the local level within a superior provincial representative democracy, remained unfulfilled. Following, the parliamentary decision between April and October 2014 in total 42 local governments and three individual mayors applied to repeal the new municipality structure law, because of the unconstitutionality – the national constitutional court rejected all their requests and considerations. The constitution accordingly only protects the institution of local self-administration, not the particular municipality. It is held to be a creature of the provincial state, enjoying no rights beyond those given to them by this state. The main argument of the court was comparatively repetitive and straightforward. The municipalities cannot claim an origin right of undisturbed existence, appreciating the great discretion of the provincial lawmakers to change the territorial structure. Further, the continued opposition of the local populations to the politics of amalgamation might be an indication for an unverifiable measure, not more. Besides, the Court rejected the applicants’ claim, that the law would violate the provisions and spirit of the European Charta on Local Self-­ Government, arguing that the Charta is not applicable to evaluate a domestic law.

6.2.3  Comparative Analysis of NSW and Styria Structural reform through compulsory council amalgamation has been the primary instrument of reform in most countries. The provincial/state governments have been the initiators of amalgamation with the intention to achieve greater efficiency. However, council amalgamations have always been contested, and are a matter of antagonism and resistance. The central government usually follows a broader

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political process providing limited participation options to the implementation of council amalgamation. This section presents in a comparative view the recent local government reform efforts by the provincial/state government of NSW and Styria. In both cases, Australia and Austria, the municipality is a ‘creature’ of the will of the upper level of government, and they have the authority to eliminate a local government, merge it with other units or form a new municipality through the legislative imperative. The radical council amalgamation initiatives in NSW and Styria was a sole initiative, no incentive for the other states to innovate through imitation and was the result of the political will of the state/provincial government and its administration. The amalgamation was designed partly as a rational strategy of reform. However, the real implementation was triggered by high politicians and their staff. Above all, the big-bang politics of amalgamation was a big surprise for the public and for local governments. There were politics of surprise in the NSW council amalgamation process, and the government put efforts to secure political interests through the council amalgamation. At the initial stage in 2013, the Minister for Local Government stated there would be no forced amalgamations of councils. However, it was found that the government announced 35 forced amalgamation proposals in the face of opposition and criticism. The State Government broadly outlined potentially significant financial benefits, such as cost savings, more public services and more significant infrastructure projects and effectiveness of council amalgamation. It was found that the State Government relied on the use of expert panels instead of direct resident consultation. The state government introduced certain forms of community consultation, but they were constructed in a particular way to limit actual politics (Farid Uddin 2018). This was also done through a form of small ways, and few, limited opportunities for councils and communities to participate in the process. Despite the efforts of the State Government, it generated community and council opposition that proceeded to interrupt and contest the council amalgamation procedure. In reaction to amalgamation opponents, the State Government was pretty silent and continued their amalgamation progression. State Government attempted to implement a ‘tick-the-box’ cosmetic consultation restructuring process to apply council amalgamation, but the process was antagonistic (Farid Uddin 2019). Councils and communities conveyed their opinions through numerous opportunities, including writing submissions, attending inquiries, writing to the media, holding protests and calling for a review, poll or plebiscite. Opponents claimed council reform was something that the state government wanted to push through, using their legislative, political muscle for the government’s benefits. Besides, this silence and rigged process, the council amalgamation supportive study-related documents were not made public, and thus the government’s claims were challenged by taking legal action against imposed amalgamation. On the other hand, politically, the Federal Government avoided the NSW council amalgamation dispute by contending that local government is entirely underneath of the authority of the state Premier and the state government (Tom 2016). In the case of NSW’s planning reform, the process aggravated instead of resolved arguments because the government tried to resolve

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oppositions by centring policymaking supremacy in the hands of the Ministers and chosen experts (MacDonald 2015). Thus the council amalgamation process was a top-down ministerial-led policy practice (Farid Uddin 2018). There was also the argument that council amalgamation was a gerrymandering way of securing electoral support as well as making sure ruling political parties voting areas increased. The elected councillors were removed and replaced by the state-appointed administrator in the amalgamated councils. The administrators were primarily former public servants, council managers and mayors, and Coalition Government’s former Members of Parliament. The State opposition also tried to gain political support as the opposition pledged they would produce a process for de-merging. It appeared that the State Government was seeking to gain electoral benefits by merging targeted councils, and the opposition political parties were also trying to acquire public support by contrasting their de-merging with amalgamation. It had been demonstrated that there were complex dynamics around NSW council amalgamation. Lastly, the point of critical understanding is that an alternative, more effective consultation process could have been used; however, it was not done because it might challenge the reform objectives of the State Government. The process instigated by the State Government can be identified as an exertion to implement amalgamation policy. Nonetheless, this strategy failed as opposition, and alternative points of antagonistic politics emerged elsewhere. In Styria, the election programs of parties of the newly elected government did not give any indication as to the government program, even of October 2010. Insofar as the change from the rhetoric of broadening and deepening the cooperation between local governments to a massive amalgamation represented a radical change of the political paradigm. The provincial politics successfully dictated a tight timeframe for the whole process and for the many and mainly small municipalities to react to imposed requirements. The provincial government ‘sold’ its de facto politics and split it into portions addressed to the general public and the local governments with traditional communicative technics, aimed to inform, in fact, to ‘massage’ the mayors in the process with ‘letters to the mayors’, ‘conferences of the mayors’. So-called non-public ‘personal talks’, involving affected mayors, administrative officials, regional party-politicians, and the provincial president or vice-­ president were critical to pushing the politics ahead behind the scene. The material communication of the provincial politics can be qualified as a mixture of the Futility of Resistance- and the Merely Good Thesis (Drew et al. 2016a, 2019). The third principal medium of its persuasive communication was to emphasise the factual evidence of its politics; to the point that these claims appeared to be excessively repetitive. The overall communication continued to be a one-way street in the direction of fewer and larger municipalities and did not represent the articulations and inputs from the local governments which were affected. To push its motivation to merge, the Styrian government commissioned three studies without tender, seeking ‘independent’ advice on the financial potentials of amalgamation and the historical foundations and legal aspects of the ‘project’. They were labelled as ‘scientific groundwork’ (Wlattnig et al. 2016) and aimed to gain support and substantiate the new politics. Two studies estimated high annual cost savings from amalgamation, but these findings were dependent on the assumptions

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underlying the reports. The studies thus more than confirmed the political will of the provincial politicians to merge, by assuming that the savings were not only technically achievable by a merged entity but that they would occur. There were no debates about the methodological quality of the reports because the government refused to fully release two of the reports in the Styrian context. All the reports were referred and reported partly and selectively in official publications and parliamentary debates highlighting their immense merits for the local government sector. Very often, the selection and precise definition of criteria, their operationalisation, in particular, the weights attached to criteria are contested by key stakeholders (Andrews 2013). The Styrian case is not a piece of good practice on how to manage the challenge of the performance measurement of local governments in how to guide a politics of amalgamation. According to the official claims, the administration has subsequently developed a set of four primaries and three additional criteria used to identify in an ‘objective’ manner the municipalities to get merged in the future. Interestingly, only the criterion local provision with essential services was rated with points. The release of the final scores of this performance measurement, calculated by the administration, was refused by the government, being communicated to each municipality mayor in the form of a ‘personal talk’ (Wlattnig et al. 2016). The criteria relating to political or democratic considerations are missing totally in the performance measurement.

6.3  Conclusion Looking at the overall strategies of council amalgamation governance, the types and processes of amalgamation could not always be distinguishable evidentially. Comprehensively, strategies have been enthused by the exertions for the reform of local governance in line with current trends, with the political style of governance playing a vital role in the policy implementation process. Scholars have identified strong ties with politics and policymaking. For example, Inch (2012) argues that while the connection with politics and policymaking is argued, policy-making and implementation shadow political option. Overall, politics is rooted in itself, ideally, like other sectors following their programs. Politicians use evidence in strategic and instrumental ways to achieve a political goal, the desired outcome. It is neither a surprise or an aberration; we should expect it. This is an essential feature of the politics of evidence (Parkhurst 2017). Thus, this book chapter robustly highlighted how the local government reforms in NSW and Styria were treated by using the political spirit of the government. Among the various strategies of local governance ‘bottom­up to top-down’ (Steiner et al. 2016), and ‘soft’ types to hard types’ (Ebinger et al. 2019), this study claims the ‘top-down’ strategy is a crucial contemporary local governance reform approach. The contemporary local government reform trends have been motivated by a desire to shift from government to governance, whereby the government uses various strategies to ensure successful implementation of structural changes. The council amalgamation structural reform program is surrounded by debates and

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disagreements, particularly in terms of purposes and processes. Consequently, it has converted as a politically motivated top-down policy process and leads to failing reform initiatives. Vojnovic and Poel (2000) by citing the research on Canadian amalgamation argued that regardless of the strong financial support, however, the council amalgamation reform has been unable to resolve various local governance challenges such as levels of poverty, homelessness, the deterioration of the underlying physical structure, and the increasing gap between the city’s spending needs and its ability to raise income. However, instead of forceful local government reform, the government could focus on legislative support to ensure financially and purposefully strengthened local governance. There is substantial research on municipal amalgamation in various countries (De Ceuninck et  al. 2010; Dollery et  al. 2007; Ebinger et  al. 2019; Farid Uddin 2019). However, these studies often focus on council demography, size, scale, efficiency, performance, and financial sustainability. A comparative analysis of the politics and process of municipal amalgamation is a new addition to the local government scholarship. Thus, this study reveals the procedure of the NSW, Australia and Styria, Austria municipal amalgamation in the context of big-bang politics and the top-down process of change. Planning, development, and local government reform is an example of the transition of political and administrative ascendency. Managing the political in local government reform has been facilitated by the new big-bang and top-down policy process. Very few of the reform initiatives are applying a step-by-step process and pursuing consensus, however, introducing the big-bang approach of radical politics. The contemporary trend is that the reform is intended and instigated by the higher authorities. State policy creators generate strategies, and these are then forced on local governments. This research is limited to the secondary sources of data and focused on two states within the Commonwealth of Australia and the Federal Republic of Austria; however in-depth and extensive research can produce more substantial insights into the contemporary trends of local governance by applying a variety of research methods and adding others countries’ and states local government reforms.

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Drew J, Dollery B (2014b) Would bigger councils yield scale economies in the Greater Perth Metropolitan Region? A critique of the Metropolitan Local Government Review for Perth local government. Aust J Public Adm 73:128–137 Drew J, Grant B, Campbell N (2016a) Progressive and reactionary rhetoric in the municipal reform debate in New South Wales, Australia. Aust J Polit Sci 51:323–337 Drew J, Kortt MA, Dollery B (2016b) Did the big stick work? An empirical assessment of scale economies and the Queensland forced amalgamation program. Local Gov Stud 42:1–14 Drew J, Razin E, Andrews R (2019) Rhetoric in municipal amalgamations: a comparative analysis. Local Gov Stud 45:748–767 Ebinger F, Kuhlmann S, Bogumil J (2019) Territorial reforms in Europe: effects on administrative performance and democratic participation. Local Gov Stud 45:1–23 Eyþórsson GT (2018) Strategies, conflicts and outcomes in amalgamation reforms: two cases in Iceland. In: Presented at the ECPR general conference in Hamburg, Germany Farid Uddin K (2018) NSW local government reform: council amalgamation, antagonism, and resistance. J Public Aff 18(4), e1725 Farid Uddin KA (2019) Neoliberal and post-political urban governance: local government amalgamations in New South Wales, Australia. Asia Pacific Asia Pac J Public Administration 41(2):97–109 Gerathy S (2015) Forced local government amalgamations, report finds most NSW councils ‘not fit for future’. ABC News, October 21 Inch A (2012) Creating ‘a generation of NIMBYs’? Interpreting the role of the state in managing the politics of urban development. Environ Plan C 30:520–535 IPART (2015) Assessment of council fit for the future proposals. NSW Kaiser C (2015) Top-down versus bottom-up: comparing strategies of municipal mergers in Western European countries. der moderne staat–dms: Zeitschrift für Public Policy, Recht und Management 8:113–127 Kaiser C, Steiner R (2012) Top-down versus bottom-up: comparing amalgamation strategies in Europe. In: XVI International Research Society for Public Management (IRSPM) conference, Rome, Italy Kalimeri V (2018) The Kallikrates vs the Kapodistrias reforms in Greece: a story of moderate success. Polit Cent Eur 14:65–76 Knaus C (2017) NSW council amalgamations: plan to merge 14 Sydney councils abandoned. The Guardian, July 27 Local Government Act 1993 (2016) NSW local government act 1993 no 30. NSW Parliamentary Counsel’s Office, NSW Local Government Division (2011) Destination 2036 discussion paper. In: Consulting E (ed) NSW: Divison of Local Governemnt, Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Government Luhmann N (1990) Ökologische Kommunikation, Kann die moderne Gesellschaft sich auf ökologische Gefährdungen einstellen? (Ecological communication: Can modern society adapt to ecological threats?). Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen Macdonald H (2015) ‘Fantasies of consensus’: planning reform in Sydney, 2005–2013. Plan Pract Res 30:115–138 Melanie K, Jacob S (2016) Council amalgamations: elected officials out and administrators in after Mike Baird sacks 42 councils. The Sydney Morning Herald, May 12 Miljan L (2019) Ford government should heed lessons of Harris amalgamation. The Star, January 21 Miljan LA, Spicer Z (2015) Municipal amalgamation in Ontario. Fraser Institute, Vancouver Munro K (2017) New Parramatta council boundaries create Liberal stronghold, data analysis suggests. The Sydney Morning Herald, May 25 Nordlinger EA (1982) On the autonomy of the democratic state. Harvard University Press, Milton Keynes NSW Government (2017) All NSW merged councils to remain in place. Retrieved from https:// dpcsc-ss.s3.amazonaws.com/Uploads/1487038848/14022017-Gladys-Berejiklian-med-relAll-merged-councils-to-remain-in-place.pdf OLG (2016) Fit for the future. Office of the Local Government NSW, NSW

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Parkhurst J (2017) The politics of evidence: from evidence-based policy to the good governance of evidence. Routledge, Oxon Pärnalaas A-L (2018) Territorial reform implementation from a strategic management perspective: the case of Estonia. Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia Pleschberger W (2003) Cities and municipalities in the Austrian political system since the 1990s. New developments between “efficiency” and “democracy”. In: Kersting N, Vetter A (eds) Reforming local government in Europe. Closing the gap between democracy and efficiency. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, pp 113–135 Ryan R, Woods R (2015) Local government capacity in Australia. Viešoji politika ir administravimas 14(3):225–248 Sancton A (2004) Beyond the municipal: governance for Canadian cities. Policy Option Montr 25:26–31 Sansom M (2015) Forced amalgamation maps of doom released: NSW council mergers. Government News, December 18 Sansom M (2017) Woollahra Council set for High Court showdown with Berejiklian over merger. Government News, May 02 Saulwick J (2016) Council mergers: Baird government smattering of victories in amalgamations battles. The Sydney Morning Herald, September 20 Schaap L, Karsten N (2016) Evaluating municipal mergers’ effects: a review of amalgamation studies in the Netherlands. In: PSA conference Schwab C, Bouckaert G, Kuhlmann S (2017) The future of local government in Europe: lessons from research and practice in 31 countries. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Sohn J (2018) Navigating the politics of evidence-informed policymaking: strategies of influential policy actors in Ontario. Palgrave Communications, p 4 Steiner R, Kaiser C, Eythórsson GT (2016) A comparative analysis of amalgamation reforms in selected European countries. In: Local public sector reforms in times of crisis. Springer, London Tavares AF (2018) Municipal amalgamations and their effects: a literature review. Miscellanea Geographica 22:5–15 TCorp (2013) Financial sustainability of the New South Wales local government sector. New South Wales Treasury Corporation (TCorp), NSW Tiley I, Dollery B (2010) Local government amalgamation in New South Wales. Centre for Local Government, School of Business, Economics and Public Policy, University of New England, NSW Tom M (2016) Alan Jones accuses Mike Baird of trying to ‘torpedo’ Malcolm Turnbull over council mergers. The Sydney Morning Herald, May 12 Vanags E, Vilka I (2006) Local government in the Baltic states: similar but different. Local Gov Stud 32:623–637 Visentin L (2017) Council victories in final embarrassing merger defeat for government. The Sydney Morning Herald, August 01 Visentin L, Saulwick J (2017) Blow to Berejiklian government’s council mergers as court rules against KPMG report secrecy. The Sydney Morning Herald, March 27 Vogel RK, Ryan R, Lawrie A, Grant B, Meng X, Walsh P, Morris A, Riedy C (2020) Global city Sydney. Progress in Planning, 136, 100426. Vojnovic I, Poel D (2000) Provincial and municipal restructuring in Canada: assessing expectations and outcomes. Can J Reg Sci 23:1–12 Wlattnig W, Kindermann M, Hörmann H-J (2016) Steiermärkische Gemeindestrukturreform 2015. Ablauf und rechtliche Umsetzung der größten Gebietsreform in der Steiermark seit 1945 (In English: Structural Municipal Reform in Styria 2015. Process and legal implementation of the biggest territorial reform in Styria since 1945). Publishing House Austria, Vienna

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Khandakar Farid Uddin  is an early career academic and researcher who has worked as an academic and researcher at the University of Dhaka, the Asian Institute of Business and Technology (AIBT), the Daffodil International University, the Stamford University Bangladesh, and at the Western Sydney University, Australia. He talented the Master of Research degree from the Macquarie University, Australia, and Bachelor and Master degrees in Public Administration from the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. His first research thesis at Macquarie University, Australia analysed the New South Wales council amalgamation antagonism and resistance. It outlined the councils and community’s reasons and strategies in opposing council amalgamation and found that the State Government applied a post-political form of governance to achieve their neoliberal objectives. At present, his Doctoral PhD research at Western Sydney University explores urban planning policy applications, outcomes and associated inequalities in Greater Sydney. His area of academic interest includes public administration, public policy, development studies, local government, urban planning and governance issues. Werner Pleschberger  has been affiliated with the Boku University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences Vienna since 1995 until his retirement at the end of 2015 as full time associate professor in the Department of Economics and Social Sciences, still taking teaching responsibilities, regularly on EU-related courses to undergraduates and graduates (including teaching activities in the Erasmus Framework at universities in Kazakhstan (2016, 2017, 2018). Guest professor at Kyoto University in Japan (2011, 2013). Has authored (or co-authored) numerous contributions to books and journals that summarise his own research and some of the international projects (currently: local state-society relations) in which he has been involved with (Local state-society relations in Austria, in press). Presentation of papers at national and international conferences. His main interest is aimed at the concept of local governance.

Chapter 7

Regional Administrative Boundaries and the Building of Internal Borders in Decentralised States. The Case of Two Spanish Interregional Borders Ramon Galindo Caldés, Albert Santasusagna Riu, and Joan Tort Donada

Abstract  The progressive devolution of powers in decentralised states requires a culture of interregional cooperation to ensure that the tendency to create differentiated regional legal systems can be overcome. Indeed, it is the border areas between these regions that are most likely to suffer the negative impact of any lack of interregional coordination. The implementation of different, or even contradictory, public policies and norms transforms the administrative boundary between regions into a real border, hindering the relationship between municipalities that share the same geographical space. This chapter analyses the construction of just such an internal border formed by the administrative boundary between three of Spain’s regions (autonomous communities) and examines how the failure to achieve interregional cooperation has negative consequences for the municipalities adjacent to this boundary. Based on the responses of mayors and town clerks recorded in focus groups and questionnaires, we see how the malfunctioning of mechanisms of interregional cooperation is an impediment to inter-municipal relations and serves to bolster the internal border. However, the municipalities making up the border area maintain, albeit not without certain difficulties, a rich network of relationships that structure and organise the territory from a cross-border perspective. Our research indicates that interregional cooperation is a necessary counterweight to decentralisation and that, as part of that cooperation, the municipalities have an important role to play. Moreover, cooperation mechanisms must also be available at the local level to complement, or even replace, interregional cooperation in the event that the latter fails to do its job properly.

R. Galindo Caldés (*) Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: [email protected] A. Santasusagna Riu · J. Tort Donada Department of Geography, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Nunes Silva (ed.), Contemporary Trends in Local Governance, Local and Urban Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52516-3_7

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Keywords  Borders · Internal border · Cooperation · Decentralisation · Regions · Administrative boundary · Municipalities

7.1  Introduction Cross-border cooperation has become a key issue in European policy-making, with efforts being stepped up in recent years to improve cooperation in border areas, especially through INTERREG and the European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTCs). Several reports have emphasised the legal and administrative obstacles that border territories face regarding cooperation (European Commission 2017). Problems arise as a result of differences in state, regional and local regulations and policy, directly affecting local government the most. The growing interest in cross-border cooperation in the European Union contrasts with the meagre attention paid to the issue at the internal borders of the Member States. In Spain, very little research has been carried out in this field, with some recent exceptions (Oliveras González and Trillo Santamaría 2014; Trillo Santamaría and Paül 2016; Tort Donada and Galindo Caldés 2018; Santasusagna Riu et al. 2019). Our research aims to examine the phenomenon by examining the situation at the border of two Spanish regions. Our hypothesis is that the construction of separate regional legal systems creates cross-border dysfunctions and tensions that have a major impact on local cross-border affairs. This largely ignored and little-known phenomenon must be tackled using a multi-level approach. The recent proposal for a European cross-border mechanism (ECBM) is an opportunity to also introduce effective regional and local cooperation mechanisms for internal borders.

7.1.1  D  ecentralisation and the Absence of Mechanisms of Coordination The model of the territorial division of powers established in Spain has been built via a progressive, asymmetric process of decentralisation, which has received the label of competitive federalism (Colomer 1998), plurinational federalism or quasi-­ federalism (Keating 2017), among others. However, its labelling as a federation is controversial (Sala 2014)—denied outright even by some academics (Aja 2014; Arzoz 2019)—and the Estado de las Autonomías (State of Autonomies) has become the preferred way of referring to it. Here is not the place to enter into a debate about the exact nature of Spain’s decentralised system, but we need to highlight two elements of interest for the present study: first, that decentralisation in Spain has indeed

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been achieved via a progressive, asymmetric process1 and, second, that the devolved regions (Comunidades Autónomas or autonomous communities) have legislative powers in many areas including education, health, agriculture, housing, environmental law, tourism, and so on. In short, Spain has achieved a high degree of decentralisation, despite recent policies reversing the trend (Máiz and Losada 2016). In legal terms, the process has meant the construction of differentiated legal systems within these regions, systems that are applicable to that regional territory and which have created a series of legal borders that, in turn, have given rise to dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in the resulting bordering spaces. Any process of decentralisation needs to be supported by instruments of coordination and cooperation. Thus, a greater degree of decentralisation (differentiating effect) should correspond to a greater degree of horizontal cooperation (taking into account the constitutional principles of equality, solidarity, coordination and cooperation). However, in Spain, it is generally held that horizontal cooperation has functioned poorly. The instruments that the law specifically foresees for fostering interregional cooperation are agreements (convenios and acuerdos), but to date very few have been introduced (García Morales 2006; Aja 2014), in a context excessively influenced by political factors (González García 2016). The passing of the years has highlighted the limitations of agreements of collaboration to address the complexities of border environments, and the need, on the one hand, for the reform of their constitutional regulation (Tajadura Tejada 2010) and, on the other, for the fostering of a culture of cooperation (García Morales 2006). We are witnesses to something of a paradox with the strengthening of cross-border cooperation within the European Union thanks to these horizontal relations but a deficient bordering between Spain’s autonomous communities (Montilla Martos 2006). The culture of cooperation needs to underpin a decentralised state, improving the functioning of the whole; yet, the results achieved to date are far from optimal. 7.1.1.1  Law, Geography and the Building of Internal Borders Space, law and society are intimately connected. Law and space are both socially produced and socially productive, while space—or more precisely spatiality—is productive of law and is produced, in part, by law (Blomley 2008).2 The relationship between law (or norms) and space is, therefore, narrow and bidirectional, so that norms produce spaces, create jurisdictional limits (Parejo Alfonso 2015) and, in turn, are effective within each regional territory. Hence, we can talk of the fact that norms have territorial efficacy and that powers are exercised in a delimited territory, 1  Keating highlights the paradox that federalism in Spain and the UK has been ruled out as a way of addressing diversity (Keating 2017). 2  In other words: “Borders are always dynamic, ever shifting. Borders are human constructs enshrined in laws, treaties, regulations, strategies, policies, plans, regulations, and so on. We draft them, modify them and erase them at our will. We create and recreate them, and cannot escape them.” (Neuman 2014).

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and, therefore, that the territory operates either positively or negatively in terms of the delimitation of a particular competence (Vaquer Caballería 2010). The territoriality principle plays an important role in the effectiveness of the norms and is fundamental in the context of border municipalities, since the regional legislator does not generally consider their peripheral position and the fact that they are in contact with another normative reality. Regional legislation creates spaces, within which administrations or entities of different types exercise their powers and competences and provide a range of public services. By one means or another, both the regional legislator and the regional administration define by inclusion or exclusion which citizens are subject to its regulation and are beneficiaries of its services. The place where an absence of mechanisms of coordination has the greatest impact is in the interregional borderland, where often a regional boundary serves simultaneously as an administrative limit and a territorial axis. In the specific case analysed in this chapter, the rivers Sénia, Algars, Ebro and Noguera Ribagorçana fulfil this dual function. We are dealing with cross-border territories that share close cultural, social and economic affinities, but which are subject to two different regional systems. In the Spanish case, the regional administrative boundary that acts as a barrier is symptomatic of the deficient functioning of the country’s regional system and of the public administration system as a whole, since it creates internal borders. These “internal borders”3 emerge de facto between regions, as a consequence of the gradual consolidation of different, and even contradictory, legal systems without effective instruments of interregional coordination and cooperation. Public activity (regulations, public policies, and so on) that fails to take into consideration other regions results in the raising of an administrative barrier that ends up having a negative impact on bordering local territories. This, as mentioned, is occurring at a time when the borders between the EU states are gradually being dissolved, and cross-­ border cooperation initiatives have been implemented. Against this backdrop, internal border spaces can be defined as those in which there is a notable interrelation between municipalities on either side of the interregional administrative boundary (Tort Donada and Galindo Caldés 2018), without their mere adjacency being a sufficient criterion. Cross-border territories are complex territorial units, whose geographical, socio-economic and cultural elements are affected and modified by the establishment of international borders and territorialisation. However, most interregional border territories also share many features of this phenomenon (Berzi 2017). Internal border spaces tend to be highly complex insofar as they are territorial areas that, in general, occupy a peripheral position with respect to their political-administrative centres, have an economy that is dependent on the public sector, an ageing population and a “duplicate” multi-level institutional system. In this context, internal border municipalities are those that form part of a

3  The concept of the “internal border” was coined in reference to Spanish health policy (Oliveras González and Trillo Santamaría 2014).

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geographical, socio-economic or cultural unit, structured and organised around an administrative boundary. In these cases, cooperation is necessary and requires a regulatory framework that generates legal certainty and stability. However, the existence of different legal systems results in contradictions and dysfunctions that hinder such cooperation and that very often cause citizens or local administrations to resort to informal or sometimes irregular mechanisms. 7.1.1.2  Aims and Scope of the Research This study addresses the phenomenon of the internal borders between three Spanish regions (Catalonia, Aragon and the Valencian Community). It does so from a transdisciplinary perspective (law and geography) as it seeks to determine (or identify) the (local) border space, analyse the role of the regional legislator in the legal construction of the border, evaluate the importance of context in law enforcement and identify and classify the “separating” elements and the “integrating” instruments of these local border communities. Our aim is to test our hypothesis regarding the creation of internal borders in Spain by focusing on the specific case of the regional border between three Spanish regions. Our research has included an examination of some 69 municipalities occupying a location adjacent to the regional borders between Catalonia and Aragon, on the one hand, and Catalonia and the Valencian Community, on the other. Our scale of analysis is that of the local level; thus, for the purposes of this study, we first identified the border municipalities, that is, municipalities occupying a position adjacent to the regional administrative boundary or the so-called contiguous municipalities (CM), municipalities within their area of influence (that is, buffer area municipalities or BAM), but we excluded those municipalities which, despite being on the border, have no relationship with neighbouring municipalities lying in the other region. These municipalities or ABM are affected by geographical barriers (either mountains or dams). Figure 7.1 shows how these three types of municipality are distributed along the regional border.

7.1.2  Methodology In conducting our research, we have drawn on a variety of methods from different disciplines. This multiplicity of perspectives on the question at stake ensures a better understanding of the phenomenon studied and guarantees that our outcomes are more reliable than if we had employed a single method (Nielsen 2010). We first considered how the legal system is structured in order to respond to a specific issue. This included a normative, bibliographic and jurisprudential study of the main policy areas (the environment, education, health, local government and public services, among others) affected by our object of study with a particular

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Fig. 7.1  Borderland between Catalonia, Aragon and Valencian Community. (Source: Authors)

emphasis on analysing the Catalan, Valencian and Aragonese regulations in these sectors. This legal analysis, in combination with other techniques of territorial analysis—including, field work, interviews with stakeholders and cartographic studies—allowed us to obtain a detailed picture of the study area. Having defined the territorial area of study and the legal context, two methods were employed to analyse the relations between border municipalities. As pointed out above, we conducted both a legal and geographical analysis of the border area, but we also employed two non-standard instruments in the fields of law and geography as described below. Thus, we organised 17 focus groups (Table 7.1), with the participation of some 120 mayors and town clerks (secretaries municipals). The purpose of these sessions was to obtain information about two particular aspects of municipal organisation: First, any dysfunctions (real or perceived) that might be attributed to the fact that distinct regulations are applied in the same territory, and, second, any instances of formal or informal cooperation between the different municipalities. The sessions also aimed at gathering information about just how these local government officials perceived the border phenomenon. Given that it is an extremely

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Table 7.1  Focus groups (January–June 2017) Region Catalonia Valencian C. Aragon Aragon Aragon Aragon Catalonia Catalonia Catalonia

Municipality La Sénia Sant Rafael R. Calaceit Calaceit Mequinensa Mequinensa Aitona Aitona Almacelles

Participants Town clerks Mayors Town clerks Mayors Town clerks Mayors Town clerks Mayors Town clerks

Region Catalonia Catalonia Catalonia Aragon Aragon Catalonia Aragon Aragon

Municipality Almacelles Alfarràs Alfarràs Areny Areny Pont de Suert Saidí Saidí

Participants Mayors Town clerks Mayors Town clerks Mayors Mayors Town clerks Mayors

Source: Authors

complex question, the sessions were open in nature, which allowed us to explore many issues on related topics. The advantage of focus groups is that they can be “used to lay the groundwork for subsequent survey research. Some research begins by using focus groups to learn about language, concepts, and factors that might be included in later research procedures” (Krueger and Casey 2015). Each focus group involved between six to ten mayors or town clerks from the municipalities located near the venue selected for the session. The two-hour sessions were held behind closed doors and no electronic recording devices were used. One of the team members acted as moderator, intervening minimally and introducing or redirecting the issues to be discussed. Secondly, all participants in the focus groups (though only in the Catalan-­ Aragonese border municipalities) responded to a questionnaire that provided us with quantitative and qualitative data on the relationship between the municipalities on either side of the border, their perception of how other levels of government face the challenges posed by the border and their preferences regarding territorial organisation from a legal perspective. In broad terms, the aspects covered by the survey were the following: –– Situations in which the different regulations adopted in Catalonia and Aragon cause problems or administrative disadvantages. –– Opinions as to whether legal mechanisms should be introduced to reduce the “negative” effects of the border in some way. –– Participation of the Town Council in mechanisms of collaboration with neighbouring municipalities that belong to the neighbouring region. –– Cultural, social and political initiatives that have been jointly adopted by the municipality and its neighbouring municipalities. –– Areas of municipal competition where cooperation (formal or informal) occurs and areas where they believe such cooperation would be appropriate. –– Opinions as to whether there should be more cooperation between the municipality and its neighbouring municipalities located in the neighbouring region. –– Opinions on the stance taken by Public Administration with regard to cooperation between the municipalities on either side of the border.

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In the following section we address the dysfunctions detected in the area as well as examples of cooperation at this local level. We also describe some possible alternatives for structuring borderlands from a legal perspective.

7.2  D  ysfunctions and Cooperation in Border Interregional Areas Our study identifies a considerable number of dysfunctions. In what follows, we do not consider those problems that arise in inter-municipal cooperation in general but only those that are a consequence—directly or indirectly—of the border. At the same time, we have also identified a number of examples of cooperation. These are, as yet, fairly weak local initiatives, and can be typically characterised as unstable and frequently informal. The territory analysed is a space of conflict (between regions) and of cooperation (between municipalities and, generally, between local governments). As such, in addition to conflicts between regional governments, we record a high institutional density and an adverse political context, and find regional policies that aim to strengthen the services (e.g. health) in the region rather than considering the needs of the territory as a whole. As a result, in some sectors we find distinct regulations, contradictory public policies and difficulties when it comes to promoting stable mechanisms of cooperation.

7.2.1  D  ysfunctions and Problems in the Border Interregional Area Our research has enabled us to detect a series of dysfunctions, the consequence of different or contradictory regulations applied by each of the regions and the lack of effective collaboration that would reduce these negative effects. In fact, the list is long and spans many different ambits, both as regards service provision (health, education, waste, firefighting, and so on) and the difficulties encountered owing to the distinct regulations applied (water, environmental protection, territorial borders, and so on). Here we find both dysfunctions (contradictions) and barriers to cooperation and, as a result, to the implementation of more efficient and effective solutions for the territory as a whole. As mentioned, the dysfunctions created by the border are mainly of two types. The first concerns the provision of public services. The municipalities in this interregional border are generally peripheral and dependent on public services (health, education, environment, infrastructures, police—the case of Catalonia—fire services, and so on) provided in the main by regional authorities. The provision of these services is separate in each of the regions, without the municipalities of the other

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region being taken into consideration, although they belong to the same geographical area. In some areas cooperation agreements exist between regional authorities—a paradigmatic case in this regard is health. Aragonese citizens from border municipalities are entitled, for example, to use Catalan hospitals and medical services, but disputes occur in relation to matters of spending and many problems remain in relation to medical care (for example, difficulties accessing medical data, medical prescriptions, emergency response calls, medical specialists, and so on). Many Aragonese citizens exploit this loophole and register in Catalonia. This situation contrasts with the well-known case of health cooperation at the national border that lies close to this area. In this instance, the French State and the Catalan regional government share the management of the Cerdanya cross-border hospital (Cerdanya Hospital/Hôpital de Cerdagne). A comparison of healthcare at the interregional and national borders highlights the paradox, with mechanisms of cooperation proving much more effective in the second case. The latter is evidence of the successful outcomes achieved by EU support channelled through ERDF funds and the European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). In contrast, interregional cooperation mechanisms in Spain have proved to be less effective. A similar situation occurs in other policy areas. In some, agreements or protocols are not enough to prevent dysfunctions, since the norm is the provision solely to citizens of the region itself (the case, for example, of education, police, and fire services). In others, no such agreement exists, so regional authorities deliver public services only within the regional territory and, in some cases, the service targets only their citizens (the case, for example, of waste disposal, spatial planning, environment, agriculture, roads, infrastructure communications, and so on). In this latter instance, problems of coordination and even contradictory policies exist. Another dysfunctional case is the promotion of the assets of tourism. Many of these belong to both regions but they are promoted separately, even to the point of ignoring the asset in the neighbouring region. This is the case, for example, of the mountain massif of Els Ports, the Mont-rebei gorge and fishing in common rivers. Dysfunctions not only affect the promotion of tourism but the regulation of the sector too, with regional parliaments implementing distinct norms. Closely related to tourism is river fishing, a significant activity for some of the border areas. The problems derived from distinct regulations being applied on each side of a river or dam have led regional authorities to adopt regulations that attempt to arrive at a common policy and the mutual recognition of fishing permits. Coordination, however, is still far from the norm in this respect. The focus groups and questionnaires revealed that dysfunctions related to the existence of different, or even contradictory, regional regulations were apparent in numerous areas, including water (dams, different public water authorities), farming and livestock holdings, environmental policies, economic activities (agriculture, hunting, fishing). One case that is especially illustrative of this situation are the environmental regulations governing Els Ports, a massif that straddles all three regions. The Catalan part of the mountain range is protected by Els Ports Natural Park (created in 2001) and is part of the Terres de l’Ebre biosphere reserve (UNESCO); the Valencian side

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of the range is protected by the Natural Park of La Tinença de Benifassà (created in 2006); while the Aragonese part is unprotected by any environmental regulation due to the opposition of landowners and local governments that have blocked all attempts to introduce legislation. As such, Els Ports exemplifies the difficulties of regime complexity, since “there is no single, unified body of hierarchically imposed rules governing a transnational issue area or policy domain, but instead a set of parallel or overlapping regulatory institutions.” (Odervest and Zeitlin 2014). And while the authors were speaking specifically about transnational situations, their analysis is also applicable to interregional governance. Other problems recorded involve difficulties in promoting cooperation and in reaching formal agreements between municipalities. One of the difficulties lies in the existence of different local government laws across regions, which in some cases prevents the application of cooperation formulas. One such obstacle is the impossibility of applying the Catalan formula for establishing ‘communities of municipalities’—inspired by the French communauté de communes—to the other two regions. Finally, minor territorial conflicts exist along the boundaries between municipalities, but only one of these would appear to be irresolvable, since it would mean modifying regional borders, which is highly improbable. In this particular case, the border runs through the Aragonese town of Pont de Montanyana, leaving part of the settlement in Catalan territory. A cooperation formula seems the most logical solution, and while a global agreement has yet to be achieved various specific local agreements have been reached. Almost all the mayors and town clerks participating in the focus groups reported that the existence of the regional boundary caused administrative problems or inconveniences and that they were, in the main, favourable to the creation of a special regime for internal border municipalities or a more flexible regulation in the border area. Indeed, 74.6% of the mayors and town clerks in the Catalan-Aragonese border considered that distinct regional regulations cause problems or inconveniences of an administrative nature, a percentage that rose in certain areas, most notably Ribagorça, to 93.3%. The same participants enumerated a long list of dysfunctions in the policy areas of health, education, agriculture, the environment, and so on. The following additional negative effects were also mentioned: –– Difficulties in managing infrastructure commonly shared with other municipalities, if both regional administrations have to participate. Infrastructure connecting both sides of a border—such as bridges and roads—are not a priority for regional administrations. –– The extraterritorial effects of administrative activity are not considered, leading to problems (waste, urban planning, and so on). –– The need to take into account two different legal systems when launching a cooperation initiative between municipalities, since they are sometimes divergent (the solution for one municipality might not be possible for the other) or even contradictory, provoking a range of different effects on both sides of the border.

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–– Difficulties in sharing technical services, since their legal framework differs (e.g. urban planning, environmental law, and so on). Technical support is provided by the provincial councils and the counties, but only within their territorial area. –– Companies and individuals providing services on both sides of the administrative boundary are subject to dual regulations. The same situation is found in the case of farms and industrial activities. Overall, the interregional borderland is perceived as being a conflictive environment and, sometimes, the arena for disputes between regions. Paradoxically, no specific local conflicts of any relevance were detected, rather relationships in general can be described as good. However, the willingness for further collaboration often ran into a conflictive political environment at the regional level. Transboundary issues are potentially controversial, which dissuades local and sub-regional governments from cooperating in certain situations. We asked mayors and town clerks for their perception of the stance taken by regional and sub-regional governments in relation to cooperation in border areas. Ironically, only 26.1% of Catalan respondents considered the Aragonese regional government to be opposed to interregional cooperation (vs. 12.9% of Aragonese respondents with respect to the Catalan regional government). Two thirds of all respondents considered the stance of both regional governments regarding cooperation to be one of indifference.4 There is, as such, a widespread perception that regional governments have no interest in border municipalities, due to their peripheral situation and limited relevance for regional politics. Indeed, the origin of the recurrent conflicts around the border often lie in regional and not in local politics.

7.2.2  Space of Conflict… and Space for Cooperation? Our study, on the other hand, detects a clear space for cooperation, there being no major inter-municipal conflicts, while informal cooperation agreements have been entered into in various sectors. 75% of questionnaire respondents reported that their municipality participated in at least one collaboration mechanism with adjacent municipalities. Indeed, low levels of population and the dependence on public services mean that in many cases cooperation is the most efficient and the most effective option. What is evident is that the area has a clear background in undertaking both social and cultural initiatives of cooperation. As a result, we detect a clear culture of cooperation at the local level and an awareness of the need to activate the territory as a whole. In this sense, 90.6% of Catalan and 86.8% of Aragonese

4  Catalan mayors and town clerks also believed that the stance taken by sub-regional governments (provinces and counties) was one of indifference, but their Aragonese counterparts considered that they were in favour of cooperation. On this issue, we find greater variation, with a highly positive perception in some provinces (Huesca, Tarragona) and in some counties (Terra Alta, Matarranya, Ribagorça, among others).

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respondents stated that there was likely to be more cooperation with municipalities belonging to the other region. The questionnaire identified instances of cooperation (both formal and informal) in various areas of local service provision. Thus, between 10% and 15% of respondents reported cooperation in local roads, waste, public transport, sports facilities and social services. Civil defence and health are also cited (23–28%), but these are regional rather than local services. As for the willingness to cooperate, more than half the respondents claimed that there should be cooperation in local roads, civil defence, environmental protection and public transport. Tourism was cited by 60% of respondents. More than a third also cited social services, police and health, and around a quarter of them cited waste, sports facilities, specialised social services, land use and nurseries. The preference for certain local services appears to depend on the specific local context and type of municipality, but there was a widespread willingness to cooperate on many issues. Additionally, the focus groups and questionnaires also pointed to strong social, cultural and economic links at the local level. In this respect, we found a diverse array of initiatives that reinforce cooperation. For example, Aragon and Catalonia have regional agreements on health, education and fire services but the same agreements have not been reached between the Valencian Community and Catalonia. Some of these have a formal structure, the case, for example, of the mancomunidad “Taula del Sénia”, which brings together 27 local governments from the three regions. Nevertheless, it has very limited powers and resources. Some mayors and town clerks highlighted its positive role in addressing common concerns for municipalities on both sides of the border, claiming it was also a useful tool for furthering dialogue and discussion between local governments. As we were able to verify in the focus group held in the “Sénia area” (at Sant Rafael del Riu), the mayors share a common discourse and are on good terms with each other, regardless of the political party or region of origin. As they explained, having a regular forum for discussion helped to address transboundary issues and to maintain a permanent channel of communication. Other agreements had been entered into without the prior establishment of a legal entity. A good example of this is an agreement between sub-regional authorities (comarcas) in all three regions to promote Els Ports for tourist purposes. The “Tres Territoris” agreement seeks to promote, via a common website, the tourist offer of the territory on a transboundary basis. Despite this potential weakness, a common map has been produced depicting the whole of the border area. We also found local agreements between municipalities promoting school transport, school activities (music, nurseries) and local roads, especially in the northern section of the Catalan-Aragonese border. These are weak agreements from a legal perspective and the mayors and town clerks expressed the need for new tools to guarantee legal security and to reinforce cooperation. Another example of cooperation detected was Ribagorza Románica, a temporary heritage project supported by EU funds, but which is no longer active. Overall, therefore, the situation as regards trans-border cooperation remains poor at the regional level, but much stronger at the local level. However, legally speaking,

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the latter cooperation agreements are relatively weak and unstable. There is, however, a clear awareness among local border governments regarding the need to forge a common front when addressing certain issues, such as the improvement of communications (the joint call for enhanced transport infrastructure) or the sharing of public services.

7.2.3  Legal Mechanisms to Strengthen Local Cooperation Solutions such as the merging of municipalities, the modification of regional boundaries or the introduction of radical legal reforms are clearly not feasible. The only way to avoid the strengthening of internal borders is to enhance interregional cooperation and, in particular, to foster inter-municipal cooperation and broader local cooperation (including the sub-regional tier of government, namely the provinces and counties or comarcas). To conclude, it is apparent that there are various options available for improving cooperation between border municipalities. As Table  7.2 shows, border municipality special regime appeared as the preferred option for the respondents of our questionnaire (especially for the town clerks). A special regime could go some way to addressing these dysfunctions. In the same way that investments are prioritised, subsidies are granted, and extraordinary resources are transferred for other types of special regime, such as tourist, historic-artistic or mountain towns, the mechanisms might also be applied to the case that concerns us here. However, it would first be necessary to determine the economic impact of the border in this local context.5 The application of a special regime is not new in this context. In fact, Catalan legislation already provides for a Table 7.2  Opinions expressed as to whether legal mechanisms should be introduced to reduce in some way the “negative” effects of the existence of the border They are not necessary Regional agreements suffice Flexible regulation of border municipalities Possibility of activating flexible instruments Special regime for border municipalities Consortium (consorcio) Mancomunidad Other options .A.

Catalonia 2 1 16 13 14 – 3 3 –

% 6.0 3.0 48.5 39.4 42.4 – 9.1 9.1 –

Aragon 10 3 11 10 18 3 5 – 2

% 25.6 7.7 28.2 25.6 46.2 7.7 12.8 – 5.1

Total 12 4 27 23 32 3 8 3 2

% 16.7 5.6 37.5 31.9 44.4 4.2 11.1 4.2 2.8

Source: Adapted from Tort Donada and Galindo Caldés (2018)

5  Technical support for border municipalities is also necessary. The formal cooperation required to avoid situations of deadlock needs to include technical assistance and legal tools, with a consideration of their application in both regimes.

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special “internal border” regime under Law 22/2009, on the sustainable management of inland waters. This states that “Fishing in the stretches of watercourses that border the autonomous community of Aragon can be subject to special regulation, adjusted to the management carried out in the two autonomous communities”. Indeed, coordinated regional laws could be another means to reduce the number of dysfunctions. Again, as regards fishing permits, an agreement has been reached to avoid contradictory and potentially problematic regulations. Aragonese legislation provides for the validity of the Catalan permits, in case of reciprocity. Moreover, Catalan legislation on rates and public prices states that the controlled fishing areas that border Aragon should have a differentiated fee, that is, one fixed by both autonomous communities. This implies that the respective regional parliaments have to enter into negotiation, a solution that is not readily applicable to most dysfunctional issues. Further legal options are also possible, such as introducing greater flexibility in law enforcement in border areas, thereby allowing border municipalities to adapt to the local context. The introduction of this flexibility and asymmetry in legislation is desirable, as is the use of pilot or sunset legislation. The principle of differentiation – present in both Catalan and Aragonese statutes—already justifies the differential treatment of these municipalities, and the local environment is especially suited to experimentation since its effects can be readily defined and evaluated. There is, indeed, a close relationship between decentralisation and legal experimentation (Doménech Pascual 2005). On the other hand, there is a wide variety of instruments that could be used for inter-municipal cooperation. Two options appear as primary formulas based on the creation of a legal entity: mancomunidades and consortiums.6 The former represents inter-municipal cooperation in its purest form, since they are established by the mutual agreement of the municipalities and no other authorities or private parties are involved (Nieto Garrido 2007). Such inter-municipal associations “are involved in service provision and local infrastructure and can often be designed for the development of a very specific area of cooperation” (Pano Puey et al. 2018). Consortia, in contrast, while they are also founded on a voluntary basis, allow for multi-level cooperation, as not only municipalities can participate in them. Provinces, counties, regions (autonomous communities), even private organisations can be involved. Both options could be a suitable option for grouping border territories and delivering public services. These are both effective, efficient systems for the provision of municipal public service from an economic perspective (Bel and Warner 2015) and could be strategic tools for sharing projects and addressing common interests, as the Taula del Sénia mancomunidad has proved. However, mayors and town clerks from border areas stated that this is not their preferred formula for cooperation.

6  Some private law formulas might also be adopted by the municipalities, such as public trading companies (sociedad mercantil administrativa), foundations or associations. The fact of their being a private law formula in this case would restrict the kind of activities they could engage in.

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Other legal options to cooperate include a wide range of solutions that do not mean the creation of a legal entity. The most common involve local agreements (convenios), voluntary formal agreements between different administrations, including municipalities and others. These agreements, which must have a “common purpose”, are bilateral (or multilateral) in which the obligations and commitments are compulsory for all parties (Vilalta Reixach 2017). Another possibility are the so-called river contracts (which draw their inspiration from the French contrats de rivière), an instrument to restore, improve or preserve a river through a series of actions agreed to by all users and by the corresponding public administrations (Brun 2010). An example of such an agreement can be found on the Catalan-Aragonese border (Contracte del Riu Matarranya), a unique case in Spain, in which the water authorities (Ebro Hydrographic Confederation, Catalan Water Agency), Aragonese regional government, users and other organisations all participate. Finally, another French-inspired formula (communauté des communes) has been transposed to Catalan local government law. This is a community of municipalities, similar in many respects to a mancomunidad but without legal entity. Without losing sight of the fact that we are dealing with a complex territory, one that requires different solutions to address each specific case, two elements need to be considered. The formula adopted must be based on the principles of subsidiarity and voluntariness and it must be agile and diverse and provide financial sufficiency.

7.3  Conclusion The Spanish State today is based on differentiated regional legal systems and while the effects of this differentiation should be balanced by formulas of coordination and cooperation, existing mechanisms do not always work properly. Indeed, the number of interregional agreements serves as a good example of just how poorly horizontal cooperation functions in Spain. Against this backdrop, we define internal borders as those that occur de facto between regions, as the latter progressively consolidate different, even contradictory, legal systems. As a result, an administrative barrier is created that impacts primarily on the bordering municipalities, which we define as internal border municipalities. Herein lies the paradox: while we are witnessing growing cross-border cooperation within the European Union, internal borders within decentralised states are being strengthened. In this study, our aim was to detect if there were any dysfunctions attributable to the existence of this administrative boundary and how centrifugal and centripetal forces operate in relation to its associated border areas. We have, in fact, identified a large number of dysfunctions, not all of which reflect the deficient structuring of the respective regional legal systems, with some being more obviously the result of the absence of mechanisms of cooperation. Indeed, this lack of cooperation between regional governments (with some fairly limited exceptions in the case of healthcare) means the dysfunctions tend to be attributable to informal mechanisms of

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cooperation and fragile legal formulas, including instances of fraudulent registration. Overall, we detect considerable legal insecurity and the marked nature of the disadvantages that municipalities suffer when seeking to cooperate with neighbouring municipalities in the other region, with which they have obvious interests in common. Figure 7.2 shows two perspectives of the border area. In the case of the interregional periphery, different sets of circumstances reinforce this peripheral situation, including interregional conflicts, an unfavourable political context or the path taken to implement excluding regional policies. From this perspective, a municipality forms part of a region, a province and a county, and each regional and intermediate government stresses this territorial attitude, marking the regional boundary as a frontier. The outcome of this is a clear and differentiated regulation and divergent public policies in the two regions. The effect in border areas is that municipalities find it difficult to promote stable cooperation mechanisms with neighbouring municipalities. Thus, while they share a border area, their respective regional centre (Barcelona, Zaragoza and Valencia) pulls them apart, thereby reinforcing the internal border. What is created is a space of conflict, where regulations and policies do not seek cooperation but rather to reinforce the territory, generally at the expense of the neighbouring region. Forces of this kind operate in border areas, which in our case are geographical, social and cultural units. Internal border municipalities constitute, on the other hand, their own local context. When they cooperate, the centre lies in the same territory. In this interregional centre—or borderland—we find a space for cooperation and a broad array of distinct manifestations: there is an absence of relevant local

Fig. 7.2  Conflict and cooperation dynamics in interregional areas. (Source: Authors)

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conflicts and a dense network of formal and informal local agreements. The most effective option for them is typically to cooperate and, despite difficulties, they sometimes find the way to do it. As such, border areas are spaces for cooperation, since they share a common territory, culture, social linkages and economic interests, including tourist assets. In a complex—i.e. from a geographical, social, political, institutional and legal perspective—peripheral, rural environment, cooperation is necessary. Governments (state, regional and local) need to change the scale at which they operate and the way in which they perceive the territory, that is, not from an exclusive but from an inclusive perspective. All dynamics of conflict and competition need to be overcome (and not only those existing between regional governments), and a culture of territorial cooperation needs to be enhanced. On the other hand, the law should not constitute a barrier; rather, it should be a useful instrument of cooperation. Cooperation requires a legal framework that guarantees legal security in border areas at the same time as it helps avoid dysfunctions and facilitates cooperation. The law must fulfil this function, providing a toolbox of legal instruments that can help adapt regulations to the local context. Subsidiarity, asymmetry and efficiency must be the driving principles of regional legislators and regional governments, endowing municipalities with a significant role in promoting cooperation. As we pointed out at the start of the chapter, our study confirms that the construction of internal borders leads to dysfunctions that have the biggest impact on cooperation at local level. This situation is being ignored by regional governments and the state but needs to be tackled, as existing cooperation instruments have proved ineffective. Consideration should be given to using mechanisms that are similar to European cooperation instruments (EGTC, ECBM), since the problems detected resemble those found at country border areas. The results obtained in our research are relevant as they serve to highlight the existence of the problem. However, a more in-depth analysis needs to be carried out to examine the situation in terms of different sectors and for internal borders in other parts of Spain. According to the data collected in our study, we are on the right path for delving more deeply into the issue of internal borders and the construction of effective cooperation mechanisms. The instruments used—focus groups, interviews and questionnaires—have been useful in revealing a phenomenon that has barely been studied up till now. They have given us access to opinions, perceptions and new information. Nevertheless, these still need to be compared with the existing legal framework, a complex task that is unfeasible within the scope of this work. Acknowledgements  This research was funded by the Escola d’Administració Pública de Catalunya (EAPC) Research Program (JT089150) and Program 2017SGR1344 (Grup de Recerca Ambiental Mediterrània), supported by the Generalitat de Catalunya. The authors also wish to acknowledge funding from CSO2015-6787-C6-4-P of the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness of the Government of Spain and the postdoctoral scientific project concerted between the University of Barcelona and Societat General d’Aigües de Barcelona (Agbar).

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References Aja E (2014) Estado autonómico y reforma federal. Alianza Editorial, Madrid Arzoz X (2019) Extent and limits of devolution in Spain. European Public Law 25(1):83–103 Bel G, Warner ME (2015) Inter-municipal cooperation and costs: expectations and evidence. Public Adm 93(1):52–67 Berzi M (2017) The cross-border reterritorialization concept revisited: the territorialist approach applied to the case of Cerdanya on the French-Spanish border. Eur Plan Stud 25(9) Blomley N (2008) Making space for law. In: Cox KR, Low M, Robinson J (eds) The Sage handbook of political geography. Sage, London Brun A (2010) Les contrats de rivière en France: enjeux, acteurs et territoires. Les Cahiers du Droit 51(3–4):679–704 Colomer JM (1998) The Spanish ‘state of autonomies’: non-institutional federalism. West Eur Polit 21(4):40–52 Doménech Pascual G (2005) Descentralización administrativa y experimentalismo democrático Cuadernos de la Cátedra Fadique Furió Ceriol, 52/53 European Commission (2017) Easing legal and administrative obstacles in EU border regions García Morales MJ (2006) Las relaciones gubernamentales en el Estado Autonómico: estado de la cuestión y problemas pendientes. In: García Morales MJ, Montilla Martos JA, Arbós Marín X (eds) Las relaciones intergubernamentales en el Estado Autonómico. CEPC, Madrid González García I (2016) El papel de la norma en la cooperación interterritorial. Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals 23:160–200 Keating M (2017) Europe as a multilevel federation. J Eur Publ Policy 24(4):615–632 Krueger RA, Casey MA (2015) Focus groups: a practical guide for applied research. Sage, Singapore Máiz R, Losada A (2016) The Erosion of regional powers in the Spanish ‘state of autonomies’. In: Requejo F, Nagel KJ (eds) Federalism beyond federations. Asymmetry and processes of resymmetrisation in Europe. Routledge, Abingdon Montilla Martos JA (2006) El marco normativo de las relaciones gubernamentales. In: García Morales MJ, Montilla Martos JA, Arbós Marín X (eds) Las relaciones intergubernamentales en el Estado Autonómico. CEPC, Madrid Neuman M (2014) Rethinking borders. In: Steele W et al (eds) Planning across borders in a climate of change. Routledge, Abingdon, pp 15–30 Nielsen LB (2010) The need for multi-method approaches in empirical legal research. In: Cane P, Kritzer HM (eds) Emprirical legal research. Oxford University Press, Oxford Nieto Garrido E (2007) Inter-municipal cooperation in Spain: Dealing with microscopic local government. In: Hulst R, Montfort A (eds) Inter-municipal cooperation in Europe. Springer, Dordrecht Odervest C, Zeitlin J (2014) Assembling an experimentalist regime: transnational governance interactions in the forest sector. Regul Govern 8 Oliveras González X, Trillo Santamaría JM (2014) Fronteras en el contexto español: ¿barreras o puentes para la cooperación sanitaria? Documents d’Anàlisi Geogràfica 60(1):135–159 Pano Puey E, Magre Ferran J, Puiggròs Mussons C (2018) Beyond size: overcoming fragmentation by inter-municipal associations in Spain? The case of Catalonia. Int Rev Adm Sci 84(4):639–658 Parejo Alfonso L (2015) La construcción del espacio. Una introducción a la ordenación territorial y urbanística. Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia Sala G (2014) Federalism without adjectives in Spain. Publius J Federal 44(1):109–134 Santasusagna Riu A, Galindo Caldés R, Tort Donada J (2019) Furthering internal border area studies: an analysis of dysfunctions and cooperation mechanisms in the water and river management of Catalonia, Aragon and the Valencian Community (Spin). Sustainability 11(16):4499

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Tajadura Tejada J (2010) El principio de cooperación en el Estado Autonómico. Granada, Comares Tort Donada J, Galindo Caldés R (dirs.) (2018) L’articulació geogràfica i jurídica dels municipis fronterers: radiografia de la cooperació local en els límits autonòmics entre Catalunya, Aragó i la Comunitat Valenciana. Escola d’Administració Pública de Catalunya, Barcelona Trillo Santamaría JM, Paül V (2016) Transboundary protected areas as ideal tools? Analyzing the Gerês-Xurés transboundary biosphere reserve. Land Use Policy 52:454–463 Vaquer Caballería M (2010) La eficacia territorial y temporal de las normas. Universitat de València - Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia Vilalta Reixach M (2017) Las relaciones interadministrativas en la nueva Ley de régimen jurídico del sector público. Cuadernos de Derecho Local 44:48–82 Ramon Galindo Caldés  Lecturer in Administrative Law at the Open University of Catalonia and Associated Lecturer in Administrative Law at the University of Barcelona. BA in Political Science and Sociology at the University of Basque Country (1999), MA in Public Management at the Pompeu Fabra University, Autonomous University of Barcelona and ESADE (2003), DEA in Political Science at the University of Barcelona (2003) and PhD in Law at the University of Barcelona (2012). He has awarded with the CEMCI Prize for Advanced Scientific Research on Local Administration and Government (2013), with an essay on local districts. His research areas include local government law, sub-municipal government, interregional cooperation, science organisation, algorithmic transparency and civil service law. Member of some research projects, the latest The geographical and legal articulation of the border municipalities: in-depth analysis of the cooperation in the regional boundaries between Catalonia, Aragon and the Valencian Community (2016-2017), Innovation in the public service delivery through personalization and proactive provision using massive data and artificial intelligence (2018-2019), Legal challenges of using massive data to foster innovation and good governance through artificial intelligence (2018-2020), Transparency of algorithms in metropolitan municipalities (main researcher, 2019). Albert Santasusagna Riu  PhD in Geography, Spatial Planning and Environmental Management (University of Barcelona, 2017), MSc in Spatial Planning (University of Barcelona, 2013) and BA in Environmental Sciences (University of Barcelona, 2011). Award to the best doctoral thesis in Geography (University of Barcelona, 2017) and Extraordinary end-of-course prize in BA (University of Barcelona, 2011). Associate lecturer in Geography (University of Barcelona) and postdoctoral researcher in urban sustainability, funded by Agbar (Societat General d’Aigües de Barcelona). Award in Geography and Natural Sciences (Pau Vila Award, Institut de Ciències de l’Educació, 2008), Antoni Esteve Research Award (Fundació Lacetània, 2012) and Manlleu City Council Research Award (2012). He has participated in several research projects (Ministry of Economy, Government of Spain) and in inter-­regional border spaces project funded by School of Public Administration of Catalonia (EAPC), as well as scientific coordinator of conferences such II and III Jornades Cerdà (2017, 2019) and III and IV Jornada de Joves Investigadors de l’Institut de Recerca de l’Aigua (2018, 2019). He is also involved in scientific dissemination projects, such as STEM Barcelona (Barcelona City Council, The New York Academy of Sciences) and Scientific Culture Unit of the University of Barcelona (Camins infinits, Toc-Toc, Science Festival and Science Space in Annual Education Show). Joan Tort Donada  Professor of Geography at the University of Barcelona, where he is teaching since 1990 and become head of the Department of Geography in 2018. Graduated in Law at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (1982), in Geography and History at the University of Barcelona (1989) and PhD in Geography at the University of Barcelona (1999). His research interests encompass Regional Studies, Landscape, Toponymy, Epistemology in Geography, Spatial Planning, and Literary Geography. He has focused attention to the study of place names, and the relationship between place names and landscape, which was the subject of his doctoral thesis in

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Geography (1999). Prior to academic career, he has been working during thirteen years in applied Geography as civil servant. Among his latest works (as author or coordinator): Atlas de los paisajes agrarios de España (Madrid, 2013-2014), Names in daily life. Proceedings of the XXIV International Congress of Onomastic Sciences. ICOS-24 (Barcelona, 2014), Paisajes patrimoniales de España (Madrid, 2018) i Els municipis fronterers. Radiografia de la cooperació entre Catalunya, Aragó i la Comunitat Valenciana (Barcelona, 2018).

Chapter 8

The Impact of European Regional Policy and Local Action Groups on Inter-­ municipal Cooperation in Slovakia Ľudmila Malíková and Martin Daško

Abstract  One of the most widespread forms of inter-municipal cooperation has been the Local Action Groups that take advantage of EU subsidies to develop municipalities and regions. Their great advantage is not only the opportunity for regional development of municipalities through a redesigned EU project submission system, but also the involvement of a wider spectrum of actors’ networks from the public, private and civil sectors in joint development programmes. One of the problems of this process may be the institutional division of regional self-­ government, which determines how municipalities choose “partners” for cooperation. The research question of this study is how the institutional division of self-governing regions influences cooperation between municipalities in Local Action Groups in the Slovak case study. Is the system of self-governing regions, which is anchored in legislation, an advantage or a limiting factor for cooperating municipalities? This chapter responds to the fact that the “artificial” division into regions may ultimately disadvantage municipalities in choosing cooperating partners. Municipalities are in practice choosing partners for cooperation within a single self-government region. The research is based on the comparison of two regions, Trnava and Nitra, looking at the activities of the established Local Action Groups. Our qualitative research is based on an analysis of the founding treaties of the cooperating municipalities, interviews with the direct actors of the Local Action Groups and analysis of their activities overall. The chapter enables us to understand the possibilities of cooperation for the smallest municipalities in Slovakia in a more complex way. Keywords  Local Action Groups · Regions · Inter-municipal cooperation · LEADER programme

Ľ. Malíková · M. Daško (*) Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava, Trnava, Slovakia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Nunes Silva (ed.), Contemporary Trends in Local Governance, Local and Urban Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52516-3_8

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8.1  Introduction Through regional policy, the EU has, over the past decades, significantly influenced the activities of regional and local authorities in its Member States to help regions balance the economic and social disparities between them. The policy responds to the needs of economic growth as well as the growth of employment and the overall development of self-government. The economic and social situation is different in each of the 281 NUTS 2 regions and 1348 NUTS 3 regions within the Member States. Therefore it is important for the Member States and their regions to be prepared and able to draw on the funds distributed by the European Commission to various areas of regional development. After joining the EU in 2004, the Slovak Republic became part of this policy and draws subsidies for regional development from several funds: the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund, and the European Social Fund, as well as the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund. This development mechanism creates new demands for developing human resources and preparing them for a new organizational system capable not only of clearly setting common goals but also of achieving results that have to be regularly monitored, evaluated and appraised in the particular environment of the community or region of a Member State. This chapter deals with the impact of European regional integration policy on the cooperation between municipalities and the challenges of implementing European regional development programs in the conditions pertaining in Slovakia. It looks at networking among local government actors by creating new partnerships and their ability to cooperate and integrate their interests in larger units and in new organizational forms. The European LEADER (Liaison Entre Actions de Développement de l’Économie Rurale/Links between the rural economy and development actions) methodology has brought new forms of intergovernmental cooperation into the regional space in the form of municipalities networking in new organizational groups labeled Local Action Groups (LAGs). These groups initiate cooperation between public, private and non-governmental actors on the bottom-up governance principle. The LEADER methodology envisages the financing of operational programs within the framework of NUTS 2 regions (i.e. a region with upwards of 800,000 inhabitants), which in Slovakia means the territorial division of the country into four regions, which comprise the NUTS 2 operational units. However, Slovakia has eight self-governing regions (politically-elected authorities) that were created in 2001 as part of the decentralization process, and these correspond to the NUTS 3 division. This presents a challenge for the cooperation between political units (municipalities and regions) in the preparation and implementation of projects under the NUTS 2 operational programs of the European Commission. The cooperation and partnership criteria set out in the operational programs affect how municipalities join together in specific LAGs in order to implement joint projects. They envisage new forms and content when organizing cooperation between local government areas and the development of partnerships between not

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only municipalities but also regions. Given the strong legitimacy of regional self-­ government in Slovakia’s public administration system, these new forms of cooperation through the LEADER program may present a new challenge for the future shape of cooperation between municipalities and regions. This chapter is divided into five sections focused on European regional policy and its impact on the regions of the EU Member States; how European territorial division affects Slovakia; the impact of the decentralization of public administration in Slovakia on its settlement structure; how Local Action Groups function as a form of inter-municipal cooperation in Slovakia; and look at the LAGs in the Trnava and Nitra region as a case study of inter-regional collaboration. In our research, we have used qualitative and quantitative data, interviews with actors directly involved in LAGs and local and regional authorities, and other sources. We also used the case study method, where we try to show the specificities of the networking of municipalities in the LAG in two neighboring self-governing regions, the Trnava and Nitra regions. The main research question is: How do the pre-accession decisions of governments before 2004 affect inter-municipal cooperation in Slovakia? One of the conditions for accession to the EU was to decentralize public administration. The principle of subsidiarity was adopted and original competences for local governments and regions in Slovakia were created. The paper raises the question of how the pre-accession legislative changes affect the functioning of municipalities and their cooperation. Current trends in local governments are constantly changing. The processes of decentralization and balancing the differences between regions in countries such as Slovakia are not completed yet. The Slovak Republic is an example of the fact that even after almost 15 years of its membership in the EU, new challenges have appeared, which were not identified before 2004. Inter-municipal cooperation and specific local action groups in Slovakia are an example of how to tackle the problems of decentralization and fragmented settlement structures. Current trends in local governance are confronted with new challenges. The paper discusses possible solutions in the trends of current trends in Slovakia.

8.2  T  he Development of European Regional Policy and Its Impact on the Regions of EU Member States European Union policy is governed by the principle of subsidiarity, which in short means transferring competencies from central governments to the smallest possible self-governing units. However, it is important that decision making is satisfactory and not inconsistent with the legislation of the state or the EU itself (Láštic 2010). This principle meant that the Central European countries needed to reform public administration, as up until accession to the EU decision making tended to be rather centralized. The essential condition for the success of devolved decision making and for solving problems with self-government lies primarily in having an efficient

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mechanism for financing the activities of municipalities and regions. Self-­ governments may have competencies but may not have sufficient resources (financial, human, expert, technical, and so on) to accomplish them. In such cases, the intervention of the central government is needed. If they cannot help, then the principle of subsidiarity allows EU bodies to propose forms of assistance to the regions and municipalities of Member States. Since its inception, the EU has developed a sophisticated system for supporting regional policy. The EU institutions define regional policy as one of the most important investment actions to help the Member States remove the differences between regions. In particular, it focuses on priorities such as the competitiveness of regions, job creation, sustainable development, economic growth and related improvements in the lives of the population (Europa.eu 2016). Operational programs and finance are then allocated for individual priorities and redistributed to each country, or to regions. Since the 1950s, the regional policy has been an essential part of the development of the EU as a whole. Its increasing and irreversible role is confirmed by the following table (Table 8.1), which shows rising expenditure and planned expenditure to support regions within the EU Member States within the budgetary periods where Slovakia has been a member. Budgets for the different programming periods in the 2004–2020 period, which are approved by the European Commission, have a rising tendency. In the future, it can be expected (with the possible inclusion of new Member States) that the funds for regional development will be much higher. The European Union distinguishes the ‘categories’ according to which funds are allocated to the Member States depending on the needs of individual regions. In the 2014–2020 programming period, resources from the individual funds are different. This is illustrated in the following table (Table 8.2), which also shows the different categories of countries according to average GDP. Resources from the above funds have been distributed to a total of 274 regions at NUTS 2 level across the EU in 2014–2020, including most of the territory of the Slovak Republic, which falls into the category of ‘less developed regions’.1 The Table 8.1.  Budgets of all EU funds for regional development in selected programming periods Programme Period 2004–2006 2007–2013 2014–2020

Budget (€) 213 bill. (for the15 EU members) + 22 bill. (for new members like Slovakia) 347 bill. c. 352 bill.

Total Budget (€) 235 bill. 347 bill. c. 352 bill.

Source: Európska komisia (2014, p. 4)

1  The category of less developed regions within Slovakia does not include the region with the capital city of Bratislava, where the average GDP per capita in comparison with the EU average is much higher than in the rest of the Slovak Republic.

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Table 8.2  Budget of EU funds for Regional Development Support in the 2014–2020 programming period in a total of 274 NUTS 2 EU regionsa Category Less developed regions Transition regions More developed regions For all categories

Definition of Category GDP/ head