Contemporary Politics in Japan [Reprint 2020 ed.] 9780520332799

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Contemporary Politics in Japan

Contemporary Politics in Japan

Masumi Junnosuke TRANSLATED BY

Lonny E. Carlile

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley Los Angeles London

Contemporary Politics in Japan is an English-language adaptation of Gendai seiji, 2 vols. (Tokyo: T h e University of Tokyo Press, 1985). T h e Publisher gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Japan-United States Friendship Commission and the Suntory Foundation.

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England © 1995 by T h e Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Masumi, Junnosuke, 1926[Gendai seiji. English] Contemporary politics in Japan / Masumi Junnosuke : translated by Lonny E. Carlile. p. cm. Rev. translation of: Gendai seiji. 1985. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-520-05853-4 (alk. paper).—ISBN 0-520-05854-2 (pbk.: alk. paper) I.Japan—Politics and government—1945- . I. Title. DS889.M3457413 1995 952.04—dc20 94-23660 CIP Printed in the United States of America 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 T h e paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. ©

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

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vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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xi

Introduction: Contemporary Politics

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i

PART 1 • LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980 1. Security Treaty Revision 2. Income Doubling

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/

13

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15

51

3. The Reversion of Okinawa 4. Remodeling the Archipelago

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85

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123

5. The Purification of the Political World

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158

PART 2 • THE DYNAMICS OF THE 1955 SYSTEM 6. The LDP

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205

7. The Bureaucracy and Interest Groups 8. The Socialists

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9. The Labor Movement

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251

305 /

351

10. Multiple Parties and Nonpartisans Epilogue: LPD Rule in the 1980s

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/

383

408

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203

CONTENTS

APPENDIX i: LDP PARTY PRESIDENT SELECTION PROCESSES, 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 9 0 TABLES

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

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445 /

495

487

441

TABLES

1. Mainstream/Anti-Mainstream Alignments and Factional Affiliations of Key LDP Diet Members Under Ishibashi and Kishi (December 1956-July i960) / 445 2. Mainstream/Anti-Mainstream Alignments and Factional Affiliations of Key LDP Diet Members Under Ikeda (July 1960-November 1964) / 446 3. Mainstream/Anti-Mainstream Alignments and Factional Affiliations of Key LDP Diet Members Under Satô (November 1964-July 1972) / 447 4. Mainstream/Anti-Mainstream Alignments and Factional Affiliations of Key LDP Diet Members Under Tanaka (July 1972-December 1974) / 449 5. Mainstream/Anti-Mainstream Alignments and Factional Affiliations of Key LDP Diet Members Under Miki, Fukuda, and Ôhira (December 1974July 1980) / 451 6. Backgrounds of LDP Representatives, 1958-1979 7. Backgrounds of the LDP Councilors, 1956-1977

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452 453

8. Associational Affiliations of LDP Representatives, 1958-1979

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9. Associational Affiliations of LDP Councilors, 1956-1977

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455

10. Factional Distribution of LDP Diet Members, 1958-1990

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456

11. Backgrounds of LDP Diet Faction Members, 1975 12. Political Contributions, 1966-1974

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/

454

460

460

13. Revenue Sources of Political Parties, 1976 and 1980

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461

14. Tanaka Cabinet Support Rate Among Political Party Supporters, 1972 and 1974 / 461 vii

via

LIST OF TABLES

15. T h e Structure of Employment in Chiba Prefecture, 1960-1975 16. T h e Structure of Employment in Kimitsu City, 1960-1975 17. T h e Structure of Employment in Japan, 1950-1987

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/

/

461

462

462

18. Employed Population by Occupational Category, 1955-1985

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463

19. Support for the Left and Right Socialist Parties by Region, 1954-1955 20. Occupational Backgrounds of JSP Representatives, 1958-1979 21. Occupational Backgrounds of JSP Councilors, 1956-1977

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/

/

1

464

465

22. T h e Factional Distribution of JSP Diet Members, 1958-1979

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466

23. Attitudes Toward the Company A m o n g Labor Union Members, 1979 and 1980 / 468 24. T h e Membership of Major Labor Union Centers, 1965-1980

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468

25. Attitudes Toward Participation A m o n g Labor Union Members, 1974 and 1980 / 469 26. Political Attitudes of Labor Union Members: T h e Need for Union Political Activities, 1978 / 469 27. Political Attitudes of Labor Union Members: Attitudes Toward Political Parties, 1978 / 470 28. Political Party Support A m o n g Labor Union Members, 1978-1980

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470

29. Political Party Support A m o n g Labor Union Members, 1960-1976

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471

30. Political Party Support A m o n g Office and Line Workers, 1975 and 1980 31. Votes Received and Seats Captured by the JSP in General Elections, 1958-'99°

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47 2

32. Support for the JSP by Occupational Category, 1955-1985 33. Support for the JSP by Type of Region, 1965-1985

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473

34. S u p p o r t f o r the JSP by Type of Region, 1955-1980

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474

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35. T h e Occupational Composition of JSP Support, 1955-1985

473

/

474

36. Votes Received and Seats Captured by the LDP in General Elections, 1958-1990

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475

37. Support for the LDP by Occupational Category, 1955-1985 38. Support for the LDP by Type of Region, 1965-1985

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39. T h e Regional Distribution of LDP Support, 1965-1985

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476 /

476

475

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LIST OF TABLES 40. The LDP-JSP Oligopoly, 1958-1990

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ix

477

41. Abstention and Nonpartisanship, 1958-1980

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477

42. Votes Received and Seats Captured by the J C P in General Elections, 1958-1990 / 478 43. Backgrounds and Affiliated Organizations of All J C P Diet Members, I95 6 -'979

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478

44. Votes Received and Seats Captured by the DSP in General Elections, 1960-1990 / 479 45. Backgrounds and Affiliated Organizations of All DSP Diet Members, 1960-1979 / 479 46. Votes Received and Seats Captured by the CGP in General Elections, i9 6 7- ! 99° / 480 47. Backgrounds and Affiliated Organizations of All CGP Diet Members, i9 6 5-!979 / 4 8 o 48. Koenkai Membership Among Voters for Political Parties, 1967-1976

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481

49. Party Affiliations of Local Government Executives and Assemblymen, 1965, 1975, and 1985 / 482 50. Switching of Political Party Support, 1975 (A)

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484

51. Switching of Political Party Support, 1975 (B)

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484

52. Difference Between Absolute Share of the Vote and Rate of Support for Political Parties, 1958-1980 / 485 53. Mainstream/Anti-Mainstream Alignments and Factional Affiliations of Key LDP Diet Members Under Suzuki, Nakasone, Takeshita, Uno, and Kaifu (July 1980May 1990) / 485

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am pleased to see the English-language version of my Contemporary Politics in Japan. The Epilogue was added for this version. I hope that this book will be read in conjunction with my earlier volume, Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955 (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985)I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to Professor Lonny Carlile, presently at the University of Hawaii, for his excellent translation of the Japanese version in the face of its many lengthy, difficult quotations. I wish to thank Professor George Akita (emeritus) for checking the translation and making valuable suggestions. I am grateful to Betsey Scheiner for her masterful editing. I am much indebted to Professor Chalmers Johnson for his unstinting and unflagging support in helping to see this translation through to its publication. I would like to acknowledge with appreciation the financial support given by the U.S.Japan Friendship Commission and the Suntory Foundation. Finally, but not least, I am indebted to the University of Tokyo Press and the University of California Press for providing me with the opportunity to publish my version of recent political developments in Japan. Masumi Junnosuke Summer 1994

xi

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary Politics

THE 1955 SYSTEM

The long reign of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP, Jiyu Minshuto) began when two conservative parties merged in the fall of 1955. The primary motivation for its creation was a remarkable socialist advance. The Left and Right Socialist parties did increasingly well in the first three general elections held after the end of the Allied Occupation in 1952. They controlled nearly one-third of the seats (155 of 467 seats, or 33.2 percent) in the House of Representatives, the lower house, in 1955 when they merged in the hope of seizing the reins of government. On no other occasion in Japanese history had socialist parties attained this much strength. Even at their prewar height in the early 1930s, the proletarian parties had won only a handful of seats. In the general election of 1947, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP, Nihon Shakaito) had, under the direction of its right wing, won 143 seats to become the leading party. But this achievement occurred in the midst of the postwar socioeconomic confusion and the Occupation's democratization policies and did not rest on a stable foundation. By contrast, the advance of the socialist parties in the 1950s was propelled by the support of massive labor unions. Thanks largely to the backing of Sohyo (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai, or General Council of Trade Unions ofJapan), the Left Socialists came to dominate after the parties' reunification. As the Rono (Labor Farmer) ideology-inspired Left Socialist platform of 1954 suggests, their objective was to pursue "class struggle" and socialist revolution via parliamentary democracy. Sohyo was created in 1950 at the direction of the Occupation Forces' General Headquarters (GHQ); it specifically excluded labor leaders affiliated with the Japan Communist Party (JCP, Nihon Kyosanto). With the out1

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INTRODUCTION: CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

break of the Korean War, it veered suddenly and sharply left and began to push labor unions toward "class struggle" grounded in intense shopfloor, industry, and community-based actions. Fierce battles ensued with big business, which had recovered managerial prerogatives that had eroded during the Occupation and was attempting a "rationalization of production." In the face of this socialist threat, the two conservative parties—the Liberal and Democratic parties—toned down their own internal conflicts and mutual antagonisms. " T h e Mission of the Party," the statement that accompanied the formation of the LDP in November 1955, announced that the party would "wholeheartedly fight the communist and class socialist forces that are planning a dictatorship." In the background, strong pressures for stable conservative government came from the zaikai (leaders of organized big business—literally, the "financial world"). Thus, the L D P and JSP each consolidated their camps in fall 1955 not for the sake of cooperation but for confrontation. Their actions formed a domestic c o m p o n e n t of the international Cold War structure in East Asia. THE SYSTEM OF LDP RULE T h e basic organizational structure of the L D P was established while Kishi Nobusuke was party president and prime minister in 1957-60. Its most important element was the habatsu, or faction, the unit that was utilized in distributing party and governmental posts. Balancing factional rivalries by a careful allocation of such posts was the key to successful management of the party, which in turn was a prerequisite for retaining the office of prime minister, a post held concurrendy by each LDP party president. T h e distribution of available posts could lead to a mainstream alliance (shuryúha) of progovernment factions, an anti-mainstream alliance (hanshuryüha) of antigovernment factions, and a handful of neutrals; or else to a solidaristic "allparty" regime (kyotó taisei) backed by all of the factions. Faction leaders, party executives, midlevel party officers, and backbenchers all maneuvered, aligned, and clashed within the framework of this system in their efforts to keep the incumbent government in power, take control of the government, or get hold of higher-level posts. Factional infighting was most heated during the selection of a party president. T h e first such batde followed the retirement of Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro in 1956. Kishi, the front runner, lost by a mere 7 votes to the first runner-up, Ishibashi Tanzan, because the latter had allied with the second runner-up. T h e distribution of money and empty promises of party and government posts became routine tactics for hammering together a majority in a party presidential election. T h e factional affiliation of each Diet member was ascertained through a careful scrutiny of the voting and votegathering process; after Prime Minister Ishibashi fell ill and had to resign,

INTRODUCTION: CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

3

almost all L D P Diet m e m b e r s were placed o n the roster o f o n e faction or another. T h e " e i g h t divisions," as the leading factions were known in thé early years o f the party, solidified u n d e r the Kishi cabinet. Kishi maintained his cabinet by delicately balancing the mainstream a n d anti-mainstream factional g r o u p i n g s that e m e r g e d o u t o f his particular pattern o f post distribution. H a d s o m e o n e else w o n , h e w o u l d have b e e n f o r c e d to m a n a g e the party in m u c h the same m a n n e r . Calls f o r the dissolution o f the factions were v o i c e d repeatedly thereafter, b u t at n o p o i n t were they carried out. Instead, such calls were utilized as w e a p o n s in interfactional battles. Probably n o o n e , n o t even those w h o were calling f o r the elimination o f the factions, really believed that they c o u l d b e dissolved. A s l o n g as the L D P maintained a stable majority, legislative bills should have b e e n passed by the Diet o n c e a consensus was r e a c h e d within the party. Nevertheless, there were times w h e n the JSP was able to obstruct governm e n t bills that it o b j e c t e d to. T i m e w o u l d r u n o u t o n a Diet session, causing bills to b e shelved or withdrawn. O n occasions w h e n the L D P then ext e n d e d the session or called a " f o r c e d v o t e " ( kyokô saiketsu) in favor o f the bill, the JSP reacted harshly, causing deliberations to c o m e to a grinding halt as the party in power a n d the opposition c o n f r o n t e d each other. W h e r e subsequent negotiations between the g o v e r n m e n t a n d the opposition p r o v e d s u c c e s s f u l — t h e eventual o u t c o m e in most i n s t a n c e s — D i e t proceedings were " n o r m a l i z e d " a n d the e n t a n g l e m e n t resolved. B u t o n occasion, clashes between the g o v e r n m e n t party a n d the opposition gave rise to an extraparliamentaiy m o v e m e n t . P e o p l e would mass a r o u n d the Diet building a n d e n c o u r a g e the JSP to h a r d e n its stance. A s if in collusion, the L D P anti-mainstream factions w o u l d start to criticize the g o v e r n m e n t , precipitating the fall o f the cabinet. O n l y o n c e was this scenario played o u t in its entirety, d u r i n g the revision o f the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in i960. T h e o u t c o m e was the automatic approval o f the new security treaty a n d the resignation o f the Kishi cabinet. ADVANCED INDUSTRIALIZATION Until i960 the L D P was d o m i n a t e d by factions whose leaders h a d b e e n opp o n e n t s o f Yoshida Shigeru (prime minister, 1946-47, 1949-54). T h e cabinet o f Ikeda Hayato (1960-64) b e g a n a p e r i o d o f d o m i n a n c e by f o r m e r bureaucrats associated with Yoshida. I k e d a learned a very important lesson d u r i n g the security treaty disturbances. H e assumed a low profile a n d turned public attention f r o m politics to the e c o n o m y with his c o n c e p t o f " i n c o m e d o u b l i n g . " As a result, the system established in 1955 turned into a m e c h a n i s m f o r fostering rapid e c o n o m i c growth. T h e i n c o m e d o u b l i n g plan was first a n d f o r e m o s t a regional developm e n t p r o g r a m . T h e policy-making process surrounding the associated Law

4

INTRODUCTION: C O N T E M P O R A R Y POLITICS

for the Construction of New Industrial Cities promulgated in May 1962 was very different from the process seen in the security treaty crisis. Mainstream and anti-mainstream LDP Diet members, attempting to secure gains for their home district and favored interest groups, alternately allied and clashed with government ministries intent on expanding their jurisdictions. A lobbying network cum pork barrel distribution apparatus linking the center to the countryside had already begun to take shape during the final years of the Occupation, when groups seeking subsidies and permits started to converge regularly on the Diet, the Diet office building, and the central ministries in Tokyo. With the regional development program, that apparatus began to operate at full capacity. The major players in this process were the LDP, the central ministries, and pressure groups. JSP Diet members were left out in the cold. There were no protest demonstrations, strikes, or petition drives. The extraparliamentary demonstrations were replaced by Tokyo-bound local government heads and local assemblymen from rural prefectures. The regional development-type policy process became the norm, repeated regularly on both a small and a large scale during the rapid economic growth of the 1960s. "Mass society" refers to the phenomenon of individuals drifting away from existing structures of political organization; social relations diversify and their fluidity increases as industrialization advances. It is not the same thing as political ignorance or lack of interest in politics. Individuals in traditional societies exist within a network of permanent and stable social relationships consisting of blood relatives and others to whom they are linked by kinship or kinship-like ties. People in these societies tend not to take an interest in politics, but they are integrated into the political system by locally influential people who mobilize their votes during elections. In large metropolitan areas busding with commuters and transients, social relations of this sort are difficult to sustain. People are informed about and interested in politics, but they often do not have a political party that they support. They often abstain from voting since there are no local influentials to counter this impulse and mobilize them. According to public opinion surveys during the 1960s, nonpartisan voters of this kind increased rapidly, especially in the metropolitan areas. The regional development policies of the period sought to correct interregional inequalities, but the result was rapid economic and population growth in the Pacific Belt region that connects the four major industrial areas surrounding Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Fukuoka. Wide disparities in income between these and outlying areas appeared, along with overpopulation in the former and depopulation in the latter. The arrival of "mass society" as a consequence of this advanced industrialization weakened the LDP's jiban (base of electoral support) and initially strengthened the JSP's. As a countermeasure, the LDP drew up plans to train party headquarters

INTRODUCTION: CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

5

personnel and local party leaders. In 1961 it established a system of local organizers modeled on that of the British Conservative Party. But the LDP prefectural federations were riven by local factional conflicts and personal feuds that the party headquarters could not control. In the end, these efforts to strengthen the party's local organizational structure proved ineffective. Ultimately, it was the efforts of individual Diet members and candidates that contributed most to the defense of the LDP's jiban. They poured money and energy into fortifying their personal jiban in their home districts, which were weakening in the face of the newly emerging mass society. Personal support associations (koenkai) proliferated during the 1958 general election. Organized and permanent, they frustrated efforts to strengthen the party's prefectural organizations. When regional development began, the koenkai served as mechanisms for channeling public works projects and heavy and chemical industrial plants to local electoral districts. The consequence was the further spread of mass society and a further undermining of the conservatives' support. As LDP Diet members strengthened their koenkai to compete with other LDP Diet members running in their districts, they became even more tighdy aligned with the factions at the center. Individual LDP candidates needed their faction leaders and fellow faction members to obtain subsidies, special concessions, campaign funding, official party sponsorship, and speakers for campaign endorsements. A faction leader needed to line up several dozen Diet members in order to make a bid for the government. Driven by the needs of both sides, factional networks spread from the center to the local districts. As factional clashes in the center became linked with rivalries between individual LDP Diet members, they reinforced each other and factional conflict became all the more bitter. In this way, the LDP was torn by factions that extended from the center to the periphery. The party's effort to dissolve the factions and consolidate its local organizations failed. By 1961, when koenkai memberships surpassed 10 million, the LDP had changed from a party of Diet members into a mass party based on factions and koenkai.

T H E EBBING OF T H E SOCIALIST MOVEMENT Initially, the socialist movement, propelled by the spread of mass society, made steady gains. But the JSP did not perform as well as expected in the 1958 general election, and it received a major jolt when a group split off from it to form the Democratic Socialist Party (Minshu Shakaito) in January i960. Many of the younger members of the JSP secretariat were beginning to harbor reservations about the Rono ideology that had come to dominate the party. They chose as their leader Organization Bureau chief Eda Sa-

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INTRODUCTION: C O N T E M P O R A R Y POLITICS

buro, who, along with other party activists, was pushing for "structural reform." Structural reform was approved as party policy at the JSP party congress of October i960. Concerned with methods for furthering the socialist movement in a mass society, it was criticized as revisionism by the party's Rono theoreticians. Other groups joined the fray, and the debate was transformed into factional infighting. Sterile struggles continued until Eda Saburo bolted from the party in 1977. T h e stakes in these intra-JSP disputes, which lay outside the arena of government, were considerably lower than those in the LDP. But the JSP infighting was even more extreme than the grudge-stained disputes of the LDP. T h e JSP squandered its energy on self-destructive factional infighting and lost the strength it needed to nurture and expand its support base. As before, Sohyo remained its primary sponsor. But besieged by advancing industrialization, Sohyo began to alter its own course. Its "class struggle" orientation of the 1950s was intended to transcend the limitations of enterprise-based unionism, but in the end Sohyo could not succeed. Particularly in the large private corporations, workers felt a deeply ingrained dual allegiance to the company and the union. They feared that their company might fail if there was labor strife and saw the growth of the company through "production rationalization" as more desirable. Company efforts to create second unions succeeded, undermining strikes. Led by the large companies in the heavy and chemical industrial sector, technological innovation and production rationalization proceeded. Productivity increased and wages rose. In the late 1960s, the system of organizing work groups around experienced skilled workers was replaced by a system of centralized supervision based on merit. This, in turn, set the stage for the transformation of Japanese unions into organs for labor-management cooperation.

THE ARRIVAL OF MASS SOCIETY Political fluidity is not the only characteristic of mass society. O n occasion, mass movements emerge that successfully mobilize individuals for specific political objectives within the pluralistic and fluid setting. T h e most notable examples of this phenomenon during the late 1960s were the "citizens' movements" (jumin undo) against pollution and environmental degradation that appeared throughout the country. They were the response of society to issues generated by regional development. T h e impact of environmental damage was not restricted to any one social stratum but affected them all. T h e movements involved the spontaneous participation of intellectuals, who could afford to spare the required time, and amateur activists, whose experience made them into on-site leaders. Neither their administrative organization nor their participants were clearly delineated. If anything, these movements tended to resist formalization and institutionalization.

INTRODUCTION: CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

7

The environmental damage and the issues associated with these movements were highly specific. As a consequence, the course of their development as well as their outcomes varied from movement to movement. They had a localized, one-time character. The growing importance of the mass media is another indicator of mass society. Media reports of a specific, localized movement stimulate similar movements elsewhere. Together they can exert tremendous political pressure. It is unlikely that the antipollution legislation of the early 1970s would have been realized without this base. The progressive governors and mayors elected throughout the country during the 1960s and 1970s were also a phenomenon of mass society. Most of them were independents who were nominated and supported by the opposition parties. They attracted nonpartisan voters. They attacked earlier local government administrations for their loyalty to LDP and corporate interests and their lack of consideration for the living environment and living standards of citizens at the grass roots. Through the mass media and various citizen groups, they succeeded in mobilizing a portion of the fluid and formless mass society. The heyday of progressive local government leaders was the early 1970s. Their situation, however, was precarious. In many cases, they were under siege from local assemblies in which conservatives held a majority and from the bureaucratic apparatuses of the center and local governments. In response, the progressive leaders attempted to introduce institutions for citizen participation, thereby creating further friction with existing institutions. Channeling a form of energy that rejects formalization into institutions and then stabilizing and sustaining it was a formidable task. The indicator of the arrival of mass society in national general elections was the increase in the number of political parties. In 1967 the Clean Government Party (CGP, Kômeitô) made a noisy debut. The organizational core of the JCP, DSP, and the CGP were—respectively—the Communist Party organization, Dômei (Japan Confederation of Labor), and the Sôka Gakkai Buddhist sect. They attracted the floating vote in urban electoral districts and took advantage of the vacuum left by the decline in LDP and JSP's share. The number of votes received and seats held by these parties fluctuated considerably, and it would be inappropriate to label their performance an unqualified advance. Nonetheless, the strength of the opposition forces (including the declining JSP) began to approach that of the LDP during the 1970s. THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE INDUCEMENT MECHANISM By the 1970s a number of changes were also apparent in the mechanisms that had induced advanced industrialization. Even though it is often diffi-

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INTRODUCTION: C O N T E M P O R A R Y POLITICS

cult to determine to what extent specific incidents are reflections of more general changes, the following points can be made. The ex-bureaucrat members of the Diet and the central government ministries (and in particular the economic affairs ministries) originally constituted the core of the inducement mechanism. Because of expertise gained during their earlier careers and because of their personal connections in the bureaucracy and organized business, the ex-bureaucrat politicians were able to attain positions superior to those of other Diet members. Party politicians—that is, politicians who lacked such a background—were essential in securing parliamentary seats and in steering the Diet, and they played a critical role in arranging factional alliances. But their role in the inducement mechanism was supplemental to that of the ex-bureaucrats. One might have expected their influence to pale further after prewar party politicians who were powerful enough to stand up to the ex-bureaucrats— men like Ono and Kono—passed away in the mid-1960s. Instead, the phenomenon of ex-bureaucrats dominating the party by virtue of their bureaucratic backgrounds diminished during this period. The reason was that by the mid-1960s, LDP rule was more than a decade old, and through their involvement in the policy-making process party politicians had accumulated knowledge and experience equal to that of the ex-bureaucrats. Likewise, although the backgrounds of the ex-bureaucrats might have given them an initial advantage, if they were to rise in the political world they still needed to gain political skills by getting involved in Diet activities. The differences between ex-bureaucrats and party politicians did not disappear, but their importance diminished. A new style of leadership—of people like Tanaka Kakuei and Ohira Masayoshi—became the requisite for wielding power and influence. During the late 1960s, the influence of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) declined. People began to speak of the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC, Seimu Chosakai) as the most important agency of government. Budget requests and bills were drafted joindy by relevant ministries, interested Diet members, and concerned pressure groups. PARC reviewed these, modified them, and imposed priorities on them; if matters could not be settled there, then the party leadership made a decision. Competition among ministries to expand their jurisdictions led them to ally with Diet members and pressure groups in an attempt to break through the budgetary constraints imposed by MOF. As that ministry's restraining powers declined, the decision-making influence of PARC and the party leadership mounted. The heavy and chemical industries grew rapidly as a result of the government's inducement mechanism. Under the policies and guidance of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), technological innovation and "production rationalization" produced spectacular success. For the most part, trade and capital were liberalized during the 1960s. In the

INTRODUCTION: C O N T E M P O R A R Y POLITICS

g

process, the business world became increasingly independent and MITI's influence declined. T h e Industrial Problems Research Association (Sanken, or Sangyo Mondai Kenkyukai, formed in 1966), in which the leaders of the four major business associations and top managers from various industries gathered, came to perform the role of a zaikai General Headquarters in establishing basic strategies for such matters as overseas resource development, industrial restructuring, and antipollution measures. T h e zaikai channeled funds to the LDP and its factions. Although discomfited by the party's factional infighting and promiscuous spending, business leaders could not turn their backs on their "prodigal son." T h e long-term decline of the LDP in the face of mass society nevertheless continued. T h e potential consequences of this for the business world were not as severe as they might have been, because the threat of the socialist movement was subsiding as support for the JSP declined and a new, more moderate current came to dominate the labor movement. T h e increase in the number of parties appeared to provide an avenue of escape for the zaikai in the event that the LDP lost its majority. T h e zaikai's view seems to have been that, if worse came to worst, it could take the DSP and the C G P under its wing. THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP T h e establishment of the Tanaka cabinet (1972-74) can be considered the symbolic culmination of Japan's postwar politics. A prime minister with a background like Tanaka Kakuei's was unprecedented. His entry into the political world from society's periphery, his discovery of a path to power amid the postwar turmoil, and his climb to the top on the resources he procured from the process of rapid economic growth were the stuff of legends. W h e n he reached the top, his rise was compared to that of Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-98), w h o advanced from the meanest poverty to the status of imperial adviser. Tanaka's popularity lay in his "man in the street" and "get things d o n e " image; unlike the ex-bureaucrat politicians, he projected a traditional, paternalistic aura. But whereas other party politicians relied on instinct and skillfully staged, personally enacted political performances, Tanaka possessed tremendous stamina and administrative ability. He was often called "the computerized bulldozer." H e relied heavily on bureaucrats and was able to gain their trust and confidence by applying their knowledge and expertise. Unlike the party politicians w h o preceded him, he had the ability to manipulate bureaucrats for his own ends. Tanaka's background, ability to raise funds, leadership qualities, and g o o d luck were extraordinary. But it was rapid economic growth and the development b o o m that created a political system in which a man of his character could flourish. Ironically, the very traits that propelled him into

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INTRODUCTION: CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

the prime ministership brought about his downfall in 1974. To Miki Takeo (prime minister, 1974-76), Tanaka's successor, elevation to the presidency of the LDP was "a bolt from the blue." Miki was first elected to office as an independent in 1937. He began the postwar period as the leader of a series of small centrist parties that aligned repeatedly with various conservative factions. When the LDP was formed, his faction lodged itself in the leftmost position and continually called for party modernization. Although he led his own faction and held a series of important cabinet and party posts, he was always considered a minor player. By the time he became prime minister, he was already sixty-seven years old. The fall of the Tanaka government presented Miki with an opportunity to implement the policies that he believed in. He directed all his efforts toward legislation for the "purification of politics." However, his was an interim government with a weak cabinet under a second-string prime minister and was intended by the LDP as a way of weathering an unprecedented period of crisis. A strong backlash inevitably emerged from within the party as he attempted to fulfill his long-cherished mission. His mode of operation stemmed directly from the character of his cabinet. Unable to generate support for his policies inside the party, he appealed to public opinion and the opposition parties, thereby antagonizing the leaders of the ruling party. But he had to navigate gingerly, for his government would collapse if he did not soften intraparty opposition by appeasement and compromise. Miki's mode of operation proved most effective in dealing with the Lockheed scandal. Encouraged by the press and public opinion and supported by the opposition parties, Miki let the case proceed to the stage of former prime minister Tanaka's arrest. At this point, machinations to "dump Miki" began. He was eventually forced to resign and take responsibility for the tremendous LDP losses suffered in the 1976 general election. This was ironic because rather than a signal of dissatisfaction with Miki's policies, these losses were probably the result of a popular backlash against the very people in the LDP who were trying to remove Miki. SLOW GROWTH AND G O V E R N M E N T P A R T Y - O P P O S I T I O N P A R T Y PARITY

The "1955 political system" was established when advanced industrialization was just beginning. Once the process was completed, a new system appeared—hokaku hakuchu, or a near parity of Diet seats between the government party and the opposition parties. Not only did the oil crisis of 1973 irreversibly derail Prime Minister Tanaka's plan to "remodel the archipelago"; it also marked the entry of the Japanese economy into a period of slower economic growth. By this time, mass society had fully permeated Japan. During the late 1970s approximately 90 percent of the people consid-

INTRODUCTION: CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

u

ered themselves part of the middle class, while the percentage of independent voters surpassed the rate of abstention to reach a record 30 percent. T h e first ten years following the conservative merger were characterized by a batde between the LDP and JSP across a "one-third barrier" of Diet seats. In the late 1970s, in contrast, the governing and opposition parties fought across a "one-half barrier." T h e LDP experienced dramatic up-anddown swings from general election victories that gave it a stable majority of seats in the Diet to electoral defeats that brought its share of seats to just below a majority. A mere 2 or 3 percent of the LDP vote separated such victories and losses. A difference of just 1 percent resulted in a gain or loss of 15 seats. Small shifts in the floating vote had an unpredictable and dramatic effect on the balance of power. T h e JSP's share of the vote fell to around 20 percent after 1969. T h e number of third party seats increased, and the share of seats held by the JSP and other opposition parties regularly reached well above 40 percent. Assorted plans for opposition party coalitions arose, but there was little chance that such a coalition would bring about a change of government. T h e more likely prospect was that a portion of the opposition would ally with the LDP. T h e LDP nurtured and maintained its voter base through a system of pork barrel networks. Tremendous subsidies were channeled to the agricultural cooperatives (nokyo) and small and medium-sized enterprises in particular. As a result, the rate of support for the LDP among voters in the primary-industry sector and among self-employed manufacturing and retail enterprise operators reached 60 to 70 percent in the 1970s. T h e share of self-employed small businessmen within the total vote, however, never exceeded 20 percent, and the percentage of voters in the primary sector declined to just 10 percent. While the ability to gather the nokyo and small and medium-sized enterprise association votes was extremely valuable under conditions of near parity, the fact remained that two-thirds of the voters were white- and blue-collar workers. T h e pork barrel networks were therefore expanded during the 1970s to include these groups, and by the 1980s at least half of their members supported the LDP. Unlike the agricultural cooperatives and the small and medium-sized enterprise associations, however, these groups were extremely difficult to organize and their vote remained fluid. Two points stand out. First, the system of pork barrel networks led to a systematic expansion of the national budget. Pressure for budgetary expansion increased even more u n d e r slow economic growth. After 1975 deficit financing bonds were issued regularly, and the LDP f o u n d itself unable to control government spending increases. This situation is not surprising given the fact that the LDP itself was a key cause of the budgetary expansion. Earlier, M O F might have played a role, but its preferences n o longer carried sufficient weight. T h e Suzuki Zenko cabinet (1980-82) was forced

12

INTRODUCTION: CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

to mobilize zaikai figures and former bureaucrats and establish the Second Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform (Rincho) in 1981 as a mechanism for restraining budgetary expansion. A struggle then ensued in which pressures for budgetary expansion clashed with this mechanism for imposing budgetary restraint. Second, the biggest factor in the mobilization of nonpartisan voters and the floating vote was the mass media. Although we do not yet have a clear sociological understanding of this phenomenon, it is obvious that the media have become immensely important in politics. The support of public opinion has become a new source of influence. Prime Minister Miki's influence inside the party was extremely weak, but he was able to (and had no choice but to) gain the support of the press and the opposition parties by calling for the "purification of politics." Likewise, the influence of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (1983-87) inside the party was weak, and he was forced to use the mass media as a weapon. In both cases, there was tension between intraparty politics and mass media politics. Prime Minister Nakasone's popularity was a major factor in the huge LDP victory in the 1986 double election. Nakasone interpreted the cause of the victory to be his success in maintaining a firm grip on the party's "regular customers" in the self-employed and primary sectors while appealing to the "gray zone" of television viewers that accounted for 40 percent of the electorate. He was absolutely correct. Interest groups and mass society were the two principal products of the era of high economic growth, and the pork barrel apparatus and the mass media were the means by which they were mobilized. But the "regular customers" remained incorporated in the LDP's network only because their interests were being furthered by it. When their interests were threatened, there were backlashes. On the other hand, it proved impossible to turn the mass media-mediated floating vote from a gray zone into regular customers. Support from this group could disappear in an instant. As a result of these factors, Nakasone found that, instead of "finally settling postwar politics," postwar politics "finally setded" him. Postwar politics, it seems, could not be completely setded during the period covered in this book.

ONE

Security Treaty Revision

FROM THE 1956 LDP PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION TO THE ISHIBASHI CABINET

The First LDP Presidential Election Unable to decide on a party president at the time of the November 1955 conservative merger, the LDP started out under a proxy committee system. The committee had four members: from the Democratic Party, former party president Hatoyama Ichiro and Executive Council chairman Miki Bukichi, and from the Liberal Party, former party president Ogata Taketora and Executive Council chairman Ono Banboku. It was decided that "within an extremely short time following the formation of the party, delegates from the merged branches will be selected to represent the general membership and they, along with the members of both houses, will vote as electors in a party presidential election." Hatoyama was prime minister at the time but, because of his age and poor health, his political career was not expected to last much longer. Ogata was increasingly seen as the most likely candidate for the party presidency and therefore as the next prime minister. Miki, a propelling force behind the conservative merger, tried to arrange a way for Hatoyama to become the party's first president, but in the end he seems to have concluded that the prime minister had no chance of winning a race against Ogata. Shinoda Kosaku, a close associate of Ogata's, claims that "Ogata's batde with Hatoyama ended when Ogata became a proxy committee member. A clear promise was made that Hatoyama would retire and hand things over to Ogata at the April 1956 party presidential election." According to Sugaya Kiroku, another of Ogata's close lieutenants, "Once persuaded that Hatoyama would lose, Miki Bukichi resolved to surrender the casde to '5

i6

LDP R U L E , 1955 - 1980

Ogata and secretly conveyed this decision to Ogata. Ogata was convinced that he could win and, trusting Miki completely, believed that [Miki] would get Hatoyama to step down." Ogata refused to consider even a temporary Hatoyama presidency. He feared that if Hatoyama lingered in the prime ministership, he himself would be passed over and the successor government would go to then-secretary general Kishi Nobusuke. For his part, Kishi felt that the chances of a Kishi government would lessen if Ogata became prime minister and the old Liberal Party was allowed to tighten its position. (Watanabe 1967:26-26) On the evening ofJanuary 28,1956, Ogata died suddenly from heart failure. At his wake, the talk leaned toward choosing Ishii Mitsujirô, the former chairman of the Liberal Party's Executive Council and an old friend of Ogata's, as his successor. Ishii, however, had neither the influence nor the ability needed to replace Ogata effectively in a campaign for control of the government. Ono, who had backed Ogata in order to land an influential position in the political world, immediately declared his support for Hatoyama. Thus, the field of candidates in the party presidential race narrowed to just one candidate, Hatoyama. The result of the election held during the party convention on April 5 was 394 votes out of 489 for Hatoyama. The 95 invalid and blank votes indicated the presence of an anti-Hatoyama bloc— the old Yoshida Shigeru faction led by Ikeda Hayato. Prime Minister Hatoyama went to Moscow that fall and signed the JapanSoviet joint communiqué. He announced his retirement at a press conference on November 2, the day after he returned. The previous August he had divulged to the LDP leadership his intention to retire after his visit to the Soviet Union and had asked that the selection of a successor be expedited. His promise to retire helped bring the Japanese-Soviet talks to a conclusion by placating those in the party who opposed the talks and drawing attention to the problem of selecting a successor. Now that he was retiring, however, Hatoyama had neither the capacity nor the desire to influence the selection of his successor. There were now three candidates: Secretary General Kishi, Minister of Trade and Industry Ishibashi Tanzan, and Executive Council chairman Ishii Mitsujirô. In addition to his own faction and the segment of the old Yoshida faction led by his younger brother, Satô Eisaku, Kishi was supported by a group from the old Hatoyama faction under Kôno Ichiro and a segment of the old Progressive Party (Kaishintô) led by Oasa Tadao. Ishii obtained the support of the old Ogata faction, or the mainstream of the old Liberal Party. Ishibashi did not have much of a support base. Sasaki Hideyo, of the Ishibashi faction states, "Only five people showed an interest when we first established an office for the Ishibashi faction." (Asahi Shinbun 1980:294) Ishibashi's initial support came from Ishida Hirohide and others of the antiYoshida wing of the old Liberal Party. Ôkubo Tomejirô and close lieuten-

SECURITY TREATY REVISION

/;

ants of Hatoyama joined in, and the Ishibashi faction eventually numbered about 20. O k u b o and his group wanted to back the candidate who was most like Hatoyama. Ishii was the successor of Ogata, Hatoyama's rival. Kishi had close ties to the bureaucracy and was therefore not the kind of person who could get along well with party politicians. Furthermore, his ally Kono was much too individualistic for their taste. This left Ishibashi, who had the kind of frank and open personality that Hatoyama's loyalists could appreciate. It appeared that no single candidate controlled a majority of the votes. In light of their plentiful supply of funds, it was thought that a Kishi-KonoSato alliance would come closest to a majority, but both Ishibashi and Ishii would have trouble gaining even a third of the vote. In these circumstances the uncommitted Ono, who controlled 50 Diet members, held the swing votes. Each of the three candidates visited the O n o residence in Takanawa to kowtow for his support. Ono, however, was coy. "My mind," he said, "is blank, 'whiter than white, like the snows of Mount Fuji.'" In the end, he supported Ishibashi in the belief that he had established a secret agreement. Ishida and Kuraishi Tadao of the O n o faction prepared the ground. According to Kuraishi, he and O n o met twice. He conveyed Ishibashi's promise to O n o that "if an Ishibashi government is formed, I will leave the party completely in your hands." O n o took this to mean that he would be chosen secretary general or party vice president. (Watanabe 1967:29-32) The Alliance of the Runners-Up An anti-Kishi "alliance of the first and second runners-up" was established by the Ishibashi and Ishii factions. Since Kishi forces would clearly exceed 200, Ishibashi and Ishii had no hope of victory without the alliance. The discussions between officers of the two factions began at the Fukudaya teahouse in Kojimachi late in the evening of December 13 and continued through to the following morning. Each faction argued that it was certain to come out in second place and demanded that the other candidate withdraw. T h e debate between O n o and Ikeda Hayato was particularly heated. They bet ¥200,000 on the outcome of the initial balloting. It is said that O n o later took ¥200,000 from Ikeda and enjoyed an evening of extravagant merrymaking in Kagurazaka. O n December 14, Diet members from both factions gathered at Tokyo Kaikan and formally agreed to an "alliance of the first and second runners-up." T h e Kishi faction did not stand by idly. Judging that Ishibashi would come in second and Ishii third, it moved to establish an alliance with Ishii. Confident that it could gather a majority on its own, it refrained from any overt action. It did, however, maneuver behind the scenes to split the Ishii and Ishibashi forces. Kishi states in his memoirs that a secret pact was drawn up between the Kishi and Ishibashi factions to the effect that "if the differ-

18

LDP RULE, 1955-1980

ence between first and second place is greater than 50 votes, then the second place [candidate] will withdraw his candidacy and recommend the person in first place." (Kishi 1983:273) Was there indeed such an agreement? Kuraishi describes the following: On the morning of the party presidential election, after the cabinet meeting ended, Kono called me and said: "The contest has been decided. Kishi will win. Last night, in a single evening, I bought 17 votes from the anti-Kishi forces. I wonder what Ono plans to do after Ishibashi loses." He then tried to convince me to change sides. When I flady refused, Kono gave up. I asked him then, "Who do you mean when you say 17 votes?" "A man of prominent standing and his followers," was Kono's reply. Since the results of the vote turned out to be 10 or so votes less than what we had calculated the night before, I believe that what Kono said was true. (Watanabe 1967:124) On the first ballot Kishi received 223 votes; Ishibashi, 151; and Ishii, 137. In the runoff, it was Ishibashi, 258; Kishi, 251; and one invalid vote. Twentyeight of the total of 288 votes that went to Ishibashi and Ishii in the initial balloting were diverted to Kishi in the runoff, and 2 were invalid or abstentions. It appears that these 30 votes came out of Ishii's first-round votes. Kishi later recalled: At first it was between Ishii and me. This was interpreted as a contest between representatives of the old Democratic Party and the old Liberal Party. Ono Banboku and Kono Ichiro tried to prevail on Hatoyama, but in the end Hatoyama said that he did not want to get involved in the matter of selecting a successor party president and refrained from exercising any leadership. From the perspective of what was going on in the party, you would think that he owed me a favor, but he was also a relative of Ishii's. Then, in addition to the two of us, it turned out that Ishibashi would also be running. As for how I myself felt at the time, things were not as intense as in recent party presidential elections and I believe I entered the election in a more relaxed state of mind. The biggest ringleader [in the maneuvering around Ishibashi's sudden emergence] was undoubtedly Ishida Hirohide. Relying on Miki Takeo and Matsumura Kenzo as his main backing, Ishida came out in support of Ishibashi. To tell the truth, no one was cognizant of the fact that there was a firm agreement between Messrs. Ishii and Ishibashi on a first and second runnersup alliance, and although we could not fully ascertain that I would be able to gain a majority in the first round, we did think that in the second round we could beat the runner-up by a considerable margin. (Kishi, Yatsugi, and ltd 1981:155-57) Things may indeed not have been quite as intense as they became in subsequent party presidential elections. The tacticians in the Ishibashi faction, which did not have much of a base, succeeded because the factional composition of the LDP was still fluid. Factional ties were strengthened

SECURITY TREATY REVISION

ig

during the desperate vote gathering that accompanied this election, and leaders learned that they needed a faction if they were to gain control of the government. The wanton disbursement of money and posts that later became the standard method of maintaining factional solidarity was already apparent. Informed sources suggest that the Kishi faction spent ¥300 million, the Ishibashi faction ¥150 million, and the Ishii faction ¥80 million on this "live ammunition." It was said that the Ishibashi faction's chief of staff, Ishida, issued sixty promissory notes for cabinet posts—there were only eighteen of them—as collateral. Notes for the ministership of commerce and industry were allegedly given to five people and the agricultural ministership to eight. There was also a scramble for local party delegates. The votes of the prefectural delegates, allocated two to a prefecture, were consequential in a close race. Most of these delegates were prefectural assemblymen who were susceptible to temptation. Precisely for this reason the members of the three factions, looking somewhat like the barkers that innkeepers hire to attract customers (or worse, like pimps) staked out Haneda Airport, Ueno Station, and Tokyo Station in search of arriving delegates. They packed the delegates into deluxe hotels and inns and showered them with money, women, and other goodies. (Watanabe 1967:127) The Formation of the Ishibashi Cabinet

Ishibashi Tanzan was named prime minister on December 20, 1956. Forming a cabinet, however, proved extremely difficult. When the attestation ceremony was finally held on December 24, the three cabinet ministers from the upper house had still not been selected. An attestation ceremony for two of those ministers was somehow arranged on December 27, but the person to head the Defense Agency was not decided until February 2, 1957. As rewards for their services in the trifactional alliance, Miki was named LDP secretary general; Ikeda, finance minister; and Ishida, chief cabinet secretary. The biggest question was what to do with Kishi, who might conceivably establish a formidable enemy camp. In the end, he was named foreign minister. Kishi recalls the process leading up to his selection: It was my understanding that it had been decided between Ishibashi and Ishii that, if an alliance of the first and second runners-up was formed, the winner would make the other the vice premier. I put forward an argument that direcdy conflicted with this, and it seems that they argued for a couple of days over how to respond. T h e upshot was that Ishii would join the cabinet as vice premier, but anything else would go against the understanding. I think that he did not join the cabinet for this reason. I don't know, of course, what Ishii has written about this. (Kishi, Yatsugi, and ltd 1981:159)

20

LDP R U L E , 1955 - 1980

What Ishii wrote was the following: In accord with the promise, there was a request from Party President Ishibashi that I too join the cabinet. They asked me, as party vice president, what post I would like so I answered, foreign minister.... However, Kishi visited Ishibashi at cabinet formation headquarters within several hours. Kishi's assertion was, "I lost the election. From now on we must operate on the basis of party unity. Unless we do, others will be contemptuous. In order to do so, it would be best for me to enter the cabinet. I will treat all that has happened as water under the bridge. If you agree, I will join the Ishibashi cabinet. If this is to be, then it will have to be a quite important post. After all, I came in first place in the first round. Nothing less will do if I am to gain the understanding of those who worked with me. I am therefore seeking the foreign ministership." To this, Ishibashi replied, "To tell the truth, there is this promise that I made to Ishii. I have to make Ishii vice premier." Kishi replied, " I am not against Ishii's vice premiership. I think it would be fine for him to become [vice premier], but if he does right away it will not go over well with those who supported me. Would it be possible to put it off a while? I do, however, want the post of foreign minister sent around to m e . . . . " Kishi left after saying this. Ishibashi said, "This is what he told me. What shall I do?" So I said, "Given Kishi's position, it is a perfectly reasonable request. It would not be good to have trouble in the party later because of a presidential election. We must not create a precedent that will cause turmoil every two years during the presidential elections. I will cool things down in my camp. If two or three months from now—perhaps when you go on an overseas trip—you arrange for [me to become] acting prime minister in your absence, then matters will take their course naturally." (Ishii 1976:407) Although Ishii felt that he deserved to become vice premier in accord with the agreement of the runners-up alliance, if he had been named vice premier, Kishi might have taken a hostile stance toward the cabinet. Likewise, because Ono had been promised that the party would be "left in his hands," he therefore expected to be named party vice president after he heard Miki had been named secretary general. But if Ono was made party vice president, he would outrank Kishi. In the end, Kishi was named foreign minister and the vice premiership and party vice presidency were left vacant. Needless to say, the jilted Ishii and Ono were upset. In these circumstances, intraparty infighting would undoubtedly have caused the Ishibashi cabinet to collapse before long. Therefore, Ikeda, Ishida, and others lined up ¥400 million to bring about a dissolution of the Diet following the state of the nation address on January 29. (Miyazaki 1970: 190) But Prime Minister Ishibashi was hospitalized with pneumonia on Jan-

SECURITY TREATY REVISION

21

uary 24. His condition worsened, and he developed a speech impediment. Kishi, who was named temporary acting prime minister on December 31, gave the state of the nation address and stood before the interpellations of the Diet budgetary committee. On February 23 Ishibashi sent a letter of resignation—written by Miki—to Kishi and Miki. The letter contained a plea for "party harmony and the dissolution of the factions . . . as well as . . . the normalization of Diet operations." The Ishibashi cabinet fell, in this fashion, after a mere two months.

THE KISHI CABINET AND THE NEW ERA OF JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONS The New Era ofJapan-U.S. Relations

When the Ishibashi cabinet resigned en masse on February 23, 1957, Kishi was really the only choice available for the prime ministership. Ono, perturbed by Ishibashi's appointments, reconciled with Kóno and came out in support of Kishi. Consequently, Miki, Ishida, and Ikeda pressed forward with arrangements for the transfer of government to Kishi. Even as he held back tears while he drafted the letter of resignation that Ishibashi had asked him to write, Miki was probably already starting to think of ways to dominate a Kishi cabinet. Kishi was designated prime minister in the Diet on February 25. Aside from the addition of Ishii as concurrent party vice president and state minister without portfolio, the new cabinet was composed of exactly the same people as the Ishibashi cabinet. The foreign ministership was held concurrently by Kishi. Ishibashi remained party president for a while, but at the March 21 party convention Kishi was elected the third president of the LDP by a vote of 471 out of 476 votes. The Kishi cabinet worked to pass the budget and legislation prepared by the preceding cabinet. Although Kishi made some hawkish statements concerning the interpretation of the Constitution, his management of the Diet was, on the whole, "low profile." He refrained from submitting bills that might incite the J S P and made no attempt to force through any of the previously submitted bills that the J S P objected to. The Diet passed the fiscal 1957 budget and other major bills and adjourned rather quietly on May 19. Kishi visited six Southeast Asian countries (Burma, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Thailand, and Taiwan) between May 20 and J u n e 4. He made the rounds of nine other countries in Southeast Asia and Oceania (South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines) between November 18 and December 8. One purpose of these trips was to pave the way for negotiations with the United States. He planned to demand a new system ofJapan-U.S. cooperation in which Japan would be "Asia's Japan," a country playing a major role in the economic

22

LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980

development of Southeast Asia. The second was to cultivate the Southeast Asian market and construct an anti-communist economic zone for the Japanese economy, which had begun to experience the initial spurt of high economic growth that economists have labeled the Jinmu Boom. After Kishi returned from his first Southeast Asian tour, the cabinet met on June 14 to adopt an "Oudine of Comprehensive Emergency Measures" as an amendment of existing fiscal and economic policies. It also approved the Defense Conference's "First Defense Rationalization Plan," which called for an 180,000-man ground self-defense force, a maritime self-defense force of 124,000 tons, and 1,300 airplanes. Both measures were part of the preliminary arrangements for Kishi's trip to the United States, the former in préparation for a foreign-exchange loan request and the latter for a request to revise the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Kishi met with President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and others between June 19 and 21. The United States did not immediately accede to the request for a revision of the security treaty, but it did agree to establish a joint Japan-U.S. committee to study the issue. In addition, although it rejected a request for the reversion of sovereignty over Okinawa and the Bonin Islands, it reaffirmed Japan's latent sovereignty. The joint communiqué released on June 21 emphasized the need for the Free World to maintain its ability to prevent an invasion in the face of international communist expansion; it described relations between Japan and the United States as "entering a new era based on common interests and trust." The Yoshida faction observed Kishi's efforts with disapproval. Immediately before Kishi's departure, Yoshida published an article in the Mainichi shinbun entitled "What Is Desired of Prime Minister Kishi During His Visit to the U.S." (morning ed., June 14, 1957), in which he stated that there was no need to change the security treaty or the Japan-U.S. Administrative Agreement. He gave the following reasons: (1) the relationship of trust between the two countries will deepen through mutually honoring the treaty; (2) there is no change in the international situation that necessitates revision; (3) an unequal treaty exists between Britain and the United States, and there are many other examples; and (4) the present is an age of collective defense, and a defense capacity cannot be maintained by one country alone. He warned that even if the United States were to demand that Japan increase its defense capacity, Japan "should not agree to an increase that does not correspond to its economic capacity." After returning to Japan on July 1, Kishi reorganized his cabinet. He replaced everyone except state minister Ishii. Ichimada Naoto (Kôno faction) replaced Ikeda as minister of finance. Five members of the Kôno faction, including Kôno himself, entered the cabinet. Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishida was replaced by Aichi Kiichi and shifted to the post of labor minister. From the Satô faction, Tanaka Kakuei became minister of posts and tele-

SECURITY TREATY REVISION

23

communications at the age of thirty-eight. The post of foreign minister, which had been held concurrently by the prime minister, was filled by Japan Chamber of Commerce president Fujiyama Aiichiro, a close friend of Kishi's from the war years. Kishi later said: I had b e e n considering Fujiyama for the cabinet for quite some time. A t first, he was hesitant about b e c o m i n g a politician, b u t I worked hard to convince him a n d h a d h i m b e c o m e foreign minister. In the area of diplomatic relations in Asia, I wanted to have Fujiyama pay particular attention to the problem of C o m m u n i s t China. We speak of diplomatic relations, but whether U.S. affairs or Asian affairs, the f o u n d a t i o n is e c o n o m i c relations. T h a t is why I t h o u g h t that I would have Fujiyama make full use of his talents in the e c o n o m i c arena, in which h e had b e e n involved until then. I stressed on every possible occasion that in the future I wanted him to b e highly active as a leading politician in the conservative party. Fujiyama and I had b e e n very close since the T o j o cabinet days, and after the war I was i n d e b t e d to him for allowing m e to make a living by installing m e as an executive o f Nitto Chemicals after I g o t out of S u g a m o [Prison]. It was therefore my wish that h e enter the political world and make great strides in the future. (Kishi, Yatsugi, a n d ltd 1981:185-86)

As for the party officers, Secretary General Miki became PARC chairman and was replaced by Kawashima Shojiro (Kishi faction). Sunada Shigemasa (Kono faction) continued as chairman of the Executive Council. After Sunada passed away in December, Sato took his place. Ono was appointed party vice president. LDP president Kishi and JSP chairman Suzuki Mosaburo negotiated legislation and the timetable for Diet dissolution in April 1958. They agreed that the JSP would introduce a motion of no confidence on April 25 and there would be dissolution immediately prior to a vote on the motion on April 26. Thus, the first general election under these two parties was held on May 22. There were no compelling issues. The results were 287 seats (61.5 percent) for the LDP and 166 seats (35.1 percent) for the JSP. The JCP obtained 1 seat, and the various minor parties and independents won 13. The JSP's 166 seats turned out to be its highest in the postwar period. But at the time, the party was frustrated by the lack of growth in its vote. Kishi interpreted the JSP's failure to make the large gains that it had in the past three elections as a victory for him and organized his second cabinet brimming with confidence. He appointed Ikeda a state minister in the cabinet in order to ingratiate himself with a powerful figure in the anti-mainstream factions. As for Ikeda, he probably intended to use his position in the cabinet to force Kishi from office. By contrast, Kono sought to inherit the government by defending Kishi. This was how Ikeda and Kono became each other's fiercest rivals.

24

LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980 The Security Treaty Revision Negotiations

Foreign Minister Fujiyama worked on the revision of the security treaty. He states in his memoirs: You could say that Kishi was thinking of the security treaty as the first step in a larger plan. He would arrange the revision of the treaty, a pending national issue, during his administration and bring about a "new Japan-U.S. era." We would have Ike [Eisenhower] come for the signing and bring about the first visit to Japan by a U.S. president while in office, thereby providing concrete validation of Japan-U.S. cooperation. He would then use these accomplishments as a way to assure a long tenure in office. (Fujiyama 1976:61) Kishi, Fujiyama, and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II held talks on August 25, 1958, at the foreign minister's residence in Shirogane. T o g o Fumihiko (chief of the security section of the Foreign Ministry American Affairs Bureau) remembers: Ambassador MacArthur, referring to his talk with Minister Fujiyama on July 30, stated that the two possible methods by which Japan's views might be realized were to leave the current treaty as it is and establish supplementary arrangements on specific issues or to attempt to conclude a new agreement based on mutual assistance that would be compatible with the Japanese constitution. He also stated that he would like to know whether, if the latter method proved feasible, Japan would want it. And even if that were possible, would Japan still consider the former appropriate? Prime Minister Kishi's response was very clear and forceful. The prime minister began by saying, "This is what I think." He then expressed himself roughly as follows: "If it is to be a matter of fundamentally revising the treaty, then we can expect heated debate in the Diet. But only by going through the process of a heated debate can we place the JapanU.S. relationship on a firm foundation. I feel that it is desirable to revise the current treaty fundamentally, if that can be done. Of course, if a new treaty requires an inordinate amount of time, then we have no choice but to leave the current treaty as it is and resolve specific issues through supplementary agreements. (Togo 1982:62-63) T o g o adds that "the prime minister's unequivocal and decisive demeanor while speaking was highly impressive." T h e Foreign Ministry was, in fact, quite taken aback. Treaty Bureau chief Takahashi Michitoshi states, "If we chose a new treaty, we would have to redo a huge number of administrative agreements and, on top of that, the Diet interpellations would involve tremendous work. That was why the Foreign Ministry planned to go with ' a m e n d m e n t s . ' . . . When we were told by the foreign minister, who had just returned from the tripartite talks that, at Kishi's behest, it was going to be a 'new treaty,' we were really, truly surprised." (Fujiyama 1976:63) Agreement was reached between Japan and the United States regarding the negotiations for revision as a result of talks between Fujiyama and Sec-

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retary of State Dulles in Washington on September 11 and 12. Negotiations between Fujiyama and MacArthur began on October 4. T h e initial schedule was for "signing by the end of the year, submission to the reopened regular Diet session early next year." Fujiyama boasted that he "would reach a compromise after two or three negotiations with the United States." In fact, there were no signs of rough sailing in the negotiations. If anything, the obstacle was party infighting: the anti-mainstream factions were not happy when the mainstream factions scored points. Support for the mainstream was growing in the PARC foreign policy investigation committee, until then a base of operations for the anti-mainstream factions. T h e anti-mainstream formed a "Foreign Policy Issues Study Group" on September 5. It sent invitations to 260 nonmainstream lower and upper house Diet members and held its first general meeting on September 18, at which it moved to form an anti-Kishi front under the guise of opposition to Fujiyama's diplomacy. Fujiyama did not pay much attention, but he was aware of the difficulties he faced:

Because I felt that there was no o n e other than Yoshida who could pull the party together o n foreign policy issues, as soon as I became foreign minister I went to Hakone, where he was recuperating, to make a courtesy call. A n d when the security treaty revision negotiations began, I immediately went to his home in Oiso to receive his opinion. Yoshida said, "You don't really need to tamper with it," and would not easily bend his views. I felt that, underneath, there was an emotional dimension of "what I established is the best there is. . . ." In addition to this sort of thinking, it took time to convince Yoshida because he strongly resented Kishi. I frequendy left after engaging only in small talk. . . . T h e former affiliates of the Liberal Party around Ikeda Hayato followed [Yoshida's] example and voiced objections to the revision, saying that "the United States is in no hurry" and it is better to continue to rely on the United States. Ishii Mitsujiro, who was close to Yoshida and the Ishii faction, also took an "it's too early" position. T h e sense in the party was that I "should mind my own business." In addition, conflict emerged over whether Okinawa and the Bonins should be included in the treaty's jurisdiction. Matsumura Kenzo and Miki Takeo of Kaishinto lineage were adamandy opposed on grounds that "if Okinawa and the Bonins are included, it will open the way for a military alliance." By contrast, when I came up with a proposal to leave out Okinawa and the Bonins, Kono Ichiro, Ikeda Hayato, Sato Eisaku, and others objected that "there is n o reason to revise the treaty [if that is the case] This was the first time that I had the experience of being roughed up in the party. It was not clear to me if the various factions took exception based on the pros and cons of the security treaty, or because they were opposed out of concern for the unstable political situation stemming from the matter of

26

LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980

the Police Duties Law, or if they were aiming for an early party presidential election in order to remove Kishi. It was about this time that I began to feel uneasy about the character of Kishi, whom I had known for the past twenty years. I resolved nevertheless that I must help him and, at the very least, effect the revision of the security treaty. (Fujiyama 1976:93-95)

After some energetic preparation, the October 16 general meeting of LDP Diet members approved the continuation of the negotiations for revision. Two days later, a bill to revise the Police Duties Law was suddenly proposed. Government and opposition parties clashed. T h e Diet fell into confusion, and its business ground to a halt. Fujiyama j u d g e d that there was no way to avoid breaking off the negotiations. T h e formal negotiations at the Foreign Ministry were suspended following the third meeting on December 17, and the informal negotiations at the Imperial Hotel were also interrupted. By this time, however, the general framework of the treaty proposal had been worked out.

THE REVISION OF T H E P O L I C E LAW A N D T H E SECRET PACT BETWEEN KISHI A N D O N O

The Revision of the Police Duties Law A draft amendment to the Police Duties Law appeared suddenly, toward the end of September 1958. T h e bill, which sought to widen the powers of the police, was prepared in utmost secrecy under the supervision of State Minister Aoki Kazuo, the chairman of the National Public Safety Commission. T h e commission approved the introduction of the bill on September 25. Party officials and the LDP members of the local administration committees of the upper and lower houses met on October 6 and agreed to expedite its passage. A review of the bill began in the PARC local administration and justice subcommittees on the morning of October 7. T h e subcommittees were scheduled to continue the review that afternoon, but a noon meeting of the party executive council, in one precipitous stroke, granted formal party approval to the bill's introduction. The cabinet approved the bill late the same afternoon through a circular passed among the members. The bill was introduced into the House of Representatives at 6:00 P.M. on October 8. LDP secretary general Kawashima refused a JSP request for cancellation of the introduction because of "circumstances within the party." He added that "a meeting of party heads would be meaningless unless the [JSP] changes its basic stance of opposition to introduction," signaling that the LDP intended to railroad the bill through the committee even if it meant unilateral deliberation in the face of an opposition boycott. O n October 9

SECURITY TREATY REVISION

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the LDP's top six executives and an executive council meeting affirmed this approach, and a party statement was released which stated that "passage during the current Diet session would be striven for." Kishi later said: The revision of the Police Duties Law was an important piece of legislation for my administration. I anticipated considerable opposition to revision of the security treaty and was firmly determined to brush such opposition aside and complete that task even if it meant placing my life on the line. I felt that revision of the Police Duties Law was absolutely essential for maintaining order. (Kishi, Yatsugi, and ltd 1981:196)

The mainstream factions had just finished deflecting an attack of the antimainstream factions over the security treaty issue. The sudden introduction of the Police Duties Law revision strengthened party solidarity further. The secretary general claimed that "everyone is in favor of this bill irrespective of whether they are mainstream or anti-mainstream." Seeing such solidarity at the Diet members' meeting on October 9, Kishi "smiled with his eyes in apparent satisfaction." At the Diet members' meeting on October 13, Kishi made a hyperbolic speech about how the success or failure of the bill would decide the fate ofJapan; at the same time, the secretary general declared a ban on all Diet member gatherings outside the Diet building, canceled all trips to local districts, required listing of contact addresses in the event members needed to be summoned immediately, and directed a roll call to be taken in the Diet chambers every morning. The party leaders had undoubtedly calculated that they could pass the bill. Opposition from the JSP and Sohyo was expected, but it was thought that if the bill were introduced suddenly they would not have time to stir up public opinion and the JSP would be forced to compromise before a hard-line LDP stance. Instead, the hard line of the LDP strengthened the JSP's position and its solidarity. When the JSP leadership first requested the retraction of the bill on October 8, the general feeling was that "it will be a great success if [we] can simply hold out until the end of the week [Saturday, October n ] . " Provoked by the refusal of the LDP to withdraw the bill, however, theJSP's rank and file fell in line. Sohyo and Zenro Kaigi backed the party as well. Kato Kanju received thunderous applause from both the right and the left wings of the party at a meeting of JSP Diet members on October 9, when he asserted, "Let us put the destiny of the party on the line in a fight to stop [the bill]." When the bill was referred to the local administration committee at the discretion of the lower house speaker on October 11, the JSP feared that it would face a backlash of public opinion if it "vetoed deliberation" by walking out. It was therefore leaning toward merely censuring the government's reactionary policies during deliberation. But at the central executive com-

28

LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980

mittee meeting that afternoon, the view predominated that if it were to adopt such a tactic under the present circumstances, "we will be shunted aside as the L D P wants and will be putting a damper on a rising extraparliamentary movement." T h e decision was consequently made to use physical force to block the reopening of the local administration committee. Party officials j u m p e d at a mediation offer from the speaker of the house on October 15. T h e JSP Representatives' conference then fell into a pandem o n i u m of catcalls. Fearful that the JSP would be attacked as a "violent party" if it relied exclusively on a boycott of Diet deliberations and physical blockage, Chairman Suzuki Mosaburo, Secretary General Asanuma Inejiro, Diet Steering Committee chairman Kono Mitsu, and other party officials pushed for " a struggle in the Diet within the maximum permissible legal limits." Also on October 15, the American N B C network broadcast an interview with Kishi conducted by reporter A. P. Brown on the subject of the abolition of Article 9 of the Constitution and Japan's relations with China. T h e Japanese press responded with fury, and opposition to the Police Duties Law escalated into an effort to unseat Kishi. At the JSP central committee meeting on October 19, after the party executive proposed a fight within the Diet to defeat the bill, the committee's left-wing members prepared an amendment (later rescinded) advocating a strategy that included a general strike and j o i n t action with the JCP. In late October the JSP Diet steering committee put itself on an "ultra-emergency footing" and concentrated party parliamentary effort on preventing an extension of the Diet session. T h e party's executives wavered on the matter of physical action. The Surprise Extension In late October the issue was whether the current Diet session, scheduled to e n d November 7, could be extended. At first, the zaikai adopted a waitand-see attitude. But on October 30 the Economic Reconstruction Council (Keizai Saiken Kondankai) expressed support for Kishi. O n November 1 LDP executives approved a thirty-day extension of the Diet session. Kishi delegated Diet strategy to the secretary general and his group, who opted for a surprise attack. O n the evening of November 4 the final bell rang to open the plenary Diet session without the usual preliminary bell. T h e government party's Representatives burst into the chamber as Vice Speaker Shiikuma Saburo declared a thirty-day extension of the session from the floor. By the time the astonished opposition party Representatives burst in, it was too late. T h e opposition had Speaker of the House Hoshijima Niro trapped in his office throughout. T h e LDP Diet members celebrated at the teahouses in Akasaka. They

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assumed that the public would accept this fait accompli as it had accepted an earlier "irregular Diet" (in 1954, under the Yoshida cabinet). But the next morning's newspapers strongly denounced the forced extension. The movement outside the Diet intensified. Sohyo, Zenro Kaigi, and other labor union federations entered into a concerted national strike on November 5, which mobilized 4 million people. The Diet was surrounded by 10,00030,000 demonstrators. Declaring the extension invalid, the JSP Diet delegation walked out on November 7 and ignored LDP requests to open negotiations. The leaders of the government were in a vulnerable position. In situations of this sort, the anti-mainstream factions begin to put pressure on the government. Maneuvering of this sort had already commenced in late October. It grew more vigorous as press coverage increased, the movement outside the Diet grew, and the JSP hardened its position. Economic Planning Agency director Miki and Prime Minister Kishi got into a heated argument when the former suggested nullifying the extension. Matsumura and other members of the anti-mainstream, opposing unilateral LDP deliberations, called for the normalization of Diet operations. After November 7 they argued that the LDP should accept the JSP's condition that the reform bill be withdrawn. O n the other hand, Kono, Ono, and others of the mainstream factions were wary of a compromise between Kishi and the antimainstream. Losing the prime minister at this point would have a severe impact on their own political careers. Ono stated that the LDP would conduct the Diet's business without the opposition if the JSP did not agree to negotiate. Kono took the hard-line position that nothing short of continued Diet deliberation could be conceded. Leaders of the LDP and JSP packed themselves into a room at the Prince Hotel for ten days of secret negotiations that ended November 22. They agreed that (1) the bill would be considered shelved, (2) the lower house would be allowed to recess automatically, and (3) the House of Councilors would deliberate the supplementary budget and other bills and then adjourn. In addition, it was decided that the JSP would provide the vice speaker in the House of Representatives. The anti-mainstream factions demanded that Kishi accept responsibility for the debacle. O n December 27 the three anti-mainstream cabinet members (Ikeda, Miki, Nadao) resigned. They formed an alliance named the Reform Deliberation Council, demanded that incumbent party officers be replaced, and opposed moving up the date of the party presidential election from March to January. When Kishi attempted a compromise, Kono and Ono turned a cold shoulder toward him. In order to keep these two essential cabinet members in the fold, Kishi and Sato were forced to sign an agreement reserving the government for them.

30

LDP RULE, 1955 -1980 The Secret Pact Between Kishi and Ono

Kishi and Sato prepared the agreement on January 16, 1959. Kishi recalls: Toward the end of the previous year—I think it was right after the resignation of the three cabinet ministers—Kono went to see Sato and said, " I ' m concerned about Ono's behavior. Ikeda and Matsumura are trying to win him over. We have to keep Ono on our side. We could eliminate this problem if the prime minister told Ono that he would 'pass [the presidency] on to y o u . ' " When I later heard the story from Sato, I said, " I can't do that." But Sato said, "Kono insisted that it really doesn't matter what happens afterward. All that matters is that you say this." So I replied, "If that's the case, then tell him I will meet with him." . . . At the meeting on January 3 [5?], I followed Kono's script. Ono was happy. I do not know the full story even now. I have no proof whatsoever that Ono was in fact doing what Kono said he was or whether Ono's attitude had indeed been changing. All I know is what Kono told me. But given the situation in the party at the time, I concluded that it was possible and agreed to meet. Ono may very well not have been thinking along those lines. It could be that someone had prepared a script in order to get me to say, " I will pass it on to you." If so, then the authors of the script were people who wanted to see an " O n o cabinet" formed. But to this day I still do not know who they a r e . . . . On the afternoon of January 16 Vice President Ono, Executive Council chairman Kono, Minister of Finance Sato, and I met at the Korin Room of the Imperial Hotel and signed an agreement. The document was phrased in abstract language, but its purport was that the four of us would cooperate in the realization of the security treaty revision and that Vice President Ono would be recommended to succeed as party president after the Kishi government ended. Hokkaido Colliery and Steamship Company president Hagiwara Yoshitaro, Daiei Incorporated president Nagata Masaichi, and Kodama Yoshio were present as witnesses. (Kishi, Yatsugi, and ltd 1981 ¡451-52) Ono's memoirs state: During a year's end wrapped up in political crisis, there was an urgent request from someone concerned about my activities, which was transmitted through Daiei president Nagata Masaichi, Hokkaido Steamship and Colliery Company president Hagiwara Yoshitaro, and Kodama Yoshio, who were friends of Kishi and Sato, asking that I continue to cooperate with the mainstream factions as before. On January 5, as I was relaxing at my villa in ltd, I received an unexpected telephone call from Prime Minister Kishi. Kishi was at his villa in Atami. He said that he was going to have a villawarming party and invited me to come over. When I arrived, I found Kono there also. On that occasion, he made the following earnesdy worded request to me: "Please, I want you to help the Kishi cabinet. I intend to lead a short and merry life. I do not seek to cling to the government forever. But if I were to

SECURITY TREATY REVISION

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withdraw now, people would say that the Kishi cabinet didn't accomplish a thing. It would be the laughingstock of the public. As the accomplishment of the Kishi cabinet that will take its place in history, I want to achieve the security treaty revision. Once the treaty revision is completed, I will withdraw. As for my successor, I think you, Ono-san, would be the best. I intend to support you as the successor party president.... I said, "I am not the type of person who is suited to become prime minister, nor do I have that ambition." I really did not have that kind of intention, so I did not make much of it. Soon thereafter, on the evening ofJanuary 9 [16?], we met again in Tokyo. I recall that it was in the Korin Room in the new wing of the Imperial Hotel in Hibiya. In addition to Kishi, Kono Ichiro, and myself, Kishi's younger brother Sato Eisaku was present, along with Nagata Masaichi, Hagiwara Yoshitaro, and Kodama Toshio, who were friends of Kishi, Sato, and Kono. The two brothers, Kishi and Sato, reiterated, "Please save the Kishi cabinet. If you do, we will withdraw without fail, immediately after the security treaty revision, and hand the government over to you, Ono-san." Sato was even on his knees pleading. Not only that, but Kishi began saying that if you don't think an oral promise is enough, then I will write it up in a contract. Since there weren't any calligraphy brushes in the room, an aide was called and sent out to get a brush, inkstone, and ink along with a roll of letter paper. Kishi then took the brush and personally drew up a document requesting Ono to be his successor. He even made a promise regarding the order of the governments—Kono after Ono and Sato after Kono. The seven people attending each signed the document. It was decided that it would be kept in a safe at Hagiwara's Hokkaido Colliery. (Ono 1962:145-47) Yomiuri shinbun reporter Watanabe Tsuneo took a photograph of the agreement and kept it. It reads as follows: Deed of Agreement We hereby pledge the following: To cooperate, unite, and strive to realize the items agreed to in the presence of Hagiwara, Nagata, and Kodama on January 16,1959. It is dated January 16. There are four signatures: Kishi, Ono, Kono, and Sato, with written seals under the signatures of Kishi and Sato. The "item agreed to" was, in short, post-Kishi government succession in the order of Ono, Kono, and Sato. According to reports that Watanabe Tsuneo verified direcdy with Ono and Kono, they wrote this order down with a calligraphy brush on a separate sheet of paper. Undoubtedly, neither Kishi, Sato, nor Kono thought that Ono, who was so uninformed about administrative procedures that he could not even be trusted with Diet interpellations, could withstand the heavy responsibilities of the prime ministership. Even if an Ono cabinet were formed, it would probably be a short-lived one. Ono him-

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LDP R U L E , 1955 - 1980

self was probably not very confident. But if they insisted on giving the office away, why not take it? (Watanabe 1967:46-49) The impact of the agreement was felt immediately. Ono and Kono embarked on an effort to consolidate the party, and Kishi was reelected president at the January 24 party convention. The anti-mainstream factions ran Matsumura as their candidate in total disregard for his chances of winning. The vote was 320 votes for Kishi and 166 for Matsumura. Kono and Ikeda and the Reshuffling of the Cabinet Kishi, who had regained his confidence as a result of the LDP victory in the House of Councilors election of June 2, 1959, reshuffled the party officers and reorganized the cabinet. Everyone in the cabinet was replaced except Foreign Minister Fujiyama and Finance Minister Sato. As a result of this reorganization, Kono held no post in the cabinet or the san'yaku (the three party officers), while Ikeda entered the cabinet as minister of international trade and industry. Kono had supported Kishi ever since the two men had concluded a compact in New York in September 1955. (Masumi 1985:318) Nevertheless, Kono felt secure about his position. He interpreted the situation as one in which Kishi was not in a position to make the switch to Ikeda and that Kishi had litde choice but to either rely on him or give up the government. He therefore turned down an invitation to join the cabinet and demanded the post of secretary general, the shortest route to the next prime ministership. Sato, on his part, conspired secretly with Ikeda, an old friend from his high school years, in order to outflank Kono. It was inconsistent for Ikeda to enter the cabinet after storming out of his post late in the previous year. But he saw entry into the cabinet as a shortcut to the prime ministership and decided to accept the Commerce and Industry post. According to Kishi's memoirs: From the time of the House of Councilors election, there was a lot of talk about Party Vice President Ono's proposal of "Kono as secretary general, Ikeda as executive committee chairman, and Sato as PARC chairman." Kono was infatuated with the post of secretary general. However, I had no desire to see a "Secretary General Kono." I intended to have Kono enter the cabinet. The reason was that when the second Kishi cabinet was formed the previous June, there was a lot of criticism that it was a "Brothers Kishi cabinet" as a consequence of my having selected my younger brother, Sato, to become minister of finance. I felt that I should let others who were considered influential leaders enter the cabinet in order to counter this charge. But it proved impossible to obtain cooperation from Kono and Ikeda at the same time. There was tremendous antagonism between the two of them and there was absolutely no reason to expect them to join hands and help me. As for which of the two I would choose under such circumstances, my mind was already made up. It was

S E C U R I T Y T R E A T Y REVISION

K o n o . G i v e n the f r i e n d l y relationship b e t w e e n us u p to that p o i n t , I w a n t e d to o b t a i n K o n o ' s c o o p e r a t i o n . I t h e r e f o r e called h i m in first a n d tried sincerely to prevail u p o n h i m . I d i d so with t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g that if h e a g r e e d , t h e n I k e d a w o u l d g o o v e r to t h e anti-mainstream. K o n o r e j e c t e d t h e o f f e r . I still d o n o t u n d e r s t a n d his f r a m e o f m i n d at that time. I said to K o n o : " I find it e x t r e m e l y regrettable, b u t if y o u insist I have n o c h o i c e . H o w e v e r , since y o u ' v e t u r n e d m e d o w n , I m u s t d e v o t e all m y efforts to prevailing o n Ikeda. I w a n t y o u to u n d e r s t a n d this." " T r y as y o u m i g h t , I d o n ' t t h i n k I k e d a will a g r e e . If h e does, I w a n t y o u to call m e in a g a i n , " K o n o said, a n d left. A f t e r that, I invited Ikeda. A s I e x p e c t e d , I k e d a w o u l d n o t give m e the n o d . I finally said, " A l l right, I see. Earlier I asked f o r K o n o ' s h e l p , b u t that didn't work. A n d n o w y o u have t u r n e d m e d o w n as well. U n d e r these circumstances, I have n o c h o i c e b u t to give u p the cabinet. W h e n that h a p p e n s , the q u e s t i o n will b e w h o is n e x t . G i v e n d e v e l o p m e n t s u p to now, I personally have n o c h o i c e b u t to s u p p o r t V i c e P r e s i d e n t O n o . If y o u are willing to a g r e e to a n " O n o c a b i n e t " t h e n that's w h a t I'll d o . " (Kishi 1983:489-91) K o d a m a , in w h o m Kishi c o n f i d e d at the time, recalls: Kishi said, " I w a n t y o u to talk to K o n o ; by all m e a n s g e t h i m to j o i n t h e c a b i n e t a n d c o o p e r a t e . If K o n o a n d O n o still refuse to d o so b e c a u s e o f the matter o f m y b r o t h e r [Sato] t h e n , even t h o u g h I a m r e l u c t a n t to d o so, I have n o c h o i c e b u t to seek Ikeda's c o o p e r a t i o n . " H e c o n t i n u e d , " B u t g i v e n o u r relationship u p to now, I d o n o t favor s u c h a c o u r s e . " W h e n h e said this, Kishi a p p e a r e d full of torment. A t t h e time, K o n o h a d left t h e matter o f his f u t u r e c o m p l e t e l y in O n o ' s h a n d s . For this reason, t h e p r o p e r thing f o r m e to d o was to prevail o n O n o first. T h u s , j o i n i n g O n o in a r o o m in t h e H a s e g a w a t e a h o u s e in Akasaka, I started o u t with, "Boss, this m a t c h c o u l d e n d u p with t h e h a w k s n a t c h i n g away the aburage [fried b e a n c u r d ] ! " [i.e., s o m e o n e h a v i n g his fair share taken away by s o m e o n e else]. O l d m a n B a n b o k u , with t h e l o o k o f a fretfully a w a k e n e d tiger, r e s p o n d e d suspiciously, " A n d w h o , m i g h t I ask, is t h e h a w k ? " G o i n g straight to the p o i n t , I said, " A t this rate, Kishi will p r o b a b l y j o i n u p with I k e d a o u t o f despair." "Well, I myself think that I k e d a will turn h i m d o w n . Now, w h a t is it that y o u want m e to d o ? " A p p a r e n d y , O n o h a d n o t g o t t e n t h e message. I a d d e d , "Personally, I think that it w o u l d b e wise to have K o n o e n t e r the cabinet." O n o t h o u g h t a litde. H e t h e n said, "It will p r o b a b l y b e okay to d o as y o u say. In that case, I'll tell K o n o . " H e s e e m e d to have m a d e u p his m i n d . R i g h t at that very m o m e n t , the d o o r swished o p e n a n d K o n o h i m s e l f ent e r e d t h e r o o m u n a n n o u n c e d . K o n o h a d until t h e n b e e n m e e t i n g with t h e m e m b e r s o f his f a c t i o n o n the s e c o n d f l o o r o f t h e t e a h o u s e .

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LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980 He abruptly started talking about the situation in the Ikeda faction, "According to information just received, Ikeda seems to have decided that he will absolutely not enter the cabinet no matter how much Kishi tries to prevail upon h i m . . . . " Kono declared this triumphantly, with an I-told-you-so look on his f a c e . . . . Old man Banboku's face was gleaming, as if to say "my wish has been granted." But, sly old fox that he was, he was somewhat more circumspect than Kono, "I see, so that was the decision.... In any event, let's sit tight one more day and see if [Kishi] gives up the cabinet...." After this, I nonchalantly reported the situation [at the teahouse] over the telephone to Kishi and counseled, "If you were to visit Ono early tomorrow morning and talk to him personally, Ono, being the compassionate type, would surely help with Kono's entry into the cabinet." But Kishi replied, "I appreciate your telling me this but, to tell you the truth, I am sick and tired of these idiotic factional fights. The way things are, I don't see how anyone can engage in responsible politics. I am going to meet with Ikeda tomorrow and if he still insists that he won't do it, then I'll have no choice but to throw in the towel." He had halfway given up, it seemed.... Early in the afternoon of the following day, the five of us—Messrs. Ono and Kono, Hagiwara Yoshitaro, Nagata Masaichi, and myself—met in a room in the Imperial Hotel reserved for the exclusive use of Daiei president Nagata. Old man Banboku opened, "Kishi has invited Ikeda this afternoon, but I doubt that Ikeda will accede to his request." Kono said something to the same effect as O n o . . . . Since it would not do for me to remain silent, I gave my long-standing opinion: "Unless Ikeda is really stupid, he will present some tentative conditions to Kishi. He will then enter the cabinet in due time. The match will turn out just the way Ikeda wants it. The hawk will have snatched the aburage." Both Ono and Kono, however, contested my theory. They took turns saying, "I don't care what you say. For the sake of his honor as a politician, Ikeda surely would not do such a thing...." As we continued our exchanges along these lines, there was a telephone call from outside [the hotel] that Ikeda's entry into the cabinet had been decided. Instantly, the atmosphere in the room turned tense. Both Ono and Kono's expressions suddenly changed. We stared at one another without saying a word. (Kodama 1961:466-47)

At Ikeda's residence in Shinanomachi, Tanaka Kakuei arrived to congratulate Ikeda on his entry into the cabinet. According to Ohira Masayoshi's memoirs, Tanaka said, "Make this a decision for the sake of the country. If you do, the next government is yours. Make it a decision without regrets." He then asked a highly reluctant Mrs. Ikeda to get [Ikeda's] tuxedo ready. (Ohira 1966:12) It was in this manner that Kishi made the switch from Kono to Ikeda.

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THE SECURITYTREATYDISTURBANCE Diet Deliberations The negotiations over the revision of the security treaty were interrupted by the disorder in the Diet over the revision of the Police Duties Law. Informal negotiations resumed after Kishi was reelected party president in January 1959. A draft treaty was completed, and consultations over the related administrative agreements progressed. Opinions inside the LDP clashed, and efforts to resolve them did not go smoothly. Nevertheless, the party executive council approved an outline of the contents of the revised treaty and administrative agreement on April 11. Formal negotiations resumed on April 13. A tentative working draft evolved in May and June. The talks were halted once again, however, by the entanglements that accompanied the second cabinet reorganization in mid-June. The drafts of a new treaty and administrative agreements were at last approved by the executive council on October 21 and by a general meeting of the party's Diet members on October 26. Talks between Fujiyama and MacArthur concluded on January 6, i960, a year and three months after the ¡nidation of negotiations. There had been twenty-five formal negotiation sessions alone. Kishi personally attended the signing ceremony in Washington on January 19. After the treaty was introduced into the Diet on February 5, debate ensued over issues like mutual defense obligations, prior consultation, the jurisdictional area covered by the treaty, and the requirement of a gradual increase in selfdefense capacity. The government's interpellations were extremely unclear. For instance, Articles 4 and 6 of the treaty state that Japan and the United States can consult each other and that the United States will use military bases in Japan "whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened." The "final" unified government position that Kishi presented to the House of Representatives special committee on security on February 26 defined the Far East "as far as this treaty is concerned" as "by and large" the area north of the Philippines plus Japan and the regions surrounding it, including South Korea and the Republic of China. Kishi quickly added, "In cases where an armed attack is carried out in this area or else the safety of this area is threatened by developments occurring in surrounding regions, the sphere of activity . . . of the United States will not necessarily be limited to this area." Conflict in the LDP intensified. According to Ono, the Kishi and Sato factions, considering work on the new treaty completed, began behind-thescenes maneuvering for a third, post-ratification term for Kishi. I had heard rumors about the unrestrained issuing of blank checks, but I did not believe them, figuring that a man who had gone so far as to sign a contract

36

LDP RULE, 1955 -1980 would surely not renege on a promise. But as the maneuvering for a third term became more intense, I began to sense that something was w r o n g . . . . I met with Kishi on the evening of March 15, i 9 6 0 . . . . Kishi had invited the political section chiefs of the various newspapers to the Fukudaya teahouse in Yotsuya [Kojimachi] and was in the midst of entertaining them. He was to excuse himself from the meeting at 9:00 P.M. and meet with me in a separate room. Kishi's idea of scheduling a talk requiring the utmost secrecy on an evening when he was entertaining journalists and, of all places, under the very same roof was certainly novel—in the darkness at the base of a lighthouse, you could say. Kawashima was also present on this occasion. Reaffirming the contract, Kishi stated clearly, " I have no thought whatsoever of running a third time. After the ratification of the new treaty, I will pass the baton to you." I told Kono, and on the morning of March 17 he visited Kishi's residence in Nanpeidai. Kishi said the same thing then. Kono immediately issued a statement promising cooperation with the Kishi cabinet and called off most of the antiKishi drive. This meant that on this occasion, too, Kono and I were completely hoodwinked. (Ono 1962:149-50)

T h e f o u r party leaders ( O n o , K o n o , Kawashima, a n d Miki) a g r e e d to a q u i c k approval o f the treaty o n M a r c h 21, a n d the f o u r anti-mainstream faction leaders c o n c u r r e d at a m e e t i n g o n M a r c h 22. A t this m e e t i n g , the principals also f o u n d themselves a g r e e i n g that Kishi s h o u l d n o t serve a third t e r m . O n May 18, the day a f t e r the executive c o u n c i l a n d the Diet m e m b e r s ' g e n e r a l assembly a p p r o v e d a n e x t e n s i o n o f the Diet session, six f a c t i o n s — the Ikeda, M i k i / M a t s u m u r a , O n o , K o n o , Ishii, a n d Ishibashi f a c t i o n s — met. T h e y a g r e e d that they w o u l d n e i t h e r h e l p n o r h i n d e r the p r i m e minister's e f f o r t to steer the treaty t h r o u g h the Diet a n d w o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e instead o n b l o c k i n g the third term. F u j i y a m a describes the situation as follows: It took at least half a year to get Yoshida's approval. I believe that in the end Yoshida came to understand that the United States really wanted a revision. . . . In contrast, Kono Ichiro's criticism of the revision grew increasingly vehement. . . . But I felt I understood his character and remained unconcerned.... I had talks with him in which I tried to argue the merits of the security treaty, but he never did dwell on its content. Kono was probably just using the security treaty as "anti-Kishi" m a t e r i a l . . . . Miki Takeo also said quite a few things, but I have no recollection of their content. They, too, were undoubtedly part of the "anti-Kishi" campaign inside the party. Ishibashi Tanzan did not agree with Kishi regarding relations with China, and Matsumura Kenzo did not like Kishi. For these reasons, the two of them assumed an attitude of indifference toward the security treaty revision....

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O n e other thing that I cannot forget regarding the security treaty was the matter of Secretary General Kawashima Shojiro. He came to my office saying, "We have to promote the security treaty. I want you to provide some money." I therefore gave him ¥10 million. A week later he said, "Another ¥10 million. . . . " He took this away too. (Fujiyama 1976:93-97)

May ig: Forced Passage T h e Diet's deliberations began in February; falling prey to the JSP, they became deadlocked. T h e government blundered repeatedly during interpellations. Then, in a move that took even some of the LDP's own Diet members by surprise, an extension of the session and approval of the new treaty, the new agreements, and related legislation were railroaded through the House of Representatives on the evening of May 19. Prime Minister Kishi's intention was to complete the ratification of the new security treaty before the scheduled arrival of President Eisenhower on June 19. According to the rules of the Constitution, if it was passed on May 19, it would automatically become law thirty days later even if the House of Councilors did not vote on it. This was, without a doubt, an unusual forced vote. T h e meeting of the officers of the house steering committee that began around noon on May 19 could not resolve its debate over the extension of the session, and the meeting was adjourned at 4:28 p.m. Informal attempts at conciliation were also fruidess. Amid great confusion, a meeting of the steering committee, with only ruling party committee members present, passed a motion approving the extension of the session. Meanwhile, the special committee on the security treaty was called to order at 1:40 p.m. but recessed later to ascertain the situation in the steering committee. The disorder continued. As the 10:25 p.m. bell signaled the opening of a lower house plenary session, Chairman Ozawa Saeki called a meeting of the special committee on the security treaty to order. The government and the ruling party claimed that the motions to extend the session and end interpellation, along with three i t e m s — " t h e item of approving the new treaty, the item approving the new administrative agreements, and the law to consolidate legislation related to the new treaty and agreement"—were approved by a majority within the space of two minutes. T h e JSP committee members claimed that they submitted a motion of no confidence against Chairman Ozawa the moment the session opened and that this item had priority. T h e transcript of the committee meeting merely records the following: "10:25 P-M- Chairman Ozawa: Before the recess—(there are many speaking out and leaving their seats. T h e chamber is in pandemonium. Transcription impossible) — 1 0 : 2 7 P.M."

At 10:50, Speaker of the House of Representatives Kiyose Ichiro called

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LDP RULE, 1955- 1980

five hundred police into the chamber. At 11:07, the police began forcibly hauling out JSP Diet members and aides who were staging a sit-in before the speaker's office in an attempt to block the opening of the session. The plenary session opened at 11:49, and a fifty-day extension of the session was unilaterally approved by the LDP. The new security treaty and related laws were approved during the reopened plenary session, which began at 12:06 A.M. on May 20. The total time involved was twelve minutes. The opposition parties were absent, and twenty-six members from the LDP including Miki, Matsumura, Ishibashi, and Kono either were "absent with honor" or walked out. Outside the chambers, in the rain, 30,000 demonstrators had surrounded the Diet. There were 3,500 policemen on the Diet building perimeter. The chairman of the JSP Diet countermeasures committee, Yamamoto Koichi, judged that the political situation would, if anything, take a turn in his party's favor if the government and LDP were to call in the police. He told Speaker of the House Kiyose, "At present, we have called for the mobilization of 1,000 [in fact, 300] brawny union members to counter what appear to be gangsters called in by the LDP. If you, Mr. Speaker, are unreasonable, we are determined to introduce another several thousand union members and fight all out." Kiyose replied, "Give me some time to think." The police were called in as hoped. Later, Yamamoto reported to JSP chairman Asanuma that he intimidated Speaker of the House Kiyose "in order to make evident the violence of the government and the LDP." Asanuma responded, "You did well. Thanks to your efforts the political situation is developing favorably." (Yamamoto 1983:130-33) On the morning of May 20 the newspapers all carried editorials attacking the forced passage. The major newspapers sold out in no time at train stations around the country. Only the sports dailies remained. The situation resembled closely the reaction to the sudden dissolution that accompanied the revision of the Police Duties Law on November 4 of two years earlier. With this episode as a catalyst, an extraparliamentary movement rose up and surrounded the Diet. Encouraged, the JSP challenged the government and the LDP. And maneuvering by the anti-mainstream factions to bring down the cabinet intensified. Demonstrations and Strikes

The movement opposing the security treaty revision had not yet fully blossomed in 1959. The National Conference to Stop the Security Treaty Revision formed on March 28 had, by the year's end, orchestrated ten separate protest actions. But these had been timed to coincide with labor union struggles, and most of the participants were union members and students. Sohyo chairman Ota Kaoru called the security treaty "a heavy burden."

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Working with the National Conference, Sohyo tried on every possible occasion to expand the movement's mobilizing capacity by publicizing the security treaty revision and linking it to other issues. Unlike the Police Duties Law, which was associated with the oppressive prewar image of the police, the treaty issue proved difficult to present simply and directly. But during the November 27 struggle, it was reported that the security treaty would be signed the following January and that Prime Minister Kishi had received a vacation home from a trading company in conjunction with South Vietnamese reparations. Furthermore, the struggle was carried out just as collective bargaining over a lump sum allowance was reaching its peak. Twenty-nine industrial union federations and 1 million participants were successfully mobilized. Ota commented, "We finally made the link between the economic struggle and the political struggle that we were hoping for." (Ota 1976:137-38) The radicals forged ahead. Zengakuren (National Federation of Student Self-Government Associations) and union members invaded the Diet, where the atmosphere had become quite strained during the debate over the Vietnamese reparations. The following day, January 16, seven hundred Zengakuren students staged a sit-in at Haneda International Airport in an attempt to block Prime Minister Kishi and his delegation's departure for the United States to sign the new security treaty and administrative agreement. Meanwhile, the JCP castigated the Zengakuren leadership as Trotskyists. Brought into disarray by this split, the movement came to a standstill. During the Diet interpellations that began in February, JSP representatives hammered away at the issues of prior consultation and the scope of the "Far East." The government delegation's failure to provide clear answers to the interpellations increased the suspicion and doubt of the public. After an April 4 rally to collect signatures on petitions opposing ratification, direct petitioning of the Diet began to spread. From mid-April, civic groups and labor unions in the Tokyo area conducted daily district-by-district petition campaigns. Representatives from rural areas began to participate as well. Buses carrying petitioners from nearby prefectures and lines of people from all walks of life began to be seen in front of the Diet. On April 26 a continuous stream of 80,000 people marched toward the Diet. In the afternoon 5,500 mainstream Zengakuren members clashed with policemen in front of the Diet's main gate, causing twenty-eight injuries. Chairman Ota writes: It was during the big April 25 [April 26?] petition movement that the key to advancing the security treaty struggle was grasped. I am told that this petition movement was thought up by some professors and was based on the citizen's right to petition stipulated in the Constitution. People are liable to be frightened of demonstrations. But this was petitioning and the tactic was to place

40

LDP RULE, 1955-1980 one's signature [on a piece of paper], something that anybody can do. Six million signatures were collected in no time, and we used these to organize demonstrations at the Diet building, which we labeled "group petitionings." T h e "burdensome security treaty," it seems, had b e c o m e the property of the people and [the movement] gathered m o m e n t u m rapidly as the situation was made apparent by the Diet deliberations. (Ota 1976:140)

Also important was the Miike dispute (discussed in Chapter 9), which was reaching a climax about this time. A union member had been stabbed to death by gangsters hired by management on March 29. The April 17 Tanro (Japan Coal Miners' Union, Nihon Tanko Rodo Kumiai) convention rejected a proposal for mediation by the Central Labor Relations Board's Fujibayashi Keizo and called a strike. Ota writes: If there had been no Kubo incident in the Miike struggle and if the matter had been resolved, I d o not think that the security treaty struggle would have turned out the way it did. . . . We were not cognizant of the interrelationship between Miike and the security treaty at the start, nor could anyone have been aware of it. T h e relationship between "the security treaty system and the rationalization [of p r o d u c t i o n ] " — a principle of mutual d e v e l o p m e n t — w a s established, you might say, as we f o u g h t "with all our might." (Ota 1976:159)

O n May 5 Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced that the Soviets had shot down an American spy plane that had penetrated deeply into his country's territory; he fulminated that an element within the U.S. government was trying to undermine the U.S.-Soviet summit that was two weeks away. On May 9 he warned, "If provocations against the Soviet Union from the sky continue, in addition to shooting down such planes, rockets will be aimed at their bases." Of the seven U-2S deployed at overseas U.S. military bases, it became known that three were in Japan. A burst of student and citizen demonstrations occurred in various parts of South Korea beginning in April. There was a student demonstration in Seoul on April 18 and a demonstration involving 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 on April 2 6 . The South Korean parliament passed a resolution calling for the immediate resignation of President Rhee Syngman. The president resigned on April 27. The evening of May 19 arrived. The forced passage in the Diet ignited misgivings and fears that had been stirred up by the debate over the scope of the "Far East" and the U-2S. The movement started a blaze that spread instantly. According to reports of the National Conference, there were 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 participants on May 20, and 1 7 5 , 0 0 0 on May 27. This was a blaze without a unified objective or direction. If there was a common denominator, it was distrust and anger against the Kishi cabinet and its arrogant forced passage. Opposition to the security treaty revision was transformed into protest against the forced passage. Prime Minister Kishi refused interview requests from reporters. In spite

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of editorials in the Asahi and Yomiuri on May 21, pressing strongly for the cabinet's resignation and a dissolution of the lower house, on May 23 Kishi conveyed to Secretary General Kawashima, Executive Council chairman Ishii, and PARC chairman Funada Naka his determination to "have neither a full resignation nor dissolution until the new security treaty has been ratified." T h e prime minister finally appeared before reporters on May 28, obstinately insisting that "Japan is a nation of parliamentary politics. T h e absolute majority within the LDP which, in turn, occupies an absolute majority in the Diet, participated in the vote on the security treaty. Therefore, in light of the law, there is nothing wrong with this vote." H e then tried to line up the three middle factions of Ikeda, O n o , and Ishii on his side in order to isolate the three anti-mainstream factions of Kono, Miki/Matsumura, and Ishibashi. In response, the anti-mainstream factions agreed on June 1 to form an alliance to press for Prime Minister Kishi's immediate resignation. T h e JSP contemplated linking u p with the LDP anti-mainstream factions in order to bring about Kishi's immediate resignation and, circumstances permitting, the establishment of a coalition government devoted to a defense of the Constitution and the promotion of peace. Arrangements were made for Sasaki Kozo to negotiate with Matsumura, and Wada Hiroo and Yamamoto with Kono. K o n o promised to consider a coalition government and, "as for the ouster of the Kishi cabinet, if the JSP is serious about it, we of the anti-mainstream will cooperate behind the scenes." (Yamamoto 1983: 139-40) O n June 4 the Japan National Railways Union (Kokuro) and the National Railway Locomotive Engineers Union (Doro) struck. T h e only previous instances of strikes conducted with a clear-cut political objective were the 1952 Roto Strike in opposition to the Anti-Subversive Activities Act and the revision of various labor-related laws, and the 1958 strike against the revision of the Police Duties Law. In the five direct actions of the Roto strike, the number of participants in the largest, second wave was estimated at 1 —1.5 million. T h e strike against the revision of the Police Duties Law was much larger. T h e June 4 strike is said to have been the largest of the postwar period, with 76 local and industrial federations and 4.6 million individuals participating. T h e number of stores participating in a "closed-for-the-day strike" conducted by retailers is said to have numbered 20,000. Two days earlier, the government had declared that political strikes with the objective of stopping the revision of the security treaty, the resignation of the cabinet, or the dissolution of the Diet were illegal. But after the strike, it released a statement which stated that "there had been extremely few incidents stemming from disorder" because "the g o o d people of Japan" had " a d o p t e d a level-headed attitude" and the "current action . . . had not escalated to the point where it would become a political pressure." Never-

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L D P R U L E , 1955-1980

theless, police officials "frankly admitted" that the strike "was refined to a m u c h greater degree than expected" and that " a n anti-Kishi atmosphere had permeated the general populace." Japan National Railways officials defined the strike as a dispute between the government and the JNR unions and, after issuing a perfunctory administrative directive, avoided active intervention. T h e press was also friendly to the unions. T h e confidence of the JSP was boosted by the strike's success and the rise of the mass movement. T h e JSP party congress on June 6 proposed a strategy of Diet member mass resignation. O n June 5 t h e J C P daily newspaper, Akahata (Red flag), praised the "great achievement" of the June 4 strike while charging that "the action taken by the Zengakuren leadership and other Trotskyists was outright treachery." T h e DSP opposed the action on grounds that using a strike to transform a political situation went against parliamentary democratic politics. O n June 10 U.S. presidential press secretary James Haggerty arrived at Haneda Airport to make arrangements for President Eisenhower's visit to Japan. Fifteen thousand demonstrators gathered there. They surrounded the car carrying Ambassador MacArthur and Haggerty, shaking it and pelting it with rocks. Haggerty had to be rescued by the police and taken to the U.S. embassy by helicopter. Some 235,000 people demonstrated in front of the Diet on the following day. Their slogans were " O p p o s e Security Treaty Ratification!" "Dissolve the Diet!" "Overthrow Kishi!" and " O p p o s e Ike's Visit!" Haggerty departed from Tachikawa air force base that evening. O n June 15 there was a strike with the General Federation of Private Railway Workers' Unions of Japan (Shitetsu Roren) at the vanguard, in which h i local industrial federations and 5.6 million individuals participated. Unions and supporting groups also conducted a protest demonstration at the Diet that day. A National C o n f e r e n c e demonstration of 200,000 marched in orderly fashion from Hibiya to the Diet. A demonstration by Zengakuren, which was acting independently, circled the Diet. Blood first flowed during the early evening of that day. Around 5:15, when columns of the Society to Criticize the Security Treaty approached the edge of the House of Councilors' waiting room, the marchers were attacked by a rightwing group carrying a banner that read "Restoration Action Brigade." Thirty minutes later, 80 people had been injured. A r o u n d 5:40, the main Zengakuren group assembled before the south gate of the Diet and attempted to enter the grounds. Riot police tried to stop the students with fire hoses, but they were still able to enter. After encircling them, the police suddenly attacked and pushed the students outside the gate. A female student was crushed to death. T h e students entered the Diet grounds for a second time around 8:00 and, surrounded by police, started a protest rally with about 4,000 participants. Around 9:00, they observed a m o m e n t of silence for the student who died. A r o u n d 10:00 the police attacked again and

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removed the students. There was a total mobilization of the city's ambulances but even that proved insufficient. Police trucks were set ablaze. Tear gas was fired around 1:30 A.M. The police then chased and assaulted the students. Groups of college professors, media representatives, and passersby were also assaulted. Ota states: I do not think that during the height of the security treaty struggle either we at Sohyo, or the JSP or the JCP, were exercising leadership. We could not control it. Although the leaders and theoreticians later talked as if they had pulled [the movement] along, the truth is that it has to be considered a spontaneous rising of the masses and a magnificent cresting of mass struggle. While you could talk about rapid growth in the economy, among both the workers and the people, there was—at the base where they were gasping for breath and where the old war scars were—an unfathomable and tremendous mobilization. This became a French-style demonstration that buried the streets. Although it would be wrong to say that there was no leadership at all—there was a certain general framework of sorts—nevertheless, I believe that the primary force, or the lead player, was clearly the masses. (Ota 1976:165)

The Cancellation of Ike's Visit The movement to force a cancellation or postponement of President Eisenhower's visit intensified after the forced passage of May 19. On May 25 JSP representatives presented an open letter to Ambassador MacArthur demanding a postponement of the visit. A heated exchange took place between Ambassador MacArthur and JSP chairman Asanuma, and after the meeting the ambassador denounced the JSP. A large number of statements calling for the postponement of the visit were issued by groups of academics and intellectuals, and letters of similar purport were sent to friends and acquaintances in the United States. There was tumult within the LDP and the business community. On June 5 LDP Executive Council chairman Ishii recommended the postponement of Ike's visit to Kishi. National Public Safety Commission chairman Ishihara Kan'ichiro sounded pessimistic at a government gathering called the following day to discuss security plans for the visit. The Keizai Doyukai, at a meeting of its leadership on the evening ofJune 7, also came to the conclusion that if a political ceasefire could not be arranged there was no choice but to cancel the invitation. Kishi and MacArthur, by contrast, adopted an extremely hard line. A fiveministers' conference on May 27 attended by Prime Minister Kishi, Vice Prime Minister Masutani Shuji, Foreign Minister Fujiyama, Finance Minister Sato, and Minister of International Trade and Industry Ikeda reconfirmed the invitation. On June 7 Kishi invited to the prime minister's official residence representatives of the Yomiuri shinbun, Mainichi shinbun, NHK

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LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980

(Japan Broadcasting Corporation, Nihon Hoso Kyokai), Mainichi shinbun, and Tokyo shinbun and demanded that they foster public opinion welcoming Ike's visit. O n June 8 it was the Kyodo News Service, Chubu nihon shinbun, Hokkaido shinbun, Nishi nihon shinbun, a n d Nihon keizai shinbun a n d o n

June 9, Asahi shinbun. MacArthur invited the chief editors of the various newspapers and harangued them about how the cancellation of Ike's visit to Japan would be a victory for the forces of communism. With the June 10 Haggerty incident as a catalyst, the tone of press editorials began to change. T h e papers uniformly criticized the incident as a "breach of international confidence." As for the business community, on June n Keidanren, Nikkeiren, the Japan Chamber of C o m m e r c e , and Keizai Doyukai concurred in favor of welcoming Ike. O n June 13 the DSP approved a resolution welcoming him. O n June 14 Sohyo president Ota privately requested that the JSP and the JCP call off demonstrations against the Eisenhower visit. T h e JSP canceled its demonstrations at H a n e d a on June 15. T h e Police Agency established plans to mobilize 270,000 police and encircle Eisenhower and the emperor's car with sixty police motorcycles during their passage from Haneda to the Imperial Palace. T h e bloodshed occurred at this point, on the evening of the June 15. T h e June 17 editions of seven Tokyo newspapers carried a j o i n t declaration that stated: "Irrespective of the circumstances involved [and] regardless of the reasons for i t . . . , eliminate violence and protect parliamentarianism." T h e Japan Newspaper Association was used as a vehicle to ask regional papers to publish the declaration. Aside from a small number of papers (e.g., Hokkaido shinbun, Ehime shinbun), all t h e m a j o r r e g i o n a l a n d p r e f e c t u r a l p a -

pers followed suit the following morning. At the behest of the Doyukai, the business community released a four-association j o i n t statement calling for the elimination of violence and the defense of parliamentarianism. A n emergency cabinet meeting was held around 4:00 P.M. on June 16 to request a postponement of Ike's invitation. T h e reason was concern for public order. Fujiyama writes: T h e L D P said that it would have [Eisenhower] transported by helicopter f r o m H a n e d a Airport to the Imperial Palace a n d would hold a w e l c o m i n g reception there. B u t the United States would n o t agree to this. I heard s o m e o n e was d e m a n d i n g that Kishi deploy the Self-Defense Forces. T h e r e was talk o f sending them out without their guns. T h a t w o u l d b e the same thing as [using] the police. H o w c o u l d anyone think o f anything so ridiculous? I rushed over, a n d w h e n I g o t there Kishi said, "I've d e c i d e d against it because [Defense A g e n c y director] A k a g i [Munenori] is against it." Relieved, I later shook hands with Akagi. I think it was a great accomplishment o n Akagi's part. (Fujiyama 1976: 10)

According to Akagi, there was never any formal discussion of mobilizing the Self-Defense Forces during the cabinet meeting, but there was a request for

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their deployment from Sato, Ikeda, Kawashima, and others. On either June 14 or 15, Akagi was called to Kishi's private residence in Nanpeidai and presented with a strong demand for deployment. The Kishi residence was surrounded by demonstrators. Akagi stated flady that the Self-Defense Forces should not be mobilized. Kishi, with his arms crossed, listened in silence but in the end agreed. He did not, however, give up on Ike's visit. At an emergency cabinet meeting during the early dawn hours of June 16, Kishi was still determined to welcome Ike. But on opening the emergency cabinet meeting at 4:00 P.M., Kishi announced that he would like to have the visit canceled. Akagi, who was tensely expecting Kishi to order the SDF deployment, was taken by surprise. (Akagi 1 9 7 3 : 1 0 3 - 6 ) There was one other factor that might have been important: " T h e view of the 'Palace' was communicated to the prime minister over the telephone by Koizumi Shinzo around June 15. It undoubtedly arose out of a concern that something might happen to His Majesty, who was to ride in the car with the president from Haneda." (Asahi shinbun, August 3, i960; for the treaty revision problem, see Hidaka i960) Automatic Approval and, Ratification The new treaty was automatically ratified at midnight on June 19. Kishi comments: Even now when I recall the events of that time, I am filled with emotion. I spent June 18 through the morning of June 19 at the Prime Minister's Residence in Nagatacho. On the evening of June 18,1 sent the cabinet ministers who had gathered at the official residence back to their offices. This was to assure their personal safety and prevent any interruption of their duties, as there was a danger that the official residence would be attacked by a mob. Only my younger brother, Sato Eisaku, remained. "Let's have some brandy," he said and brought out a bottle and glasses. The two brothers sat in the Prime Minister's Residence sipping brandy late into the night, waiting for the hour of the automatic approval to arrive. It had all started the day before when Police Superintendent General Ogura [Ken] came to me and said, "Please evacuate the Prime Minister's Residence." Superintendent Ogura demanded the following: "The riot police and the regular police are exhausted from trying to control the demonstrators day after day. I have lost confidence in our ability to assure the safety of the Prime Minister's Residence and would like for you to move to another location." . . . I said, "I, too, do not want to be assaulted and killed by a mob. But if there is no other location to go to, then, as prime minister, the only place for me is Prime Minister's Residence. It would be, to say the least, awfully disgraceful if I were injured while hiding out in some strange place." . . . I had resolved that, as long as the security treaty revision was realized, I did

46

LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980 not mind being killed. I would be most happy if the place I died were the Prime Minister's Residence. And if I was going to die, it would be sufficient for me alone to die. But my brother insisted that he "could not leave his older brother there by himself," so it came to pass that just the two of us held the casde. At midnight on J u n e 19, when the hour of automatic approval arrived, I was truly relieved. After a short while, Secretary General Kawashima arrived and requested that "since the security treaty revision has now been established, I would like the prime minister to declare that he will resign in order to stabilize the people's sentiments." I refused. "The security treaty revision may have been completed in Japan, but the United States has not yet done so. Once the United States does and [the treaty's] validity has been fully established, I will resign, but at this stage I cannot." (Kishi, Yatsugi, and Ito 1981:562-63)

In a surprise move on the morning of J u n e 20, the L D P contingent in the House of Councilors unilaterally approved the new treaty-related domestic legislation. Thirty thousand union members and students demonstrated before the Diet building and the Foreign Ministry. Ratification of the new treaty was decided "by circular" in a cabinet meeting on the evening of J u n e 21. T h e emperor acknowledged it that evening, thereby completing the procedures for ratification. On J u n e 22 some 60,000 members of HI local and industrial federations affiliated with Sohyo and Churitsu Roren (Federation of Independent Labor Unions of Japan, Churitsu Rodo Renraku Kaigi) called an early morning general strike. At J N R , almost 1,100 scheduled trains were halted or delayed. It was the first time since J N R was established that the entire Tokaido trunk line was paralyzed. Approximately 120,000 unionists, students, and other citizens demonstrated before the Diet and in downtown Tokyo. At 10:00 A.M. on J u n e 23 instruments of ratification were exchanged at the Foreign Minister's Residence in Meguro. Fujiyama recollects: Thinking that I wanted to finish the signing of the instruments of ratification first, I returned to my office in the Hotel New Japan. There I received a call from the Foreign Ministry: "JSP Representative Matsumoto Shichiro is looking for you, so you should not stay at your office." I had the instruments of ratification brought immediately from the Foreign Ministry and, taking along my aide Uchida Hiroshi, I went to my sister-in-law [Kimura Aiko] 's place in Aoyama. There I signed [the instruments] and affixed my seal. I rarely visit there so my sister-in-law was extremely taken aback when I came barging in without notice, demanding that she lend me a room. All that was left was the prime minister's signature, but there was a report that the Zengakuren was trying to seize the instruments of ratification. Uchida had made arrangements by telephone with Kishi's aide, Wada Tsutomu. We met at the intersection of Aoyama 6-chome, and I handed them to him in a

SECURITY TREATY REVISION

candy box. When I returned to my office, I received a telephone call from the Prime Minister's Residence saying that they had been safely delivered. In an effort to complete the administrative procedures within the day, [the instruments] were carried to the Imperial Palace as soon as the prime minister had signed them; they were placed in a Foreign Ministry safe once His Majesty had signed them. Everything was completed around nine o'clock that evening. Although automatic approval was sufficient for the treaty itself, the related domestic legislation had to be put before the House of Councilors. Beginning at ten o'clock on the morning of June 20, a surprise committee meeting was held with the LDP alone participating. The committee's business was disposed of in about two minutes, and the plenary session opened. The JSP caught on to what was going on right about then. Its members opened the door and came pouring in. Without paying any heed, the House passed [the bills] with a series of yeas. Akagi and I were seated in the House of Councilors ministers' gallery.... I assembled several officials from the Police Agency and the Foreign Ministry to discuss the ceremony for exchanging the instruments of ratification. . . . It was agreed that, given its nonvisibility and security needs, the Foreign Minister's Residence would probably be best. As for the time, it had been confirmed that the U.S. Senate was to approve the new treaty at 3:00 A.M. on June 23, so we decided to begin at 10:00 A.M. . . . We had promised to notify the press of the schedule for the ceremony of exchange one hour before it started. If it was to begin at 10:00 A.M., then notification had to be given at 9:00 A.M. But in that case, there was a chance that it would be announced on the 9:00 radio news and the Zengakuren students at [the] Komaba [campus of the University of Tokyo] would come rushing over. Pressed by these circumstances, we made our notification at 9:10 A.M., when the news ended, and decided that the exchange ceremony would begin at 10:10. The next matter was the security of the Foreign Minister's Residence. If the demonstrators showed up, they could be stopped on the single street leading up to the residence from the road along Shirogane. The problem was how to escape once the ceremony had ended. We Japanese participants could hole up there, but Ambassador MacArthur was holding the instrument so we had to return him to the embassy quickly. We therefore asked a favor of the two houses in the back of the Foreign Minister's Residence so that, in case of an emergency, we could climb over the fence of the residence, pass through those houses, and slip out the other side. We had an embassy car parked on the far side of the private residences and, stacking beer crates on this side of the residence's wall, we arranged it so that the ambassador could climb over the f e n c e . . . . The ceremony of exchange was held on schedule at 10:10. We finished it quickly and hurriedly toasted with champagne. The Zengakuren had not arrived. Ambassador MacArthur was therefore able to leave through the residence's front gate without incident. I stayed behind and held a press con-

47

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LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980

ference. . . . I too had the good fortune of being able to leave through the front gate. I'm told that students from the nearby Meiji Gakuin University thronged the residence five minutes after I left. (Fujiyama 1976:107-12) Kishi revealed his decision to withdraw on June 23. The rule of the antiPotsdam faction was thereby ended. The Structure of the Myth and the Nightmare T h e pattern of conflict found in the process leading from the genesis of the security treaty revision issue to its resolution resembled that of the Police Duties Law in a number of ways. The mzyor players were (1) the government and the LDP mainstream factions, (2) the anti-mainstream factions, (3) the JSP, and (4) the extraparliamentary movement. The first phase of each opened with the submission of a government bill. T h e government and mainstream factions submitted bills with the intention of attaining policy goals that would provide them with a foothold for long-term governance. The anti-mainstream, feinting here and there, observed the events carefully as they unfolded. It did not care whether the government's effort led to failure or success as long as it paved the way for a cabinet resignation. O n e way for the anti-mainstream factions to gain control of the government was to cooperate with the government and then inherit it. The other was to wrest the cabinet away from the incumbent administration by toppling it. In either case, the cabinet would not receive total cooperation from the ruling party. Outside the LDP, the JSP vehemendy opposed the government's proposal and appealed to forces outside the Diet for help. O n most such occasions, an extraparliamentary movement of sufficient magnitude failed to materialize. T h e JSP therefore did not have confidence in its ability to block the LDP proposal. It would throw a feint or two and watch the unfolding situation closely in order to ascertain how hard a line to take. If the LDP's negotiations with the JSP over the steering of Diet deliberations dragged on or if endless debate unfolded, the government would find itself boxed into a corner as the end of the session approached. At this point, it proceeded to either extend the session or pass the bill forcibly. A second stage began to unfold at this point. There was an intense backlash in the press and, simultaneously, an extraparliamentary movement arose. Encouraged, the JSP hardened its stance, and maneuvering by the LDP anti-mainstream factions intensified. A proposal for an early resignation of the cabinet was made, and even in the mainstream factions some individuals began to waver. What is particularly noteworthy in the cases under review is the expansion of the extraparliamentary movement. Why did it grow so large? Japan's

SECURITY TREATY REVISION

4g

rapid economic growth had just begun. With the exodus of population from the countryside and the rapid expansion of the cities, pluralization and social fluidity—that is, the phenomena of mass society—were occurring at a rapid rate. Anomie spread amid the changes that prosperity brought. The painful memories of the war fifteen years earlier were still fresh in people's minds. Whatever justification there might have been for the revision of the Police Duties Law and the new security treaty, they tended to rub salt in old wounds. At the same time, the people had also received fifteen years of education in democracy. Their understanding of democracy might have been abstract and highly idealistic, but they did not accept the rationales being put forward to justify the forced passages. When the image of a war criminal (Kishi) was added to the mix, it is not surprising that an intense backlash occurred. But even if this sort of susceptibility had become widespread, had there been no organizations to mobilize it, the extraparliamentary movement would probably not have succeeded. Among these organizations were, first of all, the mass media. The tumult of the Diet deliberations and the Diet building perimeter was conveyed instantly to the public. National newspaper networks had been established by this time. Television networks were on the verge of covering the entire nation. The rate of television ownership had been a mere 0.1 percent in 1953, but in i960 it was 33.2 percent. Thus, it was not just the "crowd" around the Diet's perimeter that was thrown into an extraordinary arousal. The dispersed members of the "general public" observing these events in their living rooms were also infected by the rising spirit and pulled toward the Diet perimeter. The second set of mobilizers was the JSP and the labor unions. In both the revision of the Police Duties Law and the new security treaty, Sohyo organized a protest movement at an early point. But this movement was isolated and possessed very little influence. Once stage two was reached, however, it became the nucleus of mass demonstrations. The political demonstrations and labor union political strikes were no longer isolated. The socialist movement began to resonate with the conditions of mass society. The third phase was the resolution of the crisis. In the case of the revision of the Police Duties Law, the LDP mainstream factions conferred secretly with the JSP in a room at the Prince Hotel. In order to normalize the Diet, they decided that deliberations on the bill would be halted and the bill itself would be shelved. Elsewhere, Kishi concluded a secret pact with Ono, thereby preempting a defection from the mainstream and narrowly staving off the fall of his government. But in the case of the security treaty revision, even though the business community and the newspapers, shocked by the June 10 Haggerty incident, called for the elimination of violence and the defense of parliamentarianism, the awakened extraparliamentary move-

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ment was in no mood to be pacified. In the end, Kishi canceled Ike's visit and announced his resignation while simultaneously arranging for the results of the forced passage to gain automatic approval. Kishi's resignation served to calm public opinion. Still confronting each other, the mainstream and anti-mainstream factions scuffled their way through the party presidential election. Ikeda was eventually chosen. And it was the Ikeda cabinet that ultimately resolved the situation and solidified LDP rule.

TWO

Income Doubling

T H E 1960 PARTY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Ikeda Declares His

Candidacy

Kishi announced his resignation on June 23. The unprecedented extraparliamentary movement disappeared from the periphery of the Diet, and the location of the stage shifted. Intense factional fighting ensued over the selection of the new LDP president. Efforts within the party to narrow the field to a single candidate ended in failure, and on July 8 LDP secretary general Kawashima reported to Kishi that "there is no choice but to hold a vote." Minister of International Trade and Industry Ikeda, Vice Premier Ono, Executive Council chairman Ishii, and Matsumura announced their intention to run on July 9. Foreign Minister Fujiyama did so on July 10. The situation was chaotic. Ito Masaya, who was close to Ikeda, states: Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiina said that he wanted to meet with Ohira [Masayoshi]. Ohira said, "Buu-cAara, you come too," so I went along even though I had no idea what it was all about. Shiina was waiting in the lobby. "You, who are Ikeda's staff advisers, please don't make any moves now, and keep quiet. I thought that Ikeda was acting foolishly when he became one of the three cabinet members who resigned [from the Kishi cabinet], but I do not think so now. Ikeda's in a particularly important position, so please be careful." Shiina repeated "Be careful" over and over. He was probably suggesting that Ikeda would be next and that we should keep the larger context in mind.... One morning around that time, when I was riding in a car with Ikeda, he

5'

52

LDP RULE, 1955 -1980 said, near the Benkei Bridge in Akasaka Mitsuke, as if he had just remembered it, "Today, a wizard came to see me. He said that I would be next." . . . There was considerable talk among those around Ikeda that it would be disadvantageous for him to run at that time. After the June 15 incident, a meeting of the Ikeda faction ended and everyone left. Only Ikeda, Ohira, and I stayed on at [Ikeda's] private residence. "It would be best for you to pass it up this time. You are the darling of the conservatives, and it would not be good for you to pick up scars at a time like this. Why not let Ishii or someone else take it up first and then run after things have settled down?" Ikeda nodded as he listened, but when Ohira finished, he said, " I understand what you are saying, but my eyes see something called the government. The government is before me." . . . Ikeda advocated [selection by] vote and refused to budge. He appeared extremely high-handed. Ikeda was considered combative and obstinate, and for several days before the presidential election he was trounced thoroughly in the newspapers and on television.... In the end, Secretary General Kawashima's effort to arrange a negotiated selection came to naught and it was decided that a vote would be held. I immediately began preparing for Ikeda's candidacy. He held a press conference at the Prince Hotel to formally declare it. He unveiled his policy stands, which were built around the Income Doubling Plan and included such items as the reconstruction of parliamentary politics and the promotion of international cooperation. Ono declared, Ishida declared, and then Matsumura Kenzo declared. Fujiyama said that he would run in order to demonstrate the viability of his faction. It turned into a free-for-all. We set up a campaign office in the Prince Hotel five days before the election and divided up the work of obtaining supporters. The primary tactic was individual visitation. The targets were not just Diet members but also the delegates who represented the prefectural federations. One or two people from each prefectural federation would come to Tokyo with the right to vote. We traveled as far as Atami, boarded the train, and tried to persuade them. Or we employed the more elaborate approach of having them stay in our faction's hotel. Everyone was frantic—Maeo [Shigesaburo] with the prefectural delegates, Ohira working behind the scenes, Ohashi as the tactical adviser in charge of reading the vote, and Suzuki Zenko with countermeasures against the other factions. Ikeda calmly went about at his normal pace amid all of this. He would go to the hotel in the morning, greet the delegates—in effect, show his face— and then return home at 5 : 0 0 . . . . We first lined up Sato's support. Next, the decision was made that the Kishi faction's vote would be unpledged. The Ono, Kono, and Ishii factions countered Ikeda and tried to broaden their front in the name of "marshaling the party politician factions." The Miki, Matsumura, and Fujiyama factions operated independendy. The Kishi faction later changed its unpledged vote to support Ikeda. (ltd 1966:74-78)

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53

Ohira recalls: This was the first time that I had ever made the arrangements for a presidential race. I had no idea where I should begin and was completely at a loss as to what to do. I therefore took my troubles to Tanaka Kakuei, who had played a critical role in the Kishi camp during the previous presidential race sis the staff adviser of the Sato faction. A memorandum from Tanaka several pages long was delivered to me two or three days later. Not only did it contain an outline of policies that should be adopted in a presidential race; he had even listed concrete tactics that could be used in a campaign and provided a budget estimate in blue ink, with the important items highlighted in red. I appreciated Tanaka's kindness. I immediately went over to see Ikeda with the memorandum in hand. Ikeda was in a bad mood and said just one thing: "You must not do anything where you have to spend money—not a single cent." I replied, "I understand, but I'm not sure how much I can live up to your expectations. I will do all that I can to take your wish into account. However, we intend to take charge of this campaign. If possible, I would like you not to interfere in any way." We operated in just this fashion. (Ohira 1978:98-99) The Ikeda faction raided the other factions using the generous supply of funds received from the zaikai mainstream. (Word at the time had it that this amounted to ¥1 billion.) ltd and Ohira's strategy was to gain the cooperation of the Sato faction, cut into the Kishi faction, and win over the Fujiyama faction. The key to the success of this strategy was the link between Ohira and the Sato faction's Tanaka Kakuei. (Watanabe 1967 ¡59-60) Ikeda and Sato Sato decided to support Ikeda. Ikeda and Sato had been classmates in the old Fifth Higher School in Kumamoto. They attended Kyoto and Tokyo universities and then entered the Ministry of Finance and the Railway Ministry, respectively. They were both midcareer bureaucrats at the time of the defeat. After the war, they served as vice ministers of the finance and transportation ministries, entered the political world in the 1949 general election, and distinguished themselves as top students in the "Yoshida School." "The two of them provided a great contrast," says Hori Shigeru, who was close to Sato. "When he drank, Ikeda was much more interesting. He would loosen u p . . . . Sato drank, but you had no idea whether he was enjoying it." (Hori 1975:107) Mrs. Sato relates: Whenever Ikeda came to our house, he always made himself at home. After he got some liquor in him, he would boss me around. . . . He once told me, " T h e service in this house is no good." He then started to bang the table.

¡4

LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980 "Hey, you!" he shouted. I had to shout back, "I'm not your wife!" Ikeda said something like, " I am aware of that." It did not faze him in the l e a s t . . . . It seemed to me that husbands who are as much trouble as Ikeda are quite rare. At the same time, Mrs. Ikeda's devotion was most thorough. Since her husband did not like Western clothes, no matter how hot a day it was, she would change into a proper kimono and tabi before her husband came home and wait for him. She was that much of a perfect wife. By contrast, my husband was very litde trouble. I do not necessarily mean this as a compliment, nor was this a product of my "training." Eisaku, who was the seventh among ten brothers and sisters, probably picked up the habit of doing things himself when he was small. He was surprisingly dexterous. When he was with the railways, he would often catch eels and other fish, clean them, and cook them himself. He bragged that he "should open up an eel restaurant." He was happy to do simple carpentry work and could carry it out experdy. He often helped with things like closing the rain shutters and pulling out and putting away the bedding. He washed his own handkerchiefs even after he became prime minister. "It's nice because it makes my hands clean," he would say. He took his own underwear to the laundry hamper and sometimes washed it in the bathroom. (Sato 1974:155-62)

Ikeda and Sato were old friends, but they were placed in a situation that made them political enemies. T h e two publicly parted company at the time of the 1955 conservative merger, with Ikeda joining the L D P and Sato remaining an independent together with Yoshida. In the presidential election to choose Hatoyama's successor (December 1956), Ikeda supported Ishii in the first round and Ishibashi in the runoff whereas Sato supported his brother Kishi from start to finish. Kyodo News Agency correspondent Uchida Kenzo writes: One snowy day when I visited Sato's private residence in Tokyo's Setagaya Ward, there were no other visitors. A bored Sato, responding to a question from me, spoke about Ikeda and their long f r i e n d s h i p . . . . I was left with the strong impression that Sato was trying to say that, although he was two years younger than Ikeda, in terms of his political career and as a disciple of Yoshida, he had consistendy been one step ahead. There was no reason why he had to play second fiddle to Ikeda forever. Sato's expression when he finished speaking was not his usual poker face but instead a sweet-and-sour smile in which a feeling of fond nostalgia was mixed with a sense of rivalry. (Uchida 1983:65) It could be that Sato had originally entertained the possibility of an O n o prime ministership. There was, after all, the previous January's secret agreement with Ono. A n d if Ikeda became prime minister, Sato might lose his chance. An O n o interim cabinet might be desirable. Or did he perhaps have an even more complicated strategy in mind? On the morning of J u n e 23, he placed a telephone call to the O n o faction's chief lieutenant, Murakami Isamu, who recalls:

INCOME DOUBLING Sato said, "Kishi will announce his retirement at the government-ruling party summit that follows the exchange of instruments of ratification today. What do you plan to do after that?" I replied by turning the tables on him and asked him for a d v i c e . . . . "We want to create an O n o government, even if it is for only, let's say, half a year. Isn't there some good way to do this?" "Well, I should think that you advisers will have to put a lot of effort into it." "That is what I am asking you. What kind of effort should we put into it?" "Ok, I see. Then let's do it this way. I want you and, from our side, Hon, to negotiate the terms in utmost secrecy. That should more or less take care of it. The sooner the better. I know. At 3:00 P.M. today I will have H o n go to a place that you specify. There the two of you can work out the details. By all means, keep it top secret." Sato kept repeating "top secret." His tone brought home to me that the direction of the upcoming presidential election—that is, whether or not there would be an O n o government—would be determined by these MurakamiHori talks. I designated the Kawasaki teahouse in Akasaka to Hori. There I delivered the most fervent speech of my life. "I will not even bother to bring up the promise made by the two brothers, Kishi and Sato. It is not simply for Ono's sake that I want you to establish an O n o cabinet. It, by extension, is also something that will be good for Sato. As you know, Ikeda is aiming for the next term, and if things continue to go the way they have, it looks as though it will indeed be Ikeda. If we have an Ikeda cabinet, it will take quite a few years for it to get back to you. Isn't that right?" "That's right." "Now, if it were to be Ono, I would have him step down in half a year. It's now late June, so the end of next January. Ishibashi was [prime minister for] just two months. Yet he's now a 'former prime minister.' In Ono's case, six months will suffice to make him 'former prime minister.' I will ask his doctor to say that his blood pressure is high and he can no longer bear the responsibility of being prime minister. He could step down before the budget committee meets in February...." "I see. I don't think that Sato would have any complaints about that." Hori brought up a variety of items. "Incidentally, what are you going to do about personnel choices once an Ono government is created—that is, the lineup in the party and the cabinet?" "We don't have to have any ministers from the O n o faction. But if I were allowed just one wish, it would be that Fukuda Tokuyasu of the Ono faction, who has a background in the Foreign Ministry, or Aoki Masashi, be made chief cabinet secretary [at the time, not a ministerial post]. Beyond that, we do not need any party posts or any ministerships." "I can see that you are determined. I will go back and discuss it with Sato and try to arrange things according to your wishes. Let's meet here again at the same time tomorrow." With that, we parted for the time being. At the second set of MurakamiHori talks, Hori started out by saying: "When I spoke with Sato, he felt that

33

¿6

LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980 would be fine and was quite pleased. But Sato did say something about you. That is, aren't you going to at least be the secretary general? He said that he would not mind having you and that I should ask you direcdy about it. What do you say?" I said, "No such thing. How can I tell the other members of the Ono faction not to enter the cabinet if I myself become secretary general? Hon, I will take no post whatsoever and will continue to work on behalf of Ono. I will hole up in, perhaps, the Number 14 waiting room of the Diet. On hot days I will use a fan and on cold days I will sit in the sun. I will adopt the attitude that during Ono's term of office I have been placed in a cauldron of hell." "Is that right? You're a great man! That clinches it." Hori and I exchanged a firm handshake. I thought that if Sato were to back Ono fully, then Kishi would also support him. There would be 150 people in their two factions, and 50 to 60 people in the Ono faction. With that, I judged, we would clinch it. Then Hori made a proposal. "Ikeda asked Sato to meet with him, but Sato hasn't yet met with him because he is waiting for the results of the discussions between you and me. We must hurry and have Ono meet with Sato before Sato meets with Ikeda. Tonight would be best. A restaurant or hotel would be too conspicuous. Your house or the house of someone you know would be fine. Sato says that he is willing to go if you designate the time and place. If the two of them were to shake hands there, then the matter would be virtually setded." "I see. I'm counting on you." I bowed deeply to Hori and rushed over to the Ono office in the Hotel New Japan "Sato is delaying Ikeda's request and is saying that he wants to meet with you, Ono-ttzn, alone. This being the case, you must meet and shake hands," I said. Ono said, " H m m m , " and thought for a while. The Diet member [who was in the room] inteijected, "Hori, is it? Are you sure about this arrangement?" Ono immediately joined in. "There is something fishy about this. Can we trust him?" He was most reticent. I was shattered. It seemed as if the " O n o government establishment" plan that I had worked over two days to put together had come crashing down. However, I pulled myself together. "Tonight's Ono-Sato talk is something that they actively proposed to us. I responded to them. But if you insist that you do not want to meet, what can I do? I will turn them down. I then humbly apologized to Hori and declined the Ono-Sato talks. Kishi and Sato could now openly back Ikeda. I hate to even think about it. (Murakami 1981:134-39)

Hori makes no mention of these talks. According to him, there was no bid by the Sato faction to have Sato follow Kishi, but it did occur to everyone in it that if the presidency went to Ikeda there would be no Sato era. Three alternatives were considered—to choose Ishii (Hori himself thought that

INCOME DOUBLING

57

Ishii would be good); to have the speaker of the House of Councilors Matsuno Tsuruhei run, although this would be highly irregular; or to support Ikeda, with whom there was deep friendship. In order to figure out what to do, Hon rode with Sato from Sato's house in Daizawa. About the time that they passed the Toyokawa Inari shrine in Akasaka, Sato said, "Matsuno . . . is, after all, a member of the House of Councilors.... Why don't we go with Ikeda?" Hori agreed. (Hori 1975:107-8) Kishi and Ono

Kishi did not have the least intention of observing his secret agreement with Ono: I intended to carry out my promise as long as Ono and Kono observed their promise to me. But Kono adopted a stance of opposition during the reshuffling of the advisers and party officers of the second Kishi cabinet in J u n e [1959]. Whatever the reason, this was clearly a violation of their promise. At this point, you could say that the contract was no longer valid. (Kishi 1983:455)

Ono sent messengers and visited the Kishi residence personally to encourage Kishi to implement the agreement, but Kishi dodged the issue and did not make his position clear. The reporter Watanabe was there when Murakami reported the results of a meeting with Kishi in which Murakami had acted as Ono's messenger. Murakami said he received the impression that Kishi would support Ono. Watanabe met with Kishi alone later that day and asked him about his intentions. Kishi stated, "I am not in any way being cynical. My mind is white as white can be, like the white snows of Mount F u j i . . . . " Watanabe noted that Kishi's expression was enough to make one shudder. Could he have been taking revenge against Ono for the events of three and a half years earlier? Watanabe doubled back and warned Ono, "Kishi is definitely not going to support you." Ono, however, still expected the Kishi faction's support, because he trusted the faction's top chief steward, Secretary General Kawashima. (Watanabe 1967:57-58) The Ono faction tried to create a coalition of the first and second runners-up with the Ishii faction in order to counter the Ikeda faction. It was estimated that the Ishii faction controlled 79 votes, with its primary force in the House of Councilors. The Ono faction thought that it could get the votes of the Kono faction, the Kawashima-affiliated group in the Kishi faction, and individual defections from other factions, for a total of 170 votes in the first round of voting. It therefore felt that victory would be easily assured if the Ishii faction joined up. Kono worked as hard as he could on behalf of Ono. He obtained funds from Hagiwara, Nagata, Kodama, and other sponsors and passed them on to Ono. According to Yamashita Isamu, Ono's aide in charge of "live am-

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munition," the money totaled ¥300 million. The largest contribution from an individual was the ¥50 million contributed by Takasaki Tatsunosuke. "I feel that, in the end, the reason for the defeat was money. According to what I know, Ikeda's side spent perhaps twice as much as the O n o camp, or about ¥700 million." (Watanabe 1967:63-64)

Kishi and Fujiyama In the end, Kishi came out in support of Ikeda, but he may have originally considered Fujiyama. According to Fujiyama's recollections: I believe it was July 1 [June 30?], i960.1 received a telephone call from Kishi. "I want to talk to you for a moment. I want you to drop by before the meeting starts," he said. . . . Kishi wanted to talk about the successor party president. "Things are so confused. We can't seem to decide on anyone. When you think about it, in a situation like this it would be best for someone like Yoshida to run but that would be impossible. All of this is the result of having revised the security treaty, and we have to consider how we are going to handle the aftermath. Why don't you run as a candidate?" . . . It seems he thought that I would be the second best person to operate, without damage, the revised security treaty system that he had worked on. When I returned to my office in the Hotel New Japan, I told those present about this discussion. These were people like Ozawa Saeki, Esaki Masumi, and Endo Saburo. They all said, "If that's what Kishi is saying, then you should run." I said, "Maybe I should give it a shot," and made up my mind to take up the challenge. Ozawa accompanied me on a visit to see Secretary General Kawashima, w h o had an office in the Imperial Hotel. When Ozawa brought up the subject of a Fujiyama candidacy, Kawashima said rather coolly, "Perhaps it would be better for you to not think about matters of this sort." What he seemed to be saying was, "You are still a freshman Diet member. You can't possibly understand the political world." Ozawa, however, had firmly made up his mind. . . . I also communicated my intentions clearly to Kishi that same day, saying, "I will go along with the matter that you mentioned." Two or three days after having psyched myself up for it, I visited Kishi's private residence in Nanpeidai. I told him, "I am now even more resolved to go through with it. I have to get started. I would like you to do what you can to line up the Kishi faction, and I would also like you to appeal to the people you have connections with. This is to use for these activities. . . . " I handed him what was e x p e c t e d . . . . " Kishi said, " F i n e . . . . " It was past midnight on July 10 that I announced my candidacy. Perhaps two days later Kishi asked me to his house. W h e n we met, he said abrupdy, "End your candidacy. If Ishii were to get the government, with Kono backing him, it would be a pro-communist government and that would be terrible. Could you quit and help out Ikeda?" I brushed this aside, saying, "I can't. I have declared my candidacy and revealed my policies. I cannot rescind them so lightly. How could you, at this stage . . . ?" (Fujiyama 1976:116-19)

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According to Miyazaki Yoshimasa, a reporter for the Yomiuri shinbun, on July 12, the night before the party convention, the strategies and estimates of the various factions were as follows. There were 286 Representatives, 135 Councilors, and 92 local delegates, for a grand total of 513 votes. The objective was to gain a majority of 257 votes. The Ikeda faction had lined up the Sato faction and the bulk of the Kishi faction. It estimated that it could get 112 votes from the Representatives, 40 from the Councilors, and 40 from the local delegates, for a total of 192. It thought that it could then get the support of the Fujiyama faction and others in the runoff. The Ono faction had brought together the Kono faction and those in the Kishi faction associated with Kawashima for 95 Representatives, 39 Councilors, and 45 local delegates, or a total of 179 and a first-place finish. In the runoff, it thought that it could win through an alliance of the first and second runners-up. The Fujiyama faction, which was not all that concerned with winning, had a target of 135, with 50 Representative, 55 Councilor, and 30 local delegate votes. The faction was leaning toward support for Ikeda in the runoff. The Matsumura faction, which was also oblivious to the matter of winning, estimated that it had a solid 52 votes. There was quite a bit of support for Ikeda in the runoff. A Nihon Television Network program, "The Direction of the Party Presidential Election," estimated 178 votes for Ikeda, 180 votes for Ono, 80 votes for Ishii, 60 votes for Fujiyama, and 45 votes for Matsumura but found it difficult to predict the runoff. It felt nonetheless that Ikeda's lead would be maintained. (Miyazaki 1970:248-50) Ono and Ishii Ono received favorable information until the night ofJuly 12. According to his advisers' reports, Kawashima had lined up 24 votes in the Kishi faction, the Fujiyama faction would not support Ikeda in the runoff, and the first and second runners-up alliance with Ishii had become a certainty. Before dawn on July 13, however, the tone of the reports changed completely. The Fujiyama faction would probably come out in favor of Ikeda in the runoff. The Kishi and Sato factions had solidified in support of Ikeda. The greater part of his House of Councilors support had been eaten into by the Ikeda faction. The majority of the local delegates who were supposed to have been packed into the Hotel New Japan had not shown up, and most of the rooms that had been reserved for them in the hotel were empty. The final, fatal piece of information was delivered in the presence of Kawashima by the Ishii faction's Nadao Hirokichi through Aoki Tadashi, who was in charge of liaisons with the Ishii faction. A considerable part of the Ishii faction in the House of Councilors had been co-opted by the Ikeda faction and even if Ono were to remain in the runoff vote, he would only receive 20 or at best 25 votes out of the Ishii faction's total of 70.

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N o matter how one calculated it, O n o was not going to win. O n o deliberated with Kawashima and Aoki, Murakami, and Mizuta Mikio—his advisers in charge of liaisons with the Ishii, Sato, and Fujiyama factions, respectively. He decided to withdraw his candidacy and support Ishii. Ishii states: There were quite a few people in my faction who claimed that they did not want to back O n o when the runoff came around. I j u d g e d that there was a particularly large number of people of this sort in the House of Councilors. . . . I thought that it might be best to let [the O n o faction] know about this ahead of time. I therefore sent two or three fellows—including Nadao Hirokichi and Sakata Michita—over as messengers on the night before the presidential election and had them relay this message: "I realize that you might be counting on us but given the situation, I cannot promise with certainty that all of the votes of my faction will go to you if you come out ahead. This being the case, in the event that I should come out ahead, I would like you to feel free to do as you wish about assisting me." Hearing this, Mizuta Mikio and several others of the O n o faction said, "We appreciate your frankness. But the fact remains that the O n o faction cannot win on its own. It would be a shame to drift apart in this way, vote individually, and then lose. Why don't we run Ishii and have everyone back him?" In the O n o camp were Hagiwara Yoshitaro, Nagata Masaichi, and others from the business world and, among the party politician types, Kawashima Shojiro, K o n o Ichiro, and o t h e r s . . . . These people talked it over and by dawn they had agreed to back me. . . . I then visited Matsumura and declared that we in the party politicians' factions should combine forces against Ikeda, with his bureaucratic background, whom Kishi and Sato were backing. He decided that if that was how the O n o faction felt, then he too would withdraw [from the race] and support me. Thus, by coincidence, it came to pass that those who were considered party politicians would unite against Ikeda and fight an election battle between the party politicians and the ex-bureaucrats. It appeared that Kawashima, too, was initally in favor of this. Tremendous momentum had built up, and it looked as though I would win if things continued as they were. (Ishii 1976:424-26) Murakami recalls: That evening, we conducted our final vote count at the Imperial Hotel with our allies Kono Ichiro and Kawashima Shojiro. A pact had been concluded with the Ishii faction so that in the runoff vote, the faction that came out behind promised to vote for whoever came out ahead in the first round of voting, whether it was O n o or Ishii. In that evening's reading of the vote, everyone agreed that O n o was certain to come out in first place with 170 votes while Ishii, in a conservative estimate, would get around 70 to 80 votes. Since several votes each were to come from the Ishibashi and Fujiyama factions during the runoff, it should have been

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feasible for O n o to control a majority in the r u n o f f as long as the Ishii faction did not crumble. W h e n I returned to the office in the New J a p a n , . . . I told O n o , "Everything is fine, so y o u can sleep without any w o r r y . . . . " I h a d him take a sleeping pill and walked him to his r o o m o n the fifth floor. I then called in Tokuyasu Jitsuzo and asked him to give o n e last push to a n u m b e r o f Fujiyama faction Councilors after sunrise tomorrow. I returned to my own r o o m o n the fourth f l o o r . . . and fell asleep. I was awakened after about an h o u r by the noisy ring o f the telephone at the edge o f my pillow. T h e call was from Mizuta Mikio. . . . " A p r o b l e m has c o m e up, which I must discuss with y o u immediately. I can't talk to y o u over the p h o n e , so could y o u c o m e here right away?" . . . I h e a d e d for the r o o m o n the seventh floor where Mizuta and A o k i were. I passed an officer of the Ishii faction as h e left Mizuta's room. O n c e I entered the room, Mizuta, with a very stern expression, spoke. " I k e d a has cut into the Ishii faction. T h e Lower House members o f the Fujiyama faction have also b e e n lost. Even if we do make it to the runoff, at best around 20 p e o p l e will shift their vote to O n o . This will hurt h i m . " " T h a t can't be. . . . Only a little while a g o I p u t O n o to sleep telling him that everything was fine, that he should rest and didn't have to worry. Does h e know about this?" "I think h e knows." T h e three o f us went to O n o ' s room. O n o was already awake and lying o n the sofa in a yukata. It was all so sudden that I felt like a pigeon that h a d just b e e n shot with a B B gun. Mizuta started out with a grave expression. "I don't think we have a chance...." O n o nonchalantly said, without any indication of surprise, "I think so too." (Murakami 1981:131-42) O n o ' s o w n m e m o i r s state as f o l l o w s : O n July 12, the day b e f o r e the presidential election, I went to b e d late with the refreshing feeling that the battle had been won. A n u m b e r o f my comrades were g o i n g to continue the fight through the night. It was quite late, after 2:00 A.M., when I was left alone in my b e d r o o m . I closed my eyes thinking that it was now u p to heaven to determine w h o won and w h o lost. Shortly afterward, I was awakened by my comrades Murakami Isamu, Mizuta Mikio, and A o k i Tadashi. A o k i reported that around 2:30 A.M., h e was called to the Imperial Hotel by Secretary General Kawashima, where h e saw N a d a o Hirokichi o f the Ishii faction. " T h e Ishii faction in the House o f Councilors has been eaten into by the Ikeda faction and has collapsed. If there is a runoff, only 20 to 25 votes will g o to O n o . This is not what was promised, and I realize I may be causing some trouble for y o u . . . . " A c c o r d i n g to Mizuta, the votes o f the Fujiyama faction had virtually all g o n e over to Ikeda as a result o f aggressive final maneuvering by Kishi.

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It was evident that even though I might come in first place in the first vote, I could not win in the runoff. Kawashima eventually followed the three of them into the room. The five of us decided if the "party politicians" were going to win, then there was no choice but for me to withdraw and give my support to I s h i i . . . . I was forced to swallow my tears and accept the contradictory logic that because I had at least twice as many votes and strong solidarity [in my faction], I should withdraw my candidacy and direct this majority of votes to the lowerranked c a n d i d a t e . . . . The balloting was postponed for a day as a consequence of my withdrawal. But this postponement, too, was not a good thing. Over the course of the day, the allied army of party politicians whose ranks had faltered were picked off, one after another. This battle ended in a defeat of the party politician factions, whose arrows were broken and their ammunition gone. (Ono 1962:152-55)

Before dawn on July 13, the reporter Watanabe entered Ono's dimly lit room. O n o was there by himself. Cigarette butts rolled messily out of the ashtray on the side table, indicating that a tremendous number of people had been entering and leaving until a just a little while before. "Why did you back down?" he asked. O n o replied, "Kawashima's the villain. I was completely fooled." He rumpled up his face, rubbed his eyes, and blew his nose. Nowhere in his distinctive eyebrows, his large eyes, and his reddish nose could one see the majesty and energy ofjust an evening earlier. "What if you were to leave the LDP and create a new party with the 'party politician factions'?" Watanabe queried. With a despairing expression, O n o replied, "I really would like to create a new party. I wouldn't even have to be the president. But it would take a billion yen to create a new party. There is no way that I could come up with that kind of money." As if he just remembered something, he picked up the receiver, dialed a number, and called his aging wife at his house. " T h e fight is over. I'm okay." It was a voice filled with yearning and kindness. After hanging up, his body sank deeply into the sofa, as if all of the strength had gone out of it. (Watanabe 1967:8-9) The Party Politician and the Ex-Bureaucrat Factions T h e party politicians rushed to consolidate: Matsumura's candidacy had to be ended. T h e rise of the party politician factions during the afternoon was awesome. O n e even heard whispers that Ikeda had already lost. Ohira recalls: A party convention was scheduled on July 13, i960, at Sankei Hall. Although the Ikeda faction attended, the Ishii faction did not, and the long-awaited party convention was canceled. I was called to a room in Sankei Hall by Ikeda and Sato and received the order to "meet with Miki Takeo right away and request that he align with us." Tsukada Juichiro, Nadao Hirokichi, Inaba

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Osamu, and some others were standing in front of Miki's room. "Kono, Miki, Matsumura, and others are now in this room with Ishii and O n o , holding an important conference. We absolutely cannot let you meet Miki," they said and refused to let me enter. T h e atmosphere in the area was such that it was as if an Ishii cabinet had already been established. Congratulatory remarks were being exchanged! (Ohira 1978:100-101) If the party politician factions, claiming victory, had stormed into the auditorium at this point and conducted the vote, Ishii might have been elected. But because Fujiwara Yoshie was to give a recital in Sankei Hall that evening, the convention was postponed until the following day and its site shifted to the Hibiya Auditorium. During that one evening, Kishi, Sato, and others solidified the support for Ikeda. Partly in response to demands from the zaikai, which was weary of Kono, Kishi—who had until then left everything to Sato—now rose furiously to action and rallied his band. (Miyazaki 1970: 251-52) Kishi notes, "At the last minute, I pulled back everyone in my faction who had gone over to Fujiyama and O n o instead of Ikeda and told them to back Ikeda. Because of this, both Fujiyama and O n o came to resent me strongly." (Kishi, Tatsugi, and ltd 1981:245) "At the very last minute" refers to the midnight hours of July 13. Fuke Shun'ichi, who had been dispatched to the Fujiyama faction by Kishi, relates: O n the day before the presidential election (July 13), those in the Kishi faction who were moving to back Fujiyama were one by one called into the office in the Prime Minister's Residence. I was called in last and told, "It's for the sake of the country. Vote for Ikeda." I said, "Just a moment. You were the one who mediated between Fujiyama and me. Your sincerity will be called into question if you do that." But Kishi's feelings were firm. "This is not a personal matter. I am acting out of concern for the country. If you do not do what I say, I will drop you in the next election." (Fujiyama 1976:12) Fujiyama ran in spite of Kishi's efforts to stop him. He recalls: Even on that very morning [July 14] Kishi was pressuring me to withdraw my candidacy.... When I returned to my office o n the ninth floor of the New Japan, Ozawa Saeki, Endo Saburo, Esaki Masumi, and Ino Hiroya, along with Miura Kazuo, Shiikuma Saburo, Fuke Shun'ichi, Sugihara Arata, and o t h e r s — a total of about thirty p e o p l e — w e r e gathered there. T h e people who had come to me from the Kishi faction had been directed by Kishi the previous day to support Ikeda. They were quite agitated and were in the midst of discussing the matter. W h e n I entered, Ozawa said, " U n d e r these conditions, we may only be able to attract 14 or 15 votes." Since Ozawa had initially said that "perhaps if all goes well we can get something like 120 votes," he was quite shocked and took the matter most seriously. To this, I said, "I cannot very well step down at this

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stage. I am going to run. If there are those among you who think that it would be better to quit, feel free to vote as you please." With that, voices rose: "Everyone, let us go with Fujiyama!" I think that perhaps Fuke led the cheer. . . . Everyone regained their vigor. We split up into separate cars and headed for Hibiya. We arrived at the site quite a bit later than scheduled. Esaki walked among the delegates shouting, "Fujiyama has not stepped down! He has not stepped down!" (Fujiyama 1976:123-25)

Kawashima, who paved the way for Ono's abandonment of his candidacy and support for Ishii, pulled his troops out at the last minute and voted for Ikeda. When the reporter Watanabe asked later about his reasons, Kawashima responded, "Although I made a promise to support Ono, once O n o withdrew his candidacy I was not obligated to support Ishii. To top it off, on the morning of the convention [July 13], Miki Takeo, Matsumura Kenzo, and others around Ishii joined with Kono and began drumming up their own selfish enthusiasm. That is why I pulled the troops." (Watanabe 1967:20) T h e result of the party presidential election was 246 votes for Ikeda, 196 votes for Ishii, and 49 votes for Fujiyama in the first round. In the runoff, it was 302 votes for Ikeda and 194 votes for Ishii.

T H E IKEDA C A B I N E T A N D I N C O M E D O U B L I N G

The Ikeda Cabinet Caving in to demands from the Kishi and Sato factions, Ikeda excluded the Kono, Miki/Matsumura, and Ishibashi factions from his cabinet. The membership, excluding the prime minister and the Councilors, consisted of four people from the Ikeda faction; two each from the Kishi, Sato, and O n o factions; one each from the Ishii and Fujiyama factions; and one neutral. Ohira was made chief cabinet secretary and Ito Masaya, chief aide. For the party offices, Ikeda selected Masutani of the Ikeda faction to be secretary general, Hori of the Sato faction to be Executive Council chairman, and Shiina Etsuzaburo of the Kishi faction to be PARC chairman. T h e cabinet was formally established on July 19. Sentiment favoring the formation of a new political party ran strong in the Kono faction, which opened a policy seminar in Karuizawa on August 8. But the move was called off on August 22 when it was learned that few people in the other factions would be willing to go along with it. Ono, too, urged Kono not to leave. Meanwhile, the Kishi and Sato factions formed a group on July 1 to demand that Kono, Miki, and others who were absent from the May 19 forced vote be placed before the party disciplinary committee. O n August 17, however, the party disciplinary committee made the decision not to pursue the matter. T h e Ikeda cabinet scheduled a general election for four months later in

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order to distance itself as much as possible from the nightmare of the security treaty crisis. In a major overhaul of the party's posture, it made "Forbearance and Patience" its motto and redirected its policy emphasis from political affairs to the economy. On September 3 the cabinet decided to "endeavor to sustain an average economic growth rate of 9 percent over the next three years in order to double the national income within ten years." On August 5 the LDP, supported by the zaikai, included an identical policy in its "new policies." The LDP had thus come out in full support of Ikeda's designs in an effort to recover its popularity. Believing that the quickest way to recover international confidence would be to have the LDP achieve an overwhelming victory, the zaikai1s Economic Reconstruction Council made an unprecedented contribution of ¥800 million to the party. According to Ito, the idea for the income doubling plan came to Ikeda one day as he sat talking and drinking whiskey with a group of newspaper reporters during his stint as state minister in the Kishi cabinet. The idea was first made public in February 1959 when Ikeda returned to his electoral district in Hiroshima and spoke of a "salary doubling plan" to the reporters who had followed him from Tokyo. (Ito 1966:62) About a year earlier, in fall 1958, Ikeda had resigned his post as state minister over the handling of the Police Duties Law revision, thereby openly going over to the anti-mainstream. The salary doubling plan was undoubtedly meant to challenge the Kishi cabinet. Ikeda became the minister of international trade and industry in the cabinet reshuffling that J u n e and used the doubling plan in his speeches throughout the campaign leading up to the J u n e House of Councilors election. Kishi learned that the idea was popular, and he abruptly announced, at the suggestion of Agricultural Minister Fukuda Takeo, an "income doubling ten-year plan," which then became one of the three key policies of his cabinet. Both Kishi and Finance Minister Sato mentioned during the Diet session that fall that they wanted to start implementing the plan in the fiscal i960 budget. As a result, the LDP PARC's economic investigation committee conscripted Economic Planning Agency staff members to draft specific legislation. The EPA opposed the effort on grounds that the "New Economic Plan" for 1958-62 had not yet run its course and the task of drafting the new plan should be undertaken after it completed a twenty-year long-term forecast that it was in the midst of preparing. But faced with insistence that the matter had to be taken up immediately because it was a part of the party platform, the EPA cooperated. The LDP's economic investigation committee released an "Outline Proposal for Doubling National Income" on October 16. But at the economic ministers' meeting on October 21, the EPA's proposal was ferociously attacked by MITI Minister Ikeda and Finance Minister Sato, who claimed that statistically the plan was extremely sloppy. With that, the plan died. Ikeda revived the idea and made it his showcase policy. By i960 income

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doubling was no longer a mere dream. The "Bottom-of-the-Pan Recession" (1957-58) that followed the "Jinmu Boom" (1954-57) turned out to be surprisingly short. The tight money policy was loosened. Capital and inventory investment, which had temporarily held back between the end of 1958 and early 1959, recovered. Plants that had earlier been considered surplus were running at full capacity. The "Iwato Boom," which began in 1958, lasted more than two years. Its driving force was the heavy and chemical industries. In the process, attitudes toward economic growth began to change. Before the Jinmu Boom, it was believed that rapid growth was a one-time, temporary phenomenon and that eventually slower economic growth of the sort that characterized the prewar years and other countries overseas would return. By contrast, during the Iwato Boom, the view took hold that continued long-term, rapid economic growth was the norm. Ikeda spoke about his ambitions at a press conference on September 7. O n the next day he made the opening speech in a national speaking tour. Ito recalls: The first speech of the national campaign tour was given at the Kyoritsu Auditorium in Kanda on September 8. Tamura Toshio and I prepared a draft, printed it, and then passed out copies to the press corps. But Ikeda ignored the draft and gave an impassioned speech brimming with confidence. A foreign correspondent sent a wire home about the "9 percent man." The tour covered nine cities, including Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. We learned during the tour that the wounds of the security treaty crisis still festered here and there. In Sapporo, we were met by students with red flags. Nonetheless, things went well. In Sendai, a place where the progressives were so strong that they say Yoshida was booed off the stage there, there seemed to be nothing on which to hang a counterargument since [Ikeda] kept talking about concrete economic issues. In Hiroshima, workers from the Zennichi Jichiro Union were waiting for us at the station with red flags and forced Ikeda to meet with them. At Onomichi and Takamatsu, as well, the Jichiro crowded around the pier. (Ito 1966:91)

The JSP charged that the income doubling plan would widen the gap in income between large corporations, on the one hand, and farming villages and small and medium-sized enterprises, on the other, and that the dual structure should be corrected before encouraging economic growth. Nevertheless, the fact that the primary controversy now lay in economic issues demonstrated the success of Ikeda's election strategy of directing the attention of the voters away from the security treaty and toward the economy. The November 20 general election resulted in an overwhelming victory for the LDP. With 296 seats, it captured 13 more seats than it had at the time of dissolution. With the addition of independents who joined the party after

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the election, the total reached 300. The DSP's share dropped dramatically, from 40 seats to 17, while the JSP increased its seats by 23, to 145. On November 24 Ikeda visited Yoshida in Oiso to report the results of the election on his way to a retreat in Hakone. He stopped at Óiso again three days later, on his way back to Tokyo. Some time after leaving Yoshida's house, Ikeda mentioned to Itó, who was with him, "Masutani and Sato were there. Sato kept asking me to pass the next government on to him." "And how did you respond?" "I said that I would give it to him." When Itó said nothing, Ikeda laughed and said, "Who knows when I am going to quit. He doesn't. I didn't draw up a contract." (Itó 1966:113-14) Ikeda formed his second cabinet after being selected prime minister again in December. Although the number of replacements remained low, members of the Kóno and Miki-Matsumura factions that had been critical of the security treaty did enter. As a result, all factions except Ishii's were represented. Both the Kishi and the Sato factions were very unhappy with this "please everyone" style of management. The National Comprehensive Development Plan

Like Prime Minister Kishi's "income doubling ten-year plan" of a year earlier, the income doubling plan was a politically inspired idea with an uncertain technical footing. The EPA had, as it had the preceding year, calculated the growth rate to be 7.2 percent and the November 1 report of the Economic Council used this estimate. But out of political considerations, the report of the Economic Council and the LDP's "Outline Proposal for Doubling National Income," predicting a growth rate of 9 percent, were approved together at the month's last cabinet meeting on December 24. The plan of the Economic Council involved the development of a Pacific Belt region linking the country's four major industrial centers. The country would be divided into four types of regions: (1) established industrial regions (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, Hyogo, and Fukuoka), (2) the Pacific Belt region, (3) development regions (Hokkaido, Miyagi, and Toyama), and (4) others. In the name of economic rationality, administrative investment was to concentrate on improving the industrial infrastructure of specific regions in order to induce an appropriate geographic distribution of industry. Naturally enough, the underdeveloped and agricultural regions objected that measures to deal with the tensions created by rapid growth were being ignored. For instance, a call made by Ikeda at press conference on September 7 for a 60 percent reduction of the agricultural population led in early December to the formation of an "Agricultural Policy Comrades Society" by LDP Diet members with electoral districts in rural areas, who agreed to try to correct the income gap between urban and rural areas.

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Because of objections of this sort, the PARC economic investigation committee prepared its "Outline Proposal," which was then approved as party policy by the Executive Council. T h e proposal raised the following items to be addressed during the implementation of the income doubling plan or to serve as policies in their own right: (1) the modernization of agriculture, (2) the modernization of small and medium-sized enterprises, (3) the promotion of industrial development in particularly backward regions (Tohoku, Hokuriku, Hokkaido, southern Kyushu, the San'in, and Shikoku), (4) the promotion of the appropriate location of industry and a flexible approach to the regional distribution of public investment, and (5) positive cooperation in the development of the world economy. T h e "National Comprehensive Development Plan" released by the Economic Planning Agency in July 1961 therefore emphasized "the correction of disparities among regions" rather than the development of the Pacific Belt region and had as its goal "the preparation of an industrial location system appropriate from a national economy perspective." It would divide the country into eleven economic spheres based on their regional integration—rather than on their level of economic development or investment efficiency—and use a "nodal development" strategy. T h e oudine was acknowledged in a cabinet meeting on July 18. The drafting of a formal plan followed, which received formal cabinet approval that autumn. According to the resulting plan, the country would be divided into three categories: (1) overpopulated regions (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, Aichi, Osaka, Hyogo, and Fukuoka); (2) rationalization regions (Kanto, Tokai, Kinki, and Hokuriku), and (3) development regions (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu). The Law to Promote the Construction of New Industrial Cities The National Comprehensive Development Plan was merely an outline of principles and ideas. It was given concrete expression for the first time in the Law to Promote the Construction of New Industrial Cities, promulgated in May of 1962, and in the designation of specific areas as "new industrial cities" that followed. T h e following points concerning the process leading up to the designations are pertinent. First, there was competition among the central ministries and agencies. They each rushed to prepare development plans and development oudines from the time the plan was released. For instance, the Ministry of Local Autonomy announced its "Plan for the Regional Development of Core Cities" during the summer of i960. This was followed by a draft "Law to Promote the Construction of Regional Development Core Cities." T h e Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry released its "New Agricultural Policy" based on the Basic Agricultural Law (established in 1961). MITI announced its

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"Plan for the Appropriate Location of Industry" in November i960, the Construction Ministry its "Plan for Wide Area City Construction" in October i960, and the Ministry of Transportation its "Plan to Promote the Development of Industrial Harbors." Second, each agency had its favorite candidate regions and aligned itself closely with regional interests. For example, within Fukushima Prefecture, the Joban District supported by MITI clashed with the Koriyama District backed by the Ministry of Local Autonomy. In Miyagi, the Sendai city government's "Plan for the Future of the Greater Sendai Regional Nodal City" (September 1961) was influenced by the Ministry of Local Autonomy's "Plan for the Regional Development of Core Cities," while the prefectural government's "Outline Plan for the Establishment of the Greater Sendai Sphere" (April 1961) was a coastal industrial belt scheme modeled after MITI's "Plan for the Appropriate Location of Industry." The Ministry of Construction saw great potential in the Kashima District of Ibaragi in particular. The Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Local Autonomy joindy announced their respective candidate sites during the summer of 1961. The total number for the former was 54 and for the latter, 49. Third, the LDP PARC acted as mediator. Seeing a chaotic situation unfold as the various ministries and various areas competed, the LDP established a special committee on local industry in PARC and tried from the autumn of 1961 to consolidate the opinions of the key ministries involved— namely, Local Autonomy, Construction, MITI, Transportation, the Economic Planning Agency, and the Ministry of Finance. By September the LDP somehow managed to complete an outline proposal, gain the approval of a vice ministers' conference, and present it to a cabinet meeting in preparation for submission of the draft bill to the thirty-ninth extraordinary Diet session. By this time, a compromise had been reached among the clashing ministries and agencies to place the law under the joint four-ministry jurisdiction of Construction, Local Autonomy, International Trade and Industry, and Transportation, with a coordinating role for the EPA. Fourth, the bill came under attack during the cabinet meeting to review it and failed to receive cabinet approval because the ministries and agencies became entangled in factional conflicts. For example, Agricultural Minister Kono argued that the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry should be involved because, in the process of constructing the new industrial cities, MITI might intervene in the transfer of farm land and the distribution of industrial and agricultural water, as well as infringe on the Agricultural Ministry's supervisory jurisdiction over food and fertilizer processing plants. Kono may have reacted this way because the new bill appeared to reflect MITI's arguments strongly and the MITI minister happened to be Sato. The Labor, Welfare, and Posts and Telecommunications ministers followed Kono and stressed the relevance of their ministries to the proposal. The

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cabinet was ultimately unable to grant its approval, and Diet submission was postponed. After several amendments and supplementary resolutions, the fortieth Diet finally passed the bill. The EPA was made coordinator and a six-agency joint jurisdiction was established for Construction, Local Autonomy, MITI, Transportation, Agriculture and Forestry, and Labor. Fifth, the Ministry of Labor became involved because the JSP demanded an amendment to that effect. JSP Diet members had to concern themselves with the situation in their respective districts, and in the case of a law of this sort they could not very well go beyond demanding an amendment. It was the ruling party and the ministries and agencies that were overwhelming the scene. Sixth, a tremendous "lobby fight" followed the law's passage. The EPA began preparations to designate areas as development sites as soon as the law was passed. The criteria were set at a meeting of the Regional Industrial Development Council on December 18. Applications were accepted from early 1963, and on-site surveys were conducted in response to the applications. In the end, applications were received from forty-four regions in thirty-nine prefectures. The "world's greatest lobbying battle" unfolded during the six months or so leading up to the unofficial announcement of the designations on July 12. Under the original agenda, about ten sites were to be selected. Given the criteria for designation, the selection of Hokkaido's D60 region, the coast along Sendai Bay in Tohoku, Hokuriku's Toyama-Takaoka, Chugoku's southern Okayama Prefecture, and Kyushu's Oita should have been assured, and there seemed to be litde objective reason for such a batde among so many candidate sites. But other considerations began to be applied because of pressure from ministries, agencies, and party influentials. A historically unprecedented upheaval resulted. To cite just a few developments, in August 1962 Kono, now minister of construction, announced that the designation of the New Industrial Cities should give highest priority to international competitiveness. Unwarranted dispersal for the sake of righting regional disparities should therefore be avoided. The Japan Sea coast should be eliminated in favor of a concentration in the areas bordering the Inland Sea. When a powerful individual is transferred from minister of agriculture to minister of construction, the direction of the pressure that he applies also changes completely. This exacerbated the uproar. If priority were to be given to the effectiveness of investment and the number of designations pared down to four or five sites, then aside perhaps from southern Okayama and Oita, none of the candidate sites could remain idle. Conversely, if the emphasis were to be on underdeveloped regions, then it could be argued that southern Okayama should be removed from the list because of its "ripeness for development." And if one were to take the prospect of growth in trade with the Asian mainland into

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consideration, then Oita should make way for Ariake. O n top of all this, if a region had not engaged in lobbying that its selection was assured, it would be frightened by the argument that it was lacking in enthusiasm, precipitating a rush to Tokyo. Since every spot appeared sufficiently uncertain yet still sufficiently reasonable, the petition battle heated up further. As the uproar grew, the political wheeling and dealing grew intense. Things reached a climax when the leading factional figures jumped in and backed their home districts. Sato, who supported the Shunan area in Yamaguchi, and Ono, who was advocating Gifu-Ogaki, were archrivals even before these developments. EPA director Miyazawa Kiichi insisted that Shikoku should be limited to one location. The battle between Tokushima, which was recommended by Miki, and Toyo (eastern Ehime), backed by Minister of Construction Kono, reached a fever pitch. Miki eventually answered a request of a Miki faction Representative from the Toyo area and demanded that Shikoku be given two locations. Kono supported this demand, and both sites were included. Kyushu then had to be given three spots for the sake of balance, and Ariake was added. This suddenly opened up the possibility of the Tohoku's Hachinoe being selected. The inland Matsumoto-Suwa District in Nagano was able to make an inadvertent gain when it was selected in order to avoid excessive favoritism toward coastal areas. The principle of holding down the number of designations evaporated in the process, and the LDP began madly pushing for an increase in the number of designations to around twenty. In the end, six "industrial improvement special districts" were to be designated in addition to thirteen new industrial cities, with the possibility of adding one or two more sites in the future. The pattern that characterized this policy-making process differed dramatically from the one seen in the conflict over the security treaty. All of the LDP factions, whether mainstream or anti-mainstream, scrambled on behalf of their home districts. JSP Diet members found such proceedings extremely appetizing but as members of an opposition party, it was difficult for them to capture any prizes. The extraparliamentary pressures that came into play were, first, in the jurisdictional contests among the central ministries and agencies and, second, in the lobbying activities of the development regions and pressure groups. There were no demonstrations or strikes. Instead, delegations of local government heads and local assemblymen gathered around the Diet building. A lobbying network that spanned the conservative party factions, the central ministries and agencies, pressure groups, and electoral districts had already begun to form during the late Occupation period. But it lumbered into impeccable action in conjunction with the regional development policies of the Ikeda cabinet. Not only did this advanced industrialization "inducement mechanism" promote the

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emergence of "mass society," it also turned all ofJapan into a sea of sludge. It created Tanaka Kakuei's politics and severe environmental pollution. (See Fukutake 1965; Satô 1965; and Masumi 1969:400-414)

PARTY MODERNIZATION AND MIKI'S INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE The Council to Revitalize Party Style Ikeda visited the United States in late June 1961 and held talks with President John F. Kennedy. T h e j o i n t communiqué ofJune 22 included a call for free trade and an end to nuclear testing. In the personnel reshuffling that followed Ikeda's return h o m e in July, Ô n o became vice premier and K ô n o minister of agriculture. That is, Ikeda m e n d e d his relations with the party politician factions with w h o m he had battled the previous summer as a counterweight against Kishi and MITI minister Satô. Chief Cabinet Secretary Ôhira and his aide Itô arranged the rapprochement. Kishi and Satô, who were hoping that Ikeda would soon resign, were displeased. K ô n o demonstrated his political prowess by reshuffling the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and appeared to be surpassing Satô in influence. Ô n o came out openly against Kishi and Satô, prompting them to maneuver against Ikeda. They used issues like Japan-South Korean relations and the law to control political violence to attack the Ikeda cabinet. T h e movement to dissolve the factions that appeared in early 1962 was also an anti-Ikeda maneuver. T h e Council to Revitalize Party Style (Tôfù Sasshin Kondankai) was established on January 30, 1962, with Party Organization Investigation Committee chief Kuraishi Tadao at its head and with a caretaker committee composed of twenty-four Diet members. Its statement of intent claimed that recently the LDP " h a d begun to engage exclusively in factional infighting and was in danger of turning its back on the expectations of the nation." It pointed out a need to break up the factions and modernize the party. A n inaugural general meeting was held on May 7 at the Prince Hotel. Sixty-five members from both houses attended. T h e resolution adopted there stated: " (1) For the sake of modernizing and unifying our party, we will abolish the factional system that prevents this and establish a powerful leadership based on intraparty democracy. (2) We will remove all favoritism and factional constraints during party presidential elections and fully carry out the fundamental principle of independent balloting based on the individual choice of the party members. (3) We will reform the present electoral institution, which causes party members to cannibalize one another and intensifies factional rivalries, and replace it with electoral institutions more conducive to political parties." (Asahi shinbun, May 7, 1962, evening ed.) In

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addition, the council released a document on May 27 entitled "The Formation Process and the Theory and Practice of Reform" and planned to distribute approximately 100,000 copies. Virtually identical in content to the resolution cited earlier, it listed as its guiding principles the promotion of a new party style, the dissolution of the faction system, the creation of a leadership system within the party, the establishment of intraparty democracy, and the protection of national unity and democratic politics. {Asahi janaru, July 29,1962) There was a strong air of dissatisfaction with the Ikeda administration in the council as well as a great number of faces associated with the Sato faction and with the Fukuda group within the Kishi faction. As the July presidential election approached, there were indications of a shift from criticism of Ikeda to support for Sato. Precisely for this reason in April the Ikeda, Ono, and Kono factions prohibited their Diet members from joining the council; within the Kishi faction, people associated with Kawashima, who was close to the Ono and Kono factions, were critical of it. The Fujiyama faction, which was preparing to launch a Fujiyama candidacy, was in the delicate position of not being opposed to the council's criticism of Ikeda but still hesitating to support it actively because of its strong Sato tinge. The council recruited its members mainly from the Miki faction, the Ishii faction, and the "Soshinkai" (a group of "hawks" formed in late 1961). By late April, its membership had reached a total of seventy-four members from both houses, and in August, seventy-eight. On July 5 and 6, Fukuda and Kuraishi, representing the council, made the rounds of the faction heads and argued the need for a dissolution of the factions and a small district electoral system. Although Kishi and Sato indicated approval, Ikeda, Ono, and Kono were noncommittal. There were 75 votes against Ikeda even though he ran unopposed and was elected in the July 14 presidential election. These votes were believed to have come from the council. Ikeda's Reelection The Sato faction was perturbed when Ikeda placed political rival Kono in prominent posts. Militants began to argue in 1961 that Sato should run. It must have been that summer that PARC chairman Tanaka Kakuei, a Sato faction executive, spoke as follows to Sankei shinbun reporter Kusuda Minoru: There are moves inside our faction, the Sato faction, to get Sato to run against Ikeda in next year's presidential race, but I think that this is wrong. Ikeda will probably not be satisfied unless he serves another term. It would not be good for the party, nor would it be good for Sato to be unreasonable and pit himself

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LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980 against Ikeda now. I am willing to stake my life on a Sato government after Ikeda's reelection, but now is not the time. If you have the chance, could you tell Sato that this is what Tanaka thinks?

When Kusuda passed this opinion on, Sato said simply, " A s a matter of fact, I think so too." At a press conference at the Nara Hotel in December, Sato made it clear that he would not run. Ikeda announced his intention to run the following January. (Kusuda 1 9 7 2 : 2 0 - 2 4 ) But this was not enough to quell the demands in the Sato faction. Sato himself seemed to vacillate. Following a July 6 cabinet meeting, he spoke with Ikeda and mentioned that " m y faction says it wants me to run, it wants you to drop Kono, and it wants you to do what is right in foreign policy." About an hour later, Tanaka said that Sato wanted to meet with Ikeda once again. Following the talks between Ikeda and Sato, Ikeda told Ito that "Sato's not going to run." Later, Ito was told that Tanaka had argued with H o n , who was the vanguard of the sentiment favoring a contest, before Sato's very eyes and had even seized Sato by the collar in his effort to convince him not to run. (Ito 1 9 6 6 : 1 4 4 - 4 7 ) Fujiyama intended to run in this presidential election. He had resigned from the post of EPA director on July 1, the evening of the House of Councilors election. In his memoirs, he recalls: My thinking was different from Ikeda's on economic policy and, since I had just resigned from the EPA directorship, I thought that it might be good to engage in a batde. Not everyone in the Fujiyama faction was in favor of my running. Nanjo, who was close to Kishi and already unfavorably inclined toward Ikeda, was of the opinion that I should run. On the other hand, Ozawa, Esaki, and others were of the opinion that the matter should be approached "with discretion." Ono, who was vice premier at the time, was very concerned and telephoned to say that I should give up my candidacy. Nonetheless, I vacillated. Then on July 7, with the party convention only a week away, Ono said that he would visit me at my house at 10:00 A.M. I waited, planning to say, " I would like to do batde, so please let me." Around 9:00 that morning, my friend Mitarai Tatsuo came by and said, "Definitely do not run this time. Prepare for the future." I refused to take up the matter and simply said, " I see." Mitarai added as follows as he left: "You are stubborn and you may not listen to me. But if you do decide not to run, then save Ono's face by making it look as though he convinced you." . . . Ono arrived shordy after 10:00. He said, "In the future, I will cooperate fully when you run. I am thinking that I would like to make you party president at some point." So, he meant, I should not run this time. Since I thought that it wouldn't look right if I said yes right away, I responded, "Let me think about this awhile. I will visit you later." When I visited [Ono's office] late in the afternoon, it was full of people from the Ono faction, and I believe Ono was playing mahjong or something.

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W h e n I said, "I will withdraw my candidacy in accord with your recommendation," Ó n o kindly said, " G o o d . I will support you next time." (Fujiyama

1976 :i37-38) Ikeda was reelected without contest at the July 14 party convention. The "power wielders' cabinet" that included the various influential factions was dissolved in the personnel reshuffling that followed. Although Kóno remained as minister of construction and Kawashima as Administrative Management Agency director, Sato, Fujiyama, and Miki did not enter the cabinet. The clash between Ikeda, Óno, and Kóno, on the one hand, and Kishi and Sato, on the other, became apparent. In addition, Chief Cabinet Secretary Óhira and PARC chairman Tanaka, who together drafted the reshuffled roster, were made foreign minister and finance minister, respectively. The Miki Committee to Investigate the Party Organization O n July 27 Ikeda directed Secretary General Maeo Shigesaburó and other party executives to "study formally the elimination of factional abuses from a partywide perspective rather than as a movement of part of the party, as the Council to Revitalize Party Style did." They decided to establish an official party committee to investigate the party's organization. What Ikeda and others were really trying to do was prevent the council from monopolizing the cause of factional dissolution and using it to criticize Ikeda and support a Sato candidacy. Miki eventually accepted the chairmanship on September 29. The Council to Revitalize Party Style, with the new name of "Party Style Revitalization Federation," held a general meeting at the Prince Hotel on May 23, 1963, attended by 82 Diet members. Those enrolled in the federation were said to number 140. It adopted a three-item resolution: (1) A demand will be presented to the prime minister for the immediate dissolution of the factions. (2) Since instances of joint campaigning with the progressive camp, as in the Kanagawa gubernatorial election and other cases, goes against the spirit of the party's creation, thorough disciplinary measures will be sought. (3) A recommendation will be made that appropriate measures be taken in situations like the Fake Credentials scandal during the Tokyo gubernatorial election, which lead to a loss of the party's credibility. The second item was directed at Minister of Construction Kóno, who had conducted a joint campaign with the JSP in Kanagawa. The third was directed at Vice Premier Ó n o and Executive Council chairman Akagi Munenori, who had run the party's campaign headquarters during the Tokyo gubernatorial election. In addition, in late June the federation demanded the dissolution of the factions in conjunction with the personnel reshuffling scheduled for July. Sató criticized Ikeda at a June 22 press conference in Osaka for the Fake Credentials scandal and his low interest rate policy. Óno,

•j6 LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980

representing the party politician factions, immediately countered, saying, " K e e p out the anti-Ikeda Sato. We are in favor of a third term for Ikeda [next year]." Seeing factional maneuvering intensifying as the July personnel reshuffling neared, Miki's investigation committee submitted a report on July 8 concerned solely with items relating to personnel practices. This was accepted on the understanding that "it would not be considered party policy." T h e report noted, " O n e cannot ignore the fact that factional infighting within our party is weakening the leadership capacity of the party president and disrupting solidarity and discipline. T h e factional system of the sort that we see today must be dissolved at all costs, and we must return to our proper form as a public party." It then raised the following points: In filling the posts of cabinet ministers and leading party officers, it will be necessary for the president to refrain from bowing to considerations of factional and personal ties and select the best person to realize the party's interests and the policy measures he will be pursuing. We firmly believe that this is the first step in party modernization. T h e functions of the Executive Council should be strengthened so that it can become the supreme party organ both in name and in fact. A l t h o u g h council members might continue to be selected to represent a region, the existing practice of rotating seats among regions must be abolished. T h e council must be made a place where capable party members become council members; it must befit the task of determining party policy. . . . In order to improve the reputation of the Diet, it will be necessary to exercise even greater care than in the past in selecting the chairmen of the standing committees and to improve the functioning and efficiency of these committees. Faction-based personnel management must be abolished. T h e personality, outlook, and background of the individual must be respected in order to d o this. It will be necessary to stop the existing practice of allocating parliamentary vice ministerships among the factions and to utilize human resources suited to assisting the minister in these posts by respecting the opinion of the ministers. (LDP, Soshiki chosakai hdkoku, O c t o b e r 17, 1963, pp. 25-29)

Prime Minister Ikeda reshuffled personnel in the name of upholding these principles.In practice, however, the various factions decided their cabinet minister candidates independently; these were then communicated to the party executive via j u n i o r influentials known as daikashi. T h e reshuffling then concluded with barely a ripple when the party executive agreed to these candidates more or less as requested. T h e allocation among the factions remained virtually unchanged. Sato entered the cabinet as concurrent director of the Science and Technology Agency and the Hokkaido Development Agency through the mediation of Yoshida. According to Itó, Ikeda told him after a visit to Óiso on July 9 that "Yoshida has finally blurted out what he is really thinking." Itó

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surmised that Yoshida had said he wanted Ikeda to let Sato be next. T h e newspapers began to make a great fuss over the matter the day after Ikeda returned to Tokyo. What would he d o about Sato? O n o and K o n o were strongly opposed. At Ikeda's urging, O n o met with Yoshida on July 13. Yoshida apparently said, "From what I can see as I watch the LDP from the outside, it's a case of troubles both inside and out. As vice premier, you should act as a facilitator." What he meant was, " L o o k after Sato the way you are looking after Ikeda." In an interview with the press just before leaving, O n o said, "I do not intend to meet Sato. I cannot understand why [Yoshida] called me to Oiso." (Ito 1966:192) In any event, Sato entered the cabinet. T h e morale of the Party Style Revitalization Federation was undoubtedly dampened by the loss of its star member. At a press conference on July 20, Fukuda stated that its members were unhappy because the dissolution of the factions was ignored completely during the July reshuffling and that the federation would be expanded. T h e Miki investigation committee's report was submitted to Prime Minister Ikeda on October 17. Its content was basically identical to the July 8 interim report. O n October 23, the last day of the Diet session, Vice Premier O n o called the faction leaders into the party president's office in the Diet building, where the following decision was adopted: " T h e purport of the Miki report will be acknowledged in principle. But there are other issues to deal with, and we need to study it when we can. N o deadline will be set for the dissolution of the factions, which will be conducted in accord with the situation in the respective individual factions." During the discussion, K o n o retorted that "if the factions disappear, cronyism will run rampant in the party and elections will not go well." Sato argued with Miki, claiming, "It is impossible to dissolve the factions before the general election. Let's do it afterward." That evening, as Ikeda drank with his vassals at his house in Shinanomachi, he grumbled, " T h e Miki report can go to hell. It is a pointless exercise." A ratded Chief Cabinet Secretary Kurogane Yasumi pleaded to the reporters present to keep the comment off the record. O n October 24 the Executive Council decided to "acknowledge" the Miki report "in principle." At the same time, it wrote the following as one of the fifteen items in the party's general election policy: "We will resolutely implement the modernization of the party, dissolve the factions, and promote progressive policies." T h e same day, the zaikai decided to limit People's Association contributions to the election to ¥1 billion. A Factional Election: Kono and Sato T h e Lower House was dissolved and a general election was called on the rationale that it had been three years since the last election. As a conse-

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LDP RULE, 1955-1980

quence, the election lacked excitement and clear-cut issues. Nevertheless, it was unprecedentedly factional. The LDP provided roughly ¥3 million to each of its endorsed candidates, but the various factions still collected anywhere between several hundred million and one billion yen. Factions also ran their own unendorsed candidates, resulting in losses by party-endorsed candidates of rival factions. The party won 283 seats—294 seats if the Representatives who joined the party after the election are included. This was below what it won in the last election but a stable majority nonetheless. The size of the Kono faction increased dramatically, while the Sato faction shrank drastically. During the election, Minister of Construction Kono argued in various spots around the country that factions were needed. The Sato faction and the Party Style Revitalization Federation regrouped again as the "Headquarters to Promote the Transformation of People's Minds and Party Modernization." It launched an attack on Kono. It held a general meeting at the Prince Hotel on December 3, where a total of 117 Diet members attended—75 from the House of Representatives and 42 from the House of Councilors. On the following day, the group had increased to 129. At an expanded caretakers' meeting on the morning of December 9, the day of the vote to designate the prime minister, a statement of demands was approved: "Kono alone rejects the dissolution of the factions. He boasts that factions are a necessity. He abuses his powers as minister of construction and works shamelessly to strengthen his own faction. . . . We believe that, on the occasion of establishing a new cabinet, Kono's removal will be the first step toward transforming people's minds and meeting the demands of the people. We hereby gather together like-minded comrades and, with these signatures, demand a resolute decision from Prime Minister Ikeda." A delegation visited Ikeda that afternoon. Ikeda, who had promised to consider seriously "the transformation of people's minds" was afraid that the anti-Kono movement might lead to an anti-Ikeda one. He explained to Kono the folly of opposing the great cause of dissolving the factions. Ono, noting that "even in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, an allowance is made for underground testing," also approached Kono once he learned of the deteriorating situation. Kono then decided to champion quick dissolution. He called Ono, Kawashima, and Fujiyama on December 12. On December 13, the four heads of the party politician factions declared that they would dissolve their respective factions. The move, taken after they discovered that Sato intended to continue his Shuzankai, was meant to counter his sleight-of-hand. But Sato received an early warning that Kono had decided to dissolve and so, on the morning of December 13, he dissolved the Shuzankai. Under the circumstances, the Ikeda and Miki factions could not dally any longer. The Miki faction approved its dissolution on December 13, and the Ikeda faction's Kochikai

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took up dissolution procedures on December 14. As the various factions manipulated the ostensibly noble objective of factional dissolution for their own narrow tactical purposes, they were themselves swallowed up by the cause. Nevertheless, in all instances, the "dissolutions" amounted to little more than camouflage. (Sekai, February 1,1964) All of the major factions had dissolved by early January 1964. T h e thirteenth party convention on January 16 and 17, therefore, should have been a celebration of the dissolution of the factions, but the program adopted there was lukewarm. "From the start, the various factions saw factional dissolution as merely a matter of 'replacing the sign' and 'switching from a Western suit to Japanese clothes,' and they continue to exist even now in a de facto sense. Since they cannot make any 'deals' with other factions overtly, management of the Diet by Mr. Maeo and others has become all the more complex. Maneuvering within the party by the party executive is conducted very informally; that is, negotiations with the various factions are carried out underground." (Asahi shinbun, February 22, 1964) Said Sato, " T h e dissolution of the factions is a tremendous hit right now, but bamboo shoots will surely appear by early spring." (See Masumi 1969:351-69) T h e LDP factions were openly revived. The presidential election of July 1964 became the scene of intense factional maneuvering conducted in a whirlpool of money. The Miki report was left untouched in the LDP safe. No one knew that, eleven years later, when the LDP faced a crisis because of the Tanaka scandal, this document would deliver the government to Miki.

THE 1964 PARTY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND IKEDA'S THIRD TERM The Family Feud Yoshida worried that hostility might develop between Ikeda and Sato. Every time that Hori, who was close to Sato, went to Óiso, Yoshida said, "Don't let Ikeda and Sato fight. I hold you responsible." Hori would reply, "They won't as long as you are in good health." During the 1964 New Year's holiday, when Hori made his usual call, Yoshida invited him into a separate room and said: A lot of people have come by and have told me things.... I can't help feeling that it might be best if Ikeda were to step down about now. He is still young, and it might be better for him to take a break while he still has some energy left. I'm thinking of having Sato take over next. I will talk to Ikeda directly. But I want Sato, on his part, to be prepared to give [his post] back to Ikeda before he does anything embarrassing. I don't mean to imply that this is all up to me—after all, this is something that many people must decide—but as far as I'm concerned, at least, that is what I think. What do you think?

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H o n agreed and communicated this conversation to Sato. Sato assented. When March arrived and Hori went to Oiso again, Yoshida said, "As a matter of fact, I haven't spoken to Ikeda yet. . . . I asked a certain zaikai figure, since you get along well with Ikeda, could you talk to Ikeda and tell him that this is what Yoshida is thinking?" The situation had certainly changed, Hori thought. Hori received a call from the zaikai figure: "Please get the gendemen in the Sato faction to show some restraint and not do things that might irritate Ikeda. If they don't, it will make it difficult [for me] to talk to him. . . ." But when the zaikai figure spoke to Ikeda, he was reprimanded. This set the stage for a fierce feud. (Hori 1975:109-11) The collision between Ikeda and Sato was precipitated by an odd set of circumstances. Ikeda told Ito the following: On the evening of May 18, I received a telephone call from Tanaka as I was attending a gathering of zaikai people known as the Suehirokai. He said he had something to talk to me about, so I told him to come to my place. He came by at 8:30. The item of business was that Sato wanted to meet after the following day's cabinet meeting. When I said that it was too early in the game and that we shouldn't, he said, in that case, you telephone Sato direcdy. When I started to call Sato, he said that Sato was probably not home yet and asked to see my garden. After a while, I suggested that we should have my wife call Sato's wife, and I had [my wife] telephone, but Sato was taking a bath. I then told her to tell Sato to call me and had her hang up. Sato telephoned. "Could you arrange to pass it on to me without a vote? I intend to run this time," he said. I adamandy refused, saying that I could not treat the government as if I owned it. Tanaka, who had overheard the entire telephone conversation, left saying, "This has allowed me to make up my mind. It was good that you spoke so forthrighdy." (Ikeda 1 9 6 6 : 2 3 2 - 3 3 )

Tanaka described the circumstances to the Yomiuri shinbun reporter Nakano Shiro as follows. Tanaka entered the Ikeda house and said, " I want you to ask Sato to cooperate in your election to a third term on the promise that you will later abdicate to him." Ikeda dialed the telephone reluctantly, but Sato was taking a bath. He hung up and, as we sipped sake and waited, Ikeda got drunk. Sato, who comes right to the point, started out by saying, "Pass it on to me next." "How dare you!" Ikeda immediately grew belligerent. Before I knew it, they were trading fighting words. Ikeda was drunk, and there was nothing I could do. "That long bath of Sato's certainly did me in. It really did," said Tanaka. Perhaps Sato washed his underwear during the bath. (Nakano 1982:47-48) Tanaka wanted to avoid an all-out batde between Ikeda and Sato. And Ohira, with whom Tanaka probably maintained close contact, lamented to a reporter, " I am not in favor [of a third term], but if the man says himself that he will do it, then we must go along. However, this will be an expensive ticket." (Ohira Masayoshi Kaisoroku Kankokai 1982:244)

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Campaigningfor a Majority The Diet session ended on June 27. Satô resigned from his position of Science and Technology Agency director and released a policy paper entitled "The Fight for Tomorrow—Answering the Call of the Future" in preparation for the presidential election. Earlier, on January 15, he had assembled a project team modeled after the "Kennedy machine" to prepare a policy blueprint for a Satô government. The initial report was coordinated by Kusuda Minoru, of the Sankei shinbun political desk, in close association with the Satô faction policy expert, Aichi Kiichi. "The Fight for Tomorrow" was the publicly released version, from which the sections on Okinawa and China had been deleted for political reasons. Particular care was taken in addressing the task of unveiling a fresh policy framework to counter the income doubling plan and the rapid economic growth policies that were the hallmarks of the Ikeda cabinet. The result was "social development," with the message that "serious social frictions and social changes are appearing amid the storm of technological innovation and modernization" and "on the other side of the spectacular economic growth, major 'distortions' are appearing and a growing poverty amid prosperity has become an issue." The excessive tilt toward economic development should be modified and "a 'livable living environment' and a 'flourishing and lovable national geography' should be created through balanced economic progress and social development." (Kusuda 1983:46-50) The LDP party presidential election, however, is not a selection of policies but a scramble for power. Policies are at best the seasoning used to add flavor to power. Itô writes: The Diet session ended. Satô submitted his resignation from the cabinet and Fujiyama from his party office. The presidential election was about to begin. Each of them met with the prime minister. Fujiyama said, "I want you to quit and back me, your protégé." Satô said, "Whether I win or you win, let us cooperate." He repeated the words "whether I win" twice. The date for the extraordinary party convention was set for July 10. The presidential election was only two weeks away. President Ikeda, supported by the Ikeda faction, the Kawashima faction, and the former Ono faction (the Funada and Murakami groups), pitted himself against the Satô faction, the Kishi-Fukuda faction, and the Fujiyama faction. The positions of the Ishii and Miki factions were unclear. Miki met with Ikeda two days after the Diet session ended and offered his support on the condition that President Ikeda "would neither dissolve the Diet nor seek a fourth term." Three days later, the Ishii faction began to move closer to Satô. Normally, with this many alignments already arranged, it should have been clear that Ikeda would be elected to a third term. But Satô, Fukuda, and the others came up with the new tactic of arguing that each delegate should be

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allowed to vote independently and then went about "picking them off one by one with ninja squads." This created quite a commotion. There were ninja who supported Sato secretly in the Kono, Ono, Miki, and Ikeda factions, which were in the pro-Ikeda alliance group. . . . One could no longer determine the tally through the ostensibly committed votes; indeed, there were ninja at Kono's as well as at Ono's, while Miki's gave one the impression of being a [ninja] base camp. (Ito 1966:234-35) On July 4, the Sato, Fujiyama, and Ishii factions decided to establish an antiIkeda alliance. Sato and Fujiyama held talks mediated by Ishii at the Akasaka Prince Hotel on July 8, where they agreed to make it an alliance of the first and second runners-up. Hashimoto Tomisaburo, Fukuda Takeo, and Nanjo Tokuo prepared the ground for this meeting. Fujiyama recalls: Sato's group began an aggressive movement and the Fujiyama faction was gradually split between those who were associated with Kishi and Sato and those who were not. The argument appeared among those associated with Kishi and Sato that "if we are not going to come out first anyway, it would be a good idea to join up with Sato from the start." I brushed them aside, saying, "I don't want to do that. I will run." But there were indications around that time that half of the Fujiyama faction was responding to orders not from me but from Kishi. Eventually, talk arose . . . of an "alliance of the first and second runnersup" between Sato and Fujiyama. From the very beginning I was not interested since I had no desire to come to the aid of Sato in the second ballot. And within the faction, Ozawa Saeki and others were of the opinion that "if there is a runoff vote, then we should seek a recess and determine our position anew." This particular election was ostentatious. . . . A considerable amount of money was used, and I too caught some of the spray.... I was not all that close to Sato. Sato, unlike Ikeda, was not the sort of person with whom you could hold frank discussions without engendering ill will. Even later, when I became Economic Planning Agency director in the Sato cabinet, whenever I would give my opinion to Sato, he would sit and listen quiedy, and in the end say only, "I understand." He would then turn around and do something completely different from what I favored. (Fujiyama 1976:141 -45) Vice Premier Ono's death on May 29 was a painful blow for Ikeda. There was the possibility that the Ono faction might split. But Funada Naka, Mizuta Mikio, Hara Kenzaburo, and other executives of the faction forestalled such a move by passing a resolution supporting Ikeda at an Ono faction general meeting on the claim that "Ono's dying wish was support for Ikeda." Several ninja votes went to Sato nonetheless. Kono took Ono's place and carried out a frantic campaign to establish a majority on Ikeda's behalf. He spent more than ¥100 million. He was hoping to arrange a transfer of the government to himself. But one reason that more than 80 votes in the

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House of Councilors went to Sato was precisely because it was feared that Kono would be next if Ikeda were elected to a third term. Miki also did all that he could to secure the votes of his faction on behalf of Ikeda, but a ninja squad numbering more than 10 tied to Hayakawa Takashi went on to support Sato. The standard battle tactic of a presidential election—that is, bribery— was utilized to the fullest. Code words described corruption of various kinds. A "ninja squad" referred to people who secretly or else quasi-openly supported Sato against the will of the faction boss or a faction's decision. "Pole-and-line fishing" meant to bribe members of opposing factions, one at a time. "Trawling" referred to bribing them all at once. A " N i k k a " — a "two-er," as well as a brand of whiskey—referred to someone who took bribes from two factions. A "Suntory"—a "three-taker," and also a brand of whiskey—was a person who took from three factions. And an "Old Parr" was someone who took money from two or three factions but voted for no one. The convention was held on July 10. A total of 478 votes were cast. Of these, 242 went to Ikeda, 160 to Sato, 72 to Fujiyama, 1 to Nadao, and 3 were invalid. The reporter Watanabe visited Ikeda's private residence in Shinanomachi two days before the election and compared vote estimates. Watanabe said, "I calculate that at this stage support for Ikeda is 244 votes. I believe that this is an extremely dangerous number for you." Ikeda replied in a voice brimming with confidence: "271 votes are firmly assured." When Watanabe listed 20 people whose loyalties were doubtful, Ikeda detailed the behind-the-scenes arrangements made in each instance. Ikeda's estimate, however, was offby 29 votes. Ikeda said that "the moment I heard the results of the vote count, I felt a chill run down my spine." He was probably being quite truthful. (Watanabe 1967:70-71) The Tide ofProsperity The primary agenda item of Ikeda's third cabinet was the correction of the "distortions" accompanying rapid economic growth. The tide of prosperity continued to rise nonetheless. The Tokaido Bullet Train that seemed to symbolize rapid economic growth began operating on October 1. The dazzling Tokyo Olympics were held between October 10 and October 24. Ikeda had been suddenly hospitalized at the Cancer Center on September 9. Although he slipped away from the hospital to attend the opening ceremonies, his doctor recommended that he step down immediately after the Olympics, since it would be impossible for him to attend the following year's regular Diet, let alone the extraordinary session in November. Ikeda suggested, "Perhaps I wouldn't have to step down if I were willing to die." The doctor replied that "as a doctor I cannot recommend any such course."

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Ikeda then asked, " W h o put you up to this?" " M a e o and Ohira. N o one else has been told about it." When the doctor said this, Ikeda readily decided, " I see. If it's those two, I'm willing to delegate." (Ohira Masayoshi Kaisoroku Kankokai 1982:248) Ikeda passed away the following August. T h e eulogy written for him by Ito in December 1966 adroitly portrays the scenes of a rapidly progressing advanced industrialization and the emergence of mass society. Prime Minister Ikeda. You mobilized the masses. Legions of people are still moving from the rural villages to the cities. Five or six years hence, seventenths of the population of Japan may be gathered in the big cities of Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Kure, Hiroshima, and on through to Kita Kyushu. High productivity is being sought, both the rural villages and the cities are growing more fluid in character, and you see the two classes of salaried workers and managers being born everywhere. Once this land is fully populated, this phenomenon will inevitably spill over to the rural villages. We are now in a period of such rapid change that it resembles a revolution. One could say that we are living in the new century that you opened. I was there, together with you, in a very high place. They say that the tip of Tokyo Tower is always swaying. When I was with you, I truly felt the swaying. There were times during the latter half of your government that I sensed the limits of the power of a prime minister and felt uneasy. I now realize that the fundamental cause of this was the growing fluidity of society. You gave birth to the middle class. But these people have not yet discovered new principles of movement and organization. The political legacy of Prime Minister Ikeda remains undisturbed. (Ito 1966:281-82)

THREE

The Reversion of Okinawa

THE IKEDA DECISION AND THE SATO CABINET Sato, Kono, and Fujiyama O n October 25,1964, the day after the Tokyo Olympics closed, Ikeda called State Minister Kono, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suzuki Zenko, Vice Premier Kawashima, Secretary General Miki Takeo, and Assistant Secretary General Ohira to the hospital and informed them of his intention to resign. He requested that his successor as prime minister be chosen through discussions among Kawashima, Miki, and the party executives. O n October 26, the top LDP officers and the Executive Council agreed to delegate the selection to Miki and Kawashima. O n October 27, an assembly of both houses formally approved the delegation of the task to the party executives. O n October 28 Kawashima and Miki began sounding out the speakers of both houses of the Diet, party elders, three potential candidates (Sato, Kono, and Fujiyama), the chairmen and vice chairmen of various party organs, Diet members in Tokyo, and younger Diet members. All of this activity was a smoke screen. O n about October 18 Kono visited Ikeda at the Cancer Center. Ikeda shook Kono's hand and thanked him for his cooperation. He said that he had not done much to return the favor and would therefore support Kono in the next presidential election. O r so the story went. According to people close to Ikeda, he made no such pledge. When the reporter Watanabe later questioned those close to Kono, they also said that Ikeda did not state his intentions clearly. Kono nonetheless interpreted whatever was said as a promise of support from Ikeda. He felt sure because he had vied with Sato and had supported Ikeda fully up to that point. He made a similar presumption with regard to Kishi in June 1959. (Watanabe 1967:76) 85

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LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980 T a n a k a arrived at the hospital shortly after K o n o left. When I arrived at the [Cancer] Center's hospital around 3:00 or 4:00 P.M., [Ikeda] muttered, "Kono Ichiro visited here a while back and left just a moment ago," and then stared at me. "Who are you going to make my successor?" I learned at that time that Prime Minister Ikeda had made up his mind to resign. I realized immediately why Mrs. Ikeda left the room as soon as I entered. I looked directly into Prime Minister Ikeda's eyes and said clearly, "Sato Eisaku." In the LDP presidential election held in 1964, Ikeda had run for a third term out of a misunderstanding and ended up clashing severely with Sato even though it was virtually understood that Ikeda would not run and would make way for Sato. Both Prime Minister Ikeda and I were only too aware of those circumstances. Prime Minister Ikeda, staring into my eyes, said simply, "Uh-hum," and then lay down. After a while, he said, "One, you must not campaign. Two, you must not spend money. Three, all drinking and eating in the party will be banned." " I understand. I will and I'll have them observe these rules," I said, adding, "Please be sure you tell this to Ohira." (Ohira Masayoshi Kaisoroku Kankokai 1982:392)

F u j i y a m a was overseas w h e n l e a r n e d of Ikeda's r e t i r e m e n t . H e h u r r i e d b a c k to J a p a n , arriving o n the n i g h t of O c t o b e r 27. Fujiyama recalls: That evening, there was a telephone call from Maeo Shigesaburo. "You must not say anything," he said. He admonished me to "leave things to the mediators, Secretary General Miki and Vice Prime Minister Kawashima, because the situation is changing." It seems that Esaki and Maeo were in close contact and on the lookout for an opportunity to establish a Fujiyama government. They were making sure that I understood the domestic situation and did not carelessly sabotage the arrangements that they had gone to some length to make.... As instructed, I kept quiet that evening. The next day I visited Ikeda at the Cancer C e n t e r . . . . After I conveyed my best wishes for his convalescence and presented him with a short report of my trip, Ikeda said, "Things are not good, Fujiyama. I'm going to have to quit. I want you to think carefully about what will happen afterward." He then reached forward, and we shook hands. I felt that I should not stay too long and left after about ten minutes. But I did get the feeling that Ikeda was expecting something of me. Inside the Fujiyama faction at that time, Nanjo and other supporters of Kishi thought that I should not become a presidential candidate and support Sato. Esaki, myself, and others, however, viewed this as an opportunity to take control of the government. Vice Premier Kawashima and Secretary General Miki were in charge of arranging an agreement on the selection of a successor party president. Maeo Shigesaburo, who was Ikeda's heir in his faction, was doing the footwork for them. (Fujiyama 1976:153-54)

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Maeo later said: There was a danger that the party would split if Sato or Kono was chosen. Prime Minister Ikeda called Secretary General Miki and Assistant Secretary General Ohira into the hospital and told them to "think also about Fujiyama." This was also what I was thinking. . . . Kono tended to be disliked, and his reputation in the zaikai was not very good either. There was nothing all that concrete behind the talk about selecting Fujiyama, but the general feeling was that if Kono insisted on going through with [his campaign to get selected], those outside the Kono faction would feel more comfortable with Fujiyama. Kawashima had decided on Sato from the very beginning. The question was whether Miki would go along. (Fujiyama 1976:163) On November 3 Kono summoned Ikeda's aide Ito, who responded after getting clearance from Ikeda and Maeo. Ito's diary states: 5:50 P.M. Went to Fukutani teahouse in Akasaka. 6:00. Kono Ichiro, Shigemasa Seishi, and Tamura Yuzo (Yomiuri shinbun reporter) arrived. Kono described his state of m i n d . . . . " T h e prime minister once said that if there was anything that I wanted to let him know, I should contact you. I remembered t h i s . . . . "Those in charge of making the arrangements are not actively communicating what they are thinking. Things are rather blurry. I have been holding my associates back, and it is no wonder that Sato should be perceived as ahead. "Under the circumstances, I had no choice but to talk with Fujiyama this morning, and we exchanged documents saying that whichever one of us is chosen, the other will support him fully. I will eventually submit this to Prime Minister Ikeda, Kawashima, and M i k i . . . . "The true situation in the party is something like Sato 4, Kono 3, and Fujiyama, 1. Kono might be 2. The general course of events will be determined by whom you gentlemen in the Ikeda faction support. Over at Miki's, Matsumura is for Kono but Miki is opposed. Miki and Matsumura are working to harmonize their positions, but there is no clear prospect as to the outcome. "I want the prime minister to find out about the situation from you and make a resolute decision. If on the outside chance they say it is Sato, I would like to be called in to see the prime minister. If it is Kono or Fujiyama, I have no quarrel with whichever one of us he chooses since we have already come to an a g r e e m e n t . . . . " I said, " I will transmit your thinking to the prime minister.. . . Let us consider this discussion as never having occurred. Otherwise, Ikeda's resolute decision will not be a resolute decision." Kono agreed. November 4. Thursday... . I went to the hospital shordy after 11:00 and passed on the substance of what Kono said to the prime minister. The prime minister said, "Kono has certainly thought things through. Tell only Maeo what happened." At 5:00 P.M., I contacted Maeo. (Ito 1966:261-63)

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Fujiyama recalls: Aside from meeting with the mediators Kawashima and Miki because they wanted to meet each of the three candidates, I tried to be as discreet as possible in my a c t i v i t i e s . . . . In fact, however, I was secretly conducting talks with Kono during that p e r i o d . . . . We each thought that the presidency would be given to us. Kono was a leader of the anti-Sato forces and I, too, did not get along with Sato. In the end, we agreed that n o matter which of us it was, we would help one another out, and we prepared a written confirmation [of the agreement]. . . . Each one of us kept a copy and together we took an extra copy to Kawashima. Kawashima took the document and then read it through without a word. T h e only sound he made was a kind of derisive chuckle. (Fujiyama

1976:154-56)

The Decision Behind Closed Doors In his recollections, Fujiyama states: " T h e point in my life when the government drew closest to me was three or four days before the 'Ikeda decision.'" (Fujiyama 1976:157) According to the reporter Watanabe, early in the morning "about three days prior" to the Ikeda decision—which probably means November 6 — M a e o took a taxi to the back door of the speaker of the House of Representatives' residence in Akasaka and met surreptitiously with Funada. Maeo said that he did not want to give the government to Sato. At the same time, however, the sentiment in the party had made it impossible for Ikeda to choose Kono. If Kono withdrew his candidacy in favor of Fujiyama, Ikeda would be more likely to designate Fujiyama. Maeo therefore wanted Funada to convey this to Kono and have the latter give up his candidacy. That evening, Funada visited Fukutani, a teahouse that Kono frequented, passed the word to Kono, and tried to persuade him to go along. But Kono insisted that he would stay in the race. Funada also began to worry that Ikeda might not actually choose Fujiyama even if Kono did withdraw. He went looking for Maeo to press him on the matter, but Maeo had vanished. "About two days after Funada met with Kono and two days before the presidential designation"—November 7 or 8 — t h e reporter Watanabe met Kono at the Prince Hotel and suggested that Kono withdraw his candidacy. Kono pounded on the table and said: T h e situation is such that Ikeda will have to choose me whether he wants to or not. You are saying that if I withdraw, Ikeda will name Fujiyama, but if I were to withdraw, Ikeda would bypass Fujiyama and choose Sato. Ikeda has an obligation toward me, but he owes Fujiyama nothing. Maeo is fooling you. H e won't talk to me and is using Funada to con everyone. As long as I stay in the

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race, then Ikeda will have to designate me, no matter what. (Watanabe 1967: 76-78) I k e d a m a y h a v e a l r e a d y d e c i d e d to r e c o m m e n d S a t o Eisaku. O n N o v e m b e r 5, h e t o l d S a t o W a t a r u , his f o r m e r c l a s s m a t e at t h e F i f t h H i g h e r S c h o o l : I am agonizing over whether to choose Sato or Kono. I cannot forget the gratitude that I feel toward Kono, who was once so hostile but then turned around and supported me 100 percent. O n the other hand, although things have soured recently between Sato and me, when I recall how we both attended the same higher school and both came of age in the political world with Yoshida's help, I feel like handing it to S a t o . . . . It seems that Kono is totally disliked by the Tokyo zaikai and he is not doing anything about it. But then, he made an effort to go to Osaka, and his popularity in the Osaka zaikai improved. O n the other hand, with a change of government near, there is a lot of support for Sato in the Osaka zaikai. T h e House of Representatives is about evenly divided, while the House of Councilors is overwhelmingly anti-Kono. When I hear information of this sort, I am reluctant to give the government to Kono. Even so, I cannot get myself to pass it on to Sato unconditionally. I have therefore come up with three conditions. I have decided to pass it on to Sato if he agrees to them. I cannot very well tell Miki or Kawashima this, so I want you to go to Sato's house and sound him out. T h e three conditions are: First, because the Ikeda cabinet did not fall because its policies failed, I want him to issue a statement saying that he will continue Ikeda's policies. Second, he will not replace cabinet members until the House of Councilors election next year. Third, I want him to team up with Kono just as I d i d . . . . If he won't, I will give it to Kono. Tell that to Sato for me. S a t o W a t a r u r u s h e d to S a t o Eisaku's h o u s e a n d , a f t e r t r e m e n d o u s e f f o r t , g o t h i m to agree. (Hosokawa 1977:85-99) S a t o c a l l e d in T a n a k a o n N o v e m b e r 7. T a n a k a writes: It was the day before [the talks between the three candidates and Miki and Kawashima] were to be held at the Palace H o t e l . . . . Sato was waiting alone [in his faction office]. T h e door was locked, and he appeared quite tense. He said simply, "Are you absolutely certain [that I've been chosen]?" " T h e r e is no reason for me not to be," I replied. "Double check it with Ohira." . . . T h e voice on the line [Ohira] replied clearly, "Nothing whatsoever has changed." (Ohira Masayoshi Kaisoroku Kankokai 1982:39) H o w e v e r , at t h e H o c h i k a i ( I k e d a f a c t i o n ) O h i r a h a d n o t b e e n a b l e to c o n tact M a e o , a n d t h i n g s r e m a i n e d u n s e t t l e d o n t h e eve o f t h e m e e t i n g . A t 9 : 0 0 a n d 11:00 P.M., t h e r e w e r e calls f r o m M a e o , w h o said t h a t a d e c i s i o n h a d n o t b e e n m a d e . (Ito 1 9 6 6 : 2 3 4 - 6 4 ) M e a n w h i l e , in t h e F u j i y a m a o f f i c e : It was the day before the "Ikeda decision" that would determine who would manage the government. T h e traffic of faction members grew heavy, and my

go

LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980 office was filled with p a s s i o n . . . . Evening arrived, but we still could not figure out what was going on. "Whatin the world does Kawashima think he's doing?" Everyone was getting impatient, and we decided to send someone over to Kawashima's. Ayabe Kentaro was the envoy. He returned around 6:00 and reported, "Kawashima said he wants to divert the current of the Yoshida school." Kawashima added, " H e emphasized that Kono is a certainty." Since it was fine with me as long as the government was not given to Sato, I felt somewhat reassured. Ayabe suggested that we call Kono and began dialing immediately. Kono was pleased when the information about Kawashima was relayed to him. This was the only time that Kono aimed for the presidency. Convinced that they were likely to be informed of a decision in favor of a Kono government that very evening, Hagiwara Kichitaro, Nagata Masaichi, and other zaikai figures who supported Kono were waiting at the Nakagawa teahouse in Akasaka. They seemed to have already begun a banquet to celebrate the occasion. On the other hand, Esaki, who had kept in constant contact with Maeo, placed one of several calls to him that day. When he tried to confirm the "Prime Minister Kono" report, Maeo stated flatly that "there will be no such thing." He said that "Kawashima and Miki are concerned about the thinking in the zaikai." When Esaki asked him, "Is it Sato, then?" Maeo said, " I cannot say so now," and hung up the phone. Because of the way he spoke, we began to suspect that the situation was unfolding in Sato's favor. That evening (on November 8), the two mediators, who had at last begun to do something, gathered the three candidates at the Palace Hotel. They put forward the totally transparent proposal that "it would be best to have the three of you talk it over and decide. . . ." All three of us felt that there could be no such thing at this late d a t e . . . . When you looked at their expressions, it seemed clear that the decision had already been made. So, the strategy is to not let it out until the following morning, I thought. Around 8:00 that evening, Mori Kiyoshi dashed into the office and insisted, "It is certain to be Kono. It will be decided by tonight." Because we had talked to Maeo, we said that couldn't be. He then pointed to developments over the past two or three days as his evidence. "Nagata and Hagiwara called Kawashima at Hanagawa this morning and put pressure on him. He promised to bring about a Kono government by this evening." This seemed to contradict the Maeo information. Esaki again tried to determine the whereabouts of Maeo, but he was suddenly missing and unaccounted for. At around 1 :oo A.M., we at last received a report from Esaki. He said that he had finally located Maeo, who was drunk as a fish, and had the following exchange: "Did they decide on K o n o ? " — " N o such thing." "Was it Fujiyama?"—"No such thing." "Was it Sato then?" "I can't tell you. It's top secret." (Fujiyama 1976:159-61)

T h e morning of November 9 arrived. " I t was indeed a very long two weeks," writes Ohira. " A mysterious apparition known as the government had wandered between the L D P headquarters in Hirakawacho and the Cancer Center in Tsukiji looking for a place to rest." (Ohira 1978:118) At 7:00 A.M.,

THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA

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Kawashima, Miki, Ohira, and Suzuki went together to the Cancer Center. Kawashima and Miki each told Ikeda about the developments leading up to their choice of Sato and requested instructions from Ikeda. Ikeda said, "I am sorry about Kono, but Sato is an appropriate choice as my successor." Sato was selected party president at the general meeting of the party's Diet members held at 10:00 and was designated prime minister during the House of Representatives plenary session that afternoon. When Kono took his seat, Ohira went before him, bowed, and said, "We have caused you so much worry." Kono said, "That's okay, Ohira. The entire Kono faction is here today. We will all write 'Sato Eisaku' [on the ballots], so don't you worry." (Ohira Masayoshi Kaisoroku Kankokai 1982:257) Fujiyama telephoned Kono and tried to console him. Kono, who was holding up surprisingly well, responded, "Kawashima conned me. . . . You know, people who trick other people are no good. People like you and me, who are conned, are virtuous." (Fujiyama 1976:163) The Sato Cabinet Other than replacing Chief Cabinet Secretary Suzuki Zenko with the Sato faction's Hashimoto Tomisaburo, the new cabinet that came into being on November 9 duplicated the Ikeda cabinet. Sato had honored his promise to Ikeda. But during the June 3 cabinet reshuffling the following year, just before the July 1965 House of Councilors election, he formed a cabinet of his own choosing. Miki was named minister of trade and industry, Fujiyama was Economic Planning Agency director, and Fukuda, minister of finance. In the party offices, it was Kawashima as vice president, Tanaka as secretary general, Maeo as Executive Council chairman, and Akagi (of the Kawashima faction) as PARC chairman. Finance Minister Fukuda and Secretary General Tanaka, Sato's top lieutenants, were the two pillars holding up the Sato cabinet. Kono alone was missing. Sato requested that Kono and Nakamura Umekichi (of the Kono faction) enter the cabinet, but Kono demanded that either Mori Kiyoshi or Sonoda Sunao enter in place of Nakamura. Since Sato rejected the request, Kono refused to enter the cabinet. All Sato said was, "That's too bad." A month later, Kono died suddenly of an abdominal aneurism. He was sixty-seven years old. O n o had passed away the previous May. With their deaths, the powerful party politicians who inherited the Hatoyama faction departed from the scene and the dissolution of the party politician factions began. There were no longer any politicians of sufficient standing to stand in Sato's way. Neither Kawashima, Miki, nor Fujiyama had enough influence to mount a serious challenge against him. There was such a gap between his stature and that of Fukuda, Ohira, and Tanaka that it was really no contest.

g2

LDP RULE, 1955-1980

Elsewhere, the electoral base of the LDP was beginning to tremble. As a result of the seventh House of Councilors election, held on July 4,1965, the number of LDP seats declined from 75 to 71, while the JSP's increased from 28 to 36 and the Clean Government Party's (Komeito), from 4 to 11. The LDP's rural jiban was declining, and the defeat in the Tokyo regional district was particularly crushing. Furthermore, in the Tokyo prefectural assembly election of July 23, following the dissolution of the assembly over a bribery incident involving LDP assemblymen and over the selection of the assembly speaker, the number of LDP seats dropped dramatically to one-third of what the party had held. The J S P received 45 seats; the LDP, 38; the CGP, 23; the JCP, 9; and the DSP, 4.

THE BLACK MIST SCANDAL AND ANTIPOLLUTION LEGISLATION Sato's Reelection LDP Diet member Tanaka Shoji was arrested on charges of extortion and fraud on August 5, 1966. Other scandals followed, over the misuse of public authority by Transportation Minister Arafune Seijuro, Defense Agency director Kanbayashiyama Eikichi, and Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Matsuno Raizo. The LDP received a concerted attack by the press and the public. Support for the cabinet in polls taken by the major papers plunged to 25 percent. Beginning around October, an anti-Sato movement arose, which was tied to a call for party disciplinary action and the December 1 presidential election, but without a leader who could do battle against Sato. Consequently, out of a total of 459 votes, Sato received 289; Fujiyama, 89; Maeo, 47; Nadao, 11; and Noda Uichi, 19. The results were a considerable shock nonetheless. Secretary General Tanaka and others had estimated that they had 315 solid votes. The number of votes Sato received fell instead below 300, while the anti-Sato vote reached 169. Among the 270 votes of the members of the House of Representatives, the pro-Sato vote ran only around 140, not much higher than the anti-Sato vote of 130. The ballots cast for Sato came from the four mainstream factions of Sato, Funada, Miki, and Kawashima plus the majority of the Murakami (an offshoot of the old Ono faction) and Ishii factions, and parts of the Sunada (another offshoot of the old Ono faction) and old Ikeda factions. The old Kono faction split into the anti-Sato Nakasone faction (26 Diet members) and the pro-Sato Shigemasa-Mori faction (approximately 10 Diet members) . Given the zaikai's preferences, the old Ikeda faction was expected to support Sato but ended up instead casting 47 votes for Maeo—in spite of the fact that Maeo did not formally declare his candidacy—as a consequence of maneuvering by an increasingly anti-Sato Ohira. About 20 of the faction's votes nevertheless went to Sato. Fujiyama's support came from the

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three factions of Fujiyama, Nakasone, and Matsumura, plus parts of the Funada, Murakami, and old Ikeda factions. From the start, there was little thought given to actual victory. Fujiyama's objective was to obtain more than the 72 votes he received in the previous election and induce at least 150 anti-Satô votes. O n this score, his campaign was a success. T h e cabinet reshuffling following Sato's reelection rewarded the people who had helped him and established a lineup for the upcoming general election. It was labeled a "right-wing, one-lung cabinet" because the antimainstream factions were excluded. The selection that drew the most interest was the replacement for Secretary General Tanaka. While Tanaka had racked up important accomplishments in the transfer of the government from Ikeda to Satô and was delivering a considerable portion of the Satô faction's funds, there was strong resentment among the older Diet members in the faction over the fact that he had held a series of glamorous positions like PARC chairman, finance minister, and secretary general. The antiTanaka element assembled around Hori drew closer to Fukuda. Satô himself began to entertain suspicions of the rapidly advancing Tanaka and even started to evade Ôhira, who was close to Tanaka. T h e new secretary general was Fukuda. It seems plausible that Satô was thinking of having him become his successor. The Black Mist Election When the opening ceremony for an extraordinary Diet session was held on December 3, 1966, the day that Sato's third cabinet began, the opposition parties were poised to boycott the session as part of an effort to force an early dissolution by exploiting the opportunities presented by the "Black Mist" corruption scandal. No compromise could be reached. The prime minister's opening address, the interpellations, the deliberation on the supplementary budget, and all other business were conducted by the ruling party Diet members in the absence of the opposition. During this time, the JSP, DSP, CGP, and JCP held a conference of secretaries general and issued a joint communiqué stating that they would band together to force the government to dissolve the Lower House. When the extraordinary session ended in this abnormal state, the Satô cabinet concluded that there was no way to break the deadlock outside of a dissolution. The decision was made on December 27 to convene the regular session and then dissolve. The January 29, 1967, election caused the LDP to drop from its earlier standing of 283 seats to 277 and the JSP to drop from 144 seats to 140, in spite of the fact that the total number of House seats had increased by 19. Nevertheless, since the number of LDP seats did not decrease to the extent anticipated (the estimate was that the LDP would fall below 270 seats), glasses were raised in toasts of victory at the LDP's Nagatachô headquarters

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as the prime minister painted in the missing eye of a huge daruma. At JSP headquarters in Miyakezaka, where the "Black Mist' scandal was expected to bring a great victory (the estimate was that the party would win more than 150 seats), the mood was one of grief-stricken defeat. The relative share of the LDP vote had in fact dropped below 50 percent for the first time, and the LDP and JSP shares had both fallen while maintaining a two-to-one ratio. The other parties advanced. The JCP continued to hold 5 seats, but the DSP increased its seats from 23 to 30 while the CGP, which ran candidates for the House of Representatives for the first time, captured 25 seats. Secretary General Fukuda claimed, "I do not think that we have moved to a multiparty system as a consequence of this past election. All that has happened is the number of opposition parties has multiplied." But from a regional perspective, the large urban electoral districts had indeed become dominated by a multiparty system. The April 15 Tokyo gubernatorial election made this obvious. With the renewal of the security treaty ahead, the LDP needed to capture the office of the governor of Tokyo in order to assure public security in the capital. "We must not let a red flag be raised in the capital's prefectural government office." Sato believed that the election could not be won with the candidacy of Lieutenant Governor Suzuki Shun'ichi, whom the Tokyo LDP prefectural federation was recommending. Sato therefore pushed for Rikkyo University president Matsushita Masatoshi, who had already been recommended by the DSP, as the LDP candidate. The CGP ran its own candidate in order to maintain its organization. The JSP and the J C P recommended Minobe Ryokichi. In the general election, the combined LDP and DSP vote exceeded that of the JSP and the JCP. LDP solidarity, however, suffered under a borrowed candidate and morale could not be raised. The Minobe camp had come up with a blue bull's eye trademark, symbolizing "blue skies over Tokyo." It organized a citizens' movement called the "Association to Create a Bright and Progressive Prefectural Administration" and captured women's votes and the floating vote. The result was 2.2 million votes for Minobe and 2.06 million for Matsushita. This was a prototype of the sort of election where mass society and citizens' movements pushed the JSP and the JCP to the fore. The Basic Antipollution Law Although the "social development" that Sato had paraded as a criticism of Ikeda's "income doubling" in the 1964 presidential election was created as a tactic, it nonetheless foreshadowed the issues that dominated the second half of the 1960s. The social changes that accompanied advanced industri-

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alization gave birth to mass society electoral campaigns and progressive local governments. At the same time, advanced industrialization created pollution in various parts of the country, and citizens' movements arose in response. They, too, were, quintessentially mass society movements. T h e first cases of Minamata disease were discovered in 1953. In 1959 Minamata City fishermen clashed with the Chisso Corporation over compensation for lost fisheries and ended u p forcing their way into the company's Minamata factory. T h e Health and Welfare Ministry's f o o d sanitation research committee conducted a study of the disease and reported that it believed the cause was organic mercury. Not only was the report ignored, however; the committee itself was dissolved the next day by order of the ministry. T h e government's position of giving the economy priority over antipollution measures was evident. Labor unions were also weak-kneed. Popular opinion against pollution was still not very strong. Local governments around the country were frantically enacting ordinances to attract industry. T h e national government, the zaikai, and local governments worked as one in promoting plans to construct industrial complexes along the Pacific Belt. In i960 it was discovered that the "smelly fish" caught in Ise Bay were the product of oil pollution from a nearby industrial complex. T h e following year there was a sudden increase in the number of asthma patients in Yokkaichi. Patients with the same symptoms began to appear throughout the country in industrial areas with concentrated populations. Protest movements by residents living near factories became common. T h e anti-petrochemical complex movement in the three Shizuoka Prefecture municipalities of Numazu, Mishima, and Shimizu between 1963 and 1964 shocked the government and the zaikai, which had until then plunged at full speed into economic growth. As soon as the location of Fuji Oil in Mishima, Sumitomo Chemicals in Shimizu, and Tokyo Electric in Numazu was announced, a citizens' council was established in Mishima. T h e citizens were suspicious of the incoming enterprises because the arrival of Toray Corporation in 1958 had caused a water shortage; in addition, they opposed the amalgamation of the three municipalities that was then being railroaded through by the Shizuoka prefectural government. In Numazu, citizens held several hundred study group meetings, led by doctors and high school teachers. A study conducted by the Matsumura Research Group, established independently by citizens and composed of Numazu teachers, tore apart the results of a MITI-commissioned study that reported " n o likelihood of the appearance of pollution." Facing this groundswell of citizens' movements, MITI, Shizuoka Prefecture, and the enterprises involved had n o choice but to give up on the construction of the industrial complex. T h e movement was considered a monumental success. It induced the government to pass antipollution legislation. Fearing that antipollution move-

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ments around the country would obstruct the relocation of industry, the zaikai, too, agreed in principle to antipollution legislation. Thus, pollution control legislation had its origins in antipollution movements. T h e Pollution Commission, an advisory body under the welfare minister, held its first general meeting in September 1965. A report issued the following August, "Basic Measures Relating to Pollution," was the first government document ever to delineate thinking concerning pollution. T h e report stated that pollution "is a manmade p h e n o m e n o n in which there are parties who obtain profit from its creation and parties w h o receive damages as a consequence of it"; it supported the "general principle that consideration must be given to harmonizing antipollution measures and industrial development. . . . Pollution can cause damage to the health of the human anatomy and other damage that cannot be compensated for through monetary payments. In cases where these exceed a specified threshold, it is necessary to sacrifice the development of industry to some extent." In addition, the report stated on the subject of civil law responsibility that nofault liability should be adopted as the basic principle, that "the expense required in preventing pollution at individual sources" should be borne by those causing it, that the government should regulate pollution before it occurs, that the central and local governments should assist polluters in bearing the costs of prevention, and that administrative responsibility for improving the environment should be divided among a number of agencies. With this report as an impetus, the ministries and agencies began to claim jurisdiction over antipollution measures. In August 1968 the industrial location subcommittee of the Industrial Structure Council, a MITI advisory body, mentioned antipollution measures in a review of issues relating to the location of industry. According to its report, the government had been giving high priority to nodal development but the trend toward industrial concentration in the established industrial regions continued. As a result, negative consequences like overpopulation, urban sprawl, and intensified pollution had appeared in these regions. Antipollution measures were needed to eliminate factors that "obstruct the effective operation of industry." T h e report said nothing about the responsibility of the private enterprise or industry. In contrast, the " O p i n i o n Regarding the Establishment of a Basic Antipollution Law," put together in September as an opinion paper of the Local Autonomy Ministry called specifically for polluter responsibility, national or local government assessment of the costs of antipollution measures, the establishment of a pollution compensation foundation f u n d e d by payments from firms causing pollution, and various other new proposals. Its primary objective, however, was to grant power over antipollution measures to local governments. Although the proposal itself was commendable, it also implied an intention on the part of the Local Autonomy Ministry—the

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"supervisory agency" of local government b o d i e s — t o assume control over antipollution measures. In addition, the Ministry of Construction released "Antipollution Measures of the Ministry of Construction (Draft)" in November, in which it discussed the regulation of land use and legislation to promote public works projects that would prevent pollution. O n behalf of business, Keidanren submitted a statement of opinion on antipollution measures to the government and the LDP in November 1965. T h e statement did not deal at all with the responsibility of the polluter. Rather, it criticized the government sharply for its failure to establish coordinated policies for pollution prevention in such areas as industrial location and urban planning. It also demanded government subsidies and other forms of public aid for the development and installation of pollution prevention equipment. Furthermore, it stated outright that " u n d e r current circumstances where there is insufficient scientific understanding," the passage of a basic law for pollution would be "premature." But by August 1966, n o longer able to ignore the rise of public opinion on the pollution issue, Keidanren "shifted to a positive stance" on the question of legislation. (Asahi shinbun, August 5, 1966) In October Keidanren released " A n Opinion Regarding the Basic Issues of Pollution Policy," which opposed the establishment of pollution policy "strictly from the standpoint of preserving the living environment" and stressed the need to "strive for the harmonization of living environment preservation and the development of industry." T h e true thinking of the zaikai, however, was probably expressed in the following statement by the president of Mitsubishi Chemical: Currently, there is too much of a fuss being made about pollution. There are people who are trying to extort money from firms without any scientific basis. To try to solve the problem by recklessly creating a great commotion is a very dubious exercise.

A n d by Keidanren's managing director: Firms have until now spent considerable money on antipollution measures. Since antipollution measures by their nature do not lend themselves to increases in productivity, it is only natural that firms will be hesitant about them. (Asahi shinbun,

October 19,1966)

T h e Ministry of Health and Welfare released an oudine of an antipollution law in November 1966. T h e oudine was placed before the Liaison Conference Against Pollution in the prime minister's office, which consisted of representatives from fifteen ministries and agencies. Subjected to assorted demands for amendment, it appeared at one point as though the bill would be buried. Nevertheless, a draft outline was somehow completed in February 1967. It was approved at a cabinet meeting in March, thereby establish-

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ing it as the government draft. T h e draft oudine contained a number of loopholes, including a "harmonization clause" calling for "preservation of the living environment while striving for harmonization with the healthy development of the economy." The Pollution Diet T h e Basic Antipollution Law promulgated in August 1967 was a piece of hortatory legislation that required specific enabling legislation for concrete implementation. Repeated outbreaks of pollution occurred before it could be implemented. Citizens' movements spread, and local government ordinances were passed in response. According to a Ministry of Local Autonomy survey, as of July 1969, thirty-two prefectures had established pollution prevention ordinances. By the end of August 1970, forty-four prefectures had them. T h e situation had thus been transformed from a focus in the early 1960s on attracting firms to one in the late 1960s of preventing pollution. During the first half of the decade, local government heads who called for development won elections.During the latter half, the winners advocated social welfare and the rejection of large firms. Progressive chief executives headed one-fourth of all local governments. Pollution-causing industries like electric power, oil refining, and steel found it extremely difficult to establish new plants. Both the government and the zaikai began to think in terms of building huge industrial complexes far from the big cities and planning their construction with antipollution measures in mind. Because the nodal development strategy of the 1961 "National Comprehensive Development Plan" was giving rise to overpopulation in the cities and underpopulation of the countryside, the "New National Comprehensive Development Plan" that was approved by the cabinet in May 1969 adopted a "network method." Although it inherited policies of restraining the concentration of population and industry and assisting their dispersal in the countryside, the new plan proposed: (1) an emphasis on centralizing core tertiary industry supervisory functions instead of the earlier emphasis on constructing industrial belts (that is, constructing technologically advanced facilities to serve the peripheries of Sapporo, Sendai, Hiroshima, and Fukuoka as "wide-area core cities" that would take the pressure off Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya); (2) promoting the construction of bullet train lines, pan-national highways, bridges, tunnels, airports, telecommunications lines, and other trunk transportation and communication networks; and (3) constructing remote ultra-large industrial complexes via new, mixed publicprivate operational entities in the Mutsu B a y - L a k e Ogawara region, the eastern Tomakomai region, the Shibushi Bay region, and elsewhere. T h e r e were repeated outbreaks of lead pollution, photochemical smog, and sludge pollution in 1970. Citizens' movements spread explosively. In

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1970, for example, the location of Showa Denko in Fukuyama (Hiroshima Prefecture) was rejected by the city government, and Asia Oil (Sakaide, Kagawa Prefecture), Tokyo Electric (Choshi, Chiba Prefecture; Fuji, Shizuoka Prefecture), Kansai Electric (Miyazu, Kyoto Prefecture), and the petrochemical complex of the Mitsui and Mitsubishi groups (Futtsu, Chiba Prefecture) were among the projects that were stalled because of citizens' opposition movements. T h e government was forced to deal with the pollution issue wholeheartedly. In May Sato stated before a national conference of prefectural governors that "the elimination of pollution is indeed a most important political topic." T h e cabinet decided in July to set up a Central Antipollution Headquarters directly under the cabinet. T h e prime minister was to be headquarters director; the director general of the prime minister's office, deputy director; and fifteen counselor- and section c h i e f level bureaucrats from the ministries of Health and Welfare, International Trade and Industry, Construction, Local Autonomy, the Economic Planning Agency, and other involved ministries and agencies were assigned to it. At its first meeting, the prime minister said, "I want you to take great care so that there will not be the mistaken impression that the government is thinking of giving priority to industry." T h e cabinet initiated a major revision of the Basic Antipollution Law at a meeting in August. T h e Central Antipollution Headquarters submitted fourteen pollution-related laws to the extraordinary Diet session that began in November. All were passed. O f the fourteen laws, the most important was the revision of the Basic Antipollution Law. T h e "harmonization clause" was deleted and, in the spirit of Article 25 of the Constitution, the following was added: " T h e prevention of pollution is extremely important in assuring a wholesome and cultured living for the nation." T h e definition of pollution was expanded to include "contamination of the soil," the responsibility of operators for disposing of waste was made clear, and the protection of the natural environment was stipulated. In December, the JSP, CGP, and DSP jointly submitted a bill for an environmental preservation basic law. T h e y demanded the establishment of an environmental preservation ministry and a system for no-fault damage compensation. But the LDP and the government refused to cooperate. In the end, a joint resolution on environmental preservation in which the LDP participated was passed by the House of Representatives' special committee on antipollution measures and the House of Councilors plenary session. In late November, Keidanren submitted a statement of demands to the LDP, pointing out the problems that it saw in the legislation and requesting that deliberation be approached gingerly. In particular, the zaikai objected to a section in the Justice Ministry's draft of the Pollution Crimes Law that made "those who caused conditions to arise that could potentially endanger the lives or persons of the public" subject to punishment under the law.

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LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980

The zaikai mounted an intense campaign to delay and thereby kill this bill. Reneging on a promise to "submit the original draft as is," the government deleted the passage that read "caused conditions to arise that could potentially cause" so that the section simply said, "those who endangered the lives or persons of the public." Labor unions had not been very aggressive in opposing pollution, partly because they were enterprise unions. But the Synthetic Chemical Industry Workers Union—whose membership consisted largely of the unions of polluting firms—did adopt a program that included action to regulate pollution as one of its major topics for fiscal 1970. The member unions were forced to reconsider the "defend-the-firm" mentality that they had maintained until that point—where they were more likely to side with the firm than the victims in pollution cases. From then on, they became the leaders in Sohyo's pollution banishment struggle, which was based on clarifying firm responsibility and on using local citizens' movements. Sohyo at last prepared an agenda for "antipollution action." In October the four labor organizations of Sohyo, Domei, Churitsu Roren, and Shinsanbetsu decided to begin joint action against pollution and for tax reductions. Although it was quite unusual for the organizations to undertake a joint struggle, it is debatable whether their action exerted any real pressure. (Asahi nenkan 1971: 228-43; Juristo, special edition on pollution, August 10, 1970; Juristo, special edition on pollution legislation, February 10, 1971) The pollution-legislation type of legislative process was related to the regional-development type as light is to shadows, or as positive is to negative. The government and the zaikai were put in a position where they had little choice but to respond to the antipollution citizens' movements, the pressure of progressive local governments, and journalistic reporting—that is, to a style of movement that typifies the mass society condition, which occurred in response to the conflicts engendered by advanced industrialization.

T H E REVERSION OF OKINAWA

The Sato-Johnson Talks When Prime Minister Sato declared his candidacy for party president in 1964, his statement entitled "The Fight for Tomorrow" included the following promise: "Within the context of the Japan-U.S. partnership, Japan will demand from the United States the reversion of Okinawa. In exchange, it will observe a special agreement on bases relating to Okinawa." At that time, however, the reversion of Okinawa, like social development, was intended merely as an election tactic. Although Sato mentioned the reversion of Okinawa to U.S. president Lyndon B.Johnson in January 1965, he did not expect the United States readily to agree.

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It was probably during a visit to Okinawa in August 1965 that Sato seriously resolved to tackle the issue of Okinawa's reversion. When he landed at the Naha airport, he announced, "I fully acknowledge that, for our country, the postwar era will not end until the return of Okinawa to the homeland is realized." The Tôkyù Hotel, where Satô and his delegation were staying, was surrounded by demonstrators led by the "Council for the Return of Okinawa Prefecture to the Homeland." When he returned to Tokyo, the prime minister created a cabinet deliberation council on the Okinawa issue, which put forward a number of policies, including a 50 percent national treasury subsidy for compulsory education costs, free distribution of textbooks, and economic assistance. A study of the method by which sovereignty would be returned was begun at the same time. Foreign Minister Miki spoke with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other U.S. officials about the Okinawa-Bonin Islands issue in September 1967. Washington's response was stern. Although aware of Japanese sentiment, the U.S. government did not think it was desirable to modify the status of the Okinawan bases because the Vietnam situation and the situation in the rest of Asia were still threatening. Nonetheless, the parties involved agreed to hold discussions with the aim of reaching a settlement before Sato's scheduled visit to the United States in November. Miki commented that he was "neither optimistic nor pessimistic." He held preliminary negotiations with U.S. ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson to work out the general framework for the reversion with a near consensus on such issues as the expansion of self-rule in Okinawa and measures for the integration of the mainland and Okinawa. But the question of the reversion of sovereignty was deferred. During Sato's visit to the United States, he and President Johnson released a joint communiqué on November 15 at the conclusion of their talks: " T h e President and the Prime Minister agreed that the two Governments should keep under joint and continuous review the status of the Ryukyu Islands, guided by the aim of returning administrative rights over these Islands to Japan and in the light of these discussions." They added, " T h e Prime Minister stated that Japan is prepared to make a positive contribution to the peace and stability of Asia in accordance with its capabilities." And there would be full Japanese support for U.S. policies in Vietnam. Nonnuctear, on a Par with the Mainland O n his return to Japan, Satô proclaimed "the application of the three nonnuclear principles" to the Bonin Islands in response to a question from JSP secretary general Narita Tomomi on the reversion of the Bonins before a meeting of the extraordinary Diet's budget committee on December 1,1967. (The Bonin Islands were returned in June 1968.) The opposition parties

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proposed a nonpartisan resolution that would apply these principles to Okinawa as well, but the government allowed the proposal to die. In practice, "nonnuclear, on a par with the mainland" would have been extremely difficult to apply to Okinawa. The basic U.S. policy was to maintain the status quo with respect to its Okinawan bases. The Japanese Foreign Ministry, as well, judged that a "special arrangement that allows the deployment and introduction of nuclear weapons" applicable only to Okinawa would be required since otherwise it would be most difficult to fully apply the JapanU.S. Security Treaty and related agreements to a post-reversion Okinawa. But in the first Okinawan chief executive election, on October 10, 1968, the joint opposition candidate, Yara Chobyo, beat the LDP candidate and demanded "nonnuclear, on a par with the mainland" treatment for the islands. On the October 15, Acting Foreign Minister Sato (Foreign Minister Miki resigned on October 29 to run as a candidate for the party presidency) revealed his basic thinking at a press conference at the Foreign Ministry: — A f t e r laying the groundwork, I intend to visit the U n i t e d States n e x t aut u m n a n d talk to President [Richard] N i x o n . — T h e status of the U.S. military bases in O k i n a w a following reversion is still wide o p e n a n d nebulous. — T r e a t m e n t o n a par with the mainland may b e difficult if an early reversion is desired. — I t is said that the Mace B [missiles] allegedly d e p l o y e d in O k i n a w a are now quite old. Since I have n o t heard anything c o n c e r n i n g their replacement, I think that this is a point that should b e taken into consideration. — R e a f f i r m a t i o n of the status q u o is a m o n g the ideas b e i n g considered in the event that there is an early reversion. (Kusuda 1983:1:259)

Party presidential candidate Miki released an outline of policies to local zaikai figures in Osaka on October 15 in which he stated that "negotiations should be conducted with the expectation that the status of the U.S. bases that will accompany the reversion of Okinawa will be 'on a par with the mainland.'" Sato responded at a Sato faction breakfast meeting: 1. I h a d n o t initially i n t e n d e d to attend this general m e e t i n g b u t I f o u n d o u t u p o n reading this morning's p a p e r that Mr. Miki's thinking contains m a j o r discrepancies with the platform that our party has b e e n discussing at length, a n d I intend to m a k e my own thinking clear. 2. I a m staking my political career o n the reversion o f Okinawa. I want the status o f the Okinawan bases ultimately to b e o n a par with the mainland. While it is fine if Mr. Miki's par-with-the-mainland indicates an ultimate objective, if h e means that this is something to take to the u p c o m i n g n e g o tiations, we will run into some extremely difficult problems. 3. T h e bases in O k i n a w a are intimately tied to the maintenance of Japan's security. A l t h o u g h our country has the right o f self-defense, that alone is

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insufficient. We have therefore supplemented the insufficiencies with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and have thereby assured the security of the nation. The bases on the mainland remain insignificant because there are huge bases on Okinawa, and we must recognize the importance of the Okinawan bases. 4. The people of Okinawa desire a return to the homeland from the bottom of their hearts, but they also recognize [the need for] the bases and wish to tie their destiny to that of the mainland. The people understand this point well. To say that the people want parity with the mainland indicates a lack of understanding [on Miki's part]. 5. It was an oversight on my part to have had, until recently, someone serve as foreign minister whose thinking does not agree with mine. (Kusuda 1983:1:360-61)

Sato was reelected to a third term in the presidential election of November 27 and reshuffled his cabinet. He continued to insist that "the status of the bases is wide open" and refused to say whether they would house nuclear weapons. In early March 1969 the "Deliberation Council on Okinawa and Other Issues" submitted its conclusions to the prime minister. Its main points were that an agreement on timing should be reached between the United States and Japan by the end of 1969 and the actual reversion should take place in 1972 at the latest. The Japan-U.S Security Treaty and related agreements should be applied without modification to U.S. facilities after the reversion. On March 3, immediately after the release of this report, Sato responded to a question from a JSP Diet member in the House of Councilors budget committee: "The usefulness of the bases cannot be manifested without the understanding of the people of Okinawa. Since the understanding of Okinawa locally cannot be gained if there are nuclear weapons, I would like to try to persuade [the United States] along these lines." He hinted that the deployment of nuclear weapons in Okinawa might not be absolutely necessary for U.S. nuclear strategy, thereby apparently adopting something close to Miki's position. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hori later wrote: It was during a press conference before the cabinet press club either that noon or that afternoon that the question, "What does this all mean in the end?" was thrust at me. I replied: "Although the prime minister will not say so outright, what he is ultimately trying to say is that he thinks the status of Okinawa's reversion should be on a par with the mainland. Nuclear weapons will not be maintained.... This was my interpretation, but I wasn't completely sure about it. The substance of the press conference was reported in the papers the following morning. The prime minister would either tell me that I shouldn't have said anything of the kind or remain silent. . . . In the end, there was no complaint from the prime minister, and the term "nonnuclear, on a par with the mainland" became firmly rooted. (Hori 1975:120-21)

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Shortly thereafter, Shimoda Takezô, the Japanese ambassador to the United States, reported the U.S. mood: "The opinion of the State Department is quite firm. Under these circumstances, the reversion talks may not reach a conclusion." Satô asserted strongly that "whether they reach a conclusion or not, we must go with 'nonnuclear, on a par with the mainland.' " Hori says, "Although we too were somewhat dubious, if we had been induced to equivocate by the opinion of those in the Foreign Ministry and its outposts, we probably could not have gotten a reversion of the sort that we did. I felt strongly that the prime minister had exercised most extraordinary leadership." (Hori 1975:120-21) Could Satô have received information personally, outside Foreign Ministry channels? Henry Kissinger, special adviser to President Nixon in charge of National Security Council affairs, writes: The political reality was that the pressures in Japan for reversion were now unstoppable; the agitation against our presence not only posed a physical danger to our use of the bases but also could jeopardize the political position of Satô and the governing Liberal Democratic Party, which had initiated and maintained Japan's alignment with the United States for two decades. In short, the military and political risks of seeking to maintain the status quo outweighed the military cost of having somewhat less flexibility in operating the Okinawa bases under Japanese sovereignty. Indeed, our refusal to negotiate an accommodation could well lead as a practical matter to our losing the bases altogether. (Kissinger 1979:327)

On April 30, the National Security Council agreed that if the United States could obtain a satisfactory answer regarding the use of the Okinawan bases for the defense of South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, then Nixon would agree to return sovereignty over Okinawa to Japan and take into consideration the sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons—in other words, Nixon would not insist on the right to store nuclear weapons in Okinawa. (Kissinger 1979:328) When negotiations finally got under way in early June, Togo Fumihiko, chief of the American affairs bureau of the Foreign Ministry, found that "in response to our side's stand that the security treaty and related arrangements would be applied without amendment to the 1972 reversion and to post-reversion Okinawa, during the course of the talks the U.S. side accepted this in principle . . . and agreed to address these issues concretely in a joint communiqué of the prime minister and president." (Tôgô 1982:162-63) The Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué The "nonnuclear, on a par with the mainland" treatment of Okinawa and a reversion in 1972 were agreed to at the Satô-Nixon talks held November 19-21, 1969. Sato's press conference at the Hotel Washington before a

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group ofJapanese reporters at 11 ¡30 p.m. on November 21 was broadcast by satellite to Japan. In it, he said, "The general outline for the reversion of Okinawa agreed to on this occasion between President Nixon and myself is that in 1972 Okinawa will be returned to our country without the presence of any nuclear weapons whatsoever and, after reversion, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and related arrangements will be applied to Okinawa in exactly the way that they are applied to the mainland. No exceptions whatsoever will be established with respect to prior notification. This means that all of the government's principles for negotiating with the United States have been carried out." The circumstances pertaining to prior consultation in the event of an emergency introduction of nuclear weapons were quite complex. Article 4 of the joint communiqué states that "the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to Japan's own security" and "the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also a most important factor for the security of Japan." Article 8 states, "The prime minister described in detail the sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese government reflecting this sentiment. The president expressed his deep understanding and assured the prime minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United States government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese government as described by the prime minister." And in a speech before the National Press Club, Sato said that, should the United States find it necessary to use Japanese bases "for military combat operations" against an "armed attack" on South Korea, "the policy of the Government ofJapan toward prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly" in light of the security of the Far East as a whole and that this principle would apply equally to Taiwan. Kissinger describes the result as "a formula as ingenious as it was empty": T h e U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty h a d a provision f o r prior consultation over e m e r g e n c i e s . If we r e f e r r e d to it in the c o m m u n i q u é , b o t h sides c o u l d satisfy their r e q u i r e m e n t s : Satô c o u l d maintain the a n t i n u c l e a r stance o f his government; N i x o n c o u l d claim that the clause gave us the right to raise t h e issue o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s o n O k i n a w a even in a d v a n c e o f an actual e m e r g e n c y . I p u t this f o r m u l a to " Y o s h i d a , " w h o in turn o b t a i n e d Sato's approval. T h i s still left the p r o b l e m o f h o w the f o r m u l a was to e m e r g e a n d w h o w o u l d surface it. " Y o s h i d a " a n d I w o r k e d o u t a careful script in w h i c h we r e h e a r s e d o u r principals several times so that the p r o p e r r e c o r d w o u l d exist. " Y o s h i d a " c h e c k e d with Satô, w h o t h o u g h t this m i g h t work. Sato w o u l d o p e n with the standard J a p a n e s e position o p p o s i n g any introd u c t i o n o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . N i x o n w o u l d c o u n t e r by tabling a very t o u g h f o r m u l a t i o n of o u r m a x i m u m position. Satô u p o n a few m i n u t e s ' r e f l e c t i o n

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would then produce the previously agreed compromise. After pondering the matter for the benefit of officials (or at least of the record), Nixon would accept Sato's "compromise." That way the formula was a Japanese idea; it had not been imposed; the record would be pristine. (Kissinger 1979:334-35)

"Yoshida" was a mutual friend of Kissinger and Sato's, someone who did not have an official position in the Japanese government but served as Sato's envoy and as a communication channel. (Kissinger 1979:333) The Textile Issue During the presidential election of the preceding year, Nixon had promised Southern textile manufacturers and voters who were being hurt by imports of Japanese synthetic textiles that he would institute protective measures of some sort. In response to this promise, it was decided to hold "the President's decision not to insist on nuclear storage in reserve until the last minute so as to obtain the maximum concessions on textiles." Kissinger recalls, " I was far from enthusiastic about linking an issue of fundamental strategic importance with a transient domestic political problem, and in effect blackmailing the Japanese on a matter of this kind. But I was not in a strong enough position in 1969 to block the collective judgement." (Kissinger 1979:332) Negotiations had been under way since May 1969. The Japanese were initially unyielding but eventually agreed to consider specific restrictive measures. If they had refused, the nonnuclear reversion would have been endangered. Nevertheless, they maintained that the joint communiqué should address only the Okinawa problem, with no linkage to the textile issue. The Americans, however, insisted adamantly on discussing economic issues. In the end, it was decided that general economic issues such as the liberalization of trade and capital flows would be mentioned in Article 12, the last article of the communiqué. "Yoshida" regularly traveled back and forth between Satô and Kissinger as a detailed, top-secret script was prepared. But Satô could not get Japanese industry to act in accord with the script. Nor would U.S. industry behave as Nixon wanted it to. Confusion ensued. Finally, Minister of International Trade and Industry Tanaka and Ambassador David Kennedy settled the matter "forcefully" on October 15. U.S. ambassador to Japan Armin H. Meyer writes, "The textile saga was a long and sad one. No issue during my three-year sojourn in Japan was more vexatious. It poisoned the atmosphere far out of proportion to the issue's intrinsic worth." (Meyer 1974:269-70) The Automatic Extension of the Security Treaty After the release of the joint communiqué in Washington, a timetable went into effect in Japan to convene an extraordinary session of the Diet, dissolve the Diet, and hold a general election. The prime minister and his entou-

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rage arrived at Haneda on November 26. The Diet session was opened on November 29. On December 1 the prime minister discussed the return in 1972 of "a nonnuclear, on a par with the mainland" Okinawa and "the maintenance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty beyond 1970." The government was extremely sensitive about the prospects for a peaceful June 22, 1970, when the ten-year term of the security treaty would expire. The reversion of Okinawa would seem inconsequential if riots occurred like the ones ten years earlier. The student unrest that had spread throughout the universities and colleges during 1968-69 had passed its peak but still was an ominous presence. It is necessary at this point to retrace our steps and discuss the origins of the phrase "maintenance of the security treaty." A deeply rooted group of hardliners within the LDP advocated the extension of the security treaty for a fixed period. In order to soften their attack, Prime Minister Ikeda acceded to their demands and established a security treaty investigation committee in March 1962. The committee prepared a number of reports, but the one that brought it to the attention of those inside and outside the party was the "Interim Report Concerning Our Country's Security" (also known as the Hoshina report) ofJune 1966, under the Sato cabinet, which called for "extending the validity of the security treaty another ten years." The party leadership was not in a position to suppress outright the demands of its right wing. Not only was this issue being debated in a formal party organ, but also support from the intraparty right had been utilized in establishing the Sato cabinet. The Sato cabinet had used the tactic of forced passages in the Diet repeatedly in order to deal with the Japan-South Korea Treaty, the compensation of former landowners whose land had been seized during the land reform, and other issues left over from the Ikeda cabinet. Because the opposition parties and the general public had strongly criticized the "right-leaning" character of the cabinet, it would not have been desirable to bring up the fixed extension at that time. In addition, the Foreign Ministry and the Self-Defense Agency had received word that the U.S. Senate would probably oppose a revision that simply extended the treaty's period of validity while leaving the questionable reciprocal character of the current treaty intact. For these reasons, the party leadership worked hard behind the scenes to contain the fixed extension proposal. When autumn arrived, the political world was shaken wildly by the Black Mist scandal, and the security treaty issue was placed on the back burner. The Diet was dissolved, and Hoshina Zenshiro (de facto acting chairman of the security treaty committee) and Yamamoto Katsuichi, key advocates of a fixed extension, failed to get reelected. In March Kishi returned from an overseas tour with a warning from U.S. secretary of state Dean Rusk that "the treaty revision required for a fixed extension would have to be ratified by the [U.S.] Senate and that would be fraught with problems."

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Funada Naka took up the chairmanship of the security treaty investigation committee in April. Stacking the committee with advocates of automatic extension, he initiated a reconsideration of the security treaty issue and released a second interim report to publicize the reasons why the security treaty was needed. The report argued that "the foundation of Japan's prosperity is the security treaty system." Although it made no mention of the method by which the treaty might be extended, it concluded that "the treaty would be maintained over a rather long period." The "Funada Opinion" of June 1968 was prepared with the expectation that the "1970 security treaty" would become a major point of contention in the upcoming House of Councilors election. At an executive meeting and an Executive Council meeting on June 11, Chairman Funada noted for the first time that "the main current of opinion in the party is leaning toward automatic extension." This was a point on which everyone concurred. But the specific expression used in the "Funada Opinion"—"at the present date, we see no need to make any changes in the treaty"—did not explicitly reject a fixed extension. Nor did it completely rule out a change of position. Furthermore, in an intricate procedure, the document was acknowledged by the Three Party Officers as "Chairman Funada's opinion" and then the secretary general reported it to the prime minister. Although considered de facto party policy, it had not been made official party policy. In October 1969, one year and four months later, with the Sato-Nixon talks rapidly approaching, it was formally adopted as party policy. Needless to say, the U.S. policy of automatically extending the security treaty had been confirmed by then. These were the steps that led up to the reference to maintaining the security treaty in the prime minister's opening address. The Diet was dissolved on December 2, and the general election was held on December 27. The result was a stunning victory for the LDP. Its seats increased from 277 to 288, and when 12 independents were added to the roster, the total reached 300. The JSP suffered a heavy defeat, declining from its earlier 144 seats to 90. The DSP, with 31 seats as compared to its earlier 30, stayed virtually even. Both the J C P and the CGP increased their seats, the former from 5 to 14 and the latter from 25 to 47. Foreign policy investigation committee chairman Kosaka Zentaro read the draft of a party statement declaring automatic extension at an LDP Executive Council meeting on June 19, 1970. There was a momentary silence when he finished reading. A collective sigh was released. "Well, I guess that about does it. It's very well put together." The powerful voice of Fukunaga Kenji broke the silence. Executive Council chairman Suzuki promptly seconded the statement with, "There seems to be no disagreement." The Diet was not in session. As an automatic extension, there was no need for Diet ratification procedures. The strategy of an automatic extension combined

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with the closing of the Diet had been specifically adopted in order to sidestep opposition forces. In any case, friction between the JSP and the JCP as well as clashes between the JSP and the New Left meant that protests were low keyed. Thus, the Sato cabinet successfully navigated the "1970 Security Treaty Crisis." (Asahi Shinbun 1980:77-111) The Nixon

Shocks

At 10:30 p.m. on July 15,1971 (11:30 a.m., July 16, Japan time), President Nixon announced that he would visit China by May 1972. His plans were announced simultaneously in Beijing. The joint announcements also revealed that this development was the result of a series of talks that Nixon's special envoy Kissinger had held with China's Premier Zhou Enlai during top-secret trips to Beijing between July 9 and July 11. Information concerning the announcement had not been communicated over the "hot line" linking the Japanese Prime Minister's Residence and the White House, which had been installed ostensibly for the purpose of discussing emergency developments. The Japanese government was notified one hour before the president's speech in a telephone call from Secretary of State Rogers to Japanese ambassador to the United States Ushiba Nobuhiko. The information was passed on to the Japanese Foreign Ministry by an overseas telephone call from Ushiba. The news reached the Prime Minister's Residence at 11:27 a.m., just as a cabinet meeting to review the draft of the next day's opening speech before the Diet was about to end. Although Sato welcomed Nixon's China visit in his Diet speech on July 15, he must have been dealt a severe blow. The Sino-U.S. rapprochement was not entirely unexpected. The potential for approaches between the two countries existed: Chinese relations with the Soviet Union had worsened, and the United States needed to end the war in Vietnam. But no one had expected the international situation relating to China to change dramatically for some time. Japanese government leaders assumed that the United States would discuss any major change in U.S. policy—and particularly one relating to the China issue, where the effect on Japan would be extremely great—with the Japanese government ahead of time. As late as June 9, a month before Kissinger visited China, assurances were exchanged between Foreign Minister Aichi and Secretary of State Rogers, who were putting the finishing touches on the Okinawa reversion agreement in Paris, that "close contact would be maintained regarding the China issue." President Nixon delivered another shock on August 15, when he announced his "New Economic Policy," which included a temporary suspension of the dollar's convertibility into gold. The Japanese government and the Bank of Japan adopted a policy of "maintaining the existing exchange rate" and kept the Tokyo foreign exchange markets open even though

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various European countries had closed theirs. It then tried to sustain the ¥360-$! exchange rate by buying up dollars. By August 27, however, it was forced to allow a flexible exchange rate. The highlight of the international diplomatic scene that autumn was the issue of China's entry into the United Nations. Until then, the United States, Japan, and other countries had countered an Albanian resolution to give the PRC a seat and expel Taiwan by designating the motion an "important question" that required approval by a two-thirds vote. At the U.N. General Assembly the previous year, this designation was passed by a majority vote, but at the same time the Albanian resolution gained majority support. By the end o f j u n e 1971, the number of countries recognizing the PRC exceeded those recognizing Taiwan. In this context, Nixon announced his China visit. It was extremely likely that China would gain a seat at the General Assembly meeting that fall. Secretary of State Rogers announced the U.S. policy on the question on August 2: the United States would support China's seat in the United Nations and in the Security Council, but it would oppose the expulsion of Taiwan and consider Taiwan's expulsion an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. It was uncertain whether this policy would triumph or even whether the United States intended to make a positive effort to garner a majority on its behalf. The Japanese government was placed in a difficult position because it was unable to gauge the true intentions of the United States. Mistrust had grown since the Nixon Shocks. Furthermore, strong opinions opposing Japan's co-sponsorship of the U.S. proposal had been put forward not just by the opposition parties, as might be expected, but also within the LDP itself by Miki, Ohira, and others. Naturally, considerations relating to who would run the post-Sato government were involved. Secretary General Hori, fearing that the expansion of this debate would lead to fighting within the party that would make ratification of the Okinawa reversion agreement difficult, established a party position on September 21 in which the goyaku (five party officers—i.e., the "Three Party Officers" plus the vice prime minister and the chairman of the LDP assembly of Councilors) would deliberate on the matter with the prime minister and decide the party's stance. At the same time, the cabinet agreed to leave the matter entirely in the hands of the prime minister. Hori hoped to convince Sato thatJapan should not become a co-sponsor. Fukuda, who was regarded as Sato's probable successor, also opposed the co-sponsorship. Hori and Fukuda recommended to Sato that the matter be left undecided until the Diet session ended. Sato nevertheless announced on September 22 that Japan, along with the United States, would become a co-sponsoring country. At a press conference he said, "I do not have much confidence in the likelihood of winning, but maintaining principles is something that will be welcomed internationally."

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O n the subject of opposition within the LDP, he remarked sharply that "the great majority feel that China should be welcomed into the United Nations and Taiwan's seat should be secured, and this is party policy." O n September 25 the U.N. General Assembly defeated the reverse "important question" designation (55 votes for, 59 votes against, 25 abstentions, and 2 absentees) and passed the Albanian resolution by an unexpectedly large margin (76 votes for, 35 votes against, 17 abstentions, and 3 absences). (Furukawa 1981:329-59; Kusuda 1983:2:271-84) The Okinawa Diet During the extraordinary Diet session that began on October 16, the JSP, CGP, and DSP joined with the pro-China element in the LDP to put pressure on the Sato cabinet. After a motion of no confidence against Foreign Minister Fukuda and MITI minister Tanaka, who had negotiated the China representation issue and the textile issue, was defeated in early November, deliberation turned to the Okinawa reversion agreement. O n the afternoon of November 5, Foreign Minister Fukuda took the stand to explain the treaty at the House of Representatives plenary session. About ten minutes into his testimony, he abruptly j u m p e d from an explanation of Article 2 to an explanation of Article 7. The draft of his speech had been misstapled. Realizing the mistake, the foreign minister retracted the incorrect section of his speech and restarted his explanation at Article 3. The chamber, however, was in an uproar. The entire opposition delegation walked out, and the explanatory speech had to be repeated the following day. The JSP, CGP, and DSP, claiming that the "nonnuclear, on a par with the mainland" characterization was fraudulent, opposed the reversion agreement and demanded renegotiation. The three parties were united in their intent to bring down the cabinet. Meanwhile, the U.S. Senate ratified the reversion agreement on November 10. There was no turning back. In the face of the opposition parties' attempt to drag out the deliberations, the LDP passed the reversion agreement without warning on November 17 by a forced vote during a special committee meeting. Against the LDP's claim that the passage was valid and the item should now be deliberated in the plenary session, the opposition parties argued that the passage was invalid and demanded that the item be returned to the committee. The speaker of the House of Representatives tried to mediate but was turned away by the opposition. The business of the Diet ground to a halt. This was a familiar pattern of conflict, a repeat of the second stage of the security treaty conflict. Following the forced passage and the idling of the Diet, the extraparliamentary movement began to expand. In Okinawa, a second general strike led by the Council for the Return of Okinawa Prefec-

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ture to the Homeland had begun on November 10. Under the banner of total reversion, renegotiation, smashing the reversion treaty, and blocking related legislation—and with the participation of All Japan Garrison Forces Labor Union, the prefectural teachers union, Kankoro, the Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union, and others—the strike was, at roughly 100,000 participants (figures released by the action committee), the largest of the postwar period. Around 6:00 P.M., during the final march of the day, a group of radicals clashed with riot police. One policeman died after being struck by a fire bomb and beaten with sticks. Before the general strike, Chief Executive Yara had requested that "the people of the prefecture maintain their composure during this historic transitional period." In response to this incident, he released a statement that said that "the radical group should reflect on its actions and forthrightly atone for its crime." In Tokyo, Chukaku faction students called for a "riot in the capital" and went on a rampage in Shibuya on November 15, in which one police officer died. During a unified national action on November 19 as well, radical groups threw fire bombs and clashed with police. Matsumotoro restaurant in Hibiya Park was burned down, and one security officer died of shock. According to figures released by the movement's sponsors, 270,000 people (78,000 people according to police reports) participated in the central rally in Yoyogi Park on November 19. According to a Police Agency count, 526,000 people in 883 locations in all 46 prefectures participated in the unified national action. This figure is said to surpass the highest count of the security treaty struggle. Gaining confidence, the JSP and the JCP demanded the resignation of the Sato cabinet. On the one hand, as the idling of the Diet entered its third day, voices calling for a forced vote grew louder inside the LDP. On the other hand, some anti-mainstream faction leaders counseled caution and attempted to hold back the party executive. If the party had proceeded with a forced vote in the House of Representatives plenary session at this point, the pattern would have been identical to that of the security treaty crisis. The Asahi shinbun reported as follows on November 20: "The LDP resolved to use the powers of the speaker to open a plenary session of the House of Representatives and forcefully and unilaterally deliberate on the Okinawa reversion agreement if necessary. However, the opposition parties have not softened their hard-line position of refusing to deliberate unless the LDP changes its stance. Those around Speaker Funada believe that they would like to continue negotiations with the opposition parties until right before the opening of the plenary session but, given the rigid position of the opposition, the situation will be extremely difficult to bring under control." At talks between the secretaries general of the LDP, JSP, CGP, and DSP that began shortly after 6:00 P.M. on November 20, LDP secretary general Hori tried to prevail on the opposition parties. The CGP edged closer to

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the LDP position by maintaining that "the government and the LDP support a resolution on the three nonnuclear principles and a reduction of bases in Okinawa." The DSP agreed, and Hori accepted the proviso. Tomono Torao, secretary general of the House of Representatives, commented, "It felt as if I was watching the opposition party joint action, which had prided itself on its monolithic solidarity, collapse right before my very eyes, with its pieces ripping away loudly, one by one." (Hori 1975:136) Hori recalls: The terrible situation in the Diet continued. I too had no assurances but plunged ahead at full speed, ready to battle to the end. The cabinet could not resign without getting the ratification. It had no choice but to seek a national solution via a dissolution election, regardless of how that might play internationally. With the final stage of the deliberations upon us, I called a conference of the secretaries general. It turned into quite a long conference, and the JSP's Ishibashi [Masashi] argued, " T h e outcome is going to be the same no matter how long we continue. Let's stop and end it here." He wanted the talks to break down early on a note of "disharmony." . . . I had everyone exercise patience. There were a lot of reporters waiting to see who would leave the room. Since that person would probably have to say something, it would not do to have anyone leave. So, after a difficult fight, we finally reached a compromise on the three nonnuclear principles. The effort that the secretaries general Yano [Jun'ya] of the CGP and Sasaki [Ryôsaku] of the DSP put into this was considerable. (Hori 1975:134-35)

The LDP anti-mainstream watched from the sidelines, waiting for Sato's withdrawal, while the CGP and the DSP cooperated with the LDP. The special committee meeting on November 22 and the plenary session on November 24 were held with the JSP and the JCP absent. The reversion treaty was at last approved. The memories of the nightmare of i960 and the emergence of multiple parties thus combined to halt the unfolding of the "security treaty" type of process in midstream.

T H E SUCCESSORSHIP ISSUE: FUKUDA AND TANAKA

Sato Maneuvers for a Fourth Term With the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. joint communiqué in November 1969 and the automatic extension of the security treaty the following year, it appeared that the Sato government had accomplished its mandate. The government, now six years old, had been in power for a long time. The attention of the political world was thus directed toward the question of when and how Sato would retire and whether he would run for party president in late October 1970. Asked at a press conference on December 28, 1969, if, given the tremendous election victory, he intended to run for a fourth term,

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Sato replied in good spirits: "It's a little early. . . . There were voices during the election telling me to serve a fourth term, but I did not give a specific answer." At a press interview on January 4 during a visit to Ise Shrine, he commented, "Character is an issue [in finding a successor], and personal effort is also required in order to become president. But that is not all. I must also lend a hand and cultivate a successor. . . . There are three whom I am currently considering." (Kusuda 1983:2:108, no) He was considering Fukuda, Tanaka, and—could the third have been Maeo? Sato's favorite was Fukuda. Fukuda had arrived late in the political world because he was implicated and indicted in the Showa Denko scandal when he was chief of the Finance Ministry budget bureau. He captured his first Diet seat in the 1952 general election. During the Ikeda cabinet period, he organized the Party Style Revitalization Federation and continually criticized Ikeda. He was known as the "prince of the Kishi faction." Sato began treating Fukuda as his successor early on, placing him in such key posts as finance minister and party secretary general. And observers also considered Fukuda the successor president. The general reading was that if the Kishi/ Fukuda faction placed Chief Cabinet Secretary Hori in Tanaka's old position of secretary general, if the anti-Fukuda vice premier Rawashima was kicked upstairs to become speaker of the House of Representatives in the personnel reshuffling following the huge general election victory, and if Sato himself "lent a hand" in choosing his successor, then the birth of a Fukuda government would indeed be close at hand. According to the aide Kusuda, on the afternoon ofJanuary 8, Kawashima asked for an appointment with Sato. They decided to meet at Sato's villa in Kamakura late in the afternoon on Sunday, January 11. On January 10, it was reported from Chigasaki that the prime minister had told reporters that he and Kawashima had "arranged to eat dinner together and talk. I do not believe that Kawashima intends to accept the speakership. If he did, I doubt that he would take the trouble to come out to Kamakura." In this way, he revealed that the main subject of their conversation would not be the Kawashima speakership but rather the next step of who would become secretary general. With the decision made that Kawashima would remain in the office of vice premier, it seemed that Secretary General Tanaka, whom Kawashima was backing, would also remain in office. (Kusuga 1972:58-59) Therefore, the third Sato cabinet, which came into being on January 14, continued the existing Kawashima-Tanaka line. Perhaps Sato was uneasy about Fukuda's lack of personal magnetism and authority. And he himself may have had an appetite for a fourth term. Kimura Toshio, who was deputy chief cabinet secretary and close to Sato, says that one day, as he entered the business office of the prime minister's residence, Sato abruptly asked him, "Kimura, why is Fukuda forever grooming his feathers?" Kimura replied, "Oh, they will groom themselves naturally

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once he becomes party president." Kimura later interpreted this incident to mean that "deep in Sato's subconscious, he had the feeling that only he himself was up to the task for the time being. And the feeling that, since Fukuda did not yet have enough power, he must hold the fort a bit longer in order to allow Fukuda to inherit [the presidency]. And also the subconscious feeling, 'I want a fourth term.' The Kawashima-Tanaka line served his purposes." (Kusuda 1983:2:107) Tanaka himself had worked hard on behalf of Sato's reelection in November 1968. His reward was the return of the post of secretary general. (He had resigned in November 1966 in conjunction with the Black Mist scandal.) Tanaka sensed that Sato had Fukuda in mind, and to fight Fukuda would be tantamount to challenging Sato. He therefore adopted the strategy of supporting Sato while increasing the number of people tied to him inside the Sato faction. Ito recalls: I secretly thought, " T h e person who gained the most power in the recent presidential election was Tanaka. Tanaka used Sato's second reelection as a pretext for conducting a rehearsal of his own presidential election. Under the cover of the Sato faction, he has planted Tanaka-affiliated Diet members in various places. These will undoubtedly break out of their cocoons someday. Tanaka has gotten Maeo and Ohira's Kochikai on his side; he must currently have 100 Diet members under his influence. If one includes the 'line fishing' of the neutrals, it would probably total to 120 or 130 people." About a month later, I heard something from "sources close to Tanaka" . . . that seemed to validate this: "Tanaka's money made the difference in Sato's second reelection. Tanaka, having gained self-assurance, is starting to act independently. It would be very easy for him to overturn a Sato cabinet decision for the purpose of manipulating the Diet. Tanaka's power is considerable, and even Kishi is starting to panic." "This is a fight between Tanaka and Fukuda. No, it's probably a fight between Tanaka and Sato. Ohira has fallen very far behind." I could only nod in agreement. Nonetheless, someone with the kind of political influence that Sato Eisaku had was not about to let Tanaka Kakuei pull the rug from under him so easily. This fight is going to drag on, I surmised. (Ito 1982:26-27)

In order to establish his influence, Tanaka had to bide his time, because an early Sato retirement would lead to a Fukuda presidency. A fourth term for Sato was thus desirable, and following a press conference by the prime minister on December 27 in the wake of the December 1969 general election, Secretary General Tanaka gathered the reporters assigned to him and interpreted the prime minister's mindset as one where "a fourth term was a certainty." In the personnel reshuffling of January 1970, he pushed back an attack of the Fukuda-Hori line. Since there was a danger that the solidarity

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of the party might be broken if the status quo was modified, Sato was forced to choose the path of least resistance. T h e morning edition of the January 13 Asahi shinbun observed: The LDP Three Party Officers in the new Sato administration will be Tanaka of the Sato faction as secretary general, Suzuki of the Maeo faction as Executive Council chairman (both incumbents), and Mizuta of the Funada faction as PARC chairman. . . . The leadership in the party management has been given to the "anti-Fukuda forces" with the Tanaka-Maeo line as its axis. To put it the other way around, the establishment of the firm foothold for a "Fukuda government" that the Hori-Fukuda line was seeking has been frustrated, and it is now extremely difficult to predict the direction in which the "post-Sato" government will head. As spring turned to summer, the Kawashima-Tanaka line encouraged Sato in his fourth-term mood. Fukuda, who thought he would be the next prime minister, found himself in a position where he had no choice but to support Sato if he ran for a fourth term. Fukuda had repeatedly stated that "one should become party president at the request of supporters." As the fourth term mood intensified, voices began to be heard in the Fukuda camp that said: " T h e creation of a Fukuda government will be made easier if we allow him a fourth term. All we will need to do is inherit Sato's legacy in toto at the appropriate time." Meanwhile, Secretary General Tanaka was working through MITI minister Ohira to put a damper on the Maeo faction's effort to line up a majority. As the maneuvering for a fourth term proceeded, Sato commented in an interview before the cabinet press club, "You may be anxious to ask whether I will run for a fourth term. However, I would like to say that this is a small, small issue. What is needed to make the people happy is for the political situation to be stable and the LDP to be strong." O n June 29, at the Osaka World's Fair "Japan Day," he stated, "I have not yet decided whether I will run in the presidential election, nor is this the time to give you a clear-cut answer. Whatever it might be, the LDP's handling of the political situation is solid. You do not have to concern yourself with the issue of whether it will be Sato or someone else." (Kusuda 1983:2:126-27) The Kochikai: Maeo and Ohira At Maeo's "Kochikai" group, the rupture between Maeo and Ohira had gradually widened following Ikeda's death in August 1965. Ito notes that "Maeo packed virtually all of the Kochikai's caretaker positions with his own men. Ohira, as if to counterattack, established a new office and gathered younger Diet members together to form the 'Thursday Society.' The Kochikai's funds were in Maeo's hands, and Ohira began collecting his own political funds independently. . . . Outsiders were probably not aware of [the

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clash between the two], but it reverberated deeply within me." (Ito 1982: 20-21) Factions without presidential candidates have trouble keeping up morale. They are ripe for the picking by other candidates. In order to preserve his organization, Maeo was forced to run as a candidate in the November 1968 presidential election even though he knew he had no chance at all of winning. The collection of funds was left to Ohira and the gathering of votes to Suzuki. Maeo himself did not show very much enthusiasm. The result was worse than anticipated. At 96 votes, it was less than Miki obtained. The members of the Kochikai despaired. They were unhappy with Maeo and his lack of fight. Moves to bring about an Ohira candidacy ensued. By late July 1970, Ohira had gained control of the Kochikai and maintained close contact with Tanaka. Ohira told Ito: I have gotten control of everyone in the Kochikai. There are only three or four who have slipped through the cracks. The younger members are telling me to "make it clear" (i.e., become chairman of the Kochikai and enter the presidential race). Those around Maeo as well are telling him, " D o not run." This is the first item. The second item is about Tanaka Kakuei. When I met with Tanaka, he said, " . . . Whatever happens, the important thing is our footing [support in the party]. Let's make sure it's solid." (Ito 1 9 8 2 : 1 2 2 - 2 3 )

The officers of the Kochikai decided to back Maeo that summer. However, they were also concerned that the faction might collapse if he challenged Sato. At the same time, faction veterans believed that if Maeo entered a Sato cabinet where there was a rivalry between Fukuda and Tanaka, an opportunity might present itself for Maeo to become the lucky bystander who inherited the Sato successorship. Kawashima and Tanaka allegedly promised that they would give Maeo a key cabinet post in the cabinet reshuffling following the third reelection. Maeo met with Prime Minister Sato on September 22 and promised his cooperation. He had given up his candidacy. The Kawashima-Tanaka maneuvering thereby achieved its objective. The October 29 presidential election became a one-on-one battle between Sato and Miki. The results were 353 votes for Sato and 111 votes for Miki out of a total of 481. The Kawashima-Tanaka line's maneuvering was unable to stop Miki's candidacy and a greater-than-expected 128 anti-Sato votes were cast. Miki, who had launched his challenge under the banner of transforming people's hearts and minds, was in high spirits: "What we have today is not a defeat. It is a new first step toward victory in the presidential election two years hence." Sato met with Maeo immediately after his reelection and communicated his intention to forego a reshuffling of the cabinet. Maeo did not voice any objection. After that, Sato gathered together Kawashima, Tanaka, Hori, and

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others and related what had happened. While his action came as a surprise to Kawashima and Tanaka, who were expecting Maeo to enter the cabinet, it was too late. (Shortly thereafter, on November 9, Kawashima died suddenly of heart failure stemming from an asthma attack.) The Kochikai became indignant when it heard about the decision not to reshuffle the cabinet and called Maeo to task for his timidity. He apologized profusely and said dejectedly, "I do not believe that I have been tricked by Prime Minister Sato!" These circumstances made it clear that it was time for Maeo to hand the Kochikai over to Ohira. The transferal did not, however, proceed smoothly. The Kochikai decided on November 18 to set up a group leadership system, establishing a five-man committee under Chairman Maeo composed of Ohira, Suzuki, and others. Then on April 17, 1971, Ohira was formally installed as Kochikai chairman. "The clean Maeo had borrowed quite a bit of money to operate the Kochikai. This was a major factor hastening his withdrawal. Political funds flow in search of power rather than cleanliness." (Ito 1982:44) Ohira recollects: In April 1971,1 assumed Maeo's mantle and became chairman of the "Kochikai." This particular changing of the guard was not something that Maeo had planned willingly, nor was it something that I had set up. Maeo's health was not particularly good at this time and, on top of this, dissatisfaction had appeared inside the Kochikai—primarily among the younger members—because Maeo, who had challenged Sato's second [actually, third] run in a presidential election, had not challenged him in his third [actually, fourth] run. I did not intend to oppose Maeo if he continued to run the Kochikai. But I felt that if the younger members who were dissatisfied would not bow to my efforts at persuasion and insisted on parting with Maeo, then, like it or not, I could not very well let them destroy themselves. Furthermore, if Maeo said that he wanted to delegate responsibility to me to manage the Kochikai, then I was certainly prepared to take over. So I asked Maeo to make a decision. In the end, Maeo chose the path of leaving the Kochikai to me, and I decided to take up the request. (Ohira 1 9 7 8 : 1 2 1 - 2 2 )

The Revolt in the House of Councilors

The LDP suffered another painful blow in the April 1971 unified local elections. Tokyo's governor Minobe Ryokichi was reelected by an overwhelming margin, Kuroda Ryoichi beat the incumbent governor in Osaka, and in Yokohama Mayor Asukata Ichio won a third term. All three were progressives. In the June House of Councilors election as well, the LDP won 62 contested seats, below its earlier 69. The number of JSP seats, on the other hand, increased sharply from 28 to 38. The DSP seats went from 7 to 6, the CGP's fell from 13 to 10, and the JCP's increased from 4 to 6.

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On July 5 Prime Minister Sato replaced the Three Party Officers and shuffled the cabinet. Secretary General Tanaka resigned, citing the election defeat as a reason, and moved to minister of international trade and industry. The succeeding secretary general was Hori. Ito makes the following assessment: "There is nothing more indicative of the mindset of a prime minister than his personnel choices. It is clear that Sato did not consider Tanaka to be prime ministerial material. If anything, one could detect a desire to keep him away from the government. At the time, it was likely that almost no one knew this. However, there was one man who was painfully aware of it. This was none other than Tanaka Kakuei." (Ito 1982:52) At the same time, Sato made Fukuda foreign minister in order to allow him to obtain the prestige that would come from accompanying the emperor on an overseas tour in September and October. But an unforeseen obstacle appeared during the vote for the speakership of the House of Councilors. Shigemune Yuzo, who had served as speaker for nine years, had consistently supported Sato as the power wielder in the "Clean Breeze Club" (Seifu Kurabu). On July 7, Kono Kenzo, the younger brother of the late Kono Ichiro, distributed a letter entitled "Now That the Election Is Over" to all 252 members of the House of Councilors and appealed for a reform of the house. In response, the House of Councilors' twelve-member, anti-Shigemune "Cherry Blossom Society" (Sakurakai) declared its support for Kono. The LDP had 137 seats in the upper house. Twelve less votes would make an opposition victory possible. The opposition parties therefore went along with Kono. On July 13 Kono declared his candidacy in order to block a fourth term for Shigemune. On July 16 Shigemune announced that he would not run. Owing to a misunderstanding, Kono failed to withdraw his candidacy. The result was 128 votes for Kono and 116 votes for Kiuchi Shiro, who ran in Shigemune's place. Kono, who was anti-Sato and close to Tanaka, became the speaker. Kono recalls: Inside the LDP, it was Miki who encouraged me. "Don't back out, now. He [Shigemune] has done all kinds of things, so firm up your resolve and do it." . . . Miki, who alone had resisted the Sato government, probably felt that the time had come to put an end to bureaucratic government. I believe that Miki and I were in agreement on this point. I also felt that Kaku [Tanaka Kakuei] was encouraging me secretly. Since he was one of the pillars of the Sato government, he could not wish me well, but I could tell from his attitude when I ran into him in the halls of the Diet. He would, for instance, shake my hand very firmly. (Kono 1978:34-35) Tanaka and Ohira On October 22,1971, before the opening of the Okinawa Diet that year, Secretary General Hori "had an important conversation with Prime Minister

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Sato . . . [that] will never ever disappear from my memory." Hori recommended that Sato retire after the ratification: " O n c e there is the good fortune of the ratification's success, perhaps it is time to put things behind you in the political situation as well." "I think so, too. But that could very well wait until the new year, couldn't it?" (Hori 1975:134; Kishimoto 1981:147) In the meantime, Tanaka had commenced a secret campaign to line up a majority. Meetings of the Tanaka, Miki, Ohira, and Nakasone factions were held often toward the year's end. Fukuda, whose strategy was to have Sato lay the groundwork, refrained from engaging in any visible maneuvering. Ohira met secretly with Tanaka on New Year's Eve. They had earlier made a pact to the effect that Tanaka would do all that he could to establish an Ohira government. While Ohira had been in a considerably more advantageous position than Tanaka during the Ikeda era, Tanaka had accumulated influence during the Sato era and was beginning to find this vow quite burdensome. In June 1969 he revealed to Suzuki, "I will not be bound by my promise with Ohira. . . . I will decide the matter in accord with the circumstances when the time comes." (Ito 1982:28-30) The San Clemente Conundrum Asked at his first press conference of the year on January 4, 1972, whether his "successor would be determined through a battle" or through a deal, Sato replied, "Isn't it the LDP way to do things according to the party regulations? . . . It's okay if it's a fight among gentlemen, isn't it?" Sato left the next day, accompanied by Foreign Minister Fukuda and MITI minister Tanaka, to attend a U.S.-Japan summit meeting in San Clemente, California. It was decided there that Okinawa's reversion would occur on May 15. But the attention of the political world was drawn toward the succession issue, and there was speculation that Sato might make his intentions known at the meeting. An outdoor reception was held at Nixon's home on January 7. T h e seat at the head table to the left of Sato and Nixon, where the second-highest ranking Japanese official was to be seated, was reassigned somewhere along the line from Fukuda to Tanaka. Spokesmen for Tanaka explained that his accomplishments in the textile negotiations—the Japan-U.S. textile agreement was formally signed a few days earlier—were being recognized by Nixon. Those speaking for Fukuda asserted that Tanaka had arranged the change. O n January 8, following the end of the formal agenda, the Japanese delegation boarded a yacht for a cruise from Newport Beach to Long Beach. T h e press delegation boarded a separate yacht. Thanks to a rumor that Sato was at last going to cut a deal with Tanaka and Fukuda, the press yacht was packed. During the cruise, Tanaka stood alone, facing the reporters on the

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other yacht. He saluted, stood at attention, and otherwise clowned around. He remained in sight for the entire one-and-a-half-hour cruise. Tanaka may very well have been avoiding Sato and Fukuda. Throughout the entire trip, he hurried off to play golf in the early morning hours and whenever else he had any free time. (Nakano 1982:65-66) In the end, nothing happened during the trip, which the public came to label "the San Clemente conundrum." In the meantime, in accord with the discussions of October 23, Hori prepared a script for Sato's retirement at the January 21 regular party convention. Sato, however, refused to follow the script. Was this because he wanted to welcome Okinawa's reversion as prime minister? At a press conference on February 3 in Sapporo, he commented, "It seems that the gendemen of the opposition parties are not arguing very strenuously because I am about to retire. It appears that the reopened Diet will go smoothly." He added that the successor issue was a "dispute among gentlemen." Tanaka's maneuvering became all the more aggressive after the new year arrived. On January 9, the Tanaka, Ohira, and Nakasone factions met secretly and established a trifactional coalition. In March Tanaka's troops began firing "live ammunition." A new group, known as the Kakumaru faction appeared in the LDP. (In this case, Kakumaru referred to people who received money [mam] from Tanaka [Kakuei], although the term was usually used to signify a faction at the forefront of the radical student movement.) The fury increased daily. Hashimoto Tomisaburo, head of the Sato faction "Thursday Society," who was mediating between those loyal to Tanaka and those loyal to Hori, came out in support of Tanaka and initiated an offensive in the House of Councilors. The speaker of the upper house, Kono Kenzo, comments, "The House of Councilors' LDP contingent ultimately shifted to support for Tanaka. If the Shigemune administration had been in good shape, it would surely have coalesced firmly in support of Fukuda. It is clear that the success of the Kono rebellion against Shigemune a year earlier was now working in favor of Tanaka's insurrection against the Sato-Fukuda line of bureaucratic politics." (Kono 1978:94) At the invitation of Kimura Takeo, 81 members of the Sato faction from both houses met on May 9 and proclaimed their support for Tanaka. There were 102 members in the Sato faction at the time. Ito recalls: T h e Tanaka faction formally raised its banner on May 9. T h e earlier underground movement had now become public. With this, the Sato faction had in effect split into the Tanaka faction and the rest. "Prime Minister Sato is probably seething inside, and Secretary General Hori is probably finding this trying," I thought. "In any event, Tanaka's methods are frightening." To be honest, I too was taken aback. He would advance a little at a time, in a way that did not allow Prime Minister Sato to challenge him. Just as Sato began sensing that something was

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amiss, Tanaka would . . . burst into action. Sato would then think about trying to push Tanaka back but would realize that the negative consequences were too great. Tanaka would express his allegiance as Sato tried to come up with countermeasures. Just about the time that Sato forgot about what had happened, Tanaka would suddenly burst into action once a g a i n . . . . Things were beyond remedy for Sato. The situation was one where he could do little but sit quiedy and watch as Tanaka raised his banner. (Ito

1982:78-79)

The Ohira faction also began to move. At 8:00 A.M. on February 8, eight people—Ohira and five other Representatives plus Ito and Kimura of the Kochikai staff—met at a condominium in Aoyama. This de facto electionmanagement committee continued to meet about once a week until the presidential election to exchange and analyze information as well as determine strategy. They hoped to add to the 70 or so solid votes that they already had in the two Diet houses. They could not make inroads into the Fukuda or Tanaka factions. Nor was the Miki faction easy. Ultimately, the Nakasone and neutral factions became their target. They analyzed the situation in the electoral districts and tried to determine which ones they could influence most easily. Each Diet member was given a quota of five or so people. They intensified their contacts with the targeted individuals and ultimately had them meet with Ohira. This "man-to-man" strategy was truly an underground movement. Ohira was given the largest number of targets. (Ito 1982: 67) But Maeo adopted a wait-and-see attitude and would not budge until May 24. At a general meeting of the Ohira faction on that day, it was made clear that the Ohira faction would not vote for Tanaka in the first round of voting. This undoubtedly reassured the Fukuda faction. Sato formally announced his retirement on June 17. The contest over his successor was thrust onto center stage. Sato had lost the opportunity to lead in the selection of his successor. Or more accurately, he had lost his leadership capacity entirely. Perhaps he should have stepped down earlier and backed Fukuda. Kimura Toshio says, "Sato should not have run for a fourth term. The times had already changed. . . . As a close associate, I feel that I was responsible for having Sato make the wrong moves, and this all started with Sato's attempt to run the fourth time." (Miyazaki 1980:40)

FOUR

Remodeling the Archipelago

THE 1972 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE TANAKA CABINET A Contest Among Gentlemen

The Diet session ended on June 16. Before noon on the following day, Sato announced his resignation at an LDP assembly of both houses. It was decided that the presidential election would be held on July 5. Following a television broadcast from the Prime Minister's Residence, Sato encouraged Fukuda, who had come to visit him, by saying, "Now that you have made up your mind, I want you to do everything that you can to win." The Fukuda camp was overjoyed that Sato had come out in support of Fukuda. Tanaka arrived next. To him, Sato said, "I want you to make this a contest among gendemen." Tanaka had assembled Diet members from both houses at the Hotel New Otani that morning and held a rally in support of his candidacy. Following Sato's withdrawal announcement, a campaign caretaker committee of thirty Diet members was formed. Sato called in Fukuda and Tanaka on June 19. Fukuda comments: [Sato] told us the following. "I don't know which of you two it will be, but since both of you have been my supporters, no matter which of you comes in first, it would be a good idea for the one who comes in second to support him. Let's make a promise right here that you will." This was his proposal. To this, I said, first, "I am all for it. If I come in second, I will support Tanaka." Tanaka said that he agreed and that he would go along. But he also said, "Please keep this matter quiet. Should word of this leak out, certain things might no longer be possible." So I kept quiet and Tanaka kept quiet. Nor did Sato mention this matter to others. (Fukuda Takeo, "Haisho hei o kataru," Mainichi shinbun, July 31,1972) 123

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The Tanaka faction gathered the senior leaders of the Ohira, Miki, Nakasone, and Ishii factions and formed an anti-Fukuda alliance called the "Monday Society" (Getsuyokai). Associations known as the "February Society" (Kisaragikai) in the House of Representatives and the "March Society" (Yayoikai) in the House of Councilors had already been formed among the younger members. The Sato faction split, with 82 members going to Tanaka and 22 to Hori. Those affiliated with Hori supported Fukuda. The morning editions on June 20 carried the headline, "Nakasone Will Not Run, Decides to Support Tanaka." Sato had been trying to get Nakasone to declare his candidacy. Although Nakasone could not win, if the Nakasone faction voted for him in the first round of balloting, it would be disastrous for Tanaka, who was counting on those votes. Tanaka did all that he could to frustrate Sato's effort. With Nakasone's decision, Tanaka and Fukuda were running neck and neck. But then enthusiasm for Tanaka increased, and the five neutral factions began to lean toward Tanaka. The Fukuda camp received a shock when Sato announced in his home prefecture of Yamaguchi on June 21 that he would not "engage in TanakaFukuda mediation." Although he tried to assist Fukuda until the very last minute, his influence had already waned. He called in Hashimoto Tomisaburo, Aichi Kiichi, and others to ask for their cooperation but ended up arguing with them. He called in Hashimoto Ryutaro and Obuchi Keizo, whose fathers he had also taken care of, but they snapped back at him: "We're adults now and will make our own decisions." Tanaka officially declared his candidacy on June 21. Gathered at his feet were 40 Representatives from the old Sato faction and 45 Councilors. There were 32 junior Diet members in the Sato faction who had served five terms or less; of these, 27 had gone over to the Tanaka faction. Forty of the 71 members of the House of Councilors' "Clean Breeze Society" joined him. These figures increased thereafter. A federation of Tanaka supporters was formed in the House of Councilors on June 23. The morning papers all reported on June 30 that Tanaka was ahead and predicted that he would obtain 170 votes in the first round of voting. On July 2 a four-faction alliance consisting of the Tanaka, Miki, Ohira, and Nakasone factions was established. Ito recalls: A message arrived as I was conversing with Ohira in a room at the Hilton on July 2 . . . . It said that "the three [Tanaka, Ohira, and Miki] factions will cooperate henceforth on behalf of normalizing relations with China." This had been prepared secredy by Tanaka and Ohira. If this went into effect, a kind of policy agreement would be established among the three factions. The Miki faction would be able to vote for Tanaka in the second round of balloting. I sensed immediately that, with this action, the leakage among the younger members of the Miki and Ohira factions would cease. This forceful political

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act on Kakuei's part had completely isolated the Fukuda faction, because Fukuda had lost the partners with whom he could link up in the second round. It also became eminendy clear that this would have a profound impact on the behavior of the neutral factions. (Ito 1982:85) Following the cabinet meeting on July 4, Sato called in Fukuda and Tanaka. He told Tanaka, " I f you don't listen to me, I'll set up a Miki-Fukuda alliance and buy them up, Miki and all." Tanaka told Ohira, "You're the only one I can count on. Will you please take care of Miki?" "Miki's alright. He will not join up with Fukuda," Ohira replied. (Ito 1 9 8 2 : 8 6 - 8 7 ) According to Fukuda, it happened this way: This trifactional coalition—this was something completely different from the cooperation with the top runner discussed by the prime minister, Tanaka, and m y s e l f . . . . I met with the prime minister and told him about it. The prime minister therefore called in Tanaka and me once again. This was July 4, the day before the presidential election. "What is it that you have in mind, Tanaka, with this three-faction coalition? You made a promise the other day to cooperate with the front runner, did you not?" From his tone of voice, it sounded as though he was upbraiding Tanaka. Tanaka responded in this way: "Elections, you see, progress in a variety of different ways. Even between Kishi and Sato, there was that fierce exchange at election time, wasn't there?" (Laughter) It wasn't a straight answer, but he was implying that the trifactional alliance was something that was inevitable. At that point, I said, "Now that the three-faction alliance has been established, let us consider the cooperation with the top runner i n v a l i d . . . . " Nothing further was said on that topic. I personally believe that if there been a decision by Prime Minister Sato, or something of that nature, then there would have been something somewhat different from the election method that was chosen. (Fukuda Takeo, "Haisho hei o kataru," Mainichi shinbun, July 31, 1972) T h e party convention was held at the Hibiya Auditorium on July 5. Ohira, Fukuda, Miki, and Tanaka ran for president. Of the 476 ballots cast in the first round, 156 went to Tanaka, 150 to Fukuda, 101 to Ohira, and 69 to Miki. T h e results of the runoff were 282 for Tanaka and 190 for Fukuda. Tanaka was thus selected party president; he was designated prime minister in the Diet on July 6. Fukuda dates Tanaka's decision to run as "after [the race] was imminent" and "after the year [1972] began and toward the end of the regular Diet session." He adds, " A s the presidential election approached, an atmosphere of confrontation arose around us. Nevertheless, Tanaka and I maintained a friendly relationship. We sustained a sense of camaraderie based on our mutual support of the Sato administration. . . . For this reason, looking back on it, I feel that we might have avoided that fierce presidential race had the two of us gotten together and talked things over." When asked

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whether Tanaka had firmed up his resolve to run in the presidential election when Sato was reelected for the third time, Fukuda replied, " I myself do not think so." (Fukuda Takeo, "Haisho hei o kataru," Mainichi shinbun, July 31,1972) This appears a bit naive. Did Fukuda really believe this? One wonders precisely when Tanaka first heard the whispers of the witches in the wilds of the heath. That would have been the point at which the spirit that drove him initially possessed him. As his schemes succeeded, one by one, and further possibilities began to present themselves, the witches' calls grew louder, gradually firming his resolve. It would have solidified completely at the moment that Tanaka realized his success was within reach. Could this have been when he got Nakasone on his side? If this is what was meant, then Fukuda's "toward the end of the regular Diet session" is on the mark. About the tremendous amount of money that was tossed around, Fukuda says, "I got sick of it partway through the presidential election. I thought very seriously about quitting. Partway through, Bo Hideo [LDP general affairs director] said to me in all seriousness, 'Don't get involved in an election this dirty. Give it u p . ' " (Fukuda Takeo, "Haisho hei o kataru, Mainichi shinbun, July 31, 1972) He adds: I had twice as many base votes. On top of this, the general trend was for the neutral factions to support me. I thought that it was really no contest. But the mass media began writing that Tanaka was running strong. Those outside the party who were not in a position to read the vote therefore began to think that maybe it was a 5 0 - 5 0 contest. At this point Nakasone's moves began to exert considerable influence. This, in turn, turned into a judgment on the part of the neutral factions that Tanaka was ahead, and they went over to his side. (Fukuda Takeo, "Haisho hei o kataru, Mainichi shinbun, July 31,

1972) The Contemporary Hideyoshi The Tanaka cabinet came into being on July 6. Ohira had hoped for the position of secretary general but was made foreign minister for the purpose of normalizing Sino-Japanese relations. Nakasone became minister of international trade and industry. Miki became state minister at large with a rank of vice prime minister. Both the finance and the construction ministerships were filled with people tied directly to the Tanaka faction in anticipation of a plan to "remodel the archipelago." The post of chief cabinet secretary was given to Nikaido Susumu, one of Tanaka's confidants. The factional composition of the cabinet was as follows: Tanaka faction, 4; Ohira faction, 3; Miki and Nakasone factions, 2 each. Although relations with the Fukuda faction had soured, it nevertheless received two posts. The Mizuta, Funada, and Shiina factions were each given one post. In addition, three cabinet

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members were taken from the House of Councilors. Tanaka's confidant Hashimoto Tomisaburo was made secretary general. T h e chairmanship of the Executive Council went to Suzuki Zenko (Ohira faction), and the PARC chairmanship to Sakurauchi Yoshio (Nakasone faction). Overall, it was clear that seniority and reward for service were the primary criteria used in choosing cabinet ministers. T h e fifty-four-year-old leader, whose catchwords were "decision and implementation," was extremely popular. According to polls conducted by the Asahi shinbun on August 29 and 30, the approval rate for the Tanaka cabinet was 62 percent and the disapproval rate, 10 percent. These figures were the highest and lowest ever for any cabinet. T h e percentage of those who did not answer was a low 13 percent. In response to an openended question about the reasons for supporting Tanaka, 31 percent said that he was a "commoner's prime minister"; 18 percent, that he was an "implementation-oriented prime minister"; and 18 percent, that "it looks as though he will do something for us." W h e n compared with other prime ministers and candidates for the premiership, Tanaka was truly exceptional. He was born in 1918 in a poor village in Niigata Prefecture. His father was a livestock dealer. He graduated from elementary school and eventually set out for Tokyo in 1934, where he attended the C h u o Technical School, from which he graduated in 1936. He established the Kyoei Construction Office the following year. He j o i n e d the cavalry regiment in Morioka in 1939, was sent to Manchuria, and participated in the N o m o n h a n incident, where he fell ill and was hospitalized. He left the army in 1941. In 1943, he established the Tanaka Construction Company, Ltd., and became its president. Its projects were sizable enough for it to rank among the top fifty companies nationally. He was twenty-seven years old when the war ended. He had obtained subcontracted construction work in the relocation of Riken Industries' piston ring factory in Oji, Tokyo, and was in Daejong, Korea, at the time. T h e total budget for the relocation was ¥22 million. T h e war ended before actual construction work began. He was repatriated from Pusan on a coastal defense ship and landed in Aomori. He arrived in Tokyo in a freight car on August 25. Finding that his office, house, and company dormitory remained unscathed amid the ashes of Tokyo, he was able to restart his business smoothly. T h e stimulus for Tanaka's entry into the political world occurred when Oasa Tadao, an adviser to Tanaka Construction, solicited political funds. At the suggestion of Oasa, Tanaka ran for the Progressive Party in the first postwar general election. Tanaka recalls: O n e day in N o v e m b e r that year [1945], Oasa invited m e to the Shuka teahouse. . . . Oasa was sitting o n the only chair in the back o f a cold Westernstyle r o o m that had n o rug or any other furniture whatsoever.

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LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980 I summarize what he told me. The Occupation Forces had dissolved the Greater Japan Political Association. The House of Representatives was dissolved by order of the Occupation Forces on December 31, and voting was scheduled for January 31 of the following year. The Progressive Party had been formed as a new political party in time for the election but was stumped over the selection of a party head. Ugaki Kazunari and Machida Chuji were the two presidential candidates, but neither one would back down. I proposed to the two of them that, since there was an election coming up in short order, the first person to collect ¥3 million would be made party president. [Oasa] said he supported Machida. He asked, "Say, how much can you give me?" I gladly agreed. (Masumi 1985:81-85) About six months later, Oasa approached me with, "How about running in the upcoming election?" I ended up asking him, "About how much money will this involve?" "Put up ¥150,000. Keep quiet for a month, and let others handle things. You're bound to get elected." Because I fell for these words, I had the adventure of running as a Progressive Party candidate in a House of Representatives election. (Tanaka 1966:165-71)

Tanaka controlled a tremendous amount of money and passed it out ¥150,000 and ¥200,000 at a time. Those on the receiving end used these funds to run their own campaigns. The defeated Tanaka next ran in the Niigata Third District in the general election of the following April and placed third among five winning candidates. "Since I felt that it would not do to leave the campaign in the hands of others, I made up my mind to establish branch offices of my company in Kashiwazaki and Nagaoka, for which I hired close to a hundred employees, and managed the campaign directly." (Tanaka 1966:171) During his first term, Tanaka became a member of the House construction committee and affiliated with the committee to investigate illegal property transactions. Tanaka himself brought up the issue ofJSP leader Nishio Suehiro's contributions and the Showa Denko scandal before the committee on January 29, 1948. Though only a freshman Diet member, he was already a force to be reckoned with. His interpellations during deliberations were trenchant. But his spirited statements were no longer heard after the committee took up the coal nationalization issue, for Tanaka himself was embroiled in that scandal. Having landed work in refurbishing houses appropriated by the Occupation Forces, Tanaka Construction was considered one of the three most promising companies in the capital. It was also eying housing construction work in the coal mines, which were then profiting from coal production increases induced by the government's Reconstruction Finance Bank. Branch offices of the company were opened in Fukuoka near the Kyushu coal mines and in Fukushima near the Joban coal mines. Tanaka worked diligently, as a member of the Democratic Party's Shidehara faction, to take the teeth out of the Katayama cabinet's coal industry nation-

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alization bill. Tanaka, who had become parliamentary vice minister for the Justice Ministry in the second Yoshida cabinet, resigned from his post in November because of suspicions that he had accepted a ¥i million bribe during the campaign against the coal nationalization bill. He was indicted on charges of having accepted bribes in December. He declared his candidacy in the 1949 general election from a jail cell and hurried back to Niigata to campaign after his release. He was elected with a second-place standing and became a member of the construction and budget standing committees. In April 1950 he was sentenced by the Tokyo district court to six months in prison and a two-year suspended sentence. He was declared innocent by the Tokyo high court in May 1951. Tanaka was initially elected as a member of the Democratic Party through his connections with Oasa. He joined the Shidehara faction because of his opposition to the coal mine nationalization bill and left the Democratic Party together with Shidehara to form the Doshi Club, where he was put in charge of finances. He merged with the Liberal Party along with the rest of the Doshi Club and thereby became affiliated with the Democratic Liberal Party (later changed to Liberal Party), where he helped Party President Yoshida gather funds. Although Tanaka was originally with the Hirokawa Kozen faction, he eventually moved closer to Ikeda and came to be considered one of Ikeda's disciples. On the occasion of the conservative merger, he followed Ikeda into the LDP. He split with Ikeda, who supported Ishibashi, during the 1956 presidential election and joined up with Sato, who supported Kishi. He remained with the Sato faction thereafter. During his time as minister of posts and telecommunications in the Kishi cabinet, newspapers were already saying that Sato faction funds were being collected at a ratio of Sato 6, Tanaka 4. Although Tanaka was a member of the Sato faction, he was also very close to Ikeda. During the i960 general election, he joined forces with Ohira and gathered votes for Ikeda. In return, he was made PARC chairman in 1961. It was perhaps about this time that he promised Ohira to do all he could to establish an Ohira government. During the cabinet reshuffling ofJuly 1962, he again joined forces with Ohira and became finance minister, a post that he had longed for. Ohira was foreign minister. He played a decisive role, through Ohira, in bringing about Sato's designation at the time of the Ikeda decision. He was rewarded for this in 1965 by being made secretary general, another position that he had wanted. During the era of the Sato cabinets, he served as finance minister, secretary general, and minister of international trade and industry. During Sato's third and fourth runs for the party presidency and during Diet elections, he made important contributions in the area of strategy and funding. Throughout the time that he supported Sato, Tanaka cultivated his own coterie inside the Sato faction and, using it, fought against Fukuda, whom

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Sato was trying to make his successor. Elsewhere, Tanaka came to the aid of Ohira, who was trying to gain control of the Kochikai from Maeo and, linking up with Ohira, overpowered Sato and Fukuda. T h e most significant clash during this period was the one between Sato and Fukuda, on the one side, and Tanaka and Ohira, on the other. (Tachibana 1976) The Swindler Contractor Tanaka consumed a huge quantity of funds in his bid for the presidency. According to financial statements submitted by the Tanaka faction to the Ministry of Local Autonomy, Tanaka spent roughly ¥800 million between October 1971 and the following July, when he was contesting Fukuda for the party presidency. (Tachibana 1976) Informed insiders report that the total amount of political funds—"behind-the-scenes" money plus this "visible" m o n e y — w a s ten times that amount, or ¥8 billion. How was this huge sum of money obtained? No doubt, there were a large number of political contributions. But the amount of funding received in lump sums from the zaikai mainstream and large corporations was probably low, for Tanaka was an outsider. Most it came from the construction companies that emerged in great number during the regional development boom. A n d the core portion was probably obtained through "land flipp i n g " and a magician-like manipulation of taxes by the corps of "ghost companies" owned by the Tanaka household. Tachibana refers to this as the "swindlerization" of contracting and construction firms. Tanaka first became involved in this process in 1961, when he bought the real estate credit sales corporation Nihon Denken. " G h o s t " real estate firms such as Shinsei Enterprises, New Nihon Denken, and Muromachi Industries were established at this time. All were the product of regional development and skyrocketing land prices. Tanaka matured amid the rapid economic growth and the regional development b o o m of the 1960s. Adapting most adroitly, he milked "easy m o n e y " out of these trends and invested the funds on behalf of his ascent of the political world. Growth and development produced individuals like Tanaka, who possessed a superior ability to collect money. They in turn created a political world where it was possible to use these skills to gain control of the government. T h e fact that his "Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago" plan was intended to expand public works construction projects from the Pacific Belt region to the entire country was n o doubt related to his experiences, his way of thinking, and his expanding sources of funding. T h e members of the zaikai did not know how to respond when they observed this "swindler contractor" scrape together funds from outside the normal zaikai channels and close in on the government. He had independent funding sources, and it would be dangerous to lose control over him.

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They also thought that they might be able to capitalize on Tanaka's decisiveness and implementstional abilities. They edged closer to him in 1972. The Mitsubishi group's "Friday Society" invited him to speak in mid-February. Tanaka prefaced his remarks with words that could be taken as either flattery or sarcasm: "It is the greatest possible honor for me to receive my first invitation from the great and renowned Mitsubishi." He then spoke on and on about his industrial relocation plan. This speech was followed by invitations from Mitsui, Sumitomo, and others. (Shukan yomiuri, June 24,1972, as quoted in Tachibana 1976:1:425) A support club for Tanaka known as the "Monday Society" was formed, which included such influential zaikai figures as Nagano Shigeo and Doko Toshio. Another, similar club, known as the "Restoration Society," included Imazato Hiroki, Nakayama Sohei, Kikawada Kazutaka, and Nagano. But "Tanaka, who until then had had very little interaction with orthodox zaikai figures and [could] raise money on his own, could care less about the zaikai." It is said that "during meetings of the Restoration Society, Tanaka virtually monopolized the conversation. There was almost no time left for the zaikai members to speak." (Hosoya and Watanuki 1977:191) From what I have seen on television, the most appropriate characterization of Tanaka is as the boss of a construction firm. His popularity rested on his "commoner" and "action-oriented" image. Even though his background was that of a party politician—"party politician" is an ambiguous term that refers to anyone who does not have a bureaucratic background— he was a party politician of a sort different from Ono or Kono. Although Tanaka too had sharp political instincts and could play the game as well as any, that was not the extent of it. Nicknamed the "computerized bulldozer," he was also an incredibly diligent man with an outstanding memory, a calculating mind, and tremendous administrative talent. He was able to memorize the graduation dates, expertise, talents, and political coloring of the officials of all of the ministries and agencies above the rank of section chief. When bureaucrats arrived, he received them in the parlor of the household quarters of his residence rather than in the office used by everyday visitors. He would meet with them even if it meant putting off visitors who were already there. And he liberally utilized bureaucrats' opinions and knowledge in formulating policies. A Finance Ministry official stated that Tanaka "would grasp accurately what government officials were thinking and then bring that about." A MITI bureaucrat described him as a person with the "rare ability to bring out the talents of bureaucrats to the fullest." Bureaucrats obtain a sense of fulfillment when their ideas are accepted and implemented. Unlike ordinary party politicians, Tanaka did not dislike bureaucrats. On the contrary, he had the ability to gain their trust and confidence. He was, in short, a party politician who could make effective use of bureaucrats. (Tanaka 1981:279-95)

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When Tanaka Kakuei was able to defeat his more orthodox successors and climb to the apex of the political world, it marked an important political change in modern Japanese history that occurred within the context of LDP rule. It signaled the maturation of the era of rapid economic growth and the end of the era of political leadership by ex-bureaucrat politicians.

THE NORMALIZATION OF SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS Approaching Beijing Tanaka's "decide-and-implement" style was most vividly brought into play in the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations that occurred within three months of his cabinet's formation. U.S. president Nixon had visited China in 1972 and signed the Shanghai Communiqué that February. The LDP began to believe that the cabinet that succeeded Sato's would be unable to adapt to the changing external and internal situation unless it achieved a breakthrough in Sino-Japanese relations. On April 21, with Ôhira mediating, Tanaka met with Representative Furui Yoshimi, who had been working in this area. Although Tanaka said little, he asserted that he would reestablish Sino-Japanese relations if he became prime minister. He wanted a partner because he was not very good at diplomatic issues: "Why not have the three of us put our heads together to bring this about?" Furui immediately replied, "Then the foreign minister should be Ôhira." Tanaka sealed the matter with "I'd be most grateful. Please, could you do it?" Ôhira, looking glum, replied, "It's not the sort of job I'm good at." He wanted the j o b of secretary general, which was within striking distance of the party presidency, instead. Fukuda also met with Furui around that time. Furui did not sense in Fukuda the earnestness and drive that he saw in Tanaka. He told the Asahi shinbun's Furukawa Mantarô, "In comparison to Tanaka, Fukuda is too concerned with small details. His lines are too finely drawn, and he is smallminded in his thinking. . . . If Tanaka gets the government, there is a 95 percent chance that Sino-Japanese relations will be reestablished. In the case of Fukuda, although I cannot say that it would be entirely out of the question, it would at best be around 5 percent." Furui visited China on May 18 and communicated the following points to China's premier Zhou Enlai: (1) It is likely that Tanaka will win the presidential election. (2) If Tanaka becomes prime minister, he will most certainly work to reestablish Sino-Japanese relations. (3) Should this happen, it is likely that Ôhira will be cooperating in some way and Japan will be able to establish an ideal roster of people. (4) Although it is not clear what the concrete thinking of Tanaka and Ôhira is regarding the reestablishment of Sino-Japanese relations, they recognize the most important points. (5) Even

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if Fukuda wins, we cannot entirely rule out an opportunity for reestablishing Sino-Japanese relations. Even Fukuda is well aware of the situation that Japan faces. Furui added that he hoped the Chinese would be flexible toward the new government. CGP chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu, who was a friend of Tanaka's, sent a message to Zhou Enlai through a CGP delegation to Beijing that noted: (1) Tanaka is likely to win the presidential race. (2) If Tanaka is installed as prime minister, he will most certainly attempt to reestablish Sinojapanese relations. (3) Should that happen, the CGP would cooperate fully. Tanaka relayed his resolve to reestablish Sinojapanese relations through the delegation as well. Zhou responded by enclosing a letter addressed to Tanaka inside a sealed envelope addressed to Takeiri, asking Takeiri to deliver the letter when Tanaka was installed as prime minister. The gist of that letter was that if the new government was truly determined to realize the normalization of relations on the basis of the "three principles for reestablishing Sinojapanese relations" (see below), then China would actively welcome the move. On June 8 Nakasone stated that "whoever becomes prime minister should accept the three principles for reestablishing Sinojapanese relations and hasten the normalization of relations between China and Japan." He abandoned his own candidacy on June 19 and declared his support for Tanaka. O n July 2, when the trifactional agreement between Tanaka, Ohira, and Miki was established, the following passage was included in the policy agreement at the strong insistence of Miki: "The normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China is now supported by national opinion. Negotiations will be conducted with the objective of concluding a peace treaty with the People's Republic of China." The Tanaka cabinet was established on July 7. After the first meeting late that afternoon, Prime Minister Tanaka announced, "With respect to foreign relations, we shall expedite the normalization of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and thereby energetically promote peace diplomacy within the context of a rapidly changing global situation." At a press interview the same day, Foreign Minister Ohira hinted that the Japan-Republic of China (Taiwan) Treaty might be abrogated: "We shall advance negotiations for the normalization of Sinojapanese diplomatic relations, and it seems unthinkable that a Japan-Taiwan treaty could exist once these near conclusion." Beijing responded quickly. As early as July 3, the Japanophile Xiao Xiangqian had been appointed chief of the Tokyo branch of the ChinaJapan Memorandum Trade Office. O n July 10 Zhou announced, "The Tanaka cabinet has revealed that it will aim for the early normalization of Sinojapanese diplomatic relations, and this is something that deserves welcome." And on July 11 Sun Pinghua, deputy secretary of the Chinajapan

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Friendship Association, was sent to Japan as the head of a Shanghai dance troupe and charged with the task of approaching key government and LDP officials. On July 20 LDP Representative Tagawa Seiichi asked Sun Pinghua, "Are you saying that it will be all right for Prime Minister Tanaka to visit China solely on the basis of what he has indicated so far?" Sun replied, "Yes. What is important is the major principles. Prime Minister Tanaka's decision to go to Beijing is significant. If he goes, it will certainly pave the way for a breakthrough." Sun held talks with Ôhira on July 22, the first set of formal talks held between representatives of the Japanese and the Chinese governments. The Support of the Opposition Parties

JSP chairman Narita Tomomi declared on July 10 that, if the Tanaka cabinet agreed to take up the reestablishment of Sinojapanese relations on the basis of the three principles, the JSP would be willing to support the move. Former JSP chairman Sasaki Kôzô, who was scheduled to visit China on July 12, met with Tanaka and Ôhira and sounded out their intentions. "Of the three principles for reestablishing relations, the abrogation of the Japan-Taiwan treaty is the most critical. What do you intend to do about it?" asked Sasaki. Tanaka replied: "I am fully confident about the treatment of Taiwan. I will recognize the three principles for reestablishing relations." When Sasaki talked with Zhou Enlai on July 16 and 17, he related the exchange with Tanaka. Zhou said, "If Prime Minister Tanaka comes to Beijing, we will welcome him." He added: " [Tanaka's] reception cannot be bigger than the one given to Nixon. But we will treat him on a basis equal to that of Nixon." Takeiri flew to Beijing at Tanaka's request. He met with Tanaka and Ôhira four times before his trip to ascertain the government's position on the major points of the Sinojapanese negotiations. To avoid the public eye, he visited Tanaka in Mejiro in the dead of night on July 23 to make final arrangements. He carefully reconfirmed Tanaka's intention to go to Beijing with Ôhira and departed for Beijing on July 25. His three days of talks with Zhou Enlai beginning on July 27 lasted a total of ten hours. Zhou said to him, "China will not concern itself with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Once Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations are resumed, the security treaty will lose its effectiveness with respect to C h i n a . . . . In the Sino-U.S. Shanghai Communiqué in February, we did not criticize the United States for the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Why would there be any need to criticize Japan? . . . As long as a joint Sino-Japanese communiqué is released and a peace treaty is concluded, that will be fine. The remainder of the work can be left to the lawyers. Political credibility is more important. . . . It is only proper that Japan discuss the normalization

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of Sinojapanese relations beforehand with the U.S. government. Should talks with the United States not go well, I will telephone Dr. Kissinger." During the last set of talks, Zhou brought out "eight items and three secret agreement items" as Chinese proposals for the content of the joint communiqué. These were properly typed out and even contained Mao Zedong's signature. Zhou read them aloud, and Takeiri earnestly took notes. As he was writing, Takeiri noticed that his hand was beginning to shake. He says, "As I was copying the [Chinese] conditions, I realized that Sinojapanese relations could be reestablished under them. I was so elated that tears welled up in my eyes." These notes came to be known as the "Takeiri memorandum." Takeiri handed his memorandum to Tanaka and Ôhira at the Prime Minister's Residence on August 4. Tanaka skimmed through it and said, "Premier Zhou is a very sensible man. This will clinch it!" Even Ôhira, who was normally unflappable, let forth a volley of thank yous and virtually ran to the Foreign Ministry with the memorandum in his hand. The Pro-Taiwan Element and the Foreign Ministry

To prepare the ground for the next step, a "Council for the Normalization ofJapan-China Relations" (chairman, Kosaka Zentarô) directly responsible to the party president was set up inside the LDP. It proved to be very popular, attracting 249 participants. At its first general meeting on July 24, it set a target date of September 10 to determine its basic position and acknowledged that, "based on the recognition that the time is ripe for the normalization of Sinojapanese relations, the government should on this occasion engage in prudent efforts aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations between Japan and China." An August 9 general meeting adopted a two-point resolution: (1) Sino-Japanese relations will be normalized; (2) Prime Minister Tanaka will visit China for this purpose. But Kishi, Kaya Okinori, Ishii, Nadao, and others with pro-Taiwan sympathies reacted strongly. Their argument was that, although they were not opposed to the normalization of Sinojapanese relations, they were against "cutting off Taiwan." When forced to choose between Tanaka and Taiwan during the July presidential election, the young hawks chose Tanaka. The Normalization Council approved a basic policy for the normalization of Sinojapanese relations on September 8. This was made official party policy at an Executive Council meeting that afternoon. The reaction of the Foreign Ministry came in the form of a legal argument supporting the pro-Taiwan element. While it might be possible to acknowledge, as stated in the first of the three principles for reestablishing relations, that Beijing was "the only legitimate government of China," Ja-

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pan could not recognize the second principle, which asserted that Taiwan was a province of China: Japan had abandoned its dominion over Taiwan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and therefore was not in a position to make any further claims. Even worse, ifJapan accepted the third principle's "abrogation of the Japan-ROC Treaty," it would mean that its diplomatic relations until then had been based on a falsehood. It was an incontrovertible fact that Japan had concluded the Japan-ROC Treaty with Taiwan in April 1952, and it could not abrogate it. The Japan-ROC Treaty would "lapse naturally" when the normalization of Sinojapanese relations was realized. This argument was later repeated in Beijing. To coordinate the next step, aJapan-U.S. summit was held in Hawaii on August 31 and September 1. The Tanaka-Nixon communiqué stated that Tanaka's trip to China "would . . . further the trend for relaxing tensions in Asia"; at the same time, "the two governments would continue to cooperate through close consultations with a view to ensuring smooth and effective implementation of the [security] treaty." It also should be noted that Tanaka probably promised Nixon at this time that Japan would purchase airplanes from the United States. Soon after, on September 17-19, pro-Taipei Shiina Etsuzaburó, who had become LDP vice president on August 22, visited Taiwan with a letter from Tanaka. The purpose of the visit was to obtain prior approval of the normalization with China, a task that was understood to be difficult. When the delegation arrived at the Taipei airport, it was surrounded by a thousand students who threw eggs and kicked the limousine. The Beijing Talks Tanaka asked Representatives Furui, Tagawa, and Matsumoto Shun'ichi to visit China to make the final arrangements for the Sino-Japanese summit meeting. The three men left for Beijing on September 9 with the Japanese draft of the joint communiqué in hand. Although a Chinese draft had been consulted during the writing of the Japanese draft, the two differed on several critical points. The first related to the issue of ending the state of war between the two countries. The Japanese took the position that the state of war had ended with the Japan-Taiwan treaty; they suggested that China should unilaterally redeclare the end of a state of war, with Japan confirming the situation. A second difference related to the three principles for reestablishing relations. The Japanese asked that the issue of the Japan-ROC Treaty not be dealt with in the text of the joint communiqué and suggested that the Japanese government would make its stand known through some other appropriate form. The Japanese draft said absolutely nothing about sovereignty over Taiwan. At the beginning, Zhou Enlai refused to budge on the first point but in

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the end he suggested the substitution of the phrase " e n d the abnormal state of affairs between the two countries," which was used in the final version of the joint communiqué. On the second point, Zhou ultimately gave in, saying, "Regardless of whether it has to do with the preamble or the text, I would like to discuss the matter when Tanaka and Ohira visit. I do not think that resolution will be difficult." T h e three Representatives returned to Japan on September 23. Prime Minister Tanaka, Foreign Minister Ôhira, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaidô flew directly to Beijing on a special Japan Air Lines chartered plane on the morning of September 25. Following the first summit talks that afternoon, Nikaidô announced to reporters that there was " a surprisingly frank exchange of opinion." These were apparendy rather tense talks. Tanaka told Zhou Enlai the following: I must run again in a party presidential election. I must also conduct a general election. Even within my own party, there are still many problems. It was in this kind of circumstance that I made the big decision to come here. You, however, do not have party presidential elections, nor do you have general elections. While things might work the way you want them to in China, that is not how things go in my case. In Japan no thought whatsoever is given to becoming a major military power. We will not possess nuclear weapons. We even have the three nonnuclear principles. Because of the Constitution as well, this will simply not happen. Please do not say again that Japan will become a major military power or anything of that sort. There is something in Japan known as the Taiwan Group. It has been highly opposed to the normalization of diplomatic relations with China. It incessandy voices opinions of this sort inside the LDP. I have, of course, been entrusted by the LDP Executive Council to normalize Sino-Japanese relations. But this does not change the fact that the Taiwan issue remains a serious problem.... Japan cannot normalize Sino-Japanese relations in a way that will have maj o r negative consequences for Japan-U.S. relations. A major premise of SinoJapanese normalization is that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will be maintained, because the treaty is absolutely essential to Japan's peace and security. The security treaty came about because of the Sino-Soviet alliance. I would like you to understand this point well and not consider the security treaty a threat. (Nakano 1982:1965-68) During the first foreign ministers' talk on the morning of September 26, Takashima Masuo, head of the treaties bureau, spent more than an hour presenting Japan's position on the three principles for reestablishing relations. H e asserted that war with China had ended as a result of Article 1 of the Japan-ROC Treaty. Chinese foreign minister J i Pengfei remained silent, looking throughout as if he was seething with rage. At the second set

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of summit talks that afternoon, Z h o u referred to Takashima's statement: " T h e r e appears to be something amiss here. I find it hard to believe that Bureau Chief Takashima's statement represents the true thinking of Tanaka and Ôhira. T h e normalization of Sino-Japanese relations is a political issue. It is a mistake to deal with it using a legal argument." It was reported that Takashima had been insulted at being called a "legal scoundrel." N o one had m u c h of an appetite at the late lunch that followed. Ôhira and Takashima drank only water and remained d e e p in thought. T h e y refused to drink the maotai that Tanaka offered them. T h e exchange that followed is extremely revealing. Tanaka: What is the matter with you guys? Ôhira:.. . Tanaka: There's no use in worrying so much. That's what's wrong with you college graduates. Just try again tomorrow. Ôhira: O f course, I will. But how should I go about it? Tanaka: You guys are the college graduates. You figure it out. (After a period of silence) Ôhira: Say, Tanaka. When you came out of the backwoods of Echigo [Niigata], did you think that you could become prime minister? Tanaka: Are you kidding? I came out because I couldn't eat. Wasn't that the case for you? Ôhira: Me, too. You can't get by as the litde son of a poor Sanuki [Kagawa] peasant. Tanaka: If that's the case, then what is there to lose? If you can't do it, you can't do it. We'll just go back with things the way they are. I'll take responsibility for it. (Nakano 1982:1972-73)

T h e foreign ministers' talks held on the night of September 27 stretched into the wee hours of the following day. Ôhira put forward a proposal prepared by the Japanese and stood ready to allow the talks to break down if it was not accepted. Foreign Minister Ji took notes as Ôhira slowly explained item after item. A messenger carried these, page by page, to Z h o u Enlai, who was in an adjoining room. Several minutes after taking away the last page, the messenger returned and handed a note to Ji Pengfei. T h e Chinese foreign minister read the note. Saying, "It's fine," he agreed to the Japanese proposal. T h e Sinojapanese joint communiqué was signed on the morning of September 29 in the Great Hall of the People. Ôhira announced that diplomatic relations with Taipei had e n d e d the m o m e n t the j o i n t communiqué was signed. (Furukawa 1981:360-62; Nakano 1982:82-188; Nagano i983:1 -9°) T h e Tanaka cabinet had achieved the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in an extremely short time. With the positive support of the C G P and JSP and a friendly reception by the press and the public, it was able to contain the reaction of the pro-Taiwan element inside the LDP

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and the Foreign Ministry. Although this type of decision-making process was unusual, this was not the first time that it had come into play. It had also appeared in the normalization ofJapan-Soviet relations. (See Masumi 1985: 313-26) Although Tanaka had little experience in foreign relations, he had the "decision-and-implementadon" capacity of a novice, and under the right circumstances this could lead to results that perhaps could not have been achieved by someone with greater experience. This, however, was virtually the only time that his approach led to a spectacular accomplishment. T h e Tanaka cabinet seemed to burn itself out after the first three months. Development planning, the field in which the prime minister had the most experience, ran into unanticipated difficulties and ended up a miserable failure.

REMODELING THE ARCHIPELAGO AND THE OIL SHOCK The Remodeling Plan The normalization of Sinojapanese relations was the biggest item on Tanaka's agenda in the field of foreign relations. T h e biggest domestic item was "remodeling the Japanese archipelago." Just as Ikeda's "Income Doubling Plan" and Sato's "Fight for Tomorrow" were prepared by mobilizing close associates and experts, Tanaka had his aide Fumoto Kuniaki (a former reporter for Kyodo News Service) and Hayasaka Shigezo (a reporter for Tokyo taimuzu) develop a plan after Tanaka's resignation as secretary general in the wake of the Black Mist scandal. At the same time, he organized a "Committee to Study Urban Policy" within the LDP, became its chairman, and prepared a proposal in 1968 entitled General Principles of Urban Policy, which incorporated the opinions of various ministries and agencies. During his stint as minister of international trade and industry, he released an interim report of MITI's Industrial Structure Council entided International Trade and Industry Policies for the 1970s. Using this work as a basis, Tanaka published a book entitled Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago on June 20, 1972, shortly after declaring his candidacy for party president. In just one month, 400,000 copies were sold. T h e thesis of his book was as follows. Until that time, increases in national income in Japan and other countries had been achieved by concentrating population and industry in big cities. But "the advantages of urban concentration [had begun] to be outweighed by the disadvantages." Air pollution and other forms of environmental degradation, traffic congestion, and other ill effects of overpopulation had become noticeable in the cities. T h e nation was demanding a simultaneous solution to the evils of overpopulation and underpopulation. In order to accomplish this, a num-

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ber of steps were necessary: (1) Action must be taken to move industry— "the detonator and guiding force for regional development"—from the most overpopulated cities to the countryside in order to induce a recycling of population away from the overpopulated cities. (2) With "the pump primed" by scattering secondary industry, "new cities of 250,000" containing a full array of urban functions must be constructed to absorb this population. (3) An efficient transportation network placing all major areas of the Japanese archipelago within a "one-day sphere of accessibility" must be built to compensate for the disadvantages of locating industry in the countryside. In order to achieve these objectives, tax incentives and disincentives must be utilized in addition to an efficient and farsighted management of fiscal investment funds. If these steps were taken, overpopulation and underpopulation, along with the various problems accompanying them, would dissipate and the "disparity between urban and rural areas, between the prosperous Pacific coast and the stagnating Japan Sea coast," would be eliminated. In order to improve the quantity and quality of the country's social capital and welfare facilities, it would be necessary to assure "reasonably rapid economic growth." This required a transformation of the industrial structure from one based on environmentally destructive heavy and chemical industries to one that was "knowledge-intensive," and a switch from the present "growth-pursuit pattern" of economic management to a "growthutilization pattern" that actively used the expanded capacity of the economy to fulfill the welfare needs of the people. A growth-utilization pattern of economic management required expansionary fiscal policies in which "we . . . free ourselves from the idea of annually balanced budgets and place more importance on balanced public finances over the long run." Positive fiscal policy of this sort not only represented a way to expand social capital, improve education and medical caire, and promote technological development; it also would serve to induce rapid economic growth. The growthutilization pattern would create a propitious cycle in which "welfare promotes growth and growth promotes welfare." The plan was an extension of the New National Comprehensive Development Plan (NNCDP) that had been approved by the Sato cabinet in May 1969. From the very start, the NNCDP's call for the "expansion of development possibilities throughout the entire Japanese archipelago" had been criticized as amounting to the "comprehensive pollution" of the Japanese archipelago. Tanaka's "Remodeling Plan" appeared in fiscal 1972, just as the Economic Planning Agency was initiating a "complete overhaul" of the earlier plan. Shortly after forming his cabinet, Tanaka established a committee of about thirty people, including representatives of interested ministries and

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agencies, to study ways of reconciling the NNCDP and the Remodeling Plan. Because of the popularity of the Remodeling Plan, there was a surge of interest in participating in the committee. By the time the first meeting was finally held on August 7, the number of members had swollen to seventy-five, and the original plan to have the committee meet with the prime minister as necessary was modified to have it gather about once a month. By its second meeting, the membership had increased further, to ninety. In the meantime, a nine-agency conference of vice ministers from the ministries and agencies with an interest in the Remodeling Plan was established on August 24 to advance and coordinate the plan. The "interested" ministries and agencies were MITI, Construction, Local Autonomy, Environment, Agriculture and Forestry, Labor, Transportation, the Economic Planning Agency, and the Capital Region Improvement Council. They all championed the plan and competed with one another to put forward grand proposals. The rivalry between MITI, the Ministry of Construction, and the Ministry of Local Autonomy was particularly strong. MITI proposed a "new cities of 250,000" plan, calling for sixty to eighty cities built in regions designated as "industry attraction districts." Networks of roads, urban parks, and business facilities would be set up. Inland industrial parks and green belts would be built in the suburbs. By contrast, the Ministry of Local Autonomy's "new urban zone improvement" proposal and the Ministry of Construction's "regional core cities" proposal gave highest priority to providing a full set of urban "functions" and creating a desirable living environment in the regional cities that were to absorb more people. Under the Ministry of Local Autonomy proposal, sixty to eighty zones with populations between 200,000 and 400,000 would be chosen for development from among 328 "wide-area municipal zones" that the ministry had been working with since 1969. The Ministry of Construction proposal called for the integrated improvement of facilities related to the living environment in core cities and surrounding rural villages along with the establishment of industrial parks attuned to the particular socioeconomic characteristics of the region. As a preliminary step in the implementation of the Law to Promote the Relocation of Industry, the cabinet approved an ordinance on October 20 that divided the country into "expulsion regions" where industry would be encouraged to leave, "attraction regions" that would be given special assistance in attracting factories, and "blank regions" that would be the object of neither factory expulsions nor special assistance. Designating these areas proved extremely difficult because of the lobbying activities and protests of local governments. The exercise was brought to an end only after it was decided that the expulsion areas would be limited in number while attraction regions would be chosen liberally. The resulting expulsion regions

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were the capital and the Kinki and Chubu regions—that is, Tokyo's 23 wards and 14 other cities. The attraction regions were 27 prefectures in Hokkaido, Tohoku, Hokuriku, Koshin'etsu, San'in, Shikoku, Kyushu, and Okinawa and 712 municipalities in surrounding areas. T h e blank regions amounted to approximately 640 municipalities. T h e expulsion regions accounted for roughly 0.5 percent of the surface area of the country while the attraction regions covered 86.5 percent. T h e blank regions amounted to 13.0 percent. In terms of industrial production, the expulsion regions accounted for 25 percent; the attraction regions, 20 percent; and the blank regions, 55 percent. (Asahi nenkan, 1973:315-17; Tanaka 1981:347-59) Skyrocketing Land Prices It looked as though an even bigger version of the Ikeda cabinet's new industrial cities plan was about to unfold. But the process collapsed within a few months. T h e first setback was the defeat of the factory expulsion tax. First, vehement opposition to the expulsion tax emerged among small and medium-sized enterprises, especially in the Kansai region, as MITI drew up zonal boundaries in its industrial relocation plan. They were afraid that, if the big firms relocated to the countryside, subcontractor firms would be forced to choose between relocating and severing their relations with the parent companies. They also feared that they themselves would be subjected to the expulsion tax. Second, there was opposition from large firms. Keidanren questioned the wisdom of establishing a blanket expulsion tax when there were factories in the overpopulated areas that did not create pollution and that by nature had to be located in a big city. Third, the Federation of Iron and Steel Workers Unions asserted that the transfer of steel industry workers created too many problems in the workers' employment and living situations, their relationships with local residents, and the efficient use of capital investments and land. It would be better, it argued, to try to improve pollution control technologies and use existing sites more effectively. Fourth, some people believed that a new tax was inadvisable under circumstances where natural increases in revenues could be expected as a consequence of an upturn in the business cycle and a general election loomed. By late October, the factory expulsion tax was dead. With it went the fiscal backing for the New Cities of 250,000 project. Tanaka nevertheless raised his Remodeling Plan as a mjyor agenda item during his first Diet speech on October 28: "We must boldly transform the torrent of urban concentration that has supported the development of our economy during the one hundred years since the Meiji Restoration and strive for a balanced use of our national land by putting the vitality of the nation and the stalwart

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power of the Japanese economy to work throughout the entire Japanese archipelago." (Tanaka 1981:359-62) It appeared that Tanaka intended to call a general election once the Remodeling Plan acquired a concrete form. Within a week of his return from Beijing, the newspapers started reporting presumptuously that the Diet would be dissolved by the end of the year. The House of Representatives was, in fact, dissolved on November 13, and a general election was scheduled for December 10. Tanaka naturally boasted of the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, but he championed the Remodeling Plan even more vociferously. His plan brought abstainers to the polls in the underdeveloped regions, and voter turnout rates rose 4 to 6 percent. On the other hand, the JSP and JCP launched an all-out attack on the Remodeling Plan, claiming that it gave "priority to the interests of big capital" and would result in "the dispersal of pollution." Voter turnout rates in the big cities also increased. The result, contrary to expectations, was a major loss for the LDP. The party lost 17 seats. The JCP vote increased dramatically, particularly in the big cities, and the party's seats increased from 14 to 38. The JSP was able to recover about half of the seats that it had lost in the previous election. The CGP and the DSP experienced large losses. The second Tanaka cabinet was formed on December 22. Ohira, Miki, and Nakasone were named foreign minister, vice prime minister, and minister of international trade and industry, respectively. Fukuda entered the cabinet as director of the Administrative Management Agency. The biggest political issue was skyrocketing land prices. The Nixon Shocks of 1971 had brought about a huge inflow of U.S. dollars that resulted in surplus liquidity. Taking advantage of this, as well as the large government budgets and easy money policies that had been adopted to counter the rise in the yen, the general trading companies and other firms began buying up land. The Remodeling Plan further encouraged these activities. Perhaps one reason for the general election loss was the skyrocketing of land prices. Following the election, Tanaka moved aggressively to tackle the land price issue. Land prices, which were spiraling upward at an annual rate of 30.9 percent—35.9 percent in the Tokyo region—would surely turn the Remodeling Plan into a mirage. At a cabinet meeting on January 6, 1973, he directed the bureau chiefs of the various ministries and agencies to draft comprehensive measures against land price increases, including land tax policies and land use planning measures. At times, Tanaka himself attended their meetings. The outcome was a January 26 decision of a cabinet deliberation council, which called for "comprehensive development plans" and recommended the establishment of a "national comprehensive development agency" and a "national comprehensive development public corporation." The decision illustrates Tanaka's deep attachment to the Remodeling Plan. It also indicates his strong desire to stop land speculation and

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suppress sharp increases in land prices. The bill for a Law to Establish a National Comprehensive Development Agency, along with an abundance of related laws, was prepared and submitted to the Diet during the session. The general trading companies that had earlier bought up land with their surplus funds began to extend their reach to soybeans, raw silk, wool, lumber, and even rice in 1973. Their market-cornering and hoarding activities led to commodity shortages, which led in turn to a tremendous jump in price levels. Consumer anger and insecurity intensified, and the press attacked the leading general trading companies for their antisocial behavior. On top of this, the fiscal 1973 government budget was a mammoth, archipelago-remodeling budget. The general account budget increased by 25 percent over the previous year, the highest rate of increase in the postwar period. Public works expenditures increased 32 percent; social security expenditures, 29 percent. The massive budget encouraged further inflation. Support for the cabinet declined as the inflation rate climbed. Its approval rating, which was 62 percent the previous August, fell to 27 percent, while the disapproval rate increased from 10 percent to 44 percent. (Asahi nenkan, 1974:218-19; Tanaka 1981:380-423) The Small Electoral District Issue With the defeat in the general election of the preceding December as a stimulus, there was renewed appreciation of the merits of a small electoral district system. It was possible that the LDP would lose its majority in the House of Councilors election scheduled for July 1973. Whereas the meetings of the LDP electoral investigation committee (Matsuno Raizo, chairman) during early January focused on the House of Councilors election, by late January they had begun to recognize that the system for electing the members of the House of Representatives should also be reformed. The committee began to study the issue and by March 28 had decided that a reform of both houses of the Diet would be considered in a single package, that consideration in the House of Representatives would be given to a proposal for a combined system of small electoral districts and proportional representation, that the House of Councilors would use an unrestricted-list proportional representation system, and that local district misapportionment would be corrected. Judging that the time was ripe, Tanaka tried to railroad the item through the Diet. O n April 11 the committee approved "basic policies for reforming the system of electing Diet members." PARC approved the measure on April 24, and the Executive Council on April 27. The roster of an electoral reapportionment committee was released on May 10, and the matter progressed at such a pace that the committee held its first meeting on May 12.

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In reaction, the secretaries general of the JSP, JCP, CGP, and DSP announced on April 29 that they would carry out a joint action to stop the "retrogression of the electoral system"; on May 11 they agreed to boycott Diet deliberations. T h e JSP, JCP, and CGP linked up with Sohyo and other organizations to prepare an extraparliamentary movement. The organization sponsored by the three parties and Sohyo attracted the participation of 321,000 people in all 47 prefectures. T h e press attacked the reform plan as partisan. Observing the growth of the opposition campaign, Nakamura Umekichi and Kono Kenzo, the speakers of the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors, demanded that Tanaka drop the idea of submitting the legislation. Within the LDP itself, Secretary General Hashimoto and other executives were lukewarm about placing the bills on the Diet's agenda, fearing that the Diet, which was fast approaching the end of the session, might be thrown into confusion that would cause assorted legislation to die. Fukuda, who had advocated a system of small electoral districts earlier, supported Tanaka but Ohira, Nakasone, and Miki did not. As a result, a cabinet meeting on May 16 decided that the government would not submit the bills regarding election reform to the Diet. T h e solidarity of the opposition parties and reluctance inside the party tied Tanaka's hands. After this issue disappeared, the business of the Diet proceeded more normally, although the ruling and opposition parties clashed repeatedly over the Remodeling Plan, legislation to increase Japan National Railway fares or amend the Health Insurance Law, and two laws related to defense that were left over from the Sato cabinet. T h e LDP succeeded in obtaining two extensions of the session by forced votes, but Diet deliberations ground to a halt on each occasion. Although the session lasted an unprecedented 280 days, its performance as measured by the number of bills passed was extremely poor. When the session ended in late September, among the contested bills only the Japan National Railway, health insurance, and defense bills had passed. Virtually all of the bills relating to the Remodeling Plan had not been approved. (Tanaka 1981:424-30) The Oil Shock Cabinet meetings were solo performances by Tanaka. T h e power wielders, who attended because it was ostensibly a party unity cabinet, watched coolly as a desperate Tanaka talked endlessly. O n October 6 Fukuda gave a lecture before his faction in which he said, "Policies that ignore inflation and politics that plants fancy dreams among the people should not be allowed." He added, " T h e time has come for the entire cabinet to establish a consensus on i n f l a t i o n . . . . Since I am in a sensitive position, I have perhaps been too

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cautious about what I say and do. But if the time comes when the fate of the nation is on the line, I intend to put it all together and speak out in a loud voice." War broke out in the Middle East the same day. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced that it would reduce petroleum production drastically and raise crude oil prices dramatically. It appeared as if the prosperity of the advanced countries, which had for more than a decade depended on the stable and plentiful supply of cheap crude oil from the Middle East, would collapse in an instant. This was a particularly serious blow for Japan, which relied on imported oil for 70 percent of its primary energy, and most of this from the Arab countries. Although the actual amount imported did not decrease, oil prices became entangled in ferocious speculation and quadrupled over the next three months, thereby forcing up the already rising price index. Mass hoarding of toilet paper, scrap paper, soap, sugar, salt, and other goods in October and November testified to the near panic that afflicted consumers. Approval of the Tanaka cabinet dropped from 27 percent in April to 22 percent in November, while the disapproval rate jumped from 44 percent to 60 percent. Nevertheless, the supplementary budget that was given cabinet approval on November 22 was 1.5 times the huge supplementary budget of the preceding fiscal year. "Minister of Finance, are you sure this is what you want? Are you sure that you can manage this budget?" Fukuda asked pointedly. Finance Minister Aichi responded to this query with, "It's okay. I can handle it." He died the following day of acute pneumonia. Tanaka was reluctant to name Fukuda finance minister because it would mean abandoning the Remodeling Plan, but there was no other financial expert who was up to the task. Fukuda himself vacillated when he received the solicitation from Tanaka. The majority opinion inside the Fukuda faction was that he should "adopt the clear posture of contesting Tanaka by leaving his post of Administrative Management Agency director." But after Tanaka promised to reorient his policies, Fukuda agreed to take the job. Fukuda commented at a November 25 press conference, "The bullet train and the Honshu-Shikoku bridge, the ¥2 trillion tax cut, the fiscal 1974 budget—Prime Minister Tanaka has acknowledged that the economic policies pursued until now will be reconsidered. This means that there will be a clean slate. Economic policies from now on must involve a two-front fight against inflation and the oil recession." When asked about the Remodeling Plan, he replied, "That is Prime Minister Tanaka's personal proposal. A private plan. It has not been adopted as a government program." On December 1, during speeches opening the special session of the Diet, Tanaka reversed himself and declared that "economizing is a virtue" while Fukuda stressed "strengthening the suppression of total demand." Fukuda began redrafting the fiscal 1974 budget virtually from scratch. He insisted

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that "the stabilization of prices must begin with the constriction of public works expenditures." In line with this policy, such expenditures were reduced by 0.9 percent from the previous year in the Finance Ministry draft released internally on December 22. O n January 12, 1974, Fukuda stated in Osaka that "the price index has gone into a frenzy," but that frenzy had peaked in December 1973. (Nakano 1982:320-27) T h e shock caused by the "frenzied price index" was tremendous. According to a January 1974 National Lifestyle Survey conducted by the prime minister's office, the percentage of people who answered that their lifestyle "was improving" dropped from 27 percent in the preceding year to 10 percent, while the percentage who answered "was deteriorating" increased from 10 percent to 33 percent. "About the same" fell from 61 percent to 54 percent. To the question, "Have you changed political parties because of the commodity shortages, inflation, and so on?" 5 percent answered "yes, from the government party to an opposition party" and 4 percent, "yes, from the government party to no political party." However, the net shift in support amounted to a mere 2 percent. After analyzing these results, Miyake Ichiro concluded, "In the year 1973 we experienced one of the highest rates of inflation in twenty years (23.1 percent), and the survey data indicate that the biggest source of political dissatisfaction was the inflation issue. After 1973 the rate of support for the LDP, which appeared to be stable even though the percentage of votes received by the party fell, also began to decline." (Nenpo seijigaku 1977:274-75)

MONEY POLITICS AND THE NOVEMBER ISSUE OF BUNGEISHUNJU The Money Power Election It looked as though an upset might occur in the July 1974 House of Councilors election. Tanaka's national campaign tour, which began in Tokushima in early May and ended the day before the election, covered all the prefectures except Tochigi. He gave public speeches at 147 locations. The party rented two helicopters for the entire p e r i o d — a t a cost of ¥2 million per day per craft—which flew a total of 40,000 kilometers. An astonishing number of candidates ran, including celebrity candidates in the national district. It was estimated that the LDP spent between ¥50 billion and ¥100 billion on the election. O n e distinctive feature of this election was the use of corporations as mechanisms for gathering votes. The LDP assigned thirty-five national district candidates (excluding those affiliated with religious organizations, etc.) to specific enterprise groups and major corporations. Secretary General Hashimoto applied his skilled calligraphy to traditional scrolled paper on two separate occasions to prepare letters soliciting the cooperation of

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two thousand large and medium-sized companies from the first and second sections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Corporate executives, who had kept a low profile after the criticism they received for making huge profits during the oil shock, began to reassert themselves in response to the LDP's call to "save free society." A Keidanren vice president stated that "we have to continue to have the LDP in control," while a vice president of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce noted that "enterprise consciousness is fostered when a big project like an election is handled on a companywide basis." In the case of the Mitsubishi group, which supported Saka Ken, a forty-fiveyear-old former bureaucrat associated with the prime minister's office, 107 presidents and vice presidents placed their names on his list of supporters. Some 50,000 branch support groups were formed with the chief of each responsible for 20 people, for a total of 1 million members. Supervisory personnel at the section chief level or higher were made support group chiefs. They spread their net not only over those who worked directly under them but also to subcontractors and other businesses that they dealt with. Saka nevertheless lost. The tactic of mobilizing corporations looked as though it would pay off. The LDP leadership predicted that, even though its official target of 75 seats might be difficult to reach, at the very least it would be possible to win 73 seats. The JSP, Sohyo, women's organizations, and other groups roundly denounced this tactic, but the LDP countered with an argument of its own: "Enterprises, too, have political rights... . One cannot call companyorganized arrangements bad while claiming that union election campaigns are all right." But on July 2 Central Election Administration Commission chairman Horigome Masamichi held a press conference at the Local Autonomy Ministry and read a "chairman's opinion" that said, "There is a danger that the principles of freedom of thought and belief and freedom in voting will be compromised if company-organized campaigns are accompanied by coercion through employment or business relationships. We request that those involved apply sound judgment to their actions on this occasion." Horigome was a JSP staff member who had been recommended by his party to fill a seat on the five-man Central Election Administration Commission. He released his "chairman's opinion" without consulting the two LDP-recommended commissioners. Although technically his statement was therefore not official, the editorials of the leading newspapers declared their support for it on the grounds that it "voiced the people's humble criticism of the company-organized campaigns." On July 4 the LDP called Horigome's statement "an abuse of office and an obstruction of campaigning based on a conscious, concerted plan." But by then, it was too late, and company-organized campaigning stopped. Or so it was reported. But did it really? Might it not be that company-organized campaigns, while sensa-

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tional, are in fact relatively ineffective as a means of gathering the vote? (Nakano 1982:334-44) The outcome was a mtyor defeat for the LDP. The number of LDPsponsored winners totaled 62: 19 in the national district and 43 in the regional districts. With 3 independents entering the party, the total came to 65. With the addition of the LDP seats that were not up for reelection, the party held 129 seats. Excluding the speakership, this was a margin of 7 seats over the opposition parties. Although not a reversal, this was near parity. (Asahi nenkan 1975:223-25) TheJuly Political Crisis Prime Minister Tanaka was upbeat in spite of the House of Councilors election loss. In accord with a suggestion from Administrative Management Agency director Hon, he decided to call a meeting of the four most powerful figures in the cabinet—Vice Prime Minister Miki, Finance Minister Fukuda, Foreign Minister Ohira, and MITI Minister Nakasone—following a formal cabinet meeting on July 12 to ask for their wholehearted cooperation. But Miki visited Tanaka before the scheduled meeting and said he intended to resign. At a press conference shordy afterward, he launched into a sharp attack on the rule of money in the LDP. During the election Miki became furious when Tanaka high-handedly dropped incumbent Councilor Kujime Kentaro of the Miki faction by having the prefectural federation sponsor Tanaka confidant Gotoda Masaharu in Miki's home prefecture of Tokushima. (Gotoda lost and Kujime, running as an independent, won.) The Miki faction general meeting on the afternoon of July 11 seethed with criticisms of the party executive over the "Tokushima War." It enthusiastically supported Miki's stand against the cabinet. Miki thus took it upon himself to resign before Tanaka requested his cooperation. Miki maintained contact with Fukuda, who had attacked Tanaka fiercely during the election. Sentiment favoring belligerence pervaded the Fukuda faction general meeting that began at 2:00 P.M. on July 12 at the Akasaka Prince Hotel: "Party reform is impossible unless we censure Tanaka." "Fukuda should take a stand of opposition [within the party]." At a meeting of a Fukuda backers' club at the Nakagawa teahouse in Akasaka, former prime minister Kishi went a step further. He advocated the formation of "new Fukuda party," but Hori and others in attendance countered by arguing that he should remain: "Infighting should be avoided, and [the government] passed on smoothly. Don't betray the nation's expectations by being short-tempered." Hori invited Fukuda to join him after the meeting. The place was Hori's office in Room 606 of the Hilton Hotel: "Miki may have quit, but he also pledged cooperation outside the cabinet. He has two options. He can re-

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turn at any time, or h e can leave a n d take y o u with him. If h e takes y o u a l o n g a n d things don't work out, h e can still c o m e back. B u t if y o u quit, y o u d o n o t have the second option. You will e n d u p b o x e d into a c o r n e r with n o c h o i c e b u t to f o r m a new p a r t y . . . . If y o u quit, there will b e n o avoiding an all-out confrontation, a declaration o f war. T h e party will be threatened with a split." Four days later, o n July 16, h e reiterated, " D o n ' t quit. Can't y o u see the g o v e r n m e n t is within y o u r r e a c h ? " Shortly after 1:00 P.M. that day, Kishi a n d Ishii, in the role of the party's elder statesmen, visited T a n a k a a n d told h i m h e should have a serious talk with F u k u d a a n d d e c i d e o n countermeasures " f r o m the perspective o f what is g o o d for the country." In effect, they were warning T a n a k a a n d F u k u d a that they should c o m e to terms b e f o r e their fight g o t o u t o f hand. T a n a k a consented. T h e y then visited F u k u d a a n d told h i m the same thing. A t the very e n d , as if it was an afterthought, Kishi said, " B u t Fukuda, w h e n y o u d o m e e t with Tanaka, b e very t h o r o u g h . D e b a t e with h i m f o r two or three days, if y o u have to." Ishii sensed that something was g o i n g up. A t 2:00 P.M., H o r i held a final talk with F u k u d a at the H o t e l O k u r a . " H a v e y o u d e c i d e d ? " " I am afraid that I c a n n o t d o as y o u h a d h o p e d . I wish to submit my resignation. . . ." F u k u d a gave his resignation to T a n a k a at 4:00 P.M. But in a d e v e l o p m e n t n o o n e h a d foreseen, Hori h a d turned in his resignation thirty minutes earlier. H o r i explained, " W h e n I b e c a m e a cabinet m e m b e r , I t h o u g h t o f my role as a c o n d u i t between the p r i m e minister a n d Fukuda. Now that things have turned o u t the way they have, I can n o l o n g e r r e m a i n a cabinet m e m b e r . . . . " O n July 17 F u k u d a a n d Miki m e t at a c o n f e r e n c e r o o m in the Constitutional M e m o r i a l Hall and, s u r r o u n d e d by cameras, shook hands. O n July 18 the j u n i o r m e m b e r s o f the Fukuda, Miki, a n d Nakasone factions initiated a c a m p a i g n for r e f o r m by creating the Party Reconstruction Diet M e m b e r s ' Federation. In response, T a n a k a followed the e x a m p l e o f Prime Minister Ikeda. H e created a council to investigate "basic issues o f the party a n d its operations," a n d h e forcefully installed a reluctant Shiina Etsuzaburo as its chairman. (Mainichi S h i n b u n s h a Seijibu 1975:59-101) T h u s , T a n a k a was widely criticized inside the party f o r his m o n e y politics. Ironically, it seems it was the very same m o n e y politics that m a d e it possible f o r h i m to neutralize this criticism. It m i g h t n o t b e possible to buy voters with money, b u t it is possible to buy Diet members: It was about [July] 18 that the live ammunition began to be fired. It is customary in the political world for faction bosses to distribute cash to the rank and file during obon and at the end of the year. . . . The cover used was therefore "ochugen" [midyear gifts]. The average per person was ¥3 million to ¥5 million. These were sent not only to Tanaka faction members but also to the younger members of the other factions. The Diet members of the other factions naturally received money

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from their faction bosses, but these amounted at best to ¥600,000 or ¥700,000 to ¥1 m i l l i o n . . . . Prime Minister Tanaka's firing of live ammunition at Diet members in other factions was not something n e w . . . . Therefore, you cannot use the usual factional maps when thinking about Tanaka's support. While it is not clear if they are given fertilizer [money] because they are Tanaka sympathizers or if it's the other way around, the fact remains that there are numerous pro-Tanaka Diet members in all of the factions. The reason why they will obey Tanaka rather than their faction bosses at critical junctures is a consequence of the magnitude of the funds that [Tanaka] possesses.... When Fukuda gave his own candidates ¥5 million [in the last election of Councilors], ¥30 million was distributed by Tanaka, while in the case of the Shiina faction, ¥100 million was distributed against ¥5 million. When Shiina grumbled that "at 20 to 1 it's no contest," Nakasone is said to have complained, "At our place, it's 30 percent autonomy" ["30 percent autonomy" is commonly used to describe the lack of autonomy among local governments because 70 percent of their funding comes from the central government]. . . . To use Kishi's words, "Although they both have fingers, one of Fukuda's is worth ¥1 million while one of Tanaka's is worth ¥100 million." . . . The power [of Tanaka's money] is illustrated by his activities in countering the Seirankai. During the July political crisis, the Seirankai was divided over whether to oppose Tanaka. . . . A certain dejected Seirankai executive said, "It should become increasingly clear between now and fall who has received the most money from Tanaka." If the Seirankai could be crushed this easily, it is not at all surprising that, contrary to their initial gallantry, the various other gatherings ofjunior members invariably petered out. (Tachibana 1976:1:110-13) The zaikai was discouraged by the House of Councilors election defeat and infuriated by the resignation of the three cabinet members. It began to display openly its mistrust of its "prodigal son." Nikkeiren chairman Sakurada Takeshi said at a management seminar on July 24, "The era of an independent LDP government is virtually over, and we have entered an era of coalition government." Former Industrial Bank president Nakayama Sohei and Japan Chamber of Commerce president Nagano Shigeo made statements predicting a conservative-progressive coalition and an era of two conservative parties. On August 8 Keidanren president Doko Toshio visited Tanaka and said, "Keidanren will no longer give out any money." On August 12 Keidanren formally decided that it would no longer assist in the collection of political funds. Dokó said, "The dissolution of the LDP factions will be required before we can contribute political funds." And on August 13 Tokyo Electric decided that it would make no political contributions whatsoever. Similar moves followed by the other eight electric

¡¿2

LDP RULE, 1955-1980

companies as well as the Tokyo, Osaka, Tobu, Hiroshima, and Seibu gas companies. The November Issue

Bungei shunju

The issue of Bungei shunju that went on sale on October 9 dealt a severe blow to Tanaka. The feature articles were Tachibana Takashi's "A Study of Tanaka Kakuei: His Money Connections and His Personal Connections," which exposed the land "flipping" and behind-the-scenes money-making activities of the "Tanaka family's" collection of "ghost enterprises," and Kodama Takaya's "Lonely Queen of the Etsuzankai," which detailed the relationship between Tanaka and Sato Aki, the controller of funds for the Etsuzankai (Tanaka's support organization), as well as Sato's tremendous influence inside the Tanaka faction. Sonoda Sunao (Fukuda faction) first heard in early September that Bungei shunju was researching a "Tanaka story." Fearful that the story would be interpreted as a Fukuda faction intrigue, he scrutinized every stage from the completion of the draft, through proofreading and binding, and on to delivery of the issue. He obtained galley proofs in late September. He was also able to track developments within the Tanaka faction in considerable detail. In fact, Tanaka faction officers did interpret the articles as a Fukuda faction intrigue. Faction officers contacted Bungei shunju and exerted pressure, but to no avail. They were most anxious about the article on "Ms. S," not the one on "money connections." Several days after the magazine went on sale, Tanaka had lunch with Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido and some aides in the basement cafeteria of the Prime Minister's Residence. He suddenly said, "I came out of the country, and I've been charging ahead ever since. I became a Representative at the age of twenty-eight, and I'm now fifty-six, so my career as a Representative is twenty-eight years long. That's exacdy one-half of my life." It was possible to interpret this muttering as a statement that it was time to "throw in the towel." (Mainichi Shinbunsha Seijibu 1975:109-10) At a Fukuda faction meeting on October 11, Fukuda gave a speech in which he touched on the subject of two conservative parties and the proposal for a new conservative party. Sonoda, who followed, read a manifesto that said, "Our fight . . . is a fight to save the nation, which is decaying because of Prime Minister Tanaka, and to liberate the people from the crisis. Under the leadership of Chairman Fukuda, we pledge to volunteer ourselves as a fighting combat unit." The various meetings of the antimainstream factions called for the truth about the Bungei shunju stories. The issue was brought before the Executive Council on October 11. A discomfited-looking Secretary General Hashimoto promised to investigate. (Mainichi Shinbunsha Seijibu 1975:97)

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The impact, however, was greater overseas than at home. The story was initially covered in the issue of Newsweek that went on sale on October 14. The Baltimore Sun of October 14 followed suit, and the Washington Post of October 19. At noon on October 22, Tanaka held a press conference before foreign journalists at the Marunouchi Press Club. The 350 foreign and domestic reporters who filled the room paid no attention to his speech, focusing instead on the issue of his money connections. Tanaka, who had refused to grant a press interview to the cabinet press club and who had consistently refused any comment, was forced to reiterate strained vindications before a volley of questions from the foreign journalists. He later said that he had been extremely careless in replying to the foreign correspondents. The issue was instandy politicized when the story made the headlines the following morning. Articles about money connections filled newspaper pages daily, and it proved impossible to stop them. The telephone rang off the hook at the editorial department of Bungei shunju from the morning of October 23 on. On busy days, there were three hundred calls, with 90 percent of them calls of encouragement. Most were from women. Two parttime workers were hired to answer the calls. The rate of cabinet approval at the time was 12 percent and the rate of disapproval, 69 percent, the lowest and the highest figures, respectively, since these surveys were initiated. On the morning of October 23, the day after the uproar at the press club, LDP Budget Bureau chief Ozawa Tatsuo visited Mejiro. It was only 5:30, but Tanaka was already up. Tanaka said that he had not been able to sleep and was in a very bad mood. He told Nikaido, who arrived next, that he wanted to cancel his planned visits to New Zealand and Australia, which were only five days away. The startled Nikaido said, "That will not do. This is something that has already been decided through diplomatic channels. You must handle things properly until [U.S. president Gerald] Ford's visit. If you were to quit it would be a diplomatic disaster." "At least until Ford" became the operational timeframe of Tanaka's close associates. (Mainichi 1975:26-27) Tanaka went to the Shuka teahouse that evening with Takeshita Noboru and Ozawa Tatsuo. "Oasa called me here," he recalled nostalgically. Oasa had been waiting there one November day twenty-nine years earlier. At the time, Tanaka readily consented to contribute to Machida's candidacy and this meeting became the impetus for his entry into the political world. The person waiting for him this time was Hori, who had resigned from the cabinet three months earlier. The group talked for about one hour. Hori recalls: The prime minister was in a state of tremendous shock. On the one hand, he was bullish, but on the other, he felt a deep sense of responsibility. I believe he was in considerable anguish.

¡54

LDP RULE, 1955 -1980 [Tanaka said,] " O n c e I get back from my overseas tour, I would like you to reenter the cabinet and help me out." I responded by suggesting: "Mr. Prime Minister, isn't it true that whenever you read the papers or turn on the television these days, it's just one unpleasant thing after another? You cannot come up with good ideas in such an unpleasant environment. You now happen to be going on a nice ten-day trip to the southern hemisphere. Australia and New Zealand are probably at the height of spring, and the environment there is wonderful. Why don't you look back, in that quiet environment, at your home country of Japan? Consider the image its politics presents, and think things over carefully." (Hori 1975:153)

Ohira visited the Prime Minister's Residence shortly after noon on October 24. Although Tanaka intended to step down, he was thoroughly disconcerted. Ohira said, "An overseas tour that is already planned has to be completed. No matter how hard that might be. Things are dark both domestically and externally. But right now you must not waver." Although Ohira did not suggest direcdy that Tanaka should resign, when Tanaka asked for help in dealing with the money connections issue, he replied, "If it's a policy issue, then the LDP and the cabinet should bear the responsibility together. But this is a personal matter, and you had better make sure that you do not go down the wrong path in your thinking and in your handling of it." (Mainichi Shinbunsha Seijibu 1975:122-23) The Shiina Interim Cabinet On October 25 Tanaka visited Speaker of the House of Representatives Kono Kenzo under the guise of making a courtesy call before leaving for his overseas tour. Kono writes: It was not as though I told Tanaka outright to q u i t . . . . But it seemed that Kaku had resolved to face the consequences. I felt that the time would come again when Tanaka would be needed by Japan and that it was important for him to pull out quickly without any serious injuries. I therefore blurted out at a press conference, "Tanaka seems to be firming up his resolve." This statement was interpreted to be a "Tanaka resignation signal," and the feeling instandy filled the air that a change of government was imminent. (Kono 1978:97-98)

The normally talkative Kono was unusually laconic at the press conference. Prefacing his remarks with "this is not something that the prime minister said," he stated: "There are 'two roads' to resolving the political situation. There will probably be tremendous strife toward the end of next month." The Yomiuri shinbun reporter " K " rushed over to Kono's house in Hiratsuka that evening and was told, "Kaku is going to quit." Kono added, "Kaku was concerned about Shiina earlier. If only Shiina were well—he repeated that

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twice." The lead article in the Yomiuri shinbun on October 26 was headlined: "Prime Minister Tanaka, Prepared to Quit?" O n learning of Kono's statement in the morning paper, Shiina had his car driven to the Tanaka residence. He listened to a summary of the talk with Kono and asked point blank, "Is there anything that could be a problem politically if the content of the Bungei shunju article was investigated fully?" Tanaka strongly denied that there was anything serious. He added, "I won't attend the Diet sessions. I will use illness as my excuse. Could you handle the cabinet temporarily during that time?" Shiina did not respond immediately, claiming old age and ill health. Tanaka's intent appeared to be a temporary separation of the prime ministership and the party presidency in which he would have Shiina enter the cabinet as vice prime minister, weather the extraordinary session with Shiina in that post, and, depending on the circumstances, maybe even acknowledge a Shiina government at the party convention in January. But this would be an interim government in which Tanaka would remain party president while he waited for the storm to subside. The Sankei shinbun reporter Fujita Yoshiro visited Fukuda on the morning of October 27. Fukuda observed that, although "Nadao would be the most appropriate person" to head the next government, in the end it would probably end up a "Shiina interim cabinet." Fujita visited Miki next. Miki said that he too was to some extent responsible for resolving the political situation and declared that "the only two qualified candidates are N and M—Nadao and Miki." Moving on to Shiina, Fujita found that Shiina was thinking not of having a powerful faction leader like Fukuda or Miki follow Tanaka, but instead of a government led by Maeo, Nadao, Hori, or some other elder statesman. Shiina seemed to be undecided as to whether to include himself among the elder statesmen. Shiina met secretly with Maeo and Nadao on October 30. (Fujita 1979:37-55) Meanwhile, Ohira, too, was thinking about a separation of the prime ministership and the party presidency. At 8:00 in the evening on October 31, Ohira asked Ito, "What if I were prime minister and Tanaka were president?" Ito replied, "Things are best left simple and straightforward. An interim government would not be good. We should have a full-fledged prime minister-party president." Ohira responded, "The press conference in Rangoon [Tanaka's last stop on his tour] is important, so I will write him a letter. The press conference after he returns is the most important." The following day, Ito heard from the Asahi shinbun reporter that "the proposal for an interim prime minister and party president under Vice Prime Minister Shiina is running strong. It would be Ohira if a presidential election were held. But is Ohira really prepared to go through with a presidential election?" (Ito 1982:134-35)

LDP R U L E , 1955 - 1980

O n November 3 Hori talked with Shiina for half a day, trying to convince him that an election should be avoided in the selection of the next party president and a "Shiina interim government" should be arranged after Tanaka's withdrawal. Hori writes, "I felt wholeheartedly that Shiina should handle the task of dealing with the aftermath. This was also more or less Prime Minister Tanaka's sense of the situation on October 23." (Hori 1975: 154-55) Tanaka returned, looking haggard, to Haneda Airport late on the night of November 8. O n November 9 Shiina proposed Fukuda Hajime (Funada faction) for secretary general, Nishimura Eiichi or Kimura Takeo (both from the Tanaka faction) for Executive Council chairman, and Koyama Osanori (Ohira faction) or Nemoto Ryutaro (no faction) for PARC chairman. He claimed that he was willing to take charge of an interim government if people whose political ideals were close to his own on the questions of party reform and party management were chosen as the Three Party Officers. O n November 11, Hori proposed that Tanaka reshuffle the cabinet and name Shiina vice prime minister in anticipation of a Shiina acting prime ministership. But while Tanaka was overseas, another strategy was being refined inside the Tanaka and the Ohira factions. The plan was for the two factions to control the Three Party Officers and arrange for Ohira to inherit the government. A reshuffling was conducted along these lines on November 11. The secretary general now was Nikaido (Tanaka faction), the Executive Council chairman was Suzuki (Ohira faction, incumbent), and the PARC chairman was Yamanaka Sadanori (Nakasone faction). Shiina was not given a position in the cabinet. Both Fukuda and Miki opposed this reshuffling. T h e party was split completely in two as a consequence. "My Resolution" Tanaka gave up trying to sustain his government in the middle of November. O n November 15 the House of Councilors audit committee decided to summon representatives of the "Tanaka family" to investigate its money connections. Among those summoned was the " Q u e e n of the Etsuzankai." This development was a sudden and devastating shock for Tanaka. He complained incessantly of being tired and would return to his private residence by 2:00 or 3:00 P.M. The withering of his vitality was apparent to even the casual observer. Troubled by a chronic case of goiter and by a lack of sleep, he was unable to get his weight back to normal. Extreme nervousness increased the amount of whiskey that he drank as a nightcap. O n the evening of November 19, Kono ran into Tanaka in the washroom during an Imperial Palace banquet honoring U.S. president Gerald Ford. Kono states that

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" [Tanaka's] shoulders drooped from total exhaustion. He seemed so pitiful that I could not bear to look at him." (Kono 1978:98) The newspapers announced unanimously on November 21, the day after the formal events of Ford's Japan visit concluded, "Prime Minister Tanaka, Resolved to Step Down." Tanaka waited until Ford returned to the United States and then announced his resignation, just before 10:00 on November 26. Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeshita read "My Resolution" on his behalf. Tanaka watched this event on television in the business office of the Prime Minister's Residence with huge tears rolling down his face. During the two years and four months since taking charge of the government, I have pledged decision and implementation and have channeled all of my energy on behalf of Japan's peace and security and the stabilization and improvement of the lives of the people. As the person holding ultimate responsibility for national governance, I therefore feel a strong political and moral responsibility for the fact that the current confusion in politics stems in no small part from issues relating to me personally. As one human being, I have continued to work diligendy, without resting for even a single day, ever since I left my hometown with nothing in my pockets. Looking back, I find myself rather moved. However, as a public person, the fact that I have caused even the slightest misunderstanding among the general public is due entirely to a lack of wisdom on my part and is something that causes me insufferable anguish. I hope someday to make the truth known and to obtain the understanding of the people of the nation. (Nakano '982:373) Within a few months after the formation of his cabinet, Tanaka's popularity had fizzled out completely. The bulldozer could not keep up with the computer. It went out of control repeatedly, leading to an accumulation of failures and ill will. In the end, it seemed as though the issue of his money connections had ended his political career. They say the dying bird sings sadly. The humble words that he professed in his resolution were undoubtedly sincere. But they ultimately represented only a temporary insecurity that surfaced as he lay trapped in an impossible predicament. After he regained his vitality and his ambition, these humble words were cast aside like a pair of worn-out shoes.

FIVE

The Purification of the Political World

THE SHIINA DECISION AND THE MIKI CABINET The Four Wielders of Power Speculation and maneuvering of all kinds erupted in the middle of November, when Tanaka's resignation began to be seen as a certainty. T h e LDP was in an uproar. O n the evening of November 22 Shiina and Hori held secret discussions in a detached teahouse behind the Nakagawa in Akasaka. At Hod's urging, Shiina grudgingly resolved to use the Shiina investigative committee as a base from which to iron out consensus inside the party. T h e two men agreed that a presidential election vote had to be avoided, that turmoil within the party was a foregone conclusion if either Fukuda or Ohira took over the government, and that they had little choice but to turn to an "interim party elder." T h e discussion lasted less than an hour. They left the teahouse for the second floor of the Nakagawa inn, where they met Keidanren president Doko and a party of zaikai figures who cheered the two of them. The reception could have been interpreted as an indication that the zaikai was hoping for a "Shiina interim cabinet." At the same hour, in a different room on the second floor, Kishi and Japan Chamber of Commerce president Nagano were holding secret discussions. Kishi asked Nagano to support Fukuda. O n his way out, when he was informed by the group of reporters that Doko, Shiina, and Hori were also gathered there, he displayed fierce hostility. "This is no time for Shiina and Hori to get involved!" he said. O n the early afternoon of Sunday, November 24, Miki telephoned Shiina from his villa in Manazuru and offered his cooperation: "Even if a presidential election is held, I personally have no intention of running. In the cur-

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•59

rent crisis, I would like to throw aside my own personal considerations and cooperate fully in your mediation effort." The conversation lasted an hour. Subsequendy, Miki threatened to boycott the presidential election, if there was one, and said that he would even consider leaving the party. He secredy met with DSP vice chairman Sasaki Ryosaku early in the morning on November 26 to discuss the possibility of a conservative-progressive coalition with the JSP, CGP, and DSP. Shiina immediately picked up this piece of information. There is no way of telling how serious Miki really was about the coalition. It could have been intended to put pressure on Shiina and the others. Fukuda was also opposed to a presidential election. Because Miki, with whom he had maintained an ongoing critique of money politics since July, was claiming that he would boycott any presidential election, Fukuda could not count on the Miki faction's support. For this reason, a presidential vote would be absolutely disadvantageous for him. Fukuda met Ohira at the Hotel Pacific at 8:50 A.M. on November 25. Fukuda asked for Ohira's cooperation in arranging a negotiated selection, but Ohira adamantly demanded a vote. They parted without coming to an agreement. Shordy after 6:00 A.M. on November 27, they held a second meeting at Nagano's residence. Nagano, who sat in, argued that the LDP was in no condition to hold an election and that seniority should be respected. But Ohira could not be swayed even though Fukuda was five years older and was senior to him at the Finance Ministry. Ohira would not budge. Ohira felt that the interim government plan would collapse if an election were held. He could then line up the numbers to beat Fukuda, as long as he had the Tanaka faction behind him. The Ohira faction initiated a petition campaign calling for the abolition of backroom politicking, which attracted sympathizers among the younger Diet members. By November 30 nearly two hundred signatures had been collected. The Tanaka faction, however, was not all that keen about a presidential vote. If there was a vote, the faction would have litde choice but to support Ohira. But, more important, it had to deflect criticism away from its money politics. Thus, a negotiated selection was more desirable than an election. Furthermore, a Shiina interim government would leave open the possibility of a Tanaka comeback. Nakasone was considered the "adolescent" among the four power wielders. Judging that it would be either a Shiina or a Hori interim government, on November 17 Nakasone had already told Shiina that he would back him. Nakasone was aiming for the secretary general's position. All of the neutral factions intended to cooperate with Shiina.

160

LDP RULE, 1955-1980 The Wizard of Kume

As if on cue, Shiina burst into action following Tanaka's resignation announcement on the morning of November 26. At 11:00 A.M. that day, he gathered Fukuda, Ohira, Miki, Nakasone, Funada, Mizuta, Ishii, Nishimura, and Hon together at LDP headquarters and, acting in the role of chairman of the party's investigative council, spoke passionately about the committee's report (submitted to Tanaka on October 24). He did not say a word about a successor to Tanaka. Unable to keep quiet any longer, Ishii announced his opposition to an interim government, and then Funada asserted that the matter should be discussed at a party advisers' conference. Both statements were aimed at blocking a Shiina interim government and anticipated one headed by Fukuda. Shiina said nothing. Secretary General Nikaido sounded out the opinions of the eight faction bosses (he consulted Nishimura in the case of the Tanaka faction) as well as those of Hori and Sato. Only Ohira favored a vote. Shiina set out to setde the matter with a target date of late November, although he did not reveal his intentions to even his closest advisers. According to the reporter Fujita Yoshiro, Shiina's thinking had not changed since he discussed the matter with Hori. That is, a presidential vote should by all means be avoided. Neither Ohira or Fukuda should be made party president. Shiina hoped to resolve the situation with an interim government led by an elder party figure and then implement fundamental reforms. Such party reforms could be carried out only under a senior party figure. That being the case, who should be put in charge of the interim government? Shiina could not make up his mind. (Fujita 1979:75-76) On November 29 Shiina held separate meetings with each of the four power wielders. In response to a question from Ohira, Shiina said, "Since I am not in good physical shape, I do not have a strong desire to do it. But as a politician, I could not very well get out of it if everyone wants me to do it." At a press conference following the meeting, Ohira announced, "Shiina intends to manage the government himself." The party was in an uproar. Pestered by reporters, Shiina claimed ignorance: "The question came from him. I may have said something in jest. After all, I have no desire whatsoever to do it." Nevertheless, the prestige of Shiina's mediation effort sank precipitously, and Ohira's scheme to quash a Shiina prime ministership succeeded. That evening, Fujita spoke to Shiina's aide Iwase Shigeru, a former Sankei shinbun reporter with whom he had worked. First, he said, the Shiina interim government idea should be given up. That is the only way for the wizard of Kume (Shiina) to recover his lost powers. He must then declare that he will choose someone from among the four wielders of power. One

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day for negotiations is too short. Stall for time and postpone the decision until the following morning. As for the choice, the only possible one is Miki. He is the father of party modernization and the person who prepared the Miki Report under the Ikeda cabinet. He could probably gain the nation's understanding. Fujita concluded, "Let's go with Miki." Fujita went to Shiina's house at 7:30 A.M. on November 30. Shiina had just gotten up. He looked dazed. Clad only in a pair of undershorts, he was trying to put on a shirt. He squinted as he tried to determine which side was the front. The muscles on his legs looked like they had been scraped off. He looked pathetically thin. "Hori. It's got to be Hon," he said. Fujita objected: "Hori does not have a very good reputation. He has the dismal image of a manipulator and a factional politician. The public will not accept him. If you decide on a Hori interim government, people will probably think that you named him knowing that it would not work, so that there would be a Shiina interim government once the plan collapsed. Miki is our only choice." Shiina thought a moment and muttered, "That is a good idea. Let's go with him." (Fujita 1979:93-102) The first five-man conference began on the morning of November 30 at LDP headquarters. Shiina opened by stating that the only possible candidates for party president were the "four gathered here." He put Nakasone in charge of steering the meeting. The group discussed policies throughout the morning and exchanged opinions in the afternoon on party reform and a number of other topics. It reached a consensus on five points, including the principle that the secretary general, finance committee chairman, and accounting bureau chief would not be selected from among the party president's faction. Shiina closed the meeting with the statement, "I would like to think seriously for one more evening before coming up with my answer. I would like you to come here again tomorrow morning." Everything went according to the script that Fujita and Iwase had thought up. But even as the polite discussion went on, rupture was in the air. Should there be an actual split, there would be no choice but to hold an election vote. Nakasone also sensed the impending rupture. He met secredy that evening with a Fukuda emissary, Abe Shintaro, through the mediation of the Seirankai chairman Nakao Eiichi. They agreed to form a tripartite MikiFukuda-Nakasone alliance in the event of a presidential election, in which 48 or 49 members of the Fukuda faction, 21 members of the Nakasone faction, and 26 or 27 members of the Miki faction—a total of approximately 90—would first leave the party and then increase the group's representation to around 150 in the general election. But when Abe telephoned Fukuda around 11:00 to report on the success of the meeting, Fukuda responded in a very lukewarm manner. Shortly after 4:00 P.M., following the five-man talks, Fukuda had obtained information that Shiina was thinking of naming Miki.

i6z

LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980

Although Fukuda was not particularly pleased, there would be a presidential vote if he objected, and the party would be thrown into confusion. After meeting with Abe, Nakasone was informed by Shiina around 11:00 that he had chosen Miki. He wanted Nakasone to continue as moderator during the second round of five-man talks the next day and would like Nakasone to arrange individual consultations with Miki immediately after the announcement of the decision. Miki was acceptable as far as Nakasone was concerned, since his objective was simply to capture the post of secretary general in a change of government. He telephoned Miki immediately to tell him what he "sensed" were Shiina's intentions. "You've got to be kidding," Miki said and brushed the information off with a laugh. (Mainichi Shinbunsha Seijibu 1975:8-13) A? If Praying to God But in fact, Miki had already had the entire script explained to him late in the evening on November 29—that is, before he talked to Nakasone and even before Shiina himself knew about it. He already knew that Shiina would first declare that the candidate would be chosen from among the four of them, that the talks would be carried over to the following day, that Shiina would reveal his decision at that time, and that the person on Shiina's mind was Miki. It was probably Fujita who told Miki. When Miki first heard about it, he was rather dubious. But when he attended the five-man talks, he saw things unfold according to the script. He tried desperately to calm the rising throb of his heart as one prophecy after another came true. Shortly after noon, when the talks recessed, he telephoned Fujita: "I want to meet you at one o'clock. I'd like you to come quietly to the fourth floor of my office." Fujita describes their meeting: Miki's offices were located in an elegant building with a large front garden in a quiet part of Bancho. They had a conference room, a cafeteria, and even a full-time cook. No other politician could afford offices this impressive "on his own." The fourth floor was Miki's private room. It was hallowed ground where outsiders were not allowed. "So Shiina's not thinking about a Hori interim government, is he?" he asked me in his office in a hushed voice. "That is no more." . . . Miki leaned closer and said, "The party president doesn't have to be me. It doesn't have to be m e . . . . What is important is that Shiina comes to his decision after thinking deeply about it, as if he were praying to God. That's the key point." Then, as if staring into the back of my eyes, "Thirty-seven years, my political career has been. . . . I've had the longest career of any Diet member in the political world. . . . During that time, as you well know, I have truly directed my passion sincerely toward party modernization. That 'Miki Report' during Ikeda's cabinet...."

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"I am certain that Shiina is quite aware of that, too. That's why he is selecting you." I reminded him that Shiina was an "honor student" in the Miki Committee. As we rode the elevator, Miki grasped my hand in both of his and said, "Don't leave Shiina's side. You are in a most important position." (Fujita 1979:108-9) At 6:30 that evening (November 30), Iwase called Fujita to ask him to go to Shiina's house early the next morning. He called again about ten minutes later: "Shiina wants me to ask you to write his 'opening remarks' at tomorrow's five-man talks. Please accept." Fujita, who then went to see Miki, continues the story:

About 9:30 that evening Miki and I stood in a small parlor to the side of the front entrance of Miki's house and began talking about the "main item." "Are you sure it's not going to be Hon?" He was still concerned about a Hon interim government. "No such thing. A while ago, I got word from Shiina to write a speech for him to read at tomorrow's announcement. There is no doubt whatsoever that it will be a 'Miki designation'!" At that, he abrupdy said, "Hold on a minute." He suddenly pressed down on both of my shoulders, saying, "Fujita, it must be an extraordinary speech, one that will be remembered through the ages." Then, continuing to rock my shoulders, he said firmly, "I'll write it. I'll write it even if it takes all night. You must help me think of what to write." Clapping his hands vigorously, he called toward the back of the house in a very loud voice . . . : "Get me some paper and a pen!" I suddenly remembered that it was Miki who wrote the famous speech calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Ishibashi [Tanzan].... He took the paper that the houseboy brought and sat casually on the carpet. "So how should I write this?" Muttering, "Yes . . . that's right," Miki wrote on the paper as I dictated the tentative draft that came to mind. "There are conditions that must be fulfilled by the successor president." "What sort of conditions?" asked Miki. "Cleanliness is demanded above all. Enthusiasm for party reform is also undoubtedly essential. And ability and familiarity with p o l i c y . . . . " "That's right. That should be put i n . . . . " "I (Shiina) thought deeply about this, as if 'praying to G o d ' . . . . " " 'Praying to God' must definitely be put in." He moved the pen nervously as he spoke. "On the basis of this reasoning, I have concluded that Miki Takeo would be the best person to be the successor president." I was dumbfounded when I glanced down at Miki, who was vigorously moving his pen across the paper. It was not "writing." "Worms" were writhing. Zigzags and indiscriminate lines wriggled atop the paper. Miki had not yet noticed the "worms."

164

LDP RULE, 1955 -1980 "Could you come by tomorrow morning at 6:30?" Miki was going to write a draft of the speech. I was to write one as well. We would compare them the next morning and hand the vice president a "masterwork." It took me until dawn to complete the writing. Just before seven on the morning of Sunday, December 1 , 1 went to Miki's home in Nanpeidai. The gate, which would normally have been closed even after eight o'clock, was already wide open. The gravel driveway to the main entrance had already been cleaned, and water had been sprinkled on it [to prevent dust]. Logs burned in the fireplace of the parlor. And Mrs. Miki, in something rarely seen, was dressed in a kimono and personally brought a tray with breakfast on it. I could sense the "respect" of the entire Miki household. Miki bustled in with a stern expression on his face. He was holding a pen and some paper. "So, Fujita, did you write it?" I silently handed him the draft. I was shocked once again when I was handed his paper in exchange. Last night's "worms" were still there. Looking sheepish, he said, " I thought about writing it. But then I thought what's the use of my correcting yours. . . ." There was a moment of embarrassed laughter. Miki began reading the draft, muttering approval. The houseboy appeared at the entrance: "There is a call from Mr. Ohira." Miki's expression tensed as he received Mr. Ohira's call. "No, nothing at all. . . . Yes. . . . I really don't know. . . . No, nothing of the sort. Absolutely n o t . . . . Yes, y e s . . . . Good g r i e f — " Miki, returning his eyes to the draft, tensed up again. The veins in his temples were swollen. He probably hadn't slept since last n i g h t . . . . Ohira had probably been tormented the entire evening by the suspicion that he was the only one who had been left in the dark. . . . Feelings of alienation and anxiety undoubtedly led to this "exploratory call" to Miki. (Fujita !

979 :

n

5-'6)

Ohira heard the news about Miki from Suzuki, who had hurried over to see him that morning. Ohira telephoned Miki right away. " I haven't heard anything from Shiina. Did you receive any word?" " N o , nothing at all," was Miki's reply. (Mainichi Shinbunsha Seijibu 1975:219) After he finished reading the manuscript, Miki said to Fujita: "It's very well done. It's a 'masterwork.'" Miki's expression softened. The speech draft closed as follows: " I firmly believe Miki Takeo to be the most appropriate person to become the new party president on this occasion and hereby recommend him." Miki said that he wanted me to insert the phrase "the most senior member of the political world" before his name. It was a brilliant idea. If that was included, neither Fukuda nor Ohira could voice any complaints. An implicit "dignity" would be added. (Fujita 1979:100) After Miki saw Fujita off, he may have begun writing his acceptance speech. Representative Kaifu Toshiki visited him around 7:00 that morning. After

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entering the house, which he visited regularly, he opened the door to the study. Sensing another's presence, [Miki] quickly hid a half-written sheet of paper under the table. Kaifu, feeling a bit hurt, said, "I'm scheduled to be on television [in a panel discussion]. What should I say?" "Whatever you do, don't say too many bad things about the other factions," Miki ordered sternly. (Mainichi Shinbunsha Seijibu 1975:228)

After Fujita left Miki's residence, he visited Shiina. Shiina was seated cross-legged on the tatami of his bedroom, mumbling as he ate boiled spinach with toast. Iwase and Shiina's wife, Kimie, were silently watching over him. I handed the draft speech to Shiina. He interrupted his meal to read it. "Thank you very much. You did a good j o b . . . . " He looked up at the ceiling and closed his eyes. Thinking out loud, he said: "A person who has not failed to—show devotion and demonstrate effort toward—helping the L D P — e n d factional infighting—and transform itself into a modern political party—how about adding something like that?" . . . Iwase used [Kimie's] makeup stand as a desk to write out a final draft in large letters on a pad of stationery. Shiina read it over carefully and then said, "Pass me that red pencil." He flicked the point across a section near the end of the draft. He had crossed out "the most" in "the most senior member of the political world." (Fujita

1979:!og) Shiina read the speech before the four power wielders at 10:30 A.M. The holders of the three party posts were upset that they had not been consulted beforehand. But if they had been, the decision might not have survived. Fukuda broke the silence by saying, "It's fine with me. I have no objection." The Fukuda and Nakasone factions immediately held general meetings and approved the decision. The senior advisers' council also approved. Ohira withheld comment on grounds that this was merely a "private proposal"; at 1:40 P.M. he rushed over to Tanaka's residence. Tanaka had gone to Hanno to play golf. When Tanaka returned, he said: "There's nothing you can do about it. You were had. At 51 to 49, it's your loss." Several days later, reporters asked Ohira what he thought about the Shiina decision. He replied, "The LDP certainly has some accomplished political artists. They are not statesmen, however. They are artists." "It's a trick of history," he muttered. To his close associates, who felt cheated, he said, "I'm not all that upset." (Ohira Masayoshi Kaisoroku Kankokai 1982:373) A Bolt from

the

Blue

For Miki, the Shiina decision was "a bolt from the blue." He had first been elected to the House of Representatives at the age of thirty, as an indepen-

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dent in the April 1937 general election. In the first postwar election, in April 1946, he also ran and won as an independent. That August he participated in the formation of the Cooperative Democratic Party, which stood for modified capitalism and advocated "cooperativism." When the party's chairman was purged, Miki took his place. In March 1947 the party merged with the People's Party to form the People's Cooperative Party, and Miki became secretary general. He entered the Katayama-Ashida coalition cabinet as minister of posts and telecommunications. In April 1950, under the Yoshida cabinet, his party merged with the opposition faction in the Democratic Party to form the People's Democratic Party. Miki served as secretary general. He participated in the formation of the Japan Democratic Party in November 1954 and became minister of transportation in the Hatoyama cabinet. He then participated in the formation of the LDP in November 1955. When his party's influence began to decline, Miki tried to restore it by merging with other parties. Thereafter, Miki led a medium-sized faction as he took up such key posts as minister of international trade and industry, foreign minister, party vice president, secretary general, and PARC chairman. But he was always seen as a "second-string" player within the conservatives. His moves were strategic and earned him the title of "Balkan politician." In the presidential election that followed Hatoyama's retirement, he opposed Kishi and supported Ishibashi. He became secretary general under President Ishibashi. Under the Kishi cabinet, he opposed the revision of the Police Duties Law and resigned from his position as director of the Economic Planning Agency. He was absent from the plenary session of the House of Representatives that ratified the security treaty. Under the Ikeda cabinet, he took up the issue of party modernization and, after proposing the dissolution of the factions, took on the j o b of secretary general. As Sato's foreign minister, he began working on the negotiations for the return of Okinawa. But he later resigned and ran against Sato in the presidential election. And when Fukuda and Tanaka fought over the successorship, he linked up with Tanaka on the issue of normalizing Sino-Japanese relations and became vice prime minister in the Tanaka cabinet. He later resigned over the issue of money politics. All of this was indeed rather Balkan in character, but not unique. In the midst of intense factional infighting, any faction boss will engage in strategies of alliance and realignment. In particular, when a medium-sized faction aims for the government, there is undoubtedly little choice but to be Balkan. Miki, however, bristled at the label. He once said that he wanted "to be a Balkan politician with ideals." His intent was to avoid a foolishly selfdestructive path in the name of idealism. If even just a part of his ideals could be realized, he would not hesitate to compromise. He never toned down his criticisms of the LDP's foreign policy, economic policies, and party

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management. He might enter into alliances and break them for the sake of expedience, but he was, overtly as well as implicitly, a consistent critic of the pro-Yoshida "main current" of Ikeda and Sato and the anti-Yoshida "second current" of Kishi and Fukuda. Regardless of whether he was critical because he was in a minor current or a minor current because he was critical, the fact remains that he was consistently a potential candidate for the party presidency but never once a favorite. Then, when he was sixty-seven years old, as if "out of the blue," the crisis of the LDP brought the government to him. (Tomimori 1977:198-201) The Minor Current Prime Minister Miki was named party president by the LDP's assembly of both houses on December 4 and prime minister in the Diet on December 9. The new cabinet was a typical faction-balancing exercise. Fukuda was concurrently vice prime minister and Economic Planning Agency director, while Ohira was minister of finance. In the party, Nakasone was secretary general, Nadao (an independent) was Executive Council chairman, Matsuno Raizo (Fukuda faction) was PARC chairman, and Shiina was vice president. In other words, Miki was a prime minister with both hands tied behind his back. But the popularity of the cabinet was respectable. According to a public opinion poll taken shortly after it was formed, the approval rate was 45 percent and the disapproval rate, 19 percent. While nowhere near the 62 percent recorded at the start of the Tanaka cabinet, nevertheless the cabinet was greeted favorably. Whereas Tanaka's popularity was based on his "can do" capacity and his commoner's touch, Miki stood for purity and honesty. And Miki attempted to conduct policies that were in accord with these expectations. The political platform of the new cabinet was "politics stressing public opinion," "overcoming social inequity," and "metamorphosis into a national party." Miki's political leadership had some very unusual aspects. First, like other prime ministers, Miki consulted a brain trust composed of informed specialists, but unlike the others, he did not mobilize them through formal organizations. Instead, he met with them individually, listened to them, and asked for their advice, which provided the core of his own ideas. Furthermore, bureaucrats were not included in his coterie of advisers. It seems that he had a certain distrust of bureaucrats, and the bureaucrats, on their part, gave a cool reception to his ideas. Here, he differed from his fellow party politician Tanaka, who mobilized bureaucrats and was quite popular among them. Second, arranging a consensus ahead of time was not something that Miki was good at, nor did he take pleasure in doing it. The Miki faction was also weak on this score. He would think up ideas based on what he heard

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from his specialists and would come straight out and argue his case. Unlike other prime ministers, he prepared his Diet speeches personally, taking up to a week to do so. The draft texts prepared by the cabinet secretary would be used only for reference. There were occasions when not a single word was taken from them. He would telephone people on whom he depended, to ask for their cooperation; in fact, he was labeled a mad telephoner. He would invite people to his office and spend hours persistendy and ardently trying to prevail upon them. His method was personal and intellectual persuasion. Third, he took an interest in the media and appealed to public opinion. He did not depend on others but prepared his own memos for press interviews and television appearances. T h e criticism of the party that he had maintained as a minor current politician readily obtained the support of the public. Even after becoming prime minister, he continued to try to influence the party using the same techniques. With the press and public opinion behind him, he tried to immobilize opposition within the LDP. Fourth, he used the method of immobilizing intraparty opposition by compromising with the opposition parties and getting them on his side. His policies were more likely to win support in the opposition parties than within his own party. In this way, the anti-Miki majority in the government party became the de facto opposition party. While these methods were rooted in his personal disposition and long experience as a member of a minor current, they are also methods that a second-string prime minister has little choice but to adopt when he gains control of the government and attempts to realize his policies. Obtaining the support of the press and the opposition parties and using them to immobilize the intraparty opposition were not new techniques. They were used in Hatoyama's reestablishment of relations with the Soviet Union and in Tanaka's normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. But before, these were exceptional techniques used temporarily by a first-string, primary current cabinet. Because Miki's was a second-string, minor current cabinet, they could not remain exceptional. Yet, if they were used too forcibly, the cabinet would soon fall. T h e periodic necessity of appeasing the intraparty opposition and compromising with it led to Miki's "U-turn navigational method."

THE REVISION OF THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW AND MOVES TOWARD A TANAKA REVIVAL Revision of the Antimonopoly Law At a press conference shortly after he was named party president, Miki said, " T h e root of all evil is the presidential election"; he added that he "wished

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to eliminate corporate contributions completely within the next three years." In late December, he released his own personal proposals for general election reform, a revision of the Political Funds Control Law, and a revision of the Public Officials Election Law, which he had put together by sounding out experts after his July denunciation of money politics and his resignation from the Tanaka cabinet. The heart of presidential election reform was the establishment of a primary election system. But the Tanaka and Ohira factions strongly objected, and it was not until April 1977, under the Fukuda cabinet, that the proposal became a reality. The revision of the Political Funds Control Law barely squeaked by when Speaker of the House Kono broke a tie vote in the House of Councilors on the last day of the Diet session. By that time, however, it was full of loopholes. The revision of the Public Officials Election Law, which had as its objective "elections that do not cost money," also passed the House of Councilors on the last day of the session. It, too, was full of holes. It increased the membership of the House of Representatives by 20, to 511, thereby somewhat decreasing the imbalance in apportionment. However, the methods of the minor current prime minister were most evident in the controversy over the Antimonopoly Law. Reacting to the hoarding and market cornering of the general trading companies, which were thought to be the cause of the extraordinary commodity shortages and high inflation rate in 1973, Fair Trade Commission chief Takahashi Toshihide called for the application of the Antimonopoly Law to all areas of trading company operations. The trading companies responded by submitting a set of "general trading company behavior standards." Press criticism of big business and the trading companies mounted, and an anticorporate mood prevailed. Then the oil shock arrived in July. Suspecting that cartels were behind the "frenzied price increases" that ensued, the Fair Trade Commission strengthened its regulation of them. Between 1973 and 1974, it conducted hearings on 110 cases of suspected cartel activity. Great hope was placed on the Fair Trade Commission. When the Emergency Measures Law for the Stabilization of the People's Livelihood was passed by the Diet on December 21, the House of Councilors anti-inflation committee attached an item to the bill that called for a revision of the Antimonopoly Law that would strengthen the powers of the Fair Trade Commission. Sentiment favoring revision also grew in the opposition parties. Although the specific proposals differed, the JSP, CGP, DSP, andJCP all agreed that Article 8 (measures for the elimination of undue disparities in bargaining power) and Article 4 (stronger regulation of cartels) of the original, Occupation-era Antimonopoly Law needed to be revised. The Fair Trade Commission, with "irreversible resolve," released a ninepoint "Outline of a Proposal for the Revision of the Antimonopoly Law"

IJO

L D P R U L E , 1955 - 1980

dated September 18, 1974. T h e most important points were: (1) enterprise partitioning, (2) the public disclosure of costs, (3) directives ordering a return to status quo prices, (4) surcharges, (5) limitations on corporate stock ownership, (6) limits on stock ownership by financial institutions, and (7) criminal penalties. T h e Japan Consumer Federation supported the proposal and sent an open letter to the five political parties. T h e four opposition parties replied that they would support it. By contrast, a negative reaction grew in the LDP. Keidanren, needless to say, kept up a campaign opposing the revision. O n September 21 Cabinet Secretary Nikaido admitted that "there is probably n o choice but to submit [revision] to the next regular Diet." Miki had been advised by his experts that revision was needed. At his first cabinet meeting, on December 10, he revealed his intention to pursue a thorough revision that would include enterprise partitioning. He indicated in his policy speech before the Diet that he considered the revision to be a mayor platform of his government. T h e work of drafting the proposal was conducted primarily within the prime minister's office. T h e proposal was completed on February 18, with adjustments by the agencies conducted during the latter part of the month. T h e government's draft outline was approved at a meeting of interested cabinet ministers on March 5. Inside the LDP, Vice President Shiina led the opposition to the bill. O n March 5 he dismissed the government's rough draft with the comment, "This is not a rough government draft. It's a crude government draft." A number of reasons were put forward by those who opposed the draft. Following the oil shock, Japan's economy had fallen into a recession so serious that the country recorded its first negative growth rate since World War II. A revision of the Antimonopoly Law under these conditions would weaken the vitality of firms and diminish their international competitiveness. Furthermore, the LDP was carrying a debt of ¥10 billion from the earlier House of Councilors election. It ultimately had to rely on contributions from the members of the zaikai to pay this off, and Miki's revision would antagonize them. T h e cabinet finally approved the oudine proposal on April 14, and the bill was submitted to the Diet on April 25. T h e revision was fated to be weakened by compromise. Enterprise partitioning was one of the biggest points of contention. Strict limitations were adopted, including a stipulation that the Fair Trade Commission had to consult with the minister in charge (the minister of international trade and industry) at two points in the process: before a hearing was initiated and before a ruling was issued. This meant that the article on enterprise partitioning was a virtual dead letter even as it served to vindicate public opinion. Miki tried to achieve what was being advocated in newspaper editorials and supported by the opposition parties while still compromising with the opposition inside the party. T h e opposi-

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tion parties criticized the government draft.But if they actually killed the current bill, there was no telling when a revision might be realized. Negotiations were conducted continuously between the government and opposition parties, but these became deadlocked over the procedures for consultation between the Fair Trade Commission and the ministry in charge. Secretary General Nakasone told a group of reporters on June 19 that "there's probably no alternative but to give up on the Antimonopoly Law revision this Diet session." This was also the general understanding inside the party. At this point Miki launched a counterattack. O n June 16 he invited the chairman of the Special Investigative Committee on Antimonopoly Law Revision, Yamanaka Sadanori of the Nakasone faction, to his residence and solicited Yamanaka's cooperation. Yamanaka hesitated but finally gave in to Miki's extremely aggressive persuasion effort. Assisted by the Miki faction, Yamanaka maneuvered behind the scenes. Miki personally telephoned the opposition party executives. Finally, late in the afternoon of June 23, an agreement was reached between the LDP and the four opposition parties on a joint amendment that acceded to all of the opposition party demands except the removal of the requirement concerning consultations between the Fair Trade Commission and the minister in charge before issuing a ruling on enterprise partitioning cases. T h e following day, the LDP executive committee reacted strongly: "It is outrageous that you got the approval of the opposition parties first and left the approval of the government party for later." But with the agreement already in place, the LDP was not in a position to kill the amended bill. T h e joint amendment was passed in a House of Representatives plenary session that afternoon. The press applauded Miki. Antipathy rose within the LDP, and the amended bill was ultimately shelved in the House of Councilors. A somewhat tamer revision was passed in May 1977 under the Fukuda cabinet. (Nihon Keieishi Kenkyujo 1978:770-93; Tanaka 19811469-74) The Strike for the Right to Strike Following the conclusion of the seventy-fifth Diet, Miki was forced to rely on the "U-turn navigational method" to ameliorate resentment within the party. He promised Vice President Shiina, who had been strongly opposed to the Antimonopoly Law revision, that he would not introduce another one during the upcoming extraordinary session. He promised Minister of Finance Ohira, who was perturbed about the failure of a bill raising liquor and tobacco prices, to call an extraordinary Diet session quickly to pass the bill. The session was called on September 11. In order to please the hawks in the party, Miki became the first postwar prime minister to visit Yasukuni Shrine while in office—ostensibly as a private citizen—on August 15, the

1J2

LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980

anniversary of the war's end. In early July, he allowed the conclusion of a private agreement reopening airline flights between Japan and Taiwan. He reaffirmed the "South Korea clause" in the 1969 Japan-U.S. joint communiqué at a summit meeting held in Washington in early August. In September he reopened the suspended periodic meetings of Japanese and South Korean cabinet ministers. But the biggest appeasement was his hard-line stance against the November "strike for the right to strike" in the public sector enterprises. On November 26 the Council of Public Corporation and Government Enterprise Workers Unions (Kôrôkyô) began a huge strike that was scheduled to last at least ten days. Its objective was the recovery of public sector workers' right to strike. Public corporation and government enterprise workers had been deprived of their right to engage in dispute actions as a consequence of Government Ordinance 201, based on ajuly 1948 letter by General Douglas MacArthur, and the Public Corporation and National Enterprise Labor Relations Law promulgated in April 1949. (Masumi 1983: 281-84) The government subsequently refused to fully implement settlements that had been arbitrated under the system set up to compensate public sector workers for the denial of their right to strike. Public sector labor unions initially limited their resistance to tactics such as hunger strikes, mass leave taking, and work-to-rule actions. Later, however, Kôrôkyô began conducting shop meetings during work hours (these were de facto limited strikes) and wildcat strikes. A huge number of disciplinary rulings were handed down in response. Kôrôkyô openly called an illegal strike in March 1961, although the strike itself was ultimately avoided. In April 1964, the organization began to participate in the annual spring labor offensives with half-day strikes and coordinated actions with transport workers. In April 1972 Kôrôkyô carried out a full-day strike for the first time and in July the Japan National Railway Union made the recovery of the right to strike its top-priority objective. By this time, public sector managements were clearly softening. Although disciplinary rulings continued to be issued, their execution was often frozen, their severity "downgraded," and arrangements made to compensate for damages, as a way stopping the vicious cycle of strikes and disciplinary actions. Public sector managements gradually began to lean toward "a conditional granting of the right to strike." Thus, the top objective of the 1974 Spring Offensive was the recovery of the right to strike. On April 9, just as Kôrôkyô was about to enter into a third strike wave, which was scheduled to last five days, the Tanaka cabinet agreed to meet with labor representatives, and on April 13 Spring Offensive representatives and Cabinet Secretary Nikaidô negotiated a "five-point understanding." The government promised to establish a council of concerned cabinet ministers and issue a decision "by around autumn" of the following year.

THE PURIFICATION OF THE POLITICAL WORLD

'73

The Miki cabinet also favored granting the right to strike and declared during the 1975 Spring Offensive that it intended to break the cycle of strikes, disciplinary actions, and more strikes. But when autumn arrived, the pendulum inside the LDP had swung back to opposing the right to strike. The Tanaka faction led the way, and the Ohira faction was inclined to go along. Vice President Shiina also opposed granting the right to strike. Under this pressure, the managements of the three public corporations and five government enterprises began to waver. Miki maintained that "the page was still blank." On November 20 Korokyo, in despair, decided to begin a strike on November 26 in order to resolve the issue once and for all. The government declared that illegal political strikes were antiparliamentary, antidemocratic, disrespectful of the legal order, and "treasonous" undertakings. The resolve of the membership of the public sector unions appeared firm. The rate of support in the strike vote was 83.6 percent even in the Japan Postal Workers Union, where it was the lowest, and in the National Communication Workers Union, where it was highest, it was 91.3 percent. Almost no one broke ranks during the struggle. In addition, abundant funds were set aside for the showdown—¥5 billion by the Japan National Railways Union, ¥1.4 billion by the Japan National Railway Motive Power Union, ¥4 billion by the Postal Workers Union, and ¥9.6 billion by the National Communication Workers Union. But the damage that could be inflicted by this kind of strike was no longer as great as it once had been. The proportion of communications sent through the postal service, which the Japan Postal Workers Union was obstructing, had decreased because of the proliferation of telephones. Telephone service itself had become almost completely automated, making the National Communication Workers Union strike powerless. Trading companies, banks, and other large enterprises had increased their reliance on telex and facsimile machines, which were not affected by the strike. As for passenger transport, JNR's share had dropped from 51 percent to 30.3 percent (19 percent in the three largest cities) between i960 and 1975. Consequendy, the absentee rate among urban commuters did not increase by all that much. As for freight transport, between i960 and 1975 the JNR's share had fallen from 39 percent to 13 percent. The share of trucks had increased from 8 percent to 35 percent. Responding to an emergency transport order issued by the government, truckers traveled along the expressways day and night transporting commodities into the central markets. As a consequence, prices changed very litde. There was almost no effective support from private sector unions during the strike. As a result of Korokyo's strike call, a hard line centered in the Tanaka and Ohira factions came to dominate the LDP. If Miki had tried to recognize the right to strike, his government might very well have fallen. A fac-

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tion general meeting on November 26 passed a resolution demanding that Miki follow the decision of the party organs on this issue. Miki considered dissolving the lower house, but in the end he chose to go along with the hard-liners. On December 1, the sixth day of the strike, he released a fivepoint government declaration that was simply a reshuffled version of the opinion put together earlier by the LDP. Korokyo decided to continue the strike. But because the government's position had been made public, the action was now a protest strike. Fearing that public opinion, which sought a resolution, would turn against Korokyo, a conference of industrial federation chairmen met and decided to resolve the matter unilaterally. At noon the following day, an expanded action committee voted to "cancel the strike as of the end of the third day." The government dealt a further blow to the defeated Korokyo by issuing disciplinary rulings and filing a ¥20.2 billion lawsuit to recover damages. It also began to press for a rationalization of personnel to reduce its losses and refused to fully implement arbitration decisions. And in order to expose the public sector to the "competitive vitality" of the private sector, it promoted partial subcontracting and partial privatization. (Tanaka 1981:48385; Shimizu 1982:485-526) Ohira-Fukuda Cooperation At the time of his resignation in November 1974, Tanaka was overcome with gloom. Toward the end of the year, a "source close to Tanaka" told Ito Masaya that the former prime minister "has lost his drive completely and is saying, 'I'll be happy if I can keep forty men [in my faction].'" This discouraged Ito: "Now I won't be able [to make Ohira prime minister] no matter how hard I try." When Ito visited Finance Minister Ohira on January 8, Ohira said, "The government is moving farther and farther away." Ito agreed but was not sure how to respond. He suddenly thought of Tanaka and said, "It seems that Kaku wants you to take over thirty or so of his men." Ohira replied, half-heartedly: " I met Tanaka toward the end of the year. One really shouldn't depend on others. I'll do what I can." In other words, his hope that he would inherit the government from Tanaka had turned out to be completely off the mark, and instead he was now in a position where he had to look after Tanaka. Tanaka seems to have regained his vigor during the summer of 1975. On July 24, when Ito visited the Kochikai office, Suzuki said with a straight face, "Ohira's desire to become prime minister is slowly fading. Should things continue the way they are, Miki might very well survive a third year. Perhaps we could force him to hold the general election [scheduled for December 1976] without a dissolution and conduct a [party presidential] election un-

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der a Shiina interim government?" Ito sensed immediately that "this was Tanaka Kakuei's idea." Tanaka met with Ohira on August 13 and with Shiina on August 19. When Ito heard about the meetings, he surmised that "Tanaka has regained his ambition. His is a wish mixed with spite. He wants to topple Miki and personally take control of the government himself after making Shiina the interim president." On November 10 Ohira told Ito, "Tanaka is thinking only of himself. This man's thinking is self-centered. He is incapable of coming up with a solution to the current political crisis." In the past, whenever someone told Ohira that Tanaka was taking advantage of him, he kept quiet and merely scowled; this time, he spat out his true feelings. Ito tried to engineer an agreement between Ohira and Fukuda as a way of countering Tanaka's effort to establish a Shiina interim cabinet. Ito met with Fukuda on December 5. Ito: The economic crisis is serious. I am apprehensive about Prime Minister Miki, who doesn't have a feel for the economy. We need an . . . alliance between Ohira and Fukuda. Fukuda: I believe that an Ohira-Fukuda linkup is our only hope. If it comes about, the party and the people will probably stand behind it. Ito: What sort of arrangement would you propose .. . ? Fukuda: One where I am party president if Ohira is prime minister. Or if I am prime minister, then Ohira will be party president. Ito: Ideally, I think the two should be one. I think it would be all right if you became prime minister and party president. Fukuda: It doesn't matter which. I am concerned about changing the character of the party. Ito: How would you choose this party president? . . . Fukuda: My thinking is the same as yours, Buu-chan. The election can be a formality. Ito: . . . I don't think Miki will last very long. As you saw during the J N R strike, no countermeasures of any kind are emerging.... Shiina is waiting for power to fall into his lap, isn't he? Fukuda: No, Shiina does not aspire to be prime minister or party president. To begin with, his physical condition would not hold up. Shiina is thinking only of what is ideal [i.e., for the party to control all aspects of the election of Diet members].... Ito: I think that there is a great sense of crisis among the members of the zaikai. I believe that they are pushing for something along the lines of an Ohira-Fukuda alliance. Fukuda: They've also gone to see Tanaka. I think that [Tanaka's] thinking has changed quite a bit [from what it was]. Ito: Would there be any problems on your side [i.e., in the Fukuda faction] with an Ohira-Fukuda alliance?

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LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980 Fukuda: None whatsoever. Once I decide, the matter is settled.... Ito: Unfortunately, things do not work that way on our side. Òhira might consider it, but internally there would be varying reactions. There is also resentment toward you. Tanaka, in particular, holds a grudge against you, and there is sympathy on this s c o r e . . . . Ito: Is there anything else that we need to consider? Fukuda: Miki is rather complex. I think Tanaka and Ohira, as well as myself, are much more straightforward. Nakasone wants to become prime m i n i s t e r . . . . I believe that the people would applaud if an Òhira-Fukuda alliance were formed. Ito: I suspect that it will take at least six months for things to progress to that stage on my end. Please give yourself six months to make the appropriate arrangements on your end. Fukuda: I have been deeply moved by our discussion today. (Ito 1982: 175-77)

Ito reported the substance of the talks to Òhira on the following day. Ohira listened without saying a word, but he did not appear to be censuring Ito for unnecessary meddling. Fukuda acquiesced to Itó's request that "the budget draft be prepared by Ohira," and the budget draft was approved at a cabinet meeting on December 30. This was the beginning of the ÓhiraFukuda linkup. The Shadow Shogun of Mejiro Ito was told by a "source close to Tanaka" on January 15, 1976: Over the holidays seven hundred people came to the Tanaka residence to make New Year's calls. The attendance was tremendous. Tanaka is saying, "If Shiina's no good, then neither is Hon. Ohira, of course, is no good. Fukuda, I will definitely kill. I am the only choice, and I am going to be a shadow shogun for the time being." Tanaka is aiming to resurface in the political world and his spirits have risen to the heavens. Tanaka has gained enthusiasm for politics once again. I will make every party president an interim president until I become prime minister. I will make them deliver it to me in the end. I will get the people to think, "No one else seems to do. It has got to be Tanaka, after all." [The gist of what Tanaka said continues below.] In March my financial situation will be brought to light. I will have a third party study it, and on the basis of that analysis I will be vindicated. This is something I have to do before I become prime minister. No matter what, though, I will not give the government to Fukuda. I will make him weep until the end. Miki won't be a problem; his guard has been down from the start. Nakasone is a geisha-turned-madam. A waitress-turned-madam doesn't have a lot of confidence in her looks, so she will devote herself to running the house. A geisha-turned-madam, however, will compete with the young geisha

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forever and is therefore n o g o o d at m a n a g e m e n t . Last N o v e m b e r I m e t with Ó h i r a at the H o t e l Ókura. I said, "You d o it," but he said "I don't have the appetite." I therefore d e c i d e d to back S h i i n a . . . . Shiina's physical condition is n o g o o d . So [Shiina] b e g a n pushing Hori. . . . I absolutely refuse to h a n d the g o v e r n m e n t over to Fukuda. I'll have Fuk u d a c o m p e t e with Óhira. F u k u d a and Ó h i r a will advance neck a n d neck. As a result, neither o n e will b e able to b e c o m e prime m i n i s t e r . . . . I will prevent F u k u d a f r o m getting the g o v e r n m e n t n o matter how m u c h pressure there is f r o m the

zaikai.

"I tried so, so hard, but it's still n o g o o d " — I

want to see F u k u d a standing bewildered in the autumn rain crying a man's tears.... A f t e r this election, the party won't be able to d o a thing without me. (Itó

1982:188-91) A year earlier, Tanaka hated politics and hated people and did not even want to go to the Prime Minister's Residence. At one point, manic depression had changed the shape of his face. According to Itó, seeing that he would not be able to form a government for some time, Tanaka was now contemplating a long-term Shiina interim government. If he sent someone from the Tanaka faction in his place, that person could very well inherit the mantle and eclipse Tanaka. Shiina, however, was not a threat. "What should I do?" A bewildered Itó visited the Reverend Kaneko of the Arakawa chapel of the Konkókyó (a Shinto sect) Temple on January 15 and explained the situation. Kaneko responded immediately: "That man Tanaka is a monster." He added, "Step up your contact with Óhira. It is important for you to always maintain contact with Óhira so that he is not hypnotized by Tanaka." At this point, an overseas dispatch reported the news of the Lockheed scandal. The reviving Tanaka was dealt a severe blow as a result. Miki, who had been left for dead by the side of the road, was given a chance at resurrection thanks to this second "bolt out of the blue."

T H E L O C K H E E D S C A N D A L A N D T H E D U M P I N G O F MIKI

The Discovery of Corruption At a hearing of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee's subcommittee on multinational corporations (Frank Church, chairman) on February 4, William G. Findley, auditor of the Lockheed Corporation, revealed that his company had spent at least ¥3 billion while selling airplanes in Japan; of this, ¥210 million had been given to Kodama Yoshio. Lockheed vice president A. Carl Kotchian testified on February 6 that some of the money paid to Kodama had been passed on to Kokusai Kógyó's president, Osano Kenji, and that the money Lockheed gave to Itó Hiroshi, managing director for Marubeni, Lockheed's agent in Japan, had been used for payments to

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Japanese government officials. He also testified that it was either Marubeni's president, Hiyama Hiro, or its executive director, Okubo Toshiharu, who had indicated to him that such payments would be necessary. In 1972, Lockheed had decided to target All Nihon Airways ( A N A — Wakasa Tokuji, president) in its effort to sell its TriStar jumbo jet. In late July, at the behest of Lockheed, Marubeni's President Hiyama met with Wakasa to sound him out. Hiyama felt a "strong unease" about the sale when Wakasa showed no particular interest in the TriStar. He decided to give some money to Prime Minister Tanaka and have him use his influence to arrange ANA's purchase. Hiyama discussed the matter with Kotchian, who arrived in Japan on August 20, and they agreed to give Tanaka ¥500 million. Lockheed would deliver the money directly to Tanaka. Hiyama visited Tanaka's house in Mejiro on August 23 to solicit Tanaka's help. Tanaka is said to have agreed readily and cheerfully. He subsequently approached Wakasa, his "eternal friend" Osano (ANA's largest individual shareholder), and several others. ANA decided to purchase the TriStar in late October. At Tanaka's request, the ¥500 million commission was paid in four separate installments, in August and October of 1973 and January and March of 1974. When Tanaka was informed that the incident had been made public on February 5, he contacted Marubeni's Ito and said, "I want you to say that Tanaka did not receive any money. I can put together ¥500 million; once I have it, I am willing to return it." Miki's reaction was quick and to the point. Speaking to the lower house budget committee on February 6, he called for a full investigation of the incident. On February 16 and 17 Kokusai Kogyo's President Osano testified before the Diet. Other testimony came from ANA's Wakasa and its vice president Watanabe Naoji, along with Hiyama, Okubo, ltd, and Matsuo Taiichiro from Marubeni. Kodama was absent on grounds of illness. During his testimony, Osano denied completely any involvement with Lockheed Corporation. Hiyama and the others denied any involvement whatsoever in political payoffs. Miki used Foreign Ministry channels (Miyazawa Kiichi was foreign minister at the time) to request documentary evidence from the U.S. government, including the names of the high-level Japanese officials involved. U.S. secretary of state Kissinger was reluctant to provide the information because he feared that a widening of the scandal would disrupt the political stability of an ally. Therefore, on February 23, by unanimous vote of both the government and the opposition parties, the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors passed a resolution calling on the U.S. Senate and the U.S. government to provide all unreleased documents relating to the incident, including any containing the names of Japanese government officials. When the resolution was passed in the House of Representatives, Miki approached the podium and quickly read a statement: "In compliance

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with the intent of the resolution, I will personally, directly, and immediately pass this national consensus on to President Ford in a request in the form of a letter." Vice President Shiina, Secretary General Nakasone, and other party executives had not been informed in advance. Miki was acting on his own initiative, and Shiina was infuriated. On February 26 the evening edition of the Yomiuri shinbun carried a wire from Washington that read: "Not only the Japan desk of the State Department but the State Department staff and individuals in the White House as well were deeply moved by the striking earnestness of Miki's letter." Miki was pleased with the article. He had numerous copies made and passed them out to Diet members when they met with him. Those associated with the anti-mainstream winced when they were forced to read the article. Their displeasure increased. On March 24 the U.S. government agreed to provide Japanese prosecutors with the documents. This agreement also paved the way for obtaining depositions from people in the United States who were involved in the scandal. On April 2 Tanaka spoke at a general meeting of his faction, the Nanukakai: " T h e Lockheed issue must be brought completely to light. . . . The truth will most certainly be revealed. I myself will quietly maintain my personal dignity." He declared that Lockheed had not been brought up in any way during the Japan-U.S. summit meeting in 1972, that he drew a strict line between public and private matters in his relations with Osano, and that he had not met with Kodama for more than ten years. Miki vowed at a press conference the following day not to obstruct the release of the names of the "gray [suspect] officials" and to settle the question of political and moral responsibility. He referred to a provision in Article 47 of the criminal procedures code that said, "Documents relating to litigation shall not be made public prior to the opening of a public trial; provided, however, that this shall not apply in such cases where it is deemed appropriate for the public interest or other reasons." The U.S. documents arrived at the Tokyo district public prosecutor's office on April 10. The displeasure of the anti-Miki factions within the LDP turned to terror. At this point, a movement to " d u m p Miki" began. Shiina's Maneuvering A rift had been growing between Shiina and Miki over the prime minister's handling of the revision of the Antimonopoly Law and the strike for the right to strike. A clash became inevitable when Miki embarked on a policy of "full disclosure" of the Lockheed scandal. In the meantime, because it was beginning to appear that the special bill authorizing deficit bond issues—which was to have become the central pillar of business recovery— would not be passed, the zaikai too was beginning to desert Miki.

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Shiina revealed his intention to " d u m p Miki" for the first time in an offthe-record c o m m e n t to reporters on February 20,1976: "Miki is the proprietor of a small store. I cannot have him in charge of a big store like the LDP." At a press conference on February 27, he revealed publicly for the first time that he and the prime minister disagreed about the handling of the Lockheed scandal and the issue of party modernization. An exclusive story appeared under a large headline in the morning edition of the Yomiuri shinbun on May 13: " L D P vice president Shiina held private talks with former prime minister Tanaka on May 7, Finance Minister Ohira on May 9, and party vice president Fukuda on May 10, in which a consensus was reached on 'Prime Minister Miki's withdrawal.'" W h e n Miki's aide Nakamura rushed over to the Prime Minister's Residence around 9:00 A.M., Miki simply said, "I was certainly surprised this morning." T h e n , facing a large writing desk, he feverishly began to work on a draft of the speech that he was scheduled to give at the Nikkeiren regular general meeting that afternoon. In the speech, Miki said, " T h e s e moves before the eyes of the nation at a time when the political world is shaken by the L o c k h e e d issue and the steering of the Diet are extremely regrettable." He shunted aside demands that he step down, saying he "would not abandon halfway the mission and responsibility that I have been given." Articles reporting Miki's resolve graced the pages of the newspapers the following morning, and Shiina's maneuvering was denounced as a " L o c k h e e d coverup." T h e newspapers were inundated with critical letters. T h e telephone at the Shiina residence rang all day with protest calls. Miki was overjoyed. "Now that I think about it, I have been doing this sort of thing continually for the past forty years." T h e reporter Fujita visited Miki on May 15. "Shiina is in big trouble. My house has also been getting an almost annoying number of telephone calls, and they are all 'complaints' about Shiina. It's alarming to see that the distinguished vice president Shiina, who made such a great national decision, is being treated like a traitor," said Miki. He told Fujita that he wanted to meet with Shiina without going through a lot of formality. Fujita went directly to see Shiina, who was eating dinner. Shiina held his chopsticks still as he listened and then replied simply, "Sure. . . . I'll meet. I will attend the executives' meeting tomorrow." With a relieved look, Shiina's wife also urged that he attend. She had been under considerable strain because of the protests and threats that were flooding in. A g r o u p of rightists had even driven over in a loudspeaker truck to call Shiina a national traitor. At a press conference in Akita on May 16, where he had gone to assist in a by-election to fill a House of Councilors seat, Miki engaged in some grandstanding: " T h e L o c k h e e d scandal has brought Japanese politics to a major turning point of reform. I intend to become a 'sacrificial object' in the defense of Japan's parliamentary democracy." Stressing repeatedly that un-

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covering the Lockheed scandal would "represent the culmination of my political career," he stated, "I do not understand the true intent behind Vice President Shiina's actions. I will continue to put all my energy into politics and fulfill my mission and responsibility." Shiina and Nadao, who watched his performance on television, were flabbergasted. Shiina said, "This is not what we agreed o n — I cannot attend [the executive meeting] tomorrow under these circumstances." On May 17, when Miki asked Nadao to encourage Shiina to attend, Nadao replied, "After you made that statement in Akita yesterday... there is no way that Shiina could attend today." Miki telephoned Shiina anyway. Shiina kept saying that " [Miki] has gone crazy." (Fujita 1979:222-23) The May 19 edition of the Asahi shinbun reported that Shiina was furious. Shiina met individually with the party faction leaders and senior politicians and proceeded with his campaign to unseat Miki. Kono describes the situation: W h e n y o u get right down to it, " d u m p Miki" was a fight between Miki and Shiina over philosophy. Shiina had spent a long time as a bureaucrat. H e had also accumulated a record o f accomplishments as a politician. For this reason, h e had more than your usual deep-seated attachment to and c o n f i d e n c e in p o l i t i c s — o r , in a word, to the LDP. From the b e g i n n i n g he did n o t intend to leave the g o v e r n m e n t in Miki's hands for long. . . . It seems that [Shiina] t h o u g h t h e would try to b e tolerant, b u t what Miki did b o t h e r e d him. It is n o w o n d e r that he b e g a n to dislike Miki. "He's d o i n g o n e i m p u d e n t thing after the o t h e r ! " he would say. (Kono 1978:112-13)

Public opinion, which equated Shiina's moves with a Lockheed coverup, flared up in fierce criticism. Seeing this, Fukuda and Ohira wavered, isolating Shiina. Miki requested Nadao's mediation, and he and Shiina met in Nadao's presence on June 21. They reached a four-point agreement that promised to disclose the details of the Lockheed scandal and convene an extraordinary Diet session in order to pass important pending legislation. This temporary cease-fire represented the failure of Shiina's maneuvering. Dumping Miki Marubeni's Okubo Toshiharu and three others were arrested on June 22. Ito Hiroshi was arrested on July 2. ANA president Wakasa was arrested on July 8, and Marubeni president Hiyama on July 13. These seven men were suspected of offering bribes. The next step would be to go after those who were allegedly on the receiving end. The anti-Miki factions in the LDP were silent. The activity of the prosecutors halted abruptly, and the resulting tension lasted for days. Miki left the matter to the prosecutor's office and did nothing whatsoever to block the investigation. Then, around 6:30 A.M. on

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July 27, he suddenly received a telephone call informing him of Tanaka's arrest. Miki probably expected the anti-Miki movement within the LDP to wilt after Tanaka's arrest. It did not. The Tanaka faction suffered a severe shock, but its rage and resentment toward Miki increased a hundredfold. The Tanaka faction held a general meeting on August 4 and passed a resolution demanding that Miki step down. Ohira and Fukuda joined in, creating a tripartite alliance. A second "dump Miki" movement emerged. It justified its existence with the argument that it could not possibly be considered a "Lockheed coverup" now that Tanaka had been arrested. An association was formed of concerned midlevel Diet members, which submitted a fourpoint set of demands to the party executive that called for "an assembly of both houses and a party convention to be held at an early date to establish a party unity administration." Miki appealed to public opinion. At a press conference in Hiroshima on August 6, he stated, "I am not about to cling to the government, but I am firmly determined not to abandon my responsibilities halfway through." Then he met separately with Fukuda and Ohira. " I will not be beaten in one-on-one talks. That was how I held my own against former prime minister Sato as well as the late Kono Ichiro," he said. He talked with Fukuda for about three hours on August 11 in the Presidential Room of the Hotel Okura. He reported to his aide Nakamura that he had said, "I do owe you [Fukuda] a debt for the birth of the Miki government. But for me to promise to step down on such-and-such a date would be tantamount to turning the government into a private possession, and that is something that I cannot do." Fukuda reported, "The fact is that Miki is full of confidence and is saying, 'I have the support of 90 percent of public opinion.' He's hopeless." Talks with Ohira were held at the same place on the following day. They lasted two hours. Miki said afterward, "I told him I would never give in to attempts to drag me down in a fight for the government at a critical time like this. You [Ohira] and I go back to the Ikeda government, don't we?" Miki also met with Fukuda at the Prime Minister's Residence for an hour and a half on August 21, and with Ohira for two hours and forty minutes on August 23. Neither meeting led to an agreement. (Nakamura 1981:24.0-44) The campaign to dump Miki came to a boil on August 17 when Tanaka was freed after posting ¥200 million in bail. On August 19 Diet members from the Tanaka, Ohira, and Fukuda factions, along with the three formerly neutral factions of Shiina, Mizuta, and Funada, formed a "Deliberative Conference to Establish a Party Unity Administration." Some 277 signatures were collected on a petition demanding a general meeting of the party's Diet members on August 24. Fifteen of the 20 cabinet members signed. Miki and Nakasone rejected the demand, and the Deliberative Conference opened its own general meeting of party Diet members on Au-

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gust 24, where it approved a "party decision" calling on Miki to withdraw before the opening of the extraordinary Diet session. According to the figures released by the Deliberative Conference, 271 Diet members attended, or more than two-thirds of the party members in the two houses of the Diet. Fourteen cabinet members were there, including Fukuda and Ohira. Fukuda and Ohira arrived for talks with Miki at 5:30 P.M. on August 25, carrying the resolution of the Deliberative Conference. But no conclusion was reached, and they decided to carry their deliberations over to the next day. The general meeting of the Deliberative Conference reconvened after 7:00 P.M. and adjourned shortly thereafter when it learned that the threeleader talks had been carried over. Miki took advantage of an NHK television appearance that evening to assert, "I will not bow to a forced resignation. I cannot consent to a withdrawal before the extraordinary Diet session. I will not enter into compromises that bend principles." The telephone at the Prime Minister's Residence rang constantly after the broadcast started at 10:15. His aide Nakamura states that this was the most successful of Miki's numerous television appearances. The following morning, the newspapers reported "Signs of Retreat in Miki Withdrawal Maneuvers" and "Catastrophe Temporarily Avoided." The atmosphere was transformed completely. The tripartite talks held that day resulted in an agreement to try to resolve matters by establishing a workable compromise among the party leaders. (Nakamura 1981:247-54) Nakasone and four other leading party officials made public a proposal on August 30: (1) Party and cabinet personnel will be replaced before the extraordinary Diet. (2) The extraordinary Diet will be held at an early date and will deal with major legislation. (3) After the extraordinary session, preparations announced both inside and outside the party will be made for a general election, which will be announced both inside and outside the party. Miki, Fukuda, and Ohira agreed to cooperate. But the Deliberative Conference indicated that it would reject the proposal on grounds that it did not guarantee Miki's withdrawal. The infighting between the Miki and anti-Miki factions was resolved following an unexpected development. On September 14, the prime minister announced the following at a party assembly of both houses: (1) The Diet will not be dissolved if the business of the extraordinary session proceeds smoothly as a result of unity and cooperation within the party. (2) An extraordinary party convention will be held in October to prepare for the general election. (3) The Lockheed scandal will be used as an opportunity to resuscitate and completely reform the party. With this statement, a tentative cease-fire emerged. The party officers and cabinet were reshuffled on September 15. Nakasone stepped down as secretary general. Thirteen of the anti-Miki cabinet members—all except Vice Prime Minister Shiina and Finance Minister Ohira—were replaced.

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LDP RULE, 1955 - 1980 The Secret Agreement Between Ohira

andFukuda

For the final battle against Miki, it was necessary to narrow the field of opposing candidates to one. On October 6, after three days of persuasive effort, Tanaka Rokusuke received a signal from Ohira [that he would support Fukuda]. " I immediately contacted F u k u d a . . . . When I told him, 'Ohira has agreed,' Fukuda was h a p p y . . . . " This development was communicated to Hori via Fukuda, and on October 10 Hori and Ohira went to play golf at the Three Hundred Club in Chigasaki, Kanagawa. . . . " I won't insist on getting the government," said Ohira. Hori replied, "There will be disarray in the party if we don't decide who will follow. . . . I was trying to figure out what to do, but your decision saved the day." . . . After agreement was reached between Fukuda and Ohira . . . Hori sought party vice president Shiina's approval. According to the accounts of Kishimoto K o i c h i . . . and others involved, the meeting [between Hori and Shiina] unfolded roughly as follows. Shiina was against selecting Fukuda. " D o you seriously think he can handle it? How long do you intend to have him do it? Two months? Three months? Can he last three months?" To this, Hori replied, "Surely, it can't be three months. You need to let him have it for at least two years." (Ohira Masayoshi Kaisoroku Kankokai 1982: 409-10) On October 13 the morning edition of the Yomiuri shinbun announced, " T h e lineup has emerged of Fukuda as prime minister and party president, and Ohira as secretary general." On October 15 the extraordinary Diet session passed the most important item before it, the Special Bond Bill, which authorized bond issues to cover budgetary deficits; this was quickly followed by legislation raising J N R fares and telegraph and telephone rates. Freed of the burden of pending legislation, the Deliberative Conference to Establish a Party Unity Administration began to bring the " d u m p Miki" movement to a conclusion by uniting behind Fukuda. On October 15 it formally announced its decision. There was a banquet honoring thirteen cabinet ministers affiliated with the Deliberative Conference on October 16. I to later heard the following from Ohira: The thirteen cabinet ministers [who left] the Miki cabinet [in the reshuffling] were invited in the name of Fukuda. Although they were in fact being invited by both Fukuda and Ohira, this was kept secret.. . . When Sasaki Yoshitake asked Kanemaru, Ozawa, and Takeshita [of the Tanaka faction], "Would you in the Tanaka faction agree to Fukuda?" they said, "We wouldn't object." . . .

T H E PURIFICATION OF THE POLITICAL WORLD

I talked with Shiomi, Suzuki, Saito, and Ogawa [of the Ohira faction]. "If we were to hold a presidential election now, Ohira would win. However, if that were to happen, he wouldn't be able to gain the unified support of the party. Therefore, we're willing to go with Fukuda." . . . (Ito 1982:279) On October 17 the lead stories in all of the morning papers said, " T h e field has narrowed to Fukuda." At 3:00 P.M. on October 20 Shiina, Hori, and Funada held talks with Fukuda and Ohira. Ohira asserted that, since the general election campaign was already under way, there was no need for a showdown. (In fact, Diet members had returned to their electoral districts, and the party convention scheduled for October 30 had to be canceled.) Ohira, Fukuda, Hori, Suzuki, and Sonoda (Fukuda faction) met on October 20 at the Hotel Pacific in Shinagawa. On October 27 a document codifying the Ohira-Fukuda linkup was prepared. It read as follows: November 1976 —Ohira Masayoshi will recommend Fukuda Takeo as the designated candidate for party president and prime minister to follow Miki. —Although the prime ministership and the party presidency will be considered inseparable, Fukuda Takeo will delegate party affairs primarily to Ohira Masayoshi. —At the regular party convention scheduled for January 1977, the threeyear term for the party president in the party regulations will be changed to two years. Messrs. Ohira and Fukuda have agreed to the above on the basis of mutual trust. (Kawauchi 1982:45-46) Attached were the signatures of Fukuda, Ohira, Sonoda, and Suzuki. Hori probably did not sign because he was there as mediator. The third item in the document implied that after two years Fukuda would pass the government on to Ohira. Sonoda comments: With the resignation of the Miki cabinet a certainty, it would be natural for an Ohira cabinet to follow. Although there was nothing wrong with this in and of itself, if it happened, Fukuda Takeo—whom I continued to back—might never be able to gain the government. The five-man talks at the Hotel Pacific were the result of a request of mine to Ohira. . . . When the discussion turned to the subject of Fukuda's serving as prime minister for two years and "what was to be done after that," Ohira opened his mouth for the first time. "Perhaps there isn't much use in talking now about something that will happen two years from now. Why don't we just say that we will talk about what will happen two years from now at that time." A lesser man would have insisted, "The government will be handed to Ohira two years from now. Put that in writing." But Ohira said just the reverse. I was touched. On the way back, I remember mentioning, "Hori-jaw, Ohira has certainly

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put one over us. It's tantamount to our being forced to promise that we will do our best to set up an Ohira government two years from now." (Ohira Masayoshi Kaisoroku Kankokai 1982146-47) Fukuda, o n the o t h e r hand, later flatly d e n i e d that there was a secret agreement. (Kiyomiya 1984:253-54) The Divided LDP Election A r g u i n g that it would b e inappropriate for him to remain in the cabinet while h e was b e i n g supported by the Deliberative C o n f e r e n c e as a presidential candidate, F u k u d a resigned his positions o f vice prime minister a n d E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g A g e n c y director o n N o v e m b e r 5, the last day o f the Diet session. T h e L D P f o u n d itself plunging, divided, into the g e n e r a l election. T h e Deliberative C o n f e r e n c e established an election headquarters indep e n d e n t o f the formal party organs, called the A c t i o n C o m m i t t e e to Dissolve the Factions. It was used to coordinate efforts in the electoral districts a n d provide financial assistance to Deliberative C o n f e r e n c e candidates. T h e party was destitute. T h e zaikai held back contributions because o f its hostility toward Miki a n d its disapproval o f the fighting within the party. In the end, election f u n d s totaled approximately ¥3 billion, or a b o u t one-half those of the previous election. T h e results o f the voting o n D e c e m b e r 5 were disastrous. For the first time since the LDP's formation, the n u m b e r o f seats w o n by the party's officially sponsored candidates fell below a majority. It captured 249 seats, 22 less than it h a d w o n in the previous election, even t h o u g h the total n u m b e r o f seats h a d b e e n increased f r o m 491 to 511. T h e addition o f unaffiliated i n d e p e n d e n t s established a bare majority o f 263 seats. In this a n d the 1974 H o u s e o f C o u n c i l o r s elections, the g o v e r n i n g party a n d the opposition parties c a m e to n e a r parity. T h e N e w Liberal C l u b , c o m p o s e d o f six individuals w h o h a d left the L D P in J u n e , g a t h e r e d votes primarily in urban areas and w o n 17 seats f o r its officially sponsored candidates. T h e JSP increased its seats by 5 to a total o f 123, the C G P achieved an increase o f 27 f o r a total o f 55 seats, a n d the DSP achieved an increase o f 9 seats f o r a total o f 29. T h e J C P representation was halved to 17 seats. Miki immersed himself in writing " M y Beliefs," his statement o f resignation. H e submitted it to the three top party officers a n d distributed it to reporters o n D e c e m b e r 17. In addition to a n n o u n c i n g that he w o u l d take responsibility for the g e n e r a l election loss by resigning, h e a p p e a l e d for " a n overthrow o f m o n e y power a n d factional infighting, . . . a r e f o r m o f the party style oriented toward older politicians, . . . [and] a party presidential election system that includes a primary election." (Nakamura 1981; Tanaka 1981: chap. 3; O h i r a Masayoshi Kaisoroku Kankokai 1982:chaps. 24-26; and Asahi nenkan 1977:296-98)

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T h e Miki cabinet was a small-faction cabinet. In order for Miki to contain the hostility of the large factions and realize his goals, he had to gain the support of the press and the opposition parties. His handling of the Lockheed scandal provides a quintessential illustration of the processes and methods used by a second-string prime minister. Miki was persistent in the extreme. But the large factions and the zaikai united behind the cause of "dumping Miki," ignored the unpopularity and denunciations of their actions outside the party, and eventually seized control. T h e true character of the "conservative main current" was thereby revealed.

IN THE WAKE OF MIKI'S RETREAT: FUKUDA AND ÓHIRA Prime Minister Fukuda The Miki cabinet resigned on December 22, 1976, and Fukuda Takeo was named prime minister. O f the 508 votes cast in the House of Representatives, Fukuda received 256, only one more than a majority of the 511member lower house. There were 259 LDP Representatives present. If one adds the "independents" Tanaka and Hashimoto, the total is 261. This means that 5 party members cast invalid votes. Their identities were revealed in the national government register on January 8. Three were from the Miki faction, 1 was from the Tanaka faction, and 1 was Hashimoto. The vote in the House of Councilors was also won by just 1 vote. T h e new cabinet was "fresh yet strong" with an "elder-midlevel-youth structure." There were seven first-time cabinet ministers. O f the five leading figures of the Deliberative Conference, Hori became speaker of the lower house, Sonoda (Fukuda faction) became chief cabinet secretary, Suzuki (Óhira faction) became minister of agriculture and forestry, and Esaki Masumi (Tanaka faction) became chairman of the Executive Council. Nishimura Eiichi (Tanaka faction) became concurrent Administrative Management Agency director and vice prime minister. Óhira was named secretary general. O f the twenty members of the cabinet (excluding the prime minister), four were from the Óhira faction; three each were taken from the Fukuda, Tanaka, and Nakasone factions; and two were from the Miki faction. Since the " d u m p Miki" movement was seen as a Lockheed coverup, the popularity of the Fukuda cabinet was low, with an approval rate of 2030 percent. Nevertheless, the political situation was relatively stable thanks to the Óhira-Fukuda alliance. T h e result of the July 1977 House of Councilors election was as follows. O f the 126 seats that were up for reelection, LDP-sponsored candidates won 63, individuals recommended by the party won 2, and an independent conservative won 1. T h e addition of the 61 LDP members who were not up for reelection made a total of 127, or a margin of 4 seats over the opposition

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parties. In his election speeches Fukuda had hinted that there might be an early cabinet reshuffling and a general election. One objective in doing this was undoubtedly to fire up Representatives who were ignoring the House of Councilors election because they thought a general election would not be held for some time. After the election, he sought the opportunity for a dissolution even more actively. Ohira was against dissolution. (Ito 1982:321) Fukuda tried to prepare the ground for a House of Representatives dissolution and a party presidential election by reshuffling his cabinet on December 28. Sonoda moved over to the foreign ministership while Abe entered as chief cabinet secretary. The Three Party Offices were filled as follows: Ohira remained secretary general, Nakasone became Executive Council chairman, and Esaki became chairman of PARC. The Party Presidential Primary Election During a telephone call informing Ito of the cabinet reshuffling, Fukuda said, "It would be nice if [Ohira] could say that he does not want to run if Fukuda is going to." In response, Ohira wrote in a special column of the New Year's edition of the Sankei shinbun that he "did not wish to battle with Prime Minister Fukuda in the presidential election [but preferred to] reach a decision through discussion." What he meant was that he wanted to inherit the government via negotiation. (Ito 1982:358) The party was in an uproar from the beginning of 1978 over the registration of party members in accord with the new presidential election regulations. Fukuda called in Ito and expressed his dissatisfaction in early February: "Let's stay away from dirty business. Factional activities are not good." He called Ito in on February 12 and told him, "I will make a statement that I will back Ohira in October." Did Fukuda mean that if Ohira agreed not to fight him, then he would recommend Ohira as a candidate prior to the presidential election? Was he simply at a loss as to what to do? Or was he worried about the "secret agreement?" (Ito 1982:352-53) Since this was the first party primary election, there was no way to predict the outcome. Under the new regulations, four candidates had to run before a primary (in which LDP party members at large voted) would be held. If no candidate gained a majority, the two leading candidates would run in a "runoff" election, in which Diet members and a limited number of delegates voted. The winner would be named party president. If there was a runoff, Fukuda had no chance of victory. The Tanaka faction was antiFukuda and would back Ohira. If this happened, Ohira would probably gain a majority. It was not clear to Fukuda how much he could rely on the Nakasone faction. And because he had joined the Deliberative Conference to Establish a Party Unity Administration in order to dump Miki, there was no reason to think that the Miki faction would support him. But if Fukuda

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oversaw a general election victory, then he could probably gain the upper hand in discussions with Ohira. This kind of reasoning led Fukuda in January to begin considering dissolution. Unfortunately, he was incapacitated by colds on three separate occasions between mid-January and early April. Then Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe says, "Frankly, I felt indescribably awful. I was really worried. There was the precedent of Ishibashi Tanzan, and if his fever had worsened and led to pneumonia, there would have been terrible trouble." Rumors circulated of a chronic condition with no hope for recovery, putting the political world in an uproar. Fukuda later laughed as he told the reporter Kiyomiya, "A cancer theory, a tuberculosis theory—there seemed to be all sorts." (Kiyomiya 1984:152-62) After he recovered from his cold in April, Fukuda began moving once again toward early dissolution. During discussions with Ohira on April 26, he told Ohira, "I want you to say that, if I declare my candidacy, you will not run. I want to amend the party regulations to make the term of party president three years. Nothing can be accomplished in two years." Ohira replied, "My men are telling me to declare my candidacy, but I would prefer to make my own decision about running. You should do as you wish without worrying about me." (1101982:371) On May 3 Fukuda said at a press conference that "at the present time not even the letter d in the word dissolution is on my mind." But he added that "no agenda has been established beyond August," thereby hinting at the possibility of a dissolution that autumn. Ito was called to the Fukuda residence at 10:00 on the evening of May 11. Fukuda repeatedly said, "I have made up my mind to establish an OhiraFukuda linkup and to quit after that. I will definitely quit after that as long as Ohira does not run." Ito communicated the substance of the discussion to Ohira on the following day. "When Prime Minister Fukuda was speaking to me, he seemed half serious about quitting. Such a thing could very well occur. But we shouldn't dismantle our preparations for either war or peace." Ohira listened with an expression of total agreement. (Ito 1982:378-81) The dissension between Ohira and Fukuda reached a climax at the beginning of June. A petition against dissolution was signed by Representatives from all of the factions except Fukuda's. The total number of signatures was 160 out of the party's total contingent of 254. Diet members from the Tanaka, Ohira, and Miki factions repeatedly voiced arguments against dissolution at an Executive Council meeting on June 9. Fukuda called Ito to Nozawa on June 10 and told him, " I would like to pass the government on to Ohira. I have decided that I will not run in the presidential election. Even if there is a dissolution, I will not declare my candidacy. Everything will be ruined if Ohira and Fukuda fight. That is why I am going to sacrifice myself." At 8:00 A.M. on June 17, the last day of the Diet session, Ohira and

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Fukuda reached an agreement: "A political cease-fire will be maintained until the presidential election. Preliminary campaigning for the party presidential election will be restrained. There will be no dissolution." Fukuda stated definitively to Ohira that he would not run. After the talks, Fukuda told a group of reporters, "I am not the sort of petty person who would dissolve for the sake of his own reelection." Ito, who was called to Nozawa on July 10, brought up the "secret agreement" for the first time. Fukuda said, "All I have to do is make up my mind at the final talks. There is no secret agreement." (Ito 1982:384-88) On the way back from a summit meeting in Bonn, Fukuda stated at a press conference in Brussels on July 19 that "the Japanese prime minister will chair the 1979 Tokyo summit." This was interpreted as a declaration that Fukuda intended to run in the party presidential election. At the talks with Ohira that began on the evening ofJuly 20, Fukuda said that he wanted to dissolve the Diet. "I am afraid of a presidential election. We have no idea what might happen to the party. That is why I want to dissolve it. After I dissolve it, I will resign from the prime ministership. Ohira will probably attend next year's summit as prime minister." Why would a prime minister who called a dissolution resign after it took place? Could he have meant that, if the party was defeated in the general election, he would give way to Ohira, but if it was victorious, he would be in a position to hold Ohira back? When Ohira attended a gubernatorial rally in his home prefecture of Kagawa on July 22, he walked up to the podium wearing a headband that said "Certain Victory," and he hinted that he intended to run in the presidential election. On the following day Nakasone declared his candidacy in his home district in Maebashi and on July 30 Komoto made a de facto declaration. Thus, by mid-July four people were in the running. On August 1 Ito told Ohira, "The time has arrived. You should return the Fukuda proposal without compunction and move toward a decisive battle." It appeared that Ohira had made up his mind. (Ito 1982:392) The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed in Beijing on August 12. This was a great plus for Fukuda. It was thought that if Fukuda took the initiative, dissolved the Diet, and entered into a general election, he would win. On the morning of August 29 Fukuda told Ohira that he intended to open the Diet session on September 16 and close it on October 20. Ohira told Ito with delight that "Fukuda was relieved that he would not be running this time." But something was fishy. Should Ohira really have been happy about this situation? O n September 2 Fukuda called in Ito and again spoke of "sacrificing myself on behalf of what was good." Ito recalls: O n October 3 I received a telephone call from Ohira. . . . He revealed to me that he had met with Tanaka.

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" T a n a k a indicated his resolve, saying, 'I've been subjected to so many reprimands that I can no longer let things go. I am going to try to make a comeback.'"... Since my curiosity was piqued, I asked, " W h e r e did you meet?" " W e met at Ikeda's house. I designated the place. I felt that if we were to meet before Ikeda's Buddhist altar, we could enter into a meaningful association." ( 1 1 0 1 9 8 2 : 4 0 6 - 7 )

The Voice of Heaven Has a Funny Voice Polls related to the primary election began to be released. The September 21 edition of the Asahi shinbun found Fukuda in first place and Ohira in second. The October 10 edition of the Yomiuri shinbun reported that Fukuda had a majority, Nakasone was in hot pursuit, and Ohira faltering. On October 13 Ito announced the lifting of the political cease-fire. Ohira conducted a press conference the following day and declared that "the Ohira-Fukuda alliance will come to an end with the extraordinary Diet session." The firing commenced. The Diet members affiliated with the Kochikai returned to their electoral districts and desperately mobilized party members and party friends. In a public opinion poll published in the Mainichi shinbun on October 16, the ranking was Fukuda, Nakasone, Ohira. The extraordinary session ended on October 20. On the morning of October 21, Ohira visited Fukuda and revealed his intention to run. Fukuda said that he "would reply on October 24." That day, both Nakasone and Komoto formally announced their plans to run. On October 21 the Asahi shinbun released survey results that showed "Fukuda ahead; Ohira, overtaken by Nakasone, in third place." At 8:00 A.M. on October 24, Fukuda telephoned Ohira and said, " I cannot control things inside the faction and have no choice but to declare my candidacy. I want you to understand." The election period opened formally on November 1 and four candidates—Ohira, Fukuda, Komoto, and Nakasone—filed their candidacies. Fukuda and Ohira made courtesy calls, one right after the other, to Lower House speaker Hori. Hori asked Fukuda, "What about the events of two years ago?" Fukuda tried to brush the matter off, saying, " I can get along with Ohira." Hori stated coldly, " I feel responsible for what happened two years ago." (Kawauchi 1982:62-63) Ito writes: My rage grew with each passing day. " I was tricked by Prime Minister F u k u d a " turned into " H o w could I have let this h a p p e n ? " It then intensified into " I t would be awful if Ohira were to lose" and " W h a t should I d o ? " Each time I thought about it, I could hardly breathe. Without realizing it, I would drip cold sweat as I prayed each night for the strength to carry Ohira, all by myself, as I crawled frantically up the cliff.. . .

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When I talked with Óhira at his private residence on the morning of November 4, Mrs. Óhira spat out some bitter words. "We were tricked by Fukuda. Óhira is too easygoing. Fukuda must be given heaven's punishment!" It was a terrible fit of anger. I kept feeling as though it was being directed at me and felt very uncomfortable.. . . [A worried Itó went to pray at the Konkókyó headquarters and then returned to Tokyo.] On November 1 1 1 met with Óhira. . . . "The future is bright. You have shunted Nakasone aside and are closing in on Fukuda. Keep pushing without letting up. . . . Do not be fooled by appearances. Do not let the newspaper articles sway you. You must never abandon your hopes. God will not forsake you, so do not forsake Him. That's what He is saying." I told Óhira what I had been telling myself. Óhira was in a daze because he had nothing to hold on to. "I'm tired. Please think about what to do when I lose," he was saying. This was not surprising. It would have been odd if he hadn't been overcome after being attacked and labeled a loser in the papers. (Itó 1982:430-35)

The tide began to turn in mid-November as a result of a ferocious attack by the Óhira and Tanaka factions. The Fukuda faction quivered when it realized what was happening. The result of the vote count on November 27 was an Óhira victory by a wider margin than anyone dared to imagine: 748 points (550,891 votes) for Óhira versus 638 points (472,503 votes) for Fukuda. Nakasone received 93 points and Kómoto 46. Óhira beat Fukuda by 110 points. Fukuda confined himself in his office in the Prime Minister's Residence to decide whether to plunge into or retreat from the runoff election. Shortly after 4:00, when the outcome became evident, a heated debate erupted among the faction executives and the younger faction members who had thronged around him. There was good reason to believe that he could win the runoff. His faction had begun to approach Miki and Nakasone. On the eve of the vote count, Abe had arranged for Nakasone's support with the promise that "if Fukuda is reelected, you will be made secretary general." And it had been agreed earlier that, if Fukuda won in the primary, a grand alliance of the Fukuda, Miki, and Nakasone factions would be established immediately thereafter. A statement would be released calling for the elimination of money politics and, in a swift blow, the ÓhiraTanaka coalition would be overturned. There was no reason why this could not still be implemented now that Fukuda had come in second. Fukuda decided to withdraw from the race at 7:30. During the campaign, he had continually told Óhira, "If the first place [candidate] should outrun the second place [candidate] by 100 points, then there should be no runoff election. The second place [candidate] should withdraw out of considera-

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tion for opinion in the party." At the press conference at party headquarters, he said, "To be perfectly honest, I was surprised when I saw those results. . . . The voice of heaven sometimes can be rather funny. Today, it is not for the vanquished to talk of war." (Ohira Masayoshi Kaisoroku Kankokai 1982:476) Fukuda reminisced later with Kiyomiya: According to party regulations, it would be possible for the first and second place [candidates] in the primary election to remain and enter the runoff. But after observing the primary—a primary where money flowed with abandon and which was widely pointed out to have involved ghost party members and dog and cat party members—I became thoroughly disgusted. . . . Once again, the party's image would be degraded. How could that be avoided? T h e answer was for me to pull out and let it go naturally to Ohira. Since Ohira is a great person, I had no problem with t h a t . . . . I expressed my decision clearly to those who came to the prime minister's office and said that I would announce to the newspaper reporters that I would not enter the runoff race. After that, there was an melodramatic moment where a number of people spread their arms across the exit and tried to stop me from leaving the room. I pushed them aside and went o u t . . . . I had been thinking for some time—without any specific date in mind—to have Ohira take over after me. Since this meant that Ohira would reach that position in a very natural manner, I believe that, as far as decisions on occasions of that sort go, rather than being open to criticism, I did a good thing. (Kiyomiya 1984:292)

Prime Minister Ohira On December 1 Ohira was selected to become party president without a vote at the party convention. He wanted to make the head clerk of the Kochikai, Suzuki, secretary general. Although Suzuki would have been the right person for the job because of his political career and skills, he was particularly close to Tanaka. As might be expected, there was a strong reaction from the Fukuda and Nakasone factions, who argued that the appointment "ran counter to the agreement at the time of the Shiina decision that the secretary general would not come from the party president's faction." But Ohira wanted at all costs to avoid naming a secretary general from another faction. At the suggestion of Suzuki, he forced through the appointment of Saito Kunikichi instead. The Executive Council chairman was Kuraishi (Fukuda faction) and the PARC chairman, Komoto (Miki faction). Ohira was named prime minister by a total vote of 256 in the House of Representatives, or 8 more than the majority of 246. In the House of Councilors he received 4 votes more than the majority of 122. The new cabinet

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was divided as follows: Ohira, Tanaka, and Fukuda factions, 4 each; Nakasone faction, 3; Miki faction, 2; independent and centrist factions, 3. For the first six months or so, things proceeded smoothly. After the summit meeting held in Tokyo on June 28-29, 1979, Ohira began to move toward dissolution and a general election. On July 7 he returned to his home district in Takamatsu for the first time since becoming prime minister. He said at a press conference there that he "understood the view that he should dissolve and proceed with a revitalized administration." With this speech as a catalyst, support for a dissolution grew. Ohira's goal was to "capture a stable majority for the purpose of stabilizing the political situation" and thereby establish the basis for a long-term government. Victory in the general election appeared assured. In the twenty-two most recent gubernatorial elections, only once had a progressive won in a fullfledged battle between a progressive and a conservative. Although the LDP and the J C P had recovered in prefectural assembly elections, the JSP had been unable to reverse its decline. In mayoral elections as well, victories had been achieved through conservative-centrist links among the LDP, CGP, and DSP. Overall, the tide of progressive local governments of the 1970s was receding, and a trend of conservative revival could be seen. The approval rate for the LDP had reached a record low of 37 percent in February 1977, but by late August 1979 it was 52 percent, which was equal to the previous peak achieved under the Ikeda cabinet in June 1964. The Fukuda, Miki, and Nakasone factions tried to stave off the move by Ohira, but on September 3 he gave a policy speech before a joint plenary session of the House of Representatives and House of Councilors that was tantamount to a dissolution declaration. On September 7 a motion of no confidence sponsored by the JSP, CGP, and DSP was introduced, and the House of Representatives was dissolved. The prime minister and Secretary General Saito projected on September 28 that "seats in the above-26o range could be obtained by the officially sponsored and party-affiliated candidates." This was a conservative estimate designed for public consumption. The prediction revealed to Keidanren leaders on October 1 was that "the election of 278 candidates, both officially sponsored and nonsponsored, can be expected." Nor did the anti-Ohira factions have any doubt about an LDP victory. The igyg General Election and the Forty-Day Imbroglio Contrary to the predictions, the LDP won 248 seats, or considerably less than a majority. Although the party was able to achieve a bare majority by adding 14 victorious independents to its roster, it was amply evident that the election was a defeat. The JSP declined by 16 seats, to 107. The JCP increased its holdings from 17 seats to 39. The CGP went from 55 to 57 seats, while the

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DSP went from 29 to 35. T h e New Liberal Club dropped dramatically from 17 seats to 4. O n e reason for the LDP's defeat was, first, an excessive number of candidates. Thanks to the large number of candidates, the relative share of the vote received by the party actually increased by 2.8 percent over the previous election, to 44.6 percent. Overwhelmed by the demands from the factions, the party executive was unable to whittle down the number of candidates and, in fact, issued party credentials to 12 new ones. Another reason was that the "fiscal reconstruction" championed as a campaign promise by the prime minister was considered a policy of tax increases. With the opposition inside the party arguing that it was impossible to conduct election campaigns under these circumstances, the prime minister was forced to announce during a campaign speech in Tokyo on September 23 that he would abandon the introduction of a general consumption tax during fiscal 1980. Elsewhere, there was a series of revelations concerning questionable bookkeeping in the central ministries, governmentaffiliated organs, and public corporations, with the most prominent one concerning improper bookkeeping in the Japan Railway Construction Corporation. These heightened the backlash against tax increases. A third reason was that campaign cooperation among the four centrist parties yielded greater dividends than expected. T h e results in the 28 instances of j o i n t campaigning by the C G P and DSP were 11 victories for the C G P and 8 victories for the DSP. T h e r e were L D P runner-ups in 12 of the 21 districts in which the CGP-DSP candidate was the lowest-ranked winner. (Asahi nenkan 1980:241-43) T h e clamor for Ohira's resignation increased. T h e Fukuda, Miki, and Nakasone factions asserted that Miki had taken responsibility for the LDP defeat in an earlier election by resigning. Fukuda had been defeated in the primary election the previous year and had withdrawn from the runoff. Ohira, therefore, should also resign. Ito visited the Arakawa Konkokyo Temple on October 11. " O h i r a has run out of g o o d fortune," said the Reverend Kaneko. (Ito 1982:514) But Ohira would not budge. He was confident that he could win a contest in a general meeting of party Diet members. First, the Tanaka faction would cooperate. Second, he had potential supporters in the Nakasone and Miki factions. Third, there were supporters among the centrist factions, whom he had won over after a long period of effort. Fourth, even if the Fukuda and Ohira factions were tied in the House of Representatives, Ohira had a fifty-man "ambush squad" in the House of Councilors, which he had nurtured with great care. (Ito 1982:253) T h e three anti-mainstream factions launched one sortie after another but could not bring off a final batde. Their only h o p e was the press. If the press attacked Ohira's ineptitude and took up the issue of his political re-

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sponsibility, he would surely fall. But to everyone's surprise, there was n o surge of anti-Ohira opinion. Instead, there was merely scoffing and ridiculing of both Ohira and Fukuda. Having come this far, the anti-mainstream could not back down. It had n o choice but to select a c o m m o n candidate. O n October 31, the day after the start of the extraordinary Diet session, the three anti-mainstream factions and the g r o u p around Nakagawa Ichiro formed the Association to Improve the LDP. Fukuda, Miki, and Nakasone held discussions on November 1 and decided to have Fukuda run as their jointly backed candidate. O n November 2 a total of 151 Diet members—115 Representatives and 36 Councilors—attended a general meeting of the Association to Improve the LDP and selected Fukuda as their candidate for prime minister. O n the same day the mainstream tried to open a general meeting of Diet members called by the party executive, but the auditorium was already occupied by the anti-mainstream. Younger Diet members and aides had built a barricade by piling up chairs and desks at the front of the hall. Mainstream Representative Hamada Koichi arrived, kicked the barricade apart, and staged an "expert fight." Viewers were able to watch all of this on television. A total of 194—120 Representatives and 74 Councilors—attended the general meeting. W h e n 5 members of the Nakasone faction j o i n e d them, they were greeted with applause. T h e general meeting decided to back Ohira as the party's candidate for the prime ministership. Behind the scenes, various proposals for compromise were being considered. O n e was the "separation of prime minister and party president," or an Ohira prime ministership and a Fukuda party presidency. Fukuda arg u e d that this was the bare minimum that the Association to Improve the LDP would accept, but Ohira rejected the proposal, arguing that the Hotel Pacific agreement contained a passage that said "the prime ministership and the party presidency will be considered inseparable." Another proposal was for a "party president proxy," which would have left the issue of the separation of prime minister and party president u p to the party organs and Fukuda in charge of party affairs. Ohira was amenable to this plan, but Miki was adamantly opposed. T h e plenary session to designate the new prime minister was scheduled for 1:00 P.M. on November 5. Unveiled that morning was a proposal to "conduct a presidential election at the party convention in January of the following year." It was left unclear whether Ohira would run. Fukuda demanded that the convention "select a new party president," but Ohira opposed his condition on grounds that "it would exclude me from running for the party presidency." Fukuda nevertheless got the impression that Ohira was not going to run. Miki, however, insisted that a firm confirmation be obtained from Ohira. He barged into the president's office in the party headquarters

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building demanding, "I want you to give your word that you will resign from the party presidency at the party convention next January." Ohira refused. Miki rushed back to Fukuda's office in the Prince Hotel and pressed him to get Ohira's word that he would not run. Fukuda left reluctandy for the prime minister's office in the Diet building. When he entered the office, NHK television was broadcasting news that "with former prime minister Fukuda's withdrawal of his candidacy for prime minister, the LDP has at last been consolidated." Fukuda's expression changed. He began by saying, "According to Vice President Nishimura, you won't be running in the January party convention presidential election." Ohira replied: "I am not saying that I will not run. Someone who is presently the prime minister cannot say lighdy when he is going to quit." "If you could just give me some indication." "That is something I cannot do." (Kawauchi 1982:190-97) On November 6 the despairing members of both the mainstream and the anti-mainstream factions marched into the House of Representatives, their countenances grim. People watching their arrival on television greeted them with chuckles and sneers. The results of the first round of voting were 135 votes for Ohira and 125 votes for Fukuda. The opposition parties each voted for their own party leaders. During the runoff, Ohira received 138 votes and Fukuda 121. There were 251 invalid votes and 1 blank vote. In the runoff in the House of Councilors, the vote was 97 votes for Ohira and 52 for the JSP's Asukata Ichio. On November 8 Ohira began the work of filling his new cabinet. The anti-mainstream, which expected the usual process of first selecting the Three Party Officers and then forming the cabinet in consultation with them, was outmaneuvered. All cabinet posts except the minister of education were filled that evening. They were divided as follows: 4 each from the Ohira (excluding Ohira), Tanaka, and Fukuda factions; 3 from the Nakasone faction; 2 from the Miki faction; 1 from the centrist factions; in addition, Okita Saburo, who did not have a Diet seat, was made foreign minister. This was followed by the naming of parliamentary vice ministers. The anti-mainstream faltered, and the Association to Improve the LDP became inactive. Ohira's statement that he would select the secretary general from another faction proved effective. The three anti-mainstream factions were overcome with mutual suspicion. On November 13 Ohira held a series of conferences with Fukuda, Miki, and Nakasone. O n November 14 there was a summit meeting of the three anti-mainstream factions. On November 16 Ohira directly telephoned Sakurauchi Yoshio (Nakasone faction) and Abe Shintaro (Fukuda faction) to ask them to become secretary general and PARC chairman without going through the normal procedure of informing their faction heads first. Stunned, the anti-mainstream held a meeting of the Association to Improve the LDP, which debated inconclusively for four

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LDP R U L E , 1955 - 1980

hours. Rejection of the offers would have meant the dissolution of the tripartite anti-mainstream alliance. In the meantime, Suzuki (Ohira faction) was made Executive Council chairman. Ohira was thus able to weather the crisis, but the new cabinet proved extremely unpopular, especially because of its Tanaka-tinged coloring. An Asahi shinbun poll on December 11 showed the cabinet's approval rate at 18 percent and its disapproval rate at 38 percent. It should be noted that, during the first round of voting to designate the prime minister, the New Liberal Club's four votes went to Ohira. Ohira had reached an accord with the NLC on four items, including one on cleansing the political process, and had thereby lined up its support. He was determined to arrange the return of the NLC to the LDP when he formed his cabinet and to place the NLC's Tagawa Seiichi in the position of minister of education. The opposition of the anti-mainstream prevented such a move, but Ohira was willing to ally with the opposition parties in order to sustain his government to the extent that they agreed on policy. His contacting the CGP and DSP to pass the fiscal 1979 budget was an experiment of this sort. At a press conference on November 10, soon after he formed his second cabinet, he said, "The first thing to be considered between the government and the opposition parties is a partial coalition. This has been done before. The next stage is a policy agreement. If a policy agreement can be reached in a particular field—let us say, in social security or in defense policy—then cooperation can be obtained in that field without discussion on each occasion. But we have not yet come that far." (Asahi nenkan 1980:234-37) The ig8o Election of the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors The LDP's loss and the forty-day imbroglio seemed to suggest that the collapse of LDP one-party government was imminent. The CGP and the DSP had grown more confident as a result of their successful cooperation in the election. They established the Deliberative Conference on a Centrist Government on November 3 and reached an agreement on a plan of action on December 6. The JSP had been cool toward cooperation with the CGP before the general election but, pressured by the Sohyo, the party had Chairman Asukata announce on October 8 (immediately following the election) that the party would maintain the principle of "all-opposition joint action." He also stated, however, that the formation of any organization would begin with "the one with the greatest number." In other words, the party would hold discussions with the CGP first, rather than the JCP. On January 10 formal agreement was issued on a "JSP-CGP coalition government." A threeparty coalition thus came into being, which had the CGP as its fulcrum and excluded the JCP. Whereas attention had focused in previous years on an

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LDP-CGP-DSP coalition, it was decided that year that the CGP and DSP would join up with the JSP and confront the LDP. But it was difficult to establish a coalition between three parties whose interests had recendy been in competition. When the JSP agreed with the CGP that "under current circumstances the JCP will not be an object of these policy discussions," its action marked an important change in its position. It had litde choice in the face of a crisis over the continuing decline in its influence and the need to prevent the emergence of a conservativecentrist government. Nevertheless, there was tenacious opposition within the party. The JCP denounced the agreement as "the first step . . . toward a grand coalition with the LDP." At a meeting of the Deliberative Conference on a Centrist Government on January n , the DSP brought up the issue of contradictions between the plans for a JSP-CGP coalition and a centrist coalition government, especially in regard to such major issues as the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the Self-Defense Forces, and nuclear power. In the end, the DSP acknowledged the JSP-CGP agreement after the group affirmed the fundamental importance of the centrist coalition government proposal. The gulf between the JSP and the DSP was deep, and the CGP found itself caught in the middle. Even as they jostled one another, however, the three parties were running together. Frequent talks were held among the JSP, CGP, and DSP Diet countermeasures committees and among policy affairs committee chairmen. They also put together a joint revision of the fiscal 1980 budget and remained in step during deliberations on major legislation. Their shared objective was cooperative election campaigning in the June House of Councilors election. On May 14 the first conference ofJSP-CGP-DSP party heads was held. It formally reaffirmed that the three parties would cooperate in five of the regional electoral districts. On May 16 the JSP submitted a motion of no confidence against the cabinet as a way of boosting morale in the face of the election. It did not expect the motion to pass. The DSP may have had second thoughts, but it went along anyway. At 5:00 P.M. JSP chairman Asukata outlined the reasons for submitting the bill. His speech was followed by a statement of opposition from the LDP and statements in favor by the CGP, JCP, and DSP. Although there seemed to be an inordinate number of empty LDP seats, more than an hour still remained before the vote. LDP secretary general Sakurauchi twice slipped out of the room and rushed over to Diet Office Building Number One to summon the anti-mainstream executives. The resentment stemming from the forty-day imbroglio of the previous year had not disappeared inside the LDP. In fact, a number of incidents fanned the flames. A Las Vegas gambling incident involving Representative Hamada had come to light on March 6. The midlevel members and officers of the Fukuda, Miki, and Nakasone factions viewed it as an issue of political

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morality. Working with the opposition parties, they presented a demand to the party executive that Hamada be summoned before the Diet. On April 2 the three anti-mainstream factions, plus the Nakagawa group and some neutral factions, formed the LDP Revitalization Federation and clashed head-on with the party executive. As work for an extension of the extraordinary session approached a climax, the Revitalization Federation considered the idea of going along with the JSP's no confidence motion. The party executive tried to restrain the group by threatening dissolution and expulsion from the party. Fukuda and Miki also tried to contain the dissatisfaction of the midcareer and younger members. But just before the no confidence motion was introduced, the Revitalization Federation had presented a set of demands to the prime minister that "the prime minister exercise leadership in party reform and enforce discipline" by setting up committees to investigate the Hamada incident. The prime minister replied that he "would discuss it with the party executive." At this point the bell announcing the opening of the plenary session sounded. The position of the Revitalization Federation hardened. Its members escorted Fukuda, Miki, Nakasone, and Nakagawa to Diet Office Building Number One, where they entrenched themselves. The no confidence vote passed because of a massive absence of LDP Diet members. With 243 votes for and 187 votes against, the motion passed by a wide margin. There were 73 LDP absentees, including 69 who were "clearly purposely" absent: 34 from the Fukuda faction, 25 from the Miki faction, 2 from the Nakasone faction, and 8 from the Nakagawa group. Nakasone was in attendance. Ohira immediately called an extraordinary cabinet meeting, which decided to dissolve the House rather than resign en masse. The general election was scheduled for June 22, the same day as the House of Councilors election. After using the extreme tactic of walking out of the plenary session, members of the Revitalization Federation considered forming a new party. But a go-slow attitude gradually prevailed as Nakasone declared his defection from the anti-mainstream, a strong backlash against the walkout emerged, and problems arose over funding the new party. If the new party entered the election, there was no guarantee that its members could get elected. The party executive adopted an initial policy of expelling the absentees from the party, but there was a turnabout and the absences were overlooked. A Deliberative Conference to Resuscitate the Party built around the old Revitalization Federation was formally inaugurated on May 20. On May 22 Vice President Nishimura, Secretary General Sakurauchi, and Executive Council chairman Suzuki met with Komoto, Abe, and Nakagawa of the new organization and agreed to a cease-fire during the election. The members of the conference were fearful of not getting reelected. The LDP Council-

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ors n e e d e d support that s p a n n e d across faction boundaries. T h e zaikai, fearing an L D P split a n d political turmoil, m a d e party solidarity a condition f o r contributions to the LDP. O n May 30 the p r i m e minister o p e n e d the election c a m p a i g n with a s p e e c h in Shinjuku. His voice s o u n d e d strong a n d full o f enthusiasm, but h e was very tired. Fighting exhaustion, h e c o m p l e t e d his a f t e r n o o n r o u n d o f c a m p a i g n speeches a n d e n t e r e d T o r a n o m o n Hospital that evening. H e h a d h a d a heart attack. His condition improved, a n d it was t h o u g h t that h e c o u l d attend the V e n i c e summit m e e t i n g s c h e d u l e d f o r J u n e 22. But shordy after 2:00 A.M. o n J u n e 12, his condition suddenly deteriorated. H e passed away a little b e f o r e 6:00. H e was seventy years old. L D P candidates presented their c a m p a i g n as a " b a t d e o f m o u r n i n g . " T h e b a t d e lines o f the JSP, C G P , a n d DSP were thrown into disarray by the u n e x p e c t e d dissolution a n d the simultaneous election o f b o t h houses. As the election batde h e a t e d u p , e a c h party b e g a n to emphasize its ind e p e n d e n c e a n d criticize the others. T h e coalition g o v e r n m e n t plan fell apart. T h e J C P attacked the "JSP's rightward t u m b l e , " a n d the JSP counterattacked. T h e result o f the election was an overwhelming victory f o r the LDP. T h e party increased its seats in the H o u s e o f Representatives by 36, to 284. T h e JSP captured 107 seats, or the same as in the p r e c e d i n g election. T h e C G P d r o p p e d f r o m 56 seats to 32, a n d the D S P f r o m 35 to 32. T h e J C P fell f r o m 39 to 29 seats. T h e N L C increased its holdings f r o m 4 seats to 12, while the Social Democratic L e a g u e went f r o m 2 seats to 3. In the H o u s e o f Councilors, the L D P contingent rose by 6 seats, to 69; the JSP w o n 22 seats; the C G P , 12; the DSP, 5; the JCP, 7; a n d the Social Democratic L e a g u e , 1. (Asahi nenkan 1980:238-43, a n d 1981:202-9; Kawauchi 1982:241-43; Morita 1981: 68-73) Was this a conservative revival? T h e opposition parties w o n the distrust o f the voters by b r e a k i n g ranks even as they p u t forward a coalition plan. But the LDP, w h i c h h a d repeatedly e n g a g e d in factional infighting, h a d n o t necessarily recovered their trust. T h e voters were stunned by the s u d d e n death o f the p r i m e minister. T h e y traveled to the polling stations with a distinct f e e l i n g o f unease a n d cast 3.3 p e r c e n t worth o f sympathy votes. T h e election a p p e a r e d to b e j u s t a n o t h e r irregular oscillation o f mass society.

SIX

The LDP

FACTIONS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POSTS The LDP Diet Member Most LDP members of the Diet are former high-level bureaucrats and local elected officials. Aside from the rare individual who retires from a career as a high-level bureaucrat to become a prefectural governor and then a member of the Diet, there is no overlap between the two categories. High-level bureaucrats expand their spheres of influence by scattering subsidies from the top of the lobbying network and pork barrel apparatus, using these spheres as a base of electoral support to become Diet members. Locally elected officials nurture their electoral bases and become Diet members by scrambling for subsidies at the base of the pork barrel apparatus. Thus, the two backgrounds are interconnected. According to the figures in Kokkai giin no kosei to henka (The composition of and changes in the national Diet), between 1958 and 1976 there were more than 60 "central bureaucrats (section chief or above)" in the House of Representatives, who accounted for 12 to 15 percent of the total number of seats. (In 1979 this was down to 52 seats, or 10 percent.) Almost ninetenths were affiliated with the LDP and accounted for about 20 percent of the total LDP contingent. (Down, in 1979, to 45 seats, or 18 percent.) In the House of Councilors, 20 such members on the average were returned as a result of the elections between 1956 and 1974, accounting for 14 to 17 percent of the total. (Up, in 1977, to 24 members, or 19 percent.) More than 90 percent were affiliated with the LDP and accounted for 25 to 30 percent of the total LDP contingent. (Up, in 1977, to 23 members, or 37 percent.) "Locally elected officials" accounted for 157 members (34 percent of the total) of the House of Representatives after the 1958 general election and 205

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185 (36 percent) after the 1979 election. A total of 1,333 members were elected during the period. O f these, 662 (50 percent) were LDP Diet members, accounting for around 30 percent of the party's strength. In the House of Councilors, 23 were elected in the 1956 election (18 percent of the total), 38 in the 1977 election (30 percent), and a grand total of 278 for the entire period. O f these, 152 (55 percent) were affiliated with the LDP. In 1956, this g r o u p accounted for 21 percent of all L D P upper house members; it had increased to 33 percent in 1977. (See Tables 6 and 7.) Tables 8 and 9 indicate the number and percentage of LDP Diet members associated with specific interest groups where the affiliation accounts for at least 5 percent of the total L D P contingent. Each member was assigned to n o more than one category. In the House of Representatives the largest affiliations a r e — i n descending order—agricultural, forestry or fishery cooperatives, small and medium-sized enterprise federations (chambers of commerce), and associations representing big business. T h e order is the same for the House of Councilors, although the percentages are different. Posts and Factions T h e main concerns of a Diet member are getting elected and being appointed to party and government posts. Public law and party rules stipulate a number of posts that Diet members are to fill, and almost everyone recognizes them as the key components of a hierarchy of values. T h e peak of the hierarchy is the prime ministership, followed by cabinet ministerships (the majority of cabinet members must be Diet members) and parliamentary vice ministerships. In the Diet, the posts of speaker and vice speaker in the lower and upper houses are at the top, followed by the chairmanships of the houses' permanent committees. Under single-party L D P rule, the LDP virtually monopolized these posts. T h e various posts in the LDP its e l f — t h e party presidency, the Three Party Officers (to san'yaku), and the chairs of the PARC subcommittees—are combined with the governmental posts to form a single, unified hierarchy with the party president/prime minister at its apex. LDP Diet members try hard to secure the posts of this composite structure. T h e unit used in allocating these posts is the faction. LDP Diet members are almost without exception affiliated with a particular faction, whose boss nurtures his group as he reaches for the party presidency/prime ministership. T h e faction officers, w h o make u p the echelon just below the faction leaders, strive to obtain posts for themselves through their support of the faction leader. Below them, midlevel and younger rank-and-file members also wait to be allocated posts. T h e faction leaders and executives need to fulfill the expectations of the rank and file. T h e LDP as a whole is an alliance of several such factions.

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Factional disputes are most heated during party presidential elections. The rules governing the selection of the party president evolved as follows: 1. The term of office of a party president was originally two years. According to regulations at the time of the party's formation (approved by the January 1956 party convention), the electorate consisted of the Diet members affiliated with the party and convention delegates, two of whom were selected by each prefectural branch federation. Single-entry, secret balloting was utilized. 2. These rules were amended at the January 1962 party convention under Party President Ikeda Hayato. One delegate from the women's division and one from the youth division were added to each prefectural federation's delegation, for a total of four delegates per federation. The number of votes per prefectural delegation was reduced to one. Single-entry, secret balloting was utilized. (Asahi shinbun, January 18, 1962) 3. The rules were amended again at the January 1971 party convention under President Sato Eisaku: (a) The term of the party president was extended to three years, (b) A president could become a candidate for a third term only if he received the recommendation of at least two-thirds of the party's Diet members. In effect, this measure banned third terms, (c) Candidates were required to obtain the recommendation often of the party's Diet members. (.Asahi nenkan 1972:281) 4. The January 1977 party convention under President Fukuda Takeo reduced the term of office of the president to two years. The extraordinary party convention that April approved an amendment calling for a primary election system. Operational procedures approved that October required the recommendation of at least twenty LDP Diet members to establish candidacy. The electorate consisted of party members who had paid party dues (set temporarily at ¥1,500 per year) for two years in a row and toyu ("party friends"), or members of the Jiyu Kokumin Kaigi (Liberal People's Conference) who had paid at least the annual dues (¥10,000) to that organization. The final round was a contest between the top two candidates in the primary election. (Asahi nenkan 1978:269) 5. Under Party President Suzuki Zenko, the party Diet members' general meeting modified the party presidential primary system in June 1981: (a) Three candidates would be selected from the pool of presidential candidates during the primary election, (b) The primary election would not be conducted if there were three or fewer declared candidates, (c) The number of recommending Diet members required for the declaration of candidacy was raised to fifty, (d) The electorate consisted of party members and party friends who had paid their dues for at least three years in a row. (Asahi nenkan 1982:237) The first LDP presidential election occurred in December 1956, following the announcement of Hatoyama Ichiro's retirement. Through the ferocious maneuvering of the three candidates at that time, the embryonic factions became distinct tactical units. They quickly developed a number of

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standard election tactics, including the formation of an alliance of the first and second runners-up and the use of money and tacit promises of posts. The most spectacular party presidential elections, where wads of bills and empty promissory notes for posts were tossed about in particularly large quantities, were undoubtedly Ikeda's election in i960, his third election in 1964, and Tanaka Kakuei's election in 1972. If a faction leader had the good fortune to be elected party president and then named to head a cabinet, he was in a position to allocate the highest offices of party and government. He would take into account the balance of power among the factions, a practice that became well entrenched relatively early. When Ishibashi Tanzan resigned in 1957, after a mere two months, the Kishi cabinet was established as an alliance of the Kishi Nobusuke, Sato Eisaku, Kono Ichiro, and O n o Banboku factions. These four factions constituted the "mainstream" during the first half of Kishi's administration. The Ikeda faction replaced the Kono faction during the second half, but the basic principles involved did not change. After fierce clashes between the mainstream and anti-mainstream, occasionally a "party unity" cabinet that rewarded all the factions equally would emerge, but this, too, was just another method of balancing the factions. The LDP remained a unit despite severe factional disputes. A split would mean the collapse of LDP governance and the loss of the means to secure posts and nurture support bases. There were also lateral pressures. First, from the financial world (zaikai), which demanded the conservative merger. There were times when the zaikai became utterly disgusted with the LDP's factional infighting; it toyed with the idea of cutting off political funds and calling for a two-conservative-party system or a conservative-progressive coalition. Nevertheless, the zaikai really had little choice but to pin its hopes on continued LDP governance. A group that seceded from the LDP would immediately find its supply lines severed. Second, from the socialist parties, whose unification spurred the conservative merger. The JSP might stagnate or decline and the other opposition parties might gain in strength, but as long as the total number of seats held by the opposition parties remained near one-half, the LDP could not split. The "Three Party Officers" and the Bureaucrats After the president, the three highest posts in the LDP are the "Three Party Officers"—the secretary general, the Executive Council chairman, and the chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). The secretary general, who controls personnel affairs and finance, is of particular importance. Because an incumbent can extend his influence in the party through these duties, the secretary generalship puts the party presidency within reach. At the same time, the secretary general must be a trusted ally of the

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party president. For this reason, it became customary for secretaries general to be selected from the president's faction. The party agreed to a "separation of the president and the secretary general" in 1974, however, and secretaries general from other factions were selected under presidents Miki Takeo and Fukuda. The president's faction cannot monopolize the Three Party Officers. It is the general practice for the Executive Council chairman and the PARC chairman to be selected from other factions in order to establish an alliance of mainstream factions. The party vice presidency is also utilized in the establishment of an alliance. The factions would recommend candidates to the prime minister in accord with their internal hierarchies when a cabinet was being formed or reorganized. It is said that the prerequisite for entering a cabinet was six election victories, or approximately fifteen years for someone with consecutive victories. It is also said that a person with a bureaucratic background who reached the rank of vice minister was allowed a "bonus" worth three election victories. Major zaikai figures who joined the party were also given special consideration. Length of affiliation with the faction, degree of contribution to factional affairs, and the amount of funds contributed to the faction chief were also taken into consideration. If intrafactional discipline was upset or the number of posts allocated to the faction cut, then dissatisfaction with the faction leader increased and solidarity declined. When that happened, the amount of spoils decreased, factional ranks were raided, and should worse come to worst, the faction would split or dissolve. Consequently, the faction leader could not give an inch in his negotiations with the prime minister over posts. The prime minister and his lieutenants needed to consolidate the demands of the various factions and come up with a combination that was most advantageous for keeping the administration in power. Factions that were been cooperative and factions from which cooperation was expected were treated favorably. Factional recommendations were not automatically followed in the case of critical cabinet posts. For these, individual talents were also taken into consideration. Furthermore, it was possible to target someone for a post in order to weaken the ranks of a particular faction. The desire of a Diet member for a cabinet post is most intense. Therefore, when the prime minister ignored the recommendation of a faction and selected someone else, the faction would attempt to prevent that person from accepting. It usually failed. There are, however, only nineteen cabinet posts. There were typically twenty to thirty Representatives who had been elected six or more times but had not yet held a cabinet post. Furthermore, just because a Diet member held a cabinet post once did not mean that his appetite was sated. The party was therefore in a chronic state of acute mass hunger for cabinet posts. When rumors flew that a cabinet reorganization was near, the party would go into an uproar.

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Let us scrutinize a set of negotiations for cabinet posts. When the cabinet was reorganized after Ikeda's election for a third term in the July 1964 party presidential election, Murakami Isamu visited Ikeda as a representative of the old O n o faction to demand the inclusion of two faction members. O n o had passed away in May, immediately before the presidential election. The part of the old faction aligned with Funada Naka had supported Ikeda, while those aligned with Murakami had voted for Ikeda's opponent, Sato Eisaku. Murakami was in a difficult position. He writes: Showing Prime Minister Ikeda a list of the thirty-one members of the old O n o faction, I made the following request. "We would like you to maintain the existing [balance o f ] forces in your reorganization of the cabinet. With regard to party officers, I would like as a matter of course to obtain [posts for] several individuals as I did before." Prime Minister Ikeda said, " . . . Let me, for now, hear what it is that you want." I therefore transmitted the opinion in our faction to the prime minister. . . . "First, with regard to ministerial candidates, according to the order of things within our faction, it should be Hara Kenzaburo and Kawano Yoshimitsu. But since Hara has already been vice speaker of the House of Representatives, which is equal in rank to a cabinet ministership, I would like you this time to select Kawano, who has been elected [to the Diet] eight times. Kawano's Miyazaki Prefecture is a most unlucky place, and since Meiji it has not had one Diet member w h o became a cabinet member. . . . According to the rumors going around, Koyama Osanori of the Ikeda faction may enter the cabinet. Koyama is from the Miyazaki First [actually, Second] District and Kawano is from the Second [actually, First] District. If they enter the cabinet, the entire prefecture will probably hold lantern parades [in celebration]. Kawano has much more seniority than Koyama. Koyama is, of course, most qualified, but please select Kawano as well." I pleaded desperately. Ikeda said, " A n d next?" I therefore said, "You won't do it?" "Next, Moo-san [Murakami]. Who's next?" " T h e next person is Nakamura Kohachi. H e has had to wait a year because in last year's reshuffling you wanted MITI minister Fukuda Hajime kept in office. At that time, O n o consoled him, saying, 'Nakamura, sis long as O n o Banboku is alive, I promise you, you will enter the cabinet next time. Don't you worry. This is something that Prime Minister Ikeda promised me.' It was Nakamura Kohachi w h o strongly supported the third Ikeda term and collected signatures at the general meeting the morning after O n o passed away. Please let him enter the cabinet this time." "Next?" he said again, so I said, "You keep saying, next, next, Mr. Prime Minister. Does that mean you won't do it? Speaker of the House Funada is here, too. T h e two of us are here representing the faction. What will it be?" Funada came to my assistance by speaking out, but [Ikeda] would not answer. " A n d w h o is next?" he said sharply.

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"Next is Tokuyasu Jitsuzo, but I do not think that we have to say much on his behalf. As the director general of your cabinet's Administrative Management Agency, he most smoothly resuscitated the Awards Law. He even went to see opposition party chairmen like Nishio Suehiro and Suzuki Mosaburo. He prevailed upon them in close consultations and firmly . . . " When I said this, he said, as if taking over the conversation, "I'll take you up on that, Murakami." "Thank you very much." "And what about the second person?" "Harada Ken is next." "No, it's still a little early for him, so let's make him assistant secretary general." "If it's to be assistant secretary general at the request of the prime minister, so be it." "Now, for the other person. Could you leave that to me, Murakami?" he said. So I replied, "I see. If, after our having expressed our wishes, it's to be someone else in addition to Tokuyasu, then, given that the prerogative of selection is held by the prime minister, we shall leave it up to you." After we had taken two or three steps out of the prime minister's office, he walked up to us, saying, "Wait just a minute, Murakami." Putting his arm over my shoulder, he said, "I'll take Kanda Hiroshi as the other person." There could be, of course, no objection on my part. It was in this manner that two members of the old Óno faction—Kanda Hiroshi as welfare minister and Tokuyasu Jitsuzo as minister of posts and telecommunications—entered the cabinet. (Murakami 1981:162-65) In addition, a wide variety of lower-echelon posts were distributed. Among the government posts, the parliamentary vice ministerships typically went to third termers. Among the Diet posts, the speakerships of the lower and upper houses were reserved for senior members. Chairmanships in permanent committees were considered (in 1958) to be for those who had been elected for five terms. As for party posts, PARC's functions have increased recently, and the chairs of the fifteen subcommittees that were established to correspond to the ministries—and in particular the chairs of the commerce and industry, construction, and agricultural and forestry subcommittees—attracted a large number of hopefuls because they fostered connections with bureaucratic and industry personnel. These posts were considered higher than a parliamentary vice ministership and lower than the chairmanship of a permanent Diet committee. (Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha 1983) The Movements to Dissolve the Factions The zaikai was embarrassed by the factional disputes, and the media sneered derisively at them. For this reason, demands for the dissolution of the fac-

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tions appeared quite early, even within the party. It was Prime Minister Kishi himself who first said that these demands were "the voice of heaven." Following this announcement, in August 1958, the Ono faction's Hakuseikai, the old Yoshida faction's Heigokai, and the Kono faction's Shunjukai were "dissolved." By September, however, things were back to normal. The organizational program approved by the January 1961 party convention was unprecedentedly proactive. It established an investigative committee (Masutani Shuji, chairman) "with the aim of reforming organizationally into a modern political party." It considered the installation of a financial committee, the formation of the People's Association (Kokumin Kyokai), and the establishment of a system of local organizers, but it did not touch directly on the problem of the factions. A second investigative committee (Kuraishi Tadao, chairman), established in July of that year, took up the faction issue. Its criticisms of the system were harsh. The Kuraishi Committee interim report of November 1961 asserted: "First, let the party president, distancing himself from the interest of a single faction and consciously reflecting on his position as president of the party as a whole, personally take the lead in dissolving the factions. Second, trust the party's Diet members as a whole, place appropriate personnel in appropriate posts, and strive to give full play to their efficiency. Third, fully carry out the principle of relying on the party organs in managing party affairs. Fourth, establish a personnel bureau within the party, chaired by either the vice president or the secretary general, and put it in charge of party personnel matters. Fifth, promptly reform the election system so that there will be no infighting among party members in national elections." Movements to dissolve the factions had two sources. First, the prime minister or the mainstream factions might call for the dissolution of the factions in order to strengthen their influence within the party, as in the case of Kishi's referral to the "voice of heaven." Second, there were situations where the anti-mainstream demanded the dissolution of the mainstream. Kuraishi's committee is an example. But factional alliances are the LDP's lifeblood, and the dissatisfaction that they breed is eternal. Consequently, calls for the dissolution of the factions are also eternal. The Norms and Lineages of the Factions

The factions survived in spite of repeated movements to dissolve them. The ideal size of a faction for procuring funds, securing posts, and operating the medium-sized multiple-member constituency system is said to be fifty members, at most, in the House of Representatives. Watanabe Tsuneo wrote in 1967: U p to now, the only instances of a large faction temporarily expanding beyond this [ideal] size . . . was the Hirokawa Kozen faction during the height of Yo-

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shida Shigeru's power and the Kishi faction under the Kishi administration, which exceeded seventy-seven individuals in the House of Representatives alone. The Ikeda faction, even at the height of the Ikeda cabinets, never exceeded fifty members. Even after the Sato government took over, the Sato faction never exceeded fifty members. Even so, there was a clash within it between Hon Shigeru and Tanaka.... The late Kono Ichiro was unable to break the fifty-member barrier no matter what aggressive measures he took to expand his faction. Other things being equal, when a faction exceeds fifty members it inevitably begins to split.... Why is it that a faction cannot exceed fifty members? There are three primary reasons. The first is funding. It takes ¥200 million annually in regular operational expenses to maintain a faction of fifty Representatives. If there is an election, it is also necessary to support Diet members who lost their previous races and new candidates. The accepted opinion is that about ¥500 million is needed for this. In the case of a medium-sized faction of around twenty members, regular annual operating expenses of several dozen million to ¥100 million, and during a general election ¥100 million to ¥200 million, will suffice. The maximum amount of contributions that a single power holder can collect from the zaikai at one time—excluding special situations like a presidential election— is probably ¥500 million. The second is personnel. The duty of a powerful "boss" is to mediate the placement of his "followers" in such governmental posts as cabinet minister, parliamentary vice minister, and permanent committee chairman. But there is a limit to the number of posts that a Diet member would want that can be allocated to a faction. It is normal for a faction that takes over the government to fill a large number of posts with its members. Even so, the limit is four or five in the case of cabinet ministerships. One might be prime minister, but if one monopolized the cabinet with members of one's own faction, one's cabinet would not last a y e a r . . . . The third—and this is the most important—is the electoral system. According to the electoral districting system currendy in use, the country is divided into 118 [117] electoral districts.... In many cases, an election contest is fought not with the candidates of opposing political parties but with candidates of the same political party. This tendency is particularly critical in the case of the LDP, which has as many as 400 candidates. For this reason, it is exceptional for the candidates who battle each other in an electoral district to be affiliated with the same faction. (Watanabe 1967:144-45) Unless a faction has about forty members, its boss cannot run as a presidential candidate. Nor can it develop into a large faction unless it has someone who is likely to become such a candidate. When the boss fails to run or retires from the post of prime minister/party president, his faction declines. Submerged disputes over the inheritance of a faction often lead to a split upon a leader's retirement or death, as when the Kishi faction split into the Fujiyama Aiichiro, Fukuda, and Kawashima Shojiro factions; the Kono faction into the Nakasone Yasuhiro and Mori Kiyoshi factions; and

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the O n o faction into the Funada and Murakami factions. But some bosses of medium-sized factions of twenty to thirty members d o align themselves closely to the administration and, even though they do not harbor a presidential candidate, provide for their followers in the areas of posts, perquisites, and election campaigns. T h e Kawashima faction was of this type. It is possible to maintain a super-large faction with a membership exceeding sixty. Assuming that internal discord can be prevented, the first of the three limitations cited a b o v e — f u n d i n g — c a n be overcome by speculation in real estate and stocks and by the formation of "ghost" companies. In theory, the third limitation can also be overcome, u p until the point that the membership hits around ninety, i f — a n d here we are assuming the chances of a candidate being elected are around 80 p e r c e n t — o n e person is allowed to run in every electoral district. But the second f a c t o r — t h e rate of cabinet post allocation—would probably be reduced considerably. Let us trace briefly the lineages of the factions, as shown in Table 10. During the era of the Kishi cabinets the factions were called the "Eight Divisions" (hakko shidan). T h e Kishi faction, which was the largest, was formed when Kishi was secretary general under the Hatoyama cabinet. It split up in the summer of i960 when Kishi retired. Fujiyama seceded that August to form the Toyukai. He ran unsuccessfully in two presidential elections, and the faction dissolved in late 1971. T h e Kishi faction was inherited by Fukuda, but Kawashima and Shiina Etsusaburo—who were senior members—split off to form smaller factions. T h e Ikeda faction's Kochikai got its start in 1957. Ikeda retired as a result of illness in 1964. After Ikeda died in August 1965, Maeo Shigesaburo inherited the faction, which was in turn inherited by Ohira Masayoshi in April 1971. Those aligned with Hori split off and merged with the Sato faction. T h e Sato faction, the Shuzankai, was formed in 1957. Sato was considering Fukuda, w h o had inherited the Kishi faction, as his heir, but the influence of Tanaka within the Sato faction grew rapidly and Tanaka came to control most of its membership. Tanaka's Etsuzankai was formally established in August 1972. Those aligned with Hori split off and merged with the Fukuda faction. After O n o died in May 1964, the O n o faction was divided into the Murakami and Funada factions. T h e Murakami faction was inherited as the Mizuta Mikio faction. T h e Kono faction fell into disarray following Kono's sudden death in July 1965. Nakasone ultimately captured the loyalty of most of the members to form the Nakasone faction. T h e anti-Nakasone group formed the Mori and Sonoda Sunao factions, but these merged with the Fukuda faction in 1972. T h e Ishii Mitsujiro faction was a large faction that inherited the members of the Ogata Taketora faction. It was raided by other factions and gradually disintegrated.

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The Ishibashi faction did not have a strong base to begin with. Following Ishibashi's retirement, it ran out of both supplies and ammunition and was dissolved. The Miki faction is the sole survivor among the Eight Divisions. Thus, the Eight Divisions of the late 1950s evolved into the five great factions of the early 1970s. Among them, there was a tendency for factions led by politicians who were former high-level bureaucrats to contain a large number of members with bureaucratic backgrounds. In 1958 about 35 percent of the members of the Kishi, Sato, Ikeda, and Ishii factions were exbureaucrats. The proportion was only about 15 percent in the Miki, Ono, and Kono factions, which were led by party politicians. By contrast, the Ono and Kono factions each contained about 40 percent "locally elected public officials." This figure was about 30 percent in the Kishi and Sato factions. (Scalapino and Masumi 1962¡appendix, chart 8) In 1963 ex-bureaucrats accounted for 51.1 percent of the Ikeda and 34.8 percent of the Sato factions, as opposed to 6.7 percent of the Ono faction and 10.6 percent of the Kono faction. Former local assemblymen accounted for 33.3 percent of the Ono faction and 29.8 percent of the Kono faction, as opposed to 17.0 percent of the Ikeda and 23.9 percent of the Sato factions. (Masumi 1969:287) The labels of "ex-bureaucrat" and "party politician" factions point to differences of degree. After being tossed about for a decade by reshufflings and after building up experience in Diet activities under long-term LDP governance, differences began to wear away. Talents that were not apparent prior to entry into the Diet were developed, and the importance of background decreased accordingly. The distinction between the ex-bureaucrat and party politician factions points to two currents that flowed out of the clash between Yoshida and Hatoyama. "Ex-bureaucrat" refers to the Ikeda and Sato factions, to which the Kishi faction, which was similar in makeup, was added. "Party politician" refers to the factions of Ono and Kono, to which the similarly composed Miki faction was appended. When Ono and Kono died in 1964 and 1965, the party politician factions disappeared. And when Sato retired in 1972, the era of the bureaucratic factions ended. The arrival of Tanaka signaled its end, for he was neither a party politician nor an ex-bureaucrat. The ex-bureaucrat-party politician distinction as it applied to factions thus eroded. Nevertheless, high-level bureaucrats and locally elected public officials continue to represent important categories in the backgrounds of individual Diet members, as Table 11 shows. The Party Reform Promotion Headquarters Upset with the LDP's losses in the July 1974 "company-organized election," the zaikai demanded the dissolution of the factions and canceled its politi-

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THE DYNAMICS OF THE 1955 SYSTEM

cal contributions. The Shiina Committee, which was established in response, submitted a reform plan to Party President Tanaka on October 24 that recommended (1) not filling party and cabinet posts along factional lines; (2) consolidating political contributions; and (3) using a signed ballot in presidential elections. This was approximately one month before Tanaka stepped down. Miki Takeo, who had prepared a report on modernizing the party organization ten years earlier, subsequently entered the limelight. In January 1975 he announced a reform program centered on a primary in the presidential election. He proposed (1) that candidates in the presidential election obtain the recommendation of at least ten Diet members; (2) that all party members vote in a primary election conducted on a prefecture-byprefecture basis; and (3) that, after the nationwide vote of party members is counted, the top two candidates run in a final election restricted to Diet members. Miki hoped that the introduction of the primary election system would raise the consciousness of party members, expand the party's organization, and hold the influence of factions and money to a minimum. Strong resistance appeared within the party. The Study Committee on the Revision of Party Regulations (Tanaka Isaji, chairman), which received Miki's proposal, prepared a plan of its own. In it, the final election was to be a race among the top four candidates—in effect, a continuation of the existing system. When Miki demanded the committee reconsider its plan, the committee backtracked even further, calling for primary elections to be conducted within the prefectural party federations and final election voting to be for any candidate who came in first in at least one primary balloting. By the end of the year, the Tanaka and Ohira factions were leading a movement to halt the study of reform. Miki ended up preparing a compromise proposal in April, in which votes would be totaled in seven regional blocs and the top candidate in each bloc would run in the final election. The whole matter was shelved as a consequence of the Lockheed scandal. When Miki resigned, he again called for the introduction of the primary election system. In response, Prime Minister Fukuda established and personally headed a committee to study party reforms. The committee released a report in March 1977 that proposed (1) forming an organization of party supporters (the "Liberal People's Conference," or Jiyu Kokumin Kaigi) to strengthen the party's organization and finances; (2) introducing a presidential primary election system in which all party members and supporters participated; and (3) dissolving the factions. An extraordinary party convention approved the plan in April. The Liberal People's Conference was to be organized by region, occupation, and function, with a target membership of 1 million; it was described as "what Sohyo is to the JSP." Although the LDP received up to

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23 million votes in the general election, as of late December 1977 party members numbered only around 400,000. The aim was to organize the huge mass of unorganized supporters as toyu ("party friends") through the Liberal People's Conference and strengthen the party's financial base with the revenue derived from their membership dues. In return for annual dues of at least ¥10,000, a member could participate in the party presidential primary election. The factions were dissolved at this time. The Funada faction led the way, deciding at a general meeting in December 1976 to dissolve its Isshinkai. The largest faction, Fukuda's Yokakai, initiated a step-by-step process of dissolution toward the end of the year. In February the old Tanaka faction (Nanukakai) announced its intention to dissolve, followed by the Mizuta faction (Tatsumikai) and the Ohira faction (Kochikai). In March, the Nakasone faction (Shinsei Doshikai) and the Miki faction (Seisaku Doshikai) completed the process. But in fact, all they did was take down their storefronts. Factional activities continued. Early in 1978, with the deadline for submitting party dues just ahead, all the factions issued orders to recruit new party members and supporters. With factional activities once again being conducted openly, the number of party members—approximately 1.52 million at the end of February—nearly quadrupled. (Asahi nenkan 1978:234-35) As for the primary election system, the party convention approved a reform plan on January 20,1978. Its major points were the following: —Between November 1 and November 4, candidates will register after gaining the recommendation of twenty Diet members. —Balloting will be conducted by party members who have paid party dues two years in a row. —Voting will be on a prefecture-by-prefecture basis, and the top two candidates in a prefecture will be considered the winners. One thousand votes count as one point. The votes of those who come in third or below will be allocated proportionally to [the candidates who come in] first and second. — T h e votes received by those who come in first and second in the prefectures will be tabulated nationally to obtain a final ranking. The top two candidates will be considered the winners. — D i e t members will vote [in the final election] on the two top candidates, and the winner will become president.

Under this plan, the number of registered party members reached approximately 1.5 million—that is, 1.33 million party members, 170,000 Liberal People's Conference members, and 3,000 members of the People's Political Association. They included male housewives, dogs, and cats. The plan probably did help to expand the base of the party. At the same time, it turned

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factional disputes into a nationwide phenomenon as a result of the interfactional competition in the registration drive. (Asahi nenkan 1978:235-35; 1979:234)

FUNDING: EASY MONEY IN VARIOUS FORMS The "Decoloring" Blender Threatened by the gains of the JSP, the zaikai thought about how it might finance a stable conservative administration. Keidanren vice president Uemura Kogoro and others organized the Economic Reconstruction Council (Keizai Saiken Kondankai) on January 27, 1955, thereby prodding the zaikai into supplying the Democratic and Liberal parties with funds for February's general election. Uemura pleaded to zaikai members that, although the conservative parties were "prodigal sons," they were nonetheless the "only child"—actually, two only children—and could not be left to die; they needed to be given at least enough money to survive. The reasoning behind this particular format was as follows: "In the past, there was a danger of abuses if an industry or company gave money directly to a particular political party; this was a major reason why the public viewed such contributions with suspicion. Perhaps the people of the business world could help in purifying the political world by ceasing this practice and pooling contributions. Put the contributions into a blender to remove their coloring, so to speak, consolidate them, and use them to implement policies for reconstructing the Japanese economy and stabilizing people's livelihood." (Asahi shinbun, January 15,1955) In February the council contributed ¥100 million to the Liberal, Democratic, Left Socialist, and Right Socialist parties. It continued to operate after the election, supplying the LDP with ¥20 million in operating expenses monthly along with special funds during election campaigns and on other occasions. It collected ¥140 million in 1955, its first year of operation, and ¥1.4 billion in i960, for a total of ¥3.7 billion yen. Of this, ¥3.5 billion, or 92 percent, went to the LDP (including contributions to the Democratic and Liberal parties before their merger). The JSP received ¥75 million; the Ryokufukai (later the House of Councilors' Doshikai), ¥50 million; and the DSP, ¥30 million. Contributions to the JSP appear to have halted in October 1959. The LDP's finances have never been entirely clear, but we do know that an annual budget of ¥250 million (including a reserve fund of ¥50 million) was established in April 1957 at the suggestion of the Ishibashi cabinet's chief cabinet secretary Ishida Hirohide and LDP secretary general Miki. A monthly contribution of ¥20 million from the zaikai was scheduled— ¥12 million from the electric power industry and ¥8 million from various

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trade associations, with a per company contribution of ¥50,000 to ¥60,000 yen. (Sankei jiji, evening ed., May 3, 1957) This probably refers to contributions channeled through the council. Because the party's total income for the fiscal year amounted to ¥550 million, this meant that the council provided only 44 percent of the LDP's income. The remaining ¥310 million included ¥20,000 per month in "policy research fees" from Diet members affiliated with the party, or approximately ¥110 million from 450 Diet members. The remaining ¥200 million was gathered directly from corporations and industries. Contributions from the council increased rapidly in fiscal 1958, but they were not sufficient to cover the tremendous expansion of the party budget. The contributions of the council accounted for only 60 percent (¥3.4 billion) of the ¥6.164 billion in total revenues of the LDP during the six years between fiscal 1955 and i960. Most of the remaining 40 percent (¥2.882 billion) probably came from direct contributions by corporations and from party dues. In some cases, much of a corporation's contribution was made directly to party headquarters and not channeled through the council. In other words, a number of companies did not want to put their contributions "into a blender to remove their coloring." (Miki Yónosuke, "Zaikai: Seiji kenkin no uchimaku," Chüó kóron, June 1963) People began to call for the dissolution of the Economic Reconstruction Council after the security treaty crisis of i960. They cited several reasons. First, the council's contributions to the LDP had swelled to ¥1.4 billion in fiscal i960. Of this, ¥800 million was for campaign expenses, and the contributions demanded from industries and corporations had soared. Second, it was not clear how these funds were being used; in fact, they seemed to be encouraging factional infighting. Third, even though contributions had been consolidated, equivalent contributions or more were still being "extorted" by the factions and individual Diet members. Fourth, because of the council's "transparent" contributions, LDY-zaikai collusion was out in the open, fostering unfavorable public opinion. ("Keizai saiken kondankai no kaishôron," Asahijànaru, February 12, 1961) O n January 27, 1961, a committee established by the Keizai Dóyükai released a memorandum entitled "Interim Views on the Renovation of Politics," which suggested: — D i s s o l v i n g the E c o n o m i c Reconstruction Council. — A d o p t i n g a single-member district system, or else o n e c o m b i n e d with a proportional representation system. — E x p a n d i n g the public m a n a g e m e n t of elections, rationally calculating legally d e f i n e d election expenses, a n d strengthening punishments for violations o f election laws. — E s t a b l i s h i n g a party organization to resolve the f u n d i n g p r o b l e m and dissolve factions.

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—Restricting or banning election contributions by corporations and other organizations. Establishing a system for procuring funds principally through the party organizations. (Togawa 1961:178-79)

O n releasing the statement, Industrial Bank of Japan vice president Nakayama Sohei said, "We expect that there will be controversy when we release this memorandum. . . . It was precisely because we thought that we could dissolve the Reconstruction Council that we took the trouble to release this m e m o r a n d u m . " Chairman Yamashita Seiichi explained on February 13, "In last year's general election, the JSP made gains in the rural villages where it could not gain a foothold earlier. . . . It is now critical to modernize the conservative party, but the conservative party itself is totally absorbed in the problem of making approaches to power. T h e trend toward factionalism has intensified, and the election system has b e c o m e extremely expensive. If we are not to spend a lot of money, nothing but a single-member electoral district system will d o . " ("Keizai saiken kondankai n o kaishoron," Asahijanaru, July 29, 1962) The People's Association These zaikai actions shocked the LDP. T h e January 26, 1961, party convention approved a proposal to "establish a permanent and stable budgetary plan." President Ikeda and others initially thought of having the Liberal People's Alliance (Jiyu Kokumin Rengo), established in December 1959, take over the functions of the Reconstruction Council, but there was considerable opposition to the idea because of the alliance's ties to the Kishi faction. Instead, they created a committee of five or so influential party members to handle the procurement and administration of party funds. T h e proposed committee of five ballooned into a committee of forty-two— four or five members from each faction. But the leaders of the factions and the faction treasurers did not join. In other words, the funding networks of the factions were to be maintained while party funds were to be collected only to the extent that they did not conflict with them. It is said that only the Ikeda faction worked seriously on behalf of party-based funding. A n external, parallel association tied to the LDP, the People's Association (Kokumin Kyokai), was also planned. To avoid opportunities for corruption, it was decided that the dues of party m e m b e r s — D i e t members, local assembly members, and o t h e r s — w o u l d be handled by the financial affairs committee while "supporting dues" and contributions from party friends, advisers, and other individuals and corporations would be collected by the People's Association and sent directly to the party accounting bureau. Party revenue at the time included ¥20,000 in legislative research fees collected monthly from each of the 435 LDP Diet members as well as ¥10,000 a month

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in "special party dues," for a monthly total of ¥13 million and a yearly total of ¥156 million. T h e Reconstruction Council was dissolved in late March but contributed monthly operating expenses of ¥20 million as before until June. These were taken over by the People's Association in July. T h e targeted budget was ¥50 million each for regular operating expenses, organizational activity expenses, and public relations costs, for a total of ¥1.8 billion a year. T h e People's Association was established on July 15,1961, for the purpose of "conducting cooperative f u n d i n g efforts with political parties that are attempting to bring about sound parliamentary politics based on liberal democracy." Its collection plan established four categories of corporate members from which ¥5,000, ¥10,000, ¥50,000, and ¥100,000 were to be collected monthly. T h e preliminary estimate was for ¥100 million, to be collected monthly from 1,000 listed corporations (two subscriptions of ¥50,000 each), and ¥15 million, to be collected monthly from 150 associations (payments of ¥100,000 each). Individuals were grouped into four classes with monthly dues of ¥100, ¥500, ¥1,000, and ¥10,000. Each of the 435 LDP Diet members was expected to recruit fifty ¥100 members, ten ¥500 members, five ¥1,000 members, and two ¥10,000 members. T h e founding members were then each to obtain ten ¥5,000 members. In addition, three ¥10,000 individual memberships were to be obtained from each of the 1,000 listed corporations. This added u p to a total of ¥48,267,500 from 33,145 individual members. T h e sum total of projected contributions equaled roughly ¥1.63 billion. Since the operations of the People's Association were to be limited to the distribution of the Jiminto ho (LDP journal) and Jiminto seichokai geppo (LDP policy affairs research monthly), about 80 percent of the membership dues, or ¥130 million a month, would flow into the party's coffers. W h e n added to the ¥13 million collected from Diet members, revenues would approach the monthly target of ¥150 million and an expected annual income of about ¥1.7 billion. Collection proved more difficult than planning. (Mainichi shinbun, evening ed., July 8, 1962) As of December 20, there were only 14,500 individual and 906 corporate members. According to a report submitted to the Local Autonomy Ministry, the People's Association collected a mere ¥120 million in fiscal 1961. Perhaps ¥100 million or so of this went to the LDP. Total LDP revenue declined dramatically to less than ¥740 million. A b o u t ¥150 million was collected through the party dues paid by Diet members. T h e secretary general scraped together the rest from other sources. T h e funds collected by the People's Association increased over the years. In fiscal 1962 People's Association revenues were ¥630 million. LDP revenues were ¥1.56 billion. In fiscal 1963 they were ¥1.8 billion and ¥4.1 billion, and in fiscal 1964, ¥2.7 billion and ¥3.4 billion. T h e revenue of the People's

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Association thus surpassed the initial target, but then the party's budget also ballooned rapidly. Prefectural People's Association branches began to be formed in September 1961. By the end of the year, branches had been set up in ten prefectures. There were twenty branches at the end of 1962 and forty at the end of 1963. With the establishment of the Kumamoto Prefecture branch in December 1964, every prefecture had a branch. Most of the money collected by the branches is said to have been returned to them and used to cover the expenses of the LDP prefectural federations. During the 1969 general election, LDP accounting bureau chief Nishimura Eiichi asked thirty large corporate contributors to donate ¥1.6 billion in "security treaty funds." Immediately afterward, Keidanren levied a separate "general election fee" of ¥4 billion on various industries. The total was ¥5.6 billion, or approximately three times what was raised in the 1967 general election. There were complaints. In response, Keidanren argued, "If the Red Army mobilized and set fire to your companies next June, you would suffer losses of ¥1 billion or ¥2 billion in no time. We must have the LDP win this election in order to prevent this." The statement apparently had the desired effect: the money was collected. According to the estimates of Keidanren executives, the total amount of money transferred to the LDP factions and individual politicians almost equaled the officially declared ¥5.6 billion, suggesting that the LDP spent about¥10 billion on this election. (Asahi Shinbun 1980:174) As of July 1970, there were approximately 85,000 People's Association members; of these, 8,000 were corporate members. Seventy percent of the individual members paid ¥100 monthly. The bulk of the association's funds thus came from its corporate members. According to the reports submitted under the Political Funds Regulation Law, the total revenue of the LDP for fiscal year 1969 was ¥5.29 billion. Approximately ¥3.59 billion (or 68 percent) was provided by the People's Association. (Incidentally, this figure does not agree with the ¥5.6 billion yen cited earlier.) Income from sources other than contributions included ¥2.4 billion in legislative administration grants from the National Treasury, ¥780 million in party dues (¥10,000 annually from Diet members and ¥500 from general party members), and ¥1.27 billion in bank loans. Expenditures amounted to ¥5.3 billion. Major items included ¥2 million for allotments to approved candidates and loans to the various candidates totaling ¥1,296 million, subsidies to prefectural federations and municipal branches totaling ¥947 million, expenses totaling ¥570 million for expanding the party, campaign travel expenses totaling ¥487 million (including midyear and New Year's "gifts" to Diet members) , and research expenditures of ¥386 million (this includes "going away presents" to Diet members traveling abroad). (Asahi Shinbun 1980: 178-79)

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Factional Funds Political funding was not restricted to what was funneled into the party through the council and the People's Association or directly to party headquarters. Funds were also channeled to individual faction leaders. Not only was it difficult for industries and enterprises to turn away solicitations from LDP bigwigs with w h o m they had some sort of personal tie; there was also the need to consider the benefits and conveniences to be had from continuing such relationships. T h e keener the competition within the zaikai or within an industry, the more personal ties with influential politicians were important. ("Nurikaerareru zaikai chizu," Ekonomisuto, June 15,1959) T h e funds collected by faction leaders were used to cultivate followers. Watanabe Tsuneo writes that "the possession of the ability to supply [followers] with an appropriate amount of political f u n d s " is one of the conditions for becoming a factional boss. "It does not matter whether the required funds are furnished through assets owned personally or absorbed widely from the zaikai and other sources. (In the present-day Japanese conservative party, one must be able to provide a single Diet member with somewhere between a minimum of ¥100,000 and several hundred thousand yen during obon and New Year's and several hundred thousand to ¥2 million or ¥3 million during elections, for an average of several dozen million yen a n d — i n some cases several hundred million y e n — i n political funds annually.)" H e also states, with a large dose of irony, that an additional qualification is "to be a proponent of a particular political philosophy. (But this is not a condition for becoming a boss in the conservative party.)" (Watanabe 1958:6) A person w h o could not collect the money to nurture followers could not become a faction boss. T h e day-to-day political activities of followers required a tremendous amount of money. A personal koenkai and an electoral base had to be maintained and election campaign expenses had to be met. T h e annual allowances and certified candidate funds provided by the party were just a drop in the bucket. O n e might have invested personal assets and scraped together funds from corporations, but even this was not sufficient. A leader had to be f o u n d who could cover the shortfall. Followers flocked around such golden faucets and formed factions. As in the allocation of posts, the greater the number of followers, the more attractive the leader and his agents. Followers were enriched, and once rumors spread, their number grew. But once a certain threshold was reached, it became difficult to collect e n o u g h money. Individual shares then began to decrease. Conversely, if a faction was too small, the water pressure would drop and the followers would scatter. Between 1955 and 1962, the Ikeda faction's Kochikai accounted for 10 percent of the LDP's income, or ¥800 million. With ¥640 million, the K o n o

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faction's Daiichi Kokusei Kenkyukai and Kodokai accounted for 8.4 percent; the Sato faction's Shuzankai, 8.1 percent, with ¥623 million. The Kishi faction's Kokusei Kenkyukai, Tokakai, Kisankai, Seiji Keizai Chosakai, Shin'yukai, and Shinsei Seiji Keizai Kenkyukai together accounted for 10 percent, or¥770 million. In addition, the Hoankai's ¥280 million (Ishii faction), the Kokusai Seiji Keizai Bunka Kenkyukai's ¥240 million (Fujiyama faction), the Shin Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo's ¥140 million (Miki faction), and the Tanzankai's¥i20 million (Ishibashi faction) accounted for 10 percent, or a total of ¥770 million yen. This amounted to approximately 47 percent of the total income of party headquarters. Whereas the People's Association was able to generate only ¥120 million in fiscal 1961, the Kochikai collected as much as ¥90 million; the Shin'yukai and the Tokakai collected ¥160 million; the Shuzankai, ¥200 million; and the Daiichi Kokusei Kenkyukai, ¥110 million. Thus, a large amount of funds flowed into the factions from sources other than party headquarters. The amount of funds that did not appear in the official record—probably primarily factional or individual funds— cannot be determined. Political funding is the great mystery of the political world. Even after the Economic Reconstruction Council decided to disband, the factions' prosperity did not abate. In fact, the factions' prosperity may have been correlated negatively with the flow of funds to party headquarters. The Silk Handkerchief As a rule, politicians spend other people's money, not their own. Fujiyama, however, spent his own money. Over the course of several years, he completely squandered the fortune that he had inherited from his parents. In his memoirs, he writes: From the moment I decided to enter the political world in 1957,1 was resigned to the fact that I would have to use some of my personal assets. Given my experience as a businessman supporting Kishi Nobusuke, I thought I fully understood how politics costs money. But the actual expenses far exceeded anything that I had imagined. First, because I was completely new, during my initial election—the general election of May 1958—I had to channel a considerable amount into [my campaign]. "Election brokers," who claimed to be experts on getting elected, crowded around saying, " S o many votes would come out of this or that district, so spend this or that much," and took away [money]. To them, I was undoubtedly a sucker, ripe for the taking. I was resolved not to throw my money around indiscriminately, but still the word leaked out during the election that a well-heeled candidate had appeared. Well after the election was over, brokers came around with bills for rentals, telephone calls, and automobile expenses. . . . I learned then that you do not gain votes simply by spending

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m o n e y ; in fact, a g r e a t e r than e x p e c t e d n u m b e r o f votes c a m e from precincts w h e r e n o m o n e y was spent, w h e r e c a m p a i g n w o r k e r s canvassed tirelessly o n my b e h a l f . For this reason, I s n a p p e d my wallet s h u t d u r i n g the n e x t election. T h e b r o k e r s w e n t away, a n d only those w h o w o u l d really w o r k o n m y b e h a l f remained. T h e e x p e n s e s o f t h e f a c d o n w e r e an even b i g g e r p r o b l e m . In a d d i t i o n to c a m p a i g n s u p p o r t f o r my c o l l e a g u e s , d u r i n g obon a n d N e w Year's o n e n e e d e d [to give the customary m o n e y ] . A n d I h a d to h a n d o u t " c a m p a i g n e x p e n s e s " to the p e o p l e in m y c a m p d u r i n g g e n e r a l elections. T h e u n i t called " o n e env e l o p e " was b e t w e e n ¥300,000 a n d ¥1 million in t h e b e g i n n i n g ; after the Sato g o v e r n m e n t , it i n c r e a s e d to at least d o u b l e t h a t . . . . How, t h e n , d i d I p r o v i d e f o r t h e various e x p e n d i t u r e s that are necessary in politics? W h e n I e n t e r e d politics, I withdrew f r o m all the e x e c u t i v e positions in c o m p a n i e s that I was involved in. A m o n g t h e c o m p a n i e s o f w h i c h I was president, t h e r e w e r e s o m e that w e r e d o i n g well a n d s o m e that w e r e d o i n g poorly, b u t even in t h o s e that w e r e n ' t d o i n g well, the c o m p e n s a t i o n o f a presid e n t a m o u n t e d to at least that o f a c a b i n e t minister. For this reason, the mom e n t I e n t e r e d politics a n d b e c a m e f o r e i g n minister, m y m o n t h l y i n c o m e fell to fully one-twentieth o f w h a t I h a d r e c e i v e d u p until then. T h e e x p e n d i t u r e s f o r political activities w e r e c o v e r e d by gradually selling o f f stocks, land, my p r i n c i p a l r e s i d e n c e , a n d so o n . . . . O n the basis o f my own e x p e r i e n c e , I t h o u g h t that I w o u l d n o t have to t r o u b l e m y f r i e n d s a n d a c q u a i n t a n c e s in t h e zaikai f o r political f u n d s . B u t in t h e political w o r l d t h e r e is n o rational standard f o r s p e n d i n g m o n e y . It is said that w h e n e v e r O n o B a n b o k u r e c e i v e d a political c o n t r i b u t i o n , h e w o u l d throw it in a l a u n d r y h a m p e r . If s o m e o n e c a m e by, h e w o u l d simply say, " T a k e it o u t o f t h e r e . " B e c a u s e calculation is impossible, it is litde w o n d e r that y o u c a n n o t k e e p u p e v e n if y o u sell o f f y o u r p e r s o n a l assets. I b e c a m e aware o f this in t h e m i d d l e o f t h e I k e d a c a b i n e t a n d b e g a n to think, " T h i s l o o k s really b a d . " W h e n the Sato p e r i o d b e g a n , I b e g a n to m a k e requests o f p e o p l e with w h o m I was o n friendly terms a n d have t h e m provide political f u n d s a little at a time. By that time, I h a d finally hit t h e b o t t o m o f m y m o n e y barrel. . . . M o n e y has b e c o m e the r e a s o n w h y politics is distrusted. A l t h o u g h I b o r e virtually all o f t h e e x p e n s e s o f my political activities with my own m o n e y , I d o n o t i n t e n d t h e r e f o r e to say that " I a l o n e was c l e a n . " T h e r e was n o d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n myself a n d o t h e r s in t h e way it was spent. W h e n e v e r t h e r e is talk a b o u t politics a n d m o n e y , I say, " E v e n the silk h a n d k e r c h i e f g o t c o v e r e d with m u d . " (Fujiy a m a 1976:244-48)

A l m o s t all o f Fujiyama's political f u n d s came out o f his own pocket. With 800,000 shares at his peak, he was the second-largest stockholder in Japan National Cash Register Corporation until May i960. By the fall of 1962 he had disappeared f r o m the top ten. Since the value of a share at the time was between ¥1,200 and ¥1,300, the estimated value of his holdings was ¥1 billion. In addition, h e disposed of 400,000 shares of Nitto C h e m i c a l Industries Corporation, 300,000 shares o f Japan C o l u m b i a , and 220,000 shares o f Dai-

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Nippon Sugar Manufacturing. He sold approximately 21,000 square meters of land in Shiroganedai. T h e selling price of the Fujiyama Art Collection was approximately ¥200 million. It is said that he consumed ¥5 billion worth of assets for the sake of politics. Incidentally, according to a study by the Local Autonomy Ministry, the total amount of political funds received by the Fujiyama faction between 1958 and 1971 was ¥1,527,810,000. (Fujiyama 1976:249-50)

"Land Flipping" and Ghost Corporations Tanaka's "money pipeline" provides a sharp contrast to the political funds that Fujiyama generated from his inherited assets. Tanaka received contributions, but he also possessed his own, personal sources of funds. The "Tanaka family" coalesced during the heyday of the Tanaka Construction Company in 1947. Around 1961 this collection of "ghost corporations" evolved into a system for generating huge quantities of "easy money." T h e offices and stocks of the ghost corporations were held in the name of family members (or Tanaka himself). Their addresses were sometimes a family member's personal residence and sometimes shared with other firms. They were not listed in company directories. They sometimes did not even have a telephone number. When they did, another company would answer on their behalf. It was rare to have even a single office worker attached. T h e purpose of these ghost corporations was to earn a margin on the resale of stocks and land. They bought stocks at under par value and sold them at the market price. Extremely wide gaps between the two values meant they could obtain hundreds of millions of yen. Similarly, they bought land cheap and sold it dearly. Such ghost corporations made it possible to disperse income and escape taxation. "Losses" were incurred by entering income as "corporate expenses" in the debit column of a company's books. O n e would live on land owned by ghost corporations, hire chauffeurs through ghost corporations, and eat and drink on the "entertainment expense accounts" of ghost corporations. Their forerunner was Tanaka's Nihon Denken. Tanaka obtained Nihon Denken, a credit corporation, in May 1961. Members of the Tanaka family were installed as officers of the company. T h e company's line of business was changed to the purchase and resale of real estate. T h e company borrowed approximately ¥5 billion from banks, using the monthly installments of subscribers as collateral. By March 1962, a year after Tanaka became company president, a company that had previously had zero debt had accumulated ¥4.7 billion worth of liabilities. The value of the land in its possession rose from ¥100 million to ¥3 billion and its stock holdings from zero to ¥500 million. By March 1963, ¥600 million worth of land and ¥400 million worth of stocks had been sold, while the amount of cash on hand had decreased by as much as ¥1.3 billion. In short,

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¥2.3 billion had disappeared. Could it have been diverted into stocks of the Niigata Transport Corporation? Tanaka was installed as chairman of that corporation. T h e following year, Niigata Transport doubled its capital, and Tanaka became its primary stockholder. T h e name in which these stocks were held was changed first from Nihon Denken to Tanaka himself, and then to another ghost company, Shinsei Enterprises (established in September 1961). Meanwhile, Nihon Denken's financial situation deteriorated. Osano Kenji, who purchased the company in 1964, says, " W h e n my company investigated, it f o u n d that refunds totaling ¥7.2 billion [had to be paid to members] from a reserve fund called the maturity payment fund. In addition, there were losses amounting to ¥2.2 billion along with ¥4 billion in unaccounted-for expenses that should have been on the books." T h e money that was skimmed thereby could very well have been used in the 1964 general election and in giving birth to the Sato government. But Osano, who bought a virtually bankrupt company for ¥1.8 billion, did not lose on the deal. In September 1963, the sale of 1,100 tsubo of government-owned land was approved by the Ministry of Finance. Tanaka Kakuei was minister of finance at the time. It has been estimated that Osano earned a profit of ¥1.77 billion on the transaction. This is quite close to the ¥1.8 billion he used to purchase Nihon Denken. (Tachibana 1976:1:80-81) O n e of the most amazing instances of "land f l i p p i n g " — t h a t is, the purchase and quick resale of l a n d — w a s the resale of Mount Hodai in Futtsu City, Chiba Prefecture. In 1962 a leading member of the local business community applied for the transfer of this old Japanese army base with a magnificent view of the Miura Peninsula across Tokyo Bay. Approximately 80,000 tsubo were sold in 1964 to Azuma Industries for ¥72 million. This also occurred during Tanaka's tenure as minister of finance. (It might be noted that sales of government land were conspicuously frequent during his tenure.) While developments thereafter are quite intricate, the upshot was that on the morning of April n , 1973, A z u m a Industries sold this land to Futtsu Bussan, a leisure industry company owned joindy by Mitsui Bussan Enterprises and a number of large local landlords, for ¥980 million. Approximately two hours later, Futtsu Bussan sold the land to a company named Kishin Kosan, about which nothing else is known, for approximately ¥1.2 billion. Several minutes later, Kishin Kosan sold the land to Osano's Shinsei Enterprises for ¥1.57 billion. But Shinsei Enterprises lost n o money. According to the assessment of local real estate agents, the land was worth ¥20,000 to ¥30,000 per tsubo, or a total of ¥1.6 billion to ¥2.4 billion. If the land was developed, it would be worth ¥60,000 to ¥70,000 per tsubo. Four months later, Shinsei Enterprises, in the name of Nihon Denken, applied to the Futtsu City government for permission to construct a residential and resort complex on the land. It could easily have been worth about ¥5 billion. (Tachibana 1976:1:311-16)

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When the matter was investigated, it was found that although the transactions between Futtsu Bussan, Kishin Kosan, and Shinsei Enterprises were concluded on April 11, the contracts had been drawn up on December 4 of the previous year. According to inside information, The matter of Mount Hodai was talked about behind the scenes in the political world from quite awhile back. According to what was being said then, it was Tanaka who did it. Remember the first general election after Tanaka became prime minister in late 1972? Since he felt that he absolutely had to win, Tanaka collected money in a frenzy. He had prepared ¥10 billion to ¥15 billion in cold, hard cash, and it seems that ¥5 billion of this was borrowed from banks using single-name drafts endorsed by leading businessmen. He engaged in land flipping of various kinds in order to clear these drafts, and one of these was Mount Hodai. (Tachibana 1976:1:340)

Tanaka's funds were not limited to the easy money produced by the ghost companies. Contributions from sources like the construction industry were also generated by his mediation in the lobbying network while he was minister of finance and party secretary general. According to reports submitted to the Local Autonomy Ministry, the contributions collected by the five associations that he set up—the Etsuzankai, the Budget Research Association, the Economic and Social Research Study Group, the Political Economy Study Group, and the New Political and Economic Advancement Society (the last two were dissolved in February 1973) —totaled ¥2 billion in fiscal 1972. (This amount approximates what the Fukuda and Ohira factions raised.) About 50 percent came from the construction industry; of the 25 percent from Niigata Prefecture, where his electoral district was located, 76 percent also was from sources related to the construction industry. Not only did the construction industry provide most of Tanaka's funds, his manner of collecting and disbursing them was that of a contractor. (Tachibana 1976:1:60-61) Tanaka's regional development policies, from the National Comprehensive Development Plan to Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago, undoubtedly made his money ties with the construction industry all the more fruitful. Scattering easy money, he climbed to the top by turning the political world into something resembling the construction industry. He was probably not tied in with the zaikai establishment. Tanaka had risen outside the zaikai establishment and had approached its members from the outside. His appearance undoubtedly discomfited them at first. But they probably came to feel that they could exploit Tanaka's decisiveness and ability to get things done in dealing with problems of the early 1970s like the recession, the uneasiness over the revaluation of the yen, and the increase in international economic friction. In any event, the zaikai edged closer to him. Under its watchful eye, he held back Fukuda and gained control of the govern-

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ment. This gave him access to the LDP's treasury. He was now free to spend the easy money that had been put through the decoloring blender. The LDP treasury was empty two years later, in 1974, when he withdrew from office. In addition, the party owed ¥10 billion to the city banks for the "money power" election. According to one reporter: There is a famous story that when the government was transferred from Tanaka to Miki, the new secretary general, Nakasone, was given the key to the LDP safe. When he peeked inside, all he found was ¥ 5 0 , 0 0 0 . . . . T h e new Accounting Bureau chief wondered how in the world [Tanaka] could have emptied the safe the way he did and then go on to spend so much money that debts would run as high as ¥10 billion. . . . He found among the vouchers a tremendous amount of money that was unaccounted for, which had been entered simply as the letter sa with a circle drawn around it. They say it amounted to ¥700 million or ¥800 million. What, he sternly questioned his predecessor, is this circled sai [His predecessor] refused to answer for the longest time, but in the end he confessed that the symbol referred to the Sabo Kaikan [the building where Tanaka's private office is located]. As you know, when Tanaka disbursed his money he [ostensibly] passed out the party's money in the LDP's president's office and his own money in the Tanaka office in Sabo Kaikan. This means that, in practice, a considerable amount of the party's money was among the money that he passed out in his own office. If so, he was diverting the party's money to operate his own faction. T h e people in the mainstream factions were saying that nothing could be more preposterous. (Tachibana 1 : 3 6 2 - 6 3 )

The People's Political Association After the notoriety and the defeat of the "money power" and "companyorganized" elections, the despondent zaikai—ignoring its own record of folly—took the LDP to task. At a presidents and vice presidents' meeting on August 12, Keidanren decided that it would no longer collect political contributions. On August 13 Tokyo Electric decided it would not make political contributions of any sort. The eight other power companies followed suit. By the end of the year, a large number of banks and steel companies had stopped their contributions. In October a committee chaired by Shiina Etsuzaburo submitted a set of proposals for party reform that included conducting party and cabinet personnel affairs outside the factions and consolidating all party funding into a single channel. In March 1975 the People's Association was reorganized as the People's Political Association (Kokumin Seiji Kyokai). On March 20 the New Japan Steel Corporation announced that it would resume payment of the dues it had stopped paying to the People's Association the preceding year. Other steel and trading companies followed suit. On May 23 Prime Minister Miki Takeo said to a Keidanren general meeting, "The LDP is expanding its or-

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ganization and making efforts to cover the party budget without depending too heavily on the generosity of corporations. But until we reach our obj e c t i v e — t h e establishment of an individual contribution system—we n e e d support." O n July 17 Secretary General Nakasone and other L D P leaders met with Keidanren president D o k o Toshio, Japan Chamber of C o m m e r c e president Nagano Shigeo, Keizai Doyukai executive secretary Sasaki Tadashi, and other zaikai leaders, who agreed that full-fledged political funding would be resumed. Toward the end of the year, the zaikai deposited ¥5 billion with the People's Political Association for the purpose of repaying some of the ¥10.4 billion that the LDP had borrowed from nine leading banks. (Asahi nenkan 1976:389) According to reports submitted to the Local Autonomy Ministry, during the ten years before the implementation of the revised Political Funds Regulation Law in January 1, 1976, the parties had generated the following amounts of revenues: the LDP, ¥88 billion; the JSP, ¥5.9 billion; the DSP, ¥4.3 billion; the CGP, ¥27.3 billion; and the JCP, ¥44.9 billion. During these ten years, the income of the five major LDP factions was as follows: Fukuda's Jikyoku Keizai Kondankai and five other political funding associations, ¥8.2 billion; Tanaka's Etsuzankai and five other associations, ¥5.1 billion; Ohira's Shin Zaisei Kenkyukai and two other associations, ¥3.8 billion; and Nakasone's Shin Seiji Chosakai and four other associations, ¥3.6 billion, for a total of ¥26.7 billion, or about 30 percent of the LDP headquarter's revenue. During the nine years between 1966 and 1974, the political associations of the eighty-four Diet members of the Fukuda faction (including Fukuda himself) collected ¥23.1 billion. Tanaka and the ninety Tanaka faction Diet members collected ¥16.4 billion; Ohira and the sixty-four Ohira faction members, ¥14.4 billion; the Miki and forty-six Miki faction Diet members, ¥8.8 billion; and Nakasone and the forty Nakasone faction members, ¥8 billion. W h e n the ¥23.6 billion of the minor factions and independents is included, the total is ¥94.3 billion. This surpasses the income of LDP headquarters. T h e proportion of these contributions that can be traced to specific contributors is extremely small. T h e degree of transparency in the L D P in 1975 was 77 percent, and all of this came from the People's Political Association. T h e only contribution that can be traced to a particular contributor within that association is the ¥7.9 million provided by the Japan Electrical Manufacturers' Association. T h e officially reported contributions of the banking, steel, and electric power industries—known as the gosanke (the three primary vassals of the s h o g u n ) — f o r the years 1966-74 are indicated in Table 12. It has been reported that a change was about to occur in the relationship between the zaikai and the political world in the 1970s. Reporters noted in

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1970, during the Satô cabinet, "At the very least, the practice of the past wherein specific zaikai figures and politicians maintain links is gradually disintegrating." They predicted that, instead of "choosing a politician," the zaikai as a whole would establish itself as the power center and "give voice as well as money." (Asahi Shinbun 1980:154, 157) Another observer noted that the corporate side had come to avoid relationships with specific politicians and specific factions. The number of "lone wolf" proprietors with the discretion needed to lavish money on a particular politician or faction had decreased while the number of salaried managers had increased; intrafirm monitoring systems and labor unions kept close watch; and factional infighting was often detrimental to the businesses allied with specific factions. As firms began to provide money in equal amounts to all factions, contributing to factions became tantamount to throwing money away. Strong sentiment emerged in the zaikai to end factional funding and consolidate contributions to the LDP into a single channel. Rather than back specific politicians, businessmen began to rally around the prime minister. (Hatakeyama 1975:103-14) On the surface, this seems to imply that the leadership capacity of the bosses and the officers of the factions was decreasing. But was it? The Political Funds Regulation Law On December 27, immediately after forming his cabinet, Prime Minister Miki submitted the following proposal to the LDP: ( 1 ) Corporate contributions will be completely abolished in three years, and contributions made by individuals instead. (2) As a transitional measure, a ceiling on corporate contributions will be set in accord with their equity capital. Fierce opposition appeared within the party, but Miki stood firm. In early February he drafted an essay entitled "Why I Believe That the Complete Abolition of Corporate Contributions Is Necessary." He had it printed, took up a calligraphy brush, and personally addressed the envelopes used to send copies to members of the party. He ultimately had to give up on completely abolishing corporate contributions during his talks with Shiina in February. Instead, he asked that "within five years, the LDP cover its regular expenses with party dues and contributions from individuals." The party formally approved this proposal. A bill revising the Political Funds Regulation Law was submitted to the Diet along with a revision of the Public Officials Election Act. After chaotic debate inside and outside the LDP, the bill barely passed on July 4, the last day of the Diet session, when a 117-117 tie in the House of Councilors was broken by Speaker of the House Kôno Kenzo. (Nakamura 1981:44-48; Asahi nenkan 1975:220) The revision limited the amount of contributions and required the public release of party balance sheets. Annual contributions of up to ¥20 mil-

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lion could be made by individuals to political parties and political fundcollection associations. Gradations were established for corporations, labor unions, and other associations, with the maximum set at ¥100 million. Contributions to factions and other political associations were limited to onehalf the allowed contributions to parties. Contributions were forbidden from corporations and other entities receiving subsidies from or investments by the state. When the balance sheets were made public, political parties and political fund-collection associations were required to report the contributor and the amount for all contributions exceeding ¥10,000 per annum; other political organizations—for example, factions, koenkai, and labor unions— were required to report all contributions of more than ¥1 million per annum. Thus, an individual contributing ¥10,000 to the LDP would be required to file a report, but if he contributed ¥900,000 to Tanaka's Etsuzankai, he would not. For this reason, in fiscal 1976 Fukuda's political association, the Chiyoda Economic Deliberation Council, was only required to report 9 percent of its ¥270 million in total revenue. Miki's Policy Deliberation Council had to report 8 percent and Tanaka's Etsuzankai, 29 percent. Furthermore, multiple political associations could be established as needed. Thus, in practice there was no way for the Local Autonomy Ministry to verify that the limit of ¥1 million had indeed been honored. Still, it may have become easier for corporations to turn down solicitations of contributions of more than¥i million. (Sasago 1978:47-50) In the reports of the political parties following the revision of the Political Funds Regulation Law, revenue was conspicuously large for the LDP and the JCP. Contributions constituted 93.3 percent of the LDP's income in 1976 but declined to 53.6 percent in 1980. The proportion of individual party dues and profits from newspapers and fees for speeches increased. In the JSP, party activities accounted for approximately 40 percent of total revenue while approximately 30 percent came from the party dues of individuals. In the DSP, contributions constituted more than 60 percent. In the CGP, party activities provided more than 80 percent of the income. The J C P listed more than 90 percent as operational income. (See Table 13.) T H E KOENKAI A N D L O C A L O R G A N I Z A T I O N The Strengthening of Local Organization

Because the LDP was established to counter the advance of the JSP, the consolidation of its local organization was a pressing item on its agenda. The plan approved at the party convention of November 1955 stated: If the contemporary political environment continues to unfold as it already has, a crisis of class revolution and hopeless economic turmoil is certain. It is

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the duty of the movement to form a new party to find a way out of this political crisis. In other words, the mission of the new party is the struggle of construction against destruction.... In order [for the party] to grow into a progressive national party, it must. . . shed its earlier character as an "election organization." A "party of Diet members only," without the "backdrop of organized citizens with a shared political consciousness," is a most helpless party isolated from the masses and weak in constitution. To overcome this weakness, the organizational activities of the party must be linked directly to lives (human freedom and survival) and even to the household kitchen. T h e economic struggles (wage struggles) of the unions that have Sohyo as their major driving force are clearly class-based political struggles. T h e ultraleftist political struggle is powerful because the industry associations do not have any sort of organized political backing and are thus engaged in struggle unarmed. Our p a r t y . . . must therefore endeavor to expand its activities in the economic associations and industry organizations and direct its efforts toward mobilizing them. It must also bravely make inroads inside the labor unions. (Jiyu Minshuto 1 9 6 6 : 2 3 6 - 3 7 )

The LDP's Federation of Prefectural Branches was established prior to the second extraordinary party convention of April 5, 1956. The Hatoyama and the Ogata factions, both aiming for the presidency, competed in promoting the creation of branch federations. Then, following the sudden death of Ogata, Hatoyama was elected the party's first president. With the House of Councilors election of July looming, more than 2,200 unit branches— roughly half the number of municipalities nationwide—were established in cities, towns, and villages. The number of party members had surpassed 1 million by the third party convention in December and party dues amounted to ¥9,050,000. With annual dues of ¥200 (of this, ¥50 was transferred to party headquarters), this meant that there were approximately 450,000 dues-paying members. As of October 1961, there were 2,948 unit branches in 3,556 municipalities, and 1,438,352 party members. Quasi-party members, people who had signed up but had not yet paid their dues, numbered 4,479,220. In J u n e 1963, there were 2,600 unit branches and 1,700,000 party members; in March 1966, there were 2,569 unit branches and 1,950,000 registered party members. (Jiyu Minshuto 1966:2133"; Kokumin seiji nenkan 1963:736) The party emphasized the importance of developing "organizational leaders" in strengthening its organization. It conducted the first central seminar for training leaders in May 1956 at the Harajuku Social Services Hall in Tokyo with about three hundred participants from all over the country. A second training seminar was held for three days in September at the Japan Youth Hall in Jingu Gaien. By 1959 approximately two thousand trainees had attended a total of seven seminars. (Jiyu Minshuto 1966:214-20) In January 1959 the party adopted the policy of assigning 5 or 6 "organiza-

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tional leaders" to each town and village, and 20 or 30 to each city. By spring 1959,7,200 of them had been posted. Two years later, they numbered 12,300, and three years later (January 10,1961), 12,367. Their expenses were covered by the branches. T h e LDP Institute of Politics (Seiji Daigakuin), which o p e n e d on July 1, 1957, had an enrollment of forty-seven regular students during its first regular session. A second session, held for one month beginning March 15, had an enrollment of sixty regular students. Eight graduates obtained positions at party headquarters and ten in the prefectural federations. Because so few graduates f o u n d party-related jobs, the program was suspended. T h e party organization grew stronger after the i960 security treaty crisis. O n July 12, 1961, it was decided that new employees of the headquarters secretariat must be graduates of the Institute of Politics w h o had passed the headquarters recruitment examination when they were hired, and that the existing administrative staff would be required to graduate from a special training program. O n June 6 it was decided that the administrative staff of the new People's Association's central headquarters must also be graduates of the Institute of Politics and had to pass the association's own recruitment examination. " T h e Regulations of the Liberal Democratic Party Headquarters Secretariat (Draft)," issued in January 1961, was a huge tome o f t e n chapters and eight-nine articles. It covered such detailed matters as j o b classifications, the organizational structure of the secretariat, disciplinary measures, salaries, retirement, welfare benefits, and guarantors. It was put into effect around April 1966. According to the Asahi nenkan, the party headquarters administrative staff numbered 215 in 1963, 220 in 1964, and 227 in 1965. (Between 1970 and 1975 it was approximately 250 and decreased to around 180 after 1976.) In order to strengthen local organization, the L D P National Organizational Committee announced in May 1961, " A director will be installed in each prefectural branch federation ([they will be considered] administrative staff of the respective federations) with a monthly salary of ¥50,000, to be paid by the party headquarters. Expenses for this, including local organizing expenses, will amount to approximately ¥100 million annually." T h e proposal for salaries provided by party headquarters was never realized. T h e party's action program of July called for "a system of central and local organization leaders . . . by the end of the year." A report on organizational activities dated June 1963 stated that the number of local organizers had "increased rapidly" to 22,000. "Countering the leftist parties, between August [1962] and March [1963] independent municipal assemblymen throughout the country were invited to enter the party, and those who j o i n e d were named local organizers. As a result, 4,800 j o i n e d the party."

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Resident Local Organizers In addition, plans were made in 1961 to dispatch headquarters personnel to the prefectural federations as organizers. The action program of the 1961 party convention proclaimed that "in addition to serving in the prefectural federations as headquarters staff, [organizers] will establish a contingent of volunteer activists in the prefectural federations." In May the National Organizational Committee proposed that "three organizers be dispatched from party headquarters to each of the country's prefectures." They were to be posted in the prefectural federations in order to facilitate closer communication between party headquarters and its local organizations and to expand and strengthen the local organizations. The first recruiting drive for these "resident local organizers" was conducted in July 1961. The National Organizational Committee asked the prefectural federations to recommend candidates. The criteria for recommendation included the following: —They must not be tied to specific Diet members or prefectural assemblymen. —They must be impartial candidates who have both received the recommendation of the chairman of the prefectural federation and been reviewed by the prefectural federation executive committee. —They must have received a college degree or the equivalent and must be thirty-five years of age or younger. —They must have passed an essay examination prepared by party headquarters.

Each prefecture could recommend two candidates. No more than fifty of them would be selected to enroll in the party's Institute of Politics, where they would undergo a two-month training course followed by the headquarters staff hiring examination. No tuition would be charged for the course, and they would receive a monthly grant of ¥10,000. Once their training was completed, the appointees were generally to be attached to their native prefectures. (Soshiki joho 79 [January 1, 1963], cited in Kokumin seiji nenkan 1962:596-97) In this way, fifty-two people were recommended and twenty-eight accepted for enrollment in the third regular session of the institute. They spent six hours a day between September 15 and October 16 listening to lectures and then entered into practical training and observation in the field. A graduation ceremony was held on November 10. Twenty-seven of the graduates took up positions at party headquarters and then were posted to their native prefecture's party federation on January 10,1962. In addition, five members of the first and second graduating classes of the Institute of Politics, who had been working on the staffs of prefectural federations, were

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formally assigned positions as resident local organizers. T h e action program of 1962 said, "Measures will be taken to assure that resident local organizers will not be utilized as office assistants devoted exclusively to work inside the staff offices but will be used as true local organizers." (Kokumin seiji nenkan 1962:588) In 1962 a fourth session of the Institute of Politics was initiated in order to train twenty-eight more organizers. T h e term lasted from March 20 to April 28. Even if everyone had been posted, the prefectural federations of Yamagata, Tochigi, Saitama, Kanagawa, Mie, Gifu, Shiga, Kyoto, Hyogo, Yamaguchi, Shimane, Kagawa, and Oita would still have been without an organizer. According to a list dated January 1964, fifty-two people had been posted to thirty-six prefectural federations. Most of them were in their twenties and thirties. Thirty-eight of them were college or j u n i o r college graduates. Two were women. Chiba and Fukuoka prefectures had three organizers, but Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, Tochigi, Oita, Mie, Kagawa, and Kagoshima had none. (Ohara and Yokoyama 1965:144-45) What could the locally based organizers be expected to accomplish? T h e prefectural federations were consortia rent with factional conflict and personal feuding among Diet members and local assemblymen. Party headquarters was able to exercise almost n o control over them. T h e future and the income of resident local organizers were both extremely uncertain. Although the system was said to be based on the agency system of the British Conservative Party (Soshiki joho 100 [September 20, 1966]), the conditions that would allow it to have a practical effect did not exist at that time. Instead, it was the personal kdenkai that maintained the local influence of the LDP. The Koenkai Kdenkai-like activities date back to the prewar years. But the permanently organized koenkai of LDP candidates began to attract attention about the time of the 1958 general election. T h e kdenkai of JSP candidates became noticeable during the i960 general election. By the time of the 1963 local elections, local assemblymen were also establishing them. T h e LDP had begun to strengthen its local organization to counter the advance of the JSP, but even before any concrete results could be seen legislative candidates began putting their greatest effort into strengthening their personal electoral bases. To the extent that the koenkai functioned simply as stopgap measures to fortify what remained of traditional social relations and counteract the growth of the floating vote, they were destined over the long term to decline as mass society expanded. Over the short term, however, and to the extent that n o alternative mechanisms for mobi-

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lizing the vote existed, their activities would become more intense. We can call these "fortification-oriented kdenkai." In contrast, "development-oriented kdenkai" cut into the electoral bases of competing candidates by channeling public works construction projects to local regions and thereby gaining the support of voters. Even though their activities promoted the expansion of mass society, to the extent that the local region did not industrialize heavily and did not experience hyperurbanization, they strengthened a candidate's electoral base in the region. T h e functions of the two types of kdenkai contradicted each other, and quite a few kdenkai actually performed both functions. T h e important thing was that they were able to gather votes. LDP party headquarters was unable to suppress the growth of the kdenkai, whose activities were expanding at the expense of its effort to strengthen local organization. T h e n the party hit upon the idea of incorporating the koenkai into the local organizational structure. Its action program of January 1961 stated that, "because at present the membership of koenkai nationwide exceeds 10 million, we shall consider ways of converting these latent party members into registered party members." (Asahi shinbun, January 1, 1961) T h e Miki Commission report of October 1963 suggested that "as a transitional measure . . . the leading members of a koenkai and at least five hundred [others] shall register with the local branch and be asked to cooperate positively in party activities." But were Diet members really going to hand over to the prefectural federations their koenkai membership rosters, which were the creation of their money and sweat? Kdenkai activities intensified. In 1968 the koenkai of one Diet member from the Hokuriku region was reported to have liaison offices in all of the cities and counties in his electoral district and branches in all of its towns and villages. In each branch, positions such as secretary general, Executive Council chairman, and PARC chairman were created that were identical to those at party headquarters. They were staffed by local influential residents. In locales with only a few members, every member had a title of some kind. These officers had a firm grip on the membership in the district. T h e y paid close attention to even such minor details as which household had received a bride or whose son was reaching voting age, and they constantly updated and expanded the koenkai membership roster. Predictions of the vote based on these rosters were said to be extremely accurate. Kdenkai members were invited, in return, to participate in sightseeing bus tours of Tokyo conducted every spring and autumn. T h e y would arrive in Tokyo early in the morning and be taken first to the private residence of the Diet member, who shook hands with each of them and j o i n e d them for breakfast. T h e r e were approximately 60,000 members at the time. T h e koenkai of one Diet member from the Tokai region placed great emphasis on " P A R C "

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activities—that is, o n consolidating petitions a n d using the i n f l u e n c e o f their Diet m e m b e r to pressure the central a n d local g o v e r n m e n t s to approve them. Seven full-time staff m e m b e r s were in c h a r g e o f these activities. E a c h was assigned a particular district w h e r e they were to continually d e t e r m i n e the n e e d s o f the constituency. In 1968 they even b e g a n to work o n a local d e v e l o p m e n t plan f o r e a c h precinct. (Asahi S h i n b u n Seijibu 1968:200-201) A c c o r d i n g to a survey o f g e n e r a l elections by the Federation f o r C l e a n Elections (Komei Senkyo R e n m e i ) , 8 p e r c e n t o f the p e o p l e voting f o r the L D P in the 1967 g e n e r a l election were koenkai members. This p e r c e n t a g e increased to 12 p e r c e n t in 1969, 13 p e r c e n t in 1972, a n d 20 p e r c e n t in 1976. (See Table 48.) Factionalization T h e personal koenkai were i n c o r p o r a t e d into the factional alignments at the center. T h e rank-and-file Diet m e m b e r s obtained m o r e than m e r e assistance in political f u n d i n g f r o m the faction " b o s s . " T h e y were able to e x p l o i t the i n f l u e n c e o f the boss a n d fellow faction m e m b e r s in c h a n n e l i n g subsidies a n d o t h e r rewards o f the pork barrel apparatus to their constituencies. T h e factions turned into a kind o f mutual aid society f o r Diet members, w h o n e e d e d to satisfy the localized interests o f their respective constituencies. T h e h e l p o f the faction boss was also n e e d e d f o r a candidate to gain official party sponsorship a n d f o r c a m p a i g n speeches. T h e faction bosses, o n their part, c o m p e t e d in r e s p o n d i n g to the n e e d s o f rank-and-file m e m bers in o r d e r to maintain a n d e x p a n d the strength o f their respective factions. Factionalization was thus driven by n e e d s at b o t h ends. In the N o v e m b e r 1963 g e n e r a l election, the Ikeda faction reportedly obtained party sponsorship f o r 56 o f its 60 candidates; the Sato faction, 65 o f its 70; the K o n o faction, 56 o f 66; the O n o faction, 42 o f 49; and the Miki faction, 52 o f 58. (Yomiuri shinbun, N o v e m b e r 11,1963) Candidates u n a b l e to obtain party sponsorship ran without it, a n d 12 o f t h e m were elected. Party president Ikeda was criticized d u r i n g this election f o r having favored his own faction's candidates over those o f o t h e r factions d u r i n g a national campaign tour. D u r i n g his stop in A o m o r i Prefecture, h e m e n t i o n e d only 2 o f the 4 L D P candidates r u n n i n g in the prefecture. In Toyama he visited the stronghold o f C a n d i d a t e " A " a n d m a d e a speech in support o f C a n d i d a t e " B , " p r o m p t i n g C a n d i d a t e " A " to storm into Ikeda's r o o m a n d berate him. It was said that these events contributed to his difficult battle in the party presidential election the following year. ( S o n o d a 1966: 53-54) In this m a n n e r , the intra-LDP factional conflicts at the center a n d their counterparts at the district level b e c a m e intertwined, intensifying factional infighting. O n e indicator o f the trend was the fact that Representatives af-

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filiated with a particular faction tended to be elected only from different electoral districts. Whenever two or more LDP Representatives ran in a single district, each would affiliate with a different faction. If anything, this tendency deepened over time. In the 1958 general election, in 102 of the country's 117 electoral districts where the LDP elected multiple candidates, the factional affiliations of all the elected Representatives differed. T h e 56 Kishi faction Representatives were elected from 46 different districts; the 40 of the Sato faction, from 36 districts; the 38 of the Ikeda faction, from 32 districts; the 22 of the Ishii faction, from 22 districts; the 44 of the O n o faction, from 38 districts; and the 36 members of the Kono faction, from 35 districts. T h e situation during the i960 general election was virtually identical. According to calculations based on the roster of factions as of late 1980, the 57 members of the Suzuki faction were elected from 56 of the 130 districts nationwide; the 60 members of the Tanaka faction, from 60 districts; the 47 members of the Fukuda faction from 46 districts; the 43 members of the Nakasone faction from 43 districts; and the 31 members of the Komoto faction from 31 districts. In other words, only the Suzuki and Fukuda factions elected more than 1 Representative from a single electoral district. These were in the Ibaragi Third District and the Chiba Third District in Chiba, both large, five-member districts that elected 4 LDP Representatives. (Asahi nenkan 1981: 236-39, 243) In sum, the consolidation and strengthening of the LDP's local organization did not succeed. Instead, the personal koenkai evolved, competed, and aligned with the central factions. Factional infighting grew even more severe with the addition of the energy generated by conflicts in the districts. T h e LDP became a "faction- and kdenkai-based mass party," adapting to the expansion of mass society through the personal koenkai, an institution that, ironically, went against the grain of the party's plan to modernize its organization. The Etsuzankai T h e best-known personal koenkai was Tanaka Kakuei's Etsuzankai, based in the Niigata Third District. Tanaka had money but no electoral base during the 1946 general election. A "parachute candidate" who mobilized people associated with the wartime Riken Industry Corporation to campaign for him, he ended up losing with 36,040 votes. H e subsequently established a branch of the Tanaka Construction Company in the Third District. Employees of the firm campaigned for him in the 1947 general election, in which he achieved his first election victory, coming in third with 39,043 votes. In the 1949 general election he declared his candidacy from the jail cell where he was confined on charges stemming from the coal industry nationaliza-

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tion scandal. Upon his release, he hurried back to Niigata, where the campaign period had already opened. He won, placing second with 42,536 votes. He came in first in 1952 with 62,788 votes. Tanaka's jiban began to stabilize around this time. Etsuzankai branches were first formed in precincts between 1951 and 1953. According to the testimony of old Etsuzankai members, it was around 1952 that Tanaka—who was Executive Council chairman of the Liberal Party at the time—first began to achieve financial stability. This was the time when the battle over hydroelectric development on the Tadami River was reaching its climax in the central political world. Tanaka's jiban was located in the agricultural villages and remote mountainous areas on the periphery of Echigo where fierce landlord-tenant disputes frequently erupted before the war. After the war, Japan Farmers' Union branches were formed in the towns and villages. They became the moving force behind the land reform. But once the land reform was completed and the rural villages regained their stability, the Farmers' Union lost its influence. (Masumi 1985: 255-58) To a farmer who had just obtained his own land to till, immediate and accessible benefits were much more attractive than a vision of socialism in the future. Tanaka provided these benefits. He brought roads, bridges, tunnels, harbors, railways, reclaimed land, and a variety of other public works projects to his home district, thereby providing the farmer with jobs and conveniences and expanding his own popularity. The village influential who had until then supported the Farmers' Union and the Socialist Party gradually transferred their loyalty to the Etsuzankai. A case in point is Takahashi Torao of northern Uonuma County. Takahashi, who assumed the office of president in the Koide Agricultural Cooperative following his resignation from the Imperial Palace Police immediately after surrender in 1945, had devoted himself to the revitalization of the money-losing cooperative and had gained the confidence of the townspeople. The influence of the Farmers' Union was very strong in the cooperative. Takahashi was thus seen as a progressive. Factional infighting broke out in the Farmers' Union during the 1959 prefectural assembly election. As a result, a faction led by Miyake Seichi, the JSP (right-wing) Representative from the district, supported Takahashi as a candidate in the local race. The Koide Etsuzankai, concerned that it had no assemblymen representing Koide, also backed Takahashi. He came in first, with a vote of 10,106. Although Koide was the hub of northern Uonuma County, its unfavorable political affiliations meant that development in the area had lagged since the Meiji period. As Takahashi hustled to arrange for the construction of a road to facilitate smoother movement of automobiles and tractors in the county, he found that he had no choice but to engage Tanaka's help. Miyake, although quite famous nationally, simply could not deliver. Taka-

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hashi joined the Etsuzankai prior to the 1963 prefectural assembly election. A large number of people from the Miyake faction followed him. Tanaka's influence spread from the local farmers to the leading townsmen of Nagaoka, an old castle-town, and Sanjo, a city noted for its cutlery industry. The leading townsmen of these cities were members of the Shunjukai and the Daiwakai. The former was an organization of supporters of Watari Shiro, an incumbent of the Liberal Party, and the latter of Ono Ichiro, also associated with the Liberals. Both the Watari and Ono families were old and noted in the region. They had looked upon Tanaka as an outsider but, confronted with Tanaka's impressive rise at the center and the might of the Etsuzankai pork barrel network, they were won over. Lobbying, they came to agree, was most effective when channeled through Mejiro, the location of Tanaka's Tokyo residence. The mayors of Mishima County also pinned their hopes on Tanaka. In October 1950 Tanaka was named chairman (later president) of Nagaoka Railways. The Nagaoka Railway line was the main artery of Mishima County. It was also one of five major private railways nationally facing severe financial difficulties. Tanaka arranged a loan from the Japan Development Bank, which he used to rebuild the company, thereby winning the trust and appreciation of the county. He also selected mayors of the towns and villages of the county for the Nagaoka Railway board of directors, lined up agricultural cooperative presidents and other leading local figures, and prepared a "command structure" for his election campaigns. Mishima County was thereby incorporated into his jiban. But the vote he received in Nagaoka City was still small. Although he came in first in the Third District as a whole in the i960 general election, in Nagaoka he was fifth, with just over 7,100 votes. (It was not until he received 25,500 votes in the 1972 general election that he finished in first place.) With the assistance of the Tokyu Corporation's Goto Keita and Osano Kenji of Kokusai Kogyo, Tanaka merged Chuetsu Automobiles of Sanjo and Tochio Railways of Nagaoka in October i960 to create the Echigo Transportation Company. He became its chairman, putting virtually the entire private transportation system of central Echigo in his purview. In March of the following year, he was also installed as chairman of Niigata Transportation of Niigata City. Local Development The Etsuzankai was not a kdenkai that rescued a traditional electoral base being weakened by industrialization and urbanization. Rather, it attracted new voters and actively cut into jiban of other candidates by promoting industrialization and urbanization. In other words, it was a developmentoriented kdenkai that promoted the trend toward mass society. The organizational strengthening of the Etsuzankai began to make head-

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way around i960. Tanaka had become busy with the political world at the center and had little time left to visit his local constituency. His ability to channel public works construction projects to the local constituency, however, had increased. The general headquarters of the Etsuzankai was the secretarial section located in the offices of Echigo Transportation in Nagaoka City. According to Honma Koichi, the top aide of the local constituency: At about the same time that Echigo Transportation was started, a secretarial section was established to oversee the Etsuzankai as a whole. Earlier, key leaders in areas like southern Uonuma County, Kashiwazaki City, and Kamo City held the association together. The precincts acted independently, never as a unit. This was fine since Tanaka had time to spare and could make the rounds of the precincts without worrying about his schedule. But as Tanaka gained power in the center, it became more difficult for him to get to the Third District. Someone had to coordinate his schedule and determine how he might best spend his precious time. By that time, the amount of paper work had increased, and the secretarial section was born naturally. (Niigata Nipposha 1983:189-90)

With the secretarial section at the apex, communication councils were formed in the cities and counties. Tanaka's chief aide in Tokyo, Yamada Taiji, served as the conduit between the communication councils and Tanaka. According to the southern Uonuma County Etsuzankai president (also a prefectural assemblyman): Yamada combed the district carefully but not in any sense efficiently. Then, without one side or the other specifically taking the lead, a lobbying network was formed that linked precinct, town, and county. First, the precinct would present its priority items for the year in writing to the town communications council, where they would be sorted and collated. We would sort and collate them again at the county level and arrange them in order of priority. Then we would have Yamada conduct an on-site survey of only the highest priority items. This system was completed in 1965. Mejiro was no longer inundated with individual petitions, the projects in a region were no longer unbalanced, and things began to run very smoothly. (Niigata Nipposha 1983:192-93)

Right after Tanaka was installed as finance minister in 1962, the "Etsuzankai audit" system emerged. Yamada would come to the Third District, accept petitions from the various precinct Etsuzankai, and then "note the particulars." Association members would give highest priority to lobbying for disaster prevention measures and road improvements. Many precinct contractors participated. An Etsuzankai Youth Division was established in Muikamachi in southern Uonuma County around 1958, followed by a county communications council in 1962. Once the youth division system was completed, several older graduates of the Muikamachi Youth Division were placed, one after the other, in the municipal assemblies of the area. An All-Etsuzankai Youth

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Division was formed in August 1969. Its leader, Sakurai Shin, left the association in 1977 to become a Representative. In August 1968 an All-Etsuzankai Women's Division was set up. In this way, the Etsuzankai developed into a pyramid that extended from mayors and local assemblymen to municipal district chiefs, land improvement association directors, agricultural cooperative presidents, and even PTA officers. T h e geographical area where the development of the Etsuzankai organization lagged most was Tanaka's own Kashiwazaki City and Kariwa County. Because Tanaka so completely dominated the LDP party branch there, he felt that creating an Etsuzankai as a separate entity would amount to piling one structure on top of another. People associated with O n o or Watari could not even be selected as officers in a branch. But an Etsuzankai was established even here in 1969 because Murayama Tatsuo, a former Finance Ministry official in the Maeo faction, was elected for the first time in 1963 and his support was increasing, while people associated with O n o were gradually making their presence felt in the LDP branch. Thus, the Etsuzankai became a kdenkai that spanned the entire Third District. As of 1983, there were 317 municipal-level branches. Directives from headquarters in Echigo Transportation would reach the grass roots through these organizational channels. Membership numbered 95,000. T h e Etsuzankai did not limit themselves to lobbying and related activates. They were involved in all aspects of everyday life including births, weddings, festivals, and especially funerals. T h e r e was a regulation that when an association officer died, a wreath was to be presented to his family; when a member or someone in a member's family died, the gift was a large candle. These were delivered in the name of Tanaka Kakuei as soon as headquarters was notified by the precinct office. A large congratulatory card signed by Tanaka was sent for member weddings and eighty-eighth birthdays. Assistance was also provided in finding j o b s and mediating marriages. "Votes captured with these two," noted the president of the Northern Etsuzankai located in Teradomari, Mishima County, "absolutely will not drift away, and the parents, in particular, will support Tanaka for ten and even twenty years." It was said that the Etsuzankai specialty, the "pilgrimage to Mejiro," began around 1951-52. (But Tanaka bought part of his land in Mejirodai in 1953.) With an itinerary spanning three days and two nights, groups would depart from Niigata on an overnight train, take a bath and eat breakfast at an inn in Tokyo the following morning, and then visit Mejiro on a Kokusai Kogyo bus. Tanaka would serve them tea and pass out sweets. After that, the group typically toured the Diet building and the Imperial Palace and took in a musical at the Kokusai Theater in Asakusa. If there was time to spare, they might also go to the resort areas of Enoshima, Atami, and Izu. It was not just his own firms that benefited from the development b o o m

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that Tanaka brought about. Local construction contractors as a group received hefty profits. For the contractors, who were prevented by the heavy winter season snows from expanding their operations, the public works projects that Tanaka funneled into Niigata—and Niigata Prefecture was in the lowest ranks nationally in terms of projects like roads, bridges, riparian works—were wonderful blessings. Contractors began to appear at Tanaka's campaign offices from around the time of the 1963 general election. The relationship between the construction contractors and Tanaka grew even stronger in the late 1960s as contractors joined the Etsuzankai in droves. A hierarchical ranking evolved naturally. At the top were the Uekigumi of Kashiwazaki and the Yamazaki-gimi and Oishi-gwwi of Nagaoka. They had a major voice in the public works projects that were brought into the Third District—heavy snowfall disaster prevention projects, trunk route and branch construction work on National Highway No. 17, renovations of elementary and middle schools. When there were points of dissatisfaction, these would be shunted aside with the words, "Traffic control has already been completed in Mejiro." Election campaigns began to revolve around contractors, who would put their employees in campaign cars and were quick to respond to requests: "In the Etsuzankai as well, contractors began more and more to become branch chiefs. They had influence as bosses at work, and they delivered votes. They would come up [as candidates] for [Etsuzankai] offices because of this While their relationships were more impersonal than those of the old-time notables, the contractors did come to play similar roles. As Etsuzankai branch chiefs, contractors would sit at the top of village society, and Etsuzankai members would be selected for the village assemblies." (Niigata Nipposha 1983:254) A certain amount of unrest emerged in the Etsuzankai after Tanaka was investigated for his money ties and indicted in the Lockheed scandal. The number of public works projects decreased (although one reason for this was slower economic growth), creating conflict and division among the contractors. As the average age of Etsuzankai officers and members increased, a generational shift began to occur. Nevertheless, the numerous public works construction projects that Tanaka introduced brought benefits to the area, and these favors will not be forgotten. In the minds of the local population, Tanaka will remain a legendary figure. (See Niigata Nipposha 1983; Asahi Shinbunsha Niigata Shikyoku 1982.)

JOURNALISM, POLICY, AND PERSONALITY The Mass Media The circulation of daily newspapers in 1955 was 22.7 million and in 1975, 40.5 million. The number of people per copy decreased significantly from

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3.96 to 2.74. At the same time, a tremendous variety and number of weekly and monthly publications appeared. People read them voraciously in waiting rooms and on commuter trains. In contrast, the dissemination ratio of radios was 73.8 percent in 1955 and peaked at 81.3 percent in 1958, but declined rapidly thereafter to 57.2 percent in i960 and 45.8 percent in 1961. It was television that exhibited the most stunning growth. T h e number of sets increased from 160,000 units in 1955, with a dissemination ratio of 0.9 percent, to 1,822,000 units and a ratio of 75.6 percent in 1965. A peak of 2,282,000 units and a ratio of 94.8 percent was reached in 1970. T h e population had been absorbed into the mass media networks. Television overwhelmed radio. Early in the 1960s the "printed/linguistic symbol system" was replaced by a "visual image symbol system." T h e diffusion rate of television was just about one-third (33.2 percent) in i960. Because it was still something of a novelty, its visual images undoubtedly left a strong imprint. If television had not transmitted images of the Diet and its perimeter into Japanese living rooms, the security treaty crisis of i960 would probably not have been as explosive. T h e r e were two T V panel discussions featuring LDP head Kishi Nobusuke and JSP leaders Asanuma Inejiro and Nishio Suehiro in May. (The first round of the national television debates between U.S. presidential candidates Kennedy and Nixon was not broadcast until September 26.) O n October 12 Asanuma was assassinated at Hibiya Auditorium, right in front of the television cameras. O n November 12 Ikeda, Nishio, and Eda Saburo appeared in a simultaneous television and radio debate sponsored by the three major parties. In November of the following year, "Talking with the Prime Minister" began, an interview series that has b e c o m e a regular feature in Japanese television programming ever since. (Nihon Seiji Gakkai 1977:303-15) At the heart of the mass media network are the journalists who gather, edit, and c o m m e n t on the news. T h e y send implicit signals to the readers, listeners, and viewers gathered around the periphery of the network, subtly guiding them. Public opinion formed through this process can exhibit a power great e n o u g h to shake the foundation of rule. T h e biggest medium in the era of high economic growth in Japan was television, which excited the passions of the viewers with its images. T h e viewers, atomized and alienated in the midst of mass society, were often swept away in the deluge of information. In elections, the mobilization capacity of policy symbols and the leadership image of the political parties gradually increased. T h e traditional electoral bases and the ability of local power holders to gather votes declined in tandem. Consequently, a candidate's victory or defeat should have b e c o m e less a matter of his personal jiban and more a matter of the image and symbols of the political party with which he was affiliated. That is, koenkai activities and factionalization should have begun to wane, giving rise to the

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conditions that would make it both necessary and possible for the party organization to modernize and local organizations to consolidate. Policy Symbols Higher purposes do count when capturing or and defending a government. Even though policies may be a minor element in comparison to factional bargaining, allocating posts, and securing political funds, they are nevertheless necessary. When Hatoyama launched his programs of "Japan-Soviet negotiations" and "Constitutional revision" in September 1952, it was for the purpose of challenging his arch-rival Prime Minister Yoshida. In 1957 Kishi held out the promise of a "new era of Japan-U.S. relations" and "revision of the security treaty" as he sought an administration of his own. Even when policies are mere expedients, they become binding on their advocates once they are publicly proclaimed. Journalism expands the need for policies. Journalists demand opinions and policies from leaders. Skilled, secret manipulation and the force of personality are the hallmarks of an old-style politician. Faced with journalists who insist on insightful opinions and clear policies, political leaders present reporters with plans and viewpoints that they have acquired one way or another. They worry about the reactions of the journalists who report and comment on these plans and viewpoints and attempt to manipulate the media. Leaders hoping to head the government gather brain trusts to create flagship policies. Ikeda's "income doubling" was the banner he raised to challenge Kishi. The idea came to him while he was engaged in an exchange over drinks with a group of newspaper reporters. But assisting him was a group of economists led by Shimomura Osamu. The centerpiece of the "fight for tomorrow" that Sato released immediately before his battle with Ikeda in the 1964 party presidential election was the product of a team modeled on the Kennedy Machine led by Sankei shinbun reporter Kusuda Minoru. Similarly, the book that Tanaka published immediately before the 1972 presidential election, Remodeling theJapanese Archipelago, was written after his aides Fumoto Kuniaki (a former Kyodo News Agency reporter) and Hayasaka Shigezo (a Tokyo taimuzu reporter), and others, had reviewed documents prepared by the LDP PARC and commissions attached to MITI. Although Miki did not have one particular research group that he depended on, he had a number of learned friends and frequently solicited their advice. Soon after he became prime minister, he released a proposal for "political purification." Before such proposals could be put into effect, they had to be discussed and approved by party organs, pass through the stage of legislation drafting by the ministries involved, and get through Diet deliberations. Many of

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them evaporated or lost their teeth along the way. But these are not mere "desktop" programs lacking in substance. Standing before their political rivals, the media, and public opinion, leaders had to show that they could succeed in their missions, or at least had to appear to be doing so. Policy research of this kind is conducted not by PARC but by individuals close to the leaders or by their brain trusts. Although they might use opposition party ideas, they are never the product of policy debates between the governing and opposition parties. The Leadership Image The mass media transmit images of leaders. For example, the reporter Watanabe comments: When I was a reporter on the "Yoshida beat" and covering Yoshida the person, newspaper reporters were prohibited from even appearing at places where Yoshida might see them. But when I was frequenting the Hatoyama residence in Otowa as the reporter covering Hatoyama, I was free to enter and leave the drawing room, dining room, and kitchen as I pleased and it was not even difficult to talk face to face with Hatoyama in his second-floor study. Hatoyama himself said, "The hallway of my house is like a highway." He opened up his personal residence, and it seemed as though it was only in his bedroom that he could maintain any privacy. Perhaps it was this open personality that made the "Hatoyama boom" possible. (Watanabe 1967:96-97)

The real Hatoyama was strong-willed, hot-tempered, and likely to take things out on his aides. But before the public, he was a flawless actor. Or rather, he was a born extrovert who was honest and good-natured with a good family background. Watanabe says that Kishi possessed a sense of humor and humanism and was the kind of person one could take a liking to. To Watanabe's knowledge, Kishi never once took his temper out on his aides and close acquaintances. Even when he had been involved in a heated debate in his office, his usual smile would return the moment he stepped out the door. But he was unable to generate any mass popularity, probably because he was unable to shake the reputation of being a shrewd bureaucrat and because he was haunted by his reputation as a member of the Tojo cabinet and a war criminal. His proposal to revise the security treaty revived these memories. During this period, leaders had to project a bearing that made them appear to have the superior personality and insight befitting a leader. Choreographers and producers became necessary. Ikeda's "low posture" was a brilliant example. Although he himself loved to drink and make merry, was endowed with a fighting spirit, and therefore was probably not suited by personality to a low posture, he listened to the advice of people close to him and held back his natural inclinations. Mimicking Hatoyama, he released

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two pledges immediately after he became prime minister—he would not play golf and he would not go to a teahouse where geisha were present. On weekends, he secluded himself in Hakone to work on his garden. During his campaign tours, he avoided issues like foreign policy and defense and instead publicized the income doubling policy, using the prices of tomatoes and cabbages, or mackerel and sardines. (Memorizing numbers was one of his special talents.) Sato wrote, "Even though I am not particularly important, it may be difficult to approach me because I have a dark complexion and a piercing gaze. . . . I have admonished myself to do something about this." Sato struggled hard to increase his popularity. But even though he exhibited tremendous skill in factional personnel matters, he was not good at handling the mass media. He simply could not capture the fancy of the general public. His razor-sharp looks could not project the range of emotional expression that appealed to the sensibilities of the masses. Even though his speeches and greetings were well prepared, they lacked personality and focus and were abstract. Perhaps the incident at the time of his redrement when he roared like a tiger as he chased away a group of reporters was an explosion of his pent-up rage against the mass media that had been so cool toward him. Ono Ban-chan—who inspired Sato to say that he "wanted people to call me Ei-chan"—was a boss who rose through the ranks from a position in the Seiyukai extraparliamentary organization. His trademarks were round eyes and a red nose, which gave him a man-in-the-street sort of familiarity. In contrast, Kono's eyes were noticeably out of alignment. His deep voice and hardboiled language were easy on the ears of the masses. He had a sharp instinct and tremendous stamina. Because he was by nature incapable of keeping a secret, he did not generate suspicion in others. In contrast to Sato, who caused reporters to moan that "there are no scoops in Awaji [where Sato's residence was located]," Ono and Kono were veritable leak machines when it came to political information. Perhaps one of the secrets of the popularity of the Ikeda cabinet lay in Ikeda's ability to make good use of party politicians of this kind. Sato lost points on this score as well. Tanaka's popularity was explosive. Emerging from a remote village in Echigo, making a name for himself in the contracting business, and then becoming prime minister, he seemed like the shogun Toyotomi Hideyoshi. He possessed a knack for numbers and a force of personality that one would expect in someone with the nickname "computerized bulldozer." As minister of posts and telecommunications, he recited a naniwabushi ballad on the radio. He sang a popular song at an International Monetary Fund reception in Washington. He was always cheerful, generous, and accommodating. Not only politicians but also bureaucrats and newspaper reporters were drawn to him. "Clean Miki" followed Tanaka. Some commentators claimed

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he was a "reptile," but nonetheless he was a major senior Representative whose career spanned forty years, who was calling for the modernization of the party organization. Miki diligently prepared his speeches himself. He liked above all else to appear on television. A minor current politician, he attacked opposition within the party by using the power of the mass media. The Cabinet Approval Rate The number that comes closest to an accurate measurement of the popularity of a cabinet is the cabinet approval rate. When a cabinet's approval rate drops to a minimum level, a new prime minister will appear and, under normal circumstances, the rate of approval will rise. Popularity is, in many ways, like fate. When a person's popularity fails to rise, it is not necessarily because he is incompetent. He may be unlucky. When a person's popularity does rise, it is not necessarily because he is particularly skilled but perhaps because he is lucky. Eventually, however, fate turns its back. Even though a prime minister exhibits no unseemly behavior, the cabinet approval rate declines to a minimum level. T h e n his political rivals challenge him, just as he challenged them earlier. According to the monthly opinion polls taken by the Jiji News Service, the Tanaka cabinet received the highest cabinet approval rate since i960, or 61 percent, in October 1972 immediately following its inauguration. Tanaka also received the lowest rate—10.6 percent in November 1974. T h e rate of decline was particularly steep among freelance professionals and people in managerial positions, and among college and higher school graduates. When the cabinet approval rate fell to a low point, JSP, CGP, andJCP supporters defected almost completely, and LDP support decreased to nearly one-third of its highest point. It is not clear to what extent cabinet popularity needed to be taken into account or to what extent it was linked to the act of voting. Even though it was clear that policy symbols and leadership images were increasingly influential, one could not say that they were ever the decisive factor in an election. Why? One explanation was that, because mass society had not yet developed completely, locally oriented consciousness and traditional apathy persisted. But even had mass society fully arrived, under normal circumstances voters would have been inundated by a tidal wave of information of all sorts. Even though they were exposed to political information, they would not necessarily have acted on the basis of it. Mass society is most likely to engender urban apathy and passivity. Thus, perhaps the LDP leaders did not need to be sensitive to the reaction of the mass media. Perhaps no one watched "Talking with the Prime Minister." Perhaps it was not particularly significant that the program was being watched. But no, this was not the way they reacted. If it was being

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broadcast, then someone must be watching and there might be something to it. It was this "might be" that was public opinion. Public opinion was the possibility of a response from unspecified message receivers. It gave rise to a blackmail effect. Politicians considered public opinion polls as portents of vox populi and concerned themselves with measures to influence and counter the mass media.

SEVEN

The Bureaucracy and Interest Groups

THE LOBBYING NETWORK

The Central Ministries and the LDP The LDP and the central ministries and agencies—simply, "ministries" hereafter—were knit tightly together. The annual drafting of the government budget is a case in point. Each ministry would prepare an initial outline of the next fiscal year's budget in July. It would formally approve a ministry budget request late in August and submit it to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in September. After trimming and consolidating these, MOF would reveal its "internal release" to the ministries in November. They would then respond with their first and second "revival demands." The final draft budget would be approved by the cabinet around New Year's. Needless to say, the ministries negotiated with and pressured MOF throughout the budget drafting process. But another body was involved as well: the LDP PARC. Beginning in September, the ministries' bureau chiefs and other responsible officials would make pilgrimages to the relevant PARC subcommittees to explain their budget and the laws and ordinances involved. The subcommittee members would present their own requests and revisions in turn. To a ministry official, seeking the approval of an influential Representative presented an opportunity to demonstrate his skill. Subcommittee drafts were sent to the PARC Deliberation Commission (Seichokai Shingikai) for consolidation. Vice ministers and bureau chiefs were called in, questions were asked, and the subcommittees would back the ministries that they oversaw. In other words, PARC's deliberation commission played a MOF-like role. Once the budget received the approval of PARC, the Executive Council was no problem. During the first and second revival demands, an intense battle would develop between MOF, on the one hand, and the ministries and the 251

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LDP, on the other. A party budget policy that listed items but contained no concrete figures would emerge from this process. It would be approved by the party and passed on to the government in late December, at virtually the same time that the cabinet's approval was given to the government's draft budget. The second Kishi cabinet's minister of construction, Murakami Isamu, described this scene of gallant—and ultimately successful—negotiations between cabinet ministers, which began at 10:00 in the evening and continued until 8:15 the following morning: T h e Ministry of Construction's five-year landslide and flood control plan was carried over to the cabinet ministers' negotiations. PARC chairman Funada and the two PARC vice chairmen, Yamanaka and Bo, were also present. They were there to listen silendy, to see whose a r g u m e n t — M O F ' s or the ministry in question's—was justified. Since they would end up sitting there all night, we felt sorry, but then, it was their j o b . Negotiations between the minister of finance and me were scheduled for 8:00 P.M., but negotiations between Finance Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Fujiyama, w h o went in before me, took a long time. I was forced to wait about two hours. Resolved that I would " n o t give an inch," I marched into the finance minister's office prepared to continue straight through till morning. T h e exchanges between Finance Minister Sato and me were so intense that it seemed as if sparks were flying. "Murakami-ion, we at M O F have already added ¥20 billion to the ¥320 billion that the Economic Planning Agency said would be sufficient. Now you come along and say that you can't cut a single penny from the ¥400 billion [in your original request]. Don't be ridiculous!" "I'm being ridiculous, am I? We painstakingly surveyed, one by one, the size of every single river and the height and length of every single breakwater in the country to come up with the plan. T h e total was ¥400 billion. We therefore absolutely cannot cut anything anywhere. You know, you really should stop speaking o n the basis of hunches." We continued to cross swords thereafter, unable to make any p r o g r e s s . . . . W h e n I glanced toward the window the sun was shining. T h e night had passed, and it was now 8:15. Since we had started at 10:00 the previous evening, we had been going at it for more than ten hours. At that point, I thought to myself, all I have to do is not give in and not leave and the matter will then be taken up at the Three Party Officers' negotiations. If that happens, the party will be represented by Vice President O n o , Secretary General Kawashima, Executive Council chairman Ishii, and PARC chairman Funada. Since O n o and Funada are members of my own O n o faction and I have been friends with both Kawashima and Ishii for some time, there will be no way that I can lose. Thinking thus, I allowed the minister-level negotiations to break down and left the matter to the T h r e e Party Officers. As a result, a budget of ¥400 billion was approved in accord with my strategy. (Murakami 1981:120-22)

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The central ministries are groups of specialists who have accumulated information and experience and who maintain contacts with relevant interest groups. Although interested Diet members could intervene at any point in the process and PARC might demand revisions, it was rather difficult to escape the initial policy framework established by this group. As a rule, instead of guiding the central ministries, the LDP relied on them. They provided consistency and coherence in the face of the LDP's disruption of the formulation and implementation process stemming from the infighting among its factions and Diet members. Nevertheless, in the 1960s people began to say, "PARC is GHQ," or "The central bureaucracy is the LDP PARC." The disruptive capacity of the LDP had risen, and it was apparently beginning to lead the central ministries. MOF vice minister Nagaoka Minoru says, "I left the budget bureau in 1967 and returned in 1972. What surprised me was the change in the balance of power between politics and administration during those five years." ("Kanryotachi no zasetsu," Yomiuri shinbun, July 6, 1982) What were the reasons for this change? First, LDP wielders of power began to unveil showcase programs of their own. The ministries concerned would tailor specific programs and legislation to fit the programs of influential politicians even if those programs appeared unviable to professional bureaucrats. The ministries did not necessarily consider this accommodation undesirable. On the contrary, because the ministries were perennially competing with one another, such programs represented an excellent opportunity to expand their jurisdiction. Showcase programs were in fact often the product of covert maneuvering by a ministry. The ministries, in cahoots with the power wielders, were thereby able to overcome the constraints imposed on them by the MOF budget bureau. The solidarity of the central ministries, with MOF in the lead, began to crack. Second, as LDP rule stretched beyond a decade, party politicians began to accumulate experience and knowledge of their own. They were now able to hold their own against the specialist bureaucrats and the ex-bureaucrat Diet members. By participating for several years in PARC subcommittees and Diet standing committees, by bustling about within their own lobbying apparatuses, and by progressing to the point where they could qualify as members of the road zoku, the agriculture-and-forestry zoku, or some other zoku, they absorbed considerable specialized knowledge and experience. That expertise might have differed in content from that of the specialist bureaucrat or the ex-bureaucrat Diet member, but it was in no way inferior. In fact, it might have been more practical. How and by whom were adjustments made when a piece of legislation promoted by an alliance of seasoned Diet members, central ministries, and involved interest groups clashed with another piece of legislation promoted

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by a similar alliance? These disputes were handled by PARC, not by MOF. If the matter could not be resolved successfully there, the party leadership was the last resort. The question was then whether the party leadership had the requisite capacity for adjustment and control. The accumulating budget deficit of the late 1970s suggests that this kind of competition was most difficult to keep in check. Third, even when the LDP had a stable majority, there were frequently factions in opposition lurking within it, waiting for a bill to be shelved. The reaction to a unilateral deliberation and forced passage could also be severe. Ensuring that a piece of legislation was passed under such conditions required the dexterity and skill of a veteran Diet member. Misawa Shigeo notes: A large number of revisions are adopted in the Diet through cooperation between the two parties [LDP and J S P ] during the deliberation process. The rigid confrontation between the two parties that has made such a strong impression on people's minds since the twenty-fourth Diet (December 1 9 5 5 June 1956) is an exceptional phenomenon, seen only when the LDP comes out with a hard-line position on issues like the Constitution, foreign policy, education, and security (and, in particular, labor unions). One must not forget that the deliberation on most legislation is conducted on a "friendly basis" and that revisions of bills are achieved through compromises between the two parties. It is in cases where a piece of legislation has a weak ideological coloring—and, in particular, legislation where the interests of a specific industry (for instance, the Environmental Sanitation Law) or legislation that has a bearing on the interests of a region (development laws)—that compromises are established. Rigid confrontation occurs when pressure from the "hawks" within the two parties sways the party executive and induces it to enter into a confrontation. It was therefore natural that a "quiet Diet" was maintained during the Ikeda era, when party leadership was in the hands of the "flexible line factions." (Nihon Seiji Gakkai 1967:25-27)

The ministries were extremely busy while the Diet was in session. According to a report on the 1968 regular session (150 days) prepared by the Administrative Management Agency, approximately 1,400 documents were prepared by the ministries for the use of the prime minister in interpellations, as well as 3,000 for the use of cabinet ministers. Several dozen copies had to be prepared in each case. In one ministry, of the seventy-six working days between March and May, the staff worked straight through the night on eleven, past midnight on eight, and until midnight on twenty-four. Every bureaucratic agency had its own "Diet detail," consisting of several staff members whose primary task was to receive "summaries of questions" from opposition party Diet members before a session. Using these, section chiefs and assistant section chiefs would write "model answers," which they passed on to the minister. Whenever a minister had to respond to an interpella-

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tion, a bureau chief was at his side to provide assistance as the "government representative." Section chiefs and assistant section chiefs sat behind him as "explainers" and "attendants." A government representative made an average of eleven appearances before the Diet, but fifty or more appearances were not uncommon. One bureau chief was at the Diet on forty-six of the seventy-six working days. (Asahi Shinbun 1980:148) When the near-parity Diets came into being in the 1970s, tough tactics on the part of the steering committee zoku and the Diet countermeasures committee became all the more necessary. The exhausted vice ministers, bureau chiefs, and section chiefs in the interpellation details could only stand back and watch as politicians scurried about the waiting rooms of the Diet and the Diet office building. In July 1975 they saw a bill to raise liquor and tobacco prices and a bill to raise postal rates shelved because they could not pass the House of Councilors, where there was near parity. This was the first time that a MOF bill had ever been shelved. The batdefield had moved to the Diet building, where the starring roles were taken up by veteran Diet members. The Ladder of Promotion With the passage of the National Public Service Law in 1947, a new competitive examination system replaced the prewar higher civil service examination system. The current high-level staff examination, the "dragon gate" through which career bureaucrats must pass, was adopted in the 1960s. According to Muramatsu Michio's 1976-77 survey of 251 bureaucrats above the rank of section chief (including vice ministers and bureau chiefs), in eight ministries and agencies (the Economic Planning Agency, MOF, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, MITI, the Labor Ministry, the Ministry of Construction, and the Local Autonomy Agency), the average age of recruitment was twenty-four. Priority was given to new college graduates. Some 66.5 percent were graduates of faculties of law, and 83.6 percent were graduates of Tokyo University. Transfers occur approximately every two years. A person was promoted to subsection chief at the age of twenty-eight or twenty-nine, section chief at forty-two, and bureau chief at fifty. Section chief was the final post achievable by personnel who were not on the elite track. In ministries where the total number of section chief posts was low relative to the number of elite track bureaucrats, simply advancing as far as section chief represented a tremendous success. Ministries like the Local Autonomy Ministry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the Ministry of Construction maintain the prerogative of posting officials "on loan" to local governments. The Local Autonomy Ministry normally has roughly 40 percent of its career bureaucrats on loan. The ratio of bureaucrats with a rank of section chief or above to total

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personnel was particularly high in the Local Autonomy Ministry (11.8 percent) and the Economic Planning Agency (10.1 percent). It was 4 - 5 percent in the other six ministries. A single section chief supervised approximately twenty-four people. The percentage of bureau chiefs within a ministry was 1.8 percent in the Economic Planning Agency, 1.6 percent in the Local Autonomy Ministry, and 0.3-0.7 percent in the other ministries. Career track bureaucrats would begin to retire at the age of forty-one or forty-two. The secretariats of the ministries oversee the personnel affairs of all employees even after retirement. They exhibit concern for the elite track employees in particular, long after they retire. Those who remained would gradually rise in rank. It was the custom for all remaining members of a given class to retire when one of them finally became vice minister. Not every class, however, had one of its members become vice minister. The retirees typically found reemployment in public enterprises, the partners with whom they worked while on active duty. These enterprises normally benefited from employing former career bureaucrats. In 1975, 176 people of bureau chief rank or above "descended from heaven" to public enterprises. They included 47 from MOF (also 13 from the National Tax Administration Agency), 21 from the Ministry of Construction, 16 from the Ministry of Transportation, 15 from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and 13 from MITI. (Kokumin seiji nenkan 1977:345) "Descents from heaven" decreased during the 1970s. In addition, ex-bureaucrats sometimes became Diet members. During the 1970s, in particular, a great number of bureaucrats began to aspire to enter the political world out of frustration at the reduction of the role of the bureaucrat. ("Kanryotachi no zasetsu," Yomiuri shinbun, July 7, 1982) The Race to Get Ahead It was inevitable that horror stories circulated about the race to get ahead. Nonetheless, Representative Kakizawa Koji, formerly of MOF, says: In the bureaucratic world, it is said that the members of a "ministry-entering class" get along well with one another, and I believe that this is the case. If they are members of the same class, they are friends. But at the same time, they are one another's biggest rivals. They probably get along well in spite of this fact because the promotion structure is not a "weeding out on the basis of ability." Those who remain never give the "loser treatment" to those who, from the outside, appear "defeated and weeded out." If anything, they tend to send these people oflF with great tenderness, and those who leave make their exit quiedy. Furthermore, relatively well endowed posts in public enterprises are prepared for those who leave. . . . Class members who have left are not ignored, and friendships remain strong. It is impossible to tell whether this friendship is genuine or artificial.

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When politics was being rocked by the fierce fight between Miki and Fukuda (the " D u m p Miki" movement [of 1976]), at one point Assistant Cabinet Secretary Kaifu Toshiki had a puzzled look on his face when he spoke to Kakizawa in the small cafeteria attached to the Prime Minister's Residence: "Kakizawa, why is it that batdes for the vice ministership do not occur in M O F and other bureaucratic agencies?" "That's not an easy question to answer, but opinion does seem to converge of its own accord that in our class it's going to be so-and-so who will reach the top." "There's a convergence of opinion?" "Well, I guess there are times when opinion doesn't converge, but in the end everyone acts as if it h a d . . . . " " H m m m . I guess in the world of the bureaucrat it is a contest among gendemen after all." (Kakizawa 1 9 7 7 : 8 9 - 9 1 )

A rare instance where conflict over a personnel decision came out in the open occurred in filling the MITI vice ministership in 1963. MITI vice minister Matsuo Kinzo was scheduled to retire and "descend from heaven" to the position of executive director of Nihon Kokan. As his successor, he recommended enterprise bureau chief Sahashi Shigeru. Sahashi was the central figure in the ministry's "nationalist faction" and had been putting every effort into getting the Diet to pass the Special Measures Law for the Promotion of Designated Industries. From the standpoint of rank, the position should have gone to Sahashi, and the ministry considered his promotion a matter of course. But on July 1 MITI minister Fukuda Hajime said during a press conference, "MITI is a body for serving the public and the fact that Sahashi has a bad reputation within industry means that he is not an appropriate choice. I believe that Imai [Yoshie] would be good. I intend to make Imai the next vice minister." Sahashi's "bad reputation" refers to allegations that he had driven Maruzen Oil Company president Wada Kanji out of office during a reorganization. Whether the action was justified or some kind of hidden motive was involved, Sahashi had become the target of criticism, and Fukuda used the incident as his reason for passing over Sahashi. But the real reason could have been that Sahashi was thought to be linked to Sato. Fukuda was a member of the Ono faction and was named MITI minister on the recommendation of his faction. Ono disliked Sato and was close to Prime Minister Ikeda. Imai, Fukuda's choice, was the central personality in the ministry's "internationalist faction" and a member of the same class as Sahashi. He had gained MITI minister Ikeda's confidence with his support for liberalization during his tenure as textiles bureau chief (1958-61). From there, he had become international trade bureau chief and then left the ministry to become director of the Patent Agency. Normally, this would have meant that he would not return to MITI and therefore would not have become vice minister. (Johnson 1982:248-54)

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We were members of the same class. We were buddies who used to enjoy ourselves together when we were younger. Then fifteen years went by. In 1954, at virtually the same time, Imai became chief of the ministry secretariat's general affairs section and I became chief of its secretarial section. This was our first opportunity in years to work closely together. We were both some years past forty and at an age where we were somewhat stuffy. When the section chiefs of the secretariat were having a drink at the Kasumi Dorm, one of MITI's lodging facilities, Imai, who was sitting next to me, said all of a sudden, "You're forging a conspiracy and trying to take over MITI. I will fight you to the bitter end." I felt as if I had received an unexpected declaration of war. At first, I thought he must be drunk, that he was the type who was prone to say funny things. But he appeared to be serious, so I said, "If you're going to say such stupid things and pick a fight with me, I'm ready to take you on at any time. But I'll have you know that I am not trying to compete with you. In fact, I am willing to quit the bureaucracy at any time." It was then that I first learned that Imai felt such intense rivalry toward me. But I honesdy had no desire to compete with him . . . because I felt that Imai was a better man than m e . . . . Now that I think about it, when I was promoted to department head and then deputy bureau chief, it was a year after he was. And when I became bureau chief, it was also a year behind him. I was, in effect, chasing h i m . . . . I can see how someone with a sense of rivalry could be overcome by an unbearable feeling of insecurity. Personnel movements are apt to create situations of this kind. From around the time [we] became bureau chiefs, whenever we would meet over drinks, he would say things like, "You and I are the two stars [of our class]. The others don't c o u n t . . . . I may very well reach the vice ministership first." Or else he would start talking in a self-deprecating or challenging or nostalgic manner. . . . When he drank, he got very drunk, and when he was drunk, he got verbose and said the same thing a million times, over and over again.. . . It got to the point where I didn't feel like saying more than " I see, I see." I began to focus solely on finding ways to escape his drunken babbles, since it was all very unpleasant.. . . During this period I was called in by Vice Minister Matsuo and was asked my opinion about the selection of the next vice minister. "My successor will come from the Class of 1937. Isn't there some way that you and Imai could take turns at the j o b of vice minister?" "If by some chance I were to become vice minister, I would refuse to pass it on to Imai. I do not understand why he and I have to rotate the vice ministership.... In any event, this is a matter that you must d e c i d e . . . . " Several months passed, and I was again called in by Vice Minister Matsuo regarding the matter. " I have arranged for you to succeed me." . . . My recollection is that I only said, " I see." I do not recall a single instance in the past where I have thanked a superior for appointing me to a

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position that was widely considered a good promotion. Perhaps I seem arrogant and insolent to a superior. But in my opinion, it was just one more transfer.... Around March or April, Fujii [Heigo] of the Yawata Steel Corporation came by my office with an uncharacteristically agitated look on his face. "I just met with bzn-chan [Ono Banboku]. Ban-chan was saying . . . that [you are] going to join the Sato faction and run for o f f i c e . . . . " Mr. O n o was terribly angry. No matter how much Fujii tried to explain that it could not be true, he would not l i s t e n . . . . While O n o and I were not particularly close, there was no doubt that we knew each other well. I would meet him two or three times a year. Our relationship was one where I would appeal to him about the budget and have him provide s u p p o r t . . . . Two or three months before this incident with Fujii, the two of us [Ono and Sahashi] had a two- or three-hour chat in a room at the back of Ono's office. Our exchange went something like this: " G o into politics, Sahashi. Run, with me backing you. If you run in the Gifu First District, you are sure to get elected." "Sir, at the moment I have no desire whatsoever to enter politics, and if I did, I would enter in the Gifu Second District, where I was born." "We are of course talking about after you become vice minister and quit the bureaucracy. But do think about it carefully." Even taking this exchange into consideration, there was no basis whatsoever for the claim that I was entering politics or was part of the Sato faction. Aside from the fact that my house was near Sato's, there was no particular difference between [my relationship with Sato] and with Ikeda, Miki, or Ono It seems that the vice minister and the ministry staff negotiated with Minister Fukuda repeatedly following the minister's indication of disapproval. The minister's announcement occurred without warning in the midst of these negotiations. Even the mild-mannered Vice Minister Matsuo flew into a rage. The vice minister was angry, first of all, because of the way the announcement was made. And second, because even though the minister had expressed disapproval of Sahashi during the parleys between the minister and the vice minister, not once did he bring up a specific name as an appropriate alternative. The situation had deteriorated to the point where the minister was colliding head on with the vice minister. I believe that a minister's and a vice minister's opinion not coinciding over an issue of this kind is in no way unusual in a ministry. The minister has the authority to make appointments. The vice minister is the highest aide. These things do not become public issues because a compromise is reached during the process of discussion between the minister and vice minister. This happens because either the minister or the vice minister backs down, even if he is unhappy, so that at least the appearance of a congruence of opinion is engineered. If Fukuda had brought up Imai as the alternative candidate to Sahashi and

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had held out to the bitter end, Matsuo might have backed down. But Fukuda ignored this procedure... . The staff, however, resisted the minister. . . . Minister Fukuda eventually rescinded his earlier statement, and it was decided that the issue would be studied under a new minister following a cabinet reorganization. Although it at first appeared to be a victory for the staff, in Ikeda's cabinet reorganization the economic ministers were retained. The tables were suddenly turned. Matsuo resigned, Imai became vice minister, and I was transferred to the position of Patent Agency director. Matsuo probably could not get himself to continue serving under a minister whom he had defied.. .. When Matsuo was about to retire, I was called in and was told the following story. "Imai promised to resign voluntarily after a year and pass the post amicably over to you. He says that he will observe the ritual of making a formal promise in the presence of you and a number of senior ministry alumni. Will you settle for that?" "I will attend no such ritual.. . . But if it makes you feel any better, you're welcome to hold it on your own." To Matsuo, I must have appeared an awful guy, someone who not only would not say a single word of thanks and would not even praise him for a job well done. (Sahashi 1967:259-68)

Sahashi became vice minister fifteen months later, when Sakurauchi of the Kono faction became the minister of MITI. The Role of the Bureaucrat When high-level bureaucrats were asked who had the most influence on the decision-making process, 47.3 percent of the higher-echelon officials surveyed (such as vice ministers and bureau chiefs) answered that it was the political parties and 45.5 percent answered that it was bureaucrats. Among middle-echelon officials (section chiefs), 44.9 percent named the political parties and 40.3 percent, the bureaucrats. When fifty LDP Diet members were asked the same question, 68.0 percent said it was the political parties and 30.0 percent, the bureaucrats. Among fifty-one opposition party Diet members surveyed, 43.1 percent named the political parties and 41.2 percent, the bureaucrats. A small number of people named the mass media, the zaikai, big business, pressure groups, or citizens' movements. No one named the courts, labor unions, academics and intellectuals, or religious groups. (Muramatsu 1981:27) One question was worded as follows: "The items listed below can be considered the functions of a government bureaucracy. Which do you feel the bureaucracy spends the most time on? Choose just one." The responses were distributed as follows:

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1. "Reconciling conflicts of interest and opinion in society." (After a political decision has been made, balancing interests through administrative initiative, using delegated legislative authority, administrative discretion, and so on.) 37.1 percent. 2. "Conducting studies and analyses relating to important issues, thereby discharging the basic tasks that support political decision-making." 36.3 percent. 3. "Changing society's structure and institutions in a favorable direction." (This indicates a sense of self-importance, a belief that only the bureaucracy is the guardian of the national interest and that politics that can be dispensed with.) 14.7 percent. 4. "Reflecting the opinion of the Diet and the political parties in formulating and implementing policy." (A passive approach in which the bureaucracy is the handmaiden of politics.) 10.0 percent. Answers 1 and 2 each accounted for more than one-third; combined, they add up to approximately 75 percent. The proportion of 1 and 2 responses among forty-six LDP Diet members also totaled 75 percent and among fortyeight opposition party Diet members, 71 percent. Diet members thus seem to be in agreement with the bureaucrats on this point. (Muramatsu 1981: 102-6) High-level bureaucrats interact with political parties and interest groups. Contact with the political parties occurred once every two to three weeks in the eight ministries, but the frequency of contacts with interest groups varied considerably among the ministries. The Local Autonomy Ministry, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and Ministry of Construction met most frequendy, about two times a week. The Ministry of Finance met less than once a month. As for contact with local government representatives (chief executives, staff members, assemblymen, etc.), 58 percent responded "frequendy" in the Local Autonomy Ministry, 35 percent in the Ministry of Construction, and 20 percent in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. By contrast, 56 percent in the Ministry of Finance chose "almost never," 42 percent in the Economic Planning Agency, and 21 percent in the Ministry of Health and Welfare. When asked about the merits of "contacts with Diet members," 75.3 percent chose "one can explain the purpose of policies and request cooperation; (it contributes to mutual understanding)" and 10.4 percent chose "it contributes to the reconciliation of complex interests." For the merits of "contacts with interest groups," 45.8 percent chose "one can explain the purpose of policies and request cooperation," 28.7 percent chose "it is possible to obtain necessary information," and 21.5 percent chose "it contributes to the reconciliation of complex interests." On the other hand, for the demerits of contacts with Diet members, 42.6 percent chose "there is the

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danger that orderly administration will be disrupted," 25.9 percent chose "there are few demerits," and 15.9 percent chose "the independence of administrative judgment is lost." For the demerits of contacts with interest groups, 30.3 percent chose "there are few demerits," 25.1 percent chose "only powerful groups are given consideration," 20.7 percent chose "there is a danger that policy administration will become fragmented and lose its long-term perspective," and 13.9 percent chose "the independence of administrative judgment is lost." (Responses of 10 percent or less are not listed.) (Muramatsu 1981:220) In short, contacts with political parties had the merit of generating understanding and cooperation, but they created fears that the administrative process would be disrupted. Contacts with pressure groups had the merit of generating understanding and cooperation, providing information, and consolidating interests, but they created a fear of bias in favor of powerful groups and a fear that policy administration would become fragmented. Subsidy Administration In order to carry out its policies, the government dispenses subsidies to local governments, private sector corporations, and individuals. These subsidies are almost entirely for public works projects. In fiscal 1951 subsidies were ¥122.6 billion, or 15.5 percent of the total budget. With the beginning of the Korean War in 1950, the economy quickly turned around. Subsidies directed, in the name of economic recovery, into the improvement of railroads, roads, and harbors increased rapidly; by 1954 they constituted 29.2 percent of the total budget. Between 1955 (when rapid economic growth began) and 1977, there was a 19-fold increase (in nominal terms) in the government's general account expenditures (or io-fold in real terms, since the wholesale price index rose approximately 180 percent). Subsidies increased 24-fold. The proportion of total general account expenditures for subsidies was 26 to 27 percent in 1959-64, exceeded 30 percent in 1971, and grew to 33 percent in 1975. In the special account, expenditures increased 2.1-fold by 1965, 5.1-fold by 1970, and 17.2-fold by 1977; subsidies increased 3.1-fold, 7.2-fold, and 22.9-fold. In 1977 there were 2,166 subsidy items totaling ¥9.5664 trillion in general account expenditures (33.5 percent of the total) and 457 subsidy items totaling ¥8.0852 trillion (14.3 percent of the total) in special account expenditures. With the addition of the subsidies from government-affiliated agencies, the total is ¥18.3621 trillion—that is, 65 percent of the total general account expenditures were paid out in the form of subsidies. (Imamura 1978:57-62) Each ministry has jurisdiction over and operates several dozen to several hundred different subsidies. Each subsidy is parceled out among the min-

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istry's bureaus, departments, sections, w o r k i n g groups, a n d subsections, w h e r e they are administered. T h e staff m e m b e r s in c h a r g e draft b u d g e t requests every year a c c o r d i n g to the type a n d composition o f the subsidies. A f t e r b e i n g reviewed by various levels within the ministry, these are incorporated into the ministry's b u d g e t request a n d submitted to MOF. Following the negotiations between the ministries a n d the M O F b u d g e t bureau, b u d g e t a m o u n t s are released internally a n d revival d e m a n d s are submitted. T h e size o f subsidies is an indicator o f the power o f the administering bureaus, departments, sections, work groups, a n d subsections. T h e m o r e subsidies obtained, the larger the bailiwick. Staff m e m b e r s are therefore attuned to the government's budget-drafting policies (e.g., showcase policies like i n c o m e d o u b l i n g or r e m o d e l i n g the archipelago) and, with justifications based o n these " h i g h e r purposes," they devote themselves to exp a n d i n g existing subsidy p r o g r a m s a n d establishing new ones. Centralized Decentralization and Local Centralization T h e ministry units that oversee a policy area p r e p a r e implementation plans a n d criteria f o r allocating the subsidies over w h i c h they have gained control. L o c a l g o v e r n m e n t s a n d the g r o u p s that receive these subsidies prepare a t r e m e n d o u s v o l u m e of p l a n n i n g d o c u m e n t s based o n these, which they in turn submit to the administering units. T h e p l a n n i n g d o c u m e n t s are reviewed by the administering units to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r they fit the stipulations a n d criteria o f the implementation plans. T h e administering units can d e m a n d revisions o f the p l a n n i n g d o c u m e n t s b e f o r e subsidies are disbursed. Most subsidies are granted to local governments. M o r e than 70 p e r c e n t o f local g o v e r n m e n t revenue c o m e s f r o m three categories: " l o c a l taxes," set nationally u n d e r the Local Tax Law; " l o c a l finance equalization grants," including locally transferred taxes; a n d "national treasury disbursements" (kokko shishutsu kin). In 1975 they a m o u n t e d to 31.3 percent, 18.2 percent, a n d 22.3 percent, respectively. L o c a l finance equalization grants are transfers to local g o v e r n m e n t s f r o m the national government's special account; national treasury disbursements are direct subsidies f r o m the national gove r n m e n t . Given this revenue structure, it is virtually impossible for a local g o v e r n m e n t to operate without relying o n subsidies. T h e level o f depend e n c e o n subsidies is particularly high in rural areas because o f the extremely low proportion o f locally collected tax revenues. (Imamura 1978: 64-67) B e g i n n i n g in the mid-1950s, the v o l u m e o f subsidies b e g a n to increase dramatically, a n d representatives o f local governments b e g a n to besiege the central ministries a n d the Diet. T h e s e tendencies c o n t i n u e d , a n d the de-

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pendence of local governments deepened. Local officials—governors and mayors, local government staff members, local assemblymen—began to devote the bulk of their time to lobbying activities. O n e mayor from the Tohoku region said: Subsidies e n c o u r a g e the atomization o f the center. . . . If the central bureaucratic agencies that provide subsidies consolidated into a single unit, we would n o t have any trouble. N o t only are they divided into ministries, but also each ministry a n d agency is subdivided into bureaus, sections, work groups, and subsections—this is clearly an atomization of the center. . . . It forces us to make the rounds hither a n d thither asking for assistance. Furthermore, we are r e q u i r e d — w i t h o u t missing anything a n d before anyone e l s e — t o pick u p such information as what kinds of subsidies are b e i n g established, whose jurisdiction they fall under, which individual officials are in charge o f them, a n d what sort o f connections are required in soliciting them. We have an awful time training municipal staff employees to b e c o m e familiar with these sorts of things. (Imamura 1978:14)

T h e same mayor said, "Subsidies encourage local centralization." That is, it is the j o b of the mayor to obtain a wide range of subsidies whose purposes and attached conditions vary and then implement them in an integrated manner within the context of a municipality's or special administrative district's annual plan. He or she must first seek the consent and participation of townspeople or district residents and then organize them. Discussions must be held with agricultural cooperatives, land improvement districts, and numerous other groups within a municipality. A n organizational structure for implementing the project must be created. T h e mayor also has to get the town assembly to cooperate in gaining the subsidies and to approve the municipal budget before implementing the subsidy project. (Imamura

i978:i5) Lobbying Activities Lobbying networks were propelled by the competition among ministries and interest groups. T h e administering units and interest groups worked in collusion. T h e administering unit demanded subsidies on behalf of one or more interest groups and directed lobbying delegations to the upper echelons of the ministry, MOF, and the Diet office building. T h e lobbying delegations deployed their troops under the guidance of bureaucrats, thereby helping to expand the jurisdiction of the administering bureaucratic unit. By "scattering" subsidies, the administering unit ensnared the receiving groups in its jurisdiction, and by being ensnared, the recipient groups successfully "sponged" subsidies. A lobbying network was thus a kind of "scattering" and "sponging" arrangement. Diet representatives intervened aggressively in the activities of the lob-

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bying networks. T h e y — i n particular the road-building zoku and the agriculture and forestry zoku—cultivate intraparty influence and electoral bases by helping to distribute subsidies. Ministry and agency officials got themselves elected to the Diet by using the interest groups that they assisted as an electoral base; because o f their status as "old boys" in their former ministries, they were able to lend their g o o d offices in obtaining subsidies. T h e factions acted as mutual assistance associations of Diet members who were each influential on different issues. A lobbying apparatus was thus a tripartite coalition for distributing subsidies, which brought together the power of the central ministries, the needs o f the c o n c e r n e d interest groups, and the electoral bases of the LDP Diet members. T h e opposition parties were excluded. Although J S P Diet members were also members o f standing committees and influenced Diet deliberations and lobbying activities, they were weak in their capacity to lead lobbying groups and capture special benefits and privileges on behalf of local districts. Lobbying groups did not attempt to rely on them. T h e opposition parties, in a sense, lacked the prerequisites for corruption. A mayor from eastern J a p a n described the operation of a lobbying apparatus: Our petitioning is [directed at] both the prefecture and the national government. If the prefecture does not give us an okay, then nothing happens. Even if the prefecture does give its okay, we would get the rug pulled out from under us if we were to leave things at that. Among the recent examples where we felt we did a good j o b was the matter of obtaining night-use equipment for the city athletic field [a Ministry of Education subsidy]. The allocation for the prefecture from the ministry was enough to supply four sets. My city was removed [from the list of potential recipient cities] during the prefectural board of education's screening. I approached the prefectural government and got my city included as an alternate candidate when the prefecture reported the names of four places to the Ministry of Education. What happened next was the most critical. I went directly to Tokyo and made the following request to a Representative with whom I am on close terms: "We made it as far as alternate. Please, you must give it one more push." We thereby succeeded in staging an "upset." After all is said and done, it is having a politician put in his word that is the secret of success.... Now, when you have a Representative work on your behalf, you must work with someone who has influence over that particular agency. If it's the Ministry of Construction, it's got to be a Diet member known as a road and highway zoku, and if it's the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, it's got to be one who is known as a comprehensive agricultural policy zoku.. . . The Representative from the district that I'm close to is a road zoku. When we take a petition involving the Ministry of Health and Welfare or the Ministry of Transportation to him, he goes to a Representative in the same faction who is strong in that

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particular field. T h e deal is probably that h e will take u p requests related to roads in r e t u r n . . . . T h e ministries e x p e c t us to bring a Representative into the picture. In fact, they in fact allocate assignments a m o n g the m a y o r s — t h i s particular g r o u p of mayors is assigned to Representative A , and so o n . . . . To be honest, detailed, minuscule subsidies are a bother. W h e n it c o m e s to subsidized projects, n o matter how small the project there is a set o f procedures that have to be followed. . . . T h e National Association of City Mayors o n c e submitted examples where the personnel expenses required in complying with the procedures e x c e e d e d [the subsidy] and d e m a n d e d reforms. You should have seen the ministries get angry at that one! But we cannot press too hard. We are, after all, in their care. (Hirose 1981:160-65) Another example is provided by a mayor from western Japan: W h e n I t h u m b e d through my diary for the year 1979, [I f o u n d that] I had traveled to Tokyo twenty-three times between the period when the national b u d g e t was being prepared [the e n d o f the year] and the period w h e n detailed allocations are made [June and July]. I visited the prefectural government office two or three times a month. My days b e g a n and e n d e d with petitioning. A f t e r all, around ¥6 billion o f the city's ¥8 billion b u d g e t involves projects with subsidies f r o m the national and prefectural governments. It makes m e m a d w h e n I think that this is so in spite of the fact that local selfg o v e r n m e n t is guaranteed in the Constitution. At times like this, I have to remind myself that this is i n d e e d " a world of centralization." If f o r c e d to c o m m e n t o n e way or the other, I am the type w h o attaches greater importance to b u r e a u c r a t s . . . . I frequent the offices o f deputy section chiefs, subsection chiefs, and leaders o f task forces. Both they and I want the subsidy project to succeed. T h e y get the sense that "this man is enthusiastic and looks like h e will succeed," and their attitude changes. T h e y sometimes give m e tips to "ask this particular sensei and have him make a call to the bureau chief." W h e n I g o to Tokyo and have some free time, I make it a point to make the rounds of the bureaucratic offices even if I d o not have any particular piece of business. Even if that person is not in, I leave a small, inexpensive p r e s e n t — s o m e pickled fish eggs, for i n s t a n c e — o n his desk along with my business card. Every year in December, when the b u d g e t negotiations between the ministries and M O F begin, we organize a lobbying delegation at the town h a l l . . . . I'm not sure exactly when this started, but at present all the ministries have their own large and elaborate cheering squads. T h e Ministry of Construction even has separate cheering squads for roads, parks, rivers, and sewers and water l i n e s — t h a t is, for each o f its bureaus. . . . Rallies, visits to the Diet members' office building, petitioning M O F — we all walk about clamorously in accord with a prearranged schedule. At rallies, it is best to make yourself conspicuous by, for instance, speaking passionately.... A l t h o u g h this might sound odd, obtaining subsidies that o n e doesn't want

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is also one of the obligations that one has toward a ministry. T h e Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry added an "office expense subsidy" to its Reorganization of Rice Paddy Utilization program beginning in 1980. All that reaches us is an extremely small amount of money, and it costs us more [than we get from the subsidy item] to go through the application process and submit an expense report. W h e n we said that this was more trouble than it was worth and that we didn't want [the subsidy], we were scolded by the prefecture's agriculture department. If a municipality were to turn down a new subsidy, the prestige of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry would be shattered. (Hirose 1981:157-58,162-65) During elections, there is the added burden of lining up votes. The mayor from western Japan adds: " T h e ministries are quite blunt. When you make the rounds petitioning, there are times when they will pull out of a drawer a municipality-by-municipality breakdown of the votes that candidates received and look at the figures as they meet with you." (Hirose 1978:33-36) T h e request-processing machinery of a Representative works something like this: O n the third floor of the Diet members' office building Number Two is the office of Mr. A. T h e biggest steel cabinet in the office holds the petition files. T h e r e are a total of forty-two files—thirty for each of the six cities and twentyfour towns and villages in his election district along with twelve ministry and agency files (Finance, Education, Health and Welfare, Agriculture and Forestry, International Trade and Industry, Transportation, Posts and Telecommunications, Labor, Local Autonomy, National Land, and Defense). Let us open the file for "Village B." First, we find a "Summary Table of Requests." Each time there is a request for lobbying assistance from Village B, it is noted on this table. T h e items indicated are: (1) date (when the request was received); (2) petitioners (primarily the village mayor but also the head of the agricultural cooperative); (3) matter being requested; (4) name of ministry and names of bureau, section, subsection, and task force chiefs in charge; (5) developments during negotiations; (6) items communicated to Village B; and (7) remarks. T h e "remarks" column may contain double circles, single circles, and blank spaces. They indicate the importance of the matter to Mr. A. A double circle represents something that Mr. A will take action on and work personally to achieve; no mark represents something that he will go along with but is not concerned about the outcome. Village B is an important electoral base for Mr. A, and a double circle is attached to all eight of the submissions listed in the summary table. Behind the summary table are copies of the requests, project plans, and explanatory documents for each item requested. Let us next open the ministry file "Agriculture and Forestry." T h e agriculture- and forestry-related requests of thirty cities, towns, and villages are filed by b u r e a u — t h a t is, economic affairs bureau, structural improvement bureau, agricultural production bureau, animal husbandry bureau, etc. T h e greatest number are filed under structural improvement, because the bureau is in charge of field and agricultural land improvement. According to Mr. A, the

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ministry files are particularly handy during the final stage of negotiations, where he hears a ministry's or agency's conditions and says, " I will then withdraw Town C's request, and in return [I want] Village D ['s request accepted]." (Adapted from Hirose 1978:160-62)

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT: OVERPOPULATION AND DEPOPULATION

Nodal Development During the Occupation, the prewar Ministry of the Interior (Naimusho) was dissolved and a system was adopted for the direct election of local government heads. These reforms were aimed at reducing the central government's authority over local government. But in the new system prefectural governors and municipal mayors were still treated as "organs of the state." They were made responsible for implementing the tasks that the central government delegated to them and became the recipients of officials on temporary assignment from the various ministries. Each of the ministries tried to expand the range of tasks that they delegated to local governments and to establish new and strengthen existing local field offices and semigovernmental corporations. The Local Autonomy Agency (later, the Local Autonomy Ministry), which inherited a portion of the functions of the old Ministry of the Interior, endeavored to block the encroachments of the central ministries on local government affairs while incorporating local governments into its own bailiwick. The majority opinion in a 1957 report that recommended abolishing the prefectures, establishing a "state" system, and placing these new entities under the supervision of officials selected by the central bureaucracy was undoubtedly the product of a Local Autonomy Ministry still dreaming of resurrecting the old Ministry of the Interior. In the debates over enlarging local administrative units that occurred at this time, the view was consistently expressed that the existing prefectures were too small to be effective administrative units and that popularly elected prefectural governors could not be trusted. Beginning around i960, calls for a nationally uniform large-area administrative system were heard less and less frequently. Instead, the "nodal development method" became the new topic of debate. This method would categorize the regions of the country outside the existing industrial centers according to their level of economic development. "Development nodes" of various sizes would be established in these regions and linked organically by a transportation and communications network in line with existing patterns of regional economic integration. A development node was to serve as a catalyst for economic development throughout the surrounding region as its positive economic impact spilled over into the agriculture and forestry

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sectors on its periphery. Controversy raged over precisely what constituted a "development node" and where the appropriate sites for such nodes were. The National Comprehensive Development Plan approved by the cabinet in the fall of 1962 divided the country into three types of regions according to their degree of development: overpopulated regions (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, Aichi, Osaka, Hyogo, Fukuoka), rationalization regions (Kanto, Tokai, Kinki, Hokuriku), and development regions (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu). Development nodes were classified into two types: industrial development districts and regional development cities. The powers of the central ministries were strengthened during this period. Administrative authority over trunk highways and major rivers, both requiring wide-area coordination, was absorbed by the central ministries in 1964 with a revision of the Roads Act and the passage of the new Rivers Act. Aided by the establishment of an agricultural policy bureau, the local branch offices of the central ministries were also strengthened. And beginning in the mid-1950s, a plethora of special corporations were established: the Japan Housing Corporation, in 1955; the Aichi Waterworks Public Corporation, in 1955; the Japan Highway Public Corporation, in 1956; the Water Resources Public Corporation, in 1962; and the Hanshin Superhighway Corporation, in 1962. Although none of these represented a change in the prefectural government system, each was an incremental extension of the central government's administrative authority. The continuation of this trend meant that local governments, which were already beginning to link up vertically with the individual ministries through the central government tasks that were assigned to them and through subsidy administration, were impelled to lobby the central ministries with even greater fervor. There were thus good reasons why conservative gubernatorial candidates and the LDP unveiled the slogan "A Prefectural Government with Direct Access to the Center" during the 1963 fifth unified local elections. There were also efforts to amalgamate cities, towns, and villages for the sake of nodal development industrialization. In Sendai, Toyama-Takaoka, southern Okayama, and elsewhere, "plans for cities of a million people" and other proposals for massive amalgamations were put forward. Such amalgamations were in fact realized in Kita Kyushu (where five cities merged), eastern Osaka, Iwaki, and Kurashiki. There were also calls for amalgamations of prefectures to eliminate differentials between advanced and backward prefectures—for example, the Tokai Three-Prefecture Comprehensive Plan and the Hannawa (Osaka-Nara-Wakayama) Amalgamation Plan put forward by local business associations like the Chubu Economic Federation and the Kansai Economic Federation. These, however, were never realized. Local governments began to take on the character of a real estate agent

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as they bustled about, wooing factories in the name of regional development. Competing with one another, they prepared pamphlets introducing sites for industrial parks and housing developments, bought and developed land, and dispatched specialist staff members to Tokyo and Osaka to attract firms to locate in the sites. Increases in "population and manufacturing," which would lead to increased revenues, became the barometer of progress in local government. (Nishio Masaru, "Kaso to kamitsu no seiji gyosei," Nihon Seiji Gakkai 1977) With regional development and the arrival of outside firms, agricultural populations decreased, the population of workers and commuters increased, and social relations grew more fluid and diversified. The votegathering capacities of local leaders, neighborhood associations, and hamlet associations—all based on the earlier social structure—declined, and the koenkai of individual candidates grew more active. The newly arrived firms and labor unions performed a new kind of vote-gathering function as transferee assemblymen, assemblymen with ties to the newly arrived corporations, and union-affiliated assemblymen appeared. Conflicts between factions with ties to local firms and those with ties to newly arrived firms, between firm-affiliated factions and union-affiliated factions, and between urban and rural factions were superimposed on the traditional conflicts between factions affiliated with the prewar Seiyukai and the Minseito and the Liberal and the Democratic parties. The Keiyd Industrial Belt What kinds of changes did regional development induce in local politics? Let us look at the example of the Keiyo (Tokyo-Chiba) Industrial Belt. (The following section is based on Ohara and Yokoyama 1965 and Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyujo 1965. See also Masumi 1969:248-59.) The Location of Large Corporations in Rural Areas. During the early 1950s, local governments, plagued by budget deficits, began to acquire funds from the central government under the National Comprehensive Development Law of 1950. They used the funds to build the infrastructure that factories required. They hoped to use the increased enterprise tax income that would be generated by firms locating in the area to solve their budgetary deficits. This activity coincided with a period when large corporations were looking for areas to locate in. The combination of circumstances led to the rapid and extensive expansion of large firms into rural areas. Chiba Prefecture began to pursue a policy of industrialization by attracting outside firms in 1952-53. Tokyo Electric Corporation decided to locate its Chiba power plant on reclaimed land next to a Kawasaki Steel plant that had located there in November 1950. The Asahi Glass Company acquired 300,000 tsubo of land in the Goi-Ichihara District at this time. In addition,

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the prefectural government established, with guidance from the Tokyo regional bureau of international trade and industry (the local arm of MITI), a plan to construct a 2 million tsubo shoreline industrial belt. T h e Mitsui G r o u p took a great interest in the plan; in 1955 it was decided that Maruzen Oil (oil and petrochemicals), Idemitsu Kosan (oil products), Showa D e n k o (chemicals, fertilizers, drugs), Mitsui Engineering and Shipbuilding (shipbuilding and repair), and eleven other companies would locate on land reclaimed by the Mitsui Real Estate Development Company. MITI subsequently began to lay the groundwork for a "Keiyo Coastal Industrial Belt" that would stretch along the shores of Tokyo Bay from the capital to Chiba. With the government's plan as a catalyst, the large firms scheduled to locate in the area organized the Keiyo Industrial Belt Rationalization Deliberation Council in February 1952 and began to work on land reclamation, constructing an industrial water supply system, and various other tasks to prepare the infrastructure that they n e e d e d to move into the area. Toward the end of the year, they established an industrial construction coordinating committee within the Deliberation Council to deal with concrete technical problems. T h e actual reclamation work began in 1958. T h e locating companies came up with the idea of a powerful tripartite coordinating committee involving the national government and the prefecture, which became the "Keiyo Belt Coordinating Committee" in August 1959. T h e committee announced that, first, industrial development planning was " n o t a concern of Chiba Prefecture's industry and economy a l o n e " but instead was just one part of a comprehensive development program for the entire Tokyo Bay region. Second, this plan was but one c o m p o n e n t in a "capital region plan" that had Tokyo Bay as its axis and "aimed to expand the capital area and improve its living environment." Third, the plan would require "the preparation of industrial lots and industrial water supplies, roads, and railways, along with the development of the periphery," and this required funding. Consequently, "appropriate measures on the part of the state" were needed. Fourth, the coordinating committee "would deliberate issues on its own initiative," "suggest these to the government and involved groups," and strive for their realization. T h e chairman of the committee was Tokyo Gas Company vice president Anzai Hiroshi and its two vice chairmen were Kawasaki Steel president Nishiyama Yataro and Mitsui Real Estate Develo p m e n t president Edo Hideo. All of the presidents of the locating firms were included on its thirty-man board of directors. T h e Representatives and Councilors elected from districts in Chiba, along with the director of the Tokyo regional bureau of international trade and industry, the chief of the Economic Planning Agency's comprehensive development bureau, the secretary general of the capital region rationalization committee, and the governor of Tokyo were selected as advisers. T h e governor of Chiba Prefecture,

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the mayor of Chiba City, and the heads of the other local governments affected were designated "special members." In December 1959 a general affairs committee was established as an advisory body to promote the group's immediate objectives: (1) securing water for industrial use, (2) building railways and roads, and (3) reclaiming land and construction. Land reclamation and factory construction began in 1958-59. By the end of 1963 the Keiyo Belt Economic Coordinating Committee had become the largest development association in Japan, with executives from eighty mammoth corporations, The Keiyo Shoreline Railway began operating the following September. As of 1964, 7.48 million tsubo of industrial land had been reclaimed for the shoreline industrial belt. Some 246 firms had relocated, 2.89 million tsubo of nonreclaimed land had been developed for industrial use, and 394 factories had been built. The Locating Firms and the Prefectural Government. What was the impact of the locating firms on local politics? The prefectural agencies involved in regional development were turned into external agents of the corporations. When Governor Shibata Hitoshi and the prefectural agencies put together their industrialization policy in 1952-53, the objective was not to hand the initiative in prefectural government policy making to the incoming firms. Rather, the goal was to expand the independent sources of tax revenue in the prefecture. In 1950 they had little choice but to rely on the mediation of MITI, other central ministries, and locally elected LDP Diet members in competing with Hikari City in Yamaguchi Prefecture to woo Kawasaki Steel. The governments of Chiba Prefecture and Chiba City had no choice but to agree to meet the three demands put forward by Kawasaki Steel as conditions for the firm's move into the prefecture—the securing of electric power, the development of water resources and the laying of industrial water lines, and the construction of a harbor facility capable of handling io,ooo-ton class ships. Nor did they have any choice but to provide land for the plant free of charge and to grant exemptions from enterprise and property taxes for five years following the plant's completion. The prefectural agencies were thus saddled from the very start with the task of securing the funds needed to fulfill these obligations. Therefore, their ability to maintain the initiative against the corporations was in jeopardy from the very beginning. In 1959 a department of development was established inside the prefectural government, which was devoted to providing services for the incoming firms. But it would be an overstatement to say that the prefectural agencies subordinated themselves totally to the locating firms during this period. There were, in fact, some efforts to maintain autonomy. For instance, in 1956 the prefecture called for restructuring the budget as well as increasing producer incomes and prefectural welfare measures. It put forward a program that involved giving these goals clear priority in the budget, modern-

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izing agriculture and forestry, and developing local industrial regions. In June 1957 the prefectural assembly tried to protect its leadership in prefectural administration by establishing a special committee to study the situation. The prefecture revised its Enterprise Attraction Ordinance the same year, removing the enterprise tax exemption. It reduced the minimum size of firms covered under the ordinance from those with fixed capital investments of at least ¥50 million to those with at least ¥30 million, reduced the normal employment level from 300 to 200, and stipulated that the governor must seek the opinion of Chiba Prefecture's corporation attraction committee when offering facilities and promotional subsidies as incentives. In i960 there was a problem with the industrial water supply. The industrial water supply subcommittee of the Keiyo Belt Economic Coordinating Committee agreed in May to postpone a drainage project at Inbanuma until sufficient industrial water could be supplied through the completion of a dam at the upper reaches of the Tone River and other projects. The fourth board of directors meeting in August decided to cancel the Inbanuma drainage work altogether. In September the board members lobbied the prime minister and the heads of the ministries. MITI openly assisted by criticizing Governor Shibata for not pursuing the revision of the drainage plan aggressively enough. The governor, who was nicknamed the "agricultural policy governor," was a former Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MOAF) bureaucrat who relied on the support of assemblymen from rural areas, and he was not about to suddenly abandon the MOAF's drainage plan. In a word, the advocates of industrial development were clashing with the advocates of agricultural development. In response, MOAF proposed an irrigation development public corporation; MITI, an industrial water public corporation; the Ministry of Health and Welfare, a waterworks public corporation; and the Ministry of Construction, a water resources development public corporation. Each ministry refused to defer to the others. The Ikeda cabinet consolidated the plans in April 1961, preparing drafts of a law for the promotion of water resources development along with an enabling act for a water resources development public corporation. It introduced these bills in the Diet in late May. The bills passed the Diet on November 3. MOAF released a second drainage plan that May, which modified the first one. Thus, even as Governor Shibata was dragging his feet, MOAF's plan was being amended at the center because of pressure from the large firms. The governor became an obstacle in the eyes of the incoming firms and the LDP's mainstream factions. In the 1962 gubernatorial race they dropped Shibata and backed former Japan Housing Corporation president Kano Hisaakira. Governor Kano died within three months of taking office. Lieutenant Governor Tomono Taketo, who took his place, completely reorganized the prefectural government's administrative structure. The Development

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Department was removed from the supervision of the governor, and its functions were transferred to a newly formed public corporation with the tide of Development Agency. The prefectural administration was thus transformed into a subsidiary of the big corporations. Nevertheless, a prefectural governor cannot abandon the administration of his prefecture entirely. As ties with the Keiyo Belt Economic Coordinating Committee grew ever more intimate, the people who were negatively affected grew increasingly antagonistic. They could not be ignored. If anything, the prefectural administration became all the more sensitive to them. In January 1964 Governor Tomono announced that priority in the prefectural budget would be given to (1) promoting primary industries, (2) improving the prefecture's network of roads, (3) improving social security facilities, and (4) improving the quality of education and educational personnel. But many people doubted that such a change could be effectively implemented by a prefectural administration that was tied increasingly to the large corporations. The LDP Prefectural Federation. The inaugural convention of the LDP Chiba Prefectural Branch Federation was held in January 1956, a year after the conservative merger. The convention adopted a resolution containing twenty-three items, ranging from the restoration of prefectural budgetary health to programs for agriculture, fisheries, roads, and tourism. The resolution was presented to Governor Shibata, an independent, who was certified a "party friend." The LDP held a total of 49 seats in the prefectural assembly—29 from the old Democratic Party, 14 from the old Liberal Party, and 6 nonaligned. The JSP held 6 seats and the independent Shinsei Club, 7. The LDP was thus the leading party with approximately 80 percent of the assembly's seats. The governor remained noncommittal, however, for several reasons. First, clashes between the old Democratic and Liberal parties continued inside the LDP, and party affairs were in turmoil. Second, since the 1950 gubernatorial election, the Democratic Party had, in coalition with the JSP, aligned with the governor while the Liberal Party, as the opposition, had continually attacked him. Although the LDP held an overwhelming majority of the seats in the prefectural assembly, the local party organization was plagued by internal dissension and lacked vigor. In August 1958, just before the October gubernatorial election, Governor Shibata announced that he would join the party. He intended to win a third term with the backing of the LDP. The LDP did not have to back Shibata, but the party did not have a viable alternative candidate available. There was also the fear that the party might have unraveled had it insisted on running someone else. O n its part, it would have been impossible for the prefectural government to resolve the issues relating to development in the Keiyo Industrial Belt and the riparian works on the Tone River system on its own. Support from the LDP and the central government was required.

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Not only would it have been difficult for Shibata to resolve these issues if he had not joined the LDP; there was even the possibility that he would be forced out of office partway through his term. Therefore, in October, after the governor was elected for a third time, the LDP demanded that industrialization be promoted aggressively and the governor agreed. The proindustrialization group within the LDP prefectural federation grew quite large following the 1959 prefectural assembly election, and a realignment of the prefectural LDP organization ensued. Leading this movement was the prefectural assemblyman Sugano Gisaku. A man with interests in the liquor and food sales businesses, Sugano was the first popularly elected mayor of Yawata Town in 1947. He became a prefectural assemblyman in 1951, the chairman of the standing committee on civil engineering in 1955, chairman of both the prefectural assembly's special committee for the investigation of corporate measures and the prefectural government's committee to attract corporations in 1957, secretary general of the prefectural party federation in 1958, and speaker of the prefectural assembly in i960. As chairman of the special committee for the investigation of corporate measures, he participated in negotiations with the Keiyo Belt Economic Coordinating Committee. Through his participation in surveys of industrial areas like the Keihin (Tokyo-Yokohama), Hanshin (Osaka-Kobe), and Yokkaichi regions, he came to favor the aggressive promotion of the Keiyo Industrial Belt construction program and he befriended Lieutenant Governor Tomono, who was in charge of the prefectural government's industrialization policies at the time. Fifty-one LDP prefectural assemblymen were elected in 1959. They formed a number of conservative groups, which were linked to the LDP factions at the center through locally elected Diet members. The LDP prefectural federation organization was fortified under the leadership of Assemblyman Sugano. A prefectural LDP policy affairs research council had been established at the time of the conservative merger. It was initially nothing more than an organization to provide posts for party officials, but in December 1958 it was reorganized and actually began to perform the function of formulating party policies. In December 1959 the committee decided to press Governor Shibata to complete the construction of the industrial belt. Because these demands were made in the name of the prefectural federation as a whole, it was inevitable that measures against regional disparities, occupational changes, and pollution—all of which had become more acute with industrialization—were also put forward. But the emphasis in the demands was clearly on the promotion of industrialization. During this period, work also began on strengthening the branch organizations, in conjunction with the LDP's overall effort to modernize the party organization. Party headquarters considered Chiba a high-priority model district. Three local organizers were sent to Chiba under the party's

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local organizer program. The three local organizers came to dominate prefectural party affairs, and party membership expanded primarily because of their efforts. They did this by having the chairman of the prefectural federation organizational committee, the secretary general, and other leaders engage in "persuasion visits" with municipal executives and assemblymen and urge them to join the party or establish a branch. Their efforts initially focused on cities like Ichikawa, Chiba, and Funabashi, where the progressive vote had grown rapidly. As of 1964, party branches had been established in fifty-six municipalities (two-thirds of the prefecture's total). Many of these branches consisted of nothing more than a Diet member or candidate's personal kdenkai or an alliance of kdenkai. The prefectural federation intended first to organize a council of support associations and then absorb the kdenkai into the party organization. "Political seminars" for younger party members and "training programs" for local assemblymen were also held. The LDP prefectural federation was not happy with Governor Shibata. Because he was a former MOAF bureaucrat and his support base was in agricultural districts, he tried, within the confines of a limited prefectural budget, to direct attention to agricultural policy even as he pursued the development of industrial land. This two-pronged approach caused delays in coastal land reclamation, coastal railway construction, industrial water supply projects, and other measures demanded by the incoming firms. With the backing of people linked to the old Democratic Party, the governor announced his intention in October 1962 to run for a fourth term, thereby precipitating a split within the LDP. Most bitterly opposed was Assemblyman Sugano, who initially supported Lieutenant Governor Tomono and then declared his own candidacy. A vote of Diet members and prefectural assemblymen resulted in 32 votes for Sugano and 27 votes for Shibata. The perturbed Shibata left the party and reaffirmed his intention to run. Fearful of the consequences of a split within conservative ranks, the prefectural federation had both men withdraw their candidacies and attempted to reconsolidate the party by bringing in former Japan Housing Corporation president Kano Hisaakira as its candidate. But Shibata decided to run with the backing of people associated with the old Democratic Party. The LDP responded by purging nineteen prefectural assemblymen who were backing him and resolved to prohibit their reentry into the party. Kano took over. Under him, the LDP prefectural federation and the prefectural government were in the same hands. The prefectural PARC was reorganized once more at the September 1962 prefectural federation convention. The alignment that emerged was oriented toward breaking down barriers to industrialization in such areas as industrial water supply, the coastal railway line, industrial use roads, and harbors by subordinating the prefectural

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party and government organizations to the central government and the central LDP organization. The Labor Unions and theJSP. All of the large firms that located in the area had labor unions. Most of the union membership consisted of transferees from outside the prefecture. Many of the unions were established with the assistance of the firms and were not part of a higher-level union organization. The incoming unions and the preexisting unions did not get along. A number of labor councils were organized in August 1962 and May 1963 under the direction ofSohyo and the Japan Federation of Synthetic Chemical Workers' Unions. The preexisting prefectural labor federation did not show much interest in them. The core of the prefectural labor federation consisted of large unions like the Japan Postal Workers' Union (Zentei), the Japan National Railways Union, the National Railway Locomotive Engineers Union (Doro), the Teachers' Union (Kyoso), and the Keisei Railways Union. Their officers were JSP members, and they formed the axis of the JSP's vote-gathering machine. But only about 55,000 workers were affiliated with the prefectural labor federation. The officers of these unions were affiliated with the JSP right wing; because of their affiliation with Sohyo, however, they had remained in the JSP when a branch of the DSP was established in the prefecture in 1960. On the other hand, the mainstream of the JSP prefectural headquarters, under Representative Ogawa Toyoaki (a farmers' movement activist of the Wada faction), was linked to the JSP left wing and had close ties with Governor Shibata. The two men were said to be seeking a coalition between the old Democratic Party and the JSP. Within the prefectural labor federation, however, Ogawa's group represented a minority. The JSP had only 1,000 members. Still, it was able to gather around 200,000 votes in every House of Representatives election, because there were 150,000 residents in the Second District who worked outside the prefecture as well as a residue of supporters from the prewar farmers' movement. The Industrial Population Structure. Chiba's socioeconomic structure changed dramatically with the arrival of the large firms. Statistics on the movement of population in and out of the prefecture, employment by industry, and voting behavior show that between 1955 and 1965 Chiba was among the prefectures that experienced the most dramatic transformations in social structure. But whereas the national trend was for agricultural populations to decrease as the number of salaried workers increased, in Chiba Prefecture the agricultural population decreased very little. The number of resident commuters—most of them holding jobs in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area—increased in Ichikawa, Narashino, Funabashi, Chiba, Matsudo, Urayasu, and the other municipalities that made up the Keiyo Industrial Belt. In i960 the industries in the prefecture required 390,000 workers. The

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regular employee population was 550,000. An estimated 150,000 people, or about 27 percent of the total resident regular employees, commuted to jobs outside the prefecture. In addition, with the arrival of new firms and factories, the number of transferees from outside the prefecture increased. The prefecture began experiencing a net inflow of population in 1957. Thus, it was the increase in people who moved into the prefecture with the incoming firms and commuters who held jobs in Tokyo that caused the population to increase. The absolute number of those employed in the primary industries did not decline significantly. Even in the Keiyo Industrial Belt itself, there was no increase in the number of agricultural households with secondary employment, as was typical in suburban agricultural villages. The incoming firms were of a sort that made it extremely difficult for the agricultural population to find employment in them. The new firms relied on suppliers overseas for most of their raw materials, and their primary product markets were the factories of the Keihin Coastal Industrial Belt. The firms did not require the services of subcontractors within the prefecture. In a sense, the Keiyo Industrial Belt represented an extension of the Keihin Industrial Belt. The incoming firms were a kind of alien organism that threatened indigenous local firms. But the incoming firms' employees and the Tokyo-bound commuters, whose wages were higher those earned in the prefecture's firms, did benefit the tertiary commercial and service sector. It is probably safe to say that Chiba Prefecture represents a typical example of what happens when an agricultural prefecture industrializes rapidly by attracting outside firms. Voting Behavior. How did voting behavior change as a consequence of these changes in the industrial population structure? First, although the relative size of the conservative vote decreased and that of the progressive vote increased, before about 1955 this trend was caused primarily by changes in the population structure of the urban areas and the democratization movements in rural villages. The increase in the progressive vote thereafter was associated primarily with industrialization and urbanization. After the 1955 general election, the increase in the number of eligible voters was concentrated in the First District, and it was also in the First District that the increase in the progressive vote was concentrated. Within the district, the rates of increase in cities like Ichikawa, Funabashi, Narashino, Matsudo, Kashiwa, and Ichihara was most conspicuous. The bulk of these were undoubtedly the votes of transferees and commuters. Second, whereas the electoral bases of conservative Representatives were closely intertwined with those of local assemblymen, those of regional constituency Councilors and governors were unstable, and their ability to mobilize the vote weakened. The LDP received about the same number of votes in general and prefectural assembly elections. It received a consider-

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ably smaller number of votes in House of Councilors and gubernatorial elections. By contrast, progressives received similar numbers of votes in general, House of Councilors, and gubernatorial elections but their vote decreased dramatically in prefectural assembly elections. In the urban areas, however, the votes received in general and prefectural assembly elections were comparable. (For further examples, see Masumi 1969:259-80.) The Pacific Belt Region During the mid-1960s, Fukuyama, Mizushima, Goi, Kashima, and other new industrial cities were created in the Pacific Belt region, which stretches from Ibaragi Prefecture to Kita Kyushu. With the incoming firms came subcontractor factories and product distribution networks. Housing, roads, railroads, shopping districts, schools, and hospitals were constructed in the areas where they located. Between 1955 and 1965, the proportion of the nation's total population residing in the Pacific Belt region increased from 50 percent to 55 percent. The rate of growth in heavily populated areas like Tokyo and Osaka leveled off, while it rose in Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, Nara, Hyogo, and other neighboring prefectures. During the five years between i960 and 1965, twenty-one prefectures gained population: the highest rates of increase were in Kanagawa, with 28.7 percent; Saitama, with 24.0; Osaka, with 20.9 percent; Chiba, with 17.2 percent; Aichi, with 14.1 percent; Tokyo, with 12.2 percent; and Hyogo, with 10.3 percent. In other words, the increase was concentrated along the Tokaido Railway Line. Twenty-five prefectures lost population, including Shimane, 7.6 percent; Saga, 7.5 percent; Nagasaki, 6.8 percent; Kagoshima, 5.6 percent; Kochi, 4.9 percent; Miyazaki, 4.8 percent; Kumamoto, 4.6 percent; Yamagata, 4.4 percent; Oita, 4.3 percent; and Akita, 4.3 percent. All of the 27 cities with populations of over 300,000 increased in size, while only 7 of the 104 medium-sized cities with populations between 100,000 and 300,000 decreased. On the other hand, 210 cities (47 percent) of the cities with populations between 30,000 and 50,000; 2,007 (86 percent) of the 2,427 municipalities with populations between 5,000 and 20,000; and 315 (95 percent) of the 370 small towns and villages with populations of under 5,000 showed declines. Sixty-two percent of the small towns and villages showed declines of 10 percent or more. The first of the factors that caused this decline was income disparities across regions. Between 1955 and 1965, production volume grew 4-fold in secondary industries and 3.3-fold in tertiary industries. By contrast, the growth was only 1.5-fold in the primary industries. In 1966 the real per capita income was ¥500,000 for a person employed in manufacturing and ¥160,000 for a person in agriculture. The agrarian villages near large cities and plains

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were considerably more prosperous than agricultural villages in mountainous areas. Agricultural household income in mountain villages was ¥250,000 per household, or less than 60 percent of a household in a flatland area. The production of charcoal, previously an important source of income in mountain villages, declined from i960 because of a sharp increase in the consumption of propane and natural gas. This was particularly conspicuous in the Chugoku District. Residents of mountain villages, whose incomes were low to begin with, lost their side jobs in charcoal making and were left with little choice but to supplement their income by part-time and wagelabor jobs if they were near a city, or by migrant labor if they were not. These developments promoted an exodus from the villages. Second, because the transportation network and the mass media had expanded, the social distance between the cities and the agricultural and mountain villages shrank dramatically. One reason why people left the agricultural and mountain villages in western Japan in great numbers was that these villages were situated near the industrial regions facing the Inland Sea, so that the local population became caught up in the urban culture and product economy. Exposure to the culture and economy of the cities stimulated wants and talent. The exodus from the Tohoku region was more modest because there were fewer opportunities there for this sort of baptism in urbanism. At the same time that high economic growth and expanding transportation networks were drawing labor power to the cities, the agricultural and mountain villages were being developed as new product markets. The spread of television oriented the lifestyle and attitudes of the mountain villagers toward the cities. The increase in expenditures aimed at urbanizing lifestyles created a need for part-time or migrant work or even new jobs. Gradually, this labor force was absorbed into the secondary and tertiary sectors. The large-scale exodus gave rise to "depopulation." The term was perhaps first used formally in the 1966 interim report of the regions subcommittee of the Economic Council. It refers to a situation where community life can no longer be sustained because of a decrease in population. Such areas differ from "remote areas," because community life continues to be maintained and reproduced in remote areas. For instance, in a hamlet of thirty households, there are typically elementary and middle school annexes and a fire department with a hand-driven pump. Irrigation facilities can be maintained cooperatively, and there can be a public hall. But if groups of youngsters who have graduated from middle school find jobs in the cities and if older youths fail to return from migrant work, then households will find that they do not have anyone to take over the household. Primarily old people, women, and children will remain in the village. If the death rate exceeds the birth rate and the number of families leaving

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the hamlet increases, then it is no longer possible to maintain the annex schools, the public hall, the fire department, or the irrigation system. Although it is impossible to say how much of a population decrease will precipitate a state of depopulation verging on complete breakdown, the interim report mentioned above cited a figure of 1 or 2 percent: "Currendy, towns and villages with populations of under 20,000 are, generally speaking, experiencing a 1 or 2 percent annual population decrease. When one recalls that towns and villages of this kind constitute 73 percent of all towns and villages and that the population residing therein amounts to 25 percent of the population of the entire nation, depopulation is in no sense a problem of just one particular region. These kinds of areas are found in the agriculture-oriented regions. Half of the population engaged in agriculture and half of the cultivated land area lie within such depopulated areas." The Agricultural Structure Improvement Association considered towns and villages where the population decreased by at least 10 percent between i960 and 1965 (an annual rate of at least 2 percent) to be depopulated areas. Using this standard, 898 towns and villages (25 percent of all towns and villages nationwide) were depopulated. T h e population residing in these areas was 8.25 million (about 10 percent of the national total). Most of them lie in mountainous regions. (Imai 1968; Masumi 1969:201-8) The Case of Kimitsu City T h e finishing touch to the Keiyo Industrial Belt was the Kimitsu steelmaking complex of the Yawata Steel Corporation. (The following account is based on Tachi 1981.) Governor Shibata of Chiba Prefecture solicited the location of Yawata Steel in the Keiyo Industrial Belt in December 1959. Yawata Steel responded by conducting surveys in Kisarazu, Kimitsu, and Futtsu. It decided to locate in the Kimitsu District in November i960. Meanwhile, the Kimitsu town office, which had participated in several explanatory meetings on the attraction of heavy industry conducted by prefectural officials, set up a committee to study and discuss a basic development plan and other related items. In October Governor Shibata sent an official notice to the Kimitsu town office and the Kimitsu and Sakata fishing cooperatives. In it he proposed that "all fishing areas concerned" be bought up for use in attracting heavy industry. The Sakata fishing cooperative immediately declared its absolute opposition to land reclamation in the area on grounds that the cooperative's members were obtaining high and stable yields from what were considered Japan's finest seaweed beds and that it would probably not be in its best interest to agree to the land reclamation right away. (The cooperative eventually transferred its fishing rights and signed a compensation agreement

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in May 1965.) The Kimitsu fishing cooperative established a countermeasures committee in October and continued to study the matter. At the forefront of the people supporting the proposal were town assembly speaker Suzuki Kikujiro (who was also chairman of the Kimitsu Township Development Committee), town office general affairs section chief Sugiura Akira, and the fishing cooperative's president, Shirai Chiyokichi. Suzuki, a businessman in the commercial sector, had served as an assemblyman in Sadamoto Village beginning in 1947. He became vice speaker of the Kimitsu town assembly in 1954 and chief of the town government's general affairs department in 1955. Shirai was an elementary school teacher during the prewar years who served as a commanding officer at the front during the war. He was purged after the war, began fishing for eels, and was selected to become president of the cooperative in i960. The men conducted studies with great enthusiasm and gained powerful impressions of Yawata Steel's plants in Kyushu, Yamaguchi, and Osaka in March 1961. Suzuki describes their visit: " I f you let go of this opportunity, you will all become the laughingstock of future generations," argued the deputy mayor of Yawata City, who had come out to receive u s . . . . When you think about it, in 1889 Yawata Village was just another poverty-stricken out-of-the-way hamlet of some 300 households. It has now been transformed into a major city with a population of 800,000. When I saw this with my own eyes, I decided to trust the words of Managing Director F and stake my own political career on them. . . . Managing Director F firmly shook our hands and said, "We will, without fail, prosper, together with the local community. . . ." Even now, I cannot forget his sincere expression and his inspirational words.

Through such studies, the town leadership strengthened its resolve to buy out the area's fishing rights. The May 1961 general meeting of the fishing cooperative voted on whether to negotiate with the prefecture over the transfer of the rights. The vote was 182 votes in favor of negotiation, 7 against, and 18 for further observation. Negotiations were subsequently conducted with the prefecture regarding compensation for the fishing grounds, job transfers, and employment. Following the negotiations, the cooperative voted in July on the issue of transferring fishing rights. The vote was 156 for and 51 against, with 1 vote disqualified. The Kimitsu fishing cooperative and the Kimitsu town government signed an agreement with the prefecture annulling its rights to the fishing grounds. It has been said that there is no comparable example anywhere in the country of this kind of matter being setded so quickly. On August 7, three days before the signing, Kimitsu held a mayoral election and Suzuki won. Once the location of Yawata Steel was decided, real estate agents began to wheel and deal furiously. To prevent urbanization

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from getting out of control, Mayor Suzuki threw his efforts into drafting and implementing a plan for the town. But the Ministry of Construction was not interested in Kimitsu Town's application for consideration under the ministry's urban planning provisions. It is said that the town's request was greeted with comments like "What do you think you are doing, making an urban plan for a small town of 13,000" and "You're undertaking a town plan on behalf of a private corporation?" The town plan was finally accepted after 150 separate visits to the ministry, and the town government established its own urban planning section. A "Decision on Usage Zones" was released in December 1964, "A Decision on Town Plan Streets" in January 1965, and then a full-fledged urban plan was announced in the Kimitsu town register. Because the plan had been formulated in secret, the announcement came as quite a shock to the town's residents and to the town assembly. The farm households of the hamlets of Owada and Hitomi, with relatively large proportions of farmland, had been preparing a land improvement project designed to increase agricultural productivity and were on the verge of obtaining government approval. But because most of the paddy land in the two hamlets had been designated for residential use in the Kimitsu town register, the land improvement project was unable to obtain prefectural approval. The hamlet of Owada went along with the town government's policy, surmising that it would progress dramatically as a residential area once the Yawata Steel plant became fully operational. Hitomi hamlet reacted strongly against Mayor Suzuki's tactic of leaving residents in the dark but was unable to modify the town government's policy. Suzuki says, "I was criticized as being autocratic. But at the time the farmers lacked understanding and I was having a hard time. Public administration has to be judged by its results. I believe I succeeded." Nonetheless, this is one of the reasons why he was so badly defeated in the August 1965 election. The official Kimitsu Town comprehensive development plan was made public in November 1967. The development section was reorganized into a planning section and an urban planning section at that time. Y A., the head of the new urban planning section, was a middle school classmate of the mayor's and a former army major who had graduated from officers' training school to become a teacher at his alma mater. He was forced to work in a private corporation as a result of the public officials' purge. Following his depurging in 1951, he became a junior official in the Sunami village office, and then chief of the Kimitsu town government's construction section. It was Y. A. who proposed implementing land-use zoning under the auspices of the cooperatives. He persuaded the mayor and the assemblymen, who were initially hostile, to make study tours of cities such as Fukuoka, Yamagata, and Hiroshima, which used cooperative-based administration; he won over the farmers, who were uneasy about turning their land over for resi-

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dential use, by putting them on buses and having them observe areas where such programs had succeeded. The Owada land-use cooperative was established in 1968. Cooperatives were established in Sakata in 1969 and Kubo in 1970. The Kimitsu steel plant began regular operations in 1969. Crude steel production amounted to 3,460,000 tons that year. The plant produced 9,230,000 tons at its peak in 1973. In March 1973 Yawata merged with Fuji Steel to form New Japan Steel. With a mammoth integrated operation controlled by a computer system, the plant's production was the highest among New Japan Steel's plants. In 1973, it was run by 7,005 employees, 5,185 of them blue-collar workers. Many were transferees from Yawata Steel's home base in Kyushu. Kyushu natives accounted for more than 50 percent of its workforce. Chiba natives accounted for only 10 percent. Employees lived in huge company housing complexes, isolated from the regular residential districts. The steel plant was an island on dry land. Not only capital but also raw materials, facilities, and equipment came from outside the town. Its production was sold elsewhere. It was dependent locally for only its industrial water supply and a few miscellaneous supplies. While more than a hundred related and direct-supplier firms employing up to 13,000 people were located in the area, almost none were backed by local capital. Many of them had moved from Kyushu, and their company headquarters were not nearby. Sub-subcontractors were either local firms or firms located in Chiba Prefecture. It is in these sub-subcontractor firms that the former fishermen and ex-farmers found jobs. The most significant link between the town of Kimitsu and the steel plant lay in the municipality's tax revenues. In September 1970 five towns and villages consolidated to form an enlarged Kimitsu Town, and most of the taxes on plant-related large-scale depreciated assets were incorporated into the town's revenues. With the addition of residents' taxes paid by individuals and firms with ties to the steel plant, the proportion of town revenues supplied by sources related to the plant amounted to 69 percent, according to 1972 figures. The town's fiscal capacity index was second in the country, behind Toyota City, where the Toyota Automobile Corporation is located. The town was promoted to a city in September 1971. The municipal government organization was revamped to correspond to the expanded area under its jurisdiction, the number of city employees increased, and a majestic city hall was also erected. It was estimated that individuals with ties to the steel plant spent ¥15 billion annually in Kimitsu City. This is the equivalent of the total expenditures of Kimitsu's city government. One could say that Kimitsu City was awash in gold. But the situation changed abruptly in the wake of the oil shock in autumn 1973. Tax revenues from firms decreased, and the city's financial situ-

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ation tightened. After 1974 population stopped increasing and became more or less stable. The three early cooperatives felt the double blow of a sharp jump in construction costs and a drop in demand. Stuck with land under development for which there was very little prospect of a sale, they faced huge interest burdens. Supervising agency funds and other infusions of municipal subsidies proved of little avail and, as the city's budgetary situation deteriorated, even these could not be counted on. Social Change Advanced industrialization and regional development brought about tremendous social change. Statistics concerning the industrial population structure and the employment structure make this point succinctly. (See Tables 17 and 18.) Between 1955 and 1980 the employee population increased from 39 million to 560 million while the primary industry population (those engaged in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) decreased from 41 percent to 11 percent. The secondary industry population (those in the manufacturing sector) increased from 24 percent to 34 percent, but it reached its peak in 1975. The tertiary industry population increased from 36 to 55 percent. This figure virtually equals the number of salaried workers and self-employed. The number of salaried workers doubled from 16 percent to 30 percent between 1955 and 1975, suggesting the unfolding of mass society. AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY ADMINISTRATION The Basic Law for Agriculture As the Japanese financial situation began to improve with the outbreak of the Korean War, dissatisfaction exploded over drastic cuts in agricultural subsidies, the tightening agricultural taxation, and a low price policy for rice. In response, the government initiated incentive payments for early deliveries of rice, for overfulfilling production quotas, and for completing deliveries. De facto rice prices rose, even as the base price held firm. In addition, beginning in March 1951 Diet members sponsored a number of laws aimed at reestablishing land improvement and other subsidized projects. The entire country seemed to become the object of one subsidy program or another. A "food increase fund" was also incorporated into the fiscal 1952 budget, opening the way not just for subsidies but for investment in agriculture as well. But as record harvests occurred after 1955 amid falling international agricultural produce prices, the zaikai and the Ministry of Finance began calling for a "cheap agricultural policy." Items in the fiscal 1954 budget related to agriculture were cut drastically. Stunned, the Ministry of Agriculture and

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Forestry, rural Diet members, and, in particular, the members of the LDP PARC agricultural affairs subcommittee negotiated energetically during the budget process. A 1958 MOAF agricultural white paper stated that the fundamental problem of Japanese agriculture was its low productivity and that the small scale of Japanese farming operations had to be overcome if productivity was to be raised. The "New Agricultural, Mountain, and Fishing Village Construction Project" initiated that year shifted the emphasis in policy from increasing the production of food to improving the agricultural infrastructure. Inspired by a West German agricultural law passed in 1955, agriculture-oriented LDP Diet members moved to establish a similar law in Japan. The Basic Law for Agriculture of 1961 characterized the goals of agricultural policy as increasing productivity and balancing agricultural and manufacturing incomes. It argued that the movement of agricultural population to other industries as a result of high economic growth would lead to a decrease in the number of agricultural households, thereby inducing sales of farmland and making it possible for full-time farmers to increase the scale of their operations. If large-scale agricultural mechanization and the selective expansion of crops were introduced at this point, agricultural productivity would increase, disparities of income between agriculture and other industries would disappear, and it would become possible for fulltime farm households to maintain viable operations. At the same time, international competitiveness would be strengthened, and agricultural imports could be liberalized. House of Representatives agricultural and forestry committee chairman Sakata Eiichi (LDP) relates an episode that occurred during the passage of the Basic Law for Agriculture: It was decided that the committee would meet at 5:00 P.M. But when we all entered the room, there was not one person from the JSP. There was some talk of going ahead with the vote anyway, but I made up my mind that, even though this might be unavoidable in the end, we should [continue the meeting] . I told someone to go out again and get them. If we called them twice and they would still not return, then we could go ahead. T h e response was that they were holding a Representatives' meeting and wanted us to wait just a litde bit longer. T h e JSP entered the room, after we had waited about an hour. Not just the agriculture and forestry committee members, but everyone who had attended the Representatives' meeting came along. They did not return to their seats but instead surrounded the chairman's seat, talking and asking questions about aspects [of the bill]. If I gave up my seat, it would have signaled the end of the meeting, so I couldn't very well do that. Before I knew it, we had conferred for two hours. I have a reputation for being mild-mannered, so the JSP could not get too rough. They ultimately started to carry me away in my chair, commenting, " H e sure is heavy." (Laughter) If I was hauled away, chair and all, the meeting would be adjourned. There were perhaps three

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ruling party Representatives nearby. But because I was completely surrounded by the JSP [Representatives], it was impossible to communicate with [them]. . . . Since there wasn't much I could do if they moved my chair, I called the meeting to order. . . . The moment I declared the meeting under way, they slammed the microphones a s i d e . . . . Once the microphones were lost, I really didn't have much control [over the proceedings]. But there was a certain utility in the microphones being taken away.... [There were three things that I had to say.] The first was about closing the question-and-answer period: "Interpolation is now closed." Next, "Is there any debate? A vote will now be taken on the item." After the vote, there was one more. The wording is left up to the chairman. But since they are based on law—and this applies to all bills—these three things have to be d e c l a r e d . . . . Since all of the microphones were taken away, I was stuck. But this was in fact to my advantage, because even if I mumbled something totally incomprehensible, no one would know what I s a i d . . . . The ruling party Representatives understood the situation well and automatically stood up three times. (Laughter) I then declared the meeting adjourned. . . . Since [the JSP members] were standing on the stenographer's desk, even though she was present, she couldn't do anything and just sat there, staring blankly into space. I later asked what she had written. The transcript states clearly that the meeting was adjourned: "Commotion—meeting adjourned." (Laughter) . . . When it came time for the final Diet procedures, the JSP began to assert that [the committee vote] was not in the transcript. . . . I said, "Is there any other major law where there is a transcript of a final vote being taken?" There isn't. Things are noisy and what is listed is "commotion." (Sakata, "Sengo nósei no tenkai," Sengo nósei kenkyú shiryo, June 1963) T h e Basic Law was an abstract p i e c e o f legislation, b u t it m a r k e d the transf o r m a t i o n o f postwar agricultural policy f r o m p r i c e policy to structural policy. W i t h m u n i c i p a l g o v e r n m e n t s as the p l a n n i n g units (earlier agricultural subsidy policies w e r e c h a n n e l e d t h r o u g h agricultural o r g a n i z a t i o n s ) , a t r e m e n d o u s n u m b e r o f government-subsidized a n d - f i n a n c e d p r o j e c t s w e r e i m p l e m e n t e d t h r o u g h o u t the c o u n t r y in the n a m e o f r e f o r m i n g the agricultural structure a n d m o d e r n i z i n g agriculture. A g r i c u l t u r a l subsidies i n c r e a s e d spectacularly: ¥45.3 billion in 1959, ¥59 billion in 1961, ¥72.6 billion in 1962, ¥98 billion in 1964, a n d ¥166 billion in 1966. B u t the attempts to i m p r o v e the agricultural structure failed. T h e agricultural p o p u l a t i o n , 41.0 p e r c e n t o f the total p o p u l a t i o n in 1955, d e c r e a s e d rapidly to 19.4 p e r c e n t in 1970. T h e n u m b e r o f agricultural h o u s e h o l d s , however, d i d n o t d e c r e a s e , despite a d r o p in the p e r c e n t a g e o f n e w graduates e n t e r i n g agriculture f r o m a b o u t 25 p e r c e n t in 1950 to less than 5 perc e n t in 1970. Instead, the agricultural p o p u l a t i o n b e c a m e o l d e r a n d m o r e f e m a l e , with an increase in agricultural h o u s e h o l d s that i n c l u d e d c o m m u ters o r that grew rice f o r their o w n c o n s u m p t i o n . T h e n u m b e r o f minitractors i n c r e a s e d f r o m 500,000 in i960 to 3 m i l l i o n in 1970. T h e n u m b e r o f

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households relying solely on agriculture for their income dropped from just under 35 percent in 1955 to less than 16 percent in 1970, while the number of agricultural households whose income from nonagricultural sources exceeded their agriculture income j u m p e d from 28 percent to nearly 51 percent. The structural policies aimed at increasing the scale of operations had clearly been frustrated. T h e gap between the incomes of agricultural households and incomes in other industries seems to have disappeared, however, because of an increase in the nonagricultural income of farm households. Agricultural Cooperatives T h e national pressure group representing agriculture is a network of agricultural cooperatives (nogyo kyoddkumiai, or nokyo) organized under strong direction from G H Q during the Occupation. T h e cooperatives were in a financially precarious position during their early years, experiencing their worst conditions during the 1949 stabilization depression. With the improvement in the farm economy in 1950, however, they began to recover. Because of government protection and assistance, most were able to get back on their feet by 1955. At the heart of the cooperative system is the comprehensive agricultural cooperative (sogo nokyo). More than 99 percent of all agricultural households are members of these. They are organized into a three-tiered pyramid consisting of municipal unit cooperatives, prefectural associations, and national-level associations. Their primary operations are marketing, purchasing, and credit activities. Rice and wheat, which are the main commodities marketed, are regulated under the government's food control system. T h e agricultural cooperatives are the collection agencies used by the government in making its purchases, and the proceeds from the sales are deposited into agricultural cooperative savings accounts. T h e primary product handled by the purchasing divisions is fertilizer (produced by oligopolistic firms subject to government price controls), for which the agricultural cooperatives receive a handling fee. In short, the agricultural cooperative network represented a riskless enterprise guaranteed by the government. Using these mechanisms the agricultural cooperatives, which regulated the daily operations of farm households, became the dominant institutions in the agricultural villages after the end of the landlord system and agricultural cooperative officials became power holders in the agricultural villages. T h e most colorful of the agricultural cooperatives' annual functions was their pressure campaigns during the period when rice prices were set. In 1979, for example, the agricultural cooperatives decided in May on the price that they would demand and initiated preliminary discussions with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. At the same time, rice action headquarters were set up both at the prefectural level and in about 60 percent of the

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municipal unit cooperatives that market rice. Local assemblymen and local government heads were compelled to get involved in the petitioning. In June the cooperatives requested the presence of local Diet members at the rice price rallies that were held simultaneously in a number of prefectures. Delegations from around the country arrived in Tokyo on June 18 and held the customary rice price rally at the Budokan. The total attendance was approximately 10,000, with 400-500 delegates attending from each of the major rice-producing prefectures and several dozen from each of the smaller prefectures. About 319 Diet members participated, although roughly half of them sent proxies. After the morning rally, Diet members, grouped by electoral district, were invited to attend afternoon rallies. Discussions were held on a prefecture-by-prefecture basis, and Diet members were pressured to publicly declare their support. In July a field base was established in the Zenkyoren Building in Hirakawacho. Waves of demonstrators were launched from there, using the delegations as they arrived in Tokyo. These demonstrators confronted their Diet members and individual Rice Price Council members right up to the council meeting on July 12. During this period, the LDP and members of the Diet met daily. The intense pressure from the party was then carried over into the final negotiations between the government and the Three Party Officers. Election Campaigns The strength of the agricultural cooperatives was based on their ability to mobilize votes, particularly in rural elections. The Miyakonojo agricultural cooperative in Miyazaki's Second District was a typical example. It backed Horinouchi Hisao, a former Miyakonojo mayor who had assisted in the creation of the current agricultural cooperative. Horinouchi ran as an independent in the 1976 general election. He was elected to serve his first term in the House of Representatives, coming in first place with a vote of 65,019. He ran as a certified LDP candidate in 1979 and placed second with a vote of 58,367. The Miyazaki Second District covered five cities and four counties. Of these, one city and one county were fully within the area serviced by the Miyakonojo agricultural cooperative. The 40,000 or so votes that came from this area in the 1979 general election represented nearly 70 percent of the votes that he received. Approximately 17,000 households were members of the agricultural cooperative. On the average, each household contained four or five people, three of whom were eligible voters. The cooperative first lined up the votes of its members. It then extended its reach to their relatives, the stores where they shopped, the teachers at their children's schools, and the businessmen with whom the cooperative did business. The 900 employees of the cooperative and roughly 2,000 squad leaders in the lower-level agricultural cooperative organizations led this work. Since agri-

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cultural cooperative are prohibited from engaging in political activities, these activities were undertaken in the name of the Miyakonojo branch of the Miyazaki Farmers' Federation. T h e general secretary of the Miyakonojo branch of the Miyazaki Farmers' League, who was also a researcher in the planning section of the Miyakonojo agricultural cooperative, stated: You say that agricultural cooperative employees engage in door-to-door vote gathering under the guise of collecting account deposits? No, that does not happen. They really are collecting savings deposits. It's just that if we go out and collect savings deposits during this period, a household will often, on its own accord, understand why we came. Horinouchi's name is never brought up. If it were, that would constitute a violation. Before every election, I assemble all of the employees and I present concrete examples based on a detailed treatment in a textbook showing exactly what sort of election campaigning is allowed and what constitutes a violation. That is why we do not engage in any illegal campaigning. In the producer subcommittees and the like, it is not necessary to g o through the trouble of actually asking for votes. We say something like "Mr. Horinouchi wanted to send us some liquor, but we didn't want to inconvenience him, so we turned him down. But I do want all of you to fully take his sentiment into consideration." It has the same effect. (Tachibana 1984: 342-43) A local politician from the opposing Setoyama Mitsuo faction describes Horinouchi's election campaign as follows: From even before the start of the official campaign period, thirty to a hundred people are gathered in each of the various hamlets to attend a panel discussion. These are held regularly whether there is an election or not. But when there is an election, the meetings are scheduled to coincide with it. At that time, they do things like distribute cash dividends to each of the households based on the number of shares owned and the amount purchased [from the cooperative], or else they pass out souvenir hand towels. T h e various branch heads attend. They of course do not come right out and ask for a vote for Horinouchi, but they do "report" that a decision has been made to recommend Horinouchi and explain why Horinouchi deserves the recommendation of the agricultural cooperative. Also, in the crop subcommittees they frequently hold meetings in the name of a study session, or a pig-raising or silkworm-raising convention, or something, and " r e p o r t " Horinouchi's recommendation there. When an election draws near, these kinds of gatherings are held incessantly, all over the place. A n d employees will make the rounds of farm households o n the pretext of soliciting agricultural cooperative savings and mutual aid society contributions. Staff members in charge visit households that own livestock to give advice. Virtually every agricultural cooperative employee makes the rounds of farm households during an election period under one pretext or another. They go on like this until ten or eleven at night.

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They will also tear apart a phone book and give several pages to each of the women employees back at the office. They have them telephone people to encourage them to attend a speech given by Horinouchi. In the evening they line up ten or more cars in the various settlements to transport people to and from the speech. They also use the agricultural cooperative's van. T h e farm households go along with this out of a sense of obligation or else out of fear of retaliation. You've heard of those company-organized campaigns. Well, this is a cooperative-organized campaign. (Tachibana 1984:340-41)

The Dispersal of Vote Gathering Actually, cooperative-organized campaigns of this kind appear to be the exception. While there are a number of mammoth agricultural cooperatives with 17,000 member households, the membership of an average unit cooperative is 1,100. It is difficult enough to establish a consensus within a single unit, but much more difficult to get several to unite and put forward a candidate. T h e prefectural farmers' leagues can narrow the field of candidates they recommend to a single individual in a House of Councilors election or a gubernatorial election. In a general election, however, they recommend a large number of candidates and then leave the rest to the branch cooperatives. Recommended candidates must approach the cooperatives using their own connections and arrange individually for support. T h e National Central Association of Agricultural Cooperatives began a campaign for structural reform in 1958. In 1963 it formed the National Farmers' League (Zenkoku Nomin Sorenmei, or Zenno Soren) to oversee its political activities. Although it professed "freedom to support any political party," it has leaned most heavily on the LDP for its recommended candidates. In 1965 Mori Yasoichi, an LDP Councilor and chairman of the Aichi Prefecture central association, took over the j o b of Zenno Soren chairman. Twelve out of thirty-four organizations (most of them called "prefectural farmers' leagues") in thirty-two prefectures were members, but its ability to maintain discipline among them was limited. Zenno Soren put up two candidates as representatives of the agricultural cooperatives in the 1965 national district House of Councilors election. They attracted only 800,000 votes, and one of them lost. The agricultural cooperatives have been unable to put up any candidates of their own since then. Life in the agricultural cooperative lies, like some sort of primitive life form, in the more than four thousand unit agricultural cooperatives. Each conducts its own political campaign in accord with specific conditions in the local community. Although the vote-gathering capacity of the unit agricultural cooperatives is considerable when added up, that mass is fragmented into individual units, and it is only under the most fortuitous circumstances that matters can be coordinated from the top. Unless the system can concentrate the farm vote, its political influence is

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weak. An individual candidate might gain the support of a unit cooperative, but the number of votes that a single cooperative can mobilize is limited. To a candidate it is just one among many support groups. The LDP organized its self-styled friends of the farmer in two intraparty organizations: the 116-member agricultural and forestry subcommittee and the 215-member investigative committee on comprehensive agricultural policy. But only a few of the members of these committees were wholeheartedly concerned with the agricultural cooperatives. Most of them simply had their name placed on the roster to gain publicity among the farmers. Such Diet members frequently give in to the demands of industries and business operators whose interests clash with those of the farmer. At times, fed-up agricultural cooperatives would recommend J C P candidates. In the 1979 general election, the Aomori Second District's Tsugawa Takeichi and the Akita First District's Nakagawa Risaburo, both JCP candidates, were backed by agricultural cooperatives along with LDP candidates, and both of them were elected. The agricultural cooperative chairman who was instrumental in pushing through the J C P recommendation comments: Only one Representative attended last year's prefectural rice price rally. That showed how little Akita's Representatives do for the farmer. There was a lot of dissatisfaction in our district about Ishida Hirohide's having become completely inaccessible and the JSP's being so weak in the agricultural policy area. Well, of the nineteen members of the committee that decided on [the cooperative's] recommendation, one is DSP-aligned and the rest—myself included—are all conservatives. Nevertheless, since we all knew how Nakagawa had persevered in the Diet on the defective farm equipment issue, his recommendation went through surprisingly smoothly. So you see, it wasn't that we recommended the party known as the JCP. Rather, we recommended Nakagawa, the individual. Our recommendation this time certainly had a strong impact. The treatment that farmers get from the Representatives' aides when they go to make a request has been completely different ever since. Ishida Hirohide even dropped by the agricultural cooperative hall after the election to thank us for his victory. It had been a long, long time since anything like that had happened. (Tachibana 1 9 8 4 : 3 5 2 - 5 3 )

Was it possible for the agricultural cooperatives to influence Diet members through political contributions? The amount of political contributions involved was small. Contributions amounted to ¥56.9 million in the 1969 general election, ¥95.6 million in the 1972 general election, ¥18.8 million in the 1968 House of Councilors election, and ¥23.3 million in the 1971 House of Councilors election. The contributions during the 1971 general election and the 1972 House of Councilors election were distributed to a total of 189 individuals. These were not limited to LDP candidates and included

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JSP, DSP, independents, and candidates who ended up not running. T h e amounts ranged from ¥100,000 to a high of ¥4 million in the House of Representatives race and ¥2 million in the House of Councilors race. To the candidates, this was probably just a drop in the bucket. With the revision of the Political Funds Control Law, all political contributions whatsoever by groups receiving subsidies from the government were prohibited. While the contributions probably continued anyway, the amount involved would not have gone beyond a mere "gesture." Urban Cooperatives T h e internal weakness at the center of the agricultural cooperative network is one reason for the cooperatives' political weakness, but it is hardly the only one. The unit agricultural cooperatives themselves shrank and changed amid the decline of agriculture in the rural villages. T h e number of members declined along with the decrease in the number of farm households. There was an even more rapid change in farm household budgets and in the corresponding functions of the cooperatives. For instance, savings deposits in agricultural cooperative accounts increased 3.2-fold between 1957 and 1964. Rates of increase below the national average occurred in the major rice-producing areas: in Niigata it was 2.3-fold; in Yamagata and Akita it was 2.5-fold. By contrast, the large urban areas greatly surpassed the national average: Tokyo, 8-fold; Kanagawa, 7-fold; Osaka, 5-fold. These increases reflect more a growth in proceeds from the sale of farmland and income from outside jobs than increases in agricultural income. T h e common assumption that the proceeds from the sale of rice flow into agricultural cooperative savings account deposits no longer applied. T h e rapidly increasing funds that were made available to the agricultural cooperatives flowed out of agriculture and into destinations like the city banks. T h e agricultural cooperatives in the suburbs of major cities, in particular, contained a high percentage of "associate members," agricultural cooperative members who were not farmers. In Tokyo and Osaka, they outnumbered regular members. Such cooperatives only engaged in credit-related operations. Savings deposits exceeded ¥4 billion-¥5 billion. It might be more accurate to call these credit unions, rather than agricultural cooperatives. In 1979-80 there were 14 agricultural cooperatives in Tokyo's 23 wards. These were agricultural cooperatives without agriculture or farm households. For instance, the Omori agricultural cooperative was associated with a farmed area of a mere 10 hectares. It had 135 regular members and 1,500 associate member households. O f the regular members, only 43 of the households were qualified to vote in agricultural committee elections, which merely required that they till at least 10 ares of land and engage in

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farming for at least 60 days a year. Since these households owned a total of 8.8 hectares, the remaining 92 regular member households must have crowded onto the remaining 1.2 hectare. The cooperative had 20 officers and 60 staff employees. It marketed no produce. Most of the farmer households did not produce enough to justify marketing. The few that did, did not rely on the cooperative and instead sold their produce directly. The cooperative handled ¥65 million worth of fertilizer and herbicide, but this amounted to considerably less than the revenue that it derived handling sightseeing tours. Fully 95 percent of its total earnings came from its financial operations. The cooperative had ¥10 billion in member savings deposits. It loaned out half of this amount; the remainder was deposited with the higher-level Tokyo Credit Agricultural Cooperative Federation (To Shin'yo Nokyo Rengokai, or Toshinren). The profit from interest alone was ¥300 million. Most of the money that regular members borrowed from the cooperative did not go into farming but was used instead as operating capital for the apartments and condominiums that they operated as their sideline—in practice, their main—business. One could become an associate member by buying ¥10,000 worth of shares. There were eight times as many associate members as there were regular members. They consisted of nonfarmers who joined the cooperative in order to have access to agricultural cooperative financing. Shop owners and factory operators borrowed operating capital. Salarymen and public servants (35 percent of the total) took out housing and educational loans. (Tachibana 1984:34, 36) The type of nationwide upsurge that used to occur during the annual struggles over rice prices was not seen in later years. In 1970 the National Central Association of Agricultural Cooperatives dissolved the office that had been its central command post for the rice price struggles and introduced the Rice and Grains Central Headquarters. Working with rice alone was no longer viable. The headquarters sent out a directive ordering rice price rallies, but ten prefectures were unable to hold one, while in three that were able to hold a rally, less than a hundred people attended. In contrast, three prefectures had attendances of more than five thousand, and fourteen had more than one thousand. When people were asked about the rice price struggle, they replied, "Why not have just the miyor riceproducing prefectures handle it?" Watanabe Tsunezo, an aggressive agriculture-oriented Diet member, comments, At present, even if we could raise the rice price, the fact is that we have 6.5 million tons of surplus rice and the national treasury is bankrupt. As responsible politicians,. . . [we] can no longer advocate things like outright opposition at all costs to quality differentials and a regional division of labor in rice production. (Tachibana 1984:365, 370)

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The De-agriculturalization of Agricultural Subsidies With the overproduction of rice that began in the 1970s, subsidies began to be directed toward decreasing acreage and encouraging the cultivation of alternative crops. The size of subsidies skyrocketed. They amounted to ¥33.69 billion in 1970, when these projects were initiated. By 1977 they surpassed ¥1 trillion. Agricultural subsidies were also de-agriculturalized. Toward the end of 1978, Watanabe Michio, minister of agriculture and forestry in the Ohira cabinet, heard about the budget negotiations from upper-level ministry officials. He responded, "The general framework is fine. But I'd like one flashy new project. Something on a grand scale. I'm about to go out and get ¥10 billion. No odd amount. What do you think of 'village advancement'? In any event, think up a line for me, will you?" He took the ¥10 billion idea to the minister of finance and the secretary general. "We've held rice prices steady for some time now. When there's an election, we still rely on the rural villages. Unless we come up with some sort of new project, we won't have anything to talk about [in speeches to them]." The mainstream leadership agreed. A ¥20 billion agricultural, forestry, and fishing village emergency project was adopted, with ¥10 billion in subsidies from the national treasury and ¥10 billion to be born by the local municipalities. It proposed the following. (1) The project implementation districts would consist of 320 municipalities throughout the country. (2) The project cost per district would be ¥62.5 million. Half of the cost would be borne by local municipalities. (3) An attempt would be made to foster local solidarity, and facilities would be built to encourage interaction among residents, improve health, and increase welfare. Although it was not entirely clear why the MOAF should be in charge of this particular subsidy, the municipalities welcomed it nonetheless. Applications flooded in, and a lobbying battle ensued. When the fiscal 1980 budget was being drafted, MOF cut the project in accord with the government's policy of reducing subsidies. But the succeeding minister of agriculture and forestry, Muto Kabun, echoed what Watanabe had said to the minister of finance and the secretary general: "We lost the 1979 election because voter turnout fell in the farming villages. We need a bold policy directed at the farming villages for the 1980 House of Councilors election. It would be nice if we could promise a hike in the rice price, but if we did, urban votes would decrease. We have no choice but to continue [the project]." The minister of finance replied, "We are supposed to wield an ax against subsidies, so I want to end [this project]. Can you think up another label?" The result was the village subsidy project to improve the structure of agriculture, a ¥20 billion program to be implemented in 320 municipalities, in which the central government's share was ¥10 billion and the local burden, ¥10 billion. (Hirose 19811946)

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Perhaps because of the skyrocketing agricultural subsidies, the rate of support for the LDP among people engaged in the primary industries also climbed, from 52 percent in 1955 to 59 percent in 1965 and 62 percent in 1975. But the primary industry population decreased drastically. Therefore, the proportion of LDP supporters working in the primary industries decreased from 44 percent in 1955 to 33 percent in 1965 and 19 percent in 1975. The LDP was no longer a party of farmers, lumberjacks, and fishermen. In addition, the return on the investment of subsidies in the rural villages was extremely low: the amount of subsidy per farmer vote was extremely high. Nevertheless, under conditions of near parity with the opposition parties, the LDP needed to continue to maintain the imbalance in electoral district apportionment and its overinvestment in the rural villages. (See Tables 18 and 37.) The number of Representatives associated with primary industry decreased from 50 in 1958 to 37 in 1979. Approximately 90 percent were connected to the LDP, but they accounted for a mere 10 percent of all LDP Representatives. Similarly, the number of Representatives affiliated with farmers' unions decreased rapidly from 35 percent to 13 percent between 1958 and 1979. Almost all had JSP connections, but their proportion within the JSP fell 20 percent to 10 percent. The number of Councilors affiliated with primary industry was a dozen or so in i960, and virtually all were LDP Councilors. Among the LDP contingent, they amounted to 20 percent in the 1960s but decreased to 16 percent in the 1970s. As for Councilors affiliated with a farmers' union, there were three or so in the 1960s, almost entirely affiliated with the JSP. But they were a virtually nonexistent in the 1970s. (Naka 1980:386-87,590-91) INTERNATIONAL T R A D E AND INDUSTRY: THE GYOKAI AND T H E ZAIKAI Administrative Guidance

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was established in 1949 with the objective of attaining "economic independence" by "promoting exports" and "rationalizing industry." Its administrative guidance of industry was absolutely binding because of the foreign exchange allocation system created by the 1949 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law. Through it, MITI could regulate the volume of imports on a regionby-region, currency-by-currency, and firm-by-firm basis. It was an extremely powerful weapon of both trade and industrial policy. In the spring of 1951 as the Korean War boom declined and excess production began, MITI was able to advise and enforce orchestrated production cutbacks in the cottonspinning and rubber industries—industries where self-administered production cutbacks were difficult—because it had the authority to regulate

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the f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e allocations f o r imports o f raw materials. T h e s e production cutbacks were the first o f its "advisories to limit p r o d u c t i o n . " T h e role o f f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e controls in the rapid e c o n o m i c growth o f the 1950s a n d 1960s was i n d e e d impressive: Technology, funding, and materials were thereby concentrated in capable firms [or at least firms that were thought to be capable] through a policyoriented administration of the Foreign Capital Law and the [Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade] Control Law. The firms merely had to press forward at full speed. Even if they advanced too far and conditions of overinvestment and overproduction emerged, it was considered perfecdy routine to coordinate production through MITI advisories and through the administration of the imported raw materials allocation system. (Tsûshô sangyôshô jiju nen shi 196g, quoted in Zenshôkô Rôdô Kumiai Tsùsan Gyôsei Kenkyùkai

i9 8 3 : 34) T h e e c o n o m i c white p a p e r o f 1956 declared, "It is 'postwar' n o l o n g e r . " A t this time, the steel, machinery, a n d chemical industries were e x p a n d i n g a n d completely new industries like petrochemicals, artificial fibers, a n d electronics were getting started. With great fanfare, the term " t e c h n o l o g i cal innovation" m a d e its official d e b u t in the Kishi cabinet's 1957 long-term e c o n o m i c p l a n . T h e construction o f industrial c o m p l e x e s in the Pacific Belt region progressed. T h e growth rate o f the Japanese e c o n o m y in the p e r i o d 1955-60 r e a c h e d an average o f 10 p e r c e n t annually. M I T I a n d the industries also c o n f r o n t e d external pressure f o r trade a n d capital liberalization d u r i n g this period. Japan j o i n e d G A T T (the G e n e r a l A g r e e m e n t o n Tariffs a n d Trade) in 1956. Following the c o n v e n i n g o f a G A T T m e e t i n g in T o k y o in 1959, M I T I Minister Ikeda p r o p o s e d a plan to raise the rate o f trade liberalization (import liberalization) f r o m 40 p e r c e n t in April i960 to roughly 80 p e r c e n t three years later or, if oil a n d coal were liberalized, to a b o u t 90 percent. T h e zaikai e m b a r k e d o n a reorganization o f the e c o n o m i c world with the aim o f strengthening its political voice. T h e press reported, " T h i r t e e n years after the e n d o f the war, a zaikai is b e i n g established f o r the first time." (Nikon keizai shinbun, April 3, 1958) A b o u t this time, K e i d a n r e n c o n f i r m e d its status as the " h e a d temple o f the zaikai" a n d its president b e g a n to b e called " t h e prime minister of the zaikai." Bowing to "world o p i n i o n , " the zaikai a c k n o w l e d g e d the n e e d to liberalize trade a n d capital. It b e g a n to discuss the establishment o f a zaikai policy c o n f e r e n c e to g u i d e industrial reorganization a n d coordinate investment, along with the creation o f a zaikai-vnde research g r o u p in anticipation o f Japanese industry's entry into the international competitive a r e n a o n an equal footing. M a m m o t h enterprise g r o u p s built a r o u n d steel a n d electrical-machinery firms a n d g r o u p s affiliated with f o r m e r zaibatsu d o m i n a t e d . Using K e i d a n r e n as their base, these firms b e g a n to a p p r o a c h the g o v e r n m e n t aggressively. K e i d a n r e n

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came to be seen as an omnipotent power guiding the government rather than just another pressure group. It is possible to make a distinction between the zaikai (financial world) and the gydkai (industrial world). One commentator says: After achieving success and fame as leaders of a single firm, many businessmen are afflicted with a new drive for power and wish to throw themselves into a societal task of some kind. Of course, the desire for solid progress and diversification in one's business is likely to continue to grow; it certainly will not decrease. Some businessmen become totally absorbed in the internal development of a business and do not pay the slightest heed to external activities. Others, by contrast, are not satisfied with simply managing a business and want to give concrete form to their personal dreams through politics—including such matters as the proper character of the nation as a whole, or the capitalist system, the state of politics, the proper role of the businessman. "The zaikai" is the arena where this sort of political drive is manifested. (Suzuki Tatsuo, "Seiji o ugokasu keieisha," quoted in Hosoya and Watanuki 1977:183) The Special Measures Act In July 1961 Sahashi Shigeru was transferred from his position as head of the heavy industries bureau to that of enterprise bureau chief. Sahashi was the commander in chief of the "nationalist faction" (alternatively, the "industry faction" or "domestic faction") that was the mainstream of MITI at the time. H e had long held as his mission the strengthening of Japan's industrial structure so that it could win against international competition of all sorts. He proposed a law designed to strengthen international competitiveness and "establish a bypass around the Antimonopoly Law." To soften the potential reaction against it, the law was given the title "Special Measures Law for the Promotion of Designated Industries," or Special Measures Law. It argued: 1. There is a need to reorganize existing industries if international competitiveness is to be achieved under a liberal [global economic] system. 2. Therefore, it is desirable for firms to concentrate, merge, and specialize. 3. The government will establish [the following types of] measures to encourage the realization of this concentration, merging, and specialization: a. Special tax breaks. b. Financing. c. Measures that provide exceptions to the Antimonopoly Law. 4. The determination of what sort of reorganization of industry is desirable will be made through tripartite discussions among government, industries, and financial organs [i.e., through public-private cooperation]. (Sahashi >967:247) Sahashi writes that the most controversial—as well as the most distinctive—aspect of the bill was its use of "public-private cooperation": " T h e

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reorganization of the Japanese economy was a most urgent matter. . . . In line with this, we put forward a third approach that was neither laissez-faire nor a controlled economy. This was public-private cooperation." (Sahashi 1967:250-51) Under this system, industries would probably have been engulfed in an even more powerful system of administrative guidance under MITI in the name of "public-private cooperation." In the face of foreign pressure, MITI's fear that the industries it had so carefully nurtured would be destroyed overlapped with the fear that its jurisdiction would shrink as a consequence of liberalization. These sentiments may have also overlapped with the expectation that MITI could use the opportunity of a national crisis over liberalization to expand its own bailiwick. Bureau chief Sahashi worked tirelessly for the passage of the bill. The response was vehement. He lined up the support of the Keizai Doyukai, but Keidanren refused to support the bill and its president, Ishizaka Taizo, stated publicly that what was needed was "self-control." Industry, in fact, desired self-control. Confident that it was competitive internationally, it was anticipating increased freedom to pursue corporate activities through an amendment or abolition of the Antimonopoly Law. MOF and the leaders of the financial world were indignant because the establishment of tripartite councils intruded in their territory. The Fair Trade Commission opposed the bill on grounds that it would take the teeth out of the Antimonopoly Law. Modified slightly, the bill was introduced into a special session of the Diet in December 1962, but the session ended before it could be discussed. The bill was placed on the agenda of the regular session but was withdrawn when the session closed in July 1963. Sahashi was transferred to the post of Patent Agency director that July. The bill was reintroduced into the special Diet session that October and into the regular session the following year. It was shelved for a third time with the closing of the session in June. The miscarriage of the Special Measures Law ushered in the decline of the "nationalist faction." Imai Yoshie, who became vice minister in July 1963, was at the center of the "internationalist faction" (or "trade faction"), which had until then been held in check. Sahashi became vice minister again in October 1964, but the map of personal connections was completely redrawn in favor of the "internationalist faction," whose members were well-informed about the international situation after long years of service in Europe and America. They were undoubtedly more suited to an age of liberalization than someone like Sahashi, who once declared, "If it came to being sent overseas, I would ask if I could clean toilets or something of the sort instead." But it was not that the members of the "internationalist faction" were not nationalistic. Stationed in France and West Germany early in their careers, they had watched the governments there take a strong posi-

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tion against U.S. capital. For this reason, they could be counted on to be unyielding, as they were during the textile negotiations of the late 1960s and early 1970s. According to Morozumi Yoshihiko, an internationalist and vice minister, the "internationalist faction" refers to people who "protect the national interest using an international perspective"; it differs from the "domestic faction, which is intoxicated with a simplistic nationalism that tries to defend the fort against all intrusions." It was a "historical inevitability," he says, that the "internationalist faction" would achieve victory and the internationalization of the Japanese economy. (Kakuma 1977:52) But some of the people who were directly involved would argue that there was no such thing as a "nationalist" or an "internationalist" faction. There was, instead, a Sahashi faction and an Imai faction. NewJapan Steel Trade liberalization proceeded apace, and by April 1964 the rate of liberalization had reached 92 percent. That month, Japan shifted to IMF Article 8 status and became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), thereby becoming a full-fledged member of the advanced countries. In exchange, it faced a problem even more vexing than trade liberalization—namely, capital liberalization. When Japan joined the O E C D , it had the largest number of exceptions to the O E C D capital liberalization code of any of the sixteen member countries except Spain and Portugal. It was therefore pressured to rescind these exceptions. In MITI's view, when dealing with trade liberalization, it was sufficient to adopt "a strategy of importing technology from Europe and America, combining it with Japanese labor, and then offering products to the market that could compete profitably with those of other countries." But if capital was liberalized, then Japanese firms, with their low level of capitalization, would fall prey to foreign firms just as Western European firms had been taken over by the United States. (Johnson 1982:276) As a defense, it would be necessary to promote large-scale mergers and create economic concentrations equivalent in scale to those found in the United States and Europe. It would be necessary to reduce the present six major steel producers to two or three firms, and the ten automobile manufacturers to two. MITI's policy was to "nurture firms that could do battle internationally." Mergers and amalgamations abounded during the late 1960s. T h e largest was the merger of Yawata Steel and Fuji Steel, for which preparations were begun in 1969. The world's largest steel manufacturing company, the New Japan Steel Corporation, was born in March 1970. Three research associations—Sanken, the Friday Society (Kinyokai), and the National Land Development Research Association—were organized in 1966. Their formation attracted attention as a turning point in the

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activities of the zaikai. Each initially had a membership of about ten toplevel managers from the largest firms in banking, steel, foreign trade, chemicals, electrical power, and other industries. Sanken was designed to study the industrial structure, the Friday Society to study foreign policy issues, and the National Land Development Research Association to study regional development, including agricultural issues. T h e y had close ties with one another, and all three reviewed measures for strengthening the foundation of the Japanese economy under a liberal economic system. T h e central figures in Sanken were highly critical of Keidanren president Ishizaka's reliance on economic laissez-faire and h o p e d to "create a framework for leadership in the reorganization of industry through the zaikai's own efforts, without the help of government." T h e y did not restrict themselves to economic issues but aimed to b e c o m e a "zaikai general staff" whose scrutiny would extend even to long-term political objectives. In addition to performing the petitioning and essay writing that existing economic associations had engaged in, they also h o p e d to translate any conclusions they reached into concrete action. Sanken later brought its membership up to twenty by adding leaders of the four existing economic organizations and representatives from several key industries. It began to act as a "zaikai general headquarters," determining basic strategies on issues like overseas natural resources development, industrial reorganization, and antipollution measures. MITI's merger plans did not always succeed. In 1967-68 executives of Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler came to Japan in search of j o i n t venture partners. At that time, MITI was working to merge Japan's automobile companies into two firms built around Toyota and Nissan. It had obtained promises from the various manufacturers that they would not enter into joint ventures with the American manufacturers without first discussing the matter with MITI. But Mitsubishi Heavy Industries suddenly announced in May 1969 that it had agreed to establish a new automobile corporation with Chrysler (with Mitsubishi holding 65 percent and Chrysler holding 35 percent of the equity). T h e Mitsubishi Motors Corporation was formed in June 1970. T h e merger of Mitsubishi and Isuzu that MITI wanted was not realized, and Isuzu ended u p establishing a j o i n t venture with General Motors under a 65:35 share-holding arrangement. In this manner, the liberalization of the auto industry occurred without the implementation of MITI's reorganization plan. " A grown son [the industry] tends to forget to show gratitude toward his parents [MITI] for their loving care," commented Sahashi. Others commented that the ministry had been "bitten in the hand by its pet d o g . " (Johnson 1982:186-89) T h e Japanese economy developed rapidly during the 1960s. Crude steel production grew from 22 million tons to 93 million tons, and automobile production from 480,000 to 5,290,000 units. T h e value of petrochemical pro-

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duction increased from ¥11 billion in 1958, the year that production was first initiated, to ¥1.2 trillion in 1970. MITI, it might be said, had achieved spectacular success. But this success also represented the end of its mission. Perhaps the new international trade and industry policy made public in J u n e 1969, which stressed a switch to "private sector guidance," implicidy acknowledged this change. The 1973 reorganization of MITI was the most extensive since the one that accompanied the implementation of the peace treaty in 1952. The enterprise bureau was renamed the industrial policy bureau, the chemical bureau and the heavy industries bureau were merged, and an entirely new machinery and information industries bureau was created, putting electronics, computers, automobiles, and general machinery under one roof. The textiles and miscellaneous goods bureau was renamed the consumer goods industries bureau, and the Natural Resources and Energy Agency was created as an external agency of the ministry. The Nixon Shocks of August 1971 and the oil shock of October 1973 destroyed the international monetary system and the stable energy supply that had supported Japan's economic growth (as well as that of the other advanced countries) during the 1960s. Pollution and environmental issues became serious social problems. Movements opposing the rising cost of living began to spread. International criticism of the export drives and overseas penetration of Japanese firms rose. Trade friction appeared. It is unlikely that national crises will fail MITI. If they do, MITI will surely go out and find a national crisis. Marukei Funding The volume of subsidies administered by MITI is not all that great. In contrast to the ¥2.7 trillion administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, it amounted to a mere ¥190 billion in 1982. Most of it is directed toward technology development and capital accumulation by big corporations. Except for subsidies to small and medium-sized enterprises, little of it has much of an impact on votes. But MITI is also involved in licensing and approval activity. It handles 2,080 such items, bringing it into second place behind the Ministry of Transportation's 2,303 items. In third place is the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry with 1,446. (All 1982 figures.) Licensingand-approval authority is a much more potent source of power than subsidies. Subsidies simply represent an added incentive. Not granting a license or approval can make it impossible to operate an enterprise at all. And licensing and approval does not require budgetary appropriations beyond the personnel costs required to process the paperwork. It is, in short, an inexpensive form of regulatory power.

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MITI's most important administrative activities from the standpoint of nurturing electoral bases are the management improvement projects of the chambers of commerce and the commerce and industry associations. The management consultants and other officials of these organizations cultivate LDP votes through their services to an area's businessmen and industrialists. In the late 1960s the JCP-affiliated Democratic Commerce and Industry Association (Minshu Shókókai, or Minsho) was making gains in Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, and other progressive-led local governments. Minsho membership had grown from 62,000 in 1965 to 175,000 in 1971. This amounted to roughly 16-17 percent of all small-enterprise operators. Although the LDP did well in less industrialized regions in the 1972 general election, it suffered massive setbacks in the large urban areas. It won 271 seats, the lowest number since the conservative merger. On the other hand, the JCP captured seats in all electoral districts in Tokyo, Osaka, Kanagawa, and Kyoto. Its total jumped from 14 to 38 seats. Around the time the Tanaka cabinet was established that summer, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry asked MITI minister Nakasone for a "¥i trillion management improvement fund" for small businesses. Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry president Nagano Shigeo recalls: During my travels from Hokkaido to Kyushu to hold discussions with the leaders of the local chambers, I had been astonished by the fact that the number of small and medium-sized enterprises and ultra-small enterprises affiliated with JCP-led Minsho had increased. The incentive was that, if they joined Minsho, it would haggle taxes down for them. . . . I was overcome by a sense of crisis. I felt that I had to do something. (Nagano Shigeo, "Waga zaikai jinsei," Asahi shinbun,

February 7, 1982, as quoted in Zenshókó Rodó Kumiai

Tsüsan Gyósei Kenkyükai 1983:134)

When Nakasone received Nagano's request, he directed his vice minister to add it to the draft budget for the upcoming fiscal year. "I was having a lot of trouble with measures against Minsho when I was installed as MITI minister. . . . Nagano came to me with an extremely good proposal, so I jumped at it, saying 'I'll take you up on that. . . . I will take charge of the party, so you attack MOF.'" (Nagano Shigeo, "Waga zaikai jinsei," Asahi shinbun, February 7, 1982, as quoted in Zenshókó Rodó Kumiai Tsüsan Gyósei Kenkyükai 1983:134) Although MOF disapproved of the fact that the loans were to be unsecured and unguaranteed, the LDP pushed its objections aside by arguing that the risk involved was a small price to pay to fight Minsho. Thus, unsecured and unguaranteed "Marukei funds" were placed in the draft budget a mere month after the general election. The procedures involved were as follows:

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THE DYNAMICS OF THE 1955 SYSTEM 1. People desiring loans applied to a chamber of commerce and industry (or commerce and industry association) and discussed the matter with a chamber consultant. 2. The consultant investigated the [firm's] business situation and the repayment plan, and drew up a recommendation for funding. The recommendation was brought before a chamber review committee. 3. The members of the committee were named by the president of the chamber (or the president of the association) from among the officers of the chamber and other such individuals. 4. Loans were provided through the People's Finance Corporation [a public corporation].

Roughly ¥30 billion worth of financing was provided during fiscal 1973. The following year, urban-based LDP Diet members demanded an increased allotment to attract urban votes. The amount rose dramatically to ¥120 billion and then to ¥240 billion in 1974. "Marukei Funds Number Two," which expanded the financing to retail and service operations with "five or fewer employees" and factories of "twenty or less" was established in fiscal 1977. The ceiling on the size of a single loan was raised from ¥1 million to ¥3 million. The total was ¥510 billion in fiscal 1978. It did not increase thereafter because 30 percent of the funds were undistributed. The number of business consultants and other support personnel funded by the national treasury also increased. From 8,6oo in 1973, they more than doubled to 17,423 in 1980. Just as the agricultural cooperative staff member knew the family budget of each farm household, so these consultants and advisory personnel became intimately familiar with conditions in stores and small factories. And like the agricultural cooperative staff, they consolidated votes when election time came around. Commercial and factory operators form a very stable electoral base for the LDP. The proportion of independent commercial and factory operators among the total population was 19 percent in 1955, 20 percent in 1965, and 19 percent in 1975. LDP supporters accounted for 62 percent, 58 percent, and 59 percent of these people; they formed 24 percent, 26 percent, and 26 percent of all LDP supporters in these years. (See Tables 18 and 37.) The number of Representatives with ties to small and medium-sized industrial cooperatives decreased from 40 (9 percent) in 1958 to 34 (7 percent) in 1979. Of these, 80 percent were affiliated with the LDP. In contrast, the number of Representatives affiliated with local chambers grew from 15 (3 percent) in 1958 to 27 (5 percent) in 1979. Of these, 90 percent were LDPaffiliated. Among LDP members of the House of Councilors, those with ties to small and medium-sized industrial cooperatives numbered about 9 throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and the number associated with local chambers of commerce hovered around 3. (Naka 1980:386-87, 590-91)

EIGHT

The Socialists

UNIFICATION AND DIVISION

The 1950s were a time of class struggle. Bitter battles were fought between corporate management, which had begun implementing technological innovations and a movement to increase productivity, and Sóhyó unions, which engaged in repeated shopfloor and antidismissal actions. It appeared at the time that the Socialists might actually gain control of the government in the near future if its left wing, which was gaining in each general election with the full backing of Sóhyó, joined forces with the right wing. But after the parties united, the JSP did not continue to gain. The 1958 general election, in which it won 166 seats, turned out to be its most successful election. The party stagnated in the early 1960s and from the middle of the decade onward, its decline was evident. The decline of the JSP was caused by the advance of industrialization. It brought with it a movement to rationalize production, which was implemented despite fierce union opposition and led to the restructuring of shopfloor groups within a new centralized administrative framework. At the same time, a union movement calling for cooperation between labor and management increased its influence, precipitating a realignment of the labor front. In the face of these two pressures, Sóhyó's influence receded, and the single large electoral base of the JSP shrank. Advanced industrialization also fostered the spread of mass society. During the early 1960s it appeared that this trend would work in favor of the JSP. But from the middle of the decade, it began instead to erode the base of the JSP and promote party pluralization. The changes in union attitudes arising from the rationalization of the workplace can be seen as one aspect

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of encroaching mass society. Engulfed by the wave of mass society during the late 1960s, the electoral base of the JSP collapsed. There were no guideposts for reestablishing the vitality of the socialist movement under these conditions. In fact, one might ask, did the theory of class struggle formulated a century earlier by revolutionary intellectuals in western Europe ever prove its validity in the world? In no instance did a socialist revolution occur in a country where industrial capitalism had "matured." Rather, these occurred in countries where industrialization was delayed. Nor did they occur as a consequence of class struggle. Was there some special reason why this doctrine should maintain its validity in the midst of rapidly advancing industrialization? The situation, in fact, developed in the opposite direction. That is, as advanced industrialization proceeded, the goals of and the conditions undergirding class struggle crumbled visibly. In the present chapter, I would like to present the circumstances leading up to the unification of the socialist parties in some detail. Since my earlier work focused on the LDP (Masumi 1985), I have not covered this issue in much detail. Coverage of the subject is essential, however, to any discussion of the post-1955 JSP. Suzuki and Wada The initial stronghold of the socialist left wing was the Satsukikai (May Society) , which was formed around Suzuki Mosaburo in 1947 in opposition to Nishio Suehiro and the right wing, which controlled the party's leadership at the time. Suzuki was born in Aichi Prefecture in 1893. His father pulled a rickshaw, and his mother did piecework. The family lived in a dilapidated house, and when there was no work they ate porridge made of the lees of bean curd. Suzuki writes, "This porridge tasted so horrible that I could hardly eat it. My mother would then scold me and, crying, I would drink tears as I ate." His grades in elementary school were outstanding. With the exception of a B in chorus, he received all As. He enjoyed elementary school. There were times, however, when he tasted utter humiliation. He was chided by a teacher when he could not pay the monthly tuition of 20 sen. He was forced to stand in the hallway because he could not buy a textbook. Between leaving elementary school and graduating from Waseda University's Professional Division political economy program, he delivered newspapers and milk, pulled a cart, worked on a construction gang, worked as a street vendor, houseboy, and lacquerware-painting pieceworker, and did just about any other type of work that did not interfere with his school schedule. I will skip his romantic experiences. He graduated from the po-

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litical economy program in 1915 and joined the staff of the Hochi shinbun. He traveled to Siberia in 1918 as a foreign correspondent: "My eyes, which until then had been blurred, saw socialism very clearly." He then transferred to the Taisho nichinichi but eventually quit. From 1920 to 1922 he traveled in the United States, Europe, and Russia. While in Moscow, he participated in the Far Eastern People's Conference along with several other Japanese leftists who became prominent later. After visiting Siberia, Outer Mongolia, and China in early 1922, he landed at Shimonoseki in April. Between August and December he gave lectures about his trip. In November of that year he became a reporter for the Mainichi shinbun. He participated in founding the Political Study Association (Seiji Kenkyukai) in 1924, becoming an executive committee member and secretary, and in forming the Labor Farmer Party (Ronoto) in 1926. He left the Mainichi shinbun in 1926 to devote himself to the socialist movement. He was jailed in 1937 during the First People's Front Incident. After the war, he participated in forming the JSP in 1945 and became a member of its central executive committee. He was elected a Representative in the April 1946 general election. In 1947 he established the Satsukikai and batded with the right wing. Following the JSP's major defeat in the April 1949 general election, Suzuki became party secretary general and then chairman in January 1951. The public response was overwhelming when he stated in his inaugural address: "Young man, never take up a gun again. Ladies, do not send your husbands, your children, to battle." (Suzuki 1958) The most unusual leader of the left wing was Wada Hiroo. Born in 1903, Wada graduated from the old Sixth Higher School in Okayama and Tokyo University's Faculty of Law. He entered the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, where he showed great promise. But he was arrested and then jailed in 1941 in an incident involving the cabinet planning board. He was acquitted after the war, in September 1945, and returned to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry as chief of its agricultural policy bureau. He became agricultural minister in the first Yoshida cabinet, the position from which he implemented a program of land reform. Wada was a senior student of the "Yoshida School." Although Yoshida subsequently called Wada a dropout for joining the JSP (Ono 1962:129), the mutual respect and affection between the two did not disappear in later years. Wada was elected from the national district in the April 1947 House of Councilors election. He was in the limelight as director of the Katayama cabinet's Economic Stabilization Board. It was right after the JSP suffered its tremendous loss in the March 1949 general election that he joined that party. At a time when high-level bureaucrats entering the political world joined the conservative parties, why did Wada join the JSP? Although he never did address this question directly, he probably felt that he could re-

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alize the economic programs that he had begun as a bureaucrat u n d e r a JSP government. Shiomi Tomonosuke, who served as agricultural vice minister, says: Wada sensed that the United States did not intend to continue its military occupation of Japan for long. T h e Liberal Party and Yoshida Shigeru were there only because of the backing of the United States. . . . H e probably wagered that the "left side" would eventually be able to carry out its policies. Bureaucrats, generally speaking, want to implement their policies with the backing of the government in power, regardless of whether it is of the right or the left. In the United States, there was a plan for early withdrawal from Asia, and I think that his prognosis would have been correct had it not been for the Korean War. (Otake 1981:2:3)

In an interview in 1951, Wada said, " A JSP government will definitely arrive within a decade. But for that to happen, the left and the right [wings of the party] must unite. T h e ideology that will become its backbone should be that of Britain's [Aneurin] Bevan, its concrete policies should be like those of Sweden, and its foreign policy should suprapartisan." (Otake 1981:2:230) Although Wada was personally close to Katayama Tetsu and Kawakami Jotaro of the right wing, he disliked the boss-like tendencies of people like Nishio and Matsuoka Komakichi. But he was also critical of the fury, the recalcitrance, and the tradition of abstract debate that dated back to the prewar left wing's Proletarian Party. H e sought socialist policies that were pragmatic and rational. Policies of this kind were undoubtedly a prerequisite if the JSP h o p e d to gain control of the government. T h e zaikai and the conservative parties were filled with apprehension over the trend of JSP expansion. Some of their members demanded the reformation and strengthening of the conservative parties. Others began to feel that, if the JSP became pragmatic in the fashion of the British Labour Party or the German Social Democratic Party, a two-party rotation of government would be acceptable. In the event that this occurred, the foremost JSP leader considered worthy of confidence as a negotiating partner was Wada. Because of his background and his personality, he had numerous acquaintances in the conservative parties and in the zaikai. But because both pragmatic policies and association with the conservative parties and the zaikai were anathema to the JSP, Wada became an object of "class suspicion." Right after the split of the JSP in October 1951, Wada became chairman of the Left Socialist Party's policy affairs council; from that position he prepared a framework of policies to be implemented by a Socialist government. This plan was released by the central executive committee in October 1953. It called for an initial two-year preparatory period for "establishing an independent peace-oriented economy through the pursuit of autonomous

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neutralist diplomatic negotiations and conducting organizational preparations for socialization policies." During the next three years "the first steps of concrete advance toward socialism will be taken." Among the items to be implemented were "the nationalization of basic industries," "the democratization of corporate entities," "the modernization and cooperativization" of primary industries and small and medium-sized enterprises, and the establishment of "a planning and implementation structure." This document was adopted by the January 1954 party congress. Wada's close associate, Katsumata Seiichi, relates: The "Wada Policy Affairs Council" had a very big impact for a long time thereafter. First of all, it made policy concrete and realistic. Wada did not simply voice opposition but had a strong inclination to formulate agricultural policies, economic policies, and so on, concretely and from the standpoint of the JSP. He worked for policy making that was realistic, concrete, and coherent in content. Second, he did not simply oppose the budget but contested the "government draft" by drawing up the JSP's own "comprehensive rearrangement draft" and submitted amendments that could be implemented even under a conservative government. Third, he nurtured talented personnel among the Diet members and the party secretariat staff.... Fourth, there was the relationship with the zaikai. Because Wada thought that, as a responsible opposition party in a two-party system, [the JSP] should hold discussions with the zaikai, he met with Keidanren and Keizai Doyukai of Tokyo and with the Kansai zaikai as well. This was something that could have been done only by Wada, who was formerly a director of the Economic Stabilization Board. After that, the link was broken completely. (Otake 1981:2:87)

One other important document prepared by Wada during this period was the Left Socialist Party platform. The January 1953 party congress decided to adopt a party platform and appointed a subcommittee with Wada as its chairman. Grounded in traditional Rono theory, the draft platform that was released in November defined the fundamental contradiction of the postwar period as one between Japanese monopoly capital and the working class. The revolutionary task was social democratic revolution. The JCP's platform argued that the Occupation had maintained the emperor system along with the feudalistic character of agriculture. It stressed thatJapan had turned into a subservient colonial country through a sham peace treaty, and it called for a democratic revolution of liberation through violent struggle like that in China. By contrast, the Left Socialist draft platform viewed Japan as an advanced monopoly capitalist country like the United States and called for the peaceful achievement of socialist revolution through the Diet. It saw the achievement of independence as one aspect of the process of overthrowing monopoly capital. It is inconceivable that Wada was happy with the draft. Suzuki was probably not in favor of it either. But the January 1954 party congress approved

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the draft with a partial revision that emphasized the struggle for national independence. Thus, Rónó Marxism was reaffirmed in the Left Socialist platform. Discord and Recrimination Wada assumed the post of party secretary general at the January 1954 party congress. Katsumata relates: At that time, Chairman Suzuki wanted to make his protégé Sasaki Kózó the party's secretary general. Suzuki was someone whose tactics involved a good dose of petty intrigue. Suzuki approached me before the party congress during [former] Secretary General Nomizo [Masara] 's hospitalization. "Although it's Wada's turn after Nomizo, Wada has taken on quite a bit of debt in conjunction with the Social Times. If he became secretary general now, this would all fall on the JSP and could very well bankrupt the party. It might be best at this point to pass over Wada as secretary general." This got me quite upset. I brushed him off: "You have got to be kidding. . . . There is no one other than Wada for successor secretary general." . . . Suzuki backed down, saying, "Okay, I won't take the matter any further. No further." But the allimportant Wada suffered a stroke just before the January 1954 party congress. . . . I kept insisting that his condition wasn't very serious, so Suzuki approached Takemi Taro in order to sound out Wada's condition. I received a call from Takemi warning me to watch out, that there had been this kind of activity on the "Suzuki side." . . . I resolved to bring about a Wada party secretary generalship no matter what. It was the second or third day of the congress, and it was snowing. It was touch and go, but we received special permission from the doctor and carried Wada from his hospital bed to the Toshima Public Hall where the congress was being held. Wada brushed aside my hand as I tried to support him and stood at the podium. (Ótake 1981:52-53) The Social Times was a daily newspaper inspired by the British Labour Party's Daily Herald (first published in 1912). Capitalized at ¥10 million, it began publication in March 1952 with the aim of expanding the party organization and enlightening the masses. It was an exceedingly ambitious project. After two years and three months of inept management, the paper finally went bankrupt, ceasing publication in May 1954. Since the Left Socialists had neither financial credibility nor collateral, Wada's personal guarantees were used to obtain credit from a paper wholesaler and a printer even though he himself was not responsible for the paper. It is said that about ¥80 million was owed at the time of the bankruptcy. Even though Sóhyó took over ¥40 million-¥50 million of this debt, Wada personally owed about ¥35 million and was tormented by the debt until his death. After he died, a creditors' association wrote off the remaining debt. Both Suzuki and Eda Saburó refused to take any responsibility. It is likely that Wada came to mistrust Suzuki and Eda, even though he himself said nothing about it. According

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to Otake Keisuke, his biographer, there are extremely few instances in Wada's diary where he uses emotional expressions to describe personal relationships. The rare instances of expressed antipathy are directed at Suzuki and Eda. (Otake 1:256) The animosity between Suzuki and Wada was an open secret among newspaper reporters at the time. Although both of them were clean, sincere, and studious, the right chemistry was simply not there. Outright dissension between the two probably developed because Wada began to enter the limelight as policy affairs council chairman and secretary general and continued to solidify his position inside the party. Shimizu Shinzo relates, "The normally good-natured Suzuki would say and do some astonishing things when and only when it came to Wada. He probably saw him as a rival." (Shimizu 1965:262) Kobayashi Kohei, a former Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry bureaucrat, Councilor, and mayor of Nagaoka, who was close to Wada, states: There was, to be sure, a sort of "Wada adoration" in the press around that time. Owing in part to a buildup by the media, Wada surfaced and entered the limelight in great splendor. Chairman Suzuki was not very amused, and perhaps even contemptuous. . . . News reporters would shuffle back and forth between them with their own agenda in tow. . . . A n d one more thing. There is something about the J S P that prevents it from creating a new star at the expense of others. It is nowhere near as good at star making as the LDP. T h e J C P is better at it than the JSP. (Otake 1 9 8 1 : 2 : 2 6 1 - 6 2 )

Suzuki and the Suzuki faction's animosity toward Wada—"class suspicion"— spurred the unification of the Socialist Party. (Yanada 1956:117) Asanuma and Kawakami

The Right Socialist Party was inaugurated immediately following the 1951 split of the JSP, with Asanuma Inejiro as secretary general and the post of chairman left unfilled. Asanuma was born on Miyakejima in 1889, where his father was the mayor. Intending to become a politician, he enrolled at Waseda University over the fierce opposition of his father. Financial support was eventually cut off, and he was forced to work his way through college, although this situation turned out to be less burdensome than one might imagine. He operated a fountain pen wholesale dealership and became a well-established businessman. He was in the sumo club as well as the League of Builders (Kensetsusha Domei), a left-wing study group. He actively participated in tenancy and labor disputes throughout the country and served in offices of the Japan Farmers' Union, the Japan Miners' Union, and Sodomei in addition to being secretary of the Farmer Labor Party and a member of the Japan Labor Farmer Party executive committee. He was first elected to public office in the 1936 general election, participated in the post-

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war formation of the JSP, and was one of the few Labor Farmer Party affiliates who escaped the purge of public officials. His love for giving speeches inspired a song: 'Numa is a speech-making peasant, he is, With his filthy clothes and his beat-up shoes. If today it's the Honjo Public Hall, Tomorrow it's the temples in Kyoto.

Tadokoro Teruaki writes: That five-foot two-inch, 182-pound Asanuma Inejiro is a "hurricane." As soon as he climbs up to the podium in his batde-soiled, threadbare clothes, he plays to the crowd. He may very well say, with high-society mannerisms and a voice unbefitting his big face, " I am A s a n u m a . . . . " Or else he might suddenly open his scoop-like palms, run them through his disheveled hair, and say in a barbaric voice . . . , " T h e masses who overthrew the reactionary Tanaka [Giichi] cabinet must use that momentum to overthrow the recessionary Hamaguchi cabinet. Overthrow and overthrow again! Struggle and struggle again! This is how the government of the workers and the farmers is going to be brought into being." (Tadokoro, Musantojujigai, quoted in Tamura 1984:393)

He would inevitably start berating government officials at the end of a speech, eventually closing with a tussle with the police and his arrest. Kono Mitsu notes, "Who knows how many dozens of times Asanuma was arrested. There was undoubtedly not one detention cell in the capital with which the Asanuma of around 1931-32 was not familiar." Asanuma was no mere "speech-making peasant" agitating on behalf of political action. He earned the nickname "Mr. Now-now" for his habit of jumping into party quarrels and saying, "Now, n o w . . . . " With his kindly yet slightly eccentric face, his raspy voice, and his huge trunk, his entire body exuded humor and cheer. During grave factional infighting he would help engineer compromises and calm things down. He was secretary general when the left and the right wings battled one another. When the party split he was secretary general. And when they reunited he was again secretary general. The JSP needed him. Asanuma lived with his wife in the Dojunkai Apartments in Shirakawacho, Fukagawa. They did not have any children. On December 26, 1981, on the twenty-first anniversary of his death (his wife died that March), some reporters who knew him gathered in the now-empty apartment. When seen from the main street, it appeared seedy, decaying, as if abandoned. But in the alley, near the rooms where he lived, were two or three old-fashioned outdoor vending stalls with their bare electric light bulbs and arrangements of vegetables, tofu, and various side dishes. Aproned housewives from the neighborhood were going merrily about their shopping. With ten people, Asanuma's room was full. The middle-aged reporters sat on the floor with

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their knees together as they ate from a pot of stewed duck. Old 'Numa used to sit in this room, on the floor with his legs crossed. He used to pour some coarse tea into a teacup, add a little whiskey, and then keep company late into the night. Snacks used to consist of nothing more than some peanuts or some rice crackers. Once in a while, when some dried horse mackerel would arrive from Miyakejima, he would use his big hands to wrap two or three pieces in newspaper and give them to visitors to take home. (Tamura 1984:404-5) The first congress of the Right Socialist Party, held in January 1952, the year following the party's formation, raised the banner of "democratic socialism" and declared that the Left Socialist Party, led by a group of procommunists, would degenerate into "the puppet force of the JCP" within a few months. Kawakami Jo taro took over as party chairman at the "leap forward" party congress that August. Kawakami was also a Labor Farmer Party affiliate. He was born in the Shiba District of Tokyo in 1889. His father, originally a carpentry foreman who moved on to the used-lumber business, was baptized as a Christian and soon began to put more energy into proselytizing than into his business. Under the influence of his father, the young Kawakami took to Christianity quite easily from around the time he was in elementary school. He was extremely bright and received As in all subjects except chorus, where, like Suzuki, he received a B. Socialists do not seem to be very good at singing in harmony. He joined the debating club when he was a student in the old First Higher School. After graduating from the Tokyo University Faculty of Law, he became a lecturer at Rikkyo University. In 1918 he transferred to Kansai Gakuin University, where he met the Christian socialist Kagawa Toyohiko and began participating in the labor and political movements. He became director of the Kobe branch of the Political Study Association in 1925. He was elected as a Labor Farmer Party candidate from Kobe in the first universal suffrage election of 1928. It is said that when he realized he would have to sell the contents of his library in order to run for office, he sat in his study and cried, with his wife crying alongside. Eight people were elected from the proletarian parties in that election, including the Social Mass Party's Nishio Suehiro and the Labor Farmer Party's Mizutani Chozaburo. Because Kawakami served as general affairs director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in 1940, he was purged in the postwar public officials' purge. He was depurged in 1951. Miwajuso and Kono Mitsu, also affiliated with the Labor Farmer Party, were depurged at the same time. They all joined the Right Socialist Party. When Kawakami became chairman at the August 1952 Right Socialist Party congress, he greeted the delegates with "To me, the chairmanship is a cross. However, I have resolved that I must bear that cross and fight to the day I die." He has been called "Chairman Cross" ever since.

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Nishio's Return At the request of members with ties to the old Social Mass Party, Nishio Suehiro returned to the party in 1952 and became a party adviser. Born in 1891 in Megijima in Kagawa Prefecture, Nishio graduated from higher elementary school and then traveled to Osaka, where he became a lathe operator. In 1920 he became director of the Sodomei Osaka federation. In 1926 he participated in forming the Social Mass Party and was first elected from Osaka in the 1928 general election. He helped found the postwar JSP, eventually becoming party secretary, chief cabinet minister in the Katayama cabinet, and vice prime minister in the Ashida cabinet. He was considered the most influential power holder of the right wing. He fell from grace after being accused of complicity in the Showa Denko scandal (he was acquitted in 1958). He was defeated in the 1949 general election but was returned in the 1952 general election. T h e situation had changed completely during his absence. Sohyo had been established, and the Left Socialists were beginning to advance rapidly. Nishio was no doubt extremely displeased by the new situation and probably filled with a desire to change the course of events. With Nishio's return, the clash between the Kawakami faction, associated with the Labor Farmer Party, and the Nishio faction, associated with the Social Mass Party, was brought into the Right Socialist Party. A draft program submitted to the January 1953 party congress called for opposing rearmament but on the condition that there be "the maintenance of a capacity to keep order sufficient to prevent indirect invasion." T h e Nishio faction pressed for a revision of the program on grounds that "a party that is trying to gain control of the government should not take up opposition to rearmament or opposition to constitutional revision so frivolously." T h e Kawakami faction countered with a draft amendment of its own that demanded the removal of the conditional clause on grounds that allowing a regional collective security system would lead to a toleration of rearmament. T h e result was a draw. Both proposals for amendment were withdrawn. T h e clashes were not exclusively over rearmament. In order to expand their influence, the Right Socialists encouraged labor unions like Sodomei—reestablished to counter S o h y o — a n d farmers' associations like Zenno to join the party. It also encouraged mergers with smaller groups like the Farmers' Cooperative Party. T h e Nishio faction increased its following in the process. T h e Nishio faction was also involved in the maneuvering of the Sohyo anti-mainstream. When the core industrial unions of the Sohyo right-wing Democratic Labor Movement Study Group (Minshu Rodo Undo Kenkyukai, or M i n r o k e n ) — t h e Textile Workers' Union, the Seamen's Union, the Japan Broadcasting Labor Union, and the Japan Actors' Union—challenged

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the Sohyo executive in 1952, the Right Socialists supported them. Minroken formed a liaison council the following February with fifteen member organizations representing 700,000 unionists. At the Sohyo convention in July, the four industrial unions criticized the executives' draft program as being pro-communist in character; they argued that bringing Left Socialist conflicts into Sohyo amounted to a corruption of the labor movement. When their counterproposal was defeated, they decided to leave Sohyo. In April 1954 the Seamen's Union, the Textile Workers' Union, and the Japan Actors' Union joined forces with the Sodomei-affiliated unions to form the Japan Trade Union Congress (Zen Nihon Rodo Kumiai Kaigi, or Zenro Kaigi), representing 850,000 union members. The Nishio faction encouraged these consolidations. As the left wing was gaining strength in the general elections, the Nishio faction was able to expand its influence within the right wing. T h e Kawakami faction, which controlled the party executive, undoubtedly saw Nishio's gains as a threat. It probably agreed to go along with the Left Socialist Suzuki faction's call for unification for this reason. The Unification of the Socialist Party The Left Socialists, who had overtaken the Right Socialists in the April 1953 general and House of Councilors elections, called on the Right Socialists to merge with them. At the special Left Socialist Party congress of May 17, Chairman Suzuki announced, "Now that our party has established its leading position, it should boldly and forthrighdy appeal to the Right Socialist Party to unite the socialist political forces and build a joint struggle, starting with the lower-level organizations." In spring 1954 the Yoshida cabinet reached a state of near collapse. By late March a revival movement to form a new conservative party was under way. In response, Left Socialist chairman Suzuki and Right Socialist chairman Kawakami met in Osaka in March and Kyoto in April and hammered out a plan for a coalition government. That autumn the Democratic Party was formed, and the Yoshida cabinet fell. T h e Hatoyama cabinet was established in December. T h e House of Representatives was dissolved the following January. Maneuvers on behalf of Socialist unification were in full swing. O n January 8 two concurrendy held Socialist Party congresses adopted identical proposals for unification, which had been prepared ahead of time by unification committees in each party. T h e Democratic Party won 185 seats, considerably less than a majority, in the general election in February. Beginning in April maneuvering for conservative unification, led by the Democratic Party, suddenly became vigorous. T h e Left Socialists won 89 seats in the election and the Right Socialists, 67. T h e gains of the Left Socialists were particularly impressive. O n March 2

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Left Socialist secretary general Wada and Right Socialist secretary general Asanuma appointed ten party members each to a unification committee. T h e committee began deliberating in earnest after the local elections of May. It compared the Left Socialist Party platform adopted at the January 1954 party congress and the Right Socialist Party platform released in May 1955: First, a tentative agreement was reached that the party was a "class-oriented mass political party." But whereas the Left Socialists emphasized the core role of the proletariat and took the position that the party should represent the interests of a specific class, with farmers and small and medium-sized operators as allies, the Right Socialists asserted that workers, farmers, and small and medium-sized operators were all equal, that the Socialist Party would have no raison d'être unless widespread cooperation and support were obtained from them, and that an emphasis . . . on "class orientation" would amount to revolutionism. . . . The Left Socialists asserted that Japan was a highly developed capitalist monopoly country where the production capacity was highly developed. Therefore, full-fledged modern labor union organizations also existed. On this score Japan was in a completely different situation from colonies and semicolonies like the old India and old China. But because of the Occupation . . . , Japan was subservient to the United States. The Right Socialists asserted that, broadly speaking, a country could only be independent or a colony. Although Japan was constrained in various ways by the United States, it nonetheless belonged to the category of independent countries. The Left Socialists asserted, "The communism of the Soviet Union, except in its nondemocratic character, belongs generally to the category of socialist countries. But because it is a deviant form, we must make it clear that it differs from the socialism that we hold as our goal." The Right Socialists, claiming that the Soviet system "does not belong in the category of communism but belongs in the category of fascism and totalitarianism," strongly advocated " a fundamental criticism of the international communist movement." (Gekkan Shakaitô Henshubu 1 9 7 4 - 7 5 : 3 : 8 3 - 8 4 ) T h e two socialist parties were thus in conflict over basic principles. It is likely that they could never have reached an agreement had the negotiating committee engaged in serious debate. But because unification was seen as necessary, agreement had to be reached. On September 3 the draft Japan Socialist Party platform was completed. (Yanada 1956:120) According to public opinion polls conducted by the Jiji News Agency, the Right Socialists were still more popular than the Left Socialists, even though they had been overtaken by the Left Socialists in the general elections. (See Table 19.) On October 12 the Right Socialists and the Left Socialists held separate dissolution congresses—the former at Asakusa Public Hall and the latter at

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Toshima Public Hall. Then on October 13 the Japan Socialist Party was established at the Kyoritsu Auditorium in Kanda. The new party officers were as follows: chairman, Suzuki (Left Socialist); secretary general, Asanuma (Right Socialist); budgetary affairs committee chairman, Ito Ushiro (Right Socialist); policy affairs council chairman, Ito Kodo (Left Socialist); Diet countermeasures committee chairman, Katsumata (Left Socialist); election countermeasures committee chairman, Sasaki (Left Socialist); and control committee chairman, Kato Kanju (Right Socialist). There were four left-wing (3 Suzuki faction and 1 Wada faction) and three right-wing officers. The central executive committee contained twenty members each from the right and the left. There were fourteen advisers including Katayama, Rawakami, Nishio, and Matsuoka Komakichi. The party's action program listed the following three principles: maintaining the party's class orientation and establishing democracy within the party; eradicating the tendency to overemphasize parliamentarism and implementing day-to-day political action (in particular, party organizational activities within the context of mass activities) ; and encouraging party and mass organizations to work closely together while maintaining their mutual autonomy. It was the Suzuki faction that had promoted unification. It had united with the right wing in order to bring down Wada, and Secretary General Wada opposed the move for precisely this reason. (The Nomizo and Matsumoto factions were also opposed.) Following unification, he was given the cold shoulder. The only position that Wada held was membership in the central executive committee. But many of the younger newly elected Diet members who arrived after every election were unhappy with the factions and the seniority system inside the party. They began to coalesce around the policy-oriented Wada. The reporter Yanada notes, "It has been said that the fact that Wada never acted in a covetous manner was both a good point befitting a modern politician and a defect. Following unification, he abruptly began to pursue 'intraparty activities' in earnest. The way the Suzuki faction promoted the unification movement and handled personnel matters seems to have really gotten to him." (Yanada 1956:132) Before long the Wada faction formed a policy research association in the party secretariat in opposition to the Suzuki faction's Kurenaikai. After Ito Kodo died, Wada took the post of policy affairs council chairman at the January 1957 party congress. But he was removed after being implicated in a scandal that involved the passage of two fertilizer bills in March. Even though all of the approximately eighty Diet members who were involved were either not indicted or else not questioned at all, the JSP control committee nonetheless suspended Wada and Nomizo's right to hold party offices for one year and issued suspensions against Eda and four others lasting until the following party congress. Could this have been a

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frameup? It was not until four years later, in March 1961, that Wada reappeared in the party executive as international bureau chief. By this time, the JSP had entered a period of stagnation. Nishio's Secession from the Party Nishio was opposed to unification from the very beginning. Early in May 1955, about the time that the Right Socialists' platform was being released, he issued a pamphlet entitled "An Inquiry into the Issue of Socialist Party Unification," in which he argued that unification must not become an unprincipled compromise but must instead create a political party equal to the task of managing the political situation. After unification he particularly tried to resist the pressure of the Sohyo mainstream. T h e JSP did not make as much of a gain as expected in the May 1958 general election. Faced with "defeat," the party began to debate the subject of reorganization. Sohyo and the Socialism Association (Shakaishugi Kyokai) claimed that the party had failed to transcend the "one-third barrier" because of the vagueness of the current party platform, a lack of leadership by the party executive, and the absence of a clear-cut sense of confrontation against the establishment. A n "Association to Make the JSP Strong" was established in October, which included Sakisaka, Ota, Iwai, and Kihara Minoru. Sakisaka wrote in the December 1958 edition of the association's journal Shakaishugi (Socialism) that socialist zeal and a spirit of socialist revolution were more important than organization or structure. He demanded the ouster of the Nishio faction and a turn to the left on the part of the Suzuki faction. T h e Wada faction supported this position. T h e Nishio faction issued a rebuttal, claiming that, more than anything else, the JSP had failed because the party had been penetrated by Sohyo and lost its character as a national party. According to Matsui Masakichi, the Sakisaka essay presented itself philosophically as anti-right wing but politically was directed at establishing the culpability of the Suzuki faction. Suzuki criticized Sakisaka's conception and lack of realism in the lead essay of the January Gekkan Shakaito (JSP monthly). Realizing that a full-fledged debate was unfolding between the Suzuki faction and the association, panicked Sohyo executives led by Iwai conferred. Toward the end of December Iwai and Ota met with representatives of the four left-wing factions and agreed to circumvent a head-on collision between Sakisaka and Suzuki by channeling all discussion in an anti-right wing direction. In other words, they were supposed to j o i n forces and aim their attacks at Nishio's national party program. Nishio, of course, did not remain silent. He launched a counterattack against the class party program. O n December 10 he spoke before a large

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number of political and business world figures at a party to celebrate his acquittal in the Showa Denko scandal. Matsui claims that by this point "Nishio had probably already made a resolution of some sort, and he had a hunch that something awful was going to happen to the party." Thinking that it might be good to have one of the JSP executives serve as emcee at the party, Matsui sounded out Nishio, but Nishio had already made up his mind to have Nabeyama Sadachika, Yatsugi Kazuo, or Sugi Michisuke do the job. T h e last was a zaikai figure, and the JSP was critical of all three. (Matsui 1972:117-20) T h e JSP did poorly again in the local elections of April 1959. T h e June House of Councilors election was clearly a defeat, with the number of successful candidates dropping from 49 to 38. In June Ota and Iwai denounced the Nishio faction's call for a metamorphosis into a national party and asserted that they wanted the JSP to clarify its character as a class party. They also declared the principle that joint action with the JCP would be undertaken so long as the JCP supported peaceful revolution. The JCP had gradually moved toward support for a peaceful transition to socialism and was expanding its influence within Sohyd-affiliated labor unions. O n the day before the September JSP party congress, a national conference of the party's youth division attacked Nishio's rightist activities and approved a resolution calling for his expulsion by a vote of 98 to 21. O n the first day of the congress Sohyo secretariat chief Iwai, who was in attendance as a guest speaker, offered the following unorthodox salutation: "Bring the Nishio issue to a conclusion." T h e resentment of delegates associated with Sohyo burst forth. T h e Suzuki and Wada factions, however, could not decide to push through Nishio's expulsion. T h e Kawakami faction defended Nishio. In the end, the congress decided by a vote of 344 to 237 to place the Nishio issue before the party control committee. Ota states: There were about six hundred delegates at the party congress. The right-wing people were, naturally, united in their support for Nishio. The greater proportion of the left-wing people, including Suzuki and Sasaki, were ready to setde on something along the lines of a reprimand. At the start there were only sixty or so who favored the "Nishio expulsion." As Sohyo chairman, I resolutely advocated expulsion. [Among the sixty] were the members of the Socialism Association faction led by Sakisaka . . . , and the Kuroda Hisao and Kimura Kihachiro group. But probably some of the sixty were acting like spies. At the leadership level, the person who most strongly approved of the "Nishio expulsion" at that time was Eda Saburo.... Around that time, of course, Eda was an out-and-out Suzuki faction member, but Suzuki himself opposed the expulsion on grounds that expulsion would be too harsh. The Wada faction was also against expulsion. Those asso-

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ciated with Nichino [the Japan Farmers' Union, affiliated with the left-wing Socialists] were not sure what to do. T h e outcome was not expulsion but rather the imposition of disciplinary measures. Mr. Nishio had quite a few connections with capitalists and conservative politicians. Judging from his way of thinking, there is little doubt that he was maneuvering to make the JSP totally dependent on them and have it support rearmament.... He did not properly apologize nor did he adopt a defensive posture, but instead he countered boldly with an argument against the disciplinary measures. That is, he unleashed a "pro-rearmament" speech. Except for Nishio's trusted h e n c h m e n , most of the delegates were taken aback to learn Nishio's "true views," and in one stroke the expulsion plan gained a majority. (Ota 1976:131-34) The Formation of the DSP T h e m o t i o n t o p l a c e N i s h i o ' s case b e f o r e t h e party's c o n t r o l c o m m i s s i o n was a p p r o v e d late o n t h e n i g h t o f S e p t e m b e r 13. T h e N i s h i o f a c t i o n withdrew to the A y a teahouse near Yasukuni Shrine f o r consultation. T h e m e m b e r s d e c i d e d to w a t c h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t s in t h e p a r t y f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g w h i l e p r e p a r i n g f o r b o t h r e c o n c i l i a t i o n a n d strife. T h e N i s h i o f a c t i o n was a b s e n t f r o m t h e party c o n g r e s s t h e n e x t day. B u d g e t c o m m i t t e e c h a i r m a n Ito U s h i r o , n a t i o n a l m o v e m e n t c o m m i t t e e c h a i r m a n S o n e Eki, a n d c e n t r a l e x e c u t i v e c o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s N i s h i m u r a E i i c h i a n d I k e d a Teiji all submitt e d t h e i r r e s i g n a t i o n s . T h e c o n g r e s s a d j o u r n e d , w i t h a n a g r e e m e n t t o rec o n v e n e o n O c t o b e r 16 a n d 17. O n S e p t e m b e r 16, t h e N i s h i o f a c t i o n h e l d a g e n e r a l m e e t i n g o f its d e l e g a t e s at t h e F u k u y a i n n in K a n d a . It u n a n i m o u s l y s u p p o r t e d t h e c r e a t i o n o f a c a r e t a k e r c o m m i t t e e w i t h I t o as f o r m a l representative. O n S e p t e m b e r 18 a n e x c l u s i v e story a p p e a r e d o n t h e f r o n t p a g e o f t h e Asahi shinbun, w i t h t h e l a r g e h e a d l i n e " N i s h i o T a l k s o f P l a n f o r N e w Party." N i s h i o relates: O n September 13 . . . I was asked to appear on a Bunka Broadcasting radio program entitled "Press Conference." I was asked various questions by the Yomiuri shinbun's Sakai, the Asahi shinbun's Ota, and others, and I stated my opinions frankly. I indicated that this incident was a planned conspiracy of the left wing and that with this kind of situation in the JSP it would be virtually impossible for me to remain in the party and carry on the struggle. Ultimately, there would be little choice but to establish a new political party. (This was broadcast at 7:00 P.M.) O n the morning of September 17, about three days later, Ota of Asahi shinbun came by and said, "Yawata, our politics department chief, is saying that he'd like to find out a few things, perhaps over lunch." I casually accepted the invitation and together with Ota headed to the Alaska restaurant behind the Asahi Shinbun Building. Since on top of the fatigue that had built up over

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the past few days, I was treated to a beer, I was a bit tipsy. In addition, because of the big decision at the Aya the previous evening, I was well aware of the sentiment of my comrades on the question of forming a new political party. As a consequence, I inadvertently dropped my guard and in response to Yawata and Ota's questions spoke frankly about my plan for a new party, just as I had on the radio broadcast the previous evening. This appeared in a huge headline on the front page of the September 18 Asahi shinbun the next morning. It was a bit too early. After all, at the time Ito and the others were still meeting with Suzuki and Kawakami, trying to make various arrangements. But in retrospect, you could also say that, if anything, that bombshell statement of mine forced everyone to make up their minds. (Nishio 1968:351-52) T h e party congress reconvened on October 16 and 17, boycotted by the Nishio faction. The control committee decided to reprimand Nishio, and the congress acknowledged the measure unconditionally. At the same time, the Nishio faction set out to form a new political party. Nishio writes: We first established a temporary office in a room in Toshi Kaikan but moved to a small building in Tameike shortly thereafter. T h e post of secretariat chief was tentatively taken on by Nakamura Masao. O n e day Nakamura came to me and asked with a worried look, "Are we all right in the area of money?" "I wouldn't go so far as to say we're all right, but I do have leads for about ¥20 million," I answered. "We need at least ¥50 million by the time the party is established . . . , " he reminded me. Mr. Nakamura told me later: "We spent approximately ¥30 million during the three months between the creation of the Reconstruction Comrades Association and the formation of the DSP the following January. Roughly ¥10 million was key money for rental of the current party office, so the money spent probably amounted to around ¥20 million. At New Year's, we handed ¥200,000 or ¥300,000 to everyone. If you include that as well, then expenses amounted to around ¥4 million a month. It was really cheap when you think about it now." (Nishio 1968:350-51) The inaugural convention of the Reconstruction Comrades Association (Saiken Doshikai) was held on October 18 at the Toshi Kaikan in Kudan. The following January was set as the date for the formation of the new political party. In attendance were 250 delegates, including 21 members of the House of Representatives and 12 members of the House of Councilors. O n November 12 members of the Kawakami faction joined them, bringing the total to 31 Representatives and 14 Councilors. A survey conducted by the Jiji News Agency in November 1959 indicated support for the "former Socialist Party" at 12.5 percent and support for the "new Socialist Party" (the Nishio faction) at 6.0 percent. (Jiji Tsushinsha 19811572) The inaugural convention of the Democratic Socialist Party was held in Kudan Auditorium on January 24, i960, with 38 Representatives and 16

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Councilors attending. Many commentators and newspaper editors supported the DSP. Sone Eki was chosen party secretary. Nishio, who took office as the party's first chairman, saluted the gathering: "We pledge to work to become the main current of the progressive parties and to establish a Democratic Socialist Party government within five years." Nishio recalls, " I was sixty-nine at the time. It had come to pass that, once again, I would whip my aging body and charge my horse into the rapids." (Nishio 1968:355) In the J S P the Kawakami faction demanded at the central executive committee meeting in January that Chairman Suzuki and Secretary General Asanuma step down. It was reacting in part to the Suzuki faction's virtual monopolization of the roster of party officers at the previous year's party congress; it was also seeking compensation for not following Nishio out of the JSP. At the extraordinary party congress in March as well, the faction demanded Suzuki's and Asanuma's withdrawal and a Kawakami chairmanship. Sasaki, the most powerful person in the Suzuki faction, prepared a plan for Suzuki's voluntary resignation and the promotion of Asanuma in his place. Sohyo supported Kawakami in order to prevent the Kawakami faction from seceding from the party. The Wada faction also supported Kawakami. The Matsumoto faction supported Asanuma. The Nomizo faction switched to Kawakami at the last minute. Asanuma was elected by a vote of 228 to 209. Sasaki was the favorite for the secretary general position but declined, saying, "As the person who removed Suzuki, I cannot run for secretary general." The position went to organization bureau chief Eda of the Suzuki faction. Sohyo secretariat chief Iwai backed Eda. All of the factions were included in the new lineup of party officers. Thus, the Asanuma-Eda administration was established. The Miike Strike was reaching a climax, and the security treaty crisis was heating up.

THE STRUCTURAL REFORM DEBATE Eda and Structural Reform

On October 12, i960, the day that the Ikeda cabinet dissolved the House of Representatives, Asanuma spoke at a forum featuring the three party heads (Ikeda, Asanuma, and Nishio). He was stabbed to death by an ultra-rightist youth in front of the audience and a line of assembled television cameras. The J S P party congress that opened the following day became a memorial to the fallen socialist leader. The congress named Eda acting chairman and adopted a resolution calling for "moving beyond Chairman Asanuma's death" while fighting the general election. Reports and resolutions were passed without much debate, including a plan for "structural reform" introduced by Secretary General Eda. What was structural reform? Kishima Masamichi, a J S P clerk and one of

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the proponents of the idea, writes that "the JSP structural reform group and the structural reform argument date back to the period of debate over the Left Socialist Party platform." At a meeting after the draft of the platform was completed, Kishima found himself unable to accept Sakisaka's argument that a revolution could not be achieved without objective conditions such as war or depression. He asked whether the efforts of a subjective movement were therefore pointless. Sakisaka replied, "Kishima, is the JSP really that strong? Do you really think that a revolution can be achieved through the subjective power of the JSP?" Kishima kept quiet after that, but he began to harbor increasingly strong reservations about the party's theory and direction. (Kishima 1979:14-16) The years 1958-59 represented the "apprenticeship" of the structural reform movement. The young members of the secretariat staff organized seminars with young academics and JCP members, groping for a theory that was attuned to the present and could replace the theories of the Rono school. Gatherings of this kind, which transcended the boundaries of the Socialists and Communists in the name of structural reform, were rare in the annals of Japanese revolutionary movements. The JSP had a looser or more liberal ethos than the JCP to begin with, so we did not have any particular qualms about this. But for the JCP as well, it was an era following the Sixth Consultative Conference, when one could detect a liberal atmosphere. (Kishima 1979:22)

The structural reformers backed Eda, who was organizational committee chairman at the time. The February 1958 party congress engaged in some soul-searching over the fact that the party had only 50,000 members. The party's support of the parliamentary caucus and the meager compensation given to lower-level activists were among the issues discussed. A special committee on structural reform was established, directly responsible to the congress and headed by Eda. Eda's memorable speeches, his ability to get things done, and his modern sensibility combined to induce the activists to pin their hopes on him. And his vision of structural reform, which sought to create a party built around activists, increased their faith in him. Matsui Masakichi recalls: When I mentioned t h a t . . . Eda was having such a hard time collecting money, Sakisaka raised his voice and said, "The very idea of a socialist party thinking about raising money is depraved." I replied, "Sir, times have changed. We have to increase the salary of the secretariat staff every year. Elections now cost a lot of money. Party membership is not increasing. The current state of the party is not good." Sakisaka said, "Isn't the secretariat staff supposed to be conducting a revolution to bring about socialism? We cannot have them acting like the employees of a corporation and worrying about their salaries. Did you or I even once think about a salary during the prewar movement? (Matsui !972:97-98)

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Kishima and his group backed Eda as a candidate for the secretary generalship. W h y it was that E d a c a m e to b e a p r o p o n e n t o f structural reform is an interesting question. T o state the conclusion first, it was because E d a went along w h e n we m a d e our pitch for structural r e f o r m . . . . Eda's socialism, rather than b e i n g based on scientific principles, was based o n faith, romanticism, a n d humanism. H e had cultivated it largely during his period as a literary youth a n d in the tenancy disputes o f the prewar farmers' movement. . . . A b o v e all, E d a was naturally disposed toward the "self-reform of the r e f o r m e r " [Marx], or the constant pursuit o f progressiveness in his own t h o u g h t a n d actions, which m i g h t even b e considered the spirit o f the structural reformist. (Kishima 1979: 26-27)

Eda was born in Okayama in 1907. His memoirs depict a pastoral farming village in the early Taisho Period and a sensitive youth growing up there. H e enrolled in Seoul's Zenrin School of C o m m e r c e in 1920 and advanced to the Kobe Higher Commercial School in 1926. H e read unsystematically the works of Tolstoy and the Shirakaba school and began to develop an interest in social science. He transferred to Tokyo Commercial College in 1929 but returned to his native village the following year because of pleurisy. He threw himself into the farmers' movement in 1931, the year of the Manchurian Incident, and was jailed several times. H e was elected prefectural assemblyman in 1937. He was arrested in 1938 and released from jail in 1940, whereupon he became an undertaker: "I believe that an undertaker is higher in status than a priest. All a priest has to do is read a sutra that n o one can understand. It is the undertaker w h o consoles the grieving family to make its parting and pounds the nails into the coffin. T h e priest provides guidance to the soul of the newly departed. It is the undertaker w h o provides guidance to the surviving family. A n d it is the undertaker w h o consoles the tearful young wife w h o wants to suckle the dead baby just one more time." In 1943 Eda went to North China to assist in village construction. H e was in Shijiazhuang when the war ended and repatriated in April 1946. "I immediately moved to Saidaiji, my old movement base, borrowed a threetatami room in the corner of a rice mill, and began a new life as the secretary of the prefectural federation of farmers' unions." H e j o i n e d the left wing of the JSP. In 1947 he was elected prefectural assemblyman. In 1948 he made the motion to expel Nishio in the party's central executive committee: "My fellow comrades say even now that my speech then was the best one of my entire political career. T h e fact was that I was so angry that I could not keep from speaking out. I guess that means that it was a great speech given in a fit of anger." In 1950 he was elected to the House of Councilors. In 1963 he was elected to the House of Representatives.

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The Structural Reform Debate Eda's proposal at the October i960 party congress was written by "the three crows of the structural reform faction." According to Kishima, no one else in the secretariat was available to draft a general election campaign strategy so the matter was brought to him. H e was executive director of the J S P House of Representatives bureau at the time. When he was told he could write any kind of policy he wanted, he accepted. I immediately discussed the matter with Kato [Noriyuki] and Morinaga [Hideyoshi]. "Should we take this opportunity to introduce the structural reform plan?" "If we don't take it up, the J C P might." . . . "Most important, this program is the only way to assure new advances for the party and the socialist movement. This is our chance." We weren't quite ready to leap from the balcony of Kiyomizu Temple, but we were filled with enthusiasm and were not about to advocate doing nothing in order avoid making mistakes.... The proposal was not sent immediately to the executive committee or the congress. I remember quite well that a debate was held with key figures in the secretariat at the Kogetsu Inn near party headquarters. . . . We [brought] a furoshiki full of books and essays on structural reform and debated with strained expressions. To our surprise, the proposal was approved without much a r g u m e n t . . . . Thus, although it might have looked to the delegates at the party congress that followed Asanuma's assassination that the unanimous decision was made "without debate," one cannot say that it was strictly a formality. The conference sponsored by the secretariat had included the top polemicists of the various intraparty factions and thus signified a virtual "all-party consensus." (Kishima 1979:34-35) A n essay by Eda in the January 1961 issue of the Gekkan Shakaito ( J S P monthly) oudined his reasons for introducing the structural reform proposal and its basic content: 1. Until now, the JSP's policies have emphasized what should be done once control of the government is achieved. The process leading up to the achievement of control has been left unclear. This gap allowed the development of both the "immiseration thesis," in which revolution would be possible through the objective conditions of war and depression, and the "chipping-away thesis," in which revolution would be achieved by the bitby-bit accumulation of reforms. The structural reform plan, by contrast, makes clear the process leading up to the achievement of control over the government. 2. Whereas the government backed by monopoly capital and the forces connected with it try to maintain and strengthen an economic structure that profits monopoly capital, the structural reform plan aims to consolidate the influence of people who are hurt by monopoly capital and to transform policy. It does not merely oppose the policy put forward by monopoly capi-

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THE DYNAMICS OF THE 1955 SYSTEM tal but uses that opposition as a point of departure for limiting the exercise of power and working to transform policy. For example, it is perfecdy valid for the labor movement to oppose the firings at Miike, but it needs to link that opposition to a wider struggle to transform coal industry policy. (Summarized from Gekkan Shakaito Henshubu 1974-75:2:383)

The reaction was instant. Sakisaka, who became the target of structural reformers' attacks, contributed a piece to the February issue of Shakaishugi (Socialism). His main points were: 1. The structural reform plan ignores objective conditions and contains within it the risk of reformism. 2. To underestimate the strength of the ruling class and to confuse a governmental crisis with a crisis of the capitalist system is a tendency in the direction of reformist opportunism. 3. Because the basic contradictions of capitalism are not properly understood, the question of the transfer of power that accompanies a qualitative change is left extremely unclear. To do so is to cause socialism to regress from science to fantasy. (Summarized from Gekkan Shakaito Henshubu 1974-75: 2:386-87)

Sohyo chairman Ota published an article in the January issue of Gekkan Sdhyd (Sohyo monthly). He commented later: I am not opposed to the structural reform plan in and of itself or, should I say, structural reform in general. But even in the J S P there are strong corrupting tendencies of the sort that can be seen in its obtaining money from capitalists. I stated that the structural reform plan would therefore deteriorate into "reformism" under conditions where many people were not truly devoted to the cause... . I believe that an internal movement to remove Chairman Ota began around this time under the leadership of Eda as well as Takaragi [Fumihiko] and others in the labor movement. There had been periodic movements of this kind before, but with the structural reform debate under way, they came out into the open. (Ota 1976:68-69)

Kishima states: Against the "myth of reformism," which claimed that " a reformist is someone who limits himself to reform and a true socialist is someone who transcends reform and advances to revolution," we unambiguously felt that, in order to pursue a program that was realistic, there was no choice but to amass reforms "bit by bit." But we vacillated on the logic relating to a "qualitative leap." It took us a bit more time to move beyond the insurrectionary model of the Russian Revolution. In practice, there was also a danger in the J S P at the time that if we said, "Reformism is all right," then the DSP's tendency to simply engage in compromise and bargaining without achieving any reforms might very well take h o l d . . . .

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While the debate was conducted as a debate, democratically and out in the open, as in the exchange with Sohyo, there was still some value in it. . . . But once it was transformed into a factional dispute, the important things were "counterattack" and "defense" against the other side's "attacks" and removing "obstructions," not the vitality of the structural reform plan itself. (Kishima 1979:52-53) The party congress adopted, with modifications, Secretary General Eda's "fighting structural reform thesis, which addressed the issues that Sohyo had raised. Kawakami was elected party chairman, Secretary General Eda and PARC chairman Narita remained in office, and Wada became chief of the international affairs bureau. The composition of the central executive committee was as follows: Suzuki faction, 8; Wada faction, 3; Kawakami faction, 2; Matsumoto faction, 1; and Nomizo faction, 1. Thus, a three-faction "right-wing alliance" consisting of the Kawakami, Wada, and Eda factions came to confront a "left-wing alliance" of the Suzuki, Matsumoto, and Nomizo factions. But it is probably no longer appropriate to speak of a left wing and a right wing. Infighting had dispersed them and introduced factional maneuverings and realignments. It is perhaps better to speak of a mainstream and an anti-mainstream. TheJanuary ig62 Congress With the January party congress ahead of them, members of the Suzuki faction secretariat published a paper in the November 1961 issue of For a New Socialism (Atarashii shakaishugi no tame ni). They argued: 1. The mistaken stance of conducting battles inconspicuously, avoiding political struggles wherever possible, and making economic struggle the nucleus has crept into the current structural reform p r o g r a m , . . . and a strong tendency to evade difficult battles and to try to win favor among the masses by spreading right-leaning sentiments has emerged. At the last congress, a program was adopted that included a structural reform plan for the first time, on the condition that "it must not become reformism . . . [and] the antiimperialism struggle must not be forgotten." The reformist mood and the tendency to abandon the anti-imperialist struggle that are currendy apparent in our party are violations of the congress's decision. 2. The election campaign slogan of "also being friendly with the United States," which was derived out of tactical considerations, . . . has somehow come to bind our foreign policy program, and consequently the antiimperialist stance has c r u m b l e d . . . . 3. . . . Broadening the mass movement to the r i g h t . . . constitutes a course that tries to exclude the JCP. . . . But to advance by excluding the JCP now is defeatism. (Gekkan Shakaito Henshubu 1 9 7 4 - 7 5 : 2 : 4 2 4 - 2 5) The Suzuki/Sasaki faction hoped to attack the structural reform plan, drive Secretary General Eda from office, and replace him with Sasaki. Ensnared

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in the infighting between the Eda and the Suzuki factions, the Wada faction dissolved. The Asahi shinbun reported: Although the Wada faction . . . does not have much of a foothold in the lower levels [of the party organization], it commands more than forty members in the House of Representatives alone, making it a parliamentary faction with a force second only to the mainstream Suzuki faction. The Wada faction has already adopted a position supporting the structural reform plan, . . . but Wada has not made his own position clear.... He seems to be leaning toward supporting Sasaki.... Most members of the Wada faction feel that, unless the Suzuki-led mainstream is overthrown, the faction will have no opportunity for glory. But for Wada personally things are not so simple. Although it is said that antipathy toward Eda is involved in Wada's current leaning toward Sasaki, there is also the calculation that if Wada wants to become a key figure in the party, he cannot ignore the influence of the Suzuki faction that is backing Sasaki. (Asahi shinbun, December 17,1961, quoted in Otake 1981:2:198-99) In the end, Katsumata, Yokoji, Ishibashi, and others of the Wada faction moved to support Eda while the secretariat, which was critical of structural reform, left the Wada faction. Wada found himself out of place in his own faction. Although he may have felt more sympathetic toward the structural reform backers than toward the Sasaki faction with regard to policy, his hostility toward Eda prevented him from allying with them. The History of the Japan Socialist Party (Nihon shakaito ski) describes the congress: The twenty-first party congress was held for three days beginning on January 20, 1962. Because Sasaki had declared himself a candidate for the post of secretary general, not only the assessment of the structural reform plan but also the factional fighting and the fight over personnel selection . . . suddenly became a major focus.The structural reform program was turned into a factional tool and used in the competition for party offices and leadership rather than being purely an issue of party policy. The "three right-wing factions" of Kawakami, Wada, and Eda aligned in the mainstream while the "three leftwing factions" of Suzuki (i.e., Sasaki), the Heiwa Doshikai [of Matsumoto], and the Nomin Doshikai [of Nomizo] aligned as the anti-mainstream.... The powerful motives that originally led to the introduction of the structural reform program .. . were the strong demand from below to liquidate parliamentary factions and end the practice of having them run the party, and also a desire to create a streamlined party organization centered, as it should be, on party activists.... At the congress, strategic maneuvering and behind-the-scenes deals . . . were most intense. In inverse correlation, the content of the debate over the structural reform program deteriorated. . . . The structural reform program was turned into a mere football in the factional contest, and opinion for or against it seemed to be a barometer of factional dynamics.... It was decided that the structural reform program was "a tactic and not a strategy." At the

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same time, a full-fledged review was entrusted to the reorganized and expanded socialist theory c o m m i t t e e . . . . T h e nonsensical character of the structural reform "tactic or strategy" debate at the congress was made all the more apparent in the personnel area with Eda's reelection as secretary general and the defeat of Sasaki. . . . What does this mystifying disjuncture between policy and personnel stem from? Although, in part, it represents the traditional party's tendency toward "policy from the left and personnel from the right" in a different guise, it was fundamentally the result of the lower levels' support of the party organization, along with local activists and youth leaders, who had no ties to the factions but were impressed by Eda's accomplishments since his days as organizational bureau chief.... In addition, . . . with an upcoming House of Councilors election ahead, there was support from Diet members who felt that "public familiarity" and " m o o d s " must be respected and, in particular, that the Wada faction, as a parliamentarian's faction, had supported the Eda faction. T h e Wada faction approved the structural reform program because i t — a s a melding of Diet members w h o had been progressive bureaucrats during the war and younger Diet members who had been leaders of the postwar Mindo [in the labor movement] — e m p h a s i z e d the formulation of policy in the Diet and latched onto the structural reform program as a Diet policy. Dissatisfied with the domination of party posts by prewar executives under the Suzuki faction, they could, without hesitation, move closer to the Eda/Narita faction, which had branched off from the old Suzuki faction and had become a force in its own right. In comparison, the Kawakami faction's position was ambiguous in the beginning but came out at the last minute in support of the Eda f a c t i o n . . . . T h e Suzuki/Sasaki faction became i s o l a t e d . . . . In s u m , . . . the idealistic inclination within the party to link . . . the reform of the party's organizational structure to the party's policies was crushed b y . . . factional dynamics. (Koyama and Shimizu 1965:228-31) Eda received 323 votes and Sasaki, 260. Chairman Kawakami and international bureau chief Wada were elected without a contest. Organizational bureau chief Narita and policy planning board chief Katsumata were each elected after beating a Suzuki faction candidate. The composition of the fifteen members of the central executive committee was as follows: Suzuki faction, 3; Wada faction, 3; Kawakami faction, 2; Heiwa Doshikai, 2; Eda faction, 1; Nomizo faction, 3; and neutral, 3. With the addition of the party chairman, the party secretary, and the control commission chairman, there were 8 people supporting Eda, 8 supporting Sasaki, and 2 neutral: that is, a balance of power.

The Eda

Vision

Secretary General Eda spoke about the establishment of a JSP government to a national conference of local organizers held at Nikko on July 17, 1962.

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He stressed that a drastic transformation of party policy and organization would be required and presented a new vision of socialism: "Socialism must be something that is easily understood by the masses—something that is cheerful, exhilarating. I believe that the purpose of socialism is to induce the potential of mankind to blossom fully. T h e most notable human achievements so far are fourfold: the high average standard of living of the United States, the complete social security of the Soviet Union, the parliamentary democracy of Britain, and the peace constitution of Japan. I believe that socialism linked to the masses will be born when we consolidate these." Kishima states: We held a meeting at the Yamanoue Hotel in Surugadai, Kanda, on the night before Eda left for Nikko. It was less a matter of preparing for the organizers conference scheduled for the following day than a brainstorming session of the sort that we hold every so often with scholars from outside the party. . . . We did not in our wildest dreams imagine that [what we discussed] would be made public the following day in the form of the Eda Vision. . . . In addition to being astonished by the rapidity of Eda's comprehension and the sharpness of his intuition, we were also amazed that he would leave himself open to attacks by the enemy.... Eda's proclivity to act according to his beliefs and his natural insight without considering the consequences was one of his strengths, but it sometimes brought about his downfall.. . . When the Eda Vision was made public, we in the party structural reform group were shocked.... It was less a matter of our having doubts about the vision than of our ingrained and petty "intraparty sensibilities," which forced us to observe various procedures and limits of expression and caused us to realize intuitively that "this was not good." (Kishima i979 = 6 3- 6 4) T h e speech at Nikko was picked up immediately by the press and labeled the "Eda Vision." In addition, Eda declared on September 18, in a speech before a dinner club of zaikai figures associated with the Keizai Doyukai, that the socialist movement had until now been an "insurrectionary movement" with its revolutionary program based on an "immiseration thesis." There was the need to advance the movement and conduct the revolution in the context of prosperity and, for this reason, he was advocating the structural reform plan and the Eda Vision. He "bombastically" added that the struggle against the talks for a Japan-South Korea treaty would probably not go very far and that he did not intend to immediately nationalize major industries or place them under state control. T h e Eda Vision became the object of a concerted attack at the party congress in November. Since the structural reform debate had been relegated to the theory committee at the previous congress, this congress—lacking a topic to debate—began

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to criticize the Eda Vision instead. Two draft resolutions were introduced... . One, introduced by the anti-mainstream, demanded that Eda be censured on grounds that, "ignoring the will of the party organs, the secretary general personally revealed to those outside the party a vision that could bring confusion to the theory of socialism" and disunity to the leadership while causing insecurity and unrest in the system. The other, introduced by the mainstream, criticized party members who, following the twenty-first congress, openly disobeyed party decisions regarding peace movements. This resolution was directed against the anti-mainstream group that was trying to organize unified JSP-JCP action. . . . Many full-time activists and younger local delegates who had come out in support of Eda at the previous congress did not support him this time. . . . This was a natural reaction against the excesses of the "moody" structural reform program. The congress approved the first resolution and rejected the second. Eda immediately submitted his resignation and left the hall. But the structural reform group once again predominated on personnel issues. Narita Tomomi replaced Eda as party secretary general; Eda himself returned to his old roost of organization bureau c h i e f . . . . This discrepancy between personnel and policy is proof that the party was still dominated by the dynamics of Diet member factions. (Koyamaand Shimizu 1965:236-37) W h e n Eda submitted his resignation, the structural reform factions hastily persuaded Narita to serve as his replacement. Narita obtained the backing of the three mainstream factions—the Kawakami, Wada, and Eda fact i o n s — a n d defeated Yamamoto Koichi, the candidate put u p by the Suzuki faction, by a vote of 323 to 230. Chairman Kawakami and international bureau chief Wada were both elected for a third term while Katsumata was reelected policy planning board chief. Eda was selected as organization bureau chief by defeating the Suzuki faction candidate 329 to 225. T h e new central executive committee was composed of 9 mainstream members, 7 anti-mainstream, and 2 neutrals—the mainstream was slighdy dominant. In the November 1963 general election held under the Ikeda cabinet, the JSP won 144 seats, or one seat less than in the previous election. But as the party congress of the following year approached, factional maneuvering intensified once again. At the party congress, a fierce debate ensued between the mainstream and anti-mainstream over theory, policy, and organization, but the main focus was on the selection of party officers scheduled for the third day. T h e mainstream moved aggressively. T h e anti-mainstream decided to postpone the decisive battle until the party congress in December and to act as an intraparty opposition until then. It decided not to put u p any candidates of its own. As a result, an extraordinary situation e m e r g e d — the three mainstream factions monopolized every post. They were divided as follows: the Kawakami faction, 6; the Wada faction, 7; the Eda faction, 7; and neutrals, 1.

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The Advance of the Sasaki Faction Between early and mid-November 1964, the mainstream factions decided to try to foster party unity by arranging a fifth term for Kawakami and a third term for Narita. The gist of Narita's plan, made public on December 2, was to establish the new post of vice chairman (two were to be selected, with Sasaki and Wada scheduled to fill these posts) and to select party officers through negotiations followed by a vote. The various factions and Sohyo went along with the plan. The new vice chairmanship system was approved after fierce debate. But no agreement could be arranged for the 8 executive committee posts even on the fourth and last day of the congress, so these were decided by vote. The Sasaki faction won all 8 posts. The composition of the 19-member central executive committee was 7 mainstream (3 Kawakami faction, 2 Wada faction, and 2 Eda faction) and 11 anti-mainstream (10 Sasaki faction, 1 Heiwa Doshikai), with 1 neutral. The mainstream had fallen to minority status. How did such a reversal come about? The Sasaki faction had held a general meeting of all of the faction's 220 delegates immediately after the February congress. They agreed to work toward rectifying the right-leaning tendency of the party, gaining control of party leadership at the November congress, and strengthening the faction's leadership over local party organizations. For the next ten months the Sasaki faction engaged in shameless factional maneuvering. It was said that factional affairs received open precedence over party business at the headquarters secretariat and that factional organizers were dispatched to the local districts. The goal was to capture the local delegates who determined who won and lost at party congresses. There was also a growing animosity among the delegates toward Kawakami's and Narita's faction-oriented personnel selections: A sizable element of the 560 delegates was not controlled by the factions. . . . Many of them had placed their hopes earlier on the structural reformers and supported them when they appeared as a policy group with a fresh new impression. Now they were severely disillusioned at seeing the Narita plan focus on faction-balancing personnel decisions and the structural reformers causing the party to regress. In addition, the number of new delegates was increasing yearly. They complained about problems in their activities at the lower, grassroots level and pressed the party executive about the insufficiency of the center's leadership. Observing the party executive's consistent failure to address these [complaints] in a meaningful way, their disappointment multiplied. It is hardly surprising that their votes became floating votes that worked in favor of the anti-mainstream. (Koyama and Shimizu 1965:288-89)

The Wada and Eda factions, which had fallen to minority status, each held general meetings in January 1965. They decided to dissolve the three-faction alliance, try to gain access to control of the party leadership on their own,

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work aggressively to gain a majority in the local organizations, and thereby gain a firm basis for an advance at the next congress. In January 1965 Chairman Kawakami fell ill; he formally announced his resignation on March 10. A tripartite conference of Sasaki, Wada, and Narita on March 15 agreed that the vice chairmen, Sasaki and Wada, would take over the duties of the chairman during the upcoming House of Councilors election. Others demanded an early decision on a new chairman, and an extraordinary party congress was held in May at which Sasaki was selected chairman without a vote. Sasaki Kozo was born in 1900, the third son in a poor farm family. He graduated from Nihon University's Professional Division and then was elected as a Sendai City assemblyman. He immersed himself in labor disputes and the farmers' movement at an early date. Small in build but possessing a fiery temper, he was always the first to clash with police and get arrested. He was nicknamed "Kozo the ogre." As Suzuki's sidekick, he kept a firm grip on personnel affairs and funds and established his status as a mediator within the party. But never having stood at the podium before a plenary session, he was seen as a backroom politician. Nevertheless, with his commoner's appearance and his thick Tohoku accent, he was not unpopular. Wada stepped aside and gave Sasaki the chairmanship. O r more accurately, Wada did not have a chance of winning and had resolved to retire from the political world. At the January 1966 party congress he resigned from the vice chairmanship and did not run in the general election held on January 1967. He died suddenly of a heart attack on March 4. The Eda Faction's Counterattack O n May 11 Chairman Sasaki told organization bureau chief Eda that he wanted to halt debates over basic principles for the time being and focus the party's energy on political action. Eda agreed, on the condition that both sides obey the rules of debate and that the banner of structural reform would not be lowered. Then, in accord with arrangements made at an Eda faction caretakers meeting, Eda mentioned at a press conference on May 13 that, after the House of Councilors election, he would batde the antistructural reform group and perhaps even run for the party chairmanship at the party congress that fall. T h e old Wada faction held a caretakers meeting, where it decided to work toward overthrowing the Sasaki administration at the next party congress. Galvanized by Secretary General Narita's defection to the Sasaki faction and with the objective of installing Eda as chairman and Katsumata as general secretary, the Eda and old Wada factions began to move toward reviving the three-faction alliance by bringing in the anti-Sasaki elements in the Kawakami faction.

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Because of Eda's revelation and his criticism of the Sasaki executive, the congress became the scene of a showdown between Sasaki and Eda. Secretary General Narita tried to tide things over with a compromise giving Sasaki the chairmanship and Eda the secretary generalship, but he was unsuccessful. The vote was 295 for Sasaki versus 267 for Eda for chairman, and 321 for Narita versus 246 for Katsumata for secretary general. Kono continued as vice chairman. The composition of the 19-member central executive committee was 8 members from the Sasaki faction / Heiwa Doshikai, 4 from the old Wada faction, 2 from the Eda faction, 3 from the old Kawakami faction, and 2 neutrals. The showdown between Sasaki and Eda was carried over to the December party congress, held just before the House of Representatives dissolution. For the sake of party unity three vice chairmen—Komo, Yamamoto, and Katsumata—were selected without a contest. But the chairmanship and many of the central executive committee posts were filled by vote. Sasaki was elected chairman for a third term by a vote of 313 to 274. The composition of the 19-member central executive committee was as follows: 13 from the Sasaki faction; 1 each from the old Kawakami faction, the Heiwa Doshikai, the Eda faction, and the old Wada faction; and 2 neutrals. The Sasaki faction was in an overwhelmingly favorable position. The terms of party officers were extended to two years. In the January 1967 election, held under the Sato cabinet, the JSP won 140 seats, or 4 fewer than in the previous election, in spite of an increase of 19 seats in the House of Representatives as a whole. The defeat once again fired up the reorganization debate. In August Sasaki and Narita announced their intention to resign in conjunction with the passage of a special exemption bill for the Health Insurance Law. In the lower house's social and labor committee, the LDP had broken an understanding with the opposition parties by suddenly submitting a motion to end deliberation and passing the bill. Pandemonium ensued. After many a twist and turn, it was decided that the LDP, DSP, and CGP would accept a mediation proposal by Speaker of the House Ishii Mitsujiro. The central executive committee deferred to Chairman Sasaki and decided to accept the proposal. Faced with vociferous criticism during a JSP Representatives' conference, however, Sasaki was forced to modify his decision. He and Narita then announced their intention to resign, and an emergency extraordinary congress was called. Accepting their resignations, the congress selected Katsumata as chairman, Yamamoto as secretary general, Kono and Eda as vice chairmen, and a new central executive committee, all without a contest. The composition of the 19-member central executive committee was as follows: 8 from the Sasaki faction, 3 from the Eda faction, 3 from the old Kawakami faction, 2 from the old Wada faction, 1

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from the Heiwa Doshikai, and 2 neutrals, or 9 mainstream and 10 antimainstream. The executive under Katsumata tasted defeat in the July 1968 House of Councilors election, losing 8 seats, and the members announced their resignations at the party congress in September. It was decided there to abandon the method of selecting party officers through negotiation and to delegate the task of selecting replacements to a committee established by the congress. The committee, however, was deadlocked. There was a consensus on Narita for the chairmanship, but factional conflict over the secretary generalship grew severe and a viable compromise could not be reached. The committee reported to the congress that it "was unable to obtain a unanimous conclusion and is unable to reach a reconciliation." Unable to select the party's officers, the congress adjourned indefinitely. The talks . . . became stalemated because the Sasaki faction, which held the majority in the committee, echoed Sasaki Kozo's strong opposition to an "Eda secretary generalship" and railroaded the faction's position through. But Eda seems to have calculated that it would be to his faction's advantage to go along with the Sasaki faction's personnel scheme up to the point where a "Narita chairmanship" was settled and all that was left was the selection of a candidate for the secretary general's position. This threw the personnel negotiations into confusion. . . . The Heiwa Doshikai, the faction in the party that was the farthest to the left, rejected an "Eda secretary generalship" outright, and both the Sasaki and the Eda factions missed the opportunity to reach a compromise. It seems that the factions only realized how serious the situation was after the negotiations broke down. (Asahi shinbun, September 14, 1968, quoted in Gekkan Shakaito Henshubu 1974-75:3:346)

Matsui served as mediator. He says, " [Sasaki's] hatred of Eda was extraordinary. Sasaki's way of thinking continually threw party personnel decisions into confusion." (Matsui 1972:172) Nevertheless, Katsumata and Narita persevered, and opinion in the party at last began to solidify in the direction of an Eda secretary generalship. At the reopened congress in October, Chairman Narita and most of the central executive committee members were selected without a contest, but the secretary general, the vice chairmen, and 5 of the central executive committee member positions were put to a vote. Eda beat Yaoita Tadashi for the secretary generalship by a vote of 319 to 199. The composition of the 19-member central executive committee was as follows: Sasaki faction, 6; Katsumata (the old Wada) faction, 3; the Eda faction, the old Kawakami faction, and the Heiwa Doshikai, 2 each; the Narita faction, 1; and neutral, 3. The J S P met a most bitter defeat in the December 1969 general election, held under the Sato cabinet. Its delegation in the House of Representatives dropped to 90 seats, and a debate over reorganization occurred once again.

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Eda reported to an expanded central executive committee meeting in February 1970: 1. It has become necessary to advance from the stage in which we passively depend on the spontaneous demands and movements of the masses and the [organizational skills] of Sohyo to one in which we exhibit leadership as the party of socialism in the true sense of the term and create an organization and movement of our own. . . . Socialism should now fulfill its function as a science that leads mass movements. 2. There is no denying that policies in the J S P have not been accompanied by concrete movements.... There has been a gap between what we claim and what we really mean. 3. We have only been able to "oppose everything"; we have lacked the intellectual initiative to pose a separate path that would compel a choice on the part of the citizenry. 4. Today a wide variety of problems have appeared that did not exist in the early postwar p e r i o d . . . urban problems, high prices, pollution, education, and housing. It is in these social and economic struggles against monopoly that the people sincerely hope for a c t i o n . . . . 5. In conducting the debate over reorganizing the party, we must take up concrete issues like agriculture, the universities, the cities, and the China issue.... A changed image of the party will come about when we repeatedly present clear direction and policies on these kinds of issues. (Gekkan Shakaito Henshubu 1 9 7 4 - 7 5 : 3 : 3 8 0 - 8 1 )

None of the members of the central executive committee spoke in support. They put forward one criticism after another. Eventually, it was agreed that the entire issue should be studied further in the theory committee. TheJSP-CGP-DSP Alliance In J u n e 1970 DSP chairman Nishimura Eiichi appealed for a unification of the democratic progressive parties (the JSP, the CGP, and the DSP) by 1972 with the goal of establishing a unified progressive government by 1975. The flames spread instantaneously. The groundwork for cooperation had already been laid. The CGP was well on its to a new centrist program, having separated organizationally from the Soka Gakkai sect in the name of "separating politics and religion." Secretary General Eda was trying to extricate the J S P from Marxist Leninism. The JSP-CGP-DSP program was thus advanced by Eda, CGP secretary general Yano Jun'ya, and DSP secretary general Sasaki Ryosaku. Joint action in the Diet and cooperation in election campaigning were moderately successful. In the end, however, Eda was unable to break through the left wing's domination of the JSP. Immediately before the November 1970 party congress, Eda announced that he would run as a candidate for the party chairmanship. The JSP-CGPDSP coalition that he supported conflicted with the J S P program of joint

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action centered on the JSP and theJCP. At the congress, Narita was elected chairman, with 207 votes to Eda's 148. The secretary general's position went to Ishibashi Masashi of the Katsumata faction. Votes were also taken on 8 of the central executive committee seats, and the Eda faction was only able to capture the position of organization bureau chief. The 19-member central executive committee was composed as follows: Sasaki faction, 7; Katsumata faction, 6; Eda faction and Narita-affiliated, 2 each; and old Kawakami faction and Ota-affiliated, 1 each. T h e congress adopted a new, medium-range program ofjoint action with all the opposition parties (i.e., including theJCP) to counter the proposed JSP-CGP-DSP coalition. In another development, the Sasaki faction found that it could no longer control the Socialism Association. T h e latter began to act independendy, and people associated with it appeared in the ranks of the party executive. This clash over interparty alignment was carried over into the January 1972 party congress. Kono, Eda, Yamamoto, and others of the "Modern Progressives Study Association" (Gendai Kakushin Kenkyukai) who had worked for an Eda chairmanship submitted a resolution calling for a common platform for the realigned opposition parties. T h e delegates who supported the Narita executive countered with a resolution supporting a people's coalition government. The latter was voluntarily withdrawn, and the steering committee prevented the former from being placed on the agenda. In the December 1972 general election, held under the auspices of the Tanaka cabinet, the JSP won 118 seats, an increase of 28. As a result, the Narita executive regained face. T h e J C P made a dramatic advance from 14 seats to 38. In contrast, the CGP fell from 47 seats to 29 seats and the DSP, from 31 seats to 19. With these results, the JSP-CGP-DSP alliance was brought to a standstill for the time being. T h e program of the following February's JSP congress claimed that the distinctive feature of the general election results was that "the CGP and DSP, who call for 'centrist politics' with a vague anti-LDP character, declined while our party and theJCP, which made their position of confrontation clear, secured one-third [sic] of the total seats." Chairman Narita and Secretary General Ishibashi retained their positions. Not one member of the Eda faction was placed in the new central executive committee. T h e Asahi shinbun editorialized: With the Eda faction shut out, the new executive has strengthened its factional coloration. As a result, the Narita-Ishibashi administration appears to be headed far away from Eda and his group's "JSP-CGP-DSP" program. It will be interesting to watch what sort of stance the Eda faction, which has become completely estranged from the executive, will take from now on. (Asahi shinbun, February 9> 1973)

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THE SOCIALISM ASSOCIATION

The Labor Farmer (Rono) Group The Socialism Association (Shakaishugi Kyokai) was established in June 1951 by a coterie of Rono intellectuals including Yamakawa Hitoshi, Ouchi Hyoe, Sakisaka Itsuro, and a number ofJSP and Sohyo executives; it began to publish the journal Socialism (Shakaishugi). The objective of the association was to fortify the JSP with noncommunist, Marxist-Leninist, Rono theory. It played a central role in writing the Left Socialist Party platform in 1953, and in 1959-60 it offered theoretical guidance in the Miike coal mine dispute. When the structural reform movement gained influence within the party, the association became the ideological stronghold of the opposing factions. At its fourth general meeting, held in October 1962—Eda had launched his "vision" in July—the association adopted a program for the first time. At the fifth general meeting, in October 1963, a central committee was established and the decision was made to deploy national organizers in Kyushu and the Kansai. The association thus began to change from a study group into an organization for advancing a political movement. A platform drafted under Sakisaka's supervision was submitted to the February 1967 general meeting. At the eighth general meeting, in June 1967, the association split over a draft of a new association constitution. The original version of the new constitution stated, "In order to achieve world peace and Japan's socialist revolution, the association will engage in theoretical and applied research, surveys, and debates and will work for a class-based strengthening of the Japan Socialist Party, labor unions, farmers' unions, the Socialist Youth Federation, and the Japan Women's Conference" (italics added). Opponents moved to delete the phrase "engage in theoretical and applied research, surveys, and debates." Led by Ota Kaoru, 103 of the 183 delegates supported the amendment. Sakisaka left the meeting indignantly and, mobilizing his disciples, began the work of forming a second association. JSP chairman Sasaki and the chief of the Sohyo secretariat, Iwai, assisted him. Ota recalls: After Mizuhara Teruo, one of Sakisaka's disciples who had been active in the Zengakuren student movement at Kyushu University, became its managing director, the young activists who joined the Socialism Association were nurtured by Sakisaka and gradually developed a capacity for action.... The opinion began to spread among the younger people that it was not enough for the association to simply spread its influence through academics and educate via the left wing, and that the left wing itself was . . . not truly "left." They argued that the Socialism Association itself must be strengthened within the party.... A difference of opinion over the Miike Strike emerged among Sakisaka and

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the group of scholars from K y u s h u . . . . I told Sakisaka and the academics who were his disciples about the "reality" of the Miike Strike. . . . They tended to look at the movement through rose-colored glasses. There was a gap between those who understood that in practice [such movements] are accompanied by ugly aspects and those who d i d n ' t . . . . As for the [new] Sakisaka Association, I understand that they are making ends meet by having the Sasaki faction buy up about 3,000 copies of their journal. It just happened that the J S P had agreed at its congress that the factions would not issue any publications. Thus, the Sasaki faction used the Sakisaka [Association's] journal as a surrogate. For its part, the Sakisaka Association chose to rely on them even if it meant getting deeply involved with a faction. (Óta 1976:268-70)

The Sakisaka Association Although only three members of the House of Representatives claimed to be members of the Sakisaka Socialism Association, there were a number of affiliates in the Sasaki and Katsumata factions. There were more than ten in the House of Councilors. Nevertheless, the source of the association's power lay in the party's lower-level organization. The Tokyo branch federation controlled the local party organizations in eastern Japan. The officers of the Socialist Youth Federation (Shakai Seinen Dómei) were under its influence, and the association made impressive inroads into the Sóhyó youth division. It also acted aggressively during elections, thereby cutting into the lower-level organizations that had been the base of influence for the Sasaki faction. At the February 1973 party congress, association-affiliated delegates accounted for about 20 percent of the delegates. The association acquired posts on the central executive committee (the organization bureau chief and the youth bureau chief), thereby gaining influence over the NaritaIshibashi executive. In addition, as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, a gulf developed between the pro-China Sasaki faction and the pro-Soviet Socialism Association, and Sasaki faction Diet members began to criticize the association's ultra-leftist program. The Eda faction predicted that "in two years [the term of office of party officials], there will be a shift from a contest between the Eda and Sasaki factions to one between pro- and antiassociation groups." In early February a group called "New Current Society" (Atarashii Nagare no Kai) was formed with the aim of overcoming the JSP's dependence on labor unions and developing it into a party representing a broad range of citizens. Its membership numbered around twenty, and many were connected to the Eda faction. The focus of the January 1974 party congress was the Kyoto gubernatorial election. The Kyoto party headquarters decided to oppose a seventh term for the incumbent Ninagawa Torazó and selected Óhashi Kazutaka, chair-

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man of the Kyoto prefectural party branch, as its candidate. The party center supported Ôhashi's candidacy. But toward the end of December Chairman Narita suddenly reversed himself by supporting Ninagawa. It is plausible that there was some behind-the-scenes manipulation by a segment of the association in collusion with the JCP. Although local delegates from a dozen or so prefectures supported the Kyoto prefectural headquarters, the general feeling was that the party should not make waves with a House of Councilors election ahead. Ninagawa became the official candidate. In the election, Ohashi ran as an independent and lost by the tiny margin of 4,500 votes, or 0.4 percent of the 1.04 million votes cast. If the JSP had come out in support of Ôhashi—even if only the Eda faction had publicly supported him—the outcome might have been reversed. The outcome of the July House of Councilors election was near parity between the conservatives and the progressives. The LDP lost badly. The JSP also suffered. During the campaign a "seven-man committee" including Sasaki and Eda embarked on a nationwide tour. The scene where the two men shook hands was well received at every meeting. Perhaps this experience laid the foundation for an alliance between them. At an Eda faction meeting in September, Eda said, "With a change of government before us, it is the JSP that is the most behind the times"; he announced his intention to work for the reform of the party in cooperation with Sasaki, with whom he had clashed until then. With the prospect of a coalition government, he undoubtedly wanted to join hands with Sasaki at the December congress and do whatever it took to get himself reinstated in the executive. At the December party congress, the factional maneuvering revolved around relations with the association. The association had eaten away the influence of the anti-association group—the Sasaki faction in particular— and controlled about half of the delegates. The Katsumata faction, which had a weak lower-level organization, made overtures to the association together with Narita and Ishibashi. Meanwhile, the Sasaki faction, which had previously defended the association, approached the Eda faction and also the New Current Society, which had developed into a large force, with 23 members in the House of Representatives and 24 members in the House of Councilors. The Sasaki faction, the Eda faction, the New Current Society, and other anti-association sympathizers submitted a resolution opposing a joint communiqué that a delegation to the USSR led by Ishibashi had issued with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October. Their action vividly illustrates the transformation of factional alliances, as does the defeat of the resolution by the pro-association group. During the debate Eda, Hata Yutaka of the New Current Society, and others were attacked by name amid boisterous jeers from the pro-association group on grounds that their statements outside the party had been "anti-party in character."

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On the last day of the congress, in an attempt to achieve party solidarity and strengthen the leadership, the executive proposed a system of three vice chairmen. The proposal was rejected by an overwhelming majority. Although a general reaction against faction-balancing personnel arrangements was involved, an even bigger factor was the association's hostility toward Eda. In the end, after the persuasion of Sakisaka and others, the defeated system was resurrected and Akamatsu Isamu (Sasaki faction), Asukata Ichio (from the old Heiwa Doshikai), and Eda were selected to fill the posts. The other party officer posts were filled through consultation. The Eda faction gained three party executive positions. Eda's morale appears to have revived considerably about this time. A person who thrived on being on center stage, he had much more vitality when he held a post, even if it was only the bitterly won post of vice chairman. As he refrained from bombast and entered an alliance with his longtime enemy Sasaki, the assessment of him within the party began to change. But in February 1976 the formation of a new policy group was announced, the Society for Thinking About a New Japan (Atarashii Nihon o Kangaeru Kai), whose members would include Tokai University president Matsumae Shigeyoshi, JSP vice chairman Eda, CGP secretary general Yano, and DSP vice chairman Sasaki Ryosaku. (It was formally established in July.) The JSP's Sasaki Kozo did not hide his disapproval: "A JSP-CGP-DSP coalition is out of the question." An anti-Eda mood began to spread once again. On February 19 the JSP central executive committee tentatively accepted Eda's statement that the New Current Society "did not seek a JSP-CGP-DSP coalition" and confirmed that Eda would follow the party's policy of joint action with all opposition parties, including the JCP. The party congress held in March was immersed in the Lockheed scandal. The Sakisaka Association was quiet at the congress because it was on the defensive over the Chiba issue. But on February 22 it gathered fifty local activists at the Seiranso Inn in Yugawara and established the Yayoikai (March Society), which was formally inaugurated on June 21. It adopted the toppling of Eda as its first goal. The program of the tenth national general meeting of the Socialism Association summarized its activities in 1976 as follows: Today, the rightward shift of the JSP has further revealed its true character as [a party] hostile to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. . . . The apex of this shift is the Society for Thinking About a New Japan and the right-wing ideological attack on the party and the labor movement that is unfolding through it. We exposed the true substance of Vice Chairman Eda Saburo's attendance in the society.... The Yayoikai... was established to organize coordinated action within the party.... (Reprinted in Nakamura 1977:187. Regarding the Socialism Association, see also Asahi nenkan 1977:332; Kokumin seiji nenkan '977:423-35.)

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Eda's

Secession

The LDP cabinet was severely defeated in the December 1976 general election. The election can be considered a defeat for the JSP as well. A completely unexpected development was Eda's failure to get reelected. The leading actor disappeared from the stage just as prospects for a progressivecentrist coalition were getting brighter. His plans and hopes were reduced to nothing. Eda said little, but those who were counting on him were overcome with gloom. O n January 12, 1977, he proposed "a progressive-centrist coalition" to the central executive committee, calling for a party suited to a changing society and a concrete plan of government in anticipation of the upcoming House of Councilors election. He offered his new plan again at the February party congress. Eda's plan called for the formation of a progressive coalition consisting of (1) various progressive or liberal parties, political forces, citizens, intellectuals, and middle strata with (2) a core of socialist forces (a party and labor unions) working for incremental reforms based on the liberty and democracy of advanced nations. He argued that, if the party had embarked on such a plan of government before the last general election, a conservative-progressive reversal and a new government might have been possible. He criticized the Narita executive's program of joint action by all the opposition parties for its lack of appeal. Dominated by the Socialism Association, the central executive committee ignored Eda's statement, and the left wing began to criticize him. The resolution was passed on to the party congress. The February party congress took on the character of a trial, with Eda as the defendant. From the very start, the left wing centered on the association, and the Katsumata faction clashed ferociously with the anti-association factions of Sasaki, Eda, and the Society for Thinking About a New Japan. It was estimated that of the 509 delegates, 220 to 230 were aligned with the association, 200 were anti-association, and 80 to 90 were neutral. The p r o Socialism Association factions were critical of the politicized Society for Thinking About a New Japan that Eda was creating with the DSP and CGP and demanded that he choose between the party and the society. Eda retorted, "We are now in an era of coalition. The JSP cannot gain control of the government alone. It must absorb the centrist forces. We will not obtain the support of the nation's citizens if we keep insisting that our party is the only correct one." Eda writes: Ever since the JSP congress last February, many people have told me, "I patiently supported the JSP, but that was the last straw. I am fed up." I honesdy do not know what to say to them.

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It has been said that the J S P — a party that keeps receiving 10 million votes with a membership of only 50,000—is puzzling. . . . I myself believe that most of its supporters consider it a party that will rebuild this unjust and irrational society not through the abrupt measure known as revolution but through the accumulation of gradual reforms. Not as a political party fanatically devoted to a narrow ideology but as a party with breadth. One that is not far removed from the common sense of the nation's people and one that opens its doors to the n a t i o n . . . . Within this kind of JSP, the Socialism Association is growing yearly. As everyone knows, the association is obsessed with the righteousness of Marxism-Leninism and asserts that the path to a dictatorship of the proletariat must never be compromised. Many J S P supporters undoubtedly find it mind-boggling that the association, which renders loyalty—you might even call it "faith"—to an ideology that even the J C P has thrown out on grounds that it is not suited to the realities of a developed industrial society, has gained control over the JSP. They are also undoubtedly fed up with the impotence and incompetence of the "well-meaning individuals" inside the party who allow this farcical self-indulgence to continue. The J S P has two faces: the understanding face that Diet members show to the nation's citizens during elections and the dogmatic face that appears at party congresses and rams through rigid theory. . . . The atmosphere in the program subcommittees of a congress and the atmosphere in its policy subcommittees are so different that it makes one wonder whether they are really parts of the same party. However, whatever sort of policy that is decided, it is the party program that serves as the foundation. (Eda, Atarashii seiji 0 mezashite,

2-3) Fearful that E d a would leave the party, Chairman Narita stated, " T h e Society for Thinking is a policy study group, and I expect that Eda will leave it if it becomes a political group." After a faction officers' meeting on March 1, however, E d a told a few people that he intended to leave the party. H e planned to establish a new party and run in the House of Councilors national district using it as his electoral base. O n March 17 he finished writing a book entided Atarashii seiji o mezashite (In search of a new politics), which was scheduled for publication in April. In it, he states: The J S P must be reformed, but I know all too well already how difficult it is to institute reform from within the party. The recent J S P congress, which was dominated by the madness of people possessed by the rigid ideology of the association, appeared to me to be nothing less than a declaration of the end of the postwar JSP, on which I had staked everything. It led me to think that it would be virtually impossible to reform the party from the i n s i d e . . . . I choose recklessness deliberately. Instead of operating from inside the existing JSP, I want to go outside and act freely and in accord with my beliefs. Not only will I be called reckless; I will probably be railed at as a dissolutionist and a traitor to boot. But I will proceed down this path deliberately. I will use whatever strength I have left to engage in the things that I have discussed here

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and find out to what extent they can be realized. I am not saying that there was no merit in what the J S P has done up to this point. But these were things born out of resistance, and as an opposition party. What is sought now is constructive behavior on its part, in order to build a new J a p a n . . . . I am not saying, of course, that this kind of thing will become possible all of a sudden simply because I bolted from the party. First, I will appeal to the nonpartisan voter and, after establishing a new amalgamation, will press for a reform of the J S P from outside the party. In appealing not only to the J S P but to the other political parties as well, I want to play the role of a pawn working for the coalition government that will change Japanese history. Wishing that the blossoming branch would move I find the spring wind to be still cold This is my favorite poem by Wang Wei. (Eda, Atarashii seiji 0 mezashite, 4 9 - 5 0 )

On March 26 Eda left the party, alone, and a wrangle that had lasted seventeen years came to an end. He then announced the formation of the Social Citizens League (Shakai Shimin Rengo.) He busied himself on behalf of an amalgamation of the progressive parties, citizen activists, nonpartisans, and middle-of-the-roaders. But on May 22 he died suddenly, of lung cancer. He was sixty-nine years old. The preparatory committee of the Social Citizens League was inaugurated on the twenty-third. The Party Reform Committee

The JSP was shaken by Eda's secession. A party reform committee consisting of the entire central executive committee was established for the purpose of rebuilding the party. It held its first meeting on April 18. The composition of the 24-member central executive committee was as follows: Sasaki faction, 5 (compared to 9 in the old central executive committee); the New Current Society, 5 (previously o); the Eda faction, 3 (previously 5); the Katsumata faction, 4 (previously 5); the Yayoikai, 4 (previously 2); and nonaligned, 3 (previously 3). The point of contention was whether the Socialism Association was a political group. There was haggling over whether the association should be required to provide supporting documents. The hostility between the association and the anti-association groups deepened. The reform debate was temporarily set aside until the House of Councilors election. The JSP suffered a defeat in the election, and on July 13 Chairman Narita and Secretary General Ishibashi announced their intention to resign. The anti-association factions made preparations for a group to promote party reform on July 30 and, declaring that they "would not share the party with the association," began an anti-association campaign. The new group was formally inaugurated on August 20. The number of party members bolting over to the Social Citizens League increased; nearly 1,000

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left the party beginning in March. There were organizational splits in the Tokyo, Chiba, and Fukushima branch headquarters. A n d the Osaka branch agitated for the formation of an anti-association federation of local federations. On September 10, with Sohyo's Makieda Motofumi (Japan Teachers' Union) mediating, an agreement was drawn up between Sohyo and the Socialism Association concerning the self-reform of the association. T h e resulting reform proposal called for (1) a modification of the association constitution to make it more appropriate as the research platform of a theory study group; (2) the abolition of the association's decision-making organs and action program; (3) the reorganization of its executive organs along the lines of a research coordinating committee and the abolition of its organization department and its labor, political, youth, and other groups; (4) the holding of conferences sponsored by the association, as well as publications and documents, for J S P members and workers who support the party; (5) the subordination of the association's proposals to the decisions of the party and labor unions in case of conflict, and the removal of the association from the process of selecting party officers; (6) the establishment of a Socialism Association review committee in the central executive committee to ensure that the association operates as a study group. T h e proposal was adopted at the September party congress. T h e big issue, however, was personnel selection. Narita tried to make Yokohama mayor Asukata Ichio his successor, but the anti-association factions were strongly opposed. T h e congress was thrown into confusion on February 26 when Den Hideo and two others declared that they would leave the party. T h e congress appointed Narita and Ishibashi as interim executives and went into recess. A national inaugural convention of the Social Citizens League was held on October 29. Three months later, the JSP, in effect without an executive, finally selected Asukata as chairman at the reopened convention on December 13. Kishima states: In the beginning Narita was invaluable to the J S P and to the structural reform group, and at one time he ushered in a hope-filled "Eda-Narita" era.. . . But after he was placed in a position of leadership, he gradually moved closer to the Sasaki faction out of—as Narita would put it—"exigencies relating to the management of the party" and began to distance himself from us accordingly. After he took on the post of chairman, in particular, his inherent "play-it-safe" personality came to the fore, and the bite in his speech and actions disappeared. . . . Indeed, Narita changed nothing and altered nothing precisely when a transformation was sorely needed, and so he became a tragic figure who embodied the long-term decline of the JSP. (Kishima 1979:69. Regarding the reform committee, See Asahi nenkan 1978:238-39; Kokumin seiji nenkan !978:449 - 65-)

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THE DYNAMICS OF THE 1955 SYSTEM

JSP DIET MEMBERS AND THEIR DEPENDENCE ON LABOR UNIONS Heard but Not Seen After the JSP's defeat in the November 1963 general election, Secretary General Narita wrote an article for the January 1 edition of Shakai shinpd in which he bemoaned the weakness of the party organization and the stagnation of its activities. He said, "For many of the nation's masses, the J S P is a party whose form is known only through the media. Has it become an entity that can be heard but not seen?" He listed three defects of the JSP: (1) its weakness in the area of day-to-day activities, operations relating to the masses, and its organization of mass movements and their independent leadership; (2) its domination by members of the Diet; (3) its continuing dependence on labor unions. In the mid-1960s, there were 50,000 party members. Diet members and local assemblymen accounted for about 5,000. Workers constituted about 70 percent of the total. The union with the largest number of party members was the Japan National Railway Union, with approximately 3,500 party members, or 11.7 percent of all J N R Union members. The All Japan Telecommunications Workers' Union had less than 2,000 members, or about 0.8 percent of the union membership. In each case the J S P members in the union were union officials or potential candidates for union positions. Theyjoined together to form a J S P members' consultative conference, which worked to preserve the influence of the mainstream union movement. There seemed to be a tendency to block the entry of people who were not union officials or union official candidates and not to welcome anti-mainstream activists into the party. Perhaps for this reason, the number of party members among unionists under twenty-five was extremely low while 72.7 of all members were between the ages of thirty and forty-five. It is probably safe to assume that these approximate levels were maintained thereafter. The party's budget was plagued by deficits. Its 1968 budget white paper warned that "the assorted contradictions created by long-standing profligacy in the party budget have led to the stagnation of party activities, and the party is currendy on the verge of bankruptcy." Party headquarters owed ¥730 million. Daily interest amounted to ¥124,000. The party's general account revenues totaled ¥200 million per annum. Less than 10 percent was covered by party dues. About 60 percent was provided by Diet members. There was an average deficit of about ¥2 million monthly. The party nevertheless officially refused all donations from the zaikai. At the November 1966 party congress Sohyo chairman Ota made a rousing speech in which he declared that the party "would not receive one lousy cent from monopoly capital." Since this was the time of the Black Mist scandal and dark rumors were spreading even to the JSP, Ota's statement was approved

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unanimously without much thought given to its implications. In practice, a tiny amount of contributions does come from the zaikai. (See Table 12.) Because of an amendment of the party constitution in 1958, delegates to party conventions were selected from the prefectural branch headquarters at a ratio of 1 per 100 party members. With a membership of 50,000, approximately 500 delegates were selected, with an additional small number from supporting organizations. A Diet member did not have the right to become a delegate unless he was selected by a prefectural branch headquarters. Eda, who was organization bureau chief at the time of the amendment, says: At the time, I thought that most of the Diet members would be selected as delegates and would attend. I thought that, as a result, Diet members would be forced to behave responsibly toward the lower-level organization and there would be a healthy development of the party. B u t . . . we did not get the Diet members. [Diet members] did not want to offend the young party members who had supported them during elections and who now claimed that they wanted to become delegates. Voices arose among the delegates in favor of having Diet members automatically become delegates, but a two-thirds majority was required to amend the constitution and it proved impossible to do this. . . . But I would also like to ask why the Diet members themselves did not try more aggressively to become delegates? (Eda,

Atarashii seiji o meza-

shite, 8-9) The 1977 party congress decided unanimously to "grant eligibility to become national congress delegates, with a standard [allocation] of one-third [of total delegate seats], to all Diet members, governors who are party members, and mayors of ordinance-designated cities who are party members." (Kokumin seiji nenkan 1978:449,465) In 1963 there were 92 full-time employees in the headquarter's secretariat. In 1964 there were 146 full-time staff members in the prefectural headquarters and 117 in all of the branches. (During 1971-79 there was a staff of 140 in the headquarters secretariat and its journal bureau.) Both party headquarters and the prefectural headquarters were infiltrated by the factions. The person who controlled them could dominate the party congress delegates. This was the reason for the strength of the Sasaki faction as well as the advance of the Socialism Association. (Nakano and Iizuka 1968: 64-76, 84) Dependence on Labor Unions The JSP, with 50,000 members, could accrue 12 million votes in general elections because the Sohyo labor unions engaged in vote-gathering activities. Naturally, they gathered votes on behalf of candidates who had backgrounds in their own union, but they also worked for other candidates

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THE DYNAMICS OF THE 1955 SYSTEM

whom the union supported. Very few candidates could get elected without the support of the labor unions. The JSP also depended on Sohyo for most of its political contributions. Sohyo collected funds from its member industrial unions and passed them on to the JSP in a single package through the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions political activities committee (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai Seiji Katsudo Iinkai). The election costs of candidates with Sohyo backgrounds were borne by the union with which a candidate was affiliated. Thus, Sohyo exercised strong influence over the JSP. This influence could overwhelm the JSP and throw it into confusion. For instance, the certification of candidates for the Diet was normally decided by party headquarters and then reported to the prefectural headquarters. But during the 1963 general election Sohyo disrupted the certification process in various electoral districts in Tokyo. One particular candidate was shifted from the Seventh District to the First District against his will and lost, while a candidate from the All Communication Workers' Union, the union with the strongest voice within Sohyo, ran in the Seventh District and won. In the 1965 House of Councilors election, a new All Japan Telecommunication Workers' Union candidate ran in Tochigi Prefecture and the incumbent was removed from the list of certified candidates. The incumbent ran as an independent, thereby splitting the JSP prefectural headquarters in two. Both candidates lost. With this kind of dependence, when Sohyo stagnated and the rate of support for the JSP dropped, the decline of the JSP became unavoidable. Furthermore, Sohyo's practice of supporting the JSP exclusively came under criticism from both the Sohyo right and the Sohyo left, for different reasons. JSP Diet members had their own personal kdenkai. For those with backgrounds as doctors and lawyers, in particular, the koenkai was indispensable. Nonetheless, the kdenkai activities of the JSP candidates were apparently rather weak compared with those of other parties. According to the Fair Elections Federation, as few as 5 percent of koenkai members voted for the JSP in general elections. This figure was 9 percent in 1969, 7 percent in 1972, and 13 percent in 1976, still low in comparison to other parties. (See Table 48.) TheJSP Diet Members A large proportion of JSP Diet members had backgrounds in Sohyo. (See Tables 20 and 21.) In the House of Representatives 92 percent of the Sohyoaffiliated Representatives were members of the JSP, and they accounted for around 43 percent of the JSP members of that house. In the House of Coun-

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cilors, 93 percent were JSP members, and they made up 66 percent of those affiliated with the party. There were virtually no union officials affiliated with the JSP who did not have ties to Sohyo. The proportion was considerably greater than the proportion of former higher-level bureaucrats in the LDP. Many JSP Diet members had experience as local public officials, and as many as ten of them also had Sohyo backgrounds. About 50 percent of the Representatives with experience as local public officials were with the LDP, and 30 percent were affiliated with the JSP. Within the JSP, they accounted for around 39 percent, a higher percentage than in the LDP. In the House of Councilors, 55 percent with local public experience were affiliated with the LDP and 30 percent with the JSP. They amounted to around 30 percent within the JSP, or about the same level as in the LDP. Farmers' movement leaders in the House of Representatives decreased from 35 (7 percent) in 1958 to 13 (3 percent) in 1979. Although most of them were affiliated with the JSP, their relative importance within the party decreased gradually from 20 percent (34 Representatives) to 9 percent (10 Representatives). This trend was even more conspicuous in the House of Councilors. There were 4 members (3 percent) in 1956, but in 1977 there were none. Most were JSP members. They accounted for 8 percent of the party's contingent in 1956; in 1977 this was o percent. The smaller (5 percent or fewer) categories in the House of Representatives included former high-level bureaucrats: there were 6 in 1958 and i960, but 4 in 1976 and 1979. A few people with ties to small business federations or the primary industries were elected every term. Each of these categories accounted for about 3.9 percent. Until the 1960s 2 or 3 people associated with big business federations were elected every term. In 1979, 3 local chamber of commerce affiliates were elected. In the House of Councilors, there was only 1 former high-level bureaucrat in 1956. People associated with small business federations or primary industries were elected occasionally; they accounted, on the average, for 0.5 percent. Big business federations and local chamber of commerce affiliates consistently numbered o. (Naka 1980: 384-87,588-91) Until the early 1960s JSP Diet members belonged to the Sasaki, Wada, or Kawakami factions. (See Table 22.) From the late 1960s they belonged to the Sasaki, Eda, and Katsumata triumvirate. The Suzuki-Sasaki faction, the Wada-Katsumata faction, and the Eda faction all contained a relatively large number of labor union leaders. According to the results of general elections held between 1958 and 1976, the percentage of faction members with labor union backgrounds was 29.8 percent, 28.6 percent, and 28.0 percent, respectively, for these factions. By contrast, the figure was 15.4 percent in the Kawakami faction; it was 14.3 percent in the Socialism Association and

35°

THE DYNAMICS OF T H E 1955 SYSTEM

10.3 percent in the Nomin Doshikai. As for locally elected officials, the results of the 1979 general election indicate that this group accounted for 7 (25 percent) of the 28 members of the old Eda faction, 13 (54.2 percent) of the 24 members of the Sasaki faction, 8 (38.1 percent) of the 21 members of the Katsumata faction, and 1 (20 percent) of the 5 members of the Socialism Association. (Naka 1980:287, 313)

NINE

The Labor Movement

E N T E R P R I S E U N I O N S AND C L A S S S T R U G G L E S Enterprise Unions

At the end of the Pacific War, the Japanese labor movement was led by the moderate Sodomei and the communist-dominated Sanbetsu (Zen Nihon Sangyobetsu Kumiai Kaigi, or All Japan Conference of Enterprise Unions). Under the guidance of GHQ, Mindo (Democratization League) groups within Sanbetsu collaborated with company managements to purge JCP unionists and thereby gained a firm grip on Sohyo's leadership. Ota Kaoru, who later became chairman of Sohyo, notes: Sohyo was born as a new national center. . . . If it wasn't for the power of the U.S. Occupation forces, I doubt that the J C P members could have been purged from business or the labor unions. Both Takano Minoru and I were opposed to the kind of relationship that existed between the J C P and the labor movement. But we were also against the Red Purge, because we thought that collaborating with capital and the government to purge the JCP amounted to trampling on democracy, which is the cornerstone of a labor union. . . . But many labor union leaders did collaborate with capital and actively expelled JCP members.. . . The stance that Takano and I took was to oppose the Red Purge . . . as individuals, but even so there is no denying the fact that we led a movement that would bring about the purge of communists. (Ota 1977:17-18)

The collaboration of the Mindo groups with their respective business firms in the purge strengthened the "enterprise" character of the unions. An enterprise union is composed of the regular employees of an enterprise. Regardless of their occupational category, they all become members. Temporary workers, seasonal workers, and people in supervisory positions may 35'

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THE DYNAMICS OF THE 1955 SYSTEM

not become union members. Union officers must have a position in the firm. Even though an enterprise union might be part of a higher-level organization, it maintains full sovereignty over its operations and its budget. This organizational form reached full development immediately after the war when, nurtured by GHQ, unions organized rapidly on an enterprise-byenterprise basis. They were modeled on the wartime industrial patriotic associations, which were organized factory by factory or shopfloor by shopfloor. They contrast sharply with Western-style unions, which are organized according to industry or occupation. Enterprise unions, or unit unions (tanso), affiliate with other unit unions in an industry to form unit industrial federations (tansan). The industrial federations, in turn, affiliate with other industrial federations to form central national organizations, or "national centers." These organizations reconcile the conflicting interests of member unions; establish uniform demands; carry out survey, educational, and public relations activities; provide assistance during labor disputes; mount organization drives in unorganized areas; participate in central and local government groups as representatives of labor; and conduct exchanges with international organizations. Both Sanbetsu and the resurrected Sodomei maintained this type of structure. So did Sohyo. The seventh item of the action program adopted at the second Sohyo convention in March 1951 stated: 1. Establishing and strengthening industrial labor unions. A. . . . We will strive to unify and consolidate the individual labor unions that exist in each industry by establishing common objectives and plans that span the industrial unions and by organizing joint action among them. B. . . . In unions where industrywide union consolidation is not yet complete, we must promote joint actions to unify and merge the unions in a given industry or sector with corresponding democratic unions outside Sohyo. 2. Strengthening unit unions. A. We must [remember] that, to an extent, postwar unions started out as employee unions and have not become true organizations for class-oriented, struggle. We must also try to overcome the tremendous postpurge decline of union consciousness and [growth of] union apathy. . . . We must begin by reorganizing shopfloor unions on a foundation of class-oriented solidarity while fully instituting democracy, stopping the trend toward company unionism, fortifying union budgets, and revitalizing the day-to-day activities of unit unions. At the same time, we must fight against the disruption of unions by the JCP's unified campaign committee and by faction activities and other forms of outside control. Mass training . . . will be necessary. (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai 1974:1:385:86; italics mine)

Sohyo turned sharply to the left at its second convention, transforming itself "from a chicken into a duck." Takano Minoru was installed as secretary

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general. An important role was played by the left-wing Worker Comrade Society (Ródósha Dóshikai), composed of members of the National Railways Union, the All Japan Telecommunications Workers' Union, and the Japan Teachers' Union. Formally inaugurated on September 24, the group had been active six months earlier, with Iwai Akira as the principal organizer. The Worker Comrade Society contributed to the split in the JSP when it supported the JSP left wing at the October JSP party congress and channeled its subsequent efforts into support for the Left Socialists. Union executives entered the Left Socialist Party en masse and furthered the advance of the left wing. There seemed to be two ways of overcoming the limitations of an enterprise-based movement. The first was the promotion of shopfloor actions by digging up and aggregating shopfloor demands, confronting management, and thereby intensifying the "shopfloor class struggle." The second was the centralization of power in the industrial federations. If control over collective bargaining and the authority to call a strike was centralized in the industrial unions, then unified demands, unified bargaining, and unified agreements were possible. There was bound to be strong resistance to these efforts. Because company finances and shopfloor organizations differed in every enterprise union, the level of demands and the capacity to conduct a movement were not uniform. Workers embedded in a system of seniority and lifetime employment did not take kindly to the weakening of their company's competitiveness by a shopfloor action or strike. If bankruptcy resulted, they would lose everything. As a result, it was difficult to implement unified shopfloor actions. Company managements hammered away at these weaknesses, inducing unions to drop out of a campaign. They chipped away at shopfloor actions and tried to create moderate "second unions." Beginning in the early 1950s, managers brought heavy pressure on the unions to restore managerial prerogatives. The dissolution of Densan is a typical example. The Densan

Strike

When the Japan Electric Power Industry Labor Union (Nihon Denki Sangyo Rodó Kumiai, or Densan) was established in 1947, the electric power industry consisted of the Japan Electric Power Distribution Corporation (Nihon Hassóden Kabushiki Gaisha, or Nippatsu) and nine private power distribution companies. Nippatsu was a state enterprise created during the war in order to stabilize the supply of power; it was responsible for all generation and overall allocation of electricity. Local distribution of electric power was relegated to the nine distribution companies. A huge industrial union was organized around this consolidated power-distribution system. Densan's regional headquarters and prefectural branches consisted of em-

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ployees of all these corporations. The union was also open to the employees of the subcontractor engineering firms and construction companies involved in building generating plants. Because its central headquarters possessed very strong powers—including the right to approve and disapprove the entry and exit of union members, rights to 50 percent of union member dues, and the "three powers" (to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of the membership, to issue directives ordering dispute action, and to conclude labor contracts)—it succeeded in establishing a uniform industry wage standard known as the "Densan wage," conducted unified negotiations with the Conference of Electrical Power Operations Managers (Denki Jigyo Keieisha Kaigi, or Denkei Kaigi), and concluded a uniform contract for the entire industry. Friction between communist and Mindó affiliates within Densan was severe. It worsened after the union's fourth convention, in 1949, where the Mindó faction seized the control of the union executive from the communists. The May 1950 convention was canceled because of clashes between the two sides. The Mindó faction, which held a majority in the central executive committee, issued a "special directive" on July 12 calling on union members to reregister, ostensibly in order to ascertain responsibility for the J C P violence that had led to the adjournment of the convention. Although 108,095 members reregistered a month later, 19,282 refused. Central headquarters then took disciplinary actions against those who refused, including 411 expulsions and 117 suspensions. Under the Red Purge, company managements dismissed 2,737 ° f the people who had refused to reregister. The union's central headquarters voted "not to engage in anti-firing actions," thereby passively approving the dismissals. In this way, leading JCP-affiliated activists were rooted out of the union and the Mindó group achieved complete control over Densan for the first time since its formation. Meanwhile, management was attempting to split Densan. In September 1949 the president and vice president of Densan's Kan to regional headquarters suddenly bolted from the union; in November they established the Kanto Electric Power Distribution Labor Union (Kantó Haiden Rodó Kumiai, or Kanpai Roso) with a membership of approximately 5,000. They argued that, "because there was only one organization, in the past the Kanto distribution company, whose business situation was good, was deprived of profits by companies in other regions. The division of electric power operations into nine [separate companies] is certain to occur, and independent accounting systems will thereby be set up [in each new company]. Abundant compensation can thus be obtained if we become an independent union." In an effort to promote the second union, the management of the Tokyo Electric Company granted the new union wages above what Densan's unified bargaining had obtained, and Kanpai Roso (later the Tokyo Electric

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Labor Union) continued to expand its influence. By 1951 it had 21,800 members, or about 80 percent of the company's employees. The division of electric power operations refers to a plan to split Nippatsu's service area into nine regions, amalgamate the electric power distribution companies in each region, and reorganize them into nine electric power companies that combined both generation and distribution. Although ostensibly aimed at raising productivity by creating independent accounting systems, in reality the plan sought to dissolve Densan, with its base in Nippatsu. In April 1950 the Yoshida cabinet introduced an electric power operations reorganization law and a public enterprise law. Parliamentary entanglements led to the shelving of the bills, but on November 23 G H Q issued a letter from General MacArthur ordering the nine-part division. The government complied the next day. The establishment of the new companies, originally scheduled for October 1,1951, was moved up to May 1 as a result of a G H Q directive. In March and April of 1952 Densan submitted written demands to the Denkei Kaigi for an amendment of its labor contract and an increase in wages. Negotiations broke down. Both parties submitted a request for mediation to the Central Labor Relations Board (Chüó Rodó Iinkai, or CLRB) in May. The resulting mediation proposals were rejected by both labor and management, reigniting the dispute. The content of the CLRB mediation proposals was moderate and should not have been entirely unacceptable to Densan given the difficult circumstances it was facing. But Densan, with its 130,000 members and its unbroken record of victories, found the terms humiliating. Densan's president was selected as chairman of Sóhyó's board of trustees at the third Sóhyó convention in July. In the midst of a campaign to break out of its post-purge stagnation, Sóhyó marshaled the full might of its unions behind Densan and Tanró (Coal Miners' Union). Densan pursued a strategy that had succeeded in the past and exerted pressure by instigating massive electric power outages. Eleven outages were in fact implemented. In October management refused to participate in consolidated negotiations and requested regional talks. When Densan refused, Denkei Kaigi was dissolved, creating a situation where it was impossible to bargain unless enterprise-based unions were created. The content of the arbitration proposal that was released by the CLRB in November was even more humiliating than the mediation proposal. Densan rejected it and prepared for a third round. But by this time Densan had become isolated and the target of public criticism. Management accepted the arbitration proposal and attempted to split the union. Densan's Kansai regional headquarters requested that the power to negotiate and to call strikes be transferred to the region in accord with management's demand for regional bargaining and independent wage settlements. A second union

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(Chübu Denryoku Rodó Kumiai, or Chubu Electric Power Labor Union) was established within the Chubu regional headquarters. Then the Kansai, Chubu, and Kanto regional headquarters began, one after another, to engage in regional-level bargaining and reach independent settlements. When the Kyushu regional headquarters split on December 17, Densan finally decided to accept the arbitration proposal. At the signing the following day it was forced to accept not only the arbitration proposal itself but also the validity of the independent wage settlements that its regional branches and the second unions (the Chubu Electric Power Union and the Kyushu Electric Power Union) had reached. Schisms continued. In spring 1953 most of the Tohoku and Shikoku regional branches, about half of the Kansai branch, and part of the Kyushu and Hokkaido regional branches bolted from the union to set up enterprise unions. By the time of the union convention in May, there were about 60,000 unionists in Densan and 60,000 in the enterprise unions. By July the unions that had bolted were on the verge of holding a preparatory meeting for an industrial union federation of their own, the National Federation of Electric Power Workers' Unions (Zendenró). The Densan convention debated the issue of whether the remaining organization should continue as a single union or be reorganized on a company-by-company basis. The verdict was 292 to 44 in favor of continuing as a single unit. The March 1956 extraordinary convention decided, however, to restructure union organization in the industry regionally by incorporating existing electric power unions into Zendenró. In practical terms, this meant that Densan would be organized on an enterprise basis. Accordingly, the central union headquarters was dissolved. (Shimizu 1982:409-38) Reorienting the Class Struggle

In 1954 Densan's ninth convention noted that the following internal factors contributed to the union's fragmentation: i. About two-thirds of the union consists of workers who received prewar, military-style training in the workshops. If it weren't for the company, there would be no workers; it's our company—this kind of thinking seeped in. The monster that we thought had died in fact continues surreptitiously to live eight years later. Because union members with supervisory positions normally engage in work that complements that of management, unless they are really careful, before they know it they begin to see things from management's point of view. And because they direct the work of the general union membership, unless we are careful, their voice becomes louder than that of the union organization official. After the war, this sort of person was the most active in establishing the union. Union officials could easily obtain supervisory positions once they returned to the workplace, and management valued them highly.

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In the case of Densan, a large number of union members held supervisory positions in the enterprise.... It was here that the capitalists skillfully drove their wedge. . . . Our union . . . was born after the war, when the domestic ruling powers were still fumbling around; with the Occupation forces looking after us, we were able to establish a union without significant interference from the capitalists. After that, in the midst of inflation, we were able to make gains well beyond what was consonant with our true strength. . . . We were spoiled and . . . neglected the task of consolidating internally. 2. Opinions, emotions, and viewpoints of various kinds were sustained undigested within the union. There were people who sought job classification wages and union members who took an anti-worker position. Problems emerged where these were left unaddressed. Because the union's demands and methods were not presented for mass debate or because that debate was insufficient, dissatisfaction increased among certain strata, job categories, and regions. Splits occurred first where the members lacked a sense of solidarity and union opinion was unconsolidated.... Union members tended to become dependent on the union organization, and the organization itself was also lacking in its efforts to mobilize mass action. 3. An escapist tendency arose because we underestimated the power of the capitalists and overestimated the power of the union (insufficient analysis of conditions), tended to engage in standardized patterns of action, and made errors of judgment regarding tactics and their timing. In addition, because there were differing prewar labor practices in different companies and because we delegated to the regions demands for items like quarterly, year-end, and miscellaneous allowances without engaging in proper guidance, we, on the contrary, encouraged enterprise sectionalism. (Nihon Ródo Kumiai Sòhyògikai 1974:1 ¡514) After the unsuccessful Densan Strike in 1952, other industrywide unified actions were forced to retreat. In a Federation of Iron and Steel Workers' Union strike in 1953, the unions of the Yawata and Fuji steel compan i e s — b o t h of them leading firms—reached independent settlements. In the Japan Coal Miners' Union, the union of the Jòban Coal Mining Comp a n y — t h e largest firm in the industry—broke ranks. In the All Japan Automobile Industry Workers' Union (Zen Nihon Jidòsha Sangyò Rodò Kumiai, or Zenji), the Nissan b r a n c h — a strong b r a n c h — c o n t i n u e d a strike even after setdements were reached at Toyota and Isuzu; it was ultimately defeated and forced to dissolve in the wake of a lockout and the formation of a second union. T h e All Japan Automobile Industry Workers' Union itself was forced into dissolution in 1954. T h e orientation toward enterprise unionism is deeply rooted. At the time, two competing programs were put forward to counter this orientation: the regional organization-oriented Takano plan and the industry-based Ota-Iwai plan. They became enmeshed in differences over political programs.

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THE DYNAMICS OF THE 1955 SYSTEM T H E ÔTA-IWAI P L A N The Clash of Plans

T h e unified Worker Comrade Society was united in support of Secretary General Takano, but in 1953 cracks began to appear. At the fourth Sôhyô convention, in July, Takano proposed a "peace force plan" that defined the United States as the force of war and the U S S R as the force of peace. Convention participants clashed over whether to support Takano's plan or the "third force plan" of the Left Socialist Party, which called for affiliating with neither the United States nor the Soviet military blocs: Judging from what was actually written down, outside of the fact that the program spoke very highly of the Soviet peaceful coexistence policy following Stalin's death, the peace force in the [Sôhyô] program did not differ much from the third force in the Left Socialist Party program. But Takano, a member of the Left Socialist Party, had been approaching members of the Labor Farmer Party and t h e J C P since the beginning of the year (1953) and this was interpreted to mean that he intended, with Sôhyô's dramatic expansion and the increase in its political voice, to use the peace force plan to form a kind of national front that included the Socialists and theJCP. It was therefore felt that the autonomy of the respective political parties and the independence of the union (Sôhyô) from the parties would be compromised under the peace force plan. . . . A debate over the extent to which this change in terminology represented a deviation from the Left Socialist Party's policy spread both inside and outside the party. (Nihon Rôdô Kumiai Sôhyôgikai 1974:1 ¡526-27) T h e Takano proposal was supported at the convention, but afterward the Japan Federation of Textile Workers' Unions, the Seamen's Union, and two other industrial unions critical of Sôhyô 's "ultra-leftist tendencies" seceded; they participated in the April 1954 formation of the Zenrô Kaigi (Japan Trade Union Congress, or Zen Nihon Rôdô Kumiai Kaigi). Within Sôhyô, Synthetic Chemical Workers' Union president Ota Kaoru led an effort to oust Takano. Ôta notes: It seems that, in situations where his protégés opposed him, Takano had the habit of hastily denouncing them rather trying to reason with them. . . . He tended to view such people as "the enemy." . . . I did not oppose Takano outright and across the board. Rather, I intended to get across that it would not be good for the movement to turn Sôhyô workers, who had in practice proceeded as anticommunists until then, into procommunists just to satisfy the leadership's adherence to such a policy. . . . Inside Sôhyô, the Worker Comrade Society split and Ishiguro of the Japan Coal Miners' Union and Hiragaki of the Japan Teachers' Union—and also Masutetsu and others—came to follow Takano, while Takaragi [Fumihiko], Iwai [Akira], and I formed another group. (Ôta 1976:78, 84, 85)

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The clash intertwined with a dispute inside the Left Socialist Party. T h e Left Socialists were in the midst of preparing a party platform. Shimizu Shinzo, a member of the central executive committee, objected publicly to the platform's position on the nature of revolution in Japan. The committee asserted that a socialist revolution would be combined with a struggle for full national independence. Shimizu gave the highest priority to the nationalist revolution and asserted that a socialist revolution would follow from it. Whereas the committee made the working class the leading element and called for an alliance with working farmers and citizens, Shimizu defined the leading force as a broad-ranging national peace force that included workers, farmers, citizens, and petty capitalists. Takano supported Shimizu's proposal, and Ota was closest to the committee's. In short, the Left Socialist mainstream and the Sohyo mainstream clashed. Takano ended up bolting from the Socialism Association, followed by Shimizu. The Worker Comrade Society, composed of Sohyo-affiliated union executives, also split. (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai 1974:1:568-69) The clash between Takano and Ota was not restricted to political policy. At the fourth convention, Takano put forward a coordinated regional action program. The Amagasaki Steel Plant Strike of April-June and the Nihon Kokan Muroran Strike of J u n e - S e p t e m b e r of the following year were directed in accord with this program. Because both ended in defeat, criticism of the program mounted. In the vanguard was Ota. He says, "It may appear rather gallant to set aside, as Takano did, the intrinsic demands of workers on grounds that enterprise-based unions are limited and to concentrate exclusively on the peace movement—and it may very well be that this is made to order for an activist, pro-national-liberation sentiment—but I myself could not support it." (Ota 1976:95) Ota openly attacked Takano at an emergency meeting of the Synthetic Chemical Industry Workers' Union in March 1954: " T h e Sohyo leadership is intent on conducting political campaigns and cool toward the major actions that are important for the worker's advancement." The program of the Synthetic Chemical Industry Workers' Union stated: In assessing the reactionary forces, the agitators of the Sohyo leadership assert that the enemy has fallen into disarray and division. Even though conflicts may exist within the enemy camp, they are engaging in an internal scramble over profits on the premise that the workers do not have the power to drive a wedge into their camp. Has there been even one instance where the capitalists have split during a battle between labor and capital? . . . Furthermore, the Sohyo leadership is convinced that we workers have become conscious of ourselves as a class and that our consciousness is being raised to an extremely high level. To be sure, most workers have increased their resistance to the cutback in real wages. But overall, one cannot say that their capacity for struggle has been heightened.... It is a total contradiction

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to say that the class party is weak and workers as a class are strong. . . . It is a serious mistake not to grasp this contradiction fully and force through a Sohyo-centered political campaign. Regardless of how weak the party is, we should, above all, strengthen our class struggle and advance our movement around it. (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai 1 9 7 4 : 1 : 5 7 2 - 7 3 )

At the fifth Sohyo convention, in July 1954, Ota battled Takano for the post of secretary general but lost by a vote of 140 to 107 (with 12 blank votes). But during the campaign to increase wages in the following spring, Ota's approach was realized in the establishment of "joint action" among eight industrial unions (Tanro, the General Federation of Private Railway Workers' Unions, the Synthetic Chemical Industry Workers' Union, Densan, the National Federation of Paper and Pulp Industry Workers' Unions, the National Trade Union of Metal and Engineering Workers' Unions, the Chemical Industry Labor Federation, and the non-Sohyo Japan Federation of Electrical Machine Workers' Unions). This group became the model for subsequent "spring labor offensives." At the sixth convention, in July, Iwai Akira of the National Railways Union challenged Takano. The initial vote was 128 to 123, with 8 blank votes. Takano withdrew from the runoff, and Iwai was selected general secretary. Ota returned to the post of vice chairman and became chairman in 1958. Thus, the Ota-Iwai plan was established. The convention adopted a program that began, "The issues faced by Sohyo in the current difficult situation are, first, to assist in strengthening and coordinating unified industrial action by the industrial federations and, second, to appeal to Zenro Kaigi, Shinsanbetsu, and neutral unions to participate in joint actions and bring about the solidarity and unification of all Japanese workers." It added, "Unified industrial action is the foundation of shopfloor actions and the fundamental method for advancing the labor movement." Shopfloor actions were not being neglected. (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai 1974:11635-36) The organizational platform committee inaugurated in 1956 with Shimizu as chairman investigated policies that would strengthen the organization and enable it to overcome "enterprise sectionalism and a company unionist mentality." The "draft organizational platform" released just before the tenth Sohyo convention, in 1958, stated that shopfloor actions were the foundation of the labor movement. To overcome the disadvantages of enterprise-based unions, the movement had to eliminate the domination of the supervisory hierarchy and create a "workplace where one need not be fearful of supervisors." Therefore, shop officials should make note of the complaints and dissatisfactions of individual workers and utilize them to advance to the stage of shopfloor action, "in which everyone fights and negotiates together." To win the right to negotiate on behalf of the shop, organizations had to take a flexible approach and allow the three powers of

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bargaining, issuing action directives, and concluding agreements to be transferred to the shop in certain circumstances. But because shopfloor actions were localized in individual shops, they might be subjected to concentrated artillery fire from the company. Therefore, localized battles had to become battles of the whole, so that other shops could catch up to the successes achieved in the most advanced shops. Shopfloor actions would shake up the structure of exploitation at the point of production by having workers make themselves the "main actors" and preparing a "substructure for the move to socialism." O f course, this proposal did not advance beyond the stage of a draft. (Hyodo 1981:58-76) The Miike Dispute T h e Miike Labor Union, an enterprise union of workers at Mitsui's Miike mine, was the most advanced stronghold of the shopfloor action. It had begun its advance in autumn 1952 and continued to develop—by means of shopfloor actions as well as study groups, neighborhood activities, and housewives' associations—into the strongest union in Japan. It concentrated on settling shopfloor demands through mass bargaining accompanied by physical action. Its achievements were manifested in its shopfloor routines. These, in turn, spread to other shops via "attainment struggles." At this time, an "energy revolution" was occurring, as industries switched from coal to oil as their primary source of energy. Big business set its sights on the Miike union. In January 1959 the Mitsui Mining Company submitted a proposal to Sankoren, the federation of the six enterprise unions that organized Mitsui Mining, which included a personnel reduction of 6,000 for the purpose of "coal mine rationalization." Sankoren responded with a series of strikes. A compromise was reached on April 6 in which the company agreed not to engage in involuntary or selective dismissals even if the number of voluntary retirements did not reach 6,000 and the union agreed not to obstruct the company's solicitation of voluntary retirements. But only 1,582 employees volunteered. Anticipating a second personnel reduction plan, Sankoren held an emergency convention in July. There, the Miike Union took the hard-line position that the personnel reduction had the destruction of the union as its objective. The other unions saw it as a rationalization designed to address business losses. T h e Miike union grew isolated as it ran ahead of the pack. In August the company submitted a second rationalization plan, which included a personnel reduction of 4,580 employees in Mitsui's six mines. O f these, 2,210 were to be from Miike. This was the beginning of a planned no,ooo-person reduction in personnel in the industry as a whole (approximately 60 percent of the 180,000 workers employed by the eighteen leading firms). At the behest of the government and Keidanren, a conference of

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the presidents of the leading firms in the Coal Mine Employers' Deliberation Council resolved to "support the reconstruction of Mitsui, provide relief money, and not encroach on Mitsui's market segment." Meanwhile, Nikkeiren distributed a massive amount of public relations material. T h e Mitsui Bank, Takushoku Bank, Kangyo Bank, and others arranged to provide consortium financing for the company in three phases. A n d at a September 4 cabinet meeting the government prepared for the Miike struggle by setting u p a conference that included the justice minister, the chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, and other cabinet members concerned with public security, while the Fukuoka riot police engaged in fulldress mock battles. Collective bargaining between Mitsui Mining and Sankoren over the seco n d rationalizaton plan broke down in October, and the company ann o u n c e d that it would resume solicitations of voluntary retirees. Sankoren continued its strike, vowing to "fight even if it means shedding every last drop of blood." In light of the seriousness of the situation, a special convention of the industry union federation, Tanro, in October decided to prepare a "unified struggle" and fight " l o n g and flexibly." But even though Tanro was the most powerful industrial federation at the time, the powers that it exercised in the name of its constituent unions were limited to wage increases and actions for summer and winter bonuses. T h e authority to respond to rationalization was held by the individual enterprise unions or the companywide federations of enterprise unions. In the case of the Miike dispute, the authority was held by Sankoren. Tanro's role did not extend beyond guidance, coordination, and cooperation. Sohyo was even more of a bit player, charged only with negotiations and behind-the-scenes maneuvering with the government, the zaikai, Mitsui group executives, and the press. T h e Tanro convention policies were reaffirmed repeatedly thereafter but were not once obeyed. Even as they dispatched organizers and contributions to the struggle of the Miike Union, most of the other company union federations and individual mine unions stood back and watched developments in Sankoken, the largest of the industry's company federations. A summit conference was held in November between the president of Mitsui Mining and the chairman of Sankoren. T h e focus was on Miike. T h e company president declared, " T h e Miike reduction is not only an issue of numbers but also an issue of quality." He insisted on the dismissal of approximately 1,200 shopfloor activists, and the talks broke off. At this point C L R B chairman Nakagawa Ichiro used his discretionary powers to initiate conciliation procedures. His proposal stated: "(1) Since the essence of reconstruction is the elimination of the sources of obstructions to production, the company and the union will cooperate in establishing workplace discipline and strive to reach production targets. (2) Efforts will be made to realize the reduction of personnel in the original company proposal (2,210

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at Miike), and the union will not interfere with the soliciting of voluntary retirees. (3) If the number of volunteers does not reach the proposed figure, a separate discussion will be held; if matters cannot be arranged then, a decision will be made at the discretion of the conciliator." Most rationalization proposals at the time adopted this kind of formula. But the company refused to alter its hard-line stance. It rejected the conciliation proposal and continued to solicit voluntary retirees at Miike. Only 700 applied during the month of November. O n December 14 the company dismissed 1,492 employees. A m o n g them were 670 union activists, including 120 JSP members and 31 members of the JCP. A subsequent directive dismissed another 1,278 employees. O n January 5, i960, the Miike Union summarily rejected 1,214 of the dismissals. T h e company responded with a lockout of the entire Miike mine on January 25. T h e Miike Union called a strike of unspecified length. T h e Miike Union began fortifying its organization. It dispatched organizers to various parts of the country and, in anticipation of a long struggle, imposed a harsh ¥10,000 a month livelihood spending limit on its members. Sohyo provided ¥30 million as the first installment of a strike fund composed of ¥100 per member. Tanro approved a ¥150 million per month livelihood fund. In addition, the Tanro convention in February decided, on the one hand, to establish a strike fund of ¥600 a month per regular Tanro member and ¥1,000 a month for Sankoren affiliates and, on the other, to switch from a "long and flexible" struggle to a powerful consolidated one. O n February 26 the Tanro central action committee called for a unified strike by all Tanro branches in early April and physical action by Sankoren in late March. O n March 18 it announced a twenty-four-hour strike by all Sankoren branches on April 1, followed by a twenty-four-hour strike on April 5, a forty-eight-hour strike on April 7 and 8, and an indefinite strike by all Tanro branches beginning on April 11. Defeat and Its Lessons O n March 17 the New Miike Coal Mine Union (Shinro), with approximately 3,100 members, raised its standard. A company effort to split the union had been under way since late 1959. O n March 24 Shinro concluded an agreement calling for a quick resolution of the dispute based on the rationalization plan prepared by the company and an end to the lockout. The company agreed to provide ¥20,000 to each of the new union's members to help them get back on their feet financially. Zenro Kaigi supported Shinro, and so did the newly established DSP. T h e clash grew fierce as the company took steps to resume production. Beginning on March 19, Shinro members made almost daily lunges at the Miike Union's picket line. Zenro Kaigi dispatched a committee to the area and contributed ¥1 million in loans and 500 organizers. Sohyo systematically

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assembled its own contingent of organizers. The town and the mines began to look like a war zone. The company launched its first move on March 27 when it forcibly transported an initial shipload of 300 miners to the Yotsuyama shaft under an escort of Maritime Self-Defense Force ships. The Miike Union organized a fleet of its own and blocked the passage of the company's second shipload of 400 or so. At the Mikawa shaft, in the early morning of March 28, 1,500 Shinro unionists divided into three separate parties. About 600 of them tried to force their way into the mine. They clashed with 500 picketers who tried to stop them and precipitated a bloody melee that injured more than 200 from both sides. The company requested an injunction from the Fukuoka district court that day, and the court acceded. The situation grew even more tense as a consequence. A member of the Miike Union was stabbed to death by a band of thugs on March 29. On April 1 the government held an emergency cabinet meeting and decided to send a massive police force into the area. It also issued a statement that "the resumption of work by the second union will be secured through the use of a police force" and that "the union's picket line is illegal." Tanro made its call for a series of strikes on March 18. But the five Sankoren mines other than Miike had already completed their personnel cutbacks. With the formation of the second union at Miike as a catalyst, they began to withdraw from the battlefront by either rejecting Tanro's directive or altering their tactics. Tanro had no choice but to alter its strategy. In other words, Sankoren would call off the strike as of April 1, propose the opening of collective bargaining over working conditions in the company's five mines, and state that it would request conciliation by the CLRB in regard to Miike. It would agree to continue the strike at Miike, demand an end to company efforts to resume production, and call for an emergency convention. On April 6 CLRB chairman Fujibayashi Keizo released a conciliation proposal. Included was a stipulation that people who were dismissed would be treated as voluntary retirees and would be given an additional bonus of ¥10,000. The company accepted the proposal. The union withheld comment. Tanro reluctandy withdrew its call for a series of strikes. At its third emergency convention, in April, the position of the five Sankoren mines was that, no matter how unfavorable the CLRB proposal was, the conflict needed to be brought to an end. The 35,000-member Sankoren was the union's largest and strongest company federation of the 170,000-member Tanro. Under normal circumstances, it would not have been overturned. But a considerable number of mine-level activists among the convention delegates did not agree with the Sankoren executives. At the start of the convention, just as the security treaty struggle was reaching a climax, Sohyo chairman Ota sounded the charge. The idea of "linking up with the security treaty" captured the imagination of the activists. After a heated debate,

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the convention decided to reject the conciliation proposal and continue the struggle. Sankoren withdrew from the battlefront. The Miike Union seceded from Sankoren and joined Tanro directly. At Miike, a running battle continued over the mine's hopper station. The number of outside activists increased to the point where 10,000-20,000 of them surrounded the hopper station. Confronting them were the second union, gangs of thugs, and the police, who launched periodic attacks. On May 12, some 2,500 Miike Union picketers clashed with the police, leaving 170 wounded. On May 26 the Miike Union and the second union collided, causing a large number of injuries. On June 5 a lockout of the harbor office was instituted. On June 14 the Miike Union obstructed the transport of tools and equipment on the bay. On June 29 the Miike Union and the second union clashed on the water once again. In the meantime, Tokyo was coming to a boil over the security treaty. On May 19 the new security treaty was forcibly passed; on June 10 U.S. representative James Haggerty was attacked, and on June 15 demonstrators clashed with police around the Diet's perimeter. On June 13 and 14 the Tanro convention held in Fukuoka stressed that "the security treaty and Miike are one" and boasted that "the situation has reached a decisive turning point that is favorable to us." At Miike leaflets declared, "The day Kishi falls is the day that we win at Miike." The commotion over the security treaty began to abate following Kishi's announcement on June 23 that he was stepping down. But Miike became a deadly maelstrom. O n July 5 the company landed members of the second union on the beach in front of the enemy; on July 7 it clashed with the Miike Union on the water, leading to numerous casualties on both sides. On July 8 the Miike Union blocked an injunction against its siege of the hopper station. And on July 19, roughly 15,000 members of the Miike Union and 10,000 policemen faced off in an extremely tense atmosphere. That day, at the request of the Ikeda cabinet's minister of labor, Ishida Hirohide, the CLRB presented an unusual conciliation proposal to both the company and the union, asking that it be granted full discretionary authority. There was a temporary cease-fire. Tanro president Hara Shigeru notes, "It was at this time that we made an error of judgment. We thought that since the enemy had been driven into a corner during the battle over the hopper station, the resulting arbitration proposal was sure to be more positive than the earlier one." The conciliation proposal issued on August 10 stated: "(1) A one-month cooling-off period will be established in order to resolve the dismissal issue. The company will cancel the dismissal of people who have been designated but still remain after that period has ended, and those in question will be considered to have retired voluntarily as of the end of the period. (2) Those who resign voluntarily will be provided with ¥20,000 in addition to standard severance pay, while those who volunteer during the [cooling-off] period will receive another ¥50,000 on top of this."

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The Miike Union decided that it could not accept the proposal, but on August 16 the Tanro Central Action Committee gave it conditional approval. Sohyo decided to support Tanro. On August 18 the Tanro convention advocated using the conciliation proposal to end the dispute. On September 4 the Miike Union rejected the conciliadon proposal and held a rally. On September 6 the Tanro convention agreed to resolve the situation by means of the conciliation proposal and the Miike Union accepted the Tanro convention decision on September 9. Some 6,950 members of the Miike Union returned to work and full production was resumed on December 1, the 313th day since the company's imposition of a lockout and the union's declaration of an indefinite strike. (Shimizu 1982:447-81) In 1962 the Sohyo executive released a "draft organizational policy," which was adopted at the 1964 convention with virtually no revision. The document asserted that, even though it was necessary to strengthen industry-level organization and industry-level unified actions, under conditions where monopoly capital had recovered and issued a challenge with the backing of state authority, the "nature of the labor union movement, including shopfloor activities," needed to be reconsidered. First, shopfloor activities must be pursued with an emphasis on the "unified function" of the labor union. The experience of the Miike dispute had exposed the following limitations: "The shopfloor action . . . was onesided. . . . There was virtually no effort to place shop and shopfloor actions . . . in the context of a unified industrial struggle." Second, the delegation of the three powers to the shop organization deviated from the basic principles of the union movement. "When shop actions develop and reach a point where they halt production, they are the equivalent of a partial strike. Therefore, the basic principle of the movement shall be to quickly direct [these powers] upward to the higher-level organs and aim for the resolution of issues within the context of a wider struggle." Shop activities should monitor whether labor agreements concluded by the headquarters are being observed. Whereas the 1958 "draft organizational platform" (which did not get further than the draft stage) asserted that the worker should become the "main actor of the shop" via "shopfloor actions," this statement emphasized "unified struggles" directed by upper-echelon organizations. The times had indeed changed. (Hyodo 1981:76-80)

THE SPRING OFFENSIVE AND THE IMF-JC Holding Hands in the Dark

The struggles against the rationalization of production in the 1950s were a gallant resistance to capital's offensive. A spate of strikes lasting a hundred

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days or longer occurred under the slogan of "Absolute resistance to layoffs." But even as they gave aid to the strikes of other unions in the same industry, enterprise unions cooperated with management behind the scenes in raiding the customers of the striking firm. A strike at another company in the same industry provided a prime opportunity to expand one's share of the market. For this reason, unions thought twice before calling a strike and companies rushed to set up second unions. Ota Kaoru came up with the "spring offensive formula" in response. The spring offensives were "full-force, industry-by-industry musterings of enterprise unions held every spring"; they were "an alliance of the weak." Óta states: The idea was to "hold hands in the dark." Even enterprise unions are destined to contain demands for appreciable hikes in wages and better working conditions, and they are aware that if they strike, these will improve. But they are also faint-hearted and worry that, if their own enterprise falls behind because of a loss of its market, their own wages might not rise as a consequence. The spring offensive began in a period when . . . there was a considerable surplus of workers. . . . The thinking was that if everyone [stood up] at the same time, there would be nothing to fear. We tried to imbue the idea that if simultaneous strikes were held in an industry, there would be no need to lose markets. (Ota 1977:93) Because the whole was weak, there was no policy choice but to establish a schedule and . . . "hold each other by the hand" and help each other as much as possible. But when you strike for just a day in private industry, wages will not rise all that much. Therefore, we centered [the spring offensive] on the private railways, thinking that if unions like these strike, the public will be disturbed because it has lost its means of transportation, and the CLRB will appear. . . . We aimed to thereby extract a conciliation proposal from the CLRB and then have everyone else follow the pattern that it set. (Ota

1976:103)

The number of participants in the spring offensives mushroomed from 700,000 in 1955 to 2,400,000 in 1959. But they did not achieve much in the area of wages until i960. Annual increases were less than 10 percent, and the average was 7 percent. It was only after the security treaty crisis and the Miike strike that gains were made. Beginning in 1961, wage hikes surpassed 10 percent every year. From 1962 Sóhyó adopted the tactic of using the heavy and chemical industries, and the Japan Federation of Iron and Steel Workers' Unions in particular, as the fulcrum of the spring offensive. Under the earlier approach of using the private railways and the industrial federations affiliated with the Council of Public Corporation and Government Enterprise Workers' Unions (Kórókyó), which lacked the right to strike, the participants were often forced to swallow small wage increases imposed by the conciliation of CLRB or the Public Corporations and Government Enterprises Labor Re-

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lations Board (PCGELRB). Because they were in high-growth areas, the heavy and chemical industries "had a strong fighting capacity" and could organize "penetrating strikes." But the steel workers' union failed to get its strikes ratified at Nihon Kókan's Tsurumi plant and at Kobe Steel. In 1963 the private railways set the pace. The unions in the industry rejected a CLRB arbitration proposal and entered into a twenty-four-hour strike but ended up accepting the proposal without an additional increment. During the 1964 spring offensive, after the steel workers' union fell before management's opposition, the chemical industry workers' union and other private-sector industrial unions continued the struggle. Kórókyó called a half-day strike on April 17, which the JCP opposed. The Japan National Railway Union and other unions had trouble maintaining their solidarity. On April 16 the matter was settled at a summit between Ikeda and Óta. According to Ota: Prime Minister Ikeda decided to hold the summit—this is speculation on my part—because the LDP had scheduled a presidential election in July and there was a danger he would be hurt if a general strike was held at that time. The extremist group within the LDP was quite powerful. I am almost certain that these people were thinking that they would let us hold the April 17 strike and then clobber u s . . . . Under these circumstances, Iwai and I conducted a summit with Prime Minister Ikeda and Chief Cabinet Secretary Kurogane [Yasumi] at the Prime Minister's Residence on the day that the strike was to be held. What I said there was extremely frank and concise: "We do not particularly want to hold the strike either. Nevertheless, if we do not receive any sort of reply, we feel that we must go ahead with it. But our organization will also be destroyed. I believe that you, Prime Minister Ikeda, would prefer that we did not conduct the strike if that is at all possible. We will be inconvenienced by an offer that we cannot swallow, and won't you also, Prime Minister Ikeda, be inconvenienced by an offer that you cannot swallow?" The prime minister replied, "Indeed so." "Then please promise that you will provide wages corresponding to those in the private sector," I asserted. This was how the "confirmed items" of the Ota-Ikeda summit came into being. (Ota 1976:200-201)

The items that were confirmed in writing after the summit were as follows: " (1) The gap in wages between public enterprises and private enterprises is a matter that the PCGELRB is legally responsible for when it deals with wage issues. For this reason, it is agreed that both labor and management will strive to correct this via mediation by the PCGELRB and other means. (2) The decisions of the PCGELRB will be respected." Through the Ikeda-Ota summit, Sóhyó's spring offensive became an annual event approved by the government. The government institutionalized the spring offensive and incorporated wage increases into its income doubling plan. The number of participating unions increased dramatically, and

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the number of participating unionists mushroomed from 2.61 million in i960 to 3.61 million in 1965. Ota resigned from the Sóhyò chairmanship in July 1966 and returned to his old roost as president of the Synthetic Chemical Industry Workers' Union. The differences had deepened between him and the ardent anticommunist All Japan Telecommunication Workers' Union chairman Takaragi. In addition, he had incurred debts of ¥300 million-¥400 million as a consequence of the failure of the weekly magazine Shin shükan, and he was distressed at "seeing the weaknesses of the Mindò [movement] in various aspects of the labor movement." (Ota 1966:255) Although he himself does not mention it, the Synthetic Chemical Industry Workers' Union was also facing internal disunity. (Iwai 1971:134-35) Óta's withdrawal signaled a turning of the tide. A wave of "production rationalization" was beginning to inundate industry. Technological Innovation and Rationalization The technological innovation of the late 1950s and early 1960s had frustrated the strategy of shopfloor action and forced a reorientation of Sóhyò's program. Production processes underwent a complete metamorphosis. In the steel industry, for example, a complete renovation of production facilities occurred from the foundry to the rolling mill. In the foundry, largescale blast furnaces, oxygen-enriched blowers, and high-pressure operation systems were brought in. In steel processing, LD converters (pure oxygen blowers) were built. The smelting process was automated through the incorporation of continuous casting processes. The establishment of strip mills transformed the rolling process. Finally, the use of electronics to monitor and control all processes established a continuous and integrated automated production system. Companies embarked upon "production rationalization." The case of Nihon Kòkan is representative. "The application of science in labor management"—through clarifying job descriptions, establishing labor requirements using rational standards, separating line and staff functions, and rationalizing the wage structure—was already concerning its supervisory personnel during the early 1950s. The late 1950s was the period of the "Americanization" of labor management. In 1955, the year that the Japan Productivity Center was established, the steel industry dispatched a mission to the United States to study productivity. It absorbed industrial engineering techniques, advanced cost control methods, and the line-staff system. In 1956 Nihon Kokan began to draft an operational standards manual at its Kawasaki plant, and in 1957 "efficiency sections" for training time-study specialists were established in the various plants. The incorporation of performance-based wages into seniority-based wage packages also began that year.

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When Nihon Kókan's Mizue plant opened in 1959, the company introduced a centralized supervisory system—the "foreman system"—which it had been considering for several years. The aim was to have shopfloor technicians perform staff functions from a companywide perspective and at the same time simplify the hierarchy on the line, giving foremen wide-ranging authority over operations and personnel affairs in their units and making them responsible for achieving operational plans and cutting costs. The foremen were granted compensation equivalent to that of office staff members. The foreman system was also introduced into the older plants at Kawasaki and Tsurumi in 1963 and a "work salary," or job-based wage, was instituted, based on performance evaluations using companywide standards. From 1964 to 1967, a "consolidation plan" was implemented, involving a personnel cut of 2,200 workers in the three plants. At the new Fukuyama plant, which began operating in 1966, the distinction between office staff members and workers was abolished and a systematic "employee system" was installed, which involved "the unbiased management of compensation and promotion based on job performance abilities." Roughly half of the workers at the newest plant were subcontracted. Merit criteria were added to job-based wages. Thus, a person could remain in the same job classification but receive raises in accord with newly established "ranges" (shokkyu) if his ability improved. The new facilities, production-management techniques, and labor-management systems destroyed the existing shopfloor society. First, skills that developed through work experience with a group on the shopfloor generally became irrelevant. The new facilities, with their control panels, involved the standardized tasks of monitoring the gauges and adjusting controls. Second, the speed of the line, the allocation of tasks, and the methods of operation that had earlier been handled by senior workers, skilled workers, workers with supervisory authority, or in accord with custom were now imposed from the outside and from above in accord with operations manuals and standard time directives based on industrial engineering methods. Third, as the amount of heavy physical labor decreased, the cooperative element in work was diluted and workers found themselves facing huge machines and working in isolation. Fourth, frequent transfers weakened the worker's sense of belonging to a particular shopfloor group. Fifth, the foreman system removed the work group's leader and representative. Shopfloor society was "atomized." These atoms were then reordered in a rational labor-management system based on individualism, meritocracy, and competition. (Shimizu 1982:97-101) In the Yawata Steel Union (and most other steel industry unions) in the late 1950s, left-wing groups like the Dóshikai (Comrades' Society) clashed with right-wing groups like the Meiyükai and the Democratization Alliance (Minshuka Renmei). The union nevertheless complied with the call for re-

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sistance through shopfloor actions advocated by the Iron and Steel Workers' Federation since 1953, and undertook a struggle against rationalization that focused on the issues of staffing and transfers. The struggle intensified in 1957, when Shitomi Makoto of the Dóshikai replaced the Meiyükai's Miyata Yoshiji as union general secretary. That year, the autumn offensive had to be halted unsuccessfully after eleven waves of strikes. Miyata returned as president the following year, but the emphasis on working through shopfloor actions continued. In 1958, when the Tobata plant—the centerpiece of the second rationalization plan—started operations, the company proposed the introduction of the foreman system and the removal of foremen from union ranks. The removal of the foremen was postponed when the union resisted, but the supervisory system was strengthened even further. During the 1959 spring offensive, in spite of a stubborn fight by the Nihon Kokan and Fuji Steel unions, a settlement was reached with management because the Yawata Steel Union broke ranks. Following the spring offensive, Shitomi was returned as general secretary. Miyata became assistant general secretary in the Iron and Steel Workers' Federation headquarters. Policy began to change course in i960. In August the Meiyükai's Nakamura Takuhiko, who had replaced Shitomi as union secretary general, proposed a program of "harvesting the results of rationalization." He explained that this would involve, on the one hand, implementing wage hikes and shortening hours in order to "appropriately distribute the gains from rationalization" and, on the other, "using the fruits of prior consultation to eliminate any shifting of the burden of sacrifice [onto us] and to keep these [sacrifices] to a bare minimum." This program precipitated intense debate every year at union conventions before 1962 but became the foundation of the union's activities by the mid-1960s. After a twenty-four-hour strike by Yawata, Fuji, and Sumitomo Metals in 1965, strikes in the leading steel firms disappeared. Meanwhile, the company managements began work on a third rationalization plan. Massive new steel plants were built, the Tobata plant's supervisory system was introduced into the Yawata District, and a plan was devised to transfer almost 50 percent of the personnel at the existing Yawata plant to the new steel plants. Although negotiations to amend the collective bargaining agreement in 1962 did not proceed smoothly, in the end the union swallowed the company's demands, accepting the de-unionization of foremen in exchange for establishing shop production committees and complaint rectification committees. A j o b description system and a corresponding ability-based wage system were introduced in 1967, thereby signaling the debut of a merit-based supervision system at Yawata. Labeling the system a major step forward, the union approved it. During 1963-68 approximately 8,000 personnel were "rationalized" and sent from Yawata to new facilities in Hikari, Sakai, Kimizu, and elsewhere. In 1968 Yawata Steel estab-

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lished a "new fixed personnel system." The course of labor relations in the steel industry was thus firmly established by the mid-1960s. (Shimizu 1982: 228-44) The IMF-JC In parallel with these trends, a movement emerged to realign the labor front. Sodomei, Zenro Kaigi, and Zenkanko (which included the J N R Craft Union) formed Domei Kaigi in April 1962. Sympathetic Sohyo unions and other industrial federations affiliated with the Federation of Independent Workers' Unions (Churitsu Roren) formed the National Democratization Movement Consultative Conference (Zenkoku Minren) in February 1963 and joined Domei Kaigi as observers. The big company unions in the shipbuilding, chemicals, and steel industries found Domei Kaigi sympathizers gradually taking control. Then in November 1964 the All Japan Confederation of Industrial Labor Unions (Sangyobetsu Zen Nihon Rodo Sodomei, or Domei) was established. Its aim was to promote industrial democracy, increase productivity for the sake of Japanese independence, and assure a consonant distribution of the results. In concert with the formation and expansion of Domei, the IMF-JC (the International Metal Workers' Federation-Japan Chapter) was established in May 1965. It included the Japan Federation of Electric Machinery Workers' Unions (Churitsu Roren), the General Federation of Shipbuilders' Unions (Domei), the All Japan Auto Workers' Union (unaffiliated), the National Machinery and Metal Workers' Union (Shinsanbetsu), and the Yawata Steel and Nakayama Steel Works unions (Tekko Roren, Sohyo). With the addition of the observer unions, 540,000 unionists were represented; as ofJ u n e 1980 the figure was 1,869,219. The IMF-JC rejected class struggle and called for labor-management cooperation in response to the liberalization of the Japanese economy and the increased international competition in the metal industries. Its formation caused quite a stir because its members spanned the four established national centers of Sohyo, Domei, Churitsu Roren, and Shinsanbetsu. Miyata Yoshiji, who represented Yawata Steel in the Iron and Steel Workers' Federation and promoted the formation of the IMF-JC, states: The biggest reason why we adopted a union-oriented approach was that we felt we must eradicate interference in labor-management relations and in labor unions in particular by external forces led by the JCP—groups that were highly ideological. This was at the core of building up a Japanese style of labor relations. The second issue was rationalization.... The issue of installing new plants and equipment and the issue of technological innovation arrived together.... Situations emerged where, for example, you had ten people but because you now needed only eight, two people would be transferred....

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We had little choice but to go along with this. . . . Production would rise, the value added would increase; wouldn't this lead to prosperity for the firm? . . . We had the idea of recycling this profit and improving our working conditions. Eventually, we could carry things to where we would reach European wages levels. If the distribution was fair, then we would cooperate. (Ekonomisuto 1984:2:253)

Miyata was proud of the fact that he was an old acquaintance of zaikai figures in the iron and steel industries: " T h e response of the zaikai [to the formation of the IMF-JC] was not in any sense a welcoming one. . . . [But] the weight of steel in the zaikai is relatively l a r g e . . . . Thus, the zaikai figures w h o were watching me through these connections in the steel industry influenced other zaikai figures." H e felt it was important that the IMF-JC not expand into a national center: " T h e reason was . . . a matter of the metal workers' egoism. . . . We were saying that we would defend the metal workers exclusively." (Ekonomisuto 1984:2:259) In February 1966 the Iron and Steel Workers' Federation held an extraordinary convention at Noboribetsu and decided after a fierce debate to affiliate with the IMF-JC. According to the Ministry of Labor in 1967, the number of organized workers in the private sector w h o were affiliated with the DSP-tied Domei (1,644,000) surpassed those in unions affiliated with Sohyo (1,639,000). Overall, Sohyo represented 4,280,000 workers, a decline of 390,000 f r o m the preceding year. Domei represented 1,755,000, a gain of 590,000. Churitsu Roren represented 1,030,000, a gain of 17,000, and Shinsanbetsu, 76,000, or a gain of 6,000. T h e year 1967 ended up with a "spring offensive without a strike." Thereafter, there were almost n o instances in which unions affiliated with IMF-JC actually "struggled." Still, the "iron and steel market" and the "JC market" came to determine the size of spring offensive wage hikes. During 1961-70 nominal wages rose an average of 12 percent and real wages climbed by an average of 6 percent annually. Nominal wages rose 3.2fold and real wages, 1.8-fold. As a result of the rapid decline in birth rates and increased levels of formal education, the supply of labor decreased during this period, just as the demand for labor was increasing because of high economic growth. A shortage of young workers developed. Wages would undoubtedly have risen as a result of this situation alone. How much more did the spring offensives add to this increase? What was the difference between the "market w a g e " and the "negotiated wage"? Did the spring offensives stake a sufficiendy large claim to the expanding pie? The Impasse of the Sohyo Program During the 1970s, labor began to make "institutional demands" for a uniform national minimum wage system, an improvement of old age pensions,

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the upgrading of child allowances, and the affirmation of the public sector worker's right to strike; at the same time, it began to reconsider its emphasis on wages in the spring offensive, on grounds that not just workers, but the national citizenry as a whole, were victims of inflation. The "people's spring offensive" that began in 1974, the year after the first oil shock, adopted the objective of institutionalizing these livelihood guarantees. But it was unsuccessful, and the record Sohyo average wage increase of 32.9 percent was only a small part of the enormous profits that resulted from the frenzied inflationary spiral. In 1975 the rate of increase was 13.1 percent, and thereafter it was held to less than 10 percent. Ota argues that one of the reasons for the defeat of the 1975 spring offensive was the limitations of the enterprise union: Because they are enterprise unions, they have the disadvantage of not being able to call powerful strikes and battle with capital.. . . There was thus a certain validity to the all-region, all-household, and alltown action that Sohyo's secretary general Takano Minoru earlier tried to develop.... While the Ota-Iwai plan defeated the Takano plan, even as we embarked on an industry-by-industry formula, in reality we ourselves were a federated body of company federations. There was a limit to our fighting capacity. For this reason, we instinctively tried to supplement the weaknesses of the enterprise form by breaking through the wall of politics and strengthening the progressive party, the J S P . . . . But as we saw in the failure of the 1975 spring offensive, perhaps this too has become a kind of limitation. We advanced to a livelihood struggle and then to the people's spring offensive in order to overcome these limitations, but was it not these very limitations that forced the two-year-old people's spring offensive toward . . . stagnation and confusion? (Ota 1977:61-63) He also pointed out the amae (dependence) of labor union leaders: There is a naive sort of thinking among Japanese labor union leaders that is exemplified in the words of the Iron and Steel Workers' Union president Miyata: "Since we are cooperating with Japan Incorporated, no matter how deep the recession, they will, at the very least, compensate us for cooperating...." Having received wage hikes after ritually calling strikes, [union officials associated with Sohyo] have come to believe that the capitalists have given them out of a genuine fear of this kind of strike. Because they have no experience with strikes where there is a genuine confrontation with the capitalists, a type of thinking has emerged out of exceptional economic growth that is optimistic . . . and believes that it is possible to get by on strikes of just a day or two's duration. This kind of thinking was smashed to smithereens when they collided with capital in a stagflationary climate. When capital seriously adopted a fighting stance, they had not prepared for a forceful strike, nor did they possess the

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courage to call one. To save face, they then utilized third parties like the CLRB and the PCGELRB. This kind of passive—one might even say bureaucratic— thinking was nurtured over the twenty-year history of the spring offensive. Since Iwai, Takaragi, myself, and others like us gained our experience in an era before one could obtain the leftover scraps of economic growth, we are not naive like the current chairmen of the industrial federations.... We have entered an era where we can no longer afford to say big things at a convention or a rally and then turn around and argue that we failed because the enemy is too p o w e r f u l . . . . The press is also saying now that the wall put up by the government and by capital is too thick. But you can only determine the existence of a thick wall after you clobber it with your fist or a hammer and find that it will not give.... In practice all that has happened is that the wall has been rubbed a bit with a one- or two-day strike. When this sort of thing is deemed acceptable even by union officers and activists, all I can say is that both the leaders and the activists are beyond hope. (Ota 1977:176-78) Iwai, who was Sohyo's secretary general, resigned in 1970 with the words " T h e shopfloor is a battlefield." T h e reasons that he gave for his retirement are extremely important: It seems that there is a lot of talk over whether or not my resignation was a defeat. What was most on my mind was the expression that Ota used quite regularly: "People in the top leadership should continue until they are worn ragged." . . . But I myself thought that if a person continued until he was worn ragged and quit at that point, there would have to be a drastic change of course or a dramatic transformation. To allow matters to unfold in this manner would be an extremely unfortunate thing for the Japanese labor movement. I felt that if I was going to quit, then I had to do it in a way that would not require Sohyo to undergo a major transformation. I feel that, in the end, this was exactly how things turned out. But the question is whether we can continue as we have in the past. What I am currently saying "objectively" is based on the perception that I obtained from visiting shopfloors around the country, that the labor movement has arrived at a kind of transition point. I am referring to the disintegration of Mindo . . . or more precisely,. . . the Liaison Council for Socialist Party Members that has led the Japanese labor movement. This group began to disintegrate three or four years ago. In Ota's words, "We have something called the Liaison Council for Socialist Party Members, but we cannot really talk to each other, can we?" This kind of situation . . . clearly indicates a conflict over leadership policies. In my view, a dispute has continued all along between a program to improve working conditions within the system . . . and one that tries to maintain the class character of the labor movement by restraining people who might get caught up in the system. (Iwai 1 9 7 1 : 1 1 - 1 2 , 1 5 - 1 6 )

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THE DYNAMICS OF THE 1955 SYSTEM U N I O N S AND E N T E R P R I S E S

Dual Loyalty and Privatization During the 1950s Sohyo attempted to overcome the limitations of enterprise unions by strengthening the shopfloor movement. The objective was to intensify "class struggle," which Shimizu describes as "the formation of a mass-oriented class inside enterprise unions." What made shopfloor movements possible may have been the workplace social structure based on seniority. A number of surveys of workers in large private-sector enterprises during the mid-1950s make it clear that an attitude of "enterprise familism" was widespread and many people felt a dual loyalty, placing their trust simultaneously in management and in the union. These workers were found particularly in the cohort that established itself in large firms beginning in the 1940s and reached "ranked worker" (supervisory) positions in the early 1950s. This group set the tone in the shops. Younger workers learned their trade from their seniors. They engaged in heavy manual labor in sweatfilled shops that were segregated from the offices of white-collar workers. They spent their working lives almost completely within their shops' groups. But younger workers who began working for the companies around 1950 tended to have litde loyalty to the enterprise. And some of the new high school graduates who started jobs as office staff workers during this period became activists in mixed white- and blue-collar unions. The company supervised the shopfloor indirectly and relied on the leadership of the senior ranked workers. The unions maintained their control over the shopfloor using the same group. The ranked workers generally ran the lower-level union organizations (the branches). Consequently, when dissatisfaction toward the company increased on the shopfloor, the key to the outcome was whether the ranked workers would side with the company or with the union. As production rationalization limited the scope of ranked worker discretion, they tended to favor the union and mustered the shops on its behalf. Such conditions facilitated shopfloor movements. Dual loyalty tended to weaken shopfloor movements. According to a survey conducted at Tokyo Electric in 1961 and at Nihon Kokan in 1963, approximately 30 percent of the workers saw the labor-management relationship as conflictual, and roughly 70 percent saw it as cooperative. In every age bracket, the people who saw it as cooperative outnumbered those who saw it as conflictual. More than 40 percent of the respondents in their early twenties saw a conflictual relationship, but this figure declined steadily as age increased. By contrast, the percentage of people labeling it a cooperative relationship increased steadily with age, nearing 80 percent in the fiftyor-above age group. Shopfloor groups are, of course, not independent of the company. No worker wants the company to go bankrupt or decline be-

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cause of shopfloor actions. Workers' identification with the company does not disappear during a struggle. Company managements therefore tried to exploit these feelings and isolate or fragment the most advanced shops by forming second unions and engineering schisms. The survey also suggested that workers do not consider technological innovation and production rationalization as things that should be rejected. They felt that the growth of the company through production rationalization was desirable. The percentage who thought that "increasing the production of the company [is] the most important [way to] improve one's own life and status" was 59.7 percent and 62.6 percent; those who answered that "there is no choice but to support union activities and strive for solidarity as workers" was 23.5 percent and 29.7 percent. Support for union solidarity was highest among people in their twenties, at 40.7 percent and 51 percent, and steadily declined as age rose. Support for production increased steadily with age, peaking at 69.1 percent and 84.7 percent for people over fifty. There was thus firm ground upon which to build an acceptance of company rationalization proposals. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, production rationalization advanced at the expense of class struggle. The result was a decline in dual loyalty. According to surveys conducted at Nihon Kokan's Kawasaki plant, people expressing loyalty to the firm decreased from 54 percent in 1952 to 52 percent in 1956, and then to 22 percent in 1963. People expressing loyalty to the union increased from 47 percent to 54 percent, and then declined to 26 percent. In Nihon Kokan's Mizue plant, the percentage of workers who identified with the corporation decreased from 43 percent in i960 to 30 percent in 1963, and those who identified with the union decreased even more dramatically from 31 percent to 15 percent. A younger cohort, which was either critical or apathetic toward both the enterprise and the union gradually came to account for a large proportion of the employees; in addition, group identification among middle-aged employees had decreased. The decline in identification with the corporation and the union was accompanied by an increase of dissatisfaction with one's work. Many continued to feel that their work "was important": 79 percent at Tokyo Electric in 1961 and 68 percent at Nihon Kokan in 1963. Even among the younger cohorts, the percentage was in the 60-70 percent and 70-80 percent range. But only about 40 percent in the same surveys said that they themselves were satisfied with their work. Most of the people expressing a dual loyalty said they were satisfied. The proportion of dissatisfied workers tended to be high in the younger cohort. In the 1961 Tokyo Electric survey, "a sense of alienation" was noted by more than 60 percent of workers under thirty, 50-55 percent of workers in their thirties, approximately 40 percent of workers in their forties, and 33-34 percent of workers over fifty. An increasing number of workers, especially among the younger cohorts,

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valued life outside work. In the 1961 Tokyo Electric survey, more than 80 percent said they "thought of their own lives first." In the 1963 Nihon Kokan survey, 51 percent listed "building up one's household" as a source of "fulfillment"; 25 percent chose "hobbies and entertainment"; and a mere 11 percent chose "work at the company." In almost all surveys in the 1960s, the item desired most in the area of livelihood was increased wages. T h e item that provided the greatest sense of fulfillment was "home life" among the middle aged and "hobbies and entertainment" among the younger cohorts. Thus, beginning in the mid-1950s and carrying over into the 1960s, the seniority-based shopfloor groups in the large private-sector corporations in the heavy and chemical industry sector dissolved rapidly as a consequence of technological innovations and production rationalization. In the younger cohorts, in particular, workers appeared in great numbers who were dissatisfied with or alienated from their work and their workplace and who sought a sense of fulfillment in their private lives. Meanwhile, the increase in labor productivity was bringing about increases in wages. Among the population in general, by the mid-1960s the proportion of people who identified with the middle class surpassed the proportion of people who identified with the lower classes. Among workers in private-sector firms as well, by 1955 most office workers identified with the middle class. In surveys conducted in the late 1960s, two-thirds of production workers considered themselves part of the middle class. This change in attitude curtailed "class struggle" and "socialist revolution," and a nonclass consciousness spread. These features are, of course, part of "mass society." (Ishikawa 1975:24-25, 39-60) Changes in Identification and Middle-Class Consáousness T h e expansion of a middle-class consciousness probably accelerated the decrease in identification with the enterprise. The new personnel management techniques associated with these trends included management by objective, quality circles, and zero defect campaigns. Whereas middle-aged workers perceived the new techniques as an added burden and older workers accepted them as inevitable, they tended to engender enthusiasm among younger workers toward their work. But these sentiments were probably less a matter of loyalty to the enterprise than a fairly unemotional, calculated recognition of one's dependence. In surveys conducted during the 1970s, the proportion of positive responses to "the sense of fulfillment in one's work" was high, 60.1 percent in a 1974 New Japan Steel survey and 72.8 percent in a Japan Federation of Electric Machinery Workers' Union (Denki Róren) survey in 1980. A feeling

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of dependence on the firm was widespread. There seems to have been very litde keen resentment. (Table 23) Labor unions became auxiliary structures in the management of labor relations. Their hold over their membership declined markedly. Except among segments of the public-sector unions and certain older industries, the doctrinaire tenets of the classic works that the aging union officials and earlier activists had memorized and studied no longer held much appeal to middle-aged, middle-rank workers, let alone to the young. Even when complaints and dissatisfaction accumulated beneath the surface of individualistic meritocratic competition, it was not clear how this dissatisfaction could be mobilized. The tactic of detonating accumulated resentment during annual spring offensives lost its effectiveness in an era of administered and enterprise-based movements. Nevertheless, the number of unions and union members did not decline conspicuously (Table 24). According to the 1964 survey, whereas 86 percent responded that "unions are absolutely necessary" and 12 percent replied that "it is better to have them," a mere 1 percent answered that "it does not matter whether we have them or not," "it is better not to have them," or "it is bad to have them." It seems to be taken for granted that there will be unions in enterprises and that employees will be union members. In a 1976 survey of the Japan Federation of Electric Machinery Workers' Unions and a 1977 survey of the New Japan Steel Union, 78.9 percent and 54.6 percent, respectively, said that the time when one is "engaged in the spring struggle and in livelihood struggles for one-time bonuses" is "the time when one really senses that one is a union member." As long as unions remain in harmony with the company, this situation will undoubtedly persist. In a 1974 survey, more than 80 percent of the respondents supported the participation of unions in management (Table 25), and in a 1980 survey, more than 70 percent of the respondents said that "it is the duty of a union member" to participate in union activities (see Table 25). Attitudes in public-sector unions differed considerably from those in private-sector unions. "Production rationalization" in the public sector occurred in the 1960s—considerably later than in the private sector. Promoted by management, it met fierce opposition. Even in 1967-73, the percentage of public-sector workers acknowledging a middle-class identity was only around 20 percent. Almost 80 percent identified themselves as lower class. Nevertheless, the percentage of employees who intended to stay at their jobs was extremely high. Thus, we can see differences in dual loyalty. Few private-sector unions opposed or obstructed production rationalization, and most workers expressed at least conditional support. Production rationalization efforts picked up in the 1960s, and both productivity and wages rose. Teenage labor

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was in short supply, and members of this cohort were able to pick and choose their jobs. But the public-sector unions lacked a basis for labormanagement cooperation. Although they were enterprise unions, workers' identification with the enterprise was considerably lower than in the private-sector unions. By contrast, their identification with the union was comparatively high. They felt that production rationalization ignored existing shopfloor practices and would cause a deterioration of working conditions. The result was a vicious circle of strikes and disciplinary actions, as the public-sector unions continued to stress class struggle into the 1970s. Unions vary considerably, but it is possible to divide union members into four categories: 1. People with a sense of dual loyalty. They feel that they are both union members and employees. The enterprise and the union are not mutually antagonistic. Perhaps 50-60 percent of all union members belong to this group. 2. The group that identifies with neither the enterprise nor the union. Approximately 20-30 percent. 3. Supporters of the union who do not identify with the enterprise. These are the holdovers from the era of the shopfloor movement. Perhaps 5 - 1 0 percent. 4. Supporters of the enterprise who do not identify with the union. Perhaps 5 - 1 0 percent. Support for Political Parties Among Union Members

Surveys on the need for union political activities were conducted among the members of four unions. The Japan Federation of Electric Machinery Workers' Unions (Denki Roren) and the Japan Federation of Iron and Steel Workers' Unions (Tekko Roren) are private-sector industrial federations; the All Japan Telecommunications Workers' Union (Zendentsu) and the Japan National Railway Locomotive Engineers Union (Doro) are publicsector unions. Distinct differences between the two types are apparent in the responses; they are also apparent in the first and third questions in Table 27. The results of the surveys are as follows. In the Electric Machinery Workers' Union between 1969 and 1980, support for the LDP was less than 10 percent. Although support for the JSP fluctuated, over the period as a whole it decreased from 29.6 percent to 26.7 percent. Support for the DSP remained under 5.2 percent, while support for the JCP decreased from 3.3 percent to 1.9 percent. People who did not support any party in particular increased dramatically from 34.5 percent to 52.6 percent. Among them people leaning toward the conservatives increased, those leaning toward the progressive parties decreased, and those leaning toward neither increased.

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In the Iron and Steel Workers' Union between 1969 and 1978, support for the LDP increased from 12.4 percent to 16.6 percent. There was no significant change in the rate of support given to the JSP during those years—23.4 percent and 23.9 percent, respectively. Support for the DSP increased from 8.8 percent to 17.4 percent; support for the JCP decreased from 3.3 percent to 1.4 percent. Members with no particular party increased from 30.6 percent to 33.3 percent. Of particular note is the shift in support among workers in small and medium-sized steel firms; in contrast to the large firms, there was no change in LDP support, but support for the JSP increased from 28.6 percent to 41.0 percent. In the New Japan Steel Union, support for the LDP increased from 8.7 percent to 13.0 percent between 1974 and 1979, while support for the JSP declined from 14.9 percent to 8.6 percent. There was a dramatic increase in support for the DSP from 5.8 percent to 10.7 percent. Support for the JCP decreased from 3.1 percent to 1.6 percent, and support for no particular party increased dramatically from 39.7 percent to 55.5 percent. Among these, people leaning toward the conservatives increased. Between i960 and 1980, support for the LDP was less than 5.4 percent in the Telecommunications Workers' Union. Although support for the JSP fluctuated considerably, overall it decreased from 72.2 percent to 41.6 percent. Support for the DSP decreased from 5.2 percent to 1.2 percent; support for the JCP decreased from 3.3 percent to 2.3 percent. Support for no particular party increased from 14.7 percent to 33.0 percent. In the Locomotive Engineers Union between 1970 and 1978, LDP support decreased from 1.6 percent to 0.9 percent; support for the JSP increased from 63.3 percent to 74.7 percent. Support for the DSP decreased from 1.6 percent to 0.3 percent, and for the JCP from 6.2 percent to 0.5 percent. People supporting no party at all increased from 13.7 percent to 20.6 percent. Since the iron and steel sector is the axis of the IMFJC, it is not surprising to find an increase in LDP and DSP support and a decline in support for the JSP and JCP. Overall, if we compare the early 1960s with the early 1970s, we find that (1) LDP support, which was just a few percentage points, experienced no noteworthy change over time. (2) Support for the JSP decreased from 60 percent to around 42 percent. (3) Support for the DSP was halved from a starting point ofjust a few percentage points. (4) JCP support declined from several percent to around 1 percent. (5) There was a dramatic increase, from 13 percent to 40 percent, in people supporting no particular party. Most of them leaned toward the progressives. This was dramatically reversed in 1976. (See Tables 28 and 29.) A survey of members of the Telecommunications Workers' Union was conducted in 1976 to determine the regional distribution of party support among union members. Here, the average level of support for the LDP

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nationally was 1.8 percent. It was highest, at 3.3 percent, in Tokyo, followed by 2 percent in the Chugoku and Kan to regions. Lowest was Hokkaido, with 0.2 percent, followed by less than 1 percent in Shin'etsu, Kyushu, and Tohoku. Support for the JSP was 57.5 percent nationally. Shin'etsu's rate was highest at 71.5 percent, followed by Kyushu, Hokkaido, Tohoku, and Shikoku, all in the 60-70 percent range. The lowest figure was in Tokyo, with 36.7 percent, and in the Kinki region, with 48.0 percent. Thus, cities tended to have a lower level ofJSP support, while the rural areas had a high level. The average level of support for the DSP was 0.7 percent nationally, with the highest rate of support in the Kan to region, at 1.8 percent. The areas with more than 1 percent were Chugoku and Shikoku. The average rate of support for the JCP nationally was 5.6 percent, with the highest rate in Tokyo, at 10.7 percent, and in the Kinki region, at 9.4 percent. The lowest was Tohoku's 2.4 percent and Hokuriku's 2.6 percent. The combination of people responding "no political party of support," "not interested," and "no answer" was 33.1 percent nationally. The figure tended to be high in the cities and low in the countryside. The highest was Tokyo's 46.5 percent, followed by Okinawa, Kinki, Kanto, Chugoku, and Tokai, all in the 30-40 percent range. The lowest was Shin'etsu's 23.4 percent, followed by Hokkaido, Kyushu, Tohoku, Hokuriku, and Shikoku, all 20-30 percent. In other words, only the JSP had low rates of support in the cities and high rates of support in the countryside. The LDP, DSP, JCP, no political party of support and "other" responses tended to be high in the cities and low in the countryside. (Inagami 1981:454) As for political party support in the large Sohyo industrial unions, JSP support declined by around 40 percent and the decline was even more pronounced in the heavy and chemical industries sector. On the other hand, LDP support was only a few percentage points overall, but more than 10 percent in the heavy and chemical industries. The total of support for the DSP, JCP, and CGP was below 10 percent. The largest increase was in "no political party of support," which eventually exceeded 45 percent. To what extent do these trends differ from those among workers overall? (See Table 30.) In 1975 the rate of support for the LDP among all workers was roughly four times that of union members. The rate of support for the JSP was less than 40 percent of union members. Whereas the total for "no political party of support," "cannot say one way or the other," and "don't know" responses was around 45 percent for union members, it was around 50 percent among all workers.

TEN

Multiple Parties and Nonpartisans

TWO-PARTY OLIGOPOLY The Ebbing of the JSP In the 1958 general election, the first following the unification of the party, the J S P captured 32.9 percent of the vote and 166 (35.5 percent) seats in the House of Representatives (Table 31). Although the gains were not what the J S P executives expected and the election was interpreted as a defeat, these results turned out to be the highest share of the vote and seats ever received by the JSP. The split off of the Nishio faction in fall 1959 and the formation of the DSP in the following January—with its 38 members in the House of Representatives and 16 members in the House of Councilors—was a tremendous blow for the JSP. Nevertheless, the party did maintain a 28 percent share of the vote and a 30 percent share of the seats (140-150 seats) in the general elections of i960, 1963, and 1967. Comparing the regional distribution of the vote received in the i960 and 1967 elections, we find that the J S P dropped from 30.8 percent to 27.2 percent in thirty-six large urban electoral districts but increased from 21.0 to 26.8 percent in seventeen rural districts. It appears that the J S P was being de-urbanized. (Asahijdnaru, February 12,1967) The collapse occurred in the general election of 1969. The number of J S P seats dropped from 140 to 90. The loss seems to have resulted from an inordinate increase in voter abstentions. The party was able to regain half of these seats in the 1972 general election but remained at about 20 percent of the vote throughout the 1970s. In the 1972 and 1976 general elections the J S P received, in absolute terms (i.e., as a percentage of all eligible voters), 2.0 percent and 11.3 percent, respectively, of the vote in twenty-five large urban districts, and 15.6 percent and 15.0 percent in twenty-five nonurban

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districts. The JSP continued to stagnate in the wake of its retreat from the big cities. (Ishikawa 1978: appendix 2) According to polls taken by the Asahi shinbun, the rate of support for the Socialist parties, which was 10-20 percent up to 1952, suddenly jumped to 28 percent in 1953. It continued at this level until January 1955, when it reached over 30 percent after the unification of the Left and Right Socialists. But according to a poll taken in August i960, after the security treaty crisis, this figure dropped precipitously to 25 percent. Although the party recovered some support, the rate hovered around 30 percent. From 1967, it dropped to 20-30 percent and after 1977 generally fell below 20 percent. There is a clear-cut difference among occupations in their rate of support for the JSP (Table 32). In the growth sectors (salaried personnel and industrial workers) the rate was 50 percent in 1955, 40 percent in i960, 47 percent in 1965, 28 percent in 1970, and 30 percent in 1975. In the traditional sectors (self-employed store and factory operators and primary sector farmers, forestry workers, and fishermen) the rate was generally less than 20 percent. If we look at regional distribution (Tables 33 and 34), we find that the rate of support rises as we move from large cities to small towns and villages. The proportion accounted for by specific occupational groups changed with advanced industrialization. Table 35 looks at occupational categories as a proportion of total JSP support. Between 1955 and 1975, the share of salaried personnel and industrial workers grew from 59 percent to 78 percent, while the share of self-employed retail and manufacturing operators and workers in the primary industries dropped dramatically. Taken together, the latter groups dropped by half, from 38 percent to 20 percent. In other words, the growth-sector/traditional-sector composition of the JSP electoral base changed from 59/38 in 1955 to 78/20 in 1975. The LDP: Decline and Revival Although the LDP controlled the government, throughout the 1960s and 1970s its share of the vote declined (Table 36). The years 1963-67 marked the first phase, as its share of the vote dropped from 54.7 percent to 48.8 percent, and its share of seats from 60 percent to 50 percent. Between the i960 and 1967 general elections, the share of the vote received by the LDP in thirty-six urban electoral districts dropped from 50.4 percent to 36.4 percent; in seventeen rural districts its share dropped only slighdy, from 66.5 percent to 64.7 percent. The LDP, too, was receding dramatically in the large urban districts. (Asahi janaru, February 12, 1967) A second phase in the LDP's decline can be seen between 1972 and 1976: the party's share of the total votes fell from 46.8 percent to 41.8 percent, while its absolute share of seats was reduced from 55.2 percent to 48.7 percent. But during this period, its share in the twenty-five large urban districts

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declined only slightly, from 17.3 percent to 16.2 percent. With the addition of the New Liberal Club's 4.4 percent, there was a considerable increase. These figures foreshadow the revival of the LDP in the large urban districts. (Ishikawa 1978: appendix 2) The LDP reached its lowest relative share of the vote—41.8 percent—in 1976. It recovered to 44.6 percent in 1979, but its share of seats was at its lowest level at this point. In the 1980 double election, it recovered to the level of 1972. Like the JSP, the LDP showed clear differences between the growth and traditional sectors (Table 37). According to the Asahi shinbun's polls, more than 50 percent of self-employed retail and factory operators and those in the primary industries were LDP supporters. Could this have been the result of agricultural subsidies and government financing arrangements? Support among salaried personnel started out in the 30-40 percent range but increased to 40-50 percent in the 1970s. Support among industrial workers remained at 30-40 percent during the latter period. The party received lower rates of support in the big cities and the higher rates in the smaller towns and villages, and in 1975 there was a decrease in the cities. (Table 38) We might expect the LDP's primary support group to remain the primary industry and self-employed sectors—and the LDP did predominate in these occupational categories—but the relative sizes of the various occupational categories changed dramatically. There was an increase of LDP supporters among salaried personnel (from 12 percent to 27 percent) and industrial workers (from 15 percent to 25 percent), while the proportion in the primary industries decreased from 44 percent to 19 percent. Thus, the LDP ceased to be a political party relying on self-employed retail and factory operators and farmers, forestry workers, and fishermen for its base of support. The Shrinkage of Two-Party Oligopoly The LDP and JSP controlled the overwhelming majority of general election votes and House of Representatives seats, but the proportion of votes and seats controlled by the two parties shrank (Table 40). The two-party oligopoly peaked in 1958 and then gradually declined. The most conspicuous shift occurred between 1967 and 1969, when its absolute share of the vote declined from 56.0 percent to 46.7 percent, its relative share from 76.7 percent to 69.1 percent, and the share of the seats from 85.8 percent to 77.8 percent. About this time the differential between the rates of decline of the two parties became evident. The development of "mass society" induced by advanced industrialization ate into the vote-gathering organizations of the LDP and the JSP. Increased fluidity and pluralization in social relations weakened the mobilizational capacity of established organizations. The LDP encouraged

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THE DYNAMICS OF THE 1955 SYSTEM

advanced industrialization only to find that its traditional vote-gathering organizations were being eroded. Until the early 1960s it appeared that industrialization would add to the JSP vote, but as time passed the development of mass society began eating into the Sohyo unions and weakened their vote-gathering capacity as well. Both parties tried to implement countermeasures, but these had little visible effect. Instead, what stands out is the increase in the number of nonpartisan voters. THE NONPARTISAN WAVE No Political Party of Support W h e n Jiji Tsushinsha asked voters which party they supported, 25.6 percent answered " n o political party of support" or "don't know" in i960; the figure passed 30 percent in 1971 and reached 35.9 percent in 1980. With the addition of lukewarm party supporters w h o responded "if forced to make a choice, I would say the conservative party" and "if forced to make a choice, a progressive party," the group easily exceeded 50 percent. "Don't know" received 18.2 percent of the responses in i960, dropped below 10 percent in 1971, and decreased to a mere 5.6 percent in 1980. T h e lower the level of educational achievement, the higher the proportion of "don't know" responses. This g r o u p represented "traditional apathy." There were a large number of individuals of this type in the traditional society of the rural villages. W h e n polled, they either answered that they took greater interest in local politics than in national politics and voted for the person rather than the political party or else could provide only vague and evasive responses. At election time, they were sent by village notables to their polling stations, where they voted for the favored local candidate. T h e high voter turnout rates in rural electoral districts during national elections, the high turnout in municipal elections, and the overwhelming majority of conservative independent assemblymen in the municipal assemblies arose in this manner. Let us call this group "traditional nonpartisan voters." At the same time, the group responding " n o political party of support" was growing rapidly: it amounted to 7.4 percent in i960, passed 10 percent in 1963, exceeded 20 percent in 1971, and crossed the 30 percent barrier in 1976. T h e higher the educational level and the younger the voter, the more likely this response. With the exception of 1965, most of these respondents were independent businessmen, office workers, and production workers. Nonpartisan office and production workers grew amid the pluralized and fluid social relations of urban migrants and commuters. Personal koenkai activities had little impact on them. Newspapers and television might provide political information but did not engender political interest. W h e n in-

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terviewed, nonpartisans knew more about national politics than about municipal politics; they claimed that they voted for the party rather than the person but did not support any particular party. Even if they did, they did not get out and vote. No local notable dragged them to the polling station. A sound truck of the Election Administration Commission might make the rounds encouraging them to vote, but usually to no avail. For these reasons, voter turnout rates in large urban elections decreased. "Urban nonpartisan voters" of this sort overtook the "traditional nonpartisan voter"—whereas the ratio was 7.4:18.2 in i960, by 1980 their relative weights had reversed to Nonpartisans do sometimes vote, and people who support a political party do not always. Table 41 provides the rates of abstention and the proportion of nonpartisans. The table suggests, albeit indirectly, that the proportion of nonpartisans surpassed the abstention rate by a considerable margin during the 1970s because the number of nonpartisan voters had increased considerably. A growing middle-class consciousness appeared about the same time. On the one hand, advanced industrialization made social relations more fluid and pluralized and caused voters to withdraw from existing mobilizational organizations; on the other, it raised overall living standards. If we consider the i960 GNP 100, then the 1970 GNP would have been 451 in nominal terms and 276 in real terms. Even if we take into account the drop in the share going to labor (from 76.1 percent to 67.6 percent) and the rise in the consumer price index (from 100 to 177), income levels still rose significantly. According to a poll of the Tokyo Prefectural Public Relations Office, the total of people who judged their own circumstances to be "quite comfortable" and "okay" came to exceed the total of "still nowhere near comfortable" and "barely able to make it" about 1967. A leveling and standardization of lifestyles occurred along with this change. Distinctiveness and contrasts in lifestyle based on occupation, age, sex, or region gradually blurred in the 1960s. Electric washing machines, refrigerators, stainless steel sinks, gas water heaters, and—somewhat later— color television sets, stereo sets, as well as living room ensembles, air conditioners, and private automobiles were all dispersed among the various strata, and the middle-class lifestyle, with its distinctive lack of distinctiveness, came to be generalized. The middle-class tendency to consider one's own standard of living to be "middle" expanded year by year. The percentage of people considering themselves members of the "middle of the middle" was a mere 37 percent in 1958. But in 1964 it was 50 percent; in 1970, 57 percent; and by 1973, 61 percent. With the addition of people who answered "upper middle" and "lower middle," the total was 76 percent in 1961, 87 percent in 1964, and a remarkable 90 percent in 1970. It was 90 percent in 1973 as well. This was

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equally true of organized workers. Japan, at least in its consciousness, had become a "classless society." Citizens' Movements T h e quintessential movement that accompanied "mass society" was the citizens' movement, which took pollution problems as its focus. T h e darker side of high-speed economic growth had already become apparent in the 1950s; the amount of attention directed toward it began to peak in the late 1960s. In a poll taken in 1966, 63 percent replied "favorable" when asked about the direction of social change in the municipalities where they resided, and 18 percent answered "unfavorable." This positive assessment characterized the big cities as well, where the responses were 45 percent "favorable" and 26 percent "unfavorable." However, in a similar poll conducted in 1975, "favorable" responses fell to 45 percent, while "unfavorable" ones rose to 26 percent. The figures for the big cities were completely reversed from the earlier ones, at 30 percent versus 41 percent. A m o n g the reasons given for the "unfavorable" responses were high economic growth and development, industrial pollution, population increases, and increases in the number of automobiles. In another survey, the percentage of people responding "as long as there is appropriate compensation, a certain amount of pollution has to be tolerated for the sake of industrial progress" was halved between 1966 and 1971 from 29 percent to 13 percent. By contrast, the percentage responding "even if it is for the sake of industrial progress, pollution should never be allowed" j u m p e d from 27 percent to 48 percent. (Nihon Seiji Gakkai 1977:270-75) Local residents mobilized in response to a variety of issues arising from pollution and environmental degradation, and citizens' movements appeared throughout the country. This was the flip side of "urban apathy." T h e movements were initiated both by established organizations like the neighborhood associations and by entirely new citizens' groups organized expressly to address specific issues. Their campaigns were directed against the national government, local governments, and corporations via demonstrations, direct action, petitions, complaints, and lawsuits. In 1973 the Local Government Association conducted a nationwide study of 235 municipalities, which sought the opinions of department and section chiefs who dealt directly with residents. It reported that the "media of citizens' movements" were the following: (1) Established general local community organizations such as neighborhood associations, self-government associations, and hamlet associations were most common at 44.8 percent. (2) About 29 percent were organizations newly created for the purpose of carrying on a movement. (3) 14.5 percent were established community as-

MULTIPLE PARTIES AND NONPARTISANS

38g

sociations formed for a specific purpose or for a particular age group. Examples included women's clubs, youth clubs, retail associations, cultural groups, and parent-teacher associations. (4) Finally, 11.7 percent fell in the miscellaneous category. The second type was found most frequendy in urban areas and was most likely to occur where the issue involved was either broader or narrower than the issues encompassed by established organizations. Movements were most commonly organized to oppose redevelopment projects or high-rise buildings or to demand improvements in welfare facilities. According to a study conducted by the Local Government Comprehensive Institute in 1974, there were a total of 6,427 such associations. The most common were "consumer" associations (3,402), followed by organizations concerned with "development, environment, and pollution" (1,375), those formed to "protect nature and culture" (770), and those for the purpose of "education and regional welfare" (253). Tokyo had 1,876; Kanagawa, 384; Hokkaido, 211; Yamaguchi, 207; Osaka, 192; Fukuoka, 179; and Chiba, 152. Organizations concerned with "development, environment, and pollution" were found in Tokyo (705), Kanagawa (98), Osaka (45), Hyogo (42), Aichi (37), and Chiba (36). Citizens' movements seemed to concentrate in big cities and their peripheries and in highly industrialized areas. (Shinohara i977:96-100) The issues that gave rise to citizens' movements around the country were related to pollution and environmental destruction, both caused by rapid economic growth. The movements themselves exhibited the social characteristics that advanced industrialization brought—namely, those of a pluralized and fluid mass society. The impact of pollution and environmental destruction was not restricted to a particular occupational group but affected the multifaceted interests of all the residents in an area. The movements were advanced by the voluntary participation of an educated, leisured stratum. A small number of amateur activists participated sporadically. They did not have an office staff, and the external boundaries of the movements were unclear. They expanded and contracted in response to circumstances. Thus, from their leadership core to their outer fringes, the movements were fluid and unstructured. If anything, they resisted organization and structure. The issues addressed by citizens' movements were multilayered, but they consisted most frequently of concrete issues that were specific to a particular geographic area. Isolated and dispersed movements appeared in various localities and dissolved with the disappearance of the issue. But if issues of concern to a specific geographic area and movement were publicized by the mass media and could win the support of journalists, they prompted issues and movements in other geographic areas, spread across the country,

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and exerted strong political influence. It is unlikely that the pollution legislation of the late 1960s and after would have been realized without this process. Four principles emerged out of the movement that opposed pollution from paper mills and oil-fired power plants in Fuji City: 1. If the focus of an antipollution movement is on compensation for damages, then the movement will inevitably end in defeat. 2. It must be a movement to reform local government. 3. A powerful citizens' organization must exist regardless of whether the mayor or governor is a conservative or a progressive. 4. It is necessary to have exchanges with movements of the most advanced pollution areas and the cooperation of experts. (Gendaiyogo no kiso chishiki 1982:367)

Although not adopted here, a distinction is sometimes made between "residents' movements" (juminundo) and "citizens'movements" (shiminundo). If the issue involved is a national and generalized one from its inception rather than localized and specific, then perhaps it is more appropriate to call it a citizens' movement. The ban-the-hydrogen-bomb movement and the peace movement, for instance, emerged in the 1950s. The Citizens' League to Bring Peace to Vietnam (Beheiren) was established in February 1965. Although not dispersed and singular like the antipollution movements we have been discussing, these too were the movements of a mass society in that they were fluid and unstructured; they developed with the voluntary participation and sporadic leadership of intellectuals with time to spare and used journalists and the mass media as a major weapon. Progressive Local Government Chiefs The prototype of the progressive local government chief can be found in the four prefectural governors of Hokkaido, Nagano, Tokushima, and Fukuoka and the eleven city mayors of cities like Yokohama and Osaka, who were elected in the first unified local election of 1947. All were sponsored by the JSP. In the second unified local elections of 1951 as well, such candidates were elected in four prefectures and thirty-eight cities, and in seven prefectures and sixty cities in 1955. Among the forces at work were the current of postwar democratization, the advance of the JSP, and the rise of the labor union movement. In Hokkaido and Fukuoka, in particular, a large number of progressive mayors were elected with the support of the local labor movement centered on the coal miners. But with the beginning of rapid economic growth, the posts of these progressive local executives reverted to conservatives as the number of coal miners decreased rapidly with the switch from coal to oil and as companies began to intervene actively in the elections of local government chiefs.

M U L T I P L E PARTIES A N D N O N P A R T I S A N S

3gi

In the fifth unified local election of 1963, twenty-three LDP governors were elected under the banner of "local government linked directly to the center." T h e r e were twenty-six in 1966, the highest recorded. But in big city mayoral elections, platforms were adopted calling for "local government linked directly to local residents." Progressive mayors were elected in Osaka, Yokohama, Kita Kyushu, and elsewhere, and a "National Association of Progressive Mayors" was formed the following year. T h e number of mayors participating in the association ranged from 50 to 60. They were f o u n d most often in the Kanto, Tohoku, and Hokkaido regions, with relatively few in the Hanshin area and the rest of the western half of Japan. T h e prefectural administration of Minobe Ryôkichi began in Tokyo during the sixth unified local election of 1967. T h e number of mayors who were members of the National Association of Progressive Mayors immediately following the 1971 unified local election—including O k i n a w a — r e a c h e d 106. Geographically as well, they became a nationwide p h e n o m e n o n , as most of the cities in the three big metropolitan areas, most of the six major cities, and most of the top ten cities installed progressive governments. According to the Zenkoku shuchô meibo (National directory of local executives) compiled by the Local Government Comprehensive Institute, as of April 1976 there were 115 progressive mayors, including 4 chiefs of Tokyo's special wards, enrolled in the National Association of Progressive Mayors. With the addition of 44 mayors who had not j o i n e d , progressive mayors accounted for nearly one-fourth of the over 640 city mayor positions nationally. In addition, there were approximately 180 progressive town and village mayors. O f these, only 24 were JSP members. T h e rest were independents w h o had received recommendations and backing from one or more of four major parties: theJSP,JCP, CGP, and DSP (87 from the JSP only; 65 from the JSP and JCP; 61 from the JCP only; 27 from the JSP and CGP; 25 from the JSP, CGP, and JCP; 22 from the DSP only; and 17 from the JSP, CGP, and DSP). T h e progressive mayors mobilized the fluid and unstructured segment of society. They got elected by pointing out that previous local government administrations were loyal to the interests of the LDP and business but lacked a concern for the living environment and the living conditions of residents; they announced that local government administration should give residents priority when setting its goals. In a number of instances, citizens' movements opposed to the establishment of petrochemical plants or some other hazard determined the course of an election. In other instances, progressive mayors were elected as a consequence of corruption scandals involving conservative city administrations, a split of the vote by rival conservative candidates, and other conservative slipups. In any event, it was the active portion of the nonpartisan strata of mass society that propelled the progressive candidates into executive positions.

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The ground on which a progressive local government chief stood was extremely unstable. Elected with the votes of nonpartisan voters and assisted by the blunders of the conservatives, a chief was thrust into the midst of a conservative establishment. His partisan support in the assembly consisted of a small minority. In April 1976, for instance, only in the three prefectures of Tokyo, Kanagawa, and Okinawa, and in Yokohama and six other cities, did parties supporting the progressive executive hold either a majority or parity against those opposed to him. In addition, he was exposed to the pressures of the central LDP government and the conservative local government administrative structure that it controlled. One progressive mayor elected for the first time said that he felt like someone who had "parachuted all alone into the middle of the enemy." Using citizen participation, the local government chief had to challenge the conservative assembly and the central and local bureaucracies. When Asukata Ichio was elected mayor of Yokohama under the sponsorship of the JSP in 1963, he stated that "the 1.5 million citizens had become mayor" and proposed a "10,000-citizen assembly" chosen at random from the roster of Yokohama residents. Minobe Ryokichi declared his candidacy for the Tokyo governorship in 1967 with a JSP-JCP joint recommendation and, on the morning of his election, declared that he would take "the stand of a prefectural residents' party" representing the prefecture's 10 million citizens. These officials had to solve the problem of how to incorporate and institutionalize citizen participation in the structure of local government. It was not simply that there was friction between them and the established structure. Could citizens' movements themselves be redirected from protest to participation? Could energy that had resisted institutionalization be incorporated into institutions? The era of progressive local government heads reached its high point around 1975. There were 4 progressive-leaning independent governors in 1971 and 10 in 1975. In the meantime, LDP governments attempted to address the issues put forward by the progressive local executives. In spite of low economic growth after 1973, government spending on the environment and welfare continued to increase. The environment and welfare lost their punch as election issues. In the face of a fiscal crunch, many progressive local governments were retaken by LDP-affiliated executives. In the 1979 sixth unified local election, former Home and Local Autonomy Ministry bureaucrats were elected in Tokyo, Osaka, and five other prefectures under the banners of "fiscal reconstruction" and "local administrative professionalism." As a consequence, 20 of the 47 prefectural governors were former Home and Local Autonomy bureaucrats. On the other hand, it became difficult to get elected with only the recommendation of the LDP. The number of LDP governors, which was 21 in 1971, fell to 14 in 1975. The number of instances where cooperation was received from the DSP, or else a candidate

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ran as a conservative independent, increased. And for conservative local government chiefs of any sort, the slogans of improving welfare and citizen participation became a must. The positions retaken by the conservatives were by no means stable. They, too, had to ride the waves of mass society. (Mainichi Shinbun Shakaibu 1980:122-38; Ishikawa 1978:chap. 7; Asahi nenkan 1979:246-47) T H E WAVE OF PARTY PLURALISM

As the LDP-JSP oligopoly crumbled in the late 1960s, a wave of party pluralism washed in to fill the cracks. The first debut of the CGP in the House of Representatives in 1967 drew attention to this phenomenon. But its appearance came well after the beginning of party pluralization. The JCP had been a force since its revival in 1945 and the DSP since its split from the JSP in i960. The JCP The Japan Communist Party's organization was virtually annihilated in 1953. At the sixth national congress, in July 1955, the party resuscitated its integrated national organization and recommenced its activities. This congress was the result of a compromise between Shida Shigeo of the mainstream Tokuda faction (Tokuda himself had died in Beijing in October 1953) and Miyamoto Kenji of the anti-mainstream, internationalist faction. With Nosaka Sanzo selected as first secretary, Shida and Miyamoto gained a firm grip on the leadership of the party. But Shida fell after evidence of his misconduct while underground was brought to light. Miyamoto's position grew stronger. Meanwhile, an opposition faction was formed around Kasuga Shdjiro and other proponents of structural reform. At the seventh party congress, in July 1958, approximately one-third of the delegates were critical of the party platform proposed by Miyamoto, and it was not adopted. But the congress did abandon the "1951 party platform," which defined violent revolution as the correct line. Miyamoto was selected as party secretary general, Nosaka became central committee chairman, and Kasuga and the opposition faction gradually became isolated. Kasuga voluntarily left the party. Miyamoto was victorious at the eighth party congress, in July 1961, when his platform was adopted unanimously. This platform defined the party's fundamental aim as the struggle against "the two enemies"—U.S. imperialism and Japanese "monopoly capital." Its task was "a new democratic revolution opposing the two enemies" to be advanced by "a powerful and massive united front of the people, that is, a national democratic united front." The platform added, "If a stable majority can be obtained in the Diet, then the Diet can be changed from an organ of reactionary rule into one that serves the people."

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In the spring o f 1963 the Japanese a n d Soviet ( C P S U ) c o m m u n i s t parties clashed over a treaty to partially ban nuclear testing. T h e i r negotiations b r o k e down, a n d a public debate between the two parties ensued. T h e proSoviet g r o u p within the J C P openly o p p o s e d the Japanese party's position a n d voted f o r the ratification o f the treaty in b o t h the u p p e r a n d lower houses o f the Diet in May. A l t h o u g h the pro-Soviet g r o u p was dismissed f r o m the party, there were surprisingly few defections. In the spring o f 1966 talks between a delegation led by Secretary G e n e r a l Miyamoto a n d the Chinese C o m m u n i s t Party ( C C P ) resulted in a preliminary a g r e e m e n t o n a j o i n t c o m m u n i q u é but later b r o k e down. It is said that C h a i r m a n M a o Zed o n g insisted o n including support f o r an anti-U.S., anti-Soviet international united f r o n t in the j o i n t c o m m u n i q u é a n d d e m a n d e d that the Japan C o m m u n i s t Party support a violent revolution line. T h e pro-Chinese g r o u p in the J C P was dismissed f r o m the party. Miyamoto's administration stabilized the party even as it c o n f r o n t e d the C P S U a n d the C C P . Its intent was to create a "mass vanguard party . . . by creatively applying Marxist-Leninist theories o f party construction to the Japanese conditions o f a highly d e v e l o p e d capitalist country." T h e party's strength increased. A t the e i g h t h party congress, in July 1961, it was r e p o r t e d that there were "300,000 readers o f Akahata a n d m o r e than 80,000 party m e m b e r s . " A t the ninth party congress, in N o v e m b e r 1964, the figure was "close to 800,000 readers a n d about 150,000 party m e m b e r s " ; at the tenth party congress, in O c t o b e r 1966, it was "well over 1 million readers a n d close to 300,000 party m e m b e r s " (the estimate in a Public Security Investigation A g e n c y study in D e c e m b e r was 200,000) ; a n d at the eleventh party congress, in July 1970, it was "close to 2 million readers a n d 300,000 party m e m b e r s . " (In 1980 it was reported that there were 700,000 readers o f the main edition o f Akahata a n d 440,000 party members.) T h e eleventh party congress r e c o g n i z e d a West E u r o p e a n - s t y l e c o m m u nist party p r o g r a m — a n " a d v a n c e d country revolution" l i n e — w h i c h declared that "revolution in advanced capitalist countries is a field o f great e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n a n d practice by a new m a n k i n d " a n d r e a f f i r m e d such principles as p e a c e f u l revolution, people's parliamentarism, a n d the recognition o f multiple political parties. T h e party r e f o r m e d its leadership structure. Nosaka b e c a m e central committee chairman; Miyamoto, chairm a n o f the newly created central executive committee; a n d Fuwa Tetsuzô, h e a d o f the newly created party secretariat. In the 1972 g e n e r a l election, the J C P captured 38 seats a n d b e c a m e the s e c o n d most important opposition party. A b o u t 46 p e r c e n t o f the J C P votes c a m e f r o m p e o p l e w h o h a d voted f o r the party in the p r e c e d i n g g e n e r a l election, 22 p e r c e n t f r o m JSP voters, a n d 9 p e r c e n t f r o m L D P voters. A b o u t 2 p e r c e n t c a m e f r o m the C G P , 1 p e r c e n t f r o m the DSP, a n d 5 p e r c e n t f r o m p e o p l e w h o did n o t have the right to vote in the p r e c e d i n g election. Six

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percent came from those who abstained in the previous election, and the source of 9 percent was not clear. (Nihon Seiji Gakkai 1977:297) In November 1973, at the twelfth party congress, the JCP adopted the goal of establishing a democratic coalition government "not very late in the 1970s." It declared that the term "dictatorship of the proletariat," found in the party platform and party bylaws, was inappropriate; it was changed to "governance of the proletariat." Perhaps mimicking the 1973 "historic compromise" of the Italian Communist Party, it concluded a "ten-year accord" with the Soka Gakkai in late December 1974, which affirmed "antifascism" and the coexistence of religion and "scientific socialism." Made public the following July, this agreement set off such violent shock waves in the CGP that it was abandoned. (Asahi nenkan 1976:227-28) The emergency party congress ofJuly 1976 adopted a "Declaration of Freedom and Democracy." All instances of the term "proletarian governance" were removed from the platform and bylaws, and "Marxism-Leninism" was replaced with the standardized term "scientific socialism." (Soma 1977:457-79) JCP support was concentrated in urban areas, with its largest group of supporters found among office and line workers. (Jiji Tsushinsha 1981) Table 42 shows the share of the vote received by the JCP and the percentage of seats it obtained. Since the JCP ran candidates in virtually all electoral districts, the percentage of the vote that it received was higher than that of the other third parties. Table 43 shows the backgrounds and affiliated organizations ofJCP Representatives between 1958 and 1979 and JCP Councilors between 1956 and 1977. There was a conspicuously large number of former locally elected officials and Sohyo-affiliated union executives among the Representatives. There were no former high-level bureaucrats or Domei-affiliated unionists. The increase in the 1970s in the number of members affiliated with small and medium-sized enterprise federations and local chambers of commerce was probably a result of the activities of Minsho. The DSP The DSP was formed in January i960 after the JSP left wing and Sohyo launched an attack on the Nishio faction, which was directing Zenro Kaigi and aiding second unions. The Nishio faction, "taking on the fight that was being picked," left the JSP. A clear-cut division in relationships was thus established between Sohyo and the JSP, on the one hand, and Zenro Kaigi (later Domei) and the DSP, on the other. Although the enthusiastic DSP ran 105 candidates in the general election following the security treaty crisis and vowed to "gain control of the government after the next two general elections," it ended up suffering a stunning defeat, winning a mere 17 seats, or less than half of the 40 seats that it held at the time of the Diet's dissolu-

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tion. With 23 seats in 1963 and 30 seats in 1967, the party failed to recover its strength in the general elections that followed. Meanwhile, the relationship between the DSP and the LDP grew close. In the 1966 gubernatorial election in Kyoto, the 1967 mayoral elections in Kita Kyushu and Kyoto, and the Tokyo gubernatorial election that year, the DSP joined forces with the LDP. Since their purpose was to prevent the establishment of progressive local governments by the JSP-JCP alliance, the DSP's relationship with the JSP cooled further. Nishio announced his retirement at the July 1967 party convention. His place was taken by Nishimura Eiichi. In the 1969 general election, the party obtained 30 seats. In April 1970 its name—Minshu Shakaito—was shortened to Minshato. At a press conference in June 1970, Nishimura revealed his intention to restructure the opposition parties into a JSP-CGP-DSP coalition. Telecommunication Workers' Union president Takaragi Fumihiko had declared a unification of the labor front, and there were moves under way to unify the front around the Sohyo-affiliated Iron and Steel Workers' and Synthetic Chemical Industry Workers' federations, Churitsu Roren, and Domei. In addition, the JSP under Secretary General Eda had fallen to 90 seats in the House of Representatives, and the CGP found itself in a tight spot as a result of the Suppression of Free Speech Incident (see below). Talks among the secretaries general of the JSP, CGP, and DSP were held in July and November of 1970. The three parties then embarked on a limited joint action on current policy issues such as Sinojapanese relations and antipollution measures. In the 1971 House of Councilors election, the DSP and CGP backed JSP candidates in three electoral districts in Tochigi, Shimane, and Oita. All of them were elected. Chairman Nishimura died suddenly in April 1971 and was replaced by Kasuga Ikko. In the 1972 general election, the party's seats dropped to 19. Perhaps, as Domei and the Democratic Socialism Institute claimed, the JSPCGP-DSP coalition had confused DSP supporters. Since the CGP had also stumbled badly in this election, the JSP-CGP-DSP alliance was abandoned. Recognizing that further losses might well lead to a dissolution of the party, the DSP campaigned frantically in the 1976 general election. The Domei leadership directed its full support to the DSP. A number of New Religion organizations that had withdrawn their support from the LDP in response to the Lockheed scandal also backed the DSP. In addition, there was support from Korean residents' groups with ties to South Korea. Perhaps as a result, the number of seats held by the party increased from 19 to 29. In the November 1977 emergency party convention Chairman Kasuga retired and was replaced by Sasaki Ryosaku. (Soma 1977:506-16) DSP supporters were also a strongly urban group (Table 44); they were primarily office and line workers, along with freelance professionals and

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supervisory personnel. (Jiji Tsushinsha 1981) Table 45 shows the backgrounds and affiliated organizations of the DSP Representatives from i960 to 1974 and Councilors from 1962 to 1977. In the lower house 37.4 percent were former locally elected officials and 19 percent were affiliated with Domei; in the upper house 71 percent had ties to Domei. The CGP The Soka Gakkai sect first tried to enter the political world "to erect a national ordination hall" in the April 1955 unified local election. It fielded 54 candidates, primarily in the Tokyo area, and 52 of them were elected. At the time, there were 164,272 Soka Gakkai households. In the July 1956 House of Councilors election, the party ran 4 candidates in the national district and 2 in the regional districts, electing 2 and 1 candidates, respectively. Its share of the vote in the national district was 3.5 percent with an average of 2.44 votes per Soka Gakkai household. It ran 5 candidates in 1959 in the national district and 1 in a regional district, and all of them were elected. The share of the vote in the national district was 8.5 percent, and the per household vote 2.11. Its slogans were generally "the purification of the political world" and "clean elections," but it generated a mass of election law violations in the April 1957 House of Councilors district by-election in Osaka. Among those arrested was its staff section chief Ikeda Daisaku, who became the organization's third chairman in May i960. The Soka Gakkai did not attempt to take an official stance on the security treaty issue, leaving the matter to the discretion of the respective Diet members. In November 1961 the Soka Gakkai formed the "Komei Political League" (Komei Seiji Renmei, or Koseiren). In June 1962 Chairman Ikeda stated that making the Soka Gakkai a "third force" in the political world was "demanded by the times as well as the will and decree of Buddha." In the House of Councilors election held that month, 7 of its candidates were elected in the national district along with 2 in the regional districts. Its national share of the vote was 11.5 percent, and the per household vote was 1.52 votes. In the Tokyo gubernatorial race the following April, the Koseiren recommended an LDP-associated candidate. This was the Koseiren's first major political decision. In May 1964 Chairman Ikeda announced his intention to run for the House of Representatives. Koseiren sponsored the inaugural convention of the Komeito (Clean Government Party) in November. Its inaugural declaration stated: "The CGP holds the fusion of Buddhism and politics and Buddhist democracy as its basic ideals and will strive to purify the political world of Japan, establish the foundation of parliamentary democratic politics, sink its roots deeply into the masses, and achieve mass welfare. We

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firmly pledge before the people to fight bravely, from a broad standpoint of global nationalism, to establish for the world a framework for lasting peace." In the July 1965 House of Councilors election, all 9 CGP candidates were elected; of the 5 candidates that ran in the regional districts, 2 were elected. The party's share of the vote in the national district was 13.7 percent, with an average of 0.96 votes per household. Thereafter, the Tokyo municipal assembly was dissolved. In the ensuing election the CGP elected 23 candidates, making it the third largest party, behind the JSP and LDP. In its first general election effort, in January 1967, 25 of its 32 candidates were elected. Roughly 32 percent of the votes it received had gone to the LDP in the 1963 general election. About 28 percent came from the JSP, 3 percent from the DSP, 1 percent from the JCP, and 8 percent from independents, with 28 percent unaccounted for. Although the CGP ate into the vote of both the LDP and the JSP, the damage was greater for the JSP. (Nihon Seiji Gakkai I 977 :2 9^) Takeiri Yoshikatsu was designated chairman of the party by Soka Gakkai chairman Ikeda, and Yano Jun'ya was drafted as the party's secretary general. In the April Tokyo gubernatorial election, the party rejected a call from the LDP and fielded a candidate of its own in order to fortify its organization. This action helped to elect JSP- and JCP-backed Governor Minobe Ryokichi. In the local elections held that month, the CGP increased its 1,309 seats to 1,873. I n the 1968 House of Councilors election, 9 of its candidates were elected in the national district and 5 in the regional districts, with a share of the vote in the national district of 15.4 percent. In October 1969 an incident occurred over the publication of Fujiwara Hirotatsu's Soka Gakkai 0 kiru (I denounce Soka Gakkai). The CGP attempted to halt publication of the book by putting pressure on Fujiwara through LDP secretary general Tanaka. Fujiwara refused to give in and appealed to the press. The JCP aggressively took up the issue and criticized the CGP. In spite of the Suppression of Free Speech Incident, the CGP gained 47 seats in the December 1969 general election to become the third largest party. But in 1970 it encountered heat from the other parties in the Diet. Hoping for support from the CGP in the Kyoto gubernatorial election, the LDP helped the CGP resist these attacks. But in that election the JSP- and JCP-backed Governor Ninagawa Torazo won. The CGP was now presented with the problem of reform. In January 1970 Takeiri, Yano, and other party executives resigned from their executive positions in the Soka Gakkai. At a Soka Gakkai general meeting in May, Ikeda abandoned the goals of establishing a national ordination hall and making Nichiren Shoshu a national religion and promised the organizational separation of the Soka Gakkai and the CGP. The CGP convention in June adopted a new party platform, which removed all traces of "Buddhist de-

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mocracy"; it stated, "As a national party devoted to the centrism of respect for humanity, our party will advance with the masses through enthusiasm for progress and practical achievement." Meanwhile, the CGP joined with the DSP, wooed the JSP, and aimed for a JSP-CGP-DSP alliance. But the Eda faction, which supported this move, was overwhelmingly defeated at the November 1970 JSP party congress. In addition, it seemed difficult to promote a JSP-CGP-DSP alliance in the face of JSP-JCP joint victories in the gubernatorial elections in cities like Tokyo and Osaka and in various local elections in April 1971. Then in the December 1972 general election, the CGP met its first major defeat. The CGP was again pressed to redirect its course. In January 1973 the tenth central committee initiated a turn to the left, including a stand in favor of the immediate abrogation of the security treaty; this became official party policy at the party convention in September. Although the plan for a centrist-progressive coalition government that was submitted to the convention excluded the JCP, on December 28, 1974, the Soka Gakkai secretly signed a ten-year accord with the JCP, and Ikeda met with Miyamoto the following day at the house of the writer Matsumoto Seicho. The accord was made public in July 1975, but the backlash against it led to its abrogation in August. With the conservative-progressive near parity that followed the 1976 general election, the CGP advanced the JSP-CGP-DSP alliance once again. While strengthening its links with the DSP, it put pressure on the JSP by linking up with Matsumae Shigeyoshi's "Society to Think About a New Japan." But the February JSP congress ignored Eda's proposal to exclude the JCP and promote aJSP-CGP-DSP coalition, and Eda himself was vehemently attacked. The CGP therefore appealed at the CGP convention in late February for the formation of a centrist national front consisting of a progressive majority at the popular level (i.e., independent voters) and a progressive majority at the political party level (i.e., the centrist parties). It anticipated the participation of the JSP right wing. Instead, on March 2 the JSP promised a joint campaign with the JCP in the House of Councilors elecdon. (Soma 1977:480-505) CGP supporters, too, were clearly an urban group, composed primarily of, first, workers and, second, independent operators of retail oudets, factories, and service businesses. When the category of "housewife" was added to the survey categories, members of this group fell between the first two. (Jiji Tsushinsha 1981) Hori Yukio noted that "while the core of the CGP's support is the Soka Gakkai, it is centered on the strata of small, medium, and minuscule enterprise operators and the nonunionized workforce in the cities." This assessment appears to be accurate. It is not hard to imagine these groups supporting the JSP or the JCP. But the JSP's reliance on Sohyo led it to neglect its organizational efforts, and JCP organization drives were

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hindered by anticommunist sentiment. In this vacuum the Soka Gakkai advanced its organizational effort through appeals to this-worldly interests. But despite the party's efforts, inroads were not made into rural areas where communal solidarity remained strong. (Soma 1977:497) Table 46 shows the CGP's election results. The backgrounds of CGP Representatives in 1967-79 and Councilors in 1965-77 are shown in Table 47. It is extremely common for Diet members to be former locally elected officials. Categories with zero members are not indicated. Other Parties The New Liberal Club (NLC) was established by Kono Yohei, Tagawa Seiichi, and four others who bolted from the LDP in June 1976 in reaction against the Lockheed scandal. Sixteen of its candidates were elected in the December general election, and three to the House of Councilors in 1977. But before the first party convention in December 1978, a dispute developed between Kono, who favored a link with the centrist parties, and Secretary General Nishioka Takeo, who argued that the LDP should be the primary partner in any coalition effort. Nishioka left the party, followed by a number of incumbent Diet members. The number of seats held by the party fell to just 4 in the October 1979 general election. Following the election, the party reached a policy agreement with Prime Minister Ohira and voted for him in the balloting to choose a prime minister. The coalition effort failed because of a backlash within the LDP. In the June 1980 general election, the party captured 11 seats. The Social Democratic League (Shakai Minshu Rengo; SDL) led by Den Hideo was formed in March 1978. It represented a combination of the Social Citizens' League, formed when Eda and others left the JSP in March 1977, and a citizens' group led by Kan Naoto. It had 3 seats each in the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors at the time of the party's formation. The Wave ofParty Pluralism The third parties grew in the cities. The JCP had a solid party organization and substantial financing because of the sales of Akahata. The DSP had the support of unions affiliated with Domei. The CGP was backed by the Soka Gakkai organization of believers. Candidates of all these parties had personal koenkai (Table 48). The rate of kdenkai membership was higher among CGP voters than in the LDP. It was also high among JCP voters and rather low in the JSP. The partisan affiliation of local assemblymen is indicated in Table 49. At least 90 percent of the members of the prefectural assemblies had a party affiliation. Whereas both the LDP and the JSP declined between 1965 and

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1975, the three other parties—the DSP, JCP, and CGP—increased their presence. The rate of party affiliation was only about 40 percent in city assemblies and 10 percent in town and village assemblies. Here, too, LDP representation declined considerably, the JSP and DSP contingents did not change much, and J C P and CGP representation increased dramatically. The figures can be seen as indicators of the local vitality of these parties. As for governors and mayors, more than 60 percent and more than 90 percent, respectively, are independents. The third parties grew by eating away at the support of the LDP and the JSP as well as one another's support bases. To what extent did voters change parties? According to responses given to the question, "Which political party did you used to favor?" in an 1975 Asahi shinbun survey (Table 50), support was most stable for the LDP and CGP at 81 percent and 80 percent, followed by the JSP and JCP, at 57 percent and 58 percent, respectively. About 19 percent of former JSP support went to the LDP and 10 percent to the JCP, while 16 percent of the JCP's support went to the LDP and 14 percent to the JSP. Stable support for the DSP was 41 percent. Roughly 33 percent of former DSP support went to the LDP, and 16 percent went to the JSP. Approximately 34 percent said that they did not favor any party or else did not respond. Roughly 69 percent of those now supporting the LDP were former LDP supporters (Table 51). Former JSP supporters accounted for 10 percent of LDP support, while those with no previous party accounted for 17 percent. Some 59 percent of JSP supporters were former JSP supporters, 13 percent were former LDP supporters, and 23 percent had been nonpartisan. The situation in the third parties contrasts sharply with that in the LDP and JSP. Only 29 percent of the JCP's support consisted of former J C P supporters, 28 percent of the CGP supporters were former CGP supporters, and 25 percent of the DSP supporters were former DSP supporters. Thus, most of the support received by the third parties was absorbed from somewhere else. Among supporters of the JCP, 31 percent came from the JSP and 25 percent from the nonpartisan segment, while in the CGP 19 percent came from the LDP, 22 percent from the JSP, and 23 percent from nonpartisans. Among DSP supporters, 29 percent formerly backed the LDP, 12 percent the JSP, and 33 percent were former nonpartisans. While 71 percent of the nonpartisans were former nonpartisans, 18 percent were former JSP supporters. It is clear that there is a considerable floating vote and that support for the third parties was tied to an erosion of LDP and JSP support. Table 52 compares the stable vote (defined as the rate of support for a given party two weeks before an election) and the floating vote (defined as the difference between the stable vote and the actual vote received). After 1963 the percentage of the vote received by the LDP was lower than its rate of support. In other words, its stable vote was going elsewhere. In the JSP there

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was a continual exodus from 1958. But in the late 1970s it was minuscule, and in 1980 it reversed itself. The JCP and CGP, by contrast, consistently received more votes than predicted. The increase in the JCP vote was roughly one-half of its stable vote, while the CGP's was perhaps 40 percent of its stable vote. There were very few votes flowing into the DSP and on occasion votes flowed out. The expansion of the third parties can be divided into three phases. During the initial phase, from the late 1950s until 1967, the rate of support, the absolute share of the vote, and the seats obtained were growing but remained below 10 percent. A second phase began in 1967, when both the seats received and the absolute share of the vote were 10-20 percent. At this point the impact of the third parties began to be felt. The third phase came after 1976, when third-party seats reached the 20-30 percent level, the relative share of the vote was around 30 percent, the absolute share of the vote was 22 percent, and the rate of partisan support was around 14 percent. The JSP's share might have declined, but with the addition of various third parties to its share, the total opposition vote and parliamentary strength reached virtual parity with the LDP. Although this change made the LDP's steering of the Diet more difficult, the opposition parties were not in a position to coalesce and demand control of the government. Coalition Movements

With the LDP tasting defeat in the December 1972 general election under the Tanaka cabinet, a "conservative-progressive upset" was predicted for the summer 1974 House of Councilors elections. All four opposition parties released plans for the establishment of a coalition government. JSP chairman Narita called for "a people's coalition government consisting of all of the opposition parties" during the general election; the party's Socialist Theory Committee, headed by Katsumata, submitted a "draft unified platform" to the party congress in February that was formally approved in October. The JCP had adopted a plan of government at every party congress after 1961. At the November 1972 party congress it adopted a plan for a "democratic coalition government." The CGP approved a proposal for a "centrist-progressive government" at its convention in June. The DSP approved a plan for a "JSP-CGP-DSP coalition government" at its March 1973 convention, and in February 1974 it approved one for a "national progressive coalition government." The parties felt that conditions were ripe for unseating the LDP, which was disrupting the lives of the people with inflation and pollution and increasing the gap between rich and poor. They thought the time had come to establish a progressive coalition government to "protect the people's livelihood" and "defend the existing constitution." But even though the

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JSP proclaimed "the formation of a broad antimonopoly anti-LDP people's front" and called for an "all-opposition joint action," the JCP excluded the DSP from its "united front government" on grounds that the Democratic Socialists had failed to demand the abolition of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The CGP implicitly expressed fears of the JCP by stating that it would exclude forces aiming at a dictatorship, while the DSP excluded it openly. (Asahi nenkan 1974:223-24) In December 1974, just before the establishment of the Miki cabinet, the DSP set its sights on a "conservative-progressive link" and moved to back Miki or Kono. Although this move did not amount to anything, immediately after the formation of the Miki cabinet, DSP secretary general Tsukamoto spoke of "dialogue rather than confrontation"; at the party convention the followingjanuary he proposed a conservative-progressive program. In local elections, LDP-DSP links were conspicuous. Both the JSP and JCP severely criticized them. The motion for a vote of no confidence in December was made jointly by the JSP, CGP, and JCP. The DSP did not join them. (Asahi nenkan 1974:224-27) At a plenary session of the House of Representatives in January 1976, DSP chairman Kasuga brought up a forty-three-year-old JCP spy interrogation incident that JCP chairman Miyamoto had been involved in and asked for the government's view of the matter. The DSP and JCP collided head-on as a consequence. The goal of four-party joint action was restored during the investigation of the Lockheed Incident beginning in February. But the JCP then attacked the "Society for Thinking About a New Japan," which JSP vice chairman Eda, CGP secretary general Yano, and DSP vice chairman Sasaki had participated in, and at the July party convention Miyamoto pointed out that LDP "Diet steering" funds were being passed out to all of the other opposition parties. The other three parties countered. At the extraordinary Diet session called in September, the JCP agreed with the LDP on a session of 50 days and clashed with the JSP, CGP, and DSP. (Asahi nenkan 1977:299) The LDP suffered a massive setback in the December 1976 general election. It had no choice but to back down before the united opposition parties. Because of their joint action, the Fukuda cabinet acceded to an additional ¥300 billion tax cut and amended the government's draft budget in March 1977. But the parties continued to batde with one another. Within the JSP, the Socialism Association advanced at the February 1977 party congress and Eda bolted in March. Fighting between the association and anti-association forces grew heated. The JCP called for joint action with the JSP, but Chairman Narita was lukewarm and turned his gaze to the CGP. Following the House of Councilors election, the CGP and DSP tried to link up with the anti-association factions and drive the pro-association factions into a corner. In November, Sasaki—who had become DSP chairman—

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was seen as more positive about the JSP-CGP-DSP coalition than the rightleaning Kasuga. But because Asukata, who became JSP chairman in December, was seen as left-leaning and backed by the association, the CGP and DSP grew more cautious about the JSP. (Asahi nenkan 1978:237) In May 1978 the CGP, DSP, NLC, and SDL formed the "Twenty-First Century Club" to bring together the centrist-progressive forces. But the CGP and DSP wanted to consolidate a "centrist force" in order to counter both the LDP and the JSP; the NLC insisted on maintaining a "conservative" position even though it was affiliated with the centrist group; and the SDL was seeking a niche in which to operate as a full-fledged political party. They therefore found it extremely difficult to adopt a common position on concrete political issues. (Asahi nenkan 1979:238) In February 1979 the CGP revealed that it would support the government's budget bill if the LDP agreed to accept a revision relating to budgetary deliberations. Tripartite talks were held between Prime Minister Ohira and the heads of the CGP and DSP. Although they bore no fruit, these talks marked the first time that the CGP supported the budget. This development attracted considerable attention as the prototype for Ohira's "partial coalition." The CGP and DSP agreed in September to cooperate in the next election with a goal of obtaining 100 seats between them. Each party would choose fourteen electoral districts in which it would run candidates, and the parties would campaign jointly in all twenty-eight districts. Since the CGP had solid local organizations, it held a series of highly orchestrated gatherings attended by DSP candidates. The DSP, relying primarily on Domei unit unions, gathered votes for CGP candidates. The result was 8 victories and 6 losses in districts where the CGP aided the DSP and 11 victories and 3 losses where the DSP aided the CGP. The CGP carried a large number of incumbents and had a large base vote to begin with. Then on September 16 the CGP, DSP, NLC, and SDL signed an agreement to run jointly sponsored "consolidated centrist candidates" in ten electoral districts. The outcome was favorable: 7 victories and 3 losses. (Asahi nenkan 1980: 239, 243) The CGP and DSP, which had gained considerable confidence from these election results, reached an agreement on policy that December. The following January the JSP came to an agreement with the CGP. TheJCP was thereby excluded. AJSP-CGP-DSP alliance with the CGP as the fulcrum was thus established. In May the JSP submitted a motion of no confidence against the cabinet and, to the surprise of all, the motion was passed. The House was dissolved and a general election was held—which resulted in a huge victory for the LDP. The coalition government plan was blasted to smithereens. The opposition parties' plans for coalition government were self-aggran-

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dizing. T h e coalition formulas varied widely. But it is possible to discern a pattern. First, if the parties were arranged according to their distance from the LDP, the order would probably be DSP, CGP, SDL, JSP, JCP. An allopposition coalition was highly unlikely, and the most problematic would be a DSPJ C P coalition. Second, the policies of the CGP and DSP were quite similar, and the relationship between the parties was close. But taken together, the two parties controlled fewer than 100 seats. Even if they consolidated the "centrist forces" by linking up with the N L C (which had bolted from the LDP) and the SDL (which had bolted from the JSP), the total would still be only about 100 seats. Because the C G P and DSP stood between the LDP and the JSP, other possibilities included an LDP-DSP-CGP alignment with the DSP as the fulcrum and a JSP-CGP-DSP alignment with the CGP as the fulcrum. Third, the JSP lay between the C G P and JCP. Joint JSPJCP action went back a long way. Taken together, the two parties amounted to, at best, around 150 seats. Subsequently, the JSP leaned toward the C G P in order to arrest its decline. A JSP-CGP-DSP coalition mediated by the CGP would have controlled close to 200 seats. Finally, if the LDP had lost its absolute majority and had not undergone a split in which one of the resulting parties entered into a coalition with part of the opposition camp, then the likely outcome would undoubtedly have been a coalition between the LDP and one of the opposition parties closest to it.

THE WAVE OF MICROCHANGES A Difference of 1 Percent in the Vote Received Throughout the late 1970s, there was near parity between the government and the opposition parties. T h e wave of independent voters approached 40 percent. Pluralism and fluidity increased. A tiny change could have had gigantic consequences. In the context of the delicate balance of power that characterized conservative-progressive near parity, a change of just 1 percent in the voting rates could precipitate a tremendous disturbance. Ishikawa Masumi pointed out that the "win-loss interval"—the percentage derived by dividing the difference between the votes received by the lowest-ranking winner and the highest-ranking loser in an electoral district by the number of registered voters in that district on election day—was minuscule in the 1976 general election. In 68 (52 percent) of the 130 House of Representatives electoral districts, it was less than 1.0 percent: less than 0.5 percent in 42 districts, and 0.5-1.0 percent in 26 districts. "Stable districts," where the "win-loss interval" was more than 5 percent, numbered only 21. O f the 68 districts where heated battles occurred, 15 were districts where both the lowest-ranking winner and the highest-ranking loser were LDP or conservative independents. In 20, the lowest-ranked winner was

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LDP, and the runner-up was an opposition party member; in 22 the lowestranked winner was affiliated with the opposition, and the runner-up was LDP. Thus, if the LDP had received just 1 percent less or the opposition had gained 1 percent more of the vote, the LDP would have had 20 fewer seats; if the LDP had obtained a mere 1 percent more or the opposition parties 1 percent less, the number of LDP seats would have increased by 22. A mere 1 percent of the vote could not be taken for granted. In the large urban electoral districts, in particular, the various parties' candidates crowded around the line between winners and losers, and a minute difference in voting rates caused a big change in seats. The CGP's loss of 18 seats and the JCP's gain of 24 seats in 1972; or the CGP's gain of 26 seats, the JCP's loss of 21 seats, and the NLC's gain of 13 seats in 1976—these changes were extremely important for the party involved but resulted from tiny changes in the large urban electoral districts. (Ishikawa 1978:81-96) Unpredictability In these circumstances, the prediction of election outcomes was extremely difficult. In the case of the Asahi shinbun—and probably the other firms as well—predictions were based on macrosurveys of political party support combined with surveys of expectations after an election is announced. Even though it was difficult to accurately predict the number of seats secured by each of the parties, predictions of "overall trends" were quite accurate. In the case of the October 1979 general election under the Ohira cabinet, however, not even the "overall trends" were correct. Polling by the newspapers in late August had shown an unprecedentedly high rate of support for the LDP (52 percent in the Asahi shinbun poll). Surveys of expectations all showed about 270 seats, or a stable majority, for the LDP. The political commentators agreed completely: a great chorus proclaimed that a stable majority was a foregone conclusion. But the LDP's relative share of the vote was actually 44.6 percent, with 248 seats. In the previous general election, under the Miki cabinet in 1976, the LDP's relative share of the vote was 41.8 percent, with 249 seats. As a consequence of this huge gaffe, poll takers lost their confidence and people began to accuse polls of being a complete sham. Nonetheless, the predicted share of the vote was extremely accurate for each of the parties. The LDP's, for instance, was 45.2 percent, or only 0.6 percent off target. During the June 1980 double election, political commentators focused on whether the LDP would be able to gain a majority. Figures as low as 238 seats in the House of Representatives were put forward; a figure like 260 caused immediate derision. But the polls showed a rising tide of support for the LDP, which gained momentum with the sudden death of Prime Minister Ohira. At this point, a figure of 272 LDP seats—give or take 9—was re-

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leased. The actual outcome was 284. Estimates of the share of the vote were extremely accurate. The LDP's estimated share was 46.7 percent and its actual share was 47.9, or a difference of 1.2 percent. (Hayashi 1983:1 — n, 226) Although the estimated share of the vote for each party might be highly accurate, the situation in the respective electoral districts was quite complex and the prediction of the wins and losses of individual candidates and the number of winners was extremely difficult. Huge swings could result from a tiny change. Consequently, parties and candidates resorted to all the campaign tricks they knew. There were probably occasions when predictions had an "announcement effect." But the actual outcomes trampled all over the maneuvering and predictions. For this reason, an election was "heaven's voice." If it turned out as predicted, it was good fortune; if it was off the mark, it was bad luck. At times, this voice could sound very funny.

Mass society eroded the electoral base of the LDP and sent the party into twenty years of decline. The electoral base of the JSP eroded rapidly as well. In the space between the two parties—particularly in the big cities—the wave of party pluralism spread. The JSP lost its ability to take on the LDP. In the 1970s a delicate balance of power emerged between the opposition parties (including the JSP) and the LDP. Even though mass society did not bring about a massive shift in the new wave of independent voters, tiny movements among them exerted an unpredictable yet decisive shift in the delicate balance. LDP rule was no longer threatened by a "socialist movement" riding the tide of industrialization but by the unpredictability of mass society, which was generated as industrialization matured.

Epilogue: LDP Rule in the 1980s

T H E SUZUKI CABINET AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

In October 1955 the Left and Right Socialists merged. In the following month, the two conservative parties also joined forces. These events marked the founding of the "1955 political system." The militant labor union Sohyo, the largest at the time, backed the Socialists, while the mikai encouraged the conservatives, seeking a stable conservative regime that could counteract the growth of the Socialists and the expanding labor movement. Thus, the 1955 system was based on a political confrontation that existed in the late 1950s and early 1960s and was established against a backdrop of intense labor-management conflict. The ratio of conservative-to-leftist seats in the lower house of the Diet remained at 2 to 1, making the continuation of LDP rule possible. The long-term domination of government by the LDP, in turn, induced rapid economic growth, thereby setting in motion the second cycle of industrialization in modern Japanese history. (The first cycle occurred under the Meiji regime.) Structurally, the inducement mechanism of the LDP government consisted of the economic bureaucracy, big business, and the LDP majority in the Diet. This tripartite structure was a closed policy-making system. The balance of power among the three constituents varied with the vagaries of the ongoing process of industrialization. Industrialization gave rise to enormous social change, particularly during the 1960s. In fact, this change may have been the most radical in modern Japanese history. It had two aspects. One was socioeconomic. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the primary industrial population decreased dramatically (from 48.3 percent in 1950 to 8.0 percent in 1987), while the tertiary sector increased in an equally dramatic fashion (from 29.0 percent to 56.4 percent) . During this period, the share of the secondary industrial population 408

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first increased but then decreased. The second aspect was sociopsychological. Increased social mobility, urbanization, and the spread of mass society were coupled with the permeation of society by the mass media. These provided the setting for an increase in the number of urban nonpartisans and the expansion of citizens' movements. Three processes unfolded in the context of this rapid socioeconomic change. First, heavy and chemical industry developed, ushering in an increase in the number of industrial workers as well as the expansion of the labor movement and the power of the JSP in the 1950s and early 1960s. However, these trends were reversed in the late 1960s. The growth of high-tech industry gave rise to a change in the labor movement and a contraction of the JSP. Second, interest groups emerged, such as agricultural cooperatives and small and medium-sized enterprise associations. They were linked tightly to the bureaucracy and the LDP through the lobbying network/pork barrel apparatus, which grew along with the amount of disbursed government subsidies. This apparatus brought together the bureaucracy and interest groups. Each section of the bureaucracy distributed subsidies in order to maintain and expand its jurisdiction. Interest groups lobbied the appropriate bureaucratic sections in order to attain material benefits. The apparatus came into its own in the 1960s. Third, the spread of mass society led to a weakening of the mobilizing capacity of organizations such as labor unions and agricultural cooperatives, and also to a shrinking of the LDP's and JSP's old electoral bases. The flip side of this process was an increase in the floating vote and the number of swing voters, particularly from the late 1970s. Radical social change brought about a radical transformation of LDP rule, which manifested itself in two ways. First, the pork barrel apparatus led to a strengthening of the LDP's electoral base from the 1960s, as politicians used it to fortify their vote-gathering capacities in their electoral districts. The faction, originally a unit for distributing cabinet and party posts, took on the added function of facilitating the role of the Diet member in the lobbying network. More than anyone else, Tanaka Kakuei utilized pork barrel and regional-development politics. Operating in the political world as if it were the construction industry where he began, he clambered up the political ladder and attached himself deep inside the apparatus while strengthening his faction. He was probably the first "party politician" who was able to gain the trust of the bureaucrats. The glory days of the LDP's ex-bureaucrat factions were brought to an end when Tanaka defeated his rival and the heir apparent, Fukuda, in the LDP presidential election of 1972. In the process, he also transformed the rules and dynamics of LDP factionalism. Second, the mass media emerged as a political resource. This development, which became apparent during the 1960s, was not necessarily under

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the control of the LDP. T h e first political leader to take advantage of the mass media as a political resource was Miki Takeo. T h e public's discovery of Tanaka's " m o n e y politics" in 1974 precipitated a crisis for the LDP. Miki, who headed a small and weak faction, was suddenly seen as the prime minister who could help the party to weather the crisis. Miki loved to appear on television and to hold press interviews, and the opposition parties and the media welcomed his innovative ideas. He attempted to utilize their support to counteract the reaction against him in other factions within the LDP. As a result, the mass media were brought into the previously closed system that provided the setting for factional strife. In the 1980s the LDP's leadership sustained its narrow majority by balancing two contradictory phenomena. T h e first was the LDP's factional politics, which was increasingly dominated by the Tanaka faction, and the lobbying network and pork barrel apparatus, which had come to the fore in the 1960s. T h e second was the politics of the mass media, which had come into its own during the 1970s. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro skillfully balanced the two. Like Miki's, his faction was small and weak, but with the support of Tanaka, Nakasone managed to obtain the post of prime minister in 1982. He then made extensive use of the "Ron-Yasu relationship," his slogan of "the final settlement of postwar politics" (sengo seiji no so kessan), and other media-oriented appeals. In the process, he raised the rate of support for his government in the opinion polls. T h e LDP's overwhelming victory in the "double election" of 1986 was made possible by the successful mobilization of both the block votes of interest groups and the swing votes the party was able to attract through the mass media. As the prime minister himself proudly put it, the LDP captured not only its "own customers" but also 40 percent of the "gray z o n e " of television viewers. This great victory of the LDP, however, did not turn out to be an augur of long-term, stable rule. W h e n the government tried to pass a sales tax bill in late 1986, the interest groups that had traditionally voted for the LDP abandoned the party. Their action was consistent with the modus operandi of interest groups. T h e swing voters of the gray zone also turned their backs when Nakasone violated his pledge not to raise taxes. Their action was consistent with the modus operandi of swing voters. For the LDP, the interest groups were n o longer reliable, and the swing vote had swung in the wrong direction. Support for the cabinet dropped sharply. In local elections and by-elections thereafter, the LDP suffered drastic defeats. By October the Nakasone cabinet was forced into retreat and dropped its plan for a sales tax. W h e n the LDP government of Takeshita Noboru forced through a revised version of the sales tax (the "consumption tax") and then f o u n d itself caught up in the Recruit Scandal in 1988-89, the scenario was replayed with even more drastic results for the party. As a consequence of the 1989 House of Councilors election, the party lost majority control of one of the houses

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of the Diet for the first time in its history. The 1980s may very well have ushered in the last stage of LDP rule. Fiscal Reconstruction and Rincho

In late June and early July 1980, several people were rumored to be the successor to the late Party President Ohira, including Nakasone Yasuhiro, the junior member of the group of five senior faction leaders; Miyazawa Kiichi, the "New Leader" from the Ohira faction; and Komoto Toshio, the heir to the Miki faction. Fukuda objected to Nakasone, and Tanaka rejected Miyazawa. Suzuki Zenko, who inherited the Ohira faction, had been waiting for some time for the chance to make Miyazawa party president. But the anti-Miyazawa elements in the faction united behind Suzuki, who had close ties to Tanaka, and Fukuda supported them. In this way, the trifactional alliance between Tanaka, Ohira (Suzuki), and Fukuda was revived. The LDP assembly of both houses convened on July 15 and unanimously adopted a motion to elect Suzuki. Suzuki, who stated in his acceptance speech that he was "fully aware that he lacked the talent required of a party president," joked to a group of reporters who visited his house that evening, "I must be the first person ever to become party president without spending a cent." The three party posts were filled as follows: Sakurauchi Yoshio (Nakasone faction), secretary general; Abe Shintaro (Fukuda faction), continuing on as PARC chairman; and Nikaido Susumu (Tanaka faction), Executive Council chairman. The cabinet included Nakasone as Administrative Management Agency director, Komoto as Economic Planning Agency director, and Miyazawa as chief cabinet secretary. The Suzuki faction held 6 posts; the Fukuda faction, 4; the Tanaka faction, 4; the Nakasone faction, 2; the Komoto faction, 2; the Nakagawa faction, 1; and independents, 2. Suzuki told a group of reporters on the day of his inauguration: "I did not remain in politics in order to become prime minister and party president. As a result, I did not, as earlier prime ministers did, fight for the presidency by putting forward policies. . . . As party president, the policies of the Liberal Democratic Party are, in essence, my policies." Asked about his policies at a press conference the following day, he said they were "the politics of harmony,... the politics of discussion, politics that seeks fairness,... politics resolving inequality, rather than politics resolving poverty." Even though his basic position was vague, one issue was clear—"fiscal reconstruction," or the elimination of Japan's budget deficit. The Tanaka cabinet had issued a tremendous amount of national construction bonds under the slogan "remodeling the archipelago," and the Fukuda cabinet had issued deficit-financing bonds in order to get through the oil shock. It was difficult to restrain the pressures for pork barrel expansion. By the time the Suzuki cabinet was formed, the balance of outstanding national debt

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had reached ¥82 trillion, the burden of debt service was increasing at an annual rate of around 25 percent, and there was ¥40 trillion in outstanding local government bonds. During the drafting of the fiscal 1981 budget, the government raised taxes by ¥1.4 trillion through a 2 percent hike (¥630 billion) in corporate taxes and increases in a number of other taxes. Prime Minister Suzuki also initiated a program to reduce the deficit on which repayment began in 1985, by about ¥2 trillion annually. He hoped ultimately to reduce the amount of deficit-financing bond issues to zero during fiscal 1984. Furthermore, the budget increase was held down to 9.9 percent over the preceding year. A tight budget was thus established, in which the rate of growth was under 10 percent for the first time in twenty-two years. Meanwhile, in response to a proposal by Administrative Management Agency director Nakasone, the cabinet approved the creation of a Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform (Rinji Gyósei Chósakai, or Rinchó). The commission was established by law in November, and emeritus Keidanren president Dokó Toshio was installed as chairman. Prime Minister Suzuki thought that, since it would be impossible to impose a general sales tax and since a corporate tax hike had already been implemented during fiscal 1981, the only way left was to cut government expenditures. He decided to use Rinchó and its prestige for this purpose. At Rinchó's inauguration in March, the prime minister said, "The most pressing matter at the present time is to restore fiscal administration, with a focus on budgetary reconstruction. Therefore, we must quickly promote reforms that give priority to cutting expenditures, simplifying administrative structures, and reducing the weight of the bureaucracy. While I realize that this is all rather sudden, it would be most helpful if you could submit concrete proposals, with the compilation of the 1982 budget as your target." The zaikai strongly supported cutting expenditures through administrative reform. In February 1981 a commission was formed of representatives of the four general business associations and Kankeiren (Kansai Economic Federation) to rally behind Chairman Dokó. Before its inauguration, Dokó privately submitted a set of "items of agreement," which the prime minister promised to implement. They were the following: 1. Administrative reform can come about only through the firm resolve of the prime minister.... I want you, the prime minister, to exercise strong leadership not only over the various ministries but also inside the LDP. 2. The nation is counting on administrative reform. One of the important missions of the Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform . . . is to achieve—to use the words of the U.S.'s Reagan administration—a "small government" through a thorough rationalization of the bureaucracy and to realize fiscal reconstruction without raising taxes.. . . 3. . . . Administrative reform does not have only the central government as its target. Rather, we need to thoroughly promote the rationalization and sim-

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plification of all Japanese government administration, including problems relating to various local governments.... 4. . . . We must realize policies that harness the vitality of the private sector by striving to eliminate the3Kdeficits [in the kokutetsu (Japan National Railway), kome (rice), and kenko hoken (national health insurance) accounts], consolidate public corporations, and transfer them to private management, and also eliminate the oppression of private enterprise by state enterprise. (Kanbara 1986:20-21; italics in original) Rincho, inaugurated in March, had nine members: the zaikai, 3; labor, 2; and the bureaucracy, local government, media, and academia, 1 each. There were 21 specialists attached to it. Of these, one-third were former bureaucrats. There were 55 advisers (at the time of the commission's dissolution) . Roughly 40 percent of them were f o r m e r bureaucrats who represented the interests of the various ministries. T h e 78 attached researchers had the following backgrounds: Administrative Management Agency, 30; other ministries, 37; the zaikai, 5; the three public corporations, 3; and local governments, 3. All told, almost 100 bureaucrats and former bureaucrats were involved. Rincho and Administrative Reform Without a Tax Increase T h e Ministry of Finance's budget forecast f o r 1980-84 played a decisive role in Rincho's deliberations at the subcommittee level. It predicted that the difference between revenues and expenditures would increase annually to ¥2.77 trillion in fiscal 1982, ¥4.9 trillion in fiscal 1983, and¥6.8 trillion in fiscal 1984. T h e Ministry of Finance released the document as an initial move in a drive to establish a new large-scale indirect tax. Ogura Takekazu, chairman of a commission to study the government tax system, announced the formation of a special subcommittee in March 1981 " t o begin concrete deliberations on the new [large-scale sales] tax." In response, the zaikai insisted on "fiscal reconstruction without a tax increase." In March 1981 Prime Minister Suzuki announced his intent to cut expenditures and abandon the sales tax. Finance Minister Watanabe Michio and Chairman Doko agreed on a basic position favoring expenditure cuts. In this context, Rincho began discussing proposals f o r cutting expenditures in the draft fiscal 1982 budget. T h e Ministry of Finance, fearing it would lose budget review powers to Rincho, preempted the commission's first report by moving up the deadline f o r 1982 budget request ceilings to early J u n e and hurriedly initiated the process of compiling the budget. T h e new tax ultimately failed. Because the Ministry of Finance had favored cutting expenditures f o r some time, however, it attempted to lead Rincho by actively cooperating with it. T h e commission completed its first report in July. Thus, the attempt was made to cut expenditures using Rincho's prestige.

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T h e earlier practice had been that, when budget compilation season arrived each year, the various divisions of the LDP PARC would play the lead role. But once the second oil shock ended rapid economic growth and budget ceilings were introduced, the drafting of the budget lost m u c h of its appeal, and the attention of the zoku shifted gradually to "tax reform." A n officer of the L D P PARC said: The pattern in drafting the budget during the high-growth era was that various groups and ministries would put pressure on the budget bureau of the Ministry of Finance through zoku Diet members in order to capture as many of the fruits of growth as possible. . . . But when the framework of a minus ceiling was imposed, the fun and relish went out of budget making. At most, [the zoku] put in an appeal to the ministries' fiscal officers not to cut too much when submitting their budget request to the Ministry of Finance. By contrast, when it came to tax reform—whether on automobiles or corporations—even the slightest modification [of tax rates] would induce the industry associations and other groups to run over and cause a stir. (Uchida, Kanazashi, and Fukuoka 1988:85)

T h e main points of Rincho's first report were as follows: (1) With the exception of livelihood assistance funds, subsidies in each ministry would be cut by 10 percent. (2) A n administrative reform bill consolidating related legislation would be submitted to the Diet as a temporary special measure for the three-year period of fiscal reconstruction beginning in 1982. (3) In addition to taking appropriate measures to restrain state employees' salaries during fiscal 1981, a personnel reduction plan cutting the number of state employees by 5 percent over five years would be initiated beginning in 1982. T h e bill for legislation relating to administrative reform met the steadfast resistance of the LDP and ministries defending their vested interests. Prime Minister Suzuki had to backtrack. During the last days of the extraordinary session, the government clashed with the opposition parties, which demanded the implementation of a civil service pay hike. Diet deliberation was suspended. T h e law was at last passed in late November, after the government granted major concessions. T h e Administrative Reform Law that was passed would have reduced the projected ¥2.77 trillion deficit by only a tenth. In addition, the prediction of a natural increase in revenue proved to be off the mark because of a slowdown in the economy. T h e r e was widespread fear that there would be a ¥3 trillion shortfall in tax revenues by the end of the year. T h e only remaining option was to raise taxes. T h e zaikai fiercely opposed such a plan, but the prime minister and the Ministry of Finance refused to bend. T h e dominant view in Rincho came to be that, in the existing difficult fiscal situation, it would be virtually impossible in the absence of a tax hike to compile a budget with the existing tax structure. T h e government and the zaikai reached a compromise in December. T h e ¥700 billion drop in the

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natural increase in revenues would be offset by a ¥350 billion increase in tax revenues and by nontax revenues of an equivalent amount. In the budget proposal that was approved by the cabinet at the end of December, expenditures related to public works, small and medium-sized enterprises, and food control were placed under a zero or negative ceiling while increases in expenditures related to social security, education, and the promotion of science were held down to about 2 percent. As "excepted items," expenditures related to defense (7.8 percent) and security grew rapidly. An additional issue of deficit-financing bonds totaling ¥375 billion was approved in order to finance the revenue shortfall. In the wake of an increase in state employees' salaries, a corporate tax hike, and further deficit-financing bond issues, the zaikai developed a deep distrust of the government. Rincho's third report (the Basic Report) was submitted to the government in July 1982. The zaikai continued to demand stringent expenditure cuts. Rincho, however, argued that it would be impossible, given the worsening fiscal circumstances, to reduce deficit-financing bond issues to zero in 1984 as proposed earlier and that, furthermore, it would be impossible to manage the budget unless a flexible stance was adopted on tax increases, thereby effectively rescinding the 1984 deadline. On the question of a tax increase, it came to accept "new fiscal measures" that would not cause "an increase in the tax burden as a whole—for instance, increases in indirect taxes in exchange for a decrease in direct taxes." In July 1982 the cabinet adopted the guideline of a 5 percent reduction in budget requests in compiling the fiscal 1983 budget. It appeared certain that tax revenues for the previous year would be ¥2.9 trillion short even with a supplementary budget and that the deficit for fiscal 1982 would amount to ¥3 trillion-¥5 trillion. As opinion favoring a tax increase and increased national bond issues emerged inside the Ministry of Finance, the zaikai reiterated its demands for more drastic minus ceilings and expenditure cuts. In July, when the government caved in to LDP pressure and raised the producer rice price by 1.1 percent, Chairman Doko protested and hinted that he intended to step down. Disunity emerged in the cabinet over the Personnel Agency's recommendation of a 4.58 percent increase in state employees' salaries. The zaikai proposed a declaration of fiscal emergency and, among other things, a 10 percent reduction in state employees' salaries. Prime Minister Suzuki declared the state of fiscal emergency on September 16 and called on the public to cooperate in the fiscal reconstruction effort. He recommended a thoroughgoing cut in expenditures, an increase in the fees assessed for social services and education, a freeze in public employees' salaries, and an increase in deficit-financing bond issues. On September 24 the cabinet approved a program based on the Rincho third report. It included the establishment of an overall plan to restructure the national railways within five years. It also called for the introduction of similar laws con-

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cerning Japan Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) and the Tobacco and Salt Monopoly Corporation during the next regular Diet session and a freeze on salary increases. (Kanbara 1986) The LDP Presidential Primary The Suzuki cabinet's fiscal policy was bogged down, but both the political world and the press saw Suzuki's reelection as a foregone conclusion. As of October 12, some 244 of the 421 LDP Diet members—the 87 members of the Suzuki faction, the 107 members of the Tanaka faction, and the 50 members of the Nakasone faction—were in the pro-Suzuki mainstream. The antimainstream numbered only 131 (Komoto, 43; Fukuda, 76; Nakagawa, 12). Even if the neutrals and independents split evenly, the total would be 267 for the mainstream and 154 for the anti-mainstream. In order to force a primary election (which was mandatory if four or more candidates ran), the anti-mainstream needed at least 153 members. It also had to be able to divide its forces evenly into three parts in order to get the 50 petitioners required to qualify each candidate. A primary could also be demanded if there were three candidates and one-third (141) or more of all party Diet members approved. A primary was thus not completely out of the question. On October 12 Prime Minister Suzuki abruptly declared that he would not run for reelection. While budget frustrations had something to do with his decision, the primary reason was that he had had enough of the feuding between the pro- and anti-Tanaka factions. At a press conference on October 13, Suzuki said, " I felt that if I were to preach party harmony while personally running for the seat of party president, it would probably not be very convincing. On this occasion, I would like to bring about an administration based on true party unity—to make clear my intention to resign, to transform people's thinking, and to strive for a renewal of the party and its methods under a new party president." His wife, Sachi, later said: My husband was saying, " I f I become greedy and hang on, it will develop into something even worse than the earlier forty-day imbroglio. It could lead to a split of the party." . . . Isn't that why he, who was born in the Meiji Period, committed mass suicide? He preferred to end things himself and to sink together with all his contemporaries who were seeking the leadership. (Shukan Asahi, December 3, 1982; quoted in Uji 1 9 8 3 : 3 6 8 - 6 9 )

To be sure, things did cool down for a moment. But a mere moment is of little consequence. Former prime minister Kishi, who had become LDP supreme adviser in January 1982, had been maneuvering on behalf of a Suzuki retirement and a Komoto candidacy since late August. His aim was to eliminate Tanaka's dominance and to repair Japan-U.S. relations, which had been damaged during Suzuki's visit to the United States in May 1983. Even

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though Kishi advocated avoiding a party primary, his prediction was that if o n e were held, Komoto would come in first. Tanaka sought Suzuki's reelection b u t backed Nakasone after Suzuki a n n o u n c e d h e was going to retire. Tanaka h o p e d to expand the influence of his faction in preparation for his return to the political world. Prime Minister Suzuki felt that a negotiated agreement o n Nakasone would be satisfactory. Should the negotiations fail to bear fruit, h e t h o u g h t that a vote by both houses or an extraordinary party convention would select Nakasone, Abe, a n d Komoto, in that order. He also felt that there was n o chance that a primary would actually be held. But a mediation committee consisting of Prime Minister Suzuki, f o r m e r prime minister Fukuda, and Secretary General Nikaido failed to select a successor. Fukuda grudgingly accepted a proposal to separate the offices, with a Nakasone prime ministership and a Fukuda party presidency. Just when matters appeared to be settled, Nakasone—acting u n d e r the direction of Tanaka, who wanted to deal Fukuda a blow—rejected the settlement. A primary was held on October 23. Against all expectations, Nakasone (with the support of the Tanaka faction) obtained a majority. Of the 974,150 votes cast (a 93.1 percent t u r n o u t rate), Nakasone received 559,673 (57.6 percent of the total), Komoto received 265,078 (27.3 percent), Abe received 80,443 (8*3 percent), and Nakagawa received 66,041 (6.8 percent), with 2,915 invalid votes. Komoto a n d Abe rescinded their candidacies. Nakasone was thereby assured of the party presidency even before the party convention. (Uji 1983:chaps. 7 - 9 ) THE NAKASONE CABINET AND THE "FINAL SETTLEMENT OF POSTWAR POLITICS"

The Nakasone Cabinet and the 1983 General Election T h e Nakasone cabinet that was established o n November 27 contained Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda Masaharu a n d five other members of the "Tanaka brigade," as well as two i n d e p e n d e n t s who were aligned with Tanaka. Kato Mutsuki of the Fukuda faction, an official implicated in the Lockheed scandal, was also a cabinet m e m b e r . Nikaido, who was also implicated, continued in office as secretary general. T h e questions of the press corps focused on the disproportionate representation of the Tanaka faction and individuals tainted by Lockheed. T h e prime minister urged the reporters, "This is a cabinet oriented toward getting the j o b d o n e . I want you to observe their work." (Uji ig83:vii-ix) O n October 12,1983, the Tokyo District Court sentenced Tanaka to four years in prison. In response, Tanaka released a set of defiant "comments." T h e opposition parties introduced a resolution urging his resignation and d e m a n d i n g dissolution. In an Asahi shinbun poll conducted o n October 13

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and 14,45 percent said that Tanaka should "retire from the political world" and 35 percent said that he should "start by resigning from the Diet." In other words, a total of 80 percent favored his withdrawal. T h e Fukuda and Kómoto factions h o p e d for a voluntary resignation. Prime Minister Nakasone visited Tanaka on October 28. A l t h o u g h Nakasone "gave him as much advice as he could as a friend," Tanaka merely promised " p r u d e n c e and self-discipline." Tanaka did not have the slightest intention of resigning. Secretary General Nikaidó, along with Finance Minister Takeshita, House of Representatives administrative reform committee chairman Kanemaru Shin, and other officers of the Tanaka faction, negotiated with the JSP, CGP, and DSP over dissolution. T h e prime minister opposed a dissolution but was overridden. In the absence of the JSP, CGP, and DSP, all legislation— including six laws relating to administrative r e f o r m — w a s passed by the LDP, the New Liberal Club, and several independents. These laws also passed the House of Councilors. By the time of the dissolution on November 28, the Tanaka faction had already completed its preparations for the election and was confident that it would grow even if the LDP did poorly. Takeshita and A b e may have calculated that an era of "New Leaders" would arrive even if the LDP declined. (Asahi nenkan 1983:68-69) T h e December election was a tremendous defeat for the LDP, as it dropped from 286 seats to 250. But Tanaka captured more than 220,000 votes in the Niigata Third District, the highest number in the election. Whereas the Tanaka faction lost only 2 seats, for a total of 63, the other factions' seats fell dramatically. In the opposition parties, the JSP gained 2 seats for a total of 113; the C G P gained 29 seats for a total of 59; and the DSP gained 8 seats for a total of 39. T h e JCP lost 2 seats for a total of 27; the New Liberal Club lost 2 for a total of 8; and the Social Democratic League remained at 3. T h e LDP immediately added 9 independents to its roster, thereby maintaining a bare majority (50.7 percent). Miki and Fukuda pressed Prime Minister Nakasone to resign, but instead, on December 24, the prime minister read a statement to the Executive Council that broke through the anti-mainstream's resistance. T h e statement openly named Tanaka: " T h e biggest reason for the defeat was . . . that there was n o clear resolution of the 'Tanaka problem' and we caused unease among the citizenry regarding our handling of political ethics. I will therefore (1) remove all of Mr. Tanaka's political influence; (2) improve political ethics, thoroughly revitalize the party's character, and establish a clean party style; and (3) engage in fair personnel policies and fair party management in order to establish party unity." PARC chairman Tanaka Rokusuke (Suzuki faction) had already approached the New Liberal Club on December 19. Party representatives Tagawa Seiichi and K o n o Yóhei had originally planned a Kómoto cabinet that would bring together the Kómoto faction and the JSP, DSP, CGP, New Lib-

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eral Club, and Social Democratic League. But when this plan was frustrated on December 24 by Nakasone's statement, they switched to coalition negotiations with the LDP. O n December 26 LDP PARC chairman Tanaka and New Liberal Club secretary general Yamaguchi Toshio reached an accord that included the establishment of "political ethics." A Diet group known as the L D P - N e w Liberal People's Alliance was subsequendy formed with a total of 267 seats, thereby preventing opposition control of the critical budget committee. Tagawa took office as minister of local autonomy and national public safety commissioner. T h e CGP and the DSP, which had been planning a coalition with the New Liberal Club, attacked these moves as sneaky and treacherous. (Tagawa 1984; Tanaka 1985: chap. 2) In spite of the president's statement and the entry of the New Liberal Club, there were still six members of the Tanaka faction in the new cabinet. For secretary general, instead of Miyazawa, whom Suzuki was pushing, Miyazawa's rival, Tanaka Rokusuke, who was close to Tanaka, was chosen. Tanaka's influence was clearly evident. In March 1984 he began to engage openly in political activity. He expanded his faction by incorporating six independent Diet members. He repeatedly expressed his support for Nakasone's reelection as party president and discouraged efforts among midcareer and younger members in his faction to arrange candidacies for Vice President Nikaido and Minister of Finance Takeshita. Nakasone's reelection in the November party presidential election was considered certain. The strength of the factions that summer was Tanaka faction, 118, and Nakasone faction, 55, for a total of 173 in both houses. The Suzuki faction had 79; the Fukuda faction, 67; the Komoto faction, 35; the Ishihara Shintaro faction, 6; for a total of 187. Among the remaining 32 independents, there were a large number of surreptitious Tanaka supporters. With the inclusion of the 10 members of the House of Councilors with ties to Nakasone, the combined houses ended up with a majority of Nakasone supporters. The Failure of the Anti-Nakasone Conspiracy Former prime minister Suzuki was disgusted by Nakasone's reliance on Tanaka and upset that Tanaka Rokusuke had been drafted to become secretary general. In September Suzuki began maneuvering to arrange for Vice President Nikaido to succeed Nakasone at the end of the presidential term. Suzuki had no intention of ostracizing Tanaka, with whom he had longstanding close ties. He thought that Tanaka would not object if Nikaido, Tanaka's top lieutenant, became party president and prime minister. Former prime minister Fukuda supported the plan. It was not merely that Nakasone was Fukuda's political rival in the Gunma Third District. Fukuda was also perturbed that Nakasone had maintained his government by relying on Fukuda's arch-enemy, Tanaka. If Fukuda backed Nikaido, he could ar-

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range to have Nakasone dumped and, at the same time, split the Tanaka faction. Both former prime minister Miki and Komoto reacted strongly against Tanaka's dominance and criticized Nakasone's failure to cut his ties with Tanaka. If Nikaido could mobilize several members of the Tanaka faction along with the Suzuki, Fukuda, and Komoto factions, victory was not out of the question. Nikaido hesitated, knowing that Tanaka would not readily acquiesce. But encouraged by Suzuki, Fukuda, and others and helped by acting faction chief Esaki Masumi, he decided to run. Needless to say, the New Leaders did not support this conspiracy of elder politicians. From the sidelines, CGP chairman Takeiri, CGP secretary general Yano, and DSP chairman Sasaki maintained contact with Suzuki and Nikaido and encouraged the Nikaido movement. At the DSP convention in April, Sasaki appealed for consideration of a coalition with the LDP and expressed his opposition to a JSP-CGP-DSP alliance: "Unless the JSP unambiguously changes from a revolutionary party, it will be impossible to sit at the same table." Chairman Takeiri said at the April CGP convention that although he "would avoid haste" in deciding on a coalition with the LDP, in light of the weakening centripetal force of the JSP-CGP-DSP coalition line, "the discussion of coalition would also be set aside." The plan was for both the CGP and the DSP to support Nikaido as part of a coalition government in a runoff between Nakasone and Nikaido for the prime ministership. Later, at an expanded meeting of the party central committee, Takeiri explained that his purpose was to bring down the Nakasone cabinet, overthrow Tanaka's domination, and crack the LDP. He added that, "although this time [our role] was limited to simply waving a handkerchief from the bleachers and cheering them on, when the next opportunity comes around we'll take off our coats, if necessary, and jump into the fray." Sasaki expressed similar intentions. Both felt that, even if the LDP lost its majority, it would probably continue to be the largest party. As long as the conditions were not ripe for establishing a government of the opposition parties alone, there was no way to bring about a political transformation outside of coalition with the LDP. (Asahi nenkan 1985:75; Sasaki Ryosaku, "Ichinichi shogai," nos. 2-4, in Asahi shinbun, September 16-20, 1988) The denouement arrived all too quickly. When Suzuki mentioned the plan to back Nikaido to Tanaka on October 26, Tanaka would have none of it. He was adamandy opposed to running a Tanaka faction candidate. Nikaido visited Mejiro on October 27 and argued fiercely with Tanaka. A final mediation conference composed of representatives of the various factions and the top five party officers foundered over Fukuda, Suzuki, Komoto, and Ezaki's recommendation of Nikaido, but the top five officers ultimately prevailed by arguing that the rate of support for the Nakasone cabinet in public opinion polls was high. Nakasone was reelected party president at the October party convention. The membership of the new cabinet was as

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follows: 6 members of the Tanaka faction; 4 members each from the Suzuki, Fukuda, and Nakasone factions; 2 members from the Kómoto faction; 3 members from the House of Councilors; and 1 member from the New Liberal Club (NLC secretary general Yamaguchi). In accord with Tanaka's wishes, Nikaidó continued as party vice president in order to prevent a split of the Tanaka faction. At Tanaka's request, Kanemaru Shin (Tanaka faction), who had crushed the Nikaidó candidacy movement, was made secretary general. This went against Tanaka's original intention to back Tanaka faction administrative director Ozawa Tatsuo. Subsequently, a movement to back Takeshita appeared inside the Tanaka faction. In mid-December Minister of Finance Takeshita (the Tanaka faction's New Leader), Secretary General Kanemaru (who had actively maneuvered to block Nikaidó), and others discussed the possibility of organizing a study group. Twenty-five longtime Tanaka loyalists formed the Sóseikai, which was inaugurated in a secret ceremony at the Katsura restaurant in Tsukiji on January 23. On January 27 Takeshita got Tanaka's acknowledgment of the group; he later got Nikaidó's acknowledgment as well. By the evening ofJanuary 28, more than 70 faction members had applied for membership. But resentment was growing inside the faction. Tanaka called Nikaidó on the morning ofJanuary 31 and directed him to stop Tanaka faction Diet members from joining the Sóseikai. At the Tanaka faction general meeting that afternoon, Nikaidó stressed, "You must not forget that the Thursday Club [the Tanaka faction] is an association centered on former prime minister Tanaka." Nevertheless, prospective Sóseikai participants numbered 84 out of Tanaka's 119 faction members. If they were allowed to participate in the group's first meeting on February 7, there would be a de facto change in the leadership of the Tanaka faction. A compromise was arranged between Ozawa, on behalf of Tanaka, and Takeshita: the meeting site would be shifted from a hotel to Tanaka's faction headquarters, and the number of participants would be reduced to 30 or 40. Forty people showed up for the initial meeting. On February 13 Takeshita called on Tanaka, initiating the conversation with "I'm afraid I've caused you a lot of trouble." Tanaka replied, "No, it's okay. Let's proceed as concentric circles." But an unpleasant aftertaste remained. In the early evening of February 27, Tanaka was felled by a stroke. Rumors about his condition flew wildly. The political world assumed that he would not be able to make a comeback. Tanaka's office in the Itopia building was closed in June. The LDP was at last liberated from Tanaka's spell. (Masukomi Kenkyükai 1985)

Mass Media Politics: A New Political Resource

Prime Minister Nakasone hoped to create the "workaholic cabinet" that would bring about the "three reforms" of administration, finances, and

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education. In accord with the recommendations of the Rincho report, the privatization of the three major public corporations got under way. Stringent budgets were drafted in which allocations decreased annually. A number of private and public commissions and councils were established for specific issues. Policies were put forward and implemented in accord with reports of various kinds. The Provisional Commission on Education was established in 1984 on the basis of a recommendation by a council on culture and education. A peace issue study group recommended a reconsideration of limiting defense expenditures to 1 percent of the GNP. In 1984 a number of councils were inaugurated—on an advanced information society, on Prime Minister Nakasone's economic policies, on the issue of cabinet pilgrimages to Yasukuni Shrine. This method of establishing public and private advisory bodies outside the party, filling them with people one liked, appealing to public opinion with their reports, and thereby guiding policy, was suited to Nakasone's personal preference for top-down prime ministerial leadership. It also suggested that, as the fourth-ranking facdon, the Nakasone faction lacked troop strength and consequently was unable to adopt the traditional LDP approach of bureaucratic policy formulation and intraparty maneuvering. The Nakasone approach met a strong reaction from inside the party and from the opposition parties. For intraparty maneuvering it had to rely on the Tanaka faction, which supported Nakasone. But this reliance caused resentment among party elders and hostility in the opposition. Nakasone was chronically threatened inside and outside the party, first, by the unpopularity of his commission formula and, second, by the reaction against Tanaka's dominance. Nevertheless, he was able to maintain his cabinet because the New Leaders, who did not share the deep-seated grudges of the elder politicians, cooperated in the hope of entering a post-Nakasone cabinet. In addition, the personal popularity of the prime minister was reflected in a high rate of support for his cabinet. Prime Minister Nakasone was particularly adept at appealing to public opinion through the mass media. His biggest resource was foreign policy. In January 1983, immediately after forming his cabinet, he flew to South Korea to repair troubled Japanese-Korean relations. He then visited the United States, where he received high praise for the constructive stance that he exhibited during talks with U.S. president Ronald Reagan. Asserting that "Japan and the United States are a community of destiny stretching across the Pacific," he created the unfathomable "Ron-Yasu" relationship. For Nakasone, summit meetings and talks with heads of state were important performance opportunities. (Of course, Japanese increases in defense spending and opening of markets did not bring the expected results and disappointed the United States, while Nakasone's statements and actions fostered suspicions in Asian countries of a revival of

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militarism.) At home, Nakasone's hawkish statements, his pilgrimages to Yasukuni Shrine, and his encouragement of debate on the Constitution were unpopular. Noticing that support for his cabinet was falling, he began in spring 1984 to promote the "three reforms" as well as "flowers and greenery," "measures against cancer," "measures against juvenile delinquency," and other components of a social welfare program. His "high and stable" cabinet support remained around 40 percent. Nakasone's biggest weapon was the mass media. Just as Prime Minister Miki had used the cheers of the press and opposition parties to counter a "dump Miki" movement within the LDP, Prime Minister Nakasone used a high rate of support in public opinion polls to survive a "dump Nakasone" movement within the LDP. In the opposition parties, moves toward coalition with the LDP were proceeding apace. The DSP party convention of April 1985 stated clearly that it "would not rule out a coalition with the LDP." The action program of the December CGP convention stated that "in order to facilitate a quick response [on the issue of coalition], a body subordinate to the convention might make a decision." Even in the JSP, which was being left behind by the CGP and DSP, moves to metamorphose from a "party of resistance" to a "government party" were begun under the leadership of Chairman Ishibashi Masashi and the banner of the "New JSP" (which was simply the Eda structural reform line). The JSP had little choice but to shift to a pragmatic line. On the one hand, Sohyo was weakening as the Zendentsu and JNR unions realigned following the privatization of N T T and JNR. On the other hand, the All Japan Conference of Private-Sector Labor Unions (Zenmin Rokyo, formed in 1982) was expanding its influence. The JSP congress of January 1985 agreed to transform the party's fundamental doctrine to that of a Western-style social democratic party. A new platform stated that the party was "open to citizens of all kinds" and would not rule out a coalition with a conservative party if there was agreement on policy. The unanimously adopted congress resolution added, "While we will aim for a JSP government that will replace the LDP, we will at the same time do our utmost to establish a coalition government revolving around our party. No casual conservative-progressive coalition will be undertaken." (Asahi nenkan 1986:74) In the aftermath of the LDP-New Liberal Club coalition of spring 1983, the DSP, CGP, and JSP began moving, one by one, away from an opposition coalition and toward a coalition with the LDP. Only the JCP seemed determined to criticize the "rightward shift of the opposition" and stand firm as the "sole party of opposition." Thus, the LDP came to have a reserve army of opposition parties clamoring outside its door. But as long as the LDP maintained a majority through its coalition with the New Liberal Club, there would be no opportunity for them to jump in.

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The ig86 Double Election and the Gray Zone Prime Minister Nakasone was intent on dissolving the House of Representatives and holding a simultaneous election. Not only did he want a vindication for the defeat that he suffered in the previous election; he also hoped to circumvent the party ban on third presidential terms by a victory of the kind achieved by the Ohira cabinet in the 1980 double election. T h e Nakasone cabinet's rate of support continued to rise, and a mjyor victory was likely. T h e problem was an election law amendment to correct the apportionment of House of Representatives electoral districts that had been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Although a general election could be held even if the amendment did not pass, if the amendment passed it would provide a perfect justification for dissolution. T h e Fukuda, Suzuki, and Komoto factions stubbornly opposed the double election in order to block a third term. T h e opposition parties were also opposed, although the JSP was favorably disposed. O n May 9 the prime minister indicated that he had no intention of calling for either an extension of the session or an extraordinary session, which would set the stage for a double election. He "played dead," acting as if he had given up on the idea. T h e amendment of the election law (adding eight districts and eliminating seven) passed both houses on the heels of an imbroglio between the ruling party and the opposition. T h e session concluded on May 22. It was widely interpreted that the amendment had passed on the condition that a double election would not be held. But Secretary General Kanemaru immediately met individually with former prime ministers Kishi, Miki, Fukuda, and Suzuki to lay the groundwork for the election. T h e five party officers approved the double election on May 26. PARC chairman Miyazawa reluctantly went along. The New Leaders agreed, figuring that a general election was an expedient way to bring about a generational change in the leadership of the factions. Diet members and runners-up in the previous election were already champing at the bit to prepare for the general election. The extraordinary Diet that began on June 2 was dissolved without even opening a plenary meeting, thanks to blockage by the opposition parties. T h e election results far exceeded even the LDP's prognosis. T h e LDP delegation in the House of Representatives increased from 250 to 300. T h e JSP declined from 112 to 85, and the DSP from 38 to 26. T h e CGP lost 2 seats for a total of 56. T h e JCP remained at 26 seats. T h e New Liberal Club lost 2 seats for a total of 6, while the SDL gained 1 for a total of 4. In the House of Councilors, the LDP increased its seats from 131 to 140, while the JSP remained at 41. O n e of the reasons for the LDP's overwhelming victory was that, as a result of the double election, the vote-gathering campaigns of both houses'

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Diet members occurred simultaneously. They were added to the preliminary campaign efforts of candidates in the unified local elections scheduled for the following spring. On the one hand, personal kóenkai, agricultural cooperatives, and small business associations were mobilized to the fullest; on the other hand, the New Leaders, aiming for the post-Nakasone prime ministership, put forward freshman candidates (26 with ties to Abe, 20 with ties to Takeshita, and 11 with ties to Miyazawa). Election campaigns reached a fever pitch as the New Leaders traveled across the country on behalf of their faction's candidates. The rate of voter turnout—at 71.4 percent— exceeded that of the previous election by 3.5 percent. The LDP's relative share of the vote rose 3.6 percent to 49.5 percent. A 3.6 percent rise amounts to approximately 2.2 million votes. Mobilizing that many votes was quite a feat. A mere 1 percent change in the percentage of votes received could cause an increase or decrease of 15 seats. Prime Minister Nakasone explained the victory as follows: Whether the LDP wins or loses . . . is decided by whether new customers can be gained in new markets. For about six-tenths of the voters, markets and customers have already been decided. . . . The LDP is strong in the primary industries and among retail store and factory operators. The J S P is strong among workers. The CGP is strong with the Soka Gakkai. The DSP is strong in labor unions affiliated with Dómei. These markets and customers are more or less decided.... But the citizens of big cities will not get out and vote if the weather is bad. Or else their voting behavior will change from election to election. Four-tenths of the vote consists of these big city citizens, the new youth, and women. These are the floaters.... It is by grabbing a portion of these wives of salarymen or working wives or youths—this huge "gray zone" . . .—that the LDP will get 250 seats or 270 seats and was able, this time, to get 304. (Uchida, Kanazashi, and Fukuoka 1988:48)

It may be that, as the prime minister appealed to the gray zone, he realized that the thinking of its occupants differed from his own, which was a product of the 1920s and 1930s. Nakasone possessed a hawkish streak and was responsive to pressure from hawks, but this tendency coexisted with dovishness in his words and actions. But because the maintenance of his cabinet depended on the support of the people of the gray zone, he had to appeal to their preferences. On October 28 he spoke before a group of freshman LDP Representatives: " I have argued that the current constitution was forced on us by the United States. . . . But the old thinking of the internar period will no longer do. We must address the people with something that the postwar generation, which represents the vast majority of the population, can understand and find convincing." (Maki 1988:196-97) T h e New Leaders met on July 17 to discuss the issue of the prime minister's term of office. If the party had won only 280 seats, they could have argued that the victory was not the work of Nakasone alone, but the result

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of their ferocious competition for the post-Nakasone prime ministership. But 300 seats was simply too big a win. They agreed that, for the time being, they would strive to resolve the most pressing outstanding policy items. If the party president's term ran out while these items were still pending, they would call for an extension of the president's term. A one-year extension was formally adopted at a meeting of both houses' Diet members on September 11. (Asahi shinbun, evening ed., September 26, 1986) The New Liberal Club, abandoning its prospects for a second conservative party, dissolved in August and rejoined the LDP. The JSP accepted Chairman Ishibashi's resignation and selected Doi Takako as his successor in September. Doi was the party's first female chair. CGP chairman Takeiri revealed his intention to resign in November, and Secretary General Yano was selected to be his successor. The chairmanship of the DSP had been transferred from Sasaki to Tsukamoto Saburo the previous April. THE UPROAR OVER THE SALES TAX Introducing the Sales Tax The massive election victory put Prime Minister Nakasone in an unchallengeable position within the LDP. The elder politicians who were lying in wait for an opportunity to dump him were completely demoralized. The chairmanship of the Fukuda faction's Seiwakai was transferred to Abe on July 14, and that of the Suzuki faction's Kochikai to Miyazawa on September 4. The meek New Leaders did not defy Nakasone, who boasted of "having survived many a bloody struggle for power." Differences in age and personality were involved, but so was factional distribution. As a result of the double election, the Tanaka faction had grown to 140 members out of a total of 447. As of late 1987 the Miyazawa faction had 89; the Abe faction, 85; the Nakasone faction, 81; the Komoto faction, 33; and there were 19 independents. (Asahi nenkan 1987: no) If the Tanaka faction joined with either the Miyazawa or the Abe faction, it would have a majority—224—in an assembly of both houses. If it joined with Nakasone, it would only be short by 3. On the other hand, a three-faction alliance would be required to counter Tanaka's. The Komoto faction would not be a decisive factor in these circumstances. Although the dominance of the Tanaka faction had become all the more secure, the situation inside the faction was delicate. Takeshita dissolved the Soseikai in April and fought the general election under the direction of Thursday Club chairman Nikaido. While Takeshita was considered to have most of the faction under his wing, he required more time to consolidate it. The other factions watched him carefully. Thus, beneath Nakasone's unchallenged position was a precarious balance of power as faction leaders faced challenges from the younger generation.

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The issue of the sales tax undermined this factional balance. The Ministry of Finance used the opportunity of the LDP victory to introduce its longheld plan for a broad indirect tax. Prime Minister Nakasone, who had said earlier that he would not support such a tax, resolved to undertake a complete reform of the tax system. Nakasone's third cabinet was established on July 22. Minister of Finance Miyazawa and Secretary General Takeshita shifted to a position favoring tax reform. Fearful of being left behind, Executive Council chairman Abe concurred. All three felt that it would be best if their senior colleague Nakasone took the responsibility for an issue as sensitive as this one. On September 22 the prime minister affirmed his resolve in a speech opening the extraordinary Diet session. On October 18 Nakasone and the chairman of the LDP committee to study the tax system, Yamanaka Sadanori, averred that revenues from any new taxes would be balanced by equivalent cuts in existing taxes; they vowed to observe the party's promises in the election campaign. Nakasone was fixated on a manufacturers' sales tax, an indirect tax that was not broad. But Keidanren and Kankeiren were absolutely opposed and initiated an intense lobbying campaign. The Ministry of Finance felt that this tax would not cover the ¥4 trillion reduction in other taxes. It urged a "Japanese-style value-added tax" (or sales tax). On October 28 the government tax commission said that "in theory the Japanese-style value-added tax is most desirable." The prime minister resisted. The Ministry of Finance noted that the sales tax did not violate any campaign promises: "If businesses with annual sales of less than ¥100 million aire exempted, then 87 percent of all businesses will be removed from the tax. . . . The greater portion [nine-tenths] of the [1.48 million] retailers will not be taxpayers. . . . [With exemptions] only about four-tenths of a household budget's consumer expenditures will be taxed." Subtle changes began to appear in the prime minister's responses to Diet interpellations. He began to argue that, if limitations were applied, the measure would not necessarily constitute a broad indirect tax and would therefore not be a violation of campaign promises. The debate in the LDP PARC began on October 30. The members supporting the tax (primarily the MOF zoku) overwhelmed their opponents (the urban policy zoku and small and medium-sized enterprise zoku). On December 5 a "Basic Policy on Tax Reform" was approved. Its key items were the introduction of a sales tax and the elimination of the maruyu system (the system of tax exemptions for small savings accounts) beginning in January 1988 together with a reduction in income, resident, and corporate taxes. The debate then focused on such issues as the point at which tax exemptions would begin and the types of transactions that would be exempted. On December 23, after a battle involving alliances of industries, zoku Diet members, and ministries, the outline for the fiscal 1987 tax amend-

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ment was approved. It called for a 5 percent sales tax, 43 exempted items (later expanded to 52), and base year tax revenues of ¥5.8 trillion. The Uproar Against the Saks Tax

The party thus came out in favor of a sales tax. But distributors, retailers, and the self-employed were strongly opposed. The Japan Chamber of Commerce, whose membership included many members of the Department Store Association, the Retailers' Association, and the Chain Store Association, protested Keidanren's support of the tax and demanded that the government withdraw the proposal entirely. Beginning in late November, in the midst of their year-end sales campaigns, department stores and supermarkets everywhere began to display banners criticizing the tax and broadcast similar messages over their public address systems. Smaller retailers put up posters. On January 22 associations representing 10,000 firms sent questionnaires to 448 LDP Diet members asking their opinion on the sales tax. Party headquarters instructed them to "respond to the questionnaire in accord with the party decision." Of the 17 Diet members who did respond, 6 were opposed and 5 were in favor. The rest refused to respond. On January 26 a retailers' committee met with representatives of the JSP, CGP, DSP, and SDL to boost the morale of the opposition. An angry PARC chairman Abe met with a number of business representatives on January 27. He warned, "You had better not mess with the LDP. Step on the tail of the tiger, and you will come to regret it." People in the business world began to bolt from the party, and political contributions began to dry up. Local retailers' federations were among the most valuable sources of votes for LDP Diet members from urban districts. They were comparable to the agricultural cooperatives in rural districts. If shifts in the floating vote are a source of discomfort, a change among the small and medium-sized enterprise organizations is a certain source of terror. The LDP's Tokyo prefectural federation had already taken the lead over the rest of the country by adopting a resolution opposing the tax on October 28 of the previous year. In the Diet 150 members adopted a resolution opposing the sales tax on November 21; on December 3 they asked party headquarters to be prudent. In early February opposition surfaced within the party in twelve prefectures, and thirty-nine prefectural assemblies moved to oppose the sales tax. The government calculated the revenue portion of the fiscal 1988 budget on the basis of the LDP's policy. But in his policy speech to the reopened Diet on January 26, the prime minister made no mention of the sales tax. All of the opposition parties pounced on this omission, announcing that they "would not participate in deliberations until the bill for tax reform . . . is submitted and the government and ministry ordinances stipulating the

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42g

sales tax and other detailed items are made public." The LDP opened the House of Representatives budget committee unilaterally on February 4, and Minister of Finance Miyazawa explained the government's reasoning. The opposition parties insisted that the LDP make amends for opening the committee unilaterally and demanded that the explanation of the submission of the bill be redone. The summary interpellations of the budget committee finally began on March 3, one month after they were scheduled. The prime minister reaffirmed his position on February 10, and other party leaders also maintained their support. Consideration of a forced vote began. But opposition to the sales tax exploded inside the party, and proponents of a revision gained increasing influence. At this point, a massive loss in the March 8 regional district House of Councilors by-election in Iwate was reported. The J S P candidate, who opposed the sales tax, captured 421,000 votes in what was considered a solidly conservative district. He soundly defeated the LDP candidate, who received only 224,000 votes. (In the House of Councilors proportional representation vote in the double election, the LDP had received approximately 310,000 votes versus the JSP's roughly 224,000.) Startled party officials began to call for an amendment of the bill. The LDP's local organization also received a severe shock. The LDP caucus in the Iwate prefectural assembly had supported the sales tax during the by-election. But now it reversed itself and passed a resolution opposing the tax. The governor also announced his opposition. Party officials responded by turning away all petitions, but the local-level revolt still continued to spread. The governor of Tokyo joined the opposition. According to a Kyodo Wire Service survey, by March 20, 16 of the 47 prefectural assemblies had adopted positions opposing the tax (before the Iwate by-election only Kyoto, Hyogo, and Fukuoka had done so) and 20 had counseled caution. In Asahi shinbun polls, approval of the cabinet declined from 39 percent in the previous December to 24 percent in March, while disapproval rose from 33 percent to 56 percent. Support for the LDP decreased from 55 percent to 48 percent, and support for the J S P increased from 19 percent to 24 percent during the same period. In the April unified local elections, the LDP lost what were considered strategic governorships in Hokkaido and Fukuoka. The loss in Fukuoka, which pitted an LDP-CGP-DSP alliance against a JSP-JCP alliance, crushed its hopes of using such an alliance to manage the Diet. In the prefectural assembly elections in late April, the LDP had the smallest number of winners since its formation. Withdrawal of the Bill Nevertheless, the LDP affirmed a policy on the night of April 13 that called for passing the budget without amendment, so that it could be passed be-

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fore Nakasone left for the United States on April 29. It refused to retract the sales tax bill. The bills were passed by the House of Representatives budget committee by a unilateral forced vote on April 16. All Diet deliberations ground to a halt. The opposition parties demanded the withdrawal of the sales tax in exchange for passage of the budget. When the House of Representatives was reopened by order of the speaker of the house, the opposition parties countered with a "cow walk," where each member kept "a distance of seven meters [from the person in front] and [proceeded at a speed of] one meter per minute." The revolt lasted for two nights. When a recess was called at 3:00 P.M. on April 23, only motions of no confidence against House of Representatives budget committee chairman Sunada Shigetami and Minister of Finance Miyazawa had been voted on (neither passed). At 9:20 P.M. a mediation proposal was at last formally submitted to Speaker of the House of Representatives Hara Kenzaburo. It called for a withdrawal of the sales tax bill and a simultaneous recognition of the need for tax reform. The proposal suggested that the sales tax be setded by discussions among the various parties. The subsequent question-and-answer session went as follows: Question: What will happen if there is no agreement among the parties? Answer: I will of course place the greatest effort on obtaining an agreement, but if there is still disharmony, it will be a matter of either shelving the bill or carrying it over into the next session. In this instance, it will be shelved. Question: Generally speaking, doesn't shelving mean a rejection of a bill? Answer: That is right. It a means rejection of the bill for this Diet session. However, you must definitely engage in the establishment of the deliberative body [stipulated in the proposal for the purpose of studying tax reform]. Opposition parties: We understand. (Uchida, Kanazashi, and Fukuoka

1988:208)

High-ranking LDP officials had stepped on "the tail of the tiger." One corner of the lobbying/pork barrel system collapsed. The party's leadership was plunged into confusion. As the attacks of the opposition parties continued, the sales tax was abandoned. Postwar politics had imposed a final settlement on the Nakasone cabinet. That is, postwar politics had brought about rapid economic growth accompanied by pork barrel politics and mass society. The "safe votes" had been part of the LDP electoral base as long as their interests were met. If their interests were threatened, they would desert the LDP—although usually temporarily. The mass media might mobilize the customers of the "gray zone," but it was difficult to capture them. They could crumble like a mountain of sand. Even the prime minister was forced to wail, "The masses, like sand, do not solidify." (Asahi shinbun, July 23,1987)

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43'

The Three New Leaders The stage shifted dramatically. It came to be dominated by the New Leaders' competition to succeed Nakasone. The situation grew chaotic at a general meeting of the Tanaka faction on May 14 when Chairman Nikaido, ignoring his advanced age, suddenly announced that he intended to run for party president. Given the distribution of influence in the factions, to gain a majority or near majority the Tanaka faction had to join forces with either the Miyazawa, Abe, or Nakasone faction (in which case Takeshita would win) or else the Miyazawa, Abe, and Nakasone factions would ally against the Tanaka faction (in which case either Miyazawa or Abe would win). But if Nikaido ran and the Tanaka faction split, then other combinations would be possible. Opportunities for Nakasone to exert his influence would increase. The Komoto faction might hold the deciding vote, and there might even be a role for the party elders. Furthermore, if four of them ran, the primary election that had earlier been out of the question would be unavoidable. On June 3 the Takeshita group parted company with Nikaido's supporters. It formed the Keiseikai, with a membership of 113, on July 4. The Takeshita faction would not have a majority whether it joined forces with Miyazawa, Abe, or Nakasone. Abe, Takeshita, and Miyazawa therefore found themselves in a three-cornered deadlock. The behind-the-scenes maneuvering revolved around an Abe-Miyazawa-Komoto coalition and an AbeMiyazawa-Nakasone coalition. In either case, the coalition was predicated on one of the New Leaders' withdrawing from the race. But no one was willing to drop out. The deadlock continued. Nikaido formally withdrew his candidacy. In the end, only seventeen people had stuck with him. His greatest achievement was dragging Tanaka out of the political world along with him. At a joint press conference on the day they declared their candidacies, the three New Leaders agreed to continue discussions among themselves. What would happen if the discussions failed to bring about a resolution? Abe replied that they should "listen to the opinion of those who are senior"; Takeshita said that "voting is the starting point"; and Miyazawa suggested that "Nakasone should decide." No resolution was reached even after a fifth set of talks. On the evening of July 19, they decided to ask Nakasone for his opinion. The prime minister named Takeshita as his successor on July 20; he suggested that Miyazawa become vice prime minister and Abe, secretary general. All three had thought they had a chance. None of them had any reason to back down. And the prime minister himself had acted in a way that suggested that each of them did indeed have a good chance. Apparently, each of the three believed until the last minute that

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he would be the one whom the prime minister nominated. (Asahi nenkan 1988:67-70) Meanwhile, far from the negotiations of the New Leaders, Japan's largest labor union was being formed—the All Japan Federation of Private-Sector Labor Unions (Zenmin Róren, or Rengó), with member organizations representing 5.39 million workers (45.2 percent of all organized workers). Procommunist elements were effectively excluded. Zenmin Rókyó proudly stood as "a member of the West" in both foreign and domestic politics. If this organization was incorporated into the LDP's lobbying network, the role of the opposition parties would decline even further. Sasaki says, "If the opposition parties are divided, then there is also the danger that—if they don't watch out—Rengó will go over the heads of the JSP and DSP and confront the LDP directly with its policy and institutional demands. If that happens, the raison d'être of the opposition parties will disappear." (Sasaki Ryósaki, "Ichinichi shógai," no. 15, Asahi shinbun, October 5, 1988) Rengó announced, "We will cooperate in forming a new political force that is capable of governing and realize a healthy parliamentary democracy that will make a change of government possible.... [Rengó] embodies the possibility of a new catalytic role for the purpose of transforming the flow of politics." The formation of Rengó did not mean that the rivalry between Sóhyó and Dômei had dissipated. Nevertheless, if electoral cooperation was initiated with Rengó as the axis, the walls that divided the opposition parties could become less formidable. The question would then be, could they obtain the support of the white-collar class and the nonpartisan voters? ( Asahi nenkan 1988:75-76)

T H E C O L L A P S E OF LDP R U L E

The Two Sides of the Coin The Nakasone cabinet rested on two creaking footholds. One was LDP factional infighting, which was rooted in the pork barrel distribution structure formed during the 1960s. Tanaka had done the most to promote this system. Using it as a political resource, he had continuously come out ahead in the factional infighting and thereby maintained his dominance even after his fall. In the process, he had enlarged the central pillar of LDP rule, as well as the scope of factional infighting. The second foothold was the mass media and public opinion, which together became an important new political resource from the 1970s. Using the mass media as Miki did when he was prime minister, Prime Minister Nakasone had increased his popularity among floating voters so that he was able to survive the factional infighting. Thus, Nakasone depended on Tanaka's dominance inside the party and on his own personal popularity outside.

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433

As Nakasone himself boasted, the huge LDP victory in the 1986 double election was the result of successfully mobilizing the organized vote of interest groups and the floating vote. But the great LDP victory did not herald a long-term government as he had expected. It was, rather, simply a swing of the pendulum. Every coin has two sides, and the causes of the big LDP victory of July 1986 were also the causes of the party's downfall. The resignation of the Nakasone cabinet in October 1988 was made inevitable by the furious reaction of interest groups to the proposed sales tax and by the mass exodus of the floating vote in response to Nakasone's violation of his campaign promise. Nakasone planned to close the books on postwar politics, but in the end postwar politics closed the books on him. But there were still other books to be closed. Takeshita Noboru, who was chosen by Nakasone to become prime minister, met the expectations of Nakasone, the Ministry of Finance, and the zaikai in December 1988 by passing a touched-up version of the sales tax labeled the "consumption tax." Thanks to careful preparation beforehand, including a tightening up of discipline inside the LDP, special consideration given to trade associations, and a reduction in employee taxes, the disorder that had accompanied the sales tax did not occur. The CGP and the DSP cooperated during the deliberations, and it appeared that an LDPCGP-DSP partnership had taken root. But suddenly, the alchemy that is normally practiced in the dark recesses of the political world appeared in full view of the public. A seemingly limitless contamination had spread throughout the political, bureaucratic, and business worlds with the "easy money" spewed out by the Recruit Corporation, a "new information-industry" firm that was exploiting administrative reform and private-sector revitalization policies. It is quite likely that this contamination was built into the LDPCGP-DSP partnership. Dissatisfaction with the consumption tax and the liberalization of agricultural imports coincided with the Recruit scandal and created a vehement backlash against the LDP. The party (and other observers) was astounded by the JSP candidate's large margin of victory in the January 1989 Fukuoka Prefecture House of Councilors by-election. Then the LDP candidate in the Miyagi Prefecture gubernatorial race suddenly withdrew. In the Chiba Prefecture gubernatorial election in April, the J C P candidate ran an extremely close race against the LDP candidate. In March the former president of NTT, the showcase of privatization policy, was arrested along with the former labor vice minister, the former education vice minister, and others on charges of accepting bribes. An opinion poll in late April showed that the LDP's support had decreased to 27 percent, and the JSP's support had increased to 26 percent. (Asahi shinbun, May 8,1989) The LDP was unable to devise a strategy to break out of the crisis. The New Leaders were unable to make a move because of their collective ex-

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posure to the contamination. At the time of Tanaka's disgrace, Miki had stepped in, but this time there was no one to choose from. Both the old Miki faction (the Komoto faction) and the remnants of the NLC were slow to move. Younger Diet members, who had come of age inside the faction system, trembled at the thought of not being able to win reelection. They tried to maneuver but withdrew in the face of pressure by the factions. Unable to decide what to do, the LDP, with its 300 seats, stood stranded in the face of record low rates of cabinet support. It was an odd sight. Three hundred thousand demonstrators had not surrounded the Diet, as they had during the security treaty crisis, nor had a crowd of a million people amassed in Tokyo, as they had in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. Instead, rates of cabinet support in newspaper public opinion polls were reported as if they were the words of the Delphic oracle. The LDP turned ashen as byelections and local elections progressed in accord with the prophecies. This was parliamentary politics in the age of mass society and the mass media. Prime Minister Takeshita attempted to pass the budget bill using the resignation of the entire cabinet as collateral. But the JSP, CGP, and DSP refused to cooperate. The budget was ultimately passed by a unilateral LDP forced vote combined with automatic passage in the House of Councilors. The normal procedure under the circumstances would have been to dissolve the Diet, but a general election that promised a landslide defeat was hardly desirable. A "clean" candidate, Ito Masayoshi, turned up, but his opinion on party reform was simply too much for the party to swallow. Uno Sosuke of the Nakasone faction was therefore selected as successor, and his designation was pushed through an assembly of the LDP Diet members of both houses. But it turned out that the new prime minister carried the huge liability of a sex scandal. In the Tokyo prefectural assembly election in early July, the LDP once again tasted defeat by an unprecedented margin. Its seats decreased from 63 to 43. The JSP's increased 3-fold to 36, if one includes its "recommended" candidates. The highly unfavorable public opinion toward the LDP helped the opposition parties. The CGP and DSP turned their backs on the LDP and latched onto the JSP. The JSP thus found itself in an advantageous position. The anti-LDP floating vote cascaded toward the JSP—and the JSP began to mushroom. The JCP found itself consistently left in the lurch during the Diet deliberations and coalition government talks. But the floating vote moves about freely, and when no JSP candidates were available, it spilled over to the JCP. The ig8g House of Councilors Election

In the July 23 House of Councilors election, the LDP lost half of its seats while the JSP doubled its holdings. Rengo (an opposition party coalition

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backed by the labor center) achieved a string of wins, while the CGP, DSP, and J C P lost seats. In other words, there was a shift toward a two-party framework built around the LDP and JSP. With the addition of seats not up for reelection, the distribution was as follows: LDP, 109 (43.5 percent); JSP, 73 (29.0 percent); CGP, 21 (8.4 percent);JCP, 14 (5.6 percent); DSP, 10 (4.0 percent); and Rengo, 12 (4.8 percent). For the first time in its history, the LDP was faced with a loss of control over one house, a situation that was likely to continue for at least the next six years. Prime Minister Uno immediately announced his resignation, but there was no obvious replacement. All of the faction leaders had been contaminated by the Recruit scandal and were in the middle of a period of penitence. The one exception was Komoto, but he was seventy-nine years old. The Takeshita and Abe factions groped about, trying to preserve their influence and create the opportunity for a senior politician to become prime minister. They finally decided to back Raifu Toshiki of the Komoto faction. In addition to Kaifu, Hayashi Yoshiro (Nikaido faction), supported by the Miyazawa faction, and the Abe faction's heretic, Ishihara Shintaro, declared their candidacies. The backroom bargaining was forced into the open amid an explosion of criticism against the party leadership from younger Diet members and demands from the local districts that the leadership take responsibility for the election debacle. A presidential election involving a vote of Diet members from both houses was adopted as a temporary measure. The number of recommendations required for candidacy was set at 20 (as opposed to the usual presidential election requirement of 50), and each prefectural party federation was given 1 vote. Kaifu won on August 8, with 279 out of 451 votes. Hayashi received 120 votes and Ishihara, 48. Kaifu also won the vote for prime minister in the House of Representatives. JSP chair Doi Takako was designated the prime ministerial candidate in the House of Councilors and the opposition parties, including the JCP, voted for her. But in such circumstances, the House of Representatives vote takes priority. The new Kaifu cabinet was established by the Takeshita and Abe factions as an interim government that would lead the LDP out of its difficulties and then relinquish control to Abe. As an officer of the fifth-ranking faction, Prime Minister Kaifu's influence inside the party was weak. No "Kaifu phenomenon" appeared among the general population to counteract the pressures of the party. Although Kaifu promised to amend (not abolish) the consumption tax and implement political reform, he did not have backing inside the party. On the contrary, factional politics tended in the opposite direction. The Ministry of Finance, the propelling force behind the consumption tax, strongly resisted revision of the law, and the amendment proposal released in December was diluted considerably as a consequence. The LDP lacked the ability to respond effectively. It ignored major issues and avoided debate. Instead, it relied on an abstract slogan: "A choice of sys-

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tems—liberalism or socialism." The LDP used the prospect of opposition party rule to threaten the zaikai into providing the party with huge funds and loans that, as usual, went unaccounted for. The JSP, in contrast, had greatly increased the number of seats it held by attracting the floating and anti-LDP vote in the House of Councilors election. Older women were particularly active in the party, and a number of female candidates won seats. The popularity of the party's female chair played a major role. There was a corresponding decline in conflict within the party. But as the floating vote began to settle, the JSP's popularity seemed to stagnate. The electorate raised doubts about the ability of the JSP to manage the government. In the beginning, the JSP intended to run about 180 candidates in the general election of February 1990 but finally settled on 150. In these circumstances, the coalition among the opposition parties became important. Even as their rivalry continued, the JSP, CGP, DSP, and SDL maintained their alliance. The House ot Councilors passed the opposition parties' bill abolishing the consumption tax, but it was shelved in the House of Representatives. Although the LDP did its best to avoid the subject, the big issue in the general election was the consumption tax. The CGP and DSP were thus not in a position to turn their backs on the JSP. If they bolted from the coalition, it would most likely reflect negatively on them in the upcoming general election. But they were not in a position to share equally in the popularity gains from a coalition with the JSP. Some members felt that, since their party's future prospects were dim anyway, it would be to their advantage to mend relations with the LDP. The LDP was particularly interested in the CGP. If the LDP joined forces with the DSP, it would not reach a nuy ority in the House of Councilors. But with the CGP, it would gain such a majority. Thus, even if the LDP obtained a majority in the House of Representatives election, it would still require the help of the CGP. If the DSP was willing to go along as well, all the better. The words and actions of the heads of the three parties suggested that they were already putting out feelers. Rengo, which had gained 12 seats in the House of Councilors election, was simply not big enough to serve as a catalyst for an opposition coalition. Theiggo General Election It turned out that the LDP was able to win a stable majority in the election. Its 275 officially sponsored winners (53.7 percent of the total) were roughly 20 more than expected. With the addition of people who joined the party after being elected, the total reached 286. The JSP, whose popularity was supposedly receding, also made unexpected gains, with 136 of its candidates (26.6 percent of the total)—including 7 women—elected. With the addi-

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tion of people who joined the party after their election, the JSP total reached 139. The other parties suffered conspicuous losses. The CGP lost 4 seats for a total of 45, the J C P lost 11 seats for a total of 16, and the DSP lost 12 seats for a total of 14. The SDL remained at 4 seats, and the Progressive Party (Shinpoto) at 1. Following the election, the two parties joined forces to form the joint Progressive-Social Democratic League. In sum, there was a move toward a two-party arrangement with a relative strength of two to one. On the surface, this situation appeared to be a revival of the 1955 political system. But the electoral foundation of the two parties had been dramatically transformed over the ensuing thirty years. The LDP's fixed electoral base in agricultural cooperatives and local trade associations had shrunk, and most of its votes now came from the floating vote. The JSP found that, as labor unions changed, their capacity to mobilize votes had declined dramatically. Most of its votes, too, undoubtedly came from the floating vote. With the maturation of mass society amid a mass media network, unpredictable swings were a regular occurrence. As the saying goes, "The voice of the people is the voice of God." Perhaps so, but the voice of the people can also be an ad-libbed chorus of the tone-deaf from which one hardly expects harmony. Self-contradictions and a split personality are common. To say that this voice represents a wise choice or that it reflects a sense of balance is a matter of interpretation, perhaps even flattery. But wise or not, because voters speak with "the voice of God," elections results determine the path of the future. Having won a big victory, Prime Minister Kaifu began organizing a cabinet of his own choosing. For the Three Party Officers, he kept Ozawa Ichiro (Takeshita faction) as secretary general and reluctantly chose Kato Mutsuki (Abe faction) as PARC chairman. Nishioka Takeo (Miyazawa faction) was chosen as Executive Council chairman. Among the existing cabinet members, Finance Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (Takeshita faction) and Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro (Abe faction) were kept in office. Sakamoto Misoji (Komoto faction) was chosen to be chief cabinet secretary. Of the 21 cabinet members (including the prime minister), 6 were from the Takeshita faction; 4 each from the Miyazawa, Abe, and Watanabe Michio factions; and 3 from the Komoto faction. The Watanabe faction insisted to the end on Kato Takayuki, who had been tainted by the Lockheed scandal, but the prime minister insisted that no one who had been convicted of bribery would be allowed to enter the cabinet. Sakurauchi Yoshio (chairman of the old Nakasone faction) was chosen as speaker of the house. This was a wellbalanced lineup. The faction leaders had all stated that Kaifu would be allowed to continue in office if there was an election victory. A big victory is ultimately the product of the efforts of the candidates and faction leaders rather than the

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achievement of the prime minister alone. Still, the election had been conducted under the Kaifu cabinet. Remembering Kaifu had originally been selected to head an interim cabinet, the Takeshita and Abe factions found it extremely painful to watch his cabinet evolve into a full-fledged long-term government. Takeshita, Abe, Miyazawa, Nakasone, and Watanabe (who had inherited the Nakasone faction)—all five led the passage of the sales/consumption tax, and all five were key figures in the Recruit scandal. They now returned openly to the arena, as if their reelection proved their purity. Their "period of penitence" was over, and they were clean. In a poll taken in late March, 46 percent said it was " g o o d " that the LDP had captured a stable majority while 45 percent "did not think so." Fifty-six percent said that the election results "did not mean" support for the LDP's proposal to amend the consumption tax, and 82 percent "did not accept" the "cleansing" of the power holders associated with the Recruit scandal. (Asahi shinbun, April 2,1990) If the prime minister tried to counter opposition within his party by appealing to the opposition parties and the press as Prime Minister Miki did, a "dump Kaifu" movement was likely. Because Kaifu did not have the power to fight back, he had no choice but to compromise. One reason for the strong support for the Kaifu cabinet was his positive image of a valiant but lonely warrior. Support for the cabinet was 49 percent in March and 52 percent in May. These levels are comparable to those of the Nakasone cabinets, and like support for Nakasone, support for Kaifu came from the younger generation, urban residents, and salarymen. (Asahi shinbun, May 23,1990) In circumstances like these, the sensible strategy for the big factions was to cooperate with the prime minister on his major initiatives and wait for the next opportunity to present itself. There might be competition and rivalry but no one would make waves. Because of public opinion favoring the cabinet, the LDP's factional dynamics could not take their natural course. And the situation was complicated even further by the emergence of a new generation of power holders waiting for the next opportunity. Meanwhile, the upper house, with its opposition party majority, was demanding the abolition of the consumption tax and a political cleansing. Since the LDP could neither dissolve the upper house nor conduct a forced vote there, it had no choice but to compromise. Responding to the divided voice of the people is the mission of a politician as well as a test of his expertise. Though institutions and conditions may vary, all countries share the need to establish majority coalitions. In present-day Japan the first one that comes to mind is an LDPJSP coalition. Among segments of both parties proposals for an alliance were being made. The JSP was altering its program to prepare the party for governance. But in a full-fledged coalition, it would be necessary to agree on a policy and share cabinet posts, and at this stage it was difficult to imagine

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this kind of collaboration. The requisite conditions were not there, nor had the ground been prepared. Nevertheless, in the March poll, 63 percent said that the gains made by the JSP were "good." Roughly 47 percent hoped that the JSP "would not be afraid to compromise with the LDP and adopt a realistic response," and 41 percent hoped that the party would "not engage in any spurious compromises and would keep a close watch over the LDP's politics." Was this the voice of God? Another possibility was some sort of link between the LDP and CGP. The CGP, JCP, and DSP were perturbed by the JSP's "stealing the show" and, in contrast to the previous year, cast blank votes in the runoff in the House of Councilors to designate the prime minister. Although the CGP had frequendy announced that it would not go along with the LDP, efforts to alter its course were apparent. In the March poll, the respondents expected the centrist parties to "maintain an independent stance" (39 percent), "link up with the J S P " (33 percent), and "link up with the LDP" (19 percent). Japanese politics is presently in the midst of a massive and rapid process of transformation, which was generated both internally and externally. It is not easy to predict its future course. Two factors, however, deserve note. First, the political systems in many of the major advanced industrialized countries that were established in the 1950s began to show signs of change in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They resulted in a variety of experiments and transformations of form, stretching from the establishment of the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom (1979), through the establishment of the Mitterrand government in France (1981), to the rise of the Green Party in West Germany (1983). All occurred within the context of highly advanced industrialization and its accompanying social changes. The collapse of the LDP can be seen as another instance of these transformations. Second, the 1955 political system in Japan, as well as the European systems just noted, was formed as a domestic counterpart of the Cold War global structure. The economic friction between the United States and Japan, which originated in Japan's economic growth, has reached a critical state. With the reforms and dissolutions of communist states and German unification, East-West relations are changing dramatically. The pressures emanating from such watershed external changes are bound to have a profound effect on Japanese parliamentary politics. May 1990

APPENDIX 1: LDP PARTY PRESIDENT SELECTION PROCESSES, 1955 - 1990

LDP I N A U G U R A L C O N V E N T I O N November 15, 1955. Convention approval of organizational committee proposal to place party under temporary proxy committee consisting of Hatoyama Ichiro (prime minister), Ogata Taketora, Miki Bukichi, and Òno Banboku. HATOYAMA ICHIRO May 4, 1956. Second LDP party convention. Nomination of Hatoyama Ichirò approved by vote of 394. ISHIBASHI TANZAN December 14,1956. Third LDP party convention. Presidential election held. Preliminary vote: Kishi Nobusuke, 223; Ishibashi Tanzan, 151; Ishii Mitsujiro, 137. Runoff vote: Ishibashi Tanzan, 258; Kishi Nobusuke, 251. KISHI N O B U S U K E March 21, 1957. Fourth LDP party convention. Nomination of Kishi Nobusuke approved by vote of 471. January 24, 1959. Sixth LDP party convention. Presidential election held. Results: Kishi Nobusuke, 320; Matsumura Kenzò, 166. IKEDA H A Y A T O July 14, i960. Eighth LDP party convention. Presidential election held. Preliminary vote: Ikeda Hayato, 246; Ishii Mitsujirô, 196; Fujiyama Aiichirô, 49. Runoff vote: Ikeda Hayato, 302; Ishii Mitsujiro, 194. 441

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APPENDIX i

July 14, 1962. Eleventh LDP party convention. Presidential election held. Results: Ikeda Hayato, 391; Sato Eisaku, 17. July 10, 1964. Fourteenth LDP party convention. Presidential election held. Results: Ikeda Hayato, 242; Sato Eisaku, 160; Fujiyama Aiichiro, 72; Nadao Hirokichi, 1.

SATO EISAKU November 9,1964. LDP assembly of both houses. Nomination of Sato Eisaku ("Ikeda Decision") approved. December 1, 1966. Eighteenth L D P party convention. Presidential election held. Results: Sato Eisaku, 289; Fujiyama Aiichiro, 89; Maeo Shigesaburo, 47; Nadao Hirokichi, 11; Noda Uichi, 9. November 27, 1968. Twenty-first party convention. Presidential election held. Results: Sato Eisaku, 249; Miki Takeo, 107; Maeo Shigesaburo, 95. October 29, 1970. Twenth-fourth L D P party convention. Presidential election held. Results: Sato Eisaku, 353; Miki Takeo, 111.

TANAKA KAKUEI July 5, 1972. Twenty-seventh LDP party convention. Presidential election held. Preliminary vote: Tanaka Kakuei, 156; Fukuda Takeo, 150; Ohira Masayoshi, 101; Miki Takeo, 69. Runoff vote: Tanaka Kakuei, 282; Fukuda Takeo, 190.

MIKI T A K E O December 4,1974. LDP assembly of both houses. Nomination of Miki Takeo ("Shiina Decision") approved by unanimous vote.

FUKUDA TAKEO December 23, 1976. LDP assembly of both houses. Nomination of Fukuda Takeo approved by unanimous vote

OHIRA MASAYOSHI December 1,1978. Thirty-fifth L D P party convention. Presidential primary and withdrawal of runner-up. Results of primary (vote count, November 27): Ohira Masayoshi, 748 points; Fukuda Takeo, 638 points; Nakasone Yasuhiro, 93 points; Komoto Toshio, 46 points. Ohira formally approved by unanimous vote as a consequence of Fukuda's withdrawal from runoff.

SUZUKI ZENKO July 15, 1980. LDP assembly of both houses. Nomination of Suzuki Zenko approved by unanimous vote.

LDP PARTY PRESIDENT SELECTION

443

NAKASONE YASUHIRO July 25, 1982. Forty-first LDP party convention. Results of presidential primary acknowledged. Results of primary (vote count, November 24): Nakasone Yasuhiro, 559,673 points; Komoto Toshio, 265,078 points; Abe Shintaro, 80,443 points; Nakagawa Ichiro, 66,041 points. October 31, 1984. LDP assembly of both houses. Nomination of Nakasone Yasuhiro approved. September 11, 1986. LDP assembly of both houses. Proposal to grant Nakasone a special one-year term approved. TAKESHITA N O B O R U October 31, 1987. Forty-eighth LDP party convention. Nomination of Takeshita Noboru ("Nakasone Decision") approved. U N O SOSUKE June 2,1989. LDP assembly of both houses. Nomination of Uno Sosuke approved by majority vote. KAIFU TOSHIKI September 11,1986. LDP assembly of both houses (plus prefectural party federation delgates). Election of acting party president held. Results: Kaifu Toshiki, 279; Hayashi Yoshiro, 120; Ishihara Shintaro, 48. October 31,1989. Fifty-first LDP Convention. Nomination of Kaifu Toshiki approved.

TABLES

i Mainstream/Anti-Mainstream Alignments and Factional Affiliations of Key LDP Diet Members Under Ishibashi and Kishi (December 1956-July 1960) TABLE

Under Ishibashi: Faction Members Mentioned in the Text Mainstream Factions Ikeda Ikeda Hayato Aichi Kiichi Masutani Shüji Miki / Matsumura Matsumura Kenzô Miki Takeo Óno Öno Banboku Funada Naka Ishihara Kan'ichirö Kuraishi Tadao Mizuta Mikio

Anti-Mainstream Factions Kishi Kishi Nobusuke Akagi Munenori Fujiyama Aiichirö Fukuda Takeo Kawashima Shöjirö Köno Köno Ichirö Ichimada Naoto Sunada Shigemasa Satô Satö Eisaku Tanaka Kakuei

Ishibashi Ishibashi Tanzan Ishida Hirohide Ökubo Tomejirö Sasaki Hideyo Ishii Ishii Mitsujirö Aoki Kazuo Nadao Hirokichi Sugaya Kiroku Shinoda Kösaku Under Kishi: Estimated House of Representatives Faction Members, January 1959 Faction

Members

Kishi Köno Satö Ono

60 37 38 29

Faction Ikeda Miki / Matsumura Ishii Ishibashi/Ishida

Members 47 34 27 18

TABLES

Mainstream/Anti-Mainstream Alignments and Factional Affiliations of Key LDP Diet Members Under Ikeda (July 1960-November 1964)

TABLE 2

Membership in July 1960 Mainstream Factions

Ikeda (Köchikai) (55) Ikeda Hayato Itö Masaya (aide) Kurogane Yasumi Maeo Shigesaburö Masutani Shüji Miyazawa Kiichi Öhashi Takeo Öhira Masayoshi Suzuki Zenkö Satö (Shüzankai) (53) Satö Eisaku Hashimoto Tomisaburö Hori Shigeru Tanaka Kakuei Kishi/Kawashima (42) Kawashima Shöjirö Akagi Munenori Fukuda Takeo Shiina Etsuzaburö

Anti-Mainstream

Factions

Köno (Shunjükai) (34) Köno Ichirö Inaba Osamu Hagiwara Yoshitarö a Kodama Yoshio " Nagata Masaichi " Miki (33) Miki Takeo Hayakawa Takashi Matsumura Kenzö Fujiyama (Töyükai) (40) Fujiyama Aiichirö Ayabe Kentarö Endo Saburö Esaki Masumi Fuke Shun'ichi Ino Hiroya Miura Kazuo Nanjö Tokuo Ozawa Saeki Shiikuma Saburö Sugihara Arata Öno (32) Öno Banboku Yamashita Isamu (aide) Aoki Tadashi Fukuda Tokuyasu Funada Naka Hara Kenzaburö Kuraishi Tadao Mizuta Mikio Murakami Isamu Tokuyasu Jitsuzö

TABLES

TABLE 2

(continued)

Membership in July 1964 Faction

Members

Faction

Members

Ikeda Köno Miki Murakami' Kawashima '

49 47 37 25 18

Sato Fujiyama Fukuda' Ishii

45 20 20 14

NOTE: Listed faction members are those mentioned in text. • Zaikaifiguresrather than Diet members. 'Formerly, a part of the Ono faction. 'Formerly, a part of the Kishi faction. SOURCE: Mainstream/anti-mainstream alignments and faction membership figures (House of Representatives only) are drawn from Asahi nenkan 1974:256. TABLE 3 Mainstream/Anti-Mainstream Alignments and Factional Affiliations of Key LDP Diet Members Under Satô (November 1964-July 1972)

Membership in November 1964 Mainstream Factions

Anti-Mainstream Factions

Sato Faction (57) Satö Eisaku Hashimoto Tomisaburö Hori Shigeru Kanbayashiyama Eikichi Kimura Takeo Kimura Toshio Matsuno Raizö Tanaka Kakuei

Maeo Faction" (42) Maeo Shigesaburö Itö Masaya (aide) Fukunaga Kenji Kosaka Zentarö Öhira Masayoshi Suzuki Zenkö Yamamoto Katsuichi

Miki Faction (36) Miki Takeo Nabeshima Naotsugu

Nakasone Yasuhiro Nakamura Umekichi

Fukuda Faction (23) Fukuda Takeo Hoshina Zenshirö Kawashima Faction (18) Kawashima Shöjirö Akagi Munenori Arafune Seijürö Sonoda Sunao

Nakasone Faction 6 (24)

Fujiyama Faction (17) Fujiyama Aiichirö Ayabe Kentarö Esaki Masumi Nanjö Tokuo Matsumura Faction ' (4) Matsumura Kenzö

(continues)

TABLES TABLE 3

(continues)

Membership in November 1964 Mainstream Factions

Anti-Mainstream Factions

Funada Faction'' (15) Funada Naka Mizuta Mikio Shigemasa/Mori Faction 4 (15) Mori Kiyoshi Shigemasa Seishi Ishii Faction (14) Ishii Mitsujiro Kiuchi Shiro Nadao Hirokichi Murakami Faction'' (10) Murakami Isamu Membership in December 1966 Faction

Members

Faction

Members

Sato Fukuda Kawashima Ishii Funada Sonoda'

53 28 18 13 13 12

Maeo Miki Nakasone Fujiyama Murakami Matsumura

42 37 24 13 10 4

Membership in November 1968 Faction

Members

Faction

Members

Sato Maeo Fukuda Nakasone Kawashima Ishii Sonoda Funada Murakami

63 43 37 35 20 13 13 11 10

Miki Fujiyama Ishida Matsumura

39 6 4 3

TABLES

TABLE

3

449

(continues)

Membership in October 1970 Faction

Members

Faction

Members

Satö Ohira/ Fukuda Nakasone Shiina« Mizuta4 Ishii Sonoda Funada Murakami

62 43 37 34 20 16 13 12 10 10

Miki Fujiyama Matsumura

42 3 3

NOTE: Listed faction members tire those mentioned in text. There is a large discrepancy between the presidential election vote results and factional mainstream/anti-mainstream alignments. This is due primarily to the various intrafactional tensions described in the text. "Formerly, the Ikeda faction. 'Formerly, a part of the Kono faction. 'Formerly, a part of the Miki faction. ''Formerly, a part of the Ono faction. 'Formerly, the Mori/Shigemasa faction. 'Formerly, the Maeo faction. «Formerly, the Kawashima faction. 'Combines groups formerly associated with Funada, Murakami, and Fujiyama. SOURCE: Mainstream/anti-mainstream alignments and faction membership figures (House of Representatives only) are drawn from Asahi nenkan

1974:256.

Mainstream/Anti-Mainstream Alignments and Factional Affiliations of Key LDP Diet Members Under Tanaka (July 1972-December 1974)

TABLE 4

Membership in December 1972 Mainstream Factions Tanaka Faction (44) Tanaka Kakuei Aichi Kiichi Gotöda Masaharu Hashimoto Ryütarö Hashimoto Tomisaburö

Anti-Mainstream Factions

Independents

Fukuda Faction (65) Fukuda Takeo Bö Hideo Hon Shigeru Sonoda Sunao

Köno Kenzö Matsuno Raizö Nakamura Umekichi Nemoto Ryütarö

(continues)

450

TABLES

TABLE 4

(continued)

Membership in December 1972 Mainstream Factions

Anti-Mainstream

Factions

Independents

Kimura Takeo Nikaido Susumu Nishimura Eiichi Obuchi Keizo Ozawa Tatsuo Takeshita Noboru Ohira Faction (43) Ohira Masayoshi Ito Masaya (aide) Kosaka Zentard Koyama Osanori Maeo Shigesaburo Suzuki Zenko Miki Faction (42) Miki Takeo Furui Yoshimi Kujime Kentaro Nakasone Faction (34) Nakasone Yasuhiro Sakurauchi Yoshio Yamanaka Sadanori Shiina Faction (18) Shiina Etsuzaburo Mizuta Faction (17) Mizuta Mikio Ishii Faction (13) Ishii Mitsujiro Funada Faction (10) Funada Naka Listed faction members are those mentioned in text. Mainstream/anti-mainstream alignments and faction membership figures (House of Representatives only) are drawn from Asahi nenkan 1974:256. NOTE:

SOURCE:

TABLES

451

TABLE 5 Mainstream/Anti-Mainstream Alignments and Factional Affiliations of Key LDP Diet Members Under Miki, Fukuda, and Ôhira (December 1974-July 1980)

Under Miki Mainstream Factions

Anti-Mainstream Factions

MinorFactions

Nakasone Faction (38) Nakasone Yasuhiro Inaba Osamu Nakao Eiichi Sakurauchi Yoshio Watanabe Michio Yamanaka Sadanori

Fukuda Faction (56) Fukuda Takeo Abe Shintarö Bö Hideo Hon Shigeru (later Ind.) Katöo Mutsuki Kuraishi Tadao Matsuno Raizö Ochi Michio Sonoda Sunao

Shiina Faction (18) Shiina Etsuzaburö Iwase Shigeru (aide) Hasegawa Shirö (later Fukuda)

Miki Faction (37) Miki Takeo Furui Yoshimi Hatsumura Ryüichirö Kaifu Toshiki Komoto Toshio

Tanaka Faction (48) Tanaka Kakuei Aichi Kiichi Esaki Masumi Gotöda Masaharu Hashimoto Ryütarö Hashimoto Tomisaburö Kanemaru Shin Kimura Takeo Nikaidö Susumu Nishimura Eiichi Ozawa Tatsuo Takeshita Noboru Tamura Hajime

Ishii Faction (9) Ishii Mitsujirö Nadao Hirokichi Fuñada Faction (9) Funada Naka Mizuta Faction (13) Mizuta Mikio Nakagawa Ichirö

Öhira Faction (45) Öhira Masayoshi Itö Masaya (aide) Kosaka Zentarö Koyama Osanori Maeo Shigesaburö Miyazawa Kiichi Ogawa Heiji Saitö Kunikichi Sasaki Yoshitake Shiomi Toshitsugu Suzuki Zenkö Tanaka Rokusuke (continues)

452

TABLES (continued)

TABLE 5

Under Fukuda Fukuda Faction (53) Tanaka Faction (45) Ohira Faction (39)

Nakasone Faction (39) Miki Faction (32)

Mizuta Faction" (11)

Shiina Faction (11) Funada Faction (8) Ishii Faction (4) Under Òhira

Tanaka Faction (52) Ohira Faction (50)

Fukuda Faction (49) Nakasone Faction (41) Miki Faction (31)

Nakagawa Faction 4 (10)

Mizuta Faction (5)

NOTE: Because no party presidential elections were held during this period, it is extremely difficult to align minor factions along a mainstream/anti-mainstream axis. Faction membership figures are for members of the House of Representatives. Listed faction members are those mentioned in the text. "Formerly, the Murakami faction. 'Formerly, a part of the Mizuta faction. SOURCE: Factional alignments are based on Sato and Matsuzaki 1986:68-69, 241. Placement of factions is based on factional affiliations of the party vice president and Three Party Officers. See Sato and Matsuzaki 1986:70.

TABLE 6

Backgrounds of LDP Representatives, 1958-1979 Former Central Bureaucrats

Former Locally Elected Officials

Year of Election

Total Seats

Seats

%

Seats

%

1958 1960 1963 1967 1969 1972 1976 1979

287 296 283 277 288 271 257 253

55 61 60 57 60 54 54 45

19.1 20.6 21.2 20.5 20.8 19.9 21.0 17.7

84 88 86 79 84 80 81 80

29.2 29.7 30.3 28.5 29.1 29.5 31.5 31.6

SOURCE:

Naka 1 9 8 0 .

TABLES

t abl e 7

Year of Election 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 source:

Backgrounds of the LDP Councilors, 1956-1977

Total Seats

Former Central Bureaucrats

Former Locally Elected Officials

Seats

%

Seats

%

61 71 69 71 69 63 62 63

18 18 18 21 20 20 17 23

29.5 25.3 26.0 29.5 28.9 31.7 27.4 36.5

13 16 17 23 19 20 23 21

21.3 22.5 24.6 32.3 27.5 31.7 37.0 33.3

Naka 1980.

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472

TABLES

TABLE

30

Political Party Support Among Office and Line Workers, 1975 and 1980 (%) 1975

Party Supported LDP JSP DSP CGP JCP Conservative-leaning Progressive-leaning Nonpartisan Don't know

1980

Office Workers

Line Workers

Office Workers

Line Workers

19.7 16.4 2.4 2.5 3.7 8.7 16.0 26.0 4.6

17.5 17.4 2.7 5.3 3.3 6.6 12.1 28.8 6.3

24.6 13.8 3.9 2.9 2.9 7.7 9.2 31.6 2.7

23.8 16.7 3.8 5.6 2.7 5.6 6.4 30.7 4.4

SOURCE: Jiji Tsushinsha 1981.

TABLE 31

Votes Received and Seats Captured by the JSP in General Elections, 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 9 0

Date of Election 1958 1960 1963 1967 1969 1972 1976 1979 1980 1983 1986 1990

Absolute Share of Vote" (%)

Relative Share of Vote"

(%)

No. of Seats

%of Seats

25.2 20.1 20.4 20.4 14.6 15.6 15.0 13.3 14.1 13.1 12.4 17.7

32.9 27.6 29.0 27.9 21.4 21.9 20.7 19.7 19.3 19.5 17.2 24.4

166 145 144 140 90 118 123 107 107 112 85 136

35.5 31.0 30.8 28.8 18.5 24.0 24.1 20.9 20.9 21.9 16.6 26.6

""Absolute" refers to the share of the vote received as a percentage of the total number of eligible voters. "Relative" refers to the share of the vote received as a percentage of those who voted in a given election. SOURCE:

Asahi

shinbun.

TABLES

TABLE 32

473

Support for the J S P by Occupational Category, 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 8 5 ( % ) November August 1955 1960

Type of Occupation Overall Salaried workers Office workers Supervisory personnel Workers Industrial workers Retail staff, etc. Self-employed Retail and manufacturing Professionals Agriculture, forestry, and fishery Other and unemployed

31 50

25 40

51

39

21

15

19 23

August September 1965 1970

12 27

fune 1975

October 1980

October 1985

34 45 47

23 26 27

24 30 31

17 21 21

16 17 20

31 48 54 43 26

19 31 36 25 14

24 30 33 27 11

21 20 20 21 8

7 20 24 16 9

25 35

14 15

11 17

7 14

9 7

19 20

15 16

18 11

9 16

12 12

SOURCE: Surveys of the Asahi shinbun.

TABLE 3 3

Support for the J S P by Type o f Region, 1 9 6 5 - 1 9 8 5 ( % )

Date of Survey August 1965 September 1970 June 1975 October 1980 October 1985

Largest Cities"

Cities of 100,000+ Voters

Other Cities

43 22 20 15 17

34 23 25 17 15

39 22 26 17 17

Towns and Average Villages 30 23 23 18 15

34 23 24 17 16

"The seven largest cities in 1965 and 1970; the ten largest in 1975, 1980, and 1985. SOURCE: Surveys of the Asahi shinbun.

474

TABLES

TABLE 34

Support for the JSP by Type of Region, 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 8 0 ( % )

Date of Survey

Number of Surveys

Largest Cities"

Other Cities

Counties, Towns, and Villages

Average

2 12 12 12 12 12

29.8 27.6 23.8 12.8 11.4 7.8

25.4 21.3 20.5 14.4 11.5 10.1

20.8 17.7 18.9 13.1 12.4 9.6

24.0 21.1 20.6 13.7 11.4 9.5

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

"The seven largest cities in 1955-70; the ten largest in 1975-80. SOURCE: Jiji Tsushinsha 1981.

TABLE 35

The Occupational Composition ofJSP Support, 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 8 5 (%)

Type of Occupation Salaried workers Office workers Supervisory personnel Workers Industrial workers Retail staff, etc. Self-employed Retail and manufacturing Professionals Agriculture, forestry, and fishery Other and unemployed SOURCE:

November August August September June 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 26

30

33

38

13

12

25 3

Surveys of the Asahi shinbun.

16 4

October October 1985 1980

30 27

31 26

37 31

41 34

39 35

3 40 20 20 15

4 43 25 18 11

6 41 21 20 9

7 40 21 19 8

4 39 23 17 9

14 1

11 1

8 1

7 1

9 1

14 2

12 3

11 2

6 5

8 5

TABLES

TABLE 3 6

475

Votes Received and Seats Captured by the LDP in General Elections, 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 9 0

Year of Election 1958 1960 1963 1967 1969 1972 1976 1979 1980 1983 1986 1990

Absolute Share of Vote"

Relative Share of Vote"

No. of Seats

%of Seats

44.2 41.9 38.5 35.6 32.3 33.3 30.4 30.0 34.9 30.8 37.9 33.5

57.8 57.6 54.7 48.8 47.6 46.8 41.8 44.6 47.9 45.8 49.4 46.2

287 296 283 277 288 271 249 248 284 250 300 275

61.5 63.4 60.6 57.0 59.3 55.2 48.7 48.5 55.6 48.9 58.6 53.7

""Absolute" refers to the share of the vote received as a percentage of the total number of eligible voters. "Relative" refers to the share of the vote received as a percentage of those who voted in a given election. SOURCE: Asahi shinbun.

TABLE 37

Support for the LDP by Occupational Category, 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 8 5 (%)

Type of Occupation Overall Salaried workers Office workers Supervisory personnel Workers Industrial workers Retail staff, etc. Self-employed Retail and manufacturing Professionals Agriculture, forestry, and fishery Other and unemployed

November August August September fune 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 48 37

49 39

36

35

62

63

52 49

SOURCE: Surveys of the Asahi shinbun.

56 35

October October 1980 1985

45 39 37

50 47 45

45 41 38

52 46 44

57 55 51

50 28 20 35 58

55 38 33 43 60

52 34 33 35 59

54 45 44 46 64

67 52 48 56 66

58 60

60 58

60 46

65 57

66 65

59 52

64 55

62 45

69 55

71 48

476

TABLES

TABLE 38

Support for the LDP by Type of Region, 1 9 6 5 - 1 9 8 5 ( % )

Date of Survey August 1965 September 1970 June 1975 October 1980 October 1985

Largest Cities"

Cities of 100,000+ Voters

Other Cities

37 45 44 44 46

44 48 39 50 60

48 53 45 53 59

Toxtms and Villages Average 48 53 53 58 59

45 50 45 52 57

"The seven largest cities in 1965 and 1970; the ten largest in 1975, 1980, and 1985. SOURCE: Surveys of the Asahi shinbun.

TABLE 39

The Regional Distribution of LDP Support, 1 9 6 5 - 1 9 8 5 (%)

Date of Survey August 1965 % of total population % of total LDP support June 1975 % of total population % of total LDP support October 1985 % of total population % of total LDP support

Largest Cities"

Cities of 100,000+ Voters

Other Cities

Towns and Villages

19 16

17 18

29 31

35 35

21 20

26 22

28 28

25 29

19 15

30 31

27 28

25 26

"The seven largest cities in 1965; the ten largest in 1975 and 1985. Asahi shinbun.

SOURCE:

TABLES

TABLE 4 0

T h e LDP-JSP Oligopoly: C o m b i n e d Votes, 1958-1990 (%)

Year of Election 1958 1960 1963 1967 1969 1972 1976 1979 1980 1983 1986 1990

Absolute Share of Vote"

Relative Share of Vote"

Share of Seats

69.3 61.9 58.9 56.0 46.8 48.9 45.4 43.3 49.0 43.9 50.3 51.4

90.7 85.1 83.7 76.7 69.1 68.7 62.5 64.3 67.2 65.3 66.6 70.6

97.0 94.4 91.4 85.8 77.8 79.2 72.7 69.4 76.5 70.8 75.2 80.3

""Absolute" refers to the share of the vote received as a percentage of the total number of eligible voters. "Relative" refers to the share of the vote received as a percentage of those who voted in a given election.

T A B L E 41

Year of Election 1958 1960 1963 1967 1969 1972 1976 1979 1980

Abstention and Nonpartisanship, 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 8 0 (%)

Abstentions Nonpartisans 23.6 27.3 29.6 27.0 32.2 28.9 27.4 32.6 27.1

7.4 12.6 12.7 17.8 22.9 31.3 32.2 30.3

Don't Know

Total Nonpartisan Rate•

18.2 16.6 12.6 11.5 8.5 9.2 6.6 5.6

25.6 29.2 25.3 29.3 31.4 40.5 38.8 35.9

"(Total nonpartisan rate) = (nonpartisans) + (don't know). Jiji Tsushinsha 1981.

SOURCE:

Difference

1.7 0.4 1.7 2.9 -2.5 -13.1 -6.2 -8.8

477

478

TABLES

Votes Received and Seats Captured by the JCP in General Elections, 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 9 0

TABLE 42

Year of Election 1958 1960 1963 1967 1969 1972 1976 1979 1980 1983 1986 1990

Absolute Share of Vote"

Relative Share of Vote"

No. of Seats

%of Seats

1.9 2.1 2.8 3.5 4.6 7.5 7.5 7.2 7.3 6.3 6.1 5.8

2.6 2.9 4.0 4.8 6.8 10.5 10.4 10.4 9.8 9.3 8.8 7.9

1 3 5 5 14 38 17 39 29 26 26 16

0.2 0.6 1.0 1.0 2.9 7.7 3.3 7.6 5.7 5.1 5.1 3.1

""Absolute" refers to the share of the vote received as a percentage of the total number of eligible voters. "Relative" refers to the share of the vote received as a percentage of those who voted in a given election. SOURCE:

Asahi shinbun.

Backgrounds and Affiliated Organizations of All J C P Diet Members, 1 9 5 6 - 1 9 7 9

TABLE 43

House of Representatives

House of Councilors

Background or Affilateti Organization

No.

%

No.

%

Locally elected office Sohyo-affiliated union Churitsu Roren or other union Small business federation Farmers' union Agricultural or other cooperative Local chamber of commerce Total Diet members

37 27 3 8 2 2 5 127

29.1 21.3 2.4 6.3 1.6 1.6 3.9

2 11 1

5.4 29.7 2.7

SOURCE:

Naka 1 9 8 0 .

37

TABLES

47g

Votes Received and Seats Captured by the DSP in General Elections, 1960-1990

TABLE 4 4

Year of Election

Absolute Share of Vote"

Relative Share of Vote'

No. of Seats

% of Seats

6.4 5.2 5.4 5.3 5.0 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.5 3.5

8.8 7.4 7.4 7.7 7.0 6.3 6.8 6.6 7.3 6.4 4.8

17 23 30 31 19 29 35 32 38 26 14

3.6 4.9 6.2 6.4 3.9 5.7 6.8 6.3 7.4 5.1 2.7

1960 1963 1967 1969 1972 1976 1979 1980 1983 1986 1990

""Absolute" refers to the share of the vote received as a percentage of the total number of eligible voters. "Relative" refers to the share of the vote received as a percentage of those who voted in a given election. SOURCE:

Asahi

shinbun.

Backgrounds and Affiliated Organizations of All DSP Diet Members, 1960-1979

TABLE 4 5

House of Representatives

House of Councilors

Background or Affiliated Organization

No.

%

No.

%

High-level bureaucrat Locally elected office Sòhyò-affiliated union Dòmei-affiliated union Small business federation Farmers' union Agricultural or other cooperative Big business federation Total Diet members

9 82 10 41 6 15 12 1 216

4.2 38.0 4.6 19.0 2.8 6.9 5.6 0.5

2 2 0 22 1 0 0 0 31

6.5 6.5 0.0 71.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0

SOURCE:

Naka 1980.

480

TABLES

Votes Received and Seats Captured by the CGP in General Elections, 1967-1990

TABLE 46

Absolute Share of Vote"

Year of Election

Relative Share of Vote«

No. of Seats

%of Seats 5.1

1967

3.9

5.4

25

1969

7.4

10.9

47

9.7

1972 1976

6.0

8.5

5.9

1979

7.9 6.7

10.9 9.8

29 55

1980 1983

6.7 6.8

9.0

33

10.1

58

11.2 6.5 11.4

1986

6.6

9.4

56

10.9

1990

5.8

8.0

45

8.6

57

10.8

""Absolute" refers to the share of the vote received as a percentage of the total number of eligible voters. "Relative" refers to the share of the vote received as a percentage of those who voted in a given election. SOURCE: Asahi shinbun.

Backgrounds and Affiliated Organizations of All CGP Diet Members, 1965-1979

TABLE 47

House of Representatives Background or Affiliated, Organization

No.

%

No. 0

0.0

19

30.6

0

0.0 0.0

High-level bureaucrat

3

Locally elected office Sohyo-affiliated union

119

1.2 48.4

2 1

0.8 0.4

1

0.4

Churitsu Roren or other union Small business federation Total Diet members SOURCE:

Naka 1980.

246

House of Councilors

0 0 62

%

0.0

TABLES

TABLE 48 Koenkai Membership Among Voters for Political Parties, 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 6 Koenkai Members (%) Party LDP JSP DSP CGP JCP NLC Entire sample SOURCE:

295.

1967

1969

1972

1976

8 5 7 16 9

12 9 18 49 17

13 7 6 25 16

—

—

—

12

10

20 13 16 24 18 8 14

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Nenpo seijigaku 1977:

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n i 420,423.434.43 6 ; electoral base of, 396-97,400-407; electoral fortunes of, 108, 118,143,186, 194, •95> 315. 337. 394. 398, 418-19.424. 435. 437; formation of, 320-22,383, 395; funds received by, 218, 232; JSP policies compared with, 199, 326; labor movement as connected with, 363, 373; legislative stances adopted by, 169, 433; Ôhira as supported by, 198; Okinawa reversion as viewed by, 111-13; opposition tactics of, 93, 145,428; pollution bill proposed by, 99; progressive mayors as viewed by, 391, 392; union members in, 380-82 Democratization League, 351, 370 Den Hideo, 345, 400 Denkei Kaigi, 354-55 Densan Union. See Electric Power Industry Labor Union, Japan Department Store Association, 428 Depopulation of rural areas, 280-81, 296 Development nodes, 268-69 Development-oriented köenkai, 237 Development regions, 269 Diet building, demonstrations at, 27, 29, 39, 42, 46, 49 Doi Takako, 426, 435 Dokö Toshio, 131,151,158, 230, 412, 413 Dômei (Kaigi). See Confederation of Labor, Japan Döö region, 70 Döshi Club, 129 Döshikai, 370-71 Dulles, John Foster, 22, 25

498

INDEX

Echigo Transportation Company, 241-242, 243 E c o n o m i c Planning Agency, 65, 67, 69, 70, 74, 99,140,141; bureaucratic ranks in, 255, 256, 261 E c o n o m i c Reconstruction Council, 28, 65, 67; dissolution of, 220; political parties f u n d e d by, 218-20, 223. See also Keidanren Economy, Japanese: rapid-growth phase of, 12, 66, 81, 130,132, 204, 245, 301-2,408; recessions in, 66, 169-70; regional develo p m e n t of, 268-85; r e m o d e l i n g plan for, 130, 131,139-46,411; Southeast Asia a n d , 2 1 - 2 2 ; slow-growth p h a s e of, 1 0 - 1 2 . See also Industrialization; Mass society Eda faction, 328, 329, 331, 334, 341, 342, 344, 349-50; ideological alignments of, 3 3 2 33. 337. 339. 340. 399 Eda Saburo, 6, 245, 310-11,317, 322-36,337, 347, 396, 403; d e a t h of, 344; factional maneuverings of, 319, 333-36,399; secession of, 341-44,400; structural r e f o r m advocated by, 322-33,338, 423 E d o Hideo, 271 Eight Divisions, of LDP factions, 2 1 4 - 1 5 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 22, 37; visit to J a p a n canceled by, 45, 50 Election (s), general: koenkai voters in, 238; lab o r u n i o n candidates in, 349-50; of 1956, 3'5; o f '95 8 . 23. 205. 236, 239, 305, 318, 383; of i960, 6 6 - 6 7 , 236, 239; of 1963, 77-79, 238. 33'> 346. 348; of 1967. 93» 334; of 1969. 108, 222, 335, 396; of 1972,143, 337, 394, 402; of 1976,10,186, 342, 400, 403, 405; of : 979- 1 94~95> 206, 295,404,406; of 1980, 200-201,385,406-7,424; of 1983, 418; of 1986, 410, 424-25,433; of 1990, 436-37; press coverage of, 4 2 5 - 2 6 Elections, local government, 75, 92, 94,108, 118, 1 4 7 - 4 9 , 1 8 7 - 8 8 , 206, 236, 267-68, 291, 295. 3'9> 335. 340, 344. 347. 396. 397. 398, 410, 425,434-36 Electoral system: faction size as controlled by, 213; presidential election r e f o r m as key to, 168-69; small district plan for, 144-45; voting patterns in, 2 7 8 - 7 9 , 3 8 5 - 8 6 Electric Power Distribution Corporation, Jap a n (Nihon Hassoden Kabushiki Gaisha, o r Nippatsu), 353, 355 Electric Power Distribution Union, Kanto (Kanto H a i d e n R o d o Kumiai, or Kanpai Roso), 354-55

Electric Power Workers' Unions, National Federation of ( Z e n d e n r ö ) , 356 Electric Power Industry Labor Union, J a p a n (Nihon Denki Sangyö Rödö Kumiai, or D e n s a n ) , 360; strike organized by, 353-57 Electrical Manufacturers' Association,Japan, 230 Electrical Machine Workers' Unions, J a p a n Federation of, 360, 378-79, 382 E n d o Saburö, 58, 63 Enterprise familism, 376 Enterprise sectionalism, 360 Enterprise u n i o n s 351 - 5 7 , 367, 374 Enterprise Unions, All J a p a n C o n f e r e n c e of (Zen N i h o n Sangyöbetsu Kumiai Kaigi, or Sanbetsu), 351, 352. See also Shinsanbetsu Environmental movements, 6 - 7 , 388-89. See also Pollution E n v i r o n m e n t Ministry, 141 Equalization grants, 263 Esaki Masumi, 58, 63, 64, 74, 86,187,188, 420 Etsuzankai, 239-44 Ex-bureaucrats, 349; factional power wielded by, 8, 12,132, 205, 215; party politicians vs., 60, 62-64, 76 Expulsion regions, 1 4 1 - 4 2 Expulsion tax, 142 Extraparliamentary m o v e m e n t , 51, 94-100, 302; electoral r e f o r m as viewed by, 145; mass society as agent of, 48-49; mobilizing power of, 49-50,71; Okinawa reversion as impetus to, m - 1 2 . See also Citizens' m o v e m e n t s Factions, 205-18,432; anti-Fukuda alliance of, 124-25,133; bosses in, 206, 208, 209, 213, 223, 238; bureaucrats as c o n c e r n of, 215, 257-60; centrist, 194,195,197; dissolution of, 78—79,91, 211—12,217; e c o n o m y as issue for, 69-70, 298-300; f u n c t i o n s of, 409; f u n d i n g of, 19, 150-51, 213, 214, 223— 24, 230-32; J a p a n e s e politics as domin a t e d by, 2 - 3 , 5 , 6, 8 , 1 6 - 1 9 , 20, 22, 77, 203; köenkai i n c o r p o r a t e d into, 238-39, 245; LDP criticism of, 75-76; legislation as affected by, 298-300; neutral, 122-124, 159, 200, 334, 411, 419, 426; ninja squads in, 82, 83; n o r m s a n d lineages of, 2 1 2 - 1 5 ; posts as distributed by, 206-11; size of, 212—14. See also specific factions Factory expulsion tax, 142

INDEX Fair Elections Federation, 348 Fair Trade Commission, 169—71, 299 Fake Credentials scandal, 75 Far East, security treaty definition of, 35, 39, 40, 105 Farmers' unions, 240, 296, 349 "Fight for Tomorrow—Answering the Call of the Future, T h e " (Sato), 81,100,139 Finance Ministry, 69,114, 227, 256, 261, 285; budget as negotiated by, 251, 263, 295, 303, 413, 415; declining influence of, 8, 11, 25355; sales tax introduced by, 427, 435 Findley, William G., 177 "First Defense Rationalization Plan," 22 Fiscal reconstruction, LDP espousal of, 4 1 1 16 Floating voters, 410, 430, 433, 434,436 For a New Sodalism, 327 Ford, Gerald, 153, 156—57 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control law (1949), 296 Foreign Ministry, 46, 47, 107; Okinawa reversion as viewed by, 102, 104; Sinojapanese normalization as viewed by, 135-36,139 Foreman system, in management, 369-72 Fortification-oriented köenkai, 236-37 Friday Society (Kinyökai), 300-301 Fujibayashi Keizö, 40, 364 Fuji City, 390 Fuji Company, 95, 99 Fujii Heigo, 259 Fuji Steel Company, 300, 357, 371 Fujita Yoshirö, 155, 160-65, Fujiwara Hirotatsu, 398 Fujiwara Yoshie, 63 Fujiyama Aiichirö, 23, 32, 35, 43, 44, 252; cabinet posts held by, 46, 91; funding sources used by, 224-26; LDP factional conflicts as recalled by, 25-26,36-37,58-59,82, 86, 88, 89-90, 91; LDP presidency as contested by, 51,52, 63-64,74-75,83, 85, 88, 92-93; security treaty negotiations as recalled by, 24,46-48 Fujiyama Art Collection, 226 Fujiyama faction, 60, 61, 93, 213, 214; dissolution of, 78; funds received by, 224, 226; Ikeda's relationship with, 52, 53, 59, 64, 73, 82 Fuke Shun'ichi, 63, 64 Fukuda administration, 169, 403, 411; factional composition of, 187; unpopularity of, 187

499

Fukuda faction, 81,122, 125, 126,145, 161, 165, 189, 213, 420, 424, 426; cabinet posts held by, 194,197, 417, 421; dissolution of, 217; electoral distribution of, 239; funds received by, 228, 230, 232; origins of, 214; Öhira as viewed by, 182, 183,193,195, 199200; Party posts held by, 411; size of, 419; Tanaka as viewed by, 150,152,418 Fukuda Hajime, 156, 210, 257 Fukuda Takeo, 65, 73, 77,93, 94,166,167, 187— 93, 207, 228, 418; cabinet appointments by, 187-88; cabinet posts held by, 91,119, 143, 167; China's U.N. entry opposed by, no; factional maneuverings of, 81, 82, 129, 156, 160, 161-62,180, 181, 195-97, 209> 257> 259-60,411, 419-20; LDP presidency as contested by, 116,117,120-25,130, 133, 188-93,4°9> 4'6> 417; LDP reform as proposed by, 216; no-confidence motion against, 111; Öhira as viewed by, 174-77, 182-86,187, 200; political background of, 114; Shiina decision as viewed by, 164, 165; Tanaka compared with, 132; Tanaka's relationship with, 125-26,145-47,149-51, '52. '55 Fukuda Tokuyasu, 55 Fukunaga Kenji, 108 Fukuoka, 4, 67, 68, 98,128, 364, 365, 429, 433; extraparliamentary movement in, 389, 390 Fukushima, 69,128, 345 Fukuyama, 99, 279 Fumoto Kuniaki, 139, 248 Funada faction, 92, 93, 116,156, 182, 214; dissolution of, 217 Funada Naka 41, 81, 82, 88, 108, 112,160, 185, 210, 252 Funada Opinion, 108 Furui Yoshimi, 132, 136 Furukawa Montarö, 132 Futtsu Bussan Company, 227-28 Fuwa Tetsuzö, 394 Garrison Forces Labor Union, All Japan, 112 Gekkan Shakaitö, 318, 325-26 Gekkan Söhyö, 326 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), 297 General Principles of Urban Policy, 139 Ghost companies, 130,152, 214, 226-28 Gifu-ögaki region, 71 Goi, 279

500

INDEX

Gosanke (banking, steel, and electric power industries), 230 Gotoda Masaharu, 149,417 Goto Keita, 241 Governors, prefectural elections for, 75, 94, 39°-93 Goyaku (five party officers), 110 Gray zone, swing voters in, 410, 425,430 Green Party, German, 339 Growth-utilization policies, 141 Gyokai (industrial world), zaikai compared with, 298 Habatsu. See Factions Hachinoe region, 71 Haggerty, James, 42,49, 365 Hagiwara Yoshitaro, 30, 31, 34,57, 60, 90 Hamada Koichi, 196, 199-200 Haneda International Airport, 39, 42, 44 Hannawa Amalgamation plan, 269 Hanshin region, 391 Hanshin Superhighway Corporation, 269 Harada Ken, 211 Hara Kenzaburd, 82, 210,430 Hara Shigeru, 365 Harmonization clause, in pollution bill, 98, 99 Hanshuryuha (anti-mainstream alliance), 2 Hashimoto Ryutaro, 437 Hashimoto Tomisaburo, 82, 91, 121, 124, 187, 214; factional power wielded by, 145, 147, 152. 187 Hata Yutaka, 340 Hatoyama faction, 91, 233 Hatoyama Ichiro, 2 , 1 5 - 1 7 , 1 8 , 54, 166, 168, 207, 215, 315; public image of, 246, 247 Hayakawa Takashi, 83 Hayasaka Shigezo, 139, 246 Hayashi Yoshiro, 435 Health and Welfare Ministry, 95, 97, 99, 255, 261; regional development as aided by, 273 Health Insurance law (1973), 145 Heiwa Doshikai faction, 332, 335, 341 Highway Public Corporation, Japan, 269 Hirokawa Kozen faction, 129, 212 Hiroshima, 98, 99 History of the Japan Socialist Party, A (Koyama and Shimizu), 328-39 Hitomi village, regional development and, 283 Hiyama Hiro, 178,181

Hochi shinbun, 307 Hokaku hakuchu (near parity of Diet seats), 10-12,255,399,405 Hokkaido, 67, 68, 70,142, 356, 382, 389,429; progressive politicians in, 390-91 Hokkaido shinbun, 44 Hokuriku, 68, 70,142,382 Honma Koichi, 242 H o n faction, 214 Horigome Masamichi, 148 H o n Shigeru, 93,118; cabinet posts held by, 187; factional maneuverings of, 55-56,74, 79, 158, 160,161,177,185,191; factional power wielded by, 114, 115,155, 213; Fukuda as supported by, 124, 149-50; LDP factional conflicts as recalled by, 5 3 , 5 6 57; Okinawa reversion as viewed by, 103, 104, no, 1 1 2 - 1 3 ; party posts held by, 64, 119; Sato's retirement as sought by, 119— 20,121; Tanaka's downfall as recalled by, "53-54. ! 5 6 Hori Yukio, 399 Horinouchi Hisao, 289-91 Hoshijima Niro, 28 Hoshina report, 107 Hoshina Zenshiro, 107 Hyogo, 67, 68, 279, 389 Ibaragi, 69, 239, 279 Ichimada Naoto, 22 Ikeda, Mrs., 54, 86 Ikeda administration, 207, 208, 225, 238, 273, 322, 331,150 161, 166, 167; Ikeda Daisaku, 397-398, 399 Ikeda faction, 36, 41,53,59, 61, 73, 81, 82, 89, 92, 93, 220; dissolution of, 78; electoral distribution of, 239; ex-bureaucrats associated with, 215; funds received by, 223; LDP sponsorship of, 238; origins of, 214; size of, 213 Ikeda Hayato, 3,17, 20, 25, 30, 43, 45, 5 0 - 9 1 , 94, 114, 139; bureaucratic background of, 60, 257, 259; cabinet appointments by, 64, 67, 210, 260; cabinet posts held by, 19, 22, 23, 29; death of, 8 3 - 8 4 , 1 1 6 ; factional dissolution as managed by, 75-77; Kishi as ally of, 32-34; labor unions as treated by, 365, 368; LDP funding as managed by, 220; LDP presidency as contested by, 51 64; leadership challenges as faced by, 7 2 73,78-83; political ambitions of, 52, 6 5 66, 297; public image of, 245, 246, 247-48;

INDEX

reelection of, 66-67, 75> 83; security treaty as extended by, 107; successor as chosen by, 85-91; Tanaka's relationship with, 129 Ikeda Teiji, 320 Imai Yoshie, 257-60, 299 Imazato Hiroki, 131 Immiseration thesis, JSP, 330 Inaba Osamu, 63 Income doubling plan, 51 -84,139; economic vs. political issues in, 67-72; LDP criticism of, 81, 94; origination of, 65-66; regional development as part of, 3-4; unveiling of, 52, 66. See also Mass society Independent Labor Unions ofJapan, Federation of (Churitsu Rodo Renraku Kaigi, or Churitsu Roren), 46,100, 372, 373, 396 India, 21 Indonesia, 21 Inducement mechanism, in mass society, 7 9, 71-72, 203-4,408 Industrialization, 84, 203, 268-85, 389; political repercussions of, 3-5, 305-6,384, 385, 407; pollution as result of, 94-100; population structure in, 277-81,284, 285; relocation plan for, 130, 131,139-46; social change wrought by, 408-9,439. See also Labor movement Industrial Problems Research Association. See Sanken (Sangyo Mondai Kenkyukai, or Sanken), 9 Industrial Structure Council, 96, 139 Inflation, LDP popularity as threatened by, 143-44, '47> >69 Inland Sea, 70 Ino Hiroya, 63 Institute of Politics, LDP, 234, 235-36 Interest groups, 203, 206, 251-304,409,428, 433 "Interim Report Concerning Our Country's Security," 107 International Metal Workers' Federation-Japan Chapter (IMF-JC), 372-73, 381 International Trade and Industry Ministry (MITI), 8 - 9 , 68-69, 95. 99. 256. 296-304; factions in, 298-300; industrial relocation plan of, 141,142; Industrial Structure Council of, 96,139; mergers organized by, 300-301; political purpose of, 296-97; regional development as aided by, 272, 273; reorganization of, 302 International Trade and Industry Policies for the '97os> "39

50/

Iron and Steel Workers' Unions, Federation of. 142. 357. 367> 37'. 373. 38o> 381. 396 Ishibashi administration, 19-21 Ishibashi faction, 36, 41, 60, 64, 215; funds received by, 224 Ishibashi Masashi, 113, 337, 339, 340, 344, 345, 423, 426 Ishibashi Tanzan, 2,16,18, 36, 38,54,55, 129, 163,166,189; personality of, 17; resignation of, 208 Ishida Hirohide, 18, 292, 365; cabinet posts held by, 19, 21, 22, 218 Ishihara Kan'ichirö, 43 Ishihara Shintarö, 435 Ishihara Shintarö faction, 419 Ishiwaki Masumi, 405 Ishii faction, 36,57,59,92,124; electoral distribution of, 239; ex-bureaucrats associated with, 215; funds received by, 224; Ikeda's relationship with, 52, 61, 62, 64, 67, 73, 81, 82; origins of, 214 Ishii Mitsujirö, 16-17, '8, 19, 41,54, 58, 135, 334; cabinet posts held by, 22; factional power wielded by, 25,150, 160, 252; LDP factional conflicts as recalled by, 20; LDP presidency as contested by, 51,52, 56-57, 60, 62, 63, 64 Ishizaka Taizö, 299, 301 Isuzu Company, 301, 357 Itö Hiroshi, 177,178 Itö Ködö, 317 Itö Masaya, 65, 66, 67, 72; cabinet posts held by, 64; factional maneuverings of, 174-77, 189, 190,195; Ikeda as eulogized by, 84; LDP factional conflicts as recalled by, 5 1 52, 74, 76-77,80, 81-82, 87,115, 117,118, 121-22,155,184-85,188,191-92 Itö Masayoshi, 434 Itö Ushirö, 317, 320 Iwai Akira, 318, 319, 322, 338, 353, 360, 375 Iwaki, 269 Iwase Shigeru, 160,161,163, 165 Iwate by-election, 429 Iwato boom, 66 Japan Broadcasting Corporation, 44,197 Japan Development Bank, 241 Japan Newspaper Association, 44 Japan-Republic of China (Taiwan) treaty (•952). : 33> : 3 6 Japan Sea, 70,140 Japan-South Korea treaty, 107

502

INDEX

Japan-Soviet Joint Communiqué (1956), 16, '39 Japan-U.S. Administrative Agreement, 22 Japan-U.S. Joint Communiqué (1961), 72 Japan-U.S. Joint Communiqué (1969), 104-6, 113,172 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (i960), 35-50,58, 166,199,403; civil disturbances against, 38-45, 46-48, 234, 384; extension of, 1069, 113; forced passage of, 37-38,40; labor disputes as linked with, 364-65, 367; LDP opposition to, 3, 22; LDP support for, 3537; negotiation process in, 24-26; Okinawa reversion as connected with, 102, 103, 105; pattern of conflict in, 48—50, 65, 66, 71,107, i n , 112; political climate during, 25, 27; ratification of, 45—48; SinoJapanese normalization and, 134 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (1972), 136, 179 Japan-U.S. textile agreement (1972), 120 Jiban (base of electorial support), 4 - 5 , 92, 245; of Tanaka, 240-41. See also specific parties Jiji News Agency (Jiji Tsushinsha), 249, 316, 321, 386 Jinmu boom, 22, 66 Ji Pengfei, 137,138 Jiyu Minshutô. See Liberal Democratic Party Jôban Coal Mining Company, 357 Johnson, Alexis, 101 Johnson, Lyndon, 100-101 JSP. See Socialist Party, Japan Jiimin undo. See Citizens' movements Justice Ministry, 99 Kagawa Toyohiko, 313 Kagoshima, 27g Kaifu Toshiki, 165, 257,435-38 Kakizawa Kôji, 256-57 Kanagawa, 67, 68, 75, 99, 279, 293, 389, 392 Kanbayashiyama Eikichi, 92 Kanda Hiroshi, 211 Kaneko, Reverend, 177,195 Kanemaru Shin, 418,421, 424 Kangyô Bank, 362 Kankôrô Union, 112 Kan Naota, 400 Kanô Hisaakira, 273, 276 Kanpai Rôso Union. See Electric Power Distribution Labor Union, Kanto Kansai Electric Company, 99, 338 Kansai region, 142, 269, 356

Kanto region, 68, 354, 356, 382, 391 Kashima, 279 Kasuga Ikkó, 396, 403,404 Kasuga Shójiró, 393 Katayama Tetsu, 308, 317 Kató Kanjü, 27, 317 Kató Mutsuki, 417, 437 Kató Noriyuki, 325 Kató Takayuki, 437 Katsumata faction, 339, 340, 342, 344, 349-50 Katsumata Seiichi, 309, 310, 315, 317, 328, 402; party posts held by, 329, 333, 334-35 Kawakami faction, 314, 315, 319, 321, 322, 334, 335> 349; ideological alignments of, 327, 328, 329, 331, 333, 337 Kawakami Jótaró, 308, 313, 317, 322, 332, 333; party posts held by, 327, 329 Kawano Yoshimitsu, 210 Kawasaki Steel Company, 272 Kawashima faction, 81, 92; dissolution of, 78; origins of, 214; size of, 214-15 Kawashima Shójiró, 26, 45, 61, 73; cabinet posts held by, 75, 85, 86; factional maneuverings of, 37, 46, 52, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 88, 89, 90-91,114,117-18, 252; party positions held by, 23, 36, 41, 91 Kaya Okinori, 135 Keidanren, 44, 97, 99, 142, 194, 297-98, 309; Antimonopoly law revision as opposed by, 170, 299; money politics as supported by, 14, 218, 222, 229-30. See also Zaikai Keihin Industrial belt, 278 Keisei Railways Union, 277 Keiyó Belt Economic Coordinating Committee, 272-75 Keiyó Industrial belt, 270-79,281 Keizai Dóyókai, 43, 44, 299, 309, 330 Kennedy, David, 106 Kennedy, John F., 72, 81, 245, 246 Khrushchev, Nikita, 40 Kihara Minoru, 318 Kikawada Kazutaka, 131 Kimitsu City, 281-85 Kimitsu fishing cooperative, 282 Kimura Aiko, 46 Kimura Takeo, 121, 122 Kimura Toshio, 114—15,122 Kinki region, 68, 142, 382 Kishi faction, 35, 53, 208, 220; electoral distribution of, 239; ex-bureaucrats associated with, 215; Fukuda group in, 73,114; funds received by, 224; Ikeda's relationship

INDEX

with, 52, 59, 64, 67, 81; Kawashima g r o u p in, 57,59; size of, 213, 214; splintering of, 213 Kishima Masamichi, 322-27, 345 Kishin Kosan Company, 227-28 Kishi Nobusuke, 54, 56, 85, 86,107,115, 135, 166, 365; background of, 17, 49; factional dissolution as viewed by, 212; Fukuda as viewed by, 158; hard-line policies of, 37, 43; Ikeda's relationship with, 58, 60, 61, 63, 72, 73, 75; as L D P senior advisor, 4 1 6 17,424; leadership challenges as faced by, 17-18,19, 25, 27, 28-34, 36, 4°-4'> 42, 4 5 46, 65; leadership style of, 2 - 3 , 1 6 , 1 9 , 21 — 23; O n o alliance as viewed by, 57; political ambitions of, 21-22, 24, 31, 67, 297; public image of, 245, 246, 247; resignation of, 48, 50, 51,55; Tanaka as viewed by, 149-50,151 Kita Kyushu, 269, 279, 391, 396 Kiuchi Shiro, 119 Kiyose Ichiro, 37-38 Kissinger, Henry, 104-6,109,178 Knowledge-intensive industries, 140 Kobayashi Kohei, 311 Kobe Steel Company, 368 Kochi, 279 Kochikai group, 78-79,115,116-18,122, 130, 174,191 K o d a m a Takaya, 152 K o d a m a Yoshio, 30, 31, 33-34,57, ¡77-79 Koenkai (personal support organizations), 5, 203, 223, 232, 236-44, 245, 270, 276, 348, 386, 400 Koide agricultural cooperative, 240-41 Koizumi Shinzo, 45 Kokusai Kogyo Company, 178, 179 Komeito. See Clean G o v e r n m e n t Party K o m o t o faction, 239, 411, 418, 419,420, 424, 426, 431,434; cabinet posts held by, 421, 43 1 .437 K o m o t o Toshio, 200, 411, 420, 435; L D P presidency as contested by, 191,192,416, 417; party posts held by, 193 K o n o faction, 22, 23, 36, 41, 57, 91, 208, 212, 260; electoral distribution of, 239; funds received by, 224; Ikeda's relationship with, 52, 59, 67, 73, 78, 82-83; L D P sponsorship of, 238; party politicians associated with, 64, 215; size of, 213; splintering of, 92, 213, 214 K o n o Ichiro, 8, 16, 17, 38, 58,119, 182; death of, 91; factional power wielded by, 18, 21,

503

25. 29. 3°. 3 I - 3 2 > 60, 63, 64, 72, 73, 75; factions viewed as necessary by, 77, 78; inc o m e doubling plan as manipulated by, 69-71; Kishi-Ikeda alliance and, 32-34; L D P criticism of, 75; L D P presidency as contested by, 85—91; Ö n o supported by, 57-58; public image of, 248; Tanaka compared with, 131 K ö n o Kenzö, 119, 121, 1 5 4 - 5 5 , ' 5 6 - 5 7 . '69, 181, 231 K ö n o Mitsu, 28, 312, 313, 334, 337 Köno Yöhei, 400, 418 Korea, South, 35, 40, 72,104, 105,172, 330, 396, 422 Korean war, 2, 262, 285, 296, 308 Körökyö (Council of Public Corporation and G o v e r n m e n t Enterprise Workers Unions), 172-74, 367-68 Kosaka Zentarö, 108 Köshin'etsu, 142 Kotchian, Carl A., 177, 178 Koyama Osanori, 156, 210 Kujime Kentarö, 149 Kumamoto, 279 Kuraishi Tadao, 17, 18, 72, 73, 212 Kurashiki, 269 Kuroda Ryöichi, 118 Kurogane Yasuni, 77, 368 Kusuda Minoru, 73-74, 81, 114, 246 Kyödö News Service, 44, 54, 429 Kiyomiya Ryü, 189,193 Kyoto, 99, 339-40,396 Kyushu, 68, 70, 128, 142, 284, 338, 356, 382 Labor Farmer Party (Rönötö), 307, 313, 314, 358 Labor Farmer Union, 1, 5 - 6 Labor Ministry, 70, 141, 255, 373 Labor movement, 38, 39, 49, 204, 232, 270, 348-82; ideology of, 1, 5 - 6 , 309-10,323, 338-39. 353-53. 35 8 -75; J s p ^ supported by, 277, 346-50,409; membership numbers in, 373; middle class in, 378-80; moderates in, 9; strikes organized by, 29, 38— 45, 46-48, 49,172-74,179; Okinawa reversion as viewed by, 112; political parties as supported by, 380-82; pollution issue as viewed by, 95,100; postwar political alignments of, 1—2. See also specific unions Labour Party, British, 308, 310 Land flipping, Tanaka's wealth acquired through, 130, 152, 227

504

INDEX

Land prices, escalation of, 142—44 Laos, 2i LDP National Organizational Committee, 234. 235 L D P - N e w Liberal People's Alliance, 419, 423 LDP Prefectural Federation, 274-77 LDP Revitalization Federation, 200 Left Socialist Party, Japan, 1, 218, 306-11,313, 323, 338, 353,408; electoral fortunes of, 315, 384; third-force plan of, 358. See also Socialist Party, Japan Liaison Conference Against Pollution, 97 Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyù Minshutô, or LDP), 1-304,408-439; bribery as utilized by, 83; changing image of, 296; composition of, 205-6; conservative merger as origin of, 1-2; decline of, 7, 9,12, 201, 204, 384-86,432-36,438; electoral base of, 4 5. 69. 92, 93-94. !47> '94-95. 205, 263, 278-79.303. 3°4. 400-407,409, 430; electoral fortunes of, 10, 23, 66-67,77 _ 79> 93. 108,143,147-49,186, 201, 340, 342, 398, 402, 403, 404, 406-7,418-19,424-25,43435,436-37; extraparliamentary movement as addressed by, 392-93; finances of, 218-19, 221-32; fiscal reconstruction policies of, 411 -16; foreign policies pursued by, 296-302; government as managed by, 251-68; hard-liners in, 107,173— 74; ideological stances adopted by, no— 11, 135,137,138; legislative stances adopted by, 26-29, 35> 37-38,48, i n —13, 334; leadership styles in, 9-10, 64-65, 131-32,167-68, 247-49,4 n > 422, 425; local organization as developed by, 232-44; mainstream/anti-mainstream alliances in, 30—32; membership numbers for, 217; organizational structure of, 2 - 3 , 8 - 9 , 1 5 , 18, 208-9; policies regarded as expedients by, 81, 246; power-wielders' cabinet in, 160-62; presidential elections in, 1517, 21, 50, 54, 64, 73-75, 81-83,92-93,117, 125,168-69,188-93,207, 210, 416-17,435; post-1955 configuration of, 10—12; reform initiatives in, 75-77,144,161,163, 168-69, 215-18; regional policies pursued by, 268-96; sales tax as viewed by, 428-49; union members in, 380-82. See also specific individuals and factions Liberal Party, Japan (Jiyùtô), 15, 16, 18, 12g, 218, 240, 241, 308

Liberal People's Conference, 207, 216-17,220 Lobbying networks, 204, 205, 251-68, 292-93, 409, 410; collapse of, 430; income doubling plan and, 70-71; subsidies as concern of, 264-68, 295. See also Interest groups Local Autonomy Ministry, 68, 69, 96-97,98, 99,130,141, 148; bureaucratic ranks in, 255-56, 261; funding contributions as reported by, 221, 226, 228, 230, 232; origins of, 268 Local centralization, 263-64 Local finance equalization grants, 263 Local government: economic vs. political issues in, 69; political influence of, 19, 59; pollution issue as addressed by, 95, 97, 98-100; progressive politics in, 390-93; realtor character of, 269-70; subsidies as negotiated by, 263—68. See also elections, local government Local Government Association, 388 Local Government Comprehensive Institute, 389. 391 Local taxes, 263 Lockheed scandal, 10,177-81,183,187, 216, 244. 341. 396, 400,

403.

4'7. 437

MacArthur, Douglas, 172, 355 MacArthur, Douglas, II, 24, 25, 35, 42, 43-44, 47 Machida Chuji, 128, 153 Maeo faction, 116, 214, 243 Maeo Shigesaburô, 52, 75, 79, 84, 130; factional maneuverings of, 86-87, 88, 89-90, 116-18,122; factional power wielded by, 114, 115, 155; LDP presidency as contested by, 92, 117; party posts, held by, 91 Mainichi shinbun, 22, 43,191, 307 Malaya, 21 Mainstream factions, 2, 4, 25, 27; composition of, 208. See also specific factions Management, unions as treated by, 353, 354, 357. 3 6 7. 369-72,37 6 -78 Mao Zedong, 135, 394 Marubeni Company, 177-78 Marukei funding, 302-5. See also Money politics Marunouchi Press Club, 153 Marxism-Leninism, 309-10,323, 338-39,341, 342, 394-95 Mass media: mass society as agent of, 7; politi-

INDEX

cal influence of, 12, 49, 244-50; political uses of, 409—10,422—23 Mass society: definition of, 4; economic growth as slowed by, 10-11; extraparliamentary movement as typical of, 94-100; LDP decline as aided by, 7, 9, 12, 201, 204, 385—86,407; multiparty system in, 94; political indicators of, 6 - 7 , 203; political repercussions of, 4 - 5 , 6, 48-49; prosperity associated with, 83-84; rapid growth as agent of, 12; social change wrought by, 285, 305. 378, 439 Masutani Shuji, 43, 64, 67, 212 Matsui Masakichi, 318-19,323, 335 Matsumae Shigeyoshi, 341, 399 Matsumoto faction, 317, 322, 334; ideological alignments of, 327, 328, 329 Matsumoto Seichò, 399 Matsumoto Shichirò, 46 Matsumoto Shun'ichi, 136 Matsumoto-Suwa region, 71 Matsumura faction, 36, 41, 52, 59, 93 Matsumura Kenzó, 38; factional power wielded by, 18, 29, 30, 60, 87; LDP presidency as contested by, 32, 51, 52, 62, 64 Matsumura Research Group, 95 Matsuno Raizò, 92, 144, 167 Matsuno Tsuruhei, 57 Matsuoka Komakichi, 308, 317 Matsuo Kinzó, 257-60 Matsuo Taiichirò, 178 Matsushita Masatoshi, 94 Mayors: progressive, 94,118, 391-92; subsidy process as described by, 263-68 Meiji regime, 408 Meiyókai, 370—71 Meyer, Armin H., 106 Middle class, Japanese, 11, 84, 378-80, 387-88 Middle East, 146 Miike labor dispute, 40, 338, 361-66, 367; ideological conflicts in, 338-39, 363-66 Miike Labor Union, 361 Miki administration, 167-87,403, 406; downfall of, 187; public perception of, 167 Miki Bukichi, 15-16 Miki Commission, 75—77,161, 163, 216, 237 Miki faction, 36, 71, 92,120,122,126,159,161, 411; cabinet posts held by, 187,194, 197; dissolution of, 78, 217; Fukuda as viewed by, 188, 189; funds received by, 224, 230; Ikeda as viewed by, 52, 73, 81, 82, 83; LDP

505

sponsorship of, 238; ohira as viewed by, 195,199—200; party politicians associated with, 215; origins of, 215; Tanaka as viewed by, 124-25,133, 150; weakness of, 166, 167 Miki/Matsumura faction, 41, 64, 67 Miki Takeo, 10,18, 29, 36, 38, 62, 64, 75, 79, 81, 158-87, 229, 259, 418, 423, 434, 438; appeasement strategy of, 168, 171-74; cabinet posts held by, 29, 91,126,143, 167; China's U.N. entry opposed by, no; electoral reform as viewed by, 145, 168-69; f a c _ tional maneuverings of, 85, 86, 87-88, 89, 91) " 9 . '55. '56,158-59.160,162-65, ' 9 6 97, 200, 209, 257; funding as solicited by, 229-30, 232; LDP presidency as contested by, 117, 125; leadership style of, 167-68; mass media as used by, 423, 432; money politics as criticized by, 149, 168-69, 2 3'! Nakasone as viewed by, 420; Okinawa reversion as viewed by, 101,102; party posts held by, 218; political background of, 16566; public image of, 246, 248-49,410; resignation of, 186, 195; strategies and goals of, 166-67 Mindo (Democratization League), 351, 354, 3 6 9-375 Minamata disease, 95 Ministries, central, 251-68. See also specific ministries Minobe Ryokichi, 94, 118, 391, 392, 398 Minroken. See Democratic Labor Movement Study Group Minshu Shakaito. See Democratic Socialist Party Misawa Shigeo, 254 Mishima municipality, 95, 241 "Mission of the Party, T h e , " 2 Mitarai Tatsuo, 74 MITI. See International Trade and Industry ministry Mitsubishi Company, 97, 99, 131, 148, 301 Mitsui Company, 99, 271 Mitsui Mining Company, 361-62 Miura Kazuo, 63 Miwajuso, 313 Miyagi, 67, 69, 433 Miyake Ichiro, 147 Miyake Seichi, 240-41 Miyakonojo agricultural cooperative, 289-91 Miyamoto Kenji, 393, 394, 399, 403 Miyata Yoshiji, 371, 372—73

5O6

INDEX

Miyazaki, 210, 279, 289—90 Miyazaki Yoshimasa, 59 Miyazawa faction, 435, 437 Miyazawa Kiichi, 71, 178, 411,419, 423, 426, 429, 438; cabinet posts held by, 427; factional maneuverings of, 431; noconfidence motion against, 430 Mizuhara Teruo, 338 Mizushima, 279 Mizuta faction, 126, 182, 217 Mizuta Mikio, 60, 61, 82,160; factional power wielded by, 116 Mizutani Chózaburò, 313 MOF. See Finance ministry Money politics, 159, 166, 169,192, 217, 222, 231, 302-4; Tanaka as dependent upon, 126, 128, 130,147—48,150—51,208, 410 Mori faction, 214 Mori Kiyoshi, 90, 91, 92, 213 Morinaga Hideyoshi, 325 Mori Yasoichi, 291 Morozumi Yoshihiko, 300 Murakami faction, 92, 93, 214 Murakami Isamu, 60, 81; budget process as recalled by, 252; LDP factional conflicts as recalled by, 54-56, 67, 6 0 - 6 1 , 2 1 0 - 1 1 Muramatsu Michio, 255 Murayama Tatsuo, 243 Mutò Kabun, 295 Mutsu Bay region, 98 Nabeyama Sadachika, 319 Nadao Kirokichi, 29, 59, 60, 61, 62, 83, 92,135, 155; factional power wielded by, 181; party posts held by, 167 Nagano, 71, 390 Nagano Shigeo, 131, 151, 158,159, 230, 303 Nagaoka, 241 Nagaoka Minoru, 253 Nagasaki, 279 Nagata Masaichi, 30, 31, 34, 57, 60, 90 Nagoya, 4, 98 Nakagawa faction, 411 Nakagawa Ichiro, 196, 200, 3 6 2 - 6 3 , 4 1 6 , 417 Nagakawa Risaburò, 292 Nakamura Kòhachi, 210 Nakamura Masao, 321 Nakamura Takuhiko, 371 Nakamura Umekichi, 91, 145,180, 182,183 Nakano Shiró, 80 Nakao Eiichi, 161, 222 Nakasone administration, 4 1 7 - 3 3

Nakasone faction, 9 2 , 9 3 , 1 2 0 , 1 2 1 , 1 2 2 , 1 2 4 , 1 2 6 , 1 2 7 , 1 5 6 , 1 6 1 , 165, 171, 213,426, 431,434; cabinet posts held by, 187,194,197,437; dissolution of, 217; electoral distribution of, 239; Fukuda as viewed by, 188; funds received by, 230; Ôhira as viewed by, 193, 195,196,199-200; origins of, 214; party posts held by, 411; Suzuki as viewed by, 416; Tanaka as opposed by, 150; weakness of, 422 Nakasone Yasuhiro, 1 2 , 1 2 6 , 1 7 1 , 1 8 2 , 230, 438; anti-mainstream defection of, 200; cabinet posts held by, 126, 143, 183, 303, 412; electoral reform as viewed by, 145; factional maneuverings of, 160,161—62,197, 411; L D P presidency as contested by, 191, 417; leadership challenges as faced by, 419—21; leadership style of, 410; mass media as used by, 422-23; party posts held by, 167,188, 229; political ambitions of, 159,176, 421-22; popularity of, 420, 432; reelection as explained by, 425; successor as chosen by, 431; Tanaka as viewed by, '33. ' 4 9 . ' 5 1 Nakayama Sohei, 1 3 1 , 1 5 1 , 220 Nakayama Tarô, 437 Nanjô Tokuo, 74, 82, 86 Nara, 279 Narita faction, 329, 337 Narita Tomomi, 101,134, 327, 331, 342; factionoriented tactics of, 332, 334; J S P as led by, 34°. 343. 344. 345. 402; J S P defects as viewed by, 346; party posts held by, 329, 335. 337. 339 National Cash Register Corporation, J a p a n , 225 National Communication Workers Union, 173 National Comprehensive Development Agency law (1973), 144 National Comprehensive Development law (1950),270 National Comprehensive Development plan (1969), 9 8 , 1 4 0 - 4 1 , 228 National Comprehensive Development plan (1961), 67-68, 98, 269 National Conference to Stop the Security Treaty Revision, 38 National Farmers' League (Zennô Nômin Sôrenmei, or Zennô Sôren), 291, 314 National L a n d Development Research Association, 300-301

INDEX

National National National National National

lifestyle survey (1974), 147 Press Club, 105 Public Service law (1947), 255 Railway, Japan (JNR), 145 Railway Locomotive Engineers

Union,Japan (Dörö), 41, 380, 381 National Railways Union, Japan (Kokurö), 41, 42, 46, 172,173, 277, 346, 353, 360, 368 National Security Council, U.S., 104 National Tax Administration Agency, 256 National Trade Union of Metal and Engineering Workers' Unions, 360 National treasury disbursements, 263 NBC, 28 Nemoto Ryütarö, 156 Neutral factions, 122—124,159, 200, 334, 411, 419, 426 New Current Society (Atarashii Nagare no Kai). 339. 340-41. 344 New industrial cities, 70-71,142 New Japan Steel Corporation, 229, 284, 300, 378. 379. 3 0 1 New Leaders, LDP, 411, 422,424-26,431-32, 434 New Liberal Club, 186,194, 198, 201, 385,4046,421, 434; dissolution of, 426; electoral fortunes of, 418-19,424; formation of, 400 Newsweek, 153 New Zealand, 21 Nihon Denken Company, 226—27 Nihon Hösö Kyökai (NHK), 44, 59,197 Nihon keizai shinbun, 44 Nihon Kökan Company, 359, 368, 369-70, 371; survey of workers in, 376, 377-78 Nihon Kyösantö. See Communist Party, Japan Nihon Rodò Kumiai Söhyögikai. See Söhyö Union Nihon Shakaitö. See Socialist Party, Japan Niigata Prefecture, 127,128-29, 228, 239, 293, 418 Niigata Transport Corporation, 227 Nikaidö faction, 435 Nikaidö Susumu, 126, 137,152,153,160, 170, 172, 411, 426; factional maneuverings of, 419-20; LDP presidency as contested by, 417, 431; party posts held by, 421 Nikka bribes, 83 Ninagawa Torazö, 339-40, 398 1955 political system: dynamics of, 203-407; establishment of, 1-2,54,408, 439; leadership as transformed by, 9-10; replace-

j07

ment of, 10-12,437. See also Liberal Democratic Party Ninja squads, in factions, 82, 83 Nippatsu. See Electric Power Distribution Corporation, Japan Nishimura Eiichi, 156,160,187,197, 200, 211, 320, 336, 396 Nishio faction, 315-16, 318, 319, 321, 383, 395 Nishio Suehiro, 128, 245, 306, 308, 317, 324; DSP as founded by, 321-22; JSP as viewed by, 318—21; Right socialists as advised by, 3 : 4~'5 Nishioka Takeo, 400, 437 Nishiyama Yataro, 271 Nissan Company, 357 Nixon, Richard, 102, 104-6,109,120, 132, 134, 136, 245 Nixon Shocks, 109-11,143, 302 Nodal development method, 268-69 Noda Uichi, 92 Nokyo. See agricultural cooperatives Nomizo faction, 317, 322, 327, 328, 329 Nomizo Masaru, 310 "Nonnuclear, par with mainland," Okinawa status as, 101-7,111 Nonpartisan voters, 386-87 Nosaka Sanzo, 393, 394 Numozu municipality, 95 OasaTadao, 16,127-28,129 Occupation, Allied, 1, 2, 4, 71, 204, 268, 288 Ogata Taketora, 15-17 Ogata faction, 214, 233 Ogawa Toyoaki, 277 Ogura Ken, 43 Ohashi Kazutaka, 339-40 Ohira, Mrs., 192 Ohira administration, 405,406, 424; factional composition of, 195, 197; no-confidence motion against, 199-200; unpopularity of, 198 Ohira faction, 120,121—22,124,126,127,156, 169,189, 411; cabinet posts held by, 194, 197; dissolution of, 217; Fukuda as viewed by, 182, 183,192; funds received by, 228, 230; LDP reform as opposed by, 216; origins of, 214 Ohira Masayoshi, 8, 34, 51-53, 62-63,72, 86, 93,132,400, 411; cabinet appointments by, 193-94,197-98; cabinet posts held by, 64, 75,143,167; China's U.N. entry opposed by, no; death of, 201; factional maneuver-

5O8

INDEX

Ohira Masayoshi (continued) ings of, 8i, 84, 89, 90-91, 92, 115,116-18, 120,155,159, 160,174-77, 'So, 181,182-86; LDP presidency as contested by, 125,18893; leadership challenges as faced by, 194-98; party posts held by, 85, 187, 188; Shiina decision as viewed by, 164,176; Sino-Japanese treaty as negotiated by, 126, 132,134,135, 137-38; Tanaka's relationship with, 120, 129, 130, 133, 145,149, 154 Oil crisis of 1973, 10, 146-47,148, 169, 284, 302, 411 Oita, 70, 71, 279, 396 Okita Saburo, 197 Okubo Toshiharu, 178,181 Okayama, 269 Okinawa, m - 1 2 , 1 4 2 , 382, 391, 392 Okinawa reversion, 22, 25, 70, 81, 100-113, 120,121,166; civil disturbances connected with, 112; forced passage of, m - 1 3 ; nonnuclear status of, 101-7,111; security issues as linked with, 102,103,105,109, n o Okubo Tomejiro, 16-17 Omori agricultural cooperative, 293-94 O n o Banboku, 15,18; death of, 82,91, 210; factional power wielded by, 17, 18, 20, 21, 29, 33-34,71, 75, 2io, 252, 259; Fujiyama's relationship with, 74—75; funding as viewed by, 225; Kishi's relationship with, 30-32, 35-36.49, 57; LDP criticism of, 75; LDP factional conflicts as recalled by, 35-36; LDP presidency as contested by, 51, 52, 59-62, 63, 64; Party posts held by, 23; public image of, 248; Sato's relationship with, 54-56; Tanaka compared with, 131; Yoshida's relationship with, 77 O n o faction, 41, 55,56, 59, 74, 92, 208, 252, 257; dissolution of, 78, 212; electoral distribution of, 239; Ikeda's relationship with, 52, 57, 64, 72, 73, 81, 82; LDP sponsorship of, 238; party politicians associated with, 215; splintering of, 214 O n o Ichiro, 241, 243 Opinion polls, 147, 384, 385,401, 406, 417-18, 429, 438,439; politics as influenced by, 249-50 Organizational leaders, in local politics, 23334 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 300 Osaka, 4, 67, 68, 98, 269, 279, 293, 399; extraparliamentary movement in, 389, 390, 391

Osano Kenji, 177, 178, 179, 227, 241 Ôta faction, 337 Ôta Kaoru, 38, 39-40,43, 44, 318, 319-20,326, 338, 346; labor movement as analyzed by, 374-75; resignation of, 369; Sôhyô as led by, 351, 364, 367,368 Ôta-Iwai plan, 360, 374 Ôuchi Hyôe, 338 "Outline of Comprehensive Emergency Measures," 22 "Outline Proposal for Doubling National Income," 65, 67, 68 Overpopulated regions, 269 Owada village, regional development and, 283-84 Ozawa Ichiro, 437 Ozawa Saeki, 37, 58, 63, 74, 82 Ozawa Tatsuo, 153, 421 Pacific Belt region, 4; economic development of, 67-68,95, 130,140, 279-81, 297 PARC. See Policy Affairs Research Council Parity system, 1955 system replaced by, 10-12, 255. 399. 4°5 Party politician,Japanese, 205-6; exbureaucrat as antithesis of, 60, 62-64, factions identified with, 215; Tanaka as, 131, 409 Party Reconstruction Diet Members' Federation, 150 Party Style Revitalization Federation, 75-77, 78, 114 People's Association, LDP, 212, 220-22, 223, 224, 229, 234 People's Political Association, LDP, 229-30 People's Cooperative Party, 166 Personal support associations. See Kôenkai Philippines, 21, 35 Police Agency, Japan, 44, 47,112 Police Duties law, revision of, 26-29, 35> 38, 39,41,48,49,65, 166 Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), LDP, 23, 25; budget as considered by decision-making influence of, 8, 26, 204, 208, 211, 251, 253-54; Economic Planning Agency of, 65, 67, 69, 70,74, 99,140, 141, 255, 256, 261; electoral reform plan of, 144; income doubling as viewed by, 65, 67-68,69; sales tax as debated by, 427-28 Political Funds Regulation law (1976), 169, 222, 230, 231-32, 293 Political Study Association, 307

INDEX

Pollution, 6, 72, 94-100,140,143, 302, 388, 389-89 Pollution Commission, 97 Population, industrialization and, 270, 27781, 285, 296 Pork barrel networks, LDP support sustained by, 4 , 1 1 , 1 2 , 205, 238,409, 410, 430,432. See also Interest groups Portugal, 300 Postal Workers Union, Japan (Zentei), 173, 277 Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union, Okinawa, 112 Prefectural Branches, Federation of, 233 Prefectures: economic vs. political issues in, 69; political influence of, 19,59; pollution ordinances passed in, 98-99; regional development and, 270-79,281. See also Local government Press, 425-26; electoral reform plan as viewed by, 145; Kishi resignation sought by, 41; Miki as viewed by, 171,180-81; money politics as viewed by, 148; political influence of, 244-50; pollution issue as influenced by, 100; security treaty as viewed by, 38, 42, 44, 49 Private Railway Workers' Unions of Japan, Genera] Federation of (Shitetsu Rören), 42, 360 Private-Sector Labor Unions, All Japan Federation of (Zenmin Rören, or Rengö), 432. 434-35 Production rationalization, 8, 305, 361-62, 366, 369-72,376-78 Productivity Center, Japan, 369 Progressive local governments, 390-93. See also Extraparliamentary movement Progressive Mayors Association, 391 Progressive Party (Kaishintö),Japan, 16,12728. 437 Progressive-Social Democratic League, 437 Proletarian Party, Japan, 308 Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform, 12, 412-16 Public Corporation and Government Enterprise Labor Relations Board (PCGELRB), 367-68 Public Corporation and Government Enterprise Workers Unions, Council of (Körökyö), 172-74, 367-68 Public Officials Election law (1976), 169, 231 Public sector workers, surveys of, 378—80 Public Security Investigative Agency, 394

509

Radio, television compared with, 245 Ranked workers, in industry, 376-78 Rationalization regions, 269 Reconstruction Finance Bank, 128 Recruit scandal, 410, 433, 435,438 Red Purge, 351, 354 Reform Deliberation Council, 29 Regional development, 268-85 Regional Industrial Development Council, 70 "Regulations of the Liberal Democratic Party Headquarters Secretariat (Draft)," 234 Remodeling plan, for industry, 1 3 0 , 1 3 1 , 1 3 9 46, 228, 411 Remodeling theJapanese Archipelago (Tanaka), 139-40, 246 Rengô. See Private-Sector Labor Unions, All Japan Federation of Representatives, House of, 59, 89, 91,143, 165, 339; agricultural support for, 293, 296; bureaucrats as members in, 205; commercial interests as represented in, 304; election results in, 1, 29,187,188,197-201,334, 335, 400, 405,435; labor union members in, 348-50; legislation presented to, 26, 37, 99, h i , 112—13,430, 436; reform plan for, 144-45; resolutions passed by, 178, 193, 194; Ohira as supported in, 195; Sato as viewed by, 92 Resident local organizers, LDP support developed by, 235-36, 237 Residents' movements, 6-7, 390 Retailers' Association, 428 Revolution, Russian, 326 Rhee Syngman, 40 Right Socialist Party, Japan, 1, 218, 311—15, 384, 408. See also Socialist Party, Japan Rinchô (Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform; Rinji Gyôsei Chôsakai), 412-16 Rogers, William, 109, no Rônô (labor farmer) ideology, 309-10,323, 338-39 Rôtô strike, 41 Rusk, Dean, 101,107 Ryokufukai, 218 Ryukyu Islands, 101 Saga, 279 Sahashi Shigeru, 257-60, 298-99,301 Saitama, 279 Saitô Kunikichi, 193,194

510

INDEX

Saka Ken, 148 Sakamoto Misoji, 437 Sakata Eiichi, 286-87 Sakata fishing cooperative, 2 8 1 - 8 2 Sakata Michita, 60 Sakisaka Itsuro, 318, 323, 338, 341 Sakurada Takeshi, 151 Sakurai Shin, 243 Sakurauchi Yoshio, 127,197,199, 200,260,411, 437 Sales tax, 410, 426-30,433, 437 Sanbetsu Union. See Enterprise Unions, All J a p a n C o n f e r e n c e of San C l e m e n t e c o n u n d r u m , 1 2 0 - 2 1 San'in region, 68, 142 Sankei shinbun, 73, 81,155,160, 188, 246 Sanken (Industrial Problems Research Association; Sangyô M o n d a i Kenkyukai), 9, 300-301 Sankôren, 3 6 1 - 6 2 , 3 6 3 , 3 6 4 - 6 5 San'yaku (three party officers), 32, 206 Sapporo, 98 Sasaki faction, 327, 328, 337,340, 342, 344 d o m i n a n c e achieved by, 3 3 2 - 3 3 , 334, 335, 339. 347- 3 4 9 - 5 ° Sasaki Hideyo, 16 Sasaki Kôzô, 41, 134, 310, 317, 322, 329, 333~35> 341,403, 420, 426, 432; Eda as viewed by, 335. 34' Sasaki Ryôsaku, 113, 159, 336, 341, 396 Sasaki Tadashi, 230 Sasaki Yoshitake, 184 Satô, Mrs., 5 3 - 5 4 Satô administration, 109, 145,166,167, 225, 227, 231; China's U.N. m e m b e r s h i p as cosponsored by, 110-11; elections of, 334, 335; m a n d a t e as accomplished by, 113; Okinawa reversion as ratified by, m - 1 3 ; pollution issue as addressed by, 9 5 - 9 9 , 140; right-wing character of, 93,107; security treaty as e x t e n d e d by, 1 0 7 - 9 Satô Eisaku, 16,17, 43,45, 8 5 - 1 2 5 , 1 3 9 , 1 8 2 , 207; cabinet a p p o i n t m e n t s by, 91, 93,117, 119; cabinet posts h e l d by, 69, 80; factional dissolution as viewed by, 79; factional maneuverings of, 25, 2 9 - 3 1 , 210, 252, 257; f o u r t h t e r m as desired by, 1 1 3 , 1 1 5 , 1 1 6 , 1 2 1 ; Fukuda's relationship with, 1 1 4 - 1 5 , 1 3 0 ; Ikeda's relationship with, 53—57,60, 63, 7 3 - 8 0 ; i n c o m e doubling plan as criticized by, 71, 94; Johnson's talks with, 100-101; LDP presidency as contested by, 8 0 - 8 3 ,

85, 87, 8 8 - 9 1 ; leadership challenges as faced by, 92, 111,115—16; Nixon's talks with, 102,104-5,120; Okinawa reversion as viewed by, 1 0 2 - 3 ; public image of, 246, 248; reelection of, 9 2 - 9 3 , 1 0 3 ; r e t i r e m e n t of, 122,123; successor as chosen by, 1 1 3 15,120,125; Tanaka as viewed by, 119 Sato faction, 22, 32, 35, 78, 208; electoral distribution of, 239; ex-bureaucrats associated with, 215, 259; f u n d s received by, 224; Ikeda's relationship with, 56, 59, 64, 67, 72, 74, 8 1 - 8 2 ; LDP sponsorship of, 238; origins of, 214; size of, 213; splintering of, 124; Tanaka as influential in, 93,116,129 Sato Wataru, 89 Satsukikai, 306, 307 Scientific socialism, J C P espousal of, 395 Seamen's Union, 314, 315, 358 Seiji Daigakuin, 234, 2 3 5 - 3 6 Self-Defense Agency, J a p a n , 44-45,107, 199 Senate, U.S., 107,111,177 Sendai, 69, 70, g8, 269 Shakai shinpo, 346 Shakaishugi, 318, 326 Shangai C o m m u n i q u e (1972), 132, 134 Shibata Hitoshi, 272-77, 281 Shibushi Bay region, 98 Shida Shigeo, 393 S h i d e h a r a faction, 128,129 Shigemasa-Mori faction, 92 Shigemasa Seishi, 87 S h i g e m u n e Yuzo, 119,121 Shiikuma Saburo, 28, 63 Shiina, Mrs., 165, 180 Shiina Committee, 216, 229 Shiina decision, 1 6 0 - 6 2 , 1 9 3 Shiina Etsuzaburo, 51, 64,151, 154-65,170, 231; cabinet posts h e l d by, 167, 183; factional maneuverings of, 155-56,158,177, 179-81,185; arty positions h e l d by, 136,150 Shiina faction, 126, 182; origins of, 214 Shikoku, 68, 71, 142, 356, 382 Shimane, 279, 396 Shimizu municipality, 95 Shimizu Shinzo, 311, 359, 360, 376 S h i m o d a Takezo, 104 S h i m o m u r a Osamu, 246 Shin'etsu region, 382 S h i n o d a Kosaku, 15 Shinro Union (New Miike Coal Mine Union), 363-64 Shinsanbetsu U n i o n , ioo, 360, 372, 373

INDEX Shinsei Enterprises, 227-28 Shin shükan,369 Shiomi Tomonosuke, 308 Shirai Chiyokichi, 282 Shitomi Makoto, 371 Shizuoka, 95,99 Showa Denko scandal, 114,128, 314, 319 Shuryüha (mainstream alliance), 2 Singapore, 21 Sino-Japanese summit meeting (1972), 13638 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1977), 190 Social Citizens League (Shakai Shimin Rengö), 344-45,400 Social Democratic League, 201, 400, 404-5, 418-19,424, 428; electoral fortunes of, 436, 437 Social Democratic Party, German, 308 Soäalism ( Shakaishugi), 338 Socialism Association (Shakaishugi Kyökai), 318, 319, 344, 359; factional dominance of, 337-43.347. 349-50.403; self-reform of, 345 Socialist Party, Japan (Nihon Shakait6;JSP), ' - 2 , 74. '59. 203, 249, 305-50,400-407, 426; agricultural policies of, 292, 296; class struggle phase of, 305-6, 309-10, 323, 338-39; coalition government sought by, 198-99. 20'. 336-37.341. 399. 420,423. 434, 436; decline of, 5-7,305-6,318, 345, 383-84, 285, 393,407,409; electoral fortunes of, 6, 9, 23, 67, 92, 93-94,108, 118, 143,186,194, 201, 220, 319, 334, 335, 337, 34°. 342, 344.346,348. 383-84.394. 396, 418-19,424, 429, 433, 434-35,436-37; executive committees of, 317, 327, 329, 331, 334-35. 337. 342. 344; factionalism in, see specific factions', formation of, 307; funds received by, 218, 232, 293, 346; income doubling plan as viewed by, 66, 71; labor ideology in, 1,5-6, 204, 363, 395; LDP's relationship with, 6,11, 21, 41, 208, 240, 254, 438-39; legislative stances adopted by, 26, 27-28,70,145,169; lobbying abilities of, 265; management of, 346-47; Okinawa reversion as viewed by, 111-13; opposition tactics of, 3, 28-29, 37-38.42, 44, 47, 48, 49, 93,109,148, 428; pollution bill proposed by, 99; progressive mayors as viewed by, 391, 392; Sinojapanese treaty as supported by, 138; structural reform

511

phase of, 6, 204, 322-33,338,423; unification of, 306-20,408; union members in, 380-82 Socialist Youth Federation (Shakai Seinen Domei), 338, 339 Social Mass Party, 313, 314 Social Times, 310 Society to Criticize the Security Treaty, 42 Society for Thinking About a New Japan, 341, 342, 399.403 Sodomei Union, 314, 315, 351, 352, 372 Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan; Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai), 148, 203, 277, 395,432; electoral reform as opposed by, 145; ideological programs, of, 352-53. 366, 372, 374-75; origins of, 351; pollution issue as addressed by, 100; receding influence of, 305,386,423; right wing of, 314-15; security treaty as opposed by, 38-39,43, 46, 49; strikes as organized by, 353, 362, 363-69;JSP as supported by, 1, 6, 27, 29,198, 204, 277, 310, 318, 322, 327, 345. 346-50.382, 395. 399. 408; youth division of, 339 Soka Gahkai 0 kiru (Hirotatsu), 398 Soka Gakkai sect, 7, 336, 395, 397, 399-400 Sone Eki, 320, 322 Sonoda faction, 214 SonodaSunao, 91, 152,185-86,187,188 Soseikai, 421, 426 Soviet Union, 40,168, 330, 339, 340, 358 Spain, 300 Special Measures law (1961), 298—300 Spring offensives, 172-74,360, 366-69,373, 374 State Department, U.S., 104,179 Student Self-Government Associations, National Federation of. See Zengakuren Strikes, 29, 49, 338-39, 353, 362, 363-69; by public sector unions, 172-74,179; against security treaty, 38-45,46-48. See also Labor movement Structural reform, JSP espousal of, 6, 204, 322-33,338.423 Study Committee on Revision of Party Regulations, 216 Subsidies, negotiation process in, 262-268, 295-96. 302,409 Sugano Gisaku, 275, 276 Sugihara Arata, 63 Sugi Michisuke, 319 Sugiura Akira, 282

512

INDEX

Sumitomo Company, 95, 371 Sunada faction, 92 Sunada Shigemasa, 23 Sunada Shigetami, 430 Sun Pinghua, 133-34 Suntory bribes, 83 Suppression of Free Speech incident, 396, 398 Supreme Court, Japan, 424 Surveys: of lifestyles, 147; of nonpartisan voters, 386-88; of union political activities, 380-82; of voters, 401; of workers, 376-80 Suzuki faction, 239,411,416, 420, 421,423,426 Suzuki Kikujirö, 282-83 Suzuki Mosaburö, 23, 28, 211, 306-7,309, 310-11,313, 319, 322; J S P unification as achieved by, 315, 317 Suzuki Mosaburö faction, 311, 317, 318, 319, 329, 331, 349; structural reform opposed by, 327-28 Suzuki Sachi, 416 Suzuki Shun'ichi, 94 Suzuki Zenkö, 52, 91,108, 117,156, 165, 207; cabinet posts held by, 85,187; factional maneuverings of, 174-75, 2 0 0 > 419-20; factional power wielded by, 116, 118, 193; party posts held by, 127,198 Suzuki Zenkö administration, 1 1 - 1 2 , 4 1 1 - 1 6 Swing voters, 410, 430, 433, 434, 436 Synthetic Chemical Industry Workers Union, 100, 358, 359, 360, 368, 369, 396 Tachibana Takashi, 130,152, 229 Tadokoro Teruaki, 312 Tagawa Seiichi, 134, 136,198,400, 418-19 Taiwan, 21,104, 105, no, 111,172; SinoJapanese treaty and, 133, 135-39 Takahashi Michitoshi, 24 Takahasi Torao, 240-41 Takano Minora, 351, 352; organizationoriented plan of, 357-66 Takaragi Fumihiko, 326, 369, 375, 395 Takasaki Tatsunosuke, 58 Takashima Masuo, 137-38 Takashi Toshihide, 169 Takeiri memorandum, 135 Takeiri Yoshikatsu, 133,134-35,39^, 420,426 Takemi Tarö, 310 Takeshita administration, 410, 433-34 Takeshita faction, 435, 437 Takeshita Noboru, 153,156,418, 419,421, 431, 433; cabinet posts held by, 427; as LDP New Leader, 425,426, 438

Takushoku Bank, 362 "Talking with the Prime Minister," 245 Tamura Toshio, 66 Tamura Yuzo, 87 Tanaka administration, 172,303,337; factional composition of, 126; inflation as problem for, 145; popularity of, 249; remodeling plan as managed by, 140-42,411 Tanaka Construction Company, 127,128, 226, 239 Tanaka faction, 120,121,124,130,156,159,160; cabinet posts held by, 187,194,197,421; dissolution of, 217; electoral distribution of, 239; Fukuda as viewed by, 182,183, 188, 189, 192; funds received by, 229, 230, 232; indictments in, 417; LDP reform as opposed by, 169, 216; Nakasone supported by, 422; 1980s dominance of, 410,418, 419, 431; Ohira as viewed by, 195; origins of, 214; Suzuki as viewed by, 416 Tanaka Isaji, 216 Tanaka Kakuei, 34, 115-58,166, 417-21; background of, 9,127, 215; cabinet appointments by, 126-27; cabinet meetings as conducted by, 145; cabinet posts held by, 22-23,75; domestic policies of, 130,131, 139-46,168; downfall of, 9-10,152-57, 431,434; early career of, 127-29; electoral base of, 240-41; factional maneuverings of, 53. 73-74.80, 86, 89, 92-93,126,12930, 208, 213, 411, 420-21; factional style of, 409, 432; foreign policies of, 132-39; funding strategies of, 226-29; indictment of, 417; LDP presidency as contested by, 1 1 5 26; LDP resentment of, 93, 150; leadership style of, 8,72, 127, 131-32,139; Nakasone as viewed by, 176-77; nickname of, 131, 248; no-confidence motion against, 111; party posts held by, 91, 119, 398; popularity of, 127, 131,157,167,418; public image of, 246, 248; remodeling plan as valued by, 143; resignation of, 157,158, 160, 216; revival as attempted by, 174-77, 180, 190-91; Shiina decision as viewed by, 165; stroke suffered by, 421; Suzuki as viewed by, 417; swindling as practiced by, 130,"52 Tanaka Rokusuke, 184, 418-19 Tanaki Shoji, 92 Tanro Union. See Coal Miners' Union, Japan Taxes, 142,263,410,413-15,426-30,433,435, 43 6 - 437

INDEX

Teachers' Union,Japan (Kyöso), 277, 345, 353 Technological innovation, labor movement and, 376-78,409 Telecommunications Workers' Union, All Japan (Zendentsü), 346, 348, 354, 369, 380, 381-82, 396 Television, 49, 245 Textile issue, Okinawa reversion as linked to, 106,120, 300 Textile Workers' Union, 314, 315, 358 Thailand, 21 Thatcher, Margaret, 439 Third parties, reasons for growth of, 383-407 Tochigi, 348, 396 Togo Fumihiko, 24, 104 Tohoku, 68, 71, 142, 264, 280, 356, 382, 391 Tokai, 68, 269, 382 Tokaidö railway line, 83, 279 Tokuda faction, 393 Tokushima, 390 Tokuyasujitsuzö, 61, 211 Tokyo, 4, 67, 68, 98,142, 143, 293, 345, 382, 389; gubernatorial elections in, 75,94, 396, 398, 399; prefectural elections in, 92, 392, 434; regional development of, 270—79 Tokyo Electric Company, 94, 99,151, 229, 270, 354, 376; survey of workers in, 377-78 Tokyo Olympics, 83, 85 Tokyo Stock Exchange, 148 Tokyo University, 255 Tomakomai region, 98 Tomonö Taketo, 273-75 Tomono Torao, 113 Tone River, 273, 274 Toray Corporation, 95 Toyama, 67, 70, 269 Toyota Company, 284, 357 Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 9; Tanaka as contemporary version of, 126-30, 248 Trade Union Congress, Japan (Zen Nihon Rödö Kumiai Kaigi, or Zenrö Kaigi), 315, 372 Transportation Ministry, 69, 141, 256, 302 Trawling bribes, 83 TriStar jumbo jet, 178 Tsugawa Takeichi, 292 Tsukadajüichirö, 62 Tsukamoto Saburö, 426 Twenty-First Century Club, 404 Uchida Hiroshi, 46 Uchida Kenzö, 54

513

Uemura Kogoro, 218 Ugaki Kazunari, 128 United Nations, no-11 United States, 330, 358, 369, 416, 422, 425 Uno Sosuke, 434, 435 Uonoma County, Tanaka as supported in, 240-43 Urban areas, political parties supported in, 395- 396-97. 399. 4°o Ushiba Nosuhiro, 109 U-2 spy plane, 40 Vietnam, South, 21,101,104 Vietnam War, 109 Voters, 401, 406-7, 424-25; in agricultural cooperatives, 289—93; floating, 410, 430, 433, 434, 436; industrialization and, 27879. 385-86 Wada faction, 318, 319, 322, 334, 349; dissolution of, 328; ideological alignments of, 327. 329. 331.332-33 WadaHiroo, 41, 307-11, 316, 317-18; party posts held by, 327, 329, 333 Wada Kanji, 257 Wada Tsutoma, 46 Wakasa Tokuji, 178,181 Washington Post, 153 Watanabe faction, 437 Watanabe Michio, 295, 413, 438 Watanabe Naoji, 178 Watanabe Tsuneo, 31, 57, 62, 64, 83, 85, 88; faction sizes as reported by, 212-13; public image as considered by, 247 Watanabe Tsunezo, 294 Watari Shiro, 241, 243 Water Resources Public Corporation, 269 Wide-area core cities, 98, 269 Women, political involvement of, 436 Women's Conference, Japan, 338 Worker Comrade Society (Rodosha Doshikai), 353. 358, 359 Xiao Xiangqian, 133 Yamada Taiji, 242 Yamagata, 279, 293 Yamaguchi Toshio, 272, 389, 419, 421 Yamakawa Hitoshi, 338 Yamamoto Katsuichi, 107 Yamamoto Koichi, 38, 41, 331, 334, 337 Yamanaka Sadanori, 427

514

INDEX

Yanada Hiroyasu, 317 Yatsugi Kazuo, 319 Yomanaki Sadanori, 156,171 Yamashita Isamu, 56-57 Yamashita Seiichi, 220 Yanojun'ya, 113, 336, 341, 398, 403,420, 426 Yaoita Tadashi, 335 YaraChöbyö, 102,112 Yawata Steel Company, 281-85,300, 357, 370, 371-72 Yayoikai, 341, 344 Yokohama, 390, 391, 392 Yomiuri shinbun, 31, 59, 80, 87,154-55, '79> 180, 184, 191 Yoshida (Kissinger's friend), 105-6 Yoshida administration, 308, 315, 355 Yoshida faction, 22, 212 Yoshida Shigeru, 166, 167, 215, 246; factional power wielded by, 3, 16, 29, 36, 54, 58, 67, 76-77, 79-80,129, 213; Kishi as enemy of, 22, 25; public image of, 247 Zaikai (financial world) : cabinet posts awarded to, 209; composition of, 7; conservative interests supported by, 2, 28,158, 203, 408; economic development as pro-

moted by, 95, 285; factions as viewed by, 203; funding decisions of, 77,151-52,170, 186, 201, 208, 215, 218—20, 229—31,436; Ikeda's relationship with, 53, 65, 80; JSP as viewed by, 308, 309, 330,346-47; labor movement as viewed by, 362, 373; Köno as viewed by, 63, 87, 89, 90; Miki as viewed by, 179,187; political independence of, 9, 12, 92, 204, 297-98,300-301; pollution issue as viewed by, 96, 97, 98, 99-100; sales tax as opposed by, 413-15,427; Tanaka as viewed by, 130-31,175, 228 Zendenrö. See Electric Power Workers' Unions, National Federation of Zengakuren (National Federation of Student Self-Government Associations), 39, 42,46, 47. 338 Zenji Union. See Automobile Industry Workers' Union, All Japan Zenkankö Union, 372 Zennö Sören Union. See National Farmers' League Zenrö Kaigi. See Trade Union Congress, Japan Zhou Enlai, 109,132-38

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