Contemporary Ethical Theories

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CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL THEORIES by LUTHER J. BINKLEY, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Philosophy Fra?ikli?i and M arshall College

PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY, INC. New York, N. Y.

C opyright © 1961 by P h i l o s o p h i c a l L i b r a r y , I n c . 15 E ast 40th Street, New York 16, N . Y. A L L R IG H T S RESERVED

Library of Congress Catalog Card N u m b e r: 61-10605 M anufactured in the United States of America

D E D IC A T IO N IN M EM ORY OF

M y M o t h e r ., AND IN HONOR OF

M y F ath er

138824

TABLE Preface

OF C O N T E N T S

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ix

CH A PTER ONE I n t u it io n is m

I.

.............................................................................................................................

1

G. E. M oore: T h e N atu ralistic Fallacy and Id eal U t ilit a r ia n is m ......................................................

1

W. D. R oss: T h e R ightness of A c t s .................................

25

III. A. C. Ew ing: “ O ugh t” as the B asic E thical T erm . . .

44

II.

C H A PTER TW O T

he

E

m o t iv e

T

h eo ry

of

Et

h ic s

...........................................................................

59

I. A. J. Ayer: T h e Em otive T heory of Ethics based on L ogical P o sitiv is m ..................................................

64

II. Charles Stevenson: Ethics and Lan guage ......................

82

CH APTER TH REE T

he

L

anguage and

I. II. III.

L

o g ic o f

M

o r a ls

................................................................

103

T o u lm in : T h e Search for Good Reasons in Ethics . . 106 U rm son: “ On G rad in g” .....................................................

120

H are: M oral L an guage as P re sc rip tiv e ........................... 132 C H A PTER FO U R

E t h ic a l P h il o s o p h y a n d M

o r a i.

L

iv in g

..........................................................

1 62

W hat is Philosophy? ............................................................. 164 T h e Gam es Played by M oral P h ilo so p h e r s..................

171

Is E thical T h eo ry U seful? .................................................

185

T ow ard R em ovin g the M uddles of Classification . . . 189

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Acknow ledgm ent is gratefully m ade to the follow ing publishers and authors for perm ission to reprint from their works: George Allen & U nw in, L td .: British Philosophy in the Mid-Cen­ tury, C. A. M ace, editor; an d My Philosophical Development, by B ertran d Russell. B asil Blackw ell: L ogic an d L an g u ag e (First and Second Series), A. G. N . Flew, editor; Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis, by Jo h n W is­ dom ; and Philosophical Investigations, by L udw ig W ittgenstein. C am bridge U niversity Press: Theory of Games As a T ool for the M oral Philosopher, by R . B. Braith w aite; Priiicipia Ethica, by G. E. M oore; an d The Place of Reason in Ethics, by Stephen T o u lm in . T h e C larendon Press, O xford: T h e L an g u age of M orals, by R . M. H are; and T he Right an d the Good, by W. D. Ross. Dover Publications, Inc.: Lan guage, T ruth and Logic, by A. J . Ayer. ($1.25). R outledge and K egan Paul, L td .: Second Thoughts in M oral P h i­ losophy, by A. C. Ew ing; and The M ean in g of M eaning, by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards. Yale U niversity Press: Ethics and Lan guage, by Charles Stevenson.

PREFACE T h is book is an attem pt to explain to the reader interested in ethics and philosophy what has been h appen in g in the area of ethical theory in the present century. A m inor revolution w ithin philosophy has been developing as philosophers turn m ore and more away from the attem pt to give m oral guidance to m an toward a critical evalu a­ tion of the nature of m oral judgem ents themselves. Since this develop­ m ent in philosophy has been largely a child of contem porary English philosophers, it is not w ithout accident that m ost of tlie thinkers treated in this book are British philosophers. T h e ordinary reader does not have the time to read at length in contem porary philosophical literature, an d hence this book is one attem pt to try to explain the approaches to ethical theory an d some of the conclusions arrived at by some of the leading contem porary philosophers. In the last chapter this writer attem pts to present some of his own conclusions, as well as to ju stify what present professors of philosophy are doing as really being philosophy. I am grateful to the follow ing people for their assistance in reading the m an uscript in whole or in p art and for m aking many valuable suggestions to me: Professor R . B. Braithw aite, C am bridge U niversity; C. J . E. Dashw ood, Em m anuel College, C am bridge U niver­ sity; an d Professor Jo h n B. Noss, C hairm an of the D epartm ent of P h il­ osophy, Fran klin an d M arshall College. I am also indebted to Professor Jo h n W isdom of C am bridge U niversity for m any helpful suggestions durin g my work on the final chapter of the book. Any errors which rem ain in this book are my own, and I m ust also assume full respon­ sibility for my interpretation of the nature of contem porary philoso­ phical thinking. I should like to express my gratitude to Franklin and M arshall College for grantin g me a Sabbatical Year in 1959-60 in order that I m ight work on this book at C am bridge U niversity in England. Lastly, I w ant to express my deep thanks to L u cretia H am m ond who so ably typed my m anuscript. LUTH ER J . BINKLEY Fran k lin and M arsh all College L ancaster, Pa.

CONTEMPORARY e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s

C H A P T E R

O N E

IN TU ITIO N ISM I.

G. E. Moore: The Naturalistic Fallacy and Ideal Utilitarianism

In a real sense the revolution in ethics which m arks the twentieth century began with the pu blicatio n in 1903 of G. E. M oore’s book Principia Ethica. M oore’s careful analysis of the questions of ethics went far toward show ing that much previous w riting on this subject was quite confused, m ainly because the authors h ad failed to differen­ tiate clearly the questions which they were trying to answer. It is true that M oore’s analysis o f both n atu ralistic and m etaphysical ethical theories weakened considerably the possibility of subscribing to either of these form ulations of m oral philosophy. B u t of even more im por­ tance for the developm ent of ethical theory, his analytical m ethod and his insistence that the good could not be defined, paved the way for the form ulation of later ethical theories which appealed to the actual usage of m oral words. T h ere seems to be little doubt that M oore’s Principia Ethica is the m ost widely discussed book on ethics so far w ritten in this century. L et us turn then to M oore in order not only to note the destructive aspects of his study of previous ethical theories, bu t also to see the positive suggestions which he m akes toward the construction of an adequate theory of ethics. “ G O O D " AS A S IM P L E , IN D E F IN A B L E Q U A L IT Y T h e m ost widely discussed aspect of M oore’s thought today is centered around what he him self called “ the n aturalistic fallacy.” T h is fallacy arose out of the attem pt to define the word "g o o d ” as though it were a com plex notion and could be broken down into qu alities or properties. It was M oore’s contention that the word “ good ” when used to m ean “ the good in itself,” what philosophers have often called intrinsic good, is unique, sim ple, indefinable and unanalysable.

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Now M oore believed that he was here using the word “ good ” as it was commonly used by the ordinary m an, who also probably dim ly realized that no definition of this basic term was possible. T h ere are basic terms in any language, which are themselves such obvious and ultim ate terms, that it becomes folly to ask for a definition of them. As M oore him self stated his case: My point is that ‘good ’ is a sim ple notion, ju st as ‘yellow’ is a sim ple notion; that, ju st as you cannot, by any m anner of means, explain to any one who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is. D efinitions of the kind that I was asking for, definitions which describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, and which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible when the object or notion in question is som ething com plex. . . . B u t yellow and good, we say, are not com plex: they are notions of that sim ple kind, out of which definitions are com posed and with which the power of further defining ceases.1 It is im portant to note that M oore’s discussion is concerned only with the m eaning of the word “ good,” and that he does not m ain tain that it is im possible to describe the things which are actually good. One of the m ajo r tasks of ethics, as M oore adm its, is to discover what properties belong to things which are good. W hat he objects to is con­ fusing this description of good objects with the m eaning of the word “ good.” N o doubt this is an interesting point, bu t the reader may well ask, “ So what? W hy qu ibble about whether or not we are trying to define a word or merely in dicatin g things which may correctly be labeled with that w ord?” A nd indeed this m ight be merely an academ ic m atter, if it were not for the fact that philosophers who failed to d if­ ferentiate between their attem pted definitions of “ good ” and a recital of the properties of good things have led us into errors of the utm ost im portance; errors which m isled many into defining “ good ” as “ pleasure,” “ highly evolved behavior,” etc. If we see with M oore that “ good” is a sim ple and ultim ately indefinable quality, then we will not make the m istake of saying that “ good” and “ pleasu re” are synony­ mous. T h a t this error has in fact been com m itted im plicitly by many contem porary novelists in their portraits of the good life should be obvious to the reader, even if he does not know that m any prom inent philosophers have explicitly defined “ good ” as m eaning “ pleasure,” or what is perhaps even worse, “ the object of any desire.” If

M oore does nothing else for us, he perform s a great service by arousin g our critical m inds so that we may not be so easily taken in by beautiful prose which hides logical errors. W e have now reached the point of great im portance in M oore’s evaluation, namely, that m ost writers on ethics, h aving claim ed to have discovered the properties which belong to or accom pany all things which are in fact good, believe that by n am in g these properties they have defined the word “ good.” T h is is precisely what M oore m eans by the “ n atu ralistic fallacy.” It is com parable to a physicist’s pronouncing that since yellow is always accom panied by a certain kind of vibration, the m eaning of yellow is that vibration. T h is fallacy of attem ptin g to define “good,” a word which M oore holds to be indefinable, m ight be m ore aptly called the fallacy of definition, since M oore applies this fallacy not only to naturalistic but also to m etaphysical definitions. In fact, M oore recognizes that the term seems to be an odd one to use to criticize m etaphysical views, but insists that the sam e sort of error is m ade by this latter group when they attem pt to define “ good.” T h e reader m ight avoid some confusion in his own m ind if he therefore associates this fallacy with any attem pt to define the word “ good,” when that w ord is used to stand for “ the good in itself.” One of the classifications frequently used in m oral philosophy divides ethical theories into n aturalistic or non-naturalistic. N atu ralis­ tic theories are any which attem pt to equate “ good ” with a factual quality, such as pleasure, more highly evolved behavior, the object of hum an desire, or any other quality w'hich can be studied by the n atu ral or social sciences. On the other hand, non-naturalistic theories m ain tain that “ good” is a u niq ue concept which is given, intuited, or revealed to m an, but which under no circum stances can be studied by an appeal to facts only. T h e reader is probably fam iliar with at least one form of non-naturalistic ethics, that, for exam ple, repre­ sented in theological positions which m ain tain that “ good” is doing the w ill of God. It is apparen t that an appeal to factual sciences can help one decide if a certain act is conducive to pleasure, bu t no such ap peal could possibly disclose that the act was com m anded by God. C R IT IC IS M O F N A T U R A L IS T I C E T H IC S L et us look m ore closely now at M oore’s attem pt to dispose of various naturalistic ethical theories. H e contends that naturalistic

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ethicists have notoriously confused two questions in their studies, and hence are guilty of having com m itted the n atu ralistic fallacy. T h ey have confused the question, “ W hat things are good in themselves?” with the question “ H ow is ‘good ’ to be defined?” D iscovering then that some one n atural property, such as pleasure, is always associated with all good things, they have m istakenly concluded that it is this one property which m akes things good, and hence, this property m ust be strictly identical in m eaning with the word “ good.” It is M oore’s conviction that if these people are right, then there is strictly speaking no separate subject m atter for ethics to investigate, for these n atural properties w ill be dealt with adequately by the various sciences. A common n atu ralistic theory of ethics, which one often finds at least im plied in ordinary conversation, seeks to base the good upon some connection with evolution. M oore discusses one version of evolutionistic ethics which w ould m ain tain that “ we need only to consider the tendency of ‘evolution’ in order to discover the direction in which we ought to go.” 2 T h ere are a num ber of different issues involved here, and it may be h elpful to the reader if we attem pt to distinguish between them. (1) T h is type of argum ent involves the assum ption that evolution im plies progress; that is, that w hat appears later chronologically is an im provem ent over what went before. M oore seems to im ply in his analysis that he should not wish to identify evolution in this sense with m oral progress or im provem ent, for the later evolved is not always m orally better than that which existed earlier in time. (2) Som etim es it is m aintained that the good is that which is more highly evolved. T h e assum ption here apparen tly is not sim ply that everything which comes later in tim e is better, b u t rather that which is m ore developed in the sense of bein g better or higher. Now what is not ordinarily noticed is that a value ju dgm en t is being ap plied here by the use of “ more highly evolved.” W hat M oore wishes to point out is that “ higher and better” are evaluative judgm ents not themselves based on the course of evolution in nature. (3) A n even more cautious use of evolutionistic ethics is sometimes encountered in remarks such as “ the good is in general that which is m ore evolved.” T h ere is a great deal of vagueness in such a statem ent, for “ in gen eral” im plies not always and suggests some criterion of evaluation other than evolution itself. Furtherm ore, this position also has the vague­ ness we noted above, nam ely there is no clear specification of what “ more evolved” means. Does it m ean later in time, or higher and

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better? U n der either m eaning, as we have seen above, M oore would hold that this view fails to m ain tain its case. T h e evolutionistic ethic is a n aturalistic ethic in its attem pt to derive the m oral ought from the tendency of evolution in nature. M oore suggests that the weakness of this and all other n atu ralistic theories can be seen if one recalls that one can ask with m ean in g of any n atural occurrence whatsoever, “ Is it good?” T o answer that it is good because it represents a more evolved state of the n atu ral order is, therefore, to beg the question at issue. A m ore p o p u lar version of n aturalistic ethics, however, and one which can be traced back to A ristippus and E picurus of ancient Greece, as wrell as to the preacher Ecclesiastes in the Bible, is hedon­ ism. T h is view holds that the sole good is pleasure, and according to M oore, m istakenly defines “good ” as “ pleasure.” It is im portan t to note that M oore is not d isp u tin g the point that pleasure, am ong other things as well, is good as an end, for he is quite p repared to accept this as true. W hat he is disp u tin g is that there is n othing good bu t pleasure, and furtherm ore, he m aintains that even if this were the case, the two words would not have the same m eaning. It is of course true that many contem porary hedonists, as well as some of the ancient schools, hold that knowledge an d virtue arc good as means to pleasure, b u t they deny that they are good in themselves. A ccording to this view, if I enjoy doing logic it is not because of a desire for knowledge, but rather because d oin g logic gives me pleasure. Jerem y Bentham and Jo h n Stuart M ill were the leadin g defenders of a form of hedonism in the nineteenth century usually called u til­ itarianism . T h ey m ain tain that one ought to act so as to brin g about the greatest happiness of the persons concerned. In M ill’s little p am ph let called Utilitarianism he attem pted to offer the only evidence which he thought could be given for this position. In a fam ous analogy, he suggested that ju st as the only p ro of that a sound is au d i­ ble is that people actually hear it, so the only evidence that a thing is desirable is that people do in fact desire it. M oore has little difficulty in showing this to be an obvious case of the n aturalistic fallacy, for desirable and audible are not com parable experiences. D esirable is a value word, which means “ ought to be desired,” and not “ able to be desired,” as audible means “ able to be heard.” B u t M ill suggested that the only evidence that a thing is desirable is that people actually do desire it, and clearly this is a m atter for psychological or sociological

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investigation. However, we often say that “ I desire two pieces of cake, but it is not desirable for me to eat any m ore.” In M ill’s theory M oore finds a clear exam ple of what lie objects to, nam ely the identification of a value word with a psychological property. B u t M ill goes even further, for when we investigate what people actually do desire, he m aintains that we discover that it is pleasure. Hence, for M ill, the good can be sim ply equated with pleasure. T h ere are basically two different issues here which M oore distin­ guishes: (1) the psychological question as to whether or not we never desire anything except pleasure, and (2) the theoretical question as to whether pleasure is what is m eant by “ good.” M oore suggests that there are grave doubts in the way of accepting the contention that we never desire anything except pleasure, for it seems obvious to com­ m on sense that we desire the answers to our questions, and not just pleasure. If it was merely pleasure we w anted we could obtain more of it in short order by dism issing the questions from our m inds and finding some sort of sensual enjoyment. It m ay of course be true, as M oore is ready to concede, that pleasure is always an accom panim ent of other activities which we value, b u t it is not pleasure which we aim at in all cases. R ath er we often pursue activities which when fulfilled are in fact accom panied by pleasure. T o put it quite sim ply, when I hunt rabbits, I do so because I enjoy h un ting rabbits, and it is not true that I am merely seeking pleasure. Perhaps the poin t at issue m ight be more clearly grasped if we noted that the difficulty occurs when we view pleasure as an abstract noun, and then assum e that there is a substance for which it stands. Basically, this is an ap peal to com­ mon sense, in which case M oore thinks that one should agree with him and not with the utilitarian . C oncerning the theoretical question involved in the identifica­ tion of pleasure as the m eaning of “ good,” M oore finds this to be a clear exam ple of the n aturalistic fallacy in which a property, in this case pleasure, which seems always to accom pany good things, is isolated and identified as what “ good” actually means. As a m atter of fact, M ill in defending utilitarian ism had m odified B en th am ’s view that pleasure differed only in am ount and intensity, by insisting that there was a difference of quality as well. M ill m ade this change in the theory because it seemed to be the only way for him to show that the life of the philosopher was superior to that of the sensualist. M oore notices, quite correctly, that in so doin g M ill has really abandoned hedonism, G

for it m ust be other factors besides pleasure which could lead one to prefer a life of agonizing intellectual questioning to one of a cheerful p u rsu it of the pleasures of wine, women and song. H ere M ill is really saying that some activities are m ore desirable than others, despite his previous insistence that desirable means to actually be desired. It seems clear to com mon sense that M ill is right in suggesting that some pleasures are preferable to others; to some it is still true that the pleasure of reading Plato is preferable to the pleasure of listening to rock an d roll. However, what M ill apparently failed to see is the fact that such a statem ent of preference actually overthrows the philoso­ phical position which identifies the m eaning of “ good” with pleasure as such. M oore furtherm ore m aintains that M ill also violated the principle of organic unities in identifying pleasure with the m eaning of “ good.” T o p u t this prin ciple quite sim ply, M oore insists that a whole ex­ perience cannot be evaluated solely by adding up the parts of which it is com posed. L e t us see how v iolatin g this principle led M ill astray. W hen one looks at experiences which one considers worthwhile, one always finds pleasure to be a p art of them. In fact, upon close exam i­ nation it seems to be the only common elem ent in such diverse experi­ ences as h un ting rabbits, solving m athem atical puzzles, and loving a hum an being. Now M oore does not want in the least to deny that pleasure is a common elem ent in these and other valued experiences, bu t he does w ant to insist that the worth-whileness of these experi­ ences cannot be accounted for by sim ply saying that it is the con­ sciousness of pleasure in each of these activities which gives them their value. If pleasure were the hall-m ark of value, then we should call the m ost intense pleasurable experience the m ost valuable of all. A gain M oore finds com mon sense is on his side, for, to take an exam ple, “ it is com monly held that certain of what would be called the lowest forms of sexual enjoym ent . . . are positively bad, although it is by no means clear that they are not the m ost pleasan t states we ever experience.” 3 B u t there is still another p oin t in which com m on sense aids M oore. H e asks us to consider if we would like equally a world in which there was nothing else b u t pleasure, and a world with exactly the sam e am ount of pleasure, but with knowledge, love, and other qualities added. Clearly, he believes, no righ t thinking m an would sanely m ain tain that he w ould prefer the form er to the latter world. A nd if this is granted, then it seems to follow that pleasure is not

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the sole hall-m ark of value, although it m ay well be a p art of every com plex worthwhile experience. M oore feels confident that if he has shown to the reader that m any com plex states of m ind are more valuable than the pleasure which they contain, then no form of hedonism can be true. A nd, he also insists that hedonism is false be­ cause by com m itting the n atu ralistic fallacy it has violated the princi­ ple of not defining sim ple unanalysable entities. We have seen M oore’s keen m ind at work showing us the fallacies in the identification of a value word such as “ good ” with a n atural tendency of evolution or with a psychological property of pleasure. T o sim plify m atters a b it for the reader who may still be in doubt here, it m ight be said that M oore is objecting to the reduction of ethics to one of the n atu ral or social sciences. Ethics is concerned w'ith evalua­ ting, with calling certain types of behavior good or bad, and scientific facts which tell us how people do in fact behave do n ot really settle the questions of “ W hat ought I to do?” or “ W hat really is good?” T h a t this has not always been clearly recognized to be the case may be recalled by citing the reaction which m any people h ad to the p ublica­ tion a few years ago of the Kinsey R eports on m ale and fem ale sexual behavior. Setting aside for our purposes all questions concerning the validity of Kinsey’s procedural methods, it should be noted that even if a great m ajority of people do engage in extram arital sexual adven­ tures, this does not by any m eans im ply that such experiences are autom atically good, or that I should go and do likewise! One can always ask with significance, “ B u t is this type of conduct really good?” T h e reader is fam iliar with the old saying, “ Ju s t because everyone ju m p s over the hedge is no reason for my doing so.” Now, if one un­ derstands that there is a profound difference between studying statis­ tically the way people actually do behave and defining w hat is truly good, then one has an insight into M oore’s objection to naturalistic ethical theories. For wThat M oore is m ain tain in g is that “ good ” cannot be identified with any n atu ral property whatsoever; to attem pt to de­ fine good as pleasure, or to associate the good with what m ost people do, is to com m it the n atu ralistic fallacy. C R IT IC IS M O F M E T A P H Y S IC A L E T H IC S M oore, moreover, trains his intellectual guns upon m etaphysical ethical theories also, and to some of his argum ents in this connection we shall now turn. M etaphysical ethical views all have in com mon the

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fact that they use some m etaphysical proposition as the basis from which ethical propositions can be deduced. By and large, writers of this persuasion w ould agree with M oore that ethics cannot be inferred from the sciences, bu t their reasons for holding this position would be quite different from M oore’s. W hile M oore w ould m ain tain that one m ust intuit “ good” as a sim ple indefinable quality, they would insist that “ good” can only be understood as a supersensible reality. T o refer to our earlier classification of ethical theories, m etaphysical writers on ethics are non-naturalistic, that is, the object of study here is not a natural property existing in this w orld of space and time, but a non-natural property existing eternally in the very ground of Reality. T h u s, while for n aturalists ethics m ust be based upon know ledge of the n atu ral or social sciences, for m etaphysical ethicists know ledge of the good m ust be based on a prior study of what is ultim ately real as the ground of the universe. T o m ake this m ore con­ crete, consider the case of a theologian who believes that a personal G od is the ultim ate explan ation of all that is and w ill be, and who thus m aintains that m an cannot know how he ought to behave unless he first knows the nature of G od. C hristian ethics has often taken a form sim ilar to this in stressing that we ough t to love each other because G od first loved us. W hat is perhaps not obvious to the casual reader is that hum an love is here m ade dependent upon the prior love of G od for m an. A nd it is certainly a corollary of this view that we cannot therefore correctly understand the nature of the love which is expected of us unless we have some qu ite definite awareness of the n ature of G od ’s love for us. T o p u t this m atter in m etaphysical terms, w ithout a pi'ior know ledge of what is truly R eal one cannot know what is actually good. In his criticism of m etaphysical ethics M oore first of all notes that if these writers were logically consistent they w ould have to adm it that m an can do nothing to bring good into the universe. T h is would follow since m etaphysical writers have held that the ultim ately R eal is already the em bodim ent of the good. But, as a m atter of fact, most of these writers have accorded at least a derivative value to tem poral existence and hence have at least recognized im plicitly the possibility of m an ’s actions bringin g some good into the universe. It should be noted, however, that this position is tenable only if the ultim ate reality is not the sole good in the universe. T h u s M oore m aintains that these writers ought explicitly to tell us that our copying or trying

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to im itate the real, which already exists in the universe, w ould be a good som ething like the eternal good. B u t as a m atter of fact, what m ost m etaphysical writers m ain tain who insist that a know ledge of m etaphysics is the sole basis of ethics is som ething like the follow ing: From a consideration of what it is to be real, we can infer that what is real m ust have certain supersensible properties: bu t to have these properties is identical with being good— it is the very m eaning of the word: it follows therefore that what has these properties is good: and from a consideration of w hat it is to be real, we can again infer w hat it is that has these properties. It is plain that, if such reasoning were correct, any answer which could be given to the question, ‘W hat is good in itself?’ could be arrived at by a purely m etaphysical discussion and by that alone.4 N ow if this argum ent is to be refuted, it is necessary to show that good does not m ean that it possesses some type of supersensible property. M oore suggests that much clarity m ight be brough t into our considera­ tion at this poin t if we w ould differentiate between types of proposi­ tions. One of the chief errors of many philosophers has been to sup­ pose that all propositions are like those of com mon sense in which a relation is asserted between two existing things, such as one finds in the ordinary statem ent, “ T h e cat is in the room .” Plainly it is evident that this is not at all like a statem ent affirming “ T h is would be good, if it existed.” T h e m etaphysical writers on ethics have the virtue of not trying to reduce ethical statem ents to scientific laws of desire, but they err in believing that the good m ust actually exist somewhere. If it is obvious that the good does not exist here an d now on earth, then they reason it m ust exist in some supersensible realm. B u t as M oore so cogently points out, good has n oth ing to do with existence, either tem poral or eternal, for we can, and often do, ask “ B u t is this which exists, either tem porally or eternally, actually good?” T o m ake this a little clearer, one can certainly ask with signifi­ cance, “ Is capital punishm ent actually good?” Now capital pun ish ­ ment does exist in some states, bu t many people do in fact m aintain that it cannot be m orally justified. However, one may reply that this does not at all affect the case of the m etaphysician who m aintains that the good is eternally real; for he is speaking of the good as an eternal ultim ate reality, and not at all using the word in the hum an sense in which we can discuss the goodness of such things as capital pun ish ­ ment. It ought not to be too difficult, however, to at least conceive of

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the possibility of question in g the m oral justification of an eternal state of affairs. B ertran d R u ssell in T h e Scientific Outlook affirms that if this universe is created by a G od who as p art of his divine p lan ordains that little children should die of m eningitis and old people of cancer, then R ussell finds his own state of m oral evaluation to be far superior to that of the eternal God. W hatever the reader’s own opinion on this m atter m ay be, he ought to at least conceive of the possibility that eternality need not necessarily m ean goodness, and if he grants this, then M oore w ould hold that he should also see the fallacy of trying to base ethics on a know ledge of metaphysics. M oore is, however, a w riter who takes great pains to be fair to his opponents, and we need to recognize that the m ost com mon m eta­ physical position concerning the good has yet to be stated. T h is view holds that the good is that which is w illed by an eternal being, usually called G od. Now M oore does affirm that em pirical investigation m ight disclose a high correlation of w illing an d the good, but that would still not tell us that the good m eans to be w illed by an eternal being. H e holds that there w ould have to be some independent criterion of good which w ould be the reason for the eternal bein g w illing it to come into existence. And yet m etaphysical writers have n ot noticed that there are two different questions involved here: (1) W hat is good? an d (2) W hat is willed? For M oore, therefore, the sam e type of fallacy as that com m itted by the naturalists is operative here, namely, the confusion of good w ith another property, in this case that of being w illed in a certain way by a certain being. In short, even if the good were what was preferred by a supersensible reality, it w ould always have to be som ething other than merely such a preference. It needs to be recalled that M oore’s position that the good is a sim ple, indefinable an d unanalysable quality is actually the real basis for m uch of his criticism of n atu ralistic and m etaphysical ethics. If some of his argum ents may seem inconclusive to the reader, it is neces­ sary to rem em ber that since M oore has already declared the m eaning of good to be grasped im m ediately as a u nique property, it of course w ould be false to m ain tain that good means to be w illed by G od or some eternal being. Furtherm ore, M oore w ould m ain tain that if you an d I use our com mon sense we w ould recognize that we have at least a dim intuition of w hat good actually means, while it w ould take us through a great deal of difficult and obtuse reasoning to base our ethics on a knowledge of the nature of some supersensible being.

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T o p u t it sim ply, he w ould h old that we all have an awareness of good, but we do not all know the nature of G od. A nd it w ould seem far better to base ethics on that which we all know, with a m inim um of introspection and consideration, rather than on a supposed exis­ tence of some eternal being, about whose existence and nature there has been an endless am ount of debate in philosophical an d theological circles. B u t perhaps this is to put the case for M oore on more p rag­ m atic grounds than he w ould have wished, since clearly his m ain con­ tention is that good is a sim ple, indefinable, unique property. If his position here is true, then obviously there is no need to argue about the possibility or im possibility of m etaphysical ethics other than to show where they went astray. P R A C T IC A L E T H IC S : W H A T O U G H T W E T O D O ? T h e reader may now be somewhat im patien t w ith this treatm ent of M oore, since he may wish to know what M oore’s positive contribu­ tion to ethics was. W hile M oore was very careful in show ing the weaknesses of other prevailin g views on m oral philosophy, one has the feeling that he d id not spell out his own position as fully as he m ight. Yet he does give us some clues in this direction, an d to a consideration of his positive thought we now turn. We have thus far confined ourselves to M oore’s discussion con­ cerning various suggested definitions of the word “ good.” T h is was not merely an academ ic exercise, for M oore was quite convinced that much faulty thinking concerning what things are actually good, an d what we ought to do, springs from m istaken notions attem pting to define the m eaning of the basic ethical w ord “ good.” If we do not know what the word means, then it seems quite likely that we shall miss the m ark in our practical m oral evaluations. It is qu ite true that M oore was m ainly concerned with showing that “ the good ” is indefina­ ble, but in Principia Ethica he devotes several chapters to an explora­ tion of what we ought to do, and what things are actually good. In his later p op u lar book Ethics in the Hom e U niversity L ibrary, an d in ar­ ticles as well, he confined him self more and more to the purely theore­ tical task, probably because he recognized that until careful analysis h ad disclosed the m eaning of “ good,” it was futile to argue abou t what things actually are good. T h ere is a poin t of even greater im portance for the ordinary reader, however, for M oore, in com pany with most contem porary philosophers, d id not seek to give practical advice con­

12

cerning any p articu lar act. T h is was held to be the concern of the m oralist or preacher, and not that of the philosopher. T h e m ost the philosopher could possibly do w ould be to suggest certain types of actions which usually in m ost circum stances were probably right. All of these qualifyin g words are needed to em phasize that since circum ­ stances vary so m uch, and the philosopher has no m ore insight into what the future will brin g than anyone else, he should not be looked to for practical guidance when one faces a p articular problem . M oore points out specifically that every question about what we ought to do depends u pon causal generalization. T h e righ t in fact is always the useful in the sense that it can be determ ined only by asking if it will cause a good result. For M oore that conduct is right which will brin g abou t the greatest possible am ount of good. It is im ­ portan t to note here that he denies that there are any self-evident m oral laws which ought always to be obeyed. A ll so-called m oral laws are merely generalizations from previous hum an experience to the effect that this type of conduct usually produces a greater am ount of good than any alternative act. In fact M oore states that we can never be sure that any act is our absolute duty since we have no way of telling what act will actually produce the greatest value in the universe. B u t practical ethics can perform a m ore hum ble task, nevertheless, in that it may be able to suggest to us which acts under certain circumstances will on the whole produce the best results. B u t even here M oore finds grave difficulty, for he believes that in order to do this it w ould be necessary to take into account the effects of the act through an infinite future. G ranted the assum ption, which seems a likely one, that our acts will not generally have very long range future effects, we may be able to suggest certain types of actions which on the whole tend to produce better results than any possible alternatives. B ut, one must notice that this is a lon g way from holding that I may find an act to be my duty w ithout my raisin g any questions abou t its effects w hat­ soever. In fact, for M oore, only the end justifies the means, and any act can ju stify itself only by showing that it will produce more good generally than any possible alternative. We can m ake at best a p re­ diction, but a prediction we m ust recall is not a law, bu t only at best highly probable. T h e reader may feel that M oore seems to be m oving rather far from common sense, b u t actually he reassures us that if we search for actions which are generally better to perform than possible alternatives, we shall not go far astray by follow ing the rules recog­ .

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nized by common sense m orality. It is of some im portance, however, to notice that M oore’s justification for follow ing these principles of pro­ verbial m orality is that in any known culture they seem to be good as means to the preservation of civilized society itself. A m ong these common sense rules which seem to be required for civilization M oore m entions the respect for property, industry, tem perance and the keep­ ing of promises. H e distinguishes other m oral rules whose value de­ pends upon the p articu lar circumstances of society, an d which m ight accordingly be changed if society itself should change. As an illustra­ tion of the latter type of rules, he offers the m oral codes concerning what is usually called chastity, since it is possible to think of a hum an society existing w ithout these particular rules of our present civiliza­ tion. T o clarify this point, we m ight say that one way of justifyin g some m oral rules is to say that they are conducive to the general wel­ fare of our society as it is presently constituted. M any of our laws con­ cerning divorce and certain sexual practices which our state views as harm ful to the general w elfare of its citizens w ould be illustrative of this type of m oral rule. However, there are other m oral rules which seem to be more basic to the existence of any civilized society whatso­ ever, and we should certainly feel that there was greater reason to defend these on the ground of the survival of hum an civilization itself, rather than on the basis that they h appen to be currently the law of the land. M oore suggests that the prohibitions against m urder w ould presum ably be defended on some grounds such as the sur­ vival of hum an civilization, rather than merely in dicatin g that they are prohibited by the laws of the p articular society. ID E A L U T I L I T A R IA N IS M T h ere emerges from the above discussion, however, a poin t of some im portance. M oore’s ethical position seems to be a form of ideal utilitarianism . It should be noted that M oore does not defend the m oral rules or laws sim ply on the ground that they are known to be the best, bu t rather on the basis that it may be em pirically dem on­ strated that they are conducive to the general welfare of the people. In short, they are means to good ends. M oore states that unfortunately much m oral exhortation consists in advocating rules which are not generally practiced, and that probably no case for the general utility of such rules could be produced. One m ight think here of the exhor­ tation of pacifists to disarm and not to try to defend oneself when at­

14

tacked, for it seems difficult to make out a case for the utility of such acts, at least not in our present world. However, concerning m oral rules which are generally practiced and which can be justified on the grounds of their usefulness, M oore feels that we ought always to obey them rather than to consider our p articular case as an exception. In fact, he offers two ju stify in g reasons here: (1) we can never say that the probability of an action which is an exception achieving good re­ sults is greater than that of one which follows the rule; and (2) even if we could correctly dem onstrate a ju stifiable exception in our case, the effects m ight still be disadvantageous, for they m ight falsely en­ courage others to consider their cases as justifiable exceptions also. In summ ary, and to quote M oore him self: T h e in dividual can therefore be confidently recom m ended always to conform to rules which are both generally useful and generally practised. In the case of rules of which the general observance would be useful but does not exist, or of rules which are generally practised b u t which are not useful, no such universal recom ­ m endations can be made. In m any cases the sanctions attached m ay be decisive in favour of conform ity to the existin g custom. B u t it seems worth poin tin g out that, even ap art from these, the general utility of an action m ost commonly depends upon the fact that it is generally practised: in a society where certain kinds of theft are the com mon rule, the utility of abstinence from such theft on the p art of a single in dividual becomes ex­ ceedingly doubtful, even though the common rule is a bad one. T h ere is, therefore, a strong probability in favour of adherence to an existing custom, even if it be a bad one.5 T h e above quotation should be sufficient to show the reader that M oore was not a destructive radical concerning tradition al m orality, b u t was rather interested in the more philosophical task of correctly u nderstanding ethical language and the way it is actually used by the common sense m an. T h ere are m any cases, however, which M oore’s analysis thus far w ould apparently not cover, such as those very troublesom e choices which we all have to m ake concerning acts not expressly practiced nor com m anded by our society. In this case M oore suggests that each man m ust be his own wise m an, and attem pt to weigh as thoroughly as he can the tendency of the various possibilities open to him to prom ote good or evil. O f course, M oore does suggest that in general one ought to choose a lesser good which one can appreciate than a greater which

15

one cannot appreciate; that in general one ought to choose goods af­ fecting oneself and those one loves rather than those which have too wide a scope of beneficence; and that on the whole it is preferable to aim at a more im m ediate good rather than at a very long range good. T hese pru den tial considerations sim ply seem to recognize cer­ tain basic facts of hum an psychology, and M oore would certainly not claim that they are self-evident or alwrays to be follow ed. T h ey are merely suggestions for the in d iv id u al’s reflection, bu t the person doing the choosing m ust m ake his own decision in the last analysis. In fact, M oore has gone much further here than m ost philosophers in actually com ing to grips with some of the types of m oral ju dgm en t which the m an in the street frequently has to make. W e have thus seen that M oore’s defense of right actions would be that those acts tend to be right on the whole which generally pro­ duce the best results. B u t what are the best results? Is he really in the last analysis a u tilitarian on in tuition al grounds? T h e careful reader m ay have thought that he detected a strange switch in M oore’s argu­ m ent when he moved from the theoretical discussion of the m eaning of “ good” to the questions of practical ethics. In fact M oore rem arked several times that the u tilitarian s were generally righ t in their actions, although w rong in their theoretical justification of ethics. It would be a great m istake, however, to identify M oore w ith the classical u tili­ tarians, for he m ost clearly does not hold that the only good thing is pleasure. H e does agree with them to the extent of insisting that the only test of an action bein g right or wrong is its consequences, b u t he insists that the u tilitarian s oversim plified the m atter by h oldin g that ultim ately only pleasure or happiness is an end worthy of being sought for itself. A gain his m ost extended treatm ent of his own ideal, which has often been called ideal utilitarianism, is to be found in Principia Ethica. T h e reader should recall that M oore has m aintained that “ good” in itself, or as an intrinsic value, is not to be identified with any other property. T h u s, in whatever objects are good in themselves, one should not look for any other common property except their goodness. W hen one escapes from the hedonistic trap of trying to find pleasure as the hall-mark of good things, one’s m ind is opened so that one can find a great num ber of good things. And here again M oore tells us that this is what common sense would tell us if we would only heed it. Indeed, when one attem pts to think of things which are themselves

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good, one finds m any com plex states of affairs, what M oore has called "organ ic unities.” T o proceed in this kind of an investigation M oore calls upon the reader to use the m ethod of description and isolation, that is to describe w hat one values for its own sake, an d then to isolate as much as possible the various com ponents of these entities. Follow ing M oore’s m ethod, then, one w ould find as the m ost valued things certain states of consciousness, such as the joys of per­ sonal affection and enjoym ent of the beautiful. M oore m aintains that one does not view love or contem plate beauty as m eans to any other end, for they are of suprem e value as conscious hum an states, and form the ju stifyin g reasons and ultim ate ends of hum an actions/’ T h ere is for M oore no way of proving this poin t; all one can do is to investigate the characteristics of these states of consciousness and ap peal to one’s own intuitions. If one actually follows this m ethod, M oore thinks the answer to the question, ‘‘W hat things are in trin si­ cally good?” is much easier to find than one m ight at first suspect. For clearly, so he m aintains, if one looks closely at one’s own experiences, one can find none which one values more highly for their own sake than the joys of love and friendship and the contem plation of beauty in n atural and created objects. U sin g the same m ethod of inspection and analysis, however, one also w ill add to the list of intrinsic goods, if one has the sam e insights as M oore, such things as courage, com passion, the appreciation of tragedy, and other “ m ixed goods.” 7 M oore considers “ m ixed goods” to be those whose existence necessarily involves some intrinsically bad things, bu t whose existence is good on the whole. For exam ple, courage and com passion, which are good on the whole, necessarily involve contem pt or hatred of that which is vile or evil. One can add to this list of m ixed goods which are of great value, given our kind of world; all one needs to do is to exam ine the things which one values as ends in themselves and one w ill find on his list m ost of the tradi­ tional m oral virtues. M O O R E ’S L A T E R V IEW S O N E T H IC S We have confined our discussion of M oore’s ethical views largely to Principia Ethica, because of the great influence of this book upon m oral philosophy, but the reader ought not to assum e that M oore did not m odify his views as they received the criticism of other philoso­ phers. T h e careful reader can find evidence of M oore’s view of in ­

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trinsic goods undergoing m odification in his little volum e Ethics which first appeared in 1912. Since this volum e is prim arily devoted to a refutation of utilitarian ism and subjective ethical positions, one can m ore easily find his later position in an article publish ed in 1932, “ Is G oodness a Q uality?” and in his reply to his critics in the volum e T he Philosophy of G. E. M oore, published in 1942.8 W hile M oore did not abandon his position that good in its prim ary sense is indefi­ nable, he was m oved to suggest that the argum ents advanced in Principia Ethica failed to prove his case. H e was also forced to adm it in 1942 that the em otive theory of ethics, which m aintains that good is of course indefinable because it is merely an ejacu lation and not a concept at all, m ight be right bu t that he did not think so. Beyond that he found no proof for his earlier position on this m atter, which he still said he was inclined to accept. In his later works M oore tended to em phasize the am biguity in the word “ good.” It could be used in m any different senses, such as good as a means, good as a part, m orally good, intrinsically good. Certainly M oore at least im plicitly recognized this am biguity in Prin­ cipia Ethica, although it was perhaps somewhat obscured by his main preoccupation with the definition of “ good” in its intrinsic sense. In his Ethics M oore suggested that “ by saying that a thing is intrinsically good it means that it w ould be a good thing that the thing in question should exist, even if it existed quite alone, w ithout any further ac­ com panim ents or effects w hatsoever.” 9 Partly because it is difficult to conceive of anything existin g w ithout any accom panim ents or effects, M oore tried another approach to the definition of intrinsic goodness in a paper he gave as part of a sym posium at the A ristotelian society in 1932. H e now proposed “ worth having for its own sake” as a com­ m on expression which the ordinary man uses to describe what the philosopher calls intrinsically good. M oore further suggested that it was “ good” in this sense o f “ worth having for its own sake” with which he was prim arily concerned in Principia Ethica, and it was “ good” in this sense which he m aintained was indefinable. In fact he states, “ All the supposed proofs were certainly fallacious; they entirely failed to prove that ‘worth having for its own sake’ is indefinable. And I think perhaps it is definable: I do not know. B u t I also still think that very likely it is indefinable.” 10 One is struck by the honesty of M oore, for the above quoted passage seems to dem olish much of his carefully reasoned and well written m agnum opus. N o doubt the

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positions which arose in m oral philosophy in the intervening years caused M oore to be less certain of his position than formerly; although the reader should note that he doesn’t affirm the definability of “ good” bu t merely and honestly states that he does not know. In T h e Philosophy of G. E. M oore the interested reader can find m any excellent criticisms and com m entaries on the ethical philosophy of M oore; the m ost interesting and provocative one being the article by Charles L. Stevenson, “ M oore’s A rgum ents against C ertain Form s of E thical N atu ralism .” 11 Stevenson calls attention to the new ethical theory, with which he him self is so intim ately associated, that many ethical disagreem ents arise from disagreem ents in attitudes rather than from disagreem ents in belief. H e suggests that M oore’s analysis m ay have been faulty because of M oore’s interest in only the cognitive aspects of language. T h a t M oore was fully aware of the significance of a position which stressed ethical language as emotive, that is, as an expression of feelings an d attitudes, and that he recognized a signifi­ cant discovery here can be found in the fact that he devotes m any pages in his Reply to evalu atin g Stevenson’s suggestions and criti­ cisms.12 M oore states in this R eply that perhaps Stevenson is right; perh aps good does not nam e or describe any characteristic, either n aturalistic or non-naturalistic, bu t has only em otive m eaning. H ow ­ ever, while M oore indicates that he has no proof to offer he still thinks that when we use m oral words such as “ good” we m ean to assert som ething true or false and do not merely emote. M oore’s final ap peal is, therefore, very sim ilar to his earlier position on ultim ate questions of ethics. In refutin g subjectivism in Ethics he wrote: “ I do not see how it can be proved that he (the subjectivist) is wrong. If the question is reduced to these ultim ate terms, it must, I think, sim ply be left to the reader’s inspection. Like all ultim ate questions, it is inca­ pable of strict proof either way.” 13 T O W A R D A N E V A L U A T IO N O F M O O R E ’S E T H IC A L V IEW S In m any respects M oore provides a model for the m oral philoso­ pher of the twentieth century. In his concern with a careful analysis of the m eaning of the basic ethical terms, in his refusal to pursue a sim ple explanatory theory which does not account for all the facts, an d in his willingness to m odify and change his views as they were criticized by others, M oore stands as a paradigm of philosophical virtue. However, much m ore than this can be said in favor of M oore’s

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treatm ent of ethics. As the reader progresses in this book he will d is­ cover that most of the Anglo-Am erican thinkers treated owe a great deal to the stim ulation of M oore’s thought, although it is correct to add that few of them w ould agree with M oore’s basic contention that “ good” in its prim ary ethical sense is a non-natural, indefinable and unanalysable concept. W. K. Frankena, in an article which originally appeared in M ind in 1939, doubted whether the attem pt to define “ good ” was a logical fallacy at all.14 Clearly, as we have already suggested, M oore’s choice of the term “ n atu ralistic fallacy” was somewhat unfortun ate since he declared this type of fallacious argum ent to be the error of both n aturalistic and m etaphysical definers of the word “ good.” B u t to Frankena, if the suppressed prem ises of the n atu ralistic argum ent were brought out into the open, one w ould have a perfectly valid ethical argum ent. For exam ple, Frankena suggests that the argum ent that pleasure is good could be m ade valid logically by adding a m iddle prem ise to the argum ent as usually presented. T h e case for hedonism could then be p u t thus: (a) Pleasure is sought by all men. (b) W hat is sought by all men is good (definition). (c) T herefore, pleasure is good.15 T h e real point at issue, as Frankena sees it, is M oore’s contention that “ ethical characteristics axe different in kin d from non-ethical ones.” 16 T h e truth of the assertion that the good is a non-natural quality must first be dem onstrated before anyone who attem pts to define “ the good” m ay be accused of fallacious reasoning. A definition does not identify two different things as actually the same thing, although M oore seems to hold this view, b u t m ay rather state that two words have the same m eaning. In fact, Frankena suggests, if one takes literally M oore’s position concerning definability, one wTould have to hold that no terms whatsoever are definable. T h e issue here turns on M oore’s quotation from B ish op B u tler with which he prefaces Principia Ethica-. “ Everything is what it is, and not another thing.” In the Principia Ethica M oore frequently indicates that the ignoring of this dictum of B u tle r’s led philosophers astray into falsely identifying “ good” with some other thing. Frankena paraphrases this dictum as practised by M oore as follows: “ Every term m eans what it means, and not what is m eant by any other term .” 17 In that case no synonyms can

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be found for any term and no definitions whatsoever would be possible. W hatever the reader’s reactions to the above criticism, either in favor of M oore or o f Frankena, the real issue can be still more clearly presented. How can one tell if a quality is n atu ral or n on ­ n atu ral? How does anyone know if "g o o d ” is one or the other? Franken a indicates an agreem ent here with M oore, that one m ust ultim ately appeal to his own intuition, reasoning and careful inspec­ tion. T h e n atu ralist m ay state in all honesty that upon careful scrutiny he finds no non-natural quality associated with the word “ good ” ; in this circumstance, the in tu ition ist who holds to an awareness o f a non-natural qu ality here, should not accuse his opponent of com­ m ittin g a fallacy but rather ask him to look again to see if he cannot find it. In short, the ultim ate ap peal both for M oore and Frankena is the reader’s own inspection. Fran ken a finds no non-natural quality of "g o o d ” in his evaluation, while M oore does, b u t at the m ost this is a case of seeing things differently and not a case of fallaciou s logical reasoning. T h e issue of the definability of "g o o d ” is even m ore clearly pre­ sented in an article by G. C. Field, in which he seeks to indicate what it is that a definition attem pts to do.18 A definition, F ield suggests, "is never merely of names, b u t always of som ething that the nam e m eans to us . . . W hat gives rise to the need for philosophical thinking is that we are faced with ideas or notions which, though in common use, are not at all clearly conceived, and therefore not definable.” 19 T h e task o f the m oral philosopher w ould thus begin with a careful analysis o f the m oral judgm en ts of m ankind, in order that he m ay m ake clear an d explicit w hat the ordinary m an dim ly m eans when he uses m oral words. T o carry out this endeavor with thoroughness is to give a defi­ nition to m oral terms, such as "g o o d .” T h e fact that one could always ask with M oore, "B u t is that what we mean by good?” or "B u t is that so-called good thing actually good?” in no way, according to Field, proves that “good” can ’t be defined b u t only that we are d ealin g with a concept which is very difficult to define precisely. T h ere is thus great value in M oore’s show ing us that certain so-called definitions of “g o od ” won’t do, for there are too m any im portant uses of the word which they do not cover, b u t this should only stim ulate us to try harder. In fact, it seems rather strange to ap peal to good as a sim ple inde­ finable quality when it is applied to so m any different things. Yet, in

21

fairness to M oore, the reader should rem em ber that M oore recognized the am biguity in the use of the word “ good” and held that only when referred to as an intrinsic value was “ good” indefinable. T h u s, the differences between Field and M oore may not be as great as they seem, the issue turning on the status of intrinsic goodness. In a quite recent work, the O xford philosopher R . M. H are, although he agrees with some of the critics we have cited above that M oore’s argum ent was not well form ulated, affirms that any n atu ralis­ tic theory of ethics is boun d to fail because it leaves out the prescrip­ tive or com m endatory aspect of m oral judgm ents. H are puts the ar­ gum ent against n aturalism by suggesting that the m ost im portan t use of value words is to commend, and a n aturalistic interpretation of value words w ould m ake this activity unintelligible. Fie proposes a sim ple procedure which can be used to expose the fallacies in any naturalistic view of ethics: Let us suppose that someone claims that he can deduce a m oral or other evaluative judgem en t from a set of purely factual or descriptive prem ises, relying on some definitions to the effect that V (a value-word) means the sam e as C (a conjunction of descriptive predicates). We first have to ask him to be sure that C contains no expression that is covertly evaluative (for exam ple ‘n atu ral’ or ‘norm al’ or ‘satisfying’ or ‘fun dam en tal hum an needs’) . N early all so-called ‘naturalistic definitions’ will break down under this test— for to be genuinely n aturalistic a definition m ust contain no expression for whose ap plicability there is not a definite criterion which does not involve the m aking of a valuejudgem ent. If the definition satisfies this test, we have next to ask whether its advocate ever wishes to com m end anything for being C. If he says that he does, we have only to poin t out to him that his definition makes this im possible. . . . A nd clearly he cannot say that he never wishes to commend anything for being C; for to commend things for being C is the whole object of his theory.20 L et us show how H a re’s refutation of naturalism in ethics m ight work. If a n atu ralist defined “ good” as “ that which is m ost conducive to hum an w elfare” it is not at all clear that “ hum an w elfare” is not itself being used as a value expression. N o t only is that expression used to describe a hum an state of affairs but it often covertly suggests som ething to be desired, com mended, or approved. B u t let us suppose this definition passes the first test in order to see how the second test H are proposes w ould be applied. Does a good act m ean the sam e as an act which is conducive to hum an welfare? If so, then the sentence

22

“ T h is act which is conducive to hum an welfare is good ” could be translated into an equivalent “ T h is act which is conducive to hum an w elfare is conducive to hum an w elfare.” Now H are’s poin t is not only that this sounds odd, b u t m ore im portan t that clearly this translation could not be used for the purposes of com m ending. “ Value-terms have a special function in language, that of com m ending; and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of other wTords which themselves do not perform this function; for if this is done, we are deprived of a m eans of perform ing the fun ction .” 21 P utting aside any technical m atters, we m ay suggest at this poin t that M oore was probably attem ptin g more than anything else to state that ethical terms cannot be reduced to non-ethical terms. In more contem porary English usage, we w ould say that he was insisting that “ good ” is an evaluative word, that it makes a value judgm ent, and that such judgm ents cannot be reduced to psychological descriptions of liking, or sociological statistics of what my society approves. For the ordinary reader this is a point of some im portance, for on every hand he is told to do certain things because everyone is doing them. And if he learns nothing else from a study of M oore’s ethics, he should be able to ask with significance at such times, “ B u t is it actually good?” In this way one at least preserves p art of M oore’s attem pt to insist that “ good” must not be confused with some other notion. It is interesting to observe that another feature of M oore’s work, namely, his positive statem ents concerning intrinsic goods, is still a live option today, whether or not one calls the position Ideal U tili­ tarianism . Few reflective people would be w illing to say that only pleasure is intrinsically good, but very few w ould be w illing to exclude it altogether. For M oore there is no one characteristic in virtue of which som ething is good, but rather he finds “ an immense variety of different things, all of which are intrinsically good.” 22 T h ere seems to be no quarrel with M oore’s including am ong the intrinsic goods of life such things as knowledge, virtue, wisdom, love and the enjoym ent of beautifu l objects. T h is em phasis upon intrinsic goods led M oore to m ain tain that it is righ t to bring into existence experiences involving these high values. In fact, in P rincipia Ethica, “ righ t” for M oore was a term which could be defined in terms of good, since a right act is an act which has the best consequenccs. In other words, the ultim ate justification of an act is not that it is of a certain type, such as keeping promises, bu t rather

23

that it tends on the whole to produce the greatest am ount of good. Now obviously, since we can never clearly determ ine the effects of our actions (too w idespread, too m any unforeseen com plications), the m ost that we can do is to suggest what actions probably have the best re­ sults on the whole and in the long run. A nd here, the rules of common sense m orality seem generally to be as good as any other. T h e ultim ate justification of an act, for M oore, however, was not that it followed the prevailin g m oral code of our society, b u t rather that it tended to produce the best of all possible consequences. T h is was one feature of M oore’s view to which W. D. R oss objected, as we shall see in the next section. B u t there have been other objections to M oore’s presentation of the great intrinsic goods of life, which suggest that these “ goods” represent the form ulation of a com fortable academ ic philosopher who underrated the im portance of the “ m ixed goods” (goods accom panied by one or more evil effects) in actual life. A t the end of a perceptive study of M oore’s theory of intrinsic value, D uncan-Jones says: “ T o anyone acquainted, either with real ill fortune, or with the mere vexatiousness and hum drum ness of hum an affairs, it may seem that only m itigations of evil, or m ixed and m ediocre goods, deserve much attention as goals for action.” 23 I think it is fair to state, however, that this criticism w ould probably hold for m ost ethical philosophers ju st as much as for M oore. One addition al point, again suggested by D uncan-Jones, is that M oore may m ake too much of positively seeking to add to the value of life by m u ltiplyin g the intrinsic goods in the world. T h is sounds a bit too calcu latin g to actually work, and it may well be that many of the greatest goods come only as unsought blessings, and indeed can’t even be gotten at all through striving. As an illustration, one need only recount the platitu d e that “ H e who seeks pleasure never finds it,” and then add, that pleasure is frequently a by-product of other activities of life. T h e reader may be disappoin ted at not finding M oore giving him a quality or property by which he could clearly label all experiences which are good in themselves. It needs to be recalled that M oore has frequently warned us that we shall find no such property except the goodness itself! C ertainly one m ay find this a bit untidy, bu t M oore cautions us to seek for the truth rather than for a neat and orderly system. T o reduce the goodness of objects to some other property or

24

quality, such as pleasure or the will of God, is to sim plify where sim ­ plification leads to false results. If the reader disagrees with the results of M oore’s analysis, M oore probably w ould not have been too much troubled, for he m eant to insist prim arily on his m ethod of m aking the inquiry into ethics. One m ust first of all ask the righ t questions, and then try to answer them as best one can by an appeal to one’s reason, intuition an d common sense. When one looks closely at the questions of ethics, according to M oore, one finds that they fall gen­ erally into three m ain types: (1) W hat does the word “ good” mean?, (2) W hat things are good-in-themselves? and (3) W hat ought I to do? M oore’s insistence that we m ust learn to untangle these questions and approach each in a critical and reflective m anner certainly has helped to discourage m uch m uddled thinking in m oral philosophy. If M oore did nothing else for the study of ethics, this fastidious attention to a correct way of approach ing the subject w ould alone insure him a place in the philosoph ers’ h all of fame. As we proceed in our study, it will become apparen t that m ost contem porary philosophers have found it necessary to deal with M oore, either to acknowledge their own indebtedness to his pioneering work, or to develop or refute some of his contentions. W hile few contem porary philosophers w ould be w illing to agree that we intuitively grasp that the m eaning of “good ” is sim ple, indefinable and unanalysable, m any w ould insist that it cannot be defined by identifying it with some other n atu ralistic or non-naturalistic property.

II. W. D. Ross: The Rightness of Acts Im agine that you m ight find yourself being asked by a stranger to ju stify an act which you ju st perform ed. Suppose that you have returned a book to a friend, a book which you borrow ed some time ago and prom ised to return to him when you had finished reading it. T h e stranger m ight ask you, “ W hy did you give him that book?” Y our response m ight in such a situation be: “ W ell, you see I had bo r­ rowed the book from him some time ago and I prom ised to return it to him when I had finished reading it.” In m any cases that would probably be the end of the discussion, but suppose the stranger is in ­ terested in somewhat deeper probin g an d now asks “ B u t why should you keep the prom ise? W hy not keep the book instead? T h e person

25

from whom you borrowed it m ight not really miss it.” At this point, if you follow a m oral philosophy sim ilar to the ideal u tilitarianism of G. E. M oore your answer m ight take the follow ing form: “ In gen­ eral, I believe that it is better to keep one’s prom ises than to break them, because m ore good results. Society could not survive if we d id n ’t keep our prom ises, and certainly promise-keeping can be justified as a m eans to security and m axim um welfare in our society. On the basis of calculating the probable consequences of an action, I do not believe that one can dem onstrate the likelihood of greater good resulting from prom ise-breaking than from promise-keeping. A nd even if this case could perhaps be thought of as an exception, since the friend to whom I returned the borrow ed book is very wealthy and does not keep a record of the books he loans to friends, even so I do not think that failing to keep my prom ise could be justified, because my act m ight prove to be a bad exam ple for others who m ight not be as careful in their calculations as I am. In short, the sum total of hum an good, I believe, tends to be greater as a result of men keeping their prom ises.” 24 T h e stranger who has raised this question as to why you should keep your prom ises may not be at all satisfied with your explanation, and may suggest that you have given a needlessly com plex answer. He may retort: “ N o, I don ’t think that you have given the real reason which justifies men in keeping their promises. It is much sim pler than you have suggested, for we ought to keep our prom ises ju st because we see that it is right for us to do so. T h ere is no need to bring results or consequenccs into the picture at all. I ask you now, look carefully at your own m oral behaviour, and is not the real reason why you frequently act in certain ways sim ply that you know that such acts are right? Surely you d on ’t calculate the probable am ount of good or evil which m ight result in the world if you keep or break a promise. R ath er you clearly recognize that an act of prom ise-keeping is right, fitting, and appropriate to the situation. If you are a m oral being, that is the only justification you need to perform the act.” T h e m oral philosopher whom we are now going to consider holds to the position expressed by our stranger. Ross m aintains that Moore and other ideal u tilitarian s failed to see that the justification for right acts is not that they are means to good ends, but rather sim ply that they are seen to be right and therefore ought to be done. It does seem apparently true, does it not, that you and I do choose certain types of action because we consider them right without asking any questions

26

at all about their probable consequences. Perhaps, then R oss has a poin t and we ought to follow his line of reasoning on this m atter in some detail. D O E S M O R A L P H IL O S O P H Y R E S T O N A M IS T A K E ? T h ere have been other contem porary philosophers besides Ross who have defended the view that we have a kin d of intuitive insight into w hat acts are right, bu t the w ritings of Ross have been the m ost influential presentation of this position. Ross in T h e R ig h t and the Good,25 which shall be the m ain source for our study, acknowledges in his preface that he is indebted to Professor H . A. P richard for sug­ gesting this type of approach to him. Prichard wrote an article in Mind, in 1912 which he entitled “ Does M oral Philosophy R est on a M istake?” 26 In this p aper Prichard suggested that m oral philosophy as it was then being practised did m ost certainly rest on a m istake, namely, the error of attem pting to give reasons for doing one’s duty. H e m ain tained that m oral obligatio n cannot be reduced to acts which ought to be done because good is likely to result from them. Because philosophers have attem pted to derive the sense of obligation, of seeing that it is a duty to do som ething or other, from considerations of the consequences of the acts they have failed to notice that the rightness of “ an action of a p articular kin d is absolutely underivative or im ­ m ediate.” 27 T h u s, P richard invites m oral philosophy to pursue a new course by investigating the nature of obligation rather than concen­ tratin g on good ends. H e suggests that such study will show that obligation rests on the relations involved in the act an d not on a nicely calculated m ore or less good which is likely to result from doing the act. Prichard uses several exam ples to clarify this view of o b lig a­ tion; one such concerns itself with an obligation which I have to pay my debts. On the basis of P rich ard’s analysis, my duty to pay my debts follows from a p ast act of m ine in which I prom ised (at least im plicitly by m aking the purchase from the shopkeeper) to pay at a later date for the goods which I then received. H ere the nature of obligation seems rather clear cut, since there is a relationship im posing responsibility upon me to pay for the goods which I buy. Prichard uses another exam ple, however, of an obligation which is based on my relationship to others, but which is perhaps not so readily seen to be such. "What about my duty to tell the truth? I cer­ tainly have not explicitly prom ised you that I shall tell you the truth,

27

wh il e wh e n I p u r c h a s e a h o o k f r o m y o u r s h o p 1 m a y h a v e s i g n e d a c re d it s l ip to the el lecl t ha t I p r o m i s e d l.o p a y the a c c o u n t by a c er ta in d a t e . P r i c h a r d finds t hat there is a n i m p l i c i t r e l a t i o n here !o society, fo r the o b l i g a t i o n to tell the t rut h " i n v o l v e s a r e la t io n c o n s i s t i n g in the fact t hat o th e r s a rc t r u s t i n g us to s p e a k the t ru th, a r e la t io n

the

a p p r e h e n s i o n o f wh i ch gi ves rise to the sense t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n of the t rut h is s o m e t h i n g ow ed by us to t h e m . ” 2® P r i c h a r d ’s p o s i t i o n , then, whi ch i nf lu en ce d R o s s , was t ha t we ha v e a n i n t u i t i v e i n s i g h t i n t o o u r o b l i g a t i o n s , a n d t h er e fo re it is m i s t a k e n to seek for a n y f u r t h e r ju st if ic at io n of t h em. I f we a r e in d o u b t as to w h e t h e r o r n o t we h a v e a specific o b l i g a t i o n in a c e rt a in s i t u a t i o n , all we h a v e to d o is l o o k closely in o r d e r to d i s c o v e r w h e t h e r o r not there is one. M o r e t h a n h e l p i n g u s lo u n d e r s t a n d the n a t u r e o f this type o f i m m e d i a t e aw ar e ne s s, m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y can n o t do. It c er ta inl y c a n n o t p r o v e to u s t hat we h a v e o b l i g a t i o n s to act in a c e r ta i n wa y in o r d e r to b r i n g a b o u t g o o d r esu lt s for the g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f p e o pl e .

T H E M E A N IN G O F " R I G H T " Since, for R o s s , “ r i g h t " is the b as ic e t hi c al t er m, it is o n l y n a t u r a l t hat lie s h o u l d a t t e m p t to e x a m i n e its m e a n i n g b e f o r e lie t u rn s to the m e a n i n g o f “ g o o d . ” H e finds t hat " r i g h t ” is an a m b i g u o u s wo r d a n d in a m a n n e r very s i m i l a r to t h a t wh ic h we h a v e seen used by G. E. M o o r e he seeks to s h ow t ha t it is an i r r e d u c i b l e n o t i o n , a n d hence i n d e f i n a b l e in the strictest sense o f def i ni ti on . F i r s t o f all, R o s s seeks to r e m o v e s o m e o f the c o n f u s i o n in m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y wh i ch lie t hinks h a s b ee n b r o u g h t a b o u t by a f a i l u r e to d i f f e r e n t i a t e “ r i g h t "

f ro m

“ m o r a l l y g o o d . ” H e h o l d s t hat m o r a l l y g o o d acts a rc those wh i ch p r o c e e d f ro m a g o o d m ot i v e , such as d u t y o r love, w hi l e “ r i g h t ” refers to the acts wh i ch a rc a c t u a l l y d o n e , r e g a rd l e ss o f the m o t i v e s invo lv ed. (In fact R o s s shows t ha t he k n o w s a g r ea t d e a l o f p s yc hol og y, for he m a i n t a i n s t h a t in p r ac t i c e it is well n i gh i m p o s s i b l e e ver to di sco ve r w h a t the m o t i v e s l e a d i n g to acts a c t u a l l y arc.) R o s s h o l d s t ha t o r d i n a r y E n g l i s h u s a g e t e nd s lo h e a r h i m o u t here, for it is cor rec t lo say “ t hat act wa s r i g h t , " b u t in co r re c t to say " h e is a r i g h t m a n . ” W e m i g h t in the l a tt e r case, h owe ver , say t ha t " h e is a m o r a l l y g o o d m a n . ” 20 J5y a p p e a l i n g to w h a t we o r d i n a r i l y m e a n w h e n we u se certain wor ds, R o s s a t t e m p t s to s h o w t hat G . E. M o o r e ’s d e f i n i t i o n o f r i g h t in P r i n c i p i a E t h i c a as “ p r o d u c t i v e o f the g re a te s t p o s s i b l e g o o d " is not

28

what we mean when we use the word “ right.’’ Ross puts his case as follows: It seems clear for instance that when an ordinary m an says it is right to fulfil promises, lie is not in the least thinking of the total consequences of such an act, abou t which he knows and cares little or nothing. ‘Ideal u tilitarian ism ’ is, it would appear, plausible only when it is understood not as an analysis or defini­ tion of the notion of ‘righ t’ but as a statem ent that all acts that are right, and only these, possess the further characteristic of being productive of the best possible consequences, and are right because they possess this other characteristic.80 In other words, the productivity of the greatest good m ight well be a criterion of what acts are in fact right, but not a definition of “ righ t” itself. W hat then do we m ean by “ righ t” ? As we have already indicated, Ross holds that right is an ultim ate and irreducible notion, and hence cannot be defined. T h ere are some terms whose m eaning we seem to grasp im m ediately, an d all attem pts to define them in other terms seem to be inadequate. It is the contention of R oss that it is selfevident that “ righ t” is ju st such an irreducible notion. T h e reader may protest at this point that the criterion of self-evidence is beginning to ap pear as a curtain behind which the philosopher can hide when the going gets too tough. In fact, it could be protested that the notion of “ righ t” as irreducible was so far from being self-evident Lo even that very educated philosopher G. E. M oore, that he sought Lo derive the notion from an analysis of “ good ” ! T o this objection even the defense of the self-evident which Ross gives does not seem Lo pertain: “ . . . the nature of the self-evident is not to be evident to every m ind however undeveloped, but to be apprehended directly by m inds which have reached a certain degree of m aturity.” 31 O f course, it should be noted that Ross is defending self-evidence here against the position that prim itive man did not have an awareness of obligation s as we do today. And while his defense may meet such objections, it docs not seem to dispose of M oore and others like him. However, it must be recalled that M oore also appealed to the direct apprehension of his readers as the court of last resort in many matters, and perhaps that is what one has to do in this case also. Either you find the notion of “ righ t” as self-evident or you do not. Ross, like M oore, holds to a self-evident insight into certain

29

hroail principles of m orality which lorm a system of objective m oral truth analogous in m any respects to objective truths in any other realm, such as the sciences. It needs to be noted that he m aintains this position because he is convinced of its truth, as well as because he is convinced of the falsity of sociological theories which attem pt to define “ right” as that type of act which is approved by the society in which one lives. Ross holds, in this connection, that an ap peal to per­ sonal experience should clearly show that one does not regard as right many of the acts which his society docs in fact approve. T h u s, for exam ple, although my society approves of capital punishm ent, I m ight not consider it to be right. P R IM A F A C IE D U T IE S T h e most, interesting and ap pealin g part of the view now before us is the analysis which R oss gives of right acts. Like M oore, R oss ap ­ peals to the com mon m an ’s awareness of why he fulfils an obligation, such as to keep a prom ise, b u t he finds a quite different state of affairs to prevail from that which M oore had suggested. W hen a plain m an fulfils a prom ise because he thinks lie ought to do so, it seems clear that he docs so with no thought of its total consequences, still less with any opinion that these arc likely to be the best possible. H e thinks in fact much m ore of the past than of the future. W hat makes him think it right to act in a certain way is the fact that he has prom ised to do so— that and, usually, nothing more.'1However, Ross is fair to his opponents, and suggests that they may have been misled by those cases in which the common m an faces a conflict in his obligations. If I have m ade a prom ise to meet someone at a restaurant, and on my way to keep this engagem ent I find that I can be of great assistance to someone who has ju st been in an accident, does it not seem that I choose the act which w ill produce the greater good on the whole? And such a choice for m ost people would clearly be to render assistance to the accident victim. Ross believes that he can deal adequately with such a case within his theory of right acts without reducing right acts to those which tend to produce the greatest good, for, he m aintains, in addition to having a duty to keep prom ises I also tend to have a duty to relieve distress. Now, in the situation we have suggested, Ross m aintains that my greater duty is to relieve distress rather than to keep my prom ise to meet my friend.

30

T h e fa els t ha t o n e r ec og ni zes s o m e d u t i e s to b e m o r e b i n d i n g u p o n o n e than ot her s, a n d d i a l c er ta in types of a c l i o n u s u a l l y l e n d to be o n e ’s d ul y , led R o s s to f o r m u l a t e his c on ce pt ol' p r i m a f a d e dut ies. T h e s e p r i m a fncic d u t i e s g r o w o u t of the r e l a t i o n s h i p to o t h e r s o r to m y s e l f in whi ch 1 a m i n vo lv ed, a n d they ar c my p r o p e r d u t y unl ess s o m e m o r e s i g n i fi c an t d u l y inte rvenes b efor e I act. F o r R o s s , p r i m a f a c i a d u t i e s a r e “ c o n d i t i o n a l d u t i e s ” '1'1 which an act has b e c a u s e it is o f a c er ta in k i nd . O r in o t h e r wor ds, a ’p r i m a f a d e d u t y is an act wh i c h

is fitting or a p p r o p r i a t e to the s i t u a t i o n

a t the t ime. R o s s

a po lo gi /. cd in T h e R i g h t a n d the G o o d lor the term p r i m a f a c i e since it m i g h t s u gg e s t that he wa s r e f e r r i n g o n l y to w h a t a p p e a r e d at first s i g h t lo be o n e ’s du ty, wh il e he m e a n t to refe r to an o b j e c t i v e f e a tu r e of the m o r a l s i t u a t i o n . H o w e v e r , he s u g g e s t e d t ha t lie c o u l d n ot find a b e t t e r term, a l t h o u g h P r i c h a r d ’s use o f c l ai m c a r r i e d m u c h o f the m e a n i n g lie m e a n t to convey. H ow e v e r , it s ee ms a w k w a r d to say t hat o n e has a c l ai m to c u l t i v a t e a c er ta in k i n d o f c h a r ac t er , a n d R o s s m e a n s to i n c l u d e this d u t y to d e v e l o p o n e ’s c h a r a c t e r as p a r t o f o n e ’s p r i m a f a c i e duties. W h i l e R o s s c o n t i n u e d lo use the p h r a s e j>rima fa ci e d u t i e s iu In's l a t e r b oo k, I ' o u n d a t i o n s of E t h ic s , lie a c k n o w l e d g e d t ha t the w o r d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a d e q u a t e l y c on ve y ed what: lie m e a n t b y this m o r e c u m b e r s o m e e x p r e s s i o n . 511 T h e r e a d e r ma y, t heref ore, b e h e l pe d if lie c o n s id e rs this di s cu s si on o f p r i m a f a ci e d u t i e s lo b e r eall y a d i s c u ss i on of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f the m o r a l a g e n t in a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n at a c er ta in lime. R o s s then p r o c e e d s to gi ve an o u t l i n e of p r i m a f a ci e d u t i e s whi ch in m a n y respect s might, b e c on s i d e r e d a m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h e r ’s ve rs ion o f the ten c o m m a n d m e n t s . T h e r e a d e r s h o u l d b e ar in m i n d that. R o s s m a i n t a i n s t hat wo k n o w these ftrim a f a d e d u t i e s to be sel f-evident ly t rue; there is n o t h i n g s u b j e c t i v e a b o u t t he m in this sense. O f course, he d o c s n o t c l a i m that, his l i st i ng is c o m p l e t e or final, a l t h o u g h lie d o es b e li e ve t ha t they arc the b a s i c m o r a l c o n vi c t i o n s o f the c o m m o n man. (I) T h e r e ar c s o m e p n m / i f a c i e d u t i e s which g r o w o u t o f m y p r e ­ v i o u s acts, such as my h a v i n g m a d e a p r om i s e , o r m y h a v i n g d o n e s o m e w r o n g f u l act. T h e d u t i e s of fidelity i n c l u d e t he re f or e m y o b l i g a ­ tion to k e ep pr o mi s e s , i n c l u d i n g the i m p l i c i t p r o m i s e to soci ety to tell the trut h. D u t i e s o f r e p a r a t i o n ar e i n vo lv ed in m y o b l i g a t i o n to m a k e r e st i t u t i o n for h a r m I m a y h a v e c a u s e d by s o m e w r o n g f u l act. T h u s if 1 h a v e h a r m e d s o m e o n e by u n k n o w i n g l y s p r e a d i n g as t ru e w h a t I

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later learn was false, it is my duty to apologize and to attem pt to can­ cel out the harm which my previous act brough t about. (2) The prim a facie duty of gratitude arises from the acts of others who have conferred a benefit upon me. T h u s, I owe an obliga­ tion to my parents for the care they have taken of me as a child. (3) T h e prim a facie duties of justice arise from the fact that there is inequality in the distribution of happiness not according to merit. Ju stice then, for Ross, is my duty to seek to have rewards and pun ish ­ m ents distribu ted fairly, that is, according to what the persons in ­ volved actually deserve on the basis of their character and past actions. (4) From the n ature of m an living in a w orld where there are other men whom we can make better than they are, Ross derives the pri?na facie duties of beneficence. It thus becomes our duty to im ­ prove other people with respect to pleasure, intelligence or virtue. (5) T h e p rim a facie duty of self-improvement with respect to vir­ tue and intelligence follows from the fact that we can im prove our­ selves in these areas. R oss does not include our h aving a duty to seek our own pleasure because he thinks it odd to m ain tain that anyone actually considers this to be one of his duties. (6) Lastly, R oss finds that we have a very strong obligation not to in jure others. T h is prim a facie duty of non-maleficence he holds is more bin d in g than (4), the prim a facie duty of beneficence, for clearly “ we should not in general consider it ju stifiable to kill one person in order to keep another alive, or to steal from one in order to give alms to another.” 35 T h e fact is that non-maleficence may well be the first step on the road toward a positive program of benevolent action. Ross is quite w illing to adm it that the last three prim a facie duties m ight be held to be derivable from the consideration of good results, for these are the duties of general obligation which could be summ ed up as our duty to produce as much good as possible. However, Ross would still stress the rightness of the action as being of the kind that tended to produce the m ost good possible, rather than ju stify the act wholly in terms of its consequences. B u t it is with respect to duties of special obligation, such as those represented by types (1) and (2) above, that R oss feels he can show the superiority of his account of m oral experience to that given by ideal utilitarian ism . For according to the theory of ideal u tilitarian ism I should sim ply be concerned with bringing the m ost good possible into being, but Ross m aintains

32

that this view has lost sight of a very im portan t aspcct of m oral ju d g ­ ment, namely, the highly personal nature of an in d iv id u al’s duty and the special conditions which may be involved at a p articu lar time. If I have m ade a prom ise, then this is a special condition which helps to determ ine what will be a right act with respect to this prom ise; and if I have been aided by a friend, this too is a special condition which will help to determ ine the type of righ t act which I ought to perform in re­ turn. T o sim plify a bit, let us put the argum ent for R oss in this form. If the ideal u tilitarian is correct, then I ought to act so as to bring the most good into the world, but Ross is m ain tain in g that this view neglects the fact that I owe som ething to a benefactor sim ply because he has helped me in the past, and therefore I am under a greater obligation to do good to him than to ju st any person w hatso­ ever. T h u s, the benefactor has a claim on my action in a way which he w ould not have if he had not previously aided me. It is precisely this characteristic of failin g to account for some duties arising from special circum stances which Ross criticizes in ideal u tilitarian ism . T h u s not only does ideal u tilitarian ism seem to put forward a ju stifi­ cation of telling the truth and keeping prom ises which is more subtle than the one used by the ordinary m an, but it also fails to account for the fact that I have a special obligation to a benefactor. However, the reader m ay now ask, "W h at docs one do when there is a conflict of prim a facie duties? Suppose I m ust choose between keeping my prom ise and not in ju rin g someone. W hat guidance can be given me?” In this case, R oss could probably give more direct g u id ­ ance than in m any others, for he has m aintained, you will recall, that the duty not to in jure others (6) is actually p rim a facie more binding than the others. T h u s if keeping my prom ise to a friend seems likely to in jure him, I ought not to keep it. You may recall P lato ’s account of ju st such a predicam ent in the R ep u blic where Socrates asks if it is ju st to return a sword to a m an who in his present fram e of m ind is quite likely to kill him self.38 Suppose, however, there arc other conflicts of prim a facie duties. How ought one to choose between them? Is there any rule here? It is im portan t for the reader to bear in m ind that we are discussing prim a facie duties, that is, responsibilities which arc known im m ediately by m ature reflecting men. R oss most certainly docs not suggest that there is any rule which can be ap plied 111 the conflict of prim a facie duties, other than the one m entioned in the above p aragraph . H e is convinced

33

that our judgm ents concerning what our duty actually is in any con­ crete situation lack the certainty that attaches to our know ing the general principles of duty. It cannot be em phasized too m uch that Ross is claim ing self-evidence only for the general principles of prim a facie duties, and not for any p articu lar application of them to actual situ a­ tions. W hen we face a conflict concerning what our duty is, Ross sug­ gests that we m ust honestly recognize that we can act only on our own insight into the situation. We shall be better able to choose if we reflect carefully on the degree of prim a facie rightness of the acts in question, than if we fail to reflect, but no guarantee can be given that we shall m ake the righ t choice. In sum m ary, while according to M oore we w ould calculate the probable good our acts m ight achieve, according to Ross we w ould calculate the probable prim a facie righ t­ ness of the acts available to our choice. T H E N A T U R E OF T H E GOOD A lthough Ross is best known for his view of p rim a facie duties, he also developed a carefully worked out theory of the good. H e agreed w ith M oore that “ good ” in its prim ary sense is indefinable, but unlike M oore, he attem pted to paraphrase its m eaning as “ fine or adm irable activities of the hum an sp irit.” 37 Recognizing that the word “ good ” is actually ap p lied to m any kinds of things, such as a good book, a good student, an d a good m an, Ross m ain tain ed that the only im por­ tant usage for ethics was intrinsic good. In his analysis he rejected relation al views of the good, such as the position of R a lp h Barton Perry, that good is anything in which an interest is taken, on the grounds largely that this is not w hat we m ean when we speak of “ good” in its prim ary sense of intrinsic good. It is surely clear that when we call som ething good we are think­ ing of it as possessing in itself a certain attribu te and are not thinking of it as necessarily having an interest taken in it. If when we attend to som ething we are im pelled to describe it as good, it is surely not im possible to think that, though of course we can only discover its goodness by atten ding to it, it has its goodness before we attended to it and w ould have had it if we h ad not attended to it. A nd again it is evidently possible to think that some of the things in which an interest has been taken have nevertheless been bad. B u t if ‘good’ and ‘object of interest’ m eant exactly the same, it w ould be im possible to think either of these two things which it clearly is possible to think.38

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H o ld in g that “ good” is an objective property which cannot be ac­ counted for wholly in psychological terms, R oss insists that p art of the difficulty of writers such as Perry who attem pt to provide a n atu ralistic definition for “ good” is th at they assum e a general theory of value should apply to all the uses of evaluative words. B u t clearly econom ic value (or good) is instrum ental, w hile in the strictly ethical sense we are interested in that which is good in and for itself. Ross holds that it is true that a feeling of interest does accom pany all our applications or ascriptions of good, bu t he denies that this psychological fact de­ fines “ good.” And here again the ap peal must rest ultim ately with the reader, whom R oss asks to exam ine his own use of the word “ good” to see if he does not at least use it sometimes to m ean an object of worth whether or not he takes an interest in it. R oss thus m aintains that “ good ” in its prim ary sense is objective, although correctly described it is a qu ality which attaches only to rather com plex states of affairs. V alue judgm ents presuppose the existence of objects to which they can be applied, and hence R oss w ould apparently agree with M oore in rejectin g the m etaphysical position that values exist in some supersensible realm . In fact, R oss finds that “ . . . good is a characteristic belon gin g prim arily only to states of m ind, and belon ging to them in virtue of three characteristics— the m oral virtue included in them, the intelligence included in them, and the pleasure included in them .” 39 Consequently, there are three types of things which possess intrinsic goodness: (1) virtuous disposition and actions which sprin g from certain m otives, such as the desire to do one’s duty, the desire to bring som ething good into existence, and the desire to brin g pleasure to others; (2) know ledge which includes as part of it­ self the virtue of curiosity; and (3) pleasure, providin g that the pleas­ ure is not part of a com plex whole which has some other characteristic which would be bad. T h u s, pleasures which would be based on ignor­ ance and which are m orally evil w ould not be intrinsically good. In ­ deed, Ross even holds that pleasure is intrinsically in ferior to knowl­ edge and m oral virtue, bu t m aintains that a satisfactory life m ust include a good deal of pleasure if for no other reason than the fact that “ it is pretty clear that our pursuit of the greater goods is m ade all the more effective by intervals in which we give ourselves up to enjoying ourselves and helpin g others to enjoy themselves. T h e desire for pleasure is so strong in every one that any one who tries to ignore or suppress it entirely w ill find him self defeated by the laws

35

of hum an nature.” 40 Speaking com paratively, Ross suggests that know l­ edge is lower on the scale of intrinsic values than m oral goodness. T h u s, in a sense we can have a relative scale for directing our value choices if we always rate m oral goodness as higher than knowledge, and knowledge as higher than pleasure. B u t ju st w hat is it that R oss calls m oral goodness? It m ust be m ade clear that it is not rightness, which we have seen him m ain tain is independent of goodness. T h a t the m oral goodness of an act is not the same thing as its rightness can be clarified by m eans of an illu stra­ tion. If I return the book to my friend as I h ad prom ised I w ould when I borrow ed it from him, I have done a righ t act. However, I may have returned it to him for any one or more of various m otives. I may have returned it to him because I considered it my duty to keep my prom ise, or because I thought that by retu rn in g the book I should be h elping to b rin g m ore good into existence than if I kept the book. Or my m ain m otive m ay have been that I considered I should make the person from whom I borrow ed the book h appy by retu rn in g it to him. Now for R oss each of these motives is m orally good, although the motive of acting from duty is superior to the m otive of brin gin g good into the world, which is in turn higher than the m otivation of p ro ­ ducing pleasure in another. However, suppose that my m otive for re­ turnin g the book was my desire for a certain fiendish pleasure I would take in the action, induced perhaps because I know that my friend has told others that when I borrow som ething I never return it. My m otive therefore is purely selfish, to show my frien d that he was apparently wrong in his evaluation of me. Or, to take a m ore likely possibility, suppose one day when my frien d is visiting me I return the book to him on the spur of the m om ent, as a mere im pulsive action w ithout giving the m atter any reflection whatsoever. Now R oss w ould hold, that in all of our im agined cases the right act was done, b u t he would insist that in the last two cases, the action was m orally bad because it was either selfish or unreflective. As R oss puts it: “ M oral goodness is quite distinct from and independent of rightness, which . . . belongs to acts not in virtue of the m otives they proceed from , b u t in virtue of the nature of w hat is done.” 41 T h e reader, however, should n ot think that R oss is m aking a distinction of “ righ t” an d “ m orally good” in order to show that in practice they are far separated from each other. Such is obviously not the case, for Ross insists that if the agent of the action is m otivated by

36

one or m ore of the morally good motives and has given reflective at­ tention to all the m orally relevant aspects of the act, then the act w ill be the right act. W hat R oss has been doin g is to discuss extrem e cases, such as, on the one hand, an act which may be the right act at the time and in the circumstances b u t which is in fact done from a m orally bad m otive, and on the other hand, an act done from m orally good motives which is for the circum stances not the right act to perform . T h e reader is surely fam iliar with such cases. In the last analysis, it is only goodness of character which tends to m otivate a m an to perform right acts. “ If a m an is not m orally good, it is only by the merest accident that he ever does what he ough t.” 42 T o sum up, in practice the righ t act and m orally good motives, as well as the search for good consequences, are usually all present in some degree in any act of high m oral value. Nevertheless, Ross w ould insist that we should not confuse the rightness of actions with the m orally good, largely because such a confusion of the two usually leads to an attem pt to derive the one from the other. T h e title of the earlier book by Ross, T h e R ig h t and the Good, im plies that he is m ain tain in g that each of these terms is basic to the m oral life, and that neither one can be considered accurately if one is held to be logically dependent upon the other. T H E P SY C H O L O G Y O F M O R A L A C T IO N A lthough his m ain interest seems to have been to analyze “ righ t” an d “ good,” Ross has some rather interesting remarks to m ake about the psychology of m oral action. A ll m oral action, he holds, arises from the desire for some end which is chosen. T h e end chosen by the agent m ust be intended to lead to action, for we all have m any idle desires about which we do absolutely nothing. Furtherm ore, a distinction m ust be drawn between im pulsive action, which follows directly upon a desire, and deliberative action in which a choice or decision is m ade before the action is perform ed. T o clarify these distinctions, let us think first of all of an im p u l­ sive act, such as my graspin g the h an d rail of a banister for su p po rt in descending the stairs. T h ere doesn’t seem to be in this case any choice or deliberative process of thought involved, bu t the action is done m ore or less habitually. However, suppose I have a desire to be a fam ous movie star and although attracted by the prospect of such an existence, I do nothing about it. I neither plan to study acting nor do

37

I do any acting in am ateur productions. Such a desire is one in which I have not deliberatively chosen to seek the end involved. For our third illustration, let us suppose that I have a desire to aid M ary Brow n, a student of m ine who is not progressing at all well in her studies. I may then begin to think how I could help her to become a better student and critically exam ine the m ethods which I m ight best em ploy to achieve the desired end. I m ight also, however, in the course of my concern consider the probable consequences of such action: w ill it lead her to depend too heavily upon my guidance instead of freeing her for creative work of her own, will it be considered by other students that I have shown undue favoritism to her, or is it likely that some special tutoring is exactly what she needs to awaken her intellectual curiosity and inspire her to better academ ic efforts? I m ight after considering the possibilities here, decide to do nothing whatsoever to help M ary Brown, in which case I abandon the original desired end with which I began my process of deliberation. L et us suppose, however, that after due w eighing of the probabilities I decide to tutor her for several weeks to see if any im provem ent will result. I have then, in the la n ­ guage of Ross, set myself to act. T h ere is an im portan t distinction here, for a decision may be one to do som ething at some future date, say next year, while a setting oneself to act is an intention to bring about the act alm ost im m ediately. Now if I do not act fairly soon after I have decided to help M ary Brow n, then R oss holds I m ay have to renew my decision to act at some later date. T h u s, common sense is basically right in preferring a m an who does things now, for it realizes that postpon in g action on decisions may m ean that in m any cases the decisions will not be im plem ented by action at all. In the case we have been considering, for exam ple, I m ay become too busy to be able to offer any help to M ary Brow n, or she may be dism issed from college for failure to achieve a satisfactory record before I act in the m anner decided upon. As Ross sees it, m oral philosophy has stressed too m uch the activity of setting oneself to act, and has neglected to consider as m orally sig­ nificant the preceding process, nam ely the resolving to set oneself to act in a certain way. T h e resolutions which we make on the basis of which we then set ourselves to act are m orally significant since they are clearly the m anifestations of our m oral character. U nless we resolve on the basis of a process of deliberation to do certain acts, we may not do these acts when the occasion which calls for our action arises.

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T O W A R D A N E V A L U A T IO N O F T H E M O R A L P H IL O S O P H Y O F W. D. R O SS We have now considered two m oral philosophers who m ain tain that the basic ethical term or terms are intuited, and not reducible to other concepts. It does seem reasonable to hold that in any language there are some sim ple terms which all com m unication m ust presuppose, so that while you m ay describe what these terms represent by illu stra­ tions and analogies, it proves fruitless to attem pt to define them. H ow ­ ever, it seems that both M oore and Ross m ean more than this when they hold that the “ good ” or the “ righ t” are indefinable. M oore m ain ­ tains that “ good” is the basic ethical concept, a sim ple term known directly by the com mon m an; he then seeks to explain “ righ t” in terms of “ good.” Ross, on the other hand, holds that M oore’s analysis does violence to the experience of the ordinary m an, because “ righ t” is also an irreducible concept which no one but a philosopher would try to explain in terms of “ good.” T h e ordinary m an, on R o ss’s analysis, sim ply sees that an act is right and that he ought to do it, if there are no conflicting obligations. A ccording to M oore’s analysis, however, the com mon m an considers an act to be right if it tends to produce the m axim um good possible under the circumstances. W hat are we to make of these conflicting interpretations of the m oral experience? M ay it possibly be that they are not as far ap art as they appear to be, or is it rather that either M oore or R oss is wrong? Some of the readers of this book may have a hunch that R oss is correct in at least one respect, namely, that the reason one frequently gives for doing a certain act is that it sim ply is right. In our society it does seem true that unless there are conflicting claim s upon us, we hold that telling the truth, keeping promises, and acting justly are right acts w ithout our attem ptin g to determ ine what the consequences of such acts m ight be. On the other hand, some readers m ay argue that while this may be a correct description of the present state of affairs in m any of our m oral choices, it does not do justice to the ultim ate ju sti­ fication of these acts. T h is group m ight m aintain that ultim ately what makes any act right is its tendency to produce more good in the world rather than evil. T h e defenders of Ross m ight then ask, “ 'Why then do we not ap peal to the probable consequences in every case before we de­ cide to tell the truth?” A ll is not lost for those who sympathize with M oore, however, for they may m ain tain that after all, as a result of the experience m an has had for many, m any centuries, he has discovered

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that in alm ost all cases m ore good is produced in the world by telling the truth than by lying. In all ordinary cases therefore it is not neces­ sary to reconsider the probable consequences of telling the truth, for the experience of hum anity is sufficient evidence for us to go upon. W hen there is a conflict of obligations, however, we still do ask what will be the p robable consequences of each course of action and we choose the act which it seems likely will produce the greater good. In short, those who agree with M oore here, would m ain tain that the u lti­ m ate justification for the m orality of an act is its consequences for good or evil, while the defenders of Ross w ould hold that some acts are sim ply right because they are seen to be fitting or ap prop riate to the situation. T o the present writer it seems that strong argum ents can be offered for considering acts as ultim ately justified by their consequences and that perhaps equally strong argum ents can be given for h oldin g that some acts are sim ply righ t because they are fitting to the situation in which the agent is involved. However, I do wish to offer some sugges­ tions to explain this apparen tly am azing incom patibility of views con­ cerning m oral justification. In the first place, I w ould like to m aintain the position that the right and the good are not as far a p art in ethical practice as either M oore or R oss seem to im ply. In cases of actual m oral choice the right and the good, it seems to me, are usually connected together in such a way as to m ake it difficult for the p lain m an to separate them. T h u s, on occasions I should justify some of my acts, such as telling the truth and keeping promises, by sim ply saying that I considered them the righ t (fitting, appropriate) acts for me to do in those circumstances. If a person asks me directions to the railw ay sta­ tion, I w ould sim ply consider it the right thing to do to give him correct directions to the best of my ability. However, in the event of a conflict of duties, I w ould usually appeal to the p robable conse­ quences of the alternative acts rather than attem pt to weigh the various degrees of prim a facie rightness of the acts. W hile Ross has indicated what I think all sane men w ould agree to in stating that we have a stronger prim a facie duty not to harm others than attaches to our other prim a facie duties, I do not believe that this criterion w ill aid us in m any of our m oral conflicts. In fact Ross, it seems, does in the case of conflicting prim a facie duties introduce consequences into the discussion by m ain tain in g that we have a duty to attem pt to produce the greatest good. Now if I am to determ ine w hat the greatest good is,

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it seems that I shall have to carefully evaluate the various probabilities of the alternative actions open to me at the time. A nd yet, the reader should notice, that if he feels inclined to agree with Ross, he could still m ain tain that the ultim ate justification for any action being right is sim ply that it is the right thing to do at that time— namely, at the time of choice it is right for me to act in such a way as to produce the greatest good. T h e history of ethics has found some writers defending what are called teleological theories, while others have held to deontological theories. Now M oore’s theory is a teleological one, in that it m aintains that that which is good is ultim ately justified in terms of the conse­ quences of the act. R o ss’s view, on the other hand, is deontological in that it m aintains that the ultim ate justification for a m oral act is its character, namely, its rightness. W hile, on first glance, these views seem irreconcilable, m ay it be that they are both alternative possibili­ ties of describing substan tially the sam e m oral states? T h e teleologist chooses a universe which is intrinsically better, and thus righ t acts are those which tend to m axim ize the good in the world. T h e deontologist m aintains that it is right to choose the better universe; it is righ t to b rin g more good into existence. A nd hence, to this w riter it appears that they may not be as far ap art as they at first seem, although it is true to say that there is a difference o f em phasis in the two views. Some writers have concentrated upon the character of the actions, and others, upon their results. I should like to m aintain that both are equally relevant, and that little progress can be m ade in m oral philosophy by trying to find the one more basic than the other. W hile more serious than the dispute as to which came first, the chicken or the egg, it seems to me that little is to be gained by continuing the attem pt to explain the right in terms of the good, or the good in terms of the right. Ju s t as we have both chickens and eggs, so too we find that in our ordinary m oral discourse we use as terms both “ righ t” and “go od ,” for they seem to be quite generally involved in our discussion of m oral action. Indeed, one of the practical m erits of Ross in this connection lies in his showing us that we ought to do the right acts from m orally good motives and, I should add, in order to achieve good results. It seems therefore that M oore and Ross have called our attention to two aspects of m oral actions, neither of which can be ignored. T h ere is an even more fun dam en tal problem with respect to the theories represented by R oss and M oore. Both of these writers m ain ­

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tain that the basic ethical terras stand for non-natural qualities. It is clear that at least one of the m ain reasons for their m ain tain in g this position is their conviction that all n aturalistic definitions of ethical terms have failed adequately to convey what is ordinarily im plied in ethical talk. T h ey have attem pted to show that value words, such as good, right, beautiful, desirable, cannot be equated with psychological or sociological descriptions of actual states of affairs. T h e reader may follow them well thus far, for certainly “ desirable” is not the same as “ desired,” and the fact that a m illion Frenchm en consider some­ thing right does n ot m ake it right. We seem to recognize a profound difference between a description of an act, an d an evaluation of an act. For exam ple, I m ight describe in as much detail as I possibly could an assault which I w itnessed on the street, but the m om ent I say that this was a wicked act, or that it was right for the attacker to do w hat he did, I am u ttering a different kind of statem ent altogether. R eason in g such as this led both M oore and Ross to m ain tain that ethical words, such as “ good” and “ b ad ,” “ righ t” and “ w rong,” are not descriptions of natural qualities which appear in objects, as yellow appears in a yellow ball. N o am ount of scientific analysis, therefore, w ould be able to discover that “ good” is the desired, the more evolved behavior, or an object of interest. T h e m ost that can be done by this line of pro­ cedure would be to show that all things which are good are also de­ sired, do represent more highly evolved lines of behavior, and do con­ stitute things in A vhich someone takes an interest. T h ese n aturalistic attem pts to define good are bound to fail in the judgm en t of M oore an d Ross because good is n ot a n atural quality at all. If it is not a n atu ral quality, then what is it? T h e suggestion m ade was that it is a non-natural quality, that is a qu ality which cannot be described in the terms of any science b u t which is nevertheless objective. Furth er­ more, they m aintained since “ good” and “ righ t” are such non-natural qu alities, we apprehend them directly by acts of intuition. Again, it seems to the present writer that M oore and R oss were correct in insisting that “ good” and other ethical terms cannot be re­ duced to descriptions of psychological or sociological states of affairs. H owever, in contem porary philosophy there are very few defenders of “ good” as a non-natural quality, although a great m any affirm that “ good” is not a natural qu ality either. Perhaps ethical terms do not refer to qualties at all. A significant group of contem porary philoso­ phers, whom we shall exam ine later, m ain tain that “ good,” and other

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value words like it, are used em otively and not cognitively. T h a t is, when I say that som ething is good, I am expressing my approval of it and asking you to share my feeling of approval. We shall exam ine this theory in detail at the proper place, but I have m entioned it here in order that the reader may see that other alternatives have appeared in recent years, so that one need not choose between believing that ethical terms are descriptions of either n atu ral or non-natural qualities. In fact, it m ay well be true that both M oore and Ross were too interested in the cognitive use of language correctly to indicate some of the pecu­ liar characteristics of ethical terms. A ssum ing that statem ents must refer to qualities, and finding that ethical statem ents did not refer to natural qualities, they defended the position that they m ust therefore refer to non-natural qualities. Perhaps the reader feels in ­ clined to agree that “ good ” and “ righ t” do refer to some aspect of experience not wholly describable in n aturalistic terms. U n til we have exam ined other positions which attem pt to explain this aspect of ethical judgm ent in other ways, it may be well not to become too firmly convinced that these basic ethical terms refer to non-natural qualities. For if we can find a way of explain in g them, which does full justice to the significantly evaluative sense of the words, and yet which does not have to posit the existence of non-natural qualities, we sh all u ndoubtedly have a more defensible theory of ethics. Nevertheless, after careful reflection on the m oral philosophies which still lie before us, the reader may still find that the view of either M oore or Ross seems more adequately to account for the u nique aspects of value words than any other. One addition al difficulty, which seems join ed with the belief that “ good” and “righ t” describe non-natural qualities, is the appeal to intuition by both M oore and Ross. If many of us do not have in tu i­ tions into the nature of “ good ” or “rig h t” as non-natural and indefi­ n able qualities, does that not tend to weaken the case for these posi­ tions? It is certainly true that im m ediate insight into a situation is part of the m oral experience, but is this insight the same for all men? D o either M oore or Ross convincingly dem onstrate that all men have basically the same intuitions in m orals? Can R oss m ake out a good case for h olding that all reflective, m ature men today w ould recognize his list of p rim a facie duties as their responsibilities? W ould Eastern man as well as W estern m an subscribe to R oss’s list as a sum m ary of their values? One can see why some critics have called R o ss’s list of

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prim a facie duties a rationalized version of the code of an English gentlem an.43 D o we not face some difficulty in the fact that two E ng­ lishm en who were contem poraries (M oore and Ross) p u t forth rival explanations of what they held they knew basically by intuition? R oss does suggest that our intuitions in m oral experience must be checked upon, for he indicates that in the case of ap p aren t conflicts about our in tu ition al claim s we should ap peal to “ the verdicts of the m oral consciousness of the best people.” 44 B u t is it not fair to ask, “ B u t who are the best people?” Even if we should have some tacit agreem ent in general concerning who the best people are in our world, is it at all clear that we should find them agreeing on m oral evaluations? Cer­ tainly some of the “ best p eople” in our society are pacifists who believe in im m ediate total disarm am ent, but other equally high prin cipled people w ould hold that such a step at this time w ould be a w rong act. L e t us not overstate this p art o f our criticism of Ross, however, for he also calls for critical reflection by the in dividual on his own in tu i­ tional judgm ents as well as on those o f others by whom he m ight tend to be influenced. It m ay well be that we do have here a correct listing of the aspects involved in our form ing m oral judgm ents, nam ely in tui­ tion, appeal to the views of those whom we consider to be m orally superior, and critical reflection before choosing to act. T h e reader should not rely too heavily on unaccom panied intuitions, certainly, but may, however, still m ain tain that our basic insight into the nature of the right and the good is intuitive, although, in our application s of this insight to practical actions, we do in fact have to rely on the evaluations of others and especially upon our own careful reflection.

III. A. C. Ewing: “Ought” as the Basic Ethical Term A more recent statem ent of the objective theory o f ethics is that provided by Dr. A. C. Ew ing of C am bridge University. E w ing’s a p ­ proach is derived in m any respects from the work of M oore and Ross. H e holds to a type of intuition ist ethics which finds at least one ethical term to be indefinable, and he also is convinced that ethical terms are non-natural in their essential ethical uses. H e is unlike M oore and R oss in that he finds the basic ethical term to be “ ough t” rather than “ good” or “ righ t.” In T h e D efinition of Good,45 publish ed in 1947,

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Ew ing stressed that ethical terms refer to non-natural qu alities, and referred to his philosophy as one which em phasized the role which intuition plays in ethics. Largely because he now considers these terms to be m isleading, he has recently stated his case for an objective ethics in terms which are not as likely to be m isunderstood today. In his recent book Second T h ough ts in M oral Philosophy48 the reader can discover that Ew ing has m odified his position so as to approach what he calls a "m id d le way,” chiefly by giving more prom inence to the so-called naturalistic and emotive aspects of ethical language. It should be quite inform ative for us to exam ine Ew ing’s treatm ent of m oral philosophy, for it is a well-worked out theory which continues, while also m odifying, the tradition established by M oore and Ross. T H E "G O O D ” D E F IN E D IN T E R M S O F " O U G H T ” Ew ing agrees with M oore and R oss that at least one ethical con­ cept m ust in its prim ary use be indefinable, bu t he insists that this should not ever be considered a shortcom ing of ethics alone, for other disciplines have their basic indefinable terms as well. T o avoid circu­ larity of our definitions an d infinite regress, at least one term m ust be basic, an d hence in the strict sense of definition not definable. T h is is of course not to say that nothing can be said about the basic indefin­ able term, but only that no strict equivalent definition for it can be provided. Ew ing proposes as the basic indefinable ethical term the relation al characteristic of "oughtness.” He disagrees with M oore’s stressing "g o o d ” as the indefinable non-natural quality, for he fails to find such a quality in his own experience, nor does he find that many other philosophers have been able to locate such a non-natural quality. Likew ise, he rejects R o ss’s view that in their prim ary senses both “ righ t” and "g o o d ” are indefinable, for he does not think it necessary to introduce more than one basic indefinable term in ethical analysis. T h u s Ew ing attem pts to show that “ good” can be derived from “ ought,” which he holds is itself experienced as a non-natural relation of obligation by everyone at some time or other. In T h e D efinition of G ood Ew ing suggested that there are actually two different concepts covered by the one word “ ought.” (1) In the m ost general use “ ough t” stands for "fittingness,” which is “ a relation between an action and its environm ent.” 47 In this usage of “ ough t” one m ight suggest to a painter that he ought to use m ore yellow in his at­ tem pt to portray a rural landscape. In that type of case, one would

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m ean by “ ought” merely that it w ould be appropriate, suitable, or fitting for som ething to be done, or some object used, in that particu­ lar situation. (2) T h ere are m any instances in our lives, however, when we em ploy a m oral “ ough t” which is apparently not quite the same as merely “ fittingness.” T h u s if I say to you that you really ought to be more kind to Jack, I am not merely conveying criteria of suitability to this situation, b u t I am further suggesting that it is m orally im perative for you to change your conduct if you are to be a good m an. T h is second usage of “ ough t” is what m ost philosophers have m eant by moral obligation. Now the acid test of “ ough t” as the basic ethical term m ust be faced. Is it possible to define “ good ” in terms of “ ough t” ? In The Definition of G ood Ew ing proposed that the prim ary sense of “ ou gh t” was “ fittingness” and then suggested that “ good ” could be defined as a “ fitting object of a pro attitud e.” 48 T h e reader m ust bear in mind here that Ew ing is not attem ptin g to define all senses of the word “ good,” but rather only “ good” as intrinsically good, that is good as an end in itself. T h a t Ew ing’s definition is plausible can be shown by expan d in g his definition in the way which he suggested. First of all, if one considers that the intrinsically good is that which M oore sug­ gested, namely, that which is “ worth having for its own sake,” 49 then one can well consider it to be a fitting object for approval. For clearly, one ought to approve that which is 'worth having for its own sake. B u t since Ew ing finds that there are other attitudes which we may take toward a fitting object besides approval (such as choice, desire, liking, pursuit, adm iration), he suggests that the definition is more accurate if we substitute “ pro attitu d e” for approval. A nd Ew ing says that by “ pro attitu d e” he means “ any favourable attitude to som e­ thing.” 50 “ B u t is this anything more than a naturalistic definition of good?” the reader may ask at this point. Behind this question is the suspicion that “ fitting” is a natural psychological description of likes, choices, etc. Ew ing insists that this is not the case at all, because the word “ fitting” does not mean desired or approved, bu t rather that which is worthy of desire or approval. “ W orthy” or “ fitting” is thus used as an evaluative word, which Ew ing holds to be non-natural in the sense that is here expressed, which cannot be reduced to scientific descrip­ tions of what people actually do desire, choose, adm ire, and so on. Furtherm ore, he insists that people if they attend to their experiences

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will be aware of the prescncc in their consciousness from time to time of the relation of fittingness or m oral obligation, while tlu-y may not be aware of a non-natural quality “ goodness.” It should be clearly pointed out that while Ew ing in T he Defini­ tion of G ood considered the prim ary sense of “ ough t” to be "fittingness” in terms of which lie defined “ good,” he did not reduce moral o bliga­ tion to merely a sense of fittingness. H e did find, however, that every appeal to moral obligation involved an appeal to the fittingness of the act, although it also involved consciousness by the agent that lie should deserve moral condem nation if he did not do the act, plus the concep­ tion that in some sense a m oral law bound the agent to do the m orally required action. In his recent book, Second T h ough ts in M oral Philosophy, Ewing not only restates his case in terms more congenial to the contem porary philosophical clim ate, but also shows that lie has changed his m ind concerning certain very im portant parts of his earlier theory. Let us now turn to those aspects of his new position which bear upon the attem pt we have sketched above lo define “go od ” in terms of “ ough t.” Ew ing now stales that perhaps M oore, Ross and him self tended to stress too much the likeness of ethical judgm ents to theoretical scientific judgm ents, but that they did so because it seemed false to them that ethical judgm ents were merely statem ents of feelings (sub­ jectivism ), or were reducible to statistics of how people actually do behave in a particular society (naturalism ). He still insists that in some sense of the word, ethical judgm ents are true, but in order to m ain ­ tain this he no longer believes it necessary to postulate a specifically non-natural quality to account for their trueness. In fact he finds that the view which held to the existence of 110 11 -natural qualities was m isleading, for it still considered ethical judgm ents as though they described something, while what lie should now wish to m aintain is that value judgm ents are ways of regarding experience which arc not merely descriptive. I 11 order to find a convenient way to refer to the 110 11 -dcscriptivc aspect of ethical judgm ents he says that he will still call them non-natural concepts (although lie adm its that noil-em piri­ cal m ight be a better term) but will also indicate quite clearly that they are not descriptions of actually existing 11011 -natural qualities. Or, to put it more sim ply, ethical judgm ents arc considered by Ew ing to be concepts which are not reducible to either naturalistic or subjective elements. T h is is, as he sees it, what objectivists in ethics have wished

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to stress, and it can be m aintained w ithout the necessity of postu latin g a queer philosophical entity such as a non-natural quality. T h u s Ewing finds him self in agreem ent with m any contem porary philosophers who stress that ethical judgm ents are about attitudes, b u t he w ould insist that some attitudes can be right and others w rong on the ground of the su pportin g reasons which could be given for ad op tin g them .51 In addition to aban don in g belief in non-natural qualities, Ewing also qualifies his use of the word “ in tu ition .” In his earlier writings he has stressed that basic ethical judgm ents are intuitively ap pre­ hended. T h e word “ in tu itio n ” has fallen into disrepute in our present western society, and furtherm ore people are likely to assum e that a philosopher means m ore by it than he does. T h erefore, Ew ing sug­ gests that if he were to start w riting on ethics now he w ould not use the word “ in tu ition ,” bu t rath er “ direct cognition” to explain our insight into that which is righ t and wrong. As he puts it: W hat we cognize w ill be that certain factual properties or cir­ cumstances constitute a reason why certain attitudes ought to be adopted or certain actions done. It is not that we see im m ediately that we ought to do certain things w ithout a reason bu t that we see im m ediately that certain factors constitute a reason.52 B u t m ore can be said for preferring “ direct cognition” to “ in tu ition .” Perhaps most im portan t of all is the fact that direct cognition does not autom atically constitute a claim to knowledge, for clearly our cogni­ tions may be m istaken or at least partly in error. A nd of course this can be true of all cognitions, and is not a peculiarity only of ethical cognitions. Ew ing is thus quite w illing to adm it that certainty may not be obtain ed in ethical reasoning, but he still insists that we may be justified in holdin g our ethical beliefs to be rational, since our direct cognition into a p articu lar situation may be reinforced by coherence with other ethical cognitions we have had. A ll of these concessions, however, are largely to clarify the position which he wishes to m aintain, namely, that ethics is a unique m ental activity not reducible to anything else, although it m ay be very helpful to see that in some respects ethical statem ents resem ble descriptive statem ents, in other respects, commands, and in still other respects, decisions to act. And while the differences in his new treatm ent of ethics are in m any ways great departures from his older view, Ew ing’s

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insistence on ethics as a unique study was clearly stated in a sum m ary in T h e D efinition of G ood: . . . we m ust recognize that ethics is a branch of study of its own which cannot be reduced to or derived from any other. Good, right, obligation are not at all like non-ethical concepts and can­ not be reduced to them. T h is is not necessarily to deny that they are intim ately related to some non-ethical concepts, bu t it is to assert that they cannot ju st be identified with any com bination of such concepts.53 B u t what about Ew ing’s attem pt in The D efinition of G ood to define “ good” in terms of “ fittingness” ? Does he still hold to this analysis? Ew ing still holds that “ good ” can be defined in terms of “ ough t,” bu t he says that he erred in attem pting to define “go od ” in terms of “ fittingness,” for this word, while norm ative, is not a strictly ethical concept. In fact, he suggests that “ fittingness” seems to have been the wrong word to describe what he had in m ind, and that “ reasonableness” seems better to him now. M ore im portant, however, is his changing his position so that the m oral ought is seen as the p ri­ m ary sense of “ ought,” while the secondary sense is what he now calls “ reasonableness.” In his earlier book he suggests that he was m isled into seeing too great an analogy between aesthetics, in which “ fitting­ ness” seems to be a very im portan t basic category, and ethics. T h u s, while Ew ing still m aintains that “ ough t” is used in two senses, he now affirms that the prim ary sense is that of m oral obligation. If “ good ” is to be defined in ethics, then Ew ing says that it m ust be done in terms of the “ough t” of m oral obligation rather than in terms of “ fit­ tingness.” T h e definition of “ good” in terms of the m oral “ ough t” which Ew ing gives in Second T h ough ts in M oral Philosophy is thus quite d if­ ferent from his earlier attem pt to define “ good” in terms of “ fitting­ ness.” First of all, this view requires that intrinsic good be rendered as m eaning “what things we m orally ought ultim ately to pursu e.” 54 Secondly, one m ust note that m oral obligation is n ot ju st reason able­ ness, bu t that m oral action has a distinctive right and wrong of its own. T h is can be seen if one recalls that one should not say that a m urderer did not act reasonably, bu t rather that his act was m orally wrong. In the light of these two m ain considerations, Ew ing proposes to define “ good” in its characteristically ethical sense as “ what ought to be the object of a pro attitude.” 55

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In liis interpretation of this definition of “ good,” Ew ing shows how his position recognizes the elements of truth in the claim s of naturalists and subjectivists in ethics, bu t still m ain tain s that there is an objective norm ative judgm en t involved which cannot be explain ed in non-ethical terms. F or exam ple, if I say that giving to a deserving charity is good and that I ought to do so to the extent that I am able, this judgm en t involves passing approval on a specific type of action. Now if called upon to justify my m oral choice, I could give naturalistic reasons by stating that my contribution to the charity w ould bring satisfaction or happiness to those less fortunate than I am, and I could reinforce these reasons with a rem ark of a subjectivistic character by voicing my approval, or my society’s approval, of such actions. Ew ing adm its that these n aturalistic and subjective elem ents are indeed more germ ane to the value judgm en t expressed than he had previously no­ ticed. But he still insists that in addition to reasons of the sort m en­ tioned above, a person m aking a m oral judgm en t claim s that his atti­ tude is the right one, that it is justified by the facts of the case. T h u s while the non-natural concept of “ ought” cannot be reduced to fac­ tual statem ents, the facts of the case determ ine when “ ough t” should be applied. P R IM A -F A C IE D U T IE S T h e reader who "was first introduced to R o ss’s conception of prim a facie duties may have been qu ite im pressed by them as statem ents of principle for a m oral m an in a civilized society. T h ey have fared badly, however, at the hands of m any philosophers who have attem pted to show either that they conflict with each other in specific situations and are thus of no practical value, or that they represent the attem pt to universalize the code of an English gentlem an which would not be applicable to m any other conceivable societies. Dr. Ewing, however, believes that Ross “ m ade one of the m ost im portan t discoveries of the century in m oral philosophy in recognizing the fun dam en tal character of these prim a facie duties . . . . W here we think we m orally ought to do something, there is always one of these general principles which calls for the action.” 56 Ew ing’s m odification of the p art these principles play in m orality is such, however, as to m ake them more p alatab le for those who are inclined to reject them. In the first place, Ew ing insists that R oss is correct in m ain tain in g that the prim a facie duties are not derivable from the goodness of the

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consequences, b u t he does not view them in quite the ultim ate sense of R oss for he holds that they are only bin din g as p art of a system of ethics. Some critics of this view, such as Strawson, have m aintained th at to say that an act is actually right in the p rim a facie sense is like saying that 2 plus 2 usually equals 4.57 T h e error in this criticism, which appears to be devastating on first glance, as Ew ing sees it, is to regard prim a facie duties as statem ents about what is usually the case when they are really tendency statem ents. T h u s, clearly in m oral ar­ gum ents som ething can be said both for and again st doing any act, so that there m ay be significant reasons for choosing the act an d signi­ ficant reasons for not choosing it. W hat one m ust do is to balance these significant argum ents against each other before one chooses to act. L e t us use an illu stration to clarify this point, for it seems to be an im portan t one indeed. Suppose I am a doctor and my patien t asks me to tell him the truth about his physical condition. Now my patien t is seriously ill and I am n ot sure that he w ill recover, although he is not so ill that I believe his chances of recovery to be slim. I do know, however, that my patien t is inclined to worry a great deal abou t his health, and in the light of my u nderstanding of my p atien t I believe that I may im pede his recovery if I tell him the fu ll truth about his health. W hat shall I do? Is this a case where I ought to lie in order to prevent needless worry for my patient? "Would it aid his recovery? Now the point of Ew ing’s suggestion is that if I do decide to lie in this case, I do so because I consider that the valid reasons in this case tend to justify the act, w ithout my denying that there is also at least one valid reason against telling a lie. “ ‘It is a prim a facie duty not to tell lies’ does not m ean ‘we ought usually to avoid telling lies,’ but ‘that X wTould be a lie is always a valid m oral reason, though not necessarily a conclusive reason, again st saying X .’ ” 5S T h u s, in the illu stration we have considered above, I, as the doctor, m ight lie to my p atien t because I believed that there were other reasons in this case which overbalanced the duty not to tell lies. Ew ing m aintains that even if one violates one p rim a facie duty in favor of perform ing another, the act is affected by the fact that one has not been able to fulfill correctly all the obligations involved. If this is shown in no other way, it is at least shown by regret that one cannot always fulfill all one’s obligations, but m ore frequently the act w ill be m odified either now or later in accordance with the p rim a facie

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duties which one believed one had to violate. Dr. Ew ing’s illustration m ay help us grasp this poin t: If I have to break a prom ise even for a good reason, I ought, if possible, to ask the prom isee to release me from it, or at least warn him that I cannot keep it, or if that cannot be done in ad­ vance, apologize to him and ‘m ake it up to h im ’ in some later fashion. A t least my om ission to fulfil my p rim a facie duty to him in this case w ill increase the force of any p rim a facie obligations I may have to him as regards future actions.59 T o generalize Ew ing’s conception of p rim a facie duties, especially those of special obligation which he finds with R oss cannot be de­ fended on purely teleological grounds, he suggests that “ we ought always to do it unless there is a reason against it.” 60 In this sense, Ew ing finds that the principles of ethics are themselves prim a facie, that is, that we ought always to abide by them unless there are sufficient reasons for not doing so. Ew ing does more than sim ply defend the conception of prim a facie duties, for he also tries to show that they are true because of their place in an im plicit ethical system. H e denies that we know each prim a facie duty to be self-evidently true in its own right. T o this present w riter Ew ing m akes an excellent suggestion in affirming that our prim a facie obligation s are righ t because we apprehend “ the desirability of a certain spirit in our relations with others.” 61 H e agrees that the teleologists are right in m ain tain in g that u lti­ m ately our prim a facie duties are based on the intrinsic nature of certain experiences which are valued in their own right, bu t he adds that the spirit of promise-keeping, an d the spirit of the other p rim a facie duties, are valuable in themselves. R arely have ethical philosophers in this century stressed the sp irit in which a m an acts as an im portan t part of their analysis of ethics, and it is refreshing to find Ew ing calling our attention to this neglected aspect of the m oral life. Perhaps it is this aspect of prim a facie duties which the critics neglected to consider when they sought to reduce them to actions which were right merely because they tended to produce the greatest am ount of good in the world. B u t how else could one justify R o ss’s prim a facie duties? Ew ing answers, “ I think that each of R o ss’s prim a facie duties can be justified as involved in a certain as­ pect of the sp irit in which a good m an lives and acts, as well as on

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account of its general social consequences.” 62 Furtherm ore, Ew ing finds a kind of coherence am ong the p rim a facie duties in that they tend m utually to reinforce each other. A m an who takes seriously his obligation to keep prom ises, and n ot to lie, is also more inclined to show ap prop riate gratitude than one who violates quite easily the duties to speak the truth and keep prom ises. A n d one could justify this coherence of prim a facie duties by seeing that they sprin g from the proper attitude which a good m an takes tow ard other hum an beings. A M ID D L E W AY IN E T H IC S In Second T h ough ts in M oral Philosophy, Ew ing suggests that there seems to be some convergence of m oral philosophies today to­ w ard a m iddle way which avoids, on the one hand, the naturalistic an d subjectivistic tem ptations to reduce ethical words to psychologi­ cal statem ents or ejaculations of feeling, and, on the other hand, the objectivistic tem ptation to postulate a non-natural qu ality for ethical terms in order to show that they are not merely psychological state­ ments or em otive utterances. T h e m iddle way seems to m ain tain that ethical judgm ents are not theoretical, bu t practical; however, they can be justified by good reasons so that while they should perhaps not be called, true or false, they can be called valid or in valid, right or wrong. In these respects this new position seems to allow for the possibility of objectivity in ethical judgm ent, and therefore Ew ing welcomes it. We shall be exam in in g in some detail the works of philosophers whom Ew ing finds h olding this m id d le way in our chapter on “ T h e L an gu age and L o gic of M orals.” Perhaps we ought not to anticipate too m uch our investigation, beyond poin tin g out here that Ew ing believes that this m iddle way, while it is on the right track, has overem phasized the sim ilarity of ethical judgm ents to com m ands. W hile ethical judgm ents bear some analogy to com­ m ands or prescriptions, Ew ing w ould w ant to m ain tain that they are objectively true in a sense more analogous to the statem ents of theoretical science. H e does believe, however, that m uch of value m ay come from this new investigation into the nature of ethical language as used by the ordinary m an, for it w ill poin t in time to the real uniqueness of evaluative statem ents. A nd while it is true that in evaluating what makes som ething good, we m ust consider its factual nature and the circum stances of the case, we shall never be able to

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infer from purely factual propositions that what has certain factual properties w ill be good or bad. T h e aspect of non-natural ethical philosophies which Ew ing is seeking to preserve (because he con­ siders it true) is the uniqueness of value judgm en ts which affirm that an act is right or obligatory. T O W A R D A N E V A L U A T IO N O F A. C. E W IN G E w ing’s attem pt to preserve a non-naturalistic in terpretation of ethics is based, as we have seen, on what he takes to be the non­ n atu ral relation “ ough t.” A greeing with m any of our contem porary philosophers, Ew ing adm its that in his own experience he cannot discover a non-n atural quality of “ goodness” or “ rightness,” b u t he m aintains that he does discover a non-natural relation of “ oughtness.” M ost of the criticism s which have been directed again t his view suggest that it is not necessary to postulate that the relation of “ ough t­ ness” is non-nat’ 7--al. Straw son in his criticism of E w in g’s earlier treat­ m ent of ethicvin T h e D efin ition of G ood suggests that E w in g’s point that there Ire ju stify in g reasons for m aking ethical statem ents can stand j’t hout postu latin g a non-natural relation. T h e p oin t here seems to be that everyone recognizes that a statem ent w ith “ ough t” in it does not function in the same way as a statem ent con tain in g “ is.” L u t Strawson finds that it is sim pler to adm it this as a characteristic feature of our use of ethical words, than to postu late som ething as abstract as a non-natural relation. In concluding his review of Ew ing’s book, Strawson suggests that “ the search for the un it is the delusion.” 63 T h a t is, there is no one abstract characteristic which can be found to hold for all uses of ethical statem ents, not even the so-called non­ n atu ral “ ought.” T h e m ain criticism directed against the view defended by Dr. Ew ing is not so much that w hat he is calling attention to is untrue, as that he is stating it in terms which are out of date. T h u s, T . D. W eldon commented: Dr. Ew ing’s questions, like those of m any other distinguished m oralists, seem to m e to be unreal because the concepts used in them are out of date. I cannot see that words like “ n atu ral” , “ non-natural” , “ objectivity” , an d “ n atu ral science” are of the slightest help in elu cidating sentences in which “ good ” and “ righ t” occur. T h ey were once held to be relevant for two reasons: (a) because ethical statem ents were thought to differ from scienti­

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fic statem ents in that they expressed eternal and im m utable veri­ ties, (b) because m any scientists believed that their statem ents, since they were verifiable by a special experim ental technique, enjoyed a special status known as “ objectivity.” 64 W eldon then finds that people no longer claim eternality and im ­ m u tab ility for ethical statem ents, and there is as well a grow ing reali­ zation in contem porary philosophy that it is bein g overly restrictive to lim it objectivity to only scientific statem ents. B u t in fairness to Ewing, it needs to be pointed out that not all philosophers w ould grant that statem ents other than scientific statem ents can be objective. In ­ deed in the next chapter, we shall be exam in in g the em otive theory of ethics put forth in this century on the assum ption that since ethical utterances were not em pirical or scientific they were not even state­ ments, in the strict sense of the word. T h a t Dr. E w ing does not talk like a linguistic analyst is to be expected, for he claim s that philosophy is more than analysis of language. It is to be an inquiry into the very nature of ethics itself. As we have seen, Ew ing has m odified his treatm ent of ethics in his m ost recent book in order to brin g it into closer agreem ent with m uch of what is currently bein g done in E nglish philosophy. H is earlier book was w ritten at a time when the em otive theory seemed to be prevailing am ong philosophers, and the very fact that present day philosophers recognize that ethical sentences are not merely em otive may be due in p art to the chastening effects of such treat­ m ents of ethics as that of Dr. Ew ing. T h e points which Ew ing has attem pted to stress in his ethical theory are basically that ethical state­ m ents are objective, not subjective; and that ethical evaluations cannot be inferred m erely from statem ents of em pirical fact. W hile m any p h i­ losophers would accept these points as correct, they m ight wish to state them in language not as m isleadin g as the use of “ non-natural” and “ in tu ition .” T h u s, m any philosophers have avoided using the old expressions such as “ objective” and “ subjective,” “ n atu ral” and “ non­ n atu ral,” and have rather tried to show in what respects ethical state­ m ents are like and unlike scientific statem ents, emotive utterances, com mands, an d so on. A nd Dr. Ew ing has him self indicated that he does not find as much difference as he had once thought he did be­ tween his position and that which we shall exam ine in C h apter III of this book. Ew ing’s position does show, however, that there is a certain

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plausibility to the theory of the intuitionists, providin g one is careful to understand what they m ean and do not m ean by intuition. As he him self has clearly p u t it, a reason for h oldin g to the p art that intu ition plays in ethics is that it is not always clear that holders of other views are not developing a disguised n aturalism or su b­ jectivism . I f you adm it th at you can give good reasons for ethical actions, you m ust at some stage or other fall back on an in tu ition as to w hat reasons are ultim ately good, though if we used the term ‘practical reason’ or ‘practical ju d gm en t’ instead of intuition they [his critics] m ight be less inclined to object. (T o say that we sometimes see by ‘in tu ition ’ what constitutes a good or bad reason in ethics is only to say that we can som etim es know what is a good reason w ithout h avin g to give another reason why it is a good reason, a not very extravagant suggestion.)65 B u t Ew ing is w illing to go even further in com prom ising w ith more recent linguistic studies of ethical language. Follow ing a suggestion from Professor W isdom that the different theories of ethics are actually each calling attention to one feature to the neglect of others, Ew ing suggests: F or an objectivist cannot m ain tain that ethical judgm en ts are ju st like those of n atu ral science or any other branch of objective study, and his opponent cannot reasonably m ain tain that they are ju st com m ands or exclam ations, so that we m ust in any case p u t them somewhere in between the two, though no d ou bt some people will em phasize the analogies between them and either extreme more than others do. T h e m ost im portan t point, w ith­ o u t the of which there can be. nothing^ b u t extrem e . concession . . opposition, is that the rightness of an ethical ju d gm en t does not consist merely in its conform ity with the actual attitudes of men. Once this is granted ethical judgm ents become som ething sui generis, not reducible to any other kind bu t only discussable by analogies w ith other kinds, and we may then recognize that each theory, even if one-sided, has a certain value in bringin g out one or other of the analogies.06 B u t it is time now to turn to the exam ination of a theory which Ew ing sought to protest against in T h e D efinition of the Good.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 1 George Edward Moore, Principia Ethica. Cambridge: University Press, 1903, pp, 7-8. 2 Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 54. s Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 95. * Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 123. 5 Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 164. 6 Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 188 ff. i Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 214 ff. s G. E. Moore, Ethics. London: Oxford University Press, first edition 1912; the paper “ Is Goodness a Quality?” can be found in G. E. Moore,Philosophical Papers. London: George Allen & Unwin. Ltd., 1959, pp. 89-101;Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1942. 9 G. E. Moore, Ethics, p. 42. i ° G. E. Moore, "Is Goodness a Quality?” in Philosophical Papers, p. 98. i i Schilpp, ed., T he Philosophy of G. E. Moore, pp. 69-90. 1 2 Schilpp, ed., T he Philosophy of G. E. Moore, pp. 535-554. 13 G. E. Moore, Ethics, p. 54. 14 Reprinted in Sellars and Hospers,Readings in Ethical Theory.New Yorkt Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952, pp. 103-114. is Frankena in Sellars and Hospers, R eadings in Ethical Theory, p. 107. is Frankena in Sellars and Hospers, R eadings in Ethical Theory, p. 106. 17 Frankena in Sellars and Hospers, R eadings in Ethical Theory, p. 110. is G. C. Field, “T h e Place of Definition in Ethics” reprinted in Sellars and Hospers, Readings in Ethical Theory, pp. 92-102. 19 Field, in Sellars and Hospers, R eadings in Ethical Theory, p. 95. 20 R. M. H are, T he Lan guage of M orals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952, pp. 92-93. 21 R . M. Hare, T he Language of M orals, p. 91. 22 G. E. Moore, Ethics, p. 153. 23 Austin Duncan-Jones, "Intrinsic Value: Some Comments on the Work of G. E. M oore” in Philosophy, Ju ly 1958, p. 272. 2* I am not suggesting that anyone would give a justification for keeping his promises in exactly such a form, but am rather m aintaining that the arguments which m ight be given on the basis of the theory of ideal utilitarianism would sooner or later assume a form sim ilar to our im aginary dialogue. 20 W. D. Ross, T he R ight and the Good. Oxford: University Press, first p u b ­ lished in 1930. 26 H. A. Prichard, "Does M oral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” reprinted in Sellars and Hospers, Readings in Ethical Theory, pp. 149-162. 2T Prichard in Sellars and Hospers, Readings in Ethical Theory, p. 154. 28 Prichard in Sellars and Hospers, Readings in Ethical Theory, p. 155. 29 W. D. Ross, The R ight and the Good, p. 3. 30 Ross, The R ight and the Good, p. 9. s i Ross, The R ight and the Good, p. 12. 32 Ross, The R ight and the Good, p. 17. 33 Ross, The R ight and the Good, p. 19. 34 Ross, Foundations of Ethics-. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939, p. 85. 3 5 Ross, The R ight and the Good, p. 22. 36 Plato, T he R epublic, Book I. 37 Ross, Foundations of Ethics, p. 283. 3S Ross, The R ight and the Good, pp. 81-82. 39 Ross, The R ight and the Good, p. 122. 40 Ross, The R ight and the Good, p. 152. 41 Ross, The R ight and the Good, p. 156. 42 Ross, Foundations of Ethics, p. 310.

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43 A. C. Ewing m aintains that the prim a facie duties of Ross are "statem ent of principles which would be accepted as grounds of obligation within any civilized community.” It does seem clear that they are at the very least statements of the general basis of moral obligation for our present western civilization. See A. C. Ewing, Second Thoughts in M oral Philosophy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1959, p. 40. 44 Ross, The R ight and the Good, p. 41. 45 A. C. Ewing, The Definitio7i of Good. N. Y.: T h e Macmillan Co., 1947. 46 A. C. Ewing, Second Thoughts in M oral Philosophy. London: Routledge & Jvegan Paul, Ltd., 1959. 4 7 A. C. Ewing, T he Definition of Good p. 133. -43 A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good, p. 152. -is A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good, p. 146. 59 A, C. Ewing, The Definition of Good, p. 149. 51 Cf. Toulm in, Chapter 3 of this present study, for a development of supporting reasons for ethical judgm ents. 52 Ewing, Second Thoughts in M oral Philosophy, p. 66. 53 Ewing, The Definition of Good, p. 111. 64 A. C. Ewing, Second Thoughts in M oral Philosophy, p. 99. 55 A. C. Ewing, Second Thoughts in M oral Philosophy, p. 85. 56 A. C. Ewing, Second Thoughts in M oral Philosophy, p. 126. 57 P. F. Strawson, “ Ethical Intuitionism ,” Philosophy, 1949. Reprinted in Sellars and Hospers, Readings in Ethical Theory. N.Y.: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952, pp. 250-259. ss A. C.Ewing, Second Thoughts in M oral Philosophy, p. 110. >9 A. C.Ewing, Second Thoughts in M oral Philosophy, p. 110. 30 A. C.Ewing, Second Thoughts in M oral Philosophy, p. 126. ° i A . C.Ewing, Second Thoughts in M oral Philosophy, p. 130. A. C. Ewing, Second Thoughts in M oral Philosophy, p. 134. 63 Strawson, ‘‘Critical Notice on The Definition of the Good” , Mind, Vol. LVI1I, 1949, p. 94. 64 T . D. Weldon, ‘‘Book Review of The Definition of the Good“ in Philosophy, Vol. X X IV , 1949, p. 83. ' “5 A. C. Ewing, ‘‘Recent Developments in British Ethical T h ough t,” in Mace, ed., British Philosophy in the M id-Century, pp. 94-95. es A. C. Ewing, “ Recent Developments in British Ethical T h ough t,” in Mace, ed., British Philosophy in the Mid-Century, pp. 94-95.

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C H A P T E R

T W O

TH E EM O TIVE TH EO RY OF ETH ICS T h e variety of m oral philosophy which we are now goin g to ex­ am ine may be said to be distinctly a child of our century. In past ages there have been philosophers who doubted all previous m oral solutions; but this new position, at least in its earliest form ulations, was concerned with statin g doubts about tradition al answers to m oral questions, because it held that these questions and answers were factually m eaningless to begin with! Philosophers who thought they were d ealin g with m oral concepts were utterly m istaken, be­ cause they failed to realize that there are no concepts in norm ative ethics, bu t only ejaculations. In order to understand what this new approach is saying, the reader m ust carefully distinguish between descriptive and norm ative ethics. D escriptive ethics is concerned with statin g what in fact the m oral views of a society or of in dividuals are or have been in the past. Philosophers who defend the em otive theory of ethics do not intend to suggest that this is not an em pirical in ­ quiry, for obviously if I state that English speaking peoples hold m urder to be wrong, a way can be devised to check the truth or falsity of my statem ent. However, if I utter the norm ative sentence, “ M urder is w rong,” then we are d ealin g with another situation, for presum ably I m ean this to be taken as a m oral statem ent about what is actually wrong. W hen one thinks of ethics it is usually with respect to state­ ments such as this about what is good or bad, righ t or w rong; one is not concerned with historical or psychological statem ents about what different peoples have considered to be righ t or wrong. B u t the holders of the em otive theory assert that norm ative ethical utter­ ances are mere factually m eaningless ejaculations by which em otions are bein g expressed or aroused. On first glance the reader may consider this claim that norm ative ethics is factually m eaningless to be absurd. H e m ay m ain tain that surely not all previous thinkers were m istaken in thinking they were doin g more than m erely utterin g emotive ejaculation s when they

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sought to tell us w hat actually is good or bad. Before reaching a hasty conclusion, however, the reader ought to reserve his decision and give the em otive theory of ethics a fair hearing. Indeed he may well find that m uch can be m arshalled in its favor, especially in be­ h alf of the later versions of the theory which have corrected some of the hasty generalizations originally p u t forth. T h e em otive theory of ethics arose partly out o f a new exam in a­ tio n of the influence of lan guage u po n thought by the literary critics 'C. K. O gden and I. A. R ichards, and partly as a by-product of a p h ilo so p h ical orientation designed to deal m ore satisfactorily than the older philosophies could with recent advances in science, logic and m athem atics. L e t us glance briefly at each of these developm ents. O gden an d R ich ards in T h e M ean in g of M ean in g, which was first published in book form in 1923, were concerned with studying the influence of lan gu age upon thought by calling attention to the use of symbols. O ne of their m ain contentions was that the symbols in which we express our thought can be used for either a prim arily sym bolic or an em otive purpose. T h a t is, according to their view, the statem ents of science and m ost of the ordinary statem ents we m ake in daily life use lan guage sym bolically in order to convey inform ation about things in the world. T h ere is in such uses of language a ref­ erence, som ething to which our statem ents refer. “ I f we say ‘T h e height of the Eiffel T ow er is 900 feet’ we are m aking a statem ent, we are using sym bols in order to record or com m unicate a reference, and our symbol is true or false in a strict sense and is theoretically verifiable.” 1 T h e situation is qu ite different, however, in our em otive use of words, for then we are not seeking to convey what we claim is inform ation b u t are rather merely expressing or trying to arouse feelings and attitudes. T h u s, “ . . . if we say ‘H u rra h !’ or ‘Poetry is a sp irit’ or ‘M an is a w orm ,’ we may not be m aking statem ents, not even false state­ m ents; we are m ost probably u sin g words merely to evoke certain at­ titudes.” 2 O gden and R ich ards m ain tain that philosophers have been led astray by failin g to notice that language may very often be used em otively rather than sym bolically. T h u s some philosophers have sought for som ething to which words such as “ beauty” an d “ good” referred, and not finding anything clearly available to m eet this cri­ terion, assum ed that such words were indefinable. T h e claim o f Ogden an d R ichards is that if now these philosophers look closely at the way “ good” is used in ethical discourse they w ill find that it is used

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em otively and they w ill thus cease talking ab o u t “ good” as a unique, indefinable, unanalyzable concept. T h is peculiar ethical use of ‘good’ is, we suggest, a purely emotive use. W hen so used the w ord stands for n othing whatever and has no sym bolic function. T h u s, when we so use it in the sentence, ‘T h is is good,’ we merely refer to this, and the addition of ‘is good ’ m akes no difference whatever to our reference. W hen 011 the other hand, we say, ‘ T h is is red,’ the addition of ‘is red’ to this, does symbolize an extension of our reference, namely, to some other red thing. B u t, ‘is good’ has no com parable sym bolic function; it serves only as an emotive sign expressing our atti­ tude to this, and perh aps evoking sim ilar attitudes in other per­ sons, or inciting them to actions of one kind or another.3 O gden and R ich ard s adm it that in practice it is difficult to sep­ arate the sym bolic from the em otive m eaning since both usually occur together. N evertheless, they m ain tain that it is desirable to distinguish them in order that we may m ore clearly use and under­ stand our language, as well as to avoid being taken in by philosophers and bishops. T h u s, they offer a convenient test which can be used to decide if an expression is prim arily sym bolic or em otive: “ ‘Is this true or false in the ordinary strict scientific sense?’ If this question is relevant then the use is sym bolic, if it is clearly irrelevant then we have an em otive utterance.” 4 Perhaps it is not out of the way to suggest at this poin t that the reader ought to ponder carefully this test as form ulated by O gden and R ichards. D oes it involve an emotive overtone? C learly “ ordinary strict scientific sense” is rather vague. May it be that there is a subtle ap p eal here to our approvin g w hat is or­ dinary as well as strict and scientific, or is the ap peal rather to such a very strict criterion of truth that only logic an d m athem atics w ould qualify as true? However, in a loose sense (and I may be using “ loose” em otively myself) this is a way of d istin guish in g be­ tween language as used prim arily sym bolically and language as used emotively. Follow ing the suggestions concerning em otive language, a C am ­ bridge philosopher, R . B. Braithw aite, ap plied some interesting ob­ servations to the ethical theory of G. E. M oore. In a p ap er to the A ristotelian Society in 1928 Braithw aite suggested that M oore had neglected to note that m ost sentences using “ good ” or sim ilar ethical words are not expressions of propositions at all, but rather merely

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noises to purge the em otion of the speaker an d to produce an action or em otion in the hearer. T h e conclusion of Professor B raithw aite in this m atter was that the m oral philosopher need analyze only ethical propositions, and not the em otive ones.5 B u t this was not the line that the philosophers were goin g to take who favoured an em otive theory of ethics, for they were going to m ain tain that the specifically norm ative ethical sentences were all purely emotive. Hence if the philosopher d id not concern him self with em otive sentences in ethics, there w ould be no others in this field for h im to analyze. Another E nglish philosopher, W. H . F. Barnes, in a brief note in A nalysis in 1934 suggested that in a strict sense value ju dgm en ts were not really judgm en ts at all. “ T h ey are exclam ations of ap p rov al.” ® B arnes went on in his note to suggest that in m any areas of value, such as m atters of food and drink, we are perfectly content to recog­ nize that personal taste is all that can be appealed to in settlin g a quarrel. H is suggestion was that in a society disputes about value ju dgm en ts arise out of the opposition between what one person a p ­ proves as over against another. Such disputes cannot be settled by reasoning, b u t rath er only by changing the attitude of one of the parties to the controversy. “A ll attem pts to persuade others of the truth of value ju dgm en t are thus really attem pts to m ake others a p ­ prove the things we approve.” 7 T h is approach by Barnes was of the kin d that was to develop later into the em otive theories of A. J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson. It is now time to notice the rise of a full-fledged new philosoph ical position. It developed an em otive theory of ethics perh aps som e­ w hat independently of the work of Ogden, R ich ard s an d the others we have m entioned. L ogical Positivism , or L ogical Em piricism , is usually the nam e given to the new standpoint. Its m ain contention was that all m eaningful statem ents are either em pirical or logical. Since the logical positivists m aintained that the characteristic use of ethical words is not to describe in a scientific or em pirical sense, n or to proceed by deductions from the axiom s of logic, it follows that ethical sentences do not after all actually express propositions. A careful exam ination of ethical lan guage seemed to the logical pos­ itivists to show that we are m isled by the form of our lin guistic usage when we claim that ethical statem ents express propositions, while w hat they actually do is express our em otions and attem pt to

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arouse sim ilar em otions in others. T h u s, we find that according to the basic principles of this new philosophical orientation, a conclusion very sim ilar to that of O gden and R ichards was p u t forth. B u t let us look in more detail at the nature of L ogical Positivism , before we consider the emotive theory of ethics which it held. I f the reader knows his history of philosophy, he will recall Positivism is the nam e usually given to the philosophy of A uguste Com te. Comte h ad divided the intellectual aspects of m an ’s progress into the theological, the m etaphysical, an d the positive stages. In the m ost prim itive stage, the theological, m an sought to explain events in terms of the actions of gods, dem ons, or both. In the m eta­ physical stage m an invoked certain abstract concepts such as First Cause, U ltim ate R eality, etc., as explanatory devices. B u t the m ature stage of hum an history Com te identified with the scientific or positive age in which m an sought explanation s through u sin g the scientific m ethod to investigate all phenom ena. Com te thus suggested that a science of society (sociology) be established to study m an scientifically. Such a study w ould in time replace m an ’s reliance on the earlier stages of developm ent represented in theology and m etaphysics. T h e new twentieth century philosophy is usually called L ogical Positivism in order to show on the one hand its connection w ith the P ositivism of Com te, and on the other to indicate its great reliance upon logical rigor in its analysis. T h e basic principle of L ogical Positivism was a verification prin ciple by m eans of which only the statem ents which can be em pirically tested are considered factually m eaningful. N ow since quite clearly the statem ents of metaphysics cannot be em pirically tested, the logical positivists ruled them out as factually m eaningless. T h e logical positivists, at least at the first, centered their attention upon the nature, analysis, and m eaning of scientific statem ents and therefore in qu ired into the status of the tools of logic and m athem atics. B u t as a by-product of these studies they also sought to describe the use of ethical utterances which claim ed to be nonnative. Before we exam ine directly the nature of these inquiries into ethics, let us take a brief glance at the historical developm ent of this philosophy. L ogical Positivism had its form al beginning in V ienna in 1923 in a discussion group which evolved out of a sem inar led by the ph ilos­ opher M oritz Schlick. T h e m em bers of the Vienna Circle, as it is usually called, included the philosophers Friedrich W aism ann, R u d o lf

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C arnap, O tto N eurath , H erbert Feigl and V ictor K raft as well as Schlick him self. In addition a num ber of outstan d in g m athem ati­ cians jo in ed the group. Schlick m ain tain ed contact w ith the philos­ opher L udw ig W ittgenstein, who was living near V ienna at the time of the form ation of the V ienna Circle. A lth ough W ittgenstein was never a m em ber of this discussion group, his ideas as expressed in the T ractatu s Logico-Philosophicus8 greatly influenced the V ienna Circle and provided the basis for their early discussions. T h ey took quite seriously W ittgenstein’s exclusion of m etaphysics from the area of factually m eaningful discussion, an d then centered their attention upon developing a m ethod of logical inquiry into the status of the statem ents of science and m athem atics. Few of the origin al m em bers of the V ienna Circle m ade any direct contribution to the em otive theory of ethics, w ith the exception of Schlick, who wrote an interesting book on ethics which is m ore con­ cerned with developing a form of present psychological hedonism than with the em otive theory.9 An English philosopher, A. J . Ayer, join ed in the discussions of the logical positivists when he visited V ienna in the early thirties, and to his account of logical positivism and the em otive theory of ethics we shall now turn.

I.

A. J. Ayer: the Emotive Theory of Ethics Based on Logical Positivism

In order to help the reader to see by what lin e of argum ent the logical positivists were led to deny the m eaningfulness of metaphysics and norm ative ethics, we shall consider the classic treatm ent of this position by A. J . Ayer in L an gu age, T ru th and L o gic.10 W hile there are differences of em phasis to be found in the w ritings of various logical positivists, A yer’s general position is typical of the general principles these philosophers m aintained. T h e general philosophical principles which Ayer shared with other logical positivists, and which were the ground upon which m eta­ physics and norm ative ethics were rejected as m eaningless, may be sum m arized as follows: (1) A ll knowledge is em pirical and is derived from the sensecontinuum . T h a t is, the source of all know ledge is our experience

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of sensory reality; of w hat the common m an usually calls sense ex­ perience; of w hat Ayer calls sense content. (2) T he m eaning of an em pirical proposition is the m ode of its verification. T h is is often considered the one really basic an d crucial proposition of logical positivism . In somewhat sim pler language, to state the m eaning of an em pirical proposition is to state w hat observa­ tions w ould have to be m ade in order to determ ine w hether the p ro p ­ osition is true or false. W e shall see later that this criterion has drastic im plications for norm ative ethics as usually construed. T h is prin ciple of verification has caused m any disputes in p h ilo ­ sophical circles, for, if observation is the criterion of m eaning, many scientific hypotheses and constructs which are n ot based on observ­ able events b u t are indispensable as means of explan ation w ould have to be discarded as m eaningless. As a result of the discussion which follow ed his in itial statem ent of the verifiability principle, Ayer m odi­ fied his view in the second edition of L an g u ag e, T ru th an d L o gic by distinguishing between “ practical verifiability,” an d “ verifiability in p rin cip le.” 11 U n der the m ore rigid criterion of “ practical verifiability” I m ust be able to m ake the observations relevant to the truth or falsity of a proposition , if the proposition is to be m eaningful. U n der the m odified criterion of “ verifiability in prin cip le” I m ust “ know w hat observations w ould decide it for me, if, as is theoretically con­ ceivable, I were once in a position to m ake them .” 12 T h u s a p ro po si­ tion expressing the atom ic theory or some such statem ent as A yer’s fam ous exam ple, “ T h ere are m ountains on the farth er side of the m oon,” w ould not be m eaningless b u t w ould be verifiable in principle, since we are able to state what observations w ould be relevant to their verification. (3) T h e truth of em pirical p roposition s is never certain, only probable. Since the n um ber of observation statem ents which are relevant to the verification of any em pirical proposition is infinite, we can never approach m ore than a very high degree of p robability re­ gardin g the truth of such propositions. T h u s, for exam ple, in order to verify com pletely the truth of a scientific generalization such as “ straight sticks when im m ersed in a stream of w ater ap pear to be ben t” it w ould be necessary to carry out experim ents and observations by which all the sticks in the universe w ould be im m ersed in all the stream s of water to be fou n d anywhere. B u t since we have had a rather large num ber of confirm ing observations for the truth of such

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an em pirical generalization, we are inclined to accept it as true. Only, the logical positivist w ould rem ind us, we m ust recall that such a statem ent is only probable, very highly probable, because it is im ­ possible to carry out all the conceivable observations which w ould be required for the statem ent to be absolutely certain. A proposition, according to Ayer, if it is to be inform ative, m ust classify an d de­ scribe an experience, and since such classification and description is never com pletely exhaustive, all em pirical propositions are probable, not certain. (4) The p roposition s of logic a?id m athem atics are tautologies. I f properly stated, they are unquestionably valid. T h e reader m ay have been annoyed to read above in (3) that all em pirical propositions are only probable. Surely, I m ight say, not all propositions are only probable, for I am certain that two plus two equals four, as well as that if all m en are m ortal and Socrates is a m an, then Socrates too is m ortal. B u t such propositions, Ayer insists, are not em pirical; they are tautological or analytic, which is to say that their validity depends solely on the definitions of the sym bols they contain. “ T hey, none of them, provide any in form ation about any m atter of fact. In other words, they are entirely devoid of factual content. A n d it is for this reason that no experience can refute them .” 13 T h u s, the reader is asked to note that there are adm ittedly certain proposition s which do not owe their validity to em pirical verifications, precisely because they are not em pirical statem ents, b u t rather definitions. W e are now in a position to exam ine the status of the statem ents of norm ative ethics according to this positivistic view of Ayer. We cannot have failed to notice that he has adm itted two different types of propositions which may be said to be legitim ate: em pirical p ropo­ sitions and the analytic propositions of logic an d m athem atics. B u t the reader m ay be somewhat im p atien t to know w hat A yer proposes to do with ethical statem ents, an d as well with the statem ents of theology and m etaphysics. A pparently, one may suspect, there w ill be little room for them since they do not seem to be either tautological or em pirical. B u t let us see. (5) T h e statem ents of m etaphysics, theology and norm ative ethics are factually m eaningless. T h ey are literally nonsense. T h is follows from Ayer’s thesis that only em pirical an d tautological propositions are to be included in the ranks of m eaningful statem ents. T h e alert reader may raise an objection here, however, an d ask what Ayer does

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with statem ents such as “ G o d is good,” “ R eality is one,” and “ M urder is w rong.” T h e answer is plainly that these are sam ples of theological, m etaphysical and ethical statem ents which show quite clearly that they are not em pirical. W hat observations could we m ake relevant to their truth or falsity? Furtherm ore, we can’t even suggest what obser­ vations w ould be relevant to these claim s if we could make them. N or does it m ake sense to call the statem ents which we have listed analytic, for they claim to tell us som ething about reality, about w hat is actu­ ally the case. W e have thus seen that, gran ted the preceding principles of logical positivism , it follows consistently that the so-called statem ents of theology, m etaphysics and norm ative ethics m ust be m eaningless n on­ sense. T h is is a unique refutation of theology, m etaphysics and norm ­ ative ethics, for although the defenders of various views w ithin these disciplines are quite accustom ed to hearing that their statem ents are false, they are not used to being told that their statem ents say nothing m eaningful at all! However, Ayer and other logical positivists have realized that the m atter cannot rest at this point. T h e next step, therefore, is an attem pt to explain what has caused so m any people to be m isled for so long into believing that there actually was some m eaningful content in their m etaphysical statem ents. (6) T h e pseudo-propositions of theology, m etaphysics an d norm a­ tive ethics are the result of confusion in the use of language. T h is confusion is caused by our careless talk about words as though they were actually objects. “ In general,” Ayer says, “ the postu lation of real non-existent entities results from the superstition . . . that to every w ord or phrase that can be the gram m atical su bject of a sentence, there m ust somewhere be a real entity corresponding.” 14 T h e poin t here is that when we talk about words, bu t think or assert that we are talking about objects, we produce the kind of pseudo-propositions which are to be found in theology, metaphysics and norm ative ethics. So actually, our failure to attend carefully to our use of language has led us into the error of assum ing that because we can use a word, there m ust be an object to which it refers. “ G o d ,” for exam ple, is ju st a word, for no em pirically observable object corresponding to the word can be produced, and yet talk about G od as though this w ord referred to an existent object has led us into num erous theological conflicts in the past. One ought presum ably, therefore, not to waste

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one’s time asking questions which are not legitim ate questions in an attem pt to solve problem s that are not really problem s.15 (7) The legitim ate function of philosophy is the logical analysi of the sentences of science. Perhaps this is p u ttin g the case too strongly, for certainly Ayer an d m any other logical positivists do pay a good deal of attention to studying the way we use words in such fields as ethics. However, it is p art of the contention of the logical positivist that once we have discovered the faulty ways in which we are prone to speak, then the old so-called m ajor problem s of philosophy w ill have been elim inated, either by being rephrased as scientific questions or by being shown to be not the sort of thing that one can have any knowledge about at all. T h e true function of the philosopher is to aid in the analysis of the sentences of science. Indeed it does not seem that there w ould be much else that he could do. A t this poin t a retrospective reference is needed. It was not only logical positivism , and the w ritings of O gden an d R ichards, which m oved philosophers tow ard ad op tin g an em otive theory of ethics, but also, strangely enough, the influence of G. E. M oore. T h e reader will recall that M oore held a position quite different from the one we are now considering; he m ain tain ed that ethics is a “ non-natural” science whose subject m atter is “ a sim ple, indefinable, unanalysable object of thought.” 16 T h e p oin t of great im portance here is that the emotivists, many of whom acknow ledge the influence of M oore’s critical analysis upon their own thinking, have been led to go far beyond this great ethical theorist by rem oving the “ sim ple, indefinable, unan aly­ sable object,” not only from the realm of n atu ral inquiry, b u t also from the dom ain of m eaningful discourse. B u t let us turn now directly to the views of A. J . Ayer. Ayer be­ gins his analysis by p oin tin g out, that the works of m ost ethical p h il­ osophers contain four classes of statem ents which are rarely distin ­ guished clearly in their analyses. T h ese four classes of statem ents are: (1) propositions which express definitions of ethical terms, or ju d g ­ ments about the legitim acy or possibility of certain definitions; (2) propositions describing the phenom ena of m oral experience, an d their causes; (3) exhortations to m oral virtue; and (4) actual ethical ju d g ­ m ents.17 Ayer holds that the statem ents in the second class belon g to the realm of psychology an d sociology, while those of the third and fourth classes are mere ejaculation s or com m ands. T h u s, a “ strictly philosophical treatise on ethics” m ust be confined to statem ents of

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the first class. W hen Ayer subjects ethical statem ents of the third and. fourth classes to analysis, he finds them to be purely “ em otive.” T h u s if I say to someone, “ You acted wrongly in stealing that m oney,” I am not statin g anything more than if I had sim ply said, “ You stole that money.” In adding that this action is wrong I am not m aking any further statem ent abou t it. I am sim ply evincing my m oral d isapproval of it. It is as if I had said, “ You stole that m oney,” in a peculiar tone of horror, or w ritten it with the addition of some special exclam ation marks. T h e tone, or the exclam ation m arks, adds nothing to the literal m eaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker.18 T h e interested reader m ight practice this kind of analysis upon other m oral sentences u n til he gets the feel of the p oin t which Ayer is m aking. A fter one rephrases m oral sentences into their purely fac­ tual com ponents, as Ayer m aintains, one finds that the so-called ethical dim ension of the sentence can be conveyed by a p articu lar tone of voice or by the use of exclam ation marks. Perhaps now we are gettingclose to the real purposes of ethical language after all— to express or evoke feeling. Ayer continues by show ing that the various ethical terms express and evoke different degrees of feeling. T h u s the force of the ethical ju d gm en t increases as we proceed from , “ It is good to tell the truth,” which is little m ore than a suggestion, to “ T e ll the truth,” and. “ You ought to tell the truth,” or “ It is your duty to tell the truth.” “ In fact,” says Ayer, “ we m ay define the m eaning of the various ethical words in terms both of the different feelings they are ordinarily taken to express, an d also the different responses which they are calculated to pro­ voke.” 19 M uch of the confusion which exists in m oral philosophy is caused, Ayer believes, by the failure to distinguish between “ norm ative ethical sym bols” and “ descriptive ethical sym bols.” W hat helps to add to this confusion is the fact that sentences containing either norm ative or descriptive sym bols are constituted of the same gram m atical form ; thus a sentence, “x is good” or “ x is w rong” m ay “ express a m oral ju d gm en t” (norm ative) or state “ that a certain type of conduct is re­ pugn an t to the m oral sense of a p articu lar society” (descriptive).20 As we have already indicated, it is the form er usage which is norm ative and which Ayer holds is purely emotive.

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Failure to perceive or to observe this distinction between norm ative and descriptive ethical sym bols has produced those ethical theories, such as subjectivism and hedonistic u tilitarian ism , which have thought ethical symbols to be definable in non-ethical terms. T h u s the sub­ jectivists tell us that the good is what is generally approved of, or what is approved by an in dividual. A lthough this statem ent m ay be descrip­ tively correct in telling us what subjectivists believe to be good, it can­ not tell us what good is in the norm ative sense. F or “ it is not self­ contradictory to assert that some actions which are generally approved of are not righ t” or to assert “ that a m an who confessed that he som e­ times approved of what was b ad or w rong w ould not be contradicting him self.” 21 T h e same criticism applies to u tilitarian ism in all its v aria­ tions; the u tilitarian form ulas m ay describe for us w hat u tilitarian s h old to be good, bu t they cannot tell us what good is, since, norm a­ tively, it is not self-contradictory to say that “ it is sometimes wrong to perform the action which w ould actually or probably cause the greatest happiness,” or “ that some pleasan t things are not good, or that some bad things are desired.” 22 H ere emerges a point of some im portance. Since there are no facts, only em otions, involved in norm ative ethics, there can be no contradictions. A feeling can be subdued, b u t it can­ not be proved wrong. “ A t first glance the absolutist conception of ethics may seem to be superior to subjectivism and utilitarian ism , for absolutist ethics have not fallen into the error of trying to reduce norm ative ethical terms to non-ethical or em pirical terms. Ayer holds that the absolutists rightly consider that ethical statem ents are not verifiable by observa­ tion, bu t they wrongly assign verification to a “ m ysterious ‘intellectual in tu ition .’ ” 23 B u t actually the absolutist, who really projects his own cultural values upon the universe, fails to realize that his value ju d g ­ m ents are as unverifiable as ever: For it is notorious that what seems intuitively certain to one person m ay seem doubtful, or even false, to another. So that un ­ less it is possible to provide some criterion by which one may decide between conflicting intuitions, a mere ap peal to intuition is worthless as a test of a proposition ’s validity.24 Ayer further observes that when some intuitionists m ain tain that they “ know” that their m oral claim s are correct, all that we have is an assertion of interest to psychologists, but not one which tends to prove

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the validity of the m ain tain ed m oral judgm ent. As if this were not en ough to refute the case o f the intuitionist, Ayer shows that M oore’s refutation of n aturalism actually holds for intuitionism as well. T h u s even if an intuition ist does have experience that others d o not have, it makes no difference to the argum ent. We are still entitled to say that it is m isleadin g for him to use a value-term to designate the contents of such experience, for in this way he contrives to sm uggle a norm ative judgm en t in what purports to be a statem ent of fact.25 Lest the reader reach the false conclusion that the em otive theory is really nothing more than a m odernized version of subjectivism , nam ely that m oral judgm ents are merely assertions about my own feel­ ings, Ayer takes pains to show that his theory is not a subjectivist one, at least not in the ordinary sense of the term. For the conventional subjectivist does not deny “ that the sentences of a m oralizer express genuine proposition s,” 2r> while, according to the em otive analysis, ethical judgm ents are absolutely m eaningless and unverifiable. T o the em otivist such judgm en ts are not even assertions that we have a cer­ tain feeling but are purely and com pletely expressions of feeling. T h is rather im portant distinction rests on Ayer’s observation that we may express a feeling without asserting that we have it. For instance, I may express boredom by m aking the verifiable assertion, “ I am bored.” “ B u t,” Ayer points out, “ I can express boredom w ithout actually say­ ing that I am bored. I can express it by my tone and gestures, while m aking a statem ent about som ething wholly unconnected with it, or by an ejaculation , or w ithout uttering any words at all.” 27 Conse­ quently, while the tradition al subjectivists m ain tain that m oral ju d g ­ m ents assert the existence of certain feelings, such as approval or dis­ approval, the em otivists hold that so-called m oral statem ents are ex­ pressions and excitants of feeling without necessarily involving any assertions. Ayer is careful to consider possible objections to this position, and does point out that there is one objection to tradition al subjectivism which also applies to em olivism . T h is is the objection raised by G. E. M oore “ that if ethical statem ents were sim ply statem ents about the speaker’s feelings, it woultl be im possible to argue about questions of value.” 28 T h u s, if on the basis of em otion alone Sm ith held thrift to be a virtue and Jo n es held it to be a vice, they w ould not be d isp u t­

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ing about anything, for on the subjectivist account Sm ith w ould be saying that he approved of thrift an d Jo n es that he disapproved of it. So far as actually expressing the feelings of Sm ith and of Jon es, both of these statem ents m ight clearly be true. Now Ayer adm its that this objection applies equally to em otivism , for, if ethical ju dgm en ts do not express propositions at all, they clearlv cannot be said to express incom patible propositions. B u t Ayer contends that this objection is n ot a valid argum ent again st either subjectivism or em otivism , for he m aintains “ that one really never does dispute questions of valu e.” 29 T h is is a poin t of great im portance in A yer’s developm ent of his em otive theory of ethics, although, at first glance, it seems to be highly p arad oxical. On the surface, Ayer adm its, “ we certainly do engage in disputes which are ordinarily regarded as disputes about questions of value.” 30 B ut, upon closer exam ination, w hat seem to be disputes about questions of value are actually seen to be disputes abou t ques­ tions of fact. L e t us look at a sam ple case to see this poin t more clearly. If A m ain tain s that Sm ith acted rightly in k illin g Jones, and B that he acted wrongly, an argum ent does ensue. B u t the argum ent is over facts, not values. B may argue that Sm ith really did not act out of self-defense, that his act was prem editated, that the m otive was jealousy. B is then likely to succeed in classifying the act under what A regards as m urder, and if he has good em pirical evidence to back u p his contentions, A w ill m ost likely agree with B that Sm ith acted wrongly. In which case the “ ethical d ispute” is settled. However, let us notice that there is a presupposition involved here— one which it seems quite reasonable to make, however— to the effect that since A is likely to have undergone the sam e type of m oral conditioning as B, he w ill probably have the same ethical feeling towards m urder as B. T h e whole argum ent here has thus been an attem pt to persuade A that he was w rong concerning the facts of the case, on the assum ption that if he interprets the facts as B does, he w ill ad op t the sam e m oral attitude toward the act. B u t if A has not been subjected to the sam e m oral conditioning, if he does not have the sam e feeling tow ard m urder as B , it is im possible to continue the argum ent any further. T h ere are absolutely no propositions which are any longer relevant, for we are d ealin g now, n ot with facts, b u t with values. W hat often happens in such cases is that B w ill probably regard A as m orally perverse and self-righteously feel that his own feelings are superior to those of A. R atio n ality has now reached its lim its. “ It is because argum ent fails

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us when we come to deal with pure questions of value, as distinct from questions of fact, that we finally resort to mere abuse.” “ In short,” Ayer concludes, “we find that argum ent is possible on m oral questions only if some system of values is presupposed.” 31 Since there can be no argum ent about questions of value, norm ­ ative ethics as a discipline disappears. A ll the factual in qu iries of ethics, such as describing what are the m oral h abits of a person or group and what causes these h abits an d feelings, belon g in the realm of the social sciences. W hen one pursues such a psychological and sociological investigation of ethics, one is enabled, according to Ayer, to account for the grain of truth in certain ethical theories. K an t, for exam ple, was correct in so far as he perceived that m oral precepts do present themselves to some people as categorical com m ands. T h is is because “ one of the chief causes of m oral behaviour is fear, both con­ scious and unconscious, of a god's displeasure, and fear of the enm ity of society.” 32 H edonistic and eudaem onistic theories sprin g from the fact “ that the m oral code of a society is partly determ ined by the beliefs of that society concerning the conditions of its own h ap p i­ ness.” 33 Ayer, resorting to a novel use of G . E. M oore's n atu ralistic fallacy to refute such theories, concludes: T h e ir essential defect is that they treat propositions which refer 1 to the causes an d attributes of our ethical feelings as if they were definitions of ethical concepts. A nd thus they fail to recognize that ethical concepts are pseudo-concepts an d consequently inde­ finable.34 i

•

W e see, then, that while for M oore the basic ethical concept is unique, . indefinable ancLunanalyzable, Ayer holds that there is no m eaningful concept at all in ethical assertions. A nd obviously it is im possible to analyze ethical assertions in the way in which earlier philosophers have tried to do, since these earlier writers failed to note that ethical talk is purely and sim ply em otive. T O W A R D A N E V A L U A T IO N O F T H E E M O T IV E T F IE O R Y O F A. J . A Y E R One of the m ost striking facts in relation to the em otive theory of ethics is the vehemence of the attacks which have been m ade against it. It is not necessary to repeat here all the criticism s directed against

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this view, b u t only to p oin t out the m ost frequen t and m ost significant types of criticism s in order that the reader m ay form his own view on this question. Since m any of the criticisms which are directed again st the em o­ tive theory in p articu lar are p art of a m ore general rejection of logical positivism as a whole, it may be h elpful to consider first of all the attacks upon the basis of logical positivism . 1. A leading criticism m aintains that if one construes logical posi tivism ’s m ain principles rigidly, logical positivism ’s own house is in danger of collapse, along with those of the m ore tradition al systems of philosophy. M ore precisely, logical positivism ’s own principles seem to have no basis in positivist analysis! Such propositions as “ A ll knowl­ edge is em pirical,” “ T h e m eaning of an em pirical proposition is the m ode of its verification,” an d “ T h e statem ents of m etaphysics, theol­ ogy, and norm ative ethics are m eaningless nonsense,” are certainly neither em pirical nor analytic propositions. T h ey cannot be the form er for they are not m eant to be probabilities. T h ey cannot be the latter, for they p u rp o rt to tell us som ething abou t reality. It m ay then be charged that, in accordance with the principles of positivism , the propositions of positivism are m eaningless. In answer to this charge Schlick m ain tain ed that the logical posi­ tivist principles are only the perception of the conditions under which opinions can be form ulated at all. Schlick often referred to the socalled principles of logical positivism as standpointlessness (Stan dpunktslosigkeit), and justified this view by saying: W hoever has once gained the insight that the m eaning of every statem ent can only be determ ined by the given, cannot at all grasp any longer the possibility of any other opinion, for he sees that he has only perceived the conditions under which opinions can be form ulated at all.35 Ayer has also replied to this charge by insisting that it was never held by the logical positivists that the verification prin ciple was em pir­ ically verifiable since it was “ put forward as a definition, not as an em pirical statem ent of fact. B u t it is not an arbitrary definition. It purports to lay down the conditions which actually govern our accept­ ance, or indeed our understanding, of common sense an d scientific statem ents, the statem ents which we take as describing the w orld ‘in which we live and move an d have our bein g’.” 36

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T h e line of attack here then m ight m ore profitably be to ask w hether it is actually the case that the verification prin ciple describes the presuppositions which we use in thinking abou t the statem ents of com mon sense and science. From this point of view the basic principles o f logical positivism ap pear m ore like philosophical presuppositions which are to be accepted or rejected by the criterion of whether or not they actually are the basic presuppositions with which we approach the world. Clearly a “ stan d p o in t” is being taken here in logical posi­ tivism, and although it may indeed n ot be an arbitrary one, bu t rather one which does justice to the claim s of science, it is not properly re­ ferred to as “ standpointlessness.” A sim ilar kin d of argum ent has been m ade by such theologians as E m il Brunner, who contend that until one sees the w orld an d m an through faith in G od, one w ill be led into hopeless error, while once one has found faith in G od, then no other poin t of view can be held to be adequate. T o this writer, the principles of logical positivism are a philosophical stan dpoint, even if these very principles do seem needed for the analysis of em pirical scientific statem ents. 2. Some critics have gone even further, an d have accused logical positivism of destroying all other m etaphysical views while bein g a m etaphysic itself. It is of course granted that logical positivism is qu ite different from tradition al m etaphysical views, bu t the charge is that its principles are m etaphysical nevertheless. T h is is a very im p or­ tant objection, m ade not only by theologians an d m etaphysicians who jealou sly seek to safegu ard their own positions, b u t also by Jo h n W isdom , the C am bridge philosopher, who has carefully exam ined the presuppositions of logical positivism . Indeed, W isdom has m ain tain ed that the verification principle, which we have already noted as the key prin ciple of logical positivism , is actually “ the generalization of a very large class of m etaphysical theories, nam ely all naturalistic, em ­ pirical, positivistic theories.” 37 In fact, he continues, sooner or later m ost m etaphysical conflict finds expression in “ ‘Shall we or shall we not accept the prin ciple that the m eaning of a statem ent is the m ethod of its verification?’ and sometimes ‘Is the verification principle true?’ ” 38 Now W isdom adm its that the verification prin ciple is a peculiar m etaphysical theory, for rather than being a specific doctrine abou t reality it is m ore like “ a recipe for fram in g m etaphysical theories.” 39 T h e purpose of his article has been to show that there are certain likenesses between the verification prin ciple an d m etaphysical

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theories, especially in the disguised form of presentation. In the words of W isdom him self: I say that the verification principle is a m etaphysical principle because I w ant (1) to draw the attention of those who accept it to the deplorably old-fashioned clothes in which it presents itself. Indeed it resem bles not only positivistic theories bu t also the worst transcendental theories by ap p earin g in the disguise either of a scientific discovery rem oving p o p u lar illusion, or of a logical equation (incorrect) from which deductions m ay be m ade. N o w onder our conservative friends cannot accept it. I w ant (2) to draw the attention of those who reject it to the fact that because they are taken in by its disguise they fail to recognize the m erits which like other m etaphysical theories it conceals. Both those who accept it and those who reject it do n ot realize w hat they are doin g because they do not notice that it is disguised. B u t m etaphysics reveals the hidden, plucks the m ask of appearance from the face of reality . . .40 In the introduction to the second edition of L an gu age, T ru th and L o gic Ayer seems to hint that in a sense the prin ciples of logical posi­ tivism are a m etaphysic; at least he is w illing to call them p h ilosop h ­ ical propositions. It used to be said by the positivists of the Viennese school that the function of philosophy was not to p u t forw ard a special set of ‘p h ilosoph ical’ propositions, b u t to m ake other propositions clear; and this statem ent has at least the m erit of brin gin g out the point that philosophy is not a source of speculative truth. Nevertheless, I now think that it is incorrect to say that there are no philosoph ical proposition s.41

Ayer goes on to say that the propositions w ith which his book, L a n g ­ uage, T ruth an d L o gic deals are the sort that are asserted or denied by philosophers, and he does not see why they should not be called philosophical. W hether or not, therefore, the logical positivists are guilty of form ing a new m etaphysic while at the sam e tim e condem n­ ing all m etaphysical investigation depends upon how strictly one construes the term “ m etaphysics.” However, it does seem clear that the verification principle in itself is neither em pirical nor a logical prem ­ ise, bu t certainly in A yer’s restatem ent, a “ philosoph ical proposition .” 3. A lthough this is not very im portan t for our study of ethics, th reader m ight be interested to know that there is also considerable con­

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troversy as to whether all knowledge can be reduced to sense-contents. T h e issue is whether or not our perception of objects can be reduced sim ply to perception of sense-contents, an d whether or not our intro­ spective awareness of our own acts of apprehension, thinking and feeling can also be so reduced. B u t to recognize these issues as con­ troversial is to preclude pronouncing, one side or the other as “ m eta­ physical,” as logical positivism seems at times to have done. 4. T h ere may also be some real problem s am ong the “ pseudo­ problem s” which the logical positivists have dismissed. T h e relation between a proposition and the fact for which it stands, the status of logic itself, and indeed even some of the questions of norm ative ethics and metaphysics are significant problem s. By the presupposition s of logical positivism these questions are pointless since they do not fall into the categories of factual m eaning or definitional truth. Neverthe­ less, from other standpoints light can be shed on these questions. As we shall see later, those contem porary philosophers who are m uch in ­ fluenced by lin guistic analysis are inclined not only to take quite seriously m etaphysical problem s, but to attem pt to clarify the issues involved by careful analysis of the use of statem ents in this field. In one sense logical positivism is statin g a truism in m ain tain in g that m etaphysical questions are not factually m ean in gful in a scientific sense, b u t it does not follow from this that all m etaphysical questions are pointless. However, in form u latin g an evaluation of logical positivism we ought also to consider some of the positive contributions which this m ovem ent has m ade. T h a t it has removed much confused thinking from philosophy cannot be denied. It has also provided a clear criterion for distin guish in g between the realm of em pirical facts and the realm of values. Perhaps the greatest benefit that can come to one who studies logical positivism is that he will no longer be persuaded into thinking that science is “ a way of life,” nor will he be disillusioned on the other hand by a realization that religion and ethics can never possess the same sort of cognitive certainty as science.^It may well be that when logical positivism gives the im pression that in distinguish ­ ing the realm of em pirical facts from the realm of values it is discard­ ing the latter, this has been due m ore to the fervor with which the newborn principles were first stated than to the nature of the p rin ­ ciples themselves.< B u t let us now turn to some of the more specific criticism s leveled against the emotive theory of ethics form ulated by Ayer.

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1. T h ere have been m any criticism s of the em otive theory of ethics stem m ing from what are regarded as the effects of the theory. ? I t is im portant to note that these attacks are not concerned with the correctness of the em otive theory, bu t rather are based on the belief that if the theory is widely accepted it w ill prove d am agin g to society. < T h is line of attack usually takes the form of statin g that the emotive theory underm ines confidence in the trad ition al m oral principles of our culture, and therefore, it m ust be rejected. T h u s M artin D ’Arcy in criticizing Ayer’s L an gu age, T ru th an d L o gic writes: U nder the pretence of ultim ate wisdom it guillotin es religion, ethics, and aesthetics, self, persons, free will, responsibility and everything worth while. I thank M r. Ayer for having shown us how m odern philosophers can fiddle and play tricks while the world burns.42 T h e late British philosopher C. E. M. Jo a d argued in much the same vein: T h ere is then no ground for preferring kindness to cruelty— one’s actual preference for the form er is on a par with one’s pre­ ference for asparagus over artichokes— an d no ration al justifica­ tion for objectin g to the N azi theories of politics or the horrors of the concentration cam ps which were the instrum ents of their ap plication .43 T h ese two specim en criticism s of Ayer are themselves quite em o­ tive, and the reader ought to read them carefully lest he be too easily taken in by this line of argum ent. In fairness to Ayer it should again be pointed out that he does believe significant disagreem ent can take place in discussions of ethics. In this respect it is not like preferring one vegetable to another. N or is it quite fair to accuse Ayer of gu il­ lotining everything worth while. T o poin t out the emotive use of language in ethics and religion is not the same thing as to say that therefore they are useless. We should recall that Ayer argues that m any disputes on m oral questions are disputes about m atters of fact. T h u s, if I can show that the use of concentration cam ps by the N azis was a cruel act I can per­ suade you to condem n it, providing, of course, that you disapprove of -cruelty. H ere is a suitable use of emotive language. B u t, there’s the rub. Ayer contends— and this opens him to criticism — that if the

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parties to an ethical dispute have different standards of value and stubbornly hold on to their views, nothing can be done to show the superiority of one view to another. In that case there is no sense in asking which of the conflicting views is true. For, since the expression of a value ju d gm en t is not a proposition, the question of truth or falsehood does not here arise.44 T h e line of criticism under discussion does not actually touch the truth or falsity of the em otive theory of ethics as an account of the way m oral words are used. Nevertheless the reader may, initially at least, feel some sym pathy for views such as those of Jo a d and Father D ’Arcy, because he m ay feel that a general acceptance of the emotive theory by the p u blic m ight lead to unfortunate results. One m ight think that a theory which considers all m oral values to be sim ply em o­ tional expressions with no m eaning m ight hasten the threatened col­ lapse of the values of western civilization. It is difficult to evaluate the effects of any philosophical theory upon the practice of non­ philosophers, and in this w riter’s opinion this type of objection ought not to be basic nor be pushed too far. M ost of the great creative ad­ vances in hum an history were at first rejected by m any as dangerous to the existing social values. W hatever the reader’s view on this m atter, it is extrem ely im portan t to recall that Ayer’s purpose is not in the least to destroy ethical behavior, but rather to show more clearly what the nature of ethical dispute is. One m ight suggest that clarifying those issues in ethics which can be settled by an appeal to facts from those which involve basic disagreem ents concerning values m ight in­ deed tend toward greater hum an understanding an d tolerance. If such were to be the case, then the emotive theory w ould have good social effects. At any rate argum ents based on what m ight happen in the future are very hazardous indeed. 2. A more serious criticism, from the point of view of the p h il­ osopher, is that w hat the em otivists say ethical judgm ents mean is not what people do in fact m ean by them. Jo a d m aintains that when m osf people say “T h is is good,” they are conscious of asserting a proposition, of predicating som ething about “ this,” not of expressing their feelings.45 M uch as one m ight be inclined to adopt Ayer’s analysis of ethical statem ents, this criticism gives one pause. As we shall see, Stevenson, who developed an em otive ethical theory in greater detail than Ayer,

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does recognize that p art of an ethical statem ent involves an assertion which is not emotive. However, the peculiar character of ethical sen­ tences, he m aintains, is that they are emotive as well. L ater on we shall be looking at the views of other contem porary philosophers who m ain­ tain that one m ust study the way the word “ good” is actually used in both m oral and non-moral contexts, before ethical theory can be form ­ ulated. We shall see then that generally these thinkers do n ot sub­ scribe wholeheartedly to A yer’s version of the em otive theory, although they do agree that ethical words are in m any respects quite different from scientific or descriptive words. T h is objection does seem valid against Ayer’s view in L an g u ag e, T ru th a n d L o gic, b u t this is not to say that he has not m ade a great contribution in p oin tin g out that ethical terms do involve em otive aspects in a significant way. Perhaps he overstated his case. As a corollary to the objection we are exam ining, some critics be­ lieve that the feeling of m oral obligation is u n exp lain able by the em o­ tive theory.^This is the criticism that if an ethical ju d gm en t were nothing more than an expression of som eone’s approval or disapproval, no feeling of com pulsion would ever become associated with ethical judgments.^However, in fairness to A yer’s analysis it should be pointed out that one’s fear of the disapproval of society or G od could well in­ duce in one the psychological feeling of obligation with regard to certain types of conduct. B u t Ewing, am ong others, has poin ted o u t that he means more by obligation than a psychological feeling. Ew ing’s position is that if I ought to do something, I ought to do it whether others approve of it or not. T h u s, to say “ T h o u sh alt not steal” as an im perative statem ent im plying an obligation is not the same for Ew ing as saying “ My society disapproves of stealin g.” T h e poin t at issue here is whether or not there is som ething like objective obligation, som ething wrhich is my duty independently of society’s mores. But clearly the em otive theory can account for the psychological fact of obligation in terms of fear of the disapproval of society or God. T h e same line of argum ent continues by claim ing that if the theory were true, we could not explain how one can wish for what he believes to be w rong or how one can adm it some of his desires to be bad. Dr. Ew ing holds that the em otive theory is incom patible with the fact that: I may wish or com m and som ething which I know or believe to be wrong, and I m ay quite well think you ought to do som e­ thing which I do not wish you and w ould not dream of com­ m anding you to do, e.g. pun ish me.46

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One of the origin al logical positivists, H erbert Feigl, has in his later writings adm itted that em otivism has removed the ethical ought from its hum an context. Feigl now finds that one of the m eanings of “ objectivity” in the m oral dom ain may be “ the conform ity of the norms with the basic bio-psycho-social nature of man, especially as regards the preservation of existence, the satisfaction of needs, and the facts of growth, developm ent, and evolution.” T h ere is a m ovement here, as the reader will probably recognize, toward a n aturalistic ethi­ cal theory which bases its norms on certain biological, psychological and sociological evidence which points toward some lines of behavior as favorin g hum an growth and developm ent. Feigl in a footnote adds this significant com ment: “ T h is elem entary but im portant point stressed in natu ralistic ethics from A ristotle down to the philosophiz­ ing biologists of our time, is apt to be neglected by purely analytic philosophers.” 47 M uch can be said in favor of the emotive theory of ethics, never­ theless, and it is time to exam ine some o f the contributions which Ayer and the early defenders of logical positivism m ade to m oral philosophy. 1. T h e em otive theory has radically changed all subsequent ethical theorizing by focusing attention on the emotive effect of ethical lan g­ uage, whether or not such effect be regarded as part of the m eaning of the ethical judgm ent. A lthough there were other influences at work, there can be no d ou bt that this analysis of emotive language has lecl: to the great interest of contem porary philosophers in how ethical words are really used. M ore than this can be said, however, for there does not seem reason to doubt that all ethical judgm ents have em o­ tive conditions affecting their causation as well as em otive effects. Furtherm ore, careful analysis may well show that some ethical ju d g ­ ments are alm ost entirely em otive, particularly those which are usually referred to as ultim ate or basic. 2. Despite the many criticism s of the destructive effects of the em otive theory upon practical ethics, it is im portan t to bear in m ind at least one very im portan t positive contribution in this area. Clearly, by focusing attention on the irrational m ethods of persuasion, thus showing that m any ethical judgm ents are based not on an apprehen­ sion of hum an values, bu t on a concern to secure the interest of a p articu lar person or group, this theory gives one a m ethod of more

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critically exam in in g ethical statem ents which seem to favor the in­ terests of p articu lar organizations. 3. Furtherm ore, the em otive theory has shown that an ap p e al to factual evidence is relevant to m any ethical disputes. G ran tin g that we share a com mon bond of basic values, I can then try to show you that your condem nation of a certain act is based on a failure to know or to observe carefully all the facts of the case.

II. Charles L. Stevenson — Ethics and Language W hile Ayer’s statem ent of the em otive theory is the best known in non-philosophical circles, the m ost thorough an d precise form u la­ tion of the em otive theory of ethics to date is fou n d in Stevenson’s E th ics an d L an gu age, publish ed in 1945. L ike m ost of the holders of the emotive theory, Stevenson has been much im pressed by the work of G. E. M oore, w ith whom he agrees that ethics is not to be com pletely subsum ed under psychology, al­ though he is not ready to posit a non-natural object as the referent of the term “good.” As one m ight suspect from the title of Stevenson’s book, the an al­ ysis of language plays a large p art in his thesis. M uch confusion over ,the m eaning of “ good ” an d other ethical terms has been caused, he thinks, by a failure to take into account the two very different p ur­ poses which lead us to use language. We som etim es use language for a descriptive purpose, that is, to record, clarify, an d com m unicate beliefs— it is this use of language which characterizes science. More often, however, we use language for a dynam ic purpose, to give vent to our feelings, as when we use interjections; to create m oods, as in p o ­ etry; and to incite people to action or arouse attitudes, as in the use of oratory. Now it is only in the descriptive use of language that our words can be said to have m ean in g in the sense of h aving a referent, "th at to which people refer when they use the sign.” 48 I f we w ould restrict our use of “ m ean in g” to "referen t,” we w ould n atu rally have to declare the dynam ic uses of lan guage to be m eaningless, and this is precisely what was done by Ayer. Stevenson, however, wishes to stay closer to common sense and say that somehow words used dynam ically do have m eanings. T h is can be done if m eaning is defined in the

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“ psychological” or “ p ragm atic” sense as “ the disposition al properties that relate a sign to the psychological reactions of those who interpret or use it.” 49 T h u s, for exam ple, he would hold that a word such as “ horrible” has a kind of m eaning which is based on how the utterance of the word m ight cause me to react. I m ight screw up my face in ex­ pression of “ horror,” or I m ight protest that the act referred to is not “ horrible” to me, and so on. M ain taining, therefore, that there are two different purposes for which language is used, Stevenson differentiates what he calls “ des­ criptive m ean ing” from “ em otive m eaning.” T h e ‘descriptive m ean in g’ of a sign is its disposition to affect cognition, provided that the disposition is caused by an elaborate process of conditioning that has attended the sign’s use in com­ m unication, and provided that the disposition is rendered fixed, at least to a considerable degree, by linguistic rules. (Exception: a term w ithout previous use in com m unication may be assigned a descriptive m eaning if lin guistic rules relate it to words that have had such a use.)50 “ Descriptive m ean in g” is usually associated with the psychological acts of believing, thinking, supposing, and presum ing. “ Em otive m ean­ in g” Stevenson defines thus: T h e em otive m eaning of a word is the power that the word acquires, on account of its history in em otional situations, to evoke or directly express attitudes, as distinct from describing or design ating them .51 In short, the attitudes with which we associate em otive m eaning in ­ clude the com plex feelings of desire, wish, approval and disapproval. F or Stevenson, beliefs are the result of thinking, supposing, or pre­ sum ing, while attitudes are the em otional reactions which we ad op t toward certain beliefs. T h is distinction between beliefs and attitudes is basic in Steven­ son’s analysis, b u t he insists that this distinction is really an abstrac­ tion. In reality, in daily life, we find descriptive and em otive m eaning, beliefs and attitudes, to be united in the total situation. It is im portant to rem em ber in the analysis which follows, therefore, that descriptive and em otive m eaning are not separate entities, bu t are rather distin­ guishable aspects of a total situation ; beliefs and attitudes are in ex­

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tricably interconnected, an d “ the central problem of ethical analysis— one m ight alm ost say ‘the’ problem — is one of showing in detail how beliefs and attitudes are related.” 52 Stevenson objects to eq uatin g em otive m eaning with nonsense. It is at this point that he differs with Ayer. Stevenson wishes to keep the term em otive “ as a tool for use in careful study, not as a device for relegating the non-descriptive aspects of language to lim bo.” 53 In preparin g for his analysis of ethical disputes, Stevenson uses the “ tool” of em otive m eaning to draw several im portan t distinctions for his study. H e distinguishes three varieties of em otive m eaning according to their relationship to descriptive m eaning. (1) Em otive m eaning is “ in dependent” to whatever extent it “ is not a function of descriptive m eaning, bu t either persists w ithout the latter or survives changes in it.” 54 T h u s, for exam ple, with such a “ verbal cham eleon” as “ dem ocracy,” the independent emotive m eaning is the em otional aura which is present even though I may not be thinking at all of what the word m eans descriptively, or though the word is given a descriptive m eaning which it does not ordin arily have for me. (2) Em otive m eaning is “ dependent” to whatever extent it “ is a function of descriptive m eaning, changing with it after only a brief ‘lag ’.” 55 T h u s if the em otional au ra of “ dem ocracy” is reduced when I, who am accustom ed to thinking it to be “ rule by p o p u lar vote,” am told that it is really “ collective ow nership of the means of produ ction ,” its em otive m eaning is to that extent dependent. (5) T h ere is also a third, the “ quasi-dependent” em otive m eaning, which “ tends to move the hearer through the m ediation of a belief which isn ’t about that (the word in question) but is about som ething else that the word merely suggests.” 56 T h u s for me the em otional aura of “ dem ocracy” m ay be associated with Am erican home life or some other idea suggested by the term. Hence, em otive m eaning has a kind of inertia about it which is of suprem e im portance in ethics, for it is the characteristic of ethical terms that they, of all the words in our language, are the m ost vague. C orresponding to the two m ain uses of language, descriptive and dynam ic, there are two m ain types of disagreem ent in which men may be engaged. In disagreem ent in belief, concern is “ with how m at­ ters are truthfully to be described and ex p lain e d ;” in disagreem ent in attitude concern is “ with how they are to be favored or disfavored, and hence with how they are to be shaped by hum an efforts.” 57 E thical disputes, according to Stevenson, exh ibit disagreem ent in atti­

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tude. T h e reader may recall here Ayer’s statem ent “ that one really never does dispute about questions of value,” that all our ethical dis­ putes are really about facts, and that “when we come to deal with pure questions of value,” ration ality is at an end an d we m ust resort to “ mere abuse.” 58 Stevenson, seeing the close interrelationship be­ tween beliefs and attitudes, recognizes that disagreem ent in attitude may be caused by disagreem ent in belief and may, in turn, be resolved by agreem ent in belief. Because cognitive and em otive elements are thus causally interconnected, there is always the possibility, he m ain ­ tains, of disputes abou t even “ pure questions of value.” In exam ining typical ethical disputes, Stevenson develops two p at­ terns of analysis which are com plem entary to each other, the first of which focuses attention prim arily on the em otive aspect of the ethi­ cal term, while the second focuses attention on the term ’s descriptive aspect. H e agrees with G. E. M oore that “ good” is truly indefinable, since no definition is able to capture its emotive m eaning; bu t he is satisfied that his two patterns of analysis should “ characterize” its m eaning. T h is is perh aps an im portan t point, for while in one very strict sense the word “ good” may be indefinable, so may alm ost all words be indefinable as well, b u t that is not to say that one cannot nevertheless describe to the satisfaction of m ost people how words are used. L e t the reader beware lest he im pose a more strict requirem ent for definition upon ethical terms than he does upon other words he uses in ordinary discourse, such as table, autom obile, and so on. T h is weaker sense of definition is what Stevenson has in m ind when he out­ lines his two patterns of analysis of ethical terms. In his First Pattern of Analysis Stevenson “ characterizes” the m ean­ ing of the chief ethical terms in the follow ing m anner: (1) “ T h is is w rong” m eans I disapprove of this; do so as well. (2) “ H e ought to do this” m eans I disapprove of his leaving this undone; do so as well. (3) “ T h is is good” m eans I approve of this; do so as w ell,59 T h e reader may note that there is a great deal of difference in this first pattern of analysis from A yer’s origin al analysis. It will be rem em bered that Ayer carefully distinguished his position from su b­ jectivism by insisting that an ethical judgm en t has no m eaning, not even so far as in dicatin g the feelings of the speaker. In Stevenson’s analysis, on the other hand, there is before the im perative, “ which is

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addressed to changing or intensifying the attitudes of the hearer,” a declarative statem ent, “ which describes the attitudes of the speaker.” 60 W e can see that Ayer in his origin al haste to show that ethical ju d g ­ m ents are com pletely m eaningless somewhat overstated his case, for later, under Stevenson’s influence, he retracted his origin al radical position: T o say, as I once did, that these m oral judgm en ts are merely expressive of certain feelings, feelings of approval or disapproval, is an over-sim plification. T h e fact is rather that w hat may be described as m oral attitudes consist in certain patterns of be­ haviour, and that the expression of a m oral ju d gm en t is an elem ent in the pattern. T h e m oral ju d gm en t expresses the atti­ tude in the sense that it contributes to defining it.61 Stevenson, in using his first pattern of analysis to exam ine various exam ples of ethical disputes, finds that ethical ju dgm en ts are only verifiable to the extent that they are descriptive. Even though we do give reasons to support our judgm ents, the relationship between an im perative and its su pportin g reasons is not the sam e kin d of relation ­ ship as that between a descriptive statem ent an d its su pportin g reasons. In the latter case the relationship is a logical relation sh ip; in the form er case it is a psychological relationship. O nly in regard to state­ m ents which are logically related can we speak of verifiability. In ethical disputes, it is never contradictory not to accept the supportin g reasons offered. Furtherm ore, since there is no logical relationship be­ tween an ethical ju dgm en t and its su pportin g reasons, any su pportin g reason is as good as any other: “ Any statem ent about any m atter of fact which any speaker considers likely to alter attitudes may be ad­ duced as a reason for or against an ethical ju d gm en t.” 62 In seeking to dem onstrate his thesis, Stevenson exam ines four groups of ethical disputes to show the m ethod by which, agreem ent is often reached. T h e first group is m ade up largely of exam ples of argum enta ad hom inem , which are exceptions to his general rule since these disputes resem ble factual ones in in dicatin g logical relation ­ ship. An exam ple follows: A: It w ould be a good thing to have a dole for the unem ployed. B : B u t you have ju st said that a dole w ould weaken people’s sense of independence, and you have adm itted that nothing which has that consequence is good.63

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T h e reader can observe that here the argum ent is directed toward showing A that in su p portin g a dole for the unem ployed he was ac­ tually going against an earlier statem ent of his in which he stressed that nothing should be done which would weaken a m an ’s sense of independence. Certainly form al logic is of use here, for it can show A that he was m ain tain in g two contradictory positions, bu t that is as far as logic can go in this type of case, for it cannot by itself determ ine which judgm en t A should give up. In more form al terms, logic, in this type of dispute, may provide necessary conditions for m ain tain in g an ethical ju dgm en t (such as consistency), b u t it cannot provide sufficient conditions. T h u s, I try to appeal to what I think A m ost favors, namely, his desire to see that m an ’s sense of independence is not weakened, and on this basis I seek to persuade him to give up his inconsistent defense of a dole for the unem ployed. However, A m ight decide that a dole for the unem ployed would be better in that it would m ain tain m an ’s sense of independence. B believes that he knows A ’s strongest inclinations, however, and thus is fairly sure that pointing out the inconsistency in A ’s argum ent will cause A to agree w ith him. A t any rate, in this type of ethical dispute the supportin g reasons offered for m ain tain in g a position are logically related to the ju d g ­ ment. In the other three groups of ethical disputes which Stevenson ex­ am ines the su p portin g reasons are psychologically, rather than logic­ ally, related to the judgm en ts offered. In the second group of disputes the supportin g reasons poin t out the nature or the consequences of an act. For exam ple: A: T h e proposed tax bill is on the whole bad. B : I know little about it, b u t have been inclined to favor it on the ground that higher taxes are preferable to further bor­ rowing. A: It w ill put a great burden on the poor, and m ake little differ­ ence to the rich. B : I had not realized that. I m ust study the bill, and perhaps I shall agree with you in opposing it.G4 It should be noted in this illu stration that A ’s poin tin g out the con­ sequences of the tax bill would not have changed B ’s attitude had not B already disapproved of such a consequence. If B favored a tax

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rate of the same percentage leveled on all people regardless of their income, then A ’s argum ent w ould not have moved him to restudy the bill. T h u s, reason in this type of case does not attem pt to create new attitudes, b u t rather to m ake it clear that an act originally ap ­ proved of ought to be disapproved of if the agent carefully studies the consequences, in the light of his already established value convictions. In the third group of ethical disputes, the attem pt to settle the poin t at issue involves in dicatin g the motives of an act or the origin of an attitude. T h u s, for exam ple, A m ight poin t out to B that B ’s su pport of more lenient laws with respect to fornication was m otivated by B ’s desire to get on the “ ban d w agon.” H e m ight try to show B that no new argum ents had come forth for such legal reform , but that many people had recently come out in favor of such reform an d thus B sim ply w anted to be in fashion, and not out of date. T h e argum ent appeals therefore to a suspicion that B ’s motives are not truly of the best with regard to such drastic suggestions. O f course, B m ight counter that the fact that many other people were favoring such reform did not cause him to favor it and he m ight offer some su p po rtin g reasons in return. We m ight find a clearer case, however, if we consider m o­ tives based on ap peal to authority. In the sam e illustration, A m ight try to show B that he favored a relaxation of the laws in respect U> fornication because some outstan din g sociologists an d psychologists had come out for such change. A w ould then seek to suggest that B should think for him self, and not make his decisions by merely ap p eal­ ing to so-called authorities. In both illustrations, the poin t is that A is presupposing that B does not like sim ply to favor a proposal because it is the recent fashion, or because it is supported by some authority. If A can convince B that his m otivation has been largely of this sort, then A may be able to get B to change his opinion on the m atter in controversy. In the fourth group which Stevenson exam ines, the concern is not so much with resolving disagreem ent in attitude as with “ tem­ porarily evading the force of a disconcerting influence, or alterin g the means by which it is exerted.” 65 T h u s in an argum ent concerning the lack of honesty in governm ent officials, which A is condem ning with gusto, B m ight poin t out that dishonesty is not only true of governm ent officials, bu t seems to be basic in our present cultural norms. In fact, he m ight suggest to A that some of the advertisem ents for A ’s business which state “ Your credit is always good at A ’s” are less than the com-

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plete truth. Clearly A does not give credit again to a client who has failed to pay a currently overdue account of long standing. Further­ more, some of the claim s m ade for m erchandise are somewhat exagger­ ated in A’s advertisem ents. T h u s, although the expression m ight in ­ deed not be used in the argum ent, B is really suggesting that “ People in glass houses should not throw stones.” T h e im portan t aspect in this type of dispute is that B is not denying that there is dishonesty in governm ent, but rather is seeking to evade the force of this rem ark by appeals to some form of dishonesty in other people, even in the opponent him self. * Because he has shown the m ainly psychological relationship be­ tween the ethical ju dgm en t and its su p portin g reasons, Stevenson m aintains that we cannot speak of “ validity” in regard to these reasons unless we should choose to define validity as effectiveness. T h e conclusion from Stevenson’s first pattern of analysis is that, since reason is an interm ediary between attitudes, ration al methods can bring about agreem ent in ethical m atters only to the extent that disagreem ent in attitud e is caused by disagreem ent in belief and can, consequently, be resolved by agreem ent in belief. B u t it may well be that there are disagreem ents in attitude which are not caused by disa­ greem ent in belief. Even with the sam e facts and beliefs, it m ight still be likely that two people had different attitudes concerning the issue in dispute. As illustrations of what he has in m ind here, Stevenson writes: Some ethical disagreem ents seem rooted, rather, in the scarcity of what people want. Several nations may urge that their crowded and suffering p opulation s give them the righ t to take a disputed territory. Others seem rooted in tem peram ental differences, as when an oversexed, em otionally independent adolescent argues with an undersexed, em otionally dependent one about the de­ sirability of free love.86 If there are such cases, we could not expect unanim ity on ethical m atters even if everyone did have all the relevant facts. Stevenson is convinced that ration ality has its lim itations in ethics; and he argues that “ those who seek an absolutely definitive m ethod for norm ative ethics, and who w ant to rule out the possibility of rival m oral codes, each equally well supported by reasons” may “ want an absurdity.” 07 Lest the reader think that he may find firmer ration al su pport than this for his ethical norms, Stevenson adds, “ If the present work, m en­

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tioning supportin g reasons rather than final proofs, cannot prom ise a priori certainty in ethics, it m ust be rem em bered that m etaphysical writers, though they make more encouraging prom ises, do not always keep them .” 68 T h is point that there is a possibility of rival m oral codes all equally supported by ju stify in g reasons is of great im portance. T h ere could be only one exception to this position, and p art of the greatness of Steven­ son’s book is that he refers to it in some detail. He concedes that com­ plete ethical agreem ent could be obtain ed entirely through rational m ethods, if one grants an assum ption. T h e assum ption is, “ A ll disagree­ m ent in attitude is rooted in disagreem ent in belief.” 69 H e holds, how­ ever, that this assum ption can be neither granted nor denied with certainty, for there is no conclusive evidence either for it or again st it. A gainst it is the fact that some ethical disagreem ents seem to be rooted, as we have already noticed, in irresolvable clashes of interest, in the scarcity of what people want, or in tem peram ental differences. “ In these cases/’ he observes, “ the growth of science may, for all that we can now know, leave ethical disagreem ent perm anently unresolved.” 70 H e refuses, however, to com m it him self conclusively one way or the other in regard to this assum ption, but rather puts the question at issue quite clearly: “ If men come to share a great num ber of beliefs about x, will they have the same attitude tow ard x? O n a question of such m agnitude, it is difficult even to weigh the possibilities.” 71 T h e reader m ight well attem pt to think this through for him self, for if all disagreem ent in attitude is really based on disagreem ent in beliefs, then there is indeed great hope for achieving agreem ent in ethics. In his Second Pattern of Analysis, Stevenson focuses his attention u pon the descriptive m eaning of ethical terms. T h e general form of the second pattern of analysis is the follow ing: “ T h is is good” has the m eaning of “ T h is has tions X , Y, Z. . . .” except that “good ” has as emotive m eaning which perm its it to express proval, and tends to evoke the approval of the

qualities or rela­ well a laudatory the speaker’s ap ­ hearer.72

In the second pattern of analysis we see a difference in em phasis be­ tween Stevenson and Ayer. Ayer, in his zeal to show that norm ative ethics is m eaningless, separated “ norm ative ethical sym bols” from “ descriptive ethical sym bols,” whereas Stevenson recognizes emotive and descriptive m eaning as two distinguishable aspects of the same

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ethical symbol. B u t we m ust not be led into thinking that because ethical symbols have a descriptive m eaning that ethics is any m ore am enable to em pirical proof of validity. Stevenson makes this quite p lain by saying, “ Ethics becomes neither richer nor poorer by the second pattern, and neither m ore nor less ‘objective.’ ” 73 T h is is pre­ cisely the case, because there is no logical reason for accepting one descriptive m eaning of an ethical term instead of another. W hether we say that the “ true” m eaning of good is “ the g re a t^ t happiness of the greatest num ber,” the “ integration of interests,” “ universal love,” or “ survival,” we cannot escape the fact that “ to choose a definition is to plead a cause, so long as the word defined is strongly em otive.” 74 Furtherm ore, the definitions themselves may contain em otive terms, and em otive terms are subject to constant redefinition; they “ are prizes which each m an seeks to bestow on the qualities of his own choice.” 78 T h is process by which we change the descriptive m eaning of an em o­ tive word and thus bestow its em otive m eaning upon new descriptive aspects, Stevenson calls “ persuasive definition.” Stevenson m aintains that when one looks closely one discovers that ethical terms have m any rich and varied descriptive m eanings. T h u s, those philosophers who set up a p articular definition of good as its “ true” m eaning, and neglected other descriptive m eanings of this term, were actually p lead in g a case and not correctly describing the uses of the word “ good.” In order to understand better w hat Stevenson m eans by persuasive definitions, which change descriptive m eanings w ithout substantially changing emotive m eanings, let us suggest an exam ple. T h e descriptive m eaning of “ gentlem an” has changed from “ one who bears arm s” to “ one who is of a certain m oral or intellectual character,” but the emo­ tive approval has continued. B u t perhaps this point can be m ade still clearer if one sees that even definitions of philosophy are frequently persuasive definitions. Some people currently m ain tain that contem­ porary philosophers are not really philosophers. Behind this rem ark is an inherent persuasive definition of philosophy as concerning itself with ultim ate reality, with m etaphysics, and with the nature of the good life. Now m any contem porary philosophers do not hold that this is really philosophy, and hence when they suggest that philosophy is a critical study of ordinary lan guage as it is actually used, they too are suggesting a persuasive definition. Hence, some academ ic p h i­ losophers have at least suggested that Plato and K an t were not really

philosophers, not in the sense in which they use the word today. T h e poin t to bear in m ind here, and it is an im portan t one, is that much discussion about “ the good” and other ethical terms frequently in­ volves the use of persuasive definitions. T h e em otive approval of the good is still im plied, but the descriptive definition may vary all the way from pleasure to the will of God. Stevenson also refers to several other types of definitions, which may help us even more to understand the point which he is trying to make. A "persuasive quasi-definition,” conveyed by m eans of gestures, tones of voice, or rhetorical devices such as sim iles and m etaphors, m ay change emotive m eaning without substantially changing descrip­ tive m eaning. T h u s, for instance, to have been told that one was arguin g like a philosopher, m ight have had favorable em otive over­ tones in ancient Athens, b u t would more likely than not be con­ sidered an insult to many today. A nd yet the descriptive definition of philosophy as the search for wisdom m ight still be roughly the same. T h ere are also "m ixed definitions” in which the em otive and de­ scriptive m eaning are changed sim ultaneously. T h u s the word “ em ­ p irical” used to mean quack, and had an u npleasan t emotive signifi­ cance; while today the word stands for that which can be studied by the senses and hence is approved as the way of testing scientific theories. In science definitions are frequently non-persuasive, largely be­ cause they affect a relatively narrow range of attitudes, nam ely those which are concerned with interests shown in knowledge. B u t Stevenson finds that even in science the definitions offered may serve to determ ine interest or alter attention, so that they may shade off into persuasive definitions. Perhaps this can best be seen in the case of what Stevenson calls "re-em phatic” definitions which redirect attention forcibly through an element of p arad ox or surprise. "Infinity is not a num ber,” and "A ll em pirical statem ents are hypotheses,” are illustrations of such re-emphatic definitions. T h u s, there is no hard and . fast line which can be drawn between persuasive and non-persuasive definitions, although they seem to shade off from the more persuasive ones of ethics to the non-persuasive ones of science. W hatever emotive element there is in scientific definitions is incidental, while in ethics, the emo­ tive element is indispensable. W hen he turns to a practical exam ination of the causes of hum an conduct, Stevenson agrees with Ayer that the cause of ethical conduct 09

is social conditioning, bu t notes that this conditioning is not exer­ cised upon an unreceptive organism . W ithout training, a child’s im pulses m ight be free of m oral urgency; but if the trainin g could ap peal to no spontaneous in ­ clination of the child to do w hat he Avas trained to do, it w ould produce very weak m oral sentiments, or none at all.70 T h e reader may note a rather subtle b u t im portan t difference be­ tween Ayer and Stevenson in their regard of the em otive use of language. Stevenson does n ot agree with Ayer that em otive language need interfere with the descriptive use of lan guage by clouding our thinking, but instead regards emotive language as an inherent require­ m ent of our psychological make-up. For if we should attem pt to dis­ pense Avith the em otive use of language, “ our em otional lives,” he states, “ would derive so little exercise that life w ould be unbearable.” 77 S T E V E N S O N ’S A N A L Y S IS O F H IS R E L A T IO N S H IP W IT H A Y E R ’S V IEW S Stevenson is quite ready to agree that his work continues in the pattern of the em otive theory of Ayer, and that he finds m ore to de­ fend in the analyses of Ayer than he does to attack. However, he does indicate three contentions which he has with Ayer and others who hold sim ilar views. First, the pure em otivists such as Ayer, in their haste to separate norm ative ethics from science, have by brevity and a careless use of language given the im pression that they are discrediting ethics. In saying that he rejects metaphysics and norm ative ethics as proper studies for philosophy, Ayer has led some to believe that ethics is being swept aside. Stevenson wishes to make it clear that this is not the case at all, b u t rather that he is concerned with an analysis of what ethics actually is. Ayer has since corrected his in itial statem ents by saying that he is prim arily interested in clarity, and that he does not want it to ap pear that he is treating ethics with disrespect.78 Second, and more im portant, Stevenson reasons that the fact that ethical problem s may occasion disagreem ent in attitude does not m ake them pseudo-problem s, certainly not “ in any sense that hints at intellectual debauchery.” 79 T h ird , Ayer in saying that norm ative ethical judgm ents can be “ neither true nor false,” has ignored the descriptive m eanings of

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these judgm ents. “ It is more accurate and illu m in atin g,” declares Stevenson, “ to say that an ethical judgm en t can be true or false, but to poin t out that its descriptive truth may be insufficient to su pport its emotive repercussions.” so Stevenson is careful throughout his w ritings to distinguish the task of the analyst in m oral philosophy from that of the m oralist. T h is bifurcation is for him only provisional. However, u ntil an an al­ ysis of m oral terms has been sufficiently carried through, m oral evalua­ tions ought not to be m ade, at least not by the philosopher. As Stevenson states his case: U ltim ately, analysis and evaluation m ust be brought together; for the form er is of use only so far as it gives discipline to the latter. B u t they m ust not be forced together prem aturely. T h ey m ust carefully be distinguished before they can profitably be com bined.81 T h is statem ent is im portan t for the reader, lest he reach the m istaken conclusion that Stevenson is interested in analysis for its own sake. T O W A R D AN A N A L Y SIS O F T H E E M O T IV E T H E O R Y O F STEV EN SO N In an article in the Philosophical Review in 1948 Stevenson him ­ self m entions possible objections to his position. H e suggests that there are two possible ways by which more ration ality could be shown to be present in ethics than there appears to be on his analysis. T h ese two ways are: (1) to attem pt to prove that all disagreem ent in attitude is rooted in disagreem ent in belief; an d (2) to question the distinction which he has draw n between beliefs and attitudes.82 L e t us follow these suggestions and see where they lead. (1) Stevenson adm its that there can be no conclusive decision on the question as to whether or not there are disagreem ents in attitude which are not rooted in disagreem ents in belief. As we have already seen, however, he finds that there seem to be disagreem ents in attitude not based on disagreem ents in belief. L et us critically exam ine a p as­ sage in Ethics and L an gu age which we have already referred to: Some ethical disagreem ents seem rooted, rather, in the scarcity of what people want. Several nations may urge that their crowded and suffering population s give them the right to take a disputed territory. Others seem rooted in tem peram ental differences, as when an oversexed, em otionally independent adolescent argues with an undersexed, em otionally dependent one about the de­ sirability of free love.83 94

If one looks closely at these illustrations, it appears that it m ight be possible to reduce them to disagreem ents in belief. T h e first illu s­ tration does not seem to represent an irresolvable disagreem ent in attitude on an ultim ate question of value. A clash of interests in the hum an race, when there is a “ scarcity of what people w ant,” seems rath er to be the expression of a universal agreem ent in attitud e that to provide what people want is good. Such a clash of interests m ight be rooted in dislocations in the system of technology and distribution, not in disagreem ent in attitude. O f course, it m ight be based on a disagreem ent in attitude, if the people of a certain nation considered that only their own people should have what they want. T h e second exam ple is m ore difficult to deal with in this m anner, although one m ight venture to suggest that the tem peram ental differences which are cited are not ethically significant. One m ight argue that the belief concerning the rightness or wrongness of free love is based on other factors than the tem peram ental differences cited. Social conditioning and beliefs about psychological adjustm ent m ight play a large part here. T o this writer, however, it seems that Stevenson’s second illus­ tration would be far m ore difficult to reduce to one of disagreem ent over beliefs only. (2) Stevenson’s second suggestion that one m ight question the dis­ tinction between beliefs and attitudes has indeed been taken up by some of his critics, who usually m ain tain that it is an unrealistic b i­ furcation. T h e argum ent som etim es proceeds as follows. Stevenson, it is charged, has failed to realize that agreem ent in belief, or agree­ m ent on m atters of fact, is qu ite as dependent on agreem ent in attitude as is agreem ent in ethics. T h e attainm ent of agreem ent in belief pre­ supposes, at least, that the disputants agree to accept the principle of logical consistency. Now the acceptance of such a prin ciple has been called an “ epistem ic attitu d e,” 84 because it follows from no logical principles, and any reasons which may support it are, in Stevenson’s terms, related to it psychologically rather than logically, ju st as are the su p portin g reasons of ethical judgm ents. In other words, the claim m ade here by some of Stevenson’s critics is that the decision to be logical is not itself a logical decision, the decision to be ration al is not any more a ration al decision than the decision to be irrational. W arner Wick, one critic who pursues this line of argum ent, says: . . . T h e objectivity of m oral principles does not m ean that they may be proved any m ore (or any less) than the principle of con-

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tradiction m ay be proved. T h ere are no prior reasons for being reasonable and the question, “ Why should I be' m oral?” has no more (and no less) an answer than “ W hy should I be logical? 85 If these critics are right, it would then follow that there may be disputes in science as well as in ethics which are rooted in disagree­ m ent in attitude. T h e charge here is that Stevenson has recognized that m any ethical disputes cannot be settled merely by an ap peal to facts an d beliefs, b u t that he has failed to recognize that this same description m ight also be ap p lied to some scientific disagreem ents. M ight the disagreem ent between behaviorists and introspectionists in psychology be explained by the tem peram ental differences of the psychologists? Yet, one m ust note that Stevenson him self adm its this to be the case, as is shown by the follow ing passage: T h ere are certain evaluative issues that are integral to the very process of organizing knowledge. Interests in know ledge m ay be opposed, leadin g theorists to disagree about what is worth speak­ ing of, or what distinctions are im portant, or what schem es of classification are suitable. T h ese issues are not always factual ones in disguise, concerned with what sort of organization will serve a stipu lated purpose; for there m ay be disagreem ent about the purpose to be served. T h ey m ay be genuinely evaluative issues, requ irin g the use of methods like those we have exam ined in ethics.86 In spite of these adm issions, however, Stevenson m aintains the sharp cleavage between beliefs and attitudes, while even suggesting that it m ight be questioned. W ithout this bifurcation between beliefs and attitudes, certain of Stevenson’s other theses ap pear to be w ithout foundation. T h e first of these is the concept of independent em otive m eaning, or the power of an emotive word to affect attitudes w ithout affecting cogni­ tion. T h is is an im portan t poin t in Stevenson’s view, for we have seen him m ain tain in g that a w ord m ay change its em otive m eaning with­ out its descriptive m eaning being changed. One line of attack against Stevenson here has m ain tain ed that there seems to be no evidence, other than the assum ed bifurcation between beliefs and attitudes, that a word can actually produce a change in attitude w ithout producing a change in the cognitive field. H enry D. Aiken of H arvard U niversity argues that every linguistic sign, including an interjection, has des­ criptive m eaning, “ a reference which determ ines the appropriateness

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or inappropriateness of its use in a given context.” 87 Jo h n Dewey, the great Am erican pragm atist, agreed with Aiken so far, b u t added that what Stevenson calls “ n atural expressions,” 88 such as laughs, sighs, and groans, have a descriptive referent established “ in and because of a context of lin guistic signs.” 89 Both A iken and Dewey w ould hold that all emotive m eaning is dependent on descriptive m eaning. Aiken observes that:

'

. . . ethical terms in their characteristically ethical as well as in their other uses, possess em otive m eaning, not only in addition to, but because of their descriptive connotation. . . . Indeed, it would be strange if, m eaning what they do, they did not have such effects.90

Fin d in g all emotive m eaning to be dependent on descriptive m eaning, Dewey argued that, even though ethical terms have as their practical end and use to “ plead and advise” and to speak “ to the cognitiveaffective natures of m en,” it is erroneous to call this use a p art of their m eaning. We do not include the “ h eat” of a scientific dispute as p art of the subject-m atter of the proposition qua scientific, so we should not speak of em otive m eaning in ethics.91 T h is is a m atter of some im portance for the reader to think through, but he ought not to be misled by failin g to note that there is a vast difference between a scientific argum ent and an ethical argum ent, and that perhaps Dewey has therefore overstated the objection against Stevenson. R . M. H are, whose recent study T h e Lan guage of M orals we shall exam ine in detail later on, criticizes Stevenson for taking the attitude of approval as the basic characteristic of m oral utterances. It is true, H are suggests, that I do take an attitude of approval in utterin g moral principles, bu t that this does not at all explain what I think when I say that an act is right. H are wishes to distinguish between “ telling someone to do som ething, and getting him to do it” 92 as two logically distinct processes. T h e latter is of the nature of p ro pagan d a in which all m eans are allowed, b u t in the form er case the m oral com m and consists in telling someone to do som ething for which rational reasons can be offered. In short, H are w ould find ethical com m ands to be more like statem ents than Stevenson recognizes. It is not always clear, how­ ever, that this distinction which H are draws can be carried out con­ sistently. R . B. Braithw aite observes, “ Surely telling a person to do som ething is one way of trying to get him to do it: if the telling alone does not succeed, other ways will have to be tried— ration al ways like

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convincing him by giving reasons, irrational ways like 'persuading' him with a thumb-screw.” 93 Braithw aite, however, does agree with H are that feelings of approval are in themselves quite irrelevant to m oral judgm ents. W hile Stevenson has called our attention to atti­ tudes which accom pany m oral judgm ents, both H are and Braithw aite w ould insist that he has not adequately analyzed the m oral judgm ents themselves. O f more im portan t consequence for practical ethics is Stevenson’s definition of relevant su pportin g reasons in ethics as any effective reasons. W hile on the surface Stevenson’s view here seems to be cor­ rect in that we can ap peal to any reasons at all as su pport for our ethical judgm ent, Professor B ran d t has shown the problem posed by this position. If one is m oved to disapprove socialized m edicine by the thought that any expression of approval would oust him from his favor­ ite club, he has been moved, according to the em otive theory, by as ethically relevant a consideration as any other he m ight have thought of. Now I do not think this describes ordinary ethical thinking; we think some persuasive beliefs are distinctly irrelevant. Is there any sense of “ relevance” definable in the emo­ tive theory which w ould enable us to m ake the distinctions we all want to m ake?04 It seems clear that Stevenson was forced to take the stand he did be­ cause of the im passable gu lf which he set up between beliefs and attitudes. W ithout this separation, it is of course erroneous to set up one criterion of relevancy for m atters of fact, and another criterion for ethics. B ran d t suggests that two of the criteria for relevant su pport­ ing reasons in ethics are m oral consistency and the relative perm an­ ency of the ethical attitude (i.e. m oral attitudes are regarded by B ran d t as convictions, not as im pulses).95 O f course, in addition to these two criteria, the reasons given m ust be true propositions about facts and include all the related facts. U ndoubtedly, B ran d t’s analysis of the place of su pportin g reasons in ethical thinking seems to re­ semble more what we usually m ean in such cases than does Stevenson’s account. Stevenson did him self state, however, that the m oral philosopher “ may hope eventually, perhaps, for some all-em bracing aim ; bu t he w ill not hope to establish it before all else, or to state it in a sim ple form ula.” 96 T h e poin t to be rem em bered here is that if the m oral

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philosopher does establish a focal aim in ethics, then all ethical oughts stand in relation to it, and consequently the relation between an ethi­ cal judgm en t and its supportin g reasons would, be no less logical and no more psychological than the relation between a scientific judgm ent and its supportin g reasons. T h is is not to deny the great difference between m oral and scientific judgm ents, b u t sim ply to show that if an all-em bracing m oral aim is established, then other judgm ents re­ lated to it w ould have some logical criteria for relevance. O n the positive side of the ledger, m uch can be said for Stevenson’s analysis of ethical judgm ents. Q uite clearly alm ost no book on m oral philosophy w ritten since the p ublication of Ethics and L a n g u ag e has been uninfluenced by this work. Perhaps his greatest contribution wasto show that norm ative ethical judgm ents involve a descriptive as well as an em otive aspect, although it is the latter which is m ost distinctive about them. As we shall see later on in this book, m any contem porary philosophers have agreed with Stevenson that m oral words do have a descriptive reference, although they have not agreed with him that the characteristic m ost noteworthy about them was their em otive as­ pect. U nder his challenge, they have been led to look at the way people actually do use m oral language, an d then they have tried to state this usage in terms m ore precise than “ em otive.” Stevenson’s description of persuasive definition has becom e alm ost a contem porary classic in philosophy, for it has helped in m any cases to brin g to notice that a cause was being pleaded by certain apparently harm less definitions. A nd although we have been led to question the bifurcation between beliefs and attitudes, it does seem that some ethical disputes are rooted m ore in disagreem ent of attitude than in disagreem ent in belief. Clearly Stevenson’s presentation of the em otive theory seems more satisfactory than that of Ayer, for Stevenson does not seem to over­ state the case for the em otive theory. U ndoubtedly ethical judgm ents do have an em otive aspect to them. T h e question with which other philosophers take issue is how significant is the em otive com ponent of ethics.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 1 C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The M eaning of Meaning. London: R out­ ledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 10th edition, 1949, p. 149. 2 Ogden and Richards, The M eaning of M eaning, p. 149. s Ogden and Richards, The M eaning of Meaning, p. 125. 4 Ogden and Richards, The M eaning of M eaning, p. 150. o R. B. Braithwaite, “ Verbal Am biguity and Philosophical Analysis,” Papers of The Aristotelian Society, 1928. e W. H. F. Barnes, “ A Suggestion about Value” in Analysis, Vol. I, No. 3, March 1934, p. 45. 7 W. H. F. Barnes, “ A Suggestion about Value” in Analysis, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 46. s Ludwig W ittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophiciis. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1922. 9 Moritz Schlick, Problems of Ethics. T r., D. Rynin. N.Y.: Prentice-Hall, 1939. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic. N. Y.: Dover Publications, Inc., 2nd edition, 1935. 11 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 36. 12 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p. 36. is Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p. 79. 1-4 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 43. is Cf. W ittgenstein’s famous dictum at the end of the Tractatus: “ Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” 10 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 21. 17 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 103. is Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 107. is Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 105. 2° Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 105. 2 1 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 104. 22 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 105. 23 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 106. 2-4 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 106. 25 Ayer, “ On the Analysis of Moral Judgem ents,” Horizon, 20 (1949), pp. 178­ 179. 26 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 109. 27 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 109. 28 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 109. 2 9 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 110. so Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 110. si Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 111. 32 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, pp. 112-113. 33 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 113. 34 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd-edition, p. 113. 35 Moritz Schlick, Positivismus und Realism us, pp. 7-8. 36 A. T- Ayer, The Revolution in philosophy. London: M acmillan and Company, Ltd., 1956, p. 75. 37 John Wisdom, “ Metaphysics and Verification” (Mind, Vol. XLV1I), reprinted in John Wisdom, Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953, p. 51. 38 Wisdom in Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis, p. 51. 39 Wisdom in Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis, p. 54. 40 Wisdom in Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis, p. 55. 41 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Introduction to 2nd-edition, p. 26. 42 Quoted in Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 265. 43 C. E. M. Jo ad , A Critique of Logical Positivism, p. Il l , 44 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Introduction to 2nd-edition, p. 22. 45 Joad, A Critique of Logical Positivism, p. 23.

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46 A. C. Ewing, "Subjectivism and Naturalism in Ethics,” in Sellars and Hospers, Readings in Ethical Theory, p. 118. 47 Feigl, “ Validation and Vindication,” in Sellars and Hospers, Readings in Ethical Theory p. 679. 48 Charles L . Stevenson, Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 42. 40 Stevenson, “Emotive M eaning” in Sellars and Hospers, Readings in Ethical Theory, p. 136. so Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 70. si Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 33. 82 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 11. 53 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 79. 84 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 72. ss Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 73. 56 Stevenson, “ Brandt’s Questions about Emotive Ethics,” Philosophical Review. 59 (1950), p. 530. ’ 57 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 4. ss Compare Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p. 111. so Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 21. so Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 22 (Italics supplied), si A. J. Ayer, “ On the Analysis of Moral Judgem ents,” Horizon, 20 (1949), p. 176 (Italics supplied). 62 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 114. 63 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, pp. 115-116. 64 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 119. 65 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 127. 66 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, pp. 136-137. 67 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 31. 68 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, pp. 122-123. 69 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 136 (Italics not in original text). "0 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 137. 71 Stevenson, “ Emotive Conception of Ethics and Its Cognitive Im plications,” Philosophical Review, Vol. 59, (1950), pp. 303-304. 72 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 207. 73 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 209. 74 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 210. 75 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 213. 76 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 91. 77 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 163. 78 Ayer, "O n the Analysis of Moral Judgem ents,” Horizon, Vol. 20 (1949), p. 173. Reprinted in Ayer, Philosophical Essays. London: M acmillan Ltd., 1954. 79 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 267. so Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 267. 81 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, pp. 222-223. 82 Stevenson, “ Meaning: Descriptive and Emotive,” Philosophical Review, vol. 57 (1948), p. 142. ff. 83 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, pp. 136-137. 84 Vincent Tom as, "Ethical Disagreements and T h e Emotive Theory of Values,” Mind, vol. 60 (1951) p. 209, 214. 85 W arner Wick, “ Moral Problems, Moral Philosophy, and Metaethics: Some Further Dogmas of Em piricism ,” Philosophical Review, vol. 62 (1953), p. 20. 86 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 286. 87 Henry D. Aiken, "Ethics and Lan guage” (Book Review), Jo u rn al of Philos­ ophy, vol. 42 (1945), p. 463. 88 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 36. 89 John Dewey, "Ethical Subject-M atter and Language,” Jo urn al of philosophy, vol. 42 (1945), p. 706.

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s>o Aiken, “ Ethics and Language” (Book Review), Jo urn al of Philosophy, vol. 42 (1945), pp. 460-461. 91 Dewey, “ Ethical Subject-M atter and Language,” Jo urn al of Philosophy, vol. 42 (1945), p. 703. 92 R . M. Hare, The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 13. 93 R . B. Braithwaite, “ Critical Notice (Book Review) of H are’s The Language of M orals," M ind, April 1954, p. 251. 94 Richard B. Brandt, “T h e Emotive Theory of Ethics,” Philosophical Review, vol. 59 (1950), p. 313. 95 Brandt, “ T h e Emotive Theory of Ethics,” Philosophical Review, vol. 59 (1950), pp. 314-317. as Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 330.

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CH A PTER

TH R EE

TH E L A N G U A G E A N D LO G IC OF M O RA LS T h e m ost recent trend in m oral philosophy is to study the actual use of ethical words in our m oral discourse. In this respect m ost present treatm ents of ethics by philosophers are qu ite different from those which we have so far studied, except for Stevenson. W hile we shall find im portan t differences ap pearin g in the works of the m en we shall study in this section, it is true that none of them are claim ing to have found, or are even seeking, one m oral word such as “ good,” “ righ t,” or “ ough t” that is sim ple, indefinable an d unanalyzable. In fact, it is claim ed by these thinkers that the very search for one basic an d in­ definable ethical concept by such thinkers as M oore, Ross an d Ew ing was m isleading in that it failed to note the great variety of ways in which “ good,” “ righ t,” an d “ ough t” are actually used by the ordinary m an in his daily talk. B u t this group of thinkers does not accept the em otive theory either, for, although they generally adm it that som e­ times ethical words may be used in a prim arily em otive sense, they find that this theory does little justice to those more com m on uses of ethical words which are m ore stan dard and descriptive. T o p u t the m atter more sim ply, the writers whom we are now to exam ine suggest in one way or another that w hat has m isled us in our ethical inves­ tigations is our acceptance of a theory on the basis of a few uses of ethical language which we take to be standard uses. G ranted our theory, such as a non-naturalistic or emotive one, we then find what we are looking for, an d unintentionally perhaps, ignore or explain away the m oral lan guage which the theory does not seem to fit. T h e new approach is then to look at the ways in which we use m oral words, to exam ine the logic of ethical argum ents w ithout preconceived no­ tions of what we shall accept as the only logic, and then, an d only then, to attem pt to classify or characterize various uses of ethical words. T h is approach to the study of cthics is p art of the prevalent p h ilo ­ sophical orientation which, rather than dism issing m etaphysics and norm ative ethics as m eaningless, inquires into the use of m etaphysical

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and m oral expressions in our language. Because of the prim ary interest o f these writers in ethical talk, they are often said to be doin g m eta­ ethics (talk about e th ic s). T h a t is, they are not actually m aking ethical judgm ents nor even trying to suggest what things are actually good, bu t are rather interested in how we use ethical words. Some critics have m aintained that this is ju st an interesting gam e, b u t that it has little or no relevance for ethical philosophy as traditionally conceived. T o this charge it may be replied that an actual study o f how we use words such as “ good,” “ righ t,” and “ ought” is certainly a prelim inary investigation needed to remove confusions in our discussions, and to prevent our being taken in by highly persuasive accounts of the m oral life. R ath er than ad op tin g a pre-conceived m odel of m ean in g such that ethical words m ust either refer to some object or be em otive, the call here is to see how ethical words are used in order to discover what m eaning the ordinary m an seems to give them in his daily talk. W hen this is done the exclusive alternatives of non-naturalism or em otivism may be found to have been im posed by our own artificial m odels of m eaning, rather than by an em pirical investigation of ethical usage. T h is attention to the actual uses of language was inspired by the studies of W ittgenstein, whose philosophical concerns from abou t 1929 on took a quite different turn from those he presented in the Tractatus. We have already seen that L ogical Positivism bu ilt upon the fou n da­ tions of the Tractatus, in which m eaning was defined so as to include only the statem ents of logic and science. T h e later W ittgenstein came to see that he was bewitched by a m odel of language which allowed m eaning to only a sm all segm ent of m an ’s talk. H is new position wa9 expounded to his students and friends at C am bridge U niversity, but copies of his lecture notes1 were circulated to others also, so that his influence was widely felt in philosoph ical circles. Shortly after his death in 1951, his last book Philosophical Investigations was published, and readers had direct access to his later philosophical orien tation .2) H is new view of m eaning is dem onstrated with the aid of num erous illustrations and sam ples of how we use language. As he puts it: “ For a large class of cases— though not for all— in which we em ploy the word ‘m eaning’ it can be defined thus: the m eaning of a word is its. use in the lan gu age.” 3 For the later W ittgenstein it was a m istake to rule out of court as m eaningless statem ents which were not clearly logical or scientific.

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One of W ittgenstein’s com parisons may be h elpful to the reader at this point. H e insists that one cannot produce som ething which is com mon to all uses of language and call that the hall-m ark of lan ­ guage. Such attem pts are like trying to state what all gam es have in common. Consider the many different kinds of games there are: cardgames, board-games such as chess and checkers, ball-games, O lym pic games, etc. T h e reader at this poin t would do well to. try listing the different games he can think of, and then m ake an attem pt to say what they all have in common. “ D o n ’t say: ‘T h ere must be som ething common, or they w ould not be called “ gam es” ’— bu t look and see' whether there is anything that is com mon to all.” You m ight say that you find all gam es have com petition in common. D id you in that case consider solitaire, or throw ing a ball in the air and catching it yourself? T o say that you are com peting against the cards, or against the ball, would be to stretch ordinary usage rather far indeed, would it not? Do they all involve skill? B u t what skill does one need to play solitaire? And if you call that skill, clearly it is quite different from the skill needed for football, which is in turn different from the skill needed for chess. In such a com parison of games W ittgenstein finds what he calls “ fam ily resem blances”— that is “ sim ilarities, relation ­ ships, and a whole series of them at that.” As we go through the games we have listed, we find sim ilarities appearin g and d isappearin g so that no one common elem ent is the hall-m ark of a game. B u t as W ittgen­ stein suggests, gam es form a fam ily in a way much like “ the various resem blances between m embers of a fam ily; build, features, colour of eyes, gait, tem peram ent, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross.” 4 Now those who desire neat definitions, and ask that boundaries should be drawn which would dem arcate games from non-games, will be disappoin ted here. W ittgenstein suggests that if you wish you can draw such a boundary, but do not forget that you drew the boundary and did not find it in what ordinary people refer to as games. B u t one may protest that unless we have a convenient definition we shall be unable to tell someone what a game is. T o this W ittgenstein suggests “ I im agine that we should describe games to him, an d we m ight add: ‘T h is and sim ilar things are called “ gam es.” ’ And do we know any more about it ourselves?” 5 T h e im portance for the study of ethics of this new view of language should now become apparent. For may it not be the case that we have in this area, as well as in m ost philosophical perplexities, draw n a

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boundary ourselves in Lnat we have defined “ good ” in a certain way and then been puzzled because our definition did not seem adequate to everyone? Instead of fallin g into the old traps, therefore, it is sug­ gested that we try a new approach. Instead of beginning with a defini­ tion, let us look and see how m oral words are used, an d then we shall probably discover as W ittgenstein suggests, “ that the word m ust have a fam ily of m eanings.” 0 A m ong other things, we m ust look at the uses of “ good” and sim ilar words in non-moral contexts as well as in m oral contexts.

I.

Toulmin: the Search for Good Reasons in Ethics

Stephen T o u lm in has w ritten a full-length book, T h e Place of Reason in Ethics/ in which he m aintains that the basic task of ethical philosophy should be to seek for good reasons to su pport ethical judgm ents. A lthough T o u lm in ’s book was com pleted in 1948, the first edition was not publish ed until 1950. It is a well w ritten pioneer work attem pting to apply some of the new insights W ittgenstein p re­ sented in his later period. In fact, it is probably wise to begin with this study rather than others which appeared at about the sam e time, for T o u lm in had been a form er student of W ittgenstein him self. At the time of w riting this book T o u lm in was a m em ber of the M oral Sciences Faculty at C am bridge University, and he indicates in his preface his general indebtedness to the C am bridge philosophers such as W ittgenstein, Jo h n W isdom , an d R . B. B raith w aite.8 T h e m ain prem ise of T o u lm in ’s discussion is that the wrong ques­ tion concerning ethics has been asked by m ost m oral philosophers in their great concern to get a definition of a basic ethical term, such as goodness. T h ese philosophers asked “ W hat does ‘good’ m ean?” and hence assum ed that all other issues in m oral philosophy hinged upon answering this p rio r question. T o u lm in proposes that the central question in ethics is rather “ W hat is a good reason for a particular ethical conclusion?” 1' T h e trouble with the tradition al approaches is that they have failed to consider wliat would be good reasons in ethics because they were preoccupied with whether or not goodness is objec­ tive, subjective, or only em otive. T h u s one group o f philosophers concentrated upon the respects in which ethical statem ents arc like

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statem ents about objective properties, such as statem ents about yel­ low, while another group concentrated upon the respects in which ethical statem ents are like statem ents about feelings and attitudes, such as approvin g and disapproving. A recent grou p of philosophers, those whom we have called em otivists in our previous discussions (T o u lm in somewhat m isleadingly calls this “ the Im perative A p proach ” 10), noticed the rhetorical force of m oral utterances and have insisted that so-called ethical statem ents were not really statem ents at all, but m erely expressions of em otions. Now T o u lm in proposes to look at the function of m oral statem ents in our ordinary use, rather than to de­ fend a p articular theory abou t them. W hen we look and see, T o u lm in thinks, we shall find that ethical disagreem ent is about “ whether or not there is a good reason for reaching one ethical conclusion rather than another.” 11 T o u lm in insists that it is true to say that objectivists, subjectivists and em otivists have called attention to certain facts about ethics, bu t that in constructing theories to account for ethical judgm en ts they er­ red by ignoring other im portan t facts. T h en , sticking to their theories, these philosophers constructed ad hoc m odifications to refine their theories instead of aban don in g them. T h u s, the objectivist says that when he speaks of goodness as an objective property, he does not m ean a property which we can see, such as yellow, b u t rather a non-natural property. T h e subjectivist says that when he speaks of ethics as con­ cerned with my feelings, he does not m ean to say that this is un­ im portant, for he is really discussing attitudes of the utm ost sign i­ ficance. T h e em otivists are also likely to protest that by callin g ethical words emotive or rhetorical they do not m ean they are unim portant, an d further that the social sciences m ay help us to achieve a more balanced “ ‘in terplay’ of our feelings.” 12 T o u lm in suggests that these ad hoc m odifications are “ like trying to overcome a m istake in n atural history by saying, ‘O f course a ram is no ordinary b u ll/ instead of ad­ m ittin g that it is not a b u ll at all and starting afresh.” 13 A nd yet, as T o u lm in adm its, these traditional theories were not wholly wrong, but rather they were one-sided. W hat they were actually doing was giving us disguised comparisons rather than descriptions of m oral judgm ents. T h ese theories have called attention to som ething which is present in m oral judgm ents, b u t because some have thought that one m ust choose between these rival theories they have become m ore like party slogans than like com parisons. If we view these tradition al ethical theories then as disguised com parisons, we find that they are not incom patible

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with one another. Each is calling attention on this in terpretation to some respects in which ethical statem ents are like objective, subjective or em otive utterances. T h e danger of our bein g m isled arises when we no longer see that they are com parisons and attem pt to take each theory as claim ing literal truth. If on the other hand, we view these traditional ethical theories as disguised com parisons, we can then learn from each of them in turn about “ the incom patibility of opposed ethical judgm ents, their close relation to our feelings, and their rhetorical, im perative force.” 14 T o u lm in him self proposes an interest­ ing analogy which may help the reader to grasp the force of what he m eans by callin g ethical theories disguised com parisons: If you go to Switzerland, you may on arrival be im pressed by those features of the country which it shares with the region through which you have been traveling. ‘WhyI’ you may ex­ claim, ‘I t’s the B avarian Alps all over a g a in !’ or, ‘Properly speaking, I suppose it’s an extension of the D olom ites,’ or, ‘Ju st a grander and more rugged H au te Savoie!’— and, whichever you say, there will be some justice in your rem ark. T h e only danger is this: that you may be led to pay insufficient attention to the country itself, to its in dividual character and m erits; and to im agine that you who adm ire one aspect are in real disagreem ent with those who are struck by other features of the country.15 Now we are quite likely to recognize each of the above statem ents about Switzerland as m isleadin g com parisons, bu t we are more easily m isled by the disguised com parisons found in ethical theories. Instead of asking at once, “ Is goodness objective?” , we could m ore easily bring out the nature of the com parisons involved by recognizing in this question a shortened version of “ In what respects is goodness like and unlike a property of an object?” T o u lm in proposes then that it is time to start afresh in the study of ethics. H e calls us to cast aside the disguised com parisons which have misled us, and instead he asks us to exam ine directly the logic at work when we give good reasons for ju stify in g a p articu lar m oral action. B u t here too we find that there are dangers which we must avoid. An in itial difficulty will be encountered if we insist that all reasoning is confined to that used in m athem atics and science. T h is was the error of Ayer in L an g u ag e , T ruth and L ogic, as well as of W ittgenstein in the Tractatus. R ath er than having a preconceived doctrine of what we shall count as reasoning, T o u lm in asks us to ex­ am ine our ordinary use of words in the m an ifold contexts of hum an

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activity. W hen we do this we find that in contexts very various indeed we specify some reasons as good (or valid) and others as bad (or in ­ valid). N o teacher of m athem atics would accept as a good reason for my giving a certain answer to a problem my saying that I copied it from the answer book. H e w ould want to see what steps I used in order to get the answer. Likew ise, we should not accept as a good reason from a sergeant who ordered the men under his com m and to m arch through a swam p on a dark rainy night his statem ent that he ju st liked to see his men do this sort of thing. B u t we w ould be in ­ clined at least to consider as a good reason his statem ent that his men were being trained for tropical w arfare, and that this was therefore a necessary training device. A nd to b rin g the m atter even closer to our interest in ethics, we should not consider a good reason for opposing capital punishm ent to be: “ It is fashionable to hold such a view to­ day.” B u t we w ould consider it a good reason if we were told that capital punishm ent does not actually serve as a deterrent to crime. O f course, we m ight require other reasons as well, bu t certainly some o f them we w ould consider worthy of acceptance and others not. T h u s, instead of in sisting on the logical m odel of reasons in science and m athem atics, “ we m ust expect that every m ode of reasoning, every type of sentence, and (if one is particular) every single sen­ tence will have its own logical criteria, to be discovered by exam ining its individual, peculiar uses.” 16 W hat then is the use we m ake of m oral judgm en ts in o u r ordinary talk? In one respect at least they resem ble the statem ents of science in that m oral judgm ents aim at universality and im partiality. T h ey are not merely reports of personal experience, any m ore than scientific laws are merely reports of the sensations of the scientist. B u t we m ust also note the differences. W hen scientific laws are presented to m e I learn to predict and expect things to happen in a certain way in the future. I m ight have been surprised when I first'saw a straight stick ap p ear to be bent when I p u t it into a stream . B u t after I learned cer­ tain laws of optics, I expected this p h en om en on 'to h appen in the future. M oral ju dgm en ts are not concerned with what I shall expect in the future in this way, bu t rath er with influencing me to act in a certain way. T h e function of m oral judgm ents is therefore defined by T o u lm in as bein g “ to correlate o u r feelings an d behaviour in such a way as to m ake the fulfillm ent of everyone’s aims an d desires as far as possible com patible.” 17 A very im portant observation concerning

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the necessity for m oral judgm ents in any com m unity is m ade by T o u lm in in his suggestion that no com m unity can do w ithout some rules of behavior. Even if you should change your words, agreeing to drop all those which are now used so com monly as “ good,” “ b ad ,” “ righ t,” and “w rong,” and form a new com m unity, some of your words would in time gain the force of ethical ones. T h u s, “ ‘Y ou’ll burn yourself if you play with fire,’ uttered as the child was pu lled away from it, w ould acquire the m eaning of our own, ‘You m ustn’ t play with the fire, or you’ll harm yourself.’ ” 18 T o u lm in thus suggests that m oral judgm ents m ust be studied in the light of their function in the context of com m unal living, and then we shall find that in actual practice we do consider some reasons as good reasons while we con­ sider others as bad reasons for ju stifyin g p articular m oral actions. W hen T o u lm in turns to an exam ination of the types of reasons which are good reasons in ethical discussions, he finds elements of truth in both the positions of deontologists (such as Ross) and teleologists (such as M oore). H e finds that in general there are two m ain types of reasoning within m oral contexts: (1) that concerned with the rightness of a p articular act, an d (2) that concerned with the justice of an existing social practice. As an exam ple 'of the first type he considers how one w ould justify the keeping of a prom ise, such as a prom ise m ade to Jon es to return to him a book which I had previously borrow ed from him. In defending my action in this case I could invoke m ore an d m ore general statem ents of the accepted prac­ tices of my society. Beyond that I could not go. T h e good reasons which T o u lm in thinks I could give in such a case are, m oving from the m ost specific to the m ost general: 51 . . . “ Because I prom ised to let him have it back before m id­ day.” 52 . . . “ Because I prom ised to let him have it back.” 53 . . . “ Because I ought to do whatever I prom ise him to d o.” 54 . . . “ Because I ought to do whatever I prom ise anyone to do.” 55 . . . “ Because anyone ought to do whatever he prom ises any­ one else that he w ill do,” or “ Because it was a prom ­ ise.” 19 In this type of m oral discussion, T o u lm in finds that good reasons w ould be of the kind deontologists have suggested. However, if there is a conflict of duties, T o u lm in suggests that

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appeal to an accepted m oral prin ciple is rarely effective, for there may be several principles in apparen t conflict concerning this p a r­ ticular case. T h en , he suggests we should have to estim ate the probable consequences of our acting one way rather than another. A nd this is an appeal in effect to argum ents of the sort teleologists have offered. T h u s, if I had prom ised to return the book to Jones, bu t in the m ean­ tim e circum stances arise which im pose another duty upon me, such as my aiding an in jured person at the scene of an accident, I should decide which act will likely brin g about the best consequences, and then choose accordingly. B u t suppose I am giving my answer to a sceptic, or a philosopher, an d he still insists on asking why my act was right, even though I have already given an answer in terms of an accepted social practice, or in terms of the probable consequences. W hat m ore can I do? T o u lm in states that within my m oral code, the accepted one of my com munity, there is no moi~e that I can do. I have given good reasons for calling my act right, and m ore can’t be done. B u t as T o u lm in suggests there is a parallel here with scientific theories and disputes abou t them as well; indeed this is a com parison which suggests that some people seem to dem and m ore in the way of ju stify in g m oral acts than they do of scientific phenom ena. W ithin the fram ew ork of a particular scientific theory, one can ask of m ost things, ‘Is this really straight?’, b u t the criterion of straightness cannot be questioned: within the fram ew ork of a p articular m oral code, one can ask of m ost in dividual actions, ‘Is this really righ t?’, but the standards of rightness cannot be questioned.20 O ne m ight protest at this poin t that people do at times question scientific theories and m oral codes. O f course, b u t T o u lm in insists that this is a different kind of questioning. In the case of science, it involves going outside the theory and questioning it as a whole; this is not the same as asking if this is a case of straightness according to the accepted scientific criteria. And the same is true in m oral questions, for if I ask if prom ise-keeping is really right I am question in g the worth of the practice, and not asking whether or not this p articu lar act was a case of promise-keeping. T h is dispute then becomes one of the second type which T o u lm in has suggested: what is at issue is the justice of an existin g social practice or principle. Now if promisekeeping as a practice is called into question, I then can offer a justi-

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fication in terms of not inflicting avoidable suffering. B u t this answer T o u lm in finds ap prop riate “ only when discussing whether a social practice should be retained or changed.” 21 H e does not find this answer ap prop riate to questions concerning the rightness of a p articu lar act within the m oral code of a com munity. B u t is there clearly not a lim it to which reason can be used in m oral questions? Yes, there is, and T o u lm in tries to show certain types of lim iting questions which arise and which cannot be settled by offer­ ing good reasons. W hen, as often happens in academ ic discussions, someone asks if the Islam ic practice of allow ing a m an to have many wives is better than the practice of our society to allow a m an to have bu t one wife at a time, there is only one clear way to avoid becom ing m uddled. T o u lm in suggests that little can be accom plished by just discussing these two practices in isolation from their societies. T h e only satisfactory way of com parison here involves considering the m erits of the Islam ic system as a whole and our system as a whole. One can thus ask, “ W hich way of life is better?,” and the answer to this is a personal decision. If on the basis of such an exam in ation of the two ways of life, I should decide that the M oham m edan way is really the better, then logically I ought to move to a M oham m edan society. B u t there are also lim itin g situations which arise in actual m oral conflicts w ithin our society. Consider a case in which either of two possible courses of action are equally acceptable to the prevailing m oral code, and equally favorable in their likely consequences to others. Suppose I wish to su p po rt the cause of higher education by establishing a scholarship at my college from my own fun ds for either a N egro from the southern U n ited States or a Jap an ese. A pparently from what I can gather there are many deserving N egro and Jap a n ese students who could benefit from such a grant. "What am I to do? Such a grant w ould certainly fit into the fram ework of acts sanctioned by my society’s m oral code, and the consequences for either student and his effect upon others are quite likely to be very sim ilar. I do not have enough money to endow two such scholarships, and if I divided my money into two half-grants, a student w ithout econom ic m eans would n ot be able to benefit from my act. In such a case T o u lm in suggests I m ust make a personal choice, an d while relevant reasons can be given me, they will not be m oral reasons but w ill rather be of the form “ If I were you. . . . ” An im portan t point to note here is that m any of our

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decisions in life are like this one in that they call for personal prefer­ ence rather than for a clear indication of what is or is not m orally right. A nd to realize this is to find our way abou t in an area where we are too easily puzzled. T h ere is still one m ore lim itin g question that is sometimes asked of a m oral philosopher, and this is of the form, “ Why ought I to do what is right?” Now T o u lm in states that in a literal sense this question is illegitim ate. T u rn the question around an d ask, “ W hy is it right for me to do what I ough t?” Since the ethical notions of “ right” and “ ought” arise in the sam e contexts, this question sounds like a contra­ diction if it is taken as suggesting that “ we ‘ough t’ to do anything bu t what is ‘right.’ ” 22 In fact, if one takes such a question literally, there seems to be nothing else to do bu t to ask the questioner, “ W hat else ought I to do?” T h e whole context of intelligible m oral discussion presupposes that the people engaging in it are reasonable creatures using language in a consistent way, and it should not be any more d am agin g to m orals to adm it this than it is to science to 'a d m it that psychopaths do not accept scientific evidence. O f course, one may mean by liis'qu estion som ething of the form, "W h at is there in my psycho­ logical m akeup to m ake me want to do the righ t?” T o recognize this as what the questioner w ants to know, however, is to show that it is a question for the psychologist and not for the m oral philosopher. B u t one may protest that there is still another sense in which we m ay be expected to take the question, “Why ought I to do what is righ t?” T o u lm in suggests that the questioner may not w ant us to take his question literally at all. H e may want us to take his question in a sp iritu al or religious icontext, and in that context T o u lm in suggests the question truly comes alive. T h e questioner may be seeking a ju sti­ fication of ethical action in gen eral,'ou tside the specific ethical codes themselves. T o such a question religion may answer that one ought to do the right because it is the will of G od. Now if the questioner continues by asking “ Why ought I to do the will of G od?,” religion can reply “ Because it is in the nature of a created bein g to do the w ill of its C reator,” an d so on. As T o u lm in suggests in sum m arizing, “ Ethics provides the reasons for choosing the ‘righ t’ course: religion helps us to p u t our hearts into it.” 23 T h e reader o u g h t1not to get the im pression that T o u lm in thinks these lim itin g questions unim portant, for he insists that they ought not to be put off or ruled out of court. T h ey are am ong the m ost im portan t questions we ask in our lives;

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only, ju st as we do not expect'science to answer them, so also we ought not to expect m oral philosophy to answer them. T o u lm in concludes his study by stating that he is not claim ing that the good reasons offered for a practice m ean the same as “ the practice is righ t,” bu t rather that they provide a logical m eans of p assin g from ethically neutral facts to su p portin g ethical judgm ents: O f course, ‘T h is practice w ould involve the least conflict of in­ terests attainable under the circum stances’ does not mean the same as ‘T h is w ould be the right practice’; nor does ‘T h is way of life w ould be m ore harm oniously satisfying’ mean the sam e as ‘T h is w ould be better’. B u t in each case, the first statem ent is a good reason for the second: the ‘ethically n eu tral’ fact is a good reason for the ‘gerundive’ m oral judgem ent. If the adoption of the practice would genuinely reduce conflicts of interest, it is a practice worthy of adoption, and if the way of life w ould gen­ uinely lead to deeper and more consistent happiness, it is one luorthy of pursuit. A nd this seems so n atu ral and intelligible, when one bears in m ind the function of ethical judgem ents, that, if anyone asks me why they are ‘good reasons’, I can only reply by asking in return, ‘W hat better kinds of reason could you w ant?’24 T O W A R D A N E V A L U A T IO N O F T O U L M I N ’S P O S IT IO N T h ere is no doubt bu t that this book by T o u lm in is not only very readable bu t also quite helpful in disen tanglin g how we do actually proceed in m aking m oral judgm ents and distinguish ing this process from the m odels proposed by those ethical philosophers who called attention to only one aspect of these judgm ents bu t then claim ed that this was the only significant aspect involved. B ut is M r. T ou lm in m ak in g;an y m oral judgm ents him self? H e seems to claim that he is not, and that he is sim ply in q u irin g into the logic of m oral judgm ents as they are actually m ade in our society. However, it seems that his treatm ent of the way in which we arrive at good reasons in ethical disputes subjects him to a dilem m a. (1) Either he is not m aking m oral judgm ents, as he seems to claim, in which case he is deriving norm ative judgm ents from purely factual prem ises; or (2) in his good reasons which he gives for m oral judgm ents, such as those quoted from page 224 of his book, he does not recognize that these reasons are themselves evaluative, and not factual or “ ethically n eu tral” state­ ments. L et us exam ine this criticism in some detail. T o u lm in states several times that he is seeking to show how in

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ethics “ we pass from the factual reasons (R) to an ethical conclusion (E).” 25 T h e reader may suspect that this sounds like com m itting the n aturalistic fallacy: it seems to be an attem pt to derive an ethical “ ought” from a factual state of affairs. Of course, naturalists in ethics have often m ain tain ed that ethical oughts can be derived in this way, and if it can be done successfully w ithout sm uggling ethical statem ents into suppressed prem ises, then it is not correct to call it a fallacy. L e t us exam ine quite carefully some of T o u lm in ’s good reasons in order to discover whether or not they actually are as ethically neutral as he thinks they are. R . M. H are suggests that the follow ing debate m ight well ensue concerning T o u lm in ’s good reason for a practice as one worthy of adoption if it w ould genuinely reduce conflicts of interest: Suppose that someone were d isputin g this, by saying, ‘W ithout conflict, the full developm ent of m anhood is im possible; there­ fore it is a bad reason for callin g a practice right to say that it would involve the least conflict of interests’. We m ight reply, as M r. T o u lm in does here, ‘T h is seems so n atu ral and intelligible. . . . W hat better kinds of reason could you w ant?’. A nd if we said this, and the other m an replied, ‘I d on ’t find it n atu ral or intelligible at all; it seems to me that the developm ent of m an ­ hood is a cause superior to all others, and provides the only good reason for any m oral conclusion’, then it w ould be clear that w hat was dividin g us was a m oral difference.20 T h e point of this suggestion by H are is that T o u lm in ’s suppressed prem ise, or rule of inference for ethical judgm ents, is actually a m oral ju dgm en t itself. H are m aintains that tradition al logic has correctly understood that one can not get som ething into the conclusion of a syllogism which is not already contained in the prem ises. T h u s, from two purely factual statem ents one could not deduce an ethical con­ clusion; one of the prem ises w ould have to be a m oral judgm en t in itself if such a deduction were to be valid. H are finds therefore that what T o u lm in has apparently done, w ithout fully realizing it, is to classify a p articular practice as an instance of a general rule. T h e gen­ eral rule itself, however, expresses a m oral ju dgm en t and is not purely factual or ethically neutral. L e t us set forth H a re’s contention here in syllogistic form , in order to be quite clear as to what he thinks T o u lm in is doing. M ajor prem ise: Practices worthy of adoption genuinely reduce conflicts of interest.

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M inor prem ise: T h is is a practice which genuinely reduces con­ flicts of interest. C onclusion: T h erefore, this practice is worthy of adoption. N oth in g is wrong with the reasoning here, bu t it is surely true that the m ajor prem ise is actually statin g a m oral judgm ent, rather than reporting ethically neutral facts. If H are is correct, it then seems that T o u lm in has not derived an ethical conclusion from merely factual evidence, for his so-called ethically-neutral facts actually con­ tain a suppressed m oral judgm ent. T h ere is no doubt that H are has pointed out som ething which T o u lm in seem ed .to ignore or, at best, failed to state clearly in his analysis of the logic of ethical usage. B u t perh aps there are clues in T o u lm in ’s book which can clarify more exactly what he was trying to do. We have already noted that T o u lm in ’s m ain concern was to study the usage of m oral judgm en ts in our language in order to show how we actually do arrive at m oral judgm ents. H e clearly stated that the logic of ethics could not be reduced to that of the deductive m odel of m athem atics, bu t rather that “ every m ode of reasoning, every type of sentence, and (if one is particular) every single sentence will have its own logical criteria, to be discovered by exam in in g its individual, peculiar uses.” 27 In short, T o u lm in was prepared to find a “ p ecu liar” kind of logic at work in ethics, b u t nevertheless a logic in which one could still distinguish between some reasons as better than others. A nd yet he seems to have been m ore under the spell of m athem atical and scientific m odels than he realized in his attem pt to have his good reasons in ethics be factual or ethically neutral. C ould he not have granted, consistently with his view of ethical discussions as taking place within the context of a given society, that good reasons for a specific ethical practice are found in an ap peal to the established m oral judgm ent? O r in an ap peal to the belief that it is good to favor those practices which brin g about a greater happiness? A nd in so do­ ing, it does not seem to h arm his position to state q u ite frankly that these basic prem ises are themselves evaluative ones arrived at by the cum ulative experience of our society. Perhaps in addition to the above criticism of T o u lm in ’s approach the m ost debatable aspect of his inquiry concerns his h an dling of what he calls the lim itin g questions in ethics. I am not at all sure that it is correct to m aintain, as T o u lm in does, that it is illegitim ate to ask in a literal way, “ Why ought I to do what is righ t?” T o suggest

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that the only ap prop riate answer, if one takes this question literally is, “ W hat else ought I to d o?” is to dism iss too lightly one who seri­ ously intends this question to be answered. In this question it may well be that “ ough t” has a different connotation from “ righ t,” so that the question m ight be expan ded to, “ Why ought I to do what is gen­ erally considered righ t?” T h e questioner m ight then have in m ind the p articu lar circum stances with which he was faced, as well as the direction in which his own reasoning seemed to take him. L et me suggest an illustration in which reasoning of this sort could take place. A t the end of R o bert A nderson’s play T ea and Sympathy the wife of the house m aster in the private school goes to bed with the student accused of hom osexuality. Now it seems clear that on the basis of w hat our society generally considers right she has breached the m oral order by being u n faith fu l to her husband, as well as by seducing a young, im m ature lad. Yet no doubt she could defend her act by saying that she did w hat she ought to have done in this case, for it seemed the only way to prove to the lad that he was not really a hom osexual and could enjoy sexual intercourse with a woman whom he loved, even if he had found it im possible to go to bed with one of the town prostitutes. In this case she could hold that she did what she believed she ought to have done, despite the fact that m oral rightness was not on her side. N ow whether this illustration is convincing to the reader or not, all that I have tried to convey by it is the possibility that in some borderline cases one can ask in a m eaningful way, “ O ught I to do what is right?” If this possibility does in fact exist, then T o u lm in ’s h an dling of this question is too cavalier. B u t there is also a philosophical sense in which one can legitim ately ask, “ O ught I to do what is righ t?” W hat the questioner may then be asking for is whether there is some sort of relationship of obligation between myself and a sort of objective rightness. In such a context the question becomes one of asking in effect for the nature of the relation ­ ship which holds between an objective rightness (an “ is” statem ent) and the fact that I feel I should myself choose to act in that way (an “ ought” statem ent). We shall exam ine a controversy between H are and Ew ing in a later section of this chapter which turns on ju st this kind of question, “ O ught I to do what is right?” For our present p ur­ poses, however, it is sufficient to suggest that there are m eaningful ways of interpreting this question, other than the psychological or religious ways which T o u lm in suggests.

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W hile considering this sam e question taken in a religious context, T o u lm in also seems to have come up with too sim ple an answer. He has rescued ethics from the lim bo of emotive utterances, only to leave religion there. “ Ethics provides the reasons for choosing the ‘righ t’ course: religion helps us to p u t our hearts into it.” For a religious m an, the answer, “ I ought to do what is right because G od wills it,” may be a reason every bit as significant to him as the reasons T o u lm in puts forth to the effect that righ t acts are those which lead to the least conflict of interests and are harm oniously satisfying. Personal choice certainly influences what one gives as one’s ultim ate justificatory reasons, and it is a bit u n fair on T o u lm in ’s part to suggest that one w ould be unable to give better reasons than he him self has suggested. We have already exam ined H are’s criticism of T o u lm in ’s position with respect to the reasons T o u lm in considers the best that one can give. W hat I should like to ad d is that a religious m an could also conceivably insist that his doctrinal justification of ethical conduct is a good reason for doin g what is right, an d that this kind of reason is no more or no less em otive than those given w ithin a purely hum an context. T h ere is one other poin t on which this present w riter finds that T o u lm in has perhaps distorted actual m oral reasoning. W hile it is true that some of our debates are as to whether or not any practice is an instance of the generally accepted m oral rule, an d others are more of the form of asking for a justification for the existing rule, I do not think that T o u lm in ’s suggestion that teleological reasoning is only ap prop riate to the latter type of debate is quite correct. O f course, he does adm it consequences to the debate when two m oral principles both seem ap plicable in a p articu lar case, bu t he states that usually the most general answer to whether or not this act is righ t is of the form “ It is an instance of this general practice which is recognized as right in our society.” It seems to this w riter that one m ight tend to ju stify any p articu lar act as right by using reasons either of the de­ ontological or teleological form. For exam ple, in the illu stration we have already given we have seen that the m ost general law T o u lm in w ould give for saying this p articu lar act of prom ise-keeping is right was “ anyone ought to do whatever he prom ises anyone else that he will do” or “ Because it was a prom ise.” 28 Now it seems clear to me that in ordinary ethical discourse some people tend to give to such questions answers which are teleological. T h u s, for exam ple, I m ight

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say that this p articu lar act of prom ise-keeping is right because in general acts of prom ise-keeping tend to b rin g better consequences than acts of prom ise-breaking. In short, I w ould suggest that teleological answers are ap prop riate in either of the two types of m oral debate which T o u lm in distinguishes. T h ere is much of positive m erit in T o u lm in ’s treatm ent of ethical usage, nevertheless. H is insistence that we look and see how m oral judgm ents are actually used in life, that we should not discuss them out of their contexts, nor fit them into a preconceived theory, are indeed very helpful to one who is inclined to be bew ildered by the m ultiplicity of philosophical w riting on this topic. By exam ining actual usage in our language he finds that we do indeed claim to givq reasons for m any of our m oral judgm ents. And perhaps the greatest m erit of T o u lm in ’s in quiry is that it has stim ulated others to follow the path he indicated and study m oral judgm ents in their natural home, where they are actually used in our language. Preconceived ethical theories are disguised com parisons, an d i£ we remove the d is­ guise there is no harm in them. T h e harm comes-when we try to force our m oral judgm ents into a theory in which they sim ply do not fit, for although they are in m any ways like scientific judgm ents, or like statem ents about our likes and dislikes, or like emotive ejaculations, they are as well in m any ways different from all of these com parisons. T o u lm in suggests that no m ap is a substitute for actually taking a trip, and likewise no theory of ethical judgm ents is a substitute for actually looking at the way m oral judgm ents work in the context of m oral experience. It is perhaps u n fair to criticize him for not com ing up with more positive assertions toward an ethical theory than he has m ade, because this was, after all, not his intention. As he him self puts it:

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‘W hat is w anted’ (to ad ap t som ething Jo h n W isdom wrote in another context), ‘is some device for bringin g out the relation between the m anner in which ethical sentences are used an d the m anners in which others are used— so as to give their place on the language-m ap.’ It w ill be from such a description, or ‘language-m ap,’ rather than from a one-sided and disguised com pari­ son, that we shall obtain the understanding that we seek— whether of the generality of ethical judgm ents, their express­ iveness and rhetorical force, the function and im portance of m oral principles, the place of the m oralist, or the principles of the ‘open society’; or, most im portant, what it is that makes an ethical argum ent a valid argum ent, an d what things are good

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reasons for ethical judgm ents. Furtherm ore, such an account, free from the distractions of any p articular b egu ilin g analogy, will suggest to us all the com parisons we w ant and enable us to dis­ play the distinctions between concepts of different kinds without falsifying our usage.29

II. Urm son “On Grading” Now that by exam in in g T o u lm in ’s work we have seen the general outlines of this new approach to the problem s of ethics, let us ex­ am ine an excellent sm all p aper which tried to show how an exam in a­ tion of language usage can help us in understan din g the m oral uses of “ good.” We shall be looking quite carefully here at an extrem ely im portant paper, “ On G rad in g,” presented by the O xford philosopher J . O. U rm son in M in d in 1950.30 T a k in g the term “ grad in g” from its use in apple sorting by com­ m ercial growers, U rm son broadens its usage to operations in the m oral sphere which he finds to be sim ilar in im portan t respects. By not ap ­ proaching the difficult contexts of ethics directly, he thinks that it is possible to show that the general nature of grad in g (evaluating) is not as com plicated as it has been m ade to seem. W hen we exam ine ap ple grading, for instance, we find that it is done in accordance with a set of principles which one can learn. Furtherm ore, there is usually a specialized labelin g for grad in g such things as apples into super, extra fancy, fancy, dom estic, an d so on. By looking at such a case of gradin g we m ay be able to avoid some of the pitfalls we w ould en­ counter if we began im m ediately by exam in in g “ good ” and “ b ad .” U rm son shows that if we gran t the criteria which are given for calling an apple extra fancy, we can determ ine whether or not this apple qualifies in m eeting the stated em pirical criteria, such as size, texture, color, and so on. T h ere m ay be m arginal cases in which it is difficult to decide, bu t they are exceptions and not the rule. Now if one at­ tem pted to extend the older doctrines concerning “ good ” (as n atu ral­ istic, intuitionistic, or emotive) so as to apply them to the gradin g labels of apples, one w ould encounter a strange state of affairs. Is extra-fancy used of apples with certain n atu ral characteristics so that it is a kin d of conceptual shorthand for enum erating these character­ istics of size, texture, color, etc.? Is extra-fancy an in tu ited non-natural

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relation? Is extra-fancy ju st an em otive ejacu lation applied to some apples rather than to others? T h e absurdity of an affirmative answer to each of these questions seems apparent. Yet, as U rm son suggests, each of these three theories have rightly em phasized some points of im portance in grad in g operations. N aturalism rightly emphasizes the close connection between the gradin g label and the set of natural characters which ju stify its use; intuitionism rightly emphasizes that this close connection is not identity of m eaning and insists on the different logical char­ acter of grad in g labels and natural descriptions. B oth rightly stress the objective character of grading. T h e em otive theory, agreeing with in tuition ism about the fault of naturalism , rightly stresses that the in tu ition ist cure of suggesting that gradin g labels are a special kin d of non-natural descriptive adjective will not d o.31 T h u s, while U rm son finds that each of the three tradition al doc­ trines he exam ines in this connection correctly call attention to cer­ tain sim ilarities and differences, none is a sufficient theory in itself. U rm son insists then “ that to describe is to describe, to grade is to grade, and to express one’s feelings is to express one’s feelings, and that none of these is reducible to either of the others.” 32 W hat we can do, therefore, is by sam ples of procedure to show the sim ilarities an d differences between sorting apples into M acintoshes, D elicious, etc. and gradin g them as Super, E xtra Fancy, etc. W hile the form er is m ore like scientific classification, the latter resembles more closely wliat we usually call evaluating. B u t what b earin g has all this upon the use of words such as “ good” and “ b a d ” in ethical contexts? U rm son considers “ good ” to be a very general grading label, and general gradin g labels raise problem s which m ore specialized ones, such as those used in ap ple grading, do not. Is “ good” a general grad in g label because the criteria for it are very general and vague, or because different criteria are used in each differ­ ent context? O r is it that “ good ” has many different m eanings? Urm son m aintains that “ good ” is a grad in g label which has different criteria dependin g on the context in which it is being used. Furtherm ore, he grants that these criteria are vague, b u t does not find that this needs to be extremely puzzling. Some descriptive adjectives, such as “ b a ld ” and “ m iddle-aged” are also vague. B u t there is general consensus con­ cerning what we call a bald-headed man, or a m iddle-aged one, for

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that m atter. A nd so he finds it is with such words as “ good.” T h ere is no need for puzzlem ent here, for “ So long as there is a general con­ sensus in the em ploym ent of criteria all is w ell.” 33 T o illustrate his view that “ good” is a general gradin g label but that different criteria are ap plied in each of its different types of use, one can consider the criteria for determ ining a good cabbage, a good cheese, a good novel, an d so on. T h a t “ good ” is not shorthand for the descriptive criteria of those things to which it is ap p lied (n atural­ ism) seems evident, suggests U rm son, if we consider that if this were the case “ we should have the absurd situation that ‘good’ was a homonym with as m any p un n in g m eanings as the situation it ap ­ plied to.” 34 One m ight counter to U rm son at this poin t that “ good” and sim ilar grading labels are really expressions of likes an d dislikes by the person doing the labeling. U rm son insists, however, that granted the criteria to be em ployed in specific grad in g situations, grad in g is objectively decidable. However, very often we use such gradin g labels when all we are really entitled to do is to express our likes and dis­ likes. It is a great m istake to confuse the two different situations, and say consequently that gradin g is nothing more than an expression of personal likin g or disliking. As U rm son suggests I m ight say “ T h a t’s a good horse” and be qu ite ign oran t of what criteria a trainer would em ploy in m aking such a statem ent. I m ight in such a case sim ply be stating that I liked the looks of the horse. If I am speaking to a horse trainer, I m ight say “ T h a t horse looks good to m e,” but to a friend who is no m ore expert in horses than I am, I m ight say “ T h a t’s a good horse,” when all I am doing is expressing my personal liking. B u t because we interchange these expressions som etim es is no reason to confuse gradin g with expressions of approval, and then say that the former is really only the latter.35 T h e reader m ight now say that this does seem to be a reasonable account of grading in those cases where there are agreed upon criteria for grading. B u t while there m ight well be alm ost general agreem ent in the W estern W orld concerning what is a good apple, such does not seem to be the case with regard to a good man. W hat abou t the m oral reform er who protests that the criteria our society accepts as standards for calling a m an good, are inadequate, or m isleading, or even false? U rm son suggests that gradin g disagreem ents, including those hav­

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ing to do with m orals, fall roughly into four types. In actual practice these are frequently interm ingled, but it m ay help us to separate them in order to brin g some ligh t to this much discussed issue. (1) We accept roughly or exactly the sam e criteria of goodness (or of being first class etc.) but haven’t yet exam ined them all. W hen one says of some object under discussion that it is good and the other says that it is bad, we will be speculating on partial evidence. We can settle the question by exam in in g the other agreed criteria.36 T h is type of dispute does not raise any serious obstacles in our path, and hence U rm son thinks philosophers have tended to overlook it. L et us suggest several illustrations of this type of dispute, the first from a non-moral field, and the second from m orals itself. Suppose that I visit a friend of m ine who is a professional apple grower and on a pleasan t Sunday afternoon we stroll through his ap ple orchard. I see a tree which is filled with large, gorgeously red apples and I say “ T h a t is a good tree indeed.” H e replies, “ N o, quite the contrary. You have been m isled by the looks of the apples on it. For some strange reason the fru it from this tree always tastes ex­ tremely sour, and hence we do not m arket these ap ples.” H e m ight then insist that I taste one of the apples from the tree, and after do­ ing so, I m ight say “ Yes, this apple does taste extrem ely sour. I can see now that it is not a good ap ple tree.” W hat has happened in this very sim ple case is that I applied the criteria of looks nice and red, and is large, as the sole basis for my first judgm ent. B u t upon adding the criteria of taste, I changed my judgm en t which had not at first included that of taste at all. Som ething very like this happens as well in some cases of m oral disagreem ent. Suppose I say of Mr. Jon es that I consider him to be m orally bad, while you respond that you consider him to be m orally good. I m ight then say, “ I don ’t see how you can say that. I have found that M r. Jo n es frequently breaks his prom ises to me, and in addition he has run up a large grocery bill at the corner store which he has not paid. Why only yesterday he failed to show up at the club for our golf m atch! A nd yet he had prom ised to be there. Further­ more, surely a good m an pays his bills. Jon es has kept the grocer w aiting several m onths and has not p aid him anything on account.” You m ight reply to me, “ B u t I know Jones quite well, perhaps better than anyone else, and although I adm it that the things you say about

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him are true, I still say he is a m orally good m an. Perhaps you do not know that his little son has been extrem ely ill for the past several m onths, and that he has had to pay huge sums of money for specialists and expensive drugs. Yesterday his wife came down with the flu, and he had to stay home to take care of both his wife and his son. H e tried to call you at the club, b u t found that the line was out of order. Furtherm ore, he has not told you of his son’s serious illness, n or the grocer for that m atter, for he doesn’t desire pity. H e wants to take care of his burdens him self. I firmly believe that here is an unusual m an in our day and age, one who is indeed not only a good father and a good husband, b u t a good m an as w ell.” Now to this, if I trust your veracity (which we shall at any rate assum e in this case) I w ould probably reply, “ I see I was too hasty in calling Jo n es a m orally bad m an, bu t then I d id n ’t know at all of these things you have told m e.” W hat has happen ed here is that my origin al ju d g ­ m ent based on criteria of prom ise-keeping and debt-paying has been extended to include criteria of devotion to his fam ily an d not seek­ in g pity from others. By exam in in g other relevant criteria I have, as in the case of my ju d gm en t concerning apples, revised my original grading. (2) “We accept the sam e criteria bu t it is a m arginal case.” 37 Here again perhaps we can clarify U rm son ’s p oin t by suggesting some illus­ trations. A nd let us try to keep them sim ilar in as m any ways as possible to the above illustrations, in order that the differences will not be overly stressed. Suppose both my friend and I are professional ap p le growers. On a visit to his orchard 0 11 a pleasan t Sunday afternoon we begin to dis­ cuss a new kind of ap ple which he has produced by cross-breeding. We shall assum e that we both accept the same criteria of w hat con­ stitutes a good apple, and upon seeing, feeling, m easuring, and tasting several specimens of his new hybrid I say, “ T h is is a good ap ple in­ deed, but I do not think that it differs m uch in taste, feel, or ap pear­ ance from other varieties which are presently on the m arket. In fact, it seems to differ so little that I question the desirability of your attem pting to m ass grow such apples. People w ould not recognize the difference, and it m ight be an unusually costly experim ent for you to continue with this p roject.” My friend m ight reply, “ Yes, I realize that there is not very m uch difference between this apple and some which are already on the m arket. Nevertheless I think that the differ­

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ence, though adm ittedly slight, is still significant enough to w arrant my continuing the experim ent.” In such a case we m ight well recog­ nize that our disagreem ent could not be settled, and the disagreem ent m ight well last longer and attract more attention than the dispute m entioned under type 1. N ow in our m oral illustration, suppose both of us have the same criteria for m oral goodness an d the same facts at our disposal. I may say, assum ing the facts are the sam e as those we have given in the m oral illustration in type 1 above, “ I adm it that this is a borderline case, bu t I should still h old that Jon es was not m orally good, for surely a good m an ought to pay his bills when they are due. T h ere are m itigatin g circum stances here, it is true, b u t I should not want to call him m orally good.” You m ight then respond, “ B u t surely you are merely being obstinate. A m an who is a good father and a good husband, who doesn’t seek pity from others, who attem pts to phone people when he can’t keep his golf engagem ents, is a m orally good m an. W hat do you expect? N o m an can be wholly perfect, you know, and I subm it that Jo n es is a m orally good m an .” N otice, that more em otive utterances have been introduced here than in the case of the dispute ab o u t the new variety of apples. It m ay very well be that we have stacked the cards, so to speak, in this illustration, for it could have been conducted in m ilder tones. But, as a m atter of fact, does it not often happen that in borderline disputes concerning whether or n ot someone is a good m an emotive language and “ surely” (when it is not at all certain) are introduced into the discourse? A nd to note this is to see an im portan t difference between our gradin g or evalu­ atin g apples an d hum an beings. As U rm son says, “m oral gradin g is so m uch more im portan t; we feel so much m ore strongly ab o u t the attainm ent of high m oral grades than others.” 38 T h u s our dispute ab o u t the desirability of continuing the experim ent on the cross­ breeding of apples is less involved with our feelings than is our dis­ cussion concerning whether or n ot Jones is m orally good. Perhaps here, too, our dispute m ay not be settled, b u t we feel more deeply because we are evaluatin g another hum an being. (3) “ We have no agreem ent, or very little, on criteria. H ere we ju st cannot settle our problem s for the overwhelmingly good reason that we cannot discuss them .” 39 Very frequently this type of dispute involves discussions between people from different societies, cultures, or classes, and until the parties to the dispute recognize the different

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sets of criteria they are em ploying, little light is likely to be shed on the point at issue. If the fact that different sets of criteria are being ap plied by the parties in the dispute is not recognized, the discussion may end with each person thinking the other stupid, ignorant or obstinate. On the other hand, if it is recognized that different sets of criteria are being applied for the use of the grad in g label, such as “ good,” the discussion is more likely to shift to a discussion of the adequacy of the various criteria each party to the dispute proposes. L e t us again seek to clarify U rm son ’s point here by constructing some illustrations of this type of dispute. L e t us first look at a case which provides little trouble to us in that we know very quickly how to end the disagreem ent satisfactorily. I found the ham burgers in a new restaurant in C am bridge, England, to be very good indeed, and hence suggested to an English friend that we go there an d order ham burgers for lunch. H e replied that he too had tried the ham burgers in this p articular restaurant and had fou n d them not to be good at all. However, he was w illing to give it a second try, an d since I was enthusiastic, we went there for lunch. A fter bitin g into his ham burger, he said, “ See I was right, these are pretty terrible.” I was, on the other hand, about ready to rem ark, after taking my first bite, that my ham burger was every bit as good as the one I had had there a few days before. H is rem ark, however, quickly led me to see that we did not agree on what constituted good ham burgers. B u t more than that was quite evident, and I was amazed at my previous stupidity. I thought to myself that I should have realized that I prefer ham burgers to be rare (underdone to the Eng­ lish), while m ost Englishm en prefer their m eat to be well cooked. I explained that my preference was for rare ham burgers, and that since this restaurant seemed to be the only one in C am bridge which served them that way, I had called them “ good ham burgers.” My English friend quickly understood, and no dispute followed, for qu ite n a­ turally we sim ply h ad different tastes. T h e most obvious type of m oral dispute in this category w ould be one between in dividuals representing different cultures. T h u s, for ex­ am ple, a debate between a C hristian who insisted on m onogam y and a M oham m edan who insisted on the superiority of allow ing men to have a num ber of wives if they can support them, would fall into this classification. On this point the C hristian w ould be using his own m orality, the C hristian one, as the basis upon which he rejected the

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M oham m edan claim , while, on the other hand, the M oham m edan w ould be presupposing the teachings of M oham m ed as the auth orita­ tive ethical stan dard for discussion. Presum ably there m ight be some criteria in common in such a dispute, but basically it could be settled only by one of the parties being converted to the stan dards of the other. T h is type of dispute does not in fact occur very frequently, and if we take it as our p arad igm we are likely to be m isled. L e t us look for a typical dispute which m ight more likely occur within the fram e­ work of our own general culture. Suppose I am claim ing that too many program s given to the p ublic on Am erican television are m orally bad. I argue that there are too few program s of real education al significance and there is very little opera. If I were argu in g with you, you m ight disagree and say that you found the program s on A m erican television to be m orally good for the m ajority of the people. You may continue an d say that m ost of the people w ould turn off educational program s, an d opera would surely not be appreciated by m any in the general television public. W e m ight at that poin t agree to disagree, bu t we m ight try to push our discussions further along. I m ight say that I hold only those program s which im prove the educational and cultural level of the people to be m orally good, and therefore, cannot understand your claim to support the present program s as m orally good. You m ight counter by saying that you found the present program s on television to be m orally good because they brought a great deal of enjoym ent and happiness to the greatest num ber of Am erican viewers. Now ob­ viously we have shortened considerably the debate which m ight ac­ tually take place, bu t the poin t is that if we ever reached this place in our discussion, we should be able to recognize that our disagreem ent was caused by not h aving the sam e criteria as the basis for our calling the television program s m orally good or bad. A t this poin t we would do well to switch our dispute to the criteria we use for calling some­ thing good or bad. For unless we can get som ething like agreem ent on criteria here, we shall continue to m aintain our positions. Now of course, frequently no conversion to the other’s criteria will take place. B u t still m ore unfortun ate w ould it be if we failed to under­ stand the basis upon which our stands were taken, and instead sim ply called each other ignorant, obstinate, or stupid. (4) In this type of disagreem ent U rm son suggests that a reform er may well know that we have disagreem ents on criteria. “ H e may then

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openly reveal him self as not asking the question whether a thing is good or not by accepted standards, but as advocating new standards, new criteria.” 40 L et us recast the discussion about the value of present Am erican television program s so as to illustrate a m oral reform er at work. I m ight, as I did in (8) above, begin by saying that the m ajority of Am erican television program s are m orally bad. In doing so I m ight well realize that the prevailin g opinion has been that anything was m orally good which brought enjoym ent or pleasure to the m ajority of people, bu t I m ight so phrase my argum ent rhetorically as to lead you to think that your criteria should be the sam e as mine. My tone of voice, my gestures, my very words m ight suggest, “ How could any ration al being not clearly see that they are m orally b ad ?” Assum ing that I am a leader in society, you m ight not realize that I was actually presupposing different criteria for judgm en t than are usually used. A nd in this case we w ould have a persuasive argum ent, very much like some we have seen in looking at the em otive theory of ethics. If successful, I m ight help to get the criteria actually changed by this m ethod of discussion; if not successful with you, because you recog­ nize it as a trick, then we should probably be in the sam e position we have already sketched in (8) above. O r I m ight begin by adm itting that the usual criterion used in ju d gin g the m oral value of television program s has been the extent to which they have brought pleasure to the m ajority of people. But then I m ight go on and try to get you to see that the criterion used is not adequate or desirable, and propose my new criteria. At such a point I should try to offer reasons for my criteria bein g better ones for the present issue than the ones which you and others have gen­ erally used. Beyond that I could not go. Urm son concludes his discussion of these types of disagreem ent by stating that, “ gradin g words can only be used successfully for com­ m unication where criteria are accepted. W here they are not there can only be confusion and cross purposes until it is seen that the only discussion possible between such people is what criteria for gradin g to adopt— gradin g words must then be discussed, not used.” 41 H e also makes the helpful suggestion that a good rule of thumb to use in disputes about the m oral goodness of a person is to attem pt to find out why the m an in question is being graded as he is. We m ight then discover that the criteria being used were not the same to

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all parties in the discussion. R ath er than waste time by shouting at each other we m ight therefore profitably discuss the relevance of the p articu lar criteria we were using to the context at hand. T h e m ain point of U rm son’s p aper is thus to show that there is no logical difference between the gradin g of things, such as apples, and the grading of persons. T h a t the latter is far m ore im portant U rm son docs not for one m om ent deny, bu t that is no reason for assum ing that there is as well a logical difference in the two processes. T O W A R D A N E V A L U A T IO N O F U R M S O N ’S V IEW O F G R A D IN G One who disagrees with U rm son ’s approach m ight suggest that he has confused the gradin g of things with the m oral evaluation of persons in such a way as to ignore the great differences in these two processes. An argum ent of this sort would suggest that the grad in g of apples is an instrum ental activity, for apples are good only in so far as they arc used by man. On the other hand, the evaluation of a hum an being is concerned with an intrinsic good, with persons who are good in themselves and arc not mere m eans to some end. In fact, such a critic m ight suggest that it is not an accident of language that causes it to sound very odd to speak of grad in g persons when we mean to evaluate their m oral goodness. A second argum ent which such a critic m ight present against U rm son’s view w ould be that the properties which count toward call­ ing a m an “ good” are radically different from the properties which count toward gradin g apples as “ extra fancy.” In the latter case the properties of being of certain size, color, texture, free from blemishes, and so on would count, but in the case of m an these properties would be clearly irrelevant. In fact the properties which we do count in de­ term ining the goodness of a m an, such as his honesty, truthfulness, consideration for others, and so on, are so radically different from those used to grade things, that it m ight be said the word “ good” does not have the sam e m eaning in both procedures. Such a critic m ight adm it that what U rm son says about grad in g apples is correct, bu t still m aintain that U rm son went astray by not seeing that m oral goodness is som ething quite different from any other kind of good­ ness. T h is uniqueness is such, it m ight then be said, that only by studying m oral goodness directly can any light be shed on ethical problem s. T h e difference between the gradin g of things and the ju d g ­

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m ent of the m oral worth of a person m ight be sum m ed up, according to this line of argum ent, by saying that we do in fact blam e m en for being bad, bu t we do not in fact blam e apples for not bein g extra fancy. T h e reader’s own ju d gm en t on this m atter w ill determ ine how m uch of an influence he will allow certain language philosophers to have upon him. For if one wishes to m ain tain that ethics is a discipline all its own, uninfluenced by other studies, and that words are not used in this subject in the sam e sense as they are in other cases of ju d g in g or evaluating, then, of course, U rm son’s interesting paper will be held to be of value for one’s know ing what is involved in gradin g apples, b u t not for know ing what is bein g done in ju d g in g the m oral w orth of men. Before reaching a hasty conclusion here, one way or the other, the reader m ight well bear in m ind how one of U rm son ’s persuasion m ight reply to each of the above criticisms. In the first place, U rm son did point out, as we have seen, that the grading of m en with respect to their m oral goodness was obviously a far more im portan t activity for us than the grad in g of apples. W hat he was trying to suggest was that we m ight gain some light on the difficulties we get into in discussing m oral questions if we looked at some activities which were like the evalu atin g of persons. After we then saw how grad in g was done in an area where we were not so em otionally involved, we could then turn to m oral evaluation and see if this kind of analysis has helped us to find our way. T h e same kin d of analysis U rm son carried out with respect to how one grades apples, could also be carried out with respect to hum an activities, such as bridge-playing and football. A nd in such an analysis, which the reader him self m ight well attem pt, one w ould find certain criteria for estim ating the goodness of a football player, or a bridge-player. B u t even here, though we are dealing with hum an beings, U rm son quite honestly states that m oral evaluation is still much more im ­ portan t than being good at football or good at playin g bridge. T h e one poin t I shall m ake about this is that in grad in g people in non-moral m atters an d in gradin g things we are dealin g with dispensable qualifications in people and dispensable things. B u t m oral grade affects the whole of one’s life and social intercourse — a low grade in this makes other high gradings unim portant. . . . B u t when we acknowledge these facts we surely give no reason for expecting a logical difference as well.42

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B u t there is still the problem of instrum ental goods versus in­ trinsic good for us to clear up. Surely, an analysis of a good football player m ight still be considered an analysis of good as used in an in­ strum ental sense. Ju st as a good pen is a pen which writes well, so it m ight be said a good football player is a m an who has achieved great skill in playing the game. However, a football player, who loved foot­ b all m ore than anything else, m ight protest that it was an intrinsic good for him in that he was not using it as a m eans to popularity, to becom ing wealthy, and so on. H e m ight say that ju st as some people value knowledge in and for itself, and not as a means to som ething else, so he valued playing football in and for itself. T h is is probably a sam ple case for us to consider for it shows that the distinction be­ tween instrum ental an d intrinsic values itself is not an iron-clad one in which the boundaries are clearly m arked off. T h e critic of U rm son ’s position m ight reply, however, that this was not what he had in m ind, for he was thinking of happiness or hum an satisfaction in the gam e of life itself; he was thinking of activi­ ties which no one w ould consider a means or instrum ent to anything else. R . M. H are, who, as we shall see in the next section, elaborates a position very sim ilar to that of U rm son, m aintains that this type of inquiry into the uses of words such as “ good” in m oral and non-moral contexts applies to all uses of such words. H are suggests that the dis­ tinction of instrum ental versus intrinsic good may blin d us to the great sim ilarity in all our uses of the word “ good.” T o separate “ good” as used in instrum ental from “ good” in intrinsic contexts may thus be an artificial barrier which w ill prevent our understanding that the sam e kin d of lo g ic is at work in all our uses of this word and others like it. T o the second m ain argum ent which a critic m ight direct against U rm son’s view, we have already seen the type of answer U rm son gives. T o suggest that because the properties that are used in applyin g “ good” to the evaluation of the m oral worth of a m an are different from the properties that are used to grade apples, therefore the word “ good ” must have a different m eaning in these two cases, is to involve one in a very com plicated procedure. U rm son argues that the proper­ ties or criteria for applyin g the word “ good” are obviously different in gradin g apples from what they are in gradin g persons, bu t so too are the criteria used for gradin g apples different from those used to grade theatrical perform ances. If we then suggest that the word “ good”

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m ust have a different m eaning in all the different kinds of contexts in which it is used “ we should have the absurd situation that ‘good’ was a homonym with as many pun n in g m eanings as the situations it ap p lied to.” 43 U rm son argues that this is quite contrary to the way we actually use the w ord “ good,” for we actually recognize a common m eaning of the word but use different criteria according to the type of thing or activity to which we apply the word. T h u s, whether the reader agrees fully or n ot with U rm son ’s an al­ ysis, he ought to see that U rm son ’s revealing study may be quite a stim ulus for a more detailed study of the m oral uses of words.

III. Hare: Moral Language as Prescriptive T h e most influential treatm ent of the logic an d language of m orals is fou n d in H are’s sm all book T he L an gu age of M orals, publish ed in 1952. He conceives ethics as “ the logical study of the language of m orals,” 44 bu t insists that one m ust first know som ething about im pera­ tive sentences and non-moral uses of ethical words before one can profitably study the language of m orals itself. In effect we find him carrying on the pioneering work of U rm son, who also m ain tain ed that one m ust understand the uses of “ grad in g” or evaluative words in non-moral contexts before one can understand the function of these same words in specifically m oral situations. H are’s inquiry into the logic or ration al justification of m oral sentences is also a continua­ tion of the type of investigation started by T o u lm in , although here we shall find him p roposin g a quite different solution from that of Professor T ou lm in . H are’s general conviction concerning ethical language is that it is prim arily a prescriptive rather than a descriptive use of language. T h e function of ethical principles is to guide hum an conduct, and hence the best way actually to discover what a p articu lar m an ’s m oral principles are is to observe how he acts. M any of the confusions found in ethical philosophy H are believes are caused by a failure to see moral statem ents as a kind of prescriptive use of language, as in com mands. Hence, in the first part of his book he proposes to study im peratives as one type of prescriptive language, but he says that he does not in­ tend to argue that ethical sentences can be reduced to im peratives. It m ay be helpful to the reader to present the diagram w hich H are uses to divide in a rough way the various uses of prescriptive lan guage.45

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Prescriptive Language

Imperatives

Singular

Universal

Value-Judgements

Non-Moral

Moral

H are suggests for the purposes of his analysis that the feature which characterizes the use of im perative sentences in English is that o f com m anding. If the reader recalls his study of English gram m ar, he m ay be fam iliar with the distinction drawn between indicative sen­ tences which tell som eone w hat is the case, and im perative sentences which are “ used for telling someone to m ake som ething the case.” 40 H are illustrates this distinction by contrasting the two sentences, “ You are going to shut the door,” and "Sh u t the door.” 47 B o th of these sentences refer to the future, bu t in the first I am predictin g what you w ill do, while in the latter I am com m anding what you are to do. H are rejects the endeavor to explain im perative sentences as merely attem pts to persuade som eone to do som ething; he does so on the ground that telling someone what he is to do is a separate process from that of persuadin g him to do it. T h e failure to observe this dis­ tinction has led to a confusion of ethics with p ropagan d a. B u t this confusion of ethical statem ents with attem pts to persuade was based, according to H are, on the m ixin g and confusing of two quite different distinctions. “ T h e first is that between the language of statem ents and prescriptive language. T h e second is that between telling som eone som ething and gettin g him to believe or do what one has told h im .” 48 T h u s, in both statem ents of fact and in ethical utterances I am telling someone som ething; in the form er case I am telling him what is the case, and in the latter I am telling him what to do. Now in both cases if the hearer is disinclined to believe me, I m ay start on the process of trying to get him to accept my statem ents. T h e poin t of im portance is that this process of persuasion is not restricted to m oral injunctions, b u t is also used in the case of statem ents of fact. It is therefore ex­ tremely m isleading to suggest that m oral statem ents are persuasive, as Stevenson does, while factual statem ents are not, for the sim ple reason that neither type of statem ent is persuasive if it is an answer to a ration al question such as "W h at is the case?” or “ W hat am I to do?” B u t after the answer has been given in a ration al way, if the speaker does not assent, I m ay then resort to other m ethods to make

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him agree with me— ancl this is persuasion concerning beliefs as well as com mands. T h e point, as H are sees it, is that com m ands are like indicative statem ents in that they tell som eone som ething, and, there­ fore, they are governed by logic. If I seek to persuade someone, I may use any means at my disposal to achieve my end, bu t if I seek to give a rational answer to a question asked, I am lim ited by the rules of logic governing how to give an answer which counts as a reason. B u t what are the rules of logic which govern the perform ance of im perative statem ents? H are suggests a recasting of sam ple indicative and im perative statem ents so that we can see more clearly w hat they are telling us, and also so that we can see how these types of sentences function in different ways. For the illustration we have already used, namely, “ You are going to shut the door,” and “ Shut the door,” H are suggests the follow ing form ulation: Your shutting the door in the im m ediate future, yes. Your shutting the door in the im m ediate future, please.49 T h e first part of these recast statem ents is identical; H are calls it the phrastic (derived from the G reek word m eaning “ to p oin t out or in­ dicate” ). T h e second p art shows the difference between the indicative and im perative statem ents; H are calls it the nenstic (derived from the Greek word m eaning “ to nod assent” ) . Now the difference be­ tween the indicative and im perative sentences is seen in that the speaker nods assent to the form er by affirming, “ Yes, it is the case,” while he nods assent to the latter by affirming, “ Please, do it.” W hat H are wishes to stress is that the neustic elem ent is found in both in­ dicative and im perative statem ents if they are uttered seriously. In the case of assenting to an indicative statem ent, I indicate that I believe it to be true, while in the case of assenting to an im perative statem ent I resolve to do what the speaker has told me to do.50 Com m ands share another feature with indicative statem ents in that they can be contradicted. T h u s, ju st as the indicative statem ent, “ You are going to shut the door,” can be contradicted by saying, “ You are not going to shut the door” ; so the com m and “ Shut the door” can be contradicted by com m anding “ Do not shut the door.” Hence, logical rules are applicable to com m ands ju st as they are ap plicable to indicative statem ents. It is a tautology to say that we cannot sincerely assent to a secondperson com m and addressed to ourselves, and at the same time

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not perform it, if now is the occasion for perform ing it an d it is in our (physical and psychological) power to do so. Sim ilarly, it is a tautology to say that we cannot sincerely assent to a state­ m ent, and at the same time not believe it.51 H are furtherm ore finds that a logical relation of entailm ent can also be found which holds for com m ands as well as for im perative state­ m ents: “A sentence P entails a sentence Q if and only if the fact that a person assents to P b u t dissents from Q is a sufficient criterion for saying that he has m isunderstood one or other of the sentences.” 52 T h e existence in our ordinary language of universal im perative statem ents is strong evidence, H are thinks, for m ain tain in g that we do actually reason from these universal im perative statem ents to their en tailin g a specific act now which is covered by the universal im perative. Lest the reader may be u nfam iliar with logic, it may be h elpful to suggest in syllogistic form a sam ple entailm ent involving a universal im pera­ tive as the m ajor prem ise: Sharpen all the pencils. T h is is one of the pencils. Sharpen this pencil. B u t it would be in valid to conclude the above syllogism by saying “ You are going to sharpen this pencil.” H are indicates two of the rules which govern logical entailm ent in indicative an d im perative uses, so as to show why the latter conclusion w ould be invalid. (1) N o indicative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of prem isses which cannot be validly drawn from the in dica­ tives am ong them alone. (2) N o im perative conclusion can be validly draw n from a set of premisses which does not contain at least one im perative.53 T h u s, the reader can see that “ You are going to sharpen this pencil” w ould not validly follow from the premisses we have proposed above since the indicative am ong them does not w arrant it. B u t more im ­ p ortan t for our study of ethics is the second rule which reinforces M oore’s critique of n aturalism by insisting that no im perative con­ clusion, ethical or non-ethical, can be drawn unless at least one of the premisses is itself an im perative. O r in other words, norm ative statem ents or value judgm ents cannot logically follow from only m at­

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ters of fact. T h ere is, of course, another restriction to be placed upon reasoning involving im peratives, namely, that an im perative conclu­ sion cannot be drawn validly from an argum ent which does not at least im plicitly contain the im perative conclusion in its premisses. T h is follows from the p revailin g contem porary interpretation of de­ ductive argum ents as analytic, that is, that nothing can be added to a conclusion not found in the premisses of the argum ent, " except what can be added solely on the strength of definitions of terms.” 5* T h is reference to a deductive m odel of arguin g may call to m ind older m oral philosophies which m aintained that the basic ethical duties of m an were self-evident (the m ajor premisses), and that there­ fore one could logically deduce how one ought to act from these selfevident rules of m orality. H are does not, however, m ain tain that m oral rules are self-evident. H e cites the fact that in our ordinary usage it is much easier to com m and a p articu lar duty than to com m and a u ni­ versal principle under which such a duty could be subsum ed. T h u s it is easier for me to say to you, “ D o not lie to me now ,” than it would be for me to say to you, “ N ever lie.” I m ight sincerely subscribe to the first com m and, b u t I m ight have reservations abou t the second. If it is a question of saving one’s life by telling a lie, could I still say sincerely “ N ever lie” ? T h e universal com m and is thus not that from which we learn our p articu lar duties in various circumstances, but is rather a generalized sum m ary of many p articu lar acts. B u t H are m arshals more convincing evidence than this against h olding that basic m oral principles are self-evident. (1) I f self-evident is taken to m ean that it w ould be self-contradictory to reject it, then m oral principles cannot be self-evident for they p urport to tell us that we ought to do one thing rather than another. In this sense a self-evident statem ent is an analytic statem ent which one w ould reject only if he m isunderstood tlie m eaning of the statem ent. B u t one does not subscribe to m oral rules sim ply because he correctly understands their m eaning. (2) Suppose, however, that by self-evident m oral rules one means only that it is psychologically im possible to reject them. B u t even this rather strange use of self-evident w ould not in fact hold, for some rules which I cannot psychologically reject, you m ight well be able to reject. (S) Perhaps the usual m eaning of self-evident in these contexts is that it would not be ration al to reject it. H are in­ sists that in this kind of argum ent value-words are sm uggled in so that the issue of self-evidence is obscured. Som etim es ration al is ex­

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panded in these contexts to m ean that which a m orally developed m an or an im p artial ju d g e w ould accept. B ut, as H are indicates, “ ration al m an,” “m orally developed m an ,” and “ im p artial ju d g e” are in themselves bein g used here as value words. T o exclude from the ranks of ration al m en those who did not accept a p articu lar m oral rule as self-evident, w ould be a circular argum ent indeed. A t this poin t it m ay well seem that H are’s analysis is resultin g in some rather drastic conclusions. N o t only does he disagree with tradi­ tional naturalists that m oral principles can be derived from strictly factual premisses, b u t he also disagrees w'ith those who m ain tain that basic m oral principles are self-evident. C ould it be that he is going to m ain tain that m oral principles, while not universally true, are at least generally true? Is he going to suggest that “ One ought never to lie” is a statem ent of the type that generally holds true, b u t not al­ ways? W hile on the surface it m ight appear that this kind of approach w ould be plausible, H are rejects it completely. H e adm its that there are some rules which are of the kind that if they are not broken too often, they still hold. If the exceptions to these rules do not become too num erous with respect to the total num ber of cases, these rules m ay still be considered true. However, he does not find that a m oral rule, such as “ One ought never to lie” is of this character. As an ex­ am ple of a rule which can be occasionally broken, and still survive as true in general he suggests, “ the principle that undergraduates m ust n ot take a week off work durin g term; clearly if once or twice durin g his career an undergraduate, whose industry is otherwise ex­ em plary, takes some time off, even a week, we think no harm of it; bu t if he takes every week off, or even the m ajority, he probably gets into serious trouble.” 55 N ow H are insists that a prin ciple such as never lying is not of this character, for we do not suggest that it is all right to lie occasionally, so long as one does not lie too often. T h e exceptions to the principle of undergraduates not taking a week off work durin g term are lim ited only in num ber; as long as not too m any exceptions are taken to the rule by any one undergraduate, he may be expected still to do well in the university. B u t exceptions to such m oral rules as “ Never lie,” are lim ited not in terms of there not being too many of them, b u t rather “ by the peculiarities of p articular classes of instances.” T h u s we say “ Speak the truth in general, but there are certain classes o f cases in which this principle does not hold; for exam ple, you m ay say w hat is false in order to save life, and there

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are other exceptions which you m ust learn to recognize.” 56 T herefore, in such cases of exceptions to m oral rules the rule itself is tightened rather than loosened by the exceptions, for it is now m ore correctly rendered, “ N ever lie, except in certain classes of cases such as so and so, and so and so.” In short, the choice not to keep a m oral rule in a particular circum stance is itself a decision of principle, because in m aking the exception we are in effect m odifying the principle. T h u s H are finds, as part of our m oral developm ent which is always going on, the turning of m oral principles which we have learned “ from provisional principles into precise principles with their exceptions definitely laid dow n.” 57 H are insists that it is m isleadin g to speak of inference as alone leading one to form conclusions in m oral philosophy, for the most im portant part of m oral philosophy involves personal decision. In specific cases the m oral agent him self m ust decide whether to m odify the prevailing m oral principles in this case or not; no rule of inference can tell him what to do in such a case. Inference can tell him that if he lies in this case he w ill be breakin g the principle not to lie, or if he doesn’t lie in this case he will be observing the principle. But inference does not tell the agent which to do; he m ust m ake these decisions him self. In the interests of preserving a ration al ethic one m ust not forget that decisions concerning what to do cannot be wholly accounted for by inference alone. Principles are not only found in m orals, but also in m any of our m ore m undane activities, such as auto driving, chess playing, and so on. H are suggests one of the m ain reasons for our having principles is for teaching purposes. W hen we learn to do som ething, we do not ju st learn what to do in that particular instance, bu t rather we learn it usually as a certain type of thing which is to be done in certain types of situation. And this kind of learning is the learn ing of a prin ­ ciple, whether it be that of chess playin g or m oral living. T h ere is, however, a lim it to what can be taught to another person, in that he may, and undoubtedly will, experience situations which are not clearly covered by the principles he has been taught. T h e unexpected move by a chess opponent, the unforeseen emergency while driving an autom obile, the p articular m oral crisis faced by this in dividual, are all instances of that kind of decision which wre are all called upon to m ake without being able clearly to invoke some learned principle which can be applied to this particular case. One m ust not conclude,

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however, that all action is governed by principles to a certain point, at which decisions of our own have to take over. R ath er it is the case that the principles which we have learnt and our own decisions inter­ act constantly upon one another. I f an in dividual is too dedicated to the principles which he has learned, he may be unable to deal success­ fully with crises in which these principles do not seem to guide him. On the other hand, the person who has learned few or no principles, m ust waste a great deal of time in arriving at m any decisions which could have been more readily m ade by an appeal to principle. A criticism that is frequently leveled against contem porary philos­ ophers is that their concern with how language is used has taken them out of touch with the real problem s of the everyday m an. T h a t this is not always the case can be seen by noting that H are devotes a good deal of attention to a very practical question, “ H ow shall I bring up my children?” 53 In fact, he suggests that this is not only an im portant practical question, bu t also that by exam ining how one w ould an ­ swer it, one can discover a m ost characteristic use of m oral words. In this sphere, as in others, decisions cannot be taught, but principles can. A father cannot m ake his son’s decisions for him, but he can give his son a m oral education in such a way that his son learns by his father’s precept and exam ple what principles his father is u p ­ holding. H are’s answer to this difficult question, which philosophers have tended to ignore, is that a paren t should give his children a solid basis of m oral principles, but also allow the children am ple opportunity to m ake decisions by which these principles may be m odi­ fied, expanded, or even abandoned. T o teach only the principles, w ithout giving the opportunity of subjecting them to the learner’s own decisions of principle, is like teaching exclusively from the textbooks w ithout entering the laboratory. On the other hand, to abandon one’s child or one’s driving-pupil to his own self-expression is like p u ttin g a boy into a laboratory and saying ‘G et on with it.’ T h e boy may enjoy him ­ self or kill him self, bu t w ill probably not learn m uch science.59 B u t one m ay ask H are, “ H ow is one to ju stify a m oral decision?” H are’s answer is that one can ap peal both to the likely effects of an action one is contem plating and to the m oral principles which one holds. In short, the decision need not be arbitrary, for one can con­ tinue to ask what are the effects of observing the accepted principles, what are the effects of breaking them, and so on. H are thus disagrees

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with those who have held that m oral decisions are justified by ap peal­ ing only to principles or only to effects. B o th kinds of ap peal are always legitim ate, he insists. And if one is pressed more and more, he ultim ately m ust attem pt to specify the way of life of which his p rin ­ ciples are a part. It is in practice quite difficult, if not im possible, to give such a com plete specification of the entire way of life to which one subscribes. However, if one did give such a com plete specification of a way of life to which one subscribed, no m ore could be said to the person w7ho continued to press for m ore reasons. We can only ask him to make up his own m ind which way he ought to live; for in the end everything rests upon such a de­ cision of principle. H e has to decide whether to accept that way of life or not; if he accepts it, then we can proceed to ju stify the decisions that are based u pon it; if he does not accept it, then let him accept some other, an d try to live by it. T h e sting is in the last clause.60 Such a decision as to how one ought to live w ould not be arbitrary if it proceeded as we have described, for it w ould be based on all that could possibly be said in arriving at such a decision. T h e p oin t is that in the last analysis a decision of principle, or a value judgm ent, m ust be m ade by the in dividual, b u t this is no m ore arbitrary a m at­ ter than a scientist’s takin g over the prin ciples he is taugh t in his specialty and m odifying them if he finds good evidence for doin g so. In the end the scientist m ust rely on his own observations and ju d g ­ ments, ju st as the m oral agent m ust m ake his own decisions. If we are in general given w hat we subsequently come to see to have been good advice, we decide in general to follow the advice and adop t the principles of those who have given us this good advice in the past. T h is is what happens to any child who is well brought up. Ju s t as the scientist does not try to rewrite all that is in the textbooks, bu t takes that for granted and sticks to his own p articu lar researches, so this fortun ate child w ill take over bodily the principles of his elders and ad ap t them in detail, by his own decisions, to suit his own circum stances from time to time. T h is is how in a well-ordered society m orality rem ains stable, and at the same tim e gets adapted to changing circum ­ stances.61 GOOD:

T H E M O S T G E N E R A L A D JE C T IV E O F C O M M E N D A T IO N

H are conceives the prim ary function of value words to be com-

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m ending or condem ning, and argues that while he is concentrating upon a few typical value words it is wrong to conclude that there are not m any other words which function in a like m anner. In fact, he says “ alm ost every word in our lan guage is capable of bein g used on occasion as a value-word . . . ; and usually it is only by crossexam in in g a speaker that we can tell whether he is so using a w ord.” 02 W e have in exam in in g the n aturalistic fallacy argum ent of G. E. M oore already had occasion to cite H are’s insistence that value-words cannot be defined in terms of words that do not themselves function evaluatively in the attem pted definition. Since the u n iq ue function of value words is to com m end they cannot be derived from mere state­ m ents of fact, since factual statem ents in themselves do not function as com m endations. W hat frequently happens is that m any so-called n atu ralistic definitions of “ good” sm uggle in covertly evaluative ex­ pressions, such as “ n atu ral,” “ n orm al,” “ satisfying,” or “ fundam ental hum an need,” and thus ap pear to have successfully derived a value judgm en t from statem ents of facts. Follow ing W ittgenstein’s suggestion that we can study the logical character of words by asking how we would try to explain their m eaning to others, H are indicates that we w ould explain the m eaning of the word “ red” to a person who knows no English by p oin tin g to various red objects, and saying to him on each such occasion, “ T h a t is red.” W e could thus poin t to red autos, red stam ps, red tomatoes. In order to avoid confusing our foreign friend, we should also poin t to autos which are not red, stam ps which are not red, an d tom atoes which are not red, and utter on each such occasion, “ T h is is not red b u t so and so.” Now can a technique such as this be used to help someone understand the m eaning of the word “ good ” ? H are thinks that it can, for “ good” is like “ red” in that it can be applied to any num ber of different classes of objects frum pencils, to autos, to cards, to pictures, to men, and so on. O rdinary usage reinforces this point, for as H are suggests we know w hat is m eant when the word “g o od ” is applied to classes of objects which we have not experienced before. T h u s H are proposes that if one were conversing with a foreigner who knew the m eaning of the word “ choose,” it would be possible to teach him the m eanin g of “ good” in one lesson. H are's exam ple here is well worth quoting: Suppose that I ask him to teach me one of the gam es of his own country, and he says that he w ill teach m e about the gam e of

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smashmak. T h is gam e, he explains, is played with a thing called a shmakum. Before asking him to describe to me a shm akum , o r to proceed with his account of the game, I say to him , ‘W here do you get these shm akum s from ?’ and he answers ‘From shmakumm akers; in our country every town has a street of shmakumm akers.’ I then ask ‘Suppose you are buying a new shm akum , and you go to this street, and all sorts of shm akum s are offered you, all about the sam e price, what sort of shm akum w ould you choose?;’ and he replies ‘A ll other things bein g equal, I w ould choose the one that I could make the m ost smashes w ith.’ I then make a bold venture, an d say ‘Ah! I see, then you think the best shm akum is the one that you could m ake m ost sm ashes w ith.’63 O f course, we m ust assum e that the foreigner has already learned that “ best” is the superlative of “ good.” T h e apparently p arad ox ical part of my assertion, however, is that w ithout know ing exactly w hat a shm akum is, I can say that a good shmakum is the one that he would choose. Now if the m eaning of the word “ good” varies according to the context in which it is used, I w ould not be able to m ake such a judgm ent unless I knew a great deal more about the b all gam e which he is describing to me. T h u s, H are suggests that the w ord “ good ” has a common m eaning in all its uses; it is used, to quote the O xford E nglish Dictionary, as “ the m ost general adjective of com m endation, im plying the existence in a high, or at least satisfactory, degree of characteristic qualities which are either adm irable in themselves, or useful for some purpose . . .” 6i W e do not need therefore to learn a new lesson each time we use the word “ good” for com m ending. T h e alert reader may recognize that so far H a re’s view is very sim ilar to that of his colleague U rm son which we have already ex-; am ined. It is also like U rm son ’s view in another im portan t respect, namely, that H are insists that in learning the criteria of goodness a new lesson m ay have to be learned in each case. T h u s, w ithout know ing the criteria of good shm akum s, I should not m yself be able to pick a good one from a pile of shm akum s. B u t to recall U rm son ’s illustration, neither should I be able to select an extra fancy apple from a pile of apples unless I specifically knew the technical criteria which were to be applied. T h is sim ilarity of the use of the word “ good” w ith the use of the word “ red” should not m islead us into looking for a com mon property in all good things, ju st as we find a com mon property in all red things. In this respect, the two words function q u ite differently in­

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deed. H are finds therefore that those philosophers who have sought either a common n atu ralistic or non-naturalistic property to which “ good ” referred were barkin g up the wrong tree. R ath er, the distinc­ tion which clarifies the way in which we use “ good” is this: although the word has a com mon m eaning of com m endation in all contexts, the criteria (or the good-m aking characteristics) for the application of "g o o d ” vary according to the class of objects being discussed. T h u s, the criteria of a good pencil are quite different from those of a good auto, bu t in both cases the m eaning of the word “ good ” is to com­ m end the object referred to. Some philosophers have attem pted to differentiate between “ in ­ trinsic good” and “ instrum ental good” in order to suggest that the common property of “ intrinsic good” was an end in itself, while the common property of "in stru m en tal good” was rather that of bein g a' m eans to an end. H are suggests that this distinction fails to achieve its purpose, for clearly with reference to “ instrum ental good” it would be necessary to m ultiply properties endlessly. T h ere w ould be the tiring gam e in this case of specifying what end the specific instrum ent was a m eans toward, a saw for the end of sawing lum ber, a pencil for the end of writing, and an auto for the end of transportation, or pleasure, and so on. T h u s it is not possible to treat “ good” as exactly like “ red” in function since there are no common properties of all things called “ good.” H are finds the m ore useful distinction to be the one which U rm son an d he, am ong other contem porary philosophers, have proposed, namely, that between the m eaning of the word “ good ” and the cri­ teria for its ap plication . W e have already seen that one can apply the word “ good” correctly to objects if he does not know the criteria to be used in this p articu lar case, but also one m ight apply the criteria of “ good” for a certain class correctly and not know the m eaning of the w ord “ good.” H are suggests that a m an m ight be able correctly to classify augers into piles of good an d bad augers but think that this was sim ply a m ethod of classification not im plying the preferring of one type of auger to another. Suppose, for exam ple, that he was com ing with us on a long voyage of exploration, and we said to him ‘D o n ’t forget to bring an auger,’ an d he brought one of the bad ones, we should think that he did not know the m eaning of ‘good auger,’ although quite able to tell a good auger from a bad one.65

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We already noticed that H are states that alm ost all the words in our language may be used for the purposes of evaluation; we m ust exam ine the context of any specific rem ark to determ ine whether or not they are being used evaluatively. Does it also hold that words which are prim arily used as evaluative words, such as “ good,” may in some contexts be used descriptively? Yes, H are finds this does in fact happen in quite a few uses of words like “ good.” I may intend to do no more than convey factual inform ation in both of the follow ing sentences: “ T h is is a blue pen cil” and “ T h is is a good pencil.” Su p­ pose my hearer asks me in return, “ W hat is a blue pencil?” and “ W hat is a good pencil?” I m ight answer in the first case by poin tin g to a blue pencil and attem pt, so to speak, to explain the m eaning of my sentence. B u t I should not be doing quite the sam e thing in the case of my second sentence, for here rather than explain in g the m eaning of the word “ good” I should be telling him the criteria which I used as standards for calling the pencil in question “ good.” In the case of such things as pencils the criteria for callin g a pencil “ good,” such as that it writes smoothly, the poin t does not break off easily, and so on, are rather p ublic and generally accepted ones. Hence, I m ight have been using “ good pen cil” in this context not prim arily to com­ m end but rather as a shorthand description of the various features which are commonly thought to be associated w ith “ good pencil.” Nevertheless, the aspect of com m ending som ething as an excellent m em ber of its class is always present when I use the word “ good,” bu t in those cases where conventional usage has established criteria which are generally known and accepted the word “ good ” m ay indeed function in a descriptive m anner. One m ight be inclined to think that one of the differences brought out in the above illu stration w ould be the looseness of the use of the word “ good” when com pared with a word such as “ blue.” H are does not find this to be the case, for suppose the pencil 1 called “ b lu e” was of a new shade which was not clearly blue, nor purple, but rather called by a new trade nam e “ purblu e.” I m ight still call it "b lu e ” if it seemed to be more blue than purple, and in this case “ b lu e” would be used in a loose and vague way. O n the other hand, the criteria for calling a pencil “ good ” m ight well be so com monly accepted and exact that I m ight be conveying to you a shorthand description which you would have no trouble in recognizing. H are wishes to stress that although in conventional contexts “ good”

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may function in a descriptive capacity, it is prim arily a word express­ ing com m endation. T h e descriptive m eaning is thus only a secondary m eaning. H are suggests two m ain reasons for calling the evaluative m eaning of the word “ good ” prim ary: (1) “ the evaluative m eaning is constant for every class of object for which the word is used.”*38 T h e evaluative m eaning of “ good” is com mon to all its uses, while its descriptive m eaning varies according to the object to which one is referring. (2) T h e other reason for calling the evaluative m eaning of “ good” prim ary is “ that we can use the evaluative force of the word in order to change the descriptive m eaning for any class of objects.” 07' T h u s, as H are suggests, we m ight say that the autos of the 1950’s were not really good, while those of the 1960’s are good. W hat we have donej here is to change the standards or criteria, so that we no longer call “ good ” those cars which were very large, had a great deal of chrome trim, could go over 100 miles per hour, and so on, and now call “ good” a sm all car, not overburdened with trim, which is econom ical to run. B u t we should still be using the w ord “ good” to commend, only the standards of com m endation w ould be changed. T h ere are some cases in which we do use “ good” w ithout a com­ m endatory m eaning at all; and such are the uses which H are refers to as “ inverted commas use” an d the “ conventional use.” 68 In the inverted-commas use of the w ord “ good ” I should not be m aking a value ju d gm en t myself, bu t merely referring to the value ju dgm en t some other person(s) m ight m ake. In expan d in g such sentences I m ight wish to put “ good” into inverted-commas to show that I myself was not expressing that it was in fact good. T h u s if I were to say to you,“ T h ere is a good Elvis Presley film being shown at the R ex C inem a,” an d you were sufficiently acquain ted with the type of films I usually" com mended, you m ight recognize that I was really im plying som e­ thing like “ For those people who like this sort of film, this is a ‘good’ Elvis Presley film .” T h e conventional use of “ good” in a des­ criptive sense m ight be a little h arder to detect than the invertedcommas usage, for in this case I should merely be payin g lip-service to what the great m ajority of people in my society call “ good.” H are suggests as an illu stration in this connection the rem ark which one m ight m ake about an article of furniture to the effect that “ T h is piece of furniture is of good design.” On the surface it w ould be difficult to detect whether I were m aking a value ju dgm en t about the

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furniture or not. H are suggests how a logician m ight proceed to deter­ m ine if this sentence was an evaluative or conventional usage: ‘If som eone (not connected in any way with the furn iture trade), consistently and regardless of cost filled his house w ith furniture not conform ing to the canons by which you ju d g e the design of this furniture to be good, w ould you regard that as evidence that he d id not agree with you?' If I replied ‘N o, I w ould not; for what furn iture is of good design is one question, an d w hat furn i­ ture one chooses for oneself is another,’ then we m ight conclude that I h ad not been really com m ending the design by calling it good, b u t only payin g lip-scrvice to a convention.69 H are does not suggest at all that he has covered all the ways in which value terms are actually used, b u t rather that he has sim ply called attention to some of the m ain ways in which they are used. T h e in dividual has him self to pay attention to the way these terms are used by others, and by him self, if he is to avoid errors of m isunder­ standing and confusion. T h e reader m ay at this p oin t be curious as to the relation sh ip be­ tween choosing and com m ending which H are has frequently indicated, as well as to the relationship between the logic of im peratives and the logic of value words. H are m ain tain s in respect to the first rela­ tionship that we condem n or praise in order to gu ide choices. H e suggests that this relationship appears if one inquires into the p u r­ pose for which we use value words. We do n ot use them for things which individuals do n ot have to choose between; we do use them to help guide ourselves or others in m aking choices between things either now or in the future. If we never h ad to choose between which pencil to use, which auto to buy, which kin d of m an to em ulate, we should never apply “ good ” to these kinds of things. T h e relationship between im peratives an d value ju dgm en ts H are finds to consist in the fact that value judgm en ts can be recast into the form of universal im peratives, since all value ju dgm en ts are, at least im plicitly, universal in character. W hen I say that som ething is “ good” I im ply som ething about other objects of the sam e class with sim ilar characteristics, nam ely that they are "g o o d ” as well. T h u s, in com m ending a p articular object, I am im plicitly com m ending other objects in the sam e class which are exactly like it in the relevant re­ spects. V alue judgm ents, therefore, function like universal im peratives; one m ight recast “ T h is is a good ap p le” into “ Choose ap ples with

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exactly these characteristics.” T h e sim ilarity in the functioning of u ni­ versal im peratives and value judgm ents can be seen in the necessity to be consistent in using them. W e have already seen that if we grant exceptions to any so-called universal im perative, we m ust restrict more precisely the range of its ap plication if it is to rem ain a universal im perative. T h is sam e necessity for consistency is seen in the m aking of value judgm ents, for if one is inconsistent in the application of the w ord “ good” to sim ilar objects, com m unication fails to take place. T h u s if I said of two apples which were exactly alike (in all those respects in which they could be alike) that one was “ good” and the other was “ b ad ” you w ould be puzzled as to what I m eant. If you took me seriously, and assum ed that I was not playin g a joke, you m ight ask me “ Why do you say that? T h ey are exactly alike; how can you therefore call one ‘good’ and the other ‘b a d ’?” In reply, if I were being serious, I should then have to specify the standards I used for calling apples good, and w ould have to then be consistent and grade both apples with the sam e grad in g label. H are finds that this sam e type of logic which is used in non-moral uses of the word “ good” functions in our m oral usage of this word as well. In the use of “ good ” in m oral contexts we either directly or indirectly commend people, and the sam e requirem ent for consis­ tency applies here as in the case of gradin g apples, pencils, or autos. It is of course true, as H are takes pains to poin t out, that we are more concerned about the evaluatin g of persons since we are ourselves members of the hum an race. T h is is no reason, however, for assum ing that the logic ap plied to the use of evaluative words is different in m oral contexts from what it is in non-moral contexts. Logically, we can’t accept m oral judgm ents w ithout conform ing to them, any more than we can accept the criteria for good apples and then not use our grad in g labels consistently. In m oral uses of “ good,” as well as in non-moral uses, the word functions as a supervenience upon the various qu alities which we have recognized as the criteria of a “ good m an .” T h e characteristics which we take as criteria of a good m an, are not sufficient to entail the goodness of the m an, bu t they are necessary conditions for our apply­ ing the word correctly. T h e relation between the characteristics and the judgm en t of a m an as good H are explains as follows: “ It is that a statem ent of the characteristics of the m an (the m inor or factual prem ise) together with a specification of a stan dard for ju d g in g men

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m orally (the m ajo r prem ise), entails a m oral ju d gm en t upon h im .” 70 M oral judgm ents are so m uch more im portan t for us since we are men that we sometimes fail to see the logic of our h aving to attem pt to abide by the kinds of m oral judgm ents which wre make. T h a t many of our so-called m oral ju dgm en ts are really conventional rather than evaluative can be brough t home by H are’s reference to a very common practice of callin g the life of a saint m orally superior to the life one m ay be living now. U su ally such references are m erely conventional, for we do not intend to change our way of life and em ulate the life of a saint such as St. Francis. “ B u t if I adm it that the life of St. Francis was m orally better than mine, and really m ean this as an evaluation, there is nothing for it bu t to try to be more like St. Francis, which is arduous.” 71 T h e logic of value words is therefore much more than a lesson in how to use the English language correctly, for as Hare' rem arks, in another directly m oral reference, keen attention to the prim ary use of m oral words for evaluation may help deliver us from m oral decay. T h e remedy, in fact, for m oral stagnation and decay is to learn to use our value-language for the purpose for which it is de­ signed; and this involves not merely a lesson in talking, bu t a lesson in doing that which we com mend; for unless we are pre­ pared to do this we are doing no m ore than pay lip-service to a conventional stan dard .72 T H E F U N C T IO N O F “ R I G H T ” A N D “ O U G H T ” H are agrees with those m oral philosophers who have stated that “ good ” does not function quite the same way as “ righ t” and “ ought.” T h u s, while it is usual to speak of a good person or thing, it is usual to speak of the right act or thing. T h ere is no com parative or super­ lative in our language for “ righ t” and “ ought.” Yet despite the ob­ vious differences between “ good,” and “ ought,” all three function as value-words, and are used in both m oral and non-moral contexts. "R ig h t” an d “ ough t” share the supervenient character of “ good” in that actions cannot differ only with respect to their rightness or oughtness if they are in all other respects exactly alike. Furtherm ore “ righ t” and “ ought” are not entailed by any purely descriptive statem ents, b u t as in the case of “ good” various descriptive statem ents may furnish the standards for determ ining the rightness or oughtness of an act. T h u s, in brief, "rig h t” an d “ ough t” are value words which function

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as prescriptions for advising, for instructing, or to guide one in choos­ ing. In his analysis H are concentrates upon “ ough t” m ain tain in g that “ righ t” could be analyzed in m uch the same way. In any context, I m ight answer a question which called for a prescriptive answer such as “ W hat shall I do?” or “ W hat ought I to have done?” by giving ad­ vice or instruction for this particular occasion only, or by statin g a m ore universal com m and which w ould also hold for sim ilar occasions. L et us paraphrase H a re’s exam ples here by considering both a non­ m oral and a m oral context. Suppose you ask me “ W hat pen shall I use?” I m ight give one of three types of answer: A l. Use this pen. A2. One ought always to use a pen which writes. A3. You ought to use a pen which writes. It is clear that A l is a sin gular im perative which refers to this occasion only, while A2 is a universal im perative intended, to cover all sim ilar situations. A3 com bines features of both A l and A2 in that while it is directed to a specific occasion, it is nevertheless based upon the u ni­ versal com m and of A2. In a m oral context if you ask m e “ W hat shall I do? Shall I keep this prom ise I m ade to him ?” I m ight answer in any of three sim ilar ways: B l . Keep this prom ise which you m ade to him. B2. One ought always to keep prom ises which one has made. B3. You ought to keep the prom ise which you m ade to him. A gain, the sam e kind of analysis w ould hold. B l is a sin gular im pera­ tive, B2 a universal m oral judgm ent, and B3 is an im perative addressed to a p articular situation but based upon a universal m oral principle. W e notice therefore that “ ough t” functions as a universal im perative in both non-moral an d m oral contexts. Likew ise in “ ough t” judgm ents with reference to the past, one finds that they logically depend upon a universal im perative. T h u s if you had already chosen a pen, or failed to keep your prom ise, I m ight say som ething like the follow ing: A4. You ought to have used a pen which writes. B4. You ought to have kept your prom ise to him. In these cases I am again ap p ealin g to a universal principle, perhaps as a m eans of teaching you how to avoid m aking the sam e m istakes in the fu tu re.73

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A t this p oin t we reach a rath er crucial point in H are’s analysis of “ ought,” for he has insisted that when “ ough t” is used as a value word it entails an im perative that I should do such an d such. B u t don ’t we sometimes say, “ You ought to do this, bu t don ’t” ? N ow H are adm its that all sentences with “ ough t” in them entail im peratives if and only if “ ough t” is bein g used for the purposes of evaluation. If, as we have seen in reference to “ good,” one uses “ ough t” in a purely conventional way, then one is not really m aking a value judgm ent, and hence, no im perative is entailed by it. T h u s if one student says to another, “ You ought to go to class today, b u t don ’t,” H are would say that an expan ded form of this sentence w ould show that “ ough t” was being used in a conventional or inverted-commas way. Such an expansion m ight be, “ T h e professors at this university require class attendance and if one conform s to this standard, then one ‘ough t’ to attend class today. B u t I do not accept this artificial stan dard of edu­ cation, and think you ought not to accept it either. Hence, d on ’t go to class today.” In the above expansion the second use of ought is evaluative b u t not in the first instance in which it appears in inverted commas. T h u s H are is m aking it logically true by definition that the word “ ought” is bein g used for evaluation if and only if it entails an im perative. O f course in practice H are finds that a statem ent of the form “ I ought to do X ” is frequently a confused m ixture of three qu ite d if­ ferent kinds of judgm ents. In crucial cases concerning what one’s obli­ gation really is, it becomes im portan t to distinguish between these three different judgm ents: ,

(1) ‘X is required in order to conform to the stan dard which people generally accept’ (statem ent of sociological f a c t ) ; (2) ‘I have a feeling that I ought to do X ’ (statem ent of psycho­ logical fact); (S) ‘I ought to do X ’ (value-judgm ent).74

Now, as H are points out, m ost of us are taught to accept as our obliga­ tions the standards of our society, and in this process of education, we alm ost autom atically develop feelings of o bligation such that we generally think that we actually ought to abide by these standards which we have learned and about which we have such deep feelings. B u t in some crucial cases it m ay be necessary for us to be able to separate the sociological and psychological facts about our con dition ­ in g from an actual v alu e'ju d g m en t in order to achieve the ability to

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m ake a rational choice. H are thus proposes a crucial test which can be ap plied to discover whether someone who is telling you that you ought to do som ething is u sin g the word evaluatively or not: “ Does he or does he not recognize that if he assents to the judgm ent, he m ust also assent to the com m and ‘L et me do X ’?” 75 If the person in question does not assent to the com m and entailed by the value judgm ent, then he is not m aking a value judgm ent, bu t rather merely uttering a m oral statem ent in a conventional or inverted commas sense. T h ere is one very grave difficulty in H are’s com parison of m oral ju dgm en ts with im peratives, and that is that the latter are in correct speech ap plied only to the future, while the form er can function with reference to the past and present as well as the future. H are explains this difference by saying that universal im peratives are not properly universal, since they do not hold in all tenses, b u t rather only in the future and usually in the second person. In his concluding chapter H are, therefore, attem pts to construct an analytical m odel, which he says we ought not to take too seriously, whereby an enriched universal im perative can be created to do m ost of the jo b s done by our custom ­ ary value words, “ go od ," “ righ t” and “ ought.” It is im portan t to note that H are does not claim that this m odel of his will do justice to all the uses of value words in ordinary language, b u t only that if it can do m ost of them, it is h elpful in showing us the relationship between universal im peratives and evaluations. A fter recasting the value words “ good” and “ righ t” into expressions using “ ought,” H are makes uses of his distinction between the phrastics and neustics of sentences to enrich the im perative m ood so that it can function in all tenses as well as in the first, second and third per­ son. T h u s a p ast im perative could be fram ed, such as “ Shutting of the door by you at 11 p.m . on 4 M arch, please.” TGA n extension of this to “ Sh utting of the door by myself, or by him at 11 p.m. on 4 M arch, please” would take care of the first and third person usages as well. T h e reader may object that this sounds very strange indeed. H are w ould not deny this, but insists that this is not a question of transla­ tion from ordinary usage to form a more precise language, bu t rather it is a purely experim ental gam e to see if an enriched universal im ­ perative form could do m ost of the jo b s of value words. And if we can so enrich this universal im perative that it would hold for all times and all persons, then we have approached to the characteristic features of value judgm ents themselves.

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W e need not go into the details of H are’s analysis, in which he attem pts to construct an artificial w ord “ ought” to see if it can do both the evaluative and descriptive jobs of the ordinary English word “ ought.” It is, however, h elpful for our purposes to notice his exp lan a­ tion of the so-called objective characteristic of value judgm ents. When I appeal to a m oral prin ciple I am ap pealin g to som ething that is there already, in the sense that untold generations before me in my society agreed to subscribe to this principle. However, if I am myself using the prin ciple in an evaluative sense, I too subscribe to it at the tim e I utter it and am not merely stating a fact abou t my feelings or my society’s principles. In conclusion, therefore, H are puts the issue of m oral choice onto the shoulders of each in d ivid ual: T h a t the [m oral] principle is well established (i.e. that every­ one w ould agree with it) and that I have feelings of com punction if I break it, are facts; bu t when I subscribe to the principle, I do not state a fact, bu t m ake a m oral decision. Even if I m ake it by default— even if I ju st accept w ithout thinking the standards in which I have been brought u p — nevertheless I am, in an im por­ tant sense, m aking myself responsible for the judgm ent. And this means that, if it is an evaluative ju d gm en t at all, I cannot ju st take it as given.77 T O W A R D A N E V A L U A T IO N O F H A R E ’S V IEW O F E T H IC S AS P R E S C R IP T IV E H are’s study has been the m ost influential of the contem porary treatm ents of the language of m orals. T h is is not to say that it has not been criticized, bu t rath er that his study is recognized as being in m any ways as im portan t for the contem porary study of m oral lan g­ uage as was the work of G. E. M oore for ethical intuitionism , or the work of Charles Stevenson for the em otive theory. In general, the specific criticisms directed again st H are’s view are: (1) that he has m ade too absolute a distinction between telling someone to do some­ thing and getting one to do it, (2) that he has too closely identified ethical principles with com m ands, (S) that his overstressing of the sim ilarity of ethical principles to com m ands is based on an over­ sim plified analysis of the types of sentence which can be uttered in com m unication situations, and (4) that ought statem ents do not en­ tail im peratives. L e t us turn to an exam ination of these criticism s in some detail.

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(1) We have already had occasion to notice in exam in in g H are’s criticism of Stevenson’s em otive theory that R . B. Braithw aite has m aintain ed that H are has erred in draw ing a firm distinction between telling someone to do som ething and getting one to do it. B raith ­ w aite suggests that in actual practice when one tells someone to do som ething, one is also attem ptin g to get the person to do it. As illu s­ trations of his p oin t B raithw aite cites some advertisem ents which are presented in the linguistic form of commands, “ D rink more beer,” “ E at more ban an as.” 73 T h e poin t here is that B raithw aite m aintains that the processes of telling someone to do som ething and trying to get one to do it are not as wholly different as H are has said they are. Mr. H are, I think, has been led into error by thinking too much of the sentence spoken when a com m and is uttered and too little of the circum stances which m ade the hearer of the sentence re­ gard it as a com m and. Why the hearer does so is because the situation is one in which he takes the speaker to be intending the com m and to be obeyed, and he w ould not suppose the situa­ tion to be of this sort unless he had known of sim ilar situations in which a com m and was obeyed.79 H are was eager not to fall into an em otive theory of ethics; he wished in p articular to m ain tain therefore that ethical com m ands were not intended to have a causal effect upon the hearer. It is precisely this which Braithw aite finds wrong in H are’s analysis of com mands, for the hearer, if he understands the com m and which the speaker utters to him , recognizes it as the m ost direct and obvious way of trying to get him to do som ething. In short, Braithw aite suggests that com mands cannot be analyzed as H are attem pts to analyze them, because the com m unication situation involves both the speaker- and the hearer. By stressing telling as the hall-m ark of com m and, H are has neglected the hearer, who recognizes a com m and as not merely telling him to do som ething but also as a ration al attem pt to persuade him to do it. (2) B raithw aite also thinks that H are’s studying of sentences in isolation from their com m unication contexts not only led to the error of artificially separatin g com m ands from persuasion, bu t also led to identifying com m ands too closely w ith m oral judgm ents. Braithw aite does not m ain tain any m ore than H are does that either com m ands or m oral judgm ents are concerned with conveying feeling. M oral ju d g ­ m ents are concerned w ith policy decisions, according to Braithw aite, and as such they bear some resem blance to statem ents as well as some

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sim ilarity to com m ands. T h e prim ary difficulty in attem ptin g to ex­ p lain m oral policy proclam ations in terms of com m ands is the logical im possibility of com m anding som ething to be different with respect to the past. H are’s cnriched im perative m ood seems to stretch m oral principles pretty far in an attem pt to assim ilate them to commands. In order to clarify this criticism , let us use an illu stration which Braithw aite has used. On the basis of H are’s analysis the universal m oral principle, “ L ies ought never to be told ” can be rendered in the form of his phrastics and neustics as “ N o lies being told by anyone ever, please.” Now while B raithw aite agrees with H are’s phrastic, he disagrees with the neustic, “ because a resolve of m ine, or a com m and given by me to you, to m ake it the case that no lies have been told, ever are being told or ever w ill be told is one im possible o f fulfilm ent or obedience— logically im possible, so far as concerns lies which have been told in the past; causally im possible, so far as the lies bein g told now or to be told in the future are outside my power, or your power, to prevent.” 80 T h is difficulty, B raithw aite thinks, shows a very im por­ tant respect in which m oral policy utterances are m ore like statem ents than like com m ands. R ath er than attem pt to force them into the category of com m ands, B raithw aite suggests that an analysis of the sort H are did requires rendering my subscription to a m oral policy in sentences of the form “ I w ill play my p art in seeing that no lies are ever told” or “ I w ill ensure, so far as it rests with me, that no lies are ever told.” 81 T h e reader should note that B raith w aite’s rej casting of “ L ies ough t never to be told” is a declaration very like a statem ent, and not at all like a com mand. T h e point at issue between Braithw aite an d H are is not that m oral principles are never used as com mands, for B raithw aite adm its that in fact they are sometimes so used. W hen a m oral in jun ction is given of the form “ Y ou ought not to lie,” then one can see an obvious sim i­ larity with the language in which com m ands are uttered. B raith w aite’s contention is that this is not the philosophically basic use of m oral principles, for he finds their m ost characteristic use to be that of su b­ scribing to a policy. A nd surely to say “ I w ill play my p art in seeing that this m oral policy is fulfilled” is to utter a declaration of intention an d not to state a com m and. T h e reader w ill have to decide for him ­ self, therefore, whether the m ost characteristic use of m oral lan guage is to utter com m ands, either to others or to oneself, or to affirm one’s intention to abide by a m oral principle. W hat is clear, however, is

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that the ordinary use of ethical language is far too rich to be ade­ quately described in the sole terms of commands. (3) In his review of H are’s book and in his lectures on ethics at C am bridge U niversity, Braithw aite m aintains that H are’s confusion of ethical declarations with com m ands arose from the failure to observe the m any different kinds of com m unication situations which actually arise. Braithw aite agrees with H are that m oral language is a use of prescriptive language, but he finds that m oral policy proclam ations are so different from com m ands as to require a special category for their analysis. Indeed Braithw aite finds H are’s analysis of statem ent situations to be oversim plified as well. For our purposes, however, we may concentrate on B raith w aite’s suggested analysis of ethical lan g­ uage. T h e special com m unication situation which is present when m oral language is used in its characteristically m oral way is, accord­ ing to Braithw aite, that of proclaim in g policies. H are was led into error by failin g to notice that these proclam ations of policy can be m ade in three different kinds of context, only one of which is an alo­ gous to com m ands. L e t us exam ine each of these three contexts in turn. (a) Braithw aite finds that the m ost characteristic use of sentences such as “ N ever tell lies” is to indicate my own subscription to this m oral policy. T h u s if I say this sentence in a context in which you are asking me w hat are the m oral principles by which I live, I am not com m anding you to do likewise, b u t am rather declaring to you my m oral belief to the effect that “ I w ill play my p art in seeing that no lies are ever told.” W hat I am suggesting is that I will do my best,> recognizing that I can’t alter the lies told in the past nor prevent others from telling lies now or in the future. I am expressing my in­ tention to abide by this m oral policy not to tell lies ever. Braithw aite m aintain s that this is the basic use of ethical language, for unless one first knows what it would be like to subscribe to a policy oneself, one can’t com m and others to abide by it. And in this sense Braithw aite finds subscriptions to m oral policy analogous to confessions of belief: “Ju s t as I cannot tell anyone to believe som ething w ithout know ing what it is to believe it myself, so I cannot tell anyone to do som ething (or play his part in doing som ething) w ithout know ing what it is to do it myself (or to play my p art in doing it).” 82 It is therefore erron­ eous to suggest that subscriptions to m oral policies are like im pera­ tives; rather, they function like declarations of intention or resolu­

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tions. “ T h e only thing that could be called an im perative element in a resolution is that, in utterin g it, the speaker intends to let the hearer know that he (the speaker) w ill do som ething or w ill play his p art in doing som ething; and this im perative elem ent also occurs in the use of a confession of belief.” 83 T h e fun dam en tal use of m oral proclam ations is therefore declarative and not im perative; hence, according to Braithw aite, it is fallacious to treat m oral prin ciples as concealed im peratives. (b) L et us now suppose a situation in which you are asking me for advice. You m ight ask me, “ Should I lie to my lan d lad y about the time I came in last night?” My answer m ight be, “ N ever tell lies.” Now clearly in this situation we are dealing with the kin d of circum ­ stances which H are took to be basic in the use of m oral language. A ccording to B raith w aite’s analysis in this situation I am u tterin g to you an injunction to pursue the policy I am recom m ending. Accord­ ingly my answer m ight be expan ded to “ Play your p art in seeing that no lies are told.” I am telling you to follow this policy to the extent that you are able. Now B raithw aite adm its that in actual usage this kind of situation probably occurs m ore frequently than the first con­ text we have sketched above. H is point, however, is that the first type of situation, that of my su bscribing to the policy itself, is logically prior to my telling you to subscribe to it as well. In this context my policy proclam ation is of course analogous to utterin g a com m and, b u t Braithw aite insists that it likewise is an instruction to you to be­ lieve a statem ent which I utter. T h u s, if I say “ Believe that all u n i­ corns are square im plies that this room is painted green,” I am uttering a sentence which is no m ore and no less like a com m and than “ Never tell lies.” In short, if instructions to believe what I say, as well as m oral injunctions, function like com m ands, then it is erroneous to suggest that m oral principles are im perative while statem ents of belief are not. H are’s considering all statem ents of belief to be declarations blin ded him to those contexts in which one m ay be instructed to be­ lieve what is said. (c) Sometimes my policy proclam ations com bine features of both of the above contexts. L et us im agine a m inister who is preaching on m oral duties to his congregation. It seems safe to assum e that he is not sim ply announcing his intention of follow ing the m oral policies he is recom m ending, nor is he sim ply recom m ending that you follow them. R ath er what he is m ost likely doing is in effect som ething like

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this: “ I subscribe to these C hristian policies of love and forgiveness, and I am asking you to cooperate with me in seeing that they are fulfilled in our daily lives.” In this kind of context, we may see a request for moral cooperation in pursu in g the policies declared. T h e m inister is asking you to help him in subscribing in life to the m oral policies of love and forgiveness. A nd it should be clear as well that som etim es my statem ent to you “ N ever tell lies” is intended to be taken in the sense of asking you to cooperate with me in your doing your part, as I will do my part, to see that lies are not told. C learly there is an im perative p art to my utterance in this kind of context, b u t Braithw aite finds that this im perative aspect can also be found in those statem ent situations in which I am conveying inform ation to you. If I convey to you that it is colder in A laska than in Florida, I am telling you my own belief as well as instructing you to believe it. You w ould not on that basis, however, say the sentence was exactly like a com m and; Braithw aite w ould add it is im proper to view requests for assistance in carrying out a m oral policy as exactly like commands. In sum m ary of B raith w aite’s specific criticisms of H are’s view, we should note that he does n ot deny that m oral utterances do sometimes function like com m ands, but he insists that the basic nature of m oral prin ciples is rather found in the proclam ation of policies, or resolu­ tions to abide by the prin ciples I state. In this respect, they are more like statem ents about beliefs than they are like commands. In one ad dition al move, Braithw aite suggests that the sam e test which H are proposes for determ ining what a m an ’s m oral principles are, m ight also be used to determ ine what are a m an ’s Deliefs. I f one’s m oral p rinciples are revealed by how a m an acts, so too are his beliefs. And if this is the case, then perhaps m oral judgm ents are more like ordinary statem ents of belief concerning what is held to be true than some m oral philosophers have realized. (4) A. C. Ew ing has voiced an objection to H are’s view that an evaluative use of an “ ough t” statem ent entails my acting in conform ity with it. Ew ing points out that one m ight recognize that he ought to do som ething and yet refuse to do it. H e finds that H a re ’s position leads to the Socratic p arad o x that we never do what we see to be wrong. Com m on experience, however, seems to indicate that all of us do at times not even intend to do what we clearly see we ought to do. T h u s, H are’s analysis of the im perative nature of “ ough t” statem ents does not seem to be the case. Ew ing does find that it is true to this extent,

“ if we recognize that we ought to do som ething, we tend, other things being equal, to do it. T h e trouble is ju st that other things are very often not equal, i.e. though follow ing the righ t course has an attrac­ tion for us, som ething else attracts us also.” 84 T h e poin t of Ew ing’s criticism here is that not only in experience do we often fail to do w hat we recognize we ought to do, b u t also that it is m isleading on H are’s p art to refuse to call a ju dgm en t evaluative unless it entails an im perative to the effect that I m ust carry it out. On the surface it appears that Ew ing is righ t here, but perhaps in fairness to H are one m ight reply as follows. W hen one says that he knows that he ought to do som ething, b u t that he also does not intend to do it, that person is being insincere. T o believe that I clearly ought to do som ething im plies that when the situation arises I should act as I think I ought to. Now as H are has said, m any of our so-called m oral judgm ents are merely conventional and we do not intend to carry them out. B u t Ew ing is apparently referring to actual m oral judgm ents which I make, blit which I do nevertheless n ot intend to carry out. I m ight subscribe now to the policy “ N ever tell lies” but tomorrow when the situation arises I may lie nevertheless. H are could either say in such a case that then I had changed my m in d and at the time of the act d id not subscribe to the policy, or that my first utter­ ance of the policy was merely conventional. Braithw aite has attem pted to reply to E w ing’s criticism by draw ing a distinction between my ideal self and my everyday self. My ideal self or my ideal of my self subscribes to the policy of never telling lies, bu t my everyday self is not subscribing to this policy. T h e use of ethical language is thus a subscription by my ideal self to the m oral policy of not telling lies. I may resolve to do som ething b u t the weak­ ness of my everyday self may be such that I shall not be able to live up to my resolution. Ew ing has reacted to this postulation of two selves by suggesting that it seems more artificial to postulate an ideal self and an everyday self than to adm it quite candidly that I m ay recognize a m oral obliga­ tion and yet not intend to carry it out.85 T h e reader w ill have to make u p his own m ind on this m atter. W hether or not Braith w aite and H are are correct here, it does seem true that sincerely assenting to a m oral obligation should involve my intending to act in accordance with it, at least in so far as I am able. A pparently, this connection may not be one of logical entailm ent as H are suggested, but perhaps it is

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a principle of general m oral consistency in living in accordance with the principles one professes. On the positive side of the ledger it should be noted that H are’s analysis of m oral language is the m ost carefully worked out study we have had on this m atter. In his analysis of im peratives an d ethical sentences he has correctly shown some sim ilarities to be fou n d in these uses of language. Likew ise, he has shown that “ good” functions the sam e way in m oral an d non-moral contexts, an d that no non­ n atu ral or n atural property is required to account for this fact. “ G ood ” is used for com m ending things or persons, and what varies are the standards which are used to determ ine the goodness of the specific kinds of objects evaluated. Even if he is wrong in suggesting that m oral principles entail im peratives of action! if one subscribes to the p rin ci­ ples, it is certainly clear that he has stressed an im portan t poin t for m orality in in sisting that one should realize that if one truly assents to a m oral ju dgm en t one m ust act in accordance with it. H is insist­ ence on facing the problem of the m oral education of children as requ irin g a difficult balance between teaching m oral principles by precept and allow ing the child to m ake decisions itself, shows that m odern philosophers are not blin d to the m oral dangers of au th ori­ tarian or self-indulgent rearin g of children. In short, while H are’s book is a study in m etaethics, that is, in analyzing m oral language, rather than in exam in in g the principles of m orals themselves, never­ theless it contains an im plicit m oral philosophy worthy to be ranked with that of G. E. M oore an d W. D. Ross.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 1 These are now published as Wittgenstein: The Blue and Brown Books. Ox­ ford: Basil Blackwell, 1959. 2 Ludwig W ittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Second edition, 1958. (English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe). a W ittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, section 43. 4 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, sections 66, 67. s Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, sections 68, 69. ©Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, section 77. i Stephen T oulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics. Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950. s Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, xiii. s Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 4. Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, chapter 4. i i T oulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 57. i 2 T oulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 62. is Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 62. 14 Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 63. 15 Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 191. is T oulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 83. 17 Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 137. is Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 136. is Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 146. 20 Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, pp. 148-149. 21 Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 151. 22 Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 162. 23 T oulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 219. 24 T oulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 224. 215 Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 4. Cf. 38, 55 ff. 26 R . M. Hare, "Book Review of T oulm in ’s The Place of Reason in Ethics” in The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. I No. 4, Ju ly 1951, p. 374. 27 Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 83. 28 Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 146. 29 Toulm in, The Place of Reason in Ethics, pp. 194-195. 30 Reprinted in A. G. N. Flew, editor, Logic and Language (Second Series). O x­ ford: Basil Blackwell, 1953, pp. 159-186. si Urmson in Flew, Logic and Language (Second Series), pp. 170-171. 32 Urmson in Flew, Logic and Language (Second Series), p. 171. 33 Urmson in Flew, Logic and Language (Second Series), p. 175. 3-t Urmson in Flew, Logic and Language (Second Series), p. 176. 35 Urmson in Flew, Logic and Language (Second Series), pp. 178-179. 36 Unnson in Flew, Logic and Language (Second Series), p. 181. 37 Urmson in Flew, Logic and Language (Second Series), p. 181. 38 Urmson in Flew, Logic and Language (Second Series), p. 184. 39 Urmson in Flew, Logic and Language (Second Series), p. 181. 40 Urmson in Flew, Logic and Language (Second Series), p. 182. 41 Urmson in Flew, Logic and Language (Second Series), pp. 182-183. 42 Urmson in Flew, Logic and Language (Second Series), p. 184. 43 Urmson in Flew, Logic and Language (Second Series), p. 176. 44 R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952, v. 45 Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 3. 40 Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 5. 47 Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 5 ff. 48 Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 14.

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49 Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 17.

50 Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 18 ff. si Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 20. 52 Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 25. 53 Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 28. Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 33. 55 Hare, The Language of Morals, pp. 50-51. 50 Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 51. 57 Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 54. 5s Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 74. 59 Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 76. 60 Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 69. si Hare, The Language of M orals, pp. 71-72. 62 Hare, The Language of M orals, pp. 79-80. S3 Hare, The Language of M orals, pp. 103-104. 64 Quoted in Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 79. 65 Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 103. 66 Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 118. s? Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 119. 68 Hare, The Language of Morals, pp. 124-125. 69 Hare, The Language of M orals, pp. 125-126. 70 Hare, The Language of Morals, pp. 145-146. 71 Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 142. 72 Hare, T he Language of M orals, p. 150. 73 Hare, The Language of M orals, pp. 155-158. 74 Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 167. 75 Hare, The Language of M orals, pp. 168-169. 76 Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 189. 77 Hare, The Language of M orals, p. 196. 78 R. B. Braithwaite, “ Critical Notice (Book Review) of The Language of Morals by R. M. H are.” M ind, A pril 1954, p. 251. 79 R. B. Braithwaite, “ Critical Notice (Book Review) of The Language of Morals by R. M. H are.” M ind, April 1954, pp. 251-252. so Braithwaite, “ Review of The Language of M orals,” M ind, 1954, pp. 257-258. 81 Braithwaite, "Review of The Language of M orals," M ind, 1954, p. 258. 82 Braithwaite, "Review of The Language of Morals,” M ind, 1954,p.259. 83 Braithwaite, “ Review of The Language of Morals,” M ind, 1954, p. 259. 84 A. C. Ewing, Second Thoughts in M oral Philosophy, p. 11. 85 Based on discussions I had with Ewing and Braithwaite at Cambridge during the academic year 1959-60.

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C H A P T E R

FO U R

ETH ICA L PHILOSOPHY A N D M O R A L LIV IN G It is time now to tie together some of the loose strands of this study of contem porary ethical theory. B u t more than that seems called for. T h e reader m ay ask, ‘‘W hat is the relevance of ethical theory for m oral living?” Indeed one who is rather sceptical of the p art philosophy plays in the investigation of m orals m ight respond that this present study, like m ost contem porary works in m oral philosophy, seems to have little or no relevance to one’s facing the specific problem s of living in today’s com plex world. W hat significance do discussions concerning the definability of “ good” and analyses of how ethical language is used in m oral debates have for the ordinary m an who rises at dawn am id the unfeeling walls of his tenement, descends the iron stairs, and goes to work am ong roarin g m achines that require only his m ost m echanical movem ents to keep operating? W hen stated this way it does not ap pear that there could be m uch usefulness in ethical theory for the ordinary m an who m ust struggle to earn a liveli­ hood for his fam ily an d him self. A critic could suggest that all that the philosophers are doing is playin g word games, some of which are m ildly interesting, bu t that such gam es do not offer any m oral gu id ­ ance to the in dividual. T h is sceptical attitude tow ard a philosophical inquiry into m orality is quite frankly expressed in the follow ing p as­ sage from a recent novel by Andrew Sinclair: W hat’s good for me, I say, isn ’t good for you, b u t I reckon we’ll all have to rub along together. T h a t’s p olitical philosophy as far as I ’m concerned. A nd if some cascara speaks up tartly, W hat do you m ean by good?, I ’ll say, Suit yourself, mac, m ost people think I m ean som ething when I say the dam n word. W ith all the p h i­ losophers spillin g the beans that we can ’t talk to each other, we ju st go on yapping. A nd w hat redefinition of m ean in g’s going to stop the b ig bang?1 Now while m any w ould undoubtedly not share the cynicism of the above passage, there are quite a lot of p eo ple who seriously m aintain

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that philosophical inquiries into the way language is used are not doin g anything worthwhile to stop the destruction of the world by atom ic warfare. T h ese people are looking for a new Plato who will give them a vision and a world-view by which they can live, and since m odern philosophers do not even attem pt to give them definite principles by which they ought to live, these people then say that philosophers have sold “ ‘their truthright for a mess of verbiage.’ ” 2 T h ese charges if leveled by the laym an ought to be taken seriously by philosophers, bu t the great need for attem pting to answer these charges is heightened by the fact that some contem porary philosophers, such as Bertrand R ussell and Ernest Gellner, have m ade sim ilar ac­ cusations. T h u s R ussell in criticizing the linguistic approach to philos­ ophy of the later W ittgenstein says: T h e later W ittgenstein . . . seems to have grown tired of serious thinking and to have invented a doctrine which w ould m ake such an activity unnecessary. I do not for one m om ent believe that the doctrine which has these lazy consequences is true. I realize, however, that I have an overpoweringly strong bias against it, for, if it is true, philosophy is, at best, a slight help to lexico­ graphers, and at worst, an idle tea-table am usem ent.3 A fter R ussell explain s that he has considered the aim of philosophy to be that of understan din g the world, and to separate that which counts as knowledge from opinion, he continues his attack against lin guistic philosophy: “ . . . we are now told that it is not the world that we are to try to understand but only sentences, and it is assum ed that all sentences can count as true except those uttered by philos­ ophers. T h is, however is perhaps an overstatem ent.” 4 L ater on in the sam e article, in. sum m arizing his attack on lin guistic philosophy, R ussell says: T h e m ost serious of my objections is that the new philosophy seems to me to have abandoned, w ithout necessity, that grave and im portant task which philosophy throughout the ages has h i­ therto pursued. Philosophers from T h ales onwards have tried to understand the world. M ost of them have been unduly optim istic as regards their own successes. B u t even when they have failed, they have supplied m aterial to their successors and an incentive to new effort. I cannot feel that the new philosophy is carrying on this tradition. It seems to concern itself, not with the world an d our relation to it, bu t only with the different ways in which silly people can say silly things. If this is all that philosophy has to offer, I cannot think that it is a worthy subject of study.5

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Ernest G ellner, a R ead er at the London School of Econom ics, in Words and Things, a recent book length attack on linguistic philosophy, states his general agreem ent with R ussell in this m atter. G ellner sug­ gests that the word “ philosophy” should be reserved for the traditional study of ideas or concepts with reference to their adequacy to explain the world, and that “ those who wish to in dulge in im pressionistic lexicography find a new nam e of their own.” 6 H e accuses contem por­ ary philosophers who concentrate upon an analysis of the use of ordinary lan guage of h aving lost their confidence in saying anything about the world or about m oral action, and of therefore taking a safe way out by restricting themselves to the study of words as they are used by the ordinary m an or as they are defined in the Oxford English Dictionary. H is attack is neatly sum m arized in his epigram , “ A cleric who loses his faith abandons his calling, a philosopher who loses his re-defines his subject.” 1 W H A T IS P H IL O SO P H Y ? Before we exam ine the charge that ethical theory is not useful to men faced with m oral decisions, it seems advisable to deal with R u ssell’s and G elln er’s view that what contem porary philosophers are doing is not really philosophy. W hat is apparen tly at issue here is the suggestion that in the p ast a philosopher attem pted to describe a world­ view (a metaphysics) and a norm ative philosophy of life. T h e charge against m any contem porary philosophers is that their concern with linguistic analysis, with the use of words and sentences in the contexts in which they n aturally arise, is a study so far removed from what Plato and A ristotle tried to do that it does not deserve to be called philosophy. L et us see if some ligh t can be shed on this controversy, for this issue is probably the m ost basic one for the im m ediate future of philosophy itself. T h ose who hold to the tradition al view of philosophy as the search for wisdom often say that today philosophy no longer exists. Philos­ ophy, this group says, is concerned with understan din g the world in order that m an m ight learn how to be good. T h is was the m ain con­ cern of Plato and Spinoza, both of whom discussed philosophical prob­ lems with a view to showing m an how understanding can help him to live the good life. T h ere was no concern by these philosophers with knowledge for know ledge’s sake; know ledge for them was useful for gu id in g conduct. H ence P lato ’s philosophic m an, after he em erged from

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the cave of sense experience an d h ad glim psed the ultim ate form of goodness itself, was unable to hold fast to his old values for he now knew that which was truly R eal. U n derstan din g that which was really good, he now could not avoid living in accordance with the good. B ut for P lato this did not m ean that the philosopher engaged in con­ tem plative activity merely for the salvation of his own soul, but rather that the philosopher entered the sphere of political and social life in order to help guide other men who had not had the vision of the ultim ate good. T h e m etaphysical speculations of P lato were, therefore, necessary in order that one m ight learn how to live an ethical life. M uch the same kin d of thing can be said about Spinoza. M an was to learn all he could about the universe an d about him self, for in so do­ ing he was really learning about G od. T h is learning, moreover, was the m eans to salvation, for only by understanding could a m an be delivered from bondage to his passions into the freedom of intellec­ tually loving G od. A nd this intellectual love of G od required that the philosopher change his way of living so as to abide by the eternal laws of m orality. Philosophy as taught by P lato and Spinoza was in­ deed wisdom; it was a way of life. Now the reader m ight well ask that if this is philosophy, that is to say, wisdom for living the good life, what on earth have the authors we have considered in this book to do with philosophy? Even the in tuition ists were prim arily concerned with whether or not the basic ethical terms could be defined, and hence they d id not offer any guidance for m oral living. Yet, the reader may recall that at various points throughout this study a distinction has been drawn between the concern of the m oralist and the task of the philosopher. I have suggested that the m oralist is concerned with telling m an what he ought to do, while the m oral philosopher is concerned with studying the nature of basic ethical terms and judgm ents. H ave I stacked the cards against tradition al interpretations of philosophy in so doing? One thing needs to be said at the outset, an d that is that I do not wish to deny that a m oral philosopher m ay also be a m oralist. T h u s, for exam ple, certain parts of the w ritings of G. E. M oore do give positive m oral suggestions, as do also the w ritings of R . M. H are. Certainly, while it is logically conceivable for one to study m oral philosophy without holdin g any m oral principles him self, it is ex­ tremely unlikely that this can ever be the case. B u t I should still wish to hold that it is not the function of the m oral philosopher to

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guide conduct, b u t rather to study and analyze the nature of ethical judgm en t itself. L e t us distinguish, therefore, between first-order and second-order inquiries in ethics. T h e first-order inquiry is concerned with the actual m aking of m oral judgm ents, with telling som eone what to do, with actually subscribing to. a m oral principle. T h is is w hat I should like to call the sphere of the m oralist an d the m oral critic of our society. T h e second-order in quiry is concerned with studying the n ature of the m oral judgm ents we make, that is, with asking: to what do they refer, how do they function, in w hat respects are they like and unlike scientific statem ents, prescriptions, com m ands, em otive ejacu­ lations, and so on? A nd I should also like to suggest, as I shall attem pt to show later in this chapter, that this second-order study of ethics can have very im portan t effects upon the first-order use of m oral language itself. For exam ple, m ight it not in time effect the actual m oral pre­ scriptions we give, if we should come to accept that they were nothing m ore than em otive ejaculation s of likin g or disliking? B u t the reader may still insist on asking, “ Is this second-order analysis of m oral judgm ents really philosophy? It does not seem to be the kind of thing Plato or Spinoza were doin g.” Now some contem ­ porary philosophers w ould agree that this is not what Plato and Spinoza were doing, b u t they should say that w hat these two great men were engaged in was not philosophy but rather som ething m ore akin to theological m oralism . T o borrow a phrase from another context, some contem porary philosophers w ould say that philosophy has only recently come of age; that it has only recently em erged from the dark ages. Ju st as we should not say that m odern chemistry was n ot really chemistry because it no longer sought to transm ute base m etals into gold, so it is said that we should not dismiss contem porary philosophy as not really philosophy because it no longer attem pts to give m an a vision of the w orld by which he can live the good life. F o r som e con­ tem porary philosophers, philosophy may be said to have really begun with W ittgenstein. It is only in this century that philosophers have viewed philosophy as the detection of w hat G ilbert Ryle, an O xford philosopher, has called “ system atically m isleadin g expressions.” 8 T h e ideal which R yle proposes for philosophy is that of system atically re­ statin g in a non-m isleading form of words what is bein g m isleadingly said, so that it may refer to w hat is in fact the case. A ccording to this view the task of philosophy is to in quire into w hat it really m eans to say som ething by proceeding as follows:

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. . . We can ask w hat is the real form of the fact recorded when this is concealed or disguised and not duly exh ibited by the ex­ pression in question. A nd we can often succeed in statin g this fact in a new form of words which does exh ibit what the other failed to exhibit. And I am for the present inclined to believe that this is what philosophical analysis is, and that this is the sole an d whole function of philosophy.9 One illustration of R y le’s m ethod m ay help the reader grasp how this kind of analysis works. Ryle suggests that because two sentences have a sim ilar gram m atical form we often think that their references must be sim ilar as well. B u t statem ents which claim to be about universals are not referring to subjects as are statem ents about particulars. “ V ir­ tue is its own rew ard,” does not refer to a subject “ virtue” in the way in which “ Smith has given him self the prize” refers to the subject “ Sm ith.” A ccording to R yle, we are m isled here by the gram m atical sim ilarity of the two sentences, bu t “ it is not literally true that V irtue is a recipient of rewards. W hat is true is that anyone who is virtuous is benefited thereby.” 10 T h e origin al statem ent was m isleading, for one should not intend to refer to V irtue as a subject which exists, but rather to good men who by being virtuous gained som ething thereby. O f course, Ryle is not suggesting that in ordinary usage we should never say, “V irtue is its own rew ard,” bu t rather that when such a statem ent is im ported into philosophy as a m oral proof we need to restate it in order to avoid bein g m isled. T h e charitable reader may at this poin t say, “ Oh, I see. I t’s all a m atter of words as to whether I call what contem porary holders of chairs in philosophy do, ‘philosophy’ or n ot?” H e may im ply that if by philosophy he m eans the search for a way of life, then m any con­ tem porary professors of philosophy are not really doing philosophy, bu t linguistic analysis. Or, on the other hand, if he believes that philosophy has only been recently born as a real discipline, then he may say that what Plato and Spinoza did was not really philosophy, bu t theology or m oral preaching. B u t it is the position of this writer that to say som ething of this sort is m isleading in a way that is un fair either to P lato an d Spinoza, or to professors such as Ryle and W ittgen­ stein. I shall try to show that the differences between the tradition al way of doin g philosophy an d the contem porary ways are not as radical as has been thought by the defenders of either position. T h ose who hold that philosophy is no longer being done today,

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an d those who hold that philosophy is a new phenom enon of the twentieth century, are both m aking use of what Stevenson called “ per­ suasive definitions.” 11 B oth groups are attem ptin g to use a favorable em otive m eaning for philosophy, while at the sam e time attem pting to restrict the descriptive m eaning of the word. T h u s, the form er group is m ain tain in g that philosophy is the search for wisdom as ex­ em plified in the attem pt to form ulate a coherent world-view which will guide m en’s conduct, while the latter group is suggesting that philosophy is really concerned wTith the lin guistic analysis of m is­ leadin g expressions. Now by suggesting that these are “ persuasive de­ finitions,” I am not thereby m ain tain in g that they are purely arbitrary. Far from it, for as we have already seen, each group can give good reasons for defining philosophy in the way it does. Yet I think that it is possible to view philosophy in a sufficiently broad sense so as to em brace both tradition al philosophers and contem porary linguistic analysts as engaged in activities which are sim ilar enough to be called “ philosophy.” I have already called attention to some of the differences between philosophy as practiced by P lato and Spinoza, and philosophy as prac­ ticed by R yle and W ittgenstein. I should now like to suggest that there are some sim ilarities as well, which in the heat of debate tend to get over-looked. T h e first sim ilarity I should wish to suggest is that both tradition al and contem porary philosophers are engaged in a critical exam ination of that which the ordinary m an usually accepts in b lin d faith. T h u s, Plato in T he R e p u b lic engages in an exam in ation of justice, som e­ thing which all the participan ts in the dialogue claim to know about, bu t about which they cannot be precise. A nd indeed is not the ex­ am ination by G. E. M oore, H are, T ou lm in , and the other contem­ porary philosophers we have studied, an attem pt to analyze the m ean­ in g of those ethical terms which we all use every day, b u t yet which few of us can clearly explain ? Plato and Spinoza were both concerned with clear thinking, with precise analysis, and in this respect contem­ porary philosophers follow in their train. A second sim ilarity between tradition al philosophers and contem­ porary philosophers can be found in the methods which they use to com m unicate to others. Plato uses m etaphors, analogies, and paradoxes to convey whatever he finds the oxdinary use of language in adequate to describe. Aristotle suggested that we m ust not expect all sciences

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to be equally exact, and, hence, in his Ethics he indicates that ethics is not an exact science in the way that m athem atics is. Now contem ­ porary philosophers also insist that one ought not to require m athe­ m atical exactitude in all subjects, bu t rather that we m ust attem pt to convey our views in the type of language ap prop riate to the situ a­ tion. C ontem porary lin guistic analysts agree with the logical positivists that m etaphors, paradoxes, and analogies are not literally true, bu t then they insist that no one has ever claim ed that they were. T h e logical positivists who restricted all m eaning to those usages which could fit within their verification theory of m eaning dism issed p ara­ doxes, analogies, and m etaphors to the realm of the em otive and m ean­ ingless. R ecent lin guistic analysts, on the other hand, suggest that we m ust study the contexts of the sentences used and, in the words of W ittgenstein, ask not for their literal m eaning but rather for their use. Paradoxes, analogies, and m etaphors reveal to us that which is hidden in the ordinary and the scientific use of language. A ccording to m any contem porary philosophers, therefore, we ought not to attack paradoxes for being literally false, but rather we ought to attem pt to discover what it is that these paradoxes are calling attention to which is hidden by our usual rigid criterion of literal truth.12 T h u s, the claim of contem porary linguistic analysts that the language of m eta­ physics is m etaphorical and paradoxical, that here one has to use analogies to convey what one m eans, is not a radical new discovery at all, bu t one which P lato clearly understood when he wrote his d ia­ logues. T h e use of com parisons and analogies of ethical statem ents with other kinds of statem ents has been covered in some detail in earlier chapters of this book. W hat philosophers such as T o u lm in and H are were attem ptin g to do was to show us the respects in which ethical statem ents are like and unlike factual statem ents, scientific theories, com m ands, and so on. In this way these writers are trying to bring before us, by the use of reasoning from analogy, aspects of ethical utterances which are hidden from us in our norm al use of them. T h e reader may recall that T o u lm in , for exam ple, suggests that there is no single test for all ration al statem ents, and hence proposes that there is a logic ap prop riate to ethics which is not exactly the same as the logic of science. B u t this is very much like A ristotle’s suggestion that each science m ust have its own degree of exactness, and that ethics should not be condem ned because it is n ot as exact a science as

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m athem atics. T h u s, as we have seen, instead of follow ing the logical positivists in rejecting the reasoning in ethics as not really reasoning, m any contem porary philosophers accept as significant and attem pt to describe the kind of reasoning which we actually use when we are engaged in m oral debates. T h e chief difficulty which I find with an exclusive definition of philosophy, which w ould elim inate either the ancients or our con­ tem poraries from the ranks of real philosophers, lies prim arily in erecting artificial barriers where none are found. It is of course true that there are m any im portan t differences between the philosophy of Plato and that of a contem porary linguistic analyst, bu t I hope that I have shown at least that the differences are not as radical as m ight at first be supposed. I agree with Flew, who m aintains that epigram ­ m atic definitions of philosophy are m istaken, because the whole m ean­ ing of philosophy cannot be given in a definition. B u t these partisan slogans, as we m ay call them, of philosophy are not valueless, for they do call our attention to the differences between tradition al and contem porary philosophy which we m ight otherwise tend to overlook. As Flew suggests . . . C om pare the things people say about the nature of poetry, or nationality, or genius: poetry is em otion recollected in tran­ quillity; a nation is a society united by a com mon error as to its origins and a com m on aversion to its neighbours; genius is an infinite capacity for taking pains. As definitions of ‘poetry,’ ‘n ation ,’ or ‘genius’ none of these w ill do at all: they are ob­ viously both in some ways far too narrow an d in others far too com prehensive. B u t as epigram s about poetry, nations, and genius they all have value: there is a lot in each of them: they would all on occasion be good things to say.13 T h u s, while attem pted definitions of philosophy, such as that it is the search for wisdom, are too wide in that they cover too much, other characterizations of philosophy as a study of the usage of ordin­ ary language are too narrow. One of the m erits of G elln er’s critique is to call attention to the danger present in restricting philosophy to n oth ing more than the analysis of English sentences as they are used by the dons of O xford.14 B u t G ellner likewise shows his own partisan zeal by not w ishing to call lin guistic analysis philosophy at all. In fact, his own conclusion that, “ Philosophy is explicitness, generality, orien­ tation and assessm ent,” has the rin g of another epigram m atic slogan.15

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In deed if one takes his rem ark as m ore than that, it is far too wide a characterization of philosophy, unless G ellner w ould wish to include theology and sociology as really branches of philosophy. My suggestion then is that what contem porary language philos­ ophers are doing is philosophy, b u t that there is m uch else which also deserves to be considered philosophy. For exam ple, continental exis­ tentialism , some of the w ritings of T illich , studies in logic, philosophy of science, epistem ology, and so on, are all works in one or other area of philosophy. T o restrict philosophy too narrow ly m ight well delay future developm ents w ithin philosophy itself. However, any one who wishes to understand philosophy today m ust have m ore than a passing acquaintance with the kin d of rigorous analysis of ordinary language, as used in various contexts, which we have exam ined in the chapter on T h e L an gu ag e and L o gic of M orals. If I m ay use a m etaphor here, I should like to suggest th at lin guistic analysis is probably not the edifice of philosophy, bu t it is at least its foundation. T H E G A M E S P L A Y E D BY M O R A L P H IL O S O P H E R S One of the charges leveled again st recent philosophical inquiries into ethics is that they are n othing more than gam es of so special a nature as to be of interest only to philosophers. It is som etim es un k in d­ ly suggested that these gam es have some use in that they provide an oc­ cupation for philosophers who m ight otherwise attem pt to engage in p ractical pursuits and w reak havoc. One of the presupposition s of this k in d of attack is that the gam es in question have no relevance to the m oral problem s of the m an in the street. T h ese critics say that it is ju st one more sign of the dow nfall of philosophy that its practitioners today suffer from the occupational disease of exam in in g the usage of words in different lan guage gam es rather than d ealin g w ith truth and the age-old verities. In fact, these same critics m ight say that this book is ju st an account of the new kin ds of gam es which are currently bein g played by those in itiated into the techniques of m odern philos­ ophy. It is true that m any contem porary philosophers have opened them­ selves to this kin d of attack by their frequent reference to the various uses of language as gam es, an d by their referring to the moves which can be m ade w ithin the gam e of philosophy. T h e laym an is quite n aturally tem pted to think these gam es are on a p ar w ith chess, or anagram s, or cross-word puzzles. As such, they m ay prove quite inter­

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esting for those who like that sort of thing. B u t do they have any bearing upon the m oral life itself? First of all it is necessary to differentiate between the various uses of “ gam es” within philosophy. T o this w riter it seems clear that at least four different usages are current in contem porary philosophical literature. (1) W ittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations referred to language gam es as ways of seeing how a prim itive lan guage m ight function in order that we m ight better understand our own. T h e con­ tem porary O xford philosophers have developed this into a study of the various lan gu age gam es we play in different contexts. (2) A second usage refers to the activity of philosophy itself as a gam e w ith moves and counter moves governed by the rules of logic. (3) Som etim es the m athem atical T h eo ry of G am es is used to suggest how a kin d of m ath em atical calculus m ight be devised to assist in decision pro­ cedures w ithin m orals. (4) A fourth usage which I shall attem pt to develop w ith respect to the study of ethical theory refers to the differ­ ent kinds of gam es various philosophers have played in approach ing the study of ethics from different points of view. L e t us exam ine briefly each of these four different types of reference by philosophers to games, for unless we keep each one clear in our m inds we shall become very m uddled indeed. (1) W ittgenstein invented some “ prim itive lan guages,” such as hi fam ous lan guage which builders m ight use in their trade. T h ere are only four words in this im agined language (“ block,” “ p illar,” “slab ,” and “ beam ” ) and the builders learn to brin g the right kind of stone at a call from the forem an. Now the p oin t of this illustration of an im agined prim itive language is that one of the ways that we use language is brought out by it; namely, the use of words to stand for objects. B u t ju st as there can be m any kinds of games, such as chess, cards, anagram s, football, etc., so language is used for m any different purposes. If we, therefore, confine our attention to the use of words in our language for referring to objects we shall miss m any of the other kinds of “ gam es” which we play with our language, such as com­ m anding, speculating, play-acting, m aking up stories, praying, cursing, telling jokes, an d so on.16 W hat m ay escape the reader’s notice here is that this use of im a­ gined “ prim itive lan gu ages” for different purposes by the later W ittgenstein was intended to brin g out the dan ger in a too restricted idea of what shall count as m eaningful in a language. T h e earlier

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W ittgenstein and the logical positivists had restricted m eaningful uses of language to logic and em pirical scientific statem ents. It is undoubtedly true that the logical positivists called our attention to the fact that we did not use language in the sam e way in ethics and m etaphysics as we did in logic and the em pirical sciences. B u t then to suggest that the only really correct and m eaningful uses of our lan gu age were in logic and the em pirical sciences was as though a bridge player, upon discovering that the gam es of poker and canasta are different from bridge, w ould then say that the only real card gam e is bridge. Of course, if one w anted to play bridge one w ould have to abide by the rules of the game, b u t one m ight choose not to play that game, but some other card gam e instead. Surely in our ordinary use of language we do not always intend to be scientific, and to suggest that unless we are bein g rigorously exact in a scientific sense we are not really saying anything m eaningful is to attem pt to elim inate many of those contexts of speech from the realm of m eaning which we clearly see have a m eaning. T h e p oin t of referring to the various con­ texts in which we use lan guage as different language gam es is thus to call our attention to the fact that the verification theory of m eaning is artificially restrictive. In poin t of fact, the language which we use an d the m eaning which we intend to convey by it vary according to the kind of occasion on which we are speaking. In a certain sense, therefore, to hold that there is only one kind of acceptable m eaning, one kind of lan guage gam e that is fully acceptable, is sim ilar to a bridge enthusiast saying that bridge is the only really acceptable card gam e. B u t actually there are m any card games, and m any language gam es as well. Contem porary O xford philosophers, especially the late Jo h n A ustin, have devoted m uch attention to the study of expressions as they are used in their n atu ral contexts in our language. M uch of this study of the usage of ordinary language, as it is sometimes called, attem pts to find a p aradigm case for the usage in question, that is a stan dard usage as fou n d in a norm al context. Indeed as we grow up we learn that there are different language usages which are ap prop riate in one context bu t not in others. In fact one of the im portan t differ­ ences between lan guage gam es and other gam es is that while we can refuse to learn other games, such as chess and bridge, we m ust use lan guage if we are to be hum an beings. T h a t these contem porary studies of the language games played in different contexts are not trivial

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can be brought out by recalling that W ittgenstein had suggested that speaking a language is a form of life.17 Now the value of the study of the different lan guage gam es which we play in ordinary as well as in technical usage helps us to see that m any of the problem s of ph ilo s­ ophy have been m isunderstood because we thought that they called for em pirical answers. W ittgenstein suggested that “ these are, of course, not em pirical problem s; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those w orkings: in despite of an urge to m isunderstand them. T h e problem s are solved, not by givin g new inform ation, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle again st the bewitchm ent of our intelligence by means of lan gu age.” 19 T h e relevance for our study of ethics of this view that different language gam es m ust be played according to the context at hand should now be apparent. T h e language gam e played by the m oral philosopher who inquires into the m eaning or usage of the word “ good” is a different kin d of gam e from that of the m oralist who at­ tem pts to tell m an what is actually good. (If the reader still objects to using the word “ gam es” in this connection, he can substitute “ ac­ tivity” in the above sentence.) A nd furtherm ore, as we have already h ad occasion to note in the previous chapter, w hat I am attem ptin g to convey by saying, “ N ever tell lies,” depends upon the context in which this sentence is uttered. As Braithw aite has poin ted out, in one context I may be announcing my subscription to this policy, in an ­ other I m ay be suggesting that you subscribe to it, while in still an ­ other context I may be asking for your cooperation in helpin g me to carry out this policy. T h e im portan t poin t is that only by exam ining the expression in the context in which it is used can we tell w hat it is intended to m ean, and even then we may have to ask lead in g ques­ tions of the speaker in order to be sure. In a sense we play different language games according to the speci­ fic occasion at hand. For exam ple, if on leavin g a party I say to my hostess, “ T h a n k you very m uch. It was a w onderful party,” I should be saying what w ould be considered proper to the occasion. A ccording to the rules of correct cerem onial use of lan gu age which my society holds, it w ould be m ost rude of me to utter the blu n t truth, “ I had a m iserable time with these b o rin g people and terrible cocktails. I wish that I had never come in the first place.” Yet if we should insist on always using lan guage in a frankly descriptive way, I w ould be forced

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to say som ething of this sort. B u t suppose that I know my hostess very well, and she asks me if I really have enjoyed the people she has had at the party, I m ight play a different lan guage gam e and in courteous yet frank language tell her that I found m ost of them boring. T h e p oin t to note here is that in this case the context is different from the one m entioned earlier. In this case I know my hostess extrem ely well, an d she has asked m e for a frank opinion. N ow clearly the p oin t for our study of ethics is that if we look at our actual usage of language, we do not find that we always use words such as “ good,” “ righ t,” and “ ough t” in the sam e way. Sometimes we use them as short-hand descriptions, sometimes as m erely em otive ejaculations, som etim es as evaluations, an d qu ite often we use them in a way so as to involve aspects of all of these. If in fact w hat we intend to convey by ethical terms varies according to the contexts in which we use them, then it is artificially restrictive to suggest that there is only one correct usage of them. B u t ju st as there are times for playin g bridge an d times for playing poker, so too there are times for philosophical investigations of how we use m oral language, and other times for m aking m oral judgm ents. A fter a pleasant dinner engagem ent with the couple next door, it m ight be ap prop riate for one’s wife and oneself to play bridge with them rather than poker. O n the other hand, at a stag party it m ight be m ore ap prop riate to play poker with the boys than bridge, es­ pecially if one knows that few of the m en enjoy bridge, bu t that m ost of them enjoy poker. T h e p oin t here is that there is an ap prop riate time for m oral philosophy and an ap prop riate tim e for m oralizing. If every time you used a sentence with the w ord "g o o d ” in it I asked you w hat you m eant by “ good,” you m ight conclude that I was a very odd person indeed. B u t, on the other hand, my question would be ap prop riate if I asked one of my students what he m eant by “ good” in a certain sentence of his essay. N ow what I wish to m ain ­ tain is that if there is any help to be found in the suggestion of lan g­ uage games, one can poin t out that different gam es are being played here. In one lan guage game, one which we all use every day of our lives, we seek to apply m oral judgm ents to ourselves or others. In an ­ other kind of lan guage game, that of metaethics, the philosopher is asking how m oral judgm ents actually function. (2) Sometimes the activity of philosophy is referred to as a game. Professor Jo h n W isdom has em ployed this view in m any of his articles

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in “ Other M inds,” in which discussions are carried on between “ B lack,” “ W hite” an d “ G ray.” 19 In this conception of philosophy, moves and counter moves are m ade by the various parties to the discussion m uch as the opponents in chess move the pieces on the board. In m any re­ spects this view of philosophy resembles the dialectical m ethod of Plato, for in both recent an d ancient uses philosophy is held to con­ sist in cooperative discussion of philosoph ical issues takin g place am ong the various participan ts. P art of the reason for referring to philosophy itself as a gam e is to show that, unlike science, philosophy can expect no definitive an­ swers to the questions it asks. T h u s, for exam ple, in a dispute as to what is in fact the case, the controversy can usually be settled one way or the other. Q uestions such as “ W hat m ake of car is that?,” “ W hat is the tem perature?,” and “ W hat is the life expectancy of A m erican m ales who are now fifteen years of age?” can be settled by ap peal to the name p late on the car, the reading of the therm om eter, an d an inspection of the charts of life insurance actuaries. B u t philosophical questions are not of this sort; indeed the fact that they are not like these kinds of questions has led some people to consider philosophical questions as useless since they do not adm it of a ready and easy an­ swer. Now one of the values of thinking of philosophy as a gam e is that ju st this feature is brough t out into the open. D ifferent views may be held on various philosoph ical issues, and good reasons can be given for each position a p articu lar philosopher holds. T o recognize only one type of answer as ap prop riate to a philosophical question is to see only p art of the picture; it is like playin g chess w ithout an opponent. B u t ju st as in chess two players are needed who although they are opposed to each other do abide by the rules of the game, so in philos­ ophy alternative views need to be brought forw ard in a friendly and cooperative m anner. Philosophy, according to this view, is a gam e played by opponents each of whom is seeking the truth, while at the same time recognizing the m erits in the views of others and criticizing their shortcom ings. A nd by analogy, ju st as one can become m ore skill­ ful in playing chess, so too in philosophy one can learn to avoid re­ m aking m istakes one m ade earlier and move forw ard to m ore defen­ sible positions. L e t us use one illustration to see how this view of the nature of philosophy works. T h e argum ent between theists and atheists is still waged today, and some people tend to despair because a conclusive

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answer cannot be given which w ill satisfy both groups. We may well presum e such an argum ent to take place between two educated op­ ponents both of whom have the same facts at their disposal. T h e moves of the atheist point out to us the endless hum an suffering found in our world, the injustices which the innocent suffer, and the conflict between the so-called religious revelations which claim to be true as reasons for not believing in a god. O n the other hand, the theist who recognizes these sam e facts gives a different in terpretation to them; he views them in a different way. T h e hum an suffering and injustices in our w orld the theist finds to be signs of hum an finiteness and sin; they poin t to m an ’s need for a divine power to redeem him. A nd indeed the fact that there are so m any conflicting revelations indicates the peren nial nature of m an ’s religious quest, as well as the fact that m an cannot fully grasp the nature of the Infinite G od. Now according to this view of philosophy as a gam e it is m ost m isleading to attem pt to give a definite precise scientific solution to this kind of debate. W hat each party to this dispute is doing is to call our atten­ tion to certain features or interpretations which the other has neg­ lected. W hile it is true that, historically speaking, the atheist-theist controversies have often been bitter and acrim onious, occasionally it has happened that expert debaters on each side have learned to know the other’s gam e so well that they have continued the debate with zealous skill on the level of a m atching of wits; in other words, as a gam e. T h eo logian s “ fence” ; atheists “ take aim ” w ith sportsm anlike excitem ent; bystanders exclaim : “ T h ey are spari'ing with each other, aim in g for a knock-out” ; and so on. T h e m ain difficulty which m any people have w ith this view of philosophy as a gam e is probably caused by their thinking that all gam es are trivial or am using. One m ay think of games as the k in d of thing one does in p layin g various kinds of b all gam es, card games, chess, checkers, tic-tack-toe, and so on. B u t one m ight also recall that som etim es one speaks of the “ gam e of life,” or of “ the gam e of power politics.” NoW |I d ou bt that in this later usage anyone w ould say that the “ gam e of life” was trivial, uninteresting, and unim portan t; nor w ould anything of this sort usually be said about the “ gam e of power politics.” N ow it is of course true that it is by m eans of analogy that we transfer our use of the w ord “ gam e” to life and power politics, b u t we do so because this use helps to call our attention to some aspects we m ight otherwise have overlooked. In like m anner, the poin t of

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viewing philosophy as a gam e is surely an attem pt to call our attention to certain features of philosophy which we tended to neglect. One of these features is the thriving of philosophy when there are intelligent moves m ade defen din g alternative positions. A lso in the course of tim e certain moves are seen to be in appropriate, poorly supported, or poorly stated an d other ones are adopted instead. T h is dialectical n a­ ture of philosophy an d the unlikeness of philosophy to science are w hat viewing philosophy as a gam e reveals to us. O f course, if the com parison of philosophy to a gam e is pushed too far we may be m isled into thinking that it is exactly like any other gam e which we play. It is then that critics tell us that philos­ ophy is nothing bu t a gam e, that it is trivial and unim portan t. In ­ deed there is m erit in responsible criticism of this sort, for it brings home to us that philosophy is not ju st like a gam e of chess, th at it is dealin g with im portan t ethical and m etaphysical m atters, and that it is, or should be, seeking for the truth about the p articular problem s which it is discussing. Perhaps in order to avoid bein g m isled it m ight be better to refer to philosophy as being like a game, rather than to sim ply say that it is a game. Perhaps an illustration from another context, m ight help the reader grasp my point here. One often hears it said that M arxism is a re­ ligion, yet I dou bt if any history of the w orld’s religions w ould in­ clude a chapter on M arxism . T h e poin t surely is that in m any respects M arxism is like a religion in that it offers a way of life, has a kin d of authoritative w riting (the w ritings of M arx and Lenin), and requires obedience and devotion from its followers. By saying that M arxism is a religion one intends to bring out those respects in which it func­ tions like a religion. T h is extension of the word “ religion ” to cover M arxism may thus be revealing to us in disclosing features of M arx­ ism which were form erly hidden. B u t if one wishes to push this com­ parison to the lim it, one m ight say that M arxism hardly seems to qualify as a religion since it does not believe in a god, and does not include love and com passion as virtues. T o this it m ight well be re­ plied that some of the religions of the world, such as B uddh ism in its origin, have been atheistic, an d not all religions have preached love and com passion for others. N ow the value of this kind of exchange is that it helps to brin g out m ore clearly the respects in which M arxism is like a religion, while also calling attention to some of the respects

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in which it differs from the tradition al historical religions of the world. We should now be in a better position to seejw hat the value and danger are in calling philosoph ical investigations games. By referring to the activity of philosophy as a gam e with moves and counter-moves governed by the rules of logical reasoning, our attention is called to certain respects in which philosophy resembles other activities called games, such as chess. Ju s t as in saying “ M arxism is a religion ” so here too we are m aking suggestive com parisons which m ay bring to light what form erly was hidden. W hat m ust be insisted upon is that this is a com parison which can’t be pushed too far. For surely philosophical studies are im portan t in a way in which m ost gam es are not, in that here one searches for understanding, that is, for that which is hidden and confused in our thinking about philosoph ical questions and for what m ay still be called truth. (3) A third usage of “ gam es” within philosophy is found in the appeal to the m athem atical T h eory of G am es for suggestions con­ cerning decision procedures w ithin m oral conflicts. Professor R . B. B raith w aite’s in au g u ral lecture as the K n igh tbridge Professor of M oral Philosophy in the U niversity of C am bridge was concerned with the “ theory of G am es as a tool for the M oral Philosopher.” 20 In this lecture B raithw aite was concerned with the question, “ C an thei p h ilo­ sophical m oralist give any advice to people with different aim s as to how they may collaborate in com m on tasks so as to obtain m axim um satisfaction com patible with fair distribu tion ?” 21 Previous attem pts to deal with questions of this sort usually resorted to the use of some­ thing like B en th am ’s hedonistic calculus for m easuring the degree of pleasures and pains likely to 'be experienced by the persons effected, or else dealt with com m on m onetary units in econom ic problem s. W hat B raithw aite suggested was that the m athem atical T h eo ry of G am es provided a way of dealin g with situations in which the sam e scale of preferences was not accorded to both parties to the dispute. L et us attem pt to clarify this point. Assum ing, as one w ould have to for the purposes of using a pleasure calculus, that you and I had the sam e com parative scale of preferences and received pleasure or pain from the sam e kinds of things, it w ould be possible to m easure our preferences in such a way as to show what com bination of acts would give each of us the greatest am ount of pleasure. However, it is this kind of assum ption which Braith w aite does not w ant to m ake since

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it is in fact very difficult to assum e that any two people do have the sam e preference scale for pleasure and pain from various kinds of activity. H is assum ption is then only that the parties to a m oral dis­ pute both know their own scale of preferences in such a way as to be able to assign m athem atical degrees of preference to them, not that their preference scales are the same. T h u s, in B raith w aite’s illu stra­ tion of the conflict between two bachelors livin g in the sam e apartm ent building, both of whom have only one hour at exactly the sam e tim e for recreation, one likes to play the piano, while the other likes to play the trum pet. T h e problem arises because their apartm ents are not sound proofed, an d each prefers to play w ithout h earing the other playin g in the backgroun d as well. N ow all that is necessary to show them the best cooperative strategy to follow so that each gets the m axim um enjoym ent is that each shall provide a preference scale showing the degree to which he would choose to play his instrum ent while the other is silent, while he is silent an d the other plays, while both play at the sam e time, an d while both rem ain silent. T h e n on the basis of m athem atical calculation u sin g “ the probability-com bination-indifference m ethod” as developed in the T h eory of Gam es, which was evolved to deal with gam es involving intelligence an d not merely chance, Braithw aite can suggest to each the best strategy to pursue so that each gets the highest possible utility. T h is usage of the w ord “ gam es” as referring to the m athem atical T h eo ry of G am es as ap plied to decision procedures w ithin m orality has not been used nearly as m uch as the other two usages of “ gam es” we have already discussed. B u t the reader is likely to come across the T h eory of G am es in reference to problem s within economics, and he ought not to confuse this usage with the m ore common usages of the word in philosophy. For the unm athem atical laym an, the T h eory of Gam es is m uch like p robability theory, except that the latter wras developed with reference to games of chance, while the form er is concerned with showing one the best strategy to use in playin g games which depend to a great extent upon the use of intelligence by the players. (4) A fourth usage of “ gam es” with respect to philosophy refers to the different points of view from which philosophers approach their investigations as different games. In sum m ary of our study of ethical theory in this century I shall try to develop the view that in one sense the different ethical theories which various philosophers

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have defended can be considered as arising from somewhat different concerns of the philosophers we have studied. Or in other words, they were not all playing exactly the same kind of gam e within philosophy. O f course, it is not suggested that moves did not take place across these games, nor is it im plied that these divisions are iron-clad. R ather, the hope of this kind of exploration is to sum up for the reader the different emphases which we have found in this study of ethical theory as at least partly caused by the fact that not all of the men we have studied were seeking for exactly the same kind of thing in their investigations. It may prove helpful, therefore, to suggest that philosophers in this century have played versions of three different basic philosophical games in their studies of ethics. (I) T h e first concern at the beginning of the century was with providing a definition of the basic ethical terms. (II) One group of philosophers believed that the search for a definition had not proved fru itful, and therefore they proposed that we seek to account for the persuasiveness of m oral statem ents by con­ sidering them as emotive utterances. (Ill) M ore recently some philos­ ophers have been concerned with characterizing the function of m oral lan guage by studying how it is used in m aking m oral judgm ents. L et us explore each of these different em phases in turn. (I) The Search for a Definition— At the beginning of the twen­ tieth century m ost philosophers seemed concerned with providin g a definition of ethical terms, such as “ good,” “ righ t” and “ ought.” T h is basic task was tackled by both the naturalists and the non-naturalists. H um anists and hedonists sought for a definition of ethical words in non-ethical terms. W hile by the hedonist the good was equated with pleasure or happiness, the hum anist found that the good was that which satisfied basic hum an needs. G. E. M oore m aintained that all naturalistic definitions of ethical terms failed; for it was always pos­ sible to ask of any such suggested definition if it was exactly equiva­ lent to the word it claim ed to define. M oore adm itted that pleasure accom panied all good states, for exam ple, but said that it was always possible to ask whether or not pleasure was good. In a sim ilar m an ­ ner, as we have seen, the h um an ist seems to sm uggle in a value prem ise when he presupposes that satisfying basic hum an needs is good. T h e Intuitionists, M oore, R oss and Ew ing, also craved for a definition of the basic ethical terms but they m aintained that they could not be defined in non-ethical terms. M oore stressed the fact that some terms

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are so basic that they are not capable of being defined, bu t rath er are themselves used to define other terms. "G o o d ” to M oore was one of those basic, indefinable terms, which he held referred to a non-natural property. Ross m ain tain ed that both “rig h t” an d “ good ” were inde­ finable in the strict sense, while Ew ing sought to define other ethical terms by the indefinable relation of “ oughtness.” Now it w ould be com pletely false to suggest that any of the philos­ ophers we have m entioned above were concerned only with the defini­ tion of ethical terms, for as we have seen they were concerned with m any other questions of ethical theory as well. T h u s, M oore devoted m uch attention to presenting his ethical theory of Id eal U tilitarian ­ ism ; Ross developed the notion of prim a facie duties, and as well m ade some interesting psychological observations on m otivations; an d Ewing has been concerned with stressing the objective nature of ethical ju d g ­ m ents, as well as developing in great detail the nature of prim a facie duties. Furtherm ore, to agree that M oore showed the failure of n a­ turalists to define ethical terms, does not by any m eans indicate that the work of the n aturalists in ethics was com pletely m istaken. Far from it, for the naturalists have stressed the great relationship which exists between m an ’s psychological desires an d m orality. A ll that I have intended to suggest is that m ost ethical philosophers at the begin n in g of this century viewed their basic task as that of try­ ing to find whether or not definitions could be provided for the ethical terms we use every day. T h e ir concern was to find an exact equiva­ lence in a proposed definition, an d if that could not be found, they held that the ethical terms in question m ust be indefinable. As the reader may recall, h olding that a word such as “ good ” is indefinable in this strict sense, does not m ean that one cannot characterize it, or say anything about what kinds of things are in fact good. Furtherm ore, it should be recalled that the naturalists were trying to call our atten­ tion to the respects in which ethical statem ents were based on state­ ments about hum an desires and needs, while the non-naturalists were stressing that ethical statem ents consisted in m aking evaluations which could not solely be explain ed in terms of scientific studies of how m an did in fact behave. If the reader feels inclined to ad op t the position of the hum anist or of the non-naturalist, he can find good reasons for each position, since each certainly calls attention to some of the aspects present in ethical judgm ents. (II) Characterizing Ethical Utterances— A second group of philos­

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ophers abandoned the search for definitions of the basic ethical terms as m isguided, and attem pted instead to describe the respects in which ethical statem ents were different from the statem ents of logic and em pirical science. G enerally speaking, these philosophers held to the sam e rigid canons of definition as did the first group, bu t m aintained that the very failure to come up with acceptable definitions indicated that som ething had gone wrong. U pon exam in in g ethical utterances, the subjectivists fou n d them to be about a person’s feelings, likes, de­ sires (pro-attitudes), while the emotivists found that they were the expressions of a person’s feelings, likes, desires. We m ight note here that this group of philosophers were con­ cerned with characterizing or describing w hat ethical utterances were like, and w hat im pressed them was the sim ilarity between ethical usages on the one hand and expressions of taste, feeling, likin g and disliking on the other. T h is position is often called subjectivist, for it holds that ethical terms do not refer to any property or quality, either n atural or non-natural, but that they rather describe or express the speaker’s attitudes. T h u s, the existentialist stresses that each person m ust m ake his own m oral choices, that there are no objective rules by which he can be guided, and that there is no such thing as a basic hum an nature. O ur attention is here called to the personal nature of ethical judgm ents: I assert that this is what I believe to be right. T h e existentialist holds that those who seek an objective basis for ethics have failed to note that personal choice of a way of life is what char­ acterizes ethical proclam ations. T h e analogies which are appealed to here are those from personal tastes in such things as music, art, and literature. T h e holders of a strict em otive theory of ethics are perhaps even m ore radical than the existentialists, for this group m aintains that ethical utterances are not statem ents at all, not even statem ents con­ cerning what I like or dislike. R ath er they are utterances of my likes and dislikes, not statem ents about my feelings. O f course it was not suggested that one’s likes and dislikes are purely arbitrary, for they are shaped by the social conditioning one has received. One is taught to like and approve those things which his society tends to like and approve; it is this feature of ethics which m isled some into thinking that ethical utterances were objective. L ater defenders of the emotive theory, such as Stevenson, tend to cross over into the next kind of gam e we shall describe, for they have recognized that ethical utter­

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ances are more com plex than had first been supposed. T h e reader may recall that Stevenson suggests that there is a descriptive aspect to norm ative ethical utterances plus an em otive feeling of the sort “ I approve of this; you do so as w ell.” Few people today w ould wish to defend a straight-forw ard emotive theory of ethics, but m any w ould want to insist that this kind of ethical theory has called our attention to the im portan t part feelings play in m oral controversies. B ut the m ain criticism of this kind of game, that of seeking for one element which characterizes the nature of ethical statem ents, is precisely that the whole issue is more com­ plicated than the em otive theory says it is. W hile it is true that some­ times I may use ethical words purely to express my approval of some­ thing, or to arouse a sim ilar attitude in you, this is not the only way in which I use ethical terms. Perhaps the m ain difficulty with seeking either for a straight-forw ard definition or characterization of ethical terms is that the price p aid for sim plicity is the ign oring of other as­ pects of our use of ethical terms. T h e next kin d of gam e we are going to consider, therefore, professes to exam ine the way we actually use ethical expressions, before characterizing them. (Ill) Usage of Ethical Words— As we have indicated, the kind of activity pursued by the philosophers concerned with playin g G am e II actually shades into this game. T h e concern here is not to provide an exact definition for ethical terms, but rather to exam ine how they are used in actually m aking m oral judgm ents. T h u s far the main task of these philosophers has been to exam ine the various contexts in which we use words such as “ good ” in order to see if we can then characterize how they function when used in a norm ative m oral way. In some usages in our language the same ethical expression m ay func­ tion norm atively, while in others it functions emotively, or descrip­ tively. T h e concern of those playin g this kind of philosophical game has been to describe the various uses of words such as “ good,” both m oral and non-moral, in order to discover if one can find a p aradigm case for norm ative m oral usage. Now, as the reader may recall, not all the philosophers p ursu in g this kind of activity have come up with the same kind of standard usage or paradigm case for ethical utter­ ances. T h u s, the p arad igm case for H are is that of com m ending; for U rm son, that of gradin g; and for Braithw aite, that of declarations of policy. Again, I believe that it will prove h elpful not to view these differ­

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ent presentations of how ethical words function in their n atu ral home in our language as m utually exclusive. T h e difficulty here has been that while these writers indicate that they shall look at the usages of m oral words in a fresh and open spirit, they have tended to concen­ trate alm ost as much upon one feature of m oral usage as did the philosophers we considered above. My suggestion w ould be that each has called our attention to certain of the features of our ordinary use of m oral language, for sometimes wc m ean to commend, some­ times to grade, and sometimes to declare our m oral policy. W hat all of these have in com mon is that when they are used in a norm ative way, they are evaluative. B u t to say that w ould not help us very much, for we want to know also how these specific kinds of evaluations func­ tion. T h e writings of the philosophers we considered in C h apter III have certainly gone a long way toward h elping us to learn more about the nature of evaluation in ethics. I should not want the reader to conclude that I am pressing too far this consideration of differing philosophical games played by vari­ ous writers on ethics. A ll I am attem pting by my analysis is to help the reader to gain the understan din g that part of the reason for differ­ ences of point of view in ethics is to be found in the different interests or aim s of the writers. T h e m ain purpose of this section has been to separate the differ­ ent respects in which the word “ gam e” is used in contem porary philos­ ophy. B u t the reader may still believe that nothing has been done to try to show how philosophical investigations of ethics could be rele­ vant to the m oral problem s of the ordinary m an. We have postponed an exam ination into this kind of query long enough. L et us now see if we can provide an answer which is at all satisfactory. IS E T H I C A L T H E O R Y U S E F U L ? T h ere are two opposite dangers to be avoided in attem ptin g to answer the question concerning the usefulness of m oral philosophy for m orality. One m ust avoid over-stressing or under-estim ating the possible effect which ethical theory can have upon the m orality of the com mon m an. T h u s, on the one hand, it is sometimes m aintained that unless one has some knowledge of m oral philosophy, of what ethical terms m ean and of how they function in the process of evalua­ ting, one may not be able to m ake intelligent choices in the sphere of m orals. On the other hand, it can also be m ain tain ed that m oral

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philosophy is a second-order study, of interest only to professional philosophers; the very technicality of the study seems to guarantee that it will not have any effect upon the laym an. A n d sometimes it is added that even if the laym an does come to know about contem porary m oral philosophy, it w ill have no effect upon the m oral behavior which he learned early in life from his parents, pastors and teachers. We have already had occasion to note that some critics have held that m oral philosophy is irrelevant to m oral living because it makes no attem pt to tell one how to live. C ontem porary philosophers, as we have seen, disclaim givin g m oral guidance as part of their respon sibil­ ity as philosophers. T h ey interpret their function to be the secondorder study of how m oral judgm ents operate, how they are defended, how they are like and unlike statem ents, com m ands, em otive utter­ ances, and so on. A nd the curious reader m ay well ask, “ W hat relation ­ ship can this kin d of theoretical inquiry into the nature o f m oral judgm ents have to the kinds of m oral decisions one m ust m ake in his daily life?” ' W hat m ust not be overlooked is the fact that contem porary philos­ ophers are not the first to insist that a study of m oral philosophy is not directly relevant to m orality itself. A ristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics insisted that one ought not to study m oral philosophy early in life, for one m ay well be corrupted by this study into defending the kind of life one desired to live. H e thought that we actually gain our m orality quite early in life from those persons with whom we have had frequent contact, such as our parents and teachers. T h u s, A ristotle held that the best background for a study o f m oral philosophy is pro­ vided by the m oral education parents give their children. So contem­ porary philosophers are not saying anything radically new when they hold that a person learns how to act by precept and exam ple, an d only later does one find it necessary to give a ration al justification for this way of life. Indeed m any people never find it at all necessary to have a rational justification for their m oral behavior, bu t instead sim ply go on accepting the m oral injunctions which they acquired early in life. Some psychological and sociological studies seem to indicate that education does very little at the later stages to change one’s beliefs and attitudes. Now if this is in fact the case, the laym an m ay well say that this proves the futility o f m oral philosophy for it has no direct influence upon m oral conduct. I think that one m ust adm it that some people have expected from

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the study of m oral philosophy too much usefulness in the direct way of influencing conduct. As I have stressed m any times, contem porary philosophers do not consider it p art of their jo b to give! m oral advice, to reform the existing m oral codes, and so on. O f course, a philos­ opher may express his own “ obiter dicta” and not as p art of his task qua philosopher speak on contem porary m oral issues, ju st like any other m an. B u t when the philosopher does this kind of thing he in­ sists that his professional status gives him no m ore or no less authority in m oral m atters than is possessed by any educated m an who has in­ quired seriously into existing m oral abuses. In fact, the philosopher m ay be less know ledgeable in practical m oral m atters than many other people, because he m ay have devoted m ost of his time to aca­ dem ic research and the problem s of “ the halls of ivy.” If one, there­ fore, is seeking direct m oral guidance, one w ill not And it in the w ritings of professional philosophers. B u t I think that it can be shown that in some other way m oral philosophy can be quite useful, and indeed that it m ight even conceivably have some indirect effect upon m orals themselves. At the beginning of the twentieth century m any textbooks on m oral philosophy defined ethics as the science of conduct. Since the word “ science” now is usually taken to m ean an em pirical observational study, one does not often come across this kin d of definition anymore. B u t there may be some help for us in recalling that what this kind of definition was saying was that ethics was an organized body of knowledge abou t m oral values. It was a systematic attem pt to inquire into the basis and nature of the ethical judgm en ts hum an beings made. T h is entire book m ay be considered as an attem pt to review the results which various contem porary philosophers have proposed after m aking their detailed investigations into the nature of m oral judgm ents. As such, the prim ary justification for ethical theory should be the same as for any other system atic inquiry concerning m an and nature, namely, that it adds to our knowledge. T o insist on the im m ediate practical utility of all investigations into knowledge would not only remove ethical theory from the province of worthwhile studies, but also m ost of the theoretical sciences as well. T h e sceptical laym an m ay protest at this argum ent by suggesting that there have been m any useful by-products which have resulted from theoretical investigations in the n atu ral sciences, such as new drugs for relieving misery, je t airplanes, frozen foods, and so on, but

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that no such by-products can be traced to the study of ethical theory. U ndoubtedly it is true that m any of the theoretical sciences have pro­ duced by-products of aid to m an, bu t m ost scientists w ould insist that their researches w ould be worthwhile whether such by-products were discovered or not. In fact the utility of theoretical science can be over­ estim ated; for exam ple, would our sceptical critic claim that anyone w ould be able to see yellow better if he understood the wave theory o f light? B u t quite often a sceptical critic of the utility of ethical theory will go further and m ain tain that m oral philosophy has tended to bring about a decay in m orality in today’s world. H e m ay rem ind us of the pervadin g influence of relativism in m orality am ong modern youth, of the individualism encouraged by existentialism , and so on. H ere the charge is not that there have been no effects upon m orality arising from ethical theory, b u t rather that these effects have tended to be bad rather than good. One m ight encourage an unen din g debate at this point by suggesting that not all of the effects of theoretical and applied science have been good either. T o consider only one case, take the atom and hydrogen bom bs. Furtherm ore, it is very difficult to trace cause and effect relationships in social m atters, and it may well be that the pervadin g relativism of our age (if it is indeed true that this is the prevailin g m oral climate) could be traced to the changes in living brought abou t by better means of production, transportation and com m unication, that is, to the in dustrialization of society, rather than to m oral philosophy. T h e interested reader could well ponder for some time the alleged lack of utility or bad influence of m oral philosophy upon m orality. W hatever answer he comes up with, if he comes up with one at all, w ould have to be very tentative indeed, for here anyone lacks enough reliable inform ation to form more than an opinion. A ll that I have tried to suggest is that usefulness should not be the criterion for eval­ u atin g any theoretical inquiry, whether it be of an em pirical scien­ tific nature, or an inquiry into the status and function of m oral ju d g ­ ments. H ere I suggest the m ain criterion should be that o f whether or not the inquiry adds to our body of organized knowledge. B u t for the pragm atic reader I should like to suggest that ethical theory may be quite useful in the way in which he w ould like to see a theory useful. It is im portan t to note that I am suggesting that it may be useful, not that it actually is or has been useful. First o f all,

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a careful study of m oral philosophy may help one to differentiate more clearly between a value ju dgm en t and an em pirical factual statem ent. One m ay become m ore conscious of the different ways in which one uses language, so that one does not confuse psychological-sociological descriptions of how people do act with m oral appraisals. Secondly, one may learn to recognize the difference between su p portin g reasons given for an evaluative ju dgm en t and the uttering of em otive ejacu­ lations designed to influence attitudes. Or, in other words, a study of m oral philosophy may help to make one more alert to the persuasive­ ness of p ropagan da and more searching in his quest for reasons to su p po rt evaluations. T h ird ly , one may no longer feel that m oral judgm ents are inferior to scientific ones because they cannot be veri­ fied in the sam e way. G ranted certain agreed upon criteria in our society, m oral judgm ents can be verified in a way ap prop riate to their function. B u t perhaps this kind of utility of m oral philosophy could be best sum m ed up by saying that it may help us to remove certain m uddles in our thinking which p op u lar talk abou t m orality, or cer­ tain analyses of m oral judgm ents, have created for us. T O W A R D R E M O V IN G T H E M U D D L E S O F C L A S S IF IC A T IO N T o this w riter it seems clear that recent ethical philosophy has gone a long way tow ard rem oving some of the m uddles which tlie classifications of some previous philosophers had caused in ethical theory. By rem oving some of these artificial barriers the way m ay be opened for a fresh approach to the nature and status of m oral state­ ments. (1) Are moral judgm ents objective or subjective? Very often it is thought that the answer given to this question will determ ine quite clearly whether or not m oral judgm ents are verifiable or arbitrary. T h in gs do not follow so easily here, however, for various philosophers have used the words “ objective” and “ subjective” in quite different ways. W ithout claim ing to be exhaustive in my analysis, I should like to suggest at least three different ways in which this p air of terms have been used in m oral philosophy, and then I shall attem pt to show what feature or features of m oral judgm ents were elucidated by these various classifications. (a) One group of philosophers have said that m oral judgm ents are objective in the sense that they refer to a property or quality which can be discovered by analysis, and their opponents have m aintained

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that m oral judgm ents are subjective in that no such property or qu ality can be found. T h u s, for exam ple, G. E. M oore held that “ good ” referred to a basic indefinable non-natural property. Hence m oral statem ents were objective in that they were actually calling attention to a feature which was not any m ore arbitrary than the “ yellowness” of yellow. T h is position concerning the status of m oral judgm ents was m ain tain ed by P lato who held that there were eternal form s which the philosopher could glim pse in m om ents of intellectual intuition. Hence, the good was real, eternal, and im m utable, an d it was m an ’s task to attem pt to im itate in his own life the way of life discovered through his philosophical contem plation.

T h e subjectivists who opposed the above sketched version of ob jectivism in ethics m ain tain ed in P lato ’s day that they could not dis­ cover an eternal form of the good, and in G. E. M oore’s time, that they could not find a self-evident non-natural property of good. In this instance of the debate between objectivists and subjectivists, the issue was purely as to whether or not ethical terms referred to a property or qu ality which could be discovered, m uch as it was held that yellow referred to a qu ality yellowness. T h e laym an who asso­ ciates (subjectivism w ith relativism of a purely in dividualistic sort should note that this kin d of position is not necessarily im plied here. O f course, as a m atter of fact some writers who have denied that “ good ” referred to an objective property or qu ality also m aintained that m oral ju dgm en ts were purely arbitrary, but others defended the position that they were solidly based on a know ledge of hum an nature an d on m an ’s pragm atic experience in the school of living. B u t this is to take us into another level of the debate between objectivists and subjectivists in ethics. (b) T h ose who defend an objectivist position in ethics today some times m ean that m oral judgm ents are based on the accepted standards of hum an society, or on the accepted standards of a p articular civili­ zation. W hat is confusing in this type of debate is that the subjecti­ vist here m ay say m uch the same kind of thing as the objectivist, but call his view “ subjectivist.” One can m ain tain that m oral standards are objective in the sense that they represent the accum ulated ex­ perience of the hum an race. M an has over the centuries learned that some ways of acting are better than others, and these ways have been form ulated into m oral codes. W hat the objectivist here wishes to call our attention to is that m oral judgm ents are not like tastes, in that

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they are purely a m atter of personal preference, b u t rather that they are m ore like statem ents of em pirical scientific facts in that they refer to som ething m an has learned, whether abou t the art of livin g or about the nature of the physical world. Q uite often the objectivist appeals to such m oral ju dgm en ts as “ M urder is w rong,” m aking for it the claim that it has been universally, or m ost universally, held by all civilized peoples. T o characterize such a ju dgm en t as bein g like my tastes in food and dress w ould, the objectivist believes, be to m is­ represent it greatly. N ow one who defends a subjectivist position alon g these lines could agree to much of what the objectivist says, bu t he w ould inter­ pret m oral judgm ents differently. T h a t is, the subjectivist would agree that our m oral judgm en ts reflect the accepted standards of our civilization, bu t w ould hold that on that very ground they are su b­ jective rather than objective. A lthough it is perhaps true that all societies have condem ned som ething called “ m urder,” they have not agreed on what should count as m urder. T h u s in some prim itive societies, the k illin g of aged parents by a son is considered the son’s duty in order to prevent the suffering of the old people, while in our society, this kin d of act w ould be held to be m urder. Studies of prim i­ tive societies by the anthropologists, as well as studies of the ethics of the H o p i and N avah o Indians, have tended to show that there is quite a bit of divergence between these ways of life and our own. T h u s, while m any subjectivists on this interpretation w ould agree that m oral judgm en ts are not like tastes in food and dress, they would m ain tain they are subjective in that they are the products of a p articu ­ lar civilization at a certain tim e in its history. (c) A third use of the term objective in reference to m oral judgm ents holds to the belief that there are rational ways to solve m oral dis­ putes, while the subjectivist holds that ultim ate m oral disputes can­ not be settled rationally, b u t only by personal choice. T h e objectivists here call attention to their belief that good su p portin g reasons can be given for a m oral judgm en t, and that in prin ciple m oral disputes could be settled by exam in in g the relevant reasons. T h u s our attention is often directed to m oral disputes in which we disagree as to whether or not it was righ t for Jo h n to lie to his father concerning the hour when he arrived home last night. A fter the relevant reasons have been given, such as “ N ever tell lies,” and any extenuatin g circumstances for this case have been exam ined, the objectivist w ould hold that the

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dispute could be settled. W hat one w ould have to do is correctly to classify Jo h n ’s act, exam ine the relevant m oral principles, and give the rational answer that can be given. T h e subjectivist here w ould agree that som etim es disputes about m oral judgm ents can be settled in the way sketched above, but u lti­ m ately he w ould insist that the basic ap peal is a personal one. If one is called upon to ju stify a p articu lar m oral principle, he has to defend the way of life of which this principle is a part. B u t after this has been done, if it can be done in detail at all, the in d ivid ual must him self m ake the choice that this is the way he intends to live. In short, what the subjectivist here wishes to stress is that m oral ju d g ­ m ents are auto-referential, that is, that they refer prim arily to the “ I ” who is confessing his m oral philosophy. B u t this is not at all to im ply that m oral principles are chosen at random or arbitrarily, but rather that the in dividual him self m ust in the last analysis assum e respon­ sibility for the way of life which he intends to follow. It is the w riter’s belief that much of the confusion in the discussion of objectivism versus subjectivism in ethics could be rem oved if we determ ined which of these three senses of objectivism or subjectivism operate in the dispute. T h u s, with reference to the dispute as to whether or not m oral judgm ents refer to an objective property, it seems clear, since G. E. M oore, that either one discovers such a p ro p ­ erty in his own intuitive experience or he does not. I have not intuited such a property, and hence w ould have to call m yself a subjectivist in this sense. W ith respect to the second sense of the dispute between objectivists and subjectivists, however, I do not believe that a clear cut choice can be m ade. It seems that in this dispute what we have is a difference in em phasis, since both parties adm it that m oral judgm ents reflect the accepted standards of a society. If one believes that the accepted stan dard of his society is quite stable, and is based on hum an experience in the school of life, then he may well wish to call his m oral judgm ents objective. B ut, on the other hand, if one is more im pressed with the diversity in m oral judgm en ts within his society, with the changing pattern of w hat is approved and disapproved, and holds as well that much of what his present society considers good conduct is not actually good, then such a person w ill call his view subjectivist. T o this writer it seems that both these groups are cor­ rectly calling our attention to certain features of m oral judgm ents, and

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hence it appears to be asking too much to choose between them. In­ stead, here is a case where the dialectical m ethod of philosophy can help us by showing the aspects of m orality to which each side is callin g our attention, w ithout ignoring either the relative stability or the flux taking place within our m oral codes. As to the third sense of the debate which I have distinguished, I should like to hold that the objectivist is right in insisting that m any of our m oral disputes can be settled by giving the appropriate reasons for the judgm en t. In actual practice m any m oral disputes are undoubtedly settled in ju st that way. Nevertheless, I should also w ant to insist that the subjectivist here is ultim ately correct. A fter I have given my reasons for a m oral ju dgm en t and specified the way of life of which it is a part, all I can do is to confess to you my belief in this way of life as the best way of life, and to indicate that I shall attem pt to live by it. O f course my choice of a way of life is not arbitrary, since it is based on my social conditioning, on my rational exam ination of m oral principles and their justification, and on my seeing these principles themselves as p art of a whole way of life; but in the last analysis if you prefer another way of life, all that I can do is to attem pt to convert you. I cannot ration ally prove that my way of life is better, w ithout assum ing some of the standards of my way of life as the criteria by which other ways of life should be judged. One of the great m erits in the studies of ethics by T ou lm in , U rm son, H are and Braithw aite consists in their using sam ples of m oral ju dgm en ts and m oral argum ents to show how they actually do func­ tion when we are using them in m oral contexts. One clear result of this kind of analysis is to show that m oral judgm en ts function in some respects like objective statem ents about em pirical facts, and in other respects like subjective preferences in mattei's of taste; bu t that it is m isleading not to see that they are not exactly like either factual statem ents or expressions of preferences. T h ese philosophers have found that m oral judgm ents function to guide conduct, to voice decisions of policy, and to evaluate conduct according to the norms which are accepted by one’s society. W hen the function of m oral utter­ ances is seen in this way, it does not ap pear at all mysterious that they do not conveniently fit into a classification of either objectivity or subjectivity. I do not wish to m ain tain that it is not valuable to show in what respects m oral judgm ents function like objective statem ents of em­

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pirical facts, or in what respects they function like subjective prefer­ ences. In our society, for exam ple, our scale of values is such that the statem ent “ One ough t not to com mit m u rder” functions very much like the objective statem ent “ T h is book has two hundred pages.” R atio n al sane men w ould agree to both of these statem ents, although they w ould also recognize that the first is a statem ent about values, while the second is a statem ent of em pirical fact. T o call both of these statem ents objective in exactly the sam e sense would, therefore, be to disguise the differences between evaluations and statem ents of fact. On the other hand, there are some sim ilarities as well between the value ju dgm en t concerning m urder and preferences of tastes in that both kinds of statem ents express pro-attitudes or con-attitudes. B u t the difference between these kinds of statem ents can be, brought out by suggesting that, if I say “ I prefer peas to beans,” I do not attem pt to support my statem ent by giving reasons, while I w ould attem pt to give reasons if you questioned the m oral principle, “ One ought not to com m it m urder.” My personal preference for peas over beans is a m atter for my own private taste, while the m oral judgm en t abou t m urder involves others, indeed it involves my society an d its scale of values. It is not sim ply that I do not like to m urder anyone, in the same way that I do not like to eat beans, bu t rather that I be­ lieve m urder to be wrong and therefore confess this belief as p art of my way of life. (2 ) Are m oral judgm ents absolute or relative? T h is question i often intertw ined w ith the question concerning the objectivity or subjectivity of m oral statem ents. Again here a careful scrutiny m ay make this issue clearer than if it were presented as a choice be­ tween absolute standards which hold everywhere for all m en at all times, or relative standards which depend entirely upon the particular circumstances and people concerned at the lim e the ju dgm en t is uttered. Q uite frequently, anthropological and sociological evidence is a p ­ pealed to in su p po rt of the belief that m oral judgm ents are relative. H ow often our attention is called to the fact that people in other civilizations have had different m oral opinions from those we have in our society, or to the fact that within a given society m oral views change over the course of years. A ccording to this type of argum ent, it follows that m orals m ust be relative, for they do not rem ain con­ stant for societies and eras. W hat is not often noticed is that if this

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kind of argum ent discredits m orals, it also discredits science as well. Anyone remotely fam iliar with the history of science knows that the theories of science are not the sam e today as they were one hundred years ago, bu t few would on that basis seek to discredit the value of scientific investigations. Yet, sometimes people seem to talk in such a way as to suggest that merely because m oral beliefs have changed through the ages, therefore, they cannot be accorded a very high status; they are relative. T h is type of argum ent tends to drive some of the defenders of m orals to m ain tain that they are absolute, in the sense that they are supported by the very nature of the universe or by a transcendent G od. A nd thus the argum ent may be w aged back and forth, with little light bein g shed on the problem . It seems clear to this w riter that with a little reflection everyone knows the answer to this apparen t dilem m a, only rarely do we heed the obvious. M oral judgm ents have not rem ained constant from age to age or from civilization to civilization, although sometimes the d i­ versity of m oral standards has been exaggerated. R ecent writers in the social sciences have held that some principles seem to be part of every known society, such as a prohibition of m urder, only that so­ cieties have differed concerning what they w ould count as m urder. I shall not pursue my discussion along these lines, however, for I think a more direct approach is possible. W hen someone says m oral standards are relative, it is well to find out what that person holds they are relative to. If he then says that m orals are relative to the society in which one lives, he is uttering what appears to be an obvious truism in that clearly m orals are developed and m aintained within a p articular culture. B u t again, one can also say that our present day scientific attitud e is also a product of our western civiliza­ tion, for as Professor N orth rop has dem onstrated, Eastern cultures are m ore concerned with an aesthetic or religious outlook on life.22 In both cases, what is being done is to trace the relations of m orals, or science, to other com ponents of society. In this respect, one can correctly m aintain that both m oral attitudes and scientific beliefs are relative to the p articu lar society at a certain time. B u t there is often a subtle transition m ade in the argum ent which gives a more em otive and d isp aragin g tone to m ain tain in g that m oral attitudes are relative. For by saying that m oral attitudes are relative one frequently im plies that they are therefore w ithout foundation, com pletely artibrary, and not rationally defensible. “ It all depends on one’s state of m ind at

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the time; it all depends on how you were brought up, etc.” Again, there is truth in the charge that one’s m oral opinions arc influenced by one’s state of m ind at the time, by one’s conditioning, and so on, b u t this is not the sam e as saying that therefore one’s m oral attitudes are arbitrary. For if anything is clear, it is that one’s m oral attitudes are not arbitrary, if they are related to the society one lives in, and the kind of conditioning one has had as a child. T h is m ore subtle use of relativism to m ean arbitrariness is therefore as indefensible as an absolutistic insistence that m oral standards never really change, when in fact they do change. B u t here as in so m any philosophical debates, each side has cor­ rectly called attention to aspects of m oral judgm en ts which the other neglected. T h e absolutist has m eant to insist that there is less di­ versity in m oral standards than has been claim ed, that in a sense the basic m oral attitudes of hum an beings are somewhat constant. T h e relativist, on the other hand, has correctly stressed that over the ages m oral standards do change, that not all societies have had the sam e m oral codes, and that m oral attitudes are influenced by the prevailin g opinions of the society in which one lives. It seems to this writer that this debate has perhaps gone on long enough. I want to suggest that it is now time to recognize the truth in the claim s of both the absolutist and the relativist. T o force an exclusive choice here m ight well blin d us to im portan t aspects of m oral judgm ents. H ere I am rem inded of Professor Jo h n W isdom ’s insistence that one can say what one likes on m atters such as this, provided one has carefully exam ined the alternatives and is bearing in m in d the correct aspects to which each side in the dispute has called attention. (3) Are moral judgm ents supported by teleological or deontolog­ ical arguments? H ere again we have a classic debate between m oral philosophers, although one that is couched in m ore technical terms than the first two we have exam ined. We have had num erous occasions in previous chapters to consider philosophers, such as G. E. M oore, who m aintain that m oral judgm ents are justified in terms of the ends they serve (teleological), and other philosophers as well, such as W. D. Ross, who m ain tain that m oral judgm ents are defended as the right acts for that situation (deontological). H ere it seems that we are faced with an artificial dichotomy, it we are asked to choose be­ tween these two types of explanation s of how a m oral ju d gm en t can be defended. Sometimes we ju stify an action by sim ply saying som e­

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thing like, “ It was his duty not to lie,” while on other occasions we attem pt to show that the act in question was right because it tended to brin g about m ore goodness for those concerned than any possible alternative act. In p articu lar I should like to dissent with T o u lm in when he suggests that deontological justifications are ap prop riate in the context of a prevailin g m oral code, while teleological justifications are only ap prop riate when two principles w ithin a code conflict, or when the entire way of life itself is being evaluated. It seems to me that this is an artificial solution, for in practice one can use either form of justification at any stage of an ethical argum ent. Indeed, I am suggesting that these two types of justification for a m oral act can m utually reinforce each other. T h u s, I can say that Jo n es did the right thing in not lying to his tutor about his recent absence from college because it is w rong to tell lies, and because lies tend in the long run to brin g about less good to the parties than telling the truth does. T h e point is that som etim es it seems m ore n atu ral to ap peal to some deontological reasons, such as prim a facie duty, and at other times it seems m ore n atu ral or ap prop riate to ap peal to the likely consequences of the action. B u t to say this is not to say that one type of justification has any priority over the other.

C O N C L U S IO N T h is study of contem porary ethical theory has been an attem pt to show the kin d of investigations which contem porary philosophers are m aking in this area, to exam ine some of their conclusions, and to discuss the various approaches which philosophers have taken to m oral philosophy. As such its m ain purpose has been to try to help the laym an through the apparen t tangle of contem porary ethical theory. W hile we have m ain tain ed that it is not the function of the m oral philosopher to tell us how to live, nevertheless, it may well be that enlightenm ent about the nature of m oral judgm ents, the m eaning or characterization of ethical terms, and discussions of some contro­ versial issues within this field may have useful by-products for the reader. H e may be able to think more clearly him self when he makes actual m oral judgm ents, if he has some u nderstan din g of the way in which m oral judgm ents function, how they are like and unlike com­ m ands, im peratives, objective statem ents, em otive utterances, an d so on. As a recent writer has p u t it: 1

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T h e upshot of this is that, while it is not the business of the m oral philosopher to preach, it is always his business to en­ lighten; and the enlightenm ent which consists in the clarification of a m oral issue may well be practical guidance also. T h e m oral philosopher is more likely than other m en to penetrate the bar­ rier of em otionally charged words in which m oral discourse abounds, to see what the issues really are, and to help others to see them too.23 In this respect, contem porary m oral philosophers may share in the task of P lato ’s philosopher who, after gain in g enlightenm ent, tried to help other men to emerge from the cave.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 1 Andrew Sinclair, My Friend Ju d as. London: Faber and Faber, 1959, p. 76. 2 Quoted by A. G. N. Flew in Essays on Logic and Language (Second Series), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953, p. 5. (Flew does not m aintain this view himself; indeed he attem pts in his essay to answer this charge.) 3 Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development. London: Allen and Unwin, 1959, pp. 216-217. 4 Russell, My Philosophical Development, p. 217. s Russell, My Philosophical Development, p. 230. 6 Ernest Gellner, Words and Things. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1959, p. 265. 7 Gellner, Words and Things, p. 259. s Gilbert Ryle, “Systematically M isleading Expressions,” reprinted in Flew, ed., Logic and Language (First Series), 1951, chapter II. s Ryle, “ Systematically M isleading Expressions,” in Flew, ed., Logic and L an g­ uage (First Series), p. 36. 10 Ryle, “ Systematically M isleading Expressions,” in Flew, ed., Logic and L an g­ uage (First Series), pp. 20-21. 11 See Chapter 3 of this book. 12 For an interesting use of analogy, metaphor, and paradox in a recent paper on metaphysics see John Wisdom, “ Gods,” reprinted in Jo h n Wisdom, Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953, pp. 149-168, and in Flew, ed., Logic and Language (First Series), 1951, pp. 187-206. is A. G. N. Flew, Introduction to Logic and Language (Second Series), p. 7. 14 Gellner, Words and Things, pp. 237-239. is Gellner, Words and Things, p. 265. is Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Sections 2-65. 17 W ittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Section 23. is Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Section 109. 19 John Wisdom, Other M inds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952. 20 R . B. Braithwaite, Theory of Games as a tool for the M oral Philosopher. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1955. 21 R . B. Braithwaite, Theory of Games as a tool for the M oral Philosopher, p. 4. 22 F. S. C. Northrop, The M eeting of East and West. N. Y.: M acmillan, 1946. 23 Bernard Mayo, Ethics and the M oral Life. London: M acmillan & Co., Ltd., 1958, p. 14. v

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SU G G E ST IO N S FO R FU R TH ER R EA D IN G Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth and Logic. New York: Dover P ub lica­ tions, Inc., Second edition, 1935. ----------- , and others, The Revolution in Philosophy. L ondon : M ac­ m illan and Com pany, Ltd., 1956. Braithw aite, R. B., Theory of Games as a T oo l for the M oral Philoso­ pher. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1955. Ewing, A. C., T he Definition of Good. New York: T h e M acm illan Com pany, 1947. ----------- , Second Thoughts in M oral Philosophy. L ondon : R outledge and K egan P aul, L td ., 1959. Flew, A. G. N., editor, Logic arid Language. O xford: B asil Blackw ell, First Series, 1951. Second Series, 1953. G ellner, Ernest, Words an d Things. London : Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1959. H are, R . M., T he L an guage of Morals. O xford: T h e Clarendon Press, 1952. Jo a d , C. E. M., A Critique of L ogical Positivism. C hicago: U niversity of Chicago Press, 1950. Mace, C. A., editor, British Philosophy in the Mid-Century. London: George A llen and U nw in, Ltd., 1957. M ayo, Bernard, Ethics and the M oral Lije. L ondon : M acm illan and Com pany, L td ., 1958. M oore, G. E., Ethics. L ondon : O xford U niversity Press, First edition 1912. ’ ----------- , Philosophical Papers. London : G eorge A llen and Unwin Ltd., 1959. ’ ----------- , Principia Ethica. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press 1903. ' Now ell-Sm itli, P., Ethics. L ondon : Penquin Books, 1954. O gden, C. K., and R ichards, I. A., T he M eaning of M eaning. London : R outledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 10th edition, 1949. Ross, W. D., Foundations of Ethics. O xford: O xford U niversity Press, 1939. ----------- , The R igh t and the Good. O xford: T h e C larendon Press, 1930. R ussell, Bertrand, My Philosophical Development. London : George Allen and Unwin, L td., 1959. Schilpp, P. A., editor, The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Evanston: Northw estern U niversity Press, 1942­ 201

Schlick, M oritz, Problems of Ethics. T ran slated by D. R ynin. New York: Prentice-H all, Inc., 1939. Sellars, W ilfrid, and H ospers, Jo h n , editors, R eadin gs in Ethical Theory. New York: A ppleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952. Stevenson, Charles L., Ethics and Language. New H aven: Yale U n i­ versity Press, 1944. T ou lm in , Stephen, T h e Place of Reason in Ethics. C am bridge: C am ­ bridge U niversity Press, 1950. U rm son, J . O., Philosophical Analysis. O xford: T h e C larendon Press, 1956. W isdom, Jo h n , Other M inds. O xford: B asil Blackw ell, 1952. ----------- , Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis. O xford: B asil Blackw ell, 1953. W ittgenstein, Ludw ig, The B lu e and Brown Books. O xford: B asil Blackwell, 1959. ----------- , Philosophical Investigations. T ran slated by G. E. M. Anscombe. O xford: B asil Blackw ell, Second edition, 1958. ----------- , Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. L on d on : R outled ge and K egan Paul, Ltd., 1922.

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INDEX M arx, 178-179 Mill, J. S., 5-7 Moore, G. E „ 1-25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 39-44, 45, 61, 68, 71, 73, 82, 85, 103, 110, 135, 141, 152, 159, 165, 168, 181, 182, 190, 192, 196

Aiken, H „ 96-97 Anderson, R., 117 Aristippus, 5 Aristotle, 81, 164, 168, 169, 186 Austin, J., 173 Ayer, A. J., 62, 64-82, 84, 85, 86, 90, 92-94, 99, 108

Neurath, O., 64 Northrop, 195

Barnes, W. H. F., 62 Bentham, 5-6 Braithw aite, R „ 61-62, 97-98, 106, 153-157, 158, 174, 179-180, 184, 193 Brandt, R., 98 Brunner, E., 75 Butler, 20

Ogden, C. K., 60-61, 68 Plato, 33, 91, 163, 164-165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 190, 198 Prichard, 27-28, 31

Carnap, R ., 63-64 Comte, A., 63

Richards, I. A., 60-61, 68 Ross, W. D „ 24, 25-44, 45, 50-52, 103, 110, 159, 181, 182, 196 Russell, B „ 11, 163-164 Ryle, G „ 166-167, 168

D ’Arcy, M., 78-79 Dewey, J., 97 Duncan-Jones, 24

Schlick, M „ 63, 64, 74 Sinclair, A., 162 Spinoza, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168 Stevenson, C„ 19, 62, 79, 82-99, 103, 152, 153, 168, 183, 184 Strawson, 54

Epicurus, 5 Ewing, A. C„ 44-56, 80, 103, 157-158, 181, 182 Feigl, H „ 64, 81 Field, G „ 21-22 Flew, A., 170 Frankena, W., 20-21

T illich, 171 Toulm in, S., 106-120, 132, 168, 169, 193

Gellner, E „ 163-164, 170, 171

Urmson, J., 120-132, 142, 184, 193

Hare, R ., 22-23, 97-98, 115-116, 118, 131, 132-159, 165, 168, 169, 184, 193

Waismann, F., 63 Weldon, T „ 54-55 Wick, W., 95-96 Wisdom, J., 56, 75-76, 106, 119, 175-176, 196 Wittgenstein, L., 64, 104-106, 108, 141, 163, 166, 172-174

Jo ad , C., 78-79 Kant, 73, 91 Kinsey, 8 Kraft, V., 64

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