Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem [1 ed.] 9781443898171, 9781443888196

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Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem Edited by

Jonathan Warner, David W. Lovell and Michalis Kontos

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem Edited by Jonathan Warner, David W. Lovell and Michalis Kontos This book first published 2016 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2016 by Jonathan Warner, David W. Lovell, Michalis Kontos and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-8819-2 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-8819-6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ....................................................................................................... vii Chapter One ................................................................................................. 1 Introduction David W. Lovell, Michalis Kontos, Matteo Nicolini and Jonathan Warner Part I: Identity and Perceptions Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 18 Settling Protracted Social Conflicts: Trust, Identity, and the Resolution of the “Cyprus Issue” David W. Lovell Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 36 Foreign Interventions and Greek Cypriot Perceptions Michalis Kontos Part 2: Politics: Contemporary Issues in the Greek- and TurkishCypriot Communities Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 58 Offshore Gas: An Anticatalyst in Efforts to Reunify Cyprus Ayla Gürel Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 90 Cyprus Problem–Cyprus Hydrocarbons–Regional Co-Operation: Pieces of a Knotty Puzzle Melanie Antoniou Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 112 Erdo÷an’s Cyprus: Another Aspect of the Turkish Model Nikos Moudouros

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Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 133 Turkey: From the “Motherland” to the “IMF of Northern Cyprus”? Umut Bozkurt Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 156 Keeping the Peace: UNFICYP and its Electronic Eyes on the Green Line A. Walter Dorn Part III: Comparisons Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 176 Cyprus and Belize: The Role of Neighbours in their Stories Jonathan Warner Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 193 Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict: Comparing Cyprus and Sri Lanka Zenonas Tziarras Part IV: Going Forward: New Approaches to Resolving the Cyprus Problem Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 232 A “New” Legal Geography for the “Old” Cyprus Question: Regional Demarcation, Power-Sharing, and Divided Societies Matteo Nicolini Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 263 Civil Society Active Dialogue Networks in Cyprus: Peace-ing it Together at the Grassroots Bülent Kanol and ølke Da÷l Contributors ............................................................................................. 296 Index ........................................................................................................ 299

PREFACE

The idea for this book arose after a happy accident when we editors found ourselves brought together in a merged workshop at the 2012 conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas in Cyprus. Encouraged by the insights brought to the Cyprus problem from different perspectives, and by the productive engagement on all sides on what is a difficult and protracted set of issues, and mindful that there had been no major scholarly work on the problem for some time, we met after the workshop to begin planning in earnest. Although we were previously unknown to each other, and our intellectual journeys and disciplinary foundations were somewhat different (and our key method of communication for nearly four years has been email), we nevertheless found a rapport and, more importantly, substantial common ground. As more and more contributors were recruited to the project, and as we read their various drafts, our common ground changed very little. Our sensibilities— especially to matters such as the importance of a non-partisan presentation of the Cyprus issue, and to methodological issues— were heightened. This book is written in a spirit of hope. The long division of the population of Cyprus is, at its core, a human tragedy that we believe can be ended. Politics, and the various top-down mechanisms that have been used to address the division, have tended rather to accentuate than to resolve the Cyprus problem. Indeed, they have developed a life of their own, and vested interests benefit from their continuation. Even the discovery of oil and gas reserves under the seabed off the coast of Cyprus, with the promise of economic wealth, has become grist to this selfinterested mill. Furthermore, the continued meddling of foreigners in the affairs of Cyprus has intensified the problem and done little to assist a resolution. One of the key messages from this book is that people-topeople initiatives must supplement the plans (and posturing) of politicians in order to make progress towards an ultimate resolution of the Cyprus problem. What that resolution might look like, in institutional terms, we cannot be certain and nor do we want to prescribe. Human ingenuity is able to find a widely accepted and workable formula for a Cyprus that combines unity and diversity, acknowledges the worth of its different constituent communities, and addresses—or begins to move beyond— historical animosities and injustices. Nationalism, as Ernest Renan

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perceptively explained in the nineteenth century is not just a “daily plebiscite,” but also involves selective “forgetting.” As editors, we owe a debt to the contributors whose chapters are here assembled, and who accepted our initial invitations, and then responded cheerfully to our subsequent advice and corrections to their chapters. We thank the editorial staff of Cambridge Scholars Publishing for their equanimity in the face of a couple of missed deadlines while we, in our different time zones, coped with the heavy demands of teaching and travelling for our universities. We owe a particular debt to our partners and families, who understood our more-than-occasional distractions from everyday life while we grappled with another editorial task. And we would all like to thank Jonathan's wife, Lynda, who copy-edited the entire typescript in its penultimate version: we are deeply indebted to you, as is the dear reader! —The Editors

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM DAVID W. LOVELL, MICHALIS KONTOS, MATTEO NICOLINI AND JONATHAN WARNER

The Cyprus Problem in a World of Conflicts Conflict has been an enduring feature of human societies in general, and of the body politic in particular. Attempts to avoid conflict might indeed have been the cause of the establishment of the body politic, emerging as it was imagined by the seventeenth century thinkers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke from, respectively, the fearsome, or simply inconvenient, “state of nature.” Conflicts might have caused the renovation of the body politic on compactual grounds, at least in England during the seventeenth century. Indeed, the rule of the fundamental law of the land was established on the basis of the constitutional principle of mixed government upon a contractual basis. From that time onwards, English political power has had its root in the consent of the people. This was a shift from the “unwritten constraints of the ancient constitution, the immemorial suprema lex or common law, whose jurisdiction is unchallengeable and whose judges are the ultimate arbiters of juridical disputes” (Raffield, 2010: 85) to “mixed regime arguments [which] sprang from the constitutional dilemma raised by competing claims for royal prerogative and the extensions of parliamentary power” (Ward, 2004: 60). To sum up, modern ideas of identity exhibit a high degree of adaptation to the English legal tradition, since it “emphasized the need to balance and calibrate the distinct elements in the English polity, rather than appealing primarily to its antiquity” (Ward, 2004: 59). In international relations, conflicts can lead to the creation of new world orders and to the formulation of new politics.

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While nowadays we tend to reduce the causes of conflict to a struggle for advantage in situations of scarcity (arguably our existential situation), conflict also takes place for broadly societal, ideological, sectarian and vainglorious reasons in their own right. Indeed, the latter can engender even more cruelty and malevolence than conflicts over scarcity, which might, in any case, be susceptible to some form of transnational agreement (as exemplified by the European Coal and Steel Community: see Cameron, 2004: 211ff). More than 2,000 years ago Thucydides (1972: 80) recognized the breadth of the fundamental causes of conflict when he identified them as fear, honour and interest. How we manage a conflict, whatever its cause, is a test of human wisdom and skills (which is perhaps why, in most states, there is no right of citizens to bear arms). In important respects the longstanding institutions of government, law, diplomacy and the market are creative ways of channelling and managing conflict to beneficial ends. Wars happen when those institutions fail, when conflicting demands cannot be conciliated, when the limits of exchange are reached, or when compromise is regarded as anathema. From a political realist point of view wars also happen when a belligerent’s interests are supported by a suitable international structure; that is, when the aggressor believes that the power distribution is such that the expected benefits of the use of military violence exceed the expected costs. As Thucydides would argue, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” A more accurate term for wars between unequal belligerents is “foreign intervention.” There is little doubt that foreign intervention has decisively stimulated ethnic conflict in Cyprus. Wars “succeed”—if that is an appropriate term—when they create a new equilibrium or approach in which the issues in dispute may be peacefully addressed (Schmitt, 2006; Ortino, 2002). As Thomas Hobbes (1991: 71) put it in the seventeenth century, there is no better “hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.” Some conflicts, however, give rise to “unsuccessful” wars, where despite a military victory the issues are not resolved, continue to smoulder and are readily re-ignited, and some conflicts remain in a stalemate condition of “neither war nor peace,” where skirmishing continues and insecurity pervades everyday life. These sorts of conflicts are often described as “protracted” or “intractable.” The complexities they involve and the difficulties that their continuation creates are the subjects of this volume as they relate to the case of Cyprus, and the focus of this chapter insofar as they help us understand how solutions to the “Cyprus problem” (for want of a neutral terminology) might be approached.

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In the contemporary world, such “protracted conflicts” can be seen in both inter- and intra-state relations. The so-called “Cold War” can be considered one such interstate conflict, now ended by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, but possibly reappearing as a result of increased tensions between NATO and Russia in the twenty-first century, especially after the 2014 events in Ukraine. But the types of conflict of which Cyprus forms an example, that of disputes in divided societies can be seen, mutatis mutandis, in the Arab-Israeli conflict since at least 1947; in Lebanon since independence in 1943, but especially since the civil war (1975-1990) (Raad 1988); in Sri Lanka since 1983 (perhaps closer to resolution after a decisive but bloody military defeat of the “Tamil Tigers” in 2009), in Northern Ireland, Kashmir and elsewhere (Lijphart 2002). Ethnic and religious divisions combined with a clumsy colonial disengagement are evident in most of these conflicts. Moreover, their very length has created a depth of feeling and a realignment of material circumstances and behavioural norms which lead to an intractability that is dispiriting for those caught in its web and exasperating for outsiders of good will to observe, and for which the term “protracted social conflict” is sometimes deployed. This term proposes to capture the depth of the issues at stake and to insist that the tools of social psychology, just as much as those of international relations and jurisprudence, are necessary in building solutions.

Background to the Cyprus Problem When did the Cyprus Problem start? A number of chapters in this volume revisit and reinterpret the history of the island, often taking different starting points. Leaving aside the conflicts within and without the Byzantine Empire (palace coups and intrigues; Arab invasions) and the later conflicts between European powers (the Latin period from Richard the Lionheart’s conquest in 1189 to the capture of Venetian-ruled Famagusta in 1571), some would argue that the modern conflict has its roots in the arrival of immigrants from Anatolia after the Ottoman conquest in the 16th century (see Gazio÷lu [1990] for an account of Turkish rule of Cyprus). If there had been no emigration to Cyprus from what is now Turkey, there would be no Turkish Cypriots, and Cyprus would today most likely be part of Greece. Turkish rule lasted until 1878, when Britain and the Ottoman Empire reached an agreement that the former would lease and administer the island. The incoming British administration was met by an appeal from the Archbishop expressing the hope that, just as Gladstone had gifted the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864,

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Cyprus could expect the same. And, indeed, Britain did offer the island to Greece in 1915, in return for Greece’s joining the war against Germany and her allies, an offer that was refused, partly because the king, Constantine, thought that neutrality was in Greece’s best interests, and partly because of the close family relationship between the king and the German Kaiser (who was his brother-in-law). Britain formally annexed the island when the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the German side. In general the British administration of its colony was peaceful. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots served with the British forces in World War II, even though there was no obligation for them to do so. But the rise of anti-colonialism with the advent of the United Nations (established in 1945) led to increased agitation for the selfdetermination of the island, which would inevitably lead to enosis (the union of Cyprus with Greece). The Cypriot Greek Orthodox Church conducted a referendum in 1950, which resulted in a large number of signatures demanding enosis. When the British Colonial Secretary, Henry Hopkinson, announced that some territories, like Cyprus, could never be fully independent, Greek Cypriot indignation boiled over into violence. The campaign by EOKA, launched in 1955, saw bombings of British military installations and roadside IED’s that killed civilians; characterizing EOKA as a terrorist organization, the British responded by sending in more troops, and by trying to hunt down those seen as responsible for the attacks. This proved to be more difficult than expected: a guerrilla army with support from the local population was almost impossible to root out. Battles with holed-up irregulars or executions of those captured alive served only to create martyrs and stiffen the resolve of EOKA. The exiling of Archbishop Makarios, the leader of the Greek Cypriot community, did nothing to stem the bloodshed. The Turkish Cypriot community was drawn into the conflict, as the British recruited Turkish Cypriots to fill vacancies in the civilian police force left by Greek Cypriot resignations and sackings. A diplomatic proposal that the island should become a Turkish/Greek condominium was rejected by the Greek Cypriot population, but it did serve to awaken Turkey’s interest in the former Ottoman province. Turkey argued that, if Britain were minded to abandon its colony, then ownership should revert to Turkey, as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish Cypriot leaders proposed taksim—the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey. A peace deal produced a truce between EOKA and Britain, and a proposal of independence, guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and Britain. A constitution for the new state was drafted by Greek, Turkish and British civil servants, with no input from the Cypriots. Faced with an ultimatum that it was this

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or nothing, Dr Fazl Küçük, the Turkish Cypriot leader, and Archbishop Makarios signed, and the Republic of Cyprus was born in August 1960. In its original form, it lasted little more than three years; the bicommunal nature of the Republic collapsed in violence during the winter of 1963-4. The Turkish Cypriot population gathered into defensible areas, protected by their own militia. A United Nations peacekeeping force arrived to try to ensure an end to violence. A further bloodletting in 1967 (the Kophinou incident) led to attempts to resolve the problem; things were more peaceable, until the events of 1974. In July of that year, the Greek junta (which had been ruling Greece since 1967) organized a coup against Makarios’ government. Five days later Turkey invaded, arguing that Article Four of the Treaty of Guarantee (1960) gave it the right to do so. Although the coupist government swiftly collapsed, a truce followed by peace talks broke down, and the Turkish army swept through northern Cyprus, stopping only at the cease-fire line observed today. 200,000 Greek Cypriots were displaced from their homes in the north; for their own protection, almost all of the Turkish Cypriots living south of the ceasefire line found their way to the Turkish-controlled area, creating two ethnically distinct areas in Cyprus. Peace talks have been held intermittently since 1977; the outline agreed then still forms the basis of the type of solution sought today. The talks oscillate between aiming for a comprehensive settlement (what became the Annan Plan, that was put to separate referenda in 2004), and confidence building measures, that aim to work towards a settlement one step at a time.

Recent developments: why this book? “Of the making many books there is no end, and much study wearies the body,” the author of the Biblical book of Ecclesiastes advises his readers (12:12b). Much ink has already been spilt on analyses of the Cyprus Problem, and so it is apposite to ask why another one is needed. Over time, conflicts evolve and change. The restoration of democracy in Greece in the aftermath of the failure of the 1974 coup in Cyprus was one early and positive change. A military coup in Turkey in 1980 and the constrained democracy which followed it was less helpful, as was the Turkish Cypriot declaration of UDI in 1983. More recently, the decline of the power of the military in Turkey and the rise of political Islam there, along with Cyprus’ EU entry changed the parameters of the problem. The financial crisis affecting Greece and Cyprus since 2010, plus the changing leadership on the island have shaped the development of the issues

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involved in the Cyprus Problem. Since the 2004 referenda, the major changes on the ground have been the opening of more crossing points along the 1974 ceasefire line, more contact between members of the two communities, and the completion of a long-planned water pipeline between Turkey and north Cyprus (which should alleviate the acute water shortage on the island and the massive depletion of groundwater resources in the north). The discovery of offshore natural gas has added a new element to the mix. These developments, while not in themselves gamechangers, open up both new opportunities for, and new threats to, the peace process. It is the implications of these changes that this book seeks to explore. Contested histories make for interesting reading, perhaps; significantly, their effects are still felt today. New ways of understanding the conflict, and being able to appreciate the viewpoint of the “other” open possible pathways towards resolution of conflict. Although conflicts are all unique to some extent, there are perhaps things that can be learned from them that can help with understanding conflict and conflict resolution elsewhere. Much of the discussion in the book concerns the difficulty of producing viable constitutional and civic arrangements in an ethnicallydivided polity. It is clear that this issue dominates almost all discussion of the Cyprus Problem, from the drawing of borders, the conceptualization of identity of oneself and of the “other,” and the management of the natural resources with which the island is endowed. Other cleavages in civil society, such as gender inequality, then seem less salient. For example, politics continues to be male-dominated: the leaders of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities since independence have always been men. Women are more underrepresented in the Republic of Cyprus’ institutions than in any other EU country: only seven out of 56 members of the Republic’s House of Representatives are women; and only four out of 50 of the Turkish Cypriot assembly. Few women have held high office in the government or judiciary, and, at present, only one of Cyprus’ six representatives in the European Parliament is a woman. Progress towards gender equality is proceeding, but the issue, while important, is not seen as a top priority. This book contains contributions from both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as well as outside scholars. Many of the authors draw on the history of the Cyprus Problem. While rehashing the events of the prereferendum period won’t help solve the Problem, understanding the significance of the history to current thinking, and the intersection (or lack thereof) between the differing stories is very important. Why do Cypriots

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not perceive that they have interests in common? Are they confused about what their real interests might be? One vexed issue in writing about Cyprus is the way in which to refer to the north of the island, the area taken by Turkish forces in 1974. For Turkey and most people who live there, this area of land is now the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, with its own President, Parliament and civic institutions. For all other countries in the world, it is the Turkishoccupied part of Cyprus, and all its governmental institutions are illegitimate, merely masquerading as the genuine article. Most Greek Cypriot writers refer to north Cyprus, following United Nations resolutions, as an illegal pseudo-state and place its institutions within inverted commas. Careful writers distinguish between those institutions which are the successors of those within the competence of the Turkish Communal Chamber (which are therefore legitimate under Part V the 1960 Cyprus Constitution), and those that are in violation of the Constitution. Thus primary and secondary schools in the north are really schools, but the “universities” are not (as the power to grant University charters rests with the Government, whereas pre-university education was a matter for the communal chamber – Article 20 of the Constitution). Similarly, Mustafa Aknc is recognized as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot Community, but only as “President” of the “TRNC” or pseudo-state. While, with good will and effort, it is possible to get an agreed vocabulary, in this volume we have striven to achieve linguistic neutrality only in this introductory chapter. Elsewhere, we have chosen to allow each author to use the language of his or her choice. Readers should not infer from this that the editors necessarily endorse the formulations used.

The Structure of the Book In the opening chapter of the first section, David W. Lovell contextualizes the Cyprus Problem within the broader issues of trust and identity. In today’s world the issue of Cyprus is special for all the wrong reasons: because of the duration of the division of Cyprus; because of the involvement of the two mother countries, Greece and Turkey, which can use the two Cypriot communities as proxies for their ongoing feud; and because of the repeated failure of the United Nations’ attempts at resolution of the conflict. Even trying to outline the history of the last fifty years is fraught with difficulty, as each side sees events in partisan terms. As a result, it is with suspicion that all attempts at reconciliation continue to be viewed. The chapter provides an overview of the Cyprus problem as a background against which a discussion of the role of identity can take

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place. A necessary condition for resolving the Cyprus problem, he argues, is the creation of a Cypriot identity and then a national interest that can replace the existing loyalties to the motherlands and their cultures and traditions. In his chapter, “Foreign interventions and Greek Cypriot perceptions,” Michalis Kontos broadens the question of identity to include a consideration of the way that outsiders are viewed. Cyprus has suffered from a long history of foreign rule, interventions, and interference, and this history has shaped the nature of both the Cyprus Problem and Cypriot identities. The chapter uses a model of cognitive consistency as described by Robert Jervis (1976) and links this to the literature on foreign intervention originating from the perspective of international relations, with the aim of critically examining some of the solidified perceptions of the Cyprus problem, especially those of the Greek Cypriot political elites and public opinion. These perceptions mainly concern the role of the great powers and Cyprus’ guarantors. The Cyprus problem is a field of intensive domestic political debate in the Republic of Cyprus (which has de facto been run by the Greek Cypriot community since 1964). It has been the leading issue in all election campaigns since 1974. Non-Cypriot actors implicated one way or another in the Cyprus problem, namely the three guarantor powers (the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey) and the United States, have critically affected the form and the content of the problem. There are, however, various domestic perceptions and misperceptions relating to the “foreigners” and their role regarding the Cyprus problem which define—to a large degree—the way the Cyprus problem affects the Greek Cypriot domestic political agenda, and, therefore, the Greek Cypriot official stance in the negotiations on the Cyprus problem. The second section of the book concentrates on the contemporary political scene within the two communities, covering salient issues in their political discourse, and the issues that drive “domestic” concerns. Ayla Gürel discusses how the current politics of offshore gas complicate a settlement in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot-led Republic of Cyprus (RoC) began preparing the ground for offshore hydrocarbons exploration in the early 2000s, and in 2008, the US-based company Noble Energy was awarded a three-year licence in one of the 13 blocks in the offshore exploration area demarcated by the RoC. Since September 2011, Noble Energy has completed two test wells. In September 2013, the preliminary results of the second well showed that there was an estimated reserve of five trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the block—quite a significant resource. With the prospect of further hydrocarbon finds in this and other

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blocks licensed in early 2013, gas potentially carries a promise of unprecedented prosperity for the whole island. But the unresolved Cyprus problem stands in the way of this promise being realized. Although the RoC government maintains that in its pursuit to develop the island’s offshore natural resources it is exercising its sovereign rights as recognized by the international community, both the Turkish Cypriot authorities and the government of Turkey have voiced strong objection to these offshore initiatives. Exclusion of Turkish Cypriots from this process is inconsistent, they maintain, with the international accords that established the original RoC in 1960. The chapter analyses the reasons behind this tension over the development of Cyprus’ offshore hydrocarbons based on the parties’ expressed positions and actions. The hydrocarbons controversy stems directly from the parties’ fundamental differences about the nature of the Cyprus problem, and therefore what is politically at stake in Cyprus. As things stand, the issue of hydrocarbons appears to be deepening the chasm between the parties to the Cyprus problem and thus reducing the likelihood of a political settlement. Melanie Antoniou also looks at the effects of the discovery of hydrocarbons in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), but from the perspective of the Greek Cypriot side. The RoC has developed two strategic goals as a result of the gas discovery: the monetization of the energy fields as soon as possible, and the transformation of Cyprus into a regional energy hub. However, both of these goals are in conflict with the stated vital interests of Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey wants to reserve for itself the position of regional energy hub as part of a strategy of taking on a leadership role in the region. In addition, Turkey aims at a bigger share of maritime zone and offshore hydrocarbons in the eastern Mediterranean Sea via the expansion of her EEZ. This chapter analyses how Turkey’s pursuit of her strategic goals, in conjunction with Greek and Turkish Cypriots’ failure to recognize their real common interest in development of the gas resources could put into peril the prospects for their further development and negate the potential for Cyprus to become a bridge for the construction of a new form of regional co-operation, including between Israel and the Arab states. It suggests that inter-state cooperation could be constructed and achieved by the introduction of appropriate law enforcement agencies in international political life. These agencies would constitute a constraint on the exercise of power, leading to a reduction in violence (and the threat of violence) and movement towards a more consensual political life. Such agencies could, for instance, take the form of a regulatory system that functions as a subsystem of the Energy Charter and in harmony with the EU legal and regulatory framework.

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Although the discovery of gas also affects the relationship between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot statelet, there are other elements to the way in which that relationship is changing. The effects of the 2010 financial crisis on the economy of the RoC are well-known; less well documented are the changes in economic structure that are altering the nature of the economy, politics and society in the north. The next two chapters seek to address this omission. Nikos Moudouros focuses on the way the relationship with Turkey has changed over the past decade as the “Turkish (economic) Model” has become increasingly an undisguised neoliberalism. How this model has affected the Turkish Cypriots, and has played out in north Cyprus, forms an appropriate basis for analysing the Turkish model and Turkey’s use of soft power. The chapter argues that the dominant perception of Turkey’s national security needs in relation to Cyprus is changing contextually, resulting in modifications to Turkey’s ambition to export its modernization programme to the Turkish Cypriot community. In turn, this development in Cyprus has resulted in the discontinuity from the socio-economic system that prevailed in the Turkish Cypriot community in the immediate aftermath of 1974. The way in which the Turkish government has exported its model of transformation is through a succession of three-year financial protocols. In theory these made economic aid more contingent on results; in practice they have produced a new social dynamic within the Turkish Cypriot community, which perhaps makes an agreement with the RoC more attractive. Umut Bozkurt presents a different view of the same issue: could Turkey’s neoliberal “therapies” in north Cyprus perhaps instead lead the island further along the path of division? It was in the aftermath of the failure of the Annan Plan that Turkey assumed the de facto role of the “IMF of northern Cyprus,” aiming to effect a deeper transformation in the economy and politics of the Turkish Cypriot community. As well as insisting on austerity measures and the privatization of state owned enterprises in order to tame the “cumbersome” state in the north of Cyprus, the Turkish government opted for a strategy that defined northern Cyprus as a special investment area. As a result of this, inflows of Turkish capital have significantly increased, both through the purchase of privatized state enterprises and the privatization of infrastructure, education, and the construction and tourism sectors. The chapter seeks to locate this neoliberal restructuring of north Cyprus in a global context and not solely as a peculiarity of state formation and the local dynamics of the Turkish Cypriot community. But within that dynamic, the fear is that Turkey and north Cyprus will enter an ever-closer union, as increased dependency

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forces north Cyprus to rely ever more heavily on not only Turkish political institutions, but on Turkish businessmen as well. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been on the island since 1974. UNFICYP is invisible to most Cypriots— those impacted by its presence are limited to people living in or near the Green line or buffer zone (but this does include a large proportion of Nicosia, the only remaining divided capital in Europe). Any changes in the nature of the Cyprus Problem have the potential to change the role of UNFICYP and its monitoring and peacekeeping role. Walter Dorn explores the way in which monitoring the Green Line has changed over the past 25 years: the increasing availability of electronic surveillance has the potential to make monitoring easier, and so make it possible to head off trouble before it happens. In itself, this increased ability to be proactive can help reduce tension, as the two sides come to understand that any hostile intent by the other side will be rapidly defused, and that communicating peaceful intent (by, for example, reducing forces in sensitive areas) is facilitated. The 1974 war divided the island into two parts with a narrow demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the opposing Greek Cypriot and Turkish forces. The volatility and violence in this buffer zone, either side of the “Green Line” that marked the ceasefire positions, necessitated a constant UN peacekeeping presence. This was achieved mainly with manned observation posts (OPs), about 150 of which were established by 1975 to maintain stability and prevent flare-ups, including any lethal exchanges between the two sides. By the early 1990s, many of the countries contributing peacekeepers to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus had become tired of the stalemate and the lack of progress in negotiations, so they withdrew their troops from the force. This necessitated a reduction in the number of constantly manned OPs from 51 in 1992 to 21 in mid-1993. Further downsizing of UNFICYP by the UN Security Council in 2004 gave rise to a new approach to monitor the DMZ and produce actionable intelligence on violations. Cameras were installed in hot-spots in the Nicosia DMZ and more mobile responsive patrols were introduced as part of the new ‘concentration with mobility’ concept. This was the first time a UN peace operation used unattended cameras to monitor a demilitarized zone. The chapter examines the UN’s difficulties and successes using the remote cameras, especially during important peace-threatening incidents. Other technologies that aided UNFICYP are also reviewed for lessons that might assist an under-equipped United Nations in its watch-keeping function. The third section of the book reverses the direction of one of Walter Dorn’s questions. Peacekeeping elsewhere has learned from UNFICYP’s

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experiences; but can Cyprus, and those working to resolve the issue, learn from the history of other places? Many states have experienced British colonization and have differing ethnic groups; in some cases, independence has led, sooner or later, to violent conflict; in others, a long-lasting commitment to a politics that somehow transcends ethnicity has developed. First, the success story. In his contribution, Jonathan Warner explores the histories of Cyprus and Belize, the way that their neighbours are perceived, and how this affects each nation’s self-understanding and the effects of this understanding on political culture. Each state, of course, comprises people who have a multiplicity of individual stories, but national cohesion will exist when the stories cohere well together. In Belize, this is largely the case; in Cyprus, there are at least two competing narratives. It is the ability of Belizeans to fit their stories within a common story of Belizean identity that has allowed for peaceful coexistence—it is the inability of Cypriots to do this that led to violence and separation. The challenge for putting Cyprus back together again, then, is to seek a common Cypriot identity by finding ways to develop stories of commonality between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. Less peaceful has been the history of Sri Lanka, where, like Cyprus, ethnicity has been a major feature of the conflict between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority. Following a discussion about the concepts and methods used, Zenonas Tziarras explores the conflicts in Cyprus and Sri Lanka, and then proceeds to a comparative analysis of the two cases. Each case study examines the prominence (or lack thereof) of ethnicity in the (ethnic) conflict in question. Comparisons in terms of history, colonization, the post-independence experience, the period of conflict and the post-conflict era are made, to allow the identification of similarities and differences between them. The chapter argues that the prominence and significance of ethnicity changes over time in both conflicts, and that the similar historical circumstances of the two conflicts play an important part in determining their nature. Although the role of ethnicity does change or evolve during the course of an ethnic conflict, it comes to characterize the nature of the conflict, rather than being its root cause (Carment, 2007: 63). The chapter therefore explores other possible root causes, such as political and economic factors, horizontal inequalities, the role of education, the exploitation of ethnic identity by elites, the colonial history, and nationalism. It makes a distinction between the root causes of each conflict and the actors and other factors as the underlying reasons that trigger or exacerbate a conflict. These often differ from the perceptions between the groups that intensify and prolong the conflict. It is important then, that conflict resolution strategies should be developed that identify the root

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causes and address these, rather than concentrating on the symptom of overemphasis on ethnicity. The final section of the book looks at two different ways that the conflict might be resolved, and the island reunited. Matteo Nicolini’s chapter introduces a new way of conceptualizing the Cyprus Problem, that of Legal Geography. He is interested in two major institutional mechanisms through which multinational federations enhance consociational participation and geographical cohesion in deeply divided societies, that is, appropriate demarcation of sub-state regions and power sharing. Ethnicbased units and consociational participation aim at fulfilling the rationale of multinational federations: they preserve territorial and political integrity, and maintain diversity by including different ethnic groups in a single federal structure. But the chapter’s main concern is the applicability of this framework to Cyprus: what might a sustainable accommodation of difference look like? Part of the answer, it argues, is to use the tools of a comparative legal analysis, thus providing experiences, proposals and arrangements useful to establishing a new constitutional design of a unified Cyprus. The chapter thus aims to reassess the use of federal arrangements, in general, and of asymmetrical federalism, in particular, when accommodating divided societies. It considers the constitutional implications of regional demarcation and power-sharing between what are now two separate ethnic-oriented polities. Socio-economic factors present a significant challenge to an ethnic-construed territorial identity, and add additional layers of complexity to the problem of governance of divided societies such as Cyprus. But this complexity also presents an opportunity to reassess the criteria for demarcation of the federal territory and the ethnically-defined units, and to create a unique common territorial identity for both ethnicities. By contrast, Bülent Kanol and ølke Da÷l are concerned with the situation “the day after” a solution is agreed: what groundwork needs to be done in order to ensure that there is grassroots support for the agreement that the leaders have initialled. This is especially important given the disappointment of the 2004 referendum results: if the average Cypriot does not see how the solution will benefit him or her, it is unlikely to gain support, or, if it is implemented, is unlikely to be sustainable. The chapter emphasizes the importance of civil society, explaining how Active Dialogue Networks (ADNs), a form of participatory democracy, might help build bridges now between the communities. It describes one project where this grassroots approach is paying off and overcoming recent pessimism about the prospects of a solution. Thematic ADNs endeavour to bring together both the “key people and more people” in order to generate

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innovative solutions and recommendations to issues identified through public deliberation. The ADN discussed in this chapter was designed to deliberate upon prospective confidence building measures and subsequently to prioritize recommendations for action ranked according to their urgency, impact and practicality, using a democratic, participatory and inclusive process. Findings show that the majority of the ADN participants are of the opinion that the main form of conflict resolution strategy in Cyprus (negotiations between the leaders of the communities and their political elites) is of only limited value, and other kinds of activities are needed to complement this Track One diplomacy in order to overcome the current deadlock. These findings are in line with recent peace-building literature which focuses on the importance of civil society in building sustainable peace among different groups. While the innovative ADN methodology adds legitimacy to peace-building efforts, the chapter also draws on the literature on ontological security to explain why sustainable peace is unlikely to be built without the support of the institutions of civil society and without reconfiguring the way in which identities of “friend” and “enemy” are perceived.

Towards a solution? The chapters presented in the book in general express a cautious optimism that the Cyprus Problem is capable of being solved, but that there will need to be considerable effort put in to ensure that any solution survives in the long term. The opportunities afforded by the gas discoveries have to be balanced by the complications they create in deciding how the benefits of this bonanza should be shared out. The neoliberal policies imposed on the north by Turkey may well make the Turkish Cypriots think that an agreement with their Greek compatriots is an attractive option; but fears of changing one overload for another urges proceeding slowly. Building of trust does not happen instantaneously; the happy outcome of opening crossing points, that people visit the other side to shop or enjoy the beaches and mountains, is a move in the right direction, but in itself is insufficient. Shopping in someone’s shop or sitting on the beach in another’s village does not necessarily mean you want to live next door to them. Negotiations between the leaders of the two communities were broken off in late 2014, because of the dispute over Turkish exploration for natural gas in waters where the RoC enjoys exclusive exploitation rights. However, the election of Mustafa Aknc as Turkish Cypriot leader in April 2015 has engendered a new hope that there will be progress towards

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a solution. Lellos Demetriades, the long-time mayor of Nicosia (serving from 1971 until 2001) found a kindred spirit in Aknc, who headed the administration of the Turkish sector from 1976 to 1990. During this time they co-operated on many projects – including developing a Masterplan for the city should the division end. Aknc’s decisive victory over the incumbent Derviú Ero÷lu (Rauf Denktaú’s protégé) suggests that the Turkish Cypriots have put behind them the disappointment at the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots in the 2004 referendum. Initial signs of progress are promising—commitments by both Aknc and President Nicos Anastasiades to work together to seek a solution; a relaxation of visa requirements; the discussion and implementation of confidence building measures; and the possibility of an overall settlement within months. Turkey seems to have forgiven Aknc his initial faux pas; indeed, according to Sabah newspaper (2015; Cyprus Mail, 2015), Turkey’s minister for EU affairs, Volkan Bozkir, blamed Rauf Denktaú for the lack of a solution, a comment almost without precedent. Although, after the disappointments of the past, it is premature to announce that a settlement will shortly be reached, there does seem to be an air of optimism on the island today. The symbolism of the two leaders visiting coffee shops together on both sides of the divide is promising, and the initial commitment to working quickly towards a solution encouraging, but we’ve been here before. And, of course, reaching a sustainable solution needs more than just a political agreement between leaders. Amongst the many issues that need to be addressed which cannot be incorporated into a written agreement is that of ensuring that bridges are built between the institutions of civil society across the Green Line. Those who harbour anti-Federalist sentiments need to be included in the process, and their reservations addressed. In addition, changing the perceptions each side has of the other, and enhancing a common Cypriot identity that would respect the communities’ ethnic origins but contribute to increasing mutual trust are hard tasks that need to be accomplished to prevent yet another disappointment.

References Cameron, Fraser (2004) The European Union and Conflict Prevention, in Albrecht Schnabel and David Carment (eds.), Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality Volume 1: Organizations and Institutions Lanham, MA: Lexington Books: 207-221. Carment, David (2007) Exploiting Ethnicity: Political Elites and Domestic Conflict,. Harvard International Review, 28 (4), 62-66.

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Cyprus Mail (2015) Rauf Denktash to blame for non-solution May 18 http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/05/18/rauf-denktash-to-blame-for-nonsolution/. Gazio÷lu, Ahmet C. (1990) The Turks in Cyprus: A province of the Ottoman Empire (1571-1878) Nicosia: K. Rustem. Hobbes, Thomas (1991 [1651]) Leviathan edited by Richard Tuck Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Jervis, Robert (1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lijphart, Arend (2002) The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy, in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy Oxford: Oxford University Press, 37-54. Ortino, Sergio (2002) The Nomos of the Earth: A Short History of the Connections between Technological Innovation, Anthropological Space and Legal Order Baden-Baden: Nomos. Raad, Ghassan T. (1988) The Termination of Protracted Social Conflict in Lebanon: An Analytical Perspective, in Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills (eds), Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus (London, I.B. Taurus), 201-209. Raffield, Paul (2010) Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution: LateElizabethan Politics and the Theatre of Law Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing. Sabah (2015) Bozkr: Çözüm Eylül'de gelebilir [Bozkir: A solution could happen by September] May 15 http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/05/15/bozkir-cozum-eyluldegelebilir. Schmitt, Carl (2006) The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum Candor, New York: Telos Publishing. Thucydides (1972) History of the Peloponnesian War trans. Rex Warner, London: Penguin. Treaty of Guarantee (1960). Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Signed at Nicosia on 16 August. Text available in Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Steven R. Ratner, and David Wippman, International Law: Norms, Actors, Process: A Problem-oriented Approach (Third Edition, 2010) and at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/drwcasebook/files/cyprus_treaty_of_guaran tee.pdf. Ward, Lee (2004) The Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

PART I IDENTITY AND PERCEPTIONS

CHAPTER TWO SETTLING PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICTS: TRUST, IDENTITY, AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE “CYPRUS ISSUE” DAVID W. LOVELL UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES

I Protracted social conflicts are those modern, long-term conflicts—always simmering, but sometimes boiling over into organized violence—in which the settlements that generally put an end to violent conflicts are elusive because the issues that initiated them remain unresolved. Such issues are frankly very difficult to resolve because they tend to involve matters of identity, so crucial in the contemporary age of nationalism and its corollary, the nation state. Where one party refuses to acknowledge the legitimate identity and experience of the other the conflict becomes essentially existential; the depth of feeling which attends it is matched by a realignment of material circumstances and behavioural norms over decades and generations. The conflict itself, and all that surrounds it—the skirmishing, the resettlements, the myths, the political structures, and the continuing sense of loss and injustice—becomes the new “normal” for both parties. Socialization of the next generation is centred on the struggle; children imbibe it with their mothers’ milk. The prevailing sentiments, on both sides, are mistrust and fear. The term “protracted social conflict” seeks to capture the depth of the issues at stake in these lamentable cases, while insisting that the tools of social psychology, just as much as those of international relations, are necessary in building solutions. We are familiar with such protracted conflicts in the Middle East, with the Arab-Israeli divide since at least 1947; in Lebanon since independence in 1943, but especially since the civil war (1975-1990) (Raad 1988); in Sri Lanka since 1983 (perhaps closer to resolution after a decisive but bloody

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military defeat of the “Tamil Tigers” in 2009); and in Northern Ireland, Kashmir and elsewhere. The “Cyprus issue,” however, has a regrettably special place in the history of protracted conflicts: because of the duration of the divisions in Cyprus itself between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (formalized since 1983 by a disputed international border across the island); because of the involvement of two foreign countries, Greece and Turkey, for which the “hyphenated” Cypriot communities form proxy (and for the most part, willing) battalions in their ongoing feud; and because of the failure of the United Nations’ longstanding efforts to resolve the conflict. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was deployed in the buffer zone between the two Cypriot communities in 1964, and remains in place: one of the longest continuous deployments of peacekeepers in the UN’s history. Such is the depth of feeling among many Cypriots that simply trying to describe the last fifty years of Cyprus’ history is a minefield for the unwary, each side seeing the progression of events in highly partisan terms. (There are, nevertheless, some creditable recent accounts, including those by Michael (2011) and Heraclides (2011).) Likewise, suspicion and stereotype are the bifocals through which every attempt at reconciliation continues to be viewed. These are unsurprising characteristics of protracted social conflicts more generally. This chapter will begin by providing a brief overview of the “Cyprus issue” against which to discuss the role of identity in the creation of a relatively harmonious community that forms the ballast of a robust modern state. Drawing on the perspectives of the “protracted social conflict” model developed by Azar (1990), and of “interactive conflict resolution” of which it forms a part (Fisher 1997), I argue that the key to the causes of the division of Cyprus and to their resolution lies in acknowledging basic human needs and recognizing that identity and security are at issue. These causes are discussed, and then the importance of identity and trust are stressed. The necessary condition for a resolution to the “Cyprus issue,” I argue, is the creation of a Cypriot identity and thus a national interest that can supersede existing loyalties to external states, cultures and traditions. Many analysts are sceptical, or dismissive, of the very possibility of creating a Cypriot identity (Joseph 1985: 241-42); some are not (Yilmaz 2008: 428). My view is that a Cypriot identity need not—in fact, is quite unlikely to—be a homogeneous entity, though it does need to be distinctive from “mainland” identities and to be respectful of the historical and ethnic contribution and diversity of the communities that comprise “Cyprus.” Movement in such a direction will understandably be gradual as

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communities build trust with each other (and defeat or at least neutralize “spoilers”); some of the mechanisms for advancing this agenda will be discussed in the penultimate section of the chapter. One thing is clear: there is no “big-bang” solution to the “Cyprus issue,” and certainly no military solution. Likewise, the notion that a solution lies in negotiations between external parties, specifically Athens and Ankara (Camp 2001), posits Cypriots—wrongly, in my view—as merely pawns. In the face of the modern history of this beautiful but unhappy island, one can only hope that the methodical work of building trust is patiently advanced among the communities of Cyprus itself.

II As an island in the eastern Mediterranean, and a welcome port of call for sea-borne trade (not to mention convenient destination for conquerors and settlers), Cyprus has been subject to diverse cultural influences for thousands of years. In 1489, to mention only more recent times, it was captured by the Republic of Venice; in 1570, the Ottomans invaded; and in 1878, the island was transferred by the Ottomans to the control of the United Kingdom. After a period of rising clashes with the British in the postcolonial era after the Second World War, Cyprus became independent in 1960. Despite the machinations of the island’s communities during the struggle for independence, including a failed proposal for unification with Greece, it is essentially from the time of independence that the “Cyprus issue” emerged onto the international agenda. It was grounded in fears that an appropriate political recognition and role for the substantial, but minority, Turkish Cypriot community could not be guaranteed in the new state (and, indeed, while formal recognition of the minority community was guaranteed in the 1960 Constitution, the problems to which that gave rise led to President Makarios’ 1963 reform proposals—“The Thirteen Amendments”—and a deepening of inter-communal mistrust), and it was aggravated by outside parties with their own agendas. Violence between the Turkish-oriented and Greek-oriented communities soon broke out, and led ultimately to the deployment of UNFICYP in 1964. Ten years later, just days after an attempt by the Greek military junta to unite the island with Greece, including a coup that ousted and almost killed President Makarios, Turkish troops invaded on 20 July 1974 (on the grounds of protecting the Turkish Cypriot community) and divided the island; in 1983 this division was formalized by the declaration of independence by the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. Tens of thousands of Greek Cypriots were displaced southwards by the invasion, and tens of thousands

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of Turkish Cypriots fled to the north; thousands of poor, mainland Turks were subsequently resettled in northern Cyprus. The international community does not recognize this northern “Republic,” but is constrained in acting against it; the displaced populations and their descendants continue to feel aggrieved at their loss; and the passage of time conspires to normalize the territorial status quo and entrench the hostility. The “Cyprus issue” has been aggravated, if not fundamentally created, by the interference of colonial and other external powers. Indeed, it is the burden of Christopher Hitchens’ passionate but incisive analysis that Only four years after they had painfully achieved independence [in 1960], the Cypriots became the victims of a superpower design for partition. This partition reflected only the strategic requirements of outside powers, and did not conform to any local needs … The imposition of partition [from 1974] necessitated the setting of Greek against Turk, and Greek against Greek. (Hitchens 1997, 11-12)

In Hitchens’ view, Cyprus reached its current impasse by a series of external manoeuvres, by Greece, Turkey and Britain, often with willing Cypriot accomplices, but exploiting and fanning ancient rivalries. The two most important things to know about Cyprus in the last couple of centuries are first how it fitted into grand power strategy and second, that the people of Cyprus have rarely if ever been consulted about their fate. Hitchens insisted: that before 1955 there was no history of internal viciousness in Cyprus … In his book Years of Upheaval … Dr Henry Kissinger … speaks of “primeval hatred of Greeks and Turks,” “atavistic bitternesses” and “a lethal cocktail” … In doing so, he perpetuates a fairly widespread and commonplace view of the island’s troubles; a fatalistic view of the incompatibility of the communities that insults both of them. (Hitchens 1997: 47)

While this may be true, fifty years of division and acceptance of the narrative of historical hostility have reinforced each community’s mistrust of the other, passed on as it is to children and grand-children. Fortunately, there has been almost no violence between the communities in more than a decade, but an aggrieved stalemate continues. Meanwhile the UN’s efforts—both at keeping the parties from taking up arms once again, and at a long-term settlement of the division— continue. In the literature on conflict resolution, the peacekeeping success of the UN in Cyprus has been rightly noted. Quite simply: there has been no open warfare since 1974. Bercovitch and Jackson (2009: 81-82) point

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out that UN peacekeeping “has acquired an important reputation for impartiality and professionalism … In Cyprus, UNFICYP has prevented the re-ignition of open warfare between the Greek and Turkish communities.” But while this is important, it is not sufficient: the UN’s many efforts at settlement have thus far signally failed. The efforts by the UN Secretary-General’s recent Special Adviser (2008-14), former Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer, have not broken this dismal mediation record. While it might be easy to blame Downer himself for incautious comments, as the Greek Cypriot side has sometimes done (AP 2012), criticism of his mission reflects rather the extent of the continuing distance between the two sides. The apparent readiness of the parties to the dispute to misinterpret Downer’s statements must have had him bemused and perplexed. However that may be, the decision by Mr. Downer in early 2014 to accept an Australian government diplomatic posting, and to resign as Special Adviser, raises the prospect that a new Adviser and a fresh approach may yield results. Downer’s failure is not simply from personal shortcomings. As a long-time observer of Cyprus summed it up: [Downer] faulted in comprehending the potency of the internal political front within each side – what is known in the conflict resolution parlour as the “negotiator’s dilemma”: meaning that the intra-communal process is as significant as the actual inter-communal negotiations in successfully reaching a mediated settlement. But to be fair to Downer that is something that all negotiators and third party mediators have failed to apprehend (Michael 2014).

Yet the UN’s failure more generally suggests—odd as it may, at first, seem—that the United Nations may not be the appropriate third party to mediate in the task of building trust between the sides. The story of public mediation in Cyprus can be told in terms of recurring cycles of hopes raised and then dashed. The most recent cycle can be charted in a series of reports by the International Crisis Group (ICG). In June 2008, the ICG declared the “Best Chance Yet” for the reunification of Cyprus on the basis of the election of Demetris Christofias to the Greek Cypriot presidency. By September 2009, it described the state of play as “Reunification or Partition?” if the opportunity for a settlement was not reached by April 2010 (the date of the then-forthcoming Turkish Cypriot elections). By February 2011, the ICG was urging “Six Steps towards a Settlement,” premised on the notion that “the Cyprus reunification negotiations under way since 2008 [are] at an impasse.” The stalemate continues, as does the impression that a new approach (and not

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just a new Special Adviser) might be worth trying. Why? Because the engagement of senior public figures, from both sides, in public or semipublic talks can become, as I shall argue further below, a recipe for grandstanding and point-scoring, not necessarily for progress along the genuinely experimental, uncertain and risky path of establishing mutual understanding.

III Though there are a number of factors that affect the outcome of any conflict mediation, Ott (1972: 597) has persuasively argued that “the success or failure of mediation is largely determined by the nature of the dispute.” What, then, is the nature of the Cyprus dispute? Certainly the remaining issues over property lost in the partition bedevil the chances for a lasting peace and an end to the island’s division, as does the baleful influence of outside players (notably Greece and Turkey, who have strategic interests in Cyprus, but who have also used the “Cyprus issue” periodically as a convenient distraction from internal problems). But the fundamental problem in Cyprus is that it has not been allowed—it was not given a chance—to build a Cypriot nation after its independence from the United Kingdom in 1960. It is true that prior to the birth of the Republic there was little if any sense of a Cypriot identity. There seems to have been very little intermarriage between members of each island community over the centuries. The anti-British independence movement that became increasingly violent in the 1950s reinforced the separateness of the two communities, as overwhelming Greek Cypriot support for enosis (unification) with Greece frightened the Turkish community into a more intense identification with Turkey as protector. Inter-community violence became more prevalent. The advent of an independent republic of Cyprus—the “reluctant Republic,” as Xydis (1973) has described it—only highlighted the feelings of separateness of the two communities upon whom this political construction was thrust without adequate preparation. The absence of such a Cypriot identity was, in a sense, forcefully confirmed by Rauf Denktaú (a former leader of the Turkish Cypriot community), who was quoted in the 1990s as saying that “in Cyprus the only thing that is Cypriot is the donkey” (cited Loizides 2007: 173). Perhaps the most important lesson to draw from the series of ICG documents cited above is not to place excessive hopes on particular individuals, governments, or rounds of negotiation. The task in Cyprus is long-term; it may be assisted by the disposition of particular individuals,

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but the long-term work is the creation of a people. This means acknowledging the nature of the conflict as a protracted social conflict, and beginning the steps for building a new Cypriot sense of community. Bercovitch and Jackson have argued that following the end of the Cold War in 1989 conflicts involving identity—ethnic and religious conflicts, in particular—took the place of the previous conflicts related to competition and scarcity. They add that: Denial of identity can lead to feelings of victimization that may lead to conflict, and conflicts that are based on identity are inherently more complicated and harder to resolve than those over resources. Moreover, ethnic conflict will usually take place within a community, and often in a community with a history of hostility, the situation is further complicated. Hence, words such as intractable and protracted have been employed to describe these new types of conflict (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 5).

While noting that the Cyprus issue long pre-dates the end of the Cold War, it seems to prefigure these new types of conflict and should be approached in similar ways. In countries achieving independence in the period of decolonization, and in many of those democratizing in the “third wave” since the mid1970s (Huntington 1991), one of the key desiderata is the creation of “a people” out of the human material at hand, be it divided into tribal, or ethnic, or religious communities. British lawyer and educator, Sir Ivor Jennings, once insightfully pointed to a fundamental issue in a democracy: that “the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people” (Jennings 1956: 56). This observation holds true not just for fullblown democracies, but for any state where public consent, engagement and legitimacy are important factors in ensuring relative internal peace. Thus in any society where politics, rather than force, decides public issues, “the people” must have some sense of common purpose and destiny. They must partake of a common spirit to the extent that they do not wish to withdraw from, or wreck, the system when it decides against a part, or parts, of the people. Most political decisions involve losers as well as winners, and the longevity of the system depends on a continuing commitment on the part of the losers. This may be addressed, to some extent, by the notion that losers on some issues will be winners on others: in other words, that losers are not consistently losers. However, if there is some group or groups— however defined, whether by ethnicity, religion, or class—that continually “lose,” then the ability of the political system to fulfil its purpose without serious disruption is at risk. Especially where such consistent “losers” are

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defined in “non-negotiable” terms of identity (in other words, where there are significant barriers to them moving to another group: one does not cast off an identity as you would a jacket when the weather changes), the possibility of structural inequalities in the political system are likely, and the need for recognition of and creative adaptation to those inequalities is imperative. In his classic study, Horowitz (1985) argues that the breakdown of democracies under conditions of ethnic parties is not inevitable, but is highly likely. Lijphart (2002: 38), too, cites the conventional wisdom that “it is more difficult to establish and maintain democracy in divided than homogeneous societies.” One prudential approach is for permanent winners to moderate their demands on the spoils of victory, though such perspicacity tends to be undermined by greed and short-sightedness. And institutional responses, including “guarantees,” “quotas,” “federalism,” etc.—collectively described as a combination of “power-sharing” and “autonomy” (Gurr 1993)—are unlikely to address the insecurities of the minority in the absence of a genuinely collaborative project of nation-building.

IV A level of trust is something that must operate in all continuing human groups where simple fear and necessity have been overcome. And it is an elementary fact of the sociology of enduring democracies. That a democratic political system “represents” all the population, and not just those who voted for the incumbent government, is commonly (and properly) the message of elected leaders when they win power. But if problems are constructed in the absolutist terms of identity, rather than as an appropriate business for negotiation and compromise, their resolution becomes far more difficult than ordinary politics can often process, and the way is opened for those who want to dominate or wreck the political system. Whether or not identity (especially minority identity) is protected in constitutional documents, as it was in Cyprus in the institutional arrangements of 1960 that included inter alia a constitutional guarantee that the Vice President would be a Turkish Cypriot, the formalities themselves are symptomatic of continuing division and the paucity of common ground. Yet intercommunal trust is essential in the building of any viable political community, and a powerful factor in its disintegration is the fear of one side or the other that it will be bested despite formal guarantees. The Cyprus conflict falls into the category of what Edward Azar labeled “protracted social conflict” and what John W. Burton referred to as

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“deep-rooted conflict” (Azar and Burton 1986). The length of such conflicts stems from their connections to deeply-felt issues including identity and security. The causes of these conflicts are directly related to the frustration of basic human needs, as Azar explained: We are led to the hypothesis that the source of protracted social conflict is the denial of those elements required in the development of all people and societies, and whose pursuit is a compelling need in all. These are security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity, and effective participation in the processes that determine conditions of security and identity, and other such developmental requirements. The real source of conflict is the denial of those human needs that are common to all and whose pursuit is an ontological drive in all (Azar 1985: 60).

As Wittig explained of the context of this theorizing: Burton and Azar along with other scholars of the field propose a long-term transformative approach in order to resolve these conflicts ... Scholars of conflict resolution approaches argue that settlements reached [merely] between the political or military elites of the conflict groups fail to address the needs of the conflict societies [as a whole] and thus impede an effective conflict resolution (Wittig 2005: 2).

Yet Wittig’s research in Cyprus a decade ago concluded that “conflict resolution approaches” had produced a transformation only among the Turkish Cypriot community, not among the Greek Cypriot community. The primary evidence she adduced was the former community’s support for, and the latter’s rejection of, a referendum proposal in 2004 to allow Cyprus to join the European Union as a united country. But to conclude that conflict resolution has failed on this basis does not take into account the other factors influencing the referendum results, especially when there was arguably much more for the Turkish Cypriot community to gain from unification. Azar’s analysis underlines the importance of “a people”—and thus trust—to the building of a political community in a situation where people divide themselves into “identity groups.” The quest to find a Cypriot identity—to go beyond the identities grounded in a particular view of history and in loyalties to elsewhere—has been undermined in part by the machinations of Greece and Turkey, for whom the island populations of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots became a proxy for the larger, longterm dispute between these two countries, extending back for more than a century. This spoiling process has involved external interference but, even more importantly, a manipulation of identity on the island. Loizides argues

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that “Historically, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots have experienced strong feelings of ‘motherland nationalism,’ namely, a sense of primary loyalty to the ‘national centers’ of Ankara and Athens, respectively.” (Loizides 2007: 173) While the strand of island patriotism has waxed and waned, and “motherland nationalism” may be on the decline, he has found that that “the major focus of identity of Cypriots is identification with their respective ethnic communities in the form of Greek Cypriotism or Turkish Cypriotism” (172), a mid-way point that increases the possibilities for success for those proposals that meet these particular constituencies. Presenting the “Cyprus issue” as a challenge of identity suggests important parallels with recently emerged democracies, despite the unique elements of Cyprus. All democracies are confronted to some extent with the challenges of diversity; democratizing countries, too, face this issue in ways that often threaten to affect or even derail their transition. Most of the latter countries have emerged from periods of colonial dependence, which may have had adverse effects on their economies, but which have also affected their political development. Their borders, for example, may be colonial impositions or accommodations, sometimes literally “lines in the sand,” with little reference to the realities of geography or ethnicity on the ground. Scooping up different tribal and ethnic groups, as well as different religious groups, the arbitrary boundaries often created by colonial powers have led to significant political challenges around the world. Such challenges may not have been so evident when the major political objective was to remove the colonial overlords, but they became obvious when the question of ruling—and the real or imagined spoils of ruling—came to be managed, or divided. One of the key challenges of post-colonial independence was to build a sense of one people; this challenge has been addressed in many places in terms of nationalism. Nationalism is perhaps the most important type of “glue” that holds modern political systems together; it is particularly important in modern societies which—by virtue of their large extent, and thus the general anonymity of citizens one from another—cannot rely on personal ties to bind. It creates a virtual, national “family.” Ernest Gellner (1983: 1) explained that “Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.” National identity with its cultural, linguistic and political manifestations or yearnings, was itself in many cases a creation of the literate European middle classes. Yet the pervasive worldwide success of nationalism consists in that this—essentially modern, constructed form of identity—is considered to be both natural and timeless. It is worth noting how incredibly pervasive and persuasive the ideology of nationalism has been:

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it has become the primary form of collective identification in the modern world. Somewhat surprisingly, we can find continuing common cause for commitment, celebration and even grieving with millions of apparent strangers, who are nevertheless part of our “nation.” Benedict Anderson, writing in the early 1980s at the start of an explosion of creative rethinking of nationalism, underlined the point that a nation was “an imagined political community” (Anderson 2006: 6). And while he linked its development, from the eighteenth century onwards, to large-scale historical factors connected especially to the rise of capitalism, his view that nationalism represents a changed form of consciousness admits the possibility that it is not fixed in stone, inevitable, unchangeable. Building a Cypriot nationalism is thus not beyond the realms of possibility; and, I suggest, it is imperative. For whatever we may think of the invented and sometimes even contrived content of nationalism—or even of Anderson’s withering assessment of its “limited imaginings” (7)— its capacity to motivate people to action, and to bind them together cannot be denied. For Cyprus, many solutions have been suggested to satisfy the interests of the two major sides in one united state, from the (failed) 1960 Constitution itself through subsequent suggestions for a federated republic and variations thereupon (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993). But change always produces fertile ground for “spoilers.” Machiavelli put this point succinctly at the beginning of the sixteenth century: taking the initiative in introducing a new form of government is very difficult and dangerous, and is unlikely to succeed. The reason is that all those who profit from the old order will be opposed to the innovator, whereas all those who might benefit from the new order are, at best, tepid supporters for him (Machiavelli 1988: 20-21).

“Protracted social conflict” supplies further grounds for the creation of “spoilers” because the longer a stalemate continues the greater is the chance that makeshift accommodations become settled arrangements wherein solving the original problem upsets the new arrangements and their beneficiaries. The success of any institutional arrangement in solving the “Cyprus issue”—and I have no elegant plan to offer in this regard— will depend on the foundational work done in building confidence between the two sides and in creating the sense of a Cypriot future. Therein lies the best chance of overcoming the spoilers and naysayers.

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V The dynamics of protracted conflicts conspire to make their settlements even more difficult, as layer upon layer of grievances accumulate and a malignant equilibrium descends upon the scene. It is clear that the intercommunal talks have thus far failed, but in my view the causes of failure rest on the ways in which, and the levels at which, those talks have been conducted. While Michális Michael demonstrates the complexity and depth of the causes of the “Cyprus conflict” in his fine book on this subject, his conclusion makes a similar point: the Cyprus peace process reveals an overt overdependency on official firsttrack diplomacy that often disregards, dismisses, and silences those ideas and needs that advance alternatives to managerial politics that inhibits the negotiations. Often finding at its epicenter the sanctity of the state, the peace process has become a metaphor for perpetuating the conflict and entrenching the social status quo within both communities … A number of voices from Track Two suggest innovative and creative solutions to a range of thematic areas that preoccupy the negotiations including governance, property, security-guarantees, and procedures (Michael 2011: 201).

My purpose here is not to commend (or condemn) particular “bottomup” or “non-First Track” negotiations and meetings, of which there have been many, but rather to sketch some of the practical measures to build trust between the communities. The “protracted social conflict” perspective allows us to consider various ways of addressing the issue of trust, and indeed commends diversity in “non-First Track” measures, as did the initiators of Track Two diplomacy (Montville 1990: 162). It should be clear that even if a military approach were feasible and likely to provide military success (which it is not), it would simply not address the concerns and allay the fears of the defeated. In general, military actions do not supply solutions to problems, but (at best) allow problems to be reconceived and re-addressed. It should also be clear that meetings between officials are often set-piece affairs that reinforce the lines of division when those officials play to their own community (which there is an enormous temptation to do), or conceive of solutions at the state level. Neither type of approach has so far worked; a new dimension must be explored. The methodology for a new approach has been described in numerous works on contemporary conflict resolution, though each with slightly different emphasis (Fisher 1997; Ramsbotham et al 2011). The essence of this approach is to build understanding and trust between smaller, but key, groups of people drawn from both sides of a conflict by allowing them to

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meet in private (often at some distance from the conflict zone itself and for a significant period of time (days rather than hours)); to explore in a mediated but above all courteous way their understandings of their own and the other’s positions and needs; not to insist on “outcomes” and “statements” that might become grist to some political ambition or campaign; and not to insist on a strict timetable of meetings or press for rapid results. The expectation from such meetings is that their participants will convey their new, shared understanding to social networks and decision-makers, but also that they might suggest small-scale, even localized initiatives for mutual co-operation and assistance. Addressing the effects of the substantial inequalities that generally characterize the opposing communities in protracted social conflicts is an important step in narrowing the other gaps that bedevil their relationship. What John Burton called “second track diplomatic conflict resolution”: is a means of bringing parties to disputes together in an analytical framework controlled by a panel of facilitators to ensure there is no power bargaining, no proposals by a mediator, no proposals by parties, until there is a thorough analysis of the total situation by the parties, from which they can deduce options that fully meet their requirements (Burton 1987: 72).

To be sure, none of this (including in the context of Cyprus), is new: the first of Burton’s Centre for the Analysis of Conflict problem-solving workshops, in 1966, was focused on Cyprus. Such workshops seek to develop mutual understanding and focus on similarities. They require a certain level of openness on the part of participants (assisted not only by their attitude but also by the confidentiality of the meetings themselves), so that what were once categorical statements become questions, the systematic nature of the conflict is recognized, and the legitimacy of the other’s experience is acknowledged. There are a number of different forms in which this dialogue can take place, including interactive problemsolving, systems perspective analysis, comparative psycho-cultural narrative work, constructive conflict engagement, and so on (Ramsbotham et al 2011: 35-62). What they require above all is an understanding that traditional win-lose dynamics will not solve protracted social conflicts. But they are themselves no panacea. Among the real challenges to this general approach are first, to find the right “type” or “level” of participant, and second, the problems (and even dangers) faced by these participants in transferring their newly-gained insights to their home community (Fisher 1997: 187-212). One further note of caution should be injected at this juncture, underlining the complexity and difficulty of the task of resolving the

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“Cyprus issue.” It may be that the differences between the two major sides are so deep, that extremists on both sides are so intransigent, and that hopes for a solution are so distant as not to be a factor, that the methods of interactive conflict resolution outlined above—fallible though they might ordinarily be—are almost certain to fail. A challenging line of thought, developed by Oliver Ramsbotham (2010), identifies conflicts where debates are simply and destructively competitive and not amenable to developing mutual understanding: what he calls “radical disagreement” or “agonistic dialogue.” In such cases—for example, the Arab-Israeli conflict—the purpose of dialogue should be both, in inter-party terms, to focus on and clarify differences, and in intra-party terms, to explore and develop strategic approaches to possible futures. Thinking hard about the future and not just reacting to short-term slights and outrages is, Ramsbotham believes, a necessary step in such conflicts before interactive conflict resolution can even begin to do its work.

VI There is, among some Cypriots, a recognition that continued division is a continuing open wound. The Cyprus Friendship Programme youth bicommunal group, for example, gathered together at the centre of the island in early 2011 to proclaim their hopes: This is a time to declare that forgiveness and reconciliation are not the desires of just a few, but the powerful voice of the people of Cyprus ... We are no longer one-sided, shedding tears only for the ones lost from “our” side. We embrace caringly everyone who has lost a dear one as if we are members of the same family (LiberalPeter 2011).

How widely this view is shared I cannot tell, but protracted social conflicts are associated with underdevelopment and wide social and economic disparities. In short, Cyprus and its peoples are the poorer for their continuing conflict. Protracted social conflicts are also, by definition, not easy to resolve, and the “Cyprus issue” is no exception. Yet in my view, acknowledging the centrality of a lack of trust rather than a historic and irreconcilable ethnic divide is essential to its eventual resolution. There is a fundamental lack of trust between the two communities on the island of Cyprus, and events since 1960 have compounded this deficit. In an important sense, each side denies or refuses to recognize the identity of the other (Heraclides 2011: 130). Negotiations between the leaders of the two sides have tended to be exercises in posturing, serving rather to bolster the

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leadership of their different constituencies than to resolve the problems. Good leadership will be important on the road to an eventual resolution, but a structural shift in the way that identities are imagined is essential. Part of that shift requires a retreat in the interference of the Turkish and Greek governments, among others. But chiefly the communities must themselves build a new understanding of their situation and their common interests from the ground up, by opinion-leaders, journalists, professionals, mothers, scholars, emerging leaders, and other groups developing new ways to communicate across the Green Line. Every successful modern nation is a palimpsest of peoples, cultures and DNA, usually subscribing to unifying nationalist myths. Ultimately, nationalism is a choice; as Ernest Renan explained in 1882, nationalism is “a daily plebiscite” (Renan 1996: 53). And if nationalism is built in part on a “rich legacy of memories,” it is also built in part on selective forgetting (Hitchens 1997: 164). Let us acknowledge the wonderfully complex history of Cyprus at the crossroads of cultures in the eastern Mediterranean, but do not allow a part of the history of division and bloodshed to blind us to—or dictate—the contemporary challenges. Resolution of the “Cyprus issue” will necessarily involve government to government negotiations that address the difficult property and other issues raised by the recent division of the island, as well as interactions between civil society groups and individuals on both sides to reinforce the baseline of shared humanity; it may involve some innovative institutional arrangements; but it must also involve the recognition in some form that a Cypriot identity is something still to be created, debated and negotiated. Sadly, the timeframe for such a recognition, and for the development of such an identity, is beyond my reckoning. But history is not destiny; identities can and do change. Creating and working towards overarching goals has the capacity to bring communities together and build new relationships. The categorical notion that Cyprus is an “unimaginable community” (Calotychos 1998) is one I cannot accept.

References Anderson, Benedict (2006) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (London: Verso). Associated Press (AP) (2012) Cyprus parliament rebukes UN envoy Alexander Downer over perceived bias, The Australian 3 February 2012, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/cyprus-parliamentrebukes-un-envoy-alexander-downer-over-perceived-bias/storye6frg6so-1226261490418.

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Azar, Edward E. (1985) Protracted international conflicts: Ten propositions, International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations, 12:1, 59-70. —. (1990) The Management of Protracted Social Conflict Hampshire: Dartmouth Publishing. Azar, Edward E. and John W. Burton (eds) (1986) International conflict resolution: theory and practice Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers. Bercovitch, Jacob and Richard Jackson (2009) Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods and Approaches Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Burton, John W. (1987) Track two: an alternative to power politics, in John W. McDonald Jr. and Diane B. Bendahmane (eds), Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy Washington DC: Department of State, Foreign Service Institute: 65-72. Calotychos, Vangelis (ed.) (1998) Cyprus and its People: Nation, Identity and Experience in an Unimaginable Community, 1955-1997 Boulder: Westview Press. Camp, Glen D. (2001) The Cyprus Problem: A Cold War Legacy, Global Dialogue, 3:4, http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=171 Fisher, Ronald J. (1997) Interactive Conflict Resolution Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Gellner, Ernest (1983) Nations and Nationalism Oxford: Blackwell. Gurr, Ted Robert (1993) Minorities at Risk: A global view of ethnopolitical conflicts Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, Maria and Lenos Trigeorgis (1993) Cyprus: An Evolutionary Approach to Conflict Resolution, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37:2, 340-360. Heraclides, Alexis (2011) The Cyprus Gordian Knot: An Intractable Ethnic Conflict, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 17, 117-139. Hitchens, Christopher (1997) Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger (third edn., London: Verso). Horowitz, Donald (1985) Ethic Groups in Conflict Berkeley, University of California Press. Huntington, Samuel (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. International Crisis Group [ICG], Cyprus, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkeycyprus/cyprus.aspx. Jennings, Sir Ivor (1956) The Approach to Self-Government Cambridge: At the University Press.

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Joseph, Joseph S. (1985) Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Concern New York: Lang. LiberalPeter (2011) Cyprus: People united in a country divided, http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-580337; posted 26 March 2011. Lijphart, Arend (2002) The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy, in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy Oxford: Oxford University Press: 37-54. Loizides, Neophytos G. (2007) Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus, International Studies Perspectives, 8: 172-189. Machiavelli, Niccolò (1988) The Prince edited Q. Skinner and R. Price, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Michael, Michális S. (2011) Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History (revised edn.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. —. (2014) The end of Alexander Downer’s Cyprus adventure, Neoskosmos.com, 3 April 2014, http://neoskosmos.com/news/en/theend-of-alexander-downers-cyprus-adventure Montville, Joseph V. (1990) The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy, in Vamk D. Volkan, Demetrios A. Julius and Joseph V. Montville (eds), The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Vol. 1, Concepts and Theories Lexington, MA: Lexington Books: 161-175. Ott, Mervin C. (1972) Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution, International Organization 26:4, 595-618. Raad, Ghassan T. (1988) The Termination of Protracted Social Conflict in Lebanon: An Analytical Perspective, in Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills (eds), Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus London: I.B. Taurus: 201-209. Ramsbotham, Oliver (2010) Transforming Violent Conflict: Radical Disagreement, Dialogue and Survival London: Routledge. Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall (2011) Contemporary Conflict Resolution (third edn.) Cambridge: Polity Press. Renan, Ernest (1996) What is a Nation? in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds), Becoming National: A Reader New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press: 41-55. Wittig, Kerstin (2005) People United in a Country Divided: Bi-Communal Activities in Cyprus, Master’s thesis, Eberhard-Karls-Universität, Tübingen, http://www.peace4cyprus.net/PeopleUnited_Chapter_1.pdf. Xydis, Stephen G. (1973) Cyprus: Reluctant Republic (The Hague: Mouton).

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Yilmaz, Muzaffer (2008) The Cyprus Conflict and the Question of Identity, in Sedat Laçiner, Mehmet Özcan, øhsan Bal and Halil øbrahim Bahar (eds), USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law, Vol. 1 Ankara: International Strategic Research Organization: 427-446.

CHAPTER THREE FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS AND GREEK CYPRIOT PERCEPTIONS MICHALIS KONTOS UNIVERSITY OF NICOSIA

Introduction The Cyprus problem is a field of intensive domestic political debate in the Republic of Cyprus, (which has de facto been run by the Greek Cypriot community since 1964). One of the most discussed topics is the role foreign intervention has played: by all accounts, non-Cypriot actors, namely the three guarantor powers (the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey) and the United States have critically affected the form and the content of the problem. As a result of their interventionary behaviour, specific perceptions (and misperceptions) regarding the “foreigners” and their role in relation to the Cyprus problem have been generated among Cypriots, and especially among politicians, journalists and political authors. This development affects–to a large degree-the perspectives on progress in the negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus problem, mainly due to its impact on the Cypriot domestic political agenda. This chapter’s general objective is to examine the interaction between foreign interventions in Cyprus’ domestic affairs and the perceptions these interventions have caused among the local population, especially the Greek Cypriot decision makers and opinion leaders. I shall focus on US policy on Cyprus because, as I discuss below, despite the low intensity and frequency of American interventionism in Cyprus, Greek Cypriot decision makers and opinion leaders are often suspicious of US intentions. They tend to believe that Washington’s initiatives (sometimes labelled as “interventions”) unfold in a way that opposes Greek Cypriot interests.

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Foreign intervention in international politics 1 The concept of foreign intervention refers to an international actor’s interference (or intention of interfering) in an independent state’s affairs. The concept has been significant in several fields-such as international law, international politics and conflict analysis-since the end of the 19th century. An extensive literature is available, with a particular concentration after the end of the Cold War, mainly due to a renewed wave of US interventionism during the 1990’s (Stowell, 1939; Barnet, 1968; Friedman, 1968; Rosenau, 1969; Pearson, 1974; Tillema, 1989; Regan, 1996, 1998; Yoon, 1997; Haass, 1999; Butler, 2003; Goodman 2006). Direct (or overt) military interventions comprise the most concrete form of foreign intervention. However, interventions which have been conducted through military means but in indirect ways, as well as through non-military means, could be equally (or even more) effective in terms of serving the intervening party’s objectives. This conceptual flexibility raises questions regarding the concept’s scope: as Rosenau (1969, 154) points out, what “divides interventionary behavior from other types of international action” is inevitably vague. For example, could a phone call or a letter sent from a highly prestigious statesman of a great power to a leader of a smaller and weaker state, asking him to act in a specific way, be interpreted as an intervention? Or, could a threat of using violence or imposing other sorts of penalties be considered as interventionary behaviour, in the same way that an overt military intervention is? Given this intrinsic vagueness, an effort to provide a precise definition—or a categorization of sorts of intervention—in pursuit of clarifying the analytical framework would be mistaken. Instead, I shall follow Yoon and use “intervention” to mean different levels of action ranging from verbal statements, economic assistance or the withholding of economic assistance, initiation or increase of arms supply, deployment of advisers, deployment of combat personnel into a war zone, to actual military engagement in combat operation (Yoon, 1989: 585).

In other words, intervention is not necessarily associated with particular instruments of policy. It is sometimes conceived to include effects of meddlesome diplomacy, as well as direct military operations (Tillema, 1989: 181).

This analysis is largely based on Kontos (2014a)

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Foreign interventions in Cyprus: evolution and impact A study of the case of Cyprus benefits from the flexibility of this loose definition of foreign intervention. Cyprus has been the scene of frequent foreign interference of various types, especially since the early 1950’s, when the Greek Cypriots intensified their efforts in pursuit of selfdetermination and union with Greece (enosis). Studying intervention in Cyprus is a rather complicated task for two reasons: 1) The wide range of kinds of foreign activity in Cyprus (i.e. diplomatic initiatives, threats, inter-communal clashes influenced by foreign actors, a coup d’état orchestrated by a foreign government, foreign indirect and direct military operations) makes it risky to decide what should be considered as “foreign intervention” and what not. 2) Diametrically different perceptions among distinct actors have led to contrasting narratives regarding the island’s modern history. For example, while the Greek Cypriots consider the Turkish direct military intervention of July 1974 as an invasion that breached international law and the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership insist that it was a peace-making operation within the scope of Turkey’s guarantor status, and essential for the Turkish Cypriots’ protection. The modern history of the Cyprus problem can be divided into three periods: 1950-1959, 1960-1974 and 1974-the present. These three periods have different characteristics with regard to the interaction between foreign interventions and the domestic perceptions of them. In the first period, the Greek Cypriot majority’s point of view was that the people of Cyprus should have the right to decide their own future and-according to the same view- Cyprus should be unified with “mother Greece.” 2 The Greek Cypriot majority perceived itself as possessing a moral right to enjoy freedom and self-determination, in line with the Charter of the 2

The demand for self-determination and enosis appears repeatedly in EOKA (Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston/National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) leaflets, the main means of EOKA’s propaganda and communication with the people. For example see the leaflet titled “Our soul will not bend” signed by EOKA’s leader, Georgios Grivas, and distributed in July 1958 in Greek: “Selfdetermination is the only objective of our struggle and if we don’t achieve it the struggle will not stop, either by threats or by diplomatic deceits.” (Papageorgiou, 1984: 119-121 [in Greek]). The demand for enosis was widespread among Greek Cypriots during the 1950’s and was captured by the camera of the diplomat and poet George Seferiadis (Seferis) written in a poetic way on a wall in Alona village in 1954: “We want Greece even if we will be eating rocks.”

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United Nations’ (UN) provisions.3 At the same time, the United Kingdom rejected this claim and sought to continue London’s imperial rule. This clash of objectives led to the launch of EOKA’s4 armed struggle in 1955 and to counter-insurgency measures, ranging from police detentions and military coercion to the imposition of the death penalty. During the same period, Greece submitted five subsequent appeals to the UN, aiming to enhance the Greek Cypriots’ claim for self-determination, while Turkey demanded a say on the island’s future. A few months after the beginning of EOKA’s armed activity, the first inter-communal clash took place after the emergence of intense Turkish Cypriot opposition to enosis and demand for partition (taksim). While the Cypriot crisis was unfolding, the Cold War was escalating. These parallel developments stimulated the United States’ interest in working for the preservation of NATO’s unity in the Southeastern Mediterranean (Greece and Turkey had jointly accessed the Organization in 1952), in view of a potential increase of Soviet influence in the region (Kontos, 2014b). Students of Cypriot history of the 1950’s should be aware of the existence of a mosaic of perceptions of what was morally “right” and “legal”. This variety of perceptions was due to a vacuum of legitimacy caused by the emerging anti-colonial spirit and by the complexity of national interests and ethnic claims. In 1960 Cyprus became an independent state. Nevertheless, it soon became obvious that the young Republic of Cyprus was built on weak foundations: the legacy of inter-communal strife; the peculiarities of the Treaties of Establishment, Alliance and Guarantee; political instability in Greece; politico-ideological remnants of the previous decade which eventually led to domestic violence among Greek Cypriots; Turkish demands; and great power interests (amidst the looming Cold War) combined to produce a framework of repeated foreign interventions, which peaked in 1974. Despite the London-Zurich Agreements and the creation of an independent Republic of Cyprus, foreign intervention dramatically increased. There is much less difficulty in detecting and defining interventionary behaviour during this period. The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and its accession to the UN formed a new order of things in international law. The fact that Cyprus’ sovereignty was undermined repeatedly by foreign powers indicates the extent of the interventionary phenomenon in Cyprus. 3

According to Article 1, par. 2 of the Charter, among the United Nations’ purposes was to “develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.” 4 Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).

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The study of 1960-1974 provides dozens of examples of foreign nonmilitary interventionary or quasi-interventionary activity by the guarantor powers and the United States, including actions of a subversive or influence-building nature (see, for example, O’Malley and Craig, 1999; Soulioti, 2006; Panayiotides, 2014). In addition, two cases of direct military intervention were recorded: the Turkish bombing of Tylliria in August 1964 (Papageorgiou, 2000: 107-216) and the Turkish invasion in July 1974. In addition, numerous incidents of indirect military intervention have taken place, such as the armament and support of the Turkish Cypriot organization TMT by Turkey (Tansu, 2007), the dispatch of a Greek division to Cyprus in 1964-1967 (with the consent of the government of the Republic of Cyprus; Kranidiotis, 1985:176-183) and the Greek Juntasponsored coup d’état against President Makarios in July 1974. Foreign interventions that took place during that period formed the contemporary context of Greek Cypriot perceptions and misperceptions of the “foreigners”, their activity and their intentions in relation to Cyprus and the future settlement of the Cyprus problem. Despite the fact that the third period (from 1974) is one of less (or at least less evident) foreign interventionary activity, domestic perceptions of non-Cypriot actors (especially their objectives and intentions regarding Cyprus) remain heavily affected by the second period’s events. To a degree, foreign abuse of Cyprus’ sovereignty during the second period led to domestic overreaction to foreign diplomatic activity in relation to the Cyprus problem during the third period. Perceptions of the role of “foreigners” in Cyprus (Adamides, 2014) comprise one of the most significant components of the dominant Greek Cypriot ideology of the Cyprus problem: the Greek Cypriots feel wronged by history, especially by the way the foreign powers treated them in the second half of the 20th century, and this affects contemporary Greek Cypriot mainstream perceptions of the Cyprus problem.

Foreign interventions and subsequent Greek Cypriot perceptions Since the Cyprus question has always been a core issue in Greek Cypriot politics, in order to study and understand the contemporary political system and party politics of the Republic of Cyprus one must focus on how the Greek Cypriots have been perceiving the Cyprus question in retrospect. Perceptions are of paramount importance because they create internallyconsistent models which define the way we interpret developments in the domain of international politics. In order to understand this mechanism

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one has to study Robert Jervis’ influential treatise “Perception and Misperception in International Politics” (1976). According to the author’s definition, Consistency can largely be understood in terms of the strong tendency for people to see what they expect to see and to assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images (117).

Jervis explains the way people think about other countries, their policies and their intentions towards their own countries. He points out that Scholars have found that people’s belief structures tend toward consistency or balance. A balanced structure is one in which “All relations among ‘good elements’ [i.e. those that are positively valued] are positive (or null), all relations among ‘bad elements’ [i.e. those that are negatively valued] are positive (or null), and all relations among good and bad elements are negative (or null).” We tend to believe that countries we like do things we like, support goals we favor, and oppose countries we oppose. We tend to think that countries that are our enemies make proposals that would harm us, work against the interests of our friends, and aid our opponents (117-8).

He explains this predisposition as a simple principle which organize[s] an impressive array of our cognitions. We feel more comfortable when configurations are balanced; we learn them more quickly, remember them better when they are balanced, and interpret new information in such a way as to maintain or increase balance (118).

Jervis refers to “rational” and “irrational” consistency. By rational consistency he means those ways of interpreting evidence that conform to the generally accepted rules of drawing inferences. Conversely, irrational methods and influences violate these rules of the “scientific method” and would be rejected by the person if he were aware of employing them (119).

Jervis’ cognitive consistency model comprises a very useful analytical framework for attempting to explain the way in which foreign intervention (or perceptions of foreign intervention) affects Greek Cypriot politics and the analysis of the Cyprus problem. Greek Cypriot perceptions of the “foreigners” and their past actions inevitably affect what the Greek Cypriots believe in relation to their future intentions as well. Specific

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actions taken by non-Cypriot actors in relation to the Cyprus problem are usually interpreted with suspicion if those actors are seen as unfriendly towards Greek Cypriots. As Jervis says, the process of drawing inferences in light of logic and past experience that produces rational cognitive consistency also causes people to fit incoming information into pre-existing beliefs and to perceive what they expect to be there. (…) We ignore information that does not fit, twist it so that it confirms, or at least does not contradict, our beliefs, and deny its validity. Confirming evidence, by contrast, is quickly and accurately noted (143).

As we will see during the examination of US activity in relation to Cyprus, although the fear of foreign intervention in ways that harm Cypriot interests is not groundless, it is often exaggerated and, being mainly based on past experience, can be at variance with more recent evidence.

Greek Cypriot perceptions of US policy on the Cyprus problem As I argued in the introduction, Greek Cypriots are usually suspicious of US initiatives regarding the Cyprus problem. In the rest of this chapter I shall examine US policy in conjunction with dominant Greek Cypriot perceptions. I shall attempt to explain their correlation within Jervis’ proposed framework. US involvement in the Cyprus problem began after the end of World War II, when the United States abandoned its traditional isolationism and became a global superpower. This timing coincided with the evolution of the international system’s structure (i.e. the establishment of the United Nations and the emergence of a bipolar system and the beginning of the Cold War), as well as with developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East (i.e. the Greek Civil war, political instability in Iran and the emergence of Arab nationalism) which increased Cyprus’ geostrategic value in relation to US and Western interests. Cyprus was a British colony, and so had importance to the West over and above the strategic value of its geographic position, neighbouring the rich oil fields of the Middle East. The island’s significance became even more evident after the AngloEgyptian agreement of 1954 that led to the withdrawal of the British military forces from Suez.5 As a result, Cyprus became the most important 5

House of Commons, 28/7/1954: 496ff, quoted in Emilianides, 2014: 13.

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British-controlled territory in the region. The United States therefore started including Cyprus in its regional strategic planning. The mainstream viewpoint within US foreign policy approached Cyprus as an ideal location from which military or intelligence operations related to the Middle East could be based 6 or co-ordinated. 7 Cyprus was therefore important to the United States for reasons related to the safeguarding of Western interests in the Middle East, particularly the security of friendly Middle Eastern nations that were threatened by Soviet expansionism. However, despite the meteoric rise of US interventionism in the Third World during the first two decades of the Cold War era (Krasner, 1978: 338-342), Cyprus did not fall into the scope of the United States’ interventionary activity. The growth of left-wing radicalism in the West and the non-aligned world was perceived as a sign of the expansion of the Soviet Union’s influence beyond the “iron curtain”. This was perceived by the US foreign policy makers as an imminent threat to the United States’ security interests and therefore a good reason for intervening into the domestic affairs of other states. This interventionist policy was developed in the context of three subsequent presidential doctrines: the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Johnson Doctrine (Watson et al., 2003). In Cyprus there was no evidence that an imminent danger of Soviet infiltration existed, despite the fact that the Cypriot communist party (AKEL) 8 was highly influential in the island and its activity was systematically monitored by the US intelligence services. 9 But radical ideas came not from the communist left but the nationalist right: it was EOKA that set forth the most radical ideas in the 1950’s. During EOKA’s four years of armed activity, and especially before 1958, US involvement was limited to discreet communication of ideas and advice given to the British colonial authorities, and the designation of a diplomat, Julius Holmes, as a Special Representative of the President of the United States

6

See for example the debate over the foundation of the Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) between 1951 and 1953 and the proposal for settling its headquarters in Cyprus. For further details see Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS] 5 (1951) and FRUS 9 (1952-54). 7 See for example the use of Cyprus by the SIS and the CIA during the planning of operation TP AJAX for the overthrow of the Prime Minister of Iran Muhammad Mosaddeq in 1953. For further details see Wilber, 1969: 6. 8 The Cypriot communist party (Progressive Party of Working People) - See Adams (1971) 9 See for example Central Intelligence Agency, “Current Intelligence Weekly Review,” 14 April 1955, 12.

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in 1956.10 In some instances, US foreign policy fell into confusion as a result of conflict between US interests (especially the preservation of tranquility in NATO) and international law principles (especially Greek Cypriots evoking of the UN Charter in support of their demand for selfdetermination). An example of this kind of confusion is the (diplomatic) failure to manage the clash between Greece and the United Kingdom over the Greek recourses to the UN General Assembly in 1954, 1955 and 1956.11 The US commitment to ensure peace and stability in Cyprus (in accordance with Western interests and Cold War strategy) became more intrusive after 1958. As a result of the enhanced US position in the Middle East after the Suez Crisis (Kissinger, 1994: 548) and owing to the Cold War, the convergence of interests between the United States and the United Kingdom became more evident and the scope of their “special relationship” now embraced the Cyprus problem as well (Hatzivassiliou, 2005: 300-301). US initiatives concerning Cyprus grew after independence, particularly as a result of the inter-communal agitations of 1963-64, in the form of the submission of two failed reconciliation plans in 1964: the Sandys-Ball Plan and the Acheson plan (Panayiotides, 2014). We should note though that Cyprus’ importance to US security interests was not for the sake of the island per se: US foreign policy approached Cyprus in the context of her goal to preserve stability in the wider region and tranquility in NATO, especially between Greece and Turkey (Coufoudakis, 1999). All these developments, combined with the region’s continued geostrategic value, urged US foreign policy makers to care less for principles (i.e. safeguarding international law and the UN Charter) and more for the superpower’s security interests (i.e. achieving a balance of power that would provide for a pro-Western regional order). This position continued to dictate the Cyprus policy of the United States after the end of the Cold War. During these years (especially in the post-Cold War era), the United States continued to intervene in many nations’ domestic affairs aiming to establish or preserve its global primacy, often reinforcing the growth of anti-American attitudes around the world (Walt, 2005:87-88). In this context US policy toward Cyprus oscillated between ordinary diplomacy and covert non-military intervention. The most characteristic examples of 10

For further details see Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President, FRUS 24 (1955-57). 11 For further details see 747C.00/12-134, FRUS 8 (1952-54), 715, 747C.001/10756, FRUS 24 (1955-57): 415-416 and 436, 747C.00/2-657, FRUS 24 (1955-57): 453.

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this approach were, firstly, the role played by the United States (and especially by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger) in relation to the 1974 Turkish invasion and its aftermath (see, for example, O’Malley and Craig, 1999; Venizelos and Ignatiou, 2002; Coufoudakis, 2007; Hitchins, 2012; Rossides, 2014) and, secondly, the strong US support for the Annan plan in 2004 (see, for example, Venizelos et al., 2005). Moreover, several media reports based on leaked US diplomatic documents argue that the United States has also intervened in Cyprus’ domestic affairs through financial means, especially during the period that preceded the Annan plan referendums.12 The United States’ role in the Cyprus problem has affected the balance of power between the parties in the conflict in a way that is considered by many Greek Cypriots as undermining their rights. US support for Turkey because of her indisputable geostrategic value to NATO and Western security interests has contributed to the formation of anti-American sentiments among the Greek Cypriots, although a study of US policies on Cyprus (having in mind the models of intervention described above) suggests that there is no evidence to support US interventionism of high intensity and duration in Cyprus. In other words, no US indirect or direct military interventions have taken place, and none of the aforementioned quasi-interventionary initiatives appears to have lasted for any significant time. If we compare the kind of US interference in Cyprus with other (Cold War and post-Cold War) cases of US activity, such as in Greece, Chile, Nicaragua, Indochina, former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, US initiatives for Cyprus could mainly be interpreted as diplomatic and mediatory undertakings aiming to influence local policies in ways pursuant to the US interests.13 However, the expression “American intervention in Cyprus” or “American intervention in the Cyprus problem” appears very frequently in Greek Cypriot public discourse (public statements, newspaper reports, 12

Michalis Ignatiou, “Fund for ‘sensitive activities’. Revealing document signed by the former US ambassador in Nicosia” [ȉĮȝİȓȠ ȖȚĮ ‘İȣĮȓıșȘIJİȢ įȡĮıIJȘȡȚȩIJȘIJİȢ’. ǹʌȠțĮȜȣʌIJȚțȩ ȑȖȖȡĮijȠ ʌȠȣ ȣʌȠȖȡȐijİȚ Ƞ ʌȡȫȘȞ ʌȡȑıȕȘȢ ıIJȘ ȁİȣțȦıȓĮ], Phileleftheros, 30 November 2008. Michalis Ignatiou, “Hidden documents regarding the Annan plan: A judicial struggle of the CIA against researchers on US funding cases” [ȀȡȪȕȠȣȞ IJĮ ȑȖȖȡĮijĮ ȖȚĮ IJȠ ıȤȑįȚȠ ǹȞȐȞ: ǻȚțĮıIJȚțȒ țȩȞIJȡĮ IJȘȢ CIA ȝİ İȡİȣȞȘIJȑȢ ȖȚĮ IJȚȢ ĮȝİȡȚțĮȞȚțȑȢ ȤȡȘȝĮIJȠįȠIJȒıİȚȢ], 22 December 2008, http://infognomonpolitics.blogspot.com/2008/12/blog-post_ 22.html#.U1bOf6JaXTI. Access on 22 April 2014. 13 Van Coufoudakis, “US Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: An Interpretation,” in Van Coufoudakis (2007) pp. 169-197.

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columns, publications etc.). A Google search returns hundreds of such results in the Greek Cypriot as well as the Greek press. In most of these cases, the US activity described as “intervention” does not match the aforementioned models of foreign intervention. Usually the notion of “American intervention” is coupled with suspicion over the United States’ intentions, owing to the effect of the dominant Greek Cypriot perceptions of the US role in Cyprus. A system of “rational cognitive consistency” has been created and, to a large degree, it produces preconditioned perceptions and misperceptions of US policy. The examination of two specific sets of perceptions reinforces this hypothesis: the notion of the “Anglo-American factor” and the Greek Cypriot opposition’s reaction to the recent historic visit of US Vice President Joe Biden in Cyprus, in May 2014.

The “Anglo-American factor” and the Cyprus problem14 The United States and the United Kingdom have had a “special relationship” for more than a century, which has grown closer since World War II (Reynolds, 2006: 214). The United Kingdom, a country with a diminishing status in the early post-War era but once dominant in the Middle East, lacked sufficient material resources to meet the Soviet threat. Consequently she turned to the United States, a global superpower, for help (Mearsheimer, 2003: 328-329). From the American point of view, the United States found a loyal friend and partner in the hazardous project of the formation of a new world order, especially with regard to the oil-rich Middle East. The Suez Crisis of 1956 sealed the post-War AngloAmerican relationship in terms of power distribution and prestige: the United States became the indisputable leader and the United Kingdom, as Kissinger put it, “opted for permanent subordination to American policy” (Kissinger, 1994: 548). In Cyprus though, it was the United Kingdom that “set the rules of the game” for the West, usually with the blessing of the United States. In several cases the two powers had a common stance (or acted jointly), as in the cases of the Macmillan Plan (1958 – see Hatzivassiliou 2005:300-301) and the Sandys-Ball Plan (1964). But in other cases, they had different views: for example, the United States expressed strong reservations about the deportation of Archbishop Makarios III (1956)15 and failed to back the 14 For more details regarding this concept and its impact on Greek Cypriot politics see Kontos (2014b) 15 See for example a relevant conversation between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd in 747C.00/6-656, FRUS 24 (195557): 362-363.

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United Kingdom on the Radcliffe proposals (1957); 16 evidence also suggests opposing views (though not conflicting actions) between the two powers in relation to the Greek Junta-sponsored coup d’état and the subsequent Turkish invasion (1974 – see Savvides, 2014). The US, though, did not try to prevent Britain from carrying out her policies in these examples. In any case, it would not be an overstatement to argue that the US and the UK have had broadly similar views, perceptions and interests regarding Cyprus and the Cyprus problem since the end of World War II and especially since 1958. The Greek Cypriot mainstream views ascribe this similarity of outlook to a supposedly enduring common Anglo-American stance or even to a common decision-making structure. This dominant perception goes back to the 1950’s and 1960’s. It is affected by an anti-British sentiment, mainly nurtured by the United Kingdom’s colonial governance, and what is perceived as a British “divide and rule” policy that played up the Turkish Cypriot demand for partition in order to counterbalance the Greek Cypriot struggle for union with Greece. The oldest available references of this kind go back to the years of EOKA’s armed revolt: in the propaganda leaflets circulated by EOKA—which were mainly drafted by the organization’s leader Colonel Georgios Grivas—a perception of a common AngloAmerican stance appeared on several occasions. As shown by one of the leaflets he signed in December 1957, Grivas believed (or wanted people to believe) that the Eisenhower administration and particularly the President himself along with the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles were “dragged by [the British Tory government] and thus are jointly responsible with the criminal Tories.” According to Grivas, “the noble American nation has nowadays the misfortune to be ruled by the Eisenhower-Dulles duet which leads them to disaster” (Alexandrou, 2014). After 1974 the Greek Cypriots developed a special terminology on the Cyprus problem, including some clichés that are well known to anyone watching the news or reading Greek Cypriot newspapers. One of these is the phrase “Anglo-American factor”, which generally refers to the common mediation initiatives that the United States and the United Kingdom have undertaken in relation to the Cyprus problem. Greek Cypriot politicians throughout the political spectrum, journalists, school teachers, writers and scholars frequently refer to the United States and the United Kingdom as if these two states constituted a single actor. The assumption that the United States and the United Kingdom jointly interfere in Cypriot affairs on a constant basis – and usually in favour of Turkish 16

747C.00/2-1157, FRUS 24 (1957): 448-450.

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interests – is widespread among Greek Cypriots. Many examples of such statements and references are publicly available, including the following: Dimitris Christofias, President of the House of the Representatives (part of a speech in Thessaloniki), 11 July 2004: Since the referendum of April 24 the representatives of the UN, the Anglo-American factor and even some factors of the EU, (…) instead of studying their own mistakes, they put the blame for the rejection of the Annan plan exclusively on the Greek Cypriot leadership.17 Ioannis Kassoulides, Government Spokesman (statement to the media), 24 July 1996: The Anglo-American factor presses our side to accept the participation of the so-called ‘Turkish Cypriot forces’ in the military dialogue.18 Official school history handbook, Ministry of Education and Culture (undated): This period (1964-1967) was marked by excessive tension (…). At the same time, several efforts were made, especially by the AngloAmerican factor, for the achievement of a commonly accepted solution.19 Typos.com.cy news website, April 28, 2001: Aiming at the resumption of the talks next summer, the United Nations and other interested parties, especially the Anglo-American factor, are expected to undertake behindthe-scenes work in order to enhance the international organization’s process, after the parliamentary elections (…).20

Such statements and references tend to reproduce the perception of the existence of a permanently shared Anglo-American decision-making process, as well as the assumption that this process automatically goes against the Greek Cypriot interests and promotes Turkish ones. Cases of potentially different or opposing views and policies are rarely examined. Although the historical evidence does suggest that the two powers developed joint initiatives on the Cyprus problem from time to time, the concept of the “Anglo-American factor” is rather simplistic. It emerged within the context of a Greek Cypriot predisposition to interpret foreign policy issues related to the Cyprus problem without paying much attention 17

http://news.pathfinder.gr/greece/cyprus/77173.html. Accessed on 18 June 2012. http://athena.hri.org/news/cyprus/logosg/1996/96-07-24.logosg.html. Accessed on 16 June 2012. 19 http://www.schools.ac.cy/eyliko/mesi/themata/istoria/ekpaideftiko_yliko/pros th eto_yliko/his16.pdf. Accessed on 18 June 2012. 20 “The Cyprus problem: the talks commence in summer,” Typos, 28 April 2001, accessed on 10 July 2013, http://www.typos.com.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=4933. 18

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to extra-Cypriot variables. Contrary to this perception, the United States and the United Kingdom have been designing their policies in conjunction with, and with regard to, international and regional circumstances and imperatives. Therefore, convergence (or divergence) on Cyprus has been dependent on the degree of convergence between the two powers’ respective sets of perceptions of their own national interests. The fact that in some cases US and British policies on Cyprus concurred does not indicate or imply an absolute congruency. In cases where no specific US interests existed, the Americans would usually leave room for British choices. When interests diverged, conflicting views and policies emerged.

Joe Biden’s visit to Cyprus: A story of limited expectations and suspicion In February 2014 the President of the Republic of Cyprus and leader of the Greek Cypriot community, Nicos Anastasiades, agreed with Turkish Cypriot leader Derviú Ero÷lu on a joint declaration to mark the beginning of a new round of negotiations on the Cyprus problem.21 The United States facilitated the talks’ resumption through intensive diplomatic activity to help the two sides to find a commonly acceptable wording of the joint declaration. The renewed American interest in Cyprus (after 2004 the United States had essentially gone quiet for a while) was believed to be connected with a deal the Republic of Cyprus had signed with an American oil and gas company to commence exploratory drilling in Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in September 2011 and the subsequent discovery of significant natural gas reserves.22 In the meantime, politicians and analysts in Cyprus and the United States had argued that this development, along with Turkey’s new and controversial foreign policy under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo÷an, could (or should) lead to a new US approach on the Cyprus problem that would be more favourable to the Greek Cypriot views.23

21

“Cyprus reunification talks to resume,” BBC News, 8 February 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26093114, accessed 4 August 2014. 22 Elias Hazou, “Anastasiades: gas critical to US role in talks,” Cyprus Mail, 18 February 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/02/18/anastasiades-gas-crucial-to-usrole-in-talks/, accessed 2 August 2014. 23 Daniel Pipes, “Cyprus on the World Stage,” National Review Online, 11 October 2011, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/279700/cyprus-world-stage-danielpipes, accessed 31 October 2013. Seth Cropsey, “Will the US Choose the Right Side in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Hudson Institute, 3 July 2013,

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In this context, and amidst reports that foresaw “American intervention in the Cyprus problem,”24 US Vice President Joe Biden decided to pay a historic visit to Cyprus, the first time a sitting US Vice President had come since Lyndon Johnson’s visit in 1962. The visit was scheduled for 21-22 May 2014, four days before the European Parliament elections. While the government of the Republic of Cyprus perceived the US involvement as a positive development and carried out intensive diplomatic activity to prepare for the Vice President’s visit, 25 the opposition was rather suspicious. The issues that nurtured their suspicion were mainly two. First, they were afraid that the fact that the Vice President would meet Mr. Ero÷lu in the occupied North-a possibility the government of the Republic of Cyprus had tried to discourage-would reinforce the efforts made by the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (“TRNC”) for international recognition. According to this view, at least, this meeting could be used by the “TRNC” as a means of bolstering its viewpoint and disseminating its propaganda internationally about what the Turkish Cypriot administration perceives as “the new realities” in Cyprus. Second, it was widely thought that the US Vice President would support and advocate for President Anastasiades’ proposal for the return of the fencedoff area of Varosha in the occupied city of Famagusta as a confidencebuilding measure. Some opposition politicians (especially among the

http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=9659, accessed 31 October 2013. Michalis Ignatiou, “Change your policy on the Cyprus problem: A letter to Hillary Clinton by an American MP, member of the Jewish lobby” [ǹȜȜȐȟIJİ ʌȠȜȚIJȚțȒ ıIJȠ țȣʌȡȚĮțȩ: ǼʌȚıIJȠȜȒ ǹȝİȡȚțĮȞȠȪ ȕȠȣȜİȣIJȒ, ıIJİȜȑȤȠȣȢ İȕȡĮȧțȠȪ ȜȩȝʌȚ, ıIJȘ ȋȓȜĮȡȚ ȀȜȓȞIJȠȞ] Phileleftheros, 3 April 2012. 24 See for example “Victoria Nuland meets Anastasiades today – American intervention in the Cyprus problem,” [ǺȚțIJȫȡȚĮ ȃȠȪȜĮȞIJ: ȈȣȞĮȞIJȐIJĮȚ ıȒȝİȡĮ ȝİ ǹȞĮıIJĮıȚȐįȘ – ǹȝİȡȚțĮȞȚțȒ ʌĮȡȑȝȕĮıȘ ıIJȠ țȣʌȡȚĮțȩ,” Offsite, 4 February 2014. http://offsite.com.cy/sinantate-simera-anastasiadi-amerikaniki-paremvasi-stokipriako/, accessed 5 August 2014. Michalis Papadopoulos, “Factual American intervention,” [DzȝʌȡĮțIJȘ ǹȝİȡȚțĮȞȚțȒ ʌĮȡȑȝȕĮıȘ] Simerini, 2 February 2014. http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/97826, accessed 5 August 2014. “Cyprus problem: the decisive intervention of the United States for the common declaration – the insignificant role of the UN,” [ȀȣʌȡȚĮțȩ: Ǿ țĮșȠȡȚıIJȚțȒ ʌĮȡȑȝȕĮıȘ IJȦȞ ǾȆǹ ıIJȠ țȠȚȞȩ ĮȞĮțȠȚȞȦșȑȞ- «ǻȚĮțȠıȝȘIJȚțȩȢ» Ƞ ȡȩȜȠȢ IJȠȣ ȅǾǼ] NewsIT, 8 February 2014. http://www.newsit.com.cy/default.php?pname=Article&art_id=128107&catid=9, accessed 5 August 2014. 25 Michaella Loizou, “Biden’s visit is settled,” [«DzțȜİȚıİ» Ș İʌȓıțİȥȘ ȂʌȐȚȞIJİȞ] Simerini, 13 May 2014. http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/125887, accessed 1 August 2014.

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centrist parties) argued that such a development could lead to the consolidation of an artificial euphoria that would undermine the Greek Cypriot demand for full restoration of the integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the human rights that had been infringed as a result of the Turkish invasion of 1974.26 However, neither of these fears was confirmed by the facts. At first, during his visit in Cyprus Mr. Biden was eager to clarify that there was not any “TRNC” recognition issue. Upon his arrival at Larnaca International Airport he stated that The United States—I want to be clear about this—recognizes only one legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus, and my visit and meetings throughout the island will not change that.27

Furthermore, the US Vice President’s schedule and itinerary was designed to ensure and assure the Government that facilitating the “TRNC’s” recognition aspirations was not among his objectives. The Vice-President was very careful with his body-language. For example, he avoided entering Mr. Ero÷lu’s “presidential” residence from the main entrance; he didn’t stop on the doorstep to shake hands with Mr. Ero÷lu (and so avoided producing a photo opportunity for the Turkish Cypriot leader); indeed, he even kept on his sunglasses even after he had entered the building.28 As for the Varosha issue, no progress was made during Mr. Biden’s visit, despite his mediating efforts during a joint meeting with 26

“The parties persist with reactions for Biden’s impeding visit,” [ȈȣȞİȤȓȗȠȞIJĮȚ ȠȚ ĮȞIJȚįȡȐıİȚȢ IJȦȞ țȠȝȝȐIJȦȞ ȖȚĮ IJȘȞ İʌȚțİȓȝİȞȘ İʌȓıțİȥȘ ȂʌȐȚȞIJİȞ] Ant1iwo, 18 May 2014. http://www.ant1iwo.com/kypros/2014/05/18/synexizontai-oi-antidras eis-twn-kommatwn/, accessed 7 August 2014. “Parties: Varying reactions for Joe Biden’s imminent visit,” [ȀȩȝȝĮIJĮ: ȆȠȚțȓȜȠȣȞ ȠȚ ĮȞIJȚįȡȐıİȚȢ ȖȚĮ IJȘȞ İʌȚțİȓȝİȞȘ İʌȓıțİȥȘ IJȠȣ ȉȗȠ ȂʌȐȚȞIJİȞ] Livenews, 17 May 2014. http://www.livenews.com.cy/cgibin/hweb?-A=48055&-V=news, accessed 6 August 2014. “The issue of Famagusta will be discussed during Biden’s visit,” [ĬȑȝĮ ǹȝȝȠȤȫıIJȠȣ ıIJȘȞ İʌȓıțİȥȘ ȂʌȐȚȞIJİȞ] Kathimerini, 12 May 2014. http://kathimerini.com.cy/index.php?pageaction=kat&modid=1&artid=171024, accessed 7 August 2014. 27 “US Vice President Biden meets KKTC President Ero÷lu in Cyprus,” Today’s Zaman, 22 May 2014. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-348509-us-vice-pres ident-biden-meets-kktc-president-eroglu-in-cyprus.html, accessed 8 August 2014. 28 “Biden’s visit in Cyprus completed,” [ȅȜȠțȜȘȡȫșȘțİ Ș İʌȓıțİȥȘ ȂʌȐȚȞIJİȞ ıIJȘȞ ȀȪʌȡȠ] Phileleftheros, 22 May 2014. http://www.philenews.com/el-gr/topstories/885/200656/deipno-stous-igetes-parathetei-o-bainten-synechis-enimerosi, accessed 10 August 2014.

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President Anastasiades and Mr. Ero÷lu. According to officials of the government of the Republic of Cyprus, any potential progress was torpedoed by Mr. Ero÷lu’s demands on the issue that could not be accepted by the Greek Cypriots.29

Noble ends and harmful results It is clear that Greek Cypriot political views on the US role in Cyprus are often affected by a system of perceptions that matches Jervis’ rational consistency model. When it comes to the American objectives and intentions on Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot decision-makers and opinion leaders tend towards “interpreting evidence that conform to the generally accepted rules of drawing inferences” (Jervis, 1976:119). Moreover, they tend to shape their views based on past experience, not current evidence, in the context of a mindset that “causes [them] to fit incoming information into pre-existing beliefs and to perceive what they expect to be there” (Jervis, 1976:143). As I argued above, the Greek Cypriots often “ignore information that does not fit, twist it so that it confirms, or at least does not contradict, [their] beliefs, and deny its validity. Confirming evidence, by contrast, is quickly and accurately noted” (Jervis, 1976: 143). There is no doubt that, when it comes to the Cyprus problem, such (mis)perceptions undermine the prospects for reaching a common language among the interested parties. At the same time though, Greek Cypriot overreaction to the “role of foreigners” is based not only on misperceptions, but often also on the facts of the case. Foreign interventionism is one of the factors that have delineated the course of the Cyprus problem over the last six decades. Non-Cypriot actors should realize that they would best serve the cause of a sustainable settlement of the Cyprus problem not through intervening in Cyprus’ domestic affairs, but through enhancing its independence and integrity. When it comes to the causes of peace and stability—and despite any gains in the short run— foreign intervention is rarely successful in the long run, and, indeed, often counterproductive. The international community should draw lessons from the sad story currently unfolding in the Middle East: a whole century of 29 “’We almost reached a deal on Famagusta’,” [«ĭIJȐıĮȝİ ʌȠȜȪ țȠȞIJȐ ıİ ıȣȝijȦȞȓĮ ȖȚĮ IJȘȞ ǹȝȝȩȤȦıIJȠ»] NewsIT, 23 May 2014. http://www.newsit.com.cy/default.php?pname=Article&art_id=139772&catid=31, Accessed 8 August 2014. Petros Melaisis, “The Turks torpedoed agreement on Famagusta,” [ȅȚ ȉȠȪȡțȠȚ IJȠȡʌȓȜȚıĮȞ ıȣȝijȦȞȓĮ ȖȚĮ IJȘȞ ǹȝȝȩȤȦıIJȠ] Ant1iwo, 23 May 2014. http://www.ant1iwo.com/kypros/2014/05/23/oyasigkton-kalei-leykws ia-gia-mpainten-s/, accessed 8 August 2014.

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hegemonic interventionism and suppression by the Western powers has led to the emergence of the most brutal form of fanaticism the region has ever witnessed. As the late Kenneth N. Waltz argued in 2000: If the world is now safe for democracy, one has to wonder whether democracy is safe for the world. When democracy is ascendant, a condition that in the twentieth century attended the winning of hot wars and cold ones, the interventionist spirit flourishes. The effect is heightened when one democratic state becomes dominant, as the United States is now. Peace is the noblest cause of war. If the conditions of peace are lacking, then the country with a capability of creating them may be tempted to do so, whether or not by force. The end is noble, but as a matter of right, Kant insists, no state can intervene in the internal arrangements of another. As a matter of fact, one may notice that intervention, even for worthy ends, often brings more harm than good (Waltz, 2000 p. 13).

References Adamides, Constantinos (2014) Negative Perceptions of Foreign Actors: An Integral Part of Conflict-Perpetuating Routines, in Great Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions, eds. Michalis Kontos et al. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 197-221. Adams, Thomas W. (1971) AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Alexandrou, Haralambos (2014) EOKA Comments on International Diplomacy: Perceptions and Presentation, in Great Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions, eds. Michalis Kontos et al. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 166. Barnet, Richard J. (1968) Intervention and Revolution. The United States in the Third World New York and Cleveland: The World Publishing Company. Butler, Michael J. (2003) U.S. Military Intervention in Crisis, 1945-1994: An Empirical Inquiry of Just War Theory, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 47: 226-248. Coufoudakis, Van (2007) Cyprus and International Politics: Essays by Van Coufoudakis Nicosia: Intercollege Press. Emilianides, Achilles (2014) The Cyprus Question before the House of Commons: 1954-1955, in Great Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions, eds. Michalis Kontos et al. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 11-32.

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Friedman, Wolfgang (1968) Interventionism, Liberalism, and PowerPolitics: The Unfinished Revolution in International Thinking, Political Science Quarterly 83: 169-189. Goodman, Ryan (2006) Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, The American Journal of International Law 100: 107-141. Haass, Richard N. (1999) Intervention. The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis (2005) ȈIJȡĮIJȘȖȚțȑȢ IJȠȣ ȀȣʌȡȚĮțȠȪ ȆȡȠȕȜȒȝĮIJȠȢ: Ǿ ǻİțĮİIJȓĮ IJȠȣ 1950 [Strategies of the Cyprus Question: The Decade of 1950] Athens: Patakis. Hitchens, Christopher (2012) The Trial of Henry Kissinger London Atlantic Books. Jervis, Robert (1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kissinger, Henry (1994) Diplomacy New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks. Kontos, Michalis (2014a) Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions: An Analytical Framework, in Great Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions, eds. Michalis Kontos, Sozos-Christos Theodoulou, Nikos Panayiotides, Haralambos Alexandrou Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014: 1-6. —. (2014b) The Anglo-American Factor in Greek Cypriot Politics: English, American or “Anglo-American”? in Great Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions, eds. Michalis Kontos et al. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 188-193. Koufoudakis, Vaggelis (1999) ǹȝİȡȚțĮȞȚțȒ ǼȟȦIJİȡȚțȒ ȆȠȜȚIJȚțȒ țĮȚ ȀȣʌȡȚĮțȩ ȆȡȩȕȜȘȝĮ 1960-1991 [American Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Problem 1960-1991], in Christodoulos Yiallourides and Panayiotis Tsakonas (eds.) ǼȜȜȐįĮ țĮȚ ȉȠȣȡțȓĮ ȂİIJȐ IJȠ ȉȑȜȠȢ IJȠȣ ȌȣȤȡȠȪ ȆȠȜȑȝȠȣ [Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War] Athens: Sideris: 448-452. Kranidiotis, Nikos (1985) ǹȞȠȤȪȡȦIJȘ ȆȠȜȚIJİȓĮ: ȀȪʌȡȠȢ 1960-1974 [Unfortified Polity: Cyprus 1960-1974] Athens: Estia. Krasner, Stephen D. (1978) Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials, Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mearsheimer, John J. (2003) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

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O’Malley, Brendan and Ian Craig (1999) The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion London: I. B. Tauris Publishers. Panayiotides, Nicos (2014) The Destabilizing Foreign Interventions in the Internal Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, in Great Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions, eds. Michalis Kontos et al. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing:. 67-83. Papageorgiou, Spiros (1984) ǹȡȤİȓȠȞ IJȦȞ ȆĮȡȐȞȠȝȦȞ ǼȖȖȡȐijȦȞ IJȠȣ ȀȣʌȡȚĮțȠȪ ǹȖȫȞȠȢ 1955-1959 [Archive of the Illegal Documents of the Cyprus Struggle 1955-1959] Nicosia: Epiphaniou. —. (2000) ȉĮ ȀȡȓıȚȝĮ ȃIJȠțȠȣȝȑȞIJĮ IJȠȣ ȀȣʌȡȚĮțȠȪ 1959-1967 [The Cyprus Problem’s Critical Documents 1959-1967] Volume II Nicosia: Epiphaniou. Pearson, Frederic S. (1974) Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 18 (1974): 432-460. Regan, Patrick M. (1996) Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 40: 336-359. —. (1998) Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts, The Journal of Politics 60: 754-779. Reynolds, David (2006) From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rosenau, James N. (1969) Intervention as a Scientific Concept, The Journal of Conflict Resolution: 149-171. Rossides, Eugene T. (2014) Kissinger and Cyprus: A Study in Lawlessness Washington DC: American Hellenic Institute Foundation. Savvides, Petros (2014) The Collapse of a Fallacious Myth: The Role of Kremlin and Whitehall in the Cyprus Crisis of 1974, in Great Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions, eds. Michalis Kontos et al. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing:. 85-106. Soulioti, Stella (2006) Fettered Independence: Cyprus 1878-1964, Volume I Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. Stowell, Ellery C. (1939) Humanitarian Intervention, The American Journal of International Law 33: 733-736. Tansu, øsmail (2007) In Reality no One Was Asleep: A Secret Underground Organization, With State Support-TMT, trans. Ayhan Sütçüo÷lu Cyprus: øsmail Tansu.

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Tillema, Herbert K. (1989) Foreign Overt Military Intervention in the Nuclear Age, Journal of Peace Research 26: 179-196. Venizelos, Costas and Michalis Ignatiou (2002) ȉĮ ȂȣıIJȚțȐ ǹȡȤİȓĮ IJȠȣ ȀȓıȚȞIJȗİȡ. Ǿ ǹʌȩijĮıȘ ȖȚĮ IJȘ ǻȚȤȠIJȩȝȘıȘ [The Secret Kissinger Archives. The Decision for the Partition] Athens: Livanis. Venizelos, Costas, Michalis Ignatiou and Nikos Meletis (2005) ȈȤȑįȚȠ ǹȞȐȞ: ȉȠ ȂȣıIJȚțȩ ȆĮȗȐȡȚ. ȅȚ 129 ǾȝȑȡİȢ ʌȠȣ ȈȣȖțȜȩȞȚıĮȞ IJȠȞ ǼȜȜȘȞȚıȝȩ [The Annan Plan: The Secret Bargain. 129 Days that Shook Hellenism] Athens: Livanis. Walt, Stephen M. (2005) Taming American Power. The Global Response to U.S. Primacy New York: Norton. Waltz, Kenneth N. (2000) Structural Realism after the Cold War, International Security 25. Watson, Robert P., Charles Gleek and Michael Grillo, (2003; eds.) Presidential Doctrines: National Security from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush New York: Nova History Publications, 2003. Wilber, Donald (1969) The Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran. November 1952-August 1953, Clandestine Service History, Central Intelligence Agency (October). Yoon, Mi Yung (1997) Explaining U.S. Intervention in Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41: 580602.

PART II POLITICS: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF CONCERN

CHAPTER FOUR OFFSHORE GAS: AN ANTICATALYST IN EFFORTS TO REUNIFY CYPRUS AYLA GÜREL PRIO CYPRUS CENTRE

Introduction The discovery of a sizeable volume of natural gas in late 2011 in an offshore field south of Cyprus has triggered widespread expectation both within and outside the island that this could expedite a solution of the ageold Cyprus problem. It has since become a commonplace to talk about the existence of hydrocarbon resources as constituting a strong incentive to reach a political settlement in Cyprus. Yet, subsequent developments have been anything but compatible with this insight. What I would call “the politics of Cyprus hydrocarbons” has actually become the biggest impediment to progress in the UN-sponsored Cyprus negotiations. Indeed in October 2014 it finally brought about an interruption in the negotiations, which did not resume until after May 2015. A controversy over the right to natural resources within Cyprus’ seas, involving the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, has been brewing since about 2003. However, it had attracted little attention until tensions started escalating in September 2011. This was in the run-up to the first exploratory drilling by the (de facto Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in the so-called Aphrodite field off the island’s southern coast. That fray subsided over the subsequent months but the issue has continued to fester, and another full-blown crisis erupted three years later when the RoC permitted an exploratory well drilling for natural gas in a second offshore field, the Onasagoras, in September 2014. Though fortunately it did not lead to any military confrontation, the crisis brought

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out into the open the role of ‘Cyprus hydrocarbons’ in the diplomatic battle over ‘sovereignty’ between the two Cypriot sides. The Greek Cypriot side maintains that its actions relating to offshore hydrocarbon exploration and development fall squarely within the RoC’s sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as recognized by the international community. It is also adamant that the exercise of these rights is not conditional upon a Cyprus solution, nor is it an issue for inter-communal negotiations. Accordingly, this position excludes the Turkish Cypriots both from having a say in the exercise of these sovereign rights and from sharing any likely offshore energy wealth until after a solution of the Cyprus problem. The Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey strongly object to this approach, which, they say, is inconsistent with the RoC Constitution. They contend that the Greek Cypriot side alone is not constitutionally competent to represent Cyprus as a whole; and that the sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources in the island’s EEZ or continental shelf belong jointly to Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Thus, from this perspective, any unilateral Greek Cypriot action in this field now (i.e., before a settlement) amounts to ignoring the legitimate entitlements of the Turkish Cypriots and as such constitutes a provocation. In this chapter, the deeper political reasons behind this maritime and natural resource conflict are analysed based on the parties’ expressed positions and actions. It is shown that the offshore hydrocarbons controversy stems directly from the parties’ fundamental differences about the nature of the Cyprus problem, and therefore what is politically at stake in Cyprus. Furthermore, it is argued that, as things stand, this issue is actually deepening the chasm between the parties to the Cyprus problem and thus reducing the likelihood of a political settlement.

Political context: the Cyprus problem and negotiations The Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was established in 1960 as a bi-communal state based on power sharing between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. This constitutional structure broke down in 1963 as a result of violent inter-communal strife (Kyle, 1998; Patrick, 1976). The Greek Cypriot community assumed sole governance of the RoC, which has since functioned as a unitary state, based on the so-called doctrine of necessity.1 Over time and without any formalities—such as a renegotiation 1

The doctrine of necessity (used in law as basis for justification of extra-legal government actions in situations of public emergency) was first invoked in the 1964 case of the Attorney General of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim and others

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of the relevant international treaties—having taken place, the Greek Cypriot government came to be internationally accepted as the legitimate RoC government. In 1974, in response to a coup by Greek and Greek Cypriot armed forces with the ultimate aim of effecting enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece), Turkey invoked the Treaty of Guarantee 2 and militarily intervened. 3 Subsequently, the island was divided into a northern sector administered by the Turkish Cypriots and guarded by the Turkish army,4 and a southern sector controlled by the RoC. In 1983 the Turkish Cypriots declared independence and announced the establishment of the present Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Turkey, which does not recognize the RoC, is the only country that recognizes the TRNC. In May 2004, having conducted accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriots formally acting on behalf of the whole island, the EU accepted the RoC as a member. This happened just after the two Cypriot communities voted, in separate twin referendums, on the UN’s Annan Plan that would have reunified the island under a bi-communal federal government. The Plan, which was widely supported by the international community, notably the EU, was overwhelmingly (76 per cent) rejected by the Greek Cypriots, while the Turkish Cypriots approved it with quite a large margin (65 per cent).

which has become the landmark case in relation to the application in Cyprus of this rule. In that case, the Supreme Court justified, based on the concept of “state necessity,” its jurisdiction to hear the case (despite the absence of a Turkish Cypriot judge, as provided for in the Constitution) and the suspension or inapplicability of certain provisions of the RoC Constitution, which in turn enabled the continued functioning of the state organs with Greek Cypriot members only. For a comprehensive examination of the topic, see Markides (2006) and Hakk (2007: chapter 15). For a general discussion on the doctrine of necessity, as well as a critical assessment of its application in Cyprus and the consequences of this for the Turkish Cypriot community, see Özersay (2005). Also see Constantinou (2008), looking at the Cypriot application of the doctrine within the broader context of “states of exception.” 2 The Treaty of Guarantee, which is one of the international accords that established the RoC, made Greece, Turkey and Britain guarantors of “the independence, territorial integrity and security” of the RoC as well as “the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.” 3 Turkey and Turkish Cypriots officially describe this action as a “peace operation” while Greek Cypriots and most of the international community view it as an “invasion.” 4 According to unofficial estimates there are at present between 20,000 and 30,000 Turkish troops on the island.

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UN-sponsored inter-communal negotiations aimed at resolving the anomalous political situation on the island have been going on intermittently for over four decades. The latest round of talks began in 2008 but petered out after March 2012. In February 2014 the two communities agreed on a joint communiqué, 5 which then enabled the resumption of the talks. This agreement was reached after difficult and protracted negotiations, and with the help of intense American diplomatic efforts. It is commonly believed that the increased international interest in bringing about a Cyprus settlement on the part of the Western powers especially, has been spurred by the potential for regional energy cooperation (in particular, involving Cyprus, Israel and Turkey), which would help reduce instability in the Eastern Mediterranean.6 It is important to note that before the breakthrough that restarted the negotiations, the discussions over a joint declaration had been in a stalemate for some months, the impasse mainly stemming from the parties’ differences on how sovereignty would be exercised in a postsettlement united Cyprus.7 I shall address this point later in this chapter.

Recent Developments relating to negotiations Following their resumption in February 2014, and amid high hopes based on the two sides’ joint declaration, the negotiations gained some momentum and continued until the summer recess, though without achieving any measurable progress. On 26 September 2014, ENI-KOGAS started drilling in the Onasagoras field of the RoC’s exploration block 9 off the island’s south coast. A statement from the Turkish Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued on 3 October described the drilling in Block 9 as “illegal.” It warned that the 5

“Statement by the Secretary-General on Cyprus”, New York, Feb. 11, 2014, http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=7452. For the text of the communiqué, see http://www.uncyprustalks.org/media/Good%20Offices/Photos%20For%20Main% 20Articles/FEBRUARY_2014_JOINT_DECLARATION_FINAL.pdf. 6 “Energy is 'game changer' as Cyprus peace drive relaunched”, Kathimerini, Feb. 11, 2014, http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_11/02/2014_537284; and Elias Hazou, “Anastasiades: gas crucial to US role in talks”, Cyprus Mail, 18 February 2014, http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/02/18/anastasiades-gas-crucial-to-usrole-in-talks/. 7 “January 2014 Monthly Forecast: Cyprus”, Security Council Report, Dec. 20, 2013, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-01/cyprus_3. php.

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Turkish Cypriot side would respond to “the unilateral activities of the Greek Cypriot side” and “in co-operation with Turkey will send a seismic ship to the areas in which TPAO8 was given exploration licenses by the TRNC to conduct exploration on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot people, the co-owners of the natural resources of the Island.”9 In the same vein, a Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) statement of 4 October denounced “the Greek Cypriot Administration’s (GCA) continuing unilateral research activities of hydrocarbon resources in its [EEZ].” The statement demanded that the Greek Cypriot side “refrain from acting as if it is the sole owner of the resources of the Island … halt its unilateral research activities and … adopt an understanding with a view to establishing a new partnership.” The Turkish MFA statement also called “on the international community to act in order to prevent the provocative and unilateral steps” of the Greek Cypriots and added that, until that happens, “all kind of support to the TRNC’s future steps of conducting seismic research activities, acquiring a drilling platform and dispatching it to an area to be determined, which are necessary to protect its inherent rights over these resources, will be provided by us.”10 At the same time, Turkey issued a navigational warning (NAVTEX No. 765/2014) reserving for the period of 20 October-30 December designated areas in the RoC EEZ off the southern coast for seismic surveys by TPAO’s research ship Barbaros Hayrettin Paúa and its escort vessels M/V Deep Supporter and M/V Bravo Supporter. The survey area, which fell within the TRNC concession blocks licensed to TPAO in September 2011 (see Map 5, p.80 below), was reported to be overlapping with RoC offshore blocks 1, 2, 3, 8 and 9 (inside the latter block, bordering—but not overlapping with—the area where ENI-KOGAS was concurrently conducting exploratory drilling). 11 At the same time the Turkish armed

8 TPAO (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortakl÷) is the national oil company of Turkey. 9 “Press Statement regarding the illegal hydrocarbon exploration activities of the Greek Cypriot Administration in the Eastern Mediterranean,” TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 3, 2014, http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/press-statement20141003/. 10 “No: 311, 04 October 2014, Press Release Regarding Drilling Activity of the Greek Cypriots,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 4, 2014, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-311_-04-october-2014_-press-release-regardingdrilling-activity-of-the-greek-cypriots.en.mfa. 11 “Turkey trespasses for fourth time since hydrocarbons discovered” Cyprus Mail, Oct. 21, 2014, http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/10/21/turkey-trespasses-for-fourthtime-since-hydrocarbons-discovered/.

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forces announced that the warship TCG Gelibolu would monitor the activities of ENI’s drill ship in block 9.12 In response, the Greek Cypriot side announced on 6 October 2014 its decision to suspend its participation in the negotiations.13 On 20 October, Turkish vessel Barbaros and its two escorting ships started their exploration activities in the area designated by the Turkish NAVTEX.14 Though direct negotiations ceased, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisor (SGSA) to Cyprus, Espen Barth Eide, continued to meet the two sides in an effort to defuse the crisis over hydrocarbons and restart the talks. However, it is important to note that, because of the Greek Cypriot side’s stance, the issue of hydrocarbon resources is not part of the intercommunal negotiations and, therefore, formally remains outside the mandate of the UN. Changing this position of the UN requires the agreement of both sides. As once remarked by Alexander Downer, the previous UN SGSA, “If the two sides came together and asked us to play some sort of mediating role the Secretary-General would have a look at that and we’d discuss it and look at what we could do. But the two sides would have to come to us; we’re not trying to impose ourselves on them.”15 Still, in November 2014 the Special Adviser proposed to the two sides a plan which involved both the TPAO’s vessel Barbaros stopping its activities offshore Cyprus, and also discussions on the hydrocarbons issue in parallel with the settlement talks. It has been reported that the hydrocarbons discussions involved setting up a group of experts from both sides to deal with the technical aspects of managing hydrocarbon resources in a reunified Cyprus. Both sides rejected the proposal. 16 The Greek Cypriots did so because of their long-standing wariness of efforts to “bicommunalize” the hydrocarbons issue and their demand for not only unconditional withdrawal of the Barbaros but also Turkey’s recognition of 12

“Turkish warship continues vigil near Cyprus drilling platform”, Famagusta Gazette, Oct. 16, 2014, http://famagusta-gazette.com/turkish-warship-continuesvigil-near-cyprus-drilling-platform-p26155-69.htm. 13 Jean Christou, “President says: I had no other choice,” Cyprus Mail, Oct. 7, 2014, http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/10/07/president-says-i-had-no-other-choice/. 14 “Greek Cyprus cries foul as Turkish vessel enters waters,” Hürriyet Daily News, Oct. 20, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/mine.yucel.3/posts/10153086751002422. 15 Remarks by SASG Downer following meeting of Cyprus Leaders, 27 September 2011, United Nations Good Offices Mission, http://www.uncyprustalks.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=4998&tt=graphic&lang=l1. 16 “January 2015 Monthly Forecast: Cyprus”, Security Council Report, Dec. 23, 2014, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2015-01/cyprus_5.php.

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the RoC’s sovereign rights in its EEZ. The Turkish Cypriot side did not accept the proposal because it did not include Greek Cypriots’ suspension of their offshore exploration activities. On 30 December, at the end of the period stated in the Turkish NAVTEX, the Barbaros left the RoC exploration area. This, together with the completion of the Onasagoras drilling earlier in December, presented an opportunity for another push by the UN Special Advisor for the restart of the talks. However, despite the efforts made, on January 2 ENI-KOGAS started drilling in another field in Block 9, the Amathusa. At the same time, the RoC government spokesman stated that “the withdrawal of the Barbaros from the EEZ” to be “only one of two preconditions for the resumption of negotiations,” the other being a “tangible demonstration” by Turkey that it respected the RoC’s sovereignty.17 On 5 January President Nicos Anastasiades issued a written statement, which more or less repeated the Greek Cypriot position; the only new aspect being the idea that “all outstanding issues that have not been agreed could be discussed during the final stage of the negotiations, when the maps of the territorial adjustments are tabled, and if the dialogue is in the final stage towards a solution.”18 This was apparently meant to be a covert acceptance to talk about the hydrocarbons issue at the final stage of the negotiations. In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey’s common stance has been that the TPAO vessel Barbaros would stop its seismic surveying and leave the area only if Greek Cypriot drilling stopped. In response to the statements of the Greek Cypriot side, Turkey lost no time in issuing a new NAVTEX, “on behalf of the TRNC”19 covering a period of three months starting from 6 January and included areas overlapping the RoC’s offshore exploration area in the south. In the event, Barbaros did not leave the

17 George Psyllides, “Government adopts ‘wait and see’ policy on talks,” Cyprus Mail, Jan. 2, 2015, http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/01/02/government-adopts-waitand-see-policy-on-talks/. 18 “Written statement by the President of the Republic, Mr Nicos Anastasiades,” Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office, Jan. 5, 2015, http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/792C7CFA4D29E6C2C2257DC40057 BE34?OpenDocument. 19 “Regarding one-sided initiatives of the Greek Cypriot administration” (Official Statement), TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan. 6, 2015, http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/press-statement-regarding-one-sided-initiatives-of-the-greekcypriot-administration/. The TRNC says Turkey is asked to issue the navigational warnings on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot side, as the latter “does not have access to such instruments because of its international isolation.” Source: interview, TRNC foreign ministry official, 12 December 2014.

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Turkish Cypriot Famagusta port, 20 remaining docked there until it left Cyprus’ waters at the end of March, about a week before the Turkish NAVTEX was due to expire. In the interim, ENI-KOGAS had announced that it had “not identified exploitable hydrocarbons” in the Amathusa field it had been drilling, and its drill ship had left for Italy to undergo maintenance, which would last for four or five months. Thus emerged the “window of opportunity,” for the UN-sponsored negotiations to resume. On 7 April, after meeting separately with both Cypriot sides, Eide announced: “I see no obstacle to a very early resumption of talks once the election process in the north of Cyprus is done.”21 After a seven-month suspension, the talks recommenced in May 2015.

Maritime Boundaries: RoC, TRNC, and Turkey RoC The RoC declared a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles (NM)22 through the Territorial Sea Law passed in 1964. According to a Continental Shelf Law passed in 1974, the RoC also has a continental shelf the extent of which is defined, in accordance with the 1958 UN Convention on the Continental Shelf, as “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast of the Republic, but beyond the territorial waters, where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas.” In 1988 the RoC ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).23 Through a law passed in April 2004, the RoC’s 20 “Turkish vessel Barbaros could enter EEZ in coming days,” Cyprus Mail, Jan. 28, 2015, http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/01/28/turkish-vessel-barbaros-could-entereez-in-coming-days; and George Psyllides, “Talks can resume only if Turkey acts responsibly,” Cyprus Mail, Feb. 7, 2015, http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/02/07/talkscan-resume-only-if-turkey-acts-responsibly/. 21 “Eide: no obstacle to resumption of talks (update 2)” Cyprus Mail April 7. 2015 http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/04/07/eide-tight-lipped-after-anastasiades-meeting/ 22 1 NM= 1,852 metres. 23 UNCLOS (also called the Law of the Sea Treaty) was concluded at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III, 1973-1982), was opened for signature on 10 December 1982, and entered into force on 16 November 1994. Today the Convention stands ratified by over 160 states. The four states that voted against its adoption back in 1982 – Israel, Turkey, USA and Venezuela – are still not parties to it. However, certain provisions of UNCLOS, including those about the EEZ, have acquired customary international law status, which means they are binding on all states whether they have ratified it or not. For more on UNCLOS and maritime zones, see chapter 2 in Gürel et al. (2013).

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EEZ was proclaimed, in conformity with UNCLOS, to be up to a limit of 200 Nautical Miles extending from the coast. The RoC EEZ Law stipulates that, in case of an overlap between the EEZ of the RoC and the EEZ of any other state with coasts opposite those of the RoC, the EEZs will be delimited by agreement between the two states. Otherwise, the delimitation will not extend beyond the median line.24 The RoC signed delimitation agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010), which define the borders of its EEZ in the southwestern, southern and southeastern directions. The RoC’s declared EEZ surrounds the whole island, including the areas off coastline controlled by the TRNC, but its boundaries are not delineated only in the aforementioned directions. In the rest, boundaries still need to be agreed with Turkey and Syria. So far the RoC has consistently objected to all TRNC acts relating to these areas (see below).25

TRNC As explained before, under the present circumstances of the unresolved division of Cyprus, the RoC is solely administered by the Greek Cypriot community, but with its control restricted to the south of the dividing line; the Turkish Cypriot community’s de facto state,26 the TRNC, governs the north. The TRNC has also passed legislation relating to zones of maritime jurisdiction (Gürel et al., 2013: 23-25).

24

This is the line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baseline of each state (the latter being the boundary from which zones of maritime jurisdiction territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf of that state are measured). 25 The RoC has avoided dividing the areas off the coastline controlled by the TRNC into blocks for exploration for a number of reasons. One is that these areas have yet to be delineated. Another is that doing so would only be a symbolic act of political assertion which the RoC, as an internationally recognised state, does not particularly need. Moreover, and not least importantly, such an act would almost certainly lead to friction with the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, increasing risks of instability—something which is bad for oil and gas business. 26 Scott Pegg (1998) describes the de facto state as “a secessionist entity that receives popular support and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area, over which it maintains effective control for an extended period of time,” but “is denied legitimacy by the rest of international society.”

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Map 1 Maritime border defined in the continental shelf agreement signed between the TRNC and Turkey. [Source: Agreement Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Mediterranean Sea between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Turkey, 21 September 2011.]

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Under the TRNC Territorial Sea Law, No. 42/2002, the breadth of the territorial sea, understood as extending from the TRNC coastline, is 12 NM. With this the TRNC is in effect claiming jurisdiction in part of what the RoC had claimed for the whole island in 1964. In addition, there is the TRNC Maritime Jurisdiction Areas Law, No. 63/2005, which provides for the proclamation of an EEZ up to 200 NM, as well as for its delimitation by agreement with neighbouring coastal states. In the same law, the continental shelf is defined in accordance with international law. This is standard legislation describing the general principles which apply to TRNC acts relating to establishment and delimitation of maritime jurisdiction zones as well as the rules relating to the TRNC’s and other states’ rights and duties in these zones. On 21 September 2011 the TRNC signed a continental shelf delimitation agreement with Turkey. The agreement draws a boundary between the northern coast of Cyprus and the southern coast of Turkey (see Map 1) and is not a median/equidistance line but a line “determined on the basis of international law and equitable principles.” 27 The agreement came as part of the Turkish Cypriot side’s response to the launch a few days earlier of the first Greek Cypriot exploratory drilling in block 12.28 The RoC denounced the agreement as illegal and hence invalid.29 27

“No: 216 Press Statement On the Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement Signed Between Turkey and the TRNC,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 21, 2011, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-216_-21-september-2011_press-statement-on-the-continental-shelf-delimitation-agreement-signed-betweenturkey-and-the-trnc.en.mfa. 28 The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdo÷an stated, “We had previously brought to the international community's attention in a clear manner […] that if the Greek Cypriots started drilling, we would take a number of concrete steps together with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus […] To reflect this commitment, Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus today in New York signed a continental shelf agreement.” Jonathon Burch, “Turkey-North Cyprus gas deal set to raise regional tensions,” Reuters, Sept. 21, 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article/ 2011/09/21/uk-turkey-cyprus-idUKTRE78K6Y120110921. 29 Ibid. It could, of course, be argued that since the TRNC is not internationally recognized this agreement lacks legal validity under international law. However, two points are pertinent here: (i) the agreement is consistent with the fact that the parties who signed it recognize each other; and (ii) as part of the on-going negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, the two sides have established a “treaties committee” whose purpose is to list all the treaties and agreements which both sides concluded with third parties in the pre-settlement period and which will be binding on the united Cyprus post-settlement. A ground rule of the said committee is the presumption that all such treaties and agreements will be included in the list unless they are contrary to the provisions of the

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Turkey Turkey has a territorial sea law, which generally sets the breadth of its territorial sea at six NM with a proviso authorizing the Council of Ministers (CoM) to establish the breadth of the territorial sea, in certain seas, up to a limit exceeding six nautical miles, under reservation to take into account all special circumstances and relevant situations therein, and in conformity with the equity principle.30

Presently, a six NM limit applies to the territorial sea in the Aegean Sea while the limit in the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea is 12 NM as determined in a CoM decree.31 Turkey has no continental shelf- or EEZrelated legislation. A CoM decree established the Turkish EEZ in the Black Sea at 200 NM,32 but no EEZ proclamation exists for the Mediterranean or the Aegean Seas. Although it participated in the UNCLOS III negotiations, Turkey has not signed UNCLOS, primarily because of its conflict with Greece over maritime boundaries in the Aegean Sea.33 The Turkish perspective is that certain provisions of UNCLOS, specifically Articles 3, 33, 34 and 121,

prospective settlement. In this sense, therefore, the Turkey-TRNC continental shelf agreement could come to have legal consequences within the scope of a future settlement just as the delimitation agreements concluded between the RoC and Egypt, Lebanon and Israel presumably would. 30 Act No. 2674 of 20 May 1982, on the Territorial Sea of the Republic of Turkey, http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/TUR .htm. 31 Decree No. 8/4742, http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/TUR .htm. This decree preserved the erstwhile limits in the Mediterranean and Black Seas which applied in accordance with a previous law (Act 476 of 1964; repealed by Act 2674 of 1982) and were determined on the basis of “reciprocity” vis-à-vis other states with greater territorial sea limits in the relevant sea. See Baúeren (2010, 27-28). 32 Decree No. 86/11264 of 17 December 1986, http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/TUR .htm. 33 See Oral (2009), Kariotis (2011), Bölükbaú (2004), and ICG (2011). 34 Articles 3 and 33 concern the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, respectively. Turkey and Greece have long been in conflict over the breadth of these zones in the Aegean Sea.

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jeopardize vital interests of Turkey in the Aegean.35 Of these, Article 121 concerns islands. It provides that the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the EEZ and the continental shelf of an island are determined in the same manner as any “other land territory” (except for “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own”). During UNCLOS III deliberations, Turkey argued against the approach that was eventually adopted in Article 121, instead proposing that: islands which constitute a source of distortion or inequity in drawing boundaries between opposite or adjacent states shall have marine spaces only to the extent compatible with equitable principles and all geographic and other relevant circumstances (Marsh, 1987 cited in Bahcheli, 1990).

In a clear reference to smaller islands in the Aegean, Turkey also proposed that an island should not possess an economic zone (i.e., continental shelf or EEZ) if its land area was less than “one-tenth of the land area of the State to which it belongs” and if it was “situated in the economic zone or the continental shelf of other States” (Van Dyke, 1989). None of these proposals found enough support at the conference to be included in the Convention.

International jurisprudence on islands While the UNCLOS provisions appear to be more on the side of Greece’s rather than Turkey’s claims in the Aegean, a look at international jurisprudence relating to maritime delimitation in situations involving islands reveals a different picture. In a number of court decisions over the last four decades there has been a marked tendency towards compromise solutions achieved through restricting islands’ maritime zones, often by disregarding islands or by giving only partial effect to their presence.36 The approach adopted by the International Court of Justice and other tribunals in nearly all decisions concerning maritime spaces of islands may 35 “We will stay out [of UNCLOS] until the settlement of the Aegean dispute.” Source: Interview, Turkish foreign ministry official, November 2011. 36 Commonly cited examples of such cases concerning delimitation of continental shelf are the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of Denmark against the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands against the Federal Republic of Germany (ICJ, 1969), and the case between Libya and Malta (ICJ, 1985). For a detailed critical analysis of these and other relevant cases, see Lymperas (2011). The “distributive” approach employed by the courts at the expense of islands’ entitlement to continental shelf have been criticized by some scholars as problematic and controversial. See, for example, Tzimitras (2012).

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have implications for maritime delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular between Cyprus and Turkey. According to Harry Tzimitras (2012): This problematic precedent, coupled with the overall stance … on achieving an equitable result as an outcome of balancing an indeterminate number of factors, raises concern regarding the possible outcome of a potential delimitation exercise in the area. For instance, on the basis of previous cases, at least the ratio between the coastlines of Turkey and Cyprus is likely to be taken into consideration as a key factor and this will probably prove disadvantageous for Cyprus [as a whole; see below].

Maritime delimitation issues: Why Turkey disputes the RoC-Egypt boundary Turkey disputes the boundary agreed between the RoC and Egypt because of its own continental shelf claims in the region extending from Cyprus in the east to the Greek island of Rhodes in the west. Specifically, as depicted in a map published by the Turkish foreign ministry, Turkey claims as part of its continental shelf the area off the southern Anatolian coast limited in the east by 32° 16’ 18” E longitude, in the west by 28 00’ 00” E longitude and in the south by the equidistance/median line between the coasts of Turkey and Egypt. Turkey’s claims here are based on the view that the capacity of an island (in this case, Cyprus) to generate maritime zones should be restricted when the island’s competition for these zones is with a continental coastal state (in this case, Turkey) and hence the equidistance/median line is not applicable.37 Accordingly, Turkey maintains that the continental shelf/EEZ of Cyprus should not extend to those areas in the west of the island where Turkey’s and the RoC’s claims overlap; and that the small Greek island of Megisti (Kastelorizo/Meis), due to its geographic proximity to Anatolia,38 should be treated as “enclaved” in the 37

In Turkey’s view, in delimiting the continental shelf and/or EEZ, the equidistance/median line needs to be altered by taking into account various geographical and non-geographical circumstances ”in order to produce an equitable result.” Such circumstances include, among others, the general configuration of the coasts, length of coastlines, presence of islands and their size and positions, navigational rights and interests, defence and security interests, and economic conditions. Turkey’s perception is that this approach to delimitation is supported by state practice and jurisprudence of international courts. See Erciyes (2012) for a presentation of the Turkish MFA’s official stance. 38 The island is 1.3 km from Turkey’s south coast, and 110 km east of the Greek island of Rhodes.

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Map 2 Turkish idea of maritime delimitation between Turkey and Egypt. [Source: Erciyes (2012).]

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Turkish continental shelf, and therefore not given any ability to generate a continental shelf/EEZ for Greece. Such a proposed limitation of the two islands’ maritime areas would allow the extension of Turkey’s continental shelf/EEZ southward towards Egypt. Then, in Turkey’s view, continental shelf/EEZ delimitation could be effected between the opposite coasts of Turkey and Egypt (which are about 280 NM apart) by an equidistant line in the east-west direction touching 32° 16’ 18” E longitude in the east and 28° 00’ 00” E longitude in the west (see Map 2). Turkey’s objection to the RoC-Egypt agreement was registered with the UN in March 2004.39 The basis of this objection was said to be “legal reasons which arise from the established principles of international law”; namely, that maritime delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean, “especially in areas falling beyond the western part of the longitude 32° 16’ 18”, also concerns Turkey’s ipso facto and ab initio legal and sovereign rights” and that, therefore, delimitation in these areas “should be effected by agreement between the related states [. . .] based on principles of equity.” Both the RoC and Greece reject Turkey’s arguments. In a note verbale to the UN40 the RoC dismissed Turkey’s claim that delimitation in the western part of the longitude 32° 16’ 18” E should be effected by agreement on the grounds that such a claim would be “tantamount to accepting that islands, and even more so a sovereign island State, in this case the Republic of Cyprus, is deprived of any maritime zones, contrary to customary international law, the Convention (Articles 56, 77 and 121), and the International Court of Justice rulings.” Greece clarified its own stance in relation to maritime delimitation in the disputed area also in a note verbale to the UN.41 This came as a reiteration 39

Information Note, dated 2 March 2004, concerning Turkey’s objection to the Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone, 17 February 2003. Law of the Sea Bulletin, 54: 127, http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/CYP .htm. 40 Statement of the position of the Government of Republic of Cyprus, dated 28 December 2004, with respect to the information note by Turkey, concerning the latter’s objection to the Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone of 17 February 2003. Law of the Sea Bulletin 57: 124-125, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulleti n57e.pdf. 41 Note verbale dated 24 February 2005, addressed to the Secretary-General concerning Turkey’s objection to the Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus

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of “its long-standing position that the delimitation of [maritime zones] . . . should take place in accordance with the pertinent rules of international law on the basis of the principle of equidistance/median line.” This position, which, according to Greece, “is confirmed by widespread, longstanding State practice” is, as explained above, exactly what Turkey disputes. Baúeren (2010) argues that the Greek position would entail drawing the continental shelf/EEZ boundary between Turkey and Greece as the median line between the nearby Greek islands of Megisti (Kastelorizo/Meis) and Rhodes on the one side, and mainland Turkey on the other. Turkey’s objection to this proposed arrangement is that Turkey’s maritime zones would be entirely cut off from those of Egypt. Instead, Greece and Egypt would have opposite coasts, their potential boundary to be determined somewhere between the line connecting the Greek coasts of Crete (Kriti/Girit), Kassos (Kasos/Kaúot), Karpathos (Karpathos/Kerpe), Rhodes (Rodos) and Megisti (Kastelorizo/Meis) and the northern shores of Egypt. Maritime boundaries drawn on the basis of the RoC/Greek view are shown in Map 3. Map 4 depicts the boundaries that are in accordance with Turkey’s position.

and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone of 17 February 2003, http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/CYP .htm.

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Map 3 Turkish continental shelf and EEZ boundaries drawn as median lines as proposed by the RoC and Greece. [Source and copyright: International Crisis Group.]

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Map 4 Potential Turkish continental shelf/EEZ in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea “according to equitable principles” as proposed by Turkey. [Source: Turkish Marine Research Foundation at http://www.tudav.org/.]

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Exploration: RoC, TRNC, and Turkey RoC In 2006 the RoC began conducting seismic surveys in a 13-block exploration area to the island’s south. It held two international tenders (in 2007 and 2012). At the end of the first tender Block 12 was licensed to US-based Noble Energy and its Israeli partners Delek Drilling and Aver Oil. The second tender resulted in licensing of Blocks 2, 3, and 9 to the Italian-South Korean consortium ENI-KOGAS; and Blocks 10 and 11 to the French energy giant TOTAL (Gürel et al., 2013: 3-5). Noble launched its first drilling operation in the Aphrodite field of Block 12 in September 2011 and announced in December 2011 that it had discovered an estimated mean of 7 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas. Based on the results of an appraisal drilling conducted in summer 2013, the company revised its estimate downwards to a mean of 5 tcf.42 However, some Greek Cypriot media outlets have since reported that the actual volume of recoverable reserves in Aphrodite is more likely 3.1 tcf.43 These volumes of gas are not massive, but are commercially significant. Given the small size of the country and its small domestic market potential, most of the gas can be exported.44 The RoC made a decision early on to construct a land-based liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant. 45 This option gives the greatest flexibility in exporting the surplus gas, as it could be sent by tanker, rather than by pipeline, to distant but lucrative markets. Also it is seen by the RoC government as the way to realize its ambition of turning the island into an “energy hub,” attracting natural gas from 42

Poly Pantelides, “Noble: Cyprus’ gas world class,” Cyprus Mail, Oct. 4, 2013, http://cyprus-mail.com/2013/10/04/noble-cyprus-gas-world-class/. 43 Apparently based on a 90 per cent probability, this estimate has not been publicly confirmed either by the Republic or Noble. Noble’s existing public announcements on the size of Aphrodite reservoir refer to a ‘gross resource range’ of 3.6 tcf with 75 per cent probability and 6 tcf with 25 per cent probability, with a mean of 5 tcf (which is different from having 50 per cent probability). See Elias Hazou, “Noble exploring floating LNG option,” Cyprus Mail, Jan. 3, 2014, http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/01/03/noble-exploring-floating-lng-option/. 44 See pp. 11-12 in Natural Gas Monetization Pathways for Cyprus: Economics of Project Development Options (interim report), MIT Energy Initiative, August 2013, http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/Cyprus_NG_Report.pdf. 45 See “East Mediterranean Gas Politics: A Third Corridor?” Natural Gas Europe, Mar. 28, 2012, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/east-mediterranean-gas-thirdcorridor; and “ǹ decision for LNG terminal has already been taken, Minister says,” Cyprus News Agency, Jun. 7 2012.

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neighbouring countries (Israel, Lebanon) for processing and shipping. 46 After the revised estimates of October 2013, it became clear the Aphrodite gas resource alone was not sufficient to make a land-based LNG terminal commercially viable.47 However, encouraged by apparent possibilities of pooling resources with Israel48 and/or of additional finds in further drillings in block 12 and other licensed blocks, until the summer of 2014 the RoC government continued to push for what it called its “strategic goal” of building an onshore LNG plant. 49 The idea started fading after August 2014 and was effectively abandoned in December 2014 when it became clear that the chances of finding the required additional volumes of gas in the near future were quite slim. Since then, and especially with the plunge in petrol prices that also affected gas prices and hence the oil and gas investment climate, there has been a shift towards the more feasible idea of exporting to regional markets, such as Egypt. On 16 February 2015, the RoC and Egypt signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on energy issues, which is expected to lead to co-operation in the development the Aphrodite gas field using Egypt’s existing LNG facilities. The MoU authorizes the “Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company and the Cyprus Hydrocarbons Company to examine technical solutions for transporting natural gas, 46 See “A Lunch Conversation with Cypriot Energy Minister Yiorgos Lakkotrypis,” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Sept. 11, 2013; http://www.gmfus.org/archives/a-lunch-conversation-with-cypriot-energyminister-yiorgos-lakkotrypis, and Karen Ayat, “Lakkotrypis: Cyprus and ENIKOGAS Sign MoU,” Natural gas Europe, Jul. 30, 2014, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/eni-kogas-cyprus-gas-mou. 47 Elias Hazou, “Experts debate the viability of a LNG plant,” Cyprus Mail, Nov. 25, 2013, http://cyprus-mail.com/2013/11/25/experts-debate-the-viability-of-a-lngplant/. 48 “Anastasiades urges Israel to export gas from Cyprus,” Kathimerini, Aug. 8, 2013, http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_08/08/2013_513269; Elias Hazou, “Minister pushes plan for joint gas exports with Israel,” Cyprus Mail, Oct. 22, 2013, http://cyprus-mail.com/2013/10/22/minister-pushes-plan-for-jointgas-exports-with-israel/. 49 Elias Hazou, “Noble exploring floating LNG option,” Cyprus Mail, Jan. 4, 2014; Karen Ayat, “Lakkotrypis: Cyprus and ENI-KOGAS Sign MoU,” Natural gas Europe, Jul. 30, 2014, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/eni-kogas-cyprus-gasmou; and “Talks with Egypt on potential natural gas sale after ENI-KOGAS drilling results,” Cyprus Mail, Aug. 21, 2014, http://cyprus-mail.com/ 2014/08/21/talks-with-egypt-on-potential-natural-gas-sale-after-eni-kogas-drillingresults/.

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through a direct marine pipeline, from the Aphrodite field to Egypt.” 50 This came on the heels of news that ENI-KOGAS’s drilling at the Onasagoras prospect in Block 9 found no exploitable gas,51 and that TOTAL might be giving up its concessions in blocks 10 and 11, after failing to find tangible evidence of sufficient reserves to warrant drilling.52

TRNC On 22 September 2011 the TRNC granted to the Turkish national petroleum company, TPAO, oil and gas exploration licences for seven blocks (identified A-G) in an offshore exploration area in the north, east and south of Cyprus.53 Blocks F and G actually partly coincide with the RoC’s exploration area in the south, specifically with blocks 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 12 and 13 (Map 5). The logic of this action is that the Turkish Cypriots have as much inherent right as the Greek Cypriots to explore in the maritime jurisdiction areas of Cyprus, based on their equal political status with the Greek Cypriots as constitutional partners of the 1960 RoC. The Turkish Cypriots claim they and the Greek Cypriots still hold this sovereign right together, as there has been no formal agreement to partition the original RoC and its maritime jurisdiction zones. Rather, the two sides have been in negotiations since 1968 to do quite the opposite, i.e., to reunite Cyprus under a bi-communal federal government. Hence the Turkish Cypriot action of granting licences to TPAO in the island’s—unpartitioned—EEZ, which is “politically equivalent” to the Greek Cypriot side’s issuing of exploration licences to international companies in the same EEZ.54 The purpose of this polemical act is to assert the Turkish Cypriot position that the two communities are equally entitled to the legacy of the original, i.e., bicommunal RoC, which had ceased to exist in 1964. The apparent implication of this, that the Greek Cypriots could in principle issue exploration licences for the blocks north of the island, is, of course, hardly reassuring for the Greek Cypriots. 50

Charlie Charalambous, “Egypt eyes Cyprus gas supply,” In-Cyprus, Feb. 16, 2015, http://in-cyprus.com/egypt-eyes-cyprus-gas-supply/. 51 George Psyllides, “‘Not enough gas’ in Onasagoras,” Cyprus Mail, Dec. 19, 2014, http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/12/19/not-enough-gas-in-bloc-9/. 52 Karen Ayat, “Cyprus and TOTAL: Break or Break-up?” Natural Gas Europe, Jan. 29, 2015, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/cyprus-and-total-break-or-break-up. 53 “Decision of the TRNC Council of Ministers” No. K(II)1195-2011, Sept. 22, 2011. 54 Interview, Kudret Özersay, former Turkish Cypriot Special Representative to the Turkish Cypriot Leader, Jul. 24, 2012.

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Map 5 The TRNC licensing blocks overlapping with some of the RoC licensing blocks. [Source: Turkish MFA. TRNC: Letters A-G; RoC: Numbers 1-13.]

Following the licensing, from 26 September to 1 November 2011 the Turkish exploration vessel Piri Reis conducted seismic research on behalf of TPAO in the TRNC block G which overlaps with the RoC’s block 12. Later, in October-December 2014, as part of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot

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reaction to the launch of drilling by ENI-KOGAS in the RoC’s block 9, TPAO’s seismic research ship and its two escorting vessels (Barbaros, M/V Deep Supporter and M/V Bravo Supporter) entered the area to conduct a survey, on behalf of the TRNC, within the latter’s blocks F and G in sections overlapping the RoC’s blocks 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 12.

Turkey Increased activity for exploration of oil and gas in the Eastern Mediterranean (especially by Israel and the RoC) has induced Turkey to become more assertive as an interested coastal state in the area. Turkey made its presence known not only by patrols and navy and air force exercises, but also by expanding its oil and gas exploration activities in what it regards as its continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean. As distinct from the licences given to it by the TRNC, TPAO has licences from the Turkish government to explore in an area off the southern coast of Turkey extending from a line east of Rhodes in the west to the Gulf of Iskenderun in the east. This area is bounded by the TRNCTurkey continental shelf border in the north of Cyprus, and in the west of Cyprus by what Turkey considers to be its continental shelf border with Egypt, which lies within the EEZ claimed by the RoC. TPAO has been conducting seismic surveys in parts of the area that are closer to the Turkish coast and hence not in dispute with Greece or the RoC.

Politics of offshore hydrocarbons As is clear from the above, and contrary to expectations by many that it would act as an incentive to resolve the Cyprus problem, the discovery of offshore hydrocarbons has so far made agreement on a solution more difficult. It has exacerbated the dispute over sovereign rights in Cyprus’ EEZ, which has been festering since 2003, and which in turn has accentuated the parties’ fundamental differences at the negotiations on the crucial and persistent question of sovereignty. To see the point more clearly, one has only to look at the parties’ positions regarding this matter.55 The Greek Cypriot administration, being internationally recognized as the RoC government, maintains that it alone has the sovereign right to explore for and exploit the natural resources in Cyprus’ EEZ. Moreover, 55 For a comprehensive discussion of the positions of all interested parties and references, see Gürel et al. (2003: 41-60).

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the RoC maintains that this right is “inalienable and non-negotiable” and is not conditional on a Cyprus solution;56 that is, it is not a bi-communal issue for discussion within the context of, or parallel to, the settlement negotiations. The Greek Cypriots accept—as does the international community—that the island’s offshore natural resources belong to both communities and that their management will be a federal competence under a settlement that reunites Cyprus. However, they say that the revenues will be shared with the Turkish Cypriots only within the framework of a united Cyprus. The international community generally supports the Greek Cypriot position, although some international actors have appeared more concerned, or emphasized more firmly than others the point that revenues must be shared with the Turkish Cypriots.57 The Turkish Cypriots, together with Turkey, dispute the Greek Cypriots’ and the international community’s perception of the present political status quo in Cyprus. They say that the Greek Cypriots alone cannot legitimately represent the RoC, as this is contrary to the 1960 Cyprus Accords and Constitution. In their view, since the 1963 breakdown of the bi-communal power-sharing structures of the Republic, no single authority, constitutionally competent to represent Cyprus as a whole (i.e. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots together) has existed on the island. On this basis, they object to all Greek Cypriot actions relating to EEZ and offshore hydrocarbons development. They regard such actions as involving the exercise of sovereign rights at the international level, which the two communities possess jointly, by virtue of their being the equal cofounders of the 1960 Republic. Thus, in their view, any unilateral Greek 56 “Statements by the Government Spokesman,” Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office, Oct. 6, 2011, http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/1a80c6a9b4d04bd3c2257921002af4d 0?OpenDocument&print. 57 For example, in his recent reports on the United Nations operation in Cyprus the UN Secretary-General noted that it is important to ensure that any new-found natural resource wealth will benefit both communities. Also, the US has taken the position that the island’s natural resources “should be equitably shared between both communities in the context of an overall settlement” but, at the same time, it believes that this issue “underscores even more the need for a comprehensive settlement that would entail sharing of [hydrocarbon] revenues.” See “New US ambassador to Cyprus vows to work for reunification,” Famagusta Gazette, 20 July 2012, http://famagusta-gazette.com/new-us-ambassador-to-cyprus-vows-towork-for-reunification-p16102-69.htm; and remarks made by U.S. Department of State. Press Conference by Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Nicosia, Cyprus (13 July 2012), http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2012/195058.htm.

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Cypriot action in this field now, i.e., before a settlement, not only ignores the legitimate rights of the Turkish Cypriots, but it also creates faits accomplis that prejudice the terms of a prospective settlement with regard to sovereignty to the disadvantage of the Turkish Cypriots. It thus constitutes a further unilateral provocation on the part of the Greek Cypriots.58 With the Greek Cypriots determined to continue exploring for hydrocarbons on their own, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey moved to restore the political balance, as they see it, and have been responding to the Greek Cypriot actions by taking “reciprocal steps of equal significance.” These actions include the signing of the TRNC-Turkey Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement; the TRNC’s awarding of licences to TPAO for seven offshore blocks, two of which overlap approximately 40 per cent of the RoC exploration area in the island’s south-east; and, with help from Turkey, conducting seismic research operations in these blocks. These “reciprocal steps” are meant as a means of putting on record Turkish Cypriots claims to their equal share with the Greek Cypriots in rights concerning maritime jurisdiction and hydrocarbon exploration, notwithstanding the lack of a negotiated settlement. Alongside these tit-for-tat exploration initiatives, the Turkish Cypriots proposed that the two sides work together in developing Cyprus’ offshore hydrocarbon resources. Their proposal of September 2012 called for obtaining the consent of both sides on international agreements and exploration licences. Those licences granted unilaterally by either side would need the signature of the other side to continue to be valid. In addition, a joint decision detailing each side’s share of the resources should be negotiated.59 The Greek Cypriots ignored the proposal, as, of course, it contradicts their stance that the current RoC’s sovereign right to explore in Cyprus’ EEZ is not a bi-communal matter. The Greek Cypriot side sees the proposal as part of Turkish-Turkish Cypriot attempts to put the unrecognized TRNC on a par with the internationally recognized RoC.60 58

Although the RoC’s EEZ covers the area, it has not divided the areas off coasts controlled by the TRNC into blocks for exploration, as if tacitly agreeing to what some TC’s have argued, that natural resources should be within the competence of the constituent states in a new united Cyprus, not the federal government. 59 “[Turkish Cypriot] Talking paper on the Hydrocarbon reserves around the island of Cyprus,” Inner City Press, Sept. 29, 2012, http://www.innercitypress.com/trnc1hydrobkm092912.pdf. 60 “Statements by the Government Spokesman,” Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office, Oct. 6, 2011),

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Meanwhile, Turkey itself has another reason for opposing the Greek Cypriot pursuit of hydrocarbons: its continental shelf claim in the Eastern Mediterranean covers almost all of the EEZ claimed by the RoC in the island’s west (see Map 4, above), and therefore partially overlaps RoC exploration blocks 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 in the southwest. Resolution of these overlapping claims is rendered impossible again by the Cyprus problem. Pending a solution, and as long as Turkey does not recognize the Greek Cypriot side as the legitimate RoC government, it is difficult to see the claimants either coming together to negotiate a compromise or resorting to an international adjudicative mechanism or tribunal.61 It should be noted that Turkey seems to be making a definite distinction between how it would react to exploration in parts of blocks 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 (which it claims to be part of its continental shelf) and to exploration in blocks which the Turkish Cypriots licensed to TPAO and which overlap with RoC (blocks 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 12, and 13; Gürel et al., 2013). In the first-mentioned area, Turkey has made it clear that it would step in to halt any activity in the overlapping areas to the southwest of the island, implying that it would, if necessary, even take military action to achieve that effect. In a statement by its foreign ministry, referring to certain maritime areas “in the west of the Island included in the so-called tender opened by GCA [Greek Cypriot Administration]” which “overlap Turkey’s continental shelf in the Mediterranean Sea,” Turkey said that it “will not allow any activity over these areas.”62 An incident which took place in November 2008 indicates what might happen: two foreign-flagged exploratory ships conducting surveys on the RoC’s behalf in the relevant areas were intercepted by a Turkish warship and “forced … to cease their operations and withdraw to within the territorial waters of the RoC.”63 It is probably not just coincidence that the RoC has not, to date, licensed blocks 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7. http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/1a80c6a9b4d04bd3c2257921002af4d 0?OpenDocument&print. 61 For a discussion on the prospects of a peaceful settlement of this maritime dispute between Turkey and the present RoC, see Constantinou (2011). 62 “No 140: Press Release Regarding the International Tender for Off-shore Hydrocarbon Exploration and Exploitation Opened by the Greek Cypriot Administration,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 18, 2012, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-140_-18-may-2012_-press-release-regarding-theinternational-tender-for-off_shore-hydrocarbon-exploration-and-exploitationopened-by-the-greek-cypriot-administration.en.mfa. 63 “Turkish Press and Other Media,” Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office, Cyprus PIO, Nov. 25, 2008, http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/2008/0811-25.tcpr.html#03.

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In the second area, Turkey seems to have settled on using its navy to monitor activities without intervening—as happened during Noble’s first drilling in Aphrodite in 2011, and again recently with ENI-KOGAS’s drillings in block 9. Turkey’s support of the policy of reciprocal steps entails continued backing of Turkish Cypriots in their “activities to protect their … rights over the [island’s offshore] natural resources” including the provision of “necessary assistance for the completion of seismic research and proceeding with drilling … within the license areas granted to … TPAO by the TRNC in the south of the Island.”64

The sovereignty question Thus the discovery of offshore hydrocarbon resources, rather than acting as an enabler for reconciliation, has so far simply exacerbated the parties’ more fundamental and long-standing disagreements and hence has complicated a solution of the Cyprus problem. It is clear from the parties’ positions and actions that the controversy over the right to offshore resources is linked to the fundamental disagreement between the two sides regarding where sovereignty lies in Cyprus at present, pending a solution; and the related question of how a new state of affairs would come into being under a political settlement. The two sides’ positions in this disagreement, which have remained constant over the years, were described in a 2003 UN report on Cyprus as follows.65 According to the Greek Cypriot view, a new state of affairs in Cyprus will be created by the writing of a new constitution for the existing, internationally recognized, and continuing RoC, which will be transformed into a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation, the Turkish Cypriot community essentially being reintegrated into that state. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, maintain that a new state of affairs in Cyprus will be established through the founding of a new state by the two preexisting sovereign states or entities (i.e., the two separate administrations that now exist on the island). These entities will devolve some of their sovereignty to the new state but will otherwise retain sovereignty in their hands. Turkey, needless to say, supports the Turkish Cypriots on this.

64

“No: 170, 14 June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Second Drilling Activity of the Greek Cypriots,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jun. 14, 2013, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-170_-14-june-2013_-press-release-regarding-thesecond-drilling-activity-of-the-greek-cypriots.en.mfa. 65 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, S/2003/398, UN Security Council, Apr. 1, 2003, paragraphs 66, 73-75.

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This big gap between the parties’ positions has been a major challenge at the negotiations for decades. The Greek Cypriots continue to insist that “the [new] state of affairs that will result must be a continuation and an evolution of the [existing] Republic of Cyprus into a federal state with … a single sovereignty,” while the Turkish Cypriots talk about a new partnership state which the two existing sovereign entities/peoples will create by ceding some of their sovereignty to it.66 The arguments and assumptions that the two sides use to defend their entrenched positions are essentially the same as those that inform their stances vis-à-vis the hydrocarbons issue. Hence the Turkish Cypriot proposal—calling for co-operation between the two sides on hydrocarbons, pending a Cyprus settlement—appears to the Greek Cypriot side as being aimed at nothing but strengthening the hand of the Turkish Cypriot side at the negotiations. It is perceived as an attempt to challenge the sovereignty of the existing RoC and to put “on an equal footing the unrecognized TRNC and the legitimate state, the RoC, which is internationally recognized.” Conversely, the Turkish Cypriots perceive the determination of the Greek Cypriots to continue in their unilateral exploration for hydrocarbons as being linked with the Greek Cypriot desire for further confirmation that the status of the present RoC as a sovereign independent state is unproblematic (as the EU, which allowed the RoC to join the Union in 2004, seems to believe). It is also linked to the Greek Cypriot position that the existing RoC should essentially be preserved under any settlement.

Conclusion I have argued that, rather than serve as an incentive for the parties to solve the Cyprus problem, the discovery of natural gas has actually acted as an “anticatalyst” in efforts for a settlement. The politics of Cyprus hydrocarbons has increased tensions, undermined mutual confidence between the parties and led to a hardening of stances. 66

See, for example, PIO RoC, “The President of the Republic Mr N. Anastasiades addresses an event at the Cypriot Community Centre, in London” (21 September 2013), http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/9c0256267bb09565c2257076004d0270/8 25b75e8d46190c0c2257bed003ac419?OpenDocument; and “Cumhurbaúkan Ero÷lu Basn Mensuplarna Resepsiyon Verdi” (President Ero÷lu Holds a Reception for Press), Haber KKTC, 27 December 2013, http://www.haberkktc.com/haber/cumhurbaskani-eroglu-basin-mensuplarinaresepsiyon-verdi-84664.html.

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Yet a settlement would significantly improve the political and economic environment for hydrocarbons development in Cyprus, making it more attractive to investors, as well as allowing Cyprus to negotiate better terms with oil and gas companies, which would mean higher revenues for all of Cyprus. Moreover, some of the better options for exporting gas currently not open to Cyprus (e.g., sending it via a pipeline to Turkey and onwards to European markets) would become possible. On the face of it, this should be an attractive proposition for all parties. Cyprus (both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots) needs cash, given the struggling economies on both sides of the island. With a Cyprus-Turkey pipeline gas revenues could start flowing well before the end of the decade. Turkey needs more gas from alternative sources, and by tapping into gas from Cyprus, it would also enhance its potential as a gas transit country. But the promised economic benefits are far outweighed by the parties’ deep-seated political differences and their strategic interests as they see them—especially given that the amount of gas so far found is not vast. Thus the prospect of Cyprus’ setting a precedent in the world “of energy trade functioning as an incentive for peace between states in conflict” (Shaffer 2014) is indeed very remote. The natural gas discovery heightened the controversy vis-à-vis exploration and ownership rights over offshore natural resources, which is perceived by the parties as yet another episode in the fundamental conflict of principle between them in the context of the Cyprus problem. The controversy has thus turned into a zero-sum game, ruling out possibilities of inter-communal or regional co-operation on hydrocarbons, and complicating efforts for a solution of the Cyprus problem.

References Baúeren, Sertaç Hami (2010) Dispute over Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction Areas Istanbul: Türk Deniz Araútrmalar Vakf Yaynlar. Bölükbaú, Deniz (2004) Turkey and Greece: the Aegean Disputes London: Cavendish Publishing. Constantinou, C. (2008) On the Cypriot States of Exception, International Political Sociology, 2:2:, pp. 145-164. Constantinou, Costas M. (2011) Escapades at sea: sovereignty, legality and machismo in the Eastern Mediterranean, openDemocracy (2011) https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/costas-mconstantinou/escapades-at-sea-sovereignty-legality-and-machismo-ineastern-med.

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Erciyes, Ça÷atay (2012) Maritime Delimitation & Offshore Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: Legal & Political Perspectives, Recent Developments Ankara: TUROGE http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ site_media/html/maritime_delimitation. pdf. Gürel, Ayla, Fiona Mullen, and Harry Tzimitras (2013) The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Centre. Hakk, M. M.(2007) The Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 18782007 London: I.B. Tauris. International Court of Justice (ICJ) (1985) Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgement, I.C.J. Reports http://www.icj-cij.org/ docket/files/68/6415.pdf. —. (2009). North Sea Continental Shelf Judgment. I.C.J. Reports http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/51/5535.pdf. International Crisis Group (ICG) (2011). Turkey and Greece: Time to Settle the Aegean Dispute Istanbul/Athens/Brussels: International Crisis Group http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/B64turkey-andgreece-time-to-settle-the-aegean-dispute.aspx. Kariotis, Theodore C. (2011) Hydrocarbons and the Law of the Sea in the Eastern Mediterranean: Implications for Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, Mediterranean Quarterly 22, no. 2: 45-56. Kyle, K. (1997) Cyprus: In Search of Peace. London: Minority Rights Group International. Lymperas, Panagiotis (2011) Continental Shelf Delimitation and International Jurisprudence: The Case of Islands. Ph.D. Istanbul Bilgi University. Markides, A. (2006) The Republic of Cyprus. in C. Kortmann, J. Fleuren, and W. Voermans, eds. Constitutional Law of 10 EU Member States: The 2004 Enlargement Deventer: Kluwer BV. Oral, Nilüfer (2009). Non-Ratification of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: An Aegean Dilemma of Environmental and Global Consequence, Publicist 1 http://bjil.typepad.com/publicist/ 2009/03/publicist01-oral.html. Özersay, K. (2005) The Excuse of State Necessity and Its Implications on the Cyprus Conflict, Perceptions: Journal of international Affairs, Winter 2004-2005. Patrick, R. (1976) Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 19631971. Department of Geography Publication Series No. 4, University of Waterloo.

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Pegg, Scott (1998) De Facto States in the International System Working Paper No.21, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, 1998 http://www.liu.xplorex.com/sites/liu/files/Publications/webwp21.pdf. Shaffer, Brenda (2014) Can New Energy Supplies Bring Peace? GMF Policy Brief (2014) http://www.gmfus.org/publications/can-newenergy-supplies-bring-peace. Tzimitras, Harry (2012) The Prospects for Exploration and Exploitation of Oil and Gas in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean: Some Observations, in H. Faustmann, A. Gürel and G. Reichberg, eds. Cyprus offshore Hydrocarbons: Regional Politics and Wealth Distribution Nicosia: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and PRIO Cyprus Centre: 29-37. Van Dyke, Jon M. (1989) The Role of Islands in Delimiting Maritime Zones: The Case of the Aegean Sea, Ocean Yearbook Online 8, no. 1 (1989): 44-69.

CHAPTER FIVE CYPRUS PROBLEM – CYPRUS HYDROCARBONS – REGIONAL CO-OPERATION: PIECES OF A KNOTTY PUZZLE MELANIE ANTONIOU INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR, CYPRUS

Introduction The conflict of vital interests amongst states is often observed in the study of regional and international relations. In some of those cases, states manage to resolve their differences in a co-operative manner, while in other cases they fail to do so, resorting instead to military force. The south-eastern Mediterranean region, which comprises Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and Cyprus, is dominated by two serious disputes: the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cyprus problem. Both of these long-standing disputes are considered1 among the most difficult and complex problems on the international political agenda. Seeking the internal and external factors that have caused these disputes to remain unresolved, we could examine, inter alia, the interests of great powers and their involvement in the region, regional actors’ antagonism to each other, mistrust, a deeply rooted historical enmity among them, zero-sum attitudes,2 and the lack of a culture of dialogue (Linklater, 2005). An attempt to find a theoretical framework to explain and understand the choices, actions, behaviours and attitudes of the actors involved in 1

Lyndon B. Johnson, “Letter to Prime Minister Inonu from President Johnson,” Cyprus-Dispute.org. 5 June 1964, http://www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/john sonletter.htm (accessed 18 September 2014); House of Commons (2013); Quandt (2005). 2 The term “zero-sum attitudes” typifies political behaviour as power politics where a win by one actor means a loss for the other.

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south-eastern Mediterranean politics would conclude that political realism3 is the dominant explanatory model. Yet any political order based on realism does not form a stable foundation for co-operative and peaceful inter-state relations. What prevails within a realist order is a vicious circle of security dilemmas in an endless pursuit of power and self-interest.4 Is there any exit from that vicious circle? Is there any possibility for the creation of a new form of political co-operation? In recent years, the region has been experiencing new developments in the energy sector. Most of the states have looked for or are in the process of looking for hydrocarbons, particularly natural gas. However, as is well known within the energy industry, natural gas, as opposed to oil, is not easily monetized. Due to its nature and the current limitations of engineering and technology, natural gas is mainly transported either via trans-border gas pipelines, or by ship after having been liquefied (LNG). Although liquefied natural gas is increasingly gaining a larger share of the international market for gas, it needs an extremely costly infrastructure for its production. Therefore, its commercialization depends on the existence of sufficient quantities 5 to enable the recovery of the initial investment costs within a reasonable time period. Given the total (proven and estimated) natural gas reserves in the south-eastern Mediterranean region, the production of liquefied natural gas could become a profitable industry if it was based on a broad inter-state co-operation in order to harness economies of scales. The existing methods of production and delivery of natural gas to international markets further complicate the whole idea of energy security. For instance, the exploitation of natural gas in the south-eastern Mediterranean region and its transport via either trans-border gas pipelines 3

Realism is a school of thought of International Relations theory, which explains political life through a cyclical view of human history due to the struggle for power and security that dominates human motivation. For instance see Morgenthau (1993) and Waltz (1979). 4 Gilpin (1981); See also Ikenberry (2001); Keohane (1986); Morgenthau (1993) and Waltz (1979). 5 The geological and technical characteristics of a gas field decide the minimum size which is needed to make it profitably exploitable. For instance, according to the Cyprus Minister of Energy, the Aphrodite gas field offshore Cyprus, which has an estimated 3.6-6 tcf of natural gas is considered profitably exploitable, though it is not adequate to render an onshore LNG plant viable. See Giorgos Lakkotrypis, “More natural gas needed to sustain Cyprus LNG terminal, says minister,” Financial Mirror, 12 June 2014, http://www.financialmirror.com/news-details .php?nid=32691 (accessed 12 June 2014).

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or as liquefied natural gas requires three preconditions: political stability of the states involved; co-operation among these states; and a common regulatory system for tackling cross-boundary issues (i.e. environmental, economic, trade, investment, legal and other rules) within a common area. At the same time, the establishment of these preconditions could help the creation of a new dynamic of political co-operation in the region. Following the discovery of hydrocarbons in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) has developed two strategic goals: first, the monetization of the gas fields as soon as possible, and second, the transformation of Cyprus into a regional energy hub (Cyprus Ministry of Energy, 2013a, 2013b). For the realization of its strategic goals, the RoC proposes, inter alia, the development of a mutually beneficial co-operative relationship with Turkey after there has been a solution of the Cyprus problem. The RoC also proposes a strategic partnership with Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries with the goal of promoting a co-operative model of production of natural gas. In doing so, the RoC capitalizes on the island’s unique position as the only EU member state in the region and the only country which has managed to construct and maintain co-operative relations with both Israel and the Arab countries. However, both of these strategic goals of the RoC are in conflict with Turkey’s vital foreign policy interests. It is clearly stated in the Strategic Plan 2010–2014 of the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources that Ankara claims for herself the position of regional energy hub as a means of pursuing a leadership role in the region (Turkey, 2009). 6 Therefore Turkey rejects the idea of the development of a strategic partnership between Cyprus, Israel and the Arab countries for the production of natural gas as she wants to preserve for herself the role of strategic hub of a network of pipelines that will transfer natural gas from Caucasian, Central Asian and Middle Eastern states to Europe. In addition, Turkey claims a bigger share of maritime areas (both continental shelf and an exclusive economic zone) in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.7 Despite using the provisions of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, to which she is not a signatory) to justify her political stance, in essence Turkey disputes almost the whole of the RoC’s EEZ. In particular, Turkey claims for herself either part or the whole of blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7, and on behalf of Turkish Cypriots the blocks 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 12 and 13 (Gürel, et al., 2013; Tsakiris, 2013). 6 7

See also Han (2011) and Turkey (2011a). See Maps 3 and 4 on pp. 75-6 in the previous chapter.

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This paper analyses how Turkey’s pursuit of her strategic goals, in conjunction with Greek and Turkish Cypriots’ lack of awareness of their real common interests 8 could put into peril the prospects for further development of the Cypriot gas fields. Moreover, they could jeopardize the potential for Cyprus to become a bridge for the construction of a new form of regional co-operation that would stretch beyond Cyprus’ immediate vicinity to include Israel and the Arab states, co-operation based on effective mechanisms and law enforcement agencies that could constrain the use of power. The loss of these prospects could compromise, inter alia, the potential for Cyprus to contribute to the European Union’s (EU) energy security. Although a complete study of this new form of regional co-operation should also include an analysis of Arab-Israeli relations, it is beyond the scope of this volume. Section I of this chapter elaborates on theoretical insights on the issue of inter-state co-operation. Section II focuses on the Cyprus problem, and considers the effects on the reunification talks of the exploration for natural gas within the Cypriot EEZ, while Section III focuses on Turkey’s foreign policy strategic goals. Section IV analyses the prospects and challenges to the development of a new form of regional cooperation emerging from Turkish foreign policy ambitions, the existence of the Cyprus problem and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots’ reluctance to

8

Steven Lukes’s theory of the three “faces” (dimensions) of power focuses on the effectiveness and types of power exercised by A over B, and analyses how power works differently in conditions of conflict and consensus. According to Lukes, governments control people through three types of power: decision-making, nondecision-making and ideological. The first face of power focuses on behaviour in decision-making, and, in particular on decisions that are shaped through political action. Therefore it concentrates on issues that create overtly observable conflicts. The second view of power focuses on behaviour in decision-making and nondecision-making on actual or potential issues in which conflict might be observed either overtly or covertly. The third face of power, ideological, is the supreme exercise of power which aims to prevent people from expressing grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they even want things opposed to their own self-interest. This third dimension of power concentrates on how control over a political agenda is obtained, and analyses both overt and covert actual and potential conflicts. Observable conflicts focus on perceived subjective interests (first and second dimensions of power), whilst latent conflicts focus on people’s real interests. The third dimension of power includes both subjective and real interests. For a thorough analysis of the three faces of power theory see Lukes (2005) and also Lukes (2007) Berenskoetter (2007) and Tilly (1991). For a different view see Gilpin (1981).

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explore and defend their real common interests. Section V concludes with a summary of the arguments and assumptions made in the paper.

I. A Theoretical Debate about Inter-state Co-operation The issue of the possibility of inter-state co-operation, which lies at the heart of an on-going debate within academia over war and peace, finds liberals and realists on different sides. Although liberalism includes some important different strands, its fundamental ideas were established fairly early. From Kant (1991 [1795]) to Doyle (1986), Keohane (1984) and Ikenberry (2001), all liberals agree on the inherent incompatibility between the spirits of commerce and war, and argue for the possibility of peaceful and co-operative relations among liberal states. According to liberals, free trade and commerce transcend state barriers and nationalism and unite people around the world as one community of interests. Building on those assumptions, contemporary liberals have regarded capitalism as a factor that enables states’ cooperation, for: capitalism creates economic interdependence that moderates the conflict between states and empowers other actors who supplement states on the world political stage (Deudney, 1995:192).

Economic interdependence alters the priorities of states by transforming them from “military states” to “trading states,” which results in the decline of the importance of military power and territorial control. Therefore, when foreign policies are conducted under the parameters of economic interdependence, two main characteristics are seen in states: (1) predominantly co-operative rather than conflictual behaviour; and (2) the change in goals from power and position to wealth and welfare – or, at least, the addition of these new goals to the more classical ones (Morse, 1991: 175).

According to Gilpin (1984), all realists share three assumptions with regard to political life: first, anarchy is the rule that results in the conflictual nature of international affairs, while order, justice and morality are the exceptions; second, the nation state is the essence of social reality; and third, the struggle for power and security dominate human motivation. That is why for all realists the nature of international relations is characterized by continuity as political changes occur within the same patterns of power relations. As Gilpin points out, neither the nuclear

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revolution nor the interdependence of national economies and the advent of global society “have qualitatively transformed the nature of international relations” (1981: 213). Kenneth Waltz, the founding father of neorealism, considers that “among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (1979: 103), in the sense that in conditions of international anarchy where each state decides by itself whether or not to use force, war is endemic: Among men as among states, anarchy, or the absence of government, is associated with the occurrence of violence (Waltz, 1979:102).

Therefore the anarchical international system is one of self-help, producing insecurity because states do not trust each other. In turn, states’ security dilemma “works against their co-operation” (Waltz, 1979:105). Hence states are concerned with relative gains—who will gain more from any co-operation: states “worry about their survival, and the worry conditions their behaviour” (Waltz, 1979:105). As a consequence, according to neorealism, inter-state co-operation is hard to maintain. Critically assessing these ideas, Cox (1992) suggests that neither realists nor liberals question established forms of power politics with the purpose of improving them. As a result, both realism and liberalism become ‘problem-solving’ theories in order to ensure the maintenance of the status quo. Taking Cox’s argument as a starting point, this paper argues that, due to their nature, ‘problem-solving’ theories lack any proposal for the formation of an alternative form of political order based on effective mechanisms of constraining power, which, in turn, would encourage inter-state co-operation. In his book Man, the State, and War, Waltz (2001) develops his ideas about the importance of a third image9 in explaining the permissive cause of war: Nevertheless one can predict that, other things being equal, a weakening of law enforcement agencies will lead to an increase in crime. From this point of view it is social structure – institutionalized restraints and institutionalized methods of altering and adjusting interests – that counts (Waltz, 2001: 231).

9 The first and second image approaches in International Relations theory ascribe the cause of war to egoistic human nature (first) and modern sovereign states (second). By contrast, the third image approach relates the permissive cause of war to the anarchical international system. That is, the third image approach is a system theory focused on a third level of analysis.

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Following Waltz’s argument, I would conclude that the introduction of law enforcement agencies in international relations could alter existing patterns of power politics and facilitate inter-state co-operation. This chapter uses two examples: that of modern-democratic intra-state legal and political order, and that of the European Union. Both of these are supported by law enforcement agencies, suggesting that the development of stable inter-state co-operation is an achievable goal. I argue by the use of both domestic and European analogies10 in order to show that stable cooperation between states is possible, providing that co-operation is institutionalized and regulated by appropriate law enforcement agencies (Antoniou, 2010). Inter-state co-operation could be constructed by the establishment of law enforcement agencies regulating aspects of international political life; as they become effective, stable co-operation could become the normal condition of inter-state socialization. That is, inter-state co-operation could be constructed and achieved by the introduction of law enforcement agencies to international political life, so that they become effective constraining mechanisms on the use of power.11

II. The Cyprus Problem via the Exploration of Natural Gas in Cypriot Waters There is not even an agreed starting point of the Cyprus problem in the post-colonial period. For Greek Cypriots, the problem started with Turkey’s invasion and occupation of the northern part of the island in 1974, while for Turkish Cypriots the Cyprus problem started with the onset of the bicommunal conflicts of 1963. Each side prefers to create its 10

Many scholars reject the method of domestic analogy, as they consider that it is an unreliable method of analysing developments at the international level due to the fundamental differences between the domestic/international spheres. For instance, Bull (1977) suggests that there exists an “ontological dualism” (see Walker, 1989: 166) between community and anarchy and, thus, the attempt to compare these two distinct spheres of politics is dangerous. However, this argument easily becomes an artificial barrier to comparative analysis. The use of domestic analogy is a helpful method of drawing out fundamental assumptions about behaviours and actions of political life. Moreover, the establishment of the EU and the knowledge we have obtained by studying the European legal order as a new form of socialization questions the existence of any “ontological dualism” between the domestic and international spheres. For a thorough analysis of the European legal order see Azoulai, 2005; Jørgensen, 1999; Mattli and Slaughter, 1998; Walker, 2005; Weiler, 1982, 1993. 11 For a thorough analysis of that argument see Antoniou (2010).

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own collective memory based on its understanding of events, although neither of the stories uncovers the root causes of the problem. In fact, even before the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 both communities had formed different visions for post-colonial Cyprus.12 The formation of different visions could be the result of the existence of conflicting interests between the two communities. It could also be the result of their unwillingness to recognize their common interests, or perhaps even a lack of awareness that they even had common interests. These alternative visions, in essence, imply a difference between perceived (subjective) and real interests, and are impacted by relationships of power. As mentioned above,13 these relationships are conceptualized as a situation where A exercises power over B and affects B in a manner contrary to B’s subjective and/or real interests, within a relationship characterized by either overt, covert, or latent conflict (Lukes, 2005). In other words, any debate about the possibility of human emancipation from domination should consider that power relations might be latent as well as overt or covert, due to people’s perceptions and preferences being shaped by ideological power. A can affect B’s real interests, and not just his subjective interests even if B is not even aware of the existence of his real interests. The Cyprus problem has been caused by a combination of internal and external factors. Focusing on the internal factors, this chapter argues that the Cyprus problem is the outcome of Greek and Turkish Cypriots’ reluctance to explore and develop their real common interests and, therefore, their inability to create a vision for a common future in Cyprus independently of external actors’ interests. In turn, these different visions and the lack of realization of the two communities’ common real interests have undermined all attempts at finding a lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, despite innumerable rounds of negotiation. The lack of a common vision was manifest in the 2004 referendums on the Annan Plan and in the rhetoric that each side developed for its acceptance or rejection. It is also clearly depicted in a UN document which reports on the negotiations from 2008 – 2012 (United Nations, 2013). Since 2004 and the RoC’s full membership of the EU, however, a new chapter has opened in Cypriot history. Following the bilateral agreements for the delimitation of her EEZ with Egypt in 2003, Lebanon in 2007 and 12

The two paradigms are the ideas of enosis (the Greek Cypriots’ demand for the unification of the island with Greece) and the Turkish Cypriots’ taksim (the division of the island through the creation of a Turkish geographical area in Cyprus and the unification of that part with Turkey). 13 See above, note 8.

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Israel in 2010, the RoC proceeded with the completion of two licensing rounds authorizing offshore exploration for hydrocarbons in her EEZ. Although natural gas reserves have not been proven yet, they are estimated to be between five and seven trillion cubic feet (tcf) in block 12, while new exploration work is expected to find more gas in block 12, and in 2, 3, 9, 10, and 11 within the next few years. This new exploration will determine the actual quantities of Cyprus’ natural gas reserves, as well as what quantities of recoverable oil there might be. The United States Geological Survey estimates the existence of 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 122 tcf of recoverable natural gas in the Levant Basin Province. In the Nile Delta Basin Province, hydrocarbon reserves estimation is 1.8 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 223 tcf of recoverable natural gas (USGS, 2010a, 2010b). Cyprus’ EEZ includes parts of both these provinces. Overall, it is estimated that there is 60 tcf of recoverable natural gas reserves in Cyprus’ EEZ (Evans-Pritchard, 2014).14 The prospect of Cypriot hydrocarbon wealth, in conjunction with the RoC’s unique regional status as a member state of the EU and a country which maintains excellent relations with both Israel and the Arab countries, have contributed to the upgrade of Cyprus’ geopolitical importance. Furthermore, a number of other developments have contributed to this upgrade of Cyprus’ geopolitical importance. For example, the Ukrainian crisis has caused a rethink of the EU’s energy security agenda and the necessity for the diversification of its natural gas suppliers to lessen its dependence on Russian natural gas. In addition, the failure of the Arab Spring and the disruption to global oil production and the threat to the USA’s multiple vital interests in the region and beyond have helped focus attention on other potential friendly gas suppliers. In turn, the upgrade of her geopolitical importance has triggered and shaped a new impetus for finding a solution of the Cyprus problem.15 A new round of talks for the solution of the Cyprus problem started on 11 February 2014, on the basis of a joint declaration agreed between the leaders of the two communities (Cyprus P.I.O., 2014a). Formally or informally, directly or indirectly, these negotiations were dominated by 14

See also “Cyprus gas reserves ‘as much as 60 trillion cubic feet”, Kathimerini, 15 Mar. 2013, http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_15/03/2013_488163 (accessed 23 May 2014). 15 It is only fair to add, though, that another internal parameter that has provided momentum in favour of a solution to the Cyprus problem is the unprecedented economic crisis that the Greek Cypriots have experienced recently and the one the Turkish Cypriots experienced few years earlier.

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energy issues, by the prospect of the production of Cypriot and regional natural gas, and by discussion of the way in which gas will be delivered to international markets. Since the resumption of the talks, it seems that both parties have stuck to their previous methods of negotiation. From the rhetoric, accusations and counter-accusations developed by the two sides, it appears that the two communities still come to the talks without having developed a common vision for the future of Cyprus. They still appear to be unaware of their real common interests (Hürriyet, 2014; Cyprus P.I.O., 2014b, 2014c; Today’s Zaman, 2014). For the negotiations to succeed, the two communities need to follow a different path this time; in particular, they need to enter the talks having first decided to try to realize their real common interests and build a common vision.

III. Turkey’s Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Problem The collapse of the Soviet Union made it possible for Turkey to reshape her foreign policy. The unilateral Turkish foreign policy agenda derived from her transatlantic strategic partnership with the USA and her membership of NATO changed to a multidimensional foreign policy with direct interests in the Caucasus region and Central Asia, the Balkans and Middle East. The new framework was first articulated by President Turgut Özal and continued by the successor Kemalist administrations during the 1990s, though Turkey’s foreign policy was further developed and refined under the later AKP administrations (Davuto÷lu, 2010a; Altunúk and Martin, 2011; Bozda÷lo÷lu, 2003, 2008; Cornell, 2012; Hale, 2013; Öniú, 2010; Turan, 2013). Since then, Turkey’s foreign policy has been enriched by theoretical underpinnings from the neo-Ottoman agenda16 and has become a coherent and sophisticated policy based on three methodological principles and five operational instruments. The three methodological principles are: firstly, a vision-oriented approach to the issues instead of crisis-oriented attitudes; secondly, a consistent and systematic framework for action around the world; and thirdly, a new diplomatic style based on discourse politics and

16

Neo-Ottomanism is a political ideology which encourages Turkey’s political engagement within the formerly Ottoman geopolitical space. Although Ahmet Davuto÷lu rejects the term "neo-Ottomanism" to describe his country's new foreign policy, according to Ahmet Sözen (2010) “there is a common belief that there is a rise of something ‘Ottoman’ and that the AKP is the main perpetrator of this trend.” (See also Davuto÷lu, 2009; Rubin, 2004.)

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the projection of soft power in the region and internationally (Davuto÷lu, 2010b, 2012). The operational tools were formulated as the following: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5)

an appropriate balance between freedom and security; zero problems with neighbours; multidimensional and multi-track policies; a new diplomatic discourse, based on firm flexibility; and, “rhythmic diplomacy”, which implies a more active involvement in international relations (Sözen, 2010).

Furthermore, under AKP’s administration, Turkish foreign policy has specified its strategic goals and priorities, focusing on several key issues: the preservation and strengthening of Turkey’s transatlantic relations with the USA and NATO; the strengthening of her relations with the European Union aiming at full membership within the Union; the development of relations with the BRICS and the G-20 as a step towards a robust global activism; the establishment of her leadership status and role in the region; and, in conjunction with the above, the development of Turkey’s status and role as a regional and global energy hub (Turkey, 2011b).17 AKP’s foreign policy goals brought a new approach to the Cyprus problem, as the Turkish government moved away from the Kemalist dogma that the Cyprus problem was solved on the ground in 1974. Rather, the new approach of the Erdo÷an administration was formulated on the idea that the status quo in Cyprus is not a solution (Moudouros, 2012; Ulusoy, 2008). Within that context, Turkey co-operated with the United Nations for the completion of the Annan Plan, and mobilized her power in order to convince Turkish Cypriots to accept it during the referendum campaign in 2004, contrary to Rauf Denktash’s rejectionist position. The Erdo÷an administration has also reiterated its firm support to the bicommunal talks for a quick solution of the Cyprus problem.18 From Turkey’s perspective, Cyprus’ location means that the island is of vital importance (Davuto÷lu, 2010a). Cyprus’ territory (land, air and sea) is of crucial importance for Turkey’s security and her development in the sectors of economy, trade and energy. In other words, Cyprus is vital 17

Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa 18 “Cyprus a model for resolving global issues says Arinc,” Cyprus Mail, 7 June 2014, http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/06/07/cyprus-a-model-for-resolving-global-issuessays-arinc/ (accessed 8 June 2014); “Cyprus negotiations should be accelerated: Davutoglu,” LGC News Online News for North Cyprus, 18 May 2014, http://www.lgcnews.com/cyprus-negotiations-accelerated-davutoglu/ (accessed 19 May 2014).

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for the strengthening of Turkey’s geopolitical advantage in the region and, consequently, in the world. However, the current status quo in Cyprus and the impossibility of its legalization within the European legal order and the provisions of the international law, has, to an important extent, become a barrier to the AKP government’s pursuit of their strategic foreign policy goals. This political inconsistency between maintaining the current status quo in Cyprus and pursuing Ankara’s new strategic foreign policy goals could explain AKP’s shift from the previous Kemalist dogma. But the framework of Turkish interests that delineate the parameters within which Ankara seeks a solution of the Cyprus problem are far away from what Greek Cypriots could accept (Christou, 2014). Also, after the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriot community, and despite the rhetoric for a quick solution that is very often voiced by Turkish officials, Turkey may well prefer to keep talks going for now, and accept a solution of the Cyprus problem at an appropriate time in exchange for her full membership in the EU. But the calculus has changed since the RoC started to explore for hydrocarbons within her EEZ, despite Turkey’s attempts to prevent it (Burgess, 2013; Greek News, 2011). In addition, the prospect of Cypriot natural gas has re-invigorated the USA’s interest in Cyprus and upgraded Nicosia to the level of strategic partner (Biden, 2014). American interests include, inter alia, the exploitation of regional natural gas and its delivery into the European and international markets: in response to the urgent European need for new suppliers and corridors for natural gas, the USA is co-operating with the EU to plan the introduction of natural gas from the eastern Mediterranean to markets in Europe. For the USA, a Europe less reliant on Russian natural gas means a less powerful Russia on the international political scene (Ramirez, 2014; Nopens, 2013; Pope, 2014). The gas discovery and the overall discussion about how to deliver southeastern Mediterranean natural gas to European markets have shaped Turkey’s strategy during the current talks on the Cyprus problem. On the one hand, Cypriot natural gas and its possible exploitation in co-operation with neighbouring countries could serve as a motive for Ankara’s pursuit of a solution of the Cyprus problem, in order to prevent Turkey being sidelined. On the other hand, Cypriot natural gas could become an additional factor that further complicates an already overly complex problem. Cypriot natural gas is, therefore, a kind of a double edged sword in the hands of the negotiators. The start of the talks found Turkey’s interests and Cyprus’ interests in conflict. Whether during the

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talks the conflicted interests of the parties involved will converge is a matter yet to be proved at the negotiation table.

IV. Prospects and Challenges for a New Form of Regional Co-operation The exploitation of natural gas reserves in the south-eastern Mediterranean region depends on the development of the three factors mentioned above: political stability; inter-state co-operation; and the establishment of an appropriate regulatory system that includes an enforcement mechanism. Although there is no agreement on a single definition of political stability, there is a common understanding that a set of rules and values are necessary to facilitate stability within a political structure. These prerequisites include the rule of law, rules of governance, appropriate distribution of wealth, control of power, the management of political change and the inability of crises to blow the system apart, as well as a culture of consensus. The existence of the same set of rules and values within a political system facilitates not only political stability, but also the cultivation and maintenance of co-operative relations, and the establishment of a wellfunctioning regulatory system. From this perspective, political stability, inter-state co-operation, and law enforcement agencies work to reinforce each other: political stability builds inter-state co-operation, while in turn inter-state co-operation builds and strengthens political stability. Also, the establishment of a regulatory system, using law enforcement agencies that could be constituted, for instance, as a subsystem of the Energy Charter (EC) and in harmony with the EU legal and regulatory standards, could become effective constraining mechanisms of power projection by regional actors and, thus, create the necessary foundation for building inter-state co-operation and political stability. Taking its framework from the European legal order, the EC was established in 1991 as an EU political initiative aiming at developing energy security for Europe on the basis of the rule of law among the states of Eurasia. However, its membership has since expanded through the admission of observers from elsewhere and it has taken on a truly international character. The subsequent reinforcement of the EC with the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and Protocol resulted in the development of the first legally-binding international regime dealing with the energy sector (Antoniou, 2010). The ECT provides the legal framework and a dispute settlement system (with powers of enforcement) on matters covered by the Treaty—investment, trade, transit, competition and environment. In particular, the ECT dispute settlement system is available

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for state-to-state arbitration in almost all matters covered by the Treaty (except for competition and environmental issues), as well as for investorstate arbitration on issues of investment. The legally-binding order of both the EU and the EC are very well known in the south-eastern Mediterranean region. For instance, Cyprus and Turkey are both members of the EC, while Palestine, Syria, and Egypt are observers. Cyprus has been a member state of the EU since 2004, while Turkey is a candidate member state. Furthermore, the EU has close and multilevel relations with the rest of the south-eastern Mediterranean countries through its neighbourhood policy. Therefore, the existence and functioning of law enforcement agencies on the international political scene as mechanisms which control power politics and facilitate inter-state co-operation are not unknown within the region. However, the potential co-existence of political stability, inter-state cooperation and law enforcement agencies in the workings of regional politics would drastically change actors’ attitudes, behaviours and actions, leading to a new form of political co-operation. The RoC has a crucial responsibility to take in establishing such a new political order in the region. As a member state of the Energy Charter, but also the only member state of the EU in the south-eastern Mediterranean region, Cyprus has adopted the European consensual culture, and obtained a better understanding of inter-state co-operative behaviour and action within a legally-binding system of governance than her neighbour countries. In addition, the RoC is the only state in the region, which has managed to create and maintain friendly and co-operative relations with both Israel and the Arab countries. As a consequence, the RoC could play a decisive role in joining up all the pieces of the South-eastern Mediterranean mosaic and pushing for a new form of political co-operation independently of the regional power politics game. However, to construct such a new form of political co-operation in the region certain steps need to be taken. Some fundamental steps towards that end could be: 1) The agreement of Israel and the Arab countries to proceed to a mutually beneficial co-operation on energy issues. Cyprus, as a neutral state friendly to both, has the potential to co-ordinate this. 2) The acquiescence of Turkey to both the provisions of UNCLOS, and the abandoning of her hegemonic attitudes in the region and in Cyprus. 3) Greek and Turkish Cypriots’ realization of their real common interests and their subsequent readiness to strike a lasting solution of the Cyprus problem.

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The existence of the Cyprus problem not only prevents the RoC from delineating her EEZ with Turkey in accordance with the provisions of the UNCLOS, and, therefore, to explore and exploit her natural resources within the whole of her territory, but also generates multiple security concerns. The Cyprus problem has become a barrier to the smooth development of Cyprus’ energy sector and to her pursuit of a role in the establishment of a new form of political order in the larger region based on political stability, inter-state co-operation and a regulatory system founded upon the rule of law. In other words, the RoC’s role cannot be fully determined as long as it does not include the Turkish Cypriots’ perspectives. In summary, the potential for the transition of the south-eastern Mediterranean region to a new era of political co-operation is there. The exploitation of its natural resources and, in particular, the monetization of its natural gas is the means which could serve that purpose. The RoC seems to have realized the multiple benefits of a co-operative scheme of production and commercialization of regional natural gas. At the same time, the RoC carries important understandings of new forms of consensual and co-operative relations. However, challenges remain: ArabIsraeli enmity shows little sign of abating; Turkish ambitions for a hegemonic role in the region continue to exist; and the Cyprus problem has so far resisted all efforts at resolution. It is a hopeful sign, though, that, at the moment, the main challenges to the potential development of a new form of political co-operation appear to be of a regional, rather than global, nature.

Conclusion For too long the eastern Mediterranean region has experienced destructive conflicts and enmity that obstructed the development of a prosperous and peaceful environment. At crucial moments, having to choose between war and peace, states in the region have chosen war. Existing thought-patterns are not on the side of co-operation. However, this part of the world is being offered another opportunity for co-operation and peace. Energy resources could help move things in that direction. In particular, natural gas could create the necessary foundation for the pursuit of co-operative relations amongst the regional actors. Inter-state co-operation is not an impossible goal, either in theory or in practice. It is a result of actors’ choices, actions, behaviours and attitudes. From the perspective of realists, inter-state co-operation cannot be a stable political condition given the nature of politics: the outcome of an

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anarchical international environment creates a security dilemma which, in turn, leads to an endless pursuit of power and self-interests. Even so, realists do not preclude inter-state co-operation a priori. For liberals, there are remedies for the anarchical international environment to be found in liberal ideas, the prevalence of which enables the development of stable inter-state co-operation. This chapter has argued that inter-state cooperation could be constructed and achieved with the introduction of law enforcement agencies in international political life. Those agencies could become effective constraining mechanisms of power, which, in turn, would produce a more civilized and consensual political life. Such agencies could take, for instance, the form of a regulatory system that functions as a subsystem of the EC and in harmony with the EU legal and regulatory framework. There are good prospects for the development of stable co-operative relations in the south-eastern Mediterranean region. The issue of energy, the exploitation of regional natural gas, is a means to this end. External conditions and powerful external actors, as well as several internal factors, favour such a prospect. However, the development of a new form of political co-operation in the region faces tremendous challenges as well. The Cyprus problem, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Turkey’s foreign policy ambitions are all significant obstacles. Whether energy can truly serve as the spearhead for the construction of a new form of political co-operation in the south-eastern Mediterranean region, whether the regional actors are ready to change their patterns of political behaviour and agree on this goal remains to be seen. The benefits are many, but ultimately it requires the actors to make a choice that they may not yet be willing to make.

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Walker, R.B.J. (1989) History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 18, no. 2: 163183. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics California: Addison-Wesley. —. (2001 [1959]) Man, the State, and War: a theoretical analysis New York: Columbia University Press. Weiler, J.H.H. (1993) Journey to an unknown destination: a retrospective and prospective of the European Court of Justice in the arena of political integration, Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 4: 417-446. Weiler, Joseph (1982) Community, member states and European integration: is the law relevant? Journal of Common Market Studies 21, no. ½: 39-56. Weiler, J.H.H. (1993) Journey to an unknown destination: a retrospective and prospective of the European Court of Justice in the arena of political integration, Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 4: 417-446. Wendt, Alexander (1992) Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics, International Organization 46, no. 2: 129-169.

CHAPTER SIX ERDOöAN’S CYPRUS: ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE TURKISH MODEL NIKOS MOUDOUROS UNIVERSITY OF CYPRUS

Introduction Debates on the Turkish model are not new, although the model’s contents do change according to historical circumstances and developments. There remains, however, one issue that has endured: the central issue of the Turkish model, which is the promotion of Turkey’s domestic transformation as an archetype for the modernization for the Middle East and the Arab-Muslim world. Thus in every historical context and regardless of its ideological-political content, the Turkish model is a dynamic concept, a concept that is mainly characterized by Turkey’s development, not just by the end result of it. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government did not conceal its intention to export Turkish modernization, such as the main aspects of the economic and political development of the country as they have evolved in recent years, to countries and regions with which it claims to have historical and cultural ties. It is clear that the AKP seeks the successful implementation of this objective in these areas via policies that confer it with legitimacy, acceptance and societal consent. Within this framework, this chapter seeks to decode the Turkish model through the dialectical relationship of coercion and consent, as it is applied in Cyprus (that is, in the Turkish Cypriot community)—a region that has been absent from discussion of the implementation of the Turkish model. The first section of this chapter argues that the concept of soft power in general, a key component of the model, should be viewed in the broader context of the objectives of a state consolidating its hegemony. Therefore, the Turkish model as articulated by the AKP can best be analysed using

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Cyprus as a case study. Its implementation should also be seen in the context of retaining Turkish hegemonic policy objectives through a multifaceted and dialectical process, a relationship between coercion and consent, as Turkey sought to export its transformation model to other countries and regions. The second section examines Cyprus and especially the Turkish Cypriot community. Although the Cyprus problem is one of the main issues that pose an obstacle to Turkish foreign policy objectives such as full EU membership, the connection between the Turkish model and Cyprus has not been adequately examined in recent years. The history of the Cyprus problem, Turkey’s presence on the island, the new context after the 2004 referenda, and changes in the dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean littoral are factors that demand an examination of the concept of the Turkish model from the Cypriot perspective. The thesis of the chapter is that the post-referendum period in Cyprus can provide a good basis for analysing the various aspects of Turkish soft power and the Turkish model. It is clear that Cyprus’ geostrategic importance to Turkey’s national security remains unchanged. It is also clear, however, that AKP’s understanding of Turkey’s national security needs in the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus is changing. This change has resulted in a focus on exporting modernization to the Turkish Cypriot community and changing the status quo that was established and developed after the 1974 war. The third part of the chapter focuses on the Turkish Cypriot economy and the community’s development, a very significant expression of this “exported modernization.” In the light of the above, I analyse the ideological basis of the modernization of the Turkish Cypriot economy based on the AKP’s model in Turkey. The Turkish government’s ideological differences from the regime that has prevailed in the Turkish Cypriot community since 1974 is emphasized. Within the context of this distinction, the chapter presents the rift caused by the implementation of the AKP model within the general framework of the Turkish Cypriot community’s peculiar form of state capitalism, which to some extent replicates Turkey’s pre-1980 economic structure. The ideological legitimacy of the modernization as proposed by the AKP, this chapter claims, is also complemented by Turkey’s business community’s interests, whose objectives in Cyprus now also differ from those of previous decades. The final part of the chapter deals with the practical implementation of the Turkish economic model to the northern part of Cyprus, through the implementation of financial protocols signed between Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. It is argued that the more rigorous implementation

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of these protocols, especially after 2004, has created conditions for further opening the Turkish Cypriot economy to Turkish capital, which is the central agent of modernization. The enhanced activity of Turkish business circles has contributed to the emergence of new phenomena such as the stronger presence of “Islamic” capital, as well as to changes regarding the functioning of the power structures within the Turkish Cypriot community.

The Turkish model as a case of hegemony On 30 September 2013 at the fourth AKP Congress, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo÷an stated that his party “showed everyone that democracy can work very well in a country with a majority Muslim population.”1 This assertion raised a central issue that concerned many at the time: could Turkey be a model of modernization for the wider Middle East and the Arab-Muslim world. The dynamics of the early stages of the “Arab Spring” encouraged major international players to put the Turkish model at the forefront of discussions. U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton and the renowned scholar Tariq Ramadan were among the notable personalities who agreed that the Turkish model was a possible way to modernize the “Arab Spring” countries (Kaufman, 2011; Ramadan, 2011). This idea was not new. The Turkish model has been the subject of a broad debate since the establishment of the modern Turkish state in 1923. From then on, this concern has preoccupied both the West and the ArabMuslim world. Initially, Turkey was perceived as a state that grew out of the Kemalist national liberation movement’s refusal to agree to the regime that was imposed by the victors of World War I. Arab nationalists took Mustafa Kemal’s movement as their model in their efforts for independence (Altunúk, 2008: 43-44). At that time, the Turkish model based its hopes for development on state capitalism, and on a distinctive “statist” definition of secularism that included full control of religion (Dede, 2011: 25). Ever since, debates about the Turkish model have had similar ideological-political content. One such example is that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey was proclaimed the “Star of Islam” (Kiriúçi, 2011: 35), while in parallel the model was re-orientated to include areas such as Central Asia and the Caucasus (Göksel, 2012: 101),

1

“Baúbakan Erdo÷an’n AK Parti 4. Ola÷an Büyük Kongresi konuúmasnn tam metni,” [The full text of Prime Minister Erdo÷an’s speech to the AKP Congress] AKP, accessed September 30, 2012, http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-ak-parti-4.-olaganbuyuk-kongresi-konusmasinin-tam-metni/31771#1.

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adopting a “free market” version of the model in the new states that emerged (Mango, 1993: 726). Despite changes in the Turkish model’s contents and objectives, a basic point remains unchanged: the central issue was and is transformation and social change in Turkey. Given its late-Ottoman Empire foundations, many contemporary scholars see Turkey’s model as following an evolutionary path (Kaddorah, 2010: 114). 2 A determining factor of the model is the dialectical relationship between the stages of the country’s economic development and the evolution of secularism and Islam. Therefore, the intensity with which the Turkish model has been debated during AKP’s administrations should not cause surprise. The success of the party in the 2002 elections allowed for the realignment of forces that transformed the AKP into the purveyor of a new version of the model that replaced military might with “soft power.” There are two main ways in which the model has developed. The first was the process of internal transformation of political Islam, from which the AKP was born. The second was the full adaptation of Islam to the democratic process and a neoliberal development framework, rather than a rigorous application of Kemalist secularism and state capitalism (Altunúk, 2008: 44). Turkey’s “soft power” in foreign policy is based on these two ideas: aiming to influence the direction of change in the Middle East and creating a state of affairs in which Turkey could play a leading role. Turkish “soft power” aims to stabilize neoliberal development, attract foreign investment, integrate the economy into the world market, restrict the political role of the army, and transform state ideology (Taúpnar, 2012; Atasoy, 2011: 88; Kaln, 2008: 35). This has led to the present state of affairs where a new balance between secularism and Islam now prevails. AKP has never concealed its hope of exporting the modernization of its own government to countries with historical and cultural ties to Turkey. On the evening of 12 June 2011 when, with 49.9 % of the vote, AKP won its third consecutive general election, Erdo÷an stressed in his victory speech that, “Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul, Beirut won as much as Izmir, Damascus won as much as Ankara, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir.” 3 However, the expectation that arose as a result of the Prime Minister’s words is far from a trouble-free implementation of the model. The “Turkish model” implies 2

Emael Y. Kaddorah, “The Turkish Model: Acceptability and Apprehension,” Insight Turkey 12 (2010): 114. 3 “Hesaplaúma de÷il, Helalleúme günüdür,” [A day of legitimization, not a day of reckoning] Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi, accessed June 12, 2011, http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/hesaplasma-degil-helallesme-gunudur/8517#1.

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a clear “enforcement” aspect, to which Arab-Muslim societies have always reacted negatively (Jung, 2005: 4-5). For this reason, the Turkish government chose to use the (non-coercive) phrase “source of inspiration and hope” to describe what it was doing (Davuto÷lu, 2012: 41). Thus the AKP aims at being at the core of modernization in Turkey’s neighbourhood, giving its policy a dynamic rather than static content, and seeks to generate acceptance, consensus and legitimacy. In this way, Turkey is turning into a country symbolizing economic and political development, restoring a sense of national dignity and combating marginalization (Kaln, 2008: 31). The AKP does not want to be perceived as an enforcer of imperialist-type oppression, but as an inspiration for imperial greatness, which also promotes universal values, like good governance, the protection of human rights and a free market economy. Only through such a policy can it regain legitimacy, which is a vital element of international relations, but one which, as Kaln (2011: 6) makes clear, is lacking today. Success in terms of gaining legitimacy and popular acceptance of its foreign policy is the result of the careful use of soft power by a strong state, so that the objectives of the state are acceptable to and can be adopted by other states voluntarily (Çavuú, 2012: 25). According to Joseph Nye (2002: 4-5), soft power can make a state “attractive” to other states or regions, and through this “attractiveness” achieve accord with its foreign policy objectives. Nye originally elaborated on the concept of soft power in his work “Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power” (Nye, 1991). One of the criteria for success of soft power is the achievement of a strong state’s objectives without the use of military force or overt imposition of its will. Nye (2004: 5) says, “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness—want to follow it [...]. This soft power—getting others to want the outcomes that you want—coopts people rather than coerces them.” Nevertheless, it should be noted that Nye does not reject the existence or use of coercion (hard power). Instead, he argues that hard and soft power coexist and complement each other. Effective leadership requires a combination of these aspects of power (Nye, 2008). Thus a strong state can acquire hegemony because it has the possibility of pursuing a relatively independent course and of influencing weaker states in its neighbourhood (Fusaro, 2010: 26). Weak states choose to imitate the powerful state, adopting its economic and social institutions, its technology and culture (Cox, 1983: 171). At the same time, however, the strength of the strong state is shown through both soft power and military

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and economic supremacy. A strong state has the ability to enforce its will overtly through war, or through the threat of war (Fusaro, 2010: 26). With these facts in mind, the relationship between Turkey and Cyprus and especially the relations between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community can be analysed. The powerful state (Turkey) is trying to affirm its hegemony over a weak country (Cyprus) and community (Turkish Cypriots) through a combination of soft and hard power. The Turkish military presence in Cyprus, its economic strength and the gradual integration of the northern areas of the island into Turkey are complex factors which, without a solution to the Cyprus problem help strengthen Turkey’s hegemonic position in the region.

The ideological basis of the AKP model in Cyprus According to Ahmet Davuto÷lu, the geostrategic importance of Cyprus is such that it “cannot be overlooked by any state that wants to have regional and global influence” (Davuto÷lu, 2001: 178-9). This language is typical of Turkey’s quest for hegemony. However, the hegemonic role sought by AKP differs substantively from that which would likely have been pursued by previous governments. According to this new perspective, Turkey’s national security concerns about Cyprus are not understood solely in military terms. The importance given to the island is no longer understood through the lens of the post-1974 status quo (Davuto÷lu, 2013: 98). Indeed, Turkey’s national security interest in the Eastern Mediterranean (and therefore Cyprus) has been broadened to integrate soft power into fields such as the economy, trade and energy (Zengin, 2010: 373-4). The AKP seeks to develop a comprehensive strategy that deviates from the 1974 status quo by converting Cyprus into an area where Turkey can show its integrationist power and a consistent “commercialization” of the region. In short, Turkey seeks to play the role of a “trading state,” 4 transmitting neoliberal values to the Eastern Mediterranean. This reconstruction of Turkey’s policies in the region has raised the need for Cyprus to change. The current status quo, created in 1974, was produced under very different conditions, and has not adapted to the needs of the new Turkish foreign policy. Attempts to restructure Cyprus and its power structures (especially those in the northern part of the island), include a large element of Turkish soft power, rather than the “hard power” exercised in 1974. This is a crucial development, since hegemony

4

For a detailed discussion on Turkey as a “trading state” see Kiriúçi (2009).

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has to be established on contemporary terms, and not on the “archaic” bases of previous decades. In the summer of 2011, Erdo÷an told Turkish Cypriot journalists, “The period of craftsmanship should also be reflected in Cyprus [....]. The performance of the government in Cyprus [i.e. the “TRNC”] will naturally be assessed by you, but there you oscillate between specific parties. You need a new party like ours [AKP].” 5 With this statement, Erdo÷an essentially sought to transform the Turkish Cypriot community into an area of “Turkish modernization” modelled on AKP’s ten-year experiment in Turkey. But for the Turkish Cypriot community to enter an “era of craftsmanship” there would need to be reform of the power structures of the community, both in terms of orientation and of content. Turkey’s involvement in the Turkish Cypriot community was no longer to be limited to unconditional financial assistance. This aid had gradually expanded, affecting all spheres of Turkish Cypriot “domestic” reality. Initially, the core of the modernization process focused almost exclusively on the economic aspect. Here, the Turkish model was based on the premise that the existing structures operating in the northern part of Cyprus were unable to meet the new requirements of opening up the market and integrating it into the Turkish (neoliberal) capitalist sphere (Evre, 2012: 61). The Turkish Cypriot political and economic structures were unable to handle the transformation from a “period of apprenticeship” to that of “craftsmanship,” which AKP says it has accomplished in Turkey. According to this understanding, Turkish Cypriot economic life was still in the “archaic” realm of a form of state capitalism, on which the community’s development had been based in the early post-1974 era. The 1974 invasion marked the release of new forces based on the establishment of a separate Turkish Cypriot territorial and political context (Copeaux and Copeaux, 2009: 74), and its gradual integration into Turkey. This change in the community’s social and political fabric was the main basis upon which institutional and economic development was built. Specifically, the establishment of the “Turkish Cypriot Federated State” in 1975 led to the adoption of laws, such as the Citizenship Law, the Public Financial Enterprises Law, the Housing, Allocation of Land, and Property of Equal Value Law, the Social Housing Law, and the Civil Service Law (Aslan, 2011), all of which emphasized the “state’s” primary role in economic and social life. The needs of the Turkish Cypriot community, as 5 “2012’ye kadar bitmezse baúmzn çaresine bakaca÷z,” [If it doesn’t end by 2012, we’ll look for our own solution] Yeni Düzen, July 19, 2011.

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well as Turkey’s security-based orientation, led to the primacy of the state in a broad realm of issues, providing employment, housing and land, developing industrial and agricultural production, and even managing the tourism sector, which was to be the main “engine of growth” for the economy (Egemen, 2006: 165-170). The planned economy extended to industrial and tourist facilities, as well as to the use of arable land abandoned by Greek Cypriots. From 1975 onwards so-called state economic enterprises were created. The “Industry, Trade and Business” company (ETI) dealt with promoting trade; the “Cyprus Turkish Industrial Enterprises Holding Ltd.” (Kbrs Türk Sanayi Holding øúletmeleri) focused on developing industrial production, and CYPRUVEX managed the export of fruit and vegetables (Billuro÷lu, 2012: 59-60). These Turkish Cypriot institutions were the main structures behind economic development (Yalçn, 2008) and were the most vital element on which the community’s political and social environment was created, with almost complete dependence on Turkey (Aslan, 2011). The largest groups within the Turkish Cypriot community’s social structure were civil servants, followed by small and medium-sized rural producers, and small shopkeepers; there was only a weak commercial middle class (Aslan, 2011). This framework was incompatible with AKP’s new “national vision.” It constituted the “period of apprenticeship”, which had to be superseded. This necessity was emphasized by Turkey’s then-Ambassador, ùakr Fakl in 2010: “The TRNC resembles the Turkey of the early 1980s [....]. The loss-making SOEs, state financial support, and the sluggish bureaucracy all unfortunately hamper the private sector. Just as Turkey has overcome these obstacles, the TRNC too has the power to overcome them.”6 The Turkey of the early 1980s was, under President Turgut Özal, transformed through neoliberal reforms. Now the political challenge was to abolish the “archaic” structures in the Turkish Cypriot community. As northern Cyprus became more prosperous, Turkish business circles did not conceal their annoyance with the continuation of a development model where the state took the lead in everything. In the period following the 2004 referendum especially, Turkish capitalists’ interests in reforms in Cyprus increased. The post-referendum period was particularly favourable for implementing a change in policy. As Davuto÷lu (2013: 144-5) explained, Turkey proceeded to exploit the “moral superiority” it had gained 6

“KKTC’de Gelecek Stratejileri Konferans baúlad,” [The conference on future strategies for the TRNC has opened] Star Kbrs, May 25, 2010, accessed May 25, 2010, http://www.starkibris.net/index.asp?haberID=59638.

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worldwide by accepting the UN peace plan. At the same time, it went on to establish a new “temporary status quo” in the Turkish Cypriot community in a way that would allow it to profit from its stance at the referendum, while also allowing for a favourable future settlement of the Cyprus problem. Within this context, the most powerful business circles in Turkey intensified their pressure to make the private sector the decisive force in developing the economy. They specifically suggested adopting the neoliberal free market model, limiting the influence of the public sector and the executive in formulating legislation, thus creating favourable conditions for increased foreign investment.7 In this manner, the abolition of the “privileges” of civil servants and other workers that had been granted soon after 1974 was presented as a “necessity” and “unavoidable” pre-condition for “medium- and long-term prosperity” (TÜSøAD-øùAD, 2009: 60). The powerful Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSøAD) created a Cyprus office to increase its influence.8 The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) worked to create structures and bodies like those in Turkey, such as the Investment Advisory Council, and proposed ways to hasten the compensation of Greek Cypriot owners of property in the Turkish-occupied areas of Cyprus.9 The Turkish Economy Bank (Türk Ekonomi Bankas – TEB) and the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEøK) developed various programmes to increase foreign investment into the northern part of Cyprus, particularly in the fields of tourism and private education (TEB KOBø Akademi 2010). The All Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association of Turkey (TÜMSøAD)10 and the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), which is associated with the Islamic Gülen movement, decided

7

TÜSøAD-øùAD, Avrupa Birli÷i kap aral÷na skúmú bir ülke: Kuzey Kbrs, [North Cyprus: a country stuck on the threshold of the European Union] (østanbul: TÜSøAD Yaynlar, 2009), 56-60. 8 “Türkiye Sermayesi hzla geliyor, kavgann bir nedeni de bu,” [Turkish capital is coming quickly: a reason for a fight] Kbrs Postas, February 7, 2011, accessed February 7, 2011, http://www.kibrispostasi.com/index.php/cat/50/news/46887. 9 “TOBB Baúkan Hsarcklo÷lu: KKTC’de ekonomik reform yapmann tam zaman,” [TOBB President Hsarcklo÷lu: It’s time for the TRNC to make economic reforms] Kbrs Postas, July 26, 2010, accessed July 26, 2010, http://www.kibrispostasi.com/print.php?news=37858. 10 “1 Temmuz’da TÜMSøAD KKTC ùubesi kurulacak,” [TÜMSøAD’s Cyprus branch will be established on 1st July] Kbrs Postas, June 13, 2012, accessed June 13, 2012, http://www.kibrispostasi.com/print.php?news=82024.

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to open offices in the occupied areas to facilitate trade.11 The Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSøAD), the principal representative of so-called Islamic capital, also established a branch with the declared objective of integrating the trade and industrial production of the northern part of the island into the world economy. Indeed, according to the head of the Cyprus branch, Okyay Sadko÷lu, this association aims at fostering and promoting “traditional culture and national values” in conjunction with economic growth.12 The practical application of these initiatives was mirrored by three-year financial protocols signed between Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots. “The main objective of the programmes implemented in the TRNC is the strengthening of the Turkish Cypriot people and increasing their prosperity.” 13 With these words, Turkey’s current “Ambassador” in the occupied areas, øbrahim Akça, described the “necessity” of implementing the protocols which, due to strong Turkish Cypriot reaction, lack legitimacy. The origin of the Turkish Cypriot reaction is found in the long history of dependency on Turkey in financial as well as in political terms. This dependency created the need for the Turkish Cypriots to underline their distinct ethno-communal existence. A characteristic example was the mass demonstrations in early 2011 which took place under the banner of “Protect our Community’s Existence.” While the financial protocols do not constitute a wholly new element in Turkey’s relations with the Turkish Cypriot community, their neoliberal character, the consistency with which the Turkish government seeks their implementation, and the magnitude of the Turkish Cypriot reaction to them, require us to take a closer look both at their content and at their social and political consequences on the Turkish Cypriot community. Owing to the rapid developments that followed immediately after the AKP came to power, concerning both the Cyprus problem and Turkey’s European ambitions, a comprehensive effort of compiling a programme to serve Turkey’s new objectives in the northern part of Cyprus was 11

“Kbrsl Türk øúadamlar Konseyi TUSKON’la iúbirli÷i yapacak,” [Cyprus Turkish Businessmen’s Association will co-operate with TUSKON] Kbrs Postas, July 6, 2012, accessed July 6, 2012, http://www.kibrispostasi.com/print.php?news=83767. 12 “Sadko÷lu: Ekonomiye Can simidi olaca÷z,” [Sadko÷lu: Economy will be a life-preserver] MÜSøAD Kbrs, January 24, 2013, accessed May 28, 2014, http://www.musiadkibris.org/2013/01/24/sadikoglu-ekonomiye-can-simidiolacagiz/. 13 “Destek sözünü yineledi,” [He reiterated his promise of support] Kbrs, October 29, 2012.

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undertaken. The result made its appearance in 2007, in the form of the first financial protocol, covering the 2007-2009 period. This was a time of major political upheaval in the Turkish Cypriot community, with the assumption of power by the left-leaning Republican Turkish Party (CTP). The protocol provided for a drastic reduction in Ankara’s financing of the Turkish Cypriot budget deficit, an increase in funding for infrastructure projects by the private sector, as well as structural changes to reduce state intervention. 14 However, Turkey’s own analysis on the progress in implementing this programme was not positive. In the next protocol, covering the period 2010-2012, there was even an increase in the Turkish Cypriot budget deficit as funds earmarked for the new approach were reallocated. There was also a lack of progress in privatization, and an unexpected enlargement of the public sector as additional staff were hired. 15 This “proved” the “necessity” of a political change to bring in people who would have more legitimacy to undertake the transformation process and decision-making.

The financial protocols as “practical agent” of neoliberalism in the Turkish Cypriot Community 2009 and 2010 formed another period of upheaval in the Turkish Cypriot community. The right-wing National Unity Party (UBP) prevailed in the 2009 parliamentary elections, and the party’s leader, Derviú Ero÷lu, assumed the leadership of the community in the presidential vote of April 2010. There was a clear shift to the right in the community, a development that came to be considered as the origin of a more consistent effort of implementing transformation during the next three-year protocol for the 2009-2012 period. On 30 June 2010, following the elections for the Turkish Cypriot leader and the municipal elections in the Turkish Cypriot community, UBP decided at a cabinet meeting to implement the measures provided in the 2010-2012 financial protocol, which had been signed on 5

14

2010-2012 Kamunun Etkinli÷inin ve Özel Sektörün Rekabet Gücünün Artrlmas Program, [Programme for Improving the Efficiency of Public and Private Sector Competitiveness, 2010-2012], 5 http://www.yhb.gov.tr/files/2012kitapcik.pdf. 15 2010-2012 Kamunun Etkinli÷inin ve Özel Sektörün Rekabet Gücünün Artrlmas Program, [Programme for Improving the Efficiency of Public and Private Sector Competitiveness, 2010-2012], 5-6, http://www.yhb.gov.tr/files/2012kitapcik.pdf.

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November 2009. 16 The time selected for its implementation was not chosen at random, since by then the political atmosphere had cleared because no more elections were due. Once again, one of the major objectives of the protocol was a drastic reduction of the illegal state’s budget deficit. The target was to shrink the budget deficit from 622 million Turkish Liras in 2009 to 450 million Turkish Liras in 2010, and then to 350 million in 2011 and 320 million by 2012. 17 Similar targets were provided in the protocol to reduce state intervention in economic issues and expand areas open to privatization. The general philosophy of the protocol stressed the need to reduce state expenses and increase revenues, accelerate privatization, reduce the number of public officials and encourage private capital investment (Münir, 2010a). A further objective was to establish an “autonomous” economy and institutions that over time would make for a “competitive presence” in the international system. However, what the Turkish government essentially achieved with these changes was the introduction of a controlled neoliberal transformation, which would gradually incorporate more parts of the economy of the northern part of Cyprus into Turkey through the injection of Turkish capital. A pertinent feature was the fact that the funds coming from Turkey did not decrease, but their use did. Specifically, there was an effort to channel more money into infrastructure projects, and to encourage private business, which would benefit Turkish capital and investors. According to a report by the Turkish embassy’s Aid Committee, which was responsible for channelling the funds, in 2001 Turkey granted North Cyprus 201 million U.S. dollars, in 2006 that sum reached 438 million dollars and by 2009 amounted to 600 million dollars.19 Another noticeable difference with the new protocol regime was in the way in which it was implemented. Ankara enforced a common single approach to the programme’s implementation, preventing any disagreement

16

“Ac reçetede neler var?” [What is the painful prescription?] Yeni Düzen, July 1, 2010. 17 “Ac reçetede neler var?” [What is the painful prescription?] Yeni Düzen, July 1, 2010. 19 “TC’den KKTC’ye 1998–2010 yllar arasnda 6 milyar 191 milyon TL,” [Between 1998 and 2010 Turkey sent 6.191 billion TL to the TRNC] Kbrs Postas, September 11, 2010, accessed September 11, 2010, http://www.kibrispostasi.com/print.php?news=39220.

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within the Turkish government. 20 All Turkish state institutions directly involved in the Cyprus problem, such as the Prime Minister’s office, the Office for Cyprus Affairs, the Foreign Ministry and the military were required to maintain the same position on economic management and development in the northern part of Cyprus (Münir, 2010b). This “single line” of managing the socio-economic structure of the Turkish Cypriot community was articulated via the Turkish embassy in Nicosia and specifically by an Aid Committee. The Aid Committee is staffed by a “shadow cabinet” of Turkish bureaucrats. This committee publishes reports tracking the protocol’s implementation, and assessments of how funds have been distributed. In 2010, the Turkish ambassador, who heads the Aid Committee, held a press conference analysing a report on the protocol’s implementation. A key recommendation of this report was yet again the need for further measures to reduce government spending and to increase the rate of privatization.22 An important result of the implementation of the 2010-2012 financial protocol was the strengthened presence of the Turkish private sector and its organizational representatives working in the “TRNC.” This came as a result of a conscious political effort on the part of the Turkish government, rather than solely as a result of neoliberalism. The Turkish Prime Minister described the characteristics of the policy context by telling Turkish Cypriot journalists: The job [of building roads] will be given to the experts. We opened the tenders to Turkish bidders because we want to create opportunities for broader participation. If they want, Cypriot businessmen can participate, there is no obstacle. But we have to think about this as well: What is the capability and quality of Cypriot contractors? If you build a road and it collapses the next day, won’t you be cursing us again?”23

The strong presence of Turkish capital, which dominates and marginalizes Turkish Cypriot businesses, is most significant in such areas

20 The most recent example of disagreements taking place in the Turkish state apparatus concerning the Cyprus problem was the Annan Plan period 2002-2004. See Bahçeli and Noel (2009) pp. 240-241. 22 “Kamu Harcamalarnda yeterli tedbir alnmad,” [Not enough measures were taken on public spending] Kbrs, November 10, 2010. 23 “2012’ye kadar bitmezse baúmzn çaresine bakaca÷z,” [If it doesn’t end until 2012 we’ll look for our own solution] Yeni Düzen, July 19, 2011.

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as infrastructure24 and tourism,25investing in privatization,26 building and running shopping malls, and strategic sectors such as water and energy.27 The negative reactions of Turkish Cypriots active in these fields were not unjustified. For example, in the area around Vokolida (Bafra), a post1990 tourism development north of Famagusta, 70% of new tourist facilities and hotels were constructed entirely by Turkish companies. 28 Something similar has been taking place in the field of education, with satellite campuses of major Turkish universities and private schools now established in the northern part of Cyprus. Istanbul Technical University, Middle East Technological University, and Çukurova University have all opened branches in the occupied part of Cyprus; and the private Association of Turkish Education (TED) has established elementary and high schools. At this point mention should be made of the appearance of so-called “Islamic” capital. One example of the recent reshaping of the political and economic landscape within the Turkish Cypriot community is the role of the Turkish construction company, “Bulut ønúaat.” In 2012 it began constructing three apartment complexes and two “Islamic-style” hotels, known as “conservative hotels,” a 500 million dollar investment (Tabak, 2010). According to Temel Bulut, chairman of the company, the purpose of these buildings is to help house Turkish students and workers who want to settle in Cyprus. To this end, Bulut gives 33% percent discounts to families with three or more children (Akter, 2011), following Prime Minister Erdogan’s policy for population growth.

24 From the 2010 Turkish budget, it seems that about 125 million Turkish Liras were allocated to infrastructure projects, of which approximately 80 million went to projects undertaken by Turkish companies. New Cyprus Party Press Release: Yeni Kbrs Partisi, “Cami Yapmna Var, E÷itim ve Sa÷l÷a Yok!” [Mosques are built, but not education and health facilities] November 30, 2010. 25 For example, the 2007-2009 financial protocol included a five-year development plan for the wider Rizokarpaso region, with investments totalling $300 million in tourist facilities and roads. New Cyprus Party Press Release: Yeni Kbrs Partisi, “Karpaz Konusu Kbrs Cumhuriyeti Meclis Alt Komitesinde tartúld,” [Topics discussed in the Republic of Cyprus Karpas Assembly Subcommittee] October 26, 2010. 26 “Bedeli 14 milyon TL,” [The cost is 14 million TL] Kbrs, December 1, 2010. 27 “Türkiye’den Kuzey Kbrs’a su projesi dört yl sonra tamamlanacak,” [Project to bring water to Northern Cyprus from Turkey will be completed in four years] Kbrs Postas, December 1, 2010, accessed December 10, 2010, http://www.kibrispostasi.com/print.php?news=42748. 28 “Çözüm için buradayz,” [We’re here for a solution] Havadis, July 10, 2010.

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The emergence of an Islamic business community in Cyprus that is able to operate freely reflects a change in certain underlying processes. Just as in Turkey, the growth of Islamic capital in Cyprus is characterized by two very important features that reinforce each other. Islamist businesses have an ideological function, resulting from their success. Temel Bulut’s comments are particularly poignant: We believed that conservative hotels would work in Cyprus. At the moment anyone can dress the way they want. There are no standards. If we do not halt this situation, Cyprus will be left in the hands of a particular section of the society. Turkish citizens with their wives and their children will not be able to go to Cyprus. As the Russians are able to go there, so should the Arabs be able to.31

The candour with which Bulut expressed himself reveals his political acumen and the competitive edge that Islamic capital has acquired in recent years. The northern part of Cyprus is now an area for TurkishIslamic capital to gain hegemony over “infidels,” the “hostile” sections of society (Akter, 2011). The second and equally important function of Islamic capital is the constant pursuit of profitability by taking advantage of more conservative consumers. The vice chairman of the Bulut group, Erman Çitim, pointed out that operating conservative hotels is a necessity because of the growing market for Arab-Muslim tourism. 33 The strict, intransigent and aggressive ideological exterior of the company chairman’s statements masks a cynical economic aspect: the expansion of the tourism market will create new sources of profitability for his company in Cyprus. Through the implementation of the provisions in the protocol, efforts to transfer to Cyprus the institutions and bodies operating in Turkey are under way, aiming at strengthening the “free market.” For example, on 5 October 2010, the Foreign Investment Advisory Council was created in the occupied area, 34 mirroring an organization that already exists in Turkey. This Council formulates policies to attract capital, intensify 31

“Bulut ønúaat, Kbrs’a alkolsüz ve kumarhanesiz otel yapacak!” [Bulut ønúaat is building an alcohol- and gambling-free hotel in Cyprus!] Emlak Yorumu, December 27, 2011, accessed December 27, 2011, http://www.emlakyorumu.com/emlak-haberleri/bulut-insaat-kibrisa-alkolsuz-vekumarhanesiz-otel-yapacak/. 33 “Kbrs’ta kalcyz,” [We’re staying in Cyprus] Star Kbrs, February 2, 2012, accessed February 2, 2012, http://www.starkibris.net/index.asp?haberID=111589. 34 “Konsey özelleútirme önerdi,” [The Council proposes privatization] Havadis, July 10, 2010.

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privatization and co-ordinate between the structures of the institutions of the illegal Turkish Cypriot regime, the Turkish state and the powerful Turkish private sector. Its membership is composed of representatives from all these sectors. 35 The Council’s first declaration, in which key policy guidelines were set as regards the restructuring of the economy and the transformation of the occupied area, also contained a number of articles regarding facilitating foreign investors (including those buying land), privatization, and the improvement of co-operation between the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot private sectors.36 The crux of the programme’s philosophy, with the general aim of challenging any reaction against the measures, is the weakening of the Turkish Cypriot trade union movement. For some years now, the trade unions have been a constant thorn in the side of AKP’s attempts at ideological and political hegemony. As a result, both the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership have formulated measures to restrict the unions. Beúir Atalay, Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility for Cyprus affairs, speaking at a business conference organized by the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, described the “TRNC” as a “trade union state” and stressed that the programme being implemented had “relief” from union activity among its main objectives.37

Conclusion The Turkish model has had different natures and content at different times. However, what remains constant is the idea that transformation within Turkey can be exported to or imposed on neighbouring countries as the best pathway to modernization. The basic units of analysis of the Turkish model are the “organic” changes in Turkish society and the ideological changes that these produce. Therefore, the Turkish model, having as a key tool the implementation of Turkish soft power in foreign policy, cannot be analysed along a single dimension. Instead, the analysis of the Turkish model should keep in view the dominance that the state is seeking to establish. All dimensions of hard and soft power need to be considered, along with the dialectical relationship that develops between them. 35

“Özelleútirme,” [Privatization] Güneú, October 6, 2010. “Özelleútirme öfkesi!” [Privatization anger!] Yeni Düzen, October 7, 2010. 37 “ønsan Haklar Kurumu Eylül’de çalúmaya baúlayacak,” [Human Rights Council will start work in September] AK Parti, July 13, 2012, accessed July 14, 2012, http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/insan-haklari-kurumu-23-eylulde-cali smaya-baslayacak/28583#1. 36

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Bearing this in mind, Cyprus, the Cyprus problem, and especially the changing relations between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community, are areas that can contribute to further analysis of the Turkish model. To date, the Cyprus case as an example of Turkish exporting of modernization during AKP’s leadership has not been adequately studied. Concern for the Turkish Cypriot community and the geographical importance of Cyprus within the broader historical context are particularly important to an analysis of the efforts to export Turkish modernization. They gain even greater importance in light of Turkey's bid to become a purveyor of a new order in the Eastern Mediterranean, characterized by strategic political and economic integration. The military presence of Turkey from 1974 onwards, the continuously strengthening economic dependence of the Turkish Cypriot community on Turkey that started before the invasion, the gradual but steady multidimensional integration of the northern part of Cyprus into Turkey, and also the significance of Ankara’s political control over the north of Cyprus are all factors that provide a compelling need to analyse the implementation of the Turkish model on the island. The change in Turkey’s perception of its national security requirements in the Eastern Mediterranean has also affected its perceptions of Cyprus’ geostrategic importance. The actual importance of the island may remain constant, but over the last decade the way in which that importance has been envisaged has changed so that it now includes Turkey’s economic, trade and energy objectives. Cyprus as a geographical space is in the process of being reassembled in order to adapt to a wider range of Ankara’s policies. This new imperative has made AKP face the need to change Turkish Cypriot structures, especially economic ones. The most significant shift within the transformation took place with the break between the current Turkish government and the regime that prevailed in the Turkish Cypriot community post-1974. For Cyprus, the Turkish model refers to a clearly neoliberal reorganization of Turkish Cypriot structures, in a way that would prevent the community remaining where Turkey was prior to 1980. The Turkish Cypriot community’s peculiar state capitalism is inconsistent with the new domestic realities in Turkey. It is therefore a target for change, by means of applying neoliberal changes oriented at opening up the market. With the non-solution of the Cyprus problem and the continued isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community, an important aspect of this change is that the opening of the Turkish Cypriot economy is in one direction only—towards Turkish capital.

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The most comprehensive and structured form that the AKP model has taken is through the implementation of the three-year financial protocols signed between Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The rigorous implementation of these protocols in the past decade has created the conditions for further opening up of the Turkish Cypriot economy to Turkish capital, which is seen as the key element of modernization. Enhanced Turkish business activity has contributed to the emergence of new phenomena, such as the greater presence of “Islamic” capital, and changes in the power structures within the Turkish Cypriot community. In the period after the 2004 referenda, the Turkish model affected the power structures and has caused political upheaval in the Turkish Cypriot community. The upheaval is mainly the result of reactions to the new economic agenda, and has at its core an enhanced expression of Turkish Cypriot community identity.

References Akter, Aysu Basri. (2011) Muhafazakâr Otel [Conservative Hotel], Yeni Düzen, December 27. Altunúk, Meliha Benli (2008) The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle East, Insight Turkey, 10: 41-54. Aslan, Hakan (2011) Neo-liberal bakún tahakkümü altnda bir yeniden yaplandrma sürecinden geçen Kbrs Türk toplumunun siyasal iktisadna dair baz tespitler [Some observations on the political economy of the Turkish Cypriot community that is undergoing a neoliberal restructuring], Gaile, July 17. http://www.yeniduzen.com/detay.asp?a=32869. Atasoy, Seymen (2011) The Turkish Example: A Model for Change in the Middle East? Middle East Policy, XVIII (2011): 86-100. Bahçeli, Tozun and Sid Noel (2009) The Rise of the AK Party and Ankara’s Changing Role, in Reunifying Cyprus. The Annan Plan and Beyond, ed. Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustman (London: I.B Tauris). Billuro÷lu, Ahmet (2012) Kripto geldi mi? KKTC’nin ilannn perde gerisi [Did the cryptograph come? The background of the TRNCs foundation], Lefkoúa: Söylem Yaynlar. Çavuú, Tuba (2012) Dú Politikada Yumuúak Güç Kavram ve Türkiye’nin Yumuúak Güç Kullanm [The concept of soft power in foreign policy and Turkey’s use of soft power], Kahramanmaraú Sütçü ømam Üniversitesi øøBF Dergisi, 2: 23-37.

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Copeaux, Claire Mauss and Etienne Copeaux (2009) Taksim! Bölünmüú Kbrs 1964-2005. [Partition! Divided Cyprus 1964-2005] Translated by Ali Berkay. østanbul: øletiúim Yaynlar. Cox, Robert (1983) Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An essay in method, Millennium Journal of International Studies, 12: 162175. Davuto÷lu, Ahmet (2001) Stratejik Derinlik. Türkiye’nin Uluslararas Konumu [Strategic Depth. The international status of Turkey], østanbul: Küre Yaynlar. —. (2012) 2012 Ylna Girerken Dú Politikamz [Our Foreign Policy entering 2012], Dúiúleri Bakanl÷’nn 2012 Mali Yl Bütçe Tasarsnn TBMM Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu’na Sunulmas Vesilesiyle Hazrlanan Kitapçk. —. (2013) Teoriden Prati÷e. Türk Dú Politikas Üzerine Konuúmalar [From theory to practice. Speeches on the Turkish foreign policy], østanbul: Küre Yaynlar. Dede, Alper Y. (2011) The Arab Uprisings: Debating the “Turkish Model” Insight Turkey, 13: 23-32. Egemen, Salih (2006) Kbrsl Türkler arasnda Siyasal Liderlik [Political Leadership among the Turkish Cypriots], Lefkoúa. Evre, Bülent (2012). KKTC: Düúük Devlet Kapasiteli Demokrasi [TRNC: Democracy of a low state capacity], Stratejik Düúünce 32: 56-61. Fusaro, Lorenzo (2010) Gramsci’s concept of hegemony at the national and international level, http://www.iippe.org/wiki/images/0/09/CONF_IPE_Fusaro.pdf. Göksel, O÷uzhan (2012) Assessing the Turkish Model as a Guide to the Emerging Democracies in the Middle East, Ortado÷u Etütleri 4: 99120. Jung, Dietrich (2005) Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political Realities, Mediterranean Politics 10: 1-17. Kaddorah, Y. Emael (2010) The Turkish Model: Acceptability and Apprehension, Insight Turkey 12: 113-129. Kaln, øbrahim (2008) Turkey and the Middle East: Ideology or GeoPolitics? Private View, Autumn: 26-35. —. (2011). Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey, Perceptions, XVI: 5-23. Kaufman, Stephen (2011) Secretary Clinton Says Turkey Can Be Model for Emerging Democracies, American News & Views A Daily Newsletter from Public Affairs, American Embassy, July 18 http://photos.state.gov/libraries/burma/895/pdf/ANV20110718.pdf.

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Kiriúçi, Kemal (2011) Turkey’s “Demonstrative Effect” and the Transformation of the Middle East Insight Turkey 13: 33-55. Mango, Andrew (1993). The Turkish Model Middle Eastern Studies, 29: 726-757. Münir, Metin (2010a) øflasn eúi÷inde bir devlet [A state on the brink of bankruptcy], Milliyet, August 17, 2010 http://ekonomi.milliyet.com.tr/kktc-iflasin-esiginde-bir-devlet/metinmunir/ekonomi/ekonomiyazardetay/18.08.2010/1277811/default.htm. —. (2010b) KKTC: Tamam m devam m? [TRNC: Dissolution or Continuation?], Milliyet, August 20, 2010. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Yazar.aspx?aType=YazarDetay&ArticleID =1278635&AuthorID=57&b=KKTC:%20Tamam%20mi%20devam% 20mi&a=Metin%20Munir&KategoriID=3. Nye, Joseph (2002). Hard and Soft Power in a Global Information Age, in Re-Ordering the World, ed. Leonard Mark, London: Foreign Policy Centre: 2-10. —. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. —. (2008). The Powers to Lead. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ramadan, Tariq (2011). Democratic Turkey is the Template for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, Huffington Post, August 2. Accessed August 3, 2013 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tariqramadan/post_1690_b_820366.html. Tabak, Seda (2010) Kbrs’n ilk muhafazakâr oteli [The first conservative hotel of Cyprus], Hürriyet, March 16. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/emlak-yasam/20138727.asp. Taúpnar, Ömer (2012) Turkey: The New Model?, Brookings Institution, May 29. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/04/24turkey-new-model-taspinar. TEB KOBø Akademi (2010) Kuzey Kbrs Türk Cumhuriyeti Gelecek Stratejisi Konferans. Sonuç Raporu [Conference of the future strategy of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus]. TÜSøAD-øùAD (2009) Avrupa Birli÷i kap aral÷na skúmú bir ülke: Kuzey Kbrs [A country pressed in the doorway of European Union: North Cyprus], TÜSøAD: østanbul. Yalçn, Mehmet (2008) KKTC’nin Yakn Tarihi, Türkiye-AB øliúkileri çerçevesinde Kbrs’n gelece÷ine bakú [A view on the near history of the TRNC and the future of Cyprus in the framework of Turkey-EU relations], øùAD-TÜSøAD: Kbrs’n Gelece÷i [The future of Cyprus], østanbul.

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Zengin, Gürkan (2010). Hoca: Türk Dú Politikasnda ‘Davuto÷lu Etkisi’ [The Teacher: The impact of Ahmet Davuto÷lu on Turkish foreign policy], østanbul: ønklâp Yaynlar.

CHAPTER SEVEN TURKEY: FROM THE “MOTHERLAND” TO THE “IMF OF NORTHERN CYPRUS?” UMUT BOZKURT1 EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN UNIVERSITY

Introduction The year 2013 placed the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in the international spotlight due to a severe economic crisis which eventually forced Cyprus to seek a bailout. The novel “bailout” and “bail-in” experiment included haircut levies on large depositors together with the closure of Laiki Bank, the second largest bank in the RoC. The “remedies” recommended by the European Union (EU)/European Central Bank/International Monetary Fund task force (the Troika) also included austerity measures such as salary cuts and pay freezes in the public sector, along with an increase in working hours, and an increase in the age at which state pensions could be claimed. The economy of the “TRNC” (“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”) began to experience a downturn from the end of 2007, before the greatest impact of the global financial crisis had begun. The economy entered a recession during 2008 when its growth rate fell to -3.4 percent, down from 15.4 percent in 2004 (Güryay, 2011). The relationship between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community which had traditionally been viewed as a nurturing “motherland–infant land” relationship, was recast. Turkey assumed the role of a disciplining external force aiming to effect a deep transformation in the economy and politics of the Turkish Cypriot 1

This chapter is a revised and shortened version of an article published in the Cyprus Review, Volume 26, Number 2, pp. 83-105. It is published here with the permission of the journal’s editors.

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community.2 In its quest to tame the cumbersome state bureaucracy in the “TRNC,” Turkey imposed economic programmes that included austerity measures, including slashing public-sector salaries and the privatization of state enterprises. This chapter discusses the recent economic restructuring of the Turkish Cypriot community. In order to conceptualize the relationship between political economy and state-formation, it draws on a broadly Marxist approach, which anchors the analysis of the state in terms of its structural association to capitalism as a system of class relations. In his critique of the capitalist state, Marx focused on the role of authority in embedding the reproduction and accumulation of capital in lived social relations. Even though it was wide open to reductionist interpretations, “the old chestnut of the executive committee of the bourgeoisie” actually summed this up rather well (Radice, 2008: 1161). This does not, however, mean that states will unswervingly serve the interests of the dominant classes. In all class societies, conflicting interests continuously struggle to influence the state to gain the upper hand, and state decisions that are taken at any particular moment in history reflect a particular solution to conflicting class interests and the interests of other internal and external actors at that particular juncture. Adopting this perspective provides room to move beyond political analyses that are based on the assumption of a single common interest of the Turkish Cypriot community. In addition, it may facilitate the deconstruction of unitary actors in order to reveal the domestic origins of the big policy shifts of the recent past. Moreover, it provides a valuable contribution towards understanding the current political context in northern Cyprus. Perhaps most importantly, this perspective allows us to move beyond the state conceptualization of liberalism that becomes the embodiment of the general interest of society and the neutral arbiter of all particularistic claims. Radice (2008: 1157) notes that “the ideology of liberalism promoted a reconstitution of the state as a public realm separate from the private realm of civil society,” and that “explicit class relations are banished from the public sphere, as all citizens are recognized for political purposes to be formally equal individuals.” According to Radice, neoliberalism should be perceived as a new formulation of liberal theory from the 1990s which aims to deflect “the citizen from class identification in favour of a contractual relationship with the state, with an emphasis on concepts such as governance and civil society” (Radice, 2008: 1157). 2

This tendency was made evident in an interview given to the Turkish Edition of Fortune magazine by Halil øbrahim Akça, Turkey’s Ambassador to the “TRNC,” who, during his dialogue, defined Turkey as “the IMF of northern Cyprus” (Akça, 2011).

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In this chapter, following Radice, “neoliberalism is defined as an ideology that is regarded as a modern variant of classical economic liberalism, that aims to restrict the scope of action of the state and promote the self-regulating capacity of the market” (Radice, 2008: 1155). Talking about neoliberalism in the “TRNC” might seem contradictory due to its international isolation, which prevents its integration with the global economy. Notwithstanding the peculiar position of the “TRNC” as a result of this isolation, there seems to be “no Urtext of neoliberalism” and “this poses problems for contrasting Neoliberalism with actually existing neoliberalisms” (Jessop, 2013: 67). Jessop (2013: 66) points out that the USA is far from the originary or “pure” form of neoliberalism or, again, the singular basis for constructing an ideal type with which other “actually existing” cases can be compared in terms of their difference, deviation or derogation therefrom.

Perhaps for these reasons, it can be argued that neoliberalism should be understood as a diverse pattern of (always incomplete) neoliberalization rather than assuming that neoliberalism has an unchanging, context-free essence. Without a foundational document or “pure” exemplar against which to measure deviations in actual cases, one must study local lived realities in which people and states work out their own theories, critiques and discourses about the worlds they inhabit and how it should be organized (Jessop, 2008: 67).

Within this framework, the recent restructuring of the “TRNC” economy is best seen as an “incomplete neoliberalism.” This incomplete neoliberalism means that the 2007 crisis in northern Cyprus should be viewed as an instance of a specificity that is simultaneously reflective of a broader regional and global reality; yet such an assessment should be coupled with an analysis that properly grasps the specificity of the situation in the “TRNC” due to its dependence on Turkey. Locating economic strategies implemented in the northern part of the island in a global context is significant, as Cyprus is too often taken as a sui generis case, which makes it impossible to compare it to anything else. Such an approach enables us to grasp marked similarities between the socalled “remedies” employed in the two halves of the island. Whether it is imposed by the Troika or Turkey, the neoliberal logic behind the economic policies is hard to miss. In the RoC, a banking crisis has developed into a public deficit crisis. In the “TRNC,” even though the economy has various

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structural problems resulting from its non-recognition (such as a trade embargo, lack of direct flights undermining its tourism potential, plus a tiny domestic market constrained by limited export opportunities), the government is implementing policies which aggressively aim to roll back the state. Lapavitsas et al. (2010: 326), call attention to how austerity measures coupled with structural reforms, including further labour market flexibility, tougher pension conditions, privatization of the remaining public enterprises and of education, turned out to be key policy options for dealing with the crisis. Austerity measures and structural reforms are preferred by the ruling elites across both peripheral and core countries, since they shift the burden of adjustment onto working people. As similar economic policies are in force in the north and the south of Cyprus, it is possible to analyse the somewhat peculiar situation in northern Cyprus in the broader context of neoliberal reactions to the global crisis. The crisis in the RoC and the one in the “TRNC” cannot be analysed independently from the crisis of the Eurozone and the crisis of Turkey respectively. In the case of the RoC, the crisis unfolded in an EU where the banking crisis was moving to the periphery, and was further complicated by the fact that the RoC, as a member of the Eurozone did not have the option of devaluing its currency (Özdemir, 2013). Conversely, economic crises in northern Cyprus cannot be explained without taking account of the “TRNC’s” economic integration with Turkey. Financial assistance from Turkey has become the major source of Turkish Cypriot revenue since the 1950s and increased even more after the founding of the “TRNC” in 1983.3 Furthermore, the “TRNC” uses Turkish Lira (TL) as its currency and this makes the use of monetary policy tools impossible; and any changes in the value of the TL directly affect its economy (Güryay 2011: 67). This relationship of dependence between Turkey and the “TRNC” also explains why the economic policies implemented in the north of the island since 1974 closely track policies implemented in Turkey. Economic policies put into effect on the island, therefore, should be viewed against the backdrop of the neoliberal restructuring that was underway in Turkey from the 1980s onwards. This chapter analyses the economic policies imposed in the north after 1974 by establishing links with the prevailing ideological context in Turkey. But its main focus centres on the post-2002 period where the Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi (AKP—Justice and 3

Overall, in the 1974–2004 period, Turkey provided $3.07 billion of financial assistance to northern Cyprus. The Turkish government also invested in numerous infrastructure projects, such as building schools and hospitals, roads, irrigation networks and telecommunication facilities (Source: Bozkurt 2013b).

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Development Party) government under Recep Tayyip Erdo÷an has been a proponent of “neoliberalism with a human face.” This means that despite Erdo÷an’s people-friendly rhetoric, a neoliberal agenda defined the party’s economic policies, with the government placing priority on fiscal responsibility via budgetary austerity (Bozkurt, 2013a: 373). The AKP’s economic policies do not represent a rupture, but rather continuity with those of its predecessors. The coalition government that immediately preceded the AKP implemented an IMF-backed economic programme in 2001. The strategy was based on tight fiscal and monetary policies with the intention of contracting internal demand through a restriction on wage increases (Aydn, 2005: 127). The AKP government essentially continued implementing this programme. However, the AKP, in virtue of having a Parliamentary majority after a decade of weak coalition governments, was able to deepen the neoliberal transformation in Turkey. AKP’s neoliberalism promoted a gradual marketization of public services together with privatization ventures, the “flexibilization” of labour and so-called “urban transformation” projects, where “the demolition of public places, green areas, and historical sites, as well as the displacement of poor populations [took place], in order to rebuild the city [Istanbul] in the image of capital” (Tu÷al, 2013). The gradual empowerment of the AKP paved the way for a more thorough attempt at neoliberal restructuring in the northern part of Cyprus (Moudouros, 2013: 1). Especially after the failure of the Annan Plan in 2004, the AKP government’s rule in north Cyprus drew less on the consent of the Turkish Cypriots and more on domination. The days when Turkey’s intervention in 1974 was greeted with jubilation and relief by the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots are long gone, and today an increasing number of Turkish Cypriots are frustrated and antagonized by Turkey’s authoritarian attitude towards the “TRNC.” Turkey was metamorphosing into “the IMF of northern Cyprus.” Even though Turkey’s austerity measures caused serious discontent within the Turkish Cypriot community, it is problematic to view such policies as only top-down impositions: doing so would deny the agency of the local dynamics in the north. In fact, a significant section within the Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie joined forces with the Turkish bourgeoisie to engage in the neoliberal modernization of the economy. The philosophy behind this was to abolish economic isolation and, therefore, bring a smoother integration of the “TRNC” into the global economy.

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The Political Economy of the Turkish Cypriot Community in the Post-1974 Period Turkish Cypriot financial dependency on Turkey was established in the 1950s when Turkey began to provide financial aid to the community. This dependency relationship became deeper following the breakdown of the bi-communal RoC in 1963. It was in this period that Turkish Cypriots retreated to Turkish Cypriot enclaves following Greek Cypriot paramilitary attacks, and formed a separate administrative system, known as the “Transitional Cyprus Turkish Administration” from 1967 onwards (Navaro-Yaún, 2006: 286). Threats from the nationalist Türk Mukamevet Teúkilat (Turkish Resistance Organization–TMT) and Greek Cypriot employers deterred many Turkish Cypriots from working outside of the enclaves (Navaro-Yaún, 2006: 286-7). During this period the Turkish government paid the salaries of all Turkish Cypriot officials and members of the armed forces, and was providing welfare relief to approximately half of the Turkish Cypriot community by 1967 (Patrick, 1976: 107). Turkey played a pre-eminent role in shaping the post-1974 political economy of the Turkish Cypriot community. Following Turkey’s military operation in 1974 and the division of the island, the Transitional Cyprus Turkish Administration proclaimed itself the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in February 1975. During the period 1960-1980 Turkey was implementing a model of import substitution industrialization (ISI), where technology, capital goods and inputs were imported to build industries that could produce goods that would otherwise have been imported (Gülalp, 1985: 337). State economic enterprises played a double role in boosting the local industry. On the one hand they provided industry with low-cost inputs, and on the other, provided inexpensive consumer goods for wage earners thereby contributing to the profits of industry by keeping labour costs and the price of inputs low (Tüzün, 1986: 51; Keyder, 2003: 228). This model of planned industrialization in Turkey had an impact on the model implemented in northern Cyprus in the post-1974 era, which was defined by heavy state intervention. State-run farms, hotels, banks and factories were established (Hatay, 2005: 25). The remarkable aspects of this period were the mechanisms employed by the state to gain support and legitimize itself. In the mid-1970s it was the allocation of property of Greek Cypriots (who had moved to the south in 1974), and later the distribution of posts in the bureaucracy, state-owned enterprises and other quasi-state institutions that served as a means to cultivate legitimacy (Isachenko, 2009:70).

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In November 1983, Rauf Denktash proclaimed the “TRNC,” which was branded an “invalid” state by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 541 (Constantinou and Papadakis, 2001: 128). The post-1986 era represents a new phase in the political economy of the Turkish Cypriot community. This period is characterized by neoliberal reforms and the privatization of state economic enterprises. The shift from heavy state involvement in economic policy-making to neoliberal economic policies can be understood only by reflecting on the ideological atmosphere that prevailed in the early 1980s in Turkey. The Turkish economy had experienced a severe economic crisis in the 1970s. The crisis was related to the internal contradictions of the ISI policy in force and, specifically, resulted from Turkey’s continued dependence on the west for the import of capital goods, raw materials and intermediate goods (Tüzün, 1986: 46; Keyder, 2003: 208; Gülalp, 1993: 36). The Turkish government implemented a stabilization package on 24 January 1980 that was followed by the military coup of 12 September 1980. The 24 January decisions were designed to transform Turkey’s economy from a model based on import-substitution to one based on export-led growth (Aren, 1986: 25). The programme aimed to achieve an export oriented trade model by curbing the growth of domestic demand through a combination of contractionary fiscal and monetary policies in order to generate excess productive capacity to meet external demand (Nas, 1992: 11). Yet implementing such policies was a real challenge for the Turkey of the late 1970s defined by labour union mobilization. As a result, the military coup of 1980 reorganized the country’s political structure completely to enable the implementation of the new economic policy. The legacy of the coup was a simultaneous process of political authoritarianism and economic liberalism. The architects of the coup carried out a massive political restructuring: they dissolved all political parties, banned trade unions, carried out a large-scale purge in the civil service and expanded the role of the military in politics. The coup aimed to facilitate the structural adjustment process by creating an environment in which there was little room for opposition. While all associations were banned and labour was directly excluded from the decision-making process, the military regime asked the Türk Sanayicileri ve øúadamlar Derne÷i (TÜSøAD—Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) to make it known abroad that it would support the structural adjustment programme (Yalman, 1997: 219-220). Features of this ideological shift in economic policy-making soon became visible in northern Cyprus. The early and mid-1990s were

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characterized by the privatization of state economic enterprises. As Hatay (2008: 155) says: This decade was a period of neoliberal privatization in north Cyprus making it attractive for owners of small business enterprises, as well as highly skilled professionals, such as financial experts hired in local or offshore banks, lecturers at the universities, and businessmen who had made investments on the island. Several new hotels were built or older Greek-Cypriot ones, previously run by the government, were privatized. Together with growth in the hospitality industry, hotels began to open casinos which catered mainly to Turkish tourists. In addition, by the middle of the 1990s, changes in property laws resulted in a boom in the real estate sales and construction sector. The same period also saw the establishment of private universities in Nicosia, Kyrenia and Famagusta which attracted an increasingly large population of students from Turkey and other countries. (Hatay, 2008: 155).

A major factor that contributed to the post-1980 boom in the north was the investments of the Turkish Cypriot businessman Asil Nadir. Nadir became a household name for his transformation of a small textiles company in London’s East End into Polly Peck International (PPI), a multinational conglomerate that included investments in electronics, leisure and the Del Monte fruit group. In 1982 Nadir set up three companies in northern Cyprus: Uni-Pac Packaging Industries Ltd., Sunzest Trading Ltd. (the citrus fruit business), and Voyager Kbrs Ltd., which was responsible for running three hotels—Jasmine Court, Palm Beach and Crystal Cove (Counsell and Hope, 1993). In 1990, the British Serious Fraud Office claimed that it had evidence that Nadir had stolen millions of pounds from PPI that belonged to its shareholders. PPI collapsed in October 1990. Then, in 1993, as Nadir’s trial approached, he fled Britain for northern Cyprus. He returned seventeen years later, in 2010, saying that he wanted to clear his name. He was found guilty of ten thefts from Polly Peck totalling £29m (Casciani, 2012). Tahsin notes that Asil Nadir’s investments had a buoyant effect on the economic performance of the “TRNC” until his bankruptcy (Tahsin, 2013: 8). By the 1990s, questions arose as to whether the economic model established after 1974 would be sustainable any longer. In the mid-1990s the political conflict over the distributive capacities of the “TRNC” reached a climax (Akçal, 2011: 1733). The demise of Polly Peck also struck a major blow to the “TRNC’s” economy. In July 1994, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that health certificates issued by the “TRNC” authorities were not acceptable substitutes for the legally recognized RoC government’s documents. This meant that the “TRNC”

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citrus fruit and potato exports to the UK markets would no longer receive preferential trade treatment accorded to Cypriot exports. To make matters worse, the British authorities interpreted this decision to cover all the exports from north Cyprus (Katrco÷lu, 2006: 338). In consequence, “the economy of the ‘TRNC’ has become progressively less … integrated with international markets and more and more reliant on Turkey” (Besim and Mullen, 2009: 88). As Akçal stresses, “This ruling, still in effect, has become the severest economic embargo launched against the ‘TRNC’ and the Turkish-Cypriot community since 1974” (Akçal, 2011: 1733). In December 1999, the “TRNC” economy suffered a huge financial crisis triggered by the banking sector. The EU embargo and the dependence of northern Cyprus’ economy on Turkey (itself hit by an economic crisis in August 1999—Sabah, 2011) were the precipitating causes. The banking crisis that occurred in December 1999 in the north initially affected around 30,000 depositors. The crisis worsened by early 2000 and six banks were placed under government control. Four of these were closed by a decision of the Council of Ministers. The government sought financial aid from Ankara, but Turkey was not willing to provide unconditional support. Instead, she made aid conditional on an economic austerity package, which met widespread resistance from the opposition parties, trade unions, and the business community (Sonan, 2007: 12-13). Because of this resistance, the government was unable to implement the measures Turkey demanded, which led to a shortfall of funds. Delays in the payment of salaries in the public sector plus the suspension of payment of compensation to victims of the banking crisis contributed to increasing discontent within the Turkish Cypriot community (Sonan, 2007: 14). Essentially, the economic crisis meant that the Turkish Cypriot government could not contain the grievances through the traditional instruments of patronage and clientelism (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). This inability brought forth a significant change in attitude towards the settlement of the Cyprus problem and the EU. In an environment where the economic crisis curbed the distributive capacity of the state and generated social unrest, the United Nations’ reunification plan, with the prospect of immediate membership in the European Union was a promising new alternative to replace the old politico-economic clientistic and patronage-based structures (Sonan, 2007: 15). The collapse of the Annan Plan became a turning point for different reasons. In the aftermath of the plan’s failure, Turkey adopted a more intransigent position towards a settlement in Cyprus, and Turkey’s relationship soured with significant sections of the Turkish Cypriot community as well. The alliance—between the AKP and the Turkish

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Cypriot opposition forces—for the sake of bringing a political settlement to the Cyprus conflict in the early 2000s came to an end soon afterwards as Ankara started to impose stringent austerity measures. The post-Annan period demonstrated how Erdo÷an and his government increasingly relied on “dominance without hegemony” (Trimikliniotis and Bozkurt, 2012: 7) in its interactions with the “TRNC.” The approach was heavy-handed, and did not prioritize reaching an accord with the Turkish Cypriot community. This essentially meant that the relationship between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community, traditionally defined as a “motherland–infant land” affiliation, underwent a significant change as Turkey increasingly assumed the role of an IMFstyle disciplining external force which eventually led to rising social and political disgruntlement amongst the Turkish Cypriots. It is possible to observe that Cypriotness as a discourse articulated by the Turkish Cypriot political opposition, understood as self-determination in opposition to domination by Turkey, gained saliency at this time.

AKP and Deepening Neoliberalism in Turkey The AKP came to power in the 2002 election, in the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis. In subsequent elections, the party progressively increased its vote and won a landslide victory in the 2011 general election. The 2001 crisis had negative repercussions on all sections of Turkish society, rich and poor, educated and non-educated, urban and rural. Centre-left parties were penalized for failing to protect the interests of the poor and the underprivileged whereas centre-right parties suffered from their association with widespread corruption (Öniú, 2006). During the election campaign of 2002, Erdo÷an raised popular expectations that his party would immediately tackle problems of growing poverty, unequal income distribution and social inequality; yet the AKP operated within the neoliberal framework established by its predecessors. “Neoliberalism with a human face,” seems to have been mere rhetoric, as the neoliberal agenda remains intact, with the government placing priority on fiscal responsibility via budgetary austerity. In its long rule, AKP engaged in a gradual marketization of public services, privatization, and the “flexibilization” of labour markets. The New Social Insurance and Universal Health Insurance Act that was passed in parliament in 2008 raised the age of retirement, lengthening the contribution period towards pensions, and also reduced retirement pensions and disability and survivor benefits (Coúar and Ye÷eno÷lu, 2009: 43). AKP reduced the cost of welfare policies as a public obligation by

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subcontracting out its welfare provision duties to the private sector (Eder, 2010: 181). Charity groups and philanthropic associations began taking over some state functions. The neoliberal ideology of the party also became clearly visible in the so-called “urban transformation” projects it pioneered: public places and green areas are appropriated, historical buildings demolished and lowincome populations displaced. As Tu÷al (2013) puts it, “All these unwanted spaces (and people) are being replaced by malls, skyscrapers, office spaces, and glossy remakes of historical buildings.” This process can be defined as an explicit manifestation of “the urbanization of capital” in the words of David Harvey. Harvey (2012) emphasizes the way in which the reproduction of capital passes through processes of urbanization in myriads of ways. [T]he urbanization of capital presupposes the capacity of capitalist class powers to dominate the urban process. The city and the urban process that produces it are therefore major sites of political, social, and class struggles (65).

The neoliberalism of AKP also explains why it has managed to gain more votes in comparison to its Islamist predecessors. The party is born out of the Milli Görüú (National Outlook) tradition that represents political Islam from the 1970s onwards. In the main, the predecessors of the AKP gave voice to the losers of the economic policies implemented at the time. For example, the Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party—NSP) represented the interests of the small-scale commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in the 1970s (Toprak, 2005: 180). But the AKP went beyond appealing to the traditional support base of its predecessors to reach out to the second generation bourgeoisie, which has flourished under conditions of globalization. The first generation bourgeoisie (the “østanbul bourgeoisie”) became prominent in the 1960s and ‘70s; the second generation (the “Anatolian bourgeoisie”) grew in Anatolian cities in the 1980s. Today, this second generation bourgeoisie includes both small and medium-scale employers. Also, from the 1990s onwards the amount of Islamic capital has grown, taking advantage of the export orientation of the economy to found holding companies that have reached the size and economic power of many units of “core” capital (Haldun, 2001: 444). It was the rise of the second generation bourgeoisie that caused AKP’s split from its predecessor Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP). RP’s highlighting social justice, redistribution and heavy state intervention alienated the emerging devout second generation bourgeoisie, who became supportive of free market principles (Gümüúçü and Sert, 2010: 963).

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The economic policies formulated by the AKP since 2002 aimed to reward both the first generation and the second generation bourgeoisie (Ercan and O÷uz, 2006). On the other hand, the impact of these economic policies on the working class, unemployed and vulnerable sectors such as housewives and the elderly have hardly been positive. Even though AKP managed to achieve economic growth, this growth—which relied on shortterm capital inflows—neither reduced unemployment nor led to an increase in real wages. Instead, inequality increased, so that Turkey is now in the category of OECD member countries with the highest level of income inequality (Üstünda÷, 2008).

Turkey as the IMF of Northern Cyprus The failure of the Annan Plan was a turning point in AKP’s position on Cyprus. Many people in the north, particularly in left-wing circles, had invested a great deal of hope in the party, especially during its first term in power. Indeed, in the early 2000s Erdogan was in favour of challenging traditional Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus in order to facilitate his country’s entry into the EU. He thus gave support both to the political opposition in the “TRNC” and to Kofi Annan’s comprehensive peace plan for the resolution of the Cyprus issue, which was published soon after AKP’s electoral victory. But the Greek Cypriot rejection of the proposal inaugurated a new phase: Turkey exhibited less and less willingness to bring about a federal solution and had ceased to be supportive of confidence-building measures or initiatives aiming to increase the dialogue between the two communities (Özsa÷lam, 2011). The end of the decade saw an increasing mobilization by the Turkish Cypriots as the economic crisis precipitated social and political discontent amongst trade unions and civil society organizations. This gloominess manifested itself in three massive rallies held in January, March, and April 2011; a series of strike actions commenced, which continued throughout 2012 and 2013. Turkish Cypriot discontent was plural in form and content. The protests, led largely by the public-sector trade unions, were connected to the political parties of the Left. This is hardly surprising, as the austerity package hit hard at the Turkish Cypriot middle classes and labour aristocracy. Recent research indicates that the role of these groups is gradually being eroded: Turkish Cypriot public-sector workers are conscious of the pressure of the threat of unemployment or curtailment of their rights in an economy where insecure working conditions (precariatization) is becoming the norm for labour within both the public and private sectors. So far the opposition to Turkey’s influence has

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reflected a combination of economic and communal-cultural concerns. An emphasis on Cypriot identity can also be observed among the protestors. Disillusionment is gradually drawing support from all walks of life, including some political groups on the traditional pro-Ankara Right of the ideological spectrum (Trimikliniotis and Bozkurt, 2012: 7). To reiterate, Turkey’s intervention in the economy of northern Cyprus is nothing new. Since 1986, Turkish governments have been engaged in transforming the economy of the “TRNC” in line with their ideological orientation via economic protocols signed between Turkey and the “TRNC.” Yet the AKP tried monitoring the economic system closely, and, especially after 2006, imposed an-IMF type conditionality principle on loans and financial aid (Arslan, 2011). Although this section focuses on the post-2004 economic restructuring, it is important to provide some background to Turkey’s recent interventions in the economy of northern Cyprus. To this end, this section briefly summarizes the content of the economic protocols signed between Turkey and the “TRNC” from 1986 onwards. In line with Turkey’s neoliberal turn after the 1980 coup, certain reforms to effect a similar transformation in the economy of northern Cyprus were already under way. For example, the Turkey–“TRNC” Economic Co-operation Protocol signed on 5 December 1986 aimed to transform the economy into a free market economy. A glaring consequence of this process was the undermining of local industry. Instead of nurturing what remained, the 1986 protocol led to the legalization of offshore banks, and priority was given to other sectors: foreign trade promotion, and to education, banking and tourism. The 1992 protocol that the “TRNC” signed with Turkey included steps toward a customs union between Turkey and the “TRNC” via the elimination of excises and other tariffs (1992 TC–“TRNC” Economic Protocol). The Economic Co-operation Protocol signed in 1997 between Turkey and the “TRNC” essentially targeted privatization. The private sector would be strengthened by the creation of special departments under the supervision of the Privatization Directorate of Turkey such as the “monitoring committee” and the “privatization unit” (Arslan, 2011). The latter abolished the state economic enterprises such as Cyprus Turkish Tourism Enterprises (Kbrs Türk Turizm øúletmeleri) and Industry Holding (Sanayi Holding). In 1997 the Council of Association (Ortaklk Konseyi) was formed to strengthen co-operation between Turkey and the

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“TRNC” on commerce, economics and fiscal matters, as well as defence and security.4 Following the economic crisis that led to the collapse of the banking sector, an “Economic Stability Programme” was announced on 4 October 2000. This held the public sector responsible for the crisis and emphasized privatization along with measures aiming to restructure the banking sector (Arslan, 2011). The Council of Partnership also sought to improve cooperation in the energy, higher education and tourism sectors, as well as seeking the adjustment of “TRNC” legislation to the regulations Turkey had to strengthen the private sector and market competition (Moudouros, 2013). Another significant programme is the Sürdürülebilir Kalknma için Yaplandrma ve Destek Program (Configuration and Support Programme for Sustainable Development) (2007–2009) that was signed in 2006. In this programme the principle of conditionality was included for the first time. It was followed by the Kamunun Etkinli÷inin ve Özel Sektörünün Rekabet Gücünün Artrlmas Program (Programme for Increasing the Effectiveness of the Public Sector and the Competitiveness of the Private Sector) (2010–2012—Arslan, 2011). The 2010–2012 Programme aimed to make a drastic reduction in budget deficits as a way to reduce the state’s intervention in the economy and to boost the private sector. Accordingly, it emphasized the necessity of reducing the state’s expenses and of increasing its revenues by privatization, reducing the number of civil servants, and encouraging private capital investments (Moudouros, 2013). The latest protocol—“2013–2015 Transition to a Sustainable Economy Programme”—adopts a series of goals: taming the “cumbersome” state; producing “good governance;” transforming a system based on patronage to a more efficient capitalist model; improving efficiency in the public sector; creating an economic structure that boosted the private sector; and reducing the role of the public sector and public spending. The majority of the financial aid being provided by Turkey for the duration of the programme is earmarked to building the private sector: the most crucial aspect of the protocol is the emphasis placed on privatization; specifically, this time, on the privatization of electricity, telecommunications and seaports (Bozkurt, 2013b). Even though the economy has various structural problems mentioned earlier (small market, lack of direct flights that undermine its tourism 4

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Kuzey Kbrs Türk Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasnda bir Ortaklk Konseyi Kurulmasna øliúkin Anlaúma (Onay) Yasas, Say 9/1998 [Law on Establishing a Council of Partnership between the Turkish Republic and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 1998].

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potential and limited export opportunities), the economic policies imposed by Turkey strive aggressively to roll back the state (Bozkurt, 2013b). It is feasible to argue that apart from forcing a transformation of the so-called “cumbersome state” to a much leaner entity, the policies imposed by Turkey do not promise a way out from the economic crisis. On the contrary, its single-minded emphasis on inappropriate neoliberal reforms will lead to more unemployment and impoverishment for the Turkish Cypriots. If the protocol is fully implemented, a number of state economic enterprises will be acquired by Turkish capitalists and strategic economic sectors such as electricity and telecommunications will become private monopolies (Bozkurt, 2013b). The principle of conditionality sped up the neoliberal restructuring after 2006. The principle is an integral part of the strategy of the AKP government to produce deeper Turkish involvement in the economic and political structures of the “TRNC.” In the aftermath of the failure of the Annan Plan, the AKP has clearly set out to define northern Cyprus as an area for Turkish investment. Recent investments by large Turkish corporations in the Bafra Tourism zone are particularly conspicuous—70 percent of the new tourist facilities are being built by Turkish companies—but other new investment areas have also been established and are supported by state subsidies (Tahsin, 2012:148). A “TRNC” Investment Consultancy Council has been established, along with the Turkish-“TRNC” Business Council, whose aim is to encourage Turkish investments in the “TRNC.” Thus, investments in northern Cyprus would be coordinated by a commission of government officials of Turkey and northern Cyprus and representatives of the private sector from both sides (Tahsin, 2012: 148).

The AKP government clearly wants more Turkish capital to flow into northern Cyprus. Tahsin (2012) notes that the key expectations of AKP from the “TRNC” government are not only the limitation of public expenditure and maintenance of current privatization policies but also the opening of new areas to Turkish investment. Moudouros (2013: 15) notes that different sectors within the Turkish bourgeoisie have come to agree that the neoliberal transformation was necessary; a transformation which, in their view, could overcome the economic underdevelopment of the Turkish Cypriots. The most powerful Turkish business circles intensified their efforts to promote the private sector as the guide for development and much sought-after modernization (Moudouros, 2013: 15). They advocated the “free market” model that reduces the functions of the public sector solely to regulation of the

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legislative framework and to the creation of favourable business conditions in order to increase foreign investment. In this process, the abolition of the public sector’s “privileges,” and those of the working class in general, were presented as “necessary” and “unavoidable” prerequisites for “medium and long term prosperity” (Moudouros, 2013: 15-16). The powerful Organization of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TÜSøAD) formed a “Cyprus Department” so as to intensify its intervention. The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) worked hard to create structures and bodies such as the Investment Advisory Council, as well as proposals to help speed up the Immovable Property Commission’s procedures regarding compensations to the Greek Cypriot owners for their properties in the northern part of Cyprus. The Turkish Economic Bank (Türk Ekonomi Bankas—TEB) and the Council of Foreign Economic Relations of Turkey (DEøK) formed various programs in order to increase foreign investments, especially in the sectors of tourism and private education. The Union of All Industrialists and Businessmen of Turkey (TÜMSøAD), as well as the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), which is linked to the Islamic Gülen community, decided to open branches in Cyprus in order to facilitate foreign commerce. The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MÜSøAD) which is the primary organization of “Islamic” capital, also created a branch in the northern part of the island having as a goal the integration of commerce and industrial production to the global market (Moudouros, 2013: 16).

Hence a vital aspect in the developments relating to the implementation of the economic protocol 2010-2012 has been the greater presence of the Turkish private sector organizations in the northern part of Cyprus. This development has been the result of an intentional political strategy followed by the Turkish government, and not simply to the inherent expansive forces of private capital (Moudouros, 2013: 22). Moudouros stresses that Ankara enforced a unified political line in order to implement the programme. All institutions in Turkey which are directly involved with the Cyprus Problem, such as the Prime Minister’s office, the Ministry of State for Cypriot Affairs, the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the army, had to hold the same position on the economic programme. This “unified line” of managing the socio-economic structure of Cyprus is co-ordinated through the Turkish embassy via the Assistance Committee headed by the Turkish Ambassador to the “TRNC.” In line with its self-assigned role of closely monitoring the economy of the north, this committee publishes various reports on whether the aims of the protocol are being achieved. The upshot is that Turkish capital has considerably increased its presence

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in infrastructure and in state enterprises through privatization and in the education, construction and tourism sectors. The Bafra tourist development has already been mentioned, and a similar picture can be observed in the education sector. Departments and campuses of Turkish universities such as Istanbul Technological University, the Middle East Technical University and new private schools have opened in the northern part of Cyprus (Moudouros, 2013: 24). It must be emphasized, though, that such economic policies are not simply imposed top-down by Turkey. Certain sections of the Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie aligned themselves with the interests of the Turkish capital and came to agree on the desirability of the neoliberal transformation. However, in the period after 2004, as a result of the economic crisis and the subsequent austerity measures, the divide between the interests of the various social classes has further intensified. The cross-class alliance, established in the early 2000s for the sake of a political settlement, has fallen apart. Erhürman (2010) notes that the post-2000 period led to a split within the hegemonic class (mainly comprised of commercial bourgeoisie), who until then had supported right-wing parties, mainly the UBP. He contends (2010: 21-22) that this new group within the bourgeoisie, which was formerly represented by the Chamber of Commerce, had joined forces with the Turkish Cypriot petty bourgeoisie (civil servants, teachers, pensioners, artisans, shopkeepers) and proletariat (those working in construction, tourism, and small scale business enterprises, plus migrant workers and those crossing to the south to work) (Erhürman, 2010: 21-22) to form the grand alliance that voted in favour of the Annan Plan in 2004, and supported the winning CTP-BG slate in the 2005 parliamentary elections (Erhürman, 2010: 107). But as the 2009 elections that produced a UBP victory revealed, this alliance turned out to be only temporary. The ruling CTP–BG had the difficult task of not only representing its traditional support base among the proletariat and petty bourgeoisie, but also of keeping the support of the new bourgeoisie (Erhürman, 2010: 110). Although CTP–BG coalition did not dare to implement policies that might upset any of the classes that brought the parties to power (Erhürman, 2010: 7), the grand alliance still came to an end. In the 2009 elections, the CTP–BG lost many of the votes it had garnered in the previous election. According to Erhürman (2010: 110), the fact that the votes lost by the CTP–BG were gained by the UBP reveals that the new bourgeoisie was the main group to break away from the grand alliance. In the changed situation, the Chamber of Commerce was the first organization to express support for the latest economic protocol (the 2013–

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2015 Programme) signed in December 2012. In its published comments the Chamber declared that it was in favour of the centralization of political decisions concerning both the economy and the role of business organizations in order to support the private sector and the opening of the Turkish Cypriot economy to international commerce. More importantly, the Economic Organizations Platform—which consists of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Industry, the Union of Turkish Cypriot Hotel Owners, the League of Turkish Cypriot Businessmen, the League of Turkish Cypriot Young Businessmen and the Syndicate of Turkish Cypriot Employers—accepted the need for economic change. So an appreciable part of the Turkish Cypriot capitalist class joined forces with Turkish capitalists to work for the neoliberal modernization of the economy, causing a conflict of interest between different segments of the bourgeoisie.

Conclusion This chapter has aimed to analyse the post-2004 restructuring of the economy of northern Cyprus by drawing on an incomplete neoliberalization explained in the introduction. It has emphasized the need for an analysis that would locate this restructuring in Cyprus in a global context as well as paying attention to local dynamics and the peculiarity of the “TRNC.” A global view enables us to see significant similarities between the economic policies imposed by the Troika in the RoC and Turkey in the “TRNC.” Experience has shown that in times of crisis austerity measures and structural reforms—such as increasing labour market flexibility, restricting pension eligibility, and privatization of public enterprises and education— are preferred by the ruling elites because they shift the burden of adjustment on to working people. Today, similar economic policies are in force in both parts of Cyprus. Although the island is often seen as a sui generis case, its economic experiences are situated in the broader context of neoliberal reaction to the global financial crisis. The study of reforms in north Cyprus needs to be accompanied by an analysis that appreciates the peculiarity of how the “TRNC” came to be, and the local politico-economic dynamics. The starting point for any examination must be an analysis of the dependency of the “TRNC” on Turkey financially as well as politically. This relationship of dependence between Turkey and the “TRNC” also explains why the economic policies implemented in the north of the island since 1974 have closely echoed the ones implemented in Turkey. The turn to neoliberalism after 1986 was a

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direct consequence of the 1980 coup in Turkey, which introduced a type of political authoritarianism coupled with economic liberalism. The main focus of this chapter has been the post-2002 period, which saw the AKP rule Turkey. The neoliberal restructuring that was already underway in 1980 gained momentum under the AKP government, which sought to deepen neoliberal transformation in Turkey. Throughout its decade-long rule, the party has been supportive of “neoliberalism with a human face,” but beyond Erdo÷an’s people-friendly rhetoric, a fairly standard neoliberal agenda has remained intact. AKP’s policy in Turkey subsequently paved the way for a more thorough effort at neoliberal restructuring in the north Cyprus. After the failure of the Annan plan, Turkey increasingly positioned itself as the “IMF of northern Cyprus.” It concentrated on closely monitoring the economy of the north via three-year economic programmes, and after 2006 it introduced the principle of conditionality to effect a deeper intervention into the economic and political structures in the “TRNC.” AKP settled on a strategy that saw northern Cyprus as an area for investment, and the party consistently pushed for the limitation of public expenditures, more privatization, and for opening up new areas of the economy to private investment. As a result of these policies, Turkish capital has markedly increased its presence in the economy of the north. But it is inappropriate to view Turkey’s policies as top-down impositions only, and that state decisions that are taken at any particular moment in history represent particular solutions to conflicting class interests and the interests of other internal and external actors at that particular conjunction (Aydn, 2005: 88).

Austerity measures directed by the AKP deepened class divisions within the Turkish Cypriot community. Initially, a significant section within the Turkish Cypriot bourgeoisie joined forces with the Turkish bourgeoisie to support the neoliberal modernization of the economy, hoping that it would end the isolation of the community by allowing a smoother integration into international markets. Although the neoliberal austerity package created a negative impact on the Turkish Cypriot petty bourgeoisie and labour aristocracy, certain actors within the Turkish Cypriot community have identified their interests as being in line with the AKP and Turkish capitalism. Their support has become important in legitimizing and replicating the AKP’s approach in Cyprus.

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Gülalp, H. (1985) Patterns of Capital Accumulation and State-Society Relations in Turkey Journal of Contemporary Asia Vol. 15, No. 3: 329–348. —. (1993) Kapitalizm, Snflar ve Devlet [Capitalism, Classes and the State] Istanbul: Bilim Dizisi. —. (2001) Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey’s Welfare Party International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 33, No. 3: 443–448. Gümüúçü, S. and D. Sert (2010) The March 2009 Local Elections and the Inconsistent Democratic Transformation of the AKP Party in Turkey Middle East Critique Vol. 19 No. 1 (Spring): 953–968. Güryay, E. (2011) The Economy of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in S. Tkachenko and M. T. Özsa÷lam (eds), Isolated Part of Cyprus St. Petersburg: VVM Publishing: 79–101. Harvey, D. (2012) Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution London: Verso. Hatay, M. (2005) Beyond Numbers: An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish ‘Settlers’ in Northern Cyprus Nicosia: PRIO Report 4. —. (2008) The Problem of Pigeons: Xenophobia and a Rhetoric of the “Local” in North Cyprus The Cyprus Review Vol. 20 No. 2 (Fall): 145–172. Isachenko, D. (2009) On the Political Economy of Unrecognised Statebuilding Projects The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 44 No. 4: 61–75. Jessop, B. (2013) Putting Neoliberalism in Its Time and Place: A Response to the Debate Social Anthropology Vol. 21 No. 1: 65–74. Katrco÷lu, S.T. (2006) Causality between Agriculture and Economic Growth in a Small Nation under Political Isolation: A Case from North Cyprus International Journal of Social Economics Vol. 33 No. 4: 331– 343. Keyder, C. (2003) Turkiye’de Devlet ve Siniflar [State and Classes in Turkey] østanbul: øletiúim Yaynlar. Lacher, H. and Kaymak, E. (2005) Transforming Identities: Beyond the Politics of Non-Settlement in North Cyprus Mediterranean Politics Vol. 10 No. 2: 147–166. Lapavitsas, C. et al. (2010) Eurozone Crisis: Beggar Thyself and Thy Neighbour Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies Vol. 12 No. 4: 321–373. Moudouros, N. (2013) Islam and Neoliberal Hegemony in the Turkish Cypriot Community: A New Process of Transformation paper

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presented at the 14th Mediterranean Research Meeting, organized by the Mediterranean Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, Mersin, Turkey 20–23 March. Nas, T.F. (1992) The Impact of Turkey’s Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program: An Introduction in T. Nas and M. Odekon (eds) Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press: 11–25. Navaro-Yaún, Y. (2006) Affect in the Civil Service: A Study of a Modern State-System Postcolonial Studies, Vol. 9 No. 3: 281–294. Önis, Z. (2006) The Political Economy of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party in M. Hakan Yavuz (ed.) The Emergence of a New Turkey: Islam, Democracy and the AK Party Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press: 207–235. Özdemir, Y. (2013) Krizler, Euro Krizi ve Güney Kbrs’ta Yaúananlar ve Yaúanacaklar Üzerine [On the Crises, the Euro Crisis, What has been Experienced and What will be Experienced in Southern Cyprus] Yenidüzen Gazetesi – Kbrs Gaile eki, 7 April. Özsa÷lam, M. (2011) AK Parti ve 12 Haziran sonras Kbrs sorunu [Justice and Development Party and the Cyprus Problem after 12 June Elections] Havadis 20 June. Patrick, R. (1976) Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963– 1971.Edited by J. H. Bater and R. Preston, University of Waterloo, Department of Geography Faculty of Environmental Studies Waterloo, Ontario: University of Waterloo. Radice, H. (2008) The Developmental State under Global Neoliberalism Third World Quarterly Vol. 29, No. 6, pp. 1153–1174. Sabah (2011) Türkiye’de ekonomik krizler [Economic Crises in Turkey], 19 April. Sonan, S. (2007) From Bankruptcy to Unification and EU Membership? The Political Economy of Post Nationalist Transformation in Northern Cyprus RAMSES Working Paper 9/07 European Studies Centre, University of Oxford. Tahsin, E. (2012) Making Sense of Turkey’s Changing Cyprus Policy: The EU Factor and the Shifting Preferences of the Power Bloc, in Trimikliniotis and Bozkurt (2012): 135–151. —. (2013) The Dimensions of Neoliberalism Transformation in Case of Northern Cyprus presented at Symposium, 30 October–1 November, Neo-Liberal Transformation: Its Dimensions and Consequences Lefke, Cyprus: European University of Lefke: 1–25.

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Toprak, B. (2005) Islam and Democracy in Turkey Turkish Studies, Vol. 6 No. 2 (June): 167–186. Trimikliniotis, N. and U. Bozkurt (eds.) (2012) Beyond a Divided Cyprus: A State and Society in Transformation New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Tu÷al, C. (2013) Occupy Gezi: The Limits of Turkey’s Neoliberal Success Jadaliyya 4 June. Tüzün, G. (1986) Ekonomik Bunalm ve 24 Ocak Kararlar Uzerine [Upon the Economic Crisis and the 24 January Decisions] Istanbul. Üstünda÷, E. (2008) Türkiye Gelir Eúitsizli÷inde OECD ùampiyonlarndan [Turkey is Amongst the OECD Member Countries with the Most Unjust Income Distribution] Bianet, 22 October. Yalman, G. (1997) Bourgeoisie and the State: Changing Forms of Interest Representation within the Context of the Economic Crises and Structural Adjustment: Turkey during the 1980s. Unpublished PhD thesis, Manchester: University of Manchester, Manchester School of Social Sciences.

Legal Document Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Kuzey Kbrs Türk Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasnda bir Ortaklk Konseyi Kurulmasna øliúkin Anlaúma (Onay) Yasas, Say 9/1998 [Law on establishing a Council of Partnership between the Turkish Republic and the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, 1998].

CHAPTER EIGHT KEEPING THE PEACE: UNFICYP AND ITS ELECTRONIC EYES ON THE GREEN LINE WALTER DORN ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA

Introduction The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is the oldest UN peacekeeping force still in operation. 1 This longevity is one indication that the mission has become a “victim of its own success:” the peacekeeping has been highly effective in creating stability but no viable political solution on the divided island has been found; and there seems to be little urgency about moving forward. After a near success in achieving a negotiated settlement in 2004, which was not accepted by the Greek Cypriot side in an island-wide referendum, the United Nations sought to send a strong signal to the parties that UNFICYP was not a permanent fixture. The Security Council reduced the size of the force by one-third, forcing the mission to find an innovative solution to monitor some troubled areas. One part of the solution was a technological one: manned observation posts were replaced with unmanned surveillance cameras in certain areas to complement new mobile patrols. In so doing, UNFICYP became the first UN peacekeeping operation to use 24-hour unattended camera surveillance to monitor a conflict zone. It is ironic that one of the UN’s oldest missions has developed some of the UN’s most creative and technologically advanced solutions to peacekeeping problems. The evolution of UNFICYP’s monitoring function 1 The United Nations has only two longer-running peacekeeping missions than UNFICYP: UNTSO in Palestine and UNMOGIP in Kashmir. These, however, are observer missions, not peacekeeping forces with armed troops.

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can provide valuable lessons for other UN operations. 2 The study also gives insights into the role played by the United Nations to prevent an escalation of violence on the divided Mediterranean Island.

Background UNFICYP was created on 4 March 1964 to quell fighting between Greek and Turkish communities in areas across Cyprus. 3 Some of the most intense fighting occurred in the capital, Nicosia. To facilitate a ceasefire, a British general drew a line on a Nicosia map with a green marker and thus the term “Green Line” came to designate the area that separated the opposing forces. The UN force soon restored stability, though violent flare-ups occurred sporadically, particularly in the period up to 1967. By May 1974 a confident UNFICYP was able to reduce its size from the original 1964 strength of 6400 to 2300 personnel.4 The hope of any further reductions, however, was short-lived. In July 1974 a sudden coup d’état by Greek Cypriot National Guard (NG) forces advocating enosis, or union of Cyprus with Greece, triggered an invasion from Turkey in support of the Turkish minority. In New York, UN headquarters was at a loss and could give the UNFICYP Commander, Lieutenant-General Prem Chand, little direction other than to “play it by ear and do his best to limit violence and protect civilians” (Urquhart, 1987:256). UNFICYP performed this duty heroically by many accounts, limiting the ravages of war and saving many lives,5 but not without sustaining casualties – nine UN soldiers were killed during and shortly after the 1974 war, and 65 were wounded.6 When the smoke of the 1974 War finally cleared, Cyprus was a divided island with Turkey controlling the northern third and the Greek Cypriots controlling the southern two-thirds. Nicosia, which had been split between the two 2

An overview of technologies for peace operations is provided in Dorn (2011). The UNFICYP mission is also precedent setting in being the first peacekeeping mission to be commanded by a woman, Major General Kristin Lund of Norway, who was appointed in May 2014. 3 UNFICYP was created by Security Council Resolution 186 (1964). 4 The first figure is for June 1964 and is from the “Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, for the Period 26 April to 8 June 1964”, UN Doc. S/5764, 15 June 1964, p.2. The second figure is for May 1974 and is from the “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus”, UN Doc. S/11294, 22 May 1974, p.4. 5 For accounts of UNFICYP during the war, see Henn (2005), and Beattie (2007). 6 “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus”, UN Doc. S/11568, 6 December 1974, p.11.

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protagonists in 1964, became effectively partitioned by higher walls and impenetrable bunkers, with the zone in the middle being frozen in time. To date Nicosia remains the only divided capital in the world.7

The Evolution of UNFICYP’s Monitoring Function The 1974 war significantly altered UNFICYP’s monitoring function. For the previous decade Cyprus had been divided into seven large regions each patrolled by a UN contingent, focusing on areas where Greek and Turkish communities clashed. The 1974 war extended the “green” or dividing line across the entire length of Cyprus from east to west. Along this 180 km line two heavily-armed opposing forces (OPFORs) faced each other. In fact, the Green Line was a UN-controlled buffer zone (BZ) that ranged in width from 7 km in rural areas to just a few metres at points in Nicosia. Constant monitoring of this BZ and the forward OPFOR positions, called ceasefire lines, by the United Nations helped prevent moves forward by either Greek Cypriot or Turkish forces. UN patrolling played an important role, as before the war, though now it was focused entirely on the Green Line across the island, as opposed to monitoring potential trouble spots where the dispersed communities came close together. The war had triggered a massive population redistribution. UNFICYP estimates that 165,000 Greek Cypriots fled the newly created northern Turkish sector for the southern Greek Cypriot-controlled territory and 45,000 Turkish Cypriots left the southern Greek Cypriot sector for the Turkish north. 8 Cyprus became an island divided not only by the Green Line, but also by ethnicity. The south of the island became almost entirely Greek and the north predominantly Turkish. The BZ that separated the opposing forces became UNFICYP’s responsibility. Moreover, volatility in the BZ required UNFICYP not only to patrol vigorously but also to erect and permanently man a long string of observation posts to effect constant surveillance. Observation posts (OPs) proliferated after the 1974 war and played a crucial role in UNFICYP’s monitoring function along the Green Line. Though the war ended without an official ceasefire agreement between the 7

The divided city of Jerusalem is considered by the state of Israel as the national capital and has also been declared the future capital of a Palestinian state but it is not the capital for the two governments at present. 8 “Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre”, http://www.internal-displace ment.org. According to the website, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees gives slightly higher figures of 200,000 and 65,000 for the number of Greek and Turkish Cypriot refugees.

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parties, UNFICYP delineated the forward positions of the OPFORs upon the cessation of hostilities. Maintaining these ceasefire lines (CFLs), as they came to be called, became a crucial UNFICYP function. This involved detecting and if possible preventing moves forward by either side. Any such moves were regarded as violations of the ceasefire “arrangement.” Constant surveillance of the BZ using OPs and patrols was essential to deter, detect, and respond to such infractions. Beyond surveillance, OPs performed another crucial function: they enhanced stability. Especially during the aftermath of the 1974 war, there were many areas along the Green Line where shouting, rock throwing, and shooting incidents occurred frequently between the OPFORs. To have several “shot reports” a day in the Canadian area of responsibility (Sector 3, which included Nicosia) was not uncommon.9 Areas of such sensitivity required a constant “blue beret presence” to prevent escalation from shouting to shooting. Even with the presence of a UN OP, however, it was not uncommon for the few UN soldiers there to be unable to contain a difficult situation. They would then call a UN patrol to the area to help restore stability. The constant monitoring and pacification carried out by permanently manned OPs all along the Green Line became indispensable. By June 1975, UNFICYP had 148 OPs10 and the OP became the dominant aspect of the force’s modus operandi. While this style of peacekeeping proved successful, the peacemaking —or negotiation of a settlement—was painstakingly slow, and a political solution remained elusive. The parties did agree in 1977 that a settlement would take the form of a bizonal, bicommunal federal state, but then made little progress towards achieving it. The ceasefire in Cyprus did not turn into a formal peace and by the early 1990s several countries, including the major troop contributor, Canada, announced they would withdraw or significantly reduce their contributions to UNFICYP. This prompted the Secretary-General to warn that UNFICYP would cease to be viable by June 1993 without new contributors.11 The strength of the force’s military component fell from 2040 in November 1992 to below 1000 in mid-June 1993 12 and the Force Commander had to implement an emergency contingency plan that was to have a significant impact on the future of UN 9

Based upon the personal experience of one of the author’s research assistants as a platoon commander with UNFICYP in 1976, about a year and a half after the war. 10 “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus”, UN Doc. S/11717, 9 June 1975, p.6. 11 “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus”, UN Doc. S/25492, 30 March 1993, p.2. 12 Ibid.

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monitoring in Cyprus. By June 1993, only 21 OPs were permanently manned.13 Even after the force level was increased (thanks to Argentina’s offer of a line battalion of 375 troops), the OP manning levels were not increased to their previous levels.14 UNFICYP learned from the force reduction experience that it did not need to constantly man so many OPs to maintain stability. Instead, UNFICYP began to place greater emphasis on patrolling as a means of monitoring, as well as on accommodating (housing) military personnel in the BZ itself. The more stable military situation in Cyprus allowed this transition to fewer constantly manned OPs. The valuable lesson that the mission learned in 1993 on ways to replace permanently manned OPs would be considered and applied yet again over a decade later.

A New Approach to Monitoring In November 2002, Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented the parties with a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, or the Annan Plan, and by early 2004 the aspirations of both sides for acceptance into the European Union created a new incentive for agreement. After several modifications, the fifth version of the Annan Plan was presented to both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot populations in referenda in April 2004. The Turkish Cypriots accepted it by a margin of almost two to one, but the Greek Cypriots rejected it three to one.15 So it was not adopted, much to the disappointment of the international community. After the Greek Cypriot rejection of the plan Secretary-General Annan initiated a review of peacekeeping in the country. Based on the findings of the review team, he recommended a significant reduction in the military component of UNFICYP from 1224 to 860 personnel, under a plan called “Force 860.” He observed that the security situation on the island had 13

Only 21 OPs remained permanently manned, another three were manned during daylight hours only, and another 19 periodically. All of the above were used for overnight accommodation of UNFICYP military personnel. Finally, the remaining 108 OPs were manned less periodically than the preceding. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus”, UN Doc. S/26777, 22 November 1993, p.4. 14 Ibid., p.7. The Security Council changed the financing of the force, which precipitated Argentina’s offer. 15 There was much bitterness over this outcome, especially since the Greek Cypriot President, Tassos Papadopoulos, had campaigned against acceptance. His government had not even allowed some key supporters of the plan to appear on the national television station. See James Ker-Lindsay (2005: 118; and 2006: 412).

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become “increasingly benign over the past few years” and that a recurrence of fighting was “increasingly unlikely.”16 The mission proposed a new concept of operations, termed “concentration with mobility:” fewer manned OPs, but a more mobile force to respond quickly to incidents before they could escalate. The reduction of OPs was opposed by the Greek Cypriot government, which argued that it endangered the security of the Government-controlled areas.17 Nevertheless, the Security Council, by its Resolution 1568 of 22 October 2004, accepted the Secretary-General’s recommendations and the Force level was reduced by 30 per cent. The downsizing of UNFICYP in early 2005 posed a significant operational challenge. The 180 km Green Line still had to be monitored effectively: the mission did not want to be blamed for a flare up of violence. The Force Commander, Maj. Gen. Herbert Figoli of Uruguay, enunciated his plan to cope with the downsizing: I intend to place less reliance on static observation posts and to shift our emphasis to more mobile surveillance. Increased patrolling on the ground and in the air, combined with greater use of technology such as closed circuit television, will enhance the monitoring activity of the force. Patrol programs will be more efficiently directed to areas where presence is needed, rather than routine patrolling everywhere. I am prepared to accept some risk in quiet areas . . . Sectors must be prepared to increase the intensity of patrolling where and when it is needed and I shall augment that effort with MFR [Mobile Force Reserve] patrols when required. The force will concentrate in fewer camps and patrol bases, centralizing manpower.18

The elimination of 15 permanent OPs, 12 patrol bases, and eight camps produced substantial savings in personnel and resources, while increasing the number of personnel available for duty in operations centres and rapid reaction forces. Nevertheless, effective and constant surveillance had to be maintained, especially in the most sensitive areas, and surveillance cameras became the preferred solution.

16

“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus”, UN Doc. S/2004/756, 24 September 2004, p.6. 17 Ker-Lindsay (2005: 413). 18 Maj. Gen. H. Figoli, UNFICYP Force Commander, UNFICYP Memorandum entitled “UNFICYP 860 Concept of Operations”, October 2004, p.1.

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The Technological Contribution: Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) The plan to introduce greater use of technology such as closed circuit television was based upon several years of study by UNFICYP staff. In addition to providing proof of OPFOR “ill discipline” and violations of the ceasefire arrangement, the CCTV system was to facilitate a reduction in personnel leading to significant cost savings. The annual cost of operating a constantly manned OP is estimated by the author as approximately US$170,000 while that of operating a surveillance camera was US$15,000 for the first year of acquisition and only US$160/year in subsequent years.19 So, a camera system was over 10 times cheaper the first year and 100 times cheaper in subsequent years. With more substitutions, the cost savings would be that much greater. But for some areas, more expensive cameras with increased range and resolution would be needed. And in areas where theft, deliberate destruction or vandalism are likely, the cost of protection and replacement would need to be added. Additional watchkeeper(s) would also be needed in the Operations Centre to keep an eye on the additional screens. But the personnel requirements for additional watchkeepers would still be far lower than for human observers at OPs. Financial and personnel requirements are not the only consideration in a manned/unmanned comparison. The loss of the human presence in the immediate conflict zone is a significant drawback. In a camera-based system with no local human presence, the UN still needs to be able to respond to any problems. After a violation has been spotted by the watch officer in the Operations Centre, a call is made to the OPFORs’ local liaison officer, ideally as soon as the violation occurs. Vehicle-mounted patrols and liaison officers may also be sent to dialogue with the OPFORs 19

The estimates are based on actual UNFICYP cost figures for its personnel and CCTV system in US dollars and is based on the requirement of eight soldiers per day for each OP (three shifts a day each of two soldiers for a total of six soldiers per day plus an additional two soldiers absent for leave/medical reasons). The annual cost of operating a constantly manned OP includes US$96,000 per year for the annual salaries of these eight soldiers, plus US$73,000 per year for rations based on US$25 a day for eight soldiers for 365 days, and US$2500 for equipment. This totals US $171,500 per year for one OP. The cost for the camera system is based on the acquisition and installation price of US$15,000 and maintenance in subsequent years of US$160 annually. These figures may change over time, though the quality of the cameras (resolution range and night sense) should improve as well.

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or civilians committing possible violations. For more serious violations, UNFICYP’s response force is on standby to mount a quick reaction. The United Nations chose to deploy the cameras in sensitive areas of the buffer zone: places in Nicosia’s City Centre where the OPFORs were closest and where violations had been most frequent. The camera system was spread over 1.5 km along the narrowest part of the Green Line. This area in the centre of crowded Nicosia is a no-man’s land, providing stark evidence of the 1974 war. Majestic but uninhabited and decaying buildings, some pocked with bullet holes, remain frozen in time, an eerie reminder of the intense fighting that brought a once bustling city centre to a dead halt. The six locations chosen for the cameras were ones where incidents had been common in the past. They were intended to deter and detect ceasefire violations, including moves forward of the CFLs, shouting and verbal abuse, stone throwing, cocking and pointing of weapons, and overmanning of positions. Such violations were viewed on a 42-inch plasma monitor at Wolseley Barracks that was monitored by soldiers of the British Contingent. The Pan-Tilt-Zoom (PTZ) cameras incorporated a motion sensor, so that movements within the camera’s field of view could be highlighted for the watch officer. It was necessary for the OPFORs to accept the new camera surveillance system. The UNFICYP Commander who developed the concept in 2004 had already explained its utility to his OPFOR counterparts. Then, when the system was made operational, the Sector 2 commander, in whose downtown area of operation (AOR) the cameras were installed, also invited the local commanders to separately visit him for a briefing on the system and to view it firsthand.20 The two half-hour visits did the trick, with no opposition coming from the parties. The utility of the camera system was quickly demonstrated by the UN’s positive experiences in the first few months after installation. Many “serious” violations were spotted, and the photographic evidence from the cameras were accepted as proof of violations by the OPFOR commanders, who gave UNFICYP undertakings that they would act to prevent any recurrence. One of the six locations was on Ledra Street, which was once the major shopping street of Nicosia. It runs down the centre of Nicosia’s old city, and was the first street in the city to be barricaded when intercommunal fighting broke out in December 1963. After the 1974 invasion 20

Letter of 11 March 2008 from UNFICYP Sector 2 Commander Lt Col. T. Duncan to Turkish forces Commander Col. V. Tarakci, 1 Wolf Regiment.

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it was severed at its centre point and became the site of much OPFOR antagonism and grandstanding. The Republic of Cyprus created a visitor centre and a viewing platform on its side. The Turkish side built a symbolic stairway for observers. When the National Guard placed a CCTV system at the visitor centre in 2005, the Turks responded with a camera of their own. The UN complained and the cameras were removed. After a thaw in relations in 2007–8, it was decided to open a pedestrian crossing point between the two sides.21 The opening of the Ledra Street Crossing (LSX) on 3 April 2008 was a symbolic victory for peaceful coexistence. Nevertheless, the first days of its opening presented significant challenges for the UN. On the morning of its opening, the crossing was still contentious. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) maintained that most of the crossing area was in its territory and insisted on a right to enter, a fact disputed by the UN. The UN’s video camera had recently been installed above the centre of the crossing some five metres from the ground, attached to a beam hung between adjacent buildings. As part of the agreement to open LSX, the crossing area was to be de-militarized, i.e., unmanned by any forces, including those of the UN. As the UN avoided the area, the overhead cameras became the only UN “presence” at the crossing. The CCTV provided 360 degree surveillance that morning, which showed Turkish Cypriot Police (TCP) officers entering the area before the opening of the crossing. The Greek side immediately sealed off their side until UN mediators persuaded the TCP to exit. Such trespassing was to repeat itself, but, according to the UNIFCYP soldier who watched the CCTV recordings, “once the TCP realized that the camera was watching over this area for violations, the offenses became almost nonexistent.”22 Knowing that the camera was “live” kept people honest, just as speed cameras keep motorists more honest. Another problem emerged on the night of the opening. Greek Cypriot demonstrators wanted to take advantage of the publicity and make a statement. The protestors blocked the crossing at 9 pm and confronted the 21

On the Turkish side of the crossing, documents (e.g., passports) must be presented to border control agents. On the Greek Cypriot side, no stop is required since the Republic of Cyprus sees Cyprus as one country and the border as artificial and not legal or officially recognized. Some Greek Cypriots feared the opening of the crossing might increase acceptance of two separate states within the federal boundaries of the Republic of Cyprus. 22 Electronic communication to the author from WO2 David Provan, Continuity Operations Warrant Officer, Headquarters Sector Two, UNFICYP, Wolseley Barracks, 23 January 2009.

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TCP. The affair was captured on CCTV. The UN Police (UNPOL) Coordinator let the Cyprus Police (CYPOL) know that the United Nations had footage of the perpetrators and their banners. Although CYPOL made no arrests and did not request the footage,23 UNPOL was able to resolve the confrontation peacefully with clear evidence. The well-lit Ledra Street Crossing is open 24/7 and the camera continues to record events day and night. However, instead of having an operator observe the CCTV input throughout the night, the camera supervisor can now play back the overnight footage in the morning and still spot any night violations. The morning reviewer can thus take the same action as a 24/7 observer for small violations by issuing written complaints in the morning.

CCTV Problems and Limitations Over 150 cameras are used for monitoring UNFICYP premises, and only six are used for hotspots in the BZ across a distance spanning 1.5 km.24 Furthermore, one of the six cameras was non-functional for a half-year after installation due to a communications relay problem. Plus the CCTV cameras have significant limitations, especially if they are to be applied to other areas of Cyprus. The cameras have a “night sense” capability that falls far short of a “night vision” capability. Since violations do occur at night, there is a need to illumine the areas that the cameras view. This has been done at four of the six camera locations in Nicosia. In the other two locations the cameras only show a single bright light from a distant OP. A similar problem would occur in other areas of the BZ especially where the cameras might be used to spot illegal trafficking. One obvious solution would be to install image intensifiers, infrared systems and illuminators triggered by motion detectors. Microwave beams are used to transmit the signals from the existing camera stations to the Sector 2 Operations Centre. Sometimes, because of tree foliage along the route, the microwave signal from an OP becomes disrupted or the video link is lost or its quality degraded.25 The maintenance 23

Ibid. In addition, five UNFICYP patrol bases and observation posts have security cameras with some capability to observe OPFOR activities, though the cameras’ main function is for security of the bases and posts themselves. Email from UNFICYP Chief of Staff to the author, 6 July 2015. 25 The United Nations was unable to trim or remove the offending tree because it forms part of the Turkish Forces’ CFL and permission to deal with it was refused. In addition, the camera was put out of action due to a power surge from a lightning 24

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and repair of online cameras by the Greek Cypriot contractor has often been slow. After one camera was overpowered by a nearby lightning strike, no repair was made for over 100 days, despite insistent calls to the contractor. If the conflict intensity between the OPFORs had been higher, it is unlikely that CCTV systems could have been used to replace OPs. The relatively peaceful atmosphere made possible this technological component of the “concentration with mobility” concept. When the Green Line had seen more violence the OPFORs would probably not have tolerated the installation of cameras and might even have destroyed them with gunfire. OPFORs shooting at each other are unlikely to tolerate a video witness. When the Cyprus conflict was more intense, the human “blue beret” presence in no man’s land was absolutely necessary to prevent escalation, as both sides recognized. Nevertheless, the OPFORs are now gaining experience with the CCTV system. In the undesirable and unlikely return of high intensity conflict, the CCTVs could be extremely useful as a supplement to an expanded human presence.

Other Monitoring Systems CCTV on UN Premises Like most UN missions and international organizations around the world, UNFICYP uses CCTV systems to monitor its premises, especially the entrances and perimeter. It dramatically increased this surveillance tool after the tragic Baghdad bombings in August 2003.26 In 2004, UNFICYP ordered almost 100 security cameras for the mission, including the three sector headquarters.27 Their primary purpose has been to deter and detect any intruders.

strike on a building nearby. Written Communication from WO2 Provan, 23 January 2009. 26 The truck bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003 led to the deaths of 22 UN workers, including the head of mission, Sergio Vieira de Mello. Over 150 were wounded. 27 The physical security review following the tragic attack in Iraq of the UN headquarters on 19 August 2003 led to significant security improvements, according to Force Commander Figoli (End of Assignment Report), December 2005, p.7. The locations of the on-site cameras are UNPA (HQ UNFICYP), Sector 1 sites (Camp St. Martin in Skouriotissa, Camp Roca in Morphou, and Camp Brown at Astromeritis Crossing Point), Sector 2 site (Ledra Palace Hotel) and Sector 4 sites (Camp Izay in Athienou and Camp General Stefanik in Famagusta). Camp Istvan also has a CCTV system.

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Helicopter Reconnaissance Aerial observation is a highly effective monitoring tool that was already in use by UNFICYP before the introduction of “Force 860”. Sectors can request observation flights 24/7 from UN Flight, the Argentine helicopter unit. Helicopters provide a “bird’s eye” view of buffer zone.28 Heliborne camera imagery has been given to the parties as evidence of their violations. Digital cameras held by peacekeepers flying on the helicopters have captured numerous violations within the BZ. Air patrols have also targeted other activities including ships of doubtful origin off the Cypriot coast, public demonstrations in Nicosia, and even lost UN patrol cars. Any observation of atrocities behind OPFOR lines, which is quite easy from the air, is not acceptable to the parties. UNFICYP takes great pains not to record beyond the BZ, though some observation gives an excellent sense of military preparations and threatening activities.29

Liaison/Mediation and Force Response Observation by itself is not usually sufficient to keep the peace. After cameras or human observers spot a violation, a UN response is needed. “Force 860” envisaged “more emphasis on liaison and mediation rather than interposition of forces to prevent the recurrence of fighting.”30 The Force Commander created a new type of UN peacekeeper: the Military Observer and Liaison Officer (MOLO). This cadre represents another UNFICYP innovation in UN peacekeeping. The MOLO has the same tasks as the traditional UN military Observer (UNMO), and also the added task of enhancing “liaison with the OPFORs and to conduct more effective 28

UN Flight has Bell 212-IFR and Hughes 500D helicopters, based at the UNPA Helicopter Landing Site (HLS). The Argentine unit has flown over 15,000 hours since 1974. It usually flies at 500 to 1000 feet. A helicopter can fly from one end of the BZ to the other in under two hours. Planned UNFICYP II requirements listed that the aerial units should have the “capability to serve two separate areas simultaneously with basic FLIR for surveillance.” The surveillance safe range was specified as “5 km or 3000 feet above ground level.” 29 Still, the United Nations retains the right to lodge complaints about incidents behind the CFL that might change the status quo or military balance. Two examples: significant construction within 400 metres of the CFL or the movement of large calibre weapons within 1000 metres of the CFL. OC Ops Squadron, “CCTV Assessment,” 26 November 2009, communicated to the author by email, 3 December 2009. 30 Maj. Gen. H. Figoli, UNFICYP Force Commander, UNFICYP Memorandum entitled “UNFICYP 860 Concept of Operations”, October 2004, p.1.

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mediation.” 31 MOLOs not only respond to violations, but also try to prevent them when they see signs of emerging tension. Some incidents require the rapid response of peacekeepers. For instance, large civilian incursions into the BZ, e.g., farm workers without permits, may require escorts to facilitate or force an exit. Each sector has a Quick Reaction Force (QRF), normally made up of the sector Guard Force, the soldiers on 24-hour duty who typically provide the camp security detail (e.g., man the gates). This is backed up by a Sector Reserve on 30 minutes’ notice to move. This usually consists of soldiers on down-time who are confined to camp and on call. The next level of reserve is on two hours’ notice to move. These timings are reduced if the United Nations aims to pre-empt an event, e.g., a planned demonstration. The reserves can then be ready to deploy within minutes. The sectors must also have units on standby for the Force Commanders’ Reserve, which is only deployable on the orders of HQ UNFICYP.32

Future Possibilities: UNFICYP and Beyond While UNFICYP has broken new ground in UN peacekeeping, its technical monitoring capabilities are still far behind those of modern military forces, for instance, the NATO deployments in Bosnia or Kosovo. The threat level and risks are sufficiently low in Cyprus that a full package of sophisticated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) hardware is not necessary. But there is still much more that the mission could do in a cost-effective manner, should the political will and funding allow it. Higher resolution cameras would give better quality imagery and are now available at a much lower cost than the current UNFICYP cameras.33

31

Ibid. The Sector 2 units in the FC’s Reserve are normally used to provide the security for UNPA when the Mobile Force Reserve (MFR) deploys. The MFR is rarely deployed in a public order capacity but has been forward based at the Ledra Palace Hotel during large demonstrations at the nearby LSX crossing. The MFR is used only as a last resort in the event of hostilities between the OPFORs or if demonstrators try to forcibly enter UN areas. Usually demonstrators can be contained by the Turkish Cypriot Police (TCP), the Cyprus Police Force (CYPOL), UNPOL, or the Sector Reserves. Normally, the MFR is kept out of sight so as not to antagonize the OPFORs or demonstrators. 33 High definition video cameras (typically defined as providing an image resolution of at least 1280 by 720 pixels) are now available for less than US$500 32

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High definition (HD) cameras could help more quickly identify incidents and provide more convincing evidence to show offending OPFORs. Along the entire 180 km BZ, there are many other places where cameras would also be useful. Where the UN-administered BZ is wider, a frequent challenge is to prevent trespassing by civilians in open areas. The United Nations has difficulty preventing these movements because most of them are done clandestinely. Cameras can alert the United Nations to such trespassers and trigger a response. With a zoom capability, the HD cameras should allow vehicle license plate numbers to be read at a distance of 100 metres or more. Automated license plate reading systems are commercially available. To deal with human trafficking, a CCTV system could be used by UNPOL, especially in places known to be transit points, such as the village of Pyla. Located within the BZ, Pyla is one of the few places where Greek and Turkish Cypriots live together in the same community. Illegal immigrants often travel to Pyla and, having access to the Republic of Cyprus, can then enter other parts of the European Union. In order not to disrupt the public order, constant vigilance is needed to catch human trafficking. Well placed cameras would help that cause.34 Besides CCTV, there are many other creative technological innovations that could improve the effectiveness of UNFICYP and many other missions. These monitoring technologies are briefly reviewed here by cost level. At the low-cost end, motion sensors could be acquired to trigger illuminators once movement in the BZ has been detected. Trespassers would then be immediately illuminated on entering an illegal area and warned that they are being observed. The watchkeeper in the Operations Center would also be alerted by the sudden bright imagery. Motion sensors could also trigger an automatic alarm at the operations centre and, optionally, on location. So-called “dummy” cameras, fixed or mobile, would also be useful because the OPFORs and civilians would not know whether the cameras were operational or not. Thus the cameras could deter both OPFOR violations and civilian trespassing in the BZ. Microphones could easily be attached to the cameras to provide an per camera. Power might be a challenge in barren areas, so batteries may need to be frequently recharged, possibly by solar cells. 34 The mission’s lawyers prepared an analysis of the legal aspects of a possible UN installation of CCTV in Pyla in an unobtrusive spot, but the study failed to decide on the legality of deployment. Legal Advisor, Memo titled “Covert Electronic Video Surveillance – Legal Advice” 2 May 2008.

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audio capability in sensitive areas. This would be useful in detecting verbal abuse, which is often the first stage in an escalation. Sound recordings could verify alleged or actual violations. Furthermore, if speakers were attached, the watchkeeper could broadcast a message into areas of trouble, allowing an immediate response, something that was lost when UNFICYP OPs became unmanned. Low-cost laser range-finders can be of considerable utility. They provide the precise distance to objects close or far away from the viewer. In large areas of the BZ they would determine if a distant trespasser had crossed into the BZ. They would also be useful in observing maritime approaches on the coastal ends of the BZ. On the mountainous northern edge of the island, the manned UN OP3 is responsible for observing boats moving north of the BZ. Peacekeepers detect vessels that may be trespassing into OPFOR territorial waters, especially boats which regularly traverse to the Turkish enclave of Kokkina/Erenköy. The current method of estimating whether a boat has come within the limits of the Maritime Security Line35 is crude. The type of boat is guessed based on its shape, and its length is estimated from the grid in the observers’ binoculars. A hand chart then indicates that if the boat is over a certain length, it is likely to be inside the limited area, constituting a violation. This method is inaccurate, subjective, and prone to human error. A tripod-mounted laser range-finder would be able to make the measurement exactly, to within a few metres for objects up to 20 km away. The GIS system in UNFICYP is also quite basic by modern military standards.36 For less than US$50,000, satellite imagery could be purchased to properly geo-reference the entire BZ, allowing map coordinates to be accurate to within 2–3 metres instead of the current 100 metres offered by

35 The Maritime Security Line (MSL) is the 3000 metre seaward extension on both sides of the island of the BZ median. Vessels from both sides are advised not to cross the MSL. On the north shore the MSL is near Kokkina and on the south end of the Green line it is near Famagusta. Occasionally, fishing vessels and tourists allegedly cross the line and are apprehended by police boats of the other party, causing friction which the UN must help resolve. UNFICYP has no capacity to operate at sea. See “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus”, UN Doc. S/1995/488 of 15 June 1995 and S/1999/657 of 8 June 1999. 36 The mission upgraded this capability by establishing Geospatial Information Dissemination System (GIDS) in 2014. The GIDS Open Access allows UNFICYP staff to view the many information layers live, including information and images that UNPOL enter into their iPad Mini’s while on patrol in the buffer zone, Email to the author from the UNFICYP Chief of Staff, 6 July 2015.

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Google Earth system being used. 37 As with laser range-finders, a GIS system would also be useful in determining if a soldier or hunter has trespassed into the BZ. Often hunters dispute the UN’s claims of trespassing. Images with proper grid references and ceasefire line demarcations would be quite convincing. Medium-cost technologies (over US$50,000) include radar and acoustic/seismic sensors placed in arrays to help detect movements into and within the BZ, for example, by OPFOR soldiers, hunters, or traffickers. In other UN missions, this could be used to detect preparations for attack. The more advanced observation could trigger action by UN soldiers and police. Ground surveillance radar (GSR) can detect a person walking into a field at a distance of 10 km under all weather conditions, day and night.38 Tethered balloons could carry cameras that provide a high and wide view of the BZ or other areas of responsibility. High-end monitoring technologies include modern infrared (FLIR) cameras for aircraft. The system deployed in UNFICYP helicopters is of an old standard. Also, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could provide cost-effective airborne surveillance. They are small and can be made virtually invisible by flying at higher altitudes. The United Nations has gained valuable experience from its deployment of UAVs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in December 2013. This new form of UN reconnaissance could be transferred easily and cheaply to other missions, including UNFICYP. To use such powerful technologies without the permission or knowledge of the OPFORs involves risk. UNFICYP has grown very aware of the sensitivities of the parties to covert or unauthorized observation. To acquire intelligence on the OPFORs and then to present them with evidence of their violations could jeopardize the acceptability of the UN force to the parties. Clearly these technologies have monitoring potential, but in Cyprus they should be used with the parties’ consent, according to tradition. The direct transmission of camera imagery to the OPFORs, either periodically or in real time, might serve as a confidence-building measure in the future, particularly if they start to reduce their manning levels or 37

Google Earth Professional allows the importation of shape files which can greatly improve the accuracy of the imagery. Higher resolution imagery could be purchased at roughly US$10/ km2 (e.g., from DigitalGlobe). 38 One rotation of UK forces in UNFICYP introduced GSR because the deployed unit was already using it in training. It proved to be a useful adjunct to monitoring the BZ during their tour of duty. Source: Comment to the author made in New York, 2008, by Col. Ian Sinclair (former UNFICYP Chief of Staff, 2004–6).

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even abandon some posts. If both OPFORs had video feeds from the UN cameras they would have greater confidence that the BZ was stable. But the United Nations would have to be aware that the information could be used for an aggressive purpose, so it would have to be prepared to cut the signal if such were the case. In a situation as stable as Cyprus now is, the urgency to enhance monitoring capacity is admittedly not great. This does not, however, mean that UNFICYP should be complacent. Rather it should be constantly seeking ways to gain better awareness of the BZ. Technologies also offer new forms of innovation should the UNFICYP mandate change after a final political settlement.

Conclusions UNFICYP is often sharply criticized for its longevity and for the fact that the peacekeeping has not produced a political settlement. Some have even gone so far as to use it as an example against peacekeeping. This fails to recognize the mission’s accomplishments: at the heat of the conflict, UNFICYP needed more than 6400 troops to contain violence; now it only deploys about 800. After the 1974 War UNFICYP needed almost 100 constantly manned OPs, now it needs only two. UNFICYP must take the major credit for this transition from bloodshed to calm. As a stereotypical traditional peacekeeping mission, UNFICYP was an unlikely candidate to pioneer surveillance technology in peacekeeping. Yet tradition met modernity in UNFICYP. The innovative solution was born of necessity when the mission was forced to downsize after 2004. An unattended camera system in a conflict zone was introduced for the first time in UN peacekeeping history. This technology could be applied to many tense conflict areas such as South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Syria. Viewing and documenting violations is a key role for peacekeepers wherever they are deployed. Manned OPs allow for a constant watch and they permit a quicker response because soldiers are already in situ. Under the newer “concentration with mobility” concept, responders are kept on standby at a distance. The United Nations has limited resources to cover its peacekeeping areas, including the 180 km-long Green Line. So a camera system has great utility and is 10 to 100 times less costly for monitoring than a manned OP. In Cyprus, the level of violations is low in comparison with other UN mission areas. UNFICYP catches 600 or so violations a year,39 but none 39

For instance, in a six-month period from May to November in 2008, the number of military violations and other incidents was 352. “Report of the Secretary on

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have proven life-threatening for over a decade. The weekly body count in some other conflicts where UN missions are deployed greatly exceeds the weekly count of violations in Cyprus. All the more reason why the UNFICYP experiment with surveillance cameras carries a valuable and transferrable lesson: remote monitoring can help deter, detect, and document violations. In larger missions, where the stakes are greater, the benefits of early warning and rapid response would also be greater. The United Nations would be wise to develop the positive lessons from UNFICYP into broader policies and wider practices. 40 In an age when technology has been widely used to enhance warfare, it is only appropriate to make greater use of technology for peacekeeping. Note: This paper is based on a longer paper: “Electronic Eyes on the Green Line: Surveillance by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus,” published in Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 29, Iss. 2, pp.184–207 (2014).

References Beattie, Clay (2007) The Bulletproof Flag: Canadian Peacekeeping Forces and the War in Cyprus: How a Small UN Force Changed the Concept of Peacekeeping Forever Ottawa: Optimum Publishing International. Dorn, A Walter (2011) Keeping Watch: Monitoring, Technology and Innovation in UN Peace Operations Tokyo: United Nations University Press. Henn, Francis (2005) A Business of Some Heat: The United Nations Force in Cyprus Before and During the 1974 Turkish Invasion London: Pen and Sword Books. Ker-Lindsay, James (2005) EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus Basingstoke: Palgrave/ Macmillan. —. (2006) The UN Force in Cyprus, After the 2004 Reunification Referendum International Peacekeeping 13/3 September. United Nations Operation in Cyprus,” UN Doc. S/2008/744 of 28 November 2008, p.4. 40 The UN is showing evidence that it recognizes the need. The UN’s Departments of Peacekeeping and Field Support sponsored an Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping whose report “Performance Peacekeeping” was published in 2015 (www.performancepeacekeeping.org). The two departments are now looking at ways to implement the many recommendations from the panel report.

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Urquhart, Brian (1987) A Life in Peace and War New York: Harper and Row.

PART III COMPARISONS

CHAPTER NINE CYPRUS AND BELIZE: THE ROLE OF NEIGHBOURS IN THEIR STORIES JONATHAN WARNER QUEST UNIVERSITY CANADA

Introduction Living in a good neighbourhood has many benefits. Neighbours who tend their property well, are friendly but not invasive in their interest in your life, who keep their children and pets off your land, and have no designs on extending their garden beyond the boundary line are all positives. Neighbours from hell who are anti-social, noisy, inconsiderate and rude, who harass, bully, interfere or give unwanted attention, are undesirable in the extreme.1 What is true of individuals living in close proximity is also true of nations. A small nation will always be affected by a nearby giant. “Living next to you,” said then Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, speaking of the United States, “is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant; no matter how friendly and even-tempered is the beast, if I may call it that, one is affected by every twitch and grunt. Even a friendly nuzzling can sometimes lead to frightening consequences.” Robert N. Thompson put it more succinctly: “The United States is our friend whether we like it or not.”2 How does one conceptualize the neighbours? All nations have a creation story, as Canada’s most recent ex-Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, 1 Britain even has a website, www.nfh.org.uk set up to provide help to those suffering from such neighbours. 2 Trudeau: Speech, Washington, May 25, 1969; Thompson: House of Commons debate, January 31, 1963; both from http://www.earlegray.ca/component/content/article/10-scintillating-sayings-aboutcanada/264-canada-and-the-us-elephant. At the time, Thompson was MP for Red Deer, Alberta.

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has noted.3 These stories shape the way in which nations see themselves and how they view their neighbours. Are the neighbours viewed as friendly: helpful folk that one can trade with, and “hang out” with; do they keep themselves to themselves, and so can be ignored for most purposes, or are they seen as rivals, or even enemies—people who can’t be trusted? Stories make a difference, orientating and affecting the lenses through which people view the world. The recounting of history helps build social capital. At its best this both binds people together in a shared story of the past, that helps determine their visions of the future; and also forms a means—a bridge—to reach out to those who have a different story. A common view of the world, of history, means that people will tend to share viewpoints, and so have a common basis for agreement about the functioning of the state, of what matters, and the acceptable boundaries of action and discourse. The recounting of the Exodus of their ancestors from slavery in Egypt is foundational for Jews (the story is retold several times in the Old Testament)—a reminder of their special status in the eyes of the God who rescued them, and the privileges and responsibilities that this entailed. This chapter examines the stories of Cyprus and Belize, the way that their neighbours are perceived, and how this affects the nation’s selfunderstanding and the effects of this understanding. Each state, of course, comprises people who have a multiplicity of individual stories, but national cohesion will exist when the stories cohere well together. In Belize, this is largely the case; in Cyprus, there are at least two competing narratives. Both countries have neighbours (Turkey, Guatemala) that the majority of their population see as hostile, and the path to living at peace with such neighbours is not easy. How stories play out is important. They can be harnessed, for good or evil, to produce change or to bolster an existing viewpoint. Exclusive stories that bring out the negative side of social capital have made a settlement to the Cyprus Problem more difficult. If solidarity requires the exclusion of the other, then bridging social capital is unlikely to develop. By contrast, tensions in Belizean society have been reduced by finding ways in which different stories can be melded together to produce an harmonious whole. Stories that are, or which can become, inclusive can

3

Harper thinks that for Canada the Battle of Vimy Ridge, 1917, is part of it: the first time that Canadians participated in a battle as Canadians, rather than as part of the forces of the British Empire. Australians and New Zealanders have a similar event at roughly the same time period–the Anzac forces fighting in the Dardanelles campaign.

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draw disparate groups together, and produce a cohesive society where differences can be resolved within an agreed-upon framework.

Cyprus – one state, two stories The two major distinct ethnicities on the island of Cyprus, “Turkish” and “Greek” have differing “creation stories.” The Greek Cypriots see themselves as heirs of Alexander and the great Greek civilization that followed him; the Turkish Cypriots as the heirs of the Ottoman Empire, as developed, reformed and reinterpreted by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Cyprus’ long history has largely been a story of being incorporated into the locally-dominant empires of the day, with only rare interludes of independence. The majority of the population traces its ancestry to the Byzantine Empire, or beyond to the ancient Greek civilizations that came before the Roman conquest. Archaeological evidence suggests that the island was first settled around 10,000 B.C., but that these people died out by about 6000 B.C. New arrivals from Anatolia in 2400 B.C. knew how to work and exploit the copper they found on the island (the ancient name of the island, “kypros,” means copper), and trade with surrounding territories commenced. The Hittites, Assyrians, Egyptians and Ugarites all have references to Cyprus in their surviving written records. By 1200 B.C. Cyprus had several wealthy cities and a functioning trading economy.4 Greek civilization seems to have come with the arrival of Mycenaean settlers shortly thereafter—by the Early Iron Age Cyprus had become predominantly Greek in outlook and culture. Egyptian, and then Persian, influences were swept aside by Alexander the Great, accelerating the Hellenization of the island. After Alexander’s death, the wars between his generals ended with the Ptolemies gaining control of the island, and holding it until its incorporation into the Roman Empire in 58 B.C. It remained a Roman province for over 1000 years (being transferred to the eastern emperor’s demesne when the empire was divided). The neighbours were no longer neighbours—they were kith and kin. As the Arab soldiers of Islam expanded Moslem lands, Cyprus was attacked several times. In an early expedition, it is said, an aunt of the prophet Mohammed died when she fell off her horse by the Larnaca Salt Lake, an event commemorated by a mosque and lodge that became a place of pilgrimage for Turkish Cypriots. Eventually, the Arabs retreated. For a while, the Arabs and Eastern Roman Empire shared sovereignty over the island, until Byzantine sole control was completely restored in 958. 4

All http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prehistoric_Cyprus

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Rebellions against the Emperor in Constantinople in 1042 and 1092 were put down; but in 1185 Isaac Komnenos (himself of Imperial descent) was able to seize control. The rebellion ended, though, when Richard the Lionheart arrived from England in 1191, en route to the Crusades. Perceiving an insult to his fiancée, Berengaria, who was travelling with him, he attacked and captured Isaac, and so assumed control of the island. He soon sold it to the Knights Templar, who, in turn, sold it to Guy de Lusignan – a French Crusader, who established a dynasty that lasted for some 300 years. As influence of the Italian City-states grew, more Genoans and Venetians came to the island; in 1489 the threat of an Ottoman invasion led the last legitimate Lusignan, Caterina Cornaro, to sign the island over to Venice. The Ottoman invasion came 82 years later—Christian reinforcements from Europe failed to arrive in time to rescue the Venetians, and the Sultan in Constantinople (Istanbul) became Lord over Cyprus. The depleted population was augmented by settlers from Anatolia, the ancestors of the Turkish Cypriot population. (The Venetians and other Westerners were allowed to leave; their villages being taken over by the settlers.) By the time of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the Ottoman Empire was clearly in decline, and Britain, by means of a treaty that promised the Ottomans protection against Russia, was granted suzerainty over Cyprus. Ottoman overlordship was not formally abolished until 1914, when the Sultan’s decision to enter the First World War on the side of the Central Powers cleared the way for Britain to claim that he had violated the 1878 agreement. Britain administered the island until independence in 1960. The Greek Cypriot population sees itself as the heirs to classic Greek culture. When Britain took control of the island in 1878, a number of books appeared in the UK on the virtues of Greek civilization, and the way in which Cyprus’ “rustic republics” retained an authentic version of the ancient Greek city states. Unfortunately, this view had a very limited lifespan: British colonial officials were soon categorizing the Greek Cypriots as the true heirs of the Byzantines—with all the negative implications of complexity and intrigue which the term carries. The Turkish Cypriot version of history is slightly different, pointing out that Cyprus was never a colony of Greece (although part of the eastern Roman Empire), and that the Turkish conquest of 1570-1 was seen as by the Greek inhabitants as a liberation from the Venetian yoke that suppressed Orthodox Christianity in favour of Roman Catholicism. Venetian policy had decimated the population, so it was essential for the economy of the island to bolster the population. In any case, the Turks initially settled in the Venetian strongholds: either in the cities (Nicosia,

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Famagusta, Larnaca, Limassol Kyrenia and Paphos), or in evacuated villages, such as Temblos (Zeytinlik) and Vuda (Kalokhorio) whose names betray their Latin origin. Older versions of the story claim that Cyprus is Turkish by right of conquest; or, from a religious perspective, that, having once been incorporated into the Islamic community by the Arab conquests in the 7th to 10th centuries it could never again return permanently to Christian control. The consequence of these similar but importantly different accounts of history lead to mutually incompatible visions for the island – “Cyprus is Greek” leads to the demand for union with the Mother Country (enosis); “Cyprus is Turkish” leads to the demand for a return to Turkish rule, or, more realistically, for partition (taksim). Independence, in 1960, was an uneasy compromise that sought to build a state of Cypriots, with both taksim and enosis constitutionally prohibited. This compromise failed, or, at least, the way it was embodied in the new state’s constitution did—as the President, Archbishop Makarios, famously observed, the settlement of 1960 created a state, not a nation. 5 The Constitution attempted to protect the smaller Turkish Cypriot community by giving it an unequal share of political power: although it accounted for only about 20% of the population, it received 30% of the seats in Parliament (and Cabinet posts), and 30% of positions in the Civil Service. Where the leader of a particular state institution was a Greek Cypriot, his deputy would be a Turkish Cypriot. The highest courts in the land had foreign experts as Presidents, in order to break the tie if the Cypriot judges split along ethnic lines. The two sides have very different accounts on what happened next. The Greek Cypriot account is well expressed in the free booklet Cyprus 10,000 years of history & civilisation distributed by the Cyprus Tourism Organisation.6 The Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed on 16 August 1960. The island became a member of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Council of Europe and the Non-Aligned Movement. On the basis of the ZurichLondon agreements Britain maintained two sovereign military bases on the island with a total combined area of 158.4 square kilometres, consisting of Dhekelia to the east of Larnaka and Akrotiri-Episkopi near Lemesos. Two treaties were signed as part of the Zurich-London agreements, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee. The latter gave the right to the three

5

Statement to the Cyprus Mail March 28, 1963. Available from http://media.visitcyprus.com/media/eBrochures/High/10000_ years_of_history_lrg.pdf

6

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guarantor powers, Britain, Turkey and Greece, to take action in the event that the provisions of the Treaty were violated. Although the Cyprus constitution safeguarded the basic rights and freedoms of all its citizens, it contained community provisions that made it complex and non-workable. In 1963 the President of the Republic proposed constitutional amendments which both the Turkish Cypriot community leadership and Turkey rejected. The Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the government and proceeded to set up an illegal “Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration.” As a result of subsequent inter-communal conflict that ensued at the beginning of 1964, a United Nations Security Council resolution established a UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. In 1974 the military junta ruling Greece at the time staged a military coup in Cyprus aiming at the overthrow of elected President Makarios. Turkey used the coup as a pretext to invade militarily the island on 20 July 1974 and occupy 37% of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, displacing about 200000 Greek Cypriots from the occupied northern part of the island. Despite international condemnation of Turkey and the acknowledgement of the rights of the Cypriot people drafted in various resolutions issued by the United Nations, the Security Council, the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement and other international organisations, Turkish troops still illegally occupy the northern part of Cyprus. On 1 May 2004, with its northern part still under occupation, Cyprus became a full member of the European Union. The accession act included a protocol which states that implementation of the acquis communautaire on the areas not controlled by the Cyprus government (as a result of the Turkish invasion) is suspended. This suspension will be removed as soon as the Cyprus problem is solved. Efforts and negotiations to find a just and functional solution to the Cyprus problem are continuing.

The Turkish Cypriot account—if I might be allowed the licence to presume to speak for the Turkish Cypriots—would go something like this: The Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed on 16 August 1960. On the basis of the Zurich-London agreements Britain maintained two sovereign military bases on the island with a total combined area of 158.4 square kilometres, consisting of Dhekelia to the east of Larnaka and AkrotiriEpiskopi near Limasol. Two treaties were signed as part of the ZurichLondon agreements, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee. The latter gave the right to the three guarantor powers, Britain, Turkey and Greece, to take action in the event that the provisions of the Treaty were violated. Although the independence agreements safeguarded the basic rights and freedoms of all its citizens, they closed the door to enosis, and the complexity of the constitution required good will from all parties in order for it to function. Unfortunately, despite a decision of the Supreme Court

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Chapter Nine against it, the Makarios government refused to bring forward legislation to set up separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in the major towns, as the Constitution required. Instead, in 1963 Makarios proposed a set of constitutional amendments that would have removed many of the Turkish Cypriots’ rights, as part of the strategy of the Akritas Plan to achieve enosis. Turkey rejected the proposals and intercommunal violence erupted. The Turkish Cypriots were excluded from the Cyprus government. To keep the peace between the communities, a United Nations Peace Force was established in 1964. For the next decade, most Turkish Cypriots were forced to live in small enclaves for their mutual protection. In 1974 the military junta ruling Greece at the time staged a military coup in Cyprus aiming at the overthrow of elected President Makarios, and installed Nicos Sampson, a known EOKA terrorist, in his place. After consulting with Britain, Turkey exercised her treaty rights to intervene militarily on 20 July 1974. When peace talks failed to stop Greek Cypriot attacks on isolated Turkish Cypriot populations, the Turkish troops advanced and now occupy 37% of the island of Cyprus. Around 40,000 Turkish Cypriots were forced to leave their homes in the south, while about 200,000 Greek Cypriots left the northern part of the island. Despite ongoing efforts and negotiations to find an acceptable and just solution to the Cyprus problem, progress has been slow. In separate referenda held on 24 April 2004, Turkish Cypriots voted overwhelmingly for a settlement of the Cyprus problem, but the Greek Cypriots rejected it. Despite this result, a week later, the south of Cyprus became a full member of the European Union. The talks continue; but with little prospect of change in the near future. As a consequence, the Turkish Cypriots continue to develop the institutions of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the state they established in 1983.

Small wonder, then, that the two communities view things very differently. The same competing stories can be seen even more strikingly in school history textbooks: the Greek Cypriot narrative arc is of a struggle for the survival of Greek culture amid threats from foreign conquerors; the Turkish Cypriot one of a struggle for survival of the Turks of Cyprus in the face of Greek Cypriot aggression (Papadakis 2008). One example of the outworking of these different visions is what has happened to public holidays. In general, public holidays observed the major religious festivals of Christians and Muslims, and the national days of Greece and Turkey. Since 1974, the TRNC has cancelled Greek national and Christian holidays, and has added instead extra days to the two big Muslim holidays; in the Government-controlled areas, Moslem holidays were replaced by additional Christian ones in the 1990’s. A holiday to celebrate Cyprus’ independence was arranged for October (a more clement month for parades and open-air speechifying than August), and is still observed in

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the Government-controlled areas. The TRNC has removed the Republic’s holiday, replacing it with a day commemorating its unilateral declaration of independence in November (1983).

Belize – many peoples, many stories Belize’s early history is also complex. Originally settled by people heading south from North America, it came to be part of the Mayan lands. The Maya arrived around 2000 B.C., and founded a civilization that flourished for almost three millennia. The reasons for the decline that set in around 850-900 A.D. are still debated by archaeologists and anthropologists – overpopulation, environmental degradation, war and drought are the mostsuggested causes. Some estimates put the peak Mayan population of what is now Belize at three million people; the country today is home to only some 320,000 people in total. After the collapse of the Mayan civilization, Belize entered a dark age, and was largely bypassed by the 16th century Spanish conquistadors. The swampy, mosquito-infested land made it hard to land boats; and there seemed little prospect of finding gold, given the apparent lack of any civilization. The way was left open, therefore, for British (usually Scottish) adventurers to exploit the natural resources of the area. Spain acknowledged the rights of these pioneers (the Baymen, as they came to be called) at the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), but still made attempts to take over the developing settlement at the mouth of the Belize River during the next century. They were briefly successful while Britain’s attentions were focused on the rebellion further north, which led to the independence of the United States, but soon lost control again. The Battle of St George’s Caye in September 1798 is seen as pivotal—part of the creation story of what ultimately became Belize. A Spanish attempt to capture the Belize settlement was successfully resisted by a flotilla of boats manned by the British logger-settlers and 1200 or so of their slaves. During the course of the nineteenth century settlement in Belize expanded, and new arrivals appeared. From the creation story perspective, the most significant of these were the Garifuna—the descendants of offspring from marriages between escaped African slaves and the native peoples of the Caribbean islands (the Caribs and Arawaks). The story goes that the first community arrived on the Belizean coast on November 19, 1802, having escaped from Roatan Island off Honduras. At first treated with suspicion by the British colonists, they came to be seen as docile and hard-working.

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The ethnic patchwork of Belize was diversified in the 20th century by the arrival of Lebanese traders, Mennonites from Mexico, and, latterly, of Salvadorians and Guatemalans looking for land, Taiwanese and mainland Chinese businessmen, and sun-seeking second-home owners from the US and Canada. The Belize territory formally became a British colony in 1862, after a period in which the territory was administered from Jamaica as the more nebulously-sounding “part of the dominions of Her Majesty [Queen Victoria]” (Thomson, 2004: 83). It remained a colony until being granted independence in 1981, much later than most of the colonies of the British Empire. Public holidays commemorate foundation story events. In Belize, the civic holidays celebrate both the battle of St George’s Caye (September 10), when gallant British Baymen assisted by loyal slaves saw off a Spanish fleet (which was declared a public holiday on its centenary, in 1898); and Garifuna Settlement Day (November 19), commemorating the arrival of descendants of the Caribs, a holiday in the two southern districts (Toledo and Stann Creek) from 1943, and nationally since 1977. Independence (in 1981) is celebrated on September 21st. Also celebrated is Baron Bliss day (on March 9: this was renamed National Heroes and Benefactors’ Day in 2008), which commemorates the AngloPortuguese nobleman and traveller who arrived off the Belizean coast in January 1926, but was too ill to come ashore. He died a few weeks later, and although he never set foot in Belize, is buried there and left large sums of money to the territory in his will. The stories commemorated in Belize’s national holidays are not mutually exclusive. Just as almost everyone can celebrate Burns Night or St Patrick’s Day without having to be Scottish or Irish, so one can “become” Garifuna for a day. More importantly, they are, at some level, non-competitive. One can celebrate St George’s Caye, the arrival of the Garifuna, the wisdom of the Maya, and Creole culture without having to take a stand in seeing one, or more, of these as alien to one’s own cultural identity. The stories about the holidays can be developed over time. Creoles, rightly suspicious of celebrating the St George’s Caye battle, 7

7

“The origin myth promoted by the ‘colonials’ proclaimed that the most important event in Belize’s history was the defeat by one European empire of another over possession of a land that belonged to neither of them; … that Belizeans should be proud to be part of a great empire, even though they were a dependent and inferior part” (Shoman, 1994: 138-9).

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now stress the participation of their ancestors in the meeting that decided to fight rather than evacuate the colony.8 There are, of course, tensions in Belize—but not usually as a result of conflicting stories. Most random violence is blamed on “Guatemalans;” or, in the case of pedal-by shootings in Belize City, on the ongoing war between rival drug gangs. Chinese businessmen are occasionally attacked as their success in business (especially retailing) is supposedly resented by displaced shop-owners; but perhaps it is significant that the Arabs who previously ran most of the big retail outlets in the major towns are not blamed for the violence.

The Effects of British Rule Governing a large empire is hard work, and, where possible, it makes sense to outsource the work to the subjects. Both Belize and Cyprus were given measures of self-rule prior to independence. In Cyprus, the British Governor-General, the ultimate authority in the land, worked with a Legislative Council of 12 members—six Greeks, three Turks and three British. Inappropriate Greek demands for enosis could then always be blocked by the six non-Greeks, reinforced by the Governor-General’s veto. Divide and rule was generally effective: rarely would an issue arise where the 6 v 6 division was changed. (One case did occur: in 1931 a Turk sided with the Greeks on the issue of responsibility for a debt originally owed to the Ottomans, but which had come to be owed to Britain.) As agitation for enosis mounted in the 1950’s, Britain was able to play on the Turkish Cypriots’ fears of being subsumed into a Greek state to garner support for continuing British rule. In 1954 Henry Hopkinson (soon to be created the First Baron Colyton), the British Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, told the House of Commons that some of Britain’s colonies, because of their strategic importance, could never be fully independent, a speech which produced frustration and ultimately a violent response from the Greek Cypriots. Poor British policy decisions inflamed the matter, as they had almost 200 years earlier in North America. The Greek Cypriot leader (and ethnarch, as he would have been recognized by the Ottoman Empire), Archbishop Makarios, was sent into exile in the Seychelles for seemingly supporting EOKA’s campaign of violence, because Her Majesty’s 8

One of the Baymen brought a number of his slaves with him to Belize City for the crucial meeting: neither Shoman nor Thomson mentions this in their accounts of the battle.

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Government does not talk to terrorists. Except, of course, when it is necessary to do so. A few years later when EOKA suspended its campaign, talking resumed. But, as Joseph S. Joseph comments, The British colonial policy of “divide and rule” maintained and reinforced the ethnic, administrative, and political separation inherited from the Ottoman period. The British administration made no effort to create a unifying Cypriot political culture. The two communities were treated as separate groups for administrative purposes and antagonism between them was stirred (Joseph, 1997).

It is perhaps not a surprise, then, that the ultimate independence settlement in Cyprus produced something that lasted for only a few years. In Belize, things worked out far better. Although there were potential ways in which ethnic tensions could have been cultivated (Kriol, of Caribbean slave heritage, versus Mestizo of Spanish/Mayan heritage), there would have been little benefit to the colonial rulers to have done so. Like Makarios, the Belizean independence champion, George Price, was also originally a clergyman, but he had abandoned studying for the Catholic priesthood to enter politics. Unlike Archbishop Makarios, Price had a vision for a state that was inclusive. No-one wanted Belize to become part of Guatemala (or Mexico), or saw the other ethnic groups as somehow being entitled to dictate the fate of the country. Although the ethnicities were different and somewhat distinct, there were enough similarities (Christianity, in various forms, was, at least officially, the religion of the vast majority of all groups) and cross-cutting ties to unite people across any constant predetermined boundaries. The two major political parties—George Price’s People’s United Party (PUP), and what is now the United Democratic Party (UDP), illustrate this well. Internal selfgovernment in the last decades of colonial rule was dominated by the PUP. In 1981 the platform of the forerunner of the UDP was based on opposing independence to extract a guarantee of a robust British response to any unfriendly acts by Guatemala, and perhaps partly to try to get the thenequivalent of “gold-plated elephants” out of the retiring British regime.9

The effects of the neighbours One part of divide and rule involves bolstering favourable sides against unfavourable ones. Thus Britain could use Turkish interest in the Turks of 9 As Clare Short thought the victims of the 1997 Montserrat volcanic eruption were expecting (Hibbs, 1997).

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Cyprus as a foil to the enosis movement. The threat was that, if enosis were not abandoned, Cyprus would continue to be ruled from abroad— either as a British colony, or as a Turkish and Greek condominium. Given those horrors, independence, perhaps with the door held out to enosis later, was the least-worst option for the Greek population. When the first British Governor-General arrived in 1878, he was met by a delegation from the Greek Cypriot community, who both thanked Britain for the change of sovereignty over the island—and also looked forward to an early return of the island to Greece. (Only 14 years before, Britain had ceded the Ionian Islands, acquired from France at the end of the Napoleonic war, to Greece.) When Greece finally received the Dodecanese Islands from Italy at the end of WWII another precedent seemed to have been set, as the islands, too, had a Turkish minority.10 After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Atatürk adopted as a slogan “Peace at Home, Peace Abroad” (recently reformulated as “zero problems with neighbours”)—and the Turkish government took little interest in the fate of Cyprus. British policy, especially the divide and rule component after World War II, prompted Turkey to take more interest in Cyprus, rather than to leave the Turkish Cypriots to their fate in a Greekruled state. For the Turkish population, given that British rule would ultimately come to an end, and partition was out of the question, independence, bolstered by a guarantee from Turkey, was an acceptable second-best solution, especially as the final settlement seemed to leave the Turkish Cypriot community power to prevent the Greek Cypriot community from overwhelming them. Belize faced a different problem: a neighbour who wanted a version of enosis, but without consent. Guatemala, as the successor state to the Spanish empire, claimed that most of Belize was an integral part of her territory. In 1859, Britain and Guatemala agreed on what the boundaries of Belize would be; Guatemala gave up territorial claims to land in the south of Belize, but the Convention they signed contained a catch: article (VII) committed Britain and Guatemala conjointly to use their best efforts by taking adequate means for establishing the easiest communication...between the fittest place on the

10

Tension over the exact delineation between Turkish and Greek territory sometimes becomes violent, as happened with the dispute over Imia/Kardak in 1996. See Arapopoglou, 2002 and, for the role of journalists, who became part of the narrative, as well as reporting on it, see Manis, 2009.

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It is this article that ended up delaying Belizean independence. Guatemala claimed that, as Britain had not paid for the building of a road or railway from Guatemala City to Belize City (the preferred Guatemalan solution), she had forfeited her claim to the territory Guatemala had ceded in 1859. It was only when Guatemala promised to abide by the thenboundaries (in exchange for some rights of navigation through the sea channels in southern Belize) that Belize could become safely independent. Britain did not want to be involved in another long-range war (especially as the US had long been the hegemonic power of the region)—although she did get her chance in 1982, the year following Belize’s independence, when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. Britain’s expensive reaction in the South Atlantic on behalf of 2000 islanders and rather more British sheep, plus the continuing British military presence in Belize (for training purposes, of course) has no doubt helped squelch Guatemalan ambitions, although events in early 2016 suggest that the matter is still not finally resolved.11

The locals Even if there are baleful outside influences, why cannot the local people themselves transcend them? Why must Cypriots see themselves as Greek or Turkish, rather than as Cypriots, or, perhaps as Greek Cypriots in the same way Greek Americans see themselves as Greek Americans, or as Belizeans see themselves as Belizeans first? To try to cobble together a plausible compromise, the 1960 Cyprus Constitution was a complex document that, contrary to popular opinion, does not contain more words than there are Cypriots, but reads as if it might. To try to protect the Turkish community from being overwhelmed by the Greek majority, the Constitution mandated a Turkish-Cypriot VicePresident as a counterweight to the Greek-Cypriot President; a cabinet of seven Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots (appointed by the President and Vice-president respectively, with one of the major offices of state held by a Turkish Cypriot); a legislature with separate Greek and Turkish electoral rolls electing, by community, 35 Greek members and 15 Turkish members, and explicitly acknowledged that the proportions were impervious to any changes in population numbers. The judiciary 11

See “Guatemala annexes the Sarstoon!” Amandala March 2, 2016 pp. 1, 23.

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comprised a Supreme Court of a Turkish Cypriot judge, a Greek Cypriot judge and a neutral (the German law Professor Ernst Forsthoff) and a Court of Appeal. This comprised two Greek Cypriots, one Turk, and a neutral (first the Irishman Barra O’Brian, succeeded by the Canadian, John Leonard Wilson in 1962), who had an extra vote in the event of a tie. Even the office of coroner was divided on community lines. The result was perceived by the GC majority as highly unfair: why should a minority of some 18% have at least 30% of power – and sometimes more, given the Vice-President’s veto rights. The independence solution proved to be untenable. Although apologists for both sides claim that there was a genuine commitment to making the new Cyprus Republic work, it lasted little more than three years before violence engulfed it. Whatever the level of initial cooperation (I was told by the Turkish Cypriot leadership that they acted in good faith), mistrust and suspicion soon arose. Osman Örek, the Defence Minister, reports being told by President Makarios in 1961 that a plan to bring water by pipeline from Turkey was a non-starter, as the Greek Cypriot community would never allow Turkey to control the island’s water supply.12 By 1962, most co-operation between the Greeks and Turks had broken down. To try to pressurize President Makarios to follow through on a constitutional commitment to legislate separate Turkish and Greek municipalities in the five main towns, the Turkish Cypriot members of the legislature wielded their veto power to reject an income tax bill, with the result that there was no income tax paid by Cypriots. The next year Makarios suggested some major changes to the Constitution, which would have eroded the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. A few days later, violence erupted. Cyprus seemed set to foreshadow the path taken by Yugoslavia three decades later, rather than the peaceful transition to independence of Belize. Belize did not face challenges of the kind that Cyprus did. Both the PUP and opposition leaders agreed that the Guatemalan threat had to be removed before Belize could truly become a nation. Since independence, a vibrant (if rather strident) democracy has led to hotly contested elections, many claims of corruption and chicanery, and governments thrown out of office after a maximum of two five-year terms. Given that the Prime Minister has, on paper, far greater powers than in other Westminster democracies (such as the right to choose all judges, and to appoint a majority of the Senate) it is perhaps surprising that Belize has managed to 12 Osman Örek, comments at a conference on the Cyprus Problem, Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta, 1991.

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do as well as it has. Just before the election of March 2012, an environmental group, the Belize Coalition to Save Our National Heritage collected 20,160 signatures to force a ballot initiative referendum question on off-shore drilling (which has the potential to cause damage to Belize’s greatest marine asset, the Barrier Reef). The Chief Elections Officer (a political appointment) ruled that 8,047 signatures were invalid, taking the number of electors signing the petition below the 17,000-name threshold (10% of registered voters) required for the initiative to be subject to a vote. No violence, beyond words, resulted (the PUP, in opposition, somewhat opportunistically, said it would not allow off-shore drilling). Similarly, the disqualification of a PUP candidate on the ground that she was a US citizen on the date of her filing papers (although not by the date of the election) resulted only in claims of unfair play. It is interesting to note, also, that George Price was succeeded as leader of the PUP and as Prime Minister by Said Musa—a scion of a Lebanese family, and so of a very different ethnic background. (The election saw the UDP under Dean Barrow re-elected for a second term, albeit with a reduced majority. The Government subsequently decided to ban off-shore drilling.) But the Guatemala issue can serve to rally Belizeans, which can be illustrated by two recent events. In October 2012, Belize paid $10,000 to the Organization of American States to make an ex gratia payment to the family of a Guatemalan, shot by a Belizean soldier, allegedly in selfdefence, while the man was illegally panning for gold seven miles inside Belize. The payment was seen by many as capitulating to Guatemalan demands for compensation. 13 And in his remarks on the celebration of Taiwan’s national day in 2012, the Prime Minister, Dean Barrow, in thanking Taiwan for its diplomatic support, pointed out that both Taiwan and Belize faced territorial claims from large and powerful neighbours.14

Conclusions Belize represents a relatively successful transfer of power from an empire to a new state. Although there are tensions within the political system, it has held together, in a way that Cyprus was unable to do. The Belizeans can unite against a neighbour that they all conceptualize as dangerous; Cypriots cannot. One group views the Neighbour to the North as an 13 See reports in The (Belize) Reporter 21 October, 2012 (making the claim) and 28 October (publishing an OAS denial), and Amandala 2 November, where the Belizean Prime Minister claims credit for the idea. 14 “Belize salutes Taiwan on its 101 year of independence…” The Reporter 21 October 2012.

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invader, rapist and pillager; the other views it as a peace-keeper, saviour, and guarantor. For one, it is a good neighbour; for the other, it’s a neighbour from hell. Could a re-conceptualization of Turkey lead to a resolution of the Cyprus Problem? Unfortunately, Turkey isn’t what America is to Canada: for most of the Cypriot population it’s a more powerful Guatemala, one which has already acted (citing rights given by a treaty) to occupy a significant proportion of Cyprus’ territory. Alternatively, would it be possible for the Cypriots to start again, with the hope of a better outcome? Until this year, things did not look too promising—despite the opening of checkpoints in 2003 that allow people to cross the ceasefire line with relatively few formalities, and the large numbers of Cypriots who take advantage of this, a political solution has been out of reach. The outline of a settlement has been determined by the 1977 High Level agreement between Makarios and Denktash, but the political will to accept any manifestation of the agreement is lacking.15 Mutual suspicion has thwarted compromise, which is seen as weakness. Recent tensions over oil exploration and the weakening of the Turkish government’s desire to enter the European Union are worrying. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, unsurprisingly, has an extensive selection of material on Cyprus on its website. The “Recent Developments” section is blank (English version), and appears not to have been updated since 2008 (Turkish version).16 The last decade has mirrored the previous in its lack of progress towards a settlement. Between the referenda of 2004 and Cyprus’ entry into the EU and the election of Mustafa Aknc as the Turkish Cypriot leader in 2015 there has been precious little movement towards a settlement. Prior to this, a Turkish Cypriot might well have interpreted a “yes” vote to reunification as a weakness, as there had been no “concessions” from the Greek Cypriot side. The election of Derviú Ero÷lu (A Denktash protégé and former leader of the Ulusal Birlik Partisi) as Turkish Cypriot President in April 2010 made progress more difficult. Despite a number of initiatives by Ban Ki-Moon (resulting in five tripartite 15

The text for the High Level Agreement is available, inter alia at http://antifon.blogspot.ca/2011/02/cyprus-high-level-agreements-of-1977.html the Boutros Ghali “set of ideas” (1992) http://www.argyrosargyrou.fsnet.co.uk/Ideas.htm was followed by the Annan plan, finalized in March, 2004 (at http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf) followed the course charted in 1977. The devil, of course, was in the detail. 16 Site accessed June 29, 2015

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Ban/Christofias/Ero÷lu meetings between 2010 and 2012), even Ban called a halt, there being too little progress on the core issues to make an international conference worthwhile. An imminent reconstitution of a Cypriot state is still some way off, if less unlikely than it appeared a year or two ago. What is needed is a new story—one of Cypriotness. But how to construct an appropriate narrative? The new Cyprus Republic needs to be redesigned from scratch; even though everyone knows what it will look like, a fresh start is necessary. A new birth, a virgin birth (parthenogenesis) is arguably the most promising option. That may be the only way to start a new story, perhaps one which speaks less of the neighbours.

References Arapopoglou, Stergios (2002) Dispute in the Aegean Sea: The Imai/Kardak Crisis Report, Maxwell Air Force Base: Alabama, USA, April. Hibbs, John (1997) Short calls for an end to Montserrat aid row, Daily Telegraph 25 August. Joseph, Joseph S. (1997) Cyprus Ethnic Conflict and International Politics MacMillan (2nd edn). Manis, Athanasios (2009) The Role of Media in the Imia/Kardak Crisis: The Importance of Media Influence and its Limitations? Paper presented at the 4th Hellenic PhD Symposium on Contemporary Greece, London School of Economics, June. Papadakis, Yiannis (2008) Narrative, memory and history education in a divided Cyprus: a comparison of schoolbooks on the “History of Cyprus” History and Memory Vol. 20 No. 2 (Fall/Winter): 128-137. Portillo, Gustavo Adolfo Oreliana (2010) Background and Study of the Special Agreement between Guatemala and Belize to submit Guatemala’s Territorial, Insular and Maritime Claim to the International Court of Justice available at http://www.minex.gob.gt/ADMINPORTAL/Data/DOC/201009271713 48408BACKGROUNDANDSTUDYBOOKOFTHESPECIALAGREE MENTBETWEENGUATEMALAANDBELIZE.pdf. Shoman, Assad (1994) Thirteen Chapters of a History of Belize Belize City: Angelus. Thomson, Peter (2004) Belize: A Concise History Oxford: Macmillan.

CHAPTER TEN ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: COMPARING CYPRUS AND SRI LANKA ZENONAS TZIARRAS UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL LANCASHIRE (CYPRUS)

“There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is no male and female, for you are all one” —Galatians 3:28

Introduction Ethnic conflicts are by definition the conflicts in which “the goals of at least one party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions” (Cordell & Wolff, 2010: 4-5). But to what extent is ethnicity the underlying cause of such conflicts? Given the lack of consensus on the role of ethnicity as a cause and driver of ethnic conflicts, as well as on the concept of ethnicity itself, this chapter addresses both relevant theoretical literature and empirical evidence from existing research on the cases of Cyprus and Sri Lanka. The primary aim is to address the changing role of ethnicity in ethnic conflicts, and the ways in which it complicates conflict resolution strategies. Although the focus is on two case studies, the comparative analysis aspires to provide generalizable conclusions. Following a discussion of the concepts and methods used, the chapter is divided into three main sections: the Cyprus case study, the Sri Lanka case study, and a comparative analysis. The analysis of each case study seeks to assess the prominence (or lack thereof) of ethnicity in the conflicts in question. More specifically, in each case I look at the history from ancient times and through the different colonization periods, to the post-independence conflict period and the post-conflict era. The

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comparison of the two case studies then allows for the identification of similarities and differences. It is argued that ethnicity’s prominence changes over time and that the similar historical circumstances of the two conflicts play an important part in determining its role over time. Moreover, I argue that although the role of ethnicity can change or evolve during the course of a conflict, ethnicity essentially characterizes the nature of the conflict rather than its root causes (Carment, 2007: 63). Potential root causes are explored: political and economic factors, horizontal inequalities, the role of education, the exploitation of ethnic identity by elites, colonial history, nationalism, and so forth. Further, a distinction is made between these root causes and the actors and factors that trigger or exacerbate a conflict. The perception of these often differs between the groups that are involved in the conflict. Finally, the conclusions suggest that, given the changing role of ethnicity in ethnic conflicts, the most prominent characteristic of the conflict should be identified at any given time in order for more effective conflict resolution strategies to be formulated.

Concepts and Methodology Finding a consensus in the different approaches of scholarship to ethnicity and ethnic conflict is unlikely, given the diversity of thought on the matter. There are scholars who go so far as to suggest that “there is no sense in defining states and ethnic groups by the category of a nation” (Tishkov, 2000: 625), a view with which others would vehemently disagree. 1 Although Tishkov’s kind of thinking could prove helpful in certain contexts, it can easily complicate things when it comes to adopting a working definition of ethnicity that captures the realities on the ground. Therefore, my plan is to adopt a more moderate methodological and conceptual approach to provide working definitions that facilitate analysis and help to draw conclusions and practical policy implications. I take ethnicity to be “the state of being ethnic, or belong[ing] to an ethnic group” (Kellas, 1998: 6). In addition I accept Giddens’s (2009: 633) premise that the culture and attitudes (e.g. language, history, religion) of a certain group of people ethnically distinguish those people from other groups. In the case of Cyprus the religious, linguistic and historical differences are those between Islam and Christianity; the Turkish and Greek languages; and Ottoman and Greek ancestry. In Sri Lanka the conflicting 1

Other explanations are presented below.

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religions are Buddhism and Hinduism; the languages are Sinhala and Tamil, while the Sinhalese have mainly North-Indian and the Tamils Dravidian/South-Indian descent (Zwier, 1998: 13-15). Another important concept is that of nationalism. Nationalism is related to ethnicity—or ethnic identity—although they are not one and the same (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998: 37; Silva, 1998: 12-13). Nationalism, an older term, is mainly used to refer to an ideological/political movement that “puts the nation first before all other forms of social and political organisation” (Wolff, 2006: 32). I agree with Gellner who argues that nations do not create nationalism but rather nationalism creates nations; to this nationalist end, “Dead languages can be revived, traditions invented, [and] quite fictitious pristine purities restored” (Gellner, 1994: 64). More specifically, and central to this chapter’s argument, is not the concept of civic nationalism, which defines a nation in terms of territory, but that of ethnic nationalism (or ethno-nationalism) which seeks the creation of an ethnically pure nation by excluding anyone who does not belong to a particular ethnic group. This type of nationalism is more prone to conflict (Gurr & Harff, 1994: 18; Wolff, 2006: 32). Thus, ethnic nationalism could be associated with “ethnocentrism,” although ethnocentrism is not so much bound to a “nation” or a “race” and it mainly refers to the psychological explanations of an individual’s favourable feelings towards his or her own ethnic group and negative feelings towards other ethnic groups (Kellas, 1998: 6).

Given that a conflict is “a situation in which two or more actors pursue incompatible, yet from their own perspectives entirely just, goals” (Cordell & Wolff, 2010: 4-5) the goals of different ethno-nationalist groups, seeking to create an ethnically-pure nation and exclude other different ethnicities can lead to inter-ethnic conflict. As Kaufmann (1996: 138) put it, “Ethnic conflicts are disputes between communities which see themselves as having distinct heritages, over the power of relationship between the communities.” But this says little about why ethnic conflicts emerge. Further, as Carment (2007: 63) correctly notes, “To say that ethnic conflict arises because there are distinct ethnic groups is, at best, tautological.” Instead, a good starting point for the exploration of the root causes of ethnic conflicts would be the acknowledgment of the incompatible goals of the conflicting parties and the ways they might be shaped by ethnic identity at different times and under different circumstances. Having said that, though, we should recognize that although the same patterns can be

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found among different cases of ethnic conflict, the root causes will vary and each case will have its own particularities. Possible explanations of the causes of ethnic conflicts emanate from several disciplines, ranging from political science and sociology to anthropology, economics, theology and psychology. A major social psychological work on ethnic conflict identifies three main categories of motives: a conflict between tradition and modernization; a clash of economic interests; and tensions between cultural homogeneity and pluralism (Horowitz, 1985: 95-140). In similar vein, but from a political science perspective, Wolff (2006: 68), drawing upon Brown (2001: 4-5), argues that four types of factors constitute the “underlying causes” of ethnic conflicts: structural, political, economic and cultural factors. Each one of these types of explanations can include a series of other (secondary) factors. This framework can be used to summarize the factors that have been identified by scholars as causes of ethnic conflict (see also Blagojevic, 2009: 2-8). In many cases, although ethnic divisions and hatreds exist, they are not expressed through violent ethnic conflict: some other factors need to come into play. Such exacerbating factors, depending on the particular circumstances of the time concerned, could be, for example, the colonial administrative system (structural), elite manipulation (political), discrimination in economic (economic/social) or cultural policies (cultural) (Brown, 2001: 5). There is, of course, overlap between these categories, because actors such as religious or political leaders could be responsible for more than one of them. In short, these factors cause, exacerbate or prolong an ethnic conflict because they intensify the real or constructed ethnic divisions and hatreds. There are two main approaches used to examine the extent to which ethnicity is responsible for conflict: the “instrumentalist” and the “psychocultural.” Whereas the former stresses the exploitation of ethnic identity by elites to accomplish political or economic ends, the latter sees ethnic identity and the perceptions of ethnic groups as the primary factors leading to an ethnic conflict (Kaufman, 2011: 91). The instrumentalist approach can also be associated with Circumstantialism, and the psycho-cultural one with Primordialism (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998: 59-60). Circumstantialism focuses on the circumstances that shape the interests of a group, rather than the interests themselves, and on the claim that circumstances and social change can “encourage” or “produce” identities without “the intervening mediation of interests” (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998: 59). Primordialism “focuses on the ways ethnic and racial identities are built, rebuilt, and sometimes dismantled over time,” and “places the interactions

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between circumstances and groups at the heart of these processes” (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998: 72). Ultimately I adopt a synthesis of Circumstantialism and Primordialism, named Constructionist (or Constructivist) by Cornell and Hartmann (1998). It builds on Circumstantialism by incorporating some insights from Primordialism, such as an individual’s powerful attachment and commitment to an ethnic group which “can arouse the emotions, sometimes to the point of homicidal fury” (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998: 52). Specifically, once ethnic identity has been constructed, it becomes a central driving force of ethnic conflict. I think that the Constructivist approach can best account for the dynamic and changing nature of ethnic identity in ethnic conflicts. Methodologically, I adopt the technique of focused comparison or comparative case study. The cases are “small N” studies, as they focus on comparing a specific political phenomena in a small number of countries. Although an overarching theory is not necessary for a case study analysis, I shall employ a Construnctionist approach, for the reasons elaborated above, while the case studies fall into the category of ethnic conflicts (Hague & Harrop, 2001: 71-73). Cyprus and Sri Lanka are both cases of ethnic conflict, they both experienced British colonization, comparable social and political changes at similar times, and they both have a long history of difficult intergroup relations, horizontal inequalities and of nationalist and secessionist movements. George and Bennett (2005: 69) say that analysis of case studies requires the study of relevant variables that differentiate them. Similarly, Dion (1998: 127) notes that comparative case studies “often rely on … choosing some phenomenon of political interest, gathering data on occurrences of the phenomenon, then determining what characteristics the occurrences have in common.” In this chapter, I am trying to explain (the break-out of) ethnic conflict. My aim is to examine the extent to which ethnicity can be a causal factor in producing, exacerbating and prolonging an ethnic conflict. I conclude that the answer varies over time and depends on particular circumstances.

Cyprus: From Antiquity to Today The history of Cyprus has bequeathed us a complex social structure of several ethnic groups; the most important in terms of population are the Greek-Cypriots (GCs) and Turkish-Cypriots (TCs). This case study seeks to explore the roles of past colonizers, the Greek-Orthodox Church, and

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political parties in the ethnic conflict, and ultimately to analyse the developing role of ethnicity in the conflict. Neither GCs nor TCs have lived on the island since the beginning of time. Both groups are products of migration and other historical processes. Cyprus did not have an Hellenic character until 1200BC when it received a massive influx of Mycenaean/Greek settlers from Peloponnesus. This was due, most probably, to an earthquake and/or raids by seafaring neighbours. Their arrival had a direct effect on all aspects of life and ultimately, according to many, Hellenized the island (Peristianis, 2008: 42). Further, the passing of the island to Byzantine control (395AD) played a decisive role in shaping the Hellenic character of Cyprus. There were no TCs on the island until 1571, when the Ottoman Empire conquered Cyprus. Ottoman rule followed hundreds of years of other nonHellenic domination of the island, by such groups as the Persians, Romans, Latins, and lastly the Venetians and Genoans. In 1572 Sultan Selim II ordered a transfer of population to Cyprus from elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. Initially, 2,580 families came. By 1853 the Ottoman population census for Cyprus showed 14,983 Muslim men and 29,223 non-Muslim men (Halaço÷lu in Kzlyürek, 2009: 19-20). It is important to note that the Muslim count is probably inflated: by that time, there were also Christians, both Orthodox and Catholic, who had been converted or feigned conversion to Islam. 2 During the first centuries of Ottoman rule relations between the Muslims and Christians were peaceful, and religious differences were tolerated. Importantly, the Ottoman Empire granted autonomy to the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. Nonetheless, the Ottoman authorities maintained a much harsher attitude toward the non-Muslims, treating them as inferiors (Kzlyürek, 2009: 20-23). Two main elements played an important role in generating ethnic consciousness among the Orthodox Christians of Cyprus. First, the enlightenment (and particularly the so-called Hellenic enlightenment) and the nineteenth century development of capitalism brought nationalism and a desire for nation-states to the forefront of attention (Litsas, 2003: 5). Second, the Greek nationalism that emanated from the revolution in Greece against the Ottoman Empire from 1821 produced a desire for the reunification of all the Greek-inhabited lands of Europe and Asia Minor (Litsas, 2003: 5). The ideas of the Hellenic Enlightenment first touched 2

Those who feigned conversion did so for a number of economic, social and security reasons and were called “Linobambaki” (literally, cotton-linen, a reference to the Biblical prohibition of mixing two kinds of material in one garment, in Leviticus 19:19; see Michel, 1908).

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Cyprus’ Greek bourgeoisie through the commercial bonds it had with Greece, which led it to identify itself as ethnically Greek. As a result, it was the first group to express opposition to the Ottoman occupation, opposition which spread to the rest of the Cypriot Greek community, leading to its differentiation from other (non-Greek) Christians and to its committing revolutionary acts against the Empire (Litsas, 2003: 5). The year 1878 brought changes to Cyprus. The Ottoman government in Istanbul (the Porte), aware of the Empire’s weak position, agreed to rent Cyprus to Great Britain in exchange for British support in its war with Russia. Greek-Cypriots perceived the arrival of the British as a salutary development that would deliver them from Ottoman oppression (Kzlyürek, 2009: 28-29). Given “the overwhelming ethnic Greek character of the island,” Cypriots found the opportunity safely to express their wish for unification (enosis) with the Greek state (established in 1830), an idea that had first been suggested as early as 1828 by the governor of Greece, Ioannis Kapodistrias (Fouskas, 2001: 101; Panteli, 1990: 59-60). Greek Cypriot enthusiasm stemmed, among other things, from the fact that in 1880 William Gladstone was elected Prime Minister in Britain (Aleksandrou, 2010: 21). Gladstone’s name was associated with delivering the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864. Belief that it was Britain’s intention to do the same with Cyprus was also periodically encouraged by statements, such as Winston Churchill’s highlighting the “Hellenic” character of the island, and adding that it should be unified with Greece (Fouskas, 2001: 101). In summary, domestic and external elites had a significant role in the construction of the Greek ethnic identity. Over time, Greek ethnicity became politicized thus creating a “mass movement” which sought enosis. As a reaction, a TC nationalist movement emerged, advocating Cyprus’ return to Turkey, or, by the 1950s, for the partition (taksim) of the island along ethnic lines (Mavratsas, 1996: 77). Consequently, the relationship between the elites of the two ethnic groups deteriorated while the British system of administration worsened the situation (Kzlyürek, 2009: 30). Initially the British colonial authorities enacted a proportional administrative arrangement based on the population of each community; after TCs complained about unequal treatment the British rearranged the system so that the number of British appointed representatives together with the Muslim representatives was equal to the number of GC representatives (Kzlyürek, 2009: 31). The Governor’s casting vote could thereby ensure that the GC’s could always be overruled. Such an arrangement was part of the British strategy of “divide and rule,” which aimed at maintaining better control over the island. At the same time the GC political quest for enosis created a convenient political

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environment for the colonial authorities to strengthen their co-operation with TCs, against GC ambitions. Later developments caused tensions between the two communities. Most of the TCs adopted the modernization ideas of the Young Turk movement (1908) and later Atatürk’s reforms, which caused rapid change within the TC community. In parallel, GCs acquired more confidence in promoting unification with Greece, owing to the integration of Crete into Greece in 1912 and, later, the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in the First World War; this in turn exacerbated TC concerns. Further tensions were created in 1915 when Britain offered Cyprus to Greece in exchange for its participation in the First World War, though this never came to fruition. In 1930-31 massive GC uprisings demanding enosis occurred, and the British authorities turned Muslims against Greeks by recruiting Muslims as “gendarmes and security personnel,” thus underpinning “the transformation of Cypriot Muslims into Turkish nationalists” and diplomatically involving Turkey in Cyprus (Fouskas, 2001: 104-105; 2003: 73). Despite growing separation between the two groups, and the occasional small-scale but violent clashes, tensions were mostly contained among the elite at the political level, while among the lower, mainly rural, classes there were still peaceful inter-ethnic relationships because both Muslims and Christians of the working class faced common problems (Kzlyürek, 2009: 38). Over time this changed and the elites’ animosities gradually infected the lower levels of society, through factors such as ethnically based education and the Orthodox Church’s propaganda promoting and supporting divisions. Anagnostopoulou (1998/1999: 199-200) rightly argues that enosis was gradually imposed as Cypriot national policy among the GCs in parallel with the gradual recognition and imposition of the Church’s leadership on Orthodox Cypriots. The greater acceptance of enosis by the Church politicized it and rendered it legitimacy as the leading authority of the national struggle for liberation. “True” Cypriots were only those who were politically under and recognized by the Church as Greek Orthodox Christians. This meant that Cypriot identity was equated with being ethnically Greek. Within this framework Turkish-Cypriots could exist only as part of a minority of “other Cypriots,” or as “Turks.” The first political parties emerged during the Second World War: the communist GC AKEL and the TC KATAK. The creation of workers’ unions that followed marked the ethnic division within the working class. The first one was meant to represent both TCs and GCs, but it adopted as policy the promotion of enosis, thereby driving TCs away and to the

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creation of separate TC unions. As a result, a big gulf was generated between the communities by the 1950s (Kzlyürek, 2009: 45-49). In this climate, 1955 saw the establishment of the GC EOKA militant organization with the goal of Cyprus’ liberation and enosis. As a reaction to the creation of EOKA, the British created a police force manned by TCs while in 1957 Turkey funded the creation of the TC counterpart of EOKA, TMT, 3 which had as its ultimate goal the partition of the island. After bloody clashes and the diplomatic involvement of Britain, Turkey and Greece, the British withdrew and the Cyprus Republic was established in 1960 (Kzlyürek, 2009: 52-53). The establishment of the Republic “brought about a regime of independence ‘supervised’ by three foreign ‘guarantor’ nations (UK, Turkey and Greece)” and shattered the dreams of both communities (Trimikliniotis, 2009a: 391). It entailed abandoning the goals of enosis and taksim. The Republic’s constitution was based on a communally-based system of shared power that made a distinction between the two ethnic communities (GCs 78% and TCs 18%) and barely acknowledged other minority groups (the Maronites, Armenians, and Latins). The social and political environment after independence was not as one would expect if genuine rapprochement between the communities had taken place. Nationalism, particularly on the part of GCs, was ever more openly expressed. Stavrinides (1999: 36), writes: On Sundays, and on “national” occasions, memorial services were held in honour of the dead of the struggle, in which Makarios [the President and Archbishop] himself, his Greek ministers and other politicians made patriotic speeches. Streets and squares, social clubs and athletic games were named after EOKA heroes. The Radio and Television put out programmes extolling the heroic exploits of EOKA and the Greek people in general.

It is obvious that the establishment of the Republic was not the kind of independence the GCs had wanted. President Makarios did not see himself and act as the President of all Cypriots but rather as the Ethnarch of GCs. He is on record as saying, later, that “Independence was not the aim and purpose of EOKA struggle…Foreign factors have prevented the achievement of the national goal, but this should not be a cause for sorrow […] Greek Cypriots will march on to complete the final victory” (16 August, 1974, quoted in Stavrinides, 1999: 37). 3

TMT, the Turkish Resistance Organization was the TC military counterpart of EOKA which fought to achieve taksim–the secession of the TCs.

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The quest for enosis was not abandoned. Statements by GC officials after independence gave GCs the idea that enosis was still an achievable goal. This provoked negative feelings and attitudes within the TC community, despite the protections the Constitution afforded it. Arguably, even the “constitution itself could be described as a blueprint for further partition” (Mallison, 2005: 34). Disputes emerged over different aspects of the constitution such as the creation of separate GC and TC administrations in the largest towns, taxation, and the armed forces. Disagreement about the last of these led to the creation of different unofficial militias by the two sides, but the problems did not stop there. The GCs saw that the degree of the TC participation in the Republic’s institutions was “disproportionately large in relation to their numerical strength” (Emilianides, 2003; Mallison, 2005: 42), which allowed the TCs to form a blocking minority in the Parliament, as well as giving the TC VicePresident veto powers. In 1963 Makarios, supported by former EOKA leader, Georgios Grivas, submitted thirteen constitutional amendments to all three guarantor powers and the TC leadership. Makarios’ “thirteen points” were drafted with British help and sought to resolve deadlock by eliminating most of the TC’s veto powers. Both Turkey and the TCs rejected the proposals (Drousiotis, 2005: 111; Mallison, 2005: 208, endnote 13). This caused rising tension in both communities, as TCs opposed the GC efforts for a “just” constitution. It did not take long for the tensions to be expressed in violence. The first large scale ethnic clashes were in December 1963. The TCs withdrew from the government and parliament, formed their own institutions, and many TCs moved into camps in north Nicosia and to other areas where there were concentrations of TCs. North Nicosia and the other TC enclaves served the ethnocentric purposes of both GC and TC nationalists by forming ethnically homogenous communities (Drousiotis, 2005: 151-156). Thereafter ethnic violence spread while Turkey and Greece undertook an active role: the former attempted air-strikes and threatened an invasion, which was stopped by American diplomatic involvement; and the latter sent about five thousand troops into Cyprus to reinforce the paramilitary GC groups. The problem was internationalized; the first UN forces arrived in Cyprus in 1964 soon after the first geographic separation line (“Green Line”) was drawn in Nicosia (Drousiotis, 2005). GCs associated EOKA and its members with the liberation struggle against the British that would produce enosis. Thus, one could argue that the prominence of EOKA members within the GC community, together

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with Makarios’ nationalist rhetoric, gave a boost to opposition to the constitution, striving still for enosis and attacking the TCs who did not accept Makarios’ proposed constitutional amendments. This could mean that both the people who engaged in the ethnic clashes of 1963-1964 and the nationalist political elites sought to exploit the feelings of GCs for freedom and self-determination in order to accomplish their own ethnic nationalistic aims, and thus to accentuate the role of ethnic identity. Further, the media narratives on both sides and the involvement of the two “motherlands” played a crucial role in the exacerbation of the conflict and intensified the clashing nationalisms. After 1963, GC actions consolidated both the geographical and social cleavages between the two communities. TCs were either removed from or abandoned administrative positions, the Greek national anthem was adopted and played on official occasions, the TCs were politically isolated and the Turkish language was unofficially abolished even though, according to the constitution, it was one of the two official languages of the Republic (Trimikliniotis, 2009b, pp. 44-45). Education played an important role too. The GC educational system was based on that of Greece. Schools had been promoting Greek culture and the “national links of Cyprus with Greece” since the British colonial period (Persianis, 1981: 11). Although there was disagreement among GCs on whether education should become independent from Greece (i.e. more Cypriot), it was still “modelled upon that of Greece in order to preserve ‘Greekness.’ Education was not only politicized, but also became part of the conflict since it “influence[d]…the attitudes, the loyalties and the ideals of the people” (Persianis, 1981: 11, 22). The 1964-67 period was relatively peaceful. Generally, although GCs had not forgotten the “enosis ideal,” they were now more absorbed into problems of everyday life, thus becoming less aggressive. As Stavrinides (1999: 68-69) argues, this was because the situation which came about after the isolation of the TCs and the passing of all administrative positions and political power into GC hands was very convenient. But in 1967 another crisis took place when the GC National Guard under Grivas’ command attacked two TC-majority villages (Kofinou and Agios Theodoros, in Larnaca district). Their aim was to disarm the TC militant organization TMT which controlled the villages and created problems for their GC populations (Drousiotis, 2007). Turkey reacted by sending an ultimatum to the GC leadership warning of an invasion. Once again the US played the role of the mediator while Grivas and the Greek military division were removed from Cyprus to de-escalate the situation (Heraclides, 2006: 105).

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In 1971 EOKA B’ was established by Grivas, because Makarios had stopped pursuing enosis (Stavrinides, 1999, pp. 65-66). EOKA B’, with the support of the Greek junta, and after a series of attempts against the life of Makarios and others, conducted a coup against the Makarios government in 1974. This provided the pretext for Turkey to invade Cyprus in order to “restore the constitutional order” and “protect the TCs,” according to the official Turkish position (Drousiotis, 2003). The invasion took place in two parts (Attilas I and II) and led to the occupation of 37 percent of the Island. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus was catastrophic, creating thousands of refugees, and was responsible for many deaths and missing persons on both sides. TCs perceived Turkey’s involvement as saving and protective, a fact which enhanced their positive ethnic feelings towards the “motherland.” The situation on the other side was similar. The grievances, hatreds and feelings of injustice which the Turkish invasion caused within the GC community developed an intensified nationalism which associated TCs more directly with the Turkish nation and created a perceived equivalence of identity between the two. In addition, the post-invasion status quo entailed, among other things, the direct diplomatic involvement of Greece, and the Cyprus problem remains one of the main problems between Turkey and Greece. These external implications of the conflict played an important part in solidifying the two nationalisms and preventing TCs and GCs from resolving the problem on their own (Kzlyürek, 2009: 101-124). After the invasion a kind of political system emerged in the north, with political parties and administrative structures. An illegal state was established in 1983, called the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) and recognized only by Turkey, and thousands of settlers were brought to the island from Turkey in an effort to alter the local demographic balance. As of 2007, the population in the occupied territories was approximately 256,000, of which only 120,000 were “of full Turkish Cypriot parentage,” whereas Turkish settlers were estimated to be about 77,000, although some argue they number more than that (Bahceli, 2007). The south is still controlled by Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 constitution, as amended, is still in force. After 1974 a Cypriot identity (Cypriocentrism) became more prominent, mostly in the GC community, leading to a balanced coexistence with the Greek one. This was reflected in “symbolic official double-talk”—the use of both Greek and Cypriot flags together and the “simultaneous use of the Cypriot flag with the Greek national anthem” (Papadakis, 1998, p. 153). A similar situation can be seen in the TC

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community where, for example, the TC and Turkish flags are used “to impress upon all the existence and authority of the Turkish Cypriot state” (Papadakis, 2005: 87-88). Cypriocentrism is also evident in the political parties that dominated the political scene, especially in the GC dominated post-1974 Republic of Cyprus. The two biggest, and ideologically opposite, parties that the majority of GCs support are the left-wing AKEL and the right-wing DISI. AKEL promotes a rapprochement with TCs and advocates a Cypriot identity; DISI, having been formed mainly by pro-enosis right-wing parties or groups, honours and commemorates enosis heroes such as Grivas, promotes policy solidarity with Greece against Turkey and uses phrases such as “Cypriot Hellenism” to refer to GCs (Papadakis, 1998: 153-156). The differences between these two parties reflect the main political and ideological divisions within the GC community that have existed since the 1970s. Whilst these parties have contributed to the identity dualism they have also played a part in prolonging ideological divisions.4 On both sides the projection of ethnically-based policies is not solely verbal. The different flags, as mentioned above, their provocative uses, military parades, and more, had different meanings for each community and resulted in their alienation from one another. As Anastasiou (2008: 163) puts it, This nonverbal but powerful and ever-present exchange of meanings through national symbols resulted in the perpetual undermining and often annihilation of the conditions necessary for genuine communication.

After 1974 the de facto situation of absolute geographical division worsened the situation at the societal level. The strict division made communication across the Green line almost impossible for ordinary Cypriots. Non-communication led each side to develop its own account of history that intensified the “otherness” and hatred towards the other. This could be explained by Gordon Allport’s social-psychological “contact 4

TC political parties also started to form around the same period, although the unilateral declaration of independence of the “TRNC” came later. Rauf Denktaú, who was the founder of the “TRNC,” also founded the National Unity Party (UBP) in 1975 which dominated the TC political scene with its nationalist agenda and pro-secession policies. It contributed greatly to the consolidation of nationalism in the TC community. Serious opposition to UBP’s policies mainly arose with prosolution and pro-federation TC demonstrations against the Denktaú administration in the early 2000s. (Anagnostopoulou, 2004: 364-403)

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hypothesis” or “intergroup contact theory,” which suggests that the lack of contact between groups results in the construction of mistaken images and prejudice for one another thus alienating them (Allport, 1954; Chrysohoou, 2005: 176-177). The contact hypothesis fits with the Constructionist approach as well, given the emphasis on the construction of certain perceptions under circumstances of non-communication. The political climate summarized above characterized the first 20 to 30 years after the invasion. The situation on the island during this period (and in more recent years) has been characterized as “silent” or even “comfortable” (Adamides & Constantinou, 2012). Prior to 2000, many rounds of negotiations took place and plans for a settlement were suggested (e.g. Boutros Ghali’s “Set of Ideas”), while an important development was the granting of the status of candidate state for EU membership to Turkey in 1999. This was also the year when the efforts which led to the Annan Plan commenced. The years from 1999 to 2004 constituted a crucial period in the negotiations, resulting in the 2004 referenda on the implementation of the “Annan Plan.” In addition, in April 2003 massive TC protests against the policies of their leadership and the poor living conditions in the north led TC leader Rauf Denktaú, with Turkey’s support, to partially withdraw the restrictions on movement between the two communities (Theophanous, 2006: 82-83). As a result the tensions in the occupied area were effectively de-escalated and a new period of more intercommunal interaction began. However, only a relatively small number of people on each side travelled regularly across the Green Line and developed contacts with the other side (and along with this more favourable attitudes towards reconciliation and co-existence) (Psaltis, 2008). 5 The majority of the people in the two communities saw the withdrawal of travel restrictions as a political action undertaken by the TC leadership to accomplish economic development and the indirect recognition of the illegal “TRNC” (Psaltis, 2008: 40-41). The referenda on the Annan Plan finally took place in April 2004. 75% of GCs voted against it (“NO”) and 65% of TCs voted for it (“YES”). The GC response received international condemnation and the Republic of Cyprus was blamed for not wanting a settlement. Explanations of the GC “NO” vote vary and are still debated. Media narratives, the obscurity of some of the Plan’s points and the intensive negative portrayal of its flaws, and fear-mongering played a very important role in the negative poll result .

5 These were likely people who had pre-1974 relationships with persons of the other community.

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(Christophorou, et al. 2010; Heraclides, 2006: 380-397). Nationalist rhetoric was also very prominent: the most significant example is perhaps the attitude of the President Tassos Papadopoulos, who adopted highly theatrical and dramatic language in his final public statement before the vote, strongly urging GCs to say “NO.” The post-2004 period presents some small but important developments at the societal level of the two communities. First, it was predictable that the TCs would be disappointed with the outcome of the 2004 referenda, given that most of them were in favour of the proposed settlement. On the other side of the Green Line, the massive “NO” of the GCs led to renewed solidarity within the community against an “unjust settlement” that would once again, according to the mainstream GC narrative, favour the TCs and Turkey. Although this is a majority opinion among GCs, there are, however, also those who are in favour of reconciliation and believe that a good opportunity for re-unification was lost. What is significant after 2004, and this is not necessarily attributable to the referenda outcomes but could be a response to economic woes, is the emergence of small extreme GC nationalist groups that reprise the kind of nationalism of the 1960s.6 The Cypriot Orthodox Church, which used its influence to encourage the GCs to reject the Annan Plan, shares many of the ideas that these groups have on such issues as immigration, which both see as excessive. These nationalists occasionally undertake violent actions against TCs, migrants, and other ethnic groups (Avgi, 2013; McdonaldGibson, 2013). Likewise, the Archbishop makes polarizing distinctions between Christians and non-Christians and often uses a pro-Hellenistic nationalist rhetoric by referring, for example, to GCs as the Hellenic population of Cyprus (Tselepis, 2011: 11). It is clear that the religious elite and nationalism are still intertwined and that they contribute to building and prolonging ethnic polarization. But in contrast to the growth of negative perceptions, there is a promising aspect. Over the past few years the number of initiatives from civil society and international organizations that promote reconciliation and peace has increased significantly. Increasing co-operation has led to bi-communal conferences and research programmes on the relations between the two communities. The aim is to create a shared narrative, alleviate hatreds, and deconstruct negative images and prejudice (see, for example, AHDR, 2012; Öztoprak, 2000; Seeds of Peace, 2014).

6

Such tendencies also exist in the north, and are becoming significant in causing the greater polarization of society there (Trimikliniotis, 2010: 63).

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Sri Lanka: From Antiquity to Today The Sri Lankan case, although a more violent and protracted example of ethnic conflict, is in a sense less complicated than Cyprus since it is essentially domestic, limited to the conflict between the two major ethnic groups (Tamils and Sinhalese) on the island; no other parties or “motherlands” are actively involved. This section examines the role of ethnicity during the different periods of conflict and assesses the importance of other factors in exacerbating and prolonging conflict. Buddhist tradition, derived from religious texts and mythology, says that the Sinhala people arrived on the Island of Ceylon—it was renamed Sri Lanka in 1972—in 500 BC, that their ancestors were Aryans from north India, and that their “arrival coincided with Gautama Buddha’s nirvana” (Ram, 1989: 32). Tamils have a different version of history, claiming that Sinhala and Buddhism arrived to the island after they did. An early confrontation that has contributed to the construction of the two communities’ distinctive narratives is dated to 101 BC, when the Tamil kingdom in Anaradhapura was defeated by the Sinhalese king Duttugemenu; after that there were several further Tamil invasions of the Sinhala kingdoms. The Tamil king, Elara or Eelala, gave his name (as “Eelam”) to the Tamil secessionist movement which emerged in the 1980’s, over 2000 years later (Ram, 1989: 32). According to the Sinhalese, the victory of king Duttugemenu preserved Buddhism; it contained the dangerous Tamils and saved the Sinhalese nation (Weiss, 2011: 15-16; Bartholomeusz, 2002: 55-64). However, this narrative has been softened over the years: what is now known of this ancient history is much more nuanced than the Sinhalese nationalist version. For example, archaeological evidence has shown that the Tamils arrived in Sri Lanka as early as the Sinhalese and that “there were many Tamils in Duttugemenu’s army, while many Sinhalese fought for Elara” (Weiss, 2011: 17). Around the 5th century AD a clash between Tamil dynasties in the south of India affected Sri Lanka, and led the Sinhalese gradually to move to the south of the island thereby triggering the development of a distinct Sinhalese identity. Thus the island was loosely divided; although there were several heterogeneous areas, the north was mostly populated by Tamils and the south mainly by Sinhalese: this separation lasted until the 20th century (Weiss, 2011: 17-18). Things changed for the kingdoms of the two groups when the first colonizers, the Portuguese, arrived in Sri Lanka in 1505. At the time there were three kingdoms on the island: two Sinhalese and one Tamil. The Portuguese managed to conquer the Tamil and one of the Sinhalese

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kingdoms (Ram, 1989: 33). Both Portuguese (1505-1658) and Dutch (1658-1796) colonizers focused their efforts on the island’s coasts, leaving control over the interior to the other, unconquered, Sinhalese kingdom (Kandy) (Peebles, 1990: 34). Things changed again when the British drove the Dutch out during the Napoleonic wars. By 1815 the island was under full British control, and its administration had been centralised. British colonization brought about changes to inter-group relations within the framework of the colonial economy. For example, the Tamil community grew as Britain brought more from India to work in the tea plantations. The immigrants, though, were seen as distinct from the indigenous Tamil community, whom they soon outnumbered (Ram, 1989: 33). This immigration had a significant impact on the demographic and social dynamics of the island. Many Tamils were taught English by American Christian missionaries who went to the Tamil-dominated Jaffna peninsula to “teach and proselytize” (Weiss, 2011: 21). Moreover, as the favoured community of the British, the Tamils began to enter the civil service, the colonial administration, and the more prestigious professions by exploiting their knowledge of English (Weiss, 2011: 21-22). It is often argued that these developments in the Tamil community generated hatred in the Sinhalese community. But this is not the case: the Sinhalese had no problem with the administrative or other professional careers of the Tamils, at least not until the early 20th century. It was mainly a post-independence Sinhalese re-interpretation of 19th century history that was wrongly but intentionally used by the postindependence Sinhala administration to enhance nationalist feelings among the Sinhalese (Weiss, 2011: 21). Divisions between the Tamils and Sinhalese could also be found in religion and culture. During the nineteenth century, some members of the Sinhalese community became rich because of the privileges they had over “tax collection, the brewing of alcohol and running gambling and cock-fights” obtained through good relations with the colonial authorities (Weiss, 2011: 19). This emerging new middle class of Sinhalese was “heavily engaged in the construction of a social and religious culture of nationalism that would reconnect them with traditions from which they felt themselves previously alienated due to the cultural imperialism of the Europeans and the British” (Kapferer, 2001 paraphrased in Ali, 2006). As such the Buddhist element within the Sinhala community was enhanced, generating divisions between the two groups (Wolff, 2006: 69). Also during the 19th century German theories of “Aryanism” influenced the Sinhala elite, enhancing their ethnic consciousness while, in reaction, the Tamils reinforced their

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own ethnic identity by recalling their Dravidian descent (Peebles, 1990: 31). In the early 20th century the British introduced a representative system of government based on ethnic and religious divisions, allegedly for the better management of a multi-ethnic polity. This effectively led to the creation of two different political groups, each of which promoted its own political agenda and ethnically-based policies (Ram, 1989: 34). Universal male suffrage was granted to the whole island in 1931. Voting for members of the legislative council that Britain established in 1933 was determined by ethnic and religious categories (Tamils, Sinhalese, Europeans) leading to the perception that there was a need for different, ethnically based, political platforms (Ram, 1989: 34). By the time of independence in 1948 political parties were divided along ethnic lines, which contributed to the intensification of political, ethnic and religious differences. The situation in the legislative council, and later in the parliament, clearly favoured the Sinhalese since they constituted the majority of the population (75%). Consequently, after independence they easily won power, and did not face any difficulty in implementing policies that discriminated against the Tamils. The result of these processes was a background of polarization which provided the conditions that produced the hostile relationship between the two ethnic groups after independence. Only then were the hatred and feelings of resentment expressed which led to tensions and violence, much as in Cyprus. The United National Party (UNP) had won the 1947 elections and formed the first post-independence government. The Colonial constitution of 1931 was replaced by a new western-style more democratic one. 7 However, this new constitution “was ineffective in safeguarding the pluralistic nature of the island” and so much of the post-independence ethnic violence can be attributed to its ineffective safeguards (Ram, 1989: 35). As the Sinhalese constituted the majority and could form the government without reference to Tamil concerns, they could rule in the interests of the Sinhalese and make few concessions to the Tamils. Democracy allowed the Sinhalese to enact discriminatory policies, such as the “Sinhala only” Act which established the Sinhalese language as the official language of the state. Generally, “leaders from both sides of the conflict [were] elected simply based on their willingness to redistribute resources to their particular ethnic groups” (Carment, 2007: 65). Thus the 7

Lord Soulbury was the chairman of the British-appointed Commission that produced the constitution.

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new constitution and “electoral politics” (Silva, 1998: 21) were two of the factors that played a crucial role in transforming the silent ethnic divisions into salient tensions, and later violent clashes, between the two groups. Kellas (1998: 158-159) describes the situation in post-colonial Ceylon in this way: Where the former empires ruled indirectly through local princes or elite groups, the new “nation-states” seek direct authority and social homogeneity. Thus, official languages are introduced and one ethnic group often carries the “national” identity of the state. This leaves all the other ethnic groups and languages at a disadvantage, and their reaction takes the form of ethnic nationalism. Thus in Sri Lanka the introduction of Sinhalese as the official language...and the consequent privileges granted to Sinhalese speakers in state employment, education, and so on, provoked the Tamil nationalist reaction. The partition of Sri Lanka into two nations or federal units is the Tamil nationalist solution to the threat posed by Sinhalese nationalism.

Language, religion and education policies increased the segregation between the ethnic groups and helped delineate distinct ethnic identities. The “Sinhala only” Act, for example, aimed at entrenching Sinhalese domination of public administration and, more generally, at reviving the ancient glory of the Sinhalese (Oberst, 1988: 182-184).8 The constructed images of overrepresented Tamils in the colonial administration were used by the Sinhalese elites to justify the ethnically-based discriminatory policies (Peebles, 1990: 32). The same political and religious elites exploited and distorted ancient Sinhalese Buddhist myths and texts, as mentioned above, to suggest that there were ancient (pre-existing) hatreds between the groups (Ali, 2006). Thus they managed “to create an overarching identity that has transformed... [the Sinhalese] ...into a distinct nationality” (Peebles, 1990: 31). In education important divisive polices were introduced during the 1970s. It was much harder for Tamil students to gain entry to university as they needed higher marks, while at the same time they were also unable to access foreign currency to enable them to study in India (DeVotta, 2009: 1026). Ethnic divisions were further intensified when school and university textbooks, administration, and teacher training became ethnically based (S. Perera, 2008). In general, pro-Sinhalese policies played a very prominent role in the conflict as they weakened the “Tamil presence in education and thus also in the professions and civil 8 The Act made Sinhala the official language of Ceylon, replacing English and alienating the Tamils.

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administration,” leading Tamils to think they were “perceived as a marginal community” (S. Perera, 2008). These policies were enacted within a wider social and political climate of tension, where Tamil protests were repressed as a new anti-Tamil constitution was unilaterally drafted by the Sinhalese to replace Lord Soulbury’s. Introduced in 1972, the new constitution further undermined the multi-ethnic and pluralistic nature of Sri Lanka by diminishing the status of all religions apart from Buddhism, which was now supported by the state. In addition it ignored the Tamil desire for autonomy within a federal state (Ram, 1989: 44). In other words, the 1972 constitution was a “blatant expression of the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism that had dominated the island’s politics since 1950” (Ram, 1989: 45). In the same year, as a reaction to the new reality of discriminatory policies and political system, the Tamil New Tigers organization was formed, and four years later became the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It was a patriotic organization which believed that secession through guerrilla warfare was the only way to achieve its aims. Although there were other Tamil political parties, it was the LTTE that became the leader of the Tamil nationalist movement, because it expressed Tamil demands and opposed the 1972 constitution and other forms of unjust treatment by the Sinhalese. The LTTE demands for a homeland were based on a historical narrative claiming that until the arrival of the Portuguese the Tamils had their own state—the Kingdom of Jaffna (Ram, 1989: 48). The LTTE was countered by a Sinhalese militant group, the “People’s Liberation Front” (JVP).9 It is important to stress, though, that neither community was monolithic or static in terms of their politics or stance. The pacifist efforts of both Sinhalese and Tamils prior to the emergence of the LTTE need specifically to be acknowledged. One of the most important examples of rapprochement was the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957, an agreement between Sri Lanka's Prime Minister Solomon W. R. D. Bandaranaike and the leader of the Tamil Federal Party (ITAK) Samuel J. V. Chelvanayakam, which sought to bridge intercommunal friction by making Tamil one of the national languages and by encouraging more Tamil engagemant in local administration through a less centralized power structure. The agreement eventually failed owing to strong opposition 9

JVP started as an ethnically-inclusive Marxist group, with goals that were primarily socialist. It organized a revolt in 1971. This failed, and JVP went through an ideological transformation, becoming increasingly aligned with Sinhalese ethnic identity. It was banned in the late 1980s after it tried again (and failed) to prevent the granting of Tamil autonomy and the presence of Indian troops in Sri Lanka.

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from Buddhist monks and Jayewardene’s UNP. Although Bandaranaike continued to believe in the pact and tried to push for it within his Sri Lanka Freedom Party, strife between the ITAK and UNP-led mobs led to its failure. The decisive blow came when Buddhist monks demonstrated outside Bandaranaike’s house. The monks refused to leave unless the agreement was cancelled. Bandaranaike succumbed to the pressure, coming from the UNP and from within his party as well as from the monks, and repudiated the agreement, citing the agitation that was threatening to lead the country into chaos. This climb-down, though, served to increase unrest among the ITAK-led Tamils, which sparked Sinhalese reactions. The upheaval quickly turned into riots and political violence between the two communities. Violence de-escalated later, in 1958, but the events of 1957 further reinforced perceptions of ethnic division, and became the prelude to the Tamil quest for secession (Ram, 1989: 39-41; Zwier, 1998: 53-54). Even as late as 1976 the biggest Tamil party, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), was still advocating for a peaceful partition. But a year later the Sinhalese-dominated coalition government fell, and the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and its Leftist allies lost the elections. UNP won a decisive majority of seats in parliament (140 out of 168), which gave it almost untrammelled power and the ability to change the constitution unilaterally (Silva, 1998: 37). UNP took the opportunity to introduce a new constitution in 1978. 10 Although this constitution improved the positions of Tamils in the civil administration, it also granted great power to the President instead of the Prime Minister. 11 Sinhala remained the official language, and a new “Prevention of Terrorism” Act gave the police very broad power to intern suspects without trial. Furthermore, the Jayewardene administration emphasized its support of Sinhalese Buddhism in an effort to emulate the glory of the ancient Buddhist kingdoms while also trying to associate Jayewardene himself with the great kings of the pre-colonial era (Zwier, 1998: 57). The discriminatory Sinhala policies bolstered support for the LTTE. The limited efforts of the Jayewardene government to make concessions to

10

Although UNP appeared willing to solve the country’s ethnic divisions it did not move far enough in that direction to de-escalate the tension; it was a case of too little, too late. 11 This was important as the UNP leader and architect of the new constitution Richard Jayewardene served as Prime Minister 1977-78, and then became President.

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them were seen as inadequate by the Tamils.12 The relations between the two groups once again became increasingly tense in the late 1970s and early 1980s when anti-Tamil riots and gunfights broke out. According to Hoffman (2006: 139), the LTTE was the first to draw blood by attacking Tamil policemen and anti-secessionist politicians who had contacts with the government. The year 1983 is often seen as the beginning of the Sri Lankan civil war. It was then that the intensified hatred and tensions of previous years exploded. Among the fragmented guerrilla movement and the weakened TULF (which was deprived of its participation in Parliament), the LTTE became the most influential organization among Tamils (Ram, 1989: 5455). During the preceding few years, the LTTE had been stepping up terrorist attacks. These had started as a response to the provisions of the 1978 Constitution that gave Sinhala language and Buddhist religion special status. Its actions where countered by the military while Sinhalese gangs responded by attacking Tamils areas, thus triggering a series of bloody clashes between the Tamils and the LTTE on the one side, and the Sinhalese and army on the other. These “development[s] marked the militarisation and the steady brutalisation of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict” (S. Perera, 2008). Throughout Jayewardene’s time in office (1977-1988) linguistic and religious policies were not the only factors responsible for the escalation of the conflict; political and economic factors were also important. One Sinhalese action that caused an intense Tamil nationalist reaction was the Sinhalese settlement of the northern Dry Zone and other areas with traditionally Tamil majorities. Although Dry Zone colonization has a long history, the handling of the situation by the government during the 1970s and 1980s helped fan the flames of ethnic conflict. Sinhalese settlement aimed to increase agricultural production, but it also had the effect of altering the demographics of the Zone (Carment, 2007: 64). The government also worked with the local Muslim community to accomplish this goal, as the Muslims did not support the Tamil notion of “a traditional Tamil homeland in the North East region.” The Sinhalese could therefore engineer a clash between the Tamil and Muslim communities as well (S. Perera, 2008). In its effort to emphasize Sinhalese ethnic supremacy, the government equated the Dry Zone colonization with similar actions of Sinhalese peasants in the past, making it an “integral part of Sinhalese-Buddhist 12

For example, Jayewardene abolished the “affirmative action” standardization policy for university admission which had discriminated against the Tamils.

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nation-building” (S. Perera, 2008). Re-worked Sinhalese myths about the Dry Zone reinforced the idea that Tamils posed a threat to Sinhalese life there (Peebles, 1990: 32). According to Horowitz (1985: 175-181), constructed fears affect the psychology of groups, leading to the development of a survival instinct. But this action did not leave the Tamils unaffected; based on their own ancestral stories, they claimed a “Tamil homeland” in the Zone. These mutually-exclusive historical narratives eliminated any basis for rational management of the problem, given that the argument was ideologically driven and emotionally charged (Peebles, 1990: 32). Even though Buddhism teaches non-violence, the Sinhalese government organized and funded Buddhist ceremonies which took place before important battles, in order to excite the ethnic and religious passions of the troops. As Kent (2010: 173) put it, When a monk preaches before a group of soldiers, he walks a fine line between serving the needs of the soldiers as individuals suffering...and serving the Sri Lankan government, which needs soldiers willing to fight and die for its cause.

Within the framework of nationalist feelings, fanaticism, and the climate of conflict, the non-violent but government-sanctioned Buddhist ceremonies served the Sinhalese cause. It might seem odd that a Buddhist might resort to violence (Kent, 2010: 173); but it appears that the religious obligation of non-violence “can be overruled by the obligation to protect the Buddhist religion” (Bartholomeusz, 2002, paraphrased in Kent, 2010: 162). Another important aspect of the conflict is the role of the elites and of the Diaspora. Elites play an important role both in causing and in prolonging a conflict: ethnic leaders and elites can use ethnic divisions and conflict to acquire more power and control over their supporters. Ethnic identity and nationalism are often used to draw the attention of those living overseas who financially support their own ethnic groups at home, giving the elites an opportunity to capture this economic support (Carment, 2007: 62-63). For example the Tamil Diaspora in Tamil Nadu, south India, provided a lot of aid to the Tamils in Sri Lanka (Kellas, 1998: 159; Silva, 1998: 193-194). And the Diaspora can sometimes nudge its host country into action. As the conflict unfolded, India became more involved in the island’s internal affairs. Until 1990 it acted as a “principal mediator” in the conflict and the “presumed protector of the interests of the Tamil minorities in the island” (Silva, 1998: 194). The regional superpower pressurized the

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Jayewardene administration to resolve the conflict. After Sri Lanka’s negative response, India repudiated the embargo that had been imposed on the Tamils by the Sri Lankan government, which led the government to sign an agreement with the Tamils (Zwier, 1998: 63-64). 13 But the agreement was not acceptable to the rest of the Sinhalese body politic; bloody riots broke out, and Indian troops arrived on the island. This peacekeeping force (IPKF) tried to stop the Tamil violence, but initially had little success. A ceasefire could eventually be enforced, and the Indian forces left in 1990. But the conflict did not end. Violence continued, and all talks between the Sinhalese government and the Tamil rebels were suspended in 1995 when the LTTE ended a truce by attacking a Sri Lankan naval base. The Tamils had rejected a government proposal to cede more control over their own affairs as it stopped short of granting a Tamil homeland in the north. In response to the LTTE offensive the government launched a large-scale counteroffensive, capturing Jaffna before the end of the year (see Schaffer, 1996). Despite the government victory, the guerilla war continued. In the late 1990s Norway became involved as a mediator; this intervention was fairly successful, and a ceasefire was signed in 2002, with many concessions having been made by both sides. But the LTTE, which by that time had become more extreme, and no longer represented the views of the majority of Tamils, withdrew from the negotiations and once again resumed terrorist attacks. In 2005, the Tamil Tigers assassinated the Tamil Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, because of his involvement in the peace process and because he “played a key role in getting the group listed as a banned militant organization in the US and the UK” (BBC, 2005). Large-scale fighting re-started in July 2006 when “the LTTE closed the sluice gates of the Mavil Aru (Mavil Oya) reservoir… and cut the water supply to 15,000 villages in government controlled areas” (T. R. Perera, 2009). At around the same time the LTTE pulled out of ongoing peace talks, escalating the violence. The government finally repudiated the truce agreement in 2008, and launched a major offensive against the LTTE the following year. This action led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands Tamils, the killing of tens of thousands of civilians, and ultimately to the defeat of LTTE. 13

The agreement included merging the northern and eastern provinces; the end of the state of emergency in the north and east; immunity for militants who surrendered their weapons; the return of around 130,000 refugees from India; recognition of Tamil and English as official languages alongside Sinhala; and the possibility of posting an Indian peace-keeping force in Sri Lanka. (Zwier, 1998: 64-65)

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The aftermath of LTTE’s defeat has not solved the problems of Sri Lanka. Political and social turbulence remain, and a continued government crackdown on Tamil activists has meant that violations of human rights have continued. The island’s constitution was amended in September of 2010, removing the two-term limit on the presidency, abolishing the constitutional council,14 and giving the president the authority to appoint members of the supreme court and putatively independent commissions on human rights, the police, and elections (Economist, 2010). The Economist took issue with the new constitution for subverting democracy in Sri Lanka, and for the complete lack of any reforms to alleviate Tamil grievances. The only significant attempt to rebuild ethnic harmony was the establishment of the “Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Committee” (LLRC). However, the credibility of this committee is in serious doubt: it is made up of pro-government civil servants; it has only a limited mandate to address war crimes; it does not provide a witness protection programme; and more often than not it “works to exonerate the government and undermine its own limited calls for further inquiry” (ICG, 2011). The government is obviously reluctant to embrace reconciliation wholeheartedly or to proceed with any kind of genuine “political power sharing as an element for long-term ethnic conflict resolution” (Uyangoda, 2010, p. 111). Hence, in the words of Uyangoda (2010: 111), “The LTTE’s military defeat may not necessarily mark an end to the ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka, but rather may simply redefine the tensions and tools to political ones in the post-civil war phase.” From today’s vantage point, we could argue that this has indeed been the case since 2009.

A Comparative Analysis Having looked at the two case studies, I now turn to identifying the causes that exacerbated and prolonged these two ethnic conflicts at different times during their history. An analysis of the role of ethnicity in the ethnic conflicts in question makes it clear that there were not always ethnic divisions or hatreds, at least not in their current form. More specifically, ethnicity cannot be seen as a causative factor in these conflicts, or, at least, not for the majority of the time. There were religious and cultural 14

The Constitutional Council was introduced in 2001 by the 17th constitutional amendment in an effort to democratize and de-politicise public institutions, but it faced many shortcomings and failed to function properly. It was replaced in 2010 by the Parliamentary Council under the 18th amendment (AHRC, 2006).

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differences, but whatever tensions they produced were not salient. Somewhere along the way, especially since British rule, certain actors and factors played an instrumental role in constructing ethnic identities, intensifying ethnic divisions, and triggering violent conflict. The identification of these actors and factors, as well as when they were prominent, is essential in order to understand how ethnically-based these conflicts really are. Based on the case studies analyses, Table I shows the different actors who contributed in the emergence of the ethnic conflicts in Cyprus and Sri Lanka, and the time period of their prominence. The underlined elements are those common to both conflicts. Table I: Actors who caused, exacerbated and prolonged the conflicts Time Period PreColonial

Colonial (British)

Cyprus x Greek Orthodox Church x Economic Elites x “Motherlands” (Greece, Ottoman Empire) x Colonizers x Nationalist/Paramilitary Groups x Greek Orthodox Church x Political Parties and Unions x “Motherlands” (Greece, Turkey)

PostColonial

x x x x

Conflict Period

In Cyprus the Post-Colonial Period coincides with the Conflict Period (1960-1974) and thus the exacerbating factors remain mostly the same.

PostConflict Period

x x x x

Nationalist/Paramilitary groups Greek-Cypriot Government “Motherlands” (Greece, Turkey) Political Parties

G/C Political Parties Greek Orthodox Church “Motherlands” (Turkey) Communities Leaderships

Sri Lanka x x

Religious Leaders Kingdoms Leaderships

x Colonizers x Political and Economic Elites x Political Parties x Nationalist/Paramilitary groups x Political Parties x Sri Lankan Government x Political and Economic Elites x Religious leaders x Nationalist/Paramilitary groups x Sri Lankan Government – Army x Political Parties and Elites x

Sri Lankan Government

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The actors of the pre-colonial era created the first divisions among the communities by triggering ethnic consciousness within each group. Those of the colonial and (most importantly) post-colonial period were the ones who exploited what had been mostly silent divisions, leading the groups into violent conflict. Table II presents the ways in which policies and actions (factors) undertaken by the actors during the various time periods accomplished this. The factors labelled “exacerbating” are those that ignited the conflicts by turning silent divisions into violence; in each case the starting point lies in the British colonial period. Table II: Factors that caused, exacerbated and prolonged the conflicts Time Period

Cyprus

PreColonial

x Church Policies x Ottoman Policies x The nationalist influence of “Motherlands”

Colonial (British)

x Colonial Administration System x Colonial dividing policies x Political Elites’ quest for Enosis and ethnically based education policies x Church’s quest for enosis and dividing propaganda x Bi-communal Political Parties and Unions adopted enosis x The “Motherlands’” nationalist rhetoric

PostColonial

x Terrorist actions from paramilitary groups x Government ethnically based education and linguistic policies x Electoral and Parliamentary system x Colonial drafted constitution x G/C proposed constitutional amendments x “Motherlands” support to the respective communities x G/C dominated administration (after 1964)

Sri Lanka x x

Religious disputes Territorial disputes

x Colonial Administration System x British brought demographic changes x Horizontal inequalities (e.g. Sinhalese privileges) x Construction of ethnic and religious supremacy from elites x Colonial ethnically based constitutions x Political parties’ ethnically based political stands x Terrorist actions from paramilitary groups x Electoral and Parliamentary system x Ineffective colonial constitution x Government ethnically based education and linguistic policies x Sinhalese amended constitution x Buddhist religion strengthened over the others

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Conflict Period

In Cyprus the post-colonial period coincides with the conflict period (1960-1974) thus the exacerbating factors remain mostly the same.

PostConflict Period

x The “Cypriocentrism” and “Greekcentrism” narratives of the G/C political parties x Orthodox Church’s nationalism x The “Motherlands” influence – especially in T/C leadership’s policies

x Sinhalese dominated government x Sinhalese run administration system x Mythical and distorted historical narratives x Military and paramilitary activity x Government linguistic and religious policies x Government (Sinhalese) colonisation of Tamil lands for territorial and economic reasons x Ethnic supremacy construction based on historical narratives x The use of religious extremism by Government x Elite’s exploitation of ethnicity for political power and economic support from Diaspora x Government’s reluctance for reconciliatory reforms x Creation of biased reconciliation committee

Based on the above data it appears that there is, indeed, a pattern in the elements (both actors and factors) that played a role in creating, intensifying and prolonging the conflict. There are, of course, distinct and unique particularities in each case, but the general pattern can be summarized by grouping elements into four categories: (a) Religion, (b) Colonialism, (c) Majoritarian governance and discriminatory policies, and (d) Elite economic and political interests. During the colonial and post-colonial periods ethnicity was not salient in the sense that it was not the primary lens through which Sinhalese and Tamils saw or defined their interests. Instead, until the time of independence, other processes and circumstances triggered ethnic consciousness, gradually constructing ethnic identities, and creating the first divisions along ethnic lines. Furthermore, clashes of interest, prior to

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the actual conflict, were mainly between the elites of the ethnic groups. Later, when the elites gained power, they implemented policies and undertook series of actions that emphasized ethnic differences and communicated these differences to the lower classes of society. Educational and linguistic policies, coupled with the rhetoric and actions of political parties produced this result. As the elites’ interests had been expressed in ethnic terms and passed on to the lower classes, the conflict assumed a more ethnic character. Consequently, when violence broke out between groups, ethnicity played a more prominent role since hatred towards the “other” was effectively embodied in society: indeed, it could be argued that now ethnicity was functioning as an independent explanatory variable of conflict. Nonetheless, even during the conflict, the political and economic elites on both sides, especially in the Sri Lankan case, were able to profit financially from the unrest (Orjuela, 2003: 206). As things progressed, ethnically-based policy-making did not cease, which intensified both the conflict and ethnic hatred. In Cyprus, violent conflict technically ceased in 1974 after Turkey’s invasion and the de facto division of the island. However, since then, amidst a kind of “silent” conflict, the rhetoric and symbols used by nationalist and populist political elites on both sides have played an important role in prolonging the saliency of ethnic divisions and perceptions of otherness. A similar reality is reflected in today’s Sri Lankan politics and society. Although the conflict technically ended in 2009 with the military defeat of LTTE, the Sri Lankan government’s majoritarian and undemocratic policies continue to stir up inter-communal turbulence and instability. An important development of Tamil ethnic identity after 1995 and especially during the 2000s was the separation of the Tamil Tigers from the rest of the Tamil community as LTTE had gradually focused only on its own extremist goals. LTTE is a good example of how an ethnic organization that was created to oppose discriminatory ethnic policies and seek secession became overwhelmingly driven by ethnic nationalism with more extremist goals than the elites who created it (Kellas, 1998: 159160). The situation in Cyprus in 1974 was very similar. EOKA B’ attempted a coup against Makarios and his government mainly because he was seen to have abandoned the goal of enosis. In the early 1960s Makarios had a very good relationship with many of the militants. EOKA B’ was a relatively small group whose aims (and especially its actions) did not reflect the opinion of the majority of the GCs by the early 1970s. On the TC side, and especially in the 1960s, the militant organization TMT and

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nationalist TC leaders both played important roles in consolidating TC ethnic identity. The territorial division of the two communities was furthered by the 1974 Turkish invasion, while the self-declaration of autonomy of the “TRNC” largely realized the TC nationalist goals. Apart from these common patterns between the two conflicts, there are differences that make the cases unique and so limit the validity of any generalizations that may come out of this analysis. For example, the Cyprus case is much more complicated than the Sri Lankan one owing to the larger number of actors involved. The Cyprus case could be characterized as a liberation struggle (1950s), an ethnic conflict (1960s), a civil war in the GC community (early 1970s, as pro-Makarios groups clashed with EOKA B’) and an international conflict (1974). It could also be characterized as an extra-state15 and internationalized conflict. Violent ethnic conflict in Cyprus was limited to a shorter time period than in Sri Lanka, but whereas in Cyprus violence started before independence, in Sri Lanka it was almost exclusively post-independence. There is also a significant difference between the two cases in the way in which violence started. In Cyprus, for GC and TC militants to have the capability for armed conflict, the two “motherlands” had to play an important role in exacerbating the ethic nature of the conflict by adding a nationalist element: the two communities were “threatened” not only by the other ethnic group on the island but also by the involvement of Greece and Turkey. In the Sri Lankan case, while it is true that the Tamils received external help from the Tamil Diaspora and that both Sinhalese and Tamils used stories of their ancestry in order to construct their ethnic supremacy, there was no desire from either group for unification with their ancestors’ lands. For example, Indian Tamils did not seek territorial and political separation from Sri Lanka in order to establish a political union with India. GCs and TCs on the other hand sought to be united with their respective perceived “motherlands.” In addition, neither India nor any other third party did anything to provoke such a desire. This section has demonstrated how the prominence of ethnicity in these two ethnic conflicts has changed over time, and how other factors built and accentuated ethnic identities that soon led to violence. The similar historical experiences, actors, and factors, and the similar chronological ordering of developments in both conflicts, allow me to make certain, rough, generalizations that might apply more broadly. One would expect that the prominence of the role of ethnicity changes over 15 Extra-state conflict is the conflict between a state and a non-state political actor. One example is the conflict between Turkey and EOKA B’.

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time in other ethnic cases of conflict that have a similar history to Cyprus and Sri Lanka. Even so, these conclusions have little value if nothing follows from them. In the next section, I suggest practical policy proposals arising from the analysis of the case studies that might assist with resolving ethnic disputes.

Conclusions and Implications for Conflict Resolution The case studies provide evidence for the claim that ethnic identity does not, in itself, cause conflicts. Rather, ethnic identity, after being constructed and emphasized, can shape the motives and methods of certain actors to produce an environment prone to ethnic conflict. Competing incompatible goals of the parties in both the cases have been shaped by considerations of ethnic identity. Depending on the particular circumstances of the time, and on how “ethnicized” the clash of interests is, approaches to conflict resolution should be tailored appropriately in order to address the most prominent factors that are likely to extend the conflict. Höglund and Svensson argue that changes in the peace-making methods used may have a negative impact on their effectiveness. But they also acknowledge that, particularly in the Sri Lankan case, the international community shifted its approach because of the “parties’ intransigence” and the “lack of progress in the peace process.” They also stress the fact that the increasing autonomy and violent activity of the LTTE led the international community to deal with it as a terrorist group (Höglund & Svensson, 2011: 178-179). The most usual kind of international peace-making efforts are based on a “sticks and carrots” logic which aims at using a fixed set of incentives to bring the conflicting parties to an agreement. But this approach cannot produce positive results at all stages of a conflict because the dynamics that drive a conflict do not always remain the same. At the very least, the carrots and sticks need to change. It is vital that a correct assessment needs to be made at each state of a conflict in order for the right policies and actions to be undertaken. Bearing this in mind, the importance of the analysis of the case studies becomes clear. As the role of ethnicity in ethnic conflicts changes, the timing of action targeted at managing and resolving an ethnic conflict is crucial. The best way to resolve a clash of the parties’ goals (especially when these are deemed to be incompatible) is to make structural changes as soon as possible in order to address perceived inequalities between groups and thus remove the pretext for violence. If, however, the tensions

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boil over into violence, the underlying factors that originally caused the tensions cannot be effectively addressed. As the conflict becomes ethnically driven and the initial political and economic causes are no longer seen as important as the more salient ethnic aspect of the conflict the approach needs to change. This is where Primordialism becomes relevant: it can explain the failure of most of the settlements reached between conflicting parties after the break-out of an ethnic conflict (Kaufman, 2010: 214). In Sri Lanka, the failure of the 1995 peace talks demonstrates that when ethnic nationalism becomes radicalized and powerful within a group within an ethnic community (the LTTE in the Tamil community), then reconciliation efforts are unlikely to be fruitful, since the goals of the parties have become diametrically opposed. In Cyprus, although the 1960 constitution had set the foundations for a possibly-viable settlement, it was still incompatible with the ethnic goals of ethno-nationalists from the two groups (enosis and taksim). In addition, the various attempts at a resolution have always depended on the involvement of third parties (Greece, Turkey, Britain and the United Nations). The failure of those efforts cannot be attributed solely to the incompatible goals of the two communities, as these externally-conceived solutions often did not accommodate the requirements of one or both of the parties. The idea that conflict resolution strategies should adapt as the relative importance of ethnicity is different at different stages of a conflict reflects similar ideas and theories of state- and peace-building. In principle, every effort for conflict resolution or settlement should recognize from the start that conflicts are social activities and therefore very complicated, with multiple aspects that need to be taken into account (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 100). Other theories of conflict resolution take seriously the cultural and religious dynamics of the conflict and even the ways in which cultural particularities could promote peace and reconciliation (Ramsbotham et al., 2010: 301-315). Indigenous approaches to peace-building can also contribute to achieving more effective results. Further research is needed here, using case studies (Ginty, 2008). Lastly, from a sociological point of view, Weber (2005) argued that the institutions of a political system should embody a set of ideas, values, and cultural and religious particularities of a civilization that would allow its political arrangements to be the expression of its people. If conflict resolution, a proposed settlement or a peace-building process disregards these realities it can easily end in failure. To conclude, although ethnicity may not be the underlying cause of ethnic conflicts, it is evident that it can easily become the most important

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factor of their prolongation. The role of elites is important in constructing ethnic identity, even if elite perceptions of the conflict are mostly based on their own distinct interests, with ethnic identity used as a tool to garner support for those interests. The dynamic of the changing role of ethnicity during an ethnic conflict is directly associated with indigenous culture and social structures, as the very concept of ethnicity includes such elements. Ethnicized policies, the expression of interests in ethnic terms, and the exploitation of ethnic identity by elites come, more often than not, to be based on cultural distinctions. Therefore conflict resolution strategies should take into account such distinctions, not to intensify or solidify them, but to integrate them into possible settlement plans. Though it would be unrealistic to completely “de-ethnicize” an ethnic conflict, it would not be impossible to bridge antithetical ethnicallydefined interests. Drawing upon Apostle Paul's words in Galatians 3, cited in the beginning of this chapter, a way of accomplishing this could be through appealing to what is common across the conflicting identities. For Paul, divisive identity barriers became irrelevant because of a common denominator: Christ. Conflict resolution strategies should trace the appropriate common elements through the history of the conflicting parties, and use these as a stimulus to work towards overcoming divisions.

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PART IV GOING FORWARD: NEW APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

CHAPTER ELEVEN A “NEW” LEGAL GEOGRAPHY FOR THE “OLD” CYPRUS QUESTION: REGIONAL DEMARCATION, POWER-SHARING, AND DIVIDED SOCIETIES MATTEO NICOLINI UNIVERSITY OF VERONA AND EUROPEAN ACADEMY OF BOZEN/BOLZANO

1. Divided Societies and Federal Studies: Which Lessons for Cyprus? How divided societies co-exist is usually studied within the context of federalism, which provides arrangements establishing multi- or bi-ethnic constitutional frameworks (Duchacek 1971; Lijphart 1979; Agranoff 1999; Burgess 2006: 107 ff.; Burgess and Pinder 2007; Anderson 2008: 71 ff.). This chapter will consider the two major institutional mechanisms through which consociational participation and geographical cohesion are enhanced. It examines both regional demarcation—which governs the division of a country’s internal territory into two or more constituent units (Ramutsindela and Simon 1999)—and power sharing, i.e. political and legal arrangements that allow opposing and divided groups to share responsibilities of governing (McGarry et al., 2008). Ethnic-based units and consociational participation aim at fulfilling the rationale of multinational federations: they preserve territorial and political integrity, and maintain diversity by including different ethnic groups in a single federal structure. Could this be possible in the case of Cyprus? This is not another essay dedicated to its constitutional history—scholars have dedicated many contributions thereto (Wolfe 1988; Bahcheli 2000). The details of 1960 Constitution need not detain us here: suffice it to say that it designed a

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multinational state resting on power-sharing mechanisms—which, however, became inoperable. The breakdown of the 1960 Constitution can be traced back to the failure of the power-sharing mechanisms and to the way in which foreign countries and international actors influenced the nascent Republic. Whereas the former accentuated the separateness between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities, the latter were factors that severely affected Cyprus’ divided society (Burgess 2007: 144 ff.; Mallinson 2009). There are good reasons for a further analysis of the multi-faceted character of the Cyprus Question: the admission of the Republic of Cyprus into the European Union (Theophanous 2000: 217-221) and the failure of all the various international attempts to solve the question, such as the “Annan Plan” (Burgess 2007: 129ff.; Moulakis 2007). This chapter examines the constitutional context, from which it is possible to draw lessons for a future accommodation of the Cyprus Question. It outlines a comparative legal analysis, which provides us with experiences, proposals and arrangements useful in designing a new constitutional arrangement for a unified Cyprus.

2. Cyprus and Federal Studies: From Asymmetry to Legal Geography The present chapter aims to reassess the use of federal arrangements in the accommodation of divided societies. For this purpose, we will use a method that comes out of comparative legal studies (Sacco 1991a and 1991b; Zweigert and Kötz 1996; Gordley 1998; Reitz 1998; Monateri 2012), and which has proven to be extremely useful in cross-national analyses. The number of countries which accommodate ethno-linguistic and religious cleavages through regional demarcation and power sharing has increased steadily in recent decades (Anderson 2008: 72), demonstrating that regional demarcation and power sharing as instruments of accommodation exhibit a high degree of resilience. Indeed, they serve a unifying function in different federal governance contexts. Regional demarcation and power sharing complement the comparative method: they contribute to the study of the black-letter (written) constitution, and also assist in filling in the gaps between written provisions and the practice of law. The applicability of power sharing is due to Cyprus’ bicommunal character, which had been enshrined in the 1960 Constitution. The nascent Republic of Cyprus was given a constitutional framework based on consociationalism and on the mutual recognition of Greek- and Turkish-

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Cypriot ethnicities. The Constitution incorporated manifold power-sharing mechanisms, and “recognized […] the sense of two distinct cultural communities living together in a single polity;” at the same time, however, it accentuated their “separateness” (Burgess 2007: 130; Theophanous 2011: 51-52).1 But the application of power sharing to Cyprus should be consistent with its rationale. In order to allow both ethnicities to live in a bi-national polity, nobody would deny the presupposition that under any new constitutional framework both Cypriot communities should be put on an equal footing. “Equality” among constitutive-but-divided groups and nationalities is inherent to power sharing and consociational federalism:2 it shapes the distribution of powers, and grants matching participatory mechanisms at the national level of government. The two Cypriot communities should be termed “constitutive” nations rather than “founding” ones. The nature of “founding character” will depend on how internal and international political actors deliver reunification. Finally, we come to regional demarcation. Its absence in the 1960 Constitution was due to the fact that the two ethnicities were spread across the country, and co-existed in the same territory. The presence of dispersed ethnicities explains why the Constitution established only consociational mechanisms, disregarding geographical accommodation. This also explains why demarcation issues could easily arise in relation to future arrangements for a unified Cyprus. The 1974 Turkish occupation of the north produced a geographical and demographic reconfiguration of the island, dividing Cyprus into two separate ethnic-oriented polities. The two communities ceased to be dispersed, and became territorially concentrated along ethnic, religious, linguistic, and geographical lines (Duchacek 1977: 13). The creation of internal boundaries has thus added another layer of complexity; and power sharing, albeit necessary, is not sufficient in order to ensure accommodation and governance of Cypriot society. It could be argued that the most suitable pattern for a future accommodation in Cyprus would be an asymmetric federalism. I shall not say much on this aspect: in-depth analyses have been dedicated to the topic and to its applicability to divided societies (Tarlton 1965; Gagnon and Gibbs 1999). Furthermore, scholars usually employ a narrow notion of 1

For a comprehensive examination of how the 1960 Constitution implemented bicommunalism and power sharing see Papastathopoulos 1965: 121 ff.; Ehrlich 1966; Wolfe 1988: 75, 78. 2 See Danspecksgruber 2005: 33. On consociational federalism see Lijphart 1969; Lijphart 1979: 505ff; Lijphart 1985.

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asymmetry that concerns itself only with the distribution of powers: constituent units enjoy differentiated responsibilities because they have to meet the ethnic, linguistic, and religious needs of their respective communities. Instead, I adopt a broader notion of asymmetry, which, firstly, does not necessarily mirror accommodation of diversity, since legal asymmetry can ignore a de facto one (Watts 1999). This has occurred in India, where geographical demarcation did not grant privileged protection to linguistic communities, but facilitated the creation of new states. Secondly, this broader idea of asymmetry goes beyond legislative responsibilities to encompass overall constitutional design. In Malaysia, the 1963 Constitution adopted a “two-tier” federal system: “Malaysia is […] a Federation of three subjects (Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak), one of which (Malaya) is itself a Federation” (Harding 2012: 134). In Belgium, there are two different kinds of constituent units (communities and regions) whose territories partially overlap (Peeters 2007: 31). Further, the multi-ethnic character of federal constitutional designs can itself influence participation of ethnic-oriented units at the national level of government. Second chambers ensure consociational and institutional participation, such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second chamber (House of Peoples) comprises fifteen delegates: five Croats and five Bosniacs elected by the legislative assembly of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and five Serbian delegates nominated by the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska (article IV, para 1 of the Constitution: Mansfield, 2003). Several constitutions have mechanisms to enable the accommodation of deeply divided societies in governmental, legislative, and judicial structures. This is the case in Belgium: the Constitution requires the appointment of both Dutch- and French-speaking members in the cabinet (Article 99.2); any law altering the geographic border between the four linguistic requires the consent of each of linguistic groups in Parliament (Article 4.3); three-quarters of the members of a linguistic group represented in the Federal Parliament can stop a bill that would seriously affect the relations between the linguistic groups (the “alarm bell procedure” of Article 54 of the Constitution). The Constitutional Court comprises twelve judges, six of them from the French-speaking group, and six from the Dutch-speaking group (articles 31 and 34 of the loi spéciale du 6 janvier 1989 sur la Cour Constitutionnelle; see Lejeune 2010: 122, 127). Finally, this broader concept of asymmetric accommodation requires mechanisms that lie beyond constitutional provisions. In Spain, the basic laws of the Autonomous Communities outline the distribution of

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legislative powers (Aja 2003: 55 ff.); in Russia such distribution rests on a treaty-based mechanism, which operates separately from the Constitution. As Ross observes, over the period 1994-98 46 bilateral treaties were signed between the federal government and subjects [of the federation, and the] vast majority of these treaties (42 of the 46) also contained provisions which violated the Russian Constitution (Ross 2007: 115).

Instead, this chapter focuses on different constitutive element of asymmetric federalism: the aim is to ascertain whether “legal geography” can represent both the governing rule for divided societies, and the principle organizing multi- or bi-ethnic federal states. In this context, legal geography is a complex “building out” mechanism: it involves creating or empowering regionally defined constituent units to respond to the demands of a territorially concentrated population, and it is the heart of federal arrangements (Anderson, 2008: 73).

I shall focus on “Geography and Law” (Grossfeld, 1984), that is on the creation of spatial, as well as legal, connections between the territory and the community upon which constitutional identity is erected.

3. The Comparative Method and Legal Geography The role legal geography may play in resolving the Cyprus Question gives rise to significant issues. The first one concerns the method, where I use one of comparative law: comparative law can claim the dignity of a science [because] its objective is no longer that of systematising the legal material of one legal system, also using the knowledge of other legal systems for the purpose, but by making a comparison, verifying similarities and differences, classifying institutions and systems, ordering knowledge and creating prescriptive models (Pegoraro 2001: 117).

This is apparent for regional demarcation and power sharing, which are both legal-geography mechanisms, as well as legal taxonomies, which are the outcomes of law-based analyses of federal and regional systems. This method permits the detecting of analogies and differences between various federal constitutional designs that rest on the mechanisms of legal

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geography, and allows us to group them according to their common traits. The aim is to devise “models” of demarcation and power sharing which are “a synthesis of complexity by logical categories” useful for the advancement of comparative legal studies (Pegoraro 2001: 126). The comparative method does not have solely the aim of categorizing problems, it also has practical implications: the analyses of comparative legal studies can be useful for drafting new constitutional texts. A comparative legal examination can therefore be very fruitful in generating proposals for Cyprus’ future constitutional framework: it can reveal which types of federations are models applicable to Cyprus and it explores the legal and non-legal presuppositions necessary for the transplanted mechanisms of legal geography to work. To sum up, the use of a comparative approach seems extremely helpful when addressing the Cyprus question, since it suggests what Cyprus can learn from other multiethnic (con)federations. The concept of legal geography was first introduced in the book Township and Borough by F. W. Maitland. According to this renowned English legal historian, legal geography is the spatial relationship between a community and its territory (Maitland 1964: 6-7). 3 Communities, whether families, clans, villages, or ethnicities, are claimants asserting an exclusive and close relation with a specific territory. Maitland terms this legally relevant spatial relation as the “belongs of public law” (Maitland, 1964: 11, 29). The drawing of boundaries thus entails a close connection between land, community, and law, and highlights legal, economic, and social interactions between territory and communities. Recent research shares the rationale of Maitland’s legal geography: there is an important relationship between organized communities and territorial space. Legal geographers have therefore expanded its scope: Legal geography is not a subdiscipline of human geography, nor does it name an area of specialized legal scholarship. Rather, it refers to a truly interdisciplinary intellectual project (Braverman et al. 2014: 1).

In this regard, legal geography examines how the “spatiality of law” operates:

3

The lineage of legal geography stretches back through the centuries up to the Domesday Book, the first socio-economic geographical “map” of England. See Maitland 1987; Darby et al. 1954-67. See also Fleming 2003.

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Moreover, legal geography considers what can be labeled as the “law of spatiality”—i.e., the legal consideration of all geographic features (physical, anthropic, economic, and social). This is apparent in the work of both Manfred Langhans-Ratzeburg on the legal consideration of the cartographic representation of law and that of Walther Merk, which expressly referred to legal geography (Langhans-Ratzeburg 1928; Merk 1926). Legal geography considers place names, boundaries and “territorial segmental autonomy,” which means “in practically all cases, a federal arrangement” (Lijphart 1979: 505). Legal geography is here complementing the rules of federalism to help create power-sharing mechanisms that work. Furthermore, with the study of names of places legal geography shares a field of research with linguistics. The 878 Treaty of Wedmore between Guthrum, the Danish King, and Alfred, King of Wessex provides an example of diachronic linguistic research in relation to legal geography. The treaty allowed both kings to assert their respective “belongs of public law” on the territory they administered, thus establishing a closer connection between land, community, and law. It is the so-called Danelaw, i.e., the “territory […] subject to Danish law” (Baugh and Cable 2013: 89) that was demarcated by a boundary running roughly from Chester to London. 4 The Danish “belongs of public law” defined the legal relationship between the territory and the community, and comprised the single constitutive part of the legal-linguistic geography of Danish rule. The study of current place names provides an example of synchronic linguistics: an intriguing method of looking for the traces of former communities and the merging of different identities. 5 In addition, geographical linguistics draws boundaries in dialectology: these are the socalled isoglosses, which “will not commonly coincide or bundle together with one another in such a way as to define a single firm and satisfactory dialect boundary” (Burrow and Turville-Petre 2005: 6). This is the case with Scottish identity, whose linguistic features frequently overlap. The 4

The Danelaw as a legal-geographic relation between territory and community corresponds to the “area to the north and east of the old Roman road known as Watling Street” (Townend 2012: 81). 5 Remnants characterize, for example, the Celtic substrate in the geography of Anglo-Saxon England: see Townend (2012: 80). On interactions between Old English and Old Norse in place names, see Baugh and Cable (2013: 94).

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current boundary drawn between England and Scotland severs Scots (a variety of Old English) from English (Smith 2005: 9-10). But within England (and Scotland) there are linguistic markers that delineate geolinguistic boundaries unrelated to political ones (Upton 2012: 368). Another example of synchronic linguistics and legal geography intersecting is the way in which place-related words define the types of federalism in the United States and the EU. Both “America” and “Europe” refer to continents, i.e., the words designate specific “belongs of public law” in linguistic terms. “America” thus “serves as [a] potent label for one nation that occupies only the middle reaches of the northern part of the Americas,” while it was only in the late twentieth century that “‘Europe’ acquired an additional sense that brought it into line with ‘America:’ it now meant not only the whole continent, but served as shorthand for the European Union (EU), a politico-economic federation, which occupies only part of that continent” (McArthur 2012: 471). When comparing and contrasting different types of federalism, linguistics adds relevant arguments to legal geography—place-related words are indeed part of the constitutional identity of the federalism in question. It also adds an additional layer of complexity, since the politics of place names determines to what extent denominational issues match the territorial constitutional identity of federations. Place name policies and boundaries are public law “belongs” that are asserted by ethnic groups in multi- and bi-ethnic federations: as such, they are constitutive parts of legal geography, and will be relevant in shaping the future nature of bicommunalism and federalism in Cyprus. Legal geography thus represents an approach complementing comparative methodologies.6 The approach is not, however, neutral between outcomes, but generates substantive conclusions about real-world problems. This is apparent in the case of Cyprus, where communities are aligned along religious, ethnic, linguistic, and territorial lines. Despite this, their territorial identity can be shaped by other relevant factors, such as the profound impact of Cyprus’ admission into the EU. Hence, a comparative legal examination of the different types of multi- and bi-ethnic federations can be extremely helpful in elaborating a specific national political arrangement capable of expressing Cyprus’ unique bicommunal relationship between its communities and its territory, from which the future federal identity will be constructed. In other words, legal geography 6

On legal geography as a methodology complementing comparative law, see Grossfeld (1984: 1511), who, however, confines legal geography to the presuppositions affecting the application of, or imposing modifications on, legal arrangements.

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may give scientific support to those advocating for a single Cypriot international identity and for the union of the two territorially divided polities: while the de jure implications underlined the legal unity of Cyprus, the de facto military reality meant that the EU border ran along the so-called ‘Green Line’ dividing the country between Greek-Cypriot south and Turkish-Cypriot north (Burgess 2007: 144).

4. The Impact of Regional Demarcation on Power Sharing Several reasons can be given to support a legal analysis of the Cyprus Question through the lenses of comparative law and legal geography. Firstly, it raises a legal question concerning the geographical interrelations between communities and territory. There is a geographic space; there are two organized communities, which are politically, territorially and militarily separated. Secondly, there is what Maitland termed the “belongs of public law:” both groups claim dominium over their respective territorial space, and perhaps over the whole island. Thirdly, there are those “illegal spaces” (the areas occupied by Turkey) which are at the core of modern legal geography studies (Braverman 2011; Antosich 2013). Finally, economic factors fuse with ethnic cleavages and undermine bicommunalism. European integration and the presence of globalized functional spaces challenge the relevance traditionally assigned to religious, ethnic, and linguistic factors in determining boundaries. This is apparent for the EU’s legal geography: indeed, member states’ territory merely defines the territorial scope of the Treaties [Art. 52 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and Art. 355 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)]. There are further reasons supporting the recourse to the comparative method. Although its application to divided societies has raised objections in the field of political science (Lijphart 1971), its use in legal studies is extremely helpful. By making comparisons, by verifying similarities and differences, and by classifying institutions and systems, the comparative method avoids “ineffective […] transplants and […] establish[es] whether the culture medium of the legal system absorbing a foreign law is fertile or sterile.” (Pegoraro 2001: 120). The way regional demarcation is construed may significantly affect the legal and social conditions required for successful power sharing in multinational polities and federations. When constructing the legal geography of divided societies, demarcation can become problematic:

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regional boundaries rarely enclose a very homogeneous population, so there can be significant minorities within regions […] there may be a limit to how many regional units can realistically be created; some populations with a strong sense of distinct identity may be geographically dispersed; and strong asymmetric arrangements can be hard to sustain (Anderson 2008: 73).

This point is particularly relevant in the case of Cyprus, since an imperfect regional demarcation will affect the way power-sharing mechanisms might work. Appropriate comparisons will not include federations resting upon “homogeneous” societies (such as the United States of America, Germany and Australia) nor those where ethnic groups are dispersed. Homogeneous federations apply “territorial neutrality”7 and standardize the identity of member states. “Dispersed” federations favour regional demarcation processes based on cross-cutting constituent units where several factors (ethnic, economic, social) and numerous communities are intertwined on the same territory, and cannot be disentangled, as in South Africa. Although some societies are divided on ethnic and linguistic lines within provincial boundaries, demarcation tends to create compact socio-economic units. Malaysia provides an example: whereas particular ethnic groups are more concentrated in some states than in others, minorities are generally spread fairly evenly across the country, and the federal government accommodates diversity by promoting integration programmes (Harding 2012: 135; Bakar 2007: 74 ff.). Regional demarcation seems to be particularly appropriate for Cyprus. The Turkish occupation created both an “illegal” space and a “double” frontier—the de jure border and the de facto one running along the Green Line. This undermined the mutual recognition of the two ethnicities that the 1960 Constitution had referenced and implicitly acknowledged when detailing power sharing mechanisms that, obviously, require mutual recognition to work. Consequently, further reflection is warranted as the future application of power-sharing mechanisms in Cyprus will unavoidably require a prior demarcation process. Consociativism will not survive in the absence of a balanced geographical accommodation between the two communities (Lijphart 1977: 158-161). Comparative legal studies can point out analogies between the situation of Cyprus and that of divided societies allocated elsewhere. Northern Ireland provides a relevant comparison: although religious minorities share 7

This is apparent in the United States, where “[t]erritory [...] (except for the Indian country) is essentially neutral, that is, a blank slate to be filled in by whomever lives on the territory.” (Kincaid 2013: 133).

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the same geographical spaces, the lack of mutual recognition had been destabilising the manifold attempts to establish power sharing based institutions.8 Cyprus also has traits in common with the legal geography of Israel-Palestine, which is a “legal” geography of “illegal” spaces, where the relationship between community and territory and the process of redrawing of borders are extremely controversial.9

5. Functions and Forms of Legal Geography Regional demarcation can significantly affect the functioning of powersharing mechanisms; but it is traditionally a component of state-building processes, since it governs the division of a country’s internal territory into two or more constituent units. In aggregative federations, the outcomes of demarcation coincide with the boundaries of the pre-existing units. The process of demarcation may be a “work in progress.” A federation can accrue territory by admitting new states that were formerly separate entities, often as independent polities within an empire (as in Malaysia, India, Australia and Canada), or by carving new states or provinces out of former federal territories (as in the American Midwest). In multi-national federations, the admission of new states can alter the equilibrium between the different groups and so affect the character of the federal society. In Cyprus, the “aggregative” character of the future federation has traits in common with younger federal-regional states. A federal Cyprus presupposes the mutual recognition of its constitutive nations as recognition of the other nation is the condition required for power sharing to work. “Without adequate trust and sense of shared identity, a federal solution is unlikely to fare any better” than what went before (Bahcheli 2000: 213). In Cyprus, the establishment of a new polity and the drawing of internal boundaries will probably rest on a multi-phase state-building process, which will be partly internationally directed, and partly negotiated by the different actors. This process occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Mansfield 2003: 2061 ff.). In other cases Constituent Assemblies decide on both the creation of subnational units and the drawing of their boundaries. Legal studies on regional demarcation are indebted to the debates that took place in the Italian, Indian, and South African 8

Among others, see Schmitt (1988), Horowitz (2002), and McGarry and O’Leary (2006). 9 We usually forget that “substantial segments of the two communities have shared the land within one political framework for decades” (Sandler 1988: 47).

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Constituent Assemblies (Pedrazza Gorlero 1979; Bhattacharyya 2007, 54 ff.; Muthien and Khosa 1995). The accounts of these debates examine all relevant issues: the choice for a federal-regional design; the role of demarcation in government diversity; the production of criteria for drawing subnational boundaries. In a multi-phase and multi-actor constitutional negotiation, the mutual recognition of the Cypriot communities will probably lead to “rigid” internal boundaries so that “segments of the plural society [are] geographically concentrated,” and “boundaries between the component units […] follow the segmental boundaries” (Lijphart 1985: 5). To put it another way, ethnic-based units generally make territorial alteration impracticable. Legal geography would presuppose that the national territory had already been divided into constituent units. As a solution to the Cyprus Problem this would entail either the total or partial political reconfiguration of the island. Federal-regional constitutions consider constituent units to be indestructible—but at the same time they set mechanisms for altering their boundaries. The issue is even more contentious in multi-national federations, since territorial alteration can undermine units based on ethnicity and degrade or destroy mutual recognition and any lasting compact between the groups. Nevertheless, a study of territorial adjustment is a constitutive part of legal geography and gives rise to questions which demonstrate the complexity of spatial considerations. A first set of questions concerns a “coherence test:” should the criteria used to decide on territorial adjustment be consistent with those applied in the original demarcation of territory? If not, then how should the criteria differ? The answers to these questions will depend on the attitude that federal and regional constitutions have towards the “territorial identity” of constituent units. Constitutions may allow adjustment without imposing any explicit criteria, or permit territorial changes only when they are consistent with the ethnic, religious, and linguistic criteria which were used to prescribe the original demarcation. A second set of questions concerns the governance of divided societies. How, and in what way should territorial readjustments be consistent with the rationale of multi-national federations? This is the topic of the next section.

6. The Rationale of Legal Geography: Territorial Identity Accommodation of divided societies through constituent units is linked to “territorial identity,” which rests on the bases of linguistic, religious, and ethnic cleavages. It also presupposes a close geographical interrelation

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between community and territory. Boundaries are the visible and concrete expression of a territorial divide: they outline the territorial identity of the community, and this governs the process of formation of constitutional identity that will be common to the (federal) state as a whole. If a province or subnational state has its own minorities, extra challenges arise. In Italy, constituent units’ minorities were accommodated by giving them a strong voice in the subnational units, especially where they constituted a local majority within the subnational entity. This produced a close connection between demarcation and territorial identity within the province, and allowed for the accommodation of differences. The consequences of Italian geographical accommodation are well illustrated in the implementation of power-sharing mechanisms in South Tyrol (i.e., in one of the two provinces that comprise the Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol Region). Three communities coexist in this unit: the German-speaking majority, and the Italian- and the Ladino-speaking minorities: territorial demarcation and power sharing was effective in accommodating all three groups. The constitutional arrangements of Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol and Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste regions apply linguistic criteria to complement territorial identity (Article 116.1 of the Italian Constitution: see Palermo 2004: 107 ff.). The same thing occurs in Spain, where regional languages have official status in their respective communities. Each community has the right to use whatever name which best fits its historical identity (Articles 3.2 and 147.2.a of the Constitution: see Aja 2003: 169 ff.), thereby reinforcing local identity. As a method of organization, federalism requires that all federations— whether homogeneous or heterogeneous—determine the relationship between territory, borders, and identity. Despite this common feature, it is possible to draw a distinction between multinational and uninational federations: the difference is in how legal geography applies the “identity rule” to constituent units. Multinational federations cannot depend on an abstract concept of “territorial neutrality.”10 This is evident in Canada. The British annexation of Nouvelle France (Québec) in the Seven Years’ War turned it into a conquered colony, and therefore, under common law, should have retained its own language, religion, traditions, and its legal system based on civil law. However, a British Royal Proclamation of October 1763 set forth instructions for the Anglicization of the new colony; the British neither preserved the civil law legal tradition nor recognized the legitimacy of the French language and the Roman Catholic Church. Québec’s distinctiveness 10

See above, page 241, note 7.

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was restored with the Quebec Act of 1774 and its legal geography apparently secured by the Canada Act of 1791, which delineated the French-speaking provincial territory (Walton 1913). But the Act of Union of 1840 united the English- and French-speaking colonies, with the hope that an increasing English population would eventually dominate and assimilate the French Catholic population. Not having a space of their own would make it harder for the French population to resist this. In 1867, policy changed: a French-speaking territory was re-established, and s. 146 of the British North America Act of 1867 set the mechanisms by which new provinces might join the new Canadian confederation (Hogg 2011). The act maintained the British Parliament’s responsibility for admitting new provinces. As a result of British colonization in the nineteenth century, all the potential applicants were English-speaking communities: hence, the British Parliament’s responsibility operated as a medium that allowed the founding provinces to live together in a multinational federation, whilst allowing for the expansion of the country by the accession of more English-speaking provinces. The Constitution Act of 1982 introduced additional provisions in order to protect Québec’s identity: an amended formula for changing the boundaries of the existing provinces [section 42(e)]; the recognition of French minorities and aboriginal rights throughout the confederation (sections 16-25); an amending formula which requires the unanimous consent of all the provinces on any proposal to affect the status of official languages of English or French [subsection 41(c)]. Québec has now an effective veto on constitutional amendments, and can protect the French linguistic minorities which reside outside its borders. 11 In addition, the House of Commons “recognize[d] that the Québécois form a nation within a united Canada.” 12 Most recently, an ethnic criterion was applied to carve the Nunavut territory out of the North-Western Territories in 1999, in order to confer self-government on the Inuit people. Hence it is undisputable that Canada’s multinational character has been being shaping the legal geography of the whole confederation. When addressing the Cyprus Question, issues associated with territorial identity are especially pertinent. The 1974 Turkish occupation of the north led not only to the geographical reconfiguration of the island, but also massively altered the demographic features of legal geography.

11

Hence, Québec is the “guardian of the French language in Canada” (Oliver 2007: 172). 12 House of Commons of Canada, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Journals, No. 87 Monday 27 November 2006, 811.

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Forty years of separation and immigration from Anatolia have changed the Turkish-Cypriot community in significant ways (Burgess 2007: 130). These changes constitute a real threat to the “new” Cyprus’ legal geography, since they will make regional demarcation and power sharing much more difficult to accomplish. Acting as she did, Turkey broke the equivalence between Turkish-Cypriot identity and ethnicity.13 Changes in Turkish-Cypriot identity add another element of complexity. Immigration from Anatolia deeply altered Turkish-Cypriot ethnicity—that is, the identity of one of the major groups who assert their “belongs of public law” on the island and therefore changed the spatial and legal connections between territory and community upon which Cyprus’ legal geography should be erected.

7. The Visible Elements of Legal Geography: Boundaries and Identity Boundaries form a concrete expression of any division. The creation of two ethnically homogeneous units, as is proposed for Cyprus, will probably lead to “rigid” internal boundaries. Such rigidity could legitimize the consequences of the Turkish occupation and make “legal” which is now an “illegal” space. That would change the meaning of the double frontier: there would be the de jure frontier asserting the legal unity of Cyprus while the “Green Line” would mark the internal regional demarcation. If legitimization took place a partial mutual recognition of both ethnicities’ spaces might be attained. However, dismantling of the buffer zone and erasing the Green Line would imply substantial and contentious territorial adjustments. The buffer zone stretches for approximately 180 kilometres from east to west across the island, and covers about three per cent of the island’s land area. The width of the strip varies considerably, from only a few metres in central Nicosia to several kilometres in some of its more rural parts. (Antosich, 2013: 172). The creation of a federal Cyprus will also mean that this land would be added to the constituent units in some way. 13

This is apparent when we consider the following brief sketch of the legal and anthropic geography of Cyprus when Britain took over the island: “The population of Cyprus at the census of 1881 was 186,000 of whom one-quarter Mahometans, and the remainder of the Greek Church.” (Biddulph 1889: 714).

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The two communities propose different visions of what a federal Cyprus should look like. Whereas Greek-Cypriots favour a strong national government, and oppose the creation of an exclusive Turkish-Cypriot state, Turkish-Cypriots strongly prefer having a state of their own (Bahcheli 2009: 207; Theophanous 2000: 230 ff.). As internal boundaries affect territorial identity, power sharing, political geography, and the nature of federal governmental institutions—that is, they produce a whole new legal geography—it is reasonable to ask how an ethnic-based territorial demarcation capable of accommodating the two conflicting territorial identities might be attained. Demarcation requires the determination of criteria for drawing the border between provinces that rest on several factors, including social, linguistic, and economic. Governance of divided societies through constituent units does require the creation of nationality-based units; but it also needs appropriate criteria that complement the ethnically-oriented ones, ones that are designed to avoid the persistence of ethnic divide within the federation. Several factors influence regional demarcation. The first concerns examining the history of the entity; drawing a distinction between those federations where previously independent political communities have been integrated into a federal system and those in which a formerly unitary-state has devolved governmental powers upon a number of regions within that state. (Aroney 2006: 281).

The second factor to consider (for former colonies, at least) is the way in which self-government came about. In Canada, the confederative scheme of the British North America Act of 1867 united the colonies of Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia into a single Dominion. Canada was then divided into the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, restoring the territorial identity of the French-speaking province. This history and demarcation has shaped the relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada ever since. An analogous ethno-historical criterion was applied in India and Nigeria. After gaining its independence from the United Kingdom in 1947, the Indian Constituent Assembly adopted a federal constitution which entered into force in 1950. The constitution, however, did not use the term “federation:” due to the ethnic fragmentation of the former British Raj the term was considered a “recipe for disintegration” (Bhattacharyya 2007: 58). The Constituent Assembly admitted into the new country the former directly-ruled Raj provinces and territories, as well as the nominally

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independent princely states. As a result, three categories of constituent units were enumerated in the First Schedule to the Constitution: provinces, princely states, and union territories (such as Delhi and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands). The Federation of Nigeria was created in 1946—that is, before it gained independence—by creating three regions out of the former British colony. This arrangement favoured the three predominant ethnic groups, and was harshly resisted by the minorities living within the three regions (Elaigwu 2002; Alapiki 2005: 53; Ejobowah 2010: 255). A third area to focus on is the interactions between changes of regime and processes of demarcation. In Russia, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the 1993 federal constitution, which retained the ethnic basis of the federal system. Owing to the fragmented nature of Russian society, demarcation is based on the principles of ethnicity and territory: 21 units have been created on the basis of ethnicity, but the titular ethnic groups form a majority in only seven of these ethnically-named constituent units (Ross 2007: 109). In Ethiopia, the 1994 Constitution entrenched ethnic pluralism (Article 39; the nine Ethiopian states are all ethnically-oriented), and organized the constituent units’ boundaries along ethnic lines (Article 46.2: see Habtu 2004: 92). Ethnicity is the demarcating criterion in Tigrai, Afar, Amhara, Oromia and Somali: the overwhelming majority of their inhabitants belong to a sole ethnic group, whereas several ethnic groups coexist in the Southern regional state, in Benshagul-Gumz, and in Gambela. With the exception of South Africa,14 multi-national federations tend to draw ethnically-oriented boundaries. It does not follow, though, that each ethnic community has a state of its own; rather, each constituent unit usually comprises a majority of one ethnicity, but also includes one or more minority groups. As a consequence, the evidence from comparative legal geography would seem to support the Greek-Cypriot definition of federalism, according to which “the proposed federated state in the north would maintain a majority of Turkish Cypriots” (Bahcheli 2007: 207), but would have a significant Greek Cypriot minority.

14

A Commission on the Demarcation-Delimitation of States, Provinces and Regions was appointed in 1993, in order to redraw the geographical configuration of South Africa. It created nine provinces with crosscutting communities [s 103(2) and Schedule 1A of the 1996 constitution]; see Murray and Simeon (2009).

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8. Demarcation, Alteration, and Resolution of Ethnic Conflicts The fourth and last factor to consider is how to determine criteria of regional demarcation that are capable of avoiding ethnic conflicts. This is significant in the case of Cyprus: if demarcation were not along ethnically oriented lines, then it is unlikely to be acceptable to the communities. It should be noted that the Greek-Cypriot definition of “federal” does not produce criteria that avoid geographical disagreements. Greek Cypriots aim at re-establishing both the legal unity and territorial integrity of the island: hence, bi-zonal, bicommunal and federal arrangements are conceived of as mechanisms to establish a strong national government. Greek-Cypriot views of federalism seek to resist the “legalization of the de facto division of the island.” (Theophanous 2000: 218). A primary goal is to maintain the territorial integrity of Cyprus; only recently has a sense of the need for accommodation with the Turkish Cypriots’ different viewpoint become significant.15 The present situation of “two ethnically homogeneous units, with practically all Turkish Cypriots gathered in the north, and virtually all Greek Cypriots living in the south” (Bahcheli 2009: 206) makes a nonethnically oriented demarcation impracticable. The creation of a constituent unit comprising a clear majority of Turkish Cypriots, but with a significant minority of Greek Cypriots, is also unrealizable. Either of these options would necessarily lead to minor but significant territorial adjustments, challenging the ethnic and military implications of the Green Line. In addition, the Greek-Cypriot definition of a federal Cyprus ignores the role Turkey has been playing on the island since 1960. Among GreekCypriots the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is considered a “protectorate of Turkey” (Theophanous 2000: 218). Moreover, its territorial identity does not now correspond to Turkish-Cypriot national identity: the massive immigration of Anatolian settlers has dramatically changed the relation between the community and territory, which has become more Turkish-oriented rather than Cypriot. Future arrangements must necessarily rest on demarcation criteria that can avoid ethnic conflicts. Serious questions about the viability of a 15

“Federation [...] had never been an ideological goal of the Greek Cypriots. When Makarios and Kyprianou accepted [it] as part of the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, they considered it as the necessary price to pay in order to achieve reunification of the country” (Theophanous 2000: 230).

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federal solution for Cyprus do not arise from the idea of bicommunalism, but from the communities’ differing ideas of what a federal Cyprus should look like. If the lack of a common vision prevails during negotiations, then the outcome would be the ossification of the current de facto two-state “solution.” The two-state solution was the only practicable solution in Malaysia, where Singapore left the Malaysian federation in 1965, because of disagreements between the Singapore and Kuala Lumpur governments (Harding 2012: 43 note 58; Bakar 2007: 78). It could be argued that this analogy is irrelevant, as the pre-1974 Cyprus was not a federal state. However, the lesson for Cyprus that can be drawn from Malaysia is the necessity of avoiding the ossification of ethnic divisions, and to seek a way to sidestep the lack of a common vision during future negotiations. In Russia, demands for secession have come from those subnational units where the titular ethnic population represents the majority (Chechnya, Chuvashiya, Dagestan, Ingushetiya, Kalmykiya, North-Osetiya-Alaniya, and Tuva) (Ross 2007: 117). Similar claims for independence have also become salient and significant in Québec, Scotland, and Catalonia (Oliver 1999; Tierney 2013; Castellà Andreu 2012). In these cases, there is no dispute over demarcation: agreed-upon boundaries exist, but this is perceived as insufficient for the protection of territorial identity of the larger nation (Canada, the United Kingdom and Spain respectively). Legal methods of territorial adjustment tends to sidestep “geographical” ethnic conflicts. Federal-regional constitutions stipulate mechanisms for accommodation of disputed demarcations, and any change in borders territorial adjustment is the outcome of constitutionally specified procedures, which generally require the consent of the units affected, and sometimes of all the other units in the country in order to alter subnational boundaries. In multi-national federations, the practice of territorial adjustment has proven to be consistent with the ethnic, linguistic and religious criteria governing the original demarcation. In Switzerland, the Canton of Jura was carved out of the Canton of Berne along linguistic and religious lines. The Catholic, French-speaking inhabitants of Jura never identified with the Protestant, German-dominated Canton of Berne. In 1979 a popular vote led to a territorial alteration and to the creation of a new Canton (Belser and Setz 2013: 12). However, a small French-speaking community remained within the boundaries of the Canton of Berne after the 1979 popular vote. Since 1979 Jura had been trying to assert its “belongs of public law” on both the French minority and the communities where they live. In 2013 a new referendum was held in order to allow this minority to

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join the French-dominated Canton of Jura, and therefore to assert a new legal geography for Switzerland. The referendum failed: the French minority in Berne did not accept the process of territorial readjustment proposed by Jura (Ruiz Vieytez 2014). In India, ethnically heterogeneous provinces and 561 princely states represented the geographical legacies of the British Raj. After independence, there has been a continuous process of state creation and territorial alteration (Kumar Singh 2013) since the 1950s. The congruence between the proposed territorial readjustments and the ethno-linguistic lines is evident both in the accession to the Union of the princely state of Jammu (1947), and in the creation of the Christian-dominated states (Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram) based on tribal ethnicity (Bhattacharyya 2007: 54-55; Singh 2008). Belgium has experienced a progressive transformation into a federal state. Here, regional demarcation and territorial adjustment overlap. In order to accommodate Flemish- and French-speaking communities, the linguistic border, set in 1962, was entrenched in the constitution in 1970. Linguistic demarcation had already led to the creation of three unilingual regions (French, Flemish and German), and one bilingual entity (the capital, Brussels). Two kinds of constituent units were created: communities (1970) and regions (1980). Communities met the demands of the Flemish speakers for linguistic, cultural and educational autonomy; regions were requested by the Walloon (French-speaking) people in order to guarantee their autonomy in social and economic fields (Peeters 2007: 33, 35). The Federation of Nigeria, which has been relatively unstable since independence, provides an example of a continuous process of territorial demarcation and alteration in order to accommodate the many and often conflicting ethnic groups living within its boundaries. The need for this process is due to the presence of several crosscutting cleavages. From 1946 to 1960 “many groups of people were arbitrarily sandwiched into a territorial unit that formed a geopolitical entity called the state” (Alapiki 2007: 50). As a result, minority groups were forced to identify themselves with one of the three states, which were dominated by the three largest ethnic groups. Ethnic conflicts were accompanied by threats of secession, one of which led to war when the south-eastern state, dominated by the Igbos, declared independence (as Biafra) in 1967. The rest of Nigeria fought to stop the secession. “In the run-up to the war, and while it lasted, minorities established themselves as holding the key to the survival and

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stability of the federation” (Osaghae 1998: 10-11).16 The war ended in 1970, with the defeat of Biafra, and its reincorporation into Nigeria. But there was a price to pay, as the Nigerian federation became more complex: the […] segmentation of Nigeria’s political structure [increased] from three regions at independence in 1960 to four regions in 1963, twelve states in 1967, nineteen states in 1976, twenty-one states in 1987, thirty states in 1991, and thirty-six states in 1996. (Ejobowah, 2010: 259).

The result of these territorial adjustments also meant that no one state could dominate the central government, and that each state comprised a compact geographical area. As this approach seemed to be working, principles for territorial adjustment were enshrined in the 1979 and the 1999 federal constitutions.17 Territorial regrouping favoured ethnic-based self-government at the local level, and power sharing at the federal level. The result is that there are now national rather than regional minorities, and rather than minority-majority areas within states, there are now states for the minorities (Osaghae, 1991). The fight for new states in Nigeria ended up promoting common nationhood and encouraging the process of nation building. As already noted, the nature of the Cyprus Question makes a process of ongoing territorial adjustment non-viable, owing to the different and opposing conceptions of federalism to which Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots adhere. Despite this, however, one may find reasons for the incorporation, in future federal arrangements, of territorial adjustment procedures. First, territorial adjustment is not without precedent, and is a possibility within the scope of comparative legal geography. Second, there are areas near the Green Line or lying in the buffer zone whose incorporation within a particular unit can be extremely contentious. The Buffer Zone itself includes several settlements, where more than 10000 people live or work (Antosich 2013: 172).

16

“The role of minorities was strengthened by the fact that the head of state at the time, General Yakubu Gowon, was from a minority group (Angas), as were the top wartime and post-war federal bureaucrats and political advisers” (Osaghae 1998: 10-11). 17 Pursuant to section 8(1)(b) of the Constitution, “a proposal for the creation of the State is thereafter approved in a referendum by at least two-thirds majority of the people of the area where the demand for creation of the State originated” (Suberu 1991).

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Finally, the recourse to territorial adjustment mechanisms should play a role when addressing the future status of Nicosia as the capital of a reunified Cyprus. It should be possible to establish a bicommunal Capital Region.18 This would entail demarcation and boundaries, and the need for local bicommunal institutions to be created. In Belgium, the Brussels Capital Region was constitutionally recognized in 1970, but its institutions did not come until 1988, after a solution had been found to long-lasting disputes regarding the boundaries of the region (Peeters 2007: 34). A Capital Region should be based on and develop crosscutting ties; its bicommunal character and institutions (which would necessarily require power-sharing mechanisms) would be complemented by other non ethnically-oriented criteria. Political, economic, and social criteria could be used to create a compact metropolitan capital territory.

9. Do Economic Criteria Challenge Legal Geography? Some Concluding Remarks The application of the comparative method in legal geographic studies has demonstrated that regional demarcation and power sharing are capable of accommodating divided societies through carefully-designed structures and constituent units. Regional demarcation permits the different ethnic groups to live together within a multi-national federation. The recognition of difference and diversity in divided societies serves to hold a federation together, rather than pulling it apart, allowing power sharing to work and establishing consociational federations that aim at the maintenance of territorial integrity.19 Permitting territorial adjustments also coheres with the same goals: its practice has proven to be consistent with the ethnic, linguistic and religious criteria governing the original territorial demarcation. Both regional demarcation and territorial adjustment are, therefore, consistent with the rationale of multi-national federalism. Whilst making proposals for handling the Cyprus Question, however, other factors, especially economic ones, must be considered, which can affect the viability of territorial demarcation. These are often intertwined with the ethnically-oriented interests, and the overlap is particularly interesting, since it is a constitutive part of the Greek-Cypriot idea of federalism. As some scholars have stressed, in addition to safeguarding the 18

For a description of the bicommunal character of Nicosia, which can supplement the creation of an ad-hoc capital region see Biddulph 1889: 715. 19 Legal geography is indeed the “territorial” application of power sharing and group autonomy: see Lijphart (2004: 97, 104-105).

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rights of communities, equal and balancing weight should be given to the rights of individuals (Theophanous 2000: 234). Among individual rights, Greek Cypriots number the so-called three freedoms, of movement, settlement, and the acquisition and ownership of property anywhere in the island. These freedoms are part of the legal presuppositions necessary for a “single market” in Cyprus (as part of the EU single market) to work. Acknowledging these three freedoms reduces the role of ethnicity in shaping territorial identity. The Republic of Cyprus must respect and implement the EU acquis communautaire, as this is a requirement of EU membership. When the Cyprus Problem is solved, then the acquis must also apply also to the currently-occupied area. The respect of the acquis and its application in what would be, according to Cyprus’ new legal geography, the “legalized” (but now illegally occupied) Northern Cyprus would complement the new legal geography of the island: boundaries will certainly constitute the visible expression of two clear ethnic-oriented territorial “belongs (and divides) of public law,” but they would be irrelevant for the incorporation of Northern Cyprus into the EU. This is due to the fact that geographical extent of member states’ territory merely defines the territorial scope of the Treaties, and not the nature of government. The process of the formation of EU constitutional identity therefore departs from those typical of state-building processes. Furthermore, it is evident that the incorporation of individual rights, including those granting full participation in a free-market economy, is typical of any (multinational) federation. To this extent, the recognition of such rights in future federal arrangements does not necessarily entail the creation of crosscutting ties to the exclusion of ethnically-oriented demarcation. In the formation of units, communities will be still gathered along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines, except in the capital region. Economic factors affect the way territorial identity is conceived. In Switzerland, for example, the homogenization of society as a result of economic globalization increased mobility within the country, and migration towards metropolitan areas induced the federal government to deliver strategies for sustainable spatial planning that are based on non ethnically-oriented units.20 In Switzerland, at least, it is clear that economic factors have tended to reduce the significance of ethnicity, language and religion. As a consequence, the concept of territorial identity has been reshaped to 20 It is the so-called “Raumkonzept Schweiz” (Space Concept Switzerland) delivered by the federal government in 2012 (see Belser and Setz 2013: 6-8).

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include functional criteria, such as access to services and fiscal equalization. However, the overlap between ethnicity and free-market rights can assure the conferral of “certain guarantees to the two communities, as well as to a federal republic of Cyprus” (Theophanous 2000: 240). A socioeconomic perspective can shape the legal geography at the national level, and open up opportunities for reshaping relations between the TurkishCypriot community, federal institutions, and identity. The federation could promote a multi-level accommodation of diversity by promoting integration: there would be a territorially ethnic-oriented identity for each community, but a sole international federal identity. The interaction of traditional and socio-economic factors represents the most significant challenge to an ethnically-construed territorial identity, and adds complexity to the problem of governance of divided societies such as Cyprus. But it also presents an opportunity to reassess the criteria for demarcation of the federal territory and the ethnically-defined units, and to create a unique common territorial identity for both ethnicities. Unfortunately, economic factors could also undermine demarcation based on ethnic and territorial identity. This can occur when natural resources, or important economic and financial hubs lie in a territory which is claimed as a constitutive element of two or more conflicting ethnic groups. In Cyprus, inequalities arising from the different paths of economic growth and the socio-political development since 1974 complicate the situation. The recent discovery of oil, and disputes about its ownership, have increased tensions and brought the question of natural resource ownership to the fore. When several territorial identities and a single economic interest overlap, demarcation and delimitation are not sufficient in order to govern a society which is divided both ethnically and economically. Cyprus, like other multi-national federations, needs to be able to cope with new cleavages and factors which could pull them apart. The challenges this poses are inescapable. Indeed, it would be bizarre if the governance of divided societies were determined solely on ethnic grounds, when economic factors (which are neutral towards ethnicity and language) were of primary importance. Overlaps between ethnicity and economics show what might undermine a solution of the Cyprus problem. The nature of TurkishCypriot national (and territorial) identity, and how it relates to Turkish and

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Cypriot identities is problematic. 21 It does not follow, however, that economic and other crosscutting criteria cannot forge a new relationship between community and territory in Northern Cyprus. A multi-layered territorial identity could re-orient the Turkish Cypriots towards a Cypriotrather than a Turkish-based identity. This is apparent when considering the role that the EU integration process and the adoption of the Euro currency played in transforming identity-orientation elsewhere. Notwithstanding the current financial crisis affecting that EU identity, the EU and Euro may still be  the catalyst for new thinking in relation to the reunification of Cyprus. In this regard, […] in federal arrangements it is of utmost importance to advance a common value system, common objectives, and common institutions. The Euro serves these objectives in direct and indirect ways. At the same time, the Euro entails responsibilities in relation to fiscal prudence and also raises the issue of broader economic policy coordination. In sum, Cyprus adoption of the Euro also influences the type of the solution of the Cyprus question: the reunification of this island state presupposes an integrated society, economy, and political structure.” (Theophanous 2011: 54).

As a result, socio-economic integration based on demarcation and power sharing can support and advance a renewed Turkish-Cypriot federal loyalty. As the recognition of individual rights granting full participation in a free-market economy could reduce economic inequality, it also would help increase commitment to the new federal state.

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Indeed, Turkey has long refused to recognize the Republic of Cyprus of having de jure authority over the whole island. She retained this stance after Cyprus acceded to the EU: see Katselli 2006: 705-708.

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Hogg, Peter W. (2011) Constitutional Law of Canada Toronto: Carswell. Horowitz, Donald L. (2002) Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement: The Sources of an Unlikely Constitutional Consensus, British Journal of Political Science Vol. 32 No. 2 (April): 193-220. Katselli, Elena (2006) The Ankara Agreement, Turkey, and the EU, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 55 No. 3 (July): 705-717. Kincaid, John (2013) Territorial Neutrality and Coercive Federalism in the United States, in Stelio Mangiameli (Ed.) Federalism, Regionalism and Territory Giuffrè: Milan: 133-147. Kumar Singh, Ajay (2013) Region and state formation in India, in Stelio Mangiameli (Ed.) Federalism, Regionalism and Territory Giuffrè: Milan: 291-310. Langhans-Ratzeburg, Manfred (1928) Begriff und Aufgaben der geographischen Rechtswissenschaft (Geojurisprudenz) [Concept and implication of legal geographic studies – Geojurisprudence], BerlinGrunewald: K. Vowickel. Lejeune, Yves (2010) Droit Constitutionnel Belge: Fondements et institutions [Constitutional Law of Belgium: Foundations and institutions) Bruxelles: Larcier. Lijphart, Arend (1969) Consociational Democracy, World Politics Vol. 21 No. 2 (January): 207-225. —. (1971) Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, The American Political Science Review Vol. 65 No. 3 (September): 682693. —. (1979) Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links, Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol. 13 No. 3 (September): 499515. —. (1985) Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Theories, Publius Vol. 15 No. 2 (Spring): 3-15. —. (2004) Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, Journal of Democracy Vol. 15 No. 2 (April): 96-109. Maitland, Frederick W. (1964) Township and Borough: The Ford Lectures 1897 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. (1987) Domesday Book and beyond. Three essays in the Early History of England Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mallinson, William (2009) Cyprus, Britain, the USA, Turkey and Greece in 1977: Critical Submission or Submissive Criticism? Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 44 No. 4 (October): 737-752.

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CHAPTER TWELVE CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVE DIALOGUE NETWORKS IN CYPRUS: PEACE-ING IT TOGETHER AT THE GRASSROOTS BÜLENT KANOL AND øLKE DAöLI MANAGEMENT CENTRE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, CYPRUS; UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK, U.K.

Introduction The Cyprus problem has long attracted the attention of scholars, researchers, politicians and international organizations. Nevertheless, even the most static, protracted and normalized conflicts are not immune to the dynamic nature of society, identity and Realpolitik. Despite many obstacles, including external factors and the large number of players, finding a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus conflict is imperative. In addition, an understanding of the Cyprus problem can help advance the peace-building and reconciliation literature for at least five main reasons: (1) The prolongation of the conflict involves multiple human rights violations for the people of Cyprus. The accession of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) to the European Union (EU) without the inclusion of the Turkish Cypriots and prior to a comprehensive settlement has placed the conflict within the borders of the EU. It also presents a significant challenge for EU governance across a diverse range of issues, and especially for the EU’s objective of achieving stability in the eastern Mediterranean (Christou, 2012); (2) The conflict has significant ramifications for the relationship between NATO and the EU. Competing claims over the offshore gas resources in Cyprus, and the fact that Turkey’s geographical location as an

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Chapter Twelve important corridor for gas and oil transmission to the EU have implications for EU energy policy;1 (3) Although one can be sceptical about the Turkish governing party AKP’s (Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi - Justice and Development Party) intentions with regards to full EU membership, the non-resolution of the Cyprus conflict presents an obstacle for Turkey’s EU accession; (4) The peace negotiations that were re-launched in 2008 effectively stalled when the RoC assumed the EU presidency in 2012. The peace talks were re-initiated briefly in early 2014; however they were once more postponed indefinitely when the President of the RoC withdrew from UN sponsored negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaderships, claiming a violation of Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone by the Turkish seismic vessel Barbaros (A. Anastasiou, 2015); (5) The ongoing financial crises and economic concerns of the communities have gradually pushed the Cyprus problem down the list of priorities (Eurobarometer, 2013, 2014). Unemployment, inflation and increasing crime rates are now seen as more important. Consequently, frustrations over more immediate challenges within the communities are shifting attention away from the Cyprus problem, and reconfiguring the political dynamics on the island, leading to even deeper uncertainty.

Numerous diplomatic efforts have been made to produce peaceful reunification (H. Anastasiou, 2008). Over the decades, myriad negotiations and peace-talks have begun and have stalled, and were then perhaps fasttracked and revisited. There is a substantial literature on the Cyprus problem; the material focusing on identity, ethnicity, EU accession, and conflict resolution are very rich (See Aktar et al., 2010; H. Anastasiou, 2008; Christou, 2010; Constantinou, 2007; Diez and Tocci, 2009; Gürkaynak, 2007; Hatay and Bryant, 2008; Michael, 2007; Turk, 2006; Volkan, 2008; Wolleh, 2001). However, this by no means indicates that all aspects, angles and approaches have been covered and addressed. For example, some of the areas where the literature can be enriched and deepened are: the socio-dynamics of the willingness of people in civil society to co-operate and work together; the influence and impact of civil society on Track One level diplomacy;2 the transformation of civil society

1

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-07-219_en.htm Multi-Track Diplomacy is a conceptual way to view the process of international peace-making, focusing on the interconnectedness of different activities, individuals, institutions, and communities involved in reconciliation. As it will be discussed later on in the chapter, the multi-track diplomacy approach is based on 2

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following Cyprus’ EU accession; the interaction between local and migrant identities and their effects on reconciliation; the general impact of immigration on perceptions of nationalism and ethnic identity; and the effects of the recent regional dynamics (in the EU, the Middle East and Turkey) on the Cyprus problem. As the literature and scholarly work on the Cyprus conflict and Cypriot identities is very rich, it is unnecessary to give an historical account of the Cyprus problem or the development of ethnic identities here. Neither will this chapter delve into a theoretical discussion about the nature of civil society. Rather, the aim is to give a brief account of the key concepts used in this chapter, namely multi-track diplomacy, civil society, and ontological security.3 Introducing these three key concepts will establish the framework for the underlying argument that civil society initiatives are crucial for peace-making and peace-building in Cyprus, and will set the scene for the empirical material presented in the third and fourth sections. This chapter has three main objectives. Firstly, it presents a specific and innovative methodological approach to Track Two level peacebuilding efforts.4 Secondly, it introduces and demonstrates the relevance of the emerging literature on ontological security to Cyprus. Thirdly, it highlights the importance of “the day after” (as Kyriacou et al., 2009 call it). If there is no civic ownership of the settlement and convergence at the grassroots level, then there is no firm ground on which to build a sustainable peace, endangering the very stability and implementation of any peace agreement. Following this order, the first section of the chapter sets the scene by introducing the empirical case, the concept of “multi-track diplomacy” and provides a brief account of Cypriot civil society. The second section introduces and reviews the emerging ontological security literature and assesses its utility for conflict resolution and peace-building. In the third and fourth sections, utilizing a methodology that fuses the established theoretical framework with the empirical work, we develop a best practices schema for peace-building efforts at the grassroots level. The the works of Joseph Montville (1987), and Louise Diamond and John McDonald (1996) 3 Individuals, in addition to physical security, also seek ontological security, that is, security of the “self,” which is concerned with the identity and biographical continuity of the perceived “self.” According to scholars such as Giddens (1991), Mitzen (2006) and Rumelili (2010), ontological security is achieved by routinizing relationships with significant others, and actors therefore become attached to those relationships, which contribute to perpetuation of conflicts. 4 The various diplomacy tracks are explained in the next section.

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third section presents the details of the process and the methodology, while the fourth section analyses the empirical data within the theoretical framework. The chapter concludes by assessing what the analysis contributes to understanding reconciliation efforts and peace-building in Cyprus. The departure point for this is the premise that it is important to empower civil society organizations (CSOs) and actively engage key people and expand participation in peace and reconciliation efforts in order to build a constituency that has the involvement and participation of different groups from both urban and rural communities across the island. While the theoretical foundations presented in the first sections lay the basis for supporting this premise, the empirical case study provides a practitioner’s perspective as to how to achieve it.

1. Civil Society and Reconciliation 1.1 Why is civil society imperative for peace-building? Even though the concept of civil society has a long and distinguished history in Western political theory, the idea remains ambiguous, and “often degenerates into a muddled political slogan” (White, 1994: 376). In general, the genesis of the idea is an idealized counter-image to the state and the market in the realm of freedom and pluralism, “an embodiment of social virtue confronting political vice” (White, 1994: 376). Even though the precise meaning of “civil society” remains elusive in political theory, this general view shows that the concept needs contextualization to become meaningful. While Rakner (1992) limits the concept to organizations which actually interact with the state, Bayart (1986) confines the term to those organizations that embody a confrontational and antagonistic relationship with the state. On the other hand, Foley and Edwards (1996) adopt a wider definition, conceptualizing it as the whole realm of private voluntary associations. Despite these diverse conceptualizations, there is a convergence in the literature that civil society has come to be seen as an essential ingredient for healthy societies (see Cohen, 1994). Especially in liberal democracies, civil society has emerged as a growing third sector as an intermediary between public and private life; an arena outside the sphere of state, business and family but closely interrelated with all of these. This is by no means a new phenomenon, but from a practitioner’s perspective it is increasingly important for seeking to build a more just and ethical world. Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter we conceptualize civil society as the sum of all formal or informal groups of people who share common interests and who mobilize for the

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public benefit. In our conceptualization, the key ingredient for civil society is public benefit or common good; whether institutionalized or not, nonstate actors with a common vision and mission working towards some kind of social change or reform for public benefit are included in the definition of “civil society.” The diplomacy literature helps us locate the relevance and significance of civil society initiatives for conflict resolution and reconciliation. Partly building on the works of Joseph Montville (1987), Louise Diamond and John McDonald (1996) conceptualized multi-track diplomacy systems and identified nine tracks: Table 1

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Even though this has become a popular framework in the diplomacy and conflict resolution literature, in practice different tracks can overlap. It may not be easy to distinguish Track Two from Tracks Three and Four, as nongovernmental peace-building initiatives reach out to private citizens and businesses to support their efforts. In small communities such as Cyprus, peace activists tend to be “recycled” for different tracks simultaneously. For example, a bi-communal peace-building project implemented by a consortium of CSOs (Track Two) can work in partnership with a community media centre (Track Nine) to reach out to rural populations (Track Four) in order to engage young people in an exchange program and train them in mediation skills (Track Five), or to reach out to businesses and chambers of commerce to support economic integration through joint ventures (Track Three); as a result, the project presents a needs analysis or an evaluation report to international donors on how to plan future peace-building funding schemes (Track Eight). This blurring of distinctions across tracks however is not important for the purpose of this chapter. The important distinction is that the Track One level comprises political leaders and elites at the state level doing anything from international and domestic decision making to local and global peace-making; while Track Two diplomacy, which at times overlaps with Tracks Three, Four, Five and Six, is about the work of CSOs and nongovernmental professionals, focusing on citizen engagement and bridging the communication gap between society and political elites and institutions. It is important that all tracks work together in a collaborative and complementary way, as it would be naïve to engage with a protracted conflict solely at the Track One level and expect thereby to garner a sustainable space for peace (See Broome, 1998; Jarraud, 2012; Kyriacou et al., 2009; Lordos et al., 2009; MacGinty et al., 2006 ; Montville, 1987; Zartman, 2007). In line with Diamond and McDonald, Gürkaynak (2007) asserts that Track Two diplomacy relies on a transformation of worldview where basic human needs set the agenda and where collaboration, accessibility and inclusion are central considerations. The main goal is to bring together community members, facilitate a constructive dialogue and support inclusive, creative and sustainable approaches to reconciliation and peace-building. For many scholars within the diplomacy and conflict resolution literature (See Gawerc, 2006; John and Kew, 2008; Marchetti and Tocci, 2009; Orjuela, 2003; Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006; Turk, 2006), Track Two is the bridge between Track One and Three, an essential component of peace-building where the conflict itself has become embedded and ingrained in collective identities. This literature maintains

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that the connection established by Track Two (and other tracks) between Track One and the general public helps to support peace-building and rapprochement at the grassroots level without relying solely on the political elite or some outside actor to produce a political settlement. In cases such as Cyprus where official peace-making efforts constantly stall, Track Two is the locomotive that keeps peace-building on the agenda and fights “peace fatigue.” 5 Track Two makes the idea of peace and peace negotiations accessible to the public, which is crucial for creating ownership of what emerges and a strong constituency for peace. An example of Track One diplomacy in the Cyprus case is the socalled “Annan Plan” process in early 2000s. The Annan Plan, while negotiated on a Track One level and put to simultaneous referenda in 2004, was accepted by the Turkish Cypriot community, but turned down on Track Two and Three levels by the Greek Cypriot community. Whereas there was an extensive mobilization and proactive efforts by Turkish Cypriot civil society in the 2000s, the work being done at the Track Two and Track Three levels in the Greek Cypriot community remained minimal and failed to create support and a strong constituency for the peace plan. For Michális Michael (2007), mediators who interact exclusively with the political elite at Track One at the expense of identifying and engaging in dialogue with opposing voices create a communicative comfort zone that locks the public out and underestimates the force of public opinion (Michael, 2007). Thus, as the Annan Plan was not communicated as a beneficial option for the Greek Cypriot community and no grassroots ownership was created of the specific idea of peace on the table, the result

5

It is not uncommon for communities to develop “peace fatigue” in normalized protracted conflicts, or, as Adamides and Constantinou (2011: 242-58) call them, “comfortable conflicts.” By “peace-fatigue” we mean a shift in focus to more mundane and internal problems as people and civil society representatives start feeling disillusioned and disempowered without a tangible achievement at Track One level peace-building efforts. This was prevalent, especially among the Turkish Cypriot community, following the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriots felt that even though they had done everything within their power to change the status quo, a comprehensive settlement was not achieved. Peace fatigue can also be observed by looking at the gap between the desire for a solution and the expectation of one; according to the Cyprus 2015 survey of over 1000 people (conducted in 2011), while 69 percent of Greek Cypriots and 42 percent of Turkish Cypriots stated that they desire a solution, 61 percent and 58 percent respectively said they did not expect the peace process to succeed (Cyprus, 2015).

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was an overwhelming “no” vote (75.8% percent) in the 2004 referendum.6 This is not to suggest that there were no other causes of the “no” vote, but it does present an example of how efforts at the Track Two level are needed to transform public opinion and garner support for peace-making at the Track One level, as happened in Turkish Cypriot civil society. It should be no surprise that the proposed agreement for a comprehensive settlement after 40 years of protracted conflict failed to find support among the Greek Cypriot community. It had been discussed only at the Track One level, when substantial and encompassing peacebuilding efforts at the Track Two and Track Three levels were also required. As Track Two focuses on confidence building and the transformation of antagonistic relationships; and as saying “yes” to a comprehensive settlement, means saying “yes” to confronting ingrained societal fears and anxieties, and “yes” to living side by side with the “enemy other,” the importance of Track Two level peace-building for achieving a sustainable comprehensive settlement becomes apparent. Reconciliation is a process of restoring relationships that have been alienated due to conflict, and just as in interpersonal conflicts, reconciliation on a societal level means dealing with a history of relationships, perpetrators, victims, and beneficiaries (Bar-Tal, 2000). The more the various tracks involve and support each other in the peacebuilding process, the more space there is for reconciliation to develop within and across the communities. In this chapter, we maintain that it is difficult and unsustainable to reconcile on one level without reconciling on the others, a view which will be further supported in the second section’s discussion of the ontological security framework.

1.2 Civil society across the divide: Setting the Scene Even though the role of civil society has been discussed for centuries (Marchetti and Tocci, 2009), the literature on civil society and its impact on peace-making in Cyprus is thin. The field of conflict resolution, especially in the last decade, has increasingly paid special attention to the role of civil society in intractable conflicts. This trend is easily observable in the way international donors manage and distribute their aid programs through civil society initiatives aimed at conflict resolution and reconciliation. In the context of Cyprus, the main objectives of civil society 6

Greek-Cypriot community: Yes: 24.2 percent, No: 75.8 percent, Turnout: 88 percent; Turkish-Cypriot Community: Yes: 64.9 percent, No: 35.1 percent, Turnout: 87 percent (BBC, 2015).

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initiatives until the 1990’s focused on offering opportunities to members of the communities to develop face-to-face communication and conflict resolution skills. As civil society slowly matured, the initiatives that were focusing on enabling people to develop personal and professional relationships across the Green Line became more specific, especially after the crossing points between the two sides opened in 2003. Joint projects were developed to address shared social, political, environmental and economic concerns (Hadjipavlou, 2012). Irrespective of their “project” objectives, the underlying common goal of these bi-communal civil society efforts was to establish a common vision for the future, where the “us” and “them” and “friend” and “enemy” dichotomies could be transcended or at least mitigated, and the two main communities of the island could come to see the problem from the perspective of the “other.” Thus, the overall goal has been to promote rapprochement across the divide, and to help remove the mental barriers that lead to the view that the two communities cannot coexist side by side. Although many reconciliation efforts and civil society initiatives have been tried over the years, civil society movements have failed to have a significant effect on the course and outcome of the peace negotiations. One of the main recommendations of the CIVICUS State of Civil Society survey (2011) was that capacity building in advocacy and lobbying, establishing effective communication channels between CSOs and public officials and decision-makers, and greater co-operation among CSOs would all enhance civil society’s impact at the policy level. This could in turn encourage more people to be actively engaged in CSOs and increase the comprehensiveness of their work as well as their legitimacy. Given the peace fatigue among the Cypriot communities and the demanding nature of the work, it is extremely important to empower CSOs in order to engage more people in their operations and to enhance their lobbying and advocacy activities. Even though there have been some important developments following the opening of the crossing points, such as a significant increase in the number of bi-communal projects7 (see Mahallae, 2013), the establishment of technical committees (UN 2008), joint action and stronger civil society partnerships between the communities (see AHDR, 2011; CCMC, 2009; CYINDEP, 2006), there is no doubt that the majority of the population on the island is not actively engaged in peace and reconciliation efforts. As previously discussed, this lack of engagement poses a big concern, given the importance of establishing a peace constituency. The CIVICUS survey (2011: 112) found that 50 7

Rising from approximately 35 projects in 1995 to over 200 after 2004.

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percent of Greek Cypriots and 45 percent of Turkish Cypriots had never visited the other part of the island, and that participation in bi-communal activities remains limited to ten percent for the Greek Cypriot community and 15 percent of the Turkish Cypriot community. The bulk of CSOs are located in the capital, as are the community leaders and the technical committees established under the official negotiations, along with the international organizations engaged in peace-building. Consequently, the involvement of non-state actors away from Nicosia is relatively more difficult and so engagement in peace-building and reconciliation efforts is largely limited to the capital, with the exception of some local initiatives in Famagusta (see Mahallae, 2013). As a result, people outside the Nicosia area have mostly remained detached and distanced from the reconciliation efforts. It is absolutely imperative that more people are engaged in peace and reconciliation efforts and a constituency for peace is built across the island, with the involvement and participation of groups from other towns and rural communities. In their comprehensive analysis of island-wide peace-building activities in Cyprus, Hadjipavlou and Kanol (2008) confirm that the majority of participants in conflict resolution workshops and mediation training came from educated groups who could speak English. 8 As a result, despite having inspiring outcomes and creating a pool of highly skilled individuals equipped to contribute to the peace process, the activities were criticized for being too academic and elitist. MacGinty, Muldoon, and Ferguson emphasize that “there is often a dissonance between the peace agreed at the elite level and the interpretation and experience of that peace at the group and individual level” (MacGinty et al., 2006). This stresses the importance of having a broad constituency that takes ownership of the move to peace; without it, reconciliation may fail to develop into a transformative peace which allows the underlying causes of conflict to be addressed. The importance of a political agreement for peace-building cannot be overstated; however, what happens “the day after” an agreement (Kyriacou et al., 2009) is equally important. The reason for thinking about “the day after” is to stress the need to provide a feeling of security that the traumas of the past will not reoccur. Whether or not a political agreement will produce an environment of insecurity and fear by asking people to live with those they believed were their existential enemies depends on whether reconciliation at the grassroots level has managed to reconfigure the “self” and “other” dynamic through practices of confidence building and reconciliation. The next section discusses the relationship between the images of “self” and 8

English is the common language used in bi-communal initiatives in Cyprus.

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“other” and what reconfiguring that relationship might mean, but a metaphor seems apt here: The day after a peace agreement is like marriage after the wedding day; maintaining marital harmony is a long, transformative process where people need to believe that their identities can continue to be different without being threatening, and that they can coexist and develop a sense of shared purpose and a common vision. Looking at the example of Northern Ireland, Gallagher (2004) points out that people can maintain a level of cross-community interaction without gaining insight into alternative views on the issues that had divided their communities from each other. One particular consequence of this is “that communities in Northern Ireland have a clear sense of the wrong that has been done to them, but little understanding of the sense of victimhood that other communities feel” (Gallagher, 2004: 638). In this respect, Northern Ireland is comparable to Cyprus: since the opening of the crossing points in 2003, increased border crossings and crosscommunity interaction did not necessarily translate into meaningful understanding and reconfiguration of perceptions of the “other” community. This is apparent from the reactions to a speech made by the Republican Turkish Party (CTP9) Member of Parliament Do÷uú Derya in parliament on 15 December 2014. She said that Turkish Cypriots were not the only ones losing as a result of the Cyprus conflict, and that there was a need to acknowledge the traumas and sufferings of others. Highlighting the sufferings of Greek Cypriots, Armenians and Maronites, Derya said that the Orthodox Church had allowed abortions for rape victims in 1974, contrary to Orthodox doctrine (See Hadjipavlou 2010). This speech made the headlines the next day, both in Cyprus and in Turkey (Yenidüzen, 2014). The majority of commentary on online platforms, social media and in the mainstream media denied the claims Derya had made and condemned her for being “ignorant” and a “traitor.” Despite the fact that cross-community interaction has been increasing since the opening of the crossing points, this is a sad example which demonstrates that there is still little understanding of “the other” as different but unthreatening, and little recognition of the “other’s” pain. The argument of this section is that a signed agreement can only ever be a small part of a wider, inclusive and deliberative process of social reconciliation (see Jarraud, 2012; Kay, 2012). The next section develops 9

Republican Turkish Party, a left-wing, pro-peace, social democratic political party in the northern part of Cyprus, founded in 1970. The party was led by Mehmet Ali Talat from 1996 until his election as president in 2005.

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the concept of ontological security and relates it to questions of identity and peace-building, to further demonstrate the importance of peace ownership at the grassroots level and the role of civil society in achieving sustainable peace.

2. Are we scared of peace? Dependency of the “self” on the “other” It is easy to want peace, to long for it, but equally difficult to imagine it. Imagining peace means re-imagining the “self” and the “other” in a future full of uncertainties. Peace is conditional: in Cyprus it depends on alleviating the fears and anxieties of the two main communities on the island, but these fears and anxieties are by no means static and homogeneous. Fifty-five years after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, over 50 years after communal division, and 40 years after the physical division of the island, life in Cyprus goes on as if it were normal to have the barbed wire of the Green Line looming in the background. Even though the two main communities of the island now can freely travel across the crossing points and have increased their interactions since 2003, thousands of children of the last two generations grew up learning about the existential enemy that lived next door, just across the Green Line. The communities created an image for themselves that depended on the image of the enemy; where all internal was good and just, and all external was bad and evil (see Papadakis et al., 2006; Papadakis, 2008; Spyrou, 2006; Volkan, 2008). Peace-building and reconciliation efforts challenge this image, and hence they challenge our very identities. This is where ontological security comes into play. According to Giddens (1991: 53), self-identity is “the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography” and identity “presumes continuity across time and space.” Subsequently, he explains ontological security as the confidence the self has in sustaining a “biographical continuity” through establishing a system of basic trust in the real world and in social relations with others. Ontological security is an emotive identification, not always an overt cognitive experience (Noble, 2005); rather it is about the trust we have in the continuity of our selfidentity and in our social and material environments of action (Giddens, 1990: 92). This trust shows itself in the routines we adopt that reinforce and reproduce our ontological security. In creating a world to establish our self-identities, reinforced by routines and trust in our personal and material environment, we draw borders to decide what is in and what is out, to decide what is “us” and what is not. Giddens (1991: 42), who notes that

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“learning what is not me” is the origin of self-identity, affirms the discursive necessities that make identity dependent on difference. Drawing largely on Giddens’ work, the concept of ontological security has given birth to a growing body of literature in International Relations (Browning and Joenniemi, 2012; Kinnvall, 2004; Lupovici, 2012; Mitzen, 2006; Roe, 2008; Steele, 2005, 2008; Zarakol, 2010). Even though there is no consensus among IR scholars on whether or not states, collectives or groups are primarily driven by ontological security seeking/producing practices, Mitzen (2006) and Steele (2005) convincingly argue that communities care about their ontological security at least as much as their physical security. Self-identity is the anchor for ontological security and the foundational pillar of our biographic continuity. Rumelili (2004) and Mitzen (2006) support this view of identity construction, maintaining that identity is dependent on difference. Building on Giddens’ understanding of the link between self-identity and routines, Rumelili (2015) stresses that identity is constituted not through just any routine, but specifically through those that articulate difference and distinctiveness. For Behnke (2006), identities cannot exist without self/other distinctions, and actors constantly produce and reproduce their identities (be they national, ethnic, religious etc.) through discourses of security. As long as identity has boundaries (whether flexible or rigid), there are those that are included and those that are excluded: those that are excluded are different to the “self” for some reason. Perhaps they represent an old self, a worse self or an “other.” McSweeney (1999: 15) sees ontological security as a “property of a relationship, a quality making each secure in the other.” However, what makes the self secure in the other could be a negative relationship of enmity and hostility as well as a positive one of friendship and harmony (Roe 2008; Rumelili 2013). Browning and Joenniemi (2012) emphasize that although actors need to distinguish themselves from other actors to be able to exist, difference need not always appear as negative. Adopting a relationist approach, this chapter maintains that identity depends on self/other relations, where the construction of self is based on difference and the interaction of self with “others,” cumulatively creating a biographical narrative of the self; however, this construction is “not destined to translate into mutually exclusive and incompatible categories of subjectivity” (Browning and Joenniemi, 2012: 493). This means that identity based on difference does not have to translate into a relationship of othering and perception of the “other” as threatening.

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In protracted conflicts, identities are configured and reproduced based on an image of an existential enemy. As such, the conflict itself and the relationship with the enemy can reinforce the sense of ontological security because the “self” is dependent upon this relationship with the “enemy other,” where trust in the biographical continuity of the self becomes ingrained in the conflict-producing routines themselves. Removing the “enemy other” from the intrinsic identity definitions of the self could leave the self ontologically insecure. Confidence building measures (CBMs) that consider intricate nuances of identity and the role of ontological security in peace-building can ensure that self-identity based on difference does not translate into a relationship of enmity or othering. According to Sigel (1989: 459), “There exists in humans a powerful drive to maintain the sense of one’s identity, a sense of continuity that allays fear of changing too fast or being changed against one’s will by outside forces.” This drive is what makes all actors ontological security seekers. As actors feel existential anxiety, it is not uncommon for them to wish to reaffirm their self-identity or become compulsively attached to their routines. A critical situation that causes ontological insecurity may arise from deep uncertainty (Mitzen, 2006), such as a sudden change in the identity definitions that tie the self to the objective world, or failure to have the self acknowledged and affirmed by others (B. McSweeney, 1996; Zarakol, 2010). A peace agreement at the Track One level without reconciliation at the other tracks is an example of a critical situation that creates uncertainty because it essentially reconfigures the enemy as the new compatriot, requiring a sudden change in identity definitions, where the threatening other becomes part of the “self.” In such a state of uncertainty and insecurity, actors are tempted to engage in practices of othering to re-affirm the identity of the self, where the other is seen as not only different, but also inferior and threatening (Campbell, 1998). The self is tempted to fortify the borders of its identity, more often than not by turning to exclusivist rhetoric to differentiate between members and non-members of the in group in order to reassure itself of the boundary between them. In such situations of intensified anxiety, actors resort to xenophobic, fundamentalist and populist accounts of nationalism and religion as an ontological security-seeking strategy (Browning and Joenniemi, 2012; Kinnvall, 2004; Roe, 2008). It is worth noting but not at all surprising that historical sources on Cyprus are contradictory. Since the establishment of the short-lived Republic in 1960 each community has had its own schools, preferred newspapers, political parties, cultural and sport organizations, and preferred version of history that paints the out-group as untrustworthy and

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aggressive. For Broome (2005: 83) “the past has been distorted beyond recognition by the educational systems and political propaganda of both sides” in Cyprus. For example, while the Greek Cypriot history textbooks focus on the British rule and the events of 1974, Turkish Cypriot history textbooks focus on the Ottoman period and the inter-communal strife before the events of 1974 (Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007). History education has been based on an “essentialist argument that relies on principles of racial descent” (Papadakis, 2008: 134) as a determinant of identity, which leaves very little room for the self to “choose,” “mould” or “define” its ethnic or national identity in Cyprus. Of course the use of historical narratives to reinforce political legitimacy is by no means unique to Cyprus. In many societies, especially those with ethno-national conflicts, history is often used to propagate a narrative focusing on the suffering of one group in order to legitimate its political goals. In these narratives, the suffering of others is ignored and their historical existence and legitimacy is questioned (Papadakis 2008). There is no doubt that historical propaganda employed in textbooks for the past 40 years has played a big role in Cypriot identity formation and the (mis)perception of the other(s) as illegitimate and antagonistic. Thus, peace negotiations that rely on the reunification of Cyprus based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with political equality, single sovereignty and a single citizenship (UNSC, 2008) automatically challenge the self-narratives and consequently the ontological security of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Following LeBaron (2003), Broome et al. (2012) contend that cultural differences affect conflict communication, and that conflicts are not just about territory, boundary, and sovereignty issues but they are also about acknowledgment, representation, and legitimization of different identities, as well as ways of living, being, and making meaning. Zarakol (2010) and Rumelili (2010) argue that the prospect of peace ideally needs to challenge the fears, deprivations and isolations of groups by bringing them together, but the very process of peace-building and the possibility of a settlement creates a sense of anxiety as it entails the questioning and redefinition of the actors’ understanding of the other and a reconfiguration of group relations. Therefore the anxieties arising from the very prospect of finding a solution need to be channelled constructively to convert the feelings of ontological insecurity they engender into a feeling of ontological security. This analysis points to a gaping hole in the mainstream approach of Track One peace-building, as ignoring ontological (in)security limits its capacity to deal with the affective, emotional, and perceptual realm of peacebuilding.

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The process of peace-building and conflict resolution entails practices that challenge and try to change the narratives of, feelings towards, and understandings of the “other.” The desire to protect a “sense of self” can be the basis from which old conflicts become new (Campbell, 1998), and a peace treaty may fail to transform into a sustainable environment of peace and security owing to a lack of grassroots support. Even though peacemaking might be achieved at the “state” level once an agreement on governance is reached among elites, the ontological foundations of the conflict requiring reconciliation at the societal level need to be addressed through civil society initiatives and CBMs that can create a sense of ownership for peace and provide a space to reconfigure self-other relationships in a reflexive manner. As we have seen, identity and self-narratives are formed and sustained through both material and personal relationships. Actors reproduce ontological security by routinizing their relations with both enemies and friends (Mitzen, 2006). Thus the ultimate attainment of “peace” requires a fundamental transformation of the self, which is not an easy task. According to Kay (2012), insecurities created by peace-making can partly be alleviated by practices that appear epiphenomenal, such as truth commissions and Cold War history panels. These can be essential components of change because they help groups achieve reflexive routinization. Track One level peace-building needs civil society to initiate and sustain reflexive routinization, and confidence building practices that support reconfiguration of collective narratives to address the anxieties that trigger ontological insecurity. The discussion now turns to the application of one particular process that seeks to produce the transformations necessary to produce ontological security following a peace settlement.

3. Methodology: Deliberative Collective Wisdom The Peace and Reconciliation Active Dialogue Network (ADN) was established through the “ENGAGE-Do Your Part for Peace”10 project as a thematic multi-sector representative network. The framework of the network was established to bring together a diverse range of individuals and decision makers to diagnose and discuss issues with regards to peace and reconciliation and subsequently recommend and prioritize CBMs. The Peace and Reconciliation ADN concentrated on discussing the current situation facing Cypriots with the aim of finding a comprehensive solution 10

For more on the project see http://www.mc-med.eu/2012-02-28-09-43-21

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to the Cyprus conflict, the ways to overcome the current deadlock in the negotiations, and specifically the kind of CBMs that would contribute to reconciliation efforts. The main objective of the ADN was to create an alternative civic platform that could openly discuss and suggest confidence-building measures and develop them in a more participatory and deliberative way with grassroots support. These could in turn promote ownership of the process leading towards a sustainable and comprehensive settlement. The Peace and Reconciliation ADN methodology provides a democratic, participatory and inclusive platform for facilitated dialogue engaging both “more people and key people” in the process. The innovative methodology draws its strength from the “collective wisdom” and “Structured Dialogic Design Process” developed over 30 years by Hasan Ozbekan (1970) and Alecos Christakis (see Christakis and Bausch, 2006) that aims to create consensus among participants, and to design action plans pertaining to a collectively-identified triggering question.11 One of the main criticisms of the reconciliation efforts and bicommunal initiatives in Cyprus is that they are limited to Nicosia and fail to incorporate people and perspectives outside the capital. According to the civic map created by the Mahallae initiative, out of 684 bi-communal civil society projects completed between 1979 and 2013, only 49 were implemented by CSOs from outside Nicosia or which had branches outside the capital. 12 There are some underlying reasons for this: most donor organizations are based in the capital; the capital has three out of the seven crossing points on the island; the capital historically has a more lively and dense civil society environment, including trade unions and chambers of commerce; the remarkable peace demonstrations of the early 2000s were mostly mobilized in the capital; in Nicosia the Green Line is only a few metres wide, making crossing more time- and cost-efficient. This creates a sense of dependency on the capital rather than self-reliance of other towns and villages to sustain reconciliation efforts island-wide. The ultimate goal of the ADN was to extend reconciliation efforts beyond Nicosia and to contribute to the peace process in a positive way by 11

The methodology is grounded upon 7 laws: 1. Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety; 2. Miller’s Law of Requisite Parsimony; 3. Boulding’s Law of Requisite Saliency; 4. Peirce’s Law of Requisite Meaning; 5. Tsivacou’s Law of Requisite Autonomy in Decision; 6. Dye’s Law of the Requisite Evolution of Observations; and 7. Laouris’ Law of Requisite Action. For more, see http://harnessingcollectivewisdom.com/ 12 For more information on the Mahallae civic map see http://mahallae.org/projectdetails-view

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bringing the communities of Cyprus closer together and moving towards a comprehensive solution on the island, and by producing a representative grassroots policy paper that could show the way forward and recommend CBMs prioritized by the two main communities of the island. The Peace and Reconciliation ADN introduced the work of ENGAGE and bi-communal work to rural communities through ADN meetings and ENGAGE-On-the-Move events. Bridging the gap between rural and urban areas was inherent in the work of the thematic ADNs in general and crucial for the Peace and Reconciliation ADN in particular. One of the main strategies for the ADNs has been their collaboration and co-operation with local authorities and CSOs through rural ADN meetings to ensure ownership, sustainability and greater impact, as well as creating strategic partnerships with rural organizations and local government. By involving local opinion leaders as a means of promoting ownership and empowerment within rural communities, the ADN aspired to build a constituency for peace and to create a more inclusive environment for constructive public deliberation. The efforts of the ADN started with a bi-communal agenda-setting meeting and continued with eight mono-communal meetings (four in each community) in different locations across the island. The process concluded with a final bi-communal meeting in the Nicosia buffer zone attended by selected representatives from both communities. The mono-communal meetings were particularly significant in involving those who did not feel comfortable in expressing themselves in English. The efforts of the ADN and the subsequent policy paper were followed by a survey of participants that sought to decide on the priority of the various CBMs that had been suggested at the ADN meetings in order to provide a more representative picture of the feelings of participants. The final meeting was used to turn the findings and priorities into tangible action-oriented projects. The Peace and Reconciliation ADN meetings included 66 Turkish Cypriots and 53 Greek Cypriots and took place in both Nicosia and rural areas.13 In addition to the face-to-face rural ADN workshops, prioritization exercises were developed using two online surveys, face-to-face questionnaires, and an ad hoc meeting in Famagusta, held in order to open up participation to more individuals to increase inclusivity in order to support and strengthen advocacy efforts. For the sake of methodological cogency and coherence, the charts below focus only on the ADN meeting results. Following the mapping exercises and diagnosis at the ADN 13

Rural meetings included Paphos/Baf, Larnaca/Larnaka, Limassol/Leymosun, Deryneia/Derinya, AyiosEpiktitos/Çatalkoy, AyiosSergios/Yenibo÷aziçi, Morphou/Güzelyurt and Dikomo/Dikmen

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workshops, participants created a list of recommendations based on the issues they had identified. Fifteen CBM recommendations were generated by the Greek Cypriot and 34 by the Turkish Cypriot participants. The ADN participants were then asked to prioritize these and then vote (individually) for the five recommendations that they thought were the most urgent and that would best facilitate progress. The prioritization exercises were done mono-communally for the recommendations generated by the participants of each community; the common priority CBM analysed in this chapter was independently recommended and prioritized by both communities. The two tables below show the top five CBMs prioritized by the ADN participants. It should be noted that the greater consensus among Greek Cypriot participants is mainly due to the smaller number of recommended CBMs.

4. Analysis of the Findings The policy paper that was drafted, based on the priorities set as a result of the votes in each meeting and the contributions from the survey participants, garnered widespread support both from ADN participants and from the project associates and local partners. The three issues that gathered the most votes among Cypriots were: x

x

x

Island-wide Priority: Translation of all formal documents and signs related to central and local government offices into Turkish and translation of all road signs into three languages. 23 percent of Turkish Cypriots and 51 percent of Greek Cypriots voted for this priority. Turkish Cypriot Community Priority: The Turkish Cypriot community should be included in the EU Customs Union, ports should be opened under EU supervision, Varosha should be handed over to UN-EU supervision and Turkey should open its ports to the Republic of Cyprus. 46% percent voted for this priority. Greek Cypriot Community Priority: Design a new campaign to promote the benefits of reconciliation: “Seeing through bi-communal lenses.” 60 percent voted for this priority.

The island-wide Priority: Translation of all formal documents and signs related to central and local government offices into Turkish and translation of all road signs into three languages (Turkish, Greek and English).

Table 2

Translation of all formal documents and signs related to central and local government offices into Turkish Number of participants

Cooperation on natural reserves and energy (water, natural gas, electricity, etc.)

TCc should be included in the EU Customs Union, the Ports should be opened under EU supervision, Turkey should open its ports to the RoC, Turkey’s negotiations process should move forward, and Varosha should be handed over to UN-EU supervision GSM operators to work on both sides of the island Preparation of common history books

Top Five TC Priorities

282

50.0%

44.4%

33.3% 6

44.4% 9

33.3%

16.7%

100%

22.2%

83.3%

Guzelyurt/ Morphou

100%

Core Group

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18

16.7%

22.2%

33.3%

38.9%

27.8%

Yenibogazici/ Ayios Seryios

17.4%

30.0%

43.5% 23

0.0% 10

21.7%

26.1%

20.0%

60.0%

26.1%

Dikmen / Dikomo

30.0%

Catalkoy/ Ayios Epiktitos

66

137.9

159.5

175.2

201.7

267.2

Total %

50.0% 12

Number of participants

83.3%

18

83.3%

50.0%

39.0%

83.3%

83.3% 75.0%

88.9%

Larnaca / Larnaka

75.0%

Core Group

Organise visist by GCc/TCc civil society to high profile bodies (i.e. Turkish/Greek government officials, TCc/GCc authorities, EU institutions and etc.)

Introduction of Greek and Turkish languages to formal and non-formal education environments

Design of a joint strategy for a new peace process that includes all stakeholders

A new campaign to promote benefits of reconcilitation: "seeing through bi-communal lenses" Translation of all formal documents and signs related to central and local government offices into Turkish

Top 5 GC Priorities

8

37.5%

75.0%

100.0%

87.5%

100.0%

Paphos / Baf

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50.0%

75.0%

7

57.1%

85.7%

71.4%

85.7%

75.0% 87.5%

100.0%

Derynia / Derinya

100.0%

Limassol / Limasol

53

278.0

369.0

372.8

414.9

463.9

Total %

283

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The results of the prioritization exercise gave this as the top recommendation by both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ADN participants.1 This island-wide priority is important for both communities for numerous reasons, including trust building, practicality and legal considerations. Article 3 of the 1960s constitution states that the official languages of the Republic of Cyprus are Greek and Turkish, and that all official documents must be published in both languages. However, even though it is possible to find some documents in Turkish many others are still published only in Greek. Ensuring that all official documents are published in Turkish will allow easier access to the institutions and authorities of the Republic of Cyprus for Turkish Cypriots and will fulfil the legal provisions of the 1960s constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. In addition, it will create a stronger sense of a multilingual society and diminish the difficulties created by language barriers. Furthermore, the translation of road signs into three languages will have many positive impacts on the two communities island-wide. Implementation and promotion of this CBM in the Turkish Cypriot community is particularly significant for the Greek Cypriot community and will symbolize that the cultural heritage of the island is protected. Translation of documents and road signs is important as it demonstrates a common interest in reunifying the island. Apart from being a sign of good will, the trilingual road signs will make the lives of drivers easier. Furthermore, the visibility of such an action will be strong and longlasting. Even though there are concerns with regards to the cost of this recommendation, the Peace and Reconciliation ADN together with its local partners can achieve it through small steps and pilot projects taken in close collaboration with the local authorities. The success of pilot projects will create a snowball effect inspiring both donors and decision makers to pursue similar initiatives.

1

In the prioritization exercise for the Turkish Cypriot community, 27 percent of ADN participants (44 percent of the Core Group, 33 percent of Morphou, 17 percent of Ayios Seryios, none of Ayios Epiktitos, 43 percent of Dikomo and 22 percent of Famagusta participants) voted for this priority. In the Greek Cypriot community, 83 percent of ADN participants (83 percent each of the Core Group and Larnaca, 88 percent of Paphos, 75 percent of Limassol and 86 percent of Deryneia participants) voted for this priority.

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The Turkish Cypriot Community Priority: The Turkish Cypriot community should be included in the EU Customs Union; ports should be opened under EU supervision; Varosha should be handed over to UN-EU supervision and Turkey should open its ports to the Republic of Cyprus.2 The majority of the Peace and Reconciliation ADN members agreed that the inclusion of the Turkish Cypriot Community in the EU Customs Union would promote economic integration within the island and facilitate a sustainable and comprehensive solution to the protracted problem. The ADN members thought that the ports in the northern part of Cyprus should be opened to international traffic under EU supervision, which will necessitate the concurrent opening of ports and the airspace of Turkey to the Republic of Cyprus, thus improving the Turkey-EU negotiations process and be a move towards normalizing Turkey-Republic of Cyprus relations. The ADN members added that Varosha should be handed over to the United Nations, as clearly stated in various Security Council Resolutions,3 in order for it to be re-opened and returned to its original inhabitants with both United Nations and European Union assistance. This would not only create economic growth and investment in the town, but would also contribute significantly to a comprehensive settlement. By building trust, with good planning and vision, a revitalized Varosha could become a model of synergy and coexistence. The ADN participants agreed that these three measures were inter-connected and should be advocated as a package to help bring about a breakthrough in the stalled peace negotiations.

2

According to the prioritization exercise 49 percent of the ADN participants (100 percent of the Core Group, 83 percent of Morphou, 28 percent of Ayios Seryios, 30 percent Ayios Epiktitos, 26 percent Dikomo and 28 percent of Famagusta participants) 45 percent of the online survey respondents and 25 percent of the face-to-face questionnaire respondents voted for this priority. 3 See UNSC S/RES/550 1984, UNSC S/RES/789 1992 and UNSC S/RES/902 1994

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The Greek Cypriot Community Priority: A new campaign called "Seeing through bi-communal lenses" which aims to promote the benefits of reconciliation.4 This priority received great attention as it emerged as a result of a deliberative process at the grassroots level; and it directly reflects the needs and interests of voices that had hitherto been missing, as the majority of participants did not have any previous bi-communal experience. The campaign of “seeing through bi-communal lenses” would investigate and promote the benefits of reconciliation, (including the economic ones) by targeting strategic audiences. The participants stressed the importance of short-term small accomplishments and the need for a well-focused effort to demonstrate both sides’ commitment to peace. Nevertheless, the participants in the process expressed two main cautions. The first was in relation to the cost of some of the priorities, such as the translation of signs and documents; and the second concerned doubts about the efficacy of targeting priorities that could be implemented by local communities and local authorities without endorsement from political leaders and elites, whose lack of support could hinder and significantly slow down the efforts of the ADN. Advocating the priorities of the ADNs is important for bridging the gap between Track One and Track Two level peace-building and for maintaining the momentum and motivation for the continuation of the reconciliation efforts on the island. This is not only the will of the Cypriot communities as evidenced by the work of the ADNs and other public opinion polls 5 but is also the will of the international community that desires to see a peaceful and reunited island.6 For Cyprus to achieve peace and stability, the active participation in the process of as many people as 4 In the prioritization exercise, 80 percent of ADN participants (75 percent of Core Group, 89 percent of Larnaca, 63 percent of Paphos, 75 percent of Limassol and 100 percent of Deryneia participants), 66 percent of the online survey respondents and 74 percent of the ad hoc Nicosia meeting participants have voted for this priority. 5 For example, see Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development http://www.seedsofpeace.eu/ (Cyprus, 2015) 6 See the statements and mandates of various international organisations, such as UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/unpeacekeeping/missions/cyprus.html; The European Commission Representation in Cyprus http://ec.europa.eu/cyprus/index_en.htm; or The EU Observer https://euobserver.com/foreign/123097.

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possible is crucial. This would mean that the political negotiations at the Track One level are complemented with a parallel process of grassroots reconciliation and confidence building through representative and inclusive civil society efforts.

Conclusion How do the results from ADNs relate to the theoretical framework? The findings presented in the case study are parallel to the theoretical framework that identifies feelings of security, self-identity and trust as the main pillars of achieving sustainable peace. The island-wide priority, which recommended that road signs should be translated into three languages, would demonstrate a will to recognize the distinct identity of each community and at the same time build trust by allowing the use of each other’s language out of respect, as well as for convenience. This priority comports well with the view that “ontological security is an emotive identification and not always an overt cognitive experience” (Noble, 2005), as it is about the trust we have in the continuity of our selfidentity and in our social and material environments of action (Giddens, 1990: 92). By changing road signs and official documents we can, in part, transform daily routines that reinforce and reproduce our ontological security by inserting a part of the “other’s” identity into those routines and material environment. Furthermore, achieving progress on the Turkish Cypriot priority would contribute to the elimination of the security concerns of Turkish Cypriots. It would alleviate their sense of isolation by allowing them to integrate into the international community and provide them with a sense of legitimacy, while also addressing the fear of both communities of the potential escalation of the conflict. This is in line with the argument that conflicts are not only about territorial, boundary, and sovereignty issues, but also about acknowledgment, representation, and legitimization of different identities, as well as ways of living, being, and making meaning (LeBaron, 2003; Broome et al., 2012). The normalization of relations between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey would go a long way to reduce fears of conflict escalation. The Greek Cypriot priority of an awareness campaign to inform people about the benefits of achieving peace would address the fear of “losing out” both economically and politically, as well as their fears about Turkey (see Faustmann, 2004). This is in line with the contention that if the

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prospect of peace challenges the fears and deprivations of groups by bringing them together, and the very process of peace-building and the possibility of a settlement thus creates a sense of anxiety and ontological insecurity, then this confidence-building priority would constructively channel the prospect of finding a solution to move from a feeling of ontological insecurity to one of security (Zarakol, 2010, Rumelili 2010). The categorical difference between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot priorities (one being relatively vague; the other more ambitious) is a reflection of the different ontological security needs of the two communities. As demonstrated in the Annan Plan referendum, the Greek Cypriots are not sure if any accord with the Turkish Cypriots will make them better off, and they are concerned not to risk what they have secured as the legitimate government of Cyprus. Their ontological security rests on this legitimacy and sovereignty that has provided them with biographical continuity and safety for their self-identity. Therefore, the ADN participants suggested seeking to alleviate the fears of the Greek Cypriots by having members of their own community explain to them the benefits of a solution, especially as some of the ADN participants themselves were unsure of what might happen and therefore very cautious. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, as they demonstrated in the Annan Plan referendum, are eager to reach a solution that will legitimize their current self-government in their own territory and also help maintain their distinct Turkish Cypriot identity by lifting the isolation they face as a result of non-recognition. Their ontological security is challenged by lack of legitimacy and recognition, which in turn challenges their biographical continuity as Turkish Cypriots. Thus their priority seeks to remedy their ontological insecurities. It would not be an oversimplification to say that both sides want to consolidate what they already have. However, their initial positions diverge. Since the Annan Plan, the Greek Cypriots in general believe they will allay their fears and secure their hegemony over Cyprus by not accepting a new partnership agreement. Turkish Cypriots on the other hand, in general believe they will manage to keep what they already have and not lose their identity and self-rule. Maintaining appropriate distance from domination by either the Greek Cypriots or Turkey would be achieved by signing an agreement which would be accepted by the Greek Cypriots and endorsed by both Turkey and the international community. The different ontological security needs can explain the ambitious highly politicized CBMs proposed by the Turkish Cypriot participants and vague and low profile CBMs proposed by Greek Cypriot participants. It is perhaps not coincidental that, as we were writing this chapter the Turkish

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Cypriots once again demonstrated their strong will to solve the Cyprus problem by electing a new leader Mustafa Aknc as their President. Aknc based his campaign on achieving a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus Problem, supporting CBMs, and indicating his support for the opening of Varosha for its original owners and giving some kind of legitimacy to the port of Famagusta and Ercan airports and opening them to use by all Cypriots. Soon after his election the talks between the two sides restarted with a more positive atmosphere on both sides of the green line. In summary, failing to understand and consider the nuances of identity and its connection to ontological security, plus the latter’s link with peacebuilding has kept the Cyprus problem deadlocked for over four decades. Peace building and reconciliation efforts in Cyprus have also suffered from peace fatigue, failed to achieve tangible outcomes at the Track One level, and suffered from criticisms related to their legitimacy and inclusiveness. In this regard, the chapter has made two main contributions; one theoretical and one empirical. The theoretical contribution is to expand the field of conflict resolution by incorporating the literature on ontological security within it. This literature is beginning to produce a valuable framework for analysis in international relations and conflict resolution. Considering ontological security can also help inform policy-making and peace-building by exposing fears and anxieties and locating their causes in order to propose effective ways of transforming relationships. The empirical contribution focuses on an innovative methodology that relates the theory to practice. The ADN methodology employed by the ENGAGE project focused on involving and opening channels of communication, particularly in rural areas, between “key people and more people” by providing an open and participatory platform for dialogue and deliberation. Rural communities, civil society activists, academics, opinion makers, business people, and central and local authorities came together both mono-communally and bi-communally with the aim of enhancing understanding, trust and reconciliation between the two communities in Cyprus, and of producing a joint and representative policy paper detailing confidence building priorities. These confidence building priorities not only illustrate the operation of the theoretical framework, but also reflect the outcome of efforts towards grassroots reconciliation by documenting initiatives that take nuances of identity and ontological security seriously.

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CONTRIBUTORS

Melanie Antoniou holds a PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Leeds and a Post-doctoral fellowship in Global Governance from the European University Institute (Fl). She has been living and teaching politics in Cyprus since 2011. Umut Bozkurt is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Eastern Mediterranean University. She holds a PhD in Politics from the University of York and has been involved in number of bicommunal peacebuilding initiatives in Cyprus ølke Da÷l is a Teaching Assistant and Doctoral Researcher at the Department of Politics and International Studies, The University of Warwick. Having worked closely with numerous civil society organizations both voluntarily and professionally, she has over ten years’ experience in peacebuilding and reconciliation in Cyprus. Walter Dorn is a Professor of Defence Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) who is based at the Canadian Forces College (CFC). As an "operational professor," the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations has sent him to Cyprus, Lebanon, Haiti and the Congo, as well as serve in its Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping. His latest book is Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace (Ashgate, 2014). Ayla Gürel is Senior Research Consultant at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Cyprus Centre where she conducts research on issues relating to the Cyprus problem. Her recent writing has been on the consequences of the discovery of offshore hydrocarbons. Her most recent papers are two that she authored with Harry Tzimitras, “Beyond Energy: Remarks about the Direction of Turkey-Russia relations and their implications for the Cyprus Problem," Euxeinos 18 (2015): 29-38, and “Gas Can Become the New Lost Opportunity,” in J. Ker-Lindsay (Ed.), Resolving Cyprus: New Approaches to Conflict Resolution London: I.B. Tauris, 2014. She holds a PhD from Bilkent University, Ankara

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem

297

Bülent Kanol is the Founding Director and a Senior Consultant at the Management Centre of the Mediterranean in Cyprus and a Research Associate at the University of Manchester in UK. He holds a PhD from University of Brighton, and an MBA from Emory University. He has been actively involved in peacebuilding work academically, professionally and voluntarily in Cyprus for more than 30 years. Michalis Kontos is a Visiting Lecturer at the University of Nicosia, Departments of Law and International Relations and European Studies. He studied political science at the National and Kapodestrian University of Athens (BSc) and European politics, international relations and strategic studies at Panteion University, Athens (Post-Graduate Diploma, MA, PhD). He is a member of the recently-formed National Geostrategic Council. David W. Lovell is Professor of International and Political Studies, and Head of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of New South Wales, Australia. He has a PhD from the Australian National University, and has visited Cyprus for conferences on many occasions over the past decade. Nikos Moudouros holds a PhD in Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Cyprus. He conducts research on issues relating to the Turkish Cypriot community, and to contemporary political Islam in Turkey. Matteo Nicolini is Assistant Professor of Public Comparative Law at Verona University (Italy) and Researcher at the Institute for Studies on Federalism and Regionalism of the European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano (Italy). He holds a PhD from the University of Verona. He studied in Italy, Spain and Chile and he is author of several publications in Italian, Spanish and English. His fields of research include Comparative, Italian and European Constitutional Law; Federalism, Regionalism; European Integration; Italian, European and Comparative Regional Law; Judicial Review of Legislation; Territorial Readjustment, and Legal Geography. Zenonas Tziarras holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Warwick, UK, where he taught World Politics. He has also taught Greek-Turkish Relations at the University of Cyprus, and works as a local consultant and researcher for the Cyprus Dialogue Forum, an initiative that creates space for bi-communal civil society dialogue. He

298

Contributors

co-edited Republic of Cyprus: Dimensions of Foreign Policy (in Greek) and co-authored the forthcoming Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean: Ideology and Strategy (in Greek). He is currently a Teaching Fellow at the University of Central Lancashire (Cyprus) where he teaches modules on Security and Geopolitcs.. Jonathan Warner is currently Professor of Economics at Quest University Canada. He has previously taught in England, the United States, Russia, Poland, Belize and Kyrgyzstan, and lived and worked in Cyprus for nine years. He holds a PhD from the University of Wales.

INDEX

Note: ƒ page numbers in bold font indicate tables ƒ excepting contributors to this volume, entries include authors discussed in the text Acheson plan, 44 Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi (Justice and Development Party: AKP), 99–102, 112–21, 127–29, 136– 37, 264n3 economic infrastructure, 144–51 neoliberalism, 141–44, 147 ADN. See Active Dialogue Networks Active Dialogue Networks (ADNs), 13–14, 278–89 ENGAGE – Do Your Part for Peace project, 278–80, 289 methodology, 14, 29, 278–81, 289 Peace and Reconciliation ADN, 278, 280, 284–85 See also peacebuilding; civil society organizations; diplomacy; Nicosia Aegean Sea, 69, 70. See also Exclusive Economic Zone Afar, Ethiopia, 248. See also ethnic pluralism Aknc, Mustafa (Turkish Cypriot leader), 7, 14, 15, 191, 289 AKP. See Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) Akritas Plan. See enosis Akçal, E., 141 All Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association of

Turkey (T㺺MSøAD), 120 Allport, Gordon, 205–6 Alona, Cyprus, 38 American Midwest, 242 Amhara, 248. See also ethnic pluralism Anagnostopoulou, S., 200, 205n4 Anastasiades, Nicos (President, Republic of Cyprus), 15, 49, 50, 52, 61, 64, 78, 86 Anastasiou, H., 205, 264 Anatolia, 3, 71, 143, 178–79, 246, 249 Anderson, Benedict, 28 Anglo-American. See Greek Cypriot perceptions, Anglo-American interventionism Ankara (nation-state, Turkey), 20, 27, 38, 92, 101, 113, 115, 121, 122, 123, 128, 129, 141, 142, 145, 148 Annan, Kofi (Secretary General, United Nations), 144, 160 Annan Plan, Active Dialogue Network, 288 comprehensive settlement, 5, 160 development, 206–7 factional percentages, referenda, 60, 160, 206, 270 failure, 10, 15, 137, 141, 144, 151, 233, 269 Greek-cypriot rejection, 15, 26,

300 48, 60, 97, 100, 101, 144, 160, 182, 207, 269n5 perceived Anglo-American pressure favouring Turkish Cypriot interests, 48–49 post-Plan Greek-Cypriot radicalism, 207 post-Plan UNFICYP downsizing, 160–61 referenda (2004), 4–6, 13, 15, 26, 48, 100, 113, 119, 120, 156, 160, 182, 190–91, 206– 7, 250, 251, 252, 269–70, 288 Track One diplomacy, 269–70 Turkish state, post-Plan economic oversight, 137, 141, 144–51 Turkish state, internal disagreements, 124n20 Turkish state, post-Plan inflexibility, 137, 141–42, 144, 145, 147 Turkish-Cypriot support, 48–49, 97, 100, 149, 191 US support for Plan, 45 See also Annan, Kofi; foreign intervention in Cyprus; protred conflict; United Nations anti-British independence movement, 23, 47. See also enosis; Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) anti-federalism, 15. See also federalsim anti-Tamil. See Tamil Aphrodite field. See hydrocarbon resource disputes Arab countries, 9, 92–93, 98, 103 Arab Republic of Egypt, 73–74 Arab Spring, 98, 114 Arab-Israeli conflict, 3, 18, 31, 90, 104–5 Arab-Muslim world, 112, 114, 116. See also Islam

Index Arab nationalism. See nationalism Armenians, 201, 273 Aryanism, 209. See also Sinhalese Association of Turkish Education (TED), 125. See also education: Turkish capital investment asymmetric federalism. See legal geography Atalay, Beúir (Deputy Prime Minister, Turkey), 127 Athens, 20, 27 austerity measures, 10, 133–37, 141–44, 149–51 Aver Oil, 77. See also oil resources Azar, Edward, 19, 25–26 bailout. See financial crises Balkans, 99 Ban Ki-Moon, 191–92 Ban/Christofias/Ero÷lu meetings (2010–12), 192 Bandaranaike, Solomon W. R. D. (Prime Minister, Sri Lanka, 1956–59), 212, 213. See also Sri Lanka Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact (1957). See Sri Lanka Barbaros Hayrettin Paúa (TPAO research ship), 62–65, 81, 264n4. See also oil Baron Bliss day (9 March), 184. See also Belize Baúeren, Sertaç Hami, 69n31, 74 Bayart, 266 Behnke, 275 Belize, Belize Coalition to Save Our National Heritage, 190 Battle of St George’s Caye (1798), 183 Guatemala, territorial claims, 177, 187–88, 191 Garifuna, 183, 184 Heroes and Benefactors’ Day (2008), 184 history, early, 183–85

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem hostile neighbours, 177 independence, 186, 188, 189 national cohesion, 12, 177 People’s United Party (PUP), 186, 189, 190 Taiwanese relations, 184, 190 See also federalism; Musa, Said Bercovitch, Jacob, 21–22, 24 Berne, Switzerland, 251 Biafra (war of secession, Nigeria, 1967–70), 251–52 bicommunal state, Republic of Cyprus (1960), breakdown (1963), 5, 82, 96–97, 138 Capital Region (Nicosia), 253 Constitutional, 59–60, 79, 233– 34 civil society projects, 207, 268, 271–72, 279 economic influence, 240 geographical delineation, 249– 50 linguistic influence, 239–40 offshore resources, 63, 79, 81– 85 peacebuilding, 31, 100, 159, 207, 268, 271–72, 277, 280– 81, 283, 286, 289 See also diplomacy; legal geography Biden, Joe (US Vice President), 46, 49–52, 101 bi-ethnic federal states, 232, 236, 239. See also bicommunal state, Republic of Cyprus (1960) bipolar global political system. See Cold War borders, colonial, 27 crossing points, 6, 14, 149, 164– 68, 271–74, 279 demarcation, 187–88, 234, 237, 240–45, 247, 250–54, 274, 277, 287 EU, 240, 263

301

identity, 6, 244–48, 274–76 linguistic division, 235, 238–39, 245, 247, 251 maritime (EEZ), 62, 65–66, 67, 72, 73–74, 75, 76, 77–79, 80, 81–87, 92 trans-border gas pipelines, 91– 92 Ledra Street Crossing (LSX), 164, 240–242 See also Green Line; United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus: electronic surveillance Bosnia-Herzegovina, 235, 242. See also federalism; legal geography boundaries. See borders bourgeoisie, 134, 137, 143–44, 147, 149–51, 199 Bozkir, Volkan (Minister, European Union Affairs, Republic of Turkey, 2014–15), 15 BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), 100 British Raj, 247–48, 251 Broome, Benjamin J., 268, 277, 287 Browning, Christopher S., 275, 276 Buddhism. See Sri Lanka buffer zone. See Green Line Bulut ønúaat (Turkish construction company), 125–26 Burton, John W., 25–26, 30 Byzantine Empire, 3, 178, 179, 198 BZ. See buffer zone Canada, British Royal Proclamation of October 1763, 244 Constitution Act (1982), 245 multinational nation (Québec), 242, 244–45, 247, 250 UN troop contributor, 1990s, 159 Canton of Berne. See Berne Carment, David, 12, 194, 195, 210,

302 214, 215 Catalonia, 250 Catholicism. See Roman Catholicism Caucasus, 99, 114 CBMs. See Confidence building measures ceasefire lines (CFLs), 5, 6, 11, 158–59, 162, 163, 165, 167, 171, 191. See also borders; buffer zone; Green Line centralization, power structure, 150, 209, 212 CFLs. See ceasefire lines Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), 120, 148 Chand, Prem (UNFICYP Commander, LieutenantGeneral), 157 Chechnya, 250 Chelvanayakam, Samuel J. V. (Tamil Federal Party: ITAK), 212 Christofias, Demetris (President, Cyprus, 2008–13), 22, 48, 192 Chrysostomos II (Archbishop of Nova Justiniana and All Cyprus, 2006– ), 207 Churchill, Winston, 199. See also foreign intervention Chuvashiya, 250 Circumstantialism, 196–97. See also ethnic conflict; Primordialism CIVICUS State of Civil Society survey (2011), 271–72 civil society, bicommunal projects, 207, 268, 271–72, 279 definition, 266–67 division, 6, 32, 144 empowerment, 266, 269n5, 271, 280 neoliberalism, privacy/state relation, 134–5 peacebuilding participation, 13,

Index 14, 15, 32, 266–67, 270–71, 274, 283, 287, 289 public benefit, 267 Track One–Three diplomacy levels, 269–70 See also Active Dialogue Networks; Annan Plan; civil society organizations civil society organizations (CSOs), 14, 15, 32, 144, 207, 266, 267, 268–72, 279–80. See also Active Dialogue Networks; civil society Clinton, Hillary (Secretary of State, US), 114 Closed Circuit Television. See Green Line: CCTV Cold War, 3, 24, 37, 39, 42–45, 53, 278 colonialism, anti-colonialism, 39 Belize, 12, 183–84 British, 3, 12, 20, 42–43, 47, 183–84, 193, 197, 199–200, 203, 209, 244–48 comparative research, 12, 193– 94, 217–25 Cyprus, history, 3–5, 12, 20–21, 24, 27, 39, 42–43, 47, 178– 83, 185–87, 197 decolonization, 3, 24 Dutch, 209, 235 ethnicity, 208–25 French, 179, 209, 244–45, 247, 250–51 Portuguese, 208–9, 212 post-colonialism, Cyprus, 24, 27, 96–97,218, 219, 220 Sri Lanka, 12, 208–9, 211 See also Canada; divide and rule; Québec colony. See colonialism common law (suprema lex), 1, 244 comparative research, 12–13, 30, 96n10, 135, 143, 162, 172–3, 197

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem Cyprus / Belize, 176–192 Cyprus / Sri Lanka, 193–94, 197, 217–25 legal, 233–56 See also legal geography concentration with mobility. See Green Line Confidence building measures (CBMs) 276, 278–84, 288–89. See also Active Dialogue Networks; bicommunal state: peacebuilding; civil soiety: peacebuilding conflict (political, military), avoidance, creation of body politic, 1 causes, 2, 26–27, 90, 90n8, 94– 97 Cyprus, history, 3–6, 11–12, 90, 134 definition, 3 identity, 6, 18, 24–26, 244–48, 274–76. maritime boundaries. See borders: maritime national comparisons, 3, 11–12, 18–19, 90, 104–5 See also conflict resolution; Cypriot identity; ethnic conflict; ethnic identity; protracted conflict; protracted social conflict; resource conflict; selfidentity conflict resolution, 6, 12–14, 19, 21–22, 26, 29–31, 193, 194, 217, 223–25, 264–72, 278, 289 Cyprus, dependence on firsttrack diplomacy, 29 foreign intervention, 37, 44–49 inability to resolve. See protracted conflict interactive, 19, 30–31 new approach, 29–30 Congo, 171, 172 Congress of Berlin (1878), 179

303

consociationalism, 232–34, 241. See also bicommunal state consociativism. See bicommunal state; consociationalism; legal geography Constitution, balancing domestic polity, 1. See also Constitution, Republic of Cyprus; and under relevant nation Constitution, Republic of Cyprus (1960), 4–5, 20, 28, 180, 189, 191, 202–3, 233– 34, 241, 249 Article 20, 7 continuation, ROC, 204 coup d’etat, TRNC (1974), 204 doctrine of necessity, 59–60 failure, 28, 59–60, 180–81, 188– 89, 202, 224 identity, 25 judiciary, 188 legitimacy, TRNC (Turkish Communal Chamber), 7 Part V, 7 prohibition, taksim, enosis, 180, 181, 201, 224 reform proposals (1963), 20, 181, 182, 189, 202–3 resource conflict, 59, 79, 82, 85 See also bicommunal state Constructivism, 197, 206. See also ethnic conflict contact hypothesis, 205–6. See also ethnic conflict continental shelf, 59, 65–76, 81, 84, 92. See also Exclusive Economic Zone; maritime zones, delimitation; UN Convention on the Law of the Sea co-operation. See inter-state cooperation Cornaro, Caterina (last legitimate Lusignan), 179. Cornell, Svante, E., 99, 195, 196,

304 197 Council of Ministers. See Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus coup d’état, Cyprus, Greek junta, (July 1974), 5, 20–21, 38, 40, 47, 60, 157, 181, 182, 204, 221 Turkey (12 September 1980), 5, 139, 145, 151 See also Turkish invasion, Cyprus Cox, Robert W., 95, 116 Crete (Kriti/Girit), 74, 200 Crusades, 179 CTP. See Republican Turkish Party cultural homogeneity, cultural imperialism, 209 democracy, 25 GC / TC enclaves encouraging ethnic violence, 202, 246, 249 homogeneous federations, 241, 244 identity, 19, 244, 254 regional boundaries, contra, 240–41, 246, 249 Sri Lanka, 211 state preference, 211 versus pluralism, motive for conflict, 196 CYPOL. See Cyprus Police Cypriocentrism, 204–5, 220. See also Cypriot identity Cypriot Greek-Orthodox Church, 4, 197–200, 207, 218–220, 246n13, 273. See also religious division Cypriot identity, 198–200, 239–42, 249, 263–65, 268–69, 276–77, 288–89 absence, 7–8, 12, 23–24, 32 literature, 265 losers (minorities), 24–25, 143 prevention, Greece / Turkey, 26, 145, 200, 204–5, 246, 255– 56

Index resolving Cyprus question, 8, 12, 15, 19, 32 See also Cypriocentrism; narratives; ontological security Cypriotness, 142, 192. See also Cypriot identity Cyprus, history, 3–5, 20–21, 178– 83, 185–88, 197–207. See also narratives Cyprus Friendship Programme, 31. See also civil society: bicommunal projects; civil society organizations Cyprus hydrocarbons. See Exclusive Economic Zone; hydrocarbon resource disputes Cyprus issue, 19–24, 27, 28, 31, 32, 144. See also Cyprus Question Cyprus Police (CYPOL), 4, 39, 165, 168n32, 201 Cyprus Question, 45, 232–33, 237, 240, 245–46, 252–53, 256. See also federalism; legal geography Cyprus Turkish Industrial Enterprises Holding Ltd, 119 CYPRUVEX, 119 Dagestan, 250 Danish law, 238 Davuto÷lu, Ahmet, 99, 100, 116, 117, 119 decolonization. See colonialism Deep Supporter, M/V, 62, 81 Delek Drilling, 77 Demetriades, Lellos (mayor, Nicosia, 1971–2001), 15 demilitarized zone (DMZ), 11. See also Green Line; United Nations Peacekeeing Force in Cyprus democracy, Belize, 189–90 civil society, 266 constrained post-1980, Turkey, 5 constraints, ethnic pluralism,

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem 25–27, 210–11, 217, 221, 273 defined constituency, prerequisite, 24–27 hegemonic interventionism, 52– 53 inter-state co-operation, 95–96, 104. See also peacebuilding Islamic, 114–15 participatory, 13–14, 279 restoration post-1974, Cyprus, 5, 24 transition, 27, 115 trust, principle, 25–27 See also civil society organizations; governance Denktaú, Rauf (first President TRNC, 1983–2005), 15, 23, 100, 139, 191, 205n4, 206 Denmark, 70 Derya, Do÷uú (Republican Turkish Party – CTP – Member of Parliament), 273 Diamond, Louise, 264–65n2, 267, 268 diaspora. See Tamil diplomacy, methodology, 265–66 multi-track, 100, 264, 265, 267 non-First Track, 29 Track One, 14, 29, 264, 268–70, 276, 278, 286–89 Track Two, 29, 30, 265, 267, 268–70, 286–87 See also Active Dialogue Networks discrimination. See Tamil displacement, populations, Belize, 185 Greek Cypriots, 5, 158, 181 poor populations, 137, 143 Turkish Cypriots, 20–21, 158 See also Tamil diversity, Cyprus cultural influences, 20 ethnic, 13, 19–20, 232, 255

305

democratic challenge, 27 multinational federations, 13, 232, 235, 241, 243, 253, 255 See also division, Cyprus; ethnic groups; ethnic pluralism divide and rule, 47, 185–88, 199. See also enosis: British colonial involvement division, Cyprus, 3, 7, 10–11, 13, 19–21, 60, 66, 138, 156–57, 205, 262, 271 class, 149, 151, 200–201 divided societies, 3, 13, 18–19, 205, 240–41, 246, 274 ethnic, 3, 6, 25, 31, 196, 200– 201, 218–220, 221–22, 225, 234, 247, 250, 254–55 federalism, 13, 233, 241, 243– 44, 247, 249, 253, 255 Greek-Cypriot parties, 205 history, 32 maritime, 66n25, 83n58 neoliberalism, 10, 253–56 Nicosia (capital), 158 regional divisions, 158 resolution attempts, 15, 19, 21– 27, 31–32, 157 resolution, feigned, 15, 29 See also green line; enosis; divide and rule; legal geography; protracted conflict; taksim DMZ. See demilitarized zone domestic political debate, 8, 9, 12, 22–26, 28, 36, 38, 40, 144–51, 186, 191, 199–207, 239–43, 256, 264–87 See also Sri Lanka Downer, Alexander (UN SecretaryGeneral Special Adviser, 2008– 14), 22, 63 Doyle, Michael, 94 drilling. See hydrocarbon resource disputes Dulles, John Foster (Secretary of

306 State, US), 44–47 Dutch, 209, 235 Ecclesiastes, 5 economic intervention, TRNC, 122– 23, 137–38, 143–48, 151 Economic Co-operation Protocol (5 December 1986), 145 economic interdependence, 94 Economic Organizations Platform, 150 Economic Stability Programme, 146 See also soft power; Turkish neoliberal model education, constitutional basis, TRNC, 7 ethnicity, 12, 194, 200, 203, 211–12, 219, 221, 251, 277– 78 peacebuilding, 283 Turkish capital investment, 10, 120, 125, 136, 145, 148–49, 150 universities, 120, 125, 146, 149 schools, 7, 91, 125, 136, 149, 182, 211, 276 See also narratives; nationalism; Turkish neoliberal model Edwards, 266 EEZ. See Exclusive Economic Zone Eide, Espen Barth (UN SecretaryGeneral Special Advisor – SGSA, Cyprus), 63–65 Eisenhower Doctrine, 43–47. See also foreign intervention by United States elites, economic, 218, 220, 221 external, 199 military, 26 peacebuilding, dissonance with local level, 272 political, 8, 12, 14, 26, 136, 150, 194, 196, 199, 200, 203,

Index 209, 211, 215, 218, 219, 220, 221, 225, 268, 269, 272, 278, 286 religious, 207, 211 219 See also Buddhism; Cypriot Greek-Orthodox Church; narratives; nationalism; Roman Catholicism; Sri Lanka enemies, 14, 41, 177, 270–72, 274, 276, 278 existential, 18, 272, 274, 276. See also ontological security energy, co-operation, 61, 78–79, 87, 91– 92, 100–105, 146, 282 soft power, 100, 117 See also Energy Charter Treaty; energy hub; energy security; hydrocarbon resource disputes Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), 9, 102–3 energy hub, 9, 77, 92, 100, 255 energy security, 91–95, 98, 102, 104. See also hydrocarbon resource disputes England, compactual politics, 1 Crusades, 179 legal geography, 237n3, 238–39 English language, 209, 211, 216n13, 238–39, 245, 272, 280, 281 English legal tradition, 1. See also common law ENI-KOGAS (Italian–South Korean resource consortium), 61, 62, 64, 65, 77, 78, 79, 81, 85. See also hydrocarbon resource disputes enosis (Cyprus–Greece union), Akritas Plan, 182 British colonial involvement, 185–86, 186–87, 199–203, 219 constitutional prohibition, 180,

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem 181–2, 201, 224 definition, 4, 23, 97n12, 157, 180, 199 Greek Orthodox role, 200, 219 history, 4, 23, 38–39, 185–86, 199–205, 221, 224 See also Makarios; taksim; Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston EOKA. See Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston Ercan/Lefkoúa International Airport, Nicosia, 289 Erdo÷an, Recep Tayyip (Prime Minister, 2003–14; President 2014– , Turkey), foreign policy, 49, 68n28, 100, 114–31, 136–37, 142 TRNC–Turkey continental shelf delimitation agreement (2011), 68n28 neoliberalism, 113, 115–27, 136–37, 142, 144, 151 See also Turkish neoliberal model Erhürman, T., 149 Ero÷lu, Derviú (President, TRNC, 2010–15; Prime Minister, 2009– 10; leader, National Unity Party), 15, 49, 50, 51, 52, 86, 122, 191 Ethiopia, 248 ethnic conflict, causes, actors, 195–97, 218 causes, factors, 219–20 comparative analysis, 12, 193–98, 217, 218–20, 221–25 Cyprus, 197–207 ethnicity as nature, not cause of conflict, 12, 224–25 ethnicity, changing role in conflict, 194 ‘ethnicized’ policies / conflicts, 223, 225 foreign intervention, stimulated, 2

307

identity, 24, 193–225 legal geography, 249–50 Primordialism, 196, 197, 224 research methodology, 194–97 Sri Lanka, 208–17 See also division: ethnic; ethnicity; ethnic identity ethnic consciousness. See ethnic identity ethnic divisions. See division: ethnic ethnic group, colonial influence, 12, 27, 186, 197–99 definition, 194 ethnic nationalism (ethnonationalism), 195 ethnocentrism, 195, 202 federalism, 13, 232, 239, 241, 248, 251, 255 identity, 196–97, 209, 211, 215, 219–21 national boundaries, no reference to ethnicity, 27, 186, 194 nationalism, 194–95, 207, 211, 215, 222 religion, 186, 207, 211 Sri Lanka, 208–17 unification, 186 See also ethnic identity; ethnicity; ethnic pluralism ethnic identity, changing prominence, 222–23 conflict, 194–97, 199, 218–220 construction, 218–20, 223, 225 elite exploitation, 12, 194, 196, 199, 209–10, 220–21, 225 immigration, 265 language, religion, education policy, 211–13, 225 nationalism, 195, 203, 215 territorial, 13, 221–22 See also Cypriot identity; ethnic conflict ethnicity, definition, 194

308 federalism, 243, 246, 248, 251, 254, 255 identity, 24–25, 178, 195, 364 nationalism, 195, 199–207 political transcendence, 12–13, 186, 246 prominence in conflict, 12, 193– 99, 217–20, 222–25 symptom, 13 territorial delineation, 13, 27, 158, 248, 254 See also Cypriot identity; division, Cyprus; ethnic conflict; ethnic group; ethnic pluralism; Sri Lanka Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA: National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), 4, 38–43, 47, 182, 185, 186, 201–4, 221, 222 nationalist right, 43 See also enosis ethnic pluralism, 196, 208, 210, 212, 244, 248, 251, 266. See also ethnic group; ethnic identity ethnocentrism. See ethnic group ethno-linguistic division, 233, 239– 40, 251. See also borders: linguistic; federalism; official languages; Tamil minority, Sri Lanka EU. See European Union Euro, 256 European Central Bank, 133. See also Troika European Parliament, 6, 50 European Union (EU), acquis communautaire (‘acquired of the community’: entire body of EU law), 181, 254 Annan Plan, support, 48, 60 Cyprus membership, Eurozone (accession, 2004), 5–6, 26, 39, 60, 86, 97, 103, 136,

Index 160, 181, 191, 239–40, 181– 82, 233, 263–65 energy security agenda, 93, 98 establishment supports domestic / international comparative analysis, 96n10 federalism / synchronic linguistics, 239–40 immigration, undocumented, 169 multilevel relations, southeastern Mediterranean, 103 planning non-Russian LNG for Europe, 101 Republic of Cyprus, bailout recommendations (2013), 133, 136 Republic of Cyprus, institutional underrepresentation, women, 6 Republic of Cyprus, only regional EU state, 92, 98 Republic of Cyprus, recognised sovereignty, 86 single market, 254 sub-Energy Charter regulatory agencies aligned with EU framework, 9, 93, 102, 105 Turkey, membership (accession) stymied by Cyprus problem, 100–1, 113, 141, 144, 160, 191, 206, 264 TRNC, embargo, 141 See also Bozkir, Volkan; Energy Charter; Varosha Eurozone. See European Union Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Cyprus, 67, 75, 76 Egypt (2003), 66, 68–69n29, 71, 72, 73–74, 75, 78–79, 81, 97, 103 Lebanon (2007), 66, 68–69n29, 78, 97 Israel (2010), 9, 61, 65n23, 66, 68–69n29, 77, 78, 81, 92– 93, 98

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem Greek Cypriot justifications, 59–60, 63, 65–66, 81–83 Greek Cypriot strategy, 9, 79, 87, 92, 97–99 international law, 70 Joint Declaration (2014), 49, 61, 98 recent disputes, 61–65 Turkish Cypriot justifications, 59, 62, 66, 68–69, 82–83 Turkish Cypriot strategy, 9, 79, 87, 99 Turkey,69–77, 84, 92, 93, 99– 101, 104 US interest, 49, 98, 100 See also hydrocarbon resource disputes existential enemies. See enemies Exodus, 177 export, neoliberal modernization (Turkey), 10, 112–15, 119, 127– 28, 136, 139–43, 146–47 Fakl, ùakr (Turkish Ambassador, Nicosia), 119 Famagusta, Ottoman conquest (1571), 3, 179–80 peace-building initiatives, 272, 280, 284n1, 285n2 private universities, 140 Turkish-Cypriot port, 65, 289 See also Biden, Joe; Green Line; Varosha federalism, asymmetrical, 13, 234–36, 240– 41 comparartive analysis, 236–37 linguistics, 239–40 multi-ethnic, 235–36 rhetoric, 25 Russia, 236 Spain, 235 subnational entities, 242, 243, 244, 250 two-tier (Malaysia), 235

309

See also Annan Plan; bicommunal state, Republic of Cyprus; consociationalism; legal geography; Sri Lanka Federation of Bosnia, 235 Federation of Nigeria, 247, 248, 251–52. See also Biafra; legal geography Figoli, Herbert (Maj. Gen., Force Commander, Uruguay), 161, 166, 167 financial aid, Aid Committee (Turkish embassy, Nicosia), 123–24 Diaspora aid to Tamils, 216 Turkish aid to TRNC, 10, 118, 123–24, 138, 141–42, 145–46 See also neoliberalism; soft power financial crises, 5, 10, 133, 141–42, 150, 256, 264 First World War, 4, 114, 179, 200 flexibilization, 137, 142. See also Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi; Erdo÷an, Turkish neoliberal model; export, neoliberal modernization (Turkey) Foley, 266 Force 860. See Green Line force, armed, 4–5, 24, 53, 90, 95– 96, 116–17 ANZAC, 177n3 British, 4, 42–43, 171n38 Canada, 177n3 Greek Cypriot, 11, 60, 157–58, 201–2 peace-keeping force, UN, 5, 11, 19, 156–73, 181–82, 216, 286n6 Turkish, 7, 11, 48, 62–63, 81, 84–65, 118, 138, 157–58, 182, 201–2 See also First World War; Second World War; Turkish

310 invasion, Cyprus; Turkish troops Foreign Affairs Ministry, Turkey, 148 Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEøK), 120, 148 foreign intervention by United States, Anglo-American relations, 46– 52 economic, 45, 78, 116, 135 Eisenhower Doctrine, 43–47 foreign policy, 43–45, 99, 100, 116 frequency, 36, 37, 42–44 instances, 40, 45 mediatory, 61, 202 Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO), 43n6 missionary, 209 resource exploitation, 8, 77, 82, 98–101 security, 36, 37, 39–53, 99–100, 188, 203, 216 See also Acheson Plan; Biden, Joe; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Sandys-Ball Plan foreign intervention in Cyprus causative factor, conflict, 36, 39, 42, 52 definition, 37, 39 explanatory model, 40, 41, 45– 46, 52 Greek-Cypriot perceptions, 36– 44, 47–52 research, 8, 37, 38, 40, 41–42 self-determination, 38–39, 45 wars between unequal belligerents, 2 interventionism, 36–37, 43, 45, 52–53 See also colonialism; economic intervention, TRNC; foreign intervention, United States;

Index Greek Cypriots; LondonZurich Agreements; Turkish invasion, Cyprus Foreign Ministry (Turkish), 64n19, 70n35, 71, 84, 124 Forsthoff, Ernst, 189. See also Constitution, Republic of Cyprus: judiciary framework, Active Dialogue Network, 278 colonial economy, Sri Lanka, 209 constitutional, Cyprus, 232–34, 237 Energy Charter Treaty, 102–5 ethnic conflict, analytical, 196 EU regulation, 9, 105 federal, 13, 177–78, 232–34, 242n9 foreign intervention, analytical, 37, 39, 41–42 multi-track diplomacy, 267, 268 ontological security framework, 270 peacebuilding, civil society, analytical, 265–66, 287–89 political realism, 90–91 second track diplomatic conflict resolution, 30 Turkish foreign policy, 99–101, 112–15 Turkish modernization, 112–15, 119, 135, 142, 147–48 united Cyprus, 82 violent nationalism, Sri Lanka, 215 Fraud Office (Turkey), 140 free market, 115, 116, 120, 126, 143–47, 254–56. See also Erdo÷an: neoliberalism freedom, political basic rights, Constitution, Republic of Cyprus (1960), 181 civil society, 266 security balance, Turkish

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem foreign policy, 100 self-determination, 38, 203 ‘three freedoms’ (movement; settlement; property), Greek Cypriot individual rights, 254 See also Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) funding. See foreign intervention by United States; Troika G-20 (Group of Twenty states), 100 Galatians, 193, 225 Gallagher, 273 Garifuna. See Belize Gautama Buddha. See Buddhism; Sri Lanka GC AKEL (WWII communist party, Cyprus), 200 GCA (Greek Cypriot Administration), 62, 84 Gellner, Ernest, 27, 195 gender inequality, 6, 157n2, 210 Genoans, 179, 198 geostrategic worth, Cyprus, to Turkey, 113, 117, 128 Cyprus, to US, 42, 44, 45, Turkey, to US, 45 See also foreign intervention by United States Germany, 4, 70n6, 189, 209, 241, 244, 250, 251 Giddens, A., 194, 265n3, 274–75, 287 Gilpin, Robert G., 91, 93n8, 94 Gladstone, William (Prime Minister, UK), 3–4, 199. See also Greece: Ionian Islands governance, 13, 29, 47, 59, 102–3, 116, 134 divided societies, 13, 233–34, 243, 247, 255, 263 good governance, 116, 146 majoritarian, 220 peacebuilding, 29, 263, 278

311

See also civil society; democracy Greece, anti-Ottoman sentiment, 198, 199 Cyprus, damaging foreign intervention, 19, 21, 23, 26, 36, 203, 204 Cyprus, guarantor (Treaty of Guarantee, 1960), 4, 5, 8, 36, 38–40, 180–81, 60, 201– 2 Cyprus, integration (1910), 200 Cyprus, motherland, 7, 8, 27, 38, 180, 203, 218, 219, 220, 222 Cyprus, national holidays, 182 Cyprus, US intervention comparison, 45 Dodecanese Islands, 187 Greek junta (1967–74), 5, 6, 20, 39, 181, 182 Greek nationalism, 203 Ionian Islands (1864), 3, 187, 199 NATO (1952), 39 partisan offer from Britain (1915), 4 United Nations, 39, 44 See also borders: maritime; coup d’état; Economic Exclusion Zone; enosis (Cyprus–Greece union); financial crises; Hellenism; Republic of Cyprus; taksim (partition of Cyprus) Greek Cypriots, perceptions, foreign intervention, 8, 36–46, 52 population displacement, 5, 158, 181 See also Constitution, Republic of Cyprus; Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA); Makarios III Greek-Orthodox Church. See

312 Cypriot Greek Orthodox Church Green Line, buffer zone (BZ), 11, 19, 158– 60, 163, 165, 167–69, 170n36, 171–72, 246, 252, 280 CCTV (closed-circuit televisual surveillance), 162, 164–67, 169 concentration with mobility, 11, 156, 161, 166, 168n32, 169, 172 cross-border peacebuilding, 15, 32 Force 860, 160–61, 167–68 history, 157–60 Military Observer and Liaison Officer (MOLO), 167–68 monitoring, 11, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 165–73 observation posts (OPs), 11, 156, 158–60, 162, 165, 172 See also borders; United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Grivas, Georgios (EOKA leader), 38, 47, 202–5. See also enosis; Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston Guatemala, 177, 184–91 guerilla war. See war Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, Maria, 272 Harper, Stephen (Prime Minister, Canada), 176–77 Harvey, David, 143 Hatay, M., 138, 140, 264 hegemony, 53, 103–4, 112–17, 126– 27, 142, 149, 188, 288. See also democracy: hegemonic interventionism; foreign intervention; foreign intervention, United states Hellenic history, 178, 198–99 Hellenism, political rhetoric, 205, 207. See also narratives;

Index nationalism Heraclides, Alexis, 19, 31, 203, 207 Herzegovina, 235 heterogeneity. See ethnic pluralism Hinduism, 195 Hitchens, Christopher, 21, 32 Hobbes, Thomas, 1, 2 Hoffman, B., 214 homogeneity. See cultural homogeneity Hopkinson, Henry (British Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, 1952–55), 4, 185 Horowitz, Donald, 25, 196, 215, 242n8 hydrocarbon resource disputes, 8–9, 58–65, 78, 81–87, 90–105. Aphrodite field, 58, 77–79, 85, 91n5 Constitution, RoC, 59, 79, 82, 85 Noble Energy (US), 8, 77–78, 85 zero-sum approach, 87, 90 See also borders: maritime, Exclusive Economic Zone; liquid natural gas; oil resources; resource conflict Höglund, K., 223 ICG. See International Crisis Group identity. See Cypriot identity; nationalism: identity ideological power, 93n8, 97. See also political power Igbos, 251. See also Biafra; Federation of Nigeria Ikenberry, John G., 91n4, 94 illegality, Block 9, 61 border zone trafficking, 165 ‘illegal spaces’, 240, 246 immigrants, Pyla, 169 Northern Cyprus (TRNC), 7, 123, 127, 181, 204, 206, 240–42, 246, 254

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem TRNC–Turkey continental shelf delimitation agreement (2011), 68 See also hydrocarbon resource disputes immigration, 3, 169, 207, 209, 246, 249, 265. See also displacement, populations Immovable Property Commission, 148. See also Turkish neoliberal model income inequality. See poor populations independence, sovereign, Belize (1981), 12, 184, 186, 188–90 Cyprus (1960), 4, 12, 20–23, 39, 44, 52, 86, 178–81, 185–87, 189, 201–4, 222 decolonization, 23–24, 27, 184– 85, 190, 193–94, 209 federalism, 242, 247–48, 250– 52 Lebanon (1943), 3, 18 Sri Lanka, 209–10, 220, 222 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (1983), 20, 60, 182– 83, 205n4 See also foreign intervention in Cyprus; foreign intervention, United States; nationalism Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSøAD), 121 Sadko÷lu, Okyay (head, Cyprus branch), 121 India, 208–9, 211, 212n9, 215–16, 222, 235, 247 asymmetrical federalism, 235, 247–48, 251 federation, 242, 247–48 Tamil Nadu, south India, 215 See also federalism; Sri Lanka infrastructure, LNG, 91

313

privatization, 10, 148–49 Turkish capital, 10, 122–25, 136n3, 148–49 See also Erdo÷an: foreign policy; Turkish foreign policy; Turkish neoliberal model Ingushetiya, 250 interactive conflict resolution, 19, 31. See also diplomacy; Active Dialogue Networks intercommunal trust. See peacebuilding: inter-group trust intergroup contact theory, 206 International Court of Justice, 70, 73 International Crisis Group (ICG), 22, 23, 69, 217 international law, 37–39, 44, 65n23, 68, 73–74, 101. See also United Nations International Monetary Fund (IMF), 133, 137. See also Troika international relations, 1, 3, 8, 18, 90, 94, 95, 96, 100, 116, 289. See also diplomacy International Relations (discipline), 91n3, 95n9, 275 inter-state co-operation, co-operative model, 92 Cyprus, cooperative regional bridge, 9 hydrocarbon resources, 78, 86– 87, 90–96, 101–5 trust-building measures, 29–30, 207, 264, 271, 280 Turkey–TRNC, commerce, 127, 145–46 See also peacebuilding intervention. See foreign intervention interventionism. See foreign intervention in Cyprus; foreign intervention by United States intractable conflict, 2, 24, 270. See also protracted conflict Investment Advisory Council, 126,

314 148 Ionian Islands. See Greece IR scholars. See International Relations (discipline) Islam, 5, 114, 115, 143, 178, 182, 194, 198 political, 5, 115, 143 Israel, 9, 61, 65–66, 69, 78, 81, 90, 92–93, 98, 103, 158, 242. See also Arab-Israeli conflict; Exclusive Economic Zone Istanbul, 115, 125, 127, 137, 149, 179, 199 Istanbul Technical University, 125 Istanbul Technological University, 149 ITAK. See Tamil minority, Sri Lanka: Tamil Federal Party Italian Constitution, 244 Italy, 65, 187, 244 Jackson, Richard, 21–22, 24 Jaffna peninsula, 209 Jayewardene, Junius Richard (Prime Minister, Sri Lanka, 1977–78; President, 1978–89), 213–16. See also Sri Lanka. Jenin, 115 Jennings, Ivor, 24 Jervis, Robert, 8, 41–42, 52 Joenniemi, Pertti, 275, 276 Johnson, Lyndon B. (President, US), 43, 50, 90n1 Johnson Doctrine, 43. See also foreign intervention by United States Joint Declaration. See Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Cyprus Joseph, Joseph S., 19, 186, Jura, 250, 251 jurisprudence, 1, 3, 70, 71 Justice and Development Party. See Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi Kadirgamar, Lakshman (Tamil Foreign Minister), 216

Index Kaiser Wilhelm, 4 Kalmykiya, 250 Kant, Immanuel, 53, 94 Kapodistrias, Ioannis (Governor, Greece), 199 Karpathos (Karpathos/Kerpe), 74 Kashmir, 3, 19, 156n1. See also ethnic conflict; protracted conflict Kassos (Kasos/Kaúot), 74 Kaufmann, C. 195 Kay, Sean, 273, 278 Kellas, J. G., 194, 195, 211, 215, 221 Kemal, Mustafa, Atatürk (First President, Turkey, 1923–38), 114, 178 Kemalist administrations, 99 Kemalist dogma, 100–101 Kemalist national liberation, 114 Kemalist secularism, 114, 115 See also Turkish foreign policy Keohane, Robert, 91n4, 94 Kissinger, Henry (Secretary of State, US, 1973–77), 21, 44, 45, 46. See also foreign intervention by United States Kuala Lumpur, 250 Küçük, Fazl (Turkish-Cypriot leader), 5. See also Constitution, Republic of Cyprus Kyrenia, 140, 180 labour marketization, 136–39, 142, 144–45, 150, 151 Laiki Bank, closure, 133. See also financial crises Langhans-Ratzeburg, Manfred, 238 Larnaca / Larnaka, 51, 178, 180, 203, 280, 283, 284, 286 Latin history, 3, 180, 198, 201. See also Roman Catholicism; Roman Empire League of Turkish Cypriot Young Businessmen, 150. See also neoliberalism

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem Lebanon, 3, 18, 66, 69, 78, 90, 97. See also Exclusive Economic Zone LeBaron, M . D., 277, 287 Ledra Street Crossing. See borders legal geography, asymmetric federalism, 13, 234–36, 240–41 ‘belongs of public law’, 237–40, 246, 250 comparative methodology, 239 definition, 236–40 ethnic conflict, 249–50 regional demarcation, 13, 232– 36, 240–42, 246–51, 253. territorial adjustment, 64, 243, 246, 249–53 See also bicommunal state, Republic of Cyprus; borders; consociationalism; England; federalism legislation, 66, 68, 69, 73–74, 120, 146–48, 182, 185, 188, 189, 210, 235–36. See also Exclusive Economic Zone; governance Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Committee. See Sri Lanka Levant Basin Province, 98 liberalism, 94–95, 105, 134–35, 139, 151, 266. See also neoliberalism; Turkish neoliberal model Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. See Sri Lanka; Tamil minority, Sri Lanka Lijphart, Arend, 3, 25, 232, 234n2, 238, 240, 241, 243, 253n18 liquid natural gas (LNG), 6, 8, 14, 49, 58, 77–78, 86, 87, 91–93, 98–105, 282 export, 77–78, 87 See also Exclusive Economic Zone; hydrocarbon resource disputes LLRC. See Sri Lanka LNG. See liquid natural gas

315

Locke, John, 1 Loizides, Neophytos G., 23, 26–27 London-Zurich Agreements, 39. See also foreign intervention in Cyprus; independence losers. See Cypriot identity LSX. See borders: Leda Street Crossing LTTE. See Tamil minority, Sri Lanka: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MacGinty, Roger, 268, 272 Maitland, Frederick W., 237, 240 Makarios III (Archbishop, 1950–77; first President, Republic of Cyprus 1960–1977), Constitution, Republic of Cyprus (1960), 5, 20, 180, 189, 191, 202–3, 249 coup d’etat (15 July 1974), 20, 40, 181, 182, 204, 221 exile (1956–60), 4, 46, 185–86 Greek nationalism, 201, 182, 186, 189, 203 Malaysia, 235, 241–42, 250 male-dominated. See gender inequality maritime zones, delimitation, 9, 65– 74, 79, 83, 84, 92, 170. See also borders: maritime maritime boundaries. See borders: maritime Maronites, 201, 273 Marx, Karl, 134 Mayan, 183, 186 McDonald, John W., 265, 267, 268 McSweeney, Bill, 275 Meghalaya, 251 Megisti (Kastelorizo/Meis), 71, 74. See also Exclusive Economic Zone Merk, Walther, 238. See also legal geography methodology. See Active Dialogue Networks; diplomacy; ethnic

316 conflict: research methodology; legal geography: comparative methodology; Turkish foreign policy Michael, Michális S., 19, 22, 29, 264, 269 middle classes, 27, 119, 144, 209. See also bourgeoisie Middle East, Cyprus, influence, 265 interventionism, US, 42–46, 52– 53, 99 oil resources, 42, 92 protracted conflict, 18 Turkish modernization, 112–15, 125, 149 See also Cold War Middle East Technological University, 125. See also education: Turkish capital investment militant organization. See Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA); Türk Mukamevet Teúkilat (TMT) military action. See soft power military coup. See coup d’état Milli Görüú (National Outlook), 143 Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party: NSP), 143 mistrust, 18–21, 90, 189. See also suspicion Mitzen, Jennifer, 265n3, 275, 276, 278 Mizoram, 251 modernization, 10, 112–18, 127–29, 137, 147, 150, 151, 196, 200. See also Turkish neoliberalism; Turkish foreign policy MOLOs. See Green Line monitoring. See Green Line; hydrocarbon resource disputes Montville, Joseph., 264–65n2, 267 Moslem. See Islam Muldoon, Orla T., 272 multi-track diplomacy. See

Index diplomacy Musa, Said (Prime Minister, Belize), 190 M/V Bravo Supporter (resource exploration vessel), 62, 81. See also hydrocarbon resource disputes M/V Deep Supporter (resource exploration vessel), 81. See also hydrocarbon resource disputes myth, 18, 32, 184, 208, 211, 215, 220. See also narratives Nablus, 115 Nadir, Asil (Turkish-Cypriot businessman, Polly Peck International), 140 Nagaland, 251 narratives, Belize, national common story, 12, 177 Cyprus, competing stories, 12, 21, 38, 177, 182, 187n10, 192, 203, 206–8, 220, 277–78 mediatory, 207, 278 textbooks, 182, 211, 277 self / other, 275, 277–78 Sri Lanka, 208, 212, 215, 220 See also Belize; Cypriot identity; nationalism National Unity Party (UBP), 122, 149, 205n4 nationalism, Arab, 42, 114 conflict cause, 12, 194, 195, 197 Cypriot, 28, 32 ethnicity, 194–95, 199–207, 211, 215, 221–22, 224 identity, 18, 26–28, 32, 215, 276 immigration, effect, 265 liberalism, economic interdependence, 94 “motherland nationalism”, 27, 219 ational anthem, 203, 204 pan-Hellenism, 198–99 populism, 221, 276

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem post-colonial independence, response, 27 religion, conflict cause, 220 See also Cypriot identity; Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston; Makarios III: Greek nationalism; Türk Mukamevet Teúkilat nation-building, 25, 215. See also nationalism NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization natural gas. See liquid natural gas neoliberalism, 122–24, 134–47, 141–56 Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi (Justice and Development Party: AKP), 141–44, 147 civil society, 134–5 division, Cyprus, 10, 253–56 See also Erdo÷an; export, neoliberal modernization; flexibilization neoliberalization. See Erdo÷an: neoliberalism; neoliberalism; Turksih neoliberal model Neo-Ottomanism, 99 neorealism, 95. See also Waltz, Kenneth Nicosia, ‘bicommunal Capital Region’, 253 Green line, 11, 14–15, 157–59, 163, 165, 167, 202, 246, 253, 280 civil society Active Dialogue Networks, reconciliation, 272, 279–80. 286n4 Demetriades, Lellos (Mayor, 1976–90), 15 history, 179–80, 202 strategic partner, US (2014), 101 Turkish neoliberal foreign policy, 124, 140 See also Aknc, Mustafa; civil

317

socity organizations; Green Line Nile Delta Basin Province, 98. See also hydrocarbon resource disputes Noble Energy. See hydrocarbon resource disputes North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 3, 39, 44, 45, 99, 100, 168, 263 Northern Ireland, 3, 19, 273 North-Osetiya-Alaniya, 250 Norway, 157, 216 Nye, Joseph., 265, 267 observation posts. See Green Line OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), 144. See also Turkish neoliberal model official languages, 203, 211, 216, 245. See also borders: linguistic division; English language; ethnic identity; ethno-linguistic division offshore exploration area (13 concession blocks), 8–9, 66n25, 77, 80, 83 Blocks A–G, 79 Block 9, 61–64, 79–81, 84, 85 Block 12, 68, 77–81, 84, 92, 98 See also Exclusive Economic Zone; hydrocarbon resource disputes; liquid natural gas; oil resources oil resources, Cyprus, 49, 66n25, 77–81, 87, 98, 191, 255, 26–3–64n2 LNG contrast, 91 Middle East, 42, 46 TRNC, 81 See also hydrocarbon resource disputes; liquid natural gas Onasagoras, 58, 61, 64, 79 ontological insecurity. See ontological security ontological dualism, 96

318 ontological security, 14, 265, 270, 274–78, 287–89 OPs. See observation posts open warfare. See war OPFORs. See opposing forces opposing forces (OPFORs), 157–59, 162, 163, 166–72 Oromia, 248 Ottoman Empire, 3, 4, 20, 99, 115, 178–79, 185–86, 194, 198–200, 218, 219, 277. See also Republic of Cyprus: history; Turkish foreign policy Pan-Tilt-Zoom (PTZ) cameras. See Green Line; United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus: electronic surveillance Papadopoulos, Efstathios ‘Tassos’ Nikolaou (President, Republic of Cyprus, 2003–8), 160n15, 207 parliamentary power. See political power partition. See taksim Peace. See peacebuilding; peacekeeping; United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus peace fatigue, 269, 271, 289 peacebuilding, 14, 224, 263–78, 286, 288–89 inter-group trust, 7, 14–15, 19– 22, 25–26, 29, 31, 95, 242, 274, 276, 284–89 literature, 14 reconciliation, 7, 19, 31, 44, 85, 206, 207, 217, 220, 224, 263–81, 286–89 See also Active Dialogue Network; diplomacy peacekeeping, 5, 11, 21–22, 156–60, 167–68, 172–73, 216n13. See also United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Peloponnesus, 198 Peoples United Party (PUP). See Belize

Index Persians, 178, 198 physical security. See security pipeline gas. See liquid natural gas; oil resources Piri Reis (Turkish exploration vessel), 80 pluralism. See ethnic pluralism policy, 9, 36–37, 42–50, 64, 85, 92, 93, 99, 100–105, 113–16, 119, 124–27, 134, 136, 139, 151, 179, 185–87, 194, 200, 205, 214, 221, 223, 245, 256, 264, 271, 280, 281, 289 political elites. See elites political instability, 39, 42, 61, 66n25, 221, 242, 251–52, 263– 65, 274–76, 286–87. See also protracted conflict political power, 1, 180, 203, 217, 220. See also centralization, power structure; civil society: empowerment; foreign intervention in Cyprus; international relations; power sharing; veto powers political science, 196, 240 political stability, 11, 44, 52, 91–92, 96, 102–5, 115, 139, 156–59, 160, 172. See also civil society; peacebuilding poor populations, 21, 31, 137, 142, 144, 206, 256. See also division, Cyprus: class Portuguese, 184, 208, 209, 212 power-sharing, 13, 25, 82, 233, 234, 238, 241, 244, 253 Price, George (leader, Peoples United Party: PUP), 186, 190. See also Belize Primordialism. See ethnic conflict protracted conflict, 2–3, 18–19, 24, 29, 208, 263, 268, 269n5, 270, 276, 285 inability to resolve, 2, 7, 9, 10, 18–20, 22–26, 29, 31–32, 44, 66, 81, 90, 137, 141,

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem 144, 147, 151, 177–78, 182, 202, 212–13, 216, 223–24, 233, 251, 269–79, 289 See also cold war; protracted social conflict protracted social conflict, 3, 18–32 ‘deep-rooted conflict’, 25–6 definition, 18 See also protracted conflict PUP. See Peoples United Party Québec, 244–45, 247, 250. See also Canada; colonialism: French race. See ethnicity Radcliffe proposals (1957), 46–47. See also foreign intervention Radice, H., 134–35 Raj. See British Raj Rakner, 266 Ramadan, Tariq, 114. See also Turkish model Ramallah, 115 Ramsbotham, Oliver, 29–31, 224 rapprochement, 201, 205, 212, 269, 271. See also conflict resolution; peacebuilding realism, 91, 95 rebellion, 179, 183, 216 reconciliation. See peacebuilding referendum. See Annan Plan refugees, 158n8, 204, 216n13. S?ee also displacement regional demarcation. See legal geography regulatory standards, 102 regulatory system, 9, 92, 102, 104, 105 religious division, 3, 24, 27, 180– 82, 186, 194–98, 207–17, 218– 20, 224, 233–35, 239–44, 250, 254, 275–76 Renan, Ernest, 32 Republican Turkish Party (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi: CTP, TRNC), 122, 273

319

Republican Turkish Party– United Freedom (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi– Birleúik Güçler: CTP–BG), 149 Republic of Cyprus (RoC). See bicommunal state, Republic of Cyprus; Colonialism: Cyprus, history; Constitution, Republic of Cyprus; Cyprus, history; Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston; independence, sovereign: Cyprus (1960); Makarios III; United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Republic of Venice. See Venice Resolution 1568. See United Nations resolutions resource conflict, 6, 8–9, 24, 58–87, 92, 104, 183, 210–11, 255, 263n2. See also hydrocarbon resource disputes Rhodes (Rodos), 71, 74, 81 Richard the Lionheart, 3, 179 rights, aboriginal, 245 Constitution, 79, 244 exploitation, natural resources, 14, 58, 59, 62–64, 68, 79, 81–87, 183 foreign intervention, 53 free-market, 254–56 human, 51, 116, 217, 263 individuals, 254–56 linguistic, 244 lodement of complaints, UN, 167n29 moral, 38, 39 navigation, 71n37, 188 removal of Turkish-Cypriots’ rights (Akritas Plan), 182, 189 self-determination, 38–39, 45 sovereignty, 9, 59, 68, 73, 79, 81–87 to bear arms, 2

320 Treaty of Guarantee (1960): conquest, 5, 180–82, 191 UN Charter, 38, 39n3, 181 veto, 189 See also veto powers Roatan Island, 183 RoC. See Republic of Cyprus RoC-Egypt agreement, 73. See also hydrocarbon resource disputes RoC-Egypt boundary, 71. See also hydrocarbon resource disputes Roman Catholicism, 186, 198, 244– 45, 250. See also Cypriot Greek Orthodox Church; religious division Roman Empire, 178, 179 Rosenau, James N., 37 rule of law, 102, 104 Rumelili, Bahar, 265n3, 275, 277, 288. See also ontological security Russia, 3, 101, 126, 179, 199, 236, 248, 250 LNG, 98, 101. See also liquid natural gas Sabah, Malaysia, 235. See also federalism Sabah (newspaper), 15, 141 Sandys-Ball Plan, 44, 46. See also foreign intervention: United States Sarajevo, 115 Sarawak, 235 school. See education Scotland, 183, 184, 238–39, 250 second track diplomacy. See Track Two diplomacy Second World War, 4, 20, 42, 46, 47, 187, 200. See also Cold War secularism. See Kemal: Kemalist secularism security, physical, 166, 265, 275. See also energy security; ontological security Seferiadis (Seferis), George (diplomat, poet), 38n2. See also

Index enosis self-determination, 38, 39, 142, 203. See also colonialism; independence self-identity, 274–76, 287–88. See also ontological security; peacebuilding; sovereignty Selim II, 198 Seychelles, 185 Sinhalese, 12, 195, 208–22 government, 215, 216 Sinhala, north Indian origin, 195, 208 See also Sri Lanka social psychology, 3, 18. soft power, 10, 100, 112, 115–16, 117, 127. See also neoliberalism; Turkish neoliberal model Somali, 248 Sophronios III (Archbishop, Nova Justiniana and All Cyprus, 1865–1900), 3 Soulbury, Lord (Herwald Ramsbotham, 1st Viscount Soulbury, Governor-General, Ceylon, 1949–54), 210, 212. See also Sri Lanka South Africa, 241, 242, 248 South Sudan, 172 south-eastern Mediterranean, 90, 91, 102–5. See also hydrocarbon resource disputes sovereignty, Cyprus, foreign intervention, damage, 39–40, 187 function, differing TRNC/RoC perceptions, 61, 81–83, 85– 86, 277 history, early, 178–80 history, modern, 180–87 hydrocarbon resources, rights, 9, 59, 63–64, 73, 79–86 identity, 287–88 See also bicommunal state, Republic of Cyprus; Ethniki

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem Organosi Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA); federalism; independence, sovereign: Cyprus (1960); ontological security Soviet Union, collapse, 3, 99, 114, 248 left-wing radicalism, influence, 43 See also Cold War Sri Lanka, Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact (1957), 212 Buddhism, 195, 208–9, 211–15, 219 Colonial constitution (1931), 210 colonialism, 12, 208–9, 211 Cyprus, comparative analysis, 12, 193–94, 197, 217–25 ethnic conflict, 208–17 ethno-nationalism, 194–95, 208–12, 214, 215, 218, 221, 224 Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Committee (LLRC), 217 See also elites; narratives; religious division; Tamil minority, Sinhalese; Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), 213 state capitalism, Turkey, 113–15, 118, 128. See also Kemal Steele, Brent J., 275 subnational entities. See federalism Suez Crisis, 42, 44, 46. See also foreign intervention by United States suprema lex (common law), 1 surveillance technology. See Green Line: concentration with mobility suspicion, reconciliation attempts, Cyprus

321

Problem, 7, 19, 41–42, 189, 191 US intervention, Cyprus Problem, 36, 42, 46–50 See also mistrust; peacebuilding: inter-group trust Svensson, I., 223 Syndicate of Turkish Cypriot Employers, 150. See also Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi; Erdo÷an; export, neoliberal modernization (Turkey); Turkish neoliberal model Tahsin, E., 140, 147 Taiwanese. See Belize taksim (partition / secession), 4, 21– 23, 39, 47, 79, 97n12, 157–58, 180, 187, 199, 201, 224 See also division, Cyprus; enosis Tamil minority, Sri Lanka anti-Tamil constitution, policy, 211–14 anti-Tamil riots, 214 civil war, 214 conflict causes, 218–20 colonialism, 209–10 defeat (2009), 3, 216–17, 221 Diaspora, 215, 220, 222 divided socities, 3, 194–95, 208Dravidian descent, 195, 210 Dry Zone, 214–215 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers: LTTE), 3, 18–19, 212–17, 221, 223–24 linguistic, historical differences, 194–95, 208–9 marginalization, 209–15 nationalism, 210–11, 214 partition, 211, 213 peace talks (1995), 224 Tamil Federal Party (ITAK),

322 212, 213 Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), 213–14 secession, 213–14 violence, 212–16 See also Sinhalese; Sri Lanka TCG Gelibolu (Turkish warship), 62–63. See also hydrocarbon resource disputes Temblos (Zeytinlik), 180 territorial neutrality, 241, 244 Territorial Sea Law, 65, 68. See also borders: maritime terrorism, 4, 182, 185–86, 214, 216, 223. See also war textbooks. See narratives third image approach, 95–96 thirteen points. See Makarios Thompson, Robert N. 176 Thucydides (History of the Peloponnesian War), 2 Tigrai, 248 Tishkov, V. A., 194 TMT. See Türk Mukamevet Teúkilat TOBB. See Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey TOTAL (French energy conglomerate), 77, 79. See also hydrocarbon resource disputes tourism, 10, 119, 120, 125, 126, 136, 145–49 Tourism Enterprises (Kbrs Türk Turizm øúletmeleri), 145 See also Turkish neoliberal model TPAO (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortakl÷: National oil company, Turkey), 62–64, 79–85. See also hydrocarbon resource disputes Track One / Two diplomacy. See diplomacy Transitional Cyprus Turkish Administration, 138. See also Turkish Republic of Northern

Index Cyprus Treaties of Establishment, Alliance and Guarantee, 5, 38–39, 60, 180–82, 191. See also narratives; Turkish invasion, Cyprus TRNC. See Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Troika (European Union/European Central Bank/International Monetary Fund task force), 133–35, 150 Trudeau, Pierre (Canadian Prime Minister), 176 trust. See peacebuilding Tu÷al, C., 137, 143 Özal, Turgut (President, Turkey), 99, 119 Türk Ekonomi Bankas (Turkish Economy Bank: TEB), 120, 148. See also neoliberalism Türk Mukamevet Teúkilat (Turkish Resistance Organization–TMT), 40, 138, 201, 203, 221–2 Turkish Communal Chamber, 7 Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TÜSøAD—Türk Sanayicileri ve øúadamlar Derne÷i), 120, 139 Turkish Cypriot community, 10, 20, 26, 60, 66, 112–22, 125, 128, 129, 133–34, 137, 138, 141–42, 151, 180, 269, 272, 284 Turkish Cypriot Federated State. See Turkish Federated State of Cyprus Turkish Cypriot leadership, 113, 127, 129, 189 Turkish Cypriot Police (TCP), 164– 65, 168n32 Turkish Cypriots. See narratives; Turkish Cypriot leadership; Turkish invasion, Cyprus; Turkish Republic of Northen Cyprus Turkish Economic Bank, 148. See

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem also neoliberalism Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (1975), 118–119, 138. See also Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) Turkish foreign policy, 9, 49, 92– 93, 99–105, 113–17, 127, 144 methodology, 99 See also ecoonomic intervention, TRNC; Kemal, Mustafa, Atatürk; neoliberalism; Turkish neoliberal model Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. See Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists Turkish invasion, Cyprus, 20 July 1974, 5, 20–21, 38, 40, 45, 47, 51, 60n3, 96, 118, 128, 157, 163–4, 181, 204, 221, 222 Turkish neoliberal model, 10, 112– 15, 115–29, 136–37, 142, 144, 151 See also Erdo÷an; neoliberalism Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), capital investment, education, 10, 120, 125, 136, 145, 148– 49, 150 Council of Ministers (CoM), 69, 141 Council of Partnership, 146 economic intervention, 122–23, 137–38, 143–48, 151 illegality, 7, 123, 127, 181, 204, 206, 240–42, 246, 254 Turkish aid, 10, 118, 123–24, 138, 141–42, 145–46 See also bicommunal state, Republic of Cyprus; civil society; Denktaú, Rauf; Erdo÷an, Recep Tayyip; Ero÷lu, Derviú; Green Line; hydrocarbon resource disputes; independence,

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sovereign; neoliberalism; sovereignty, Cyprus; taksim; Turkish invasion, Cyprus; Turkish neoliberal model; Türk Mukamevet Teúkilat; UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Turkish Resistance Organization. see Türk Mukamevet Teúkilat Turkish rule, 3, 27, 47, 137, 150, 151, 180–82, 187, 198, 277, 288. See also Turkish foreign policy; Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Turkish troops, 20, 60, 181–82. See also Turkish invasion, Cyprus Türk Sanayicileri ve øúadamlar Derne÷i (TÜSøAD—Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association), 120, 139 TUSKON (Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists), 120, 121, 148 Tuva, 250. Tylliria (Turkish bombing, August 1964), 40 UBP. See National Unity Party UDP. See United Democratic Party Ukraine, 3 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), EEZ, 66, 69, 92 history, 65n23 RoC, 65, 69–70 RoC ratification, 65 UNCLOS III negotiations, TRNC (non-member), 65n23, 69–71, 92, 103–4 See also Exclusive Economic Zone; European Union: Turkey, membership (accession) stymied by Cyprus problem; hydrocarbon resource

324 disputes United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 11, 139, 156, 157n3, 160n14, 161, 181, 285. See also United Nations Resolutions UNFICYP. See United Nations peace-keeping Force in Cyprus Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), 120, 148 United Democratic Party (UDP, Belize), 186, 190 United Kingdom (UK), 8, 20, 23, 36, 39, 44, 46, 47, 49, 141, 171n38, 179, 201, 216, 247, 250 United Nations, Anglo-American intervention, 48 anti-colonialism, 4 bipolar international system, 42 Charter, 38–39 conflict resolution, failure, 19– 22, 97, 224 equitable resource access, 82 Republic of Cyprus, member (1960), 180 See also Active Dialogue Networks: Peace and Reconciliation AND; Annan Plan; United Nations Resolutions; UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf (1958), 65. See also borders: maritime; Exclusive Economic Zone United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), downsizing, 11, 157, 159–61, 172 electronic surveillance, 156, 161–73 history, 11, 19–22

Index longevity, 156 See also Green Line; United Nations Resolutions United Nations Resolutions, condemnation, Turkish annexation, 7, 181 rights of the Cypriot people, 181 UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (1964), 181 UNSC S/RES/1568 (2004), 161 UNSC S/RES/541 (1983), 139 UNSC S/RES/550 (1984), 285n3 UNSC S/RES/789 (1992), 285n3 UNSC S/RES/902 (1994), 285n3 See also United Nations Security Council; United Nations peace-keeping Force in Cyprus United States. See foreign intervention by United States United States Geological Survey, 98. See also foreign intervention by United States; legal geography US. See foreign intervention by United States US foreign policy. See foreign intervention by United States Varosha (evacuated Greek-Cypriot quarter, Famagusta), 50, 51, 281, 282, 285, 289 Venice, 3, 20, 179, 198 veto powers, 185, 189, 202, 245 Vuda (Kalokhorio), 180 Waltz, Kenneth N., 53, 91n3, 95–6. See also neorealism war, 1974 war, 11, 113, 157–63, 172. See also Turkish invasion, Cyprus Greek Civil war, 42

Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem guerilla war 4, 212–16 International Relations theory, 95n9 interventionism (just war theory), 53, 188 liberalism, 94 Napoleonic War, 187 neorealism, 95 open warfare, 21–22 Seven Years’ War, 244 stalemate conditions, 2 threat, combination soft / hard power, 117 war crimes, 217 war zone, 37 See also Biafra; Cold War; First World War; protracted conflict; Second World War; Sri Lanka; Thucydides; Turkish invasion; United Nations

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Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Warner, Jonathan, 12 water resources, 6, 125, 189, 216, 282 welfare policy, 94, 138, 142–43 West Bank, 115 Wilson, John Leonard (Republic of Cyprus, High Court, Court of Appeal), 189 win-lose dynamics, 24–25, 30. See also ethnic conflict; protracted conflict witness protection, 217 Wittig, Kerstin, 26 World War I / II. See First World War; Second World War Yoon, Mi Yung, 37 Zarakol, Ayúe, 275, 276, 277, 288 zero-sum. See hydrocarbon resource disputes