Conscience as Cognition: Phenomenological Complementing of Aquinas’s Theory of Conscience 9783631627013, 9783653025057, 3631627017

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Conscience as Cognition

European Studies in Theology, Philosophy and History of Religions Edited by Bartosz Adamczewski

Vol. 7

Jan Krokos

Conscience as Cognition Phenomenological Complementing of Aquinas's Theory of Conscience

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

The publication was financially supported by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education – National Programme for the Development of Humanities

Translation: Skrivanek Sp. z o.o.

ISSN 2192-1857 ISBN 978-3-631-62701-3 (Print) E-ISBN 978-3-653-02505-7 (E-Book) DOI 10.3726/978-3-653-02505-7 © Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Frankfurt am Main 2013 All rights reserved. Peter Lang Edition is an Imprint of Peter Lang GmbH. Peter Lang – Frankfurt am Main · Bern · Bruxelles · New York · Oxford · Warszawa · Wien All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This book is part of the Peter Lang Edition list and was peer reviewed prior to publication. www.peterlang.com

Table of Contents Introduction ......................................................................................................... 9 0.1. Subject of the study and its justification ....................................................... 9 0.2. Modern directions of research into the conscience ...................................... 14 0.3. Structure of the study and method .............................................................. 18 Chapter One The Context of Thomas’s Teaching on Conscience ....................................... 21 1.1. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum ............................................................ 22 1.1.1. Genesis of the work .......................................................................... 22 1.1.2. General description of the work ....................................................... 23 1.1.3. The place of the teaching on conscience .......................................... 24 1.2. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate ............................................................ 26 1.2.1. Genesis of the work .......................................................................... 26 1.2.2. General description of the work ....................................................... 28 1.2.3. The place of the teaching on conscience .......................................... 30 1.3. Summa theologiae ....................................................................................... 31 1.3.1. Genesis of the work .......................................................................... 31 1.3.2. General description of the work ....................................................... 32 1.3.3. The place of the teaching on conscience .......................................... 34 1.4. Summary ..................................................................................................... 38 Chapter Two Saint Thomas’s Questions about Conscience ................................................. 41 2.1. Theory of questions by Aristotle and Thomas ............................................ 41 2.1.1. Outline of the theory of questions by Aristotle ................................ 42 2.1.2. Thomas’s theory of questions ........................................................... 52 2.2. Analysis of Thomas’s questions about conscience ..................................... 56 2.2.1. General characteristics of Thomas’s questions about conscience .... 56 2.2.2. Questions about conscience in particular works of Thomas Aquinas ........................................................................... 60 2.2.2.1. Summa theologiae ............................................................... 60 2.2.2.2. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate .................................... 61 2.2.2.3. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum ................................... 62 2.2.3. Typology of Thomas’s questions about conscience ......................... 63 2.2.3.1. Questions about synderesis ................................................. 64 2.2.3.1.1. Question about the kind of being of synderesis ..... 64 2.2.3.1.2. Question about functioning of synderesis.......... 65 2.2.3.1.3. Question about properties of synderesis ........... 66

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2.2.3.2. Questions about conscience (conscientia).......................... 66 2.2.3.2.1. Question about the kind of being of conscience .... 67 2.2.3.2.2. Question about functioning of conscience......... 67 2.2.3.2.3. Questions about action by judgement of conscience ...................................................... 68 2.3. Summary ..................................................................................................... 69 Chapter Three Thomas Aquinas’s Teaching on Conscience ................................................... 73 3.1. Synderesis .................................................................................................... 73 3.1.1. Synderesis as a natural habit ............................................................. 73 3.1.1.1. Summa theologiae ............................................................... 75 3.1.1.2. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate .................................... 81 3.1.1.3. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum ................................... 84 3.1.2. The functioning of synderesis .......................................................... 87 3.1.3. The properties of synderesis – its permanence ................................. 90 3.1.3.1. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate .................................... 91 3.1.3.2. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum ................................... 92 3.2. Conscience (conscientia) ............................................................................ 94 3.2.1. Conscience as act .............................................................................. 95 3.2.1.1. Summa theologiae ............................................................... 95 3.2.1.2. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate .................................... 98 3.2.1.3. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum ................................. 104 3.2.2. The functioning of conscience........................................................ 107 3.2.2.1. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate .................................. 107 3.2.2.2. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum ................................. 109 3.2.3. The judgment of conscience and action ......................................... 110 3.2.3.1. Whether conscience is binding in general ........................ 111 3.2.3.2. Whether a false conscience is binding .............................. 112 3.2.3.2.1. Summa theologiae............................................ 112 3.2.3.2.2. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate ................. 113 3.2.3.2.3. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum ................ 114 3.2.3.3. Whether a conscience is binding in its relation to law ..... 115 3.2.3.4. How conscience binds with respect to a particular act ..... 117 3.3. Summary .................................................................................................... 118 Chapter Four Etymology of the Terms: “Conscience” and “Consciousness” and their Usage ................................................................................................ 123 4.1. ............................................................................................ 124 4.2. Conscientia ................................................................................................ 128

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4.3. “Conscience” and “consciousness” in modern languages ........................ 130 4.4. Summary ................................................................................................... 133 Chapter Five The Human Act as the Object of Conscience ............................................... 135 5.1. Human acts and acts of man...................................................................... 136 5.2. The human act as moral ............................................................................ 139 5.3. The realisation of the human act ............................................................... 147 5.4. The human act as a process and as an event ............................................. 152 5.5. Summary ................................................................................................... 156 Chapter Six Conscience and Cognition of the Human Act ............................................... 157 6.1. Conscience as consciousness of the human act ........................................ 157 6.1.1. Conscience and consciousness according to Thomas Aquinas ...... 158 6.1.2. Consciousness according to phenomenologists ............................. 162 6.2. Epistemic status of the human act and conscience ................................... 166 6.2.1. Metaphysical and phenomenological explanation of a distinguished epistemic status of the human act and conscience ................................................................................ 167 6.2.2. Significance of a distinguished epistemic status of the human act and conscience for science about conscience ..... 174 6.3. Non-actional and actional consciousness of the human act ...................... 180 6.4. Summary ................................................................................................... 187 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 189 Abbreviations ................................................................................................... 197 Bibliography..................................................................................................... 201

Introduction The problem of conscience originates from the experience of morality, from the fact that at least sometimes we become aware that we should do something, while another time that we should not do something. We also become aware of the fact that we have done something good or bad, thus we in ourselves are – and are becoming – somebody good or bad. This “awareness” of one’s own acts, i.e. the fact of conscience, requires explanation and it has been explained variously over the centuries1. Human being has always been interest in conscience. There has been no period in history that did not refer to conscience2. Biblical texts and treasures of ancient culture discuss conscience. The greatest authors of World and Polish literature3 masterfully show the “voice” of conscience calling in man, its mystery and complexity. We notice the theoretical consideration of conscience mainly in philosophical anthropology, ethics, moral theology and psychology. Meanwhile, it seams that the nature of the root of this problem is gnosiological (epistemological).

0.1. Subject of the study and its justification We want to analyse conscience as a specific cognition, i.e. source of knowledge about something.

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E.g. the following books include a review of various interpretations of conscience and the problem of conscience: Das Gewissen, Zürich-Stuttgart 1958; Das Gewissen in der Diskussion, hrsg. J. Blühdorm, Darmstadt 1976 and P. Valadier, Éloge de la conscience, Paris, 1994. See also: Sumienie, wina, melancholia. Materiały polsko-niemieckiego seminarium. Warszawa, Październik 1997, ed. P. Dybel, Warszawa 1999. See: H. Reiner, Gewissen, in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Bd. 3, hrsg. J. Ritter, Basel-Stuttgart 1974, 574-592; E. Schick, R. Hofmann, H. Häfner, Gewissen, in: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, hrsg. J. Höfer, K. Rahner, Bd. 4, Freiburg 1960, 859-867. It can be said that conscience is a great and common subject of literature, its “crucial experience”. Each great author deals directly or at least partially with the phenomenon of conscience. Let us put the example of the greatest authors: Sophocles, Dante, W. Shakespeare, F. Dostoyevsky, L. Tolstoy, G. Bernanos, F. Kafka, F. Mauriac, A. Camus, and among Polish authors – J. Słowacki, C.K. Norwid, S. Żeromski, G. Herling-Grudziński, Z. Herbert, J.J. Szczepański. The term “crucial experience” has been taken from A. Kijowski. W. Tomaszewska discusses it in Między ideą a rzeczywistością. Andrzeja Kijowskiego wizja literatury, Warszawa 2002, 77-88.

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Favouring the concept of autonomous theory of knowledge formulated by Antoni B. Stępień4, research about conscience should be conducted in a non-prejudiced, non-dogmatic way, justifying and assessing the truthfulness of one’s own first sentences by one’s own means. Meanwhile, if it is about this study, we affirm basing our analyses on Thomas Aquinas’s teaching about conscience and its complement with phenomenological research, sort of denying the possibility of non-dogmatic gnosiological analysis of conscience. However, it is not like that. There are several reasons that impose reference to Aquinas’s teaching and the way of apprehending this subject. First, a variety of apprehensions of the problem of conscience in the history of human thought, thus their probable incoherence5, requires making a choice of some concept of conscience and accepting it on a trial basis as a point of reference for gnosiological analyses. However, such a choice cannot be arbitrary. This concept should meet at least two conditions: it should treat conscience as cognition and this concept should be important and play a significant role in the history of philosophy. In our opinion, these conditions are met exactly by the concept of conscience presented by Thomas Aquinas in his works. The cognitive character of conscience is manifested in further parts of this study when we present specifically Thomas’s science about conscience6. Not only modern Thomists, but also represen4

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A.B. Stępień proposes consideration of the theory of knowledge as philosophical science, researching human cognition as informer (in the aspect of truthfulness) searching for criterion/criteria of truth (final foundation or final foundations of claiming cognition’s truthfulness), in order to assess the truthfulness of actually obtained cognitive results. A.B. Stępień, O metodzie teorii poznania. Rozważania wstępne, Lublin 1966, 72-78. In many studies, one states that there is no coherence in the apprehension of conscience, that common terminology has not been developed, that different phenomena are analyses in research on conscience. It means that sometimes one demands the omission of using the term “conscience”, at least in scientific research. According to E. Gilson, in the Middle Ages, voluntarism was also present next to intellectualist apprehension of conscience and synderesis noticed in Thomas Aquinas. Henry of Ghent was to favour completely voluntaristic apprehension of conscience (conscientia). He defined conscience as “quidam particularis motor, stimulans ad opus secundum dictamen rectae rationis”, while synderesis as “quidam universalis motor, stimulans ad opus secundum regulas universales legis naturae”. Bonaventure, whose position Gilson defines as semi-voluntarism, understood conscience as innate habitus of the power of knowledge, not apprehended in its theoretical function, but practical. Conscience understood in such a way includes partially the thing that Thomas assigns to synderesis. Bonaventure places synderesis in affection: “Dico enim quod synderesis dicit, illud quod stimulat ad bonum et ideo ex parte affectionis se tenet”. Transitional voluntarism, whose representative was Richard of Middleton, understood synderesis affectively as a natural and necessary inclination to good in general or intellectually as a persuasion of

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tatives of other philosophical schools and orientations refer to it – although critically – which seems to prove its importance in the history of philosophy7. Despite all this, Thomas’s science about conscience is not satisfactory from the point of view of the theory of knowledge, thus it demands a complement. Such a complement may be formed by phenomenological analyses, especially concerning consciousness, also because – as it seems – Aquinas had some non-thematic phenomenological knowledge founding his metaphysical considerations. Therefore, the main problem of this study – conscience as cognition – is accompanied in the background by the issue of a possible complement of Thomism with phenomenology. Substantial and historical reasons favour such a possibility. Thomism and phenomenology, two important and present trends of philosophy, implement the classical concept of philosophy in different ways. According to this concept, philosophy is autonomous knowledge (with its own object and method proper to it), of scientific (rational) character, thus intersubjectively communicative and controllable, acquired with the use of only natural human cognitive abilities, sufficiently protecting its cognitive validity. It concerns a fundamental and essential thing in a researched object, apprehends its essence and necessary conditions. If being is this object, philosophy aims at cognition of final reasons (causes) of its existence and formation, materialness analysis of what is. If cognition is this object, philosophy considers the final foundations of credibility of human cognition, and final reasons (criteria) of assessing results of

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mind, not being a compulsion, which motivates us to good. In this apprehension, conscience is a recommendation of the practical reason (see: É. Gilson, L’esprit de la philosophie médiévale, Paris 1989, 331-332). It should be emphasised that texts cited by Gilson, which should advocate a voluntaristic concept of conscience, clearly indicates at least the occurrence of an intellectual moment in conscience and synderesis, which constitutes an additional motive to consider conscience as cognition. We may use as an example the following definition of conscience (conscience morale) taken from A. Lalande’s Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie (Paris 19608, 175-176), being only a modification of Thomas’s definition: “Propriété qu’a l’esprit humain de porter des jugements normatifs spontanés et immédiats sur la valeur morale de certains actes individuels déterminés. Quand cette conscience s’applique à des actes futurs de l’agent, elle revêt la forme d’une »voix« qui commande ou défend; quand elle s’applique aux actes passés, elle se traduit par des sentiments de joie (satisfaction) ou de douleur (remords). Cette conscience est dite, suivant les cas, claire, obscure, douteuse, erronée, etc.” E.g. the following authors reference to Thomas Aquinas’s science about conscience: N. Dent in the entry Conscience (in: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2, ed. E. Craig, London-New York 1998, 579-581) and J. Górnicka-Kalinowska in the study Idea sumienia w filozofii moralnej (Warszawa 1999, 63-86).

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Introduction

this cognition as true or false8. Thomism is metaphysical in its root and it explains initial data causatively, searching for ontic reasons of being. Phenomenology cannot be reduced to the theory of knowledge and it has a strong epistemological inclination; it describes initial data (phenomena) and if it explains them, it does it not causatively, but motivationally. The object of phenomenological research is the thing that is directly given. It limits itself to description of a phenomenon’s layers revealed in the view. If experiences are not limited to sensual cognition (as it was in positivism and its continuations), it is a radically empirical science. In the initial point, Thomas’s metaphysics is also empirical, but it does not stop on the thing that is directly given, and just explains it eventually, searching for the reason of being. It can be said that work of Thomas-metaphysician starts where the work of a phenomenologist ends. If yes, the initial data adopted in metaphysics demands illumination in phenomenological research9. Étienne Gilson and Antoni B. Stępień indicate the need for complementing Thomist metaphysics with phenomenology. While finishing L’être et l’essence, Gilson talks about the essentiality of basing metaphysics on phenomenology, which is outgrown by it, without seceding from it10. Stępień perceives a substantial basis of cooperation of Thomism and phenomenology in the fact that phenomenologists have developed the method of fundamental research assumed by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas11. One should also note the position, which perceives a threat for realism in connecting Thomism with phenomenology. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec representing this position considers, though, the significance of phenomenological research in the initial phase of philosophising. How-

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A.B. Stępień, Wstęp do filozofii, Lublin 20014, 25. M.A. Krąpiec and S. Kamiński understand “classical philosophy” more narrowly and identify it with the philosophy of being or with Thomist philosophy of being. See: A. Bronk, S. Majdański, Klasyczność filozofii klasycznej, RF 39-40 (1991-1992) 1, 367-391; S. Kamiński, Teoria bytu a inne dyscypliny filozoficzne, RF 25 (1977) 1, 5-17; A.B. Stępień, Kilka uwag o „filozofii klasycznej” i relacji: metafizyka – teoria poznania, in: idem, Studia i szkice filozoficzne, ed. A. Gut, vol. 2, Lublin 2001, 413-415. One can talk about metaphysics of Thomas and phenomenology as about empirical sciences in the sense that they originate from empiricism, relations with things. É. Gilson, L’être et l’essence, Paris 19943, 332. Like each statement, it should be received carefully. Gilson does not state clearly that he means phenomenology in Husserl’s style. However, the context indicates that his understanding of phenomenology is at least close to Husserl’s descriptive phenomenology. A.B. Stępień, Tomizm a fenomenologia, in: idem, Studia i szkice filozoficzne, ed. A. Gut, vol. 2, Lublin 2001, 269-277.

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ever, he firmly emphasises the insufficiency of phenomenology in realistic eventual explanation of being and cognition12. The closeness of Thomism and phenomenology and their complementarity has intrigued philosophers. Edith Stein13, student and assistant of Edmund Husserl, used works of Thomas Aquinas, without resigning from phenomenology, but seeing in them enhancement of phenomenological analyses 14. Karol Wojtyła (John Paul II) came the way that was to some degree opposite. Studies at the theological faculty of the Jagiellonian University and “Angelicum” in Rome helped him not only become familiar with Thomas’s views, but also fascinated with them15. While preparing his habilitation thesis16, he used phenomenology and perceived in it not a competition for Thomas, but his complement. He called Thomism and phenomenology as “philosophy of being” and “philosophy of consciousness” and considered them complementary methods of philosophy17. However, it was not because of systemic or methodological reasons, but

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See: M.A. Krąpiec, Metafizyka. Zarys teorii bytu, Lublin 19953, 26. 69. 188-193; idem, Realizm ludzkiego poznania, Lublin 19952, 22-23. Let us add that for Krąpiec cognition is a being, not an informer, while the theory of cognition is metaphysics of cognition. Basic “Thomist” work by E. Stein is Endliches und Ewiges Sein. Versuch eines Aufstieges zum Sinn des Seins, Louvain-Freiburg 1950. While discussing this study, R. Ingarden says that it has a different style, but “Edith Stein is still a phenomenologist in it” (R. Ingarden, O badaniach filozoficznych Edith Stein, in: E. Stein, O zagadnieniu wczucia, transl. D. Gierulanka and J.F. Gierula, Kraków 1988, 164). Other works by Stein about Thomas Aquinas include the article Husserls Phänomenologie und Philosophie des hl. Thomas von Aquino, JPPF 1929 Ergänzugsband, 315-338 and translation of Quaestiones disputatae De veritate titled Des hl. Thomas von Aquino Untersuchungen über die Wahrheit, vol. 1-2, Breslau 1931-1935, new ed. Louvain-Freiburg 1955. See: J. Krokos, Edyta Stein – od fenomenologii do Tomasza, in: Edyta Stein. Filozof i świadek epoki. Materiały z Międzynarodowego Sympozjum w Opolu – Kamieniu Śląskim w dniach 9-10.04.1997, ed. J. Piecuch, Opole 1997, 31-50 Karol Wojtyła writes about it in the letter dated 27 March 1947 to his aunt, Zofia Poźniakowa. See: T. Karolak, Papież z Polski, Warszawa 1979, 68. It is about the study Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maxa Schelera (ed. 1, Lublin 1959). Recently, it has been published in the series of writings by K. Wojtyła Człowiek i moralność, vol. 2, Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności, ed. T. Styczeń, J.W. Gałkowski, A. Rodziński, A. Szostek, Lublin 1991, 11-128. The study titled Osoba i czyn by Karol Wojtyła is the one that connects both traditions (ed. 1. – Kraków 1969, ed. 2. – Kraków 1985; in our study we refer to the third edition: Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, ed. T. Styczeń, W. Chudy, J.W. Gałkowski, A. Rodziński, A. Szostek, Lublin 19943 – this is vol. 4 of the series Człowiek i moralność). ACr 5-6 (1973-1974) includes a discussion concerning this work, as well as issues of connecting Thomism and metaphysics.

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with regard to the fact that they complement each other in cognition and explanation of reality18. In Poland, Stępień and Władysław Stróżewski variously connect Thomist and phenomenological traditions19. Therefore, also a historicphilosophical reason constitutes the basis of our attempt of complementing Thomas Aquinas’s teaching with phenomenology.

0.2. Modern directions of research into the conscience Nowadays, the problem of conscience is undertaken in philosophy in the ethical or (more seldom) anthropological context. In this research, the cognitive function of conscience is assumed, not analysed. Having regard to works of Polish authors from the circle of Thomism and phenomenology, the following tendencies in apprehending conscience can be perceived: 1. In classical philosophical anthropology in the spirit of Thomism, the problem of conscience is mixed with metaphysical analyses of human cognition and human act. Krąpiec’s apprehension of conscience is typical and somehow a model for Thomist analyses of conscience20. While analysing the practical knowledge (phronesis) as one (next to theoretical and productive – poiesis) of the areas of human cognition, he distinguishes in it cognition (awareness) of the main principles of action, the act of conscience and practical wisdom. The main 18

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See: J.W. Gałkowski, Karol Wojtyła a fenomenologia, in: Między logiką a etyką. Studia z logiki, ontologii, epistemologii, metodologii, semiotyki i etyki. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Leonowi Kojowi, Lublin 1995, 421-422. E.g. A. Anzenbacher, Die Intentionalität bei Thomas von Aquin und Edmund Husserl, Wien-München 1972; J. Rivera, Konnaturales Erkennen und vorstellendes Denken. Eine phänomenologische Deutung der Erkenntnislehre des Thomas von Aquin, Freiburg 1967; J. Seifert, Essere e persona. Verso una fondazione fenomenologica di una metafisica classica e personalista, Milano 1989; idem, Leib und Seele. Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen Antropologie, Salzburg-München 1973; idem, Was ist und was motiviert eine sittliche Handlung?, Salzburg-München 1976; E. Schorer, Die Zweckethik des hl. Thomas von Aquin als Ausgleich der formalistischen Ethik Kants und der materialen Wertethik Schelers, Vechta 1937; In his habilitation thesis, K. Wojtyła mentions studies considering some problems froam the Thomist and phenomenological perspective. R. Sokolowski, author of The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution (Haag 1970) sees in phenomenology help with understanding the ancient and medieval concept of being and mind (www.thomasaquinas.edu/news/newsletter/1999/spring/sokolowski.htm). See: M.A. Krąpiec, Ja-człowiek, Lublin 19915, 229-231. 262-269. 299-306. 312-317; idem, U podstaw rozumienia kultury, Lublin 1991, 84-117; idem, Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet, Lublin 19982, 83-87. In the second mentioned study, Krąpiec emphasises more strongly the role of actional and non-actional reflection in the constitution of a decision as moral being.

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principles of action (“one shall do good”), identified with natural law, express in practical language the affirmation of being. Therefore, they designate the whole order of morality. Synderesis is the habit of practical intellect to apprehend these principles. The act of conscience is the act of practical reason and it consists in the production of general and particular judgements in the practical area, from the main judgement: “one shall do good” to the particular judgement determining the will to make a free decision, which is a moral being and human act in the strict sense21. Production of the particular judgement “act here, now, so and so”, which is important, because the leading component of the act of decision, supposes as follows: 1° cognition of specific variable situation, 2° cognition and acceptance of some rules of behaviour, and 3° placing oneself as the one who is to act specifically in such a recognised situation. Therefore, the act of conscience constitutes the standard of morality, i.e. conscious and free proceedings. Conscience judgement hic et nunc orders unquestionably that in the specific case one should act one way, not another. In some measure, practical wisdom is the sum of life experience. Having regard to the fact of decision-making, Krąpiec distinguishes (1) reflective cognition of what happens in oneself in the moment of decision-making, (2) the very act of cognition (conscience in the strict sense) included in a decision, the result of which is practical particular judgement, and (3) general consciousness, awareness, which is virtual reflection of all cognitive acts. Krąpiec presents the way conscience functions traditionally as practical syllogism. Despite the originality of apprehending the problem of conscience in the context of the act of decision, in fundamental theses Krąpiec does not diverge from science about conscience found in the works of Thomas Aquinas. Explanation of conscience has a metaphysical character. 2. Thomas’s science about conscience, as it is presented in anthropology, is assumed in Thomist textbooks of ethics. In ethics, proceeding in accordance with judgement of conscience and formation of conscience constitute the centre of gravity. Tadeusz Ślipko22 situates conscience in the complex of phenomena defined by him as “phenomenon of morality”. He puts the problem of conscience in fundamental (general) ethics, which – next to generally philosophical assumptions – considers subsequently the problem of human acts, purpose and sense of human existence (eudaimonology), moral good and moral values (axiology), moral law (deontology), conscience in question (syneidesiology), moral virtues (aretology) and moral responsibility. He emphasises also that the following areas are crucial for ethics: eudaimonology, axiology and deontology, while 21 22

Here, judgement is understood broadly. T. Ślipko, Zarys etyki ogólnej, Kraków 20023, 35-45. 359-388.

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syneidesiology only as the one that stays in direct connection with the first three and their complement through the theoretical study of a specific and subjective aspect of morality. Ślipko defines conscience as judgement formed in the light of general assessment or standard, concerning moral good/evil of an own specific human act. The man intends this act and causing it becomes for him the source of internal approval or the sense of guilt, being a good or bad man23. He emphasises that the fact of conscience is a concrete moral phenomenon characterised with specificity and morality. The specificity of conscience is manifested in the fact that it turns towards the own acts of the subject that causes it, thus it is the subject’s own processing in reasonable acts caused by it. Morality of conscience consists in the fact that the subject defines in the acts of conscience specific acts in the category of good, evil or moral obligation. As in classical Thomist textbooks24, two problems are the lecture’s core: conscience as subjective standard of moral action and methods of shaping certain conscience25. 3. Anthropological and ethical character of studies by Karol Wojtyła causes that the problem of conscience is discussed there with regard to its role in human moral life26. It is a sign of self-agency (i.e. person is an author) of a human being in reference to good or evil and as such it is a subjective norm (measurement) of human acts’ morality. In his habilitation thesis, Wojtyła defines conscience as the act of interior life of a person, which consists in a belief about the moral good of a given (only this one, not another) act obliges him to fulfil it, while belief about evil of a given act obliges to stop from it, to its non-fulfilment. Obligation experienced by the man in conscience concerns directly self-agency of this person (i.e. to the fact that the person is the act’s author), that he is to be an author of some act or not. He is to be an author of this act due to moral good. If this act includes moral evil in his opinion, then he should not be its author. If he is an author, then he is an author of evil. Thus, conscience as “belief” attests to the practical character of moral values, conscience as “obligation” attests directly to a causative relation of a person to good and evil27. This definition is creatively developed in Osoba i czyn (Person and Action)28 and it indicates a 23 24

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Idem, 371. In Poland, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza by J. Woroniecki (vol. 1-3, Lublin 19952) is the classical “Thomist” textbook of ethics. Its layout reflects the construction of Summa theologiae by Thomas Aquinas. Presently, the problem of “shaping conscience” or its formation is very often considered. This problem exceeds the framework of this study. See: K. Wojtyła, Ocena możliwości, op. cit., 121. Ibidem, 81. Idem, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, op. cit., 197-216.

Introduction

17

further direction of science about conscience discussed by Tadeusz Styczeń29 and Andrzej Szostek30. This direction is indicated by the question about the function of conscience and its meaning in human life. 4. While discussing phenomenological analysis of conscience, authors pose the question about the essence of conscience and sense of its “speech” as the fundamental one. Classics of phenomenology treat the problem of conscience marginally. Max Scheler discusses them alongside so-called freedom of conscience31. It is not a source of moral values, but their subject and reservoir. They are experienced in cognitive acts, while their eventual source is purely emotional love. Actions of conscience are negative and forbidding, critical and warning. Conscience does not assess, but we experience orders and urges in it as coming from outside. Scheler ascertains a special metaphysically-religious meaning of conscience. It is a final moral instance as “the voice of God”. Dietrich von Hildebrand considers conscience similarly32. For him, it is a mysterious voice, which moved by iniquitous deed destroys a piece of one’s own soul and burdens a load on it that cannot be compared with anything else33. Józef Tischner and Antoni Siemianowski refer to such an apprehension of conscience. Tischner answer to the question about “what” conscience is based on perceiving unusual power in it, which makes the man a moral personality. In its essence, conscience is primarily disclosure of a human being in its references to value, and further – disclosure of a person’s guilt or good faith. In this disclosure, conscience is “unerring”, because it cannot be checked by a “tool” different than itself34. While discussing the Thomist concept of conscience, Siemianowski35 rejects the statement that it is the voice of reason. He considers it emotional experience, coming into being in the human heart. Conscience is the heart’s fear of moral evil or pain of the heart hurt by evil that entered one’s life 29

30

31

32 33 34 35

See: T. Styczeń, Wprowadzenie do etyki, Lublin 1993, 81-141. In ABC etyki (ibidem, 285-286) Styczeń defines conscience as moral consciousness expressed in the judgement: “One should perform such an act against O or R”. A. Szostek, Wokół godności, prawdy i miłości. Rozważania etyczne, Lublin 1995, 133193. Conscience is defined there as “witness of truth about the man”, while “cognitive character” is assigned to its acts. M. Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus, in: idem, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 2, hrsg. Maria Scheler, Bern 1954, 98. 210-217. 331-341. 369. 499. 513. 537. D. von Hildebrand, Ethik, in: idem, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 2, Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln-Mainz s.a.2, 156. 181. 192. 273n. 287. 431. 446. 470-471. M. Heidegger and P. Ricoeur also identify conscience with voice. J. Tischner, Etyka wartości i nadziei, in: Wobec wartości, Poznan 1982, 96-100. Antoni Siemianowski, Sumienie, SG 5 (1979-80) 5-78. This dissertation was published under the same title in a book version (Bydgoszcz 1997).

18

Introduction

through one’s own behaviours and actions36. The voice of conscience is not cognition of good and evil, but it assumes it. Like any emotional experience, conscience is founded on cognitive acts of consciousness. It should be searched for in a higher layer of intentional experiences, not in a layer of non-intentional experiences.

0.3. Structure of the study and method Analysis of conscience in the cognitive aspect seems to be justified. There are also reasons that suggest complementing Thomist metaphysics with phenomenology. Attempting to complement Thomas’s science about conscience with phenomenology, we initially accept the inquisitive hypothesis consisting of four theses: 1° conscience is a specific kind of cognition; 2° in the view of Aquinas, conscience was explained metaphysically; 3° in Thomas’s science about conscience, theses resulting from experience were adopted; 4° phenomenological research enables indication of these theses. This hypothesis indicates a direction of further analyses and structure of the study. In the first chapter, we indicate the place of occurrence of science about conscience in the treatise of Thomas Aquinas. It is to help us grasp its character and problematic context, in which this science occurs. The second chapter defines problems undertaken by Aquinas in science about conscience. We shall reach this through an analysis of questions he poses in it. Presentation of Aristotle and Thomas’s theory of questions precedes this analysis. It shall enable understanding how Aquinas treats a question and what role it plays in his work. The theory of questions shall also help distinguish problems being the object of Thomas’s inquisitive interest, as well as emphasise primary data and (possibly) reasons for their acceptance. In the third chapter, we present Thomas’s science about conscience in the system indicated by questions about conscience analysed in Chapter Two. We draw special attention to statements of Aquinas, in which the cognitive aspect of conscience is manifested. Having regard to the role played by etymology in Thomas’s argumentation and to the fact of terminological difference we note in ethnical languages and in philosophical language, Chapter Four considers the etymology of terms “conscience” and “consciousness”, as well as the how they are used. Their synonymy would be an argument for the legitimacy of complementing the Thomist theory of conscience with phenomenological analysis of conscience. 36

Ibidem, 33.

Introduction

19

The fifth chapter concerns the human act as the object of conscience. Due to conscience as cognition, we know something about its object and the thing we know about it characterises cognition to some degree. The way of understanding a human act by Thomas and phenomenologists indicates indirectly their understanding of the cognitive function of conscience. Fundamental consistency between Thomas and phenomenologists in understanding human act constitutes the basis of analysing cognition of a human act in conscience or through conscience, which is discussed in Chapter Six. We demonstrate there the basic consistency of Thomas’s concept of conscience (consciousness) with the apprehension of consciousness we find in phenomenology. In addition, we indicate places where phenomenology enables explaining Aquinas’s metaphysics of conscience by its research. Such an intention of the study assumes mainly an analysis of Thomas’s works concerning conscience, conducted in the context of his metaphysics, particularly – his anthropology and metaphysics of cognition. We shall aim at perceiving something that is given and has metaphysical explanation in the treatise by Aquinas. A purpose here perceives the phenomenon of conscience and its view as a condition of its intellectual insight. The intellectual view of conscience is to enable perceiving the basis of complementing Thomas’s science about conscience with phenomenological analyses. The attempt of complementing it with phenomenology in order to show the cognitive aspect of conscience will meet a range of difficulties. The problem of agreeing Thomism with phenomenology comes to the fore. Although they implement the classical concept of philosophy, they differ in the way of conducting philosophical analysis, aspect and language. In addition, a dilemma is created by translations of works by Thomas and phenomenologists into Polish and English. Terminology of these translations of Thomas’s treatises is not homogenous. Moreover, it often loses gnosiological sense of Latin terminology for the benefit of metaphysical sense. That is why we align and modify translations of cited fragments while using available translations of Aquinas’s works, and sometimes we translate them again. When it is about phenomenology, the issue does not end in translations. Various authors favouring different concepts of phenomenology, differently understanding even basic phenomenological categories, have undertaken problems that are important for our subject. If we add variety and ampleness of phenomenologists’ statements, as well as that each problem discussed in this study has extensive literature on the subject37, discussion on various positions and confronting them with Thomas’s science becomes barely fea37

The course of conscience about research is in some measure “across” fundamental problems.

20

Introduction

sible. In this study, we need to stay with an indication of the phenomenological prospect of solutions of the cognitive aspect of conscience, using proposals that suit Thomas’s science best and are justified best. The subject and concept of this study has been forming through years in a dialogue with my professors and colleagues from The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw and Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. While analysing the problem, I have used their output, which is shown in the bibliography. In addition, my students also have their share in forming my look at conscience, as they force me to deepen analyses by asking about obvious things. I warmly thank everybody for their inspiration, critical views, kindness and all their help.

Chapter One The Context of Thomas’s Teaching on Conscience

Thomas Aquinas’s38 teaching on conscience appears essentially in three works: Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, Quaestiones disputatae De veritate, and the Summa Theologiae. They deserve attention as the only works in which Aquinas stated his doctrine on conscience in full. In other writings, such as the Summa contra Gentiles39, Quaestiones disputatae de malo40, De anima41 and De virtutibus42, in Quaestiones de quodlibet43 as well as the biblical commentaries44, conscience is mentioned only in passing, while the separate question devoted to it in the Quodlibets only examines false conscience and the issue of whether it is binding45. A historical examination of the problem of conscience in all of Tho38

39 40 41 42 43

44

45

The historical analysis was prepared based on the following works: M.-D. Chenu, Introduction à l’étude de saint Thomas d’Aquin, Montréal-Paris 19542; J.-P. Torrel, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. I, The Person and His Work, transl. R. Royal, The Catholic University of America Press, 2005; J.A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d’Aquino. His Life, Thought, and Work, New York 1974. Contra Gent., III, 127, 5; IV, 54, 8; IV, 77, 6; IV, 90, 9. De malo, q. 2, a. 2, ad 8; q. 3, a. 9, 13; q. 3, a. 12, 13 and ad 13; q. 5, a. 3, c; q. 7, a. 10, ad 10; q. 9, a. 2, 4; q. 16, a. 6, sc. 5 and ad 10. Q. de an., a. 20, c. De virt., q. 3, a. 2, c. and ad 3; q. 4, a. 3, sc. 3. Quodl., I, q. 5, 2 and ad 2; I, q. 8, a. 2, c.; II, q. 5, a. 2, 2; III, q. 10, a. 2, c.; III, q. 12 (two problems, present in the basic corpus, are taken up here: Utrum conscientia possit errare and Utrum conscientia erronea liget), V, q. 6, a. 2, 3; VI, q. 5, a. 3; VII, q. 5, a. 3, c.; VIII, q. 4, a. 1; VIII, q. 6, a. 3, c.; VIII, q. 6, a. 5, sc. and c.; IX, q. 7, a. 2, c.; XI, q. 10, a. 1, c. The term synderesis does not appear in the Quodlibets. In the biblical commentaries, the term conscientia occurs, amongst other places, in: In Job, c. 9-10; c. 12-13; c. 16-17; c. 24; c. 27; c. 34; c. 37; c. 39; In Isaiam, c. 3, l. 2; c. 4, l. 2; c. 5, l. 2; c. 6, l. 1; c. 23-24; c. 28; c. 38; c. 50; c. 60; c. 66; In Hieremiam, c. 10, l. 9; c. 15, l. 5; c. 27, l. 1; c. 41, l. 4; and quite frequently in the New Testament commentaries. The term synderesis does not appear in the biblical commentaries. An exception is the reportatio, by fr. Reginald of Piperno, Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Ephesios lectura. (c. 4, l. 6), Neither the term conscientia, nor synderesis appear in Thomas’s commentaries on Aristotle.

22

Chapter One

mas’s works would no doubt be of value. But for our topic, it will suffice to restrict analysis to the teaching on conscience found in the three great theological syntheses.

1.1. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum 1.1.1. Genesis of the work Scriptum super libros Sententiarum is Thomas Aquinas’s earliest text in which the teaching on conscience is enounced. According to William of Tocco, Aquinas wrote it while he was baccalaureus Sententiarum in Paris, that is, in 12525646. This means that he had already served as biblical bachelor, which opened up the long road to the chair of master of theology. It is certain he undertook this duty under Albertus Magnus47 in Cologne, which is evidenced by his commentaries on the prophet Jeremiah, the Book of Lamentations, and on a part of Isaiah. It remains uncertain whether Thomas first lectured on the Bible as biblicus in Paris, or whether he immediately took up the duties of bachelor of the Sentences48, which he performed for four years under the supervision of his master, Elias Brunet49. As bachelor, Thomas commented on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, a systematic collection of patristic views (Patrum sententias) and corresponding biblical passages, assembled into four books divided into distinctiones50, whose content was grouped according to the dichotomous division of knowledge stemming from Augustine and based on the distinction between things and signs51. The questions addressed in the first three books constituted the first group of problems. They addressed the Triune God, creation, Christ, and the vir46

47 48 49 50 51

According to the account of Bartholomew of Lucca, Thomas had worked on a second version of Book I of his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences in Rome in 126668, but abandoned the project, taking on the writing of the Summa theologiae. Cf. H.C. Scheeben, Albert der Grosse und Thomas von Aquino in Köln, DTh 9 (1931) 32 et seq. The first view is supported by P. Mandonnet, the second by J.A. Weisheipl. In 1248, Elias Brunet took over the Dominican chair for “foreigners” after Albertus Magnus, and in 1256 passed it over to Aquinas. Peter Lombard divided his work into “capitula”. The division into “distinctiones” was introduced by commentators. “Omnis doctrina uel rerum est uel signorum, sed res per signa discuntur. Proprie autem nunc res appellaui, quae non ad significandum aliquid adhibentur, sicuti est lignum lapis pecus atque huiusmodi cetera [...]. Sunt autem alia signa, quorum omnis usus in significando est, sicuti, sunt uerba”. De doct. christ., I, c 2. n. 2.

The Context of Thomas’s Teaching on Conscience

23

tues. The second group of problems comprised the questions in book four on the sacraments – since these are “signs” and not “things”. As a collection of patristic views, the work of Peter Lombard presented no specific philosophy, being merely a well-ordered and comprehensive overview of topics discussed at universities at the time. It therefore provided an excellent point of departure for the formulation of one’s own, original view on any topic an opportunity that commentators, including Thomas, readily seized upon 52. Perre Mandonnet recognised the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum as the Angelic Doctor’s first great theological work53. Aquinas’s most important philosophical and theological views were already made precise in it, including: the real difference between esse and essentia in creatures, and their real identity in God; the absence of hylemorphic dualism in pure substances; the pure potency of prime matter; unity of substantial form in bodily creatures; the recognition of agent and passive intellect in man as powers of the individual soul. The scholastic method, consisting in the analysis of a problem within the framework of a formalised discussion unit, can also be seen in the Scriptum. This unit was the quaestio, divided into articles, and these sometimes even into quaestiunculae. In Thomas’s commentary on the Sentences it is the question, situated outside the commented text, which carries the weight of the exposition. Divisio textus, containing an analysis of the commented text, as well as expositio textus, a summary explanation of the literal meaning of the text, are the relic of an earlier literary genre54.

1.1.2. General description of the work Thomas Aquinas’s Scriptum super libros Sententiarum is not a “commentary” on Peter Lombard’s Sentences in the strict sense. Weisheipl thinks that it is rather a collection of meticulously crafted scripta, taking up subjects touched upon in the Sententiae. This view is substantiated by the fact that Thomas, following Alexander of Hales55, divided the four books of Peter Lombards’ work 52 53

54

55

Cf. J. de Ghellincka, L’essor de la littérature latine au XIIIe siècle, Bruxelles 1946, 72-73. P. Mandonnet, Avertissement, in: Thomas Aquinatis, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi Episcopi Parisiensis, ed. R. P. Mandonnet, vol. 1, Paris 1929, V. In a footnote to Divisio textus Prologi cum ejus expositione Mandonnet reminds the reader that it is only in the Prologue that Thomas combines divisio with expositio. Throughout the whole work the divisio precedes the question or questions, while the expositio follows them. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, op. cit., 19. Alexander of Hales, Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardii, Quaracchi Florence 1951, vol. 1, Introitus, n. 8. p. 4.

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Chapter One

into two groups of two books each: the first treating of the going forth (exitus) of all things from God; the second, of their return (reditus) to God. According to some scholars, this principle of division will form the basic backbone of Thomas’s theological reflection and will later be applied in his Summa theologiae. Another example of Aquinas’s overcoming of Peter Lombard is his introduction of a moral anthropology, inspired by Aristotle. The forty-one questions Thomas formulates and resolves with regard to the two-page text of Distinctio XXXIII (Scriptum, liber III) from the third book of the Sentences, are seen as the first treatise of moral theology in the history of Christianity by Chenu. Because of its commentatorial nature, the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum is dependent on the structure and content of Peter Lombard’s work. This is believed to be the reason why Aquinas gave up commenting the Sentences and moved on to his own Summa. The basic subject of the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum is Divine Wisdom. As we already noted, the notion of the going forth (exitus) of all things from God is the subject of the first two books. Book One (Liber primus) is preceded by a prologue containing a methodological justification of theology. The subject of this book is the Wisdom of the Triune God. Book Two examines creation as a work of Divine Wisdom, not only theoretical, but also practical. This book also encompasses a treatise on sin, which is important to us because it is there that the doctrine on conscience is enounced. And so: distinctiones 16-20 are devoted to the creation of man; distinctiones 21-29 to the fall of man; the transmission of original sin to descendants – distinctiones 30-33; the influence of original sin on actual sins – distinctiones 34-54. The subject of the two remaining books is the return (reditus) of all things to God. Book Three is concerned with the restoration of creatures (operum restauratio), worked by the Divine Wisdom. Book Four meantime takes up perfection as the product of Divine Wisdom. The first part of Book Four is devoted to the sacraments, the second, to the glory of the resurrection.

1.1.3. The place of the teaching on conscience The core of Thomas’s teaching on conscience in the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum is in Book Two (distinctio XXIV, question 2, articles 3 and 4). This distinction belongs to a group of nine distinctiones devoted to the fall of man. Within this context, distinctio XXIV addresses the topic of liberum arbitrium (free decision) while question 2 treats of the powers (virtutes) related to free decision, its successive articles devoted to: (1) sensuality, (2) superior and inferior

The Context of Thomas’s Teaching on Conscience

25

reason, (3) synderesis and (4) conscience56. The topics of the articles which are of interest to us in Aquinas’s Scriptum are formulated as follows: utrum synderesis sit habitus, vel potentia (whether synderesis is a habit or a power), and utrum conscientia sit actus (whether conscience is an act). The other place in which the issue of conscience receives wider treatment in the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum is Book Two, distinctio XXXIX, question 3, which talks about the higher spark of reason, as Thomas calls synderesis. The following three articles address the following problems: (1) utrum superior scintilla rationis possit extingui (whether the higher spark of reason can be extinguished); (2) supposito quod non extinguatur, utrum conscientia possit errare (supposing it cannot be extinguished, whether conscience can err); (3) utrum conscientia errans liget (whether an erring conscience binds). A separate article is also devoted to conscience in Book Four. Distinctio IX addresses the issue of being able to take the Eucharist, while question 1, which contains the article of interest to us, treats the consumption of the Body of Christ. The topic of article 3 has been formulated as follows: utrum peccet quis cum conscientia peccati mortalis corpus Christi manducans (whether the one consuming the Body of Christ while conscious of a mortal sin, sins)57. Here we only signal the existence of such an article in the commentary on the Sentences, although it will not have bearing on further analysis. In the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum conscience is mentioned alongside other topics, discussed in more detail58. These brief remarks are of limited 56 57

58

It should be noted that in the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Thomas’s terminology is not yet as precise as it is in his later writings. Here conscientia has been translated as “consciousness”, which attests to the fact that the Latin term contains both of the meanings we currently attribute to the words “conscience” and “consciousness”. These subjects are as follows: the mission of the Holy Spirit, and in particular – the certitude of knowing by caritas (In I Sent. d. 17, q. 1, a. 4, sc 2); whether evil demons can do good (In II Sent. d. 7, q. 1, a. 2, 3 and ad 3); whether it is possible to merit an increase of grace (In II Sent. d. 27, q. 1, a. 5, c.); inheritance of guilt from the first parents (In II Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, c. and ad 3); whether unbaptised children experience spiritual torment (In II Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 2, sc. 1); the voluntary basis of judging acts as good or evil (In II Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 2, sc. 2); the obedience of Christians to secular power (In II Sent. d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, c); the physical pains of Christ (In III Sent. d. 15, q. 2, a. 3 qc. 3, ad 3); Christ’s doubts as a man (In III Sent. d. 17, q. 1, a. 4, ex); whether the unformed faith yields to charity (In III Sent. d. 23, q. 3, a. 4 qc 3, ex); charity as a virtue) (In III Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2); the powers of the soul as a subject of virtues (In III Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 4 qc. 4, c); the gift of science (In III Sent. d. 35, q. 2, a. 3 qc. 3c, c); lying as a mortal sin (In III Sent. d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4); the binding force of an oath taken heedlessly (In III Sent. d. 39, q. 1, a. 3 qc. 2, c, and a. 3 qc. 3, c); the matter of the

26

Chapter One

use for developing an understanding of Thomas’s teaching on conscience. They merely show that conscience is present in all walks and areas of human life. What is important, however, is that in the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Thomas situated the principal bulk of his teaching on conscience within the context of man’s ontic structure after the fall of the first parents, thus the structure of man as he is here and now. The key to understanding these reflections is free choice. The second group of problems concerns the operation of synderesis and conscience within the context of the human act. It should be noted that the derivation of all things from God is the subject of Book Two and Book One. And so the notion of conscience is accompanied by an inquiry into the mystery of creation.

1.2. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate 1.2.1. Genesis of the work Quaestiones disputatae De veritate is Thomas Aquinas’s second work containing his teaching on conscience. They were written in 1256-59 during his first regens term in Paris. As a magister in sacra pagina, a title Thomas obtained in sacrament of confirmation (In IV Sent. d. 7, q. 1, a. 2 qc. 2, c and ad 2); the sin of nocturnal pollution (In IV Sent. d. 9, q. 1, a. 4 qc. 2, 3 and c); Christ giving his Body to Judas during the Last Supper (In IV Sent. d. 11, q. 3, a. 2 qc. 2, ad 2); the relation of the Eucharist to the virtues (In IV Sent. d. 12, q. 2, a. 1 qc. 3, & a. 2); abstaining from receiving Holy Communion (In IV Sent. d. 12, q. 3, a. 2 qc. 2, 2); the satisfaction of sins (In IV Sent. d. 15, q. 1, a. 3 & a. 4 qc. 2, sc. 2); alms (In IV Sent. d. 15, q. 2, a. 1 qc. 4, sc. 1); fasting (In IV Sent. d. 15, q. 3, a. 4 qc. 1, 3); the sacrament of penance (In IV Sent. d. 16, q. 1, pr; q. 3, a. 2 qc. 5, ad 5; q. 4, a. 2 qc. 3, ex.); the confession of sins (In IV Sent. d. 17, q. 3, a. 1-4); the dispenser of the sacrament of penance (In IV Sent. d. 18, q. 1, pr; q. 2, a. 2 qc. 1, c. and ad 2); the power of the keys (In IV Sent. d. 19, q. 1, a. 3 qc. 3, 3 and ad 3); fraternal correction (In IV Sent. d. 19, q. 2, a. 3); temporal punishment (In IV Sent. d. 20, q. 1, a. 2 qc. 2, 1); the general confession (In IV Sent. d. 21, q. 2, a. 3 and q. 3, a. 1); the last anointing (In IV Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 3 qc. 1, ad. 1); the dignified reception of the sacrament of Order (In IV Sent. d. 24, q. 1, a. 3); the sacrament of matrimony (In IV Sent. d. 27, q. 1, a. 2 qc. 4, ad 1; q. 3, a. 1 qc. 3, ad 4; a. 3, ex.; d. 28, q. 1, a. 2, c; a. 4, ex.; d. 29, q. 1, a. 4, ex.; d. 32, q. 1, a. 5 qc. 2, ad 1; d. 37, q. 2, a. 1, c.; d. 38, q. 1, a. 1 qc. 3, ad 1; q. 2, a. 3 qc.1, sc. 1; a. 4 qc. 3, ex.; d. 41, q. 1, a. 5); the resurrection (In IV Sent. d. 43, q. 1, a. 1 qc. 2, ad 1), and especially consciousness of sins after the resurrection (In IV Sent. d. 43, q. 1, a. 5); the eternal punishment (In IV Sent. d. 46, q. 2, a. 3 qc. 4, ex.); the general judgement on the last day (In IV Sent. d. 47, q. 1, a. 1 qc. 2, sc. 1; a. 3 qc. 3, 3; d. 48, q. 1, a. 1, ad. 5); the status of the damned (In IV Sent. d. 50, q. 2, a. 2 qc. 2, 2 and ad 2; a. 3 qc. 2, c).

The Context of Thomas’s Teaching on Conscience

27

the first half of 125659, he was obliged to reply to quaestiones disputatae on a number of occasions throughout the academic year – this provided a master with the opportunity to demonstrate his speculative skill. Apart from this, the master’s duties included lecturing based on the appropriate, commonly recognised authorities, and delivering sermons. Petrus Cantor, who died in 1197, compares these three forms of duty to a house: the lecture is, as it were, a basis and foundation of the whole. Disputation is like the walls – for everything remains incomprehensible and cannot be taught with conviction until it has been masticated with the teeth of dispute. The delivery of sermons, which is served by the other functions, is like the roof, beneath which the faithful seek shelter from heat and unrest60. According to the description provided by Pession, during a dispute the master and his students debated the most pertinent and timely issues61. The technique as such of conducting the quaestiones disputatae is unclear. It is thought to have consisted in two parts: the debate itself and the resolution of the question, which took place on different days. On the first day the bachelor62 was the

59

60 61

62

There is no consensus among scholars as to this date. Most biographers believe it occurred in either April or May. Weisheipl situates Thomas’s promotion somewhere between March 3rd and June 17th, 1256. See also P.M. Pession, In Quaestiones disputatas introductio generalis, in: Thomas Aquinatis, Quaestiones disputatae, vol. I, De veritate, ed. Marietti, Taurini-Romae 1964, X. It is also worthwhile noting the Polish contribution to determining the authenticity and chronology of the Quaestiones disputatae, namely A. Birkenmajer’s article Über die Reihenfolge und die Entstehungszeit der Quaestiones disputatae des hl. Thomas von Aquin, PhJ 1921, 31-49. Petrus Cantor, Verbum abbreviatum, c. I. PL 205. 25. P. M. Pession, op. cit., VIII. There is no agreement as to the basic unit of discussion: whether it was the article or the question. Mandonnet believes it to have been the article, but then Thomas would have taken part in 253 disputes over the course of three years, since that is how many articles the 29 quaestiae of De veritate contain. Because the academic year was 42 weeks long, he would have had to have conducted a dispute on average twice a week. Moreover, articles 4 and 5 of question 20 would have to be separated by a long holiday break. A. Dondaine, whom Weisheipl follows on this point, believed the whole question to be the basic disputation unit, regardless of the number of articles it is made up of. But even this position does not remove all doubt; for example, it does not explain how it could have been possible to discuss a single question made up of twenty articles in one afternoon session, and one made up of only two articles in another. Cf. P. Manndonet, Chronologie des questions disputées de saint Thomas d´Aquin, RThom 1 (1918) 266-287. 340-371; A. Dondaine, Les secrétaires de s. Thomas, Roma 1956, 209-216. In Thomas’s case, this function was performed by William of Alton, an English Dominican who succeeded his master, Thomas, in the Dominican university chair reserved

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Chapter One

respondent. His task was to respond to objections or difficulties put forward by the audience concerning points (articles) proposed by the master in the order in which they were submitted. Perhaps – but here sufficient proof is lacking – he also gave so-called sed contra arguments. The secretary’s task was to record the arguments and replies. The next day, after analysing all the pro and contra arguments, the master undertook to resolve the question. Determinatio, or the definitive resolution of the question, reflected the order of the debate from the previous day, and proceeded according to the succession of the articles. The master also alluded to the reply by the bachelor of the debate. Live dispute should not be confounded with the version which the university scribes received for transcription. The latter was fully edited and documented by the master, often at a substantially later date. The Quaestiones disputatae which have come down to us are also not a reportatio, or a report from the live lecture, recorded by a student or secretary, but an ordinatio, or a work written or dictated by the author himself. Unlike the Summa theologiae, the Quaestiones disputatae are not intended for beginners, but for those advanced in the study of theology.

1.2.2. General description of the work De veritate, which is of interest to us because of the teaching on conscience contained therein, is the first part of Thomas’s Quaestiones disputatae. We find their basic chronology in the catalogue of Bartholomeus de Capua63, a document in Aquinas’s canonisation process. As we already said, the questions contained in the first part of De veritate are supposed to have been discussed in Paris in 1256-59, and there is general agreement among scholars as to the dating of this part. The second part, De potentia Dei was written in Italy, most probably during Thomas’s first year of teaching at the Roman studium at Santa Sabina in 1265-66. The third part, De virtutibus, was composed during Thomas’s second stay in Paris in 1269-72. The Quaestiones disputatae De veritate which interest us here contain the “theology on Truth”64. They were discussed during a three-year course of teaching; questions 1-7 in the first year (1256-57), questions 8-20 in the second year (1257-58) and questions 21-29 in the year 1258-59. Their unifying principle is

63 64

for foreigners in 1259-60, or Annibaldo d’Annibaldi, a native of Rome, who held the chair in 1260-62 (he later became a cardinal in 1262 and died in Orvieto in 1272). Bartholomeus de Capua, Processus Canonizationis Neapoli, publ. M.-H. Laurent, 388. Cf. In Quaestiones disputatas De veritate introductio specialis, w: Thomas Aquinatis, Quaestiones disputatae, vol. I, De veritate, ed. Marietti, Taurini-Romae 1964, XXVI.

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that their formal object is truth65. Moreover, it is thought that the questions discussed over the course of these successive years form a certain whole. The content of De veritate is arranged according to the following logical structure66: the first twenty questions are devoted to truth in itself, the last nine to truth in relation to natural and supernatural good. During the first year (125657), Thomas discussed seven questions. Having defined truth (q. 1), he considered truth as it exists in God – as known (q. 2-4) and as motivating the will in general (q. 5) and in the supernatural order (q. 6-7)67. The following year (125758) he took part in thirteen disputes on the subject of truth in creation. Two questions were devoted to angels: here, the investigation focuses on the issue of angelic knowledge (q. 8) and knowledge by illumination or speech (q. 9). The remaining questions took up the problem of truth in man. Thomas is first interested in man as the subject and object of truth (q. 10) and in how man possesses truth by nature, i.e. gets to know it himself (q. 10) as well as by the power of his own nature supported by teaching, human (q. 11) and divine (q. 12-13). Subsequent questions concern powers, habits and cognitive dispositions thanks to which truth exists in man: (a) in every man – in this life and in the current state of nature: in the supernatural order (q. 14) and in the natural (q. 15-17); in the state of innocence (q. 18); after death (q. 20); and (b) in Christ (q. 20)68. In his third year of teaching (1258-59) Thomas took part in only nine disputes, investigating truth in its relation to natural and supernatural good. When it comes to natural good, he first took up the problem of knowing the good (q. 21), and then of dispositions and acts tending to the good: (a) the rational - common to all 65 66 67

68

Ibid, XXVI et seq. Por. Ibid., XXVII. These are questions: 1. De veritate (On Truth); 2. De scientia Dei (On God’s Knowledge); 3. De ideis (On Ideas); 4. De verbo (On the Divine Word); 5. De providentia (On Providence); 6. De praedestinatione (On Predestination); 7. De libro vitae (On the Book of Life). These questions are entitled: 8. De cognitione angelorum (On the Knowledge of Angels); 9. De cognitione scientiae angelicae (On the Communication of Angelic Knowledge), which addresses the issue of how angels communicate; 10. De mente, in qua est imago Trinitatis (On the Mind, which Contains the Image of the Trinity); 11. De magistro (On the Teacher); 12. De prophetia (On Prophecy) – here, prophecy is described as a form of cognition; 13. De raptu (On Rapture); 14. De fide (On Faith); 15. De ratione superiori et inferiori (On Higher and Lower reason); 16. De synderesi (On Synderesis); 17. De conscientia (On Conscience); 18. De cognitione primi hominis in statu innocentiae (On the Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence); 19. De cognitione animae post mortem (On the Knowledge of the Soul after Death); 20. De scientia animae Christi (On the Knowledge of the Soul of Christ), which addresses the issue of Christ’s human knowledge during his life on earth.

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creatures (q. 22), those proper to God (q. 23) and those proper to man (q. 24) as well as (b) the irrational, sensual, taken as potency (q. 25) and as movement (q. 26). With regard to truth in relation to supernatural good, it was first shown as it reveals itself in all men: through grace as a source of new life (q. 27) and in the justification of sinners as a result of the new life (q. 28), and then in Christ as the primary source of created grace (q. 29)69. It must be added that the Quaestiones disputatae retain the structure of a lecture which will occur again in the Summa theologiae. Although, as we have already said, the quaestion was most probably the basic discussion unit, it is not in the question, but in the article that the contention was resolved. In the Quaestiones disputatae the article is structured much like in the Summa theologiae. It is however much broader. All of its parts, namely: difficulties, positive exposition and answers to the difficulties are very developed. In some of the questions, the difficulties number several dozen. Apart from the formal similarities between the Quaestiones disputatae and the Summa theologiae there is also a special conceptual relationship between the two. This relation was expressed most pointedly by P. Coconnier, in whose view the Quaestiones disputatae, although written earlier, are in many places “the most lucid and faithful commentary” on the Summa70. This means that it is precisely the Quaestiones disputatae that one should turn to for a broader explanation of problems treated only briefly, almost schematically, in the Summa.

1.2.3. The place of the teaching on conscience In De veritate, the teaching on conscience is presented in questions 16 and 17, which indicates that it was taken up by Thomas in his second year of teaching when he elucidated the notion of truth as it exists in created beings: in angels and in man. The problem of conscience in De veritate appears within the context of man as a subject of truth, in particular the human powers, dispositions and habits assigned to knowing the truth, as this occurs in this life (i.e. temporal, earthy life) and in the current state of nature, the natural order. And so: question 69

70

These questions are: 21. De bono (On Good); 22. De appetitu boni, et voluntate (On the Tendency to Good and the Will); 23. De voluntate Dei (On God’s Will); 24. De libero arbitrio (On Free Choice); 25. De sensualitate (On Sensuality) as sensual appetite; 26. De passionibus animae (On the Passions of the Soul); 27. De gratia (On Grace); 28. De iustificatione impii (On the Justification of Sinners); 29. De gratia Christi (On the Grace of Christ). T. Coconnier, Le vrai Thomiste, RThom 1893, 11; quoted after: P.M. Pession, art. cit., VIII.

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16. concerns synderesis (De synderesi), while question 17. treats conscience (De conscientia)71. In De veritate the subject matter of conscience clearly appears in the context of knowledge and truth whose subject is man. At the same time, the issue of human knowledge is not treated autonomously but built into a general theological scheme, departing from God’s knowledge.

1.3. Summa theologiae 1.3.1. Genesis of the work The Summa theologiae is Thomas Aquinas’s largest, most important and most mature theological work, containing the most profound synthesis of his doctrine. It has also gained the most widespread popularity and exerted an enormous influence, and not only on Catholic thought72. It was most probably written in 1266-7373. It is therefore the “latest” work in which Aquinas placed his teaching on conscience. 71

72

73

In De veritate the subject of conscience is marginally touched on in the following passages: q. 8, a. 13, 1, thus in the question regarding angelic knowledge, in particular whether angels can know the heart’s secrets; q. 9, a. 4, 2 and ad 2, concerning the communication of angelic knowledge; q. 10, a. 9, 8, where the mind is described as the image of the Trinity, and in particular the manner in which the soul gets to know its own habits; q. 15, a. 5, 3, on the occasion of discussing questions pertaining to higher and lower reason, when the issue of whether reason can sin is examined; q. 18, a. 3. sc. 1, treating of the knowledge of the first people in the state of innocence, in particular of whether Adam have faith in God in the state of innocence, as well as q. 18, a. 6. sc. 5 – could Adam be mistaken or deceived in the state of innocence. The influence of Aquinas’s theological thought is an issue in itself. Protestants also appealed to the Angelic Doctor. Some Anglican moral theology, for instance, remains under Aquinas’s influence. Cf. S. Nowosad, Nazwać dobro po imieniu. Sumienie w anglikańskiej teologii moralnej, Lublin 1996, passim; ibid., Autonomia sumienia chrześcijańskiego w ujęciu anglikańskim, in: Vivere in Christo. Chrześcijański horyzont moralności. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci księdza profesora Seweryna Rosika w 65. rocznicę urodzin, ed. J. Nagórny, A. Derdziuk, Lublin 1996, 169. It is not our task to resolve this issue. Let us only note that J. A. Weisheipl, for example, drawing on Eschmann’s A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works: Bibliographical Notes (in: É. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, New York 1956, 387), maintains that the idea of writing the Summa had already occurred to Thomas in 1265, although – as many scholars determine – he did not begin writing the work until 1266, just before, or during his second teaching in Rome. According to the account of Bartholomew of Lucca (Historia Ecclesiastica, lib. 22, c. 39, in: L.A. Muratori, Rerum

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The purpose and reasons for writing the Summa were expounded by the author himself in the Prologue to the work. The purpose of the Summa is to treat whatever belongs to the Christian religion in such a way as may benefit the instruction of beginners74. In writing the Summa Thomas thus wanted to fulfil the second of the tasks which in his view were incumbent on a catholicae veritatis doctor – a doctor of Catholic truth, namely: incipientes erudire – to instruct beginners75. Thomas’s motivation to take up the writing of such a work was the fact that the theological works in use at the time were not appropriate for beginners. For they were too lengthy, excessively detailed and unsystematic. Among the reasons for the difficulties encountered by students of sacra pagina Thomas cited: the large number of unnecessary questions, articles and arguments; inconsistency of the structure of the exposition with the order proper to a given discipline, and the subordination of the former to the arrangement of the commented book or current disputes; frequent repetition of content, causing discouragement and confusion. Spurred by these motives, Thomas wanted – as he states – by God’s help, to present in the Summa all that belongs to holy science, as briefly and clearly as the subject would allow76.

1.3.2. General description of the work Going through with the intention thus formulated, Thomas departed from the manner in which Catholic teaching was presented in many twelfth and thirteenth-century compendiums, summas and treatises, of which the Sentences of Peter Lombard were a prominent example – which does not mean that he fully abandoned it. He retained the general order of the Sentences in his Summa the-

74

75

76

Italicarum Scriptores, XI, Mediolani 1724, 1162), all three parts of the Summa were composed by Thomas during the pontificate of Clement IV and in the period of vacancy following his death, that is, by December 1st, 1271. In Weisheipl’s view, however, this information is not wholly correct, since it is known from other sources that Thomas continued his work on the third part of the Summa until December 6th, 1273, when he suddenly had to interrupt writing, reaching article 4 of question 90 in the third part. The so-called Supplementum – as Eschmann reports – was edited by means of “cutting and pasting” passages cut out from Aquinas’s commentary on the Sentences. “[...] proposed nostril intentionis in hoc opere est, ea quae ad Christianam religionem pertinent, eo modo tradere, secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium [...]”. S.th., Prologus. Here Thomas cites 1 Cor 3:1 et seq. “tamquam parvulis in Christo, lac vobis potum dedi, non escam” – as unto little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat. S.th., Prologus. S.th., Prologus.

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ologiae, with the exception of the second part, at the same time following the rules of logic and the requirements of scientific order, modelled after the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. In its structure, the Summa theologiae, intended as a textbook for students of theology, reflects the concept of sacred doctrine (sacra doctrina), namely theology, which Thomas right away expounds in the first question77. According to this concept, the central focus of all theological reflection (in its classical version78) is God, who is both the efficient and the final cause of all things in the universe, spiritual and physical. In reference to this, Stefan Świeżawski describes the structure of the Summa theologiae in the following way, exposing its division into three parts: the first devoted to God and creation, the second to ethics, and the third to Christ. The departure subject of part one (and the whole) is God as the source of all being. The first part of the Summa opens with a treatise on God, and is completed with a theology of creation. It leaves room for a treatise on man, since he appears at the juncture of spiritual and material things. The first part of the Summa theologiae thus speaks of God as efficient cause, the second and third, meanwhile, of God as the final cause: for all creatures, including man, exist in order to fulfil their ultimate end, which is God. The attainment

77

78

S.th. I, q. 1, a. 1-10; cf. In I Sent. Prol. a. 1-5; Contra Gent., I, 3-5. 9; II, 4; De verit., q. 14, a. 9-10. Next to philosophy for man’s salvation, Thomas recognises the need for theology (sacra doctrina) as a science based on divine revelation. For there are truths, necessary to salvation, that exceed the cognitive powers of reason (qui comprehensionem rationis excedit) or such as are in fact accessible to human reason (quae de Deo ratione humana investigari possunt), yet grasped only by some, following laborious enquiry and with an admixture of error (revelata and revelabile). According to Thomas, theology and philosophy share a common object: being (ens). Not just theology, but also philosophy, is mainly concerned with God. As a consequence, a special dignity (dignitas) is ascribed to theology. Being both a speculative and a practical science (speculativa et practica) (S.th. I, q. 1, a. 4) theology is superior to all other speculative and practical sciences. As a speculative science it surpasses all other speculative sciences on account of the certitude flowing from the nature of its knowledge (theology derives its certitude from the light of divine knowledge, which cannot be misled) and by reason of the superior worth of its subject-matter. As a practical science, theology surpasses the other practical sciences by reason of the fact that it tends towards the highest purpose, namely eternal bliss (S.th. I, q. 1, a. 5). Although theology can do without philosophy, it uses its achievements in order to make its teaching clearer. It does not do so due to an inner deficiency, but because our intellect is more easily led towards knowledge of that which it is beyond its power to grasp, and which is the object of this science, by departing from what it knows through its natural light (S.th. I, q. 1, a. 5). Unlike classical theology, Vaticanum II established Christ and man as the central topics of theology.

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of this end is the goal of human existence. It can be attained through the right conduct and thanks to Divine grace. The second part of the Summa, Thomas’s broadest and most mature work, is devoted to natural ethics and the supernatural ethics built upon it. This part divides into the Prima secundae, containing a presentation of general ethics, and Secunda secundae, in which questions of particular ethics are addressed. The third and final part treats the One Mediator, who leads man on the path to God. This is the Man-God Jesus Christ, who established the sacraments that they may be an unending help to man, stretching over all areas of his life, in the human journey toward man’s final end79. With regard to the Summa, Weisheipl presents essentially the same structure, although he arranges the accents differently. His main thesis is that the three parts of the Summa reveal two great visions of God, according to the conception of the exitus of all things from God and their (in particular, man’s) reditus to Him as the ultimate end. This is the composition we saw already in the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum. The exitus, or the going forth of all creatures from God, is shown in the Pars prima of the Summa. The second and third parts are the reditus – man and all creatures’ return to God. Weisheipl indicates that after removing the problem of sin from Book Two and the analysis of the virtues from Book Three, we are left with the order adopted by Peter Lombard. Pars Secunda on the other hand, is an unrivalled work of the genius of Aquinas himself. Although it remains in harmony with Peter Lombard’s writing on Christ, the Word Incarnate, the sacraments and the last things, it presents a wholly different discussion of moral issues. Man’s return to God through the virtues is ordered in accordance with the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. For this reason this part of the Summa has been called a true commentary on it.

1.3.3. The place of the teaching on conscience We shall be particularly interested in the Pars prima, since it is there that the teaching on conscience is chiefly to be found80. Most scholars agree that it was written in Rome and Viterbo between 1266 and November 1268, and so before Thomas’s arrival in Paris at the beginning of 1269. Properly speaking, only the first part of the Summa realises Thomas’s intent of writing a textbook for beginners. It is simple, yet full of metaphysical depth, succinct and well-written.

79 80

Cf. S. Swieżawski, Dział pomocniczo-naukowy, in: Thomas Aquinas, Traktat o człowieku. Summa teologiczna 1, 75-89, ed. S. Świeżawski, Kęty 19982, (5)-(6). This state of affairs has led some moral philosophers and theologians to claim that Aquinas’s moral teaching is essentially “without conscience”.

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Thomas’s teaching on conscience in the first part of the Summa theologiae appears only in two articles of question 79, concluding reflections on the intellectual powers. This question is part of a special Treatise on Man, encompassing questions 75-102 and containing a metaphysics of man. For a clear and full understanding as to the place of the teaching on conscience in the Summa, one would do well to examine – with Weisheipl – the precise structure of the Pars prima. It examines the Triune God as the source of all creatures (exitus). If we skip over question 1, on the sacred doctrine (sacra doctrina), the order of this part is as follows: qq. 2-26 treat of the existence of God and His essential attributes; qq. 27-43 of the Divine Persons; qq. 44-119 of the origin of creatures in God, in particular the production of creatures (qq. 4446), the distinction between them (qq. 47-49), different kinds of creatures – the purely spiritual, i.e. the angels (qq. 50-64), the purely corporeal, i.e. the world (qq. 65-74), man, as composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance (qq. 75102), the conservation and government of creatures (qq. 103-119). The structure of the Treatise on Man (qq. 75-102) in the Summa theologiae takes the following form. It begins with two questions on the psycho-physical unity of man, namely the essence of the soul (q. 75) and its union with the body (q. 76). The next seven questions are concerned with the powers of the soul: in general (q. 77), in particular (q. 78), the intellectual powers (q. 79), the appetitive powers in general (q. 80), the power of sensuality (q. 81), the will (q. 82), and free choice (q. 83). The next six questions treat the activity of the soul: how the soul grasps corporeal things (q. 84) the mode and order of understanding (q. 85), what our intellect knows in material things (q. 86), how the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself (q. 87), how the human soul knows what is above itself, i.e. immaterial substances (q. 88) and the knowledge of the soul separated from the body (q. 89). In these fifteen questions Thomas discusses the nature of man, distinguishing, in spiritual substances, their essence, powers and operation. He talks about this himself in the introduction of question 75, citing chapter 11 of Pseudo-Dionysius’ De Coelesti Hierarchia. The subsequent questions - as Aquinas himself says - will treat how man receives being and begins to exist. The issues addressed are, first: the creation of the first man - the production of man’s soul (q. 90), the production of man’s body (q. 91), the creation of the woman (q. 92). Then the end of man’s creation “to the image and likeness of God” (q. 93). The eight questions following treat the state and condition of the first man as regards his intellect (q. 94), the will (q. 95), mastership (q. 96), the preservation of the individual (q. 97), the preservation of the species (q. 98), as well as the condition of the offspring as to the body (q. 99), righteousness (q. 100) and knowledge (q. 101). The last question, 102, concluding the Treatise on Man, speaks of paradise as a place of man. We must note that the evident accent

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on the soul in the Treatise has its reason in the theological nature of the work, of which the Angelic Doctor himself duly explicitly told us81. And since theology is interested in all reality, only considered from the side of God, hence it is interested in that which best reflects God in every individual thing. In order to grasp the peculiarity of the place of the teaching on conscience in the Summa theologiae as well as the peculiarity of the teaching on conscience as such, we will do well to examine the order of question 79. For it is there that the core of the teaching is to be found. The question is entitled: De potentiis intellectivis – On the intellectual powers. It contains 13 articles in which the following questions are asked: a.1

“Utrum intellectus sit aliqua potentia ani- “Whether the intellect is a power of the mae”. soul?”

a.2

“Utrum intellectus sit potentia passiva”.

“Whether the intellect is a passive power?”

a.3

“Utrum sit ponere intellectum agentem”.

“Whether there is an active intellect?”

a.4

“Utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid ani- “Whether the active intellect is something mae”. in the soul?”

a.5

“Utrum intellectus agens sit unus in omni- “Whether the active intellect is one in bus”. all?”

a.6

“Utrum memoria sit in parte intellectiva “Whether memory is in the intellectual animae”. part of the soul?”

a.7

“Utrum alia potentia sit memoria intellec- “Whether the intellectual memory is a tiva, et alia intellectus”. power distinct from the intellect?”

a.8

“Utrum ratio sit alia potentia ab intellectu” “Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect?”

a.9

“Utrum ratio superior et inferior sint diver- “Whether higher and lower reason are sae potentiae”. distinct powers?”

a.10 “Utrum intelligentia sit alia potentia ab “Whether intelligence is a power distinct intellectu”. from intellect?” a.11 “Utrum intellectus speculativus et practicus “Whether the speculative and practical sint diversae potentiae”. intellects are distinct powers?” a.12 “Utrum synderesis sit quaedam specialis “Whether synderesis is a special power of potentia ab aliis distincta”. the soul distinct from the others?” a.13 “Utrum conscientia sit quaedam potentia”. “Whether conscience is a power?”

81

Cf. S.th., q. 75, Introitus.

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The main texts on conscience thus occur in the Summa theologiae within the context of discussing the nature of man in general, and the intellectual powers in particular. One could say that question 79 contains a metaphysics of human cognition, and concludes with the metaphysical problem of conscience. The second group of texts about conscience is devoted to acting in accordance with conscience. And so in the Prima secundae: question 19 is devoted to the goodness and malice of the interior act of the will (De bonitate et malitia actus interioris voluntatis), while its article 5 takes up the question: Utrum voluntas discordans a ratione errante, sit mala – whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason?; article 6: Utrum voluntas concordans rationi erranti, sit bona – whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason? Also worthy of note in the Prima secundae is article 4 of question 96, devoted to the power of human law (De potestate legis humanae), in which Aquinas considers the problem: Utrum lex humana imponat homini necessitatem in foro conscientiae – whether human law binds a man in conscience?82 82

Fragments of the teaching on conscience are moreover to be found in the following passages in the Summa theologiae: In Pars prima: q. 57, a. 4, 1, with regard to angelic knowledge, and in particular to whether angels can know secret thoughts; q. 64, a. 3, 3, while discussing the suffering of demons; q. 87, a. 2, 1, where Aquinas considers how the intellect knows the habits of the soul. In the Prima secundae: q. 85, a. 2, ad 3, thus in a passage devoted to the consequences of sin; q. 88, a. 4, c., when discussing the transformation of venial into mortal sins; q. 94, a. 1, 2, when reflecting on natural law as a habit; q. 104, a. 3, 3, when considering the binding force of the judicial precepts of the Old Law. In the Secunda secundae: q. 17, a. 8, sc., when reflecting on whether charity precedes hope; q. 21, a. 3, 1, when discussing presumption; q. 24, a. 2, 3 and ad 3, when reflecting on charity as a infused virtue; q. 25, a. 7, c., when asking whether sinners love themselves; q. 33, a. 5, c. and a. 7, c. and ad 3, which question concerns fraternal correction; q. 43, a. 4, 3, discussing scandal as a mortal sin; q. 44, a. 1, c., in which Thomas treats the precept of charity; q. 45, a. 4, 1, when reflecting on the relationship between wisdom and grace; q. 47, a. 6, ad 1 and ad 3, when resolving the question of whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues; q. 63, a. 2, ad. 3, where Thomas inquires as to whether spiritual goods are dispensed with respect to persons; q. 67, a. 2, 4 and ad 4, as well as a. 3, ad 1, concerning the injustice of a judge in judging, in particular when ruling based on evidence and contrary to known truth, and in the absence of an accuser; q. 75, a. 1, ad 2 and ad 3, where the sinfulness of derision is examined; q. 88, a. 12, ad 2, where the authority of a superior in the commutation or dispensation from a vow; q. 89, a. 7, ad 3, when considering whether an oath is binding; q. 100, a. 6, ad 2, when discussing the punishment of simony; q. 103, a. 1, c., in examining the rendering of honour; q. 129, a. 5, ad 2, when reflecting on the relationship between magnanimity and fortitude; q. 156, a. 3, 1, in the question devoted to incontinence; q. 162, a. 7, ad 3, in

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1.4. Summary We encounter the problem of conscience in many of Thomas Aquinas’s texts. Three of these deserve special mention: and Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, Quaestiones disputatae De veritate and the Summa theologiae because only in these works is conscience treated in a comprehensive manner. All three are theological works83. The purpose of the metaphysical explanations present in them is to render questions of theology more accessible by referring to what man knows by the natural light of his intellect. Moreover, these are didactic, not analytic works. The first two are the outcome of Thomas’s teaching at the University of Paris; the last, not directly related to university teaching, was written for those entering onto the path of theological reflection. The teaching on conscience contained in these works has a theologico-metaphysical character, while its presentation is consistent with the didactic paradigm in force at the time. In accordance with his conception of theology, Aquinas uses philosophy to elucidate the problems presented and to make them more accessible. The search for a rational justification of faith is co-extensive with the search for reasons to be elicited by means of the question propter quid. As we shall say, for Aristotle, it is the only “scientific” question in the strict sense, which inevitably leads toward the Absolute, where metaphysics and theology meet84. The theological order which we encounter in Aquinas’s work proceeds from God to things. Phi-

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the question devoted to pride; q. 168, a. 1, 1, devoted to modesty; q. 185, a. 4, c., on whether a bishop can lawfully forsake his episcopal cure in order to enter the religious state; q. 189, a. 3, ad 1, when talking about the binding force of a vow to enter religion. In the Pars tertia: q. 22, a. 3, 2 and sc., in the question regarding the Priesthood of Christ; q. 62, a. 4, ad 3, when discussing the grace of the sacraments; q. 66, a. 7, sc. and a. 12, 3, in the original question regarding the sacrament of Baptism; q. 68, a. 9, 3 and ad 3, when reflecting on whether infants should be baptised; q. 72, a. 7, ad. 2, when discussing the sanctifying grace of Confirmation; q. 78, a. 3, c., in relation to the proper form for the consecration of the wine; q. 79, a. 3, where Aquinas examines the forgiveness of mortal sin as the effect of the sacrament of the Eucharist; q. 80, a. 4–6, in examining the receiving of the sacrament of the Eucharist; q. 82, a. 5, ad 2, in connection to the question of whether a wicked (i.e. sinful) priest can’t consecrate the Eucharist; q. 86, a. 1, 2 and a. 3, ad 2, when considering whether all mortal sins are taken away by Penance; q. 89, a. 6, c., when reflecting on whether dead works, i.e. works done without charity, are quickened by Penance. The theological and philosophical sources of Aquinas’s teaching on conscience are related by A. Lobato, Coscienza morale e storicità dell’uomo in San Tommaso d’Aquino, in: Crisi e risveglio della coscienza morale nel nostro tempo, ed. A. Lobato, Bologna 1989, 11-22. Cf. É. Gilson, Thomism. The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, transl. L. K. Shook and A. Maurer, Toronto 20026, 1-37.

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losophical order, meanwhile, should proceed from things to the Absolute. In Aquinas’s theological works, we should thus clearly distinguish between the order of theological proof, to which the presentation of philosophical problems, assigned to theological problems, conforms, and the order of philosophical proof, which remains hidden in the theological works85. The didactic nature of Aquinas’s works is also a factor that bears on the fact that the manner in which the doctrine is expounded does not reflect the logic by which the theses of the system are arrived at, but the order of their justification, defined by the didactic paradigm of medieval universities. According to this paradigm, it was appropriate first to present the mutually opposed views of recognised authorities before one gave one’s own solution to a particular problem. This caused the reversal of the order proper to experimental science, in the broad sense of the term. In the works of Aquinas (and this can clearly be seen in the Summa theologiae), the problem of conscience is scattered among considerations of more precise questions, relating to the whole of human life in its natural and supernatural dimension. Nonetheless, its essential core is to be found in two places: anthropology and ethics. In anthropology – a theological and metaphysical one – conscience is mentioned during a discussion of the intellectual cognitive powers, and in ethics in the context of the principles governing human life. Already these observations suggest that the role which conscience plays in moral life is a consequence of its cognitive function, the function of which is given metaphysically by Aquinas.

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Gilson (ibid.) says that in the Summa theologiae philosophical views have been justified according to the rules of philosophical proof, and presented according to the order of theological proof. A similar view was held by J. Le Rohellec, P. Mandonnet and J. de Tonquédec, whom Gilson references.

Chapter Two Saint Thomas’s Questions about Conscience

In theological works by Saint Thomas Aquinas, conscience obtains metaphysical explication. The analysis of questions about conscience posed by Aquinas may appear to be a key to reach something that is given and what is then explained metaphysically. Today, one draws attention to the significant role of a question in cognition86. In addition, research concerning a question has been developed. Due to this, now we can apply advanced theoretical tools to analyse questions. From the historic-philosophical and substantial point of view, one should realize how Thomas could supposedly treat questions. Aquinas formulated his position concerning questions in a clear dependence on Aristotle, so a reference to the Philosopher is required.

2.1. Theory of questions by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas knew Aristotle’s Organon ( ) at least partially87. This is a collec88 tion of six works on logic : The Categories (Κατηγορίαι) (short dissertation on 86

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It is enough to recall a known phrase of I. Dąmbska that active cognition of reality starts from questions asked to oneself or to the environment. Other point of view concerning the role of questions in cognition may be found at J. Hintikka, who thinks that satisfying theory of questions and answers must be based on good cognition theory (idem, New Foundation for a Theory of Questions and Answers, in: Questions and Answers, ed. E. Kiefer, Dordrecht 1983, 159). In Poland, i.a. the following persons have analysed the role of questions (in the chronological order): R. Ingarden, K. Ajdukiewicz, A.B. Stępień, Andrzej Siemianowski, T. Kubiński, J. Giedymin, L. Koj, W. Marciszewski, J. Kopania, J. Pelc, A. Wiśniewski, M. Danielewiczowa, P. Leśniewski. While mentioning Thomas’s knowledge of Aristotle's studies, one should remember that he had access only to their Latin translations, not always of the best quality. Thus, caution should be maintained when clearly defining Thomas’s position on Aristotle, especially in the case of detailed matters. In the issue of problems with Medieval translations of Aristotle, see: J. Domański, Kilka uwag o teorii i praktyce przekładania w łacińskim obszarze językowym, PrzTom 1 (1984), 148-150. This is a common name of studies creating Aristotle’s Organon. However, Aristotle was not familiar with the term “logic” as a name of a specific science, although it had appeared

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names and their meaning), Hermeneutics or On Interpretation ( ) ) (long (short dissertation on propositions), Prior Analytics ( work on deductive reasoning, which is known as his syllogistic), Posterior Analytics ( ) (equally long work on demonstration), Topics ( ) (long treatise on the art of dialectic) and (short study) On Sophistical Refutations ). Thomas himself attempted to write commentaries on ( some of them. Two of his commentaries on those works are known: Sententia super Peri hermeneias (incomplete)89 and Sententia super Posteriora Analytica90. It is Aristotle’s logical works where he (basically) takes up the issue of inquiries.

2.1.1. Outline of the theory of questions by Aristotle91 Aristotle is the first philosopher dealing with the analysis of questions. As ), he understands both the action of asking and the result a “question” (

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90 91

earlier in the title of Democritus’s study (460-371) On Logic, or Criterion of Thought. In addition, the name Organon (Instrument) is more recent. In the first century BC, Aristotle’s students published his works under such a name. They also returned to the term “logic”. Aristotle himself opposes logical reasoning against analytical, physical and dialectical reasoning. According to Aristotle, logical reasoning means dealing with speaking based on acquired general knowledge; it is a demonstration but not on the basis of phrases that naturally need to be basic. The term “analytical”, i.e. “demonstrative”, would correspond with modern understanding of the term “logical”. In turn, “physical” is the method of natural reasoning and “dialectical” is the method of reasoning leading to probable results. See: T. Kotarbiński, Wykłady z dziejów logiki, Warszawa 19852, 7-8. For a study about this commentary, see: J. Isaac, Le Peri Hermeneias en occident, Paris 1953; O. Lewry, Two Continuators of Aquinas: Robertus de Vulgarbia and Thomas Sutton on the Peri Hermeneias of Aristotle, MSt 43 (1981), 58-130. Posterior Analytics had very deep influence on all systematic works of Thomas. This part of the work is changed and a corrected version of an excerpt of my article titled Pytanie a poznanie w początkach filozofii, RF 50 (2002) 1, 371-378. Contributions to Aristotle's theory of questions may be found in: Aristotle, Zweite Analytik. Die Lehrschriften, hrsg. und übertragen P. Gohlke, Paderborn 1953; M.A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki, Lublin 19943; M.A. Krąpiec, Struktura bytu. Charakterystyczne elementy systemu Arystotelesa i Tomasza z Akwinu, Lublin 19952; W. Kullmann, Wissenschaft und Methode. Interpretationen zur aristotelischen Theorie der Naturwissenschaft, London 1974; T. Kwiatkowski, Poznanie naukowe u Arystotelesa. Niektóre poglądy teoretyczne, Warszawa 1969; idem, Szkice z historii logiki ogólnej, Lublin 1993; J. Łukasiewicz, Z zagadnień logiki i filozofii. Pisma wybrane, Warszawa 1961; S. Mansion, La jugement d’existence chez Aristote, Louvain-Paris 1946; W.D. Ross, Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, Oxford 1957; S. Ziemiański, Rola przyczyn w poznaniu naukowym u Arystotelesa, RF 12 (1964) 1, 27-37.

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of this action – an interrogative phrase. Aristotle did not construct a full theory of questions, only its framework, since he was not occupied thematically with a question – only by the way of discussing the issues of syllogism and knowledge. ) “is a discourse in which, certain things being Syllogism ( stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so”92. In this definition from Prior Analytics, there resonate reminiscences from Topics, one of the earliest logic works by Aristotle, where syllogism was defined like in Analytics93, or from the dissertation On Sophistical Refutations, according to which reasoning (syllogism) rests on certain statements such that they involve necessarily the assertion of something other than what has been stated, through what has been stated94. Some commentators believe that with such a broad understanding of syllogism, it would be only about something inferring from something else95. In the strict sense, syllogisms consist only in syllogistic schemes which are included in four figures (Aristotle knew three) and reasoning that is a correct substitution of these schemes96. The first figure has a privileged significance for science in the narrowly understood sense, because all assertoric syllogisms included in it are perfect syllogisms97. Aristotle considers syllogisms in the broad sense to be a substance of discourse. Depending on their aims, he distinguishes three types of discourses: (1) discourse whose aim is truth (we see it in dialogues of Plato); (2) discourse whose aim is to convince an opponent (this is the subject of Topics); (3) discourse whose aim is to win a dispute, while a dispute’s content is indifferent (this is discussed in On Sophistical Refutations). For Aristotle, the first one is the most important, while the last is the least important. 92 93 94

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96 97

Pr. An. 24 b 18-20, transl. by A. J. Jenkinson. Top. 100 a 25. El. soph. 165 a 1, transl. by W. A. Pickard. It is a common opinion that the treatise On Sophistical Refutations is the last chapter of Topics. See: I.M. Bocheński, Ancient Formal Logic, Amsterdam 1951, 23. See: J. Salamucha, Pojęcie dedukcji u Arystotelesa i św. Tomasza z Akwinu. Studium historyczno-krytyczne, in: idem, Wiedza i wiara. Wybrane pisma filozoficzne, ed. J.J. Jadacki, K. Świętorzecka, Lublin 1997, 243-244. See: ibidem, op. cit., 244. See: Pr. An. 26 b 30-33; Post. An. 79 a 19-33. For Aristotle, perfect syllogism is such a syllogism, which needs nothing other than what is stated to make evident what necessarily follows (Pr. An. 24 b 22). The following schemes are such syllogisms in the first figure: Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio. Eventually, Aristotle reduces two last schemes to syllogisms Barbara and Celarent, considering them – as the clearest and the most obvious – as axioms of his theory. See: J. Łukasiewicz, Sylogistyka Arystotelesa z punktu widzenia współczesnej logiki formalnej, transl. A. Chmielewski, Warszawa 1988, 62.

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Sophistical or contentious syllogism functions in a discourse whose aim is to win a dispute. This starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted, but are not such, or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. Furthermore, such a syllogism can have faults in the form98. Aristotle’s remarks concerning questions are poor here and concentrate on the way of their posing to win a dispute at all costs. Dialectical syllogism occurs in a discourse whose aim is to convince an opponent. This syllogism results from opinions that are generally accepted ) and have no faults in the form99. As such, it gives only a lower or ( ). Having been occupied with this syllogism in Tophigher probability ( ics100, Aristotle suggests the division of questions101 according to the kind of ) and predicables we ask about. He distinguishes also a problem ( )102. They have the same content and form (of a dialectical premise ( an interrogative sentence). The difference is that the problem is posed alternatively (the answering person may choose from the alternative a sentence to defend), and one of its units is a premise103. In turn, each problem and premise dis98 99

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103

Top. 100 b-101 a. In Aristotle’s dialectics, deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning (somewhat more important) occur, for which dialectics is a relevant domain. In Prior Analytics 68 b 937, Aristotle presents induction in the form of some syllogism. See: T. Kwiatkowski, Dialektyka Arystotelesa, in: idem, Szkice z historii logiki ogólnej, Lublin 1993, 35. Topics are the treatise dedicated firstly to a person who asks questions, because its role in this discourse is more important than that of the answering person. In Aris(reasoning, infer, totle's Topics, this action is reflected with the verb demonstration). See: K. Leśniak, Wstęp [in: Topik] (Introduction [to Topics]), in: Arystoteles, Dzieła wszystkie, vol. 1, Warszawa 1990, 339. We only say that in Topics Aristotle suggests some division of questions, because in the strict sense no division of questions occurs there. They are mentioned by the way of dividing predicables, even not in each of them. See: Top. 101 b-103 b. As is customary, we translate Aristotle’s term as “premise”. Strictly speaking, is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. (see: Pr. An. 24 a 16. 28n; J. Łukasiewicz, Sylogistyka Arystotelesa, op. cit. 12). In addition, propositio obtains such a meaning (Latin equivalent of ). Nowadays, syllogism premises are considered as functions in a syllogism’s antecedent, while consequent is named a conclusion or deduction. The following sentence is an example of a problem: “Is an animal that walks on two feet a definition of man or no?", while the following sentence is an example of dialectic premise: “Is an animal that walks on two feet a definition of man or no?”. Having regard to modern linguistic sensitivity and knowledge of modern theories of questions, Aristotle’s differentiation of problem and premise seems to be dull (in light of mentioned examples). Similar difficulties occur also in further analyses of Aristotle’s theory of questions. This is no place to take a detailed attitude towards them. It seems that

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closes a definition ( ), property ( ), genus ( )104, or accident 105 ) , that is, predicables, which predicate about each of Aristotle’s ( ten categories. Aristotle thinks that each predicable can have assigned other kinds of questions that indicate a discourse. Therefore: (a) definition corresponds with a question if a phrase signifying a thing's essence is convertible with a subject of the definition, or not; therefore it is a question of sameness and difference106; (b) property corresponds with a question if something is predicated convertibly about the subject but it does not disclose a thing’s essence, belongs to this thing or does not belong107;

104 105

106 107

these are theses, not examples, which should be primary for understanding Aristotle’s approach. For Aristotle, the difference, as inherently generic, should be ranked together with the genus. Top. 101 b-103 b. Aristotle explains further that “the elements mentioned above are those out of which and through which and to which arguments proceed”. Now one way to confirm that is by induction: for if any one were to survey propositions and problems one by one, it would be seen that each was formed either from the definition of something or from its property or from its genus or from its accident. Another way to confirm it is through reasoning (deduction). For every predicate of a subject must of necessity be either convertible with its subject or not: and if it is convertible, it would be its definition or property, for if it signifies the essence, it is the definition; if not, it is a property: for this was what a property is, viz. what is predicated convertibly, but does not signify the essence. If, on the other hand, it is not predicated convertibly of the thing, it either is or is not one of the terms contained in the definition of the subject: and if it is one of those terms, then it will be the genus or the differentia, inasmuch as the definition consists of genus and differentiae; whereas, if it is not one of those terms, clearly it would be an accident. Top. 103 b. The following definitions may help with better understanding of further reasoning: G genus ad S SaG ~SoG S species ad G SāG R differentia ad S G (S ā GR GR ā S) D definiens ad S G R (G genus ad S R differentia ad S D = GR) P proprium ad S G (S a GP S e GP) A accidens ad S SiA SeA W convertibly ad S S a W W a S, where {a, e, i, o} constitute assertoric operators of Aristotle, while {ā, ē, ī, ō} and {a, e, i, o} are modal operators: necessity and possibility. The following question from Topics 102a is an example: “Are sensation and knowledge the same or different?” Aristotle does not give any example of such a question. Based on his explanations of properties, it could be formulated as follows: “Whether the capability of learning always belongs to man or not?” See: Top. 102 a.

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(c) genus (and its differentia) corresponds with a question if something predicated in the category of essence about one thing is predicated in the same way about another thing exhibiting differences in kind, or not108; (d) random feature corresponds with a question about what belongs and does not belong to one and the self-same thing in a different time of its existence109. For Aristotle, definition in its basic meaning belongs only to the substance, while to other categories of being only in a derivative meaning 110. Finally, he recognises that all mentioned terms can be called definitional111, because we refute a definition when we prove that discussed feature does not belong only to a defined term (it refers to properties in the same way), or that one of the elements in the definitional formula does not belong to the subject (it refers also to a random feature). Thus, questions corresponding with particular predicables are based on the question of sameness and difference. Therefore, a question is always a question of sameness and difference, regardless of which predicable we ask about. For Aristotle, strictly scientific discourse is the most important discourse type. Truth is its aim. In Topics, syllogism relevant for this dispute is called a “demon). Aristotle says that the premises from which the reasoning stration” ( starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises, which are primary and true112. In Analytics, that syllogism is treated independently, beyond the context of discourse. It is called demonstrative or scientific syllogism as a syllogism that provides apodictic or de), that is rational knowledge monstrative knowledge (

108 The following questions may serve as an example: “What is the object before you?” and “Is one thing in the same genus as another or in a different one?" Top. 102 a. 109 The following questions constitute an example: “Is the honourable or the expedient preferable?” and “Is the life of virtue or the life of self-indulgence the pleasanter?", thus questions in the type of: “which of the two does the predicate in question happen to belong more closely?” (Top. 102 b). Let us notice that in Topics for a dialectical questioner must give his opponent by the form of his inquiry the chance of announcing one of two alternatives, whichever he wishes. Therefore, the question “What is it?” is not dialectical, while the question: “Whether man has such and such a characteristics or not?” is dialectical. See: Herm. 20 b. 110 See: Met. 1030 b 7; 1031 a 1-14. More about a definition at Aristotle see: T. Kwiatkowski, Kilka uwag na temat teorii definicji u Arystotelesa, in: idem, Szkice z historii logiki ogólnej, Lublin 1993, 89-107. 111 Top. 102 b. 112 Top. 100 a-100 b.

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( )113. According to a scientific discourse, differently than when dialectics is discussed, Aristotle speaks only about premises, not problems. This is understandable because rational knowledge – as we read at the beginning of Posterior Analytics – is based on pre-existent and certain knowledge, not on problematic beliefs on which dialectics is founded. However, it should be emphasised that in spite of the doubtful cognitive value of dialectics, Aristotle considers it as one of (next to sensual and intellectual intuition) the ways of justified cognition and recognition of primary sentences114. He applies this dialectical method in Metaphysics (Book ), justifying the following principles: of non-contradiction and of excluded middle115, but also in the first book of On the Soul and in the first book of Physics. Taking into account the aporetic character of actually conducted discourses, it may be stated that according to Aristotle’s concept of knowledge, dialectics (by undertaking problems) precedes strictly understood science, being one of the ways of collecting its primary sentences. Let us get back to the demonstrative syllogism, which is Aristotle’s classical syllogism. It consists of three sentences. The first two are premises in the strict sense, the third – conclusion – may also be called a premise, because it is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. A premise then is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another116. The two first that are the beginning of deduction must be true, primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the conclusion, which is further related to them as effect to cause117. As such, 113 The adjective indicates acquisition of knowledge through reasoning, as opposed to knowledge of sensual origin. 114 See: P. Chojnacki, Metoda dialektyczna jako droga do zasadniczych przesłanek filozofii i nauki, SPCh 1 (1965) 2, 33-52; J.D.G. Evans, Aristotle’s Concept of Dialectic, Cambridge 1977, 31-41. 115 Referring to E. Zeller, O. Hamelin and T. Gomperz, Salamucha distinguishes three groups of Aristotle’s dialectic arguments: elenctic arguments, arguments through reduction to absurd (reductio ad absurdum) and systemic arguments (J. Salamucha, op. cit., 298-301). While basically agreeing with Salamucha, Krąpiec believes, though, that these three ways of argumentation cannot be contrasted too harshly, because they are connected with each other by a system, strictly speaking: with an object itself relevant to philosophy and its realisation. These three ways of argumentation are essentially an epistemological equivalence of being as being (in Aristotle’s approach) recognised in various complementary aspects (M.A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, op. cit., 219-220). 116 Pr. An. 24 a 16. 117 Post. An. 71 b 20-22. While indicating differences between a dialectical premise (it assumes either part indifferently) and a demonstrative premise (it lays down one part to the definite exclusion of the other because that part is true), Aristotle indicates also the similarity and difference between the dialectical and demonstrative syllogism. Post. An. 72a, see: Pr. An. 24a-24b; Top. 100 a 27-30; 104 a 8.

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they are not only non-demonstrated, but also indemonstrable, while their cogni) characteristic for the demonstrative tion is based on induction ( knowledge founded on sensual and intellectual intuition or dialectical reasoning. Conclusion is a sentence recognised based on premises obtained in such a way with the use of syllogistic inference. For Aristotle, syllogism understood generally in this way constitutes the substance of science. In Posterior Analytics118, which inherently is a theory of scientific knowledge, Aristotle indicates the translatability of syllogism’s premises into questions thus called syllogistic. He explains also that a syllogistic question is equivalent to a premise embodying one of the two sides of a contradiction. Therefore – he says – there needs to exist a scientific question, from which the “appropriate” conclusion of each science is developed 119. Furthermore, he di) with regard to a type of knowledge that we achieve vides questions ( by answering them. Therefore, he distinguishes as follows: (1) a question whether the connexion of an attribute with a thing is a fact ( ); )120; (2) a question what the reason of the connexion is ( 121 (3) a question whether a thing exists ( ) ; ). (4) a question what the nature of the thing is ( Aristotle explains that posing each of these questions is conditioned by the lack of knowledge, knowledge that we try to acquire by posing a specific question122. Aristotle emphasises that because of this the sequence of their posing is not arbitrary. Therefore, the question about the cause (2) assumes possession of knowledge about an occurring fact, that is knowledge we acquire by answering the question (1). In turn, the question about the nature of the thing (4) requires previous knowledge concerning the existence of this thing, therefore the question (3) precedes it123. 118 Post. An. 89 b-90 a. 119 Post. An. 77 a-b. 120 To be strict, it should be emphasised that in question (1) and (2) Aristotle uses one expression to designate both question and answer. Meanwhile, is an answer to the question (it is important with regard to the role it played in the structure of the Medieval article), while is an answer to the question . See: L. Nowak, op. cit., part I, 137-138. 121 Aristotle explains that it is about the existence in the absolute sense, i.e. if this generally exists (e.g. a centaur), not “if it is or it is not, e.g. white”. 122 For Aristotle, the statement of the lack of knowledge follows helplessness against noticed difficulties and surprise. Met. 982 b 11-25. 123 Here, two additions. First: As we emphasised, Aristotle compiles quite clearly the above-mentioned questions in two groups of two questions each, while question (1) is somewhat equivalent to question (3), because in both it is about existence of the thing:

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Aristotle demonstrates further that in all kinds of questions we ask about the ), that is medium, which has broader meaning than in a sylmiddle term ( logism and means the “nearest cause”. All searches refer then to the middle term. While posing the question (1) and (3), we ask whether a relation of an attribute with the thing ( ) or the thing itself has the middle term (i.e. its cause). If so, question (3) can be reduced to question (1) – Aristotle does it because the question (1), which is an inquiry about the property of the existing thing, already assumes the existence of this thing, which is a positive answer to the question (3). While posing the question (2) and (4), we ask what the middle term is (i.e. what its cause is), what enables the reduction of question (4) to question (2)124. Thus, only two kinds of questions are left – leading either to knowledge concerning attributes of the existing thing125 and conditional, or to knowledge , which is unconditional and does not concern attributes126. While discussing Aristotle’s theory of questions, we cannot omit Metaphysics. In Book , dedicated to substance127, Aristotle emphasises that a question – that it is so) or about the existence of the thing ( about the fact ( – that something is) is a meaningless inquiry, because it is a question about

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partial (1) or absolute (3). Second: the order of questions mentioned here could be called as model. However, in other places of Posterior Analytics (71 a 11-16; 76 a 3136; 76 b –10; 92 b 15-16), Aristotle emphasises that sometimes (simplifying) knowledge about what something is precedes knowledge of whether this thing exists. It is like that, e.g. with “triangle”. In turn, one should know about an individual both what it is and that it exists (see: K. Leśniak, Wstęp [to: Analityk] (Introduction [to Analytics]), art. cit. 123. He refers to J. Moreau, Aristote et vérité antéprédicative, in: Aristote et les problèmes de méthode. Communications présentées au Symposium Aristotelicum tenu à Louvain du 24 août au 1er Septembre 1960, 59, and he, in turn, refers to S. Mansion, op. cit., 165; see also: E. Morawiec, Podstawowe zagadnienia metafizyki klasycznej, Warszawa 1998, 217). However, it seems that the problem could be explained in the following way: when in cognition we start from the thing, the question about the existence precedes the question about the essence; when we start from a term, the question about the essence (term’s meaning) precedes the question about the existence of the thing being the subject of this term. For Aristotle, knowledge of some thing’s nature ( ) means the same as knowledge of a cause, due to which this thing exists. The concept of the cause is strictly connected with metaphysics, while in logical opinions it corresponds with the medium concept (see: Nowak, op. cit., part I, 146-154). Aristotle’s term of an attribute refers to an actually and objectively existing being: an attribute is something that belongs objectively to the thing. About these two kinds of knowledge see: T. Kwiatkowski, Rozumowania i u Arystotelesa, in: idem, Szkice z historii logiki ogólnej, Lublin 1993, 49-66. Met. 1041 a-b.

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nothing128. The fact or the existence of the thing must be known as a condition of posing a reasonable question. In this case, it is an inquiry starting from the ). For Aristotle, this is the only question to acquire unparticle “why” ( qualified knowledge of a thing in the strict sense, because it is a question about the cause. As he ascertains, we think that then we get to know something unconditionally when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be dif), whose ferent than it is129. This is the task of scientific knowledge ( , i.e. investigating, researching, therefore activities taken by activity is philosophers: contrary to men of experience, not to be satisfied with knowledge ) as a result, but when knowing a result to investigate its cause of the fact ( )130. Therefore, Aristotle says that the question about the cause does ( not concern simple beings or things the understanding of which is simple. The method of examining objects of this type has a different nature. The nature of syllogism also causes first and principal sentences, from which conclusions are deduced, to be direct sentences – sentences, whose veracity we accept on a different path than as a result of justification by the middle term131. According to Aristotle, only intuitive reason is able to recognise principles ). Intuitive reason is the principle of scientific knowl( edge ( ). , that is quick wit, cooperates ) with intuitive reason. It is a faculty of hitting upon the middle term ( – cause – instantaneously132. Therefore, intuition would be “immediate syllogism”, “momentary deduction”133. One may agree with Jan Salamucha that for Aristotle deduction is a principal – even almost the only – scientific method134, but only if Aristotle’s declarations and the fact that he is occupied with other

128 Instances given in Metaphysics would indicate that Aristotle thinks about the question in the following type: “why x is an x?”, e.g., “why thunder is a thunder?”, not “why does it thunder? 129 Post. An. 71 b. 130 Met. 981 a 25-30. 131 M.A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, op. cit., 213. S. Kamiński exposes closer the issue of “scientificity” of obtaining final premises in the classical philosophy of being (ibidem, 327-335). 132 Post. An. 89 b 10. 133 Such an understanding of the intuition (in relation to so-called syllogism of the essence) is observed by J. Goeder-Croissant (Sur la théorie de la définition dans les Seconds Analytiques, in: Actes du IIIe Congrés des Societés de Philosophie de langue francaise, Bruxelles-Louvain, 2-6 septembre 1947, 225-228) and – agreeing with it – T. Kwiatkowski (Kilka uwag na temat teorii definicji u Arystotelesa, art. cit., 106-107). 134 J. Salamucha, op. cit., 240.

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types of reasoning (including induction and analogical reasoning)135 are roughly considered136. Indeed, especially in metaphysics, Aristotle is occupied not so much with syllogistic deduction as with induction, explanation by example and three types of demonstrations present in the dialectical method: elenctic demonstration, indirect proof and systemic demonstration137. According to Krąpiec, Aristotle realises that deduction in the strict sense does not suit metaphysics, because it operates with primary terms, which – having the broadest scope – do not fit any genre or genus. Syllogism as deductive reasoning could be constructed only in relation to objects that could be recognised with the use of general terms defined by an indication of their genus and differentia specifica. Suprageneric objects (those that exceed all genres) relevant to metaphysics are beyond such definitions138, therefore beyond the whole deductive syllogistic apodictic reasoning. Thus, demonstrative syllogism is very rare in metaphysics. Krąpiec recognises a tendency for such a demonstration as a noble relict of Plato teaching. It sets excessive requirements and over the course of the years one has resigned from it for the benefit of requirements proportional to examined objects139. We said that in Aristotle’s works we see only the outline of the theory of questions, which the lack of cohesion in views concerning them allows for. Nevertheless, they include statements important for our further analyses. First, Aristotle puts the question in the area of practical skills suiting acquisition of knowledge. While locating them in various types of dialogue, he indicates that 135 Aristotle calls the analogical reasoning – “reasoning by example” ( ). See: Pr. An. 68 b 38-69 a 19. 136 Salamucha claims that apart from deduction Aristotle is occupied only with induction among other types of reasoning. However, while not starting any discussion, it needs to be emphasised that at the end of Prior Analytics “argumentation by example”, reduction, objection and reasoning from signs are mentioned. Moreover, Aristotle distinguishes the concept of idealised cognition and actual cognition. See also: P. Chojnacki, Nauka wyidealizowana i nauka faktyczna w epistemologii Arystotelesa, STNW II, 1947, 17-29; T. Kwiatkowski, Zagadnienie indukcji w metodologii Arystotelesa, in: idem, Szkice z historii logiki ogólnej, Lublin 1993, 109-124. 137 See: J. Salamucha, op. cit., 287-314. According to Salamucha referred to by Krąpiec, two methods of Aristotle's cognition of axioms: dialectical and intuitive have historicphilosophical meaning. Substantially, intuition characterised generally by Aristotle in the last paragraph of Posterior Analytics is the only possible way of establishing and recognising some axioms in any deductive system. Salamucha thought that whole dialectical argumentation by Aristotle had the character of a very harsh polemic, which was why Aristotle in Metaphysics could say a lot of things that he really did not recognise”. J. Salamucha, op. cit., 314. 138 We think only about classical definition, which is now one of many kinds of definitions. 139 M.A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, op. cit., 227-228. 232-233. 315-326.

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the material content of an answer and the kind of acquired knowledge depend on the type of questions. In a discourse with truth as its aim, asking a question is motivated by the lack of knowledge. This lack assumes some knowledge, which is reflected in the reduction of some questions to other questions, disclosing the logical order of posing them. In addition, Aristotle’s statement is important saying that basically all questions (it should be added: correctly posed) are based on considered by Aristhe question of sameness and difference. Question totle the only scientific question in the strict sense is also a question of sameness that leads to knowledge assumes knowledge and difference. The question . It is pointless to ask about the fact, because – as about the fact, knowledge has been mentioned before – the fact or the existence of the thing needs to be known as a condition of posing a reasonable question.

2.1.2. Thomas’s theory of questions140 In the problems of questions, Thomas follows Aristotle. For Aquinas, the question is not a particular subject of interest. He discusses the question incidentally, rather articulating the idea of the Philosopher than modifying his position. Having regard to the question, Thomas almost always uses the term quaestio141, which he usually understands as an issue, problem, more seldom – functionally, as an inquiry or scientific research. He uses the noun interrogatio142as a name of the operation of interrogation. Thomas understands the relation between an operation of interrogation and a problem as follows: when asking, we expect an answer that explains a question (quaestio)143. While slightly modifying Aristotle’s position, Thomas Aquinas thinks that a necessary condition of posing a question or being occupied with a problem is not the lack of knowledge, but doubt (dubitatio)144, which is the equivalent of 140 This part of the study and the next one (2.2.1) constitute a slightly changed version of my article titled Pytanie w filozofii Tomasza z Akwinu, SPCh 38 (2002), 1, 5-18. 141 The noun quaestio originates from the verb quaerere (to search, research, ask, find out) and in the actual sense it means search (for somebody or something), while in a more general sense it means scientific search, research (both as an operation and a subject of this operation: issue, problem, topic). In Thomas’s works, the term quaestio and its derivatives occur ten times more often than interrogatio. 142 The term interrogatio origins from the verb interrogare (to ask, guess, inquire) and means the same as an operation of asking questions. 143 See: e.g. S.th., I, q. 84, a. 1, c: “Respondeo dicendum, ad evidentiam huius quaestionis [...].” 144 “Consilium est quaedam quaestio, secundum philosophum. Ubi autem non est dubitatio, ibi non est quaestio. In I Sent. d. 5, q. 3, a. 1, ex.

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the Greek . Justification for this modification may be discerned in the theological character of Thomas’s work. He considers issues that are the subject of belief, providing with specifically certain knowledge. Therefore, doubts come from the fact that this knowledge exceeds human natural cognitive abilities145. Therefore – as Chenu notices – since the times of Abelard, in the scholasticism one has used to “question” not only questionable statements, but also the statements that express complete certainty in order to achieve their deeper understanding146. Basic remarks of Thomas regarding questions can be found in his commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics titled Sententia super Posteriora Analytica147. There he deals with demonstrative knowledge that he distinguishes from the dialectic, i.a. drawing attention to the function of questions in both discourses. After Aristotle, Thomas repeats that in each demonstrative knowledge, there are questions, answers and disputations peculiar to each148, and in each science, there are deceptions, peculiar to each149. Having regard to the demonstrative syllogism, to some extent one may identify the question with the premise (proposition), because it is an answer to the question150. However, it does not mean that in the demonstrative syllogism the premises are problematic. Only the conclusion is problematic. Demonstrative science asks only about the conclusion that may be deducted from premises accepted as self-evident or based on them.

See: Contra Gent., I, 4-5. M.-D. Chenu, Introduction à l’étude de saint Thomas d’Aquin, op. cit., 67-78. Sometimes, this text is quoted as Commentarium in Analytika posteriora. The role of dispute in science is more strongly emphasised in Thomas's commentary than in the work he comments. Thomas emphasises more strongly necessary conditions of such a scientific dispute. He writes: “Et quia ex interrogatione et responsione fit disputatio, consequenter ostendit quod in qualibet scientia est propria disputatio, dicens quod si disputet geometra cum geometra, secundum quod geometra, idest de his quae ad geometriam pertinent, manifestum est quod bene procedit disputatio, si tamen non solum fiat disputatio de eo quod est geometriae, sed etiam ex principiis geometricis procedatur”. In Post. Anal. l.1, lc. 21, n. 7. 149 “In prima, ostendit quod in qualibet scientia sunt propriae interrogationes, responsiones et disputationes; in secunda, ostendit quomodo in qualibet scientia sunt propriae deceptiones [...].” In Post. Anal. l.1, lc. 21, n. 1. 150 “Idem est secundum substantiam interrogatio syllogistica et propositio, quae accipit alteram partem contradictionis, licet in modo proferendi differant (hoc enim, quod ad interrogationem respondetur, assumitur ut propositio in aliquo syllogismo); in unaquaque autem scientia sunt propriae propositiones, ex quibus fit syllogismus: ostensum est enim quod quaelibet scientia ex propriis procedit; ergo in qualibet scientia est propria interrogatio.” In Post. Anal. l.1, lc. 21, n. 2.

145 146 147 148

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Dialectician asks not only about the conclusion, but also about the premises that are problematic (similarly to the conclusion)151. For Aquinas, differentiation of the question about the existence (the fact) and the question of the essence, i.e. quaestio, an est, and quaestio, quid est, is especially significant. In accordance with the nature of the thing, one cannot properly know of something what it is before it is known that it is152. Previous knowledge of the meaning of a name is necessary when one wants to indicate something153. In Summa contra gentiles, Thomas refers to Aristotle’s distinction of four kinds of inquiries from Posterior Analytics. He repeats after the Philosopher that the question “what something is” – quaestio quid est (4) relates to the question “whether it exists” – quaestio an est (3) like the question “why something is so” – quaestio propter quid (2) relates to the question “whether it is so” – quaestio quia (1). Such an allocation of some inquiries to other inquiries is based on a search for medium, which enables justifying that something is such or that something is. Next to this rationale known by Aristotle, Aquinas adds the anthropological argument. He ascertains that we observe that those who see that something is so naturally desire to know why. So, too,

151 “Sciendum tamen est quod interrogatio aliter est in scientiis demonstrativis et aliter est in dialectica. In dialectica enim non solum interrogatur de conclusione, sed etiam de praemissis: de quibus demonstrator non interrogat, sed ea sumit quasi per se nota, vel per talia principia probata; sed interrogat tantum de conclusione. Sed cum eam demonstraverit, utitur ea, ut propositione, ad aliam conclusionem demonstrandam.” In Post. Anal. l.1, lc. 21, n. 3. 152 However, there is one exception. In Contra Gent., I, 10, we read as follows: “In Deo autem hoc prae aliis invenitur, ut infra ostendetur, quod suum esse est sua essentia, ac si idem sit quod respondetur ad quaestionem quid est, et ad quaestionem an est. Sic ergo cum dicitur, Deus est, praedicatum vel est idem subiecto, vel saltem in definitione subiecti includitur. Et ita Deum esse per se notum erit”. However, let us observe that the identity of both mentioned questions is based on the qualitative identity of the answer to each of them, which we obtain when God is the subject of these questions. It does not mean that the questions are identical on their own, which is proven by another Contra Gent., I, 12, where Thomas refutes the accusation that the fact of God’s existence cannot be demonstrated rationally: “Posset tamen hic error fulcimentum aliquod falso sibi assumere ex quorundam philosophorum dictis, qui ostendunt in Deo idem esse essentiam et esse, scilicet id quod respondetur ad quid est, et ad quaestionem an est.” 153 “Unde quaestio, an est, praecedit quaestionem, quid est. Sed non potest ostendi de aliquo an sit, nisi prius intelligatur quid significatur per nomen” (In Post. Anal. l. 1, lc. 2, n. 5). This statement can be found as a response to difficulties mentioned by Thomas, considering the problem Utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile: “Quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse est accipere pro medio quid significet nomen non autem quod quid est, quia quaestio quid est, sequitur ad quaestionem an est.” S.th I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2.

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those acquainted with the fact that something exists naturally desire to know what this thing is, and this is to understand its substance154. Similarly to Aristotle, Thomas distinguishes two types of demonstration, known further as demonstratio quia and demonstratio propter quid. The first of ), while the secthem leads to knowledge about facts (Aristotle’s knowledge ). However, for Aristotle ond one leads to knowledge about the cause ( demonstration in the type of quia concerns knowledge prerequisites. Under the influence of Thomas and his a posteriori justification of God’s existence, one starts to conclude that demonstratio quia is not only some pre-scientific demonstration, but also that it belongs to science155. Just as the issue of existence is earlier than the issue of explication of what the thing is, demonstratio quia is logically earlier than demonstratio propter quid156. Thomas’s appreciation of knowledge about the facts is related to his existential concept of being. Existence (esse), as the most perfect act of being, plays in ). Therefore, it analogous role to the form in Aristotle’s being-substance ( Thomas’s search for existential causes of being would be analogous to Aristotle’s search for the formal cause occurring in propter quid demonstration (i.e. )157. It is expressed in the existence of necessary propositions, which are

154 “Sicut se habet quaestio propter quid ad quaestionem quia, ita se habet quaestio quid est ad quaestionem an est: nam quaestio propter quid quaerit medium ad demonstrandum quia est aliquid, puta quod luna eclipsatur; et similiter quaestio quid est quaerit medium ad demonstrandum an est, secundum doctrinam traditam in II Posteriorum. Videmus autem quod videntes quia est aliquid, naturaliter scire desiderant propter quid. Ergo et cognoscentes an est aliquid, naturaliter scire desiderant quid est ipsum, quod est intelligere eius substantiam. Non igitur quietatur naturale sciendi desiderium in cognitione Dei qua scitur de ipso solum quia est” (Contra Gent., III, 50). Thomas expresses the belief that questions or issues set in a logical order when developing detailed issues, writing e.g.: “Respondeo dicendum quod ista quaestio aliqualiter dependet ex praemissis” (S.th., I, q. 119, a. 2, c) and “Respondeo dicendum quod ista quaestio ex praecedenti dependet” (S.th., I-II, q. 110, a. 4, c). 155 Krąpiec refers here to John of St. Thomas who in Cursus philosophiae (Ars Logica) says about this demonstration that “imperfecte participat rationem scientiae.” Krąpiec mentions interesting proof for the scientific character of actual demonstration – the fact of replacing quia demonstration with propter quid present in Thomas’s In Post. Anal. l.13, lc. 23. However, this change cannot be treated as something special, because Thomas just repeats Aristotle’s opinion from Posterior Analytics 79 a. See: M.A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, op. cit., 228-233. 156 J. Anderson draws attention to this in the On Demonstration in Thomistic Metaphysic, NSch 32 (1958), 485 et seq.; por. M.A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, op. cit., 229. 157 See: J. Anderson, art. cit., 485 et seq.; J. Ovens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. A Study in the Greek Background of Medieval Thought, Toronto 1951

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simultaneously perceptive propositions about facts and intellectual apprehension of these facts158. In this context, an addition that appears just in Summa theologiae159 is symptomatic. Referring to the Book of Metaphysics160, Thomas distinguishes two meanings of the term “being” (ens)161: 1. being is the being-ness of the thing as divisible by the ten predicaments, 2. being is the thing indicated by the truth of a proposition. In the second meaning, being is what answers the question “Does it exist?”162. Undoubtedly, Thomas emphasises the meaning of a question more strongly than Aristotle, instead of a question in the sense of an interrogative sentence. As a necessary condition of posing a question or raising an issue, he considers the doubt, not the lack of knowledge, which is not contradictory with Aristotle’s view. In early works, he clearly emphasises that questions in the demonstrative knowledge concern only a conclusion, therefore premises answer a question, which is not scientific in the strict sense. Nevertheless, it is based on knowledge of the existence of something and knowledge of the fact, the cause of which is the being itself. Resignation from the existential concept of being allows Aristotle to apply explanatory demonstration propter quid to the existential side of the being, as well as to include demonstratio quia in the area of science.

2.2. Analysis of Thomas’s questions about conscience 2.2.1. General characteristics of Thomas’s questions about conscience Having such developed tools, we pass to the analysis of Thomas’s basic questions about conscience; more strictly: questions about synderesis and conscience (conscientia). Let us remember that the central place in Aristotle’s philosophy is

158 159 160 161 162

– referred to by Krąpiec in: M.A. Krąpiec, Teoria analogii bytu, Lublin 19932, 50-61. 90-109; M.A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, op. cit., 231-232. S. Kamiński raises the issue of general and necessary material statements in: M.A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, op. cit., 303-314. This addition is missing in Contra Gent., III, 8-9, 16. Met. 1017 a 22-35. In Met., the term occurs, translated by Wilhelm of Moerbeke as esse. Therefore, we should suppose that in this case Thomas used different translation. “[...] ens dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, secundum quod significat entitatem rei, prout dividitur per decem praedicamenta, et sic convertitur cum re. [...] Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis, quae in compositione consistit, cuius nota est hoc verbum est, et hoc est ens quo respondetur ad quaestionem an est.” S.th., I, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2.

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occupied not by an interrogative sentence, but by its content, i.e. the question, while the emphasis is put not on formulation of questions, but answers. This philosophy is not a philosophy of questions but of answers; it is solving problems, not multiplying them. Thus, except the question constituting this study's title, the rest of its content does not include questions. It should be pointed out that inquiries were added later to Summa theologiae as titles of articles. They are formulated only in introductions to particular questions as they determine inquiries raised in particular articles. Thomas’s questions determining the issues have the following form: “utrum p”, where p is a propositional variable. Such a form of basic scholastic inquiry is related to the genesis of an issue as a basic didactic unit. Firstly, it was about specifying unclear expression found during reading some text, about explanation of discrepant interpretations or solutions proposed by various authorities. Finally, the complex structure of the issue started to serve better understanding of convictions that did not raise doubts concerning their truthfulness. That is why Chenu says that the word utrum functioned in scholasticism as a stereotype and was all the time raised everywhere. It was the result of the formal evolution undergone by a question, finally keeping the rhetorical form163. The rhetorical164 form of a scholastic question in the form of “utrum p” indicates the aporetic character of Thomas’s discourse, whose basis is aporia, i.e. dubitatio, considered by Aquinas the condition of posing a question. Inquiry “utrum p” assumes the whole previous output of researches and discrepancy observed in it. In a situation where contradictions cannot co-exist simultaneously, an appropriate inquiry is constituted by the disjunctive question starting from

163 Chenu refers to Clarenbald of Arras (from the school in Chartres), who wrote after year 1153 in the commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate: “Quid quaestio sit videtur esse commemorandum... In eo autem quod dixit Aristoteles: utrosque idem utrisque opinari, illud genus quaestionum voluit intelligi, quod de certis propositionibus constituitur, ut est hoc: utrum margarita sit lapis necne. Quare et in eodem Topicorum tractatu, sed alio in loco I, 3, de omni propositione problema posse fieri commemorat. Sed illae quidem quaestiones, quae de certis propositionibus constituuntur, nil habent quaestionis praeter formam.” Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius de Trinitate. Ein Werk aus der Schule von Chartres im 12. Jahrhundert, ed. W. Jansen, Breslau 1926, 34; quoted after: M.-D. Chenu, Introduction à l’étude de saint Thomas d’Aquin, op. cit., 72. 164 This rhetoric is understood here after Aristotle as “antistrophe of dialectic” (Ret. 1354 a). Rhetoric is: “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion” (Ret. 1355 b 28-29). Rhetoric in performance of its tasks refers to explaining the meaning of words and their etymology, which should be observed due to their argumentative function in the scholastic discourse (see: M.L. Clarke, Higher Education in the Ancient World, London 1971, 11-28).

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165 the particle “whether” – , to which knowledge is the answer. Aristotle ascertains that. While commenting this fragment of Metaphysics, Thomas says that the particle “utrum” is applied in a question when a contradiction occurs166. It is inscribed in the nature of metaphysics and theology, which as the only ones (each in its order) do not argue in proof of its principles, but only thoroughly discuss (disputare) its first premises, confuting accusations or explaining difficulties167. Having regard to this, Boethius gives the following definition of the question: “Quaestio est dubitabilis propositio” – The question is a premise that can be doubted168. The scholastic question in the form of “utrum p” has its genesis in a basic didactic unit as the question. However, “utrum” (at least in Thomas’s works) occurs as an unchangeable and monotonous basis of scholastic articles (not questions)169. An article was the lowest and basic element of the scholastic work’s structure170. Its construction was strictly determined. It reflected the structure of scholastic quaestio consisting of three parts: difficulties, positive explanation and response to difficulties. Article’s title, which is often a question, expressed the problem (quaestio), the solving of which was considered in the article. The very form of this question “utrum p” justified the occurrence of pro and contra in an article. They were not to give an answer to the title question, but to indicate doubting reasons (dubitation), a necessary condition of posing a question. This combination of authorities’ opinions after the first or second part of the alternative indicated by the question “utrum p” was to lead the mind to the – disputare) applied diaessence of difficulty. Their discussion ( lectic171, being – according to Aristotle’s concept – the initial stage to the knowledge, its critical preparation172.

165 See: Met. 1055 b 32 –1056 a 15. 166 “Hac particula, utrum, interrogantes, in oppositis semper utimur, ut supra dictum est.” In Met lb 10, lc 7, n. 3. 167 S.th., I, q. 1, a. 8, c. 168 Boethius, In Topica Ciceronis, l. I (PL 64, 1048 D). The following statement of John of Salisbury corresponds with this statement: “Est autem disputare aliquid eorum quae dubia sunt, aut in contadictione posita, aut quae sic vel sic proponuntur, ratione supposita, probare vel improbare.” Ioannes Saresberiensis, Metalogicus, l. II, c. 4, PL 199, col. 860; quoted after: Pession, art. cit., VIII. 169 M.-D. Chenu, Introduction à l’étude de saint Thomas d’Aquin, op. cit., 70-80. 170 He writes about the article: M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, vol. 1-2, Freiburg im Br. 1909-1922 (disclosing history of the process that led to crystallisation of the final scheme of the scholastic question being a scheme of Thomas’s article). 171 It is believed that Abelard in Sic et Non (Prol., PL 178, 1349 A) used the dialectic consciously as the first one, presenting to consider two different solutions of a defined

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Corpus articuli included positive explanation of the author’s view, being an appropriate answer to the question introducing to the issue. Chenu says that it is determinatio considered always in the term of dispute and made with the appli, , that is the method of clear cation of Aristotle’s method “separation” from each other, and as a result defining various terms, statements and principles173. Premises and conclusion for a particular question should be found in corpus articuli, not in other parts of the article. Therefore, the title question cannot be translated into premises of the demonstration. Difficulties presented in the first part of an article were finishing it. They were not a solution to the raised question. Usually, they introduced some differentiations that were supposed to explain how quoted views of authorities should be understood or from which point of view a given statement should be considered as true174. Comments made here are reflected in the grammar structure of questions “utrum p”. First, these questions (distinctly or indistinctly) occur in the reported speech (oratio obliqua). They are preceded by a sentence, in which the verb quaerere (to search, seek, ask, learn) is the predicate, which clearly indicates separation of the interrogative function and the thing that is asked about – the question. Thomas’s texts about conscience can be the confirmation. We see there the following formulas: “Et primo (secundo etc.) quaeritur, utrum [...]” (De verit.) “Deinde quaeritur de potentiis intellectivis. Circa quod quaeruntur tredecim. Primo (secundo etc.): utrum [...]” (S.th.).

Such main sentences are missing in Scriptum super libros Sententiarum; nevertheless, coniunctivus in inquiries indicates that these are reported questions. Furthermore, these questions begin with the particle utrum, which indicates that we have to do with a compound question175. It requires the second part (in Classical Latin it starts from an). Therefore, we would have to do with alternative questions, whose parts are whether-questions.

172

173 174 175

problem through two contrary “authorities”. See: M.-D. Chenu, Introduction à l’étude de saint Thomas d’Aquin, op. cit., 79. According to Aristotle, dialectic is useful for science due to posing questions, aporia (Top. 101 a 34-37), and due to argumentation, explanation and search for scientific principles (Top. 101 b 1-4). See: T. Kwiatkowski, Dialektyka Arystotelesa, art. cit., 41-42. M.-D. Chenu, Introduction à l’étude de saint Thomas d’Aquin, op. cit., 79-80. See: ibidem, 80-81. See: R. Niemiec, J. Starowicz, Gramatyka języka łacińskiego, vol. 2, Kraków 19482, 116-117.

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According to Aristotle, questions in the form of “utrum p”, not being ques), leading to the knowledge , are not scientions about the cause ( ), tific questions in the strict sense. These are questions about the fact ( is the answer. The structure of these questions indicates to which knowledge that they are dialectical questions. It does not mean that articles of Thomas’s works are not scientific. Questions about the cause are hidden in them in corpus articuli. The answer to them is to justify a choice of one of the alternative's parties indicated by the questions “utrum p”. The aporia solution indicated by the question “utrum p” requires posing further questions. An answer to them is the reason of accepting one or another part of the alternative.

2.2.2. Questions about conscience in particular works of Thomas Aquinas Let us compare the list of basic questions referring to synderesis and conscience, just as they occur in Summa theologiae, Quaestiones disputatae De veritate and Scriptum super libros Sententiarum. As mentioned before, we reverse the sequence of these three treatises, resigning from the chronological order. Our research is not historic-philosophical, while more mature texts are more important for systematic researches.

2.2.2.1. Summa theologiae According to the above-mentioned directive, we start the analysis of questions concerning conscience from Summa theologiae. Questions determining issues raised in particular articles are formulated in it only in introductions to particular problems. Editors added them later to the text as articles’ titles, but slightly rephrased. When it is about question 79., inquiries concerning synderesis and conscience (conscientia) are the following (first, we give them in an expression, in which they occur in the introduction to the question, and then just as they were used as the article’s title): SSThS

CSThS

“[...] utrum synderesis sit aliqua potentia intellectivae partis”. “Utrum synderesis sit quaedam specialis potentia ab aliis distincta.” “[...] utrum conscientia sit aliqua potentia intellectivae partis.” “Utrum conscientia sit quaedam potentia.”

“[...] whether synderesis is a power of the intellectual part.” “Whether synderesis is a special power distinct from the others.” “[...] whether conscience is a power of the intellectual part.” “Whether conscience is a power.”

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Issues determined here by the above-mentioned inquiries are submitted to the superior issue, which is a problem of the intellectual powers. Question 79. titled De potentiis intellectivis is dedicated to it. This submission is clearly marked in the introduction to the issue, where we read: “Deinde quaeritur de potentiis intellectivis. Circa quod quaeruntur tredecim” (The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under whose head there are thirteen points of inquiry). The twelfth and thirteenth issue is the problem of synderesis and conscience. As it results from the above-mentioned comparison, questions formulated more precisely in the introduction to this question define issues that are to be raised in the twelfth and thirteenth article. In Prima secundae, we see the second group of texts of Summa theologiae in which the science about conscience occurs. Question 19. concerns the goodness or malice of the interior act of the will (De bonitate et malitia actus interioris voluntatis), and its ten articles concern factors on which the goodness or malice of the acts of the will depend. Two of these articles are interesting for us: CSthA1

CSthA2

“[...] utrum ratio errans obliget.”

“[...] whether erring reason binds.”

“Utrum voluntas discordans a ratione errante, sit mala.” “[...] utrum voluntas contra legem Dei sequens rationem errantem, sit mala.” “Utrum voluntas concordans rationi erranti, sit bona.”

“Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason?” “[...] whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against the law of God?” “Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason?”

In Prima secundae, question 96, article 4, should also be noticed – it is dedicated to the valid power of human law (De potestate legis humanae): CSthA3

“[...] utrum imponat homini necessitatem quantum ad forum conscientiae.” “Utrum lex humana imponat homini necessitatem in foro conscientiae.”

“[...] whether it [human law] binds man in conscience?" “Whether human law binds a man in conscience?"

2.2.2.2. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate In turn, let us go to basic questions about the synderesis and conscience formulated in Quaestiones disputatae De veritate. There is no dissonance here among questions formulated in the introduction to Question 16 and 17, and titles of particular articles: questions in titles of articles keep phrasings from the introduction to the question. Besides, in the very text of articles, some inquiries are formulated, but here we omit them.

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This is the list of questions concerning synderesis and conscience from issues discussed about the truth: SDVS SDVF SDVP CDVS CDVF CDVA1 CDVA2 CDVA3

“Et primo quaeritur utrum synderesis sit potentia, vel habitus.” “Secundo utrum synderesis possit peccare.” “Tertio utrum synderesis in aliquo extinguatur.” “Et primo quaeritur utrum conscientia sit potentia, vel habitus, vel actus.” “Secundo utrum conscientia possit errare.” “Tertio quaeritur utrum conscientia liget.” “Quarto quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea liget.” “Quinto quaeritur utrum conscientia in indifferentibus plus liget quam praeceptum praelati, vel minus.”

“In the first place we ask: whether synderesis is a power or a habit?” “Secondly, we ask: whether synderesis can err?” “In the third, we ask: whether there are some in whom synderesis is extinguished?” “In the first article we ask: whether conscience is a power, a habit or an act?” “In the second article we ask: whether conscience can be mistaken?” “In the third article we ask, whether conscience binds?” “In the fourth article we ask, whether a false conscience binds?” “In the fifth article we ask, whether conscience in indifferent matters binds more than the command of a superior, or less?”

It should be noticed that in De veritate the problem of conscience, though integrated with the logical structure of this part of Quaestiones disputatae, is treated more independently and comprehensively than in Summa theologiae.

2.2.2.3. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum We said that Thomas included the fundamentals of the science about conscience in Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, Book Two, distinctio XXIV, question 2. in articles 3 and 4. In the context of the first human fall, distinctio XXIV takes up the subject of liberum arbitrium (free choice), while question 2. concerns virtues, habits or powers (virtutes)176 related to free choice. Articles that are interesting for us take up the problem expressed in the following inquiries that are titles of articles: SSentS CSentS

“Utrum synderesis sit habitus, vel po- “Whether synderesis is a habit or power?” tentia.” “Utrum conscientia sit actus.” “Whether conscience is an act?”

176 Occurrence of the term virtus in this context indicates the formation of Latin terminology in Thomas's works.

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Book two, distinctio XXXIX, question 3. is another place where the problem of conscience is taken up more broadly in Scriptum super libros Sententiarum. This book concerns the superior spark of reason (superior scintilla rationis), as Thomas calls synderesis. Another three articles take up the following issues: SSentW CSentF

„Utrum superior scintilla rationis possit extingui.” “Supposito quod non extinguatur, utrum conscientia possit errare.”

CSentA1

“Utrum conscientia errans liget.”

“Whether the superior spark of reason can be extinguished?” “Assuming that it cannot be extinguished, whether conscience can err [can be mistaken]?” “Whether a false conscience binds?”

In addition, Book four discusses conscience. Distinctio IX concerns use of the sacrament of the Eucharist, while question 1. where the article in question is present – receiving Christ’s body. The issue of article 3. has been formulated in the following way: CSentA2

“Utrum peccet quis cum conscientia “Whether one errs who receives Christ's peccati mortalis corpus Christi man- body with the consciousness (conscientia) ducans.” of the mortal sin?”

2.2.3. Typology of Thomas’s questions about conscience Above we list the questions about conscience in the way they occur in each of Thomas’s works that is interesting for us, providing it with a symbol. There are 19 questions. They all are titles of articles, while in Summa theologiae (Sth) inquiries that are titles of articles differ slightly from inquiries in the introduction to a given question. In Quaestiones disputatae De veritate (DV), this difference almost does not occur, while in Scriptum super libros Sententiarum (Sent), when it comes to places interesting for us, inquiries are only titles of articles. Symbols applied to designate particular inquiries concerning conscience indicate that they may be grouped, having regard to the question's subject: synderesis (S) or conscience (C), as well as – the following issue: their place in the human ontic structure or – maybe better – their kind of being (S), their functioning (F), properties (P) and action by conscience or contrary to it (A). The outlined typology of Thomas’s questions about conscience emphasises issues raised by Aquinas and discloses assumptions adopted by him. Analysis of these questions with regard to three conditions of posing them: i.e. correctness, accuracy and legitimacy, is to help with disclosure of initial data. After Stępień, we understand these conditions as follows: 1. a correct question is a sensible and unambiguous

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question; 2. an accurate question is a question whose assumptions are true or – speaking differently – which does not have false assumptions or leading to false or senseless consequences; 3. a legitimate question is a question that has at least two sensible answers or sufficient reason of posing it in the form of justified doubt177.

2.2.3.1. Questions about synderesis Thomas poses six questions concerning synderesis in his works: about the place of synderesis in the human ontic structure or about its kind of being (3), about the functioning of synderesis (1) and its properties (2). 2.2.3.1.1. Question about the kind of being of synderesis The question about the place of synderesis in the human ontic structure occurs in all three works by Aquinas and is the basic question related to synderesis. It may be interpreted also as a question about the kind of being of synderesis, because the structure of being is determined by the kinds of being of its elements178. In spite of a difference of phrasing, questions SSThS, SDVS and SSentS can be reduced to the question SS: utrum synderesis sit potentia, vel habitus (whether synderesis is a power or a habit?). According to what we have already said, this is a dialectical question indicating the existing aporia. In Aristotle’s terminology, it would be a question about the ge). Predicables indicated by the terms: potentia or habitus, are not connus ( vertible with the question’s subject – synderesis, and this is stated substantially about many things of a different kind. Let us remember that eventually Aristotle considered all four predicables determining the kind of questions, the definitional terms, and inquiries relevant to them – questions of sameness and difference. Thus, definition by genera179 constitutes an expected answer to the question SS. – The known of question SS includes: the term synderesis and the following terms: potentia and habitus180, as well as real existence of these terms' designatum181. 177 A.B. Stępień, O metodzie teorii poznania, op. cit., 37-42, especially 41. 178 See: 3.1.1. this work. 179 14 types of definitions discussed by Aristotle are mentioned. About definition by genera, see: Met. 998 b. 180 Further analysis of the science about conscience by Thomas Aquinas discloses also other assumptions that cannot be read from the questions themselves, e.g. theory of functioning of the intellectual powers. 181 For Aristotle, actuality of the term designatum is the necessary condition of any definition (real and nominal), which in the basic sense belongs only to substances. Post. An.,

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Genus, to which synderesis is subject, is the unknown of question SS: whether it is a power or a habit or differently – whether it exists as a power or as a habit. The assumption of question SS is as follows: (1) synderesis in the human ontic structure is either a power or a habit; (2) sentences: “synderesis is a power” and “synderesis is a habit” are doubtful. The reason of question SS is the need of overcoming doubts concerning the place of synderesis in the human ontic structure or concerning a kind of its being (overcoming the aporia)182. Therefore, question SS is a correct, accurate and legitimate inquiry.

2.2.3.1.2. Question about functioning of synderesis We see the question about functioning of synderesis, which is the title of a separate article, only in De veritate. This question has the following sound: utrum synderesis possit peccare (whether synderesis can err [peccare]183) and it is the title of the second article of the question concerning synderesis. This question is marked with the symbol SDVF that can be reduced (omitting the place of this question’s occurrence) to SF. – The known of question SF includes: the term synderesis and the term peccare (thus, it is about a feature of functioning of synderesis, i.e. its erring or being mistaken). – The unknown of the question SF is the possibility of erring (being mistaken) by synderesis. – The assumption of question SF is as follows: (1) the fact of errors in the judgement of actions; (2) sentence: “synderesis can err” is doubtful. – The reason of question SF is the need of overcoming doubts concerning the possibility that synderesis errs (overcoming the aporia). Therefore, question SF is a correct, accurate and legitimate inquiry. It is a question about property ( ) – it is stated convertibly about the subject but it does not disclose the thing’s essence, only belongs to that thing. Knowledge ac. quired in this way is knowledge

92 b 5-8. 93 a 25-28. T. Kwiatkowski takes up the subject of actuality of the definition’s subject, Kilka uwag na temat teorii definicji, art. cit., 89-107. 182 Overcoming the aporia is a constant component of Thomas’s questions about conscience. 183 Peccare means also: to be mistaken. It is worth thinking about why Thomas uses the verb errare when posing a similar question regarding conscience (conscientia).

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2.2.3.1.3. Question about properties of synderesis Questions SSentP and SDVP are inquiries about properties of synderesis. They differ with the subject (in SSentP, superior scintilla rationis occurs – superior spark of reason, while in SDVP – synderesis), as well as with that SSentP concerns possibility, while SDVP – fact. It does not seem that these differences should be much emphasised. In Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, Thomas uses the expression scintilla rationis interchangeably with synderesis184, while beyond this comment the expression scintilla rationis occurs only in De veritate185. Phrasings: possit extingui and in aliquo extinguatur can be considered equivalent. Therefore – without damage to the content – SP can be adopted in the phrasing from De veritate (later phrasing): utrum synderesis in aliquo extinguatur (whether there are some in whom synderesis is extinguished?). – The known of question SP includes: the term synderesis and the term extinguere. This question concerns one property of synderesis – its permanence or impermanence. – The unknown of question SP is the possibility or fact of extinguishing synderesis. – The assumption of question SP is as follows: (1) the possibility or impossibility of extinguishing synderesis; (2) sentence: “synderesis is extinguished in something” is doubtful. – The reason of question SP is the need of overcoming doubts concerning the possibility of extinguishing synderesis (overcoming the aporia). The question SP is a correct, accurate and legitimate inquiry about the prop. erty just like SF. Acquired knowledge is knowledge

2.2.3.2. Questions about conscience (conscientia) In Aquinas’s works, 13 questions which are titles of articles concern conscience (conscientia). These are questions about the place of conscience in the human 184 Thomas writes even directly: “quod haec superior rationis scintilla quae synderesis est […].” In II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 1. c. 185 In Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, the expression scintilla rationis is used 17 times, while synderesis – 61 times. The first of them appears one more time in De veritate q. 17, a. 2, ad 3, where Thomas explains: “Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut scintilla est id quod purius est de igne, et quod supervolat toti igni, ita synderesis est illud quod supremum in conscientiae iudicio reperitur; et secundum hanc metaphoram synderesis scintilla conscientiae dicitur. Neque oportet propter hoc ut in omnibus aliis se habeat synderesis ad conscientiam sicut scintilla ad ignem. Et tamen in igne materiali aliquis modus accidit igni propter admixtionem ad materiam alienam, qui non accidit scintillae ratione suae puritatis […].”

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ontic structure or about its kind of being (3), about functioning of conscience (2) and action by conscience or contrary to it (8). 2.2.3.2.1. Question about the kind of being of conscience Similarly to synderesis, the question about the place of conscience in the human ontic structure or the kind of being of conscience occurs in all three works by Aquinas. It is a basic question concerning conscience. Differences among questions CSThS, CDVS and CSentS can be reduced to the difference of phrasing. C DVS reflects the concerned problem at the fullest: utrum conscientia sit potentia, vel habitus, vel actus (whether conscience is a power, a habit, or an act?), and this question will be marked with the abbreviation CS. Question CS is of the same type as question SS – it is a question about genus ). ( – The known of question CS includes: the term conscientia and the following terms: potentia, habitus and actus, as well as real existence of these terms' designatum. – The unknown of question CS is the kind to which conscience is subject – to be more specific: its place in the human ontic structure or the kind of being of conscience. – The assumptions of question CS are as follows: (1) conscience is a power, a habit or an act; (2) sentences: “conscience is a power”, “conscience is a habit” and “conscience is an act” – are doubtful. – The reason of question CS is the need of overcoming doubts concerning the place of conscience in the human ontic structure or conscience’s kind of being (overcoming the aporia). Therefore, question CS is a correct, accurate and legitimate inquiry. 2.2.3.2.2. Question about functioning of conscience Questions about functioning of conscience, which is the title of separate article, occur in De veritate and Scriptum super libros Sententiarum. These are questions: CDVF and CSentF. In both, a significant part is the same: utrum conscientia possit errare (whether conscience can be mistaken?) – and it will be marked with the symbol CF. However, it cannot be overlooked that CF in CSentF is preceded with the conditional: supposito quod [superior scintilla rationis] non extinguatur (assuming that [the superior spark of reason] cannot be extinguished), which is a direct reference to the answer to SSentW.

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The known of question CF includes: the term conscientia and the term errare (analogously to question SF, it is about a feature of conscience's functioning, its erring). The unknown of question CF is the possibility that conscience errs. Assumptions of question CF include: (1) the possibility of erring or nonerring by conscience; (2) sentence: “conscience can err” is doubtful. The reason of question CF is the need of overcoming doubts concerning the possibility of erring by conscience (overcoming the aporia). This question . leads to knowledge

2.2.3.2.3. Questions about action by judgement of conscience Questions about action by judgement of conscience constitute the third type of inquiries concerning conscience. There are eight of them: three each in Summa theologiae and in De veritate plus two in the commentary on the Sentences. The basic question for the question of action by conscience or contrary to it appears only in De veritate. It is the question CDVA1 and it concerns the relation of conscience to action in general. Let us mark it with the symbol C AC. It has the following sound: utrum conscientia liget (whether conscience binds?). – The known of question CAC includes: the term conscientia and the term ligare. – The unknown of question CAC is the validity of conscience. – Assumptions of the question CAC include: (1) conscience binds or does not bind; (2) the sentence: “conscience binds” is doubtful. – The reason of the question CAC is the need of overcoming doubts concerning the validity of conscience. As a question about a property of conscience, it . leads to knowledge For Thomas, the next question belonging to the type CA was more important. It occurs in all three works. If the introduction to Question 19. Prima secundae is also considered, it has four quite different phrasings. These are the following questions: CSthA1, CDVA2 and CSentA1. None of them asks about the validity of conscience in general, as was the case in CAC, but about the validity of false or erring conscience (conscientia erronea or conscientia errans) – thus, we should use the symbol CACe. The following model phrasing of this question can be found in De veritate: utrum conscientia erronea liget (whether a false conscience binds?). – The known of question CACe includes: the term conscientia erronea and the term ligare. The occurrence of conscientia erronea as the known is significant for us. – The unknown of question CACe, its assumptions and reason of posing it are similar as in CAC.

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Another three questions concern the validity of conscience with regard to its relation to law (lex). One of them concerns the relation to the law of God (CSthA2), while two others – the relation to human law (CSthA3 andCDVA3). Question CSthA2 can be rephrased in the following way: utrum conscientia erronea, contra legem Dei, liget (whether conscience against the law of God binds). This question may be marked with the symbol CACe-LD. With such a rephrased question, its known includes the inconsistency between conscience and the law of God. We already know other conditions of posing this question from analyses of previous questions. In addition, the next two questions concerning the relation of conscience to human law may be rephrased as follows: utrum conscientia erronea, contra legem humanam, liget (whether conscience against human law binds). According to our convention, these questions can be marked with the symbol C ACe-Lh. The known significant for us but not found in previous analyses is the occurrence of inconsistency between conscience and human law. However, it should be emphasised that Thomas’s phrasings differ from the model phrasing that we have proposed. Therefore: CSthA3 sounds as follows: utrum imponat homini necessitatem quantum ad forum conscientiae (whether [human law] binds a man in conscience?), while CDVA3 – utrum conscientia in indifferentibus plus liget quam praeceptum praelati, vel minus (whether conscience in indifferent matters binds more than the command of a superior, or less?). The last of questions regarding actions by conscience or contrary to it concern a specific action, namely: receiving Holy Communion. This question (CSentA2) has the following sound: Utrum peccet quis cum conscientia peccati mortalis corpus Christi manducans (whether one who receives Christ’s body with the consciousness of mortal sin errs?). Here, we shall not analyse this question because it is not significant for us. However, it should be emphasised that, contrary to other questions in type CA, in the question CSentA2 Thomas means a specific act, that is, receiving Holy Communion, which could be marked with the symbol CACC. In this case, conscientia should be translated as “consciousness” instead of “conscience”, which indicates the difficulties with translation of a Latin term.

2.3. Summary Analysis of Thomas’s questions about conscience has opened the path to his science about conscience in two ways: it has given a research tool and revealed the structure of the examined science to some extent.

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The outline of the theory of questions by Aristotle and Thomas confirms their significant role in cognition, acknowledged today by numerous researchers. In addition, the parallelism of the theory of questions, theory of cognition and theory of knowledge is manifested. Particular attention should be drawn to the indication of logical dependence of some questions on other questions, their reducibility and type of acquired knowledge determined by the type of inquiries and ). While assigning the status of strictly scientific knowledge only ( to knowledge , Aristotle and Thomas after him acknowledge that it is . While developing Aristotle’s theory of questions, based on knowledge Thomas includes questions about existential causes of being and a real demonstration in the area of science. and is manifested in a scholastic question A relation of knowledge “utrum p”, which introduces to a question (quaestio) taken up in particular articles of Medieval summas and disputes. This inquiry is rhetorical and dialectical, on its own. Strictly scientific demonstration in thus it leads to knowledge Aristotle’s sense should be expected in argumentation for one of the sides of the alternative, indicated by the question “utrum p”, whose demonstration should be in corpus articuli. Thus, demonstrative knowledge is related to rhetoric and dialectic, while a discourse (disputatio) becomes a proper space for resolving doubts and finding out truth. The analysis of particular questions about conscience has enabled establishing issues taken up by Aquinas and indicates assumptions that he adopted. Having regard to synderesis, these issues include: the kind of being of synderesis, thus – its place in the human ontic structure (of a rational soul), way of functioning of synderesis (its sinfulness or non-sinfulness) and its properties (permanence). Doubts (the reason of posing these questions) and their assumptions are based on previous knowledge about synderesis, knowledge about its fact and functioning, as well as on anthropological (metaphysical) knowledge about the structure and functioning of the human mind, rational soul and a human being as psychophysical compositum. Having regard to conscience (conscientia), Thomas is occupied with three questions: the kind of being of conscience and its place in the human ontic structure, the way of functioning of conscience (its erring), as well as the significance of conscience for human actions. These issues (questions) have arisen based on previous knowledge about the fact and functioning of conscience, errors in conscience’s judgements and about a connection (relation) between conscience and action. Similarly to the case of synderesis, Thomas relies on human metaphysics while solving issues of interest to him. Therefore, putting it in the most general way, issues of synderesis and conscience mentioned in Aquinas’s work originate both from the experience of synderesis

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and conscience, that is, direct cognition of defined facts, and from the system of human metaphysics. Let us add that issues indicated by the above-analysed questions belong to three philosophical disciplines: metaphysics (issues indicated by questions S S, SP, CS), theory of cognition (issues indicated by questions SF, CF) and ethics (issues indicated by questions CAC, CACe, CACe-LD, CACe-Lh). The issue indicated by the question CACC belongs to moral theology.

Chapter Three Thomas Aquinas’s Teaching on Conscience

Our analysis of Aquinas’s questions regarding conscience revealed that they presuppose awareness of the existence and functioning of synderesis and conscience, as well as a specific theory of man, a theory of the intellective soul and of the mind. The doctrine on conscience which we find in the three works of interest to us is to reveal that which is given (phenomenological knowledge) and that which constitutes the metaphysical explanation of these givens (metaphysical knowledge). Proceeding in accordance with the adopted methodology, i.e. recognising the Summa Theologiae as the Angelic Doctor’s most mature work, whilst discerning a similarity and complementarity in the arguments presented in the three works, we shall give the Summa priority in our analysis of conscience.

3.1. Synderesis 3.1.1. Synderesis as a natural habit The basic question about synderesis186 is concerned with its mode of being or its place within the structure of man, or more precisely – the soul (SS). To this question, all three of the texts under analysis give the same answer: synderesis is a habit. However, the path that leads to this answer is not in all cases identical. In order to elucidate why this is so, we must first make a few introductory remarks. In defining the problem circumscribed by question S S (as well as question S C ) we are alternately talking about the type of being synderesis (conscience) is, or about its place in the structure of man (the human soul). This apparent indecision stems from the fact that according to the Peripatetic tradition, it is appropri-

186 In English-language translations of Thomas Aquinas and Thomistic works the term synderesis, as a rule, is not translated, although sometimes spelled synteresis. Polish translators and Thomists on the other hand have coined various translations of it. One of the more interesting is that proposed by S. Świeżawski, who translates “synderesis” as “prasumienie” (proto-conscience), thus emphasising the connection between synderesis and conscientia (conscience).

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ate to distinguish between structure and mode of being; ontological structure is defined by the nature of the components. Following Aristotle, Thomas counts the human soul among intellectual beings (intellectualia) and, as capable of intellectual cognition, sometimes refers to it as intellect or mind. The soul is the subject of intellectual life, which includes cognitive and appetitive acts. It acts by intellectual powers (potentialities – potentiae intellectivae), which are its properties (proprietates). These include two distinct cognitive powers (intellectus passivus and intellectus agens), and the appetitive power (voluntas). These powers are all endowed with habits or dispositions (habitus) proper unto themselves, as well as virtues (virtutes). Due to its functions187, the intellect is variously called memory (since it stores forms of knowledge, species), intellect (because it knows things intuitively, perceiving them without a process of reasoning; it forms concepts – simplex apprehensio – and judgments by composing and dividing – compositio or divisio) or yet reason (if it knows something by a process of reasoning, departing from premises and arriving at a conclusion). It is also called higher reason (if it reflects on the Divine) or lower reason (if it concerns itself with temporal life). If it is aimed at knowledge for the sake of knowledge it is called theoretical reason, and practical reason if it directs human moral and productive actions188. As that which gets to know the first principles of knowledge and the first principles of action, it is also known as the intellect of first theoretical and practical principles. In order to perform their functions, intellectual powers are endowed with habits and virtues (or faults), which are essentially distinctive dispositions 189. Aquinas describes these as (relatively) stable, and disposing the subject well or ill in respect of itself or something else190. If they are given of nature, and given 187 Because all of these names point to differences in the functioning of the intellectual cognitive power, Krąpiec designated them as the functional names of reason (idem, Psychologia racjonalna, Lublin 1996, 158-160). 188 Aristotle, and following him, Thomas, distinguished three types of human activities ( , actus – in one of the senses of these terms): , and . To these three types of activity correspond three types of knowledge, but in this respect only two types of intellect are distinguished, namely (or ) and . Cf. J. Kalinowski, Teoria poznania praktycznego, Lublin 1960, 10-17. 189 On the subject of habits and virtues, see S.th., I-II, q. 49-70; De verit., q. 20, a. 2, c. 190 Cf. S.th., I-II, q. 49, a. 1-4. In these articles, we come across such definitions of habit as: “[...] habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti [...]” (S.th., I-II, q. 49, a. 1, c; cf. Met., 1022 b 4-5); “[habitus] est dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male. [...] habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male” (S.th., I-II, q. 49, a. 2, c; cf. Met., 1022 b 10-11; Nic. Et., 1105 b 25-28); “[...] habitus est quo aliqid agitur cum opus est” (S.th., I-II, q. 49, a. 3, sc., cf. De bono

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always, they are natural habits191. As permanent dispositions of the intellectual powers – which are their subject – the habits relate to the activity of a given power. And so, for instance, presiding over theoretical knowledge is: the habit of the first principles of knowledge (intellectus principiorum), wisdom (sapientia) and science (scientia), while presiding over practical knowledge are: the habit of the first principles of action (synderesis) and the habit of art (ars). Strictly speaking, the latter is subordinated to poetical knowledge; however, both Aristotle and Thomas equate this with practical knowledge192. Prudence, the first of the four cardinal virtues, is a virtue of the practical intellect, while the remaining three: justice, temperance and fortitude, are virtues of will. Keeping in mind all that we have said so far, let us return to the argumentation presented in all three of Thomas’s works in support of the thesis that synderesis is a natural habit.

3.1.1.1. Summa theologiae In the Summa theologiae, the statement that synderesis is a habit, is found in the corpus articuli: “Respondeo dicendum quod synderesis non est potentia, sed habitus [...] sed habitus naturalis” – “synderesis is not a power but a habit [...] a natural habit”193. It is the answer to a question which does not – neither in the introduction to question 79, nor as the title of article 12 – contain the term habitus194. This answer is, by all indications, the conclusion of a sequence of syllo-

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coniugali, c. 21); “[...] habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit” (S.th., I-II, q. 49, a. 3, sc., cf. Averroes, In III De anima, c. 18). In his teaching on habits, Aquinas explains that a habit can be natural in respect of universal nature or in respect of individual nature; that the natural habits proper to man come from nature only in part, and partly from an extrinsic principle; that the intellectual cognitive powers contain the seeds of the habit of understanding (the habit of the first principles of knowledge), while the intellectual appetitive powers are only invested with general principles of conduct, which are sometimes called “nurseries of virtue”. S.th., I-II, q. 51, a. 1, c. In many places Aquinas indicates that what is said of practical cognition is equally true of conduct and of art (tam in moralibus quam in artificialibus), with only one exception: in matters of art, reason is directed to a particular end, which is something of its own devising, while in matters of morality, it is directed to the general end of all human life. S.th., I-II, q. 21, a. 2, ad 2. S.th., I, q. 79, a. 12, c. It should be noted that unlike in the other works, in the Summa, question SSThS, Aquinas does not explicitly state what could be an alternative to synderesis as a power.

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gisms, a sequence in which the conclusion of the preceding syllogism becomes one of the premises of the syllogism following195. The point of departure for syllogism I is the acknowledgement that there exists a reasoning proper to practical reason, analogous to the reasoning of theoretical reason. This would be tantamount to stating a fact. Reasoning is here understood as movement (motus), which in the Aristotelian tradition is not a complete being, but a way toward being. Its existence is suspended, as it were, between pure potentiality and pure act. In order to exist, reasoning must depart from something and be directed to something that is not, as such, reasoning196. The basis of reasoning has to be firm and certain if its conclusions are also to be certain. To Aristotle, and following him, also to Thomas, it is clear that all reasoning must be founded on intellectual knowledge of first principles, which are known to us by nature, without rational investigation, and that it must lead to an intellectual grasp of the conclusion197. Thus, departing from the acknowledge195 Article 12, question 79 in the Summa theologiae offers a model example of the Aristotelian theory that scientific deduction does not stop short at one syllogism, but forms a chain of syllogistic reasoning; it is a deductive reasoning in which the conclusion of the first syllogism becomes the major or minor premise of the second syllogism etc. (cf. Post. An. 77 b 3 et seq. 78 a 14 et seq.). The theory of the “syllogistic chain” is incorporated by Thomas Aquinas, something remarked on by M. A. Krąpiec (cf. M.A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, op. cit., p. 224). 196 Cf. what has been said above of syllogistic questions and the premises of syllogisms. 197 The following explanation is given by Thomas in S.th., I, q. 79, a. 12 c: “Ad huius autem evidentiam, considerandum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, ratiocinatio hominis cum sit quidam motus, ab intellectu progreditur aliquorum, scilicet naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationis, sicut a quodam principio immobili: et ad intellectum etiam terminatur, inquantum iudicamus per principia per se naturaliter nota, de his quae ratiocinando invenimus. Constat autem quod, sicut ratio speculativa ratiocinatur de speculativus, ita ratio practica ratiocinatur de operabilibus”. One should hasten to add three explanations: 1. In spite of the different formulations we encounter in Aquinas’s works, first principles should not be understood as something innate, inborn or embraced blindly, but as necessarily (although not thematically) known along with one’s first knowledge of being. 2. For this reason, first principles are sometimes considered analytically obvious; however, the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of analyticity differs from the modern notion. Broadly speaking, in contemporary philosophy an analytic proposition is one whose logical value can be determined based on knowledge of language alone. In the Peripatetic tradition, an analytic proposition is predicated based on knowledge of the essence of an existing thing. 3. A habit, in other words a disposition to know first principles, should be clearly distinguished from the actual recognition of principles by a real subject as analytically evident in the Aristotelian sense. The habit as such belongs to every man, and every man grasps these principles non-thematically. However, to get to know them actually one needs philosophical knowledge (pre-

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ment of the existence of a form of reasoning proper to practical reason and to the knowledge of its nature, syllogism I would take the following form: Premise 1.

The reasoning (ratiocinatio) of practical reason is (in principle) the same as the reasoning of theoretical reason.

Premise 2.

Theoretical reason, in the act of reasoning, departs from the intellectual knowledge of something (ab intellectu progreditur aliquorum) known by nature, without investigation by reason, and attains intellectual cognition.

Conclusion I: It is therefore necessary (oportet198) that just as speculative principles (principia speculabilium)199 do, so should practical principles (principia operabilium) belong to us by nature or – more precisely – be given to us naturally (naturaliter nobis esse indita). The conclusion of syllogism I becomes the premise of syllogism II, which can then be presented as follows: Premise 1.

Practical principles are of the same nature as speculative principles.

Premise 2.

That which is of the same nature should, within the structure of the soul, occupy the same place (should have the same mode of being).

Hence conclusion II: Practical principles should have the same place within the structure of the soul (have the same mode of being) as speculative principles. Syllogism III takes up the conclusion of syllogism II as its first premise: Premise 1.

Practical principles have the same place within the structure of the soul (have the same mode of being) as speculative principles.

scientific or scientific). Cf. M. Gogacz, Elementarz metafizyki, op. cit., 41-42; S. Kamiński, Czym są w filozofii i w logice tzw. pierwsze zasady?, RF 11 (1963) 1, 5-23; J. Kalinowski, Teoria poznania praktycznego, op. cit., 73. 91. 93; M.A. Krąpiec, Realizm ludzkiego poznania, op. cit., 229-243; S. Swieżawski, Istnienie i tajemnica, Lublin 1993, 83-97. 198 Although sometimes translated as “it is fitting”, oportet (oportere) indicates necessity. The conclusion thus asserts the necessity for man to have an intuitive view of things, differing from angelic cognition in that it involves the senses. 199 The Latin term principium means: “that which is first” in a specific order. It is the equivalent of the Greek , which Aristotle understood as “that out of which” ( ) all being, becoming or knowledge cognition comes (Met., 1012 b 34 – 1013 a 23): the point of origin, the fundamental and immanent component of things (material cause), the cause that sets something in motion (efficient cause), as well as the formal and final cause, and the principles of knowledge from which various truths can be derived.

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Speculative principles belonging to us by nature do not belong to any distinct power, but to a habit (they exist as a habit) which we call, after Aristotle, the intellect of first principles (intellectus principiorum).

Conclusion III: Synderesis is not a power, but a habit. Subjecting the above reasoning to closer logical scrutiny we will notice that none of the syllogisms in it is a classical Aristotelian syllogism. The premises of these syllogisms are formulated in a metalanguage and not in an object language. Moreover, in the first premises of all three syllogisms an analogy is seen to exist between the reasoning of practical reason and the reasoning of speculative reason (syllogism I), and between practical principles and theoretical principles (syllogism II and III), whilst the one term is not predicated of the other200. Doubtless the premises could be reformulated so as to bring to light this function of predicating one term of the other. This is not necessary for our analysis, and we do not have to submit the above sequence to a detailed logical analysis. It will suffice if it serves to illustrate the observation made above – that Aquinas’s investigative practice was in greater measure determined by the object of investigation than by observing the strict rules of deduction201. It seems, however, that in light of Aristotle’s definition of the syllogism in the Topics, and the linguistic habits of scholastic and neo-scholastic philosophers, the above reasoning can be described as syllogistic in the broad sense of the term. What is more important for us is that to Aquinas the above, formally correct syllogistic reasoning is insufficient for the conclusion that synderesis is a natural habit. In the end, the truth of the conclusion seems to follow from the fact that it explains prior knowledge about the functioning of synderesis: that which is given before all theory. This is evidenced by the final sentences of the corpus articuli. “Unde et synderesis dicitur instigare ad bonum, et murmurare de malo, inquantum per prima principia procedimus ad inveniendum, et iudicamus inventa. Patet ergo quod synderesis non est potentia sed habitus naturalis”.

“Whence »synderesis« is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that »synderesis« is not a power, but a natural habit”.

200 Cf. W. Suchoń, Sylogistyka. Interpretacja zakresowa, Kraków 1996, especially:134140. 201 The proofs that one actually encounters in the philosophy of being, chiefly those from Aquinas’s works, are analysed by Krąpiec in: M.A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, op. cit., 233244. In this work, Kamiński also writes of deduction in the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas (355-363).

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The statement that synderesis “is said to incite to good and to murmur at evil” is introduced by the verb dicitur, which indicates that the statement is not the outcome of the argument just formulated, but founded on prior, common knowledge, obtained through dialectic. The sequence of syllogisms, the outline of which we presented, merely explains that which is given at the beginning, and which is stated in the cited sentence. This would amount to an interpretation of states of affairs based on a previously formed, legitimate concept of being as being (being as existent), something that Krąpiec and Kamiński have found to be one of the two characteristic traits (the other being historicism) of the demonstrative line of reasoning proper to the philosophy of being202. The sequence of syllogisms employed by Thomas in the Summa to demonstrate that synderesis is a natural habit would support Kamiński’s thesis that “The syllogistic deductive form, which proofs in metaphysics usually take, turns out to be merely superficial. The syllogism is usually only an auxiliary device, employed in the analytical exposure of the thesis being proved, and not the basis of its formal and deductive proof”203. But let us return to the text of the Summa. The argument contained in the corpus articuli that synderesis is a natural habit is reaffirmed in the sed contra where Aquinas references the nature of a power (metaphysical knowledge) and indicates that the functioning of synderesis is not consistent with the principles by which a power operates204. Here we have an indirect proof of the thesis: synderesis is not a power, although, as the final part of the corpus articuli suggests, prior phenomenological knowledge about the functioning of synderesis is presumed. The full text of the sed contra is as follows: “Sed contra, potentiae rationales se habent “According to the Philosopher »rational ad opposita, secundum Philosophum. Syn- powers regard opposite things«. But »synderesis autem non se habent ad opposita, sed deresis« does not regard opposites, but inad bonum tantum inclinat. Ergo synderesis clines to good only. Therefore »synderesis« non est potentia. Si enim esset potentia, is not a power. For if it were a power it oporteret quod esset rationalis potentia: non would be a rational power, since it is not enim invenitur in brutis”. found in brute animals”.

202 Ibid., 245. Cf. ibid., 362-363, 365-388. 203 Ibid., 363. 204 For Aquinas power is a potentiality (potentia) realized in an act (actus) proper unto itself. A habit, on the other hand, although it is not an act, is not a potentiality either, but a certain perfection (perfectio), an accidental form guiding the action of a power according to its nature. It is thanks to a habit that a power, whose action is not predestined to one course, becomes inclined to a specific (good or evil) action. Cf. S.th., I-II, q. 49, a. 4; q. 50, a. 27; q. 54, a. 2.

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For a complete understanding of the teaching on synderesis found in article 12 we must also examine the answer to difficulty 3. Here Thomas refers to Augustine’s De Trinitate205, observing that the first principles of action are unchanging rational rules or rational motives (rationes) concerning which one cannot err. These belong to reason as a power and to synderesis as a habit. We naturally judge both by reason and by synderesis206. This teaching on synderesis as a natural practical habit should be examined alongside secondary texts concerning natural law and the virtues. Aquinas makes a clear distinction between natural law and synderesis as a habit, demonstrating that synderesis as a law of our intellect (lex intellectus nostri) encompasses natural law, whose many precepts (praecepta) are the first principles of human action. Natural law is therefore not a habit in the proper sense. It may only be called one sensu largo, as that which owes its being to synderesis and which, as such, is encompassed by it207. Differentiating intellectual habits and virtues from virtues of will (moral virtues), Aquinas will indicate that synderesis, as a habit of practical reason, furnishes moral virtues, and therefore also actions, with ends (fines). Meanwhile the virtue of prudence (prudentia), moved by synderesis, merely supplies moral virtues with the means to an end208. In other words: the principles of action inscribed in synderesis indicate to man the ultimate goal of his actions.

205 De Trin. 12, 2. 206 “Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi incommutabiles rationes sunt prima principia operabilium, circa quae non contingit errare; et attribuuntur rationi sicut potentiae, et synderesi sicut habitui. Unde et utroque, scilicet ratione et synderesi, naturaliter iudicamus”. S.th., I, q. 79, a. 12, ad 3. 207 S.th., I-II, q. 90, a. 1; cf. S.th., I-II, q. 90, a. 2. On the classical understanding of natural law see for example J. de Finance, Éthique générale, Roma 1966, 235-307; G. Kalinowski, Initiation à la philosophie morale, Paris 1966, 103-156; M.A. Krąpiec, Człowiek i prawo naturalne, Lublin 19933; J.P. Reilly, St. Thomas on Law, Toronto 1990; T. Styczeń, Problem poznania prawa naturalnego, STV 6 (1968) 1, 121-170; A. Szostek, Natura, rozum, wolność. Filozoficzna analiza koncepcji twórczego rozumu we współczesnej teologii moralnej, Lublin 1990, 28-38; T. Ślipko, Problem stabilności prawa naturalnego, w: M. Szyszkowska, Powrót do prawa ponadustawowego, Warszawa 1999, 79-106; idem, Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit., 277-328; W. Urmanowicz, Zasięg prawa naturalnego w nauce św. Tomasza z Akwinu, CT 28 (1975) 3, 393-427; H. Waśkiewicz, Powszechność prawa naturalnego, SPCh 4 (1968) 1, 119-134. 208 S.th., II-II, q. 47, a. 6.

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3.1.1.2. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate Thomas’s reflection on synderesis as a habit is not as lucid in the Quaestiones disputatae De veritate as it is in the Summa Theologiae. Let me say that we are here concerned with article 1 of question 16. The point of departure for the argument in the corpus articuli is not fact, but the theory of participation found in the doctrine of Pseudo-Dionysius, expressed in the statement that divine wisdom joins the ends of nobler things with the beginnings of lesser things 209. This truth insofar as angels and human souls – given their natural way of knowing things – are concerned210, is expressed by Thomas as follows: Premise 1.

The natural and proper manner (modus cognoscendi) of knowing for an angelic nature is to know truth (veritatem cognoscat) without investigation or movement of reason (sine inquisitione et discursu)211.

Premise 2.

But it is proper to human nature to reach the knowledge of truth by investigating and moving from one thing to another.

Premise 3.

Hence, the human soul, according to that which is highest in it, attains to that which is proper to angelic nature, so that it knows some things at once and without investigation, however – Thomas adds – even in this case one cannot know the truth without receiving something from sense212.

Premise 4.

In angelic nature we encounter a double knowledge: speculative (speculativa) which beholds (intuetur) the truth of things simply and absolutely, and practical (practica) which directs action.

Conclusion: It is therefore necessary (oportet) that human nature, inasmuch as it attains to angelic nature, be capable of knowing the truth without investigation, both in speculative and practical matters. What the conclusion states is that man needs to behold or contemplate things intuitively, this grasp being different from angelic cognition in that it involves

209 Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, De divins nominibus, PG 3, 872 B. 210 Aquinas is referring to human nature as such, and not only man’s present condition following his fall. Hence both the habit of the first principles of action and synderesis belong to every man, including the first parents. Cf. De verit., q. 18, a. 6, sc. 5. 211 I wish to bring attention to the change of terminology regarding the knowledge of first principles. In the Summa its derivative basis is the verb intelligere. In De veritate – cognoscere. 212 This statement will return in Aquinas’s writings on conscience. It should be interpreted in the spirit of genetic empiricism and the psychophysical unity of man.

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the senses. This thesis follows from four truths regarding the nature of angelic cognition, the connection of higher things with lower, the fact of human intuitive cognition and the double nature of angelic knowledge (speculative and practical). The reasoning performed would therefore be a complex syllogism. The subsequent course of Thomas’s argument in corpus articuli 1 (question 16) constitutes a reply to the following questions, not formulated by Aquinas: 1. If it is necessary for human nature to be endowed with intuitive knowledge of truths in speculative and practical matters, then what type of truths should these be?; 2. What is the provenance of these truths? Thomas’s answer to question 1 goes as follows: it is necessary that the knowledge (cognitio) in question be the principle (principium) of all knowledge that follows, whether speculative or practical, because it is more stable and certain. To question 2, he answers that this type of knowledge must belong to man by nature because it is, as it were, the seed plot (seminarium) of all the knowledge that follows213. This knowledge must also be habitual so that it can readily be used whenever necessary214. Again Aquinas reasons per analogiam: just as there is, in the soul, a natural habit which knows the principles of speculative science (known as the intellect of first principles), so there is in the soul a certain natural habit of the first principles of action, which are the universal principles of natural law (and this, precisely, is what synderesis is). It is an intellectual habit, although – as already noted – Thomas does not consider intellect a power different from reason215. This is the course that Aquinas’s reasoning takes in corpus articuli question 16, article 1. However – something Aquinas fully realises – it does not sufficiently substantiate the thesis that synderesis is a habit. The corpus articuli concludes with a sentence in which Aquinas indicates that it needs to be more fully investigated whether the name synderesis designates a natural habit similar to 213 Thomas explains that in all natures natural seeds pre-exist in the action that follows from them and in its effects. 214 “Oportet etiam hanc cognitionem habitualem esse, ut in promptu existat ea uti cum fuerit necesse”. De verit., q. 16, a. 1, c. 215 “Sicut autem animae humanae est quidam habitus naturalis quo principia speculativarum scientiarum cognoscit, quem vocamus intellectum principiorum; ita in ipsa est quidam habitus naturalis primorum principiorum operabilium, quae sunt naturalia [*universalia] principia iuris naturalis; qui quidem habitus ad synderesim pertinet. Hic autem habitus non in alia potentia existit, quam in ratione [*ratio]; nisi forte ponamus intellectum esse potentiam a ratione distinctam, cuius contrarium supra, dictum est” (De verit., q. 16, a. 1, c). This citation is taken from the Marietti edition; given in square brackets and marked with the symbol * are versions from the Leonine edition. On identity between intellect and reason see De verit., q. 15, a. 1.

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the habit of the first principles, or the power of reason itself with such a habit. He also adds that it makes little difference which option is chosen since 1, the doubts raised concern the meaning of the name and not the thing it designates, and 2, the power of reason as such could not be termed synderesis if it was divorced from all habits. For natural knowledge belongs to reason by way of a natural habit, as is evidenced by the understanding of first principles. We do not find an ultimate answer to the question “utrum synderesis sit potentia, vel habitus”, namely that synderesis is a habit, in the corpus articuli of De veritate. What speaks in favour of this is the rejection of the difficulties – 16 arguments positing synderesis as a power – and the support given to the positions articulated in the sed contra. There Aquinas employs indirect proof. And so: 1. admitting, as a hypothesis, that synderesis is a power, one would have to admit that it is a power of reason (potentia rationalis), and as a power will be directed to opposites; but this is not the case, because synderesis always incites to good and never to evil216 – which constitutes a reference to prior knowledge about the functioning of synderesis; 2. if synderesis as a power were to be opposed to reason, then an act of synderesis should differ from an act of reason, meanwhile – Thomas states – there is no act of synderesis that cannot be performed by reason217, which again presupposes a definite knowledge of the rational nature of an act of synderesis; 3. synderesis should be recognised as a habit, and because it is a habit (or behaves like one) it is the opposite of the tendency (fomes) which always incites to evil218, whereby Thomas is again referring to prior knowledge about the functioning of synderesis and the tendency to evil; 4. this knowledge also becomes an argument against the thesis that synderesis would simply be a cognitive power; meanwhile that it is not a power that 216 “Si synderesis sit potentia, oportet quod sit potentia rationalis. Sed rationales potentiae se habent ad opposita. Ergo synderesis ad opposita se habebit; quod est falsum, quia semper instigat ad bonum, nunquam autem ad malum”. De verit., q. 16, a. 1, sc. 1. 217 “Item, si synderesis est potentia, aut est eadem cum ratione, aut alia. Sed non eadem, quia contra rationem dividitur in Glossa [ordin. ex Hieronymo], Ezech. 1. Nec potest dici quod sit alia a ratione: specialis enim potentia specialem actum requirit; nullus autem actus synderesi attribuitur quem ratio facere non possit; ratio enim ipsa et instigat ad bonum, et remurmurat malo”. De verit., q 16, a 1, sc. 2. 218 “Item, fomes semper inclinat ad malum, synderesis semper ad bonum. Ergo ista duo directe opponuntur. Sed fomes est habitus, vel per modum habitus se habens: ipsa enim concupiscentia, quae in pueris habitualis est, secundum Augustinum, in adultis vero actualis, fomes esse dicitur. Ergo synderesis est habitus” (De verit., q. 16. a. 1, sc. 3). The tendency to sin (fomes), often identified with concupiscence (concupiscentia), belongs to sensuality (sensualitas), and not to the intellect, as synderesis does. Cf. In II Sent. d. 31, q. 2, a. 5, 3 & ad 3; d. 32, q 1, a. 1, c; De verit., q. 16, a. 1, sc. 3 & ad 7; S.th., I-II, q. 74, a. 3; q. 81, a. 3; q. 91, a. 6.

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tends to action is manifested by the fact that the powers that tend to action are adequately divided into the irascible, the concupiscent and the rational 219; 5. that synderesis is a habit is evidenced by its similarity to the understanding of principles which is a habit: for synderesis never errs in the operative part of the soul, just as the understanding of principles does not in the speculative part 220 – which once more is a reference to prior knowledge about the functioning of synderesis.

3.1.1.3. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Similarly, in the earlier Scriptum super libros Sententiarum221, the reply to the question “Utrum synderesis sit habitus, vel potentia” (is synderesis a habit or a power) is also given in the sed contra. The argument in support takes the following form: synderesis is a habit, firstly because, since it never errs, it must refer to one thing, whereas a power of reason is directed to opposites222; secondly, synderesis, which always tends to good, is opposed to the tendency to sin (fomes) which always urges to evil, and which is a habit223. This argument is founded on immediate knowledge of the fact that synderesis never errs and always tends to good, as well as a metaphysical understanding of powers and habits. We find further arguments in support of the thesis that synderesis is a habit in the corpus articuli. It is also there that the arguments cited in the sed contra are enlarged upon. Unlike in his later writings, in the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Aquinas is only beginning to develop a terminology adequate to the problem, and is more careful in formulating his theses. This is the case in the corpus of the article of interest to us. Citing Augustine224 and Aristotle225, Aquinas states that all movement insofar as natural things are concerned begins with 219 “Item, si synderesis est potentia, aut est cognitiva, aut motiva. Sed constat quod non est cognitiva absolute, ex hoc quod actus eius est inclinare ad bonum, et remurmurare malo. Ergo si sit potentia, erit motiva. Hoc apparet esse falsum, quia potentiae motivae, sufficienter dividuntur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem et rationalem, contra quas dividitur synderesis, ut prius, argum. 1, dictum est”. De verit., q. 16 a. 1, sc. 4. 220 “Item, sicut in parte animae operativa synderesis nunquam errat, ita in parte speculativa intellectus principiorum nunquam errat. Sed intellectus principiorum est habitus quidam; ut patet per Philosophum in VI Ethic. [cap. VI]. Ergo synderesis est habitus”. De verit., q 16 a. 1, sc. 5. 221 In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 3. 222 In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, sc. 1. 223 In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, sc. 2. 224 De Gen. ad litt. VIII, 21, PL 34, 388-389. 225 Phys. 241 b-267b.

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an unmoved mover (ab immobili movente procedit); the same should therefore hold true for reasoning (in processu rationis) which, being in some way in motion, derives a conclusion from premises226. Modifying Thomas’s argument, this fragment could be arranged into the following syllogism: Premise 1.

All natural movement begins with an unmoved mover.

Premise 2.

Reasoning is a natural movement.

Conclusion: Reasoning begins with an unmoved mover, i.e. consists in deriving conclusions from premises. The conclusion of this syllogism legitimates the statement that all reasoning (ratio) should depart from knowledge such as would be uniform and at rest, and which one does not attain by investigation or a process of discursive reasoning, but which presents itself to the mind at once. And just as theoretical knowledge is deduced from certain per se nota principles, whose habit is called the intellect of first principles, so practical reason, too, must deduce from certain per se nota principles. This is required in order to prevent evildoing and to keep the Divine commandments, etc. And synderesis is just such a habit. Aquinas goes on to explain that synderesis differs from practical reason, not by virtue of power, but by virtue of habit227, which – like the habit of theoretical principles – is in some sense innate (innatus) to our minds due to the functioning of the light of the agent intellect228. In the corpus articuli Aquinas, first citing the Posterior Analytics and then the Prior Analytics, will moreover add that sense and memory are

226 “[...] cum enim ratio varietatem quamdam habeat, et quodammodo mobilis sit, secundum quod principia in conclusiones deducit, et in conferendo frequenter decipiatur […]”. In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, c. 227 The same argumentation will be pronounced in the answer to difficulty 1, in which synderesis is opposed to the rational, concupiscent and irascible powers: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod synderesis dividitur contra alias potentias, non quasi diversa per substantiam potentiae sed per habitum quemdam; sicut si intellectus principiorum contra speculativam rationem divideretur”. In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1. 228 “Oportet quod omnis ratio ab aliqua cognitione procedat, quae uniformitatem et quietem quamdam habeat; quod non fit per discursum investigationis, sed subito intellectui offertur: sicut enim ratio in speculativis deducitur ab aliquibus principiis per se notis, quorum habitus intellectus dicitur; ita etiam oportet quod ratio practica ab aliquibus principiis per se notis deducatur, ut quod est malum non esse faciendum, praeceptis Dei obediendum fore, et sic de aliis: et horum quidem habitus est synderesis. Unde dico, quod synderesis a ratione practica distinguitur non quidem per substantiam potentiae, sed per habitum, qui est quodammodo innatus menti nostrae ex ipso lumine intellectus agentis, sicut et habitus principiorum speculativorum, ut, omne totum est majus sua parte, et hujusmodi [...]”. In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, c.

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required for knowing first principles, and suggests that this knowledge is instantaneous229. He points the argument with a statement that seems to connote a certain hesitancy as to the proper designation of synderesis. For we read: ”Et ideo dico, quod synderesis vel habitum “And hence I say that we call by the name tantum nominat, vel potentiam saltem sub- of synderesis either only a habit, or at least a jectam habitui sic nobis innato”. power subjected to the habit thus innate to us”.

In the replies to the difficulties we find yet other explanations which either directly or indirectly suggest that synderesis is not a power. Let us cite the explanations given in response to difficulties 3, 4 and 5, since they bring something novel to our understanding of Aquinas’s teaching on synderesis. We find out that the universal norms of natural law are not inscribed in synderesis as a habit is in a power, but rather, as collected into habits, they become inscribed in it – just as the principles of geometry are written into geometry230. Aquinas also explains that although an act of synderesis is a judgment, like an act of free decision, synderesis cannot be equated with free will, because the latter is properly associated with particular judgment or the judgment of choice, whilst synderesis is concerned with the general or universal judgment, according to the general norms of natural law231. The next explanation takes note of the difference be229 “Licet ad determinationem cognitionis eorum sensu et memoria indigeamus, ut in 2 Post. dicitur. Et ideo statim cognitis terminis, cognoscuntur, ut in 1 Poster. dicitur. Et ideo dico, quod synderesis vel habitum tantum nominat, vel potentiam saltem subjectam habitui sic nobis innato”. In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, c. 230 “Ad tertium dicendum, quod universalia juris non inscribuntur synderesi, quasi habitus potentiae, sed magis quasi collecta in habitu inscribuntur ipsi habitui; sicut principia geometricalia geometriae inscribuntur” (In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3; por. In II Sent. d. 7, q. 1, a. 2, ad. 3). In one of the secondary passages of this commentary Aquinas will conclude that what is by nature inscribed in synderesis is the natural end of human conduct: “[...] unde sicut in ratione speculativa sunt innata principia demonstrationum, ita in ratione practica sunt innati fines connaturales homini; unde circa illa non est habitus acquisitus aut infusus, sed naturalis, sicut synderesis, loco cujus Philosophus in 6 Ethic. ponit intellectum in operativis” (In III Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 4 d, c). 231 “Ad quartum dicendum, quod judicium non eodem modo libero arbitrio et synderesi convenit: quia ad synderesim pertinet universale judicium, secundum universalia juris principia: semper enim de conclusionibus per principia judicatur; unde et scientia resolutiva judicandi ars dicitur: Sed ad liberum arbitrium pertinet judicium particulare de hoc operabili, quod est judicium electionis. Unde synderesis non est idem quod liberum arbitrium” (In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, ad. 4). This position is a consequence of Aquinas’s recognition of a real difference between the rational cognitive power (the intellect) and the intellectual appetitive power (the will). The ethical intellectualism of Socrates is

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tween acquired and natural habits: the former are lost, for instance through poor memory, while the latter never expire. The habit of theoretical principles and synderesis are natural habits of the latter type232.

3.1.2. The functioning of synderesis Aquinas devotes a separate article to the functioning of synderesis only in the Quaestiones disputatae De veritate. After stating, in question 16, article 1, that synderesis is a habit, he asks, in article 2, whether synderesis can err (utrum synderesis possit peccare) (SDVF, which we reduced to question SF). The verb peccare which occurs in the contexts of interest to us, can be translated as both to err, to make an error, to be wrong or to sin. It is interesting that Aquinas decided to use this verb, laden with moral and theological connotations, with regard to synderesis, instead of errare233, which he employed for conscience, and which conveys taking a roundabout or uncertain way, going astray, also intentionally, and yet without clear axiological overtones. To find the answer, we must examine Aquinas’s metaphysics of cognition, according to which neither sense nor intellect can be deceived in their proper object, while the object proper of the intellect is the quiddity of a material thing. Just as it gets to know the quiddity of a thing (intuitively), the intellect also knows the first principles of knowledge and of action, and so cannot err in this respect. An error can however occur in judgment or in the process of reasoning234. That is why insofar as the understanding of the first principles of knowledge and action (synderesis) is concerned, one can only ask about whether it can err, not of itself, but on account of ill will, which error constitutes a sin, and this precisely is why the verb peccare is used in the context of synderesis. For a sin (peccatum), whether in the action (actionibus) of natural things or in

founded on the recognition of only one power of the soul. The possibility of reducing the volitive to the cognitive is discerned by P. Lapie (idem, Logique de la volonté, Paris 1902, 383), with whom J. Kalinowski enters into a polemic (idem, Logika norm, Lublin 1993, 49-50). 232 The difficulty: “Praeterea, habitus amittitur per oblivionem, vel alio modo. Sed synderesis semper manet, quae etiam post mortem peccato remurmurat, cujus murmur vermis dicitur. Ergo synderesis nominat potentiam, et non habitum” (In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, 5). And the explanation of the difficulty: “Ad quintum dicendum, quod habitus naturalis nunquam amittitur synderesi” (In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, ad 5). 233 Cf. In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 3; De verit., q 16, a. 1, sc. 5; S.th., I, q. 79, a. 12, ad 3. 234 Cf. In I Sent. d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; De verit., q. 1, a. 12; Contra Gent., I, 59. III, 108; S.th. I, q. 85, a. 6.

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the production of art or in the functioning of will, is nothing other than a defect or disorder of the appropriate action (propriae actionis), as when something does not operate as it should235. If one were to accept this interpretation as valid, the problem addressed in the article would not be whether synderesis can make a mistake, but whether synderesis as such can succumb to ill will. Having said so, let us return to the main line of the argument. The answer to the question posed in the title of the article is: synderesis never errs (non peccat). Aquinas defends this thesis in the corpus articuli in the following manner, employing complex syllogistic reasoning: Premise 1.

In all its activities nature intends what is good and the conservation (conservatio) of things produced through the activity of nature.

Premise 2.

In all natural action, there are always present principles: permanent, unchangeable and preservative of right order (permanentia et immutabilia, et rectitudinem conservantia), for there could not be any stability or certainty in things that flow from these principles if the principles themselves were not firmly established (firmiter stabilita).

Premise 3.

This regularity applies not only to human action, but to all mutable being. For all changeable things are reduced to (reducuntur) some first unchangeable thing.

Premise 4.

All knowledge is derived (derivatur) from some most certain knowledge concerning which there can be no error, and this is the knowledge of the first general principles, in reference to which everything else which is known is examined and by reason of which every truth is approved and every falsehood rejected. If any error could take place in these, there would be no certainty in the whole of the knowledge which follows236.

Conclusion: For probity to be possible in human actions, there must be some permanent principle which has unwavering integrity, in reference to which all human works are examined, so that that permanent principle will resist all evil and assent to all good. This is synderesis, whose task it is to warn against evil and incline to good. There-

235 De verit. q. 24, a. 7, c. Here, Thomas cites Phys. 199 a 33. 236 “[…] omnis specifica cognitio derivatur ab aliqua certissima cognitione circa quam error esse non potest, quae est cognitio primorum principiorum universalium, ad quae omnia illa cognita examinantur, et ex quibus omne verum approbatur, et omne falsum respuitur”. De verit., q. 16 a. 2, c.

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fore, we agree that there can be no error in it237, i.e. synderesis never sins238. The above argument has all the signs of a systemic proof, which Krąpiec lists as one of the three ways of justifying metaphysical theses, next to indirect proof and elenctic proof239. All four premises are the theses of a metaphysical system, with premises 2 and 4 strengthened by an auxiliary indirect proof. Of significance to the problem of the functioning of synderesis are two more arguments contained in the sed contra, which support the thesis that synderesis does not sin. The first cites the fact that there is something in us that always urges to evil, namely the tendency to sin (fomes), of which we have already spoken. In addition, bearing in mind both that good is always purer than evil (since, as opposed to evil, it can exist without an admixture of evil), Aquinas draws the following conclusion from the functioning of the tendency to sin: therefore (ergo) there will also be something that always inclines to good240. This can only be synderesis. Synderesis does not sin because – the second argument of the sed contra states – something that belongs to a thing by nature, belongs to it always. And since synderesis murmurs against evil (remurmuret malo) by nature, it, as such, never assents to it, and therefore does not sin. This argument, in light of the explanations regarding the term peccare which Aquinas uses with regard to synderesis, should be understood as follows: synderesis does not sin because it is not subject to ill will, and it is not subject to it because – we infer based on Aquinas’s doctrine – the habits of the first principles of knowledge and action, being natural habits, are independent of will (of acts of free decision)241.

237 “Unde et in operibus humanis, ad hoc quod in eis aliqua rectitudo esse possit, oportet esse aliquod principium permanens, quod rectitudinem immutabilem habeat, ad quod omnia opera examinantur; ita quod illud principium permanens omni malo resistat, et omni bono assentiat. Et hoc est synderesis, cuius officium est remurmurare malo, et inclinare ad bonum; et ideo concedimus quod in ea non possit esse peccatum”. De verit., q. 16, a. 2, c. 238 De verit., q. 16, a. 2, sc. 1 239 Cf. M.A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, op. cit., 246-254. 240 “Ergo et aliquid erit quod semper inclinat ad bonum”. De verit., q. 16, a. 2, sc. 1. 241 Setting aside the language of scholasticism one might say that the first principles of knowledge and of action determine the manner in which we know and act, i.e. that in knowing or acting we always know and act in accordance with these principles. They are the a priori of human knowledge and action. The Husserlian understanding of this a priori would be helpful in its interpretation. Cf. S. Judycki, Wiedza a priori – struktura problemu, in: Studia metafilozoficzne, vol. 2, Kategorie filozoficzne. Istnienie i sąd, ed. A.B. Stępień, J. Wojtysiak, Lublin 2002, 19-92; P. Łaciak, Struktura i rodzaje poznania a priori w rozumieniu Kanta i Husserla, Katowice 2003.

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The answers to the difficulties which might suggest that synderesis sins, not only argue to the contrary, but deepen our knowledge about the functioning of synderesis. And so, responding to difficulty 1, founded on a gloss to Ezekiel 1:17, drawn from the commentary of Jerome, Aquinas explains that synderesis is never led into error (praecipitatur)242 when it comes to general principles. But error can happen in the application of general principles to a particular case because of imperfect or erroneous deduction (deductio) or false assumption. Even then the error does not lie on the part of synderesis but on the part of conscience (conscientia) which applies (applicat) the general judgment of synderesis to a particular act243. Responding to difficulty 2, which alludes to the Gospel of John 14:2, Aquinas distinctly places the general judgment of synderesis in a syllogism, where it becomes one of the propositions, whereas the judgment of higher reason can be another; and the latter – as opposed to the judgment of synderesis – can be false. For an understanding of the functioning of synderesis, it is important that in response to difficulty 2, the general judgment of synderesis is rendered concretely: “that worship should be offered to God”. This would mean that it cannot merely be identified with the judgment: do good and avoid evil. We will disregard answers to the remaining difficulties because they offer nothing novel to our subject.

3.1.3. The properties of synderesis – its permanence The third of the questions about synderesis concerns its properties, and more precisely its permanence or stability. We encountered this question, marked SP, in the formula from De veritate: utrum synderesis in aliquo extinguatur – are there some in whom synderesis is extinguished (SDVP)? It has its equivalent in SSentP. We have already discussed the differences in the formulation of this question. We are now interested in the argument in favour of the thesis which constitutes the answer to SP. 242 The verb praecipitare occurring here (from praeceps, -ipitis) means to bring something down, to knock down, to fall into, to ruin something by hastiness or frivolity. “[...] synderesis nunquam praecipitatur in universali. [...] Et ideo non dixit simpliciter quod praecipitatur synderesis; sed quod conscientia praecipitatur, quae universale iudicium synderesis ad particularia opera applicat”(De verit., q. 16, a. 2, ad 1). The term was used by Jerome in the abovementioned gloss, writing of synderesis: “Hanc interdum praecipitari videmus” (In Ez. I c. 1, PL 25, 22C). The use of the verb praecipitare confirms that in Aquinas’s view, an error of synderesis would in essence be a sin, since “praecipitatio in operabilibus nihil aliud est quam peccatum” (De verit., q. 16, a. 2, 1). 243 Thomas replies to difficulty 6 in a similar vein.

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3.1.3.1. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate In De veritate (q. 16, a. 3), Aquinas makes the answer to question SDVP dependent on how one understands the expression “synderesim extingui”244. In the corpus articuli, he differentiates between the absolute and conditional extinguishment of synderesis. In the absolute sense, synderesis as a habitual light (lumen habituale) cannot be extinguished, because the human soul cannot be deprived of the agent intellect through which we know (nobis innotescunt) the first speculative and practical principles245. Aquinas indicates that the light of the agent intellect comes from the very nature of the soul, and is that whereby the soul is made intellectual, capable of knowing by intellection (cum per hoc sit intellectualis). We can speak of the relative or conditional extinguishment of synderesis, not in reference to a habitual light but to an act of synderesis. The latter, in turn, can be extinguished in two ways. For example, when the act of synderesis ceases, as in people whose bodily organs have been injured, thus making them incapable of the use of free choice or of reason. Secondly, when the act of synderesis is deflected toward the contrary. This, however, does not happen by reason of a universal judgment of synderesis (iudicium universale) but because in particular activities the force of concupiscence or of another passion so absorbs reason that in choice the universal judgement of synderesis is not applied to the particular act246. Aquinas indicates that it is possible for reason to be so overpowered by a particular passion or defect as to become incapable of applying the universal judgment to the particular act (responses to difficulties 1, 3 and 4) 247. Aquinas solves difficulty 5, which treats the removal of the inclination to evil from the blessed, by referring to the previous theoretical conclusions, according to which evil is a privation, and therefore does not belong to nature. The blessed can therefore liberate themselves from the inclination to evil (inclinatio 244 “Dicendum quod synderesim extingui, intelligi potest dupliciter”. De verit., q. 16, a. 3. c. 245 An explanation which we find in the Summa theologiae can help to understand this position. Talking about intellectual habits, Thomas reports that the only habit that could be destroyed is the one having an opposite, either in respect of itself or in respect of its cause. Having no opposite, the habits of the passive intellect, directly produced by the agent intellect, cannot be destroyed, and these are the first principles of knowledge and action. S.th., I-II, q. 53, a. 1, c. 246 This statement becomes clearer in light of what was said in 3.1.2. with regard to question SF – whether synderesis can sin. It turns out that synderesis cannot sin, but neither can it habituate the acts proper unto itself if these are not performed, as happens in the cases Thomas discusses. Hence synderesis cannot be extinguished, but for various reasons cannot be heard. 247 Cf. also S.th., I-II, q. 53, a. 1; S.th., I-II, q. 85, a. 2.

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ad malum). Meantime good and the inclination to good belong to nature itself, hence they cannot be taken even from the damned.

3.1.3.2. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum In the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum248 the equivalent of question SDVP is the question SSentP. Differently than in De veritate, this question is divided from question SSentS by fourteen distinctions. The answer to the question: utrum superior scintilla rationis possit extingui – whether the higher spark of reason can be extinguished – is ultimately the same as to SDVP: “[...] superior rationis scintilla quae synderesis est, extingui non potest, sed semper repugnat omni ei quod contra principia naturaliter sibi indita est”.

“[…] the higher spark of reason, which is synderesis, cannot be extinguished, but always opposes all that is contrary to the principles bestowed on it by nature”.

Let us at once note that an equivalent statement found in both of the sed contrae takes a somewhat different form than the one cited: “[…] scintilla rationis per peccatum non ex- “[…] the spark of reason is not extinguished tinguitur.” by sin”.

The difference between these formulas results from another argument. In the corpus articuli Aquinas makes reference to the fact that synderesis always and systematically opposes itself to that which is contrary to the first principles of action given to us by nature249. In the sed contra on the other hand, he indicates that the only thing capable of causing the extinguishment of synderesis is peccatum – error, but also sin, namely an error made consciously and willingly250. If we compare the answer to question SSentP from the corpus articuli with the answer to question SDVP, we will notice that in the commentary on the Sentences Aquinas does not make a distinction between the conditional and the absolute extinguishment of synderesis. But the argument, too, is different. Whereas in De veritate Aquinas’s point of departure was the manner of understanding “syndere248 In II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 1. 249 According to Aquinas’s teaching, synderesis is not only a natural habit of the human cognitive powers but also of pure intelligences (angels and demons). Hence in one of the secondary passages on synderesis we read that synderesis has not been extinguished in demons, although it is not on account of their sin that it does not murmur in them, but due to the punishment imposed on them. In II Sent. d. 7, q. 1, a. 2, 3 i ad. 3. 250 Cf. 3.1.2.

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sim extingui”, in the commentary he begins his argument by recalling the theory of participation from De divinis nominibus of Pseudo-Dionysius251 and the Liber de causis. According to the said doctrine, a creature standing lower in the hierarchy of beings participates in a higher being because that which is highest in the lower being reaches that which is lowest in the highest being. Aquinas explains, somewhat differently than in De veritate, what cognitive participation, linking the rational soul with that of an angel, is. Namely: the proper type of knowledge for a rational soul joined to a body is that which departs from the sensual and tends to the intellectual, the intelligible. The rational soul knows truth by investigation, by reasoning, and that is why its knowledge is called rational252. Meanwhile an angel, as a disembodied being, apprehends (apprehendat) truth without investigation, and is therefore called an intellectual nature. It is therefore necessary (oportet) that there be an intellectually cognitive power (virtus) in the rational soul, which would know the truth at once without investigation, just as the first speculative and practical principles known to us by nature are grasped253. Up until this point the line of reasoning intended to lead to the answer to question SDVS is essentially the same as in the case of SSentP. Its further course is determined by the specific nature of question SSentP. Ultimately, the argument offered in support of the thesis that synderesis or the higher spark of reason cannot go out is that it can never err as to the first principles of action, just as the intellect cannot err regarding the first principles of knowledge. But prior to this, Aquinas explains why this intellectual power is called a spark, and this explanation seems to have the force of an argument: as a spark flies up from a fire, remaining a part of it, so this power is the highest part of the human intellect, which attains to the intellect of the angels254. Synderesis (and – we may add – the intellect of the first principles of speculative knowledge) is therefore not something different from the human intellect, but rather its most perfect part. In the sed contra, the possibility of the extinguishment of synderesis is examined in the context of sin. The spark of reason cannot be extinguished by sin, firstly because sin cannot destroy the light of the intellect which is in us as 251 In the De veritate this theory is the basis for justifying the thesis that synderesis is a habit – the answer to question SDVS. 252 In an analogous passage in the De veritate (q. 16, a. 1, c.) Aquinas expressis verbis does not mention the sensual beginnings of human knowledge, but underlines its discursive nature instead. 253 In II Sent, d. 39, q. 3, a. 1, c. 254 “[..] et haec virtus scintilla convenienter dicitur, quod sicut scintilla est modicum ex igne evolans; ita haec virtus est quaedam modica participatio intellectualitatis, respectu ejus quod de intellectualitate in angelo est: et propter hoc etiam superior pars rationis scintilla dicitur quia in natura rationali supremum est […]”. In II Sent, d. 39, q. 3, a. 1, c.

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God’s image, and secondly – sin cannot eradicate that which belongs to something by nature, and the inclination to good belongs to human nature. The answers to the difficulties only demonstrate that it is not synderesis but conscience that errs. However, they contain new assertions which shed light on Aquinas’s understanding of synderesis. And so, replying to difficulty 3, Aquinas explains that just as the light of the intellect is insufficient for knowing the truths of faith, so synderesis – not alone, but only united to the light of faith – murmurs against all that is contrary to faith. Hence, although synderesis never expires and always murmurs against evil generally, it does not do so in those who are without faith255. Replying to difficulty 5, in which the lack of an inclination to good in criminals is invoked as an argument for the extinguishment of the spark of reason, Aquinas explains that even the criminal has a natural inclination (inclinatio) to good, but this inclination is not an act, but only the ordainment of nature to act. This ordainment, in turn, along with the disposition, is never realised in act by wanting – actually – a particular good, because of some permanent obstacle binding the will. Yet all the same it remains natural knowledge. And this is why the murmuring of reason against the will never ceases, even if the will is not obedient to reason256.

3.2. Conscience (conscientia) Let us now move on to an analysis of the texts regarding conscience. These answer questions about the place of conscience in the ontological structure of man, its kind of being (CS), the functioning of conscience (CF) and acting in accordance with conscience (CA).

255 “Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut lumen intellectus naturale non sufficit in cognoscendo ea quae fidei sunt; ita etiam non sufficit in remurmurando his quae contra fidem sunt, nisi lumine fidei adjuncto; et ideo synderesis etiam in infidelibus manet integra quantum ad lumen naturale; sed quia privato lumine fidei excaecati sunt, non remurmurat eorum synderesis his quae contra fidem sunt. Vel dicendum, quod synderesis semper remurmurat malo in universali; sed quod in haeretico non remurmurat huic malo particulari, hoc contingit propter errorem rationis in applicatione universalis principii ad particulare opus, ut patebit in sequenti articulo”. In II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 1, ad 3. 256 “Ad quintum dicendum, quod etiam in damnato manet naturalis inclinatio qua homo naturaliter vult bonum; sed haec inclinatio non dicit actum aliquem, sed solum ordinem naturae ad actum. Hic autem ordo et habilitas nunquam in actum exit, ut bonum actualiter velit, propter perpetuum impedimentum obstinationis voluntatem ligantis; sed tamen naturalis cognitio manet; et ideo semper manet murmur rationis contra voluntatem; voluntas tamen nunquam rationi obedit”. In II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 1, ad 5.

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3.2.1. Conscience as act Regarding the place of conscience in the ontological structure of man or its kind of being, Aquinas poses the same question in all three of the works analysed. This question we have designated as CS. Its most complete formulation can be found in CDVS: utrum conscientia sit potentia, vel habitus, vel actus – is conscience a power, a habit, or an act? The answer given in all three texts is the same: conscientia est actus – conscience is an act. It is the argumentation that differs, however. But before we go on to consider it, let us pause for a moment to examine the term actus. , designates the The term actus, the Latin equivalent of the Greek actively determining factor of being. It is ordained to the passively determined ). Both factors are fundamental and integral factor, potentia (potency, components of every being, with the exception of the Pure Act (God), and therefore also of cognition and activity. Act actualises potency, and as such, is a more perfect component of being and “prior to potency”, as Aristotle says 257. The actualisation of potency, the transition from potency to act, is a motion in the metaphysical sense, and as such, also explains cognition and activity. That is why the Latin term actus is as a rule translated as “act”, although sometimes also as “activity”258.

3.2.1.1. Summa theologiae It is worth noting that in the Summa theologiae, question CSThS occurs in the context of a discussion about the nature of intellectual powers 259, the fact of which is reflected in its formulation, as in the introduction to question 79: “[...] utrum conscientia sit aliqua potentia intellectivae partis”. To the question formulated thus Thomas replies: conscientia non est potentia – conscience is not a power. This affirmation is already made in the sed contra where we also find the principal argument in support of this thesis, namely: conscientia deponi potest, non autem potentia – conscience can be put aside, but a power cannot. It should be noted that the reply is a negative judgment. In the sed contra we do not yet find out what conscience is, but only what it is not. From the theory of negative judgment we know that it suggests definite positive knowledge, which in the negative judgment is not yet precise, but only outlined. What is, therefore, the argument that supports the thesis that conscience is not a power? It is knowledge 257 Met. 1049 b 5. 258 Cf. M.A. Krąpiec, Akt i możność, in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, vol. 1, Lublin 2000, 145-150, where a bibliography is also provided. 259 S.th., I, q. 79, a. 13.

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of the fact that conscience can be laid aside, which presupposes some kind of knowledge of what conscience is, and moreover, knowledge about the nature of power, namely, that it cannot be laid aside (of which we have already spoken when discussing synderesis). Aquinas’s reasoning in article 13 no longer takes the form of a sequence of syllogisms, as was the case in article 12 where synderesis was discussed. A positive answer to the question from the title is given at the beginning of the corpus articuli: “Respondeo dicendum quod conscientia, pro- “Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, prie loquendo, non est potentia, sed actus”. but an act”.

Aquinas’s argumentation in support of this thesis has a double character: linguistic and functional. In the linguistic argument, Thomas refers to a common way of speaking, and – what is important – to the etymology of the term conscientia260: “Conscientia enim, secundum proprietatem vocabuli, importatat ordinem scientiae ad aliquid: nam conscientia dicitur cum alio scientia”.

“For conscience [or: consciousness], according to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of knowledge to something261: for conscience [or: consciousness] may be resolved into »cum alio scientia«, i.e. knowledge applied to an individual case [knowledge applied to something]”.

Because – continues Aquinas – the application of knowledge to something is done by some act, the very meaning of the name already indicates that conscience (or consciousness) is an act. Another argument intended to support the thesis that conscience (although not consciousness) is an act, derives from its functioning. Conscience functions in three ways, which ultimately result from a threefold application of our cognition or knowledge to what we do. In enumerating them, Aquinas seems to ap-

260 We will discuss the etymology of the term conscientia in Chapter Four. At this point, let us only note that in both Polish and English the term can be translated as both “conscience” and “consciousness”. Due to the meaning of both of these terms as well as their phraseology, one cannot limit the translation of the Latin “conscientia” to only one of them. 261 Thomas uses the pronoun aliquid, which points to ontological distinctness (cf. distinctness as a transcendental property of being – M.A. Krąpiec, Metafizyka, op. cit., 128131).

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peal to what is commonly believed about the manner in which conscience functions: “Dicitur enim conscientia testificari, ligare vel instigare, et etiam accusare vel remordere sive reprehendere”.

“For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke”.

When conscience witnesses, the application of knowledge to act consists in our recognising (recognoscimus) that we have done or failed to do something. When conscience incites or binds, the application of knowledge to act consists in judging (per nostram conscientiam iudicamus) that something should be done or not done. When conscience excuses, accuses or torments, the application consists in judging (per conscientiam iudicamus) whether the act performed was (morally) good or bad. Aquinas sums up his description of these three ways as follows: “Patet autem quod omnia haec consequuntur actualem applicationem scientiae ad ea quae agimus. Unde proprie loquendo, conscientia nominat actum”.

“Now, it is clear that all these things follow the actual application262 of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act”.

More precise explanations of the nature and functioning of conscience are given in answers to the difficulties suggesting that it is a power. Addressing the first difficulty, founded on a statement by Origen from the Commentarium in Epistolam ad Romanos263, as well as Augustine from De Genessi ad litteram264, Thomas writes that conscience is sometimes called a spirit (spiritus), and spirit is thought to be mind. Explaining difficulty 2, he says that conscience can only be said to be defiled in the cognitive and not in the ontic sense: it is not defiled as a subject (in subiecto), but as the thing known is in knowledge (sicut cognitum in cognitione) – insofar as someone knows he is defiled. Replying to the third difficulty, in which it is said, amongst other things, that we are directed in our actions by many habits of knowledge (per multos enim habitus cognoscitivos dirigimur in agendis), Thomas explains that act, although it does not always remain in itself (non semper maneat in se), always 262 The noun applicatio used by Thomas Aquinas is a verbal noun and comes from the verb applico -are (composed of the prefix ad- and the stem plico), indicating special closeness or familiarity; here the intimate connection between knowledge and act. 263 In Rom. 2, 9: PG 14, 893 (in the footnote to S.th., I, q. 79, a. 13, 1, in the Leonine edition erroneously cited as In Rom. 2, 15). 264 De Gen. ad litt. 12, 7: PL 34, 459.

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remains in its cause which is either a power or a habit. Allowing that conscience may be informed (informatur) by numerous habits, all of these, nonetheless, derive their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of the first principles of action, which is called synderesis. For Thomas, it is clear that conscience has the nature of an act because it operates like act. Calling it a habit or a power, or for that matter calling a power conscience, has no basis in fact, but only in language. Aquinas is fully aware, in his answers to the difficulties and at the close of the corpus articuli, that sometimes the same term (by metonymy) is applied to both the act and the habit or power that the given act stems from. Moreover, many different designations were employed in the writings of the ancients, with the term “conscience” used to designate (by Jerome) the first natural habit (or synderesis), the natural power of judgment (Basil) or the law of our intellect (John Damascene).

3.2.1.2. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate As in the question on synderesis, in the De veritate Aquinas undertakes a broader analysis of the problem of conscience than what was offered in the Summa. Of pivotal importance in question 17 is article 1, whose title question – CDVS: utrum conscientia sit potentia, vel habitus, vel actus (is conscience a power, a habit or an act?) – we have identified as providing the most complete overview of the place of conscience in the ontological structure of man and its mode of being. This question has been marked with the symbol C S. Even before we begin, we must note that unlike in the first article from De veritate where synderesis was discussed, and even more so in the articles of the Summa theologiae of interest to us, here Thomas makes his progression towards the answer by first rejecting two positions: that conscience is a power, and that conscience is a habit. The article contains a double sed contra. The first rejects the position that conscience is a power, the second – that it is a habit. In the corpus articuli, Aquinas begins to solve the problem by indicating that the name conscientia (conscience or consciousness) is commonly employed in three ways. Sometimes, it is used to indicate the thing of which one is conscious (pro ipsa re conscita), or yet a power or a habit by which we are conscious (pro potentia qua conscimus; pro habitu), or finally, an act. More important than this classification is the reason for it. Aquinas writes:

Thomas Aquinas’s Teaching on Conscience “Et huius distinctionis haec videtur esse ratio; quia cum scire sit aliquis actus, et circa actum consideretur obiectum, potentia, habitus, et ipse actus; invenitur quandoque aliquod nomen quod ad ista quatuor aequivocatur: sicut hoc nomen intellectus quandoque significat rem intellectam, sicut no-mina dicuntur significare intellectus; quandoque vero ipsam intellectivam potentiam; quandoque vero habitum quemdam; quandoque vero actum”.

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“The reason for this distinction seems to be that, since there is an act of conscience, and since an object, a power, a habit, and act itself are considered with reference to the act, we sometimes find a name which is used equivocally for all four of these. Thus, the name understanding sometimes signifies the thing understood (intellectam), as names are said to denote concepts (intellectus); sometimes, it signifies the intellective power itself; sometimes, a habit, and, sometimes, an act”.

This explanation is of great interest to us. For it speaks not only of the polysemous nature of the term conscientia and its metonymous use, but also shows that in the centre of the term’s semantic field is conscientia as act, and that an act of consciousness or conscience is central to a reflection on the object, power, habit and act. Furthermore, also important is the comparison of the function of the term conscientia with that of the term intellectus, which would suggest (and, in my view, does suggest) their substantial proximity. Their linguistic proximity is recognised by Aquinas himself, who says that these terms should be employed according to common usage (usus loquendi)265. Thomas’s further argument in the corpus articuli, leading to the thesis that conscience is an act, is founded on the above explanation. Like in the Summa theologiae, in the De veritate the argumentation given in support of the thesis that conscience is an act, is linguistic and functional. But unlike in the Summa theologiae, where these two lines of argument were equally important, here the functional is subordinated to the linguistic. In the De veritate, Aquinas, adopting the common usage in keeping with Aristotle’s directive from the Topics, asks about what conscience is (knowing the name, he asks about its proper reference266), or – to put it differently – about what the name “conscience” belongs to in first place. Aquinas begins to answer to this question by appealing to common linguistic usage. He first notes that according to common usage, the term conscientia is applied to the thing of which one is con265 Thomas cites Aristotle’s Topics (110 a 16). Aquinas’s argument, contained in the corpus articuli, becomes more intelligible if we consider more fully the relevant fragment from the Topics: “Moreover, you should define what kind of things should be called as most men call them, and what should not. For this is useful both for establishing and for overthrowing a view: e.g. you should say that we ought to use our terms to mean the same things as most people mean by them, but when we ask what kind of things are or are not of such and such a kind, we should not here go with the multitude […]”. 266 Cf. 2.1.2.

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scious (pro re conscita): that which is in my conscience (id est quod est in conscientia mea), as when we say: “I will reveal my conscience to you”267. However – he states – as far as this manner of speaking is concerned, the name conscientia cannot be properly ascribed to a power or a habit, but only to an act, because it is only in an act that all the things that are said of consciousness of conscience come together268. Arguing further, he says that it is not customary to apply the same name to a power, an act and a habit, unless the act is proper to the power or habit269. Meanwhile: “Nomen enim conscientiae significat applicationem scientiae ad aliquid; unde conscire dicitur quasi simul scire. Quaelibet autem scientia ad aliquid applicari potest; unde conscientia non potest nominare aliqem habitum specialem, vel aliquam potentiam, sed nominat ipsum actum, qui est applicatio cuiuscumque habitus vel cuiuscumque notitiae ad aliquem actum particularem”.

“For the name conscience [or: consciousness] means the application of knowledge to something. Hence, to be conscious (conscire) means to know together (simul scire). But any knowledge can be applied to a thing. Hence, conscience cannot denote a special habit or power, but designates the act itself, which is the application of any habit or of any knowledge to some particular act”.

And since any knowledge can be applied to something, the name “conscience” cannot be given to some particular habit or power, but only to the act of applying a habit or knowledge of something270 to a particular act. And so the function-

267 The relevant text in Aquinas, reads: “Dicam tibi conscientiam meam”. 268 “Illud quidem secundum usum loquentium esse videtur ut conscientia quandoque pro re conscita accipiatur, ut cum dicitur: Dicam tibi conscientiam meam; id est quod est in conscientia mea. Sed potentiae vel habitui proprie loquendo, hoc nomen attribui non potest, sed solum actui; in qua significatione sola concordant omnia quae de conscientia dicuntur”. De verit., q. 17, a. 1, c. 269 To illustrate this, Aquinas invokes the example of seeing, which is the act proper to the power of sight, as well as actual knowledge, which is the act proper to the habit of knowledge. This makes it possible to call both a power and an act “sight” or “knowledge”. 270 Thomas uses the Augustinian term notitia. In book IX of De Trinitate, notitia is part of the first triad of the image of God in creation. This triad is made up of: mens – notitia – amor (mind – knowledge – love). In book X, Augustine introduces a distinction between nosse and cogitare. The first is the act of knowing something indistinctly (being familiar with something), the second – of distinct knowledge. In Aristotle (e.g. De an. 429 a 23; Met. 981 a 5-7, Nic. Et. 1139 b 17, 1147 b 4-5) we encounter the term (opinion, intellectual conviction, belief), which, contrary to scientific knowledge ( ), can be both true and false (a sudden and unjustified belief). It is the lowest of the activities of reason: based on experience and involving common notions (cf. P. Siwek, [Commentary to:] Aristotle O duszy, in: idem, Dzieła wszystkie, vol. 3,

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ing of conscience serves as an argument in favour of ascribing the name conscientia to an act. At the same time, this functioning – known from elsewhere – demonstrates that conscience is not an act proper to some particular power or habit – a fact Aquinas already noted in the analysed passage from the Summa. Already knowing the answer to the article’s title question, Aquinas goes on to explain, in the corpus articuli, what this application of the knowledge of something to a specific act would consist in. Although the outcome of this explanation will be consistent with the description of the functioning of conscience known to us from the Summa theologiae, in the De veritate Aquinas will bring to light the principle of differentiating the various functions of conscience. The indication of two distinct ways in which knowledge, or better yet notitia, is applied to an act, is of fundamental importance. The first of these refers to fact, and consists in considering (consideratur) whether the act exists or has existed271. A certain “sensitive knowledge” (notitia sensitiva272) is applied to a particular act: whether memory (memoria273) – when we recall what was done, or sense – through which we perceive (percipimus) the act in which we are now engaged. In this case conscience (consciousness) witnesses something (conscientia testificare aliquid274) that is the first of its functions275.

271 272

273 274 275

Waszawa 1992, 118-119, footnote 50). Bearing this in mind, Aquinas’s use of the term notitia would not be without significance. “[…] uno modo secundum quod consideratur an actus sit vel fuerit: alio modo secundum quod consideratur an actus sit rectus vel non”. De verit., q. 17, a. 1, c. De verit., q 17, a. 1, c. is the only place in Aquinas’s writings where this expression occurs. An explanation of the notion of notitia sensitiva could be sought in the meaning , as given by Aristotle in the analysis of ethical cognition. Cf. W. of the term Galewicz, O Arystotelesowskiej teorii poznania praktycznego, RF 50 (2002) 1, 83-103. Thomas employs the term memory (memoria), which he applies to the active memory of animals. In reference to man, he uses the term reminiscentia. In this case, Thomas refers to Rom 9: 1: „Testimonium mihi perhibente conscientia mea”. Aquinas’s remarks on the role of sense in the knowledge of an act give rise to interpretative difficulties. These may be resolved by considering his genetic empiricism and doctrine of the psycho-physical unity of man. Aquinas also tries to maintain the principle “nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit prius in sensu” when analysing the cognition of actions. This does not mean, however, that in every case and in the strict sense actions are known through the senses, i.e. that the senses perform a cognitive function in this type of cognition. This is not the case for example when the intellect knows its own actions or acts of the will (cf. De verit., q. 10, a. 9; S.th., I, q.87, a. 3-4). It is rather that – as S. Swieżawski says – an intellectual (thus also spiritual act) that would occur without the involvement of all the lower powers (including the sensitive or even the vegetative) never occurs in a particular person. The material, bodily element essential to these powers, is the source of the complexity and multiplicity characterising even our highest,

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The subsequent functions of conscience have to do with the other way of applying knowledge (notitia) to a particular act, which happens when we want to find out whether an act is correct or not. This can be done in two ways: 1. when we are directed through the habit of knowledge (per habitum scientiae) to do or not to do something; 2. when we examine, with reference to the habit of knowledge, whether the act was right or not. The first of these, analogous to theoretical discovery, derives conclusions from principles – for, as if taking counsel with ourselves, we look for what should be done, based on our knowledge. We then say that conscience prods, urges, or binds. The second way, analogous to the process of judging, reduces conclusions to principles. With reference to the act done, we say that conscience accuses or causes remorse (accusare vel remordere), when what has been done turns out to be out of harmony with the knowledge according to which it is examined; but when what has been done is in harmony with knowledge, we say that conscience defends or excuses (defendere vel excusare). Under both of these ways, tending to determine the integrity or iniquity of an act, conscience applies to the act (either all together, or only one of these): synderesis and wisdom, which perfects the higher reason, as well as the habit of science, which perfects the lower reason. The Corpus articuli concludes with the following sentences: “Ad hos enim habitus examinamus quae fecimus, et secundum eos consiliamur de faciendis. Examinatio tamen non solum est de factis, sed etiam de faciendis; consilium autem de faciendis tantum”.

“We examine what we have done according to these habits, and, according to them, we take counsel about what should be done. Examination, however, concerns not only what has been done, but also what is to be done. But counsel concerns only what is to be done”.

In other parts of question 17, article 1 of the De veritate, we find the completion of the teaching on conscience contained in the corpus articuli. Already in the sed contra, intended to prove that conscience is an act, Thomas states that to say that conscience accuses and excuses, is only valid if we consider it an act (Sed non accusatur aliquis vel excusatur, nisi quod actu considerat), and that if we call conscience knowledge with comparison (scientia cum collatione), then it is actual knowledge276.

spiritual actions (judging and reasoning) (S. Swieżawski, Wstęp do kwestii 79, in: Thomas Aquinas, Traktat o człowieku, op. cit., 275). We should keep this explanation in mind when talking about the role of sense in the cognition of actions. 276 One should note that Thomas maintains the argument from the corpus articuli in the sed contra: the functional argument justifies linguistic usage.

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Replying to the difficulties, Aquinas explains that conscience is sometimes confused with synderesis, as in Jerome, which is due to the fact that the whole force of conscience, as examining or taking counsel (tota vis conscientiae examinantis vel consiliantis) depends on the judgment of synderesis, just as the whole truth of speculative reason depends on first principles. Furthermore, the “defilement of conscience” of which the Epistle to Titus (1:15) speaks, should not be understood as if conscience were the thing defiled, but that the “defilement” is done in consciousness (in conscience) as the thing known is in knowledge. To the difficulty having its origin in the Epistle to the Hebrews (9:14) – that a defiled conscience is cleansed, Thomas indicates that the unity of conscience does not consist in being the subject of cleanness and uncleanness, but in the examination of both by conscience (per conscientiam examinantem), not in a single act, but based on the same principles. Important statements about the judgement of conscience will be given as reasons against the indentification of conscience with free choice. Namely, that being a dictate of reason (rationis dictamen), it refers to a particular act, that it is simply knowledge, that even when the judgment of free choice goes astray, the judgment of conscience does not. Among the arguments, substantiating the claim that conscience is not a habit, that Aquinas agrees to, the most important one, from our point of view, is that which states that man has conscience from the very moment he undertakes his first act. Rejecting arguments in favour of conscience being a habit, Aquinas says that conscience is called the law of our understanding because it is a judgment of reason derived from the natural law; that its act perfect the habits of wisdom and science from which they proceed; that it can also be said of conscience that is has been planted in us by God, if we admit that its principle and source is synderesis. This cursory and selective presentation of the article indicates that the notion of conscience has been more amply discussed in the De veritate than in the Summa theologiae. In the De veritate, as in the Summa theologiae, it is said of conscience that it witnesses, binds or urges, accuses or causes remorse, but also that it defends and excuses. In this statement, Thomas seems to have wanted to stress that conscience not only reacts to evil, but also to good. Also unlike in the Summa theologiae, where the function of witnessing is related to the action of recognising (recognoscere), while the remaining two to the action of judging (iudicare), in the De veritate all of these essentially consist in considering (considerare), although when it comes to knowing the integrity or iniquity of an act, Thomas does not use the verb iudicare, but rather inspiciere, consiliare, examinare, discutere. It is as if in the De veritate Thomas was still looking for the right vocabulary, while his position in the Summa theologiae already has a more systemic character.

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Reading De veritate it becomes readily evident that the term conscientia is used in a twofold sense: conscience and consciousness. Aquinas also clearly states that conscience is not an act of a single power or habit, but of many different powers and habits. In witnessing, it only applies sensitive knowledge (in the sense of which have spoken), while applying the operative habits (including synderesis) only in judging of an act.

3.2.1.3. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum In the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum the question concerning the place of conscience in the ontological structure of man and its kind of being, just like in the Summa, is put by Thomas right after he solves an analogous question regarding synderesis 277. Question CSentS is formulated as follows: Utrum conscientia sit actus – is conscience an act; the answer – conscience is an act. Right at the beginning of the corpus articuli, just like in the later works, Aquinas notes that the term conscience is sometimes used in reference to the thing of which one is conscious, and sometimes to the habit that enables such consciousness, and along with this habit – natural law, and that it is a theoretical habit. Some use the term to designate a particular power, but this – says Aquinas – is an excessively digressive and improper way of speaking278. But none of these meanings – Thomas observes – conveys the linguistic usage in accordance with which it is said that conscience binds or charges with sin, which happens through actual rational consideration, thus precisely through conscience279.

277 In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 4. 278 This and the following remarks differ somewhat from similar remarks made in the later works of Aquinas discussed here. 279 “Respondeo dicendum, quod conscientia multis modis accipitur. Quandoque enim dicitur conscientia ipsa res conscita […]. Quandoque vero dicitur habitus, quo quis disponitur ad consciendum; et secundum hoc ipsa lex naturalis et habitus rationis consuevit dici conscientia. Quidam etiam dicunt, quod conscientia quandoque potentiam nominat; sed hoc nimis extraneum est, et improprie dictum: quod patet, si diligenter omnes potentiae animae inspiciantur. Nullo autem horum modorum conscientia sumitur, secundum quod in usum loquentium venit, prout dicitur ligare vel aggravare peccatum: nullus enim ligatur ad aliquid faciendum nisi per hoc quod considerat hoc esse agendum; unde quamdam actualem considerationem rationis, per conscientiam, communiter loquentes intelligere videntur: sed quae sit illa actualis rationis consideratio, videndum est”. In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 4, c.

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In the next step, Thomas cites book 6 of the Nichomachean Ethics280, and, analysing the practical syllogism one uses when choosing or rejecting something, he demonstrates that conscience is an act. The initial statement reads: “In syllogismo autem est triplex consideratio, “In the syllogism however, there is a triple secundum tres propositiones, ex quarum dua- consideration, according to three propositions, bus tertia concluditur”. of which the third is inferred from the other two”281.

The said “consideration” (consideratio) is the point of gravity here, hence Aquinas will go on to say that synderesis, to which the general principles of natural law belong, provides the major premise in this syllogism, while its consideration is the act of synderesis. The minor premise is furnished by the higher reason or the lower reason, and its consideration involves acts of reason. The consideration of the conclusions obtained is a consideration of conscience 282, regardless of whether they refer to the present, the past or the future, for: “[…] quia conscientia et factis remurmurat, et faciendis contradicit: et inde dicitur conscientia, quasi cum alio scientia, quia scientia universalis ad actum particularem applicatur: vel etiam quia per eam aliquis sibi conscius est eorum quae fecit, vel facere intendit: et propter hoc etiam dicitur sententia, vel dictamen rationis: et propter hoc etiam contingit conscientiam errare, non propter synderesis errorem, sed propter errorem rationis [...]”

“[...] conscience both murmurs against what is done and against that which is to be done: hence it is said that conscience is, as it were, knowledge with an admixture of something else: for universal knowledge is applied to a particular act, or through it someone becomes conscious of what he has done or what he intends to do: and because of this we speak of the judgment or dictate of reason: and this in turn makes conscience err, not because of an error of synderesis, but because of an error of reason [...]”

Aquinas closes the corpus articuli with the observation that synderesis, natural law and conscience must be differentiated. Natural law designates the universal principles of law as such, synderesis – their habit or power with a habit, 280 Aquinas is doubtless interested in the chapter on practical reasoning. Cf. Nic. Et., 1139 a 20 –1139 b 16. 281 Cf. the problem of whether questions can be transformed into premises, discussed in the part devoted to the Aristotelian and Aquinian theory of questions. The cited sentence confirms that in the Aristotelian tradition the term propositio ( ) was also applied to the conclusion. Cf. 2.1.1., footnote 102. 282 “[...] synderesis in hoc syllogismo quasi majorem ministrat, cujus consideratio est actus synderesis; sed minorem ministrat ratio superior vel inferior, et ejus consideratio est ipsius actus; sed consideratio conclusionis elicitae, est consideratio conscientiae”. In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 4, c.

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and conscience – the application, by inference, of natural law to action. This means that conscience is an act283. An additional argument in favour of the thesis that conscience is the “actual consideration of reason”, namely an act, is found in the two sed contrae. In the first, Thomas observes that although it is said that conscience charges with sin, this is only because something is opposed to the actual consideration of reason284. In the second, meantime, that calling conscience a dictate of reason is appropriate only when we consider that a dictate is said to be an act by which reason judges that something should be done285. Also of interest from our point of view is the answer to the second difficulty in which conscience is equated with free choice. Aquinas explains (as already mentioned in the corpus articuli) that a judgment depends both on free choice and on conscience and synderesis, but in different ways. He concludes this explanation with the statement that the pronouncement of conscience is intellectual, while choice is an affectual pronouncement286, although both belong to the sphere of action, as Aristotle demonstrates in book 6 of the Nichomachean Ethics287.

283 The precision of this statement leaves much to be desired. We must, however, keep in mind that we are dealing with the earliest of the works analysed here. 284 “Sed contra, conscientia peccatum aggravare dicitur. Sed aggravatio peccati esse non potest nisi per hoc quod contradicitur actuali rationis considerationi. Ergo videtur quod conscientia actualem rationis considerationem nominet”. In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 4, sc. 1. 285 “Praeterea, ut dictum est, conscientia a quibusdam dictamen rationis dicitur. Sed dictamen actum quemdam nominat, secundum quod ratio aliquid faciendum dijudicat. Ergo videtur quod conscientia actum nominet”. In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 4, sc. 2. 286 This statement stems from Aquinas’s conception of man as a psycho-physical compositum. Just as cognition begins with the senses, so the pursuit or desire of a particular good begins with the affects. 287 “Ad secundum dicendum, quod judicium ad liberum arbitrium pertinet, ad conscientiam, et synderesim; sed diversimode; quia ad liberum arbitrium pertinet judicium quasi participative, quia per se voluntatis non est judicare; unde ipsum judicium electionis liberi arbitrii est: sed judicium per se vel est in universali, et sic pertinet ad synderesim; vel est in particulari, tamen infra limites cognitionis persistens, et pertinet ad conscientiam; unde tam conscientia quam electio, conclusio quaedam est particularis vel agendi vel fugiendi; sed conscientia conclusio cognitiva tantum, electio conclusio affectiva: quia tales sunt conclusiones in operativis, ut in 6 Ethic. dicitur”. In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 4, ad. 2.

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3.2.2. The functioning of conscience The next problem Thomas examines regarding conscience is its functioning. He devotes separate articles to this problem in the De veritate and the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum. Questions CDVF and CSentF, serving as the titles of these articles, are essentially identical. Hence we have marked their following formulation with symbol CF: utrum conscientia possit errare – can conscience be mistaken? The context within which the question appears in each of these works is different however. Whereas in De veritate question CDVF is articulated after question CDVS, in the commentary on the Sentences question CSentF is preceded by question SSentP, regarding the possibility of extinguishing the higher spark of reason (synderesis). The assumption introduced by CF, that the higher spark of reason cannot be extinguished, ties into the answer to this question. The full formula of question CSentF is: supposito quod [superior scintilla rationis] non extinguatur, utrum conscientia possit errare. The answer to question CF is the same in both works: conscientia errare potest – conscience can make mistakes, which, however, does not mean that it does or that it must do so of necessity. What sort of argument in favour of this thesis do we find in each of the works?

3.2.2.1. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate In De veritate (q. 17, a. 2), already in the sed contra Thomas presents two arguments in favour of the view that conscience can make mistakes; however, the problem is only elucidated in the corpus articuli. Aquinas departs from a conclusion drawn in the question’s previous article, namely that conscientia nihil aliud est quam applicatio scientiae ad aliquem specialem actum, with the functioning of concience presented in the form of a practical syllogism. Aquinas discerns two places288 that are responsible for the potential error of conscience: false premises or the faulty construction of a syllogism. Conscience, which applies knowledge to some special act, can apply knowledge that in itself is false. This, however, cannot be the judgement of synderesis (iudicium synderesis), of which we know that it is always true, but a judgment of the higher or lower reason. For the latter embraces something more particular, that which the judgment of synderesis, which is universal, is to be applied to. An error in the conclusion arrived at by conscience may thus appear on account of an error in the premise. Such an error can also occur when conscience fails to make a cor288 “[…] conscientia nihil aliud est quam applicatio scientiae ad aliquem specialem actum. In qua quidem applicatione contingit esse errorem dupliciter: uno modo, quia id quod applicatur, in se errorem habet; alio modo ex eo quod non bene applicatur”. De verit., q. 17, a. 2, c.

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rect application to acts, as when the proper form of argumentation is omitted in the theoretical syllogism. But in the second part of the corpus articuli Aquinas explains that there are certain matters in which conscience does not make mistakes, and can never do so. This happens when the particular act to which conscience is applied, has a universal judgment about it in synderesis289. And so synderesis is not mistaken when it comes to statements such as that “I should not love God” or “Some evil should be done”)290, just as one cannot make a mistake in theoretical knowledge, claiming that “This whole is greater than its part”. For in both cases both the major premise is self-evident in so far as it exists in the universal judgment, and the minor, by means of which the particular predication of identity is made, is also self-evident. The following statements, which we encounter in the explanation of the difficulty, and which help to understand the functioning of conscience, are also worth noting. Responding to difficulty 2, Aquinas agrees that conscience adds something to knowledge291, but what it adds is precisely the application of that knowledge to a particular act. Let us emphasise however, that the said knowledge is not knowledge in the strict sense, i.e. true knowledge, but knowledge broadly understood as acquaintance with something (notitia) – for according to the common use of the word, we say that we know (scire) everything with which we are acquainted (novisse)292. Thomas also considers the comparison of conscience to fire, and of synderesis to a spark (hence the designation of synderesis as a spark of conscience), mentioned in difficulty 3, an insufficient argument for the thesis that conscience does not err. For he says that this metaphor only indicates that synderesis – like a spark flying up from a fire – is that which is highest in the judgment of conscience. Any other conclusions derived from this metaphor are not justified. Moreover, real fire is modified because a foreign element is added to it, while this cannot be said of the spark on account of its purity. An error can thus appear in conscience because it has to do with particu289 “Sciendum tamen, quod in quibusdam conscientia nunquam errare potest: quando scilicet actus ille particularis ad quem conscientia applicatur, habet de se in synderesi universale iudicium” (De verit., q. 17, a. 2, c). This would be an enthymeme. 290 These claims are false; nonetheless, Thomas gives them as examples, doubtless to emphasise that the infallibility of conscience, treated of herein, applies both to true as well as to false judgments. 291 “[...] conscientia addit aliquid supra scientiam [...]”. De verit., q. 17, a. 2, 2. 292 “Vel dicendum, quod cum dico conscientiam, non dico vel implico scientiam solummodo stricte acceptam prout est tantum verorum, sed scientiam largo modo acceptam pro quacumque notitia, secundum quod omne quod novimus, communi usu loquendi scire dicimus”. De verit., q. 17, a. 2, ad 2.

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lars, which, like matter, are something alien to reason. This error does not occur in synderesis, which remains in its purity293. Explaining difficulty 7, Aquinas says that not conscience, but synderesis, is the first rule of human actions. Conscience is a kind of regulated rule (regula regulata), hence an error can appear in it.

3.2.2.2. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum The argument used in the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum294 to support the thesis that conscience can make mistakes is essentially the same as in De veritate. There are a few differences, however. Although Aquinas does present conscience as syllogistic demonstration, he does not mention that the conclusion of conscience stands in a relation of direct consequence to the universal judgement of synderesis. Indicating that error cannot appear in the first principles of action – the first principles that are self-evident (per se nota) – Aquinas says that these belong to synderesis, for example the principle that obedience is owed to God 295. Aquinas seems to differentiate between synderesis and the first principles of action, among which he includes not only “do good and avoid evil”, but also for instance the commandment to obey God. An error of conscience may be due to particular norms, which are known either by investigation on the part of reason, or – what is important – by the assent of faith)296. In the answers to difficulties, on the other hand, we come across the following statements: 1. conscience, which is called a witness (testis), does not make mistakes, when it accuses the will of acting against conscience, which does not mean that it cannot make mistakes when it makes pronouncements as to what should or should not be done297; 2. conscience is said to be a natural ability of 293 “Et tamen in igne materiali aliquis motus accidit igni propter admixtionem ad materiam alienam, qui non accidit scintille ratione suae puritatis; et ita etiam aliquis error potest accidere conscientiae propter commixtionem eius ad particularia, quae sunt quasi materia a ratione aliena, qui non accidit rationi in sua puritate existenti”. De verit., q. 17, a. 2, ad 3. 294 In II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 2. 295 “Haec autem principia agendorum naturaliter cognita ad synderesim pertinent, sicut Deo esse obediendum, et similia”. In II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 2, c. 296 “Haec autem propria principia non sunt per se nota naturaliter sicut principia communia: sed innotescunt vel per inquisitionem rationis, vel per assensum fidei”. In II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 2, c. 297 “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod conscientia dicitur esse testis, inquantum id retinet contra quod voluntas fecit, quasi voluntatem accusans de eo quod sibi non obedivit: et in hoc non errat, quia facere contra conscientiam, peccatum est, ut infra dicetur: sed

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judgement, but it is this ability not of itself, but only inasmuch as the habit of synderesis is maintained in it298; 3. conscience is the application of universal principles (the so-called first law) to particular acts, but it is neither the first, nor the guiding law of human action299; 4. nor is conscience simply knowledge (such knowledge is always true), but, insofar as its nature is concerned, is knowledge according to the one whose conscience it is300; 5. an error of conscience consisting in (amongst other things) the acceptance of a false premise, has to be distinguished from an error of choice, when the will follows that which is put before it by sense301.

3.2.3. The judgment of conscience and action Next to questions pertaining to conscience as such we also distinguished a number of questions regarding the relation of conscience to action. These define the following problems: whether conscience is binding in general, whether a false conscience is binding, whether conscience is binding in light of its relation to law, and how conscience binds in particular acts. All of these are the object of moral theology and ethics, which their placement within the Summa theologiae and the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum confirm. In our presentation of them we will focus only on those moments which treat of the cognitive nature of conscience.

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propter hoc non removetur quin errare possit in hoc quod de faciendo vel non faciendo sententiat”. In II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1. “Ad secundum dicendum, quod conscientia dicitur naturale judicatorium non per se, sed inquantum virtus synderesis in ipsa manet; sicut virtus principiorum salvatur in conclusionibus: et ex parte illa non errat”. In II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2. “Ad tertium dicendum, quod conscientia non est prima lex et primum dirigens in humanis actibus, sed quasi quaedam applicatio primae legis, scilicet principiorum communium, ad actus particulares [...]”. In II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3. “Ad quartum dicendum, quod conscientia non dicitur scientia simpliciter, sed secundum quid, scilicet secundum aestimationem illius cujus est conscientia: dicitur enim conscientia, secundum quod aliquis sibi conscius est. Quamvis autem scientia semper sit verorum, non tamen quidquid aliquis aestimat se scire, verum est: et ita non oportet quod semper sit conscientia vera”. In II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 2, ad 4. “Ad quintum dicendum, quod in conclusione particularis agendi dupliciter contingit esse defectum. Uno modo ex falsitate principiorum ex quibus syllogizatur; et hoc modo in conclusione tenetur id quod veritati contrarium est: et hic est error conscientiae. Alio modo ex impetu passionum absorbentium et quasi ligantium rationis judicium in particulari, ut actu non consideret nec hoc nec ejus oppositum, sed voluntas sequatur delectabile quod sensus proponit; et hic est error electionis, et non conscientiae”. In II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 2, ad. 5.

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3.2.3.1. Whether conscience is binding in general It is only in De veritate that Aquinas devotes a separate article to the question of whether conscience binds in general. The title of this article articulates question CDVA1. Because it is concerned with the relation of conscience to action in general we have marked this question with the symbol CAC. Its formula is the following: utrum conscientia liget – does conscience bind? The answer and the bulk of the argument are given in the corpus articuli, beginning with the sentence: “Dicendum, quod conscientia procul dubio “Conscience is certainly binding”. ligat”.

And ending in the sentence: “Unde, cum conscientia nihil aliud sit quam “Consequently, since conscience is nothing applicatio notitiae ad actum, constat quod con- else but the application of knowledge to an scientia ligare dicitur vi praecepti divini”. act, it is obvious that conscience is said to bind by the power of a divine precept”302.

The core of the argument is the necessity implied by the fact that one thing is bound by another. As opposed to in corporeal things, in spiritual things the necessity is not absolute but conditional (conditionata), as when the will is moved by the indication of an end. But all precept that applies to the will is binding only through knowledge of the precept. Necessity in spiritual things occurs only when there is a precept and when the precept is known. Aquinas, therefore, says that it is the same power by which the precept binds and by which knowledge binds, since the knowledge binds only through the power of the precept, and the precept only through the knowledge303. One could therefore say, without straying from Aquinas’s thought, that conscience not only binds, but cannot do anything else, since it is the application of knowledge to an act. The cognitive nature of conscience is also evidenced by the answers to the difficulties, the first two of which are of the greatest interest from our point of view. It is in them that Aquinas first observes that man does not establish his

302 It seems that Aquinas is not referring to a positive Divine commandment (or at least not only), but to a precept emanating from the fact of creation, and so a precept inherent in the very nature of man, and therefore also in the nature of conscience. 303 “[...] ita eadem virtus est qua praeceptum ligat et qua scientia ligat: cum praeceptum non liget nisi per virtutem scientiae, nec scientia nisi per virtutem praecepti”. De verit., q. 17, a. 3, c.

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own law, but through knowledge of the law, which is established by someone else, he becomes bound to fulfil it304. Next, that conscience, acting upon counsel (per modum consiliationis), binds when we understand counsel as an action of reason inquiring about things to be done. For it also then considers the precept. But when we understand counsel as persuasion or inducement to do something that isn’t necessary, then conscience binds only in virtue of what is contained in it. It cannot bind in any other way than the counsel itself: one should not disregard it, but one is not obliged to follow it305.

3.2.3.2. Whether a false conscience is binding Another problem to which Aquinas devotes separate articles is that of whether a false or erring conscience is binding. We have marked the question addressing this problem with the symbol CACe. In the different works this question taken on different formulations, which we have marked, accordingly, with the symbols CSthA1, CDVA2 and CSentA1. 3.2.3.2.1. Summa theologiae We have already spoken of the fact that in the Prima secundae question 19 the formula of the question featured as the title of article 5 differs from the formulation which is found in the introduction to this question. In the corpus articuli, right at the very beginning, Thomas explicitly states that to inquire whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire “whether an erring conscience binds”, which again is a modification of the question from the introduction which treats of erring reason. The answer to these questions is twofold. In the sed contra Aquinas, departing from the definition of conscience as the application of knowledge to some action, and citing the Epistle to the Romans (14:23), says: “Voluntas ergo discordans a ratione errante, “Therefore when the will is at variance with est contra constientiam. [...] Ergo voluntas erring reason, it is against conscience. […] discordans a ratione errante, est mala” Therefore the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason”.

304 De verit., q. 17, a. 3, ad. 1. 305 “Sed cum conscientia non liget nisi ex virtute eius quod in conscientia habetur, conscientia quae ex consilio sequitur, non alio modo potest obligare quam ipsum consilium; ex quo aliquis obligatur ut non contemnat, sed non ut impleat”. De verit., q 17, a. 3, ad. 2.

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– which answers the title question directly. Meanwhile, the second part of the corpus articuli answers the question as formulated in the introduction of the question and its modification at the beginning of the corpus articuli – an indirect answer, moreover. Having presented arguments in support of the thesis that a will at variance with erring reason or with an erring conscience is not evil (this argumentation is founded on the differentiation of good, indifferent and evil actions), concludes that this solution is unreasonable. Why? Because the will always follows what reason puts forward, and it does so not only when it comes to indifferent actions, but also those that are good or evil. For the goodness of malice of the will depends on its object, however not on account of its nature, but on account of what has been accidentally apprehended by reason as evil or good306. If an erring reason presents good as evil to the will, then the will, pursuing that good, would be pursuing it as evil: it would therefore will evil, and would therefore be evil itself. A similar situation occurs when an erring reason presents evil as good to the will307. 3.2.3.2.2. Quaestiones disputatae De veritate The argument given in De veritate in support of the thesis that conscience is certainly binding, although more complex, does not essentially differ from that we encountered in the Summa theologie. In the corpus articuli Aquinas, referring to the view that a mistaken conscience does not bind in things which are intrinsically evil, but does bind with regard to indifferent things, explains in what sense conscience is binding. This obligation cannot be understood in the sense that we act rightly when fulfilling it, but rather that in not fulfilling it, we commit a sin. For this obligation does not make what one does according to it good, but makes it a sin not to follow what is prescribed by it. A certain remark that Aquinas makes is of importance here, namely that the obligation does not flow from the counsel (consilium) of conscience, but from the dictate of precepts (praecepta). 306 Thomas’s basic texts on conscience take up the issue of examining the goodness or malice of one’s own actions. For in our own conscience we also judge of other people’s actions. In a number of places, Aquinas sets down the rules we should follow in judging another. And so for example in matters subject to the judgment of public authorities, those wielding that authority (e.g. a judge) should mould his conscience not based on his own knowledge, but based on procedural evidence (S.th., II-II, q. 67, a. 2-3). One should also refrain from suspecting another of sin if there is no certainty about this (S.th., II-II, q. 100, a. 6, ad 2). 307 This problem returns for example in S.th., III, q. 80, a. 4, 5 and ad. 5, which refer to a sinner who is not conscious of his sin (peccator non habet conscientiam sui peccati), which unconsciousness can be through his fault (per culpam suam) or not.

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In light of this, he observes that the correct conscience binds absolutely and for an intrinsic reason (absolutely and in every case); the false binds in an accidental way – in a certain respect, or conditionally308. Out of the answers to the difficulties, the most important ones are answers 2, 4, 8 and 9. In answer 2 Aquinas explains that the dictate of conscience is nothing other than the delivery of a divine command to him who has conscience309. This statement would seem to complement the theory of conscience. In answer 4 Thomas differentiates between the unprobable (as should be rejected) and the probable conscience. If a false conscience persists, then it binds, but this does not mean that it binds absolutely and in every event)310. Answer 8 meanwhile treats of the fact that a false conscience can be rejected by removing the error. In answer 9, conscience is said to be a means by which not only the content of a precept is delivered, but also that which constitutes its reason (e.g. goodness as such or the order of a superior). 3.2.3.2.3. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum The argument given in the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum in favour of the thesis that a mistaken conscience binds, is the same as in the two later works. The question of interest to us, CSentA1, defines the article making up the question concerning the higher spark of reason (superiori scintilla rationis)311. It is posed following an analysis of whether synderesis can be extinguished and whether

308 “Secundum hoc enim ligare conscientia dicitur, quod aliquis, nisi conscientiam impleat, peccatum incurret; non autem hoc modo quod aliquis implens recte faciat. Alias enim consilium obligare diceretur: implens enim consilium recte agit; sed tamen ad consilia dicimur non ligari, quia qui consilium praeterit, non peccat; ad praecepta autem ligari dicimur, quia si non servamus praecepta, peccatum incurrimus. Non igitur propter hoc conscientia dicitur ad aliquid ligare, quod si illud fiat, ex tali conscientia bonum sit: sed quia si non fiat, peccatum incurritur. [...] Diversimode tamen recta conscientia et erronea ligat: recta quidem ligat simpliciler et per se; erronea autem secundum quid et per accidens. Dico autem rectam ligare simpliciter, quia ligat absolute et in omnem eventum. [...] Sed conscientia erronea non ligat nisi secundum quid et sub conditione”. De verit., q. 17, a. 4, c. 309 “[...] conscientiae dictamen nihil est aliud quam perventio praecepti divini ad eum qui conscientiam habet [...]”. De verit., q. 17, a. 4, ad. 2. 310 “[...] quod quando conscientia non est probabilis, tunc debet eam deponere; sed tamen dum manet, si contra eam faciat, mortaliter peccat. Unde per hoc non probatur quod conscientia erronea non liget dum manet, sed solum quod non ligat simpliciter et in omnem eventum”. De verit., q. 17, a. 4, ad. 4. 311 In II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 3; see: In II Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 2, sc 2.

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conscience can err. The argument, as such, is therefore of less interest to us than the way in which it is formulated, as in the corpus articuli: “Conscientia enim quoddam dictamen rationis est. Voluntas autem non movetur in aliquid appetendum, nisi praesupposita aliqua apprehensione: objectum enim voluntatis est bonum vel malum, secundum quod est imaginatum vel intellectum. Intentionem autem boni vel mali ratio ipsa demonstrat”.

“Conscience is certainly a dictate of reason. The will meanwhile is not moved by something desirable unless this has previously been apprehended: for the object of the will is good and evil, but only in as far as this has been imagined or intellectually grasped. Reason itself demonstrates the intention of doing good or evil”.

Replying to difficulty 3, Aquinas states, more explicitly than in De Veritate, that conscience is not binding of itself, but by virtue of the power of a divine precept: it commands doing something, not because of what is pleasing to it, but because this is the Divine precept, or because something is known as being a Divine precept312.

3.2.3.3. Whether a conscience is binding in its relation to law Among the questions regarding conscience, which define the problem areas of individual articles, we have also distinguished three which concern the issue of whether conscience is binding on account of its being consistent or at variance with the positive law (lex). We said that one of them pertains to the relation of conscience to the Divine law (CSthA2), and marked it with the symbol CACe-LD, while the remaining two are concerned with the relation to human law (C SthA3 and CDVA3), accordingly marked as CACe-Lh. Aquinas asks question CACe-LD in the Summa theologiae – Pars Prima Secundae, right after the question about whether an erring conscience is binding CACe. In both cases, however, the essence of the problem is not conveyed by the title formulas (let us recall that these were added to Aquinas’s text), but by those in the introduction to each of the articles. When Aquinas asks – in question 19, article 6 – whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against the law of God (as mentioned in the introduction to the question), he is concerned with 312 “[...] quod conscientia obligat non virtute propria, sed virtute praecepti divini: non enim conscientia dictat aliquid esse faciendum hac ratione, quia sibi videtur; sed hac ratione, quia a Deo praeceptum est; unde per accidens ex virtute divini praecepti obligat, inquantum dictat hoc ut praeceptum a Deo: et ideo dictamen conscientiae plus obligat quam praeceptum divinum, in cujus virtute ligat [...]” (In II Sent, d. 39, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3). It remains open to discussion whether Thomas has in mind here only the positive Divine law, or also natural law.

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whether an erring conscience excuses, as he explains at the beginning of the corpus articuli313. Resolving this question, Aquinas states ignorance sometimes causes an act to be involuntary, and sometimes not. In the latter case, the will obedient to an erring reason is evil, in the former – it is not. It is important for our reflection that an error of reason or conscience can be involuntary (when it is not caused by negligence) and voluntary (when reason or conscience err in that which they ought to know, either directly, or through negligence)314. And that which one ought to know is, to Aquinas, the Divine law. The failure to know it is something voluntary. Thus a will that abides by erring reason can be evil, because a will abiding by erring reason is evil and opposed to natural or positive Divine law. Also bearing in mind what has already been said about conscience, in particular with regard to its functioning, we should note that according to Thomas, conscience, although it does not obtain the knowledge to be applied to an act, bears responsibility if the knowledge that it is possible to obtain is lacking or if this knowledge is unreliable – a fact that the solution to difficulty 3 clearly confirms315. The problem of whether a conscience at variance with human law is binding, as defined by question CACe-Lh, receives treatment in the Summa theologiae and in De veritate316. The place in which the relevant articles occur suggests differences of argument. Question CSthA3, corresponding to question CACe-Lh, defines the problem of question 96, article 4, devoted to the power of human law. Hence the argument in support of the thesis that human law sometimes binds a man in conscience (in foro conscientiae), and sometimes not, is founded on the distinction between just and unjust laws. Just laws bind in conscience from the eternal law whence they are derived. Unjust laws never bind if they are opposed to the Divine law. Meanwhile if they are contrary to human good, they as a rule do not bind, unless it is to avoid a greater evil (to avoid scandal or disturbance)317.

313 “[...] sicut praemissa quaestio eadem est cum quaestione qua quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea liget; ita ista quaestio eadem est cum illa qua quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea excuset”. S.th., I-II, q. 19, a. 6, c. 314 “[...] ratio vel conscientia erret errorevoluntario, vel directe, vel propter negligentiam, quia est error circa id quod quis scire tenetur [...]”. S.th., I-II, q. 19, a. 6, c. 315 “[...] supposito errore rationis vel conscientiae qui procedit ex ignorantia non excusante, necesse est quod sequatur malum in voluntate. Nec tamen est homo perplexus: quia potest ab errore recedere, cum ignorantia sit vincibilis et voluntaria”. S.th., I-II, q. 19, a. 6, ad. 3. 316 We also find this subject mentioned in: In II Sent. d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, c. 317 S.th., I-II, q. 96, a. 4, c.

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In De veritate, question CDVA3, corresponding to question CACe-Lh, is the title of article 5 (the last) of the question regarding conscience. The argument supporting the thesis that one should be more obedient to one’s conscience than to one’s superior318 is based, on the one hand, on the observation that the obligation of conscience has its foundation in the force of Divine command (as demonstrated in article 3), and on the other, on the distinction between a correct conscience and a false conscience. By virtue of Divine law, a correct conscience binds even against the command of a superior. Hence a correct conscience binds absolutely and perfectly. Meanwhile, a false conscience binds against the command of a superior conditionally and imperfectly in indifferent matters, on condition that it endures and when not acting in accordance with it is a sin; and it does not bind when following a false conscience against the command of a superior, we avoid sin319. A remark made in the answer to difficulty 4, concluding the questions about conscience in De veritate, is also of importance to us. Thomas says that although it is true that a subject should not judge the command of the superior, but only his own fulfilment of it, nevertheless: “Unusquisque enim tenetur actus suos examinare ad scientiam quam a Deo habet, sive sit naturalis, sive acquisita, sive infusa: omnis enim homo debet secundum rationem agere”320.

“For each is bound to examine his actions according to the knowledge he has from God, whether natural, acquired, or infused. For every man should act according to reason”.

In this manner, solving the problem of whether a conscience at variance with human law is binding, Thomas returns to the thesis that the obligation of conscience has its foundation not in conscience as such, but in the precept applied to a particular act. In applying the knowledge of this precept, conscience must consider not only the content of the legal precept, but also, amongst other things, the competence of the lawgiver establishing it.

3.2.3.4. How conscience binds with respect to a particular act The last of the questions concerned with acting against or in accordance with conscience, refers to a particular act, namely taking Holy Communion. This question (CSentA2) is: Utrum peccet quis cum conscientia peccati mortalis corpus 318 “Ergo, videtur quod magis est obediendum conscientiae quam praelato”. De verit., q. 17, a. 5, sc. 319 De verit., q. 17, a. 5. c. 320 De verit., q. 17, a. 5. ad 4.

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Christi manducans – whether he who receives Christ’s body with consciousness of mortal sin, sins. We will not examine the replies to this question in detail because they contribute nothing new to our understanding of the teaching on conscience. We should, however, note that this is a new type of question. The prior questions of the CA type referred to the binding force of conscience in general, errors in the judgment of conscience and their consistency or inconsistency with Divine and human law. Meanwhile, CSentA2 focuses on a particular act, receiving Holy Communion, which can be expressed with the symbol CACC.

3.3. Summary The foregoing presentation of Aquinas’s teaching on conscience in the broad sense (including both synderesis and conscience) confirms that it is woven into the theological inquiry constituting the core of Aquinas’s system, that its natural (as opposed to supernatural) explanation is essentially and above all a metaphysical explanation321, and that its argumentation is determined by the scholastic didactic paradigm. For this reason, the order proper to philosophical inquiry, which should aim to explain the existence of conscience (conscientia) has been reversed in Aquinas’s works. This order was partially highlighted with the aid of the Aristotelian and Aquinian theory of questions. This outline brought to light the original givens of the teaching on conscience and the ensuing steps in the metaphysical discourse. From the philosophical point of view, the problem of conscience (conscientia) should precede the problem of synderesis. For synderesis, as a habit belonging to a particular power, is midway between potency and its realisation (act), and can therefore be known only by its act (per actum suum), and this in two ways: in the act itself, when in performing the act we recognise it as belonging to a particular habit322, and when we inquire into the nature and idea of the habit by considering the act323. In Thomas’s teaching on conscience the original datum given at departure is the existence of conscience (conscientia), i.e. its various acts. There is no doubt about this, thus the quaestio an est of conscience is never anywhere articulated, 321 The primacy of metaphysical explanation in Thomas’s teaching on conscience is evidenced by the altogether metaphysical problem defined by the questions basic to this teaching: SS i CS – questions about the mode of the existence of conscience and about its place in the ontological structure of man. 322 A habit is properly present in the act of which it is the cause. 323 S.th., I, q. 87, a. 2. Cf. In III Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 2; Contra Gent., II, 75. III, 46; De verit., q. 10, a. 8-9; Q. de an., a. 16, ad. 8; S.th., I, q. 87, a. 1.

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either explicitly or implicitly. One might say that conscience itself manifests its esse, while Aquinas only takes account of this. He does however explicitly answer quaestio quia, namely that conscience 1, witnesses, when we recognise or consider that we have done or failed to something; 2, binds or incites, when we judge (iudicamus) that something should or should not be done; 3, accuses, torments or rebukes when we judge (iudicamus) that what we have done is morally good or bad. Next to these observations one can mention others, enlarging the original knowledge which is then to be causally explained ( knowledge). The most important of these is a statement regarding the object of conscience (i.e. particular acts, chiefly one’s own, but also – in another way – those of others324), and establishing the possibility that conscience can make mistakes or be suppressed. These findings are for Thomas the basis for quaestio quid est conscientia. The answer to this question demands proof from the cause (demonstratio propter quid) in which we are no longer concerned with fact, but with cause knowledge). The thesis that conscience is an act is such an answer. It ( rests on the assumption that: we know that conscience (especially its functions) exists and is a fact, on the one hand, and we are familiar with the ontological structure of man, including – in particular – the mind. This final answer as to what conscience is was preceded in Thomas’s exposition by more specific answers to questions about the nature of conscience 325. It is above all the ordainment or application (applicatio) of knowledge or acquaintance with something (notitia) to something, namely to one’s own activity. In the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, the nature of conscience as the application of knowledge to something else is not portrayed “directly”, but elucidated systemically326 by reference to a practical syllogism327, in which conscience only examines the conclusions obtained from premises provided by the act of synderesis and reason or the assent of faith. In De veritate328, this “application” is explained more closely. In witnessing, conscience applies, to a par-

324 The role of conscience in the judgment of another’s act is only briefly referenced in Aquinas’s writings, although these mentions are worthy of note. 325 According to Aristotle and Thomas this would also be quaestio quid ( ), which has its grammatical basis. 326 Let us recall that according to Aristotle the demonstrative syllogism is the means by which scientific knowledge is obtained. In matters of practical action, the practical syllogism is applied. 327 In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 4, c. 328 De verit., q. 17, a. 1, c.

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ticular act, sensitive knowledge regarding that act 329. In binding or inciting, conscience, like theoretical discovery, proceeds from principles to conclusions. Meanwhile in accusing or excusing, it reduces conclusions to principles. Only the last two functions declare an act righteous or malicious, applying to it habits of practical reason – synderesis and wisdom, which perfect the higher reason, and science, which perfects the lower reason330. According to Thomas Aquinas, conscience is not the original source of knowledge or acquaintance with something, but only applies or ordains the knowledge or acquaintance obtained from elsewhere to a particular act. In spite of this, conscience is a certain type of knowledge which has its own proper object, and which realises the potentialities of a given power or habit. As such, it is a certain dictate of reason. Being knowledge, the judgment of conscience is independent from the judgment of free choice. This cognitive nature of conscience, coupled with the nature of the human act, gives rise to specific consequences when it comes to the binding of conscience, including an erring conscience. Although conscience as such is not the source of any universal precept, it nonetheless brings to light the knowledge of such precepts, which is a precondition for the precept to be binding in the fulfilment of a particular act. Will, on 329 We have already discussed difficulties in the interpretation of Thomas’s pronouncements on the presence of the senses in the cognition of an act. These pronouncements are comprehensible if we assume that Aquinas is chiefly talking about actions manifesting themselves in the body. 330 Only to these two functions can practical propositions, namely valuating, practical and normative as well as imperative propositions, be ascribed. These differ by virtue of their content, structure and the intensity of their practical force. This force is strongest in imperative propositions (issued by an act of the will), and weakest in valuating propositions (which retain the structure of theoretical propositions). Practical propositions are the linguistic symbol of valuating propositions, norms and commands, which Kalinowski defines in the following manner: (1) a valuating proposition, resulting from the cognitive intellectual act of judgment, is a proposition that ascribes a certain practical value to a given human activity; (2) a norm, resulting from the cognitive intellectual act of judgment, is a proposition that states the duty or possibility of doing or not doing something; (3) a command is an act of the intellect, undertaken following an act of the will, remaining under its influence and permeated by it, motivating its addressee to perform or to refrain from performing a particular act. The justification of practical propositions (1) and (2) as to their truth value is effected either by evidence (first judgments are justified by analytical self-evidence, recognised by the intellect habituated by the socalled habit of the first principles of action or art, or by indirect inference. Meanwhile propositions (3), expressing commands in the proper sense, do not have a truth value, and so also their proper justification, but only a specific practical value whereby they are either binding or non-binding, having its basis in the norm (cf. J. Kalinowski, Teoria poznania praktycznego, op. cit., 53-76).

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the other hand, can only follow what is brought to light by reason, while conscience is the means by which the agent subject knows moral precepts and their “justification”, their certainty as well as all the moments which constitute an action. Taking into account all of Thomas’s doctrine, one should say that conscience performs two tasks: a purely cognitive task, when it witnesses or judges an act done or being done, and a cognitive-creative task, when it co-constitutes an intended action, binding or inciting the will to do good and to refrain from evil. In light of the Aristotelian-Aquinian order of questions and the proper order of philosophical inquiry, the problem of synderesis appears when we ask why conscience is such and such, and in particular when we ask why it operates as it does (quaestio propter quid). Thomas seeks this reason in the intellectual powers and habits. At the same time he emphasises that although conscience can be informed by various cognitive (as well as sensitive) powers and habits, a special role is due to synderesis, since it is from synderesis, as the habit of the first principles of action, that the efficacy of all other practical powers and habits is derived. The habit of reflection or taking counsel, belonging to conscience, also depends on synderesis, analogously to the manner in which all the truth of theoretical reason depends on the first principles of knowledge. One should note that Thomas distinguishes between 1, synderesis as the habit of the first principles of action, 2,. the first principles of action inscribed in synderesis, among which are sometimes included the principles of natural law and the assent of faith, and 3, the act of synderesis which considers these principles. He also sometimes speaks of the judgment of synderesis, which is either equated with the act of synderesis or understood as the result of that act. In his doctrine on synderesis as a habit Thomas on the one hand draws upon systemic knowledge regarding the functioning of intellectual powers, theoretical and practical reasoning as such, which departs from per se nota first principles, as well as the theory of participation, and on the other, on certain immediate givens, such as that there is a reasoning proper to practical reason and that synderesis only inclines to good and reviles at evil. This last statement, founded on immediate givens, also enables Aquinas (with the aid of systemic solutions) to solve the problem of whether synderesis sins or errs331, where this problem becomes the subject of a separate article. In De veritate meanwhile, the answer to the question of whether synderesis can sin is clearly based on a systemic proof. The question regarding the sin or error of synderesis is ultimately a question 331 Let us recall that when speaking of synderesis, Thomas uses the term peccare, and not errare – as in the case of conscience.

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about the reason that would explain factual errors of conscience and indicate their source, namely: a false premise of reason or the faulty construction of a syllogism. We must add that Thomas draws a distinction between a syllogism based on two premises and the enthymeme when the minor premise follows directly from the universal judgment of synderesis and is unsaid332. In this second case conscience does not err. Nor does it err when, as a witness, it merely accuses the will for its action against conscience, although it can err when judging of what should and should not be done333. Ultimately, the systemic argumentation gives grounds for the statement that synderesis cannot be extinguished in the absolute sense. When it comes to conditional extinguishment, Aquinas seems to appeal to empirical data: 1. the impairment of bodily organs, which prevents free decision and the use of reason, 2. the stifling of reason by concupiscence or another passion.

332 Thomistic textbooks indicate that as opposed to the logical syllogism, the practical syllogism admits two additional premises (the polysyllogism, also called the multi-premise syllogism), one of which expresses moral knowledge, and the other empirical knowledge. Here is an example of such a syllogism: a) Evil should be avoided (the first principle of synderesis) b) Lying is an evil (moral knowledge) c) Therefore lying should be avoided (general conclusion) d) This act is a lie (empirical knowledge) e) Therefore this act should be avoided (practical, impersonal conclusion) f) I should avoid this act (judgment of conscience). This syllogism is analysed by A. Szostek, Normy i wyjątki. Filozoficzne aspekty dyskusji wokół norm ogólnie ważnych we współczesnej teologii, Lublin 1980, 33-35. 333 Cf. In II Sent. d. 39, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1.

Chapter Four Etymology of the Terms: “Conscience” and “Consciousness” and their Usage

On the starting point of his considerations, Thomas Aquinas refers to etymology of the word conscientia and the way it is understood secundum proprietatem vocabuli or proprie loquendo334. Thereby he is in harmony with his own theory of questions, where knowing a name’s meaning is one of the conditions for posing a sensible question. In the peripatetic tradition, a word, its etymology and meaning play an important role in research of the “thing itself”335. As was mentioned before, Aristotle ascertained that the reality of the term designations is the necessary condition of any definition, not only the real definition, but also a nominal one. As we have already emphasised, Aquinas gives a very simple etymology of the term conscientia (= cum alio scientia). It is worth pausing for a while and looking more closely at the etymology of two basic terms: synderesis and conscientia, especially as they occur in Aquinas’s science about conscience and the latter is translated in some languages as “consciousness” and “conscience”. 334 Cicero translates Greek word as veriloqium, i.e. “true way of speaking” – the way of speaking that respects “true sense of a word” (see: J. Picoche, Dictionnaire etymologique du français, Paris 1983, Introduction). On the other hand, Horace indicates that usually it is a custom, i.e. colloquial meaning of words in everyday speech, that decides on selection of words: “Usus quem penes arbitrium est et ius et norma loquendi.” (Horace, Ars poetica 71-72). Thomas connects these two approaches. 335 Here we refer to the phenomenological motto “zurück zu den Sachen selbst” to emphasise – despite differences – that in Thomas’s philosophy and in phenomenology it is about the "thing itself" that presents itself, not about its representative. It should also be noticed that linguistic analyses play important cognitive role in phenomenology. A. Pfänder ascertains clarification of the sense (Sinnklärung) of colloquial speech words as a necessary method preparing appropriate phenomenological research, which is to bring to things on their own. A. Pfänder, Phänomenologie des Wollens. Eine psychologische Analyse. Motive und Motivation, Leipzig 19302, 7-8; idem, Philosophie auf phänomenologischer Grundlage. Einleitung in die Philosophie und Phänomenologie, hrsg. E. AveLallemant, H. Spiegelberg, München 1973, 46-49. 56-72; idem, Ethik (Ethische Wertlehre und ethische Sollenslehre) in kurzer Darstellung, hrsg. P. Schwankl, München 1973, 53. 135.

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4.1. While searching for sources of two modern terms: “consciousness” and “con. It is a compound noun. Its root science”, we find the Greek word ( ) means knowledge, cognition. It originates from the verb , which may indicate common cognition, not proven scientifically, usual implies the condition of mind cerlooking or experiencing. In Aristotle, 336 tainty, characterising the highest level of knowledge, i.e. knowledge . – is a preposition equivalent to the English “with” and Polish “wraz” Prefix (together). origins from337 the expression , which Noun adopts three meanings: 1. to know something about somebody, especially to his/her disadvantage, 2. to know about something together with somebody else, to be initiated or complicit in something, 3. to see something clearly, to be sure. Xenophon, a disciple of Socrates, uses this verb, having in mind con-science about another man’s deed based on own co-experience. In Sophocles’ Antigone, this phrase is used as a designation of con-science about prohibited or reprehen, this knowledge is resible behaviour. In the expression ferred to own behaviour and this expression means “being aware of oneself, having somebody as a witness”, as it occurs in Plato’s The Symposium338. Both these meanings have often been connected, like in Plato's The Republic339, when Cephalus says about a man who is not aware (of himself) of any injustice (“Someone who knows that he hasn’t been unjust”). Such a connection of both can be omitted as meanings occurs occasionally in Aristotle340. However, Euripides does in Orestes, which results in declining the reference to itself for the benefit of something terrible having been done, which is known together with some other person. This condition of consciousness has also been called and described as “spiritual suffering, torment, torture”, which threatens me with destruction. In Aristotle, who was younger than Euripides, the term means knowledge, understanding something – as a synonym of words

336 Met. 981 a 24n; Phys. 194 b 18 et seq. 337 I use here two entries placed in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie: A. Diemer, Bewußtsein, Bd. 1, hrsg. J. Ritter, Basel-Stuttgart 1971, 888-896, and H. Reiner, Gewissen, art. cit., as well as the study by J. Stępień, Teologia świętego Pawła. Człowiek i Kościół w zbawczym planie Boga, Warszawa 1979, 39-79. 338 Sym. 216 b. 339 Rep. 331 a. 340 An. hist. 618 a 26.

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341 and , as opposed to “ignorance” ( ). In the is an active condition ( ): “quick wits”, “ability of unethical sense, (scientific derstanding”, which should be distinguished both from (common belief or opinion). concerns the same, knowledge) and so it connects with (practical wisdom or prudence), but does not identify with it: “For practical wisdom issues commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not to be done; but understanding only judges.”342 Alwin Diemer picks out also a Greek equivalent of consciousness in , (empathy, sensory perception), and (conservation, maintenance, safeguarding). Although they primarily indicate conscience, they include two significant moments of a more recent, modern notion of consciousness: synthetically synthesising currently occurring indicates these moments. Ludwig acts, experiences or conditions343. Prefix Klages344, to whom Diemer refers, sees the pre-concept of the idea of con(a thinking of sciousness in great measure in Aristotle’s term thinking, i.e. self-thinking thought)345, while Philip Merlan346 believes that Plotinus’s or (accompanying something, careful observation, awareness of what one is doing)347 is the closest to the modern notion of consciousness (more strictly: self-consciousness).

341 The term means the action of cognition, especially acquisition of knowledge through reasoning. In the broader meaning, it occurs in all places where it is about common cognition (ordinary knowledge). 342 Nic. Et. 1143 a 9. The end of this quotation in Greek sounds as follows: . 343 “[...] die synthetisch-synthetisierende Leitung der genannten Instanz sowie ihre begleitende, »konkomitierende« Funktion gegenüber jeweils gegebenen Akten, Erlebnissen und Zuständen”. A. Diemer, art. cit., 889. 344 L. Klages, Vom Wesen des Bewußtsein, Bonn 20085. 345 See: Met. 1072 b 18; 1074 b 34. According to Aristotle, the way of existence of divine mind is expressed in thinking about oneself as the best being, as well as thinking is a thinking’s thinking or thinking about thinking ( ). The phrase genetivus used here has a dual meaning: it means the subject fulfilling the action of thinking (thinking a thought – gen. subiectivus) or the object of thinking (thinking about thinking – gen. obiectivus). See: M. Auerbach, M. Golias, Gramatyka grecka, Warszawa 19854, 173. 346 Ph. Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness. Problems of the Soul in the Neoaristotelian and Neoplatonic Tradition, Den Haag 1963, 114 et seq. 347 G. Reale (see idem, Storia della filosofia antica, vol. 5, Lessico, indice e bibliografia, Milano 1989) assigns to Plotinus the establishment of the term of conscience as moral and intellectual consciousness, as a sense of human exceptionality against other things, as the ability of concentration on oneself and reaching the divine element. He also em-

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Therefore, it can be stated that the noun has adopted the following meanings in the pre-Christian era (sporadically from the fifth to second century before Christ and more often from the first century): (1) “con-science”, but referred only to own proceedings, “concomitant consciousness”, usually evaluating proceedings from the moral point of view (usually negatively); (2) substantially (without losing the meaning of “consciousness”) it is: (a) (sometimes) inner anxiety related to own wrong operations (psychological aspect); (b) attitude – if being free from such an anxiety is captured as the condition of “righteous conscience”; (c) authoritative instance, to which sometimes a sacral role has been assigned (identifying it with deity); (3) conscious “inside” of the man including his thoughts, attitudes, desires, thus consciousness, which is morally judged by itself or by external instances 348. Hans Reiner emphasises that in the meaning (1) has not been included in technical language of classical philosophers. It is completely absent in Plato and Aristotle349. While it has been in common use since the first century , introduced to philosophy by younger stoics, adopts before Christ. the meaning (3)350. has appeared also in Jewish and Christian antiquity. The term However, here it has been used mainly in the meaning of conscience351. Under

348 349

350 351

phasises that such an understanding of conscience that has lasted till today was prepared by the Socratic concept of and , Plato’s concept of internal man and state, actualising itself in internal man, Aristotle’s and old and new stoic school, where the terms , and conscientia already appeared. This transition to the meaning (3) is noticeable especially in places where “staining” is discussed. P. Siwek emphasises that Aristotle assigned to common sense some type of consciousness, i.e. reflexive cognition of sensual perception. This type of reflection should be differentiated from reflection in the strict sense, which is cognition of own intellectual acts. However, it does not mean that Aristotle used the term . See: P. Siwek, Experimental Psychology, New York 1959, 347-360. Epictetus, for example, demands purity from the sage, which he aligns with a spiritual leading power. The matter would require research that is more detailed; however, the signal to the above-mentioned statement is constituted by any reference to the Bible in the entry developed by G. Siewerts Bewußtsein in: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, hrsg. J.

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the influence of Hellenistic wisdom literature, mainly in the meaning of “inside” (human inside), this term appears in Hellenistic wisdom books in The Septuagint352. It is present in Philo of Alexandria in a similar meaning, becoming the main notion of his theology353. It adopts a broader scope of meaning in the New Testament. Con-science referring to the moral thing is the basic meaning. In several places, it adopts the meaning of “con-science of other people”354, however usually it is a con-science about the moral character of own proceedings, i.e. concomitant consciousness355. It occurs also as an instance of selfjustification or self-accusation and as “inside” (i.e. human inside)356. For Christians, conscience is always a common knowledge about God, hence its close relation with belief357. Conscience as “inside” dominates in the Apostolic Fathers. adopts the meaning In Ignatius and partially in Clement of Rome, of “conscience obedient” to orders of Church hierarchy. In Justin, it becomes again an autonomous and self-critical instance, which in the sense of the “Golden Rule” makes aware of the discrepancy between demands against others occurs in all and own proceedings. In the younger Church Fathers, meanings known from the New Testament.

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354 355 356

357

Höfer, K. Rahner, Bd. 2, Freiburg 1958, 329-330, where the entry Gewissen, developed by E. Schick, R. Hofmann and H. Häfner (art. cit., 859-867) has such a reference. Strictly speaking, the noun in the Old Testament occurs only in Eccl 10:20 and in Wis 17:10. In the New Testament, we do not see it in Evangels, except more recent variant Jn 8:9, while it belongs to the most frequently applied terms in the to the Christian glossary is assigned acepistles of Paul. Introduction of tually to Saint Paul. However, reality designated by this term occurs very often. More about conscience in the Bible see: X. Léon-Dufour, Conscience, in: Vocabulaire de théologie biblique, ed. X. Léon-Dufour, Paris 200913; J. Stępień, op. cit., 47-79. According to Philo, God puts into man, creating a demonstrational (assessing) centre for own good or bad proceedings. It is a witness of all secret plans and becomes an internal accuser, even judge. It calls for conversion. In addition, the function of previous perception is assigned to it. See: H. Reiner, art. cit., 578. See: 2 Cor 4:2; 5:11. Rarely, occurs with the genitival noun adjunct, e.g. consciousness of sins (Heb 10:2) or consciousness of God (1 Pet 2:19). The conscience testimony is discussed (Rom 2:15; 2 Cor 1:12; 1 Cor 10:25.28; 10:29). Such an opinion refers mainly and firstly to specific individual own proceedings, but also to some kinds or types of proceedings (1 Cor 8:7-12; 10:25-29); in the case of doubts is able and entitled to own decisions – this is how independent it is (1 Cor 10:29; Rom 14:23). Having such an instance is assigned to each man, pagans as well (Rom 2:14-15; 2 Cor 4:2). Conscience opinion is valid for a person in question (Rom 2:14-15; 13:7). In more recent post-Paul works, is understood as “inside” (Heb 9:9). 2 Cor 1:12; Acts 23:1; 1 Pet 2:19; 3:21.

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358 The term , which essentially affected the medieval theory of conscience, appeared in the initiated by Origen359 chain of identifying living in a human being or with the spirit360, which is in the soul, with teaches it and manages it, thus giving it particular historical importance. Further, Origen identifies this “spiritus praesidens animae” with a spiritual strength materialised in Ezekiel’s vision as an eagle361. Jerome refers to this in his commentary and as the on Ezekiel. He writes about the power that Greeks call spark of conscience (scintilla conscientiae), it was not extinguished in Cain despite his sins362. In the Bible, this spark is called the spirit (spiritus). Paul writes to the Thessalonians that it should be kept (servari) untouched by body and soul363. It could be read in this text and especially in the verb servari that protecting or guarding is the significant task of scintilla conscientiae. When in the mid twelfth century, because of a mistake caused by the term servari occurring in Jerome’s instead of article and marginal gloss referring to it, there appeared and dominated medieval science about conscience, seeing in the driving force different from conscientia.

4.2. Conscientia Latin conscientia is a calque of the Greek . It consists of the core scientia (knowledge of something or a skill, knowledge, branch of knowledge) and the prefix co(n) – which means the same as the preposition cum and expresses accompanying somebody, relationship or relation, having something, synchronism, translated as “with”, “together with”, “in connection” or “company with”. The noun scientia origins from the participle sciens, -entis, translated adjectively as “knowing about something”, “being aware of something”, “doing something deliberately”, “being familiar with something”, “being able to do something”, “competent”, and nominally as “somebody who knows what’s

358 It origins from the verb : to keep, store, protect against something, strictly follow. 359 Origen introduces the metaphor of a spur ( , stimulus) and worm ( , vermis). See: H. Reiner, art. cit., 580-581. He refers to J. Stelzenbergere, Syneidesis bei Origenes, Paderborn 1963, who is the author of many studies concerning the terms of syneidesis and conscientia. 360 Thomas Aquinas knew about this perfectly. See: S.th., I, q. 13, 1. 361 In Ez. Hom. I, 16, PG 13, 681 b. 362 “[...] quam Graeci vocant , quae scintilla conscientiae in Cain quoque peccatore [...] non exstinguitur”. As cited in: Reiner, art. cit., 581. 363 In Ez. I, 1 6/8, PL 25; 1 Thess 5: 23.

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what”, “specialist”, “expert”. Conscientia and scientia are derivatives – respectively – from the following verbs: conscire (to feel guilty, to know something well) and scire (to learn, to know something, to realize something, etc.). The term conscientia means as follows: (1) knowledge about something common with somebody, co-knowledge; (2) consciousness of own moral value and merits or committed guilt and misdemeanours; (3) conscience not burdened with any guilt or bad (compunction); (4) knowledge, familiarity with something. In Latin, the term conscientia appeared in the first century BC364, thus at the . Consciensame time as a more and more common use of the term , but Diemer perceives difficulties in tia is a calque of the Greek transition from Greek terminology to the Latin one. He thinks that reconstruction of meanings of Greek terms is far from the meaning of conscientia as conscience. Latin Antiquity knew the term conscientia mainly as consciousness, although cogitatio, apperceptio and sensus internus can also be translated as “consciousness”. Nevertheless, in Latin, conscientia occurs in the meaning of both consciousness and conscience. We can find a double meaning often at Seneca and Cicero. The latter defines conscientia as “certissima scientia et (ut sic dicam) certitudo eius rei quae animo nostro inest: sive bonum, sive malum”365. Meanings overlap, but after Reiner, we can distinguish the following meanings of the term conscientia occurring with the Romans: (1) “con-science” is a basic meaning – and it is: (a) rather con-science unrelated with the moral context, concomitant consciousness, while sometimes human “inside” is emphasised, also without moral reference, only in the sense of something that is hidden for another person; (b) con-science of another person or common knowledge; (c) knowledge and cognition; (2) materially (here moral context also does not come to the fore) it is: (a) (i) consciousness of something evaluated positively, which, though, is not equal with “good conscience”; (ii) consciousness of proceedings evaluated negatively366, i.e. conscience, but sometimes in improper form as the fear of punishment or twinge of conscience; 364 As the first, Auctor ad Herennium had used this term, then many times Cicero, even more often Seneca and occasionally Livius, Tacitus, Pliny the Younger, Quintilian, Suetonius and others. 365 Cicero, Pro Milone, 63; as cited in: A. Diemer, art. cit., 890. 366 E.g. at Cicero conscientia occurs clearly as conscience.

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(b) basis: “recta conscientia” and “mala conscientia”367; (c) internal witness equipped with divine authority entitled to autonomy368. In Latin studies by the Church Fathers, in the meaning of conscience, conscientia occurs the most often in Tertulian and then in Augustine in full meaning. The Bishop of Hippo Regius emphasises more clearly than the New Testament that conscientia of Christians is always simultaneously the knowledge about own condition “against God” (coram Deo), which means also before the face of God (in conspectu Dei). For Augustine, conscientia is a con-science because God from His side also knows secrets of conscience369. The meaning of “inside” occurs clearly, while Augustine defines the “Golden Rule” (one should not treat others in ways that one would not like to be treated) as “scripta conscientia”370, but also “lex naturalis”371. Thomas Aquinas takes over this term. In his works, conscientia does not lose the relation with its meaning as consciousness even where it occurs in the context of morality (as conscience). Diemer ascertains even that in Aquinas’s studies, conscientia in its function of provision clearly indicates the unity of both meanings of this term, namely consciousness and conscience372. Formation of the modern notion of consciousness free from the term of conscience is assigned to René Descartes, although the idea of consciousness occurs rarely in his works and always in connection with the term cogitatio373. Nevertheless, since his works, consciousness has become a central anthropological problem as a significant moment constituting the man.

4.3. “Conscience” and “consciousness” in modern languages In modern (European) languages, we see a double phenomenon: 1. creation of terms corresponding with the term conscientia on its basis and based on native words, 2. linguistic differentiation of both meanings of the term conscientia, i.e. consciousness and conscience, and their non-differentiation. 367 368 369 370 371

E.g. at Seneca. Such is Cicero’s understanding of conscientia. See: Mt 6:4; Heb 4:13. See: e.g. Conf. 10:22. Conf. 1, 18. God wrote this law in hearts, God speaks in conscientia. Ep. 157, 3, 15; En in Ps. 57, 1; Sermo 12, 4. 372 A. Diemer, art. cit., 890. 373 Idem.

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The term conscientia lies at the heart of Romance and English terminology. In the French language374, in both meanings: as consciousness and conscience, only one term is applied: conscience. It appeared in the twelfth century and constitutes a simple acquisition of the Latin equivalent. Sometimes in the philosophical language, in order to distinguish both meanings, it appears in the following form: conscience psychologique (consciousness) and conscience morale (conscience)375. Conscience, especially in the meaning of consciousness, within the French language is considered purely a philosophical term. In the meaning of spontaneous consciousness, the word sentiment is applied, while connaissance – as reflective consciousness. In colloquial language, this word occurs much more frequently than conscience or sentiment. The Italian word coscienza also origins from the Latin conscientia376. Apart from consciousness and conscience, it means also as follows: sense of duty, responsibility, and conscientiousness. Similarly to the French language, the word consapevolezza appears in the meaning of consciousness or realising something. The English language377 distinguishes consciousness in the sense of awareness and conscience in the sense of conscience, which is “consciousness of moral worth”378. Similarly to the French and Italian language, both English words are derivatives from the Latin. Conscience closer to the Latin prototype appeared in the first half of the thirteenth century in place of the previous Old English term inwit, in the meaning of moral sense of what is good or bad. One century later, consciousness appeared in the meaning of awareness of oneself, internal cognition or confidence. Two words occur in the German language379. The older one comes from the eleventh century – it is Gewissen meaning “conscience”: consciousness of moral proceedings. It appeared in the German language due to the gloss to Psalm 374 I use the following dictionaries: H. Bénac, Dictionnaire des synonymes, Paris 1956; A. Dauzat, J. Dubois, H. Mitterand, Dictionnaire étymologique et historique du français, Paris 1964; A. Dauzat, J. Dubois, H. Mitterand, Nouveau dictionnaire étymologique et historique, Paris 19682; J. Picoche, op. cit. 375 A. Lalande, op. cit., 173-176. 376 See: F. Palazzi, Novissimo dizionario della lingua italiana, Milano br18; A. Prati, Vocabolario etimologico italiano, Milano 1970. 377 See: J.T. Shipley, Dictionary of Word Origins, New York 19492; The Oxford English Dictionary, prep. J.A. Simpson, E.S.C. Weiner, t. 3, Oxford 1989, 754-756; The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, ed. C.T. Onions, G.W.S. Friedrichsen, R.W. Burchfield, Oxford 19925. 378 J.M. Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, ed. 1, 1905, new ed.: Gloucester, Mass.: P. Smith, 1960, 215. art. “conscience”. 379 See: H. Reiner, art. cit.; A. Diemer, art., cit., as well as: Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen. A-G, ed. W. Pfeifer, Berlin 1989.

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68:20. While translating it, Notker Teutonics applied the calque of Latin conscientia. Gewissen origins from the Old High German380 abstractive deadjectival noun giwizzani, formed from the past participle giwizzan of the verb wizzan (wissen – to know). The term Bewußtsein is more recent than Gewissen (it appeared in the fifteenth century) and it refers to consciousness. Actually, the infinitive took the form of a noun. As a pure infinitive, bewusst sein is a translation of Latin sibi conscium esse present in old glossaries381. The noun itself occurs in four forms of notation: Bewußt sein, Bewußtsein, Bewußt-sein, bewußt Sein. The first form occurs in Christian Wolff382 and constitutes a translation of the Cartesian term conscientia. Karl P. Kisker formed Bewußt-sein analogously to Heidegger’s term Da-sein. It occurred in his German translation of French psychiatrist Henri Ey’s study about consciousness in 1967383. H. Biäsch created the fourth form of the notation bewußt Sein384. Bewußtsein became a philosophical term thanks to Wolff in 1719. Etymological beginnings of this term reach the Middle High German form bewust, present next to forms: bewist and bewüst, which is a participial form of the verb bewissen falling into disuse (to know thoroughly or – in the reflexive form – to be familiar with something). That word was built by addition to forms created from the verb wissen of the prefix be (bi), observed already in the eighth century in the Old High German present participle unbiwizzanti, being the equivalent of the Latin ignorans. The Polish sumienie385 means actually “doubt”386. In the fifteenth century, it occurred in the form sąmnienie and sampnienie, while in the nineteenth century it was sumnienie. It consists of the prefix są, which in the Polish language has

380 Old High German language, covering in the years 700-1100 the area of central and southern Germany, went between in the flow of Christian Greek and Latin terminology to the Slavic languages. See: Z. Klemensiewicz, Historia języka polskiego, part 1, Warszawa 1961, 24-27, and the statement of Jan Miodek on TV, Ojczyzna-polszczyzna: Język polski w Europie. Dziedzictwo germańskie, 1.03.2003. 381 Diemer refers to B. Farbers, Thesaurus eruditionis scholasticae, the first edition of which was published in 1571. 382 In the form that is not present today: Bewust seyn. Chr. Wolff, Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt, Hale 1719, t. 1, cap. 3, § 194, reprint: Hildesheim 1997; as cited in: A. Diemer, art. cit., 890. 383 Original title: H. Ey, La conscience, Paris 1963. 384 H. Biäsch, Modalität und Bewußtsein, PsR 2 (1951) 194-203. 385 A. Brückner, Słownik etymologiczny języka polskiego, Warszawa 19895, 341-342. 482. 526. 386 In Church Slavonic language: sąmineti se means: to suspect; sumnenje, sumnia, sumlja, sum – suspicion; in Serbian language: sumnia – doubt.

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collateral su – it is a non-separate preposition which means “commonality”387. The root mnie means, “to think one way or another”. “Consciousness” seems to be more recent than “conscience”. It is a derivative from the verb świadczyć, through the adjective świadom, świadomy, which means: “known from experience”, “experienced”, “well-informed”, “knowing”. In the passive meaning, it is “known to someone”. Świadomość is “information from experience”388. According to principles of word formation, the noun świadomość was formed through adding the formative –ość to the root of the adjective świadomy. This formative not only indicates that it is the abstract noun, but also that it is the name of a specific condition, namely “being conscious”389. Therefore, it can be said that “conscience” and “consciousness” are etymologically identical. Differences are clearer when we consider phrasemes. We say that we are “conscious of something”, not that we are “conscientious of something”. There is the “obligation to follow one’s conscience”, “we are guided by conscience”, “we follow the conscience, by conscience, contrary to conscience”. All these phrases indicate the moral aspect of proceedings. However, if we say that we “followed the consciousness”, we keep in mind only the cognitive aspect. This semantic difference is more obvious when we consider phrases talking about “lack of conscience” or “being conscienceless” and about “lack of consciousness”, “loss of consciousness or recovery”, “gaining consciousness”. Therefore, we say only about “pangs of conscience”, “salving one’s conscience”, “being conscious-stricken”, “having something on one’s conscience”, “freedom of conscience” or “being on somebody’s conscience”. However, there are also phrasemes that bring both terms closer to each other with regard to their meaning, e.g.: “awakening or pricking somebody’s conscience” and “awakening of somebody’s consciousness”, “sensitive conscience” and “awakening, deep, full, narrowed, living consciousness”.

4.4. Summary The above terminological analyses show that two key terms present in Thomas’s science about conscience, namely conscientia and synderesis, should be consid: the first one as its ered as originating from the Greek word calque, the latter as a copier’s mistake that occurred relatively later. Medieval 387 E.g. Polish “sąsiad”, “sąsiedni” (“neighbour”, “neighbouring”) is the one who sits with me. 388 S.B. Linde, Słownik języka polskiego, vol. 5, Lwów 1859, reprint: Warszawa 1995, 511-512. 389 See: S. Szober, Gramatyka języka polskiego, Warszawa 1957, 115. 125.

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understanding of synderesis, as it is noticeable in Thomas’s teaching, joins on (and its Latin equivalent), the one hand the whole content of while on the other hand material, metaphysical explanation of the fact of conscience through indication of its constant, durable reason, whose features are . Synderesis is not the Latin equivalent of included in the word , but it bears new contents as a rule. Contrary to the Greek and “conscientia”, “synderesis” does not function in colloquial language, but it is a technical term of scholasticism, thus often it is not translated. Nevertheless, the Polish translation of this term proposed by Stefan Swieżawski is interesting: pre-conscience or proto-conscience. It indicates a strong relation of proto-conscience (synderesis) with conscience, referring to a range of meanings of Greek and Latin terms. and Latin “conscientia” oscillate between the modThe Greek ern meaning of “conscience” and “consciousness”, while conscience as the consciousness of moral good or evil dominated in Antiquity and the Middle Ages over the neutral notion of consciousness, which has been dominating in philosophy since Descartes. In modern languages originating from Latin, both meanings of the term “conscientia” are referred to by one term or by terms keeping the root of the Latin term, while equivalents of “consciousness”, in contrast to equivalents of “conscience”, have been subject to advanced mutation and appeared later, as if mapping the chronology of the appearance of meanings of its Greek and Latin equivalent. In German, English and Polish, although “conscientia” is expressed by two different words, they are semantically convergent with regard to their structure and etymology. Semantic proximity of “conscience” and “consciousness” results from the fact that they are derivatives from verbs indicating acquiring or having knowledge, which would be another argument for the cognitive character of conscience and consciousness. In spite of their synonymousness, their translatability is essentially unilateral: usually “conscience” can be expressed by “consciousness”, but not conversely. Therefore, they are not synonymous.

Chapter Five The Human Act as the Object of Conscience

Defining conscience (conscientia), Aquinas designated it (amongst other things) as the application of our knowledge to something (ad aliquid) and indicated that that to which this knowledge is applied is the particular action (ad aliquem actum particularem), i.e. what we do (ad ea quae agimus)390. The context in which the statement occurs and its literal formulation seem to indicate that Aquinas was above all concerned with the own act of the subject of conscience 391, although we find suggestion in his works that at times the actions of others are also subject to the judgment of conscience392. Although we are interested in the cognitive aspect of conscience, we will need to analyse action as its object. This manner of proceeding is justified, both from the standpoint of Thomistic philosophy, and phenomenology. In his analyses of psychological structures, Aquinas gives primacy to the study of objects as such, and only then to the identification of the acts, habits and powers proper to them. In this he applies the Aristotelian principle which states that the species of an act is determined by its object393 – not by the material, but by the formal object proper and adequate to a given act. Phenomenological studies have also shown that there exists an essential correlation between acts of consciousness and their object. Basic types of objects of consciousness (including objects of knowledge) have their corresponding acts or courses of consciousness, while

390 Cf. S.th., I, q. 79, a. 13, c; De verit., q. 17, a. 1, c; In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 4, c. 391 In De veritate Aquinas explicitly writes: “Unusquisque enim tenetur actus suos examinare ad scientiam quam a Deo habet, sive sit naturalis, sive acquisita, sive infusa: omnis enim homo debet secundum rationem agere”. De verit., q. 17, a. 5. ad 4. Similarly in the commentary on the Sentences: “[…] vel etiam quia per eam aliquis sibi conscius est eorum quae fecit, vel facere intendit [...]”. In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 4, c. 392 Cf. S.th., II-II, q. 67, a. 2-3; q. 100, a. 6, ad. 2. These suggestions are interesting. They would confirm that the noun (the Greek equivalent of conscientia) means not only co-knowledge of one’s own act, but also – and this in the initial meaning – co-knowledge about the act of another based on one’s own co-experience. Cf. chapter 4.1 of this work. 393 “[...] actus habet speciem ab obiecto”. S.th., I, q. 87, a. 4, 2. ad 2.

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specific kinds of acts of consciousness correspond to the specific structures and properties of objects394.

5.1. Human acts and acts of man That which differentiates a human act in the set of all objects is the experience of I have of myself. For in experiencing myself I sometimes also experience that I “am acting”, or that “something is happening in me”. In the first case I feel myself the agent, in the second, that something takes place in me “in spite of my will” or sometimes even “against my will”, something of which I do not feel myself to be the cause. In question 1, in the opening of the second part of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas recognises that only those actions of which one is master deserve the name of “human” actions or actions proper to man as man. These actions include only those that proceed from a deliberate will. Only these does man control (only of these is he master) in the full sense of the word395. This leads Aquinas to distinguish between the human act (actus humanus) and the act of man (actus hominis). Embracing this distinction, Karol Wojtyła defines actus humanus as the act of a person, and explains that the Latin term points to a certain interpretation of the act, rooted in the concept of potentia-actus, by which Aristotelians and Thomists explain the variability and dynamism of being. He points to a certain kind of becoming, which occurs in the potentiality of a personal subject, i.e. to a

394 Husserl recognised the object of consciousness as the clue of the constitution effected in consciousness (cf. idem, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, hrsg. von S. Strasser, The Hague 19632, 87-91. 122-124), which made the problem of being the ultimate horizon of the problem of consciousness (cf. E. Fink, Das Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls, in: idem, Studien zur Phänomenologie 1930-1939, Den Haag 1966, 189). With respect to the cognition of a literary work the problem of the adaptation of cognition to the basic structure of the object of cognition was taken up by Ingarden (cf. idem, O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego, transl. D. Gierulanka, Warszawa 1976, 15-19). 395 “Respondeo dicendum quod actionum quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae proprie dicuntur humanae, quae sunt propriae hominis inquantum est homo. Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod est suorum actuum dominus. Unde illae solae actiones vocantur proprie humanae, quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem, unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt”. S.th., I-II, q. 1, a. 1, c.

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certain ontic structure, and not only to the way in which it manifests itself396. Contrary to the human act (actus humanus), in the act of man (actus hominis), in which something happens independently of man’s will, the human person as a specific “self” does not act, and so does not experience his agency as a “self”, an “I”, even though he is the subject of what happens in him. Not so with the human act. In experiencing my act I feel myself the subject and the agent of that act, whereby it becomes clear that the moment of agency constitutes an action as an action397. The problem of the human act is resolved somewhat differently by Jerzy Kalinowski, who thinks that the human act can be understood either as an act of reason or an act of will, or yet an act of man jointly brought into being by both of his intellectual powers. The essence and structure of the act thus understood make it possible to examine on the cognitive, appetitive and productive plane. On the cognitive plane, the act manifests itself as the contemplation of reality , contemplatio). On the appetitive plane the act turns out to be moral, ( since in performing it man takes a positive or negative attitude toward his final and objective good and end. When the act is examined in its productive aspect, it turns out that the product of an act can be the act itself (e.g. the product of running is running) or a certain specific change brought about by it in the world (in the agent or outside him). The fact that every human act forms the man who performs it, makes every human act a moral one. Moreover - as Kalinowski firmly underlines - contemplation, behaviour and production are not types, but aspects of human action. Every action can therefore be considered under three aspects, for everyone at once has a moral and contemplative aspect, or a moral and productive aspect, or a moral aspect alone398. We encounter yet another, unopposed definition of the actus humanus in the work of Tadeusz Ślipko. Ślipko defines the actus humanus as an act which, insofar as agency is concerned, proceeds from the will of man, compelled to action by rational knowledge of the good (man’s end) as its intended effect399. This act he calls rational (voluntarium), and adds that what it needs to come into being are the causative participation of the will and knowledge of the good as man’s end. 396 K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, op. cit., 73-76. 397 Ibid., 109-124. 398 J. Kalinowski, Teoria poznania praktycznego, op. cit., 49-53. Kalinowski cites K. Twardowski’s, O czynnościach i wytworach, in: Księga pamiątkowa ku uczczeniu 250tej rocznicy założenia Uniwersytetu Lwowskiego przez króla Jana Kazimierza, Kraków 1911, 3 et seq. (this text was recently published in: Psychologia w szkole lwowsko-warszawskiej, ed. T. Rzepa, Warszawa 1997, 109-141). 399 T. Ślipko, Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit., 63.

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In light of the designations cited here it must be concluded that the object of conscience is not what takes place in us in spite of our will or involuntarily, a type of involuntary action or volition-less becoming, but what we ourselves do consciously and of our own accord, and what we call an act. Only over this type of act is the agent master, and it is properly what can be called actus humanus. The strict connection between act and agent which comes to light in the cognition of the act, finds its ontic explanation in the accidental mode of being. For an act is a being which of necessity is in something else as its subject (esse in alio)400. The act’s accidental mode points to its determination by a subject, thanks to which it exists. In the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas the subject of an act is always a concrete person, when he or she acts humanly, i.e. in accordance with human nature, and so as a rational and free being. For Thomas, intellect and will are powers of the human soul, intellectual powers, because the human soul is an intellectual being (intellectuale). As a form, the soul is a substance, an incomplete one, granted, but one that is the subject of its accidents. In the strict sense, it is the subject (subiectum) of intellectual powers and their actions; in the broad sense, the subject of all the powers, including the bodily or sensitive, belonging to the human compositum as their principium. This is why all human actions contain an intellectual component, while acts of intellect and will are sensu stricto intellectual and conscious actions401. This is why Karol Wojtyła says that “By an act we mean only the c o n s c i o u s a c t i v i t y of man”402, and that when we say “conscious action”, we thereby state that this action is effected in a manner proper to and characteristic of the will403. The intellectual and conscious nature of action is of key significance to its cognition. One should also underline the ontic connection of an act with its sub-

400 In IV Sent. d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2. Thomas, alluding to the Metaphysics of Avicenna defines substance (and accident) in the following way: “[...] per se existere non est definitio substantiae: quia per hoc non demonstratur quidditas ejus, sed ejus esse; [...] sed definitio, vel quasi definitio, substantiae est res habens quidditatem, cui acquiritur esse, vel debetur, ut non in alio; et similiter esse in subjecto non est definitio accidentis, sed e contrario res cui debetur esse in alio; et hoc nunquam separatur ab aliquo accidente, nec separari potest: quia illi rei quae est accidens, secundum rationem suae quidditatis semper debetur esse in alio”. 401 In this statement we are referring to those acts of intellect and will that constitute actions, i.e. cognition and volition. This does not mean that the operation of mind is fully conscious. The process of abstraction, which takes place in the intellect, is an example of the unconscious operation of mind. 402 K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, op. cit., 73. 403 Ibid., 76.

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ject, the human suppositum. In performing an action, man impresses his personal mark upon it, the mark of his own nature; it is in the act that he makes himself known to himself and to others.

5.2. The human act as moral The issue of the morality of the act is important 404 from the viewpoint of the subject of this work, because due to its moral character an act is the object of conscience. To begin, we must note that we ascribe morality not only to acts405, but also to judgments and norms, experiences, attitudes and models. We also speak of moral sense or moral feeling, and finally of moral man. Despite this, the human act is the terminus ad quem of morality406. Morality denotes concrete human activities, man’s specific manner of being as man, a person’s mode of being as a person, consisting in the actualisation of one’s potential. Judgments, norms, experiences, attitudes and models can be called moral only by metonymy on account of their reference to human activity. In taking up the problem of morality one must draw a clear distinction between questions about the essence of morality and questions about its basis, norms and criteria407. The first of these is of interest to us. If we acknowledge 404 The morality of acts is, strictly speaking, an ethical problem, which it is not our purpose to address. Discussions on the notion of morality have been going on for years in Poland, and elsewhere. There is abundant literature on this subject. One has but to mention the works of K. Frenkel, J. Woroniecki, J. Keller, T. Kotarbiński, I. Lazari-Pawłowska, M. Ossowska, F.W. Bednarski, T. Ślipko, H. Juros, T. Styczeń, A. Szostek, A. Rodziński, B. Chyrowicz, T. Sikorski. 405 That is why – it seems – moral philosophers treat the fact or morality or the ethical fact as the object of ethics or moral science in their point of departure. T. Ślipko, for example, considers a compound of phenomena (the phenomenon of morality) discovered in human consciousness as precisely such a fact, encompassing the experience of values, duty, the pursuit of ends, conscience, acts of choice and decision – defining our moral conduct in a way proper unto itself. Although in his view so-called primary facts are of significance for the structure of morality, including: the pursuit of ends, the experience of values and the experience of imperatives. Cf. T. Ślipko, Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit., 35-38. 406 Cf. T. Styczeń, A. Szostek, Uwagi o istocie moralności, in: T. Styczeń, W drodze do etyki, Lublin 1984, 140. 407 We find an example of when the two are mixed up in the work of C.H. Moonen, Die Bestimmung der Sittlichkeit. Eine kritische Untersuchung, Roma 1993. Already in the introduction (Einleitung) he writes: “In den Veröffentlichungen der Letzten Dezennien auf dem Gebiet der katholischen Fundamental-Moraltheologie finden sich mehrere Ver-

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that the object of conscience is the human act as moral, then we must answer the question of whether the quality of morality belongs to an act on account of the fact that it is one, or because it remains in a relation to something else, for example, that it is performed in view of some particular good or value. For Aquinas, every act (actus humanus) is at once a moral act (actus moralis), because it proceeds from a deliberate will408. The epithet “moral” only underscores what is characteristic of the human mode of being, namely that man as man directs himself in a rational and free way. That is why it is claimed that all rational and free acts of man, by which he defines himself, have a reference to moral norms: they are either consistent with them or opposed to them409. Jacek Woroniecki recognises all of man’s acts which “he commits consciously and deliberately, and for which he is responsible” 410 as moral. A similar position is taken by Wojtyła, who thinks that all acts have a moral value. This value is an inner property of the act on account of the fact that only a person can be an agent – something that cannot be said of the activity of subjects which are not persons411. For the act – according to the Aristotelian and Thomistic concept - is a special kind of actualisation of the personal agent subject, an

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suche, die Sittlichkeit, den sittlichen Wert oder Unwert menschlicher Handlungen, in neuer Weise zu bestimmen. Diese Versuche sind die Folge einer Abwendung von Objekt, Zweck (finis operantis) und Umständen bestimmt. [...] In dieser Studie ist für uns folgendes wichtig: Die ganze Polemik um theologische Normenbestimmung und die damit zusammenhängenden Ablehnung der in der katholischen Moraltheologie bisher traditionellen Lehre über Objekt Zweck (Ziel) und Umstand als bestimmende Elemente für den sittlichen Charakter menschlicher Handlungen, geht u.E. von einer irrigen Inhaltsbestimmung des Begriffes ‘Objekt der Handlung’ aus” (ibid., 7-8). These two problems, defined by the pair of questions: “What is morality?” (a question about the essence of morality) and “What should I do and why?” (a question about the moral norm and its foundation), are clearly differentiated by T. Biesaga (cf. idem, Spór o normę moralności, Kraków 1998, 9), citing K. Wojtyła Człowiek w polu odpowiedzialności (Rome-Lublin 1991), T. Styczeń Problematyka etyczna a życie and Uwagi o istocie moralności (coauthored by A. Szostek), published in Wprowadzenie do etyki (Lublin 1993) as well as A. Szostek O dwóch typach sytuacji macierzystej etyki (ZN KUL 16 (1973) 2, 61-63). This is evidenced by the following statements: “[...] actus nostri dicuntur morales secundum quod a ratione ordinatur in finem voluntatis; ex hoc enim habent rationem boni vel mali” (In IV Sent. d. 16, q. 3, a. 1-1, c.); “[...] actus dicuntur humani, inquantum procedunt a voluntate deliberata. [...] et quia, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, mores proprie dicuntur humani, actus morales proprie speciem sortiuntur ex fine, nam idem sunt actus morales et actus humani” (S.th., I-II, q. 1, a. 3, c.); “Dicuntur autem aliqui actus humani, vel morales, secundum quod sunt a ratione” (S.th., I-II, q. 18, a. 5, c.). Cf. C.H. Moonen, op. cit., 17 et seq. J. Woroniecki, op. cit., vol. 1, 31. K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, op. cit., 59.

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actualisation of will guided by reason412. Hence, according to Wojtyła, the essence of moral life should be sought in the agency of a person, in their causative attitude toward good and evil413: as the author of an act, man at once fulfils himself in it414. A moral person comes into being, becoming good or bad. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec also ascribes the attribute of “morality” to all acts. This is manifest most of all in his conception of decision as the real source of moral action and being. The act of decision (and not only it) is a moral entity because “as a whole” it is ordained to the norm of decent (i.e. moral) conduct, which is the real nature of being discovered by the intellect in theoretical cognition, and above all, the nature of man and other creatures. The reason justifying the morality of a decision as a moral being is anthropological (metaphysical). Krąpiec claims that all decisions at the basis of human activity are an integral part of being human, and as such have an essential impact on man’s attitude, decide his morality and ultimately “shape” his personal face 415. There are no morally indifferent decisions416. Aquinas himself, however, spoke of “morally indifferent” or morally indefinite acts (actus indifferens)417. In the Quaestiones disputatae De malo, he cites the view that actions are morally indifferent in themselves (secundum se), which is supposedly evidenced by the fact that something is originally simply an act, and only then a moral action418. Thomas does not agree with this position. The

412 Cf. K. Wojtyła, Problem oderwania przeżycia od aktu w etyce na tle poglądów Kanta i Schelera, in: idem, Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności, ed. T. Styczeń, J.W. Gałkowski, A. Rodziński, A. Szostek, Lublin 1991, 162. 413 Cf. Idem, Ocena możliwości, op. cit., 121. 414 Idem, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, op. cit., 195. 415 M.A. Krąpiec, U podstaw rozumienia kultury, op. cit., 102. 416 Ibid., 120. We leave the problem of the criterion of morality to moral philosophers. It was a subject of discussion between M. A. Krąpiec and A. Wawrzyniak on the one hand, and T. Styczeń and A. Szostek on the other. The record of the said discussion about the criterion of morality was published in RF 31 (1983) 2, 47-104 and in RF 32 (1984) 2, 149-194, and the synthetic positions of each of the parties are presented in: Krąpiec (idem, U podstaw rozumienia kultury, op. cit., 117-134) and Szostek (idem, Wokół godności, prawdy i miłości, op. cit., 74-82). The discussion receives treatment in articles by E. Kaczyński (Etyka powinności czy etyka decyzji? Spór T. Stycznia z M.A. Krąpcem. Próba zrozumienia, STV 29 (1991) 2, 61-77), W. Chudy (Spór w Szkole Lubelskiej o podstawy i punkt wyjścia etyki, RF 45 (1997) 1, 200-210) and the already cited monograph by T. Biesaga Spór o normę moralności. 417 In II Sent. d. 40, a. 5; De malo, q. 2, a. 5; S.th., I-II, q. 18, a. 8-9. 418 “[...] prius non dependet a proprietatibus posterioris. Sed actus est prior naturaliter quam moralis: quia omnis actus moralis est actus, sed non convertitur. Cum ergo bonum et

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explanation which he gives in De malo is expanded and made more precise in the Summa theologiae, where we read that although it is true that in terms of species (secundum suam speciem) there may be morally indifferent acts (such as picking up a blade of grass or going out into a field), yet due to circumstances specific acts, as proceeding from deliberate reason, are either good or bad. And those acts that do not proceed from deliberate reason (we might say: spontaneously), are essentially neither human nor moral acts, such as when a man strokes his beard or moves his hand or foot (examples given by Aquinas) 419. Only actions considered in themselves can be morally indefinite, while concrete actions are always moral, and these were the ones the above mentioned authors had in mind. In order to understand the Aquinian and Thomistic conception of the act as moral one must recall Aquinas’s position regarding the inner goodness or malice of actions (ex genere). This is a development of Peter Lombard’s view in light of Aristotle’s teaching. According to Aquinas, that which decides an action’s morality is its object or the end of the action (obiectum, finis operis): what the action objectively tends towards, regardless of the agent’s intention420. In the act, i.e. in moral action, the end which is the terminus of the act, is also its be-

malum sint proprietates moris, non secundum se conveniunt actui in quantum est actus”. De malo, q. 2, a. 4, 12. 419 “[...] actus omnis habet speciem ab obiecto; et actus humanus, qui dicitur moralis, habet speciem ab obiecto relato ad principium actuum humanorum, quod est ratio. Unde si obiectum actus includat aliquid quod conveniat ordini rationis, erit actus bonus secundum suam speciem [...]. Si autem includat aliquid quod repugnet ordini rationis, erit malus actus secundum speciem [...]. Contingit autem quod obiectum actus non includit aliquid pertinens ad ordinem rationis, [...] et tales actus secundum speciem suam sunt indifferentes” (S.th., I-II, q. 18, a. 8, c). “Respondeo dicendum quod contingit quandoque aliquem actum esse indifferentem secundum speciem, qui tamen est bonus vel malus in individuo consideratus. et hoc ideo, quia actus moralis [...] non solum habet bonitatem ex obiecto, a quo habet speciem; sed etiam ex circumstantiis, quae sunt quasi quaedam accidentia; [...] Et oportet quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam circumstantiam per quam trahatur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus ex parte intentionis finis. [...] Necesse est autem quod vel ordinetur, vel non ordinetur ad debitum finem. Unde necesse est omnem actum hominis a deliberativa ratione procedentem, in individuo consideratum, bonum esse vel malum. Si autem non procedit a ratione deliberativa, sed ex quadam imaginatione, [...] talis actus non est, proprie loquendo, moralis vel humanus; cum hoc habeat actus a ratione. Et sic erit indifferens, quasi extra genus moralium actuum existens”. S.th., I-II, q. 18, a. 9, c. 420 Cf. K. Flannery, The Multifarious Moral Object of Thomas Aquinas, Th 67 (2003) 1, 95-118; T. Hoffmann, Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert and Duns Scotus, Th 67 (2003) 1, 73-94.

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ginning, since it is what the will intends (intendere), what it tends to as the known good421. Factors helping to define the morality of an action are the circumstances, including the end in view of which the agent acted (finis operantis)422. Hence, in Thomist ethics it is underlined that on account of their object, actions are by nature morally good or bad. The circumstances can only change the moral qualification of an action good per se, but not of one that is bad per se. The Aquinian and Thomistic view of the act is therefore all-encompassing. It includes the action of man as such, which has its own inner sense, defined, above all, by the end of the action, subjective circumstances (motives) and objective circumstances, which, although they do not alter the nature of the act, can change its moral qualification within the bounds of its nature. The Aquinian understanding of the act also contains an immanent reference to the norm of morality, namely man’s rational nature. The notion of act thus encompasses all of the moments which define act as act, and therefore also as moral. The morality of action receives different treatment from the phenomenologists. In phenomenological ethics, whose central theme is value423, we come 421 The use and understanding of the verb intendere by Aquinas echoes the phenomenological theory of intentionality. Aquinas uses the term, amongst other things, in reference to intellectual and sensory cognition (cf. e.g. S.th., I, q. 79, a. 9-10; I, q. 81, a. 1, 1) as well as concupiscence. When it comes to intending acts of will, it is worth citing the following passage: “[...] actus dicuntur humani, inquantum procedunt a voluntate deliberata. Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum et finis. Et ideo manifestum est quod principium humanorum actuum, inquantum sunt humani, est finis. Et similiter est terminus eorundem, nam id ad quod terminatur actus humanus, est id quod voluntas intendit tanquam finem [...]” (S.th., I-II, q. 1, a. 3, c). In defining action, the notion of intending is cited by C.H. Moonen (op. cit., 17): “Menschliches Handeln, jede konkrete menschliche Tat, ist ein intentionaler Vorgang, ein Vorgang, dessen Wesen vom Wollen und Intendieren der jeweiligen Person geprägt wird. Der Gesamtakt einer menschlichen Handlung umfaßt zwar nicht nur das Wollen und Intendieren, das sich auf ein äußeres Tun, auf die Ausführung des Gewollten, richtet, sondern auch die Ausführung des Gewollten selbst, das äußere Tun, das durch das Wollen, Intendieren bestimmt wird”. The already cited work by A. Anzenbacher Die Intentionalität bei Thomas von Aquin und Edmund Husserl is devoted to the problem of intentionality in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and E. Husserl. 422 A rhythmic medieval poem lists the circumstances of action: quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando. 423 Basic to this problem is M. Scheler’s opus vitae – Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (op. cit.), first published in 1913-1916 in the “Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung”. We find a similar direction of ethic inquiry in the manuscripts of E. Husserl (cf. A. Roth, Edmund Husserls ethische Untersuchungen, Den Haag 1960).

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across an analysis not so much of act (Tun) as of man’s action (Handlung, Handeln) as a bearer (although not the only one) of moral value424. In the Husserlian interpretation, value is the intentional correlate of acts of valuing. Max Scheler viewed the person as the basic bearer (Träger) of moral value, which means that “good” and “evil” are personal values. “In the second line” (Scheler’s designation) the directed strivings of the moral potencies of a person, which are called “virtues” and “vices”, are bearers of moral values. It is only “in the third line” that a person’s acts, including acts of will and action 425, are bearers of moral values. In Scheler’s view426, moral value appears with the emergence of other object values: the act of volition (especially in choice), directing itself intentionally toward other object values (vital, spiritual) and realising them, of necessity, al424 The introduction of the category of value to the theory of action corresponds to the introduction of feelings as a distinct type of perception of values in the theory of cognition. This sometimes leads to the questioning of Thomas’s conception of conscience as intellectual. The resolution of this problem would require a broad work analysing the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of practical knowledge and the phenomenological theory of axiological cognition. We only bring attention to a number of moments which indicate that these two positions are not antagonistic: 1. in Aquinas’s philosophy feelings are located in the sensitive realm, in phenomenology they are conscious experiences; 2. in Aquinas, feelings do not serve a cognitive purpose, which they do in phenomenology; 3. in Thomism, practical knowledge, which is founded in theoretical knowledge, is presided over by synderesis (the first principle of practical knowledge has an axiological character); in phenomenology, the cognition of values, which is an axiological cognition, is also founded in theoretical knowledge. 425 „Was vielmehr allein ursprünglich »gut« und »böse« heißen kann, d.h. dasjenige, was den materialen Wert »gut« und »böse« vor unabhängig von allen einzelnen Akten trägt, das ist die »Person«, das Sein der Person selbst, so daß wir vom Standpunkt der Träger aus geradezu definieren können: »Gut« und »Böse« sind Personwerte. [...] In zweiter Linie aber sind Träger der spezifisch sittlichen Werte auch noch nicht einzelne konkrete Akte der Person, sondern die Richtungen ihres sittlichen »Könnens« [...] die [...] »Tugenden« und »Laster« heißen. [...] Erst in dritter Linie sind Träger des »gut« und »böse« die Akte einer Person, darunter auch die Akte des Wollens und Handelns”. M. Scheler, Der Formalismus, op. cit., 50 et seq.; cf. idem, 105-106. 426 There is a number of Polish-language works on Scheler’s philosophy of value and ethics. One has but to mention the collection of essays K. Wojtyła: Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności (op. cit., which includes the habilitation thesis: Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maxa Schelera), as well as books: H. Buczyńska-Garewicz (Uczucia i rozum w świetle wartości, Warszawa 20032), J. Trębicki (Etyka Maxa Schelera. Przyczynek do ogólnej teorii wartości, Warszawa 1975), A. Węgrzecki (Scheler, Warszawa 1975) and P. Orlik (Fenomenologia świadomości aksjologicznej (Max Scheler – Dietrich von Hildebrand), Poznań 1995).

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though seemingly in passing, becomes a bearer of moral value. The positive or negative object value, having a place in the hierarchy of values, realised by the acting person, is the determinant of moral good or evil. Continuing Scheler’s research on moral values, Dietrich von Hildebrand indicates that moral value only belongs to action which meets the following conditions: 1. is a response to value, 2. is motivated by a morally significant value, 3. is based on the recognition of a situation as morally significant, 4. encompasses the desire to be good, permeating that action, and 5. is free. Hildebrand understands “action” broadly as all of human activity, consciously bringing about some kind of state of affairs, an objective change in the world. Human will, which commands the realisation of a given state of affairs, is master of all action. According to Hildebrand, apart from the sphere of human action moral good occurs in two other spheres. The first is constituted by the will’s specific answers to value, which do not lead to action, but remain an immanent activity of the subject, above all - affective activity. The second sphere consists in the relatively fixed qualities of a person’s character, namely virtues and vices427. Drawing inspiration from the works of Scheler and Hildebrand, Roman Ingarden underlines that in speaking of morality we are not concerned with any activity of man, but only such activity as can realise a particular value: the value of “good” or “evil” in the moral sense428. In this statement, one should not ascribe to the term “value” anything other than that it introduces a differentia specifica with respect to the moral act, this being good or evil, which in turn designates the aspect of act of interest to moral cognition. The moral value of an act is its property, as opposed to the values or goods with a view to which the act is performed. Ingarden’s argument in support of this statement consists in noting that although moral values do appear in conscious experience, such acts as seeing, hearing, sensing, are not in themselves subjects of moral values, unless it is by virtue of circumstance429. Similarly, not all feelings are bearers of these val427 D. von Hildebrand, Ethik, op. cit., 355-390; idem, Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung. Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis, Darmstadt 1969, 29-63. Apart from the already mentioned work by Orlik, issues in the ethics of Hildebrand are broadly discussed in: T. Biesaga (Dietricha von Hildebranda epistemologiczno-ontologiczne podstawy etyki, Lublin 1989), P. Góralczyk (Możliwość uwzględnienia założeń systemowych etyki Dietricha von Hildebranda w teologii moralnej, Poznań 1989), and S.T. Zarzycki (Dietricha von Hildebranda filozoficzno-teologiczne podstawy duchowości serca, Lublin 1997). 428 R. Ingarden, Wykłady z etyki, ed. A. Węgrzecki, Warszawa 1989, 121-122. 429 Unlike J. Woroniecki, K. Wojtyła and M.A. Krąpiec, Ingarden is above all referring to the act (action) as such, and not a particular act. Their conclusions as to the morality of the act are, however, concurrent.

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ues. Schadenfreude, for example, is one, but not the joy of receiving roses, if we do not account for other circumstances. Bearing in mind that throughout history various answers have been given to the question as to what is the bearer of values (the acting subject, i.e. person, the will or a decision of the will, action as such), Ingarden admits the possibility that different types of moral values correspond to different bearers430. He recognised the following as indispensable (although perhaps insufficient) conditions of moral action: 1. the participation of a subject which, conscious of certain facts and values, directs the action; 2. the action of a conscious subject as such; 3. a horizon of values of various types against the background of which the action is performed; 4. responsibility of the agent subject; 5. his freedom of decision and action; 6. the person (the “I” ruling in it) as the source of decision and basis of responsibility431. The two interpretations of the morality of the act: Thomistic and phenomenological, are complementary. In his habilitation thesis, Wojtyła observed that the ethical system of Max Scheler can be helpful in analysing moral facts on the phenomenal and experiential level, but that it does not suffice for a scientific (metaphysical) interpretation of Christian ethics432. The reason for this insufficiency is the separation of the object value toward which human action directs itself from the moral value of action, which appears “on the occasion” of man’s realisation of the object value. Meanwhile, according to the Thomistic tradition, that which determines the moral goodness or iniquity of an act is its object, or as Wojtyła says - the object component of the act433. For epistemological analyses it is important that the act seen from the moral perspective be given to conscience in full, in its subject-object frame of reference. The moral act or activity is a compound of corresponding moments which determine the act as such and such, and as good or evil. The full moral signifi-

430 R. Ingarden, Wykłady z etyki, op. cit., 287 et seq., 304-305. 431 Ibid., 292-305. In the treatise O odpowiedzialności i jej podstawach ontycznych (in: idem, Książeczka o człowieku, Kraków 1972, 77-184) Ingarden distinguishes: bearing responsibility, taking responsibility, charging with responsibility, and appropriate action. 432 Cf. K. Wojtyła, Ocena możliwości, op. cit., 119-126. By the notion of “Christian ethics” in this work K. Wojtyła understood moral theology, thus certain charges levelled against the metaphysics of Scheler seem out of place, for instance that it is insufficient for a theological formulation of ethical content. We, for our part, are chiefly interested in strictly philosophical (ethical) arguments. For a major part of Wojtyła’s work is par excellence philosophical and ethical. The belief in the insufficiency of phenomenology which should be complemented and completed with classical metaphysics, is maintained by Wojtyła in Osoba i czyn. 433 Cf. K. Wojtyła, Ocena możliwości, op. cit., 57-65.

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cance of the act is disclosed in two horizons: the subjective, encompassing, amongst other things, the intention of the agent subject, and his moral knowledge, and the objective, defined by place, time and other circumstances.

5.3. The realisation of the human act The human act, as Aquinas says, proceeds from a rational will, and that is why a person performing an act can be master over it. In phenomenological ethics, human action is also presented as an act of the will, which maintains control over it. The act, as an activity of the human subject, realises itself thanks to the joint act of intellect and will, and has its stages and layers. The schema of this joint action, developed by Aquinas, shows the emergence of act as a real entity434. We can discern three basic phases in it: intention, decision and execution435. All practical activity begins with an act of cognition, the thought or idea of a given object perceived as either good or bad. With regard to this object, the will takes a specific position: it either finds complacence or an absence of complacence in it436. Influenced by complacence, the idea is transformed into an intention (in the strict sense), when the intellect discerns an end possible to attain in the good thus known. This in turn enables the complacence of the will to be formed into an intention to achieve that end. This is the phase of the emergence of an act, called intention. It begins with an idea, an intellectual moment, and ends in an intention formed by the will. The second phase of the emergence of act encompasses the means necessary to realise the intention. The intellect takes counsel with itself, considering the means to the intended end. To this, the will either assents or not. The intellect then, having the will’s assent, compares the means to which the will has as434 S.th., I-II, q. 8-17; In Et. nic, lb. 3, lc. 5-9. This schema was presented and analysed by J. Woroniecki (idem, op. cit., vol. 1, 103-107), and – as a corollary, by M.A. Krąpiec (idem, Psychologia racjonalna, op. cit., 259-263; idem, U podstaw rozumienia kultury, op. cit., 109-111). Krąpiec referred to Woroniecki’s analysis as “succinct and correct”. 435 This does not mean that all three phases have to occur in a particular act, or – even more so – that they have to be conscious. It is worthy of attention that Scheler distinguishes similar phases of the act, namely: disposition, intention, decision and execution (cf. M. Scheler, Der Formalismus, op. cit., 141-152). The difference is that according to Aquinas, an act emergence in view of an end, and in Scheler’s case, it does so with a view to values. 436 The idea and complacence (or lack thereof) as such, suffice for the emergence of an act. This is the case when one simply desires something, when the will is satisfied (the act of decision) with an inner complacence toward some object.

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sented and deliberates on them (hence deliberation) in order to provide the will with an argument for choosing the most appropriate. The choice (a work of the will) of an appropriate means concludes the second phase of the emergence of an act. As in the first phase, so in the second the intellect plays a directive role: it prepares the choice produced by the will. The fact that it prepares it does not mean that it thoroughly defines it. The will does not have to act “on deliberation”. It can even omit deliberation. Even though the intellect guides the will, the will itself is free and so are its acts, actions. The intention formed and the choice of means to be applied to bring about the end introduce the third phase, that of executing the intention. Whereas the first two phases belonged strictly to the spiritual, the third usually goes beyond this sphere. It encompasses my body, tools, and other people. It begins with a command formulated by the intellect. This command orders the enactment of what is intended. The intellect thus directs execution, while the will activates the spiritual and bodily powers to submit to the intellect: it performs the active commands of the intellect, inciting other powers of the soul and members of the body to submit to them (passive execution). The will also ultimately decides whether the end has been achieved, finding or not finding satisfaction in its achievement437. The will’s decision does not have to correspond to the objective state of affairs, which can be known by the intellect as it judges the whole course of the act. The above scheme shows that both intellect and will play a part in the realisation of an act438, not as distinct subjects of action however, but as powers of the human suppositum439. In spite of their distinctness440 in the realisation of an 437 The end achieved ceases to be one, and becomes a more or less permanent effect, the product of a given act: a specific factual state, state of affairs, some object, and in particular a thing. This entails man’s responsibility, as the author of the act, not only for the act itself, but also for its consequences. Cf. R. Ingarden, Książeczka o człowieku, op. cit., 79-100. 438 The participation of the intellect and the will in the realisation of an act is not only a feature of human action. Aquinas expresses this in the statement: “necesse est quod [Deus] per intellectum et voluntatem agat” (S.th., I, q. 19, a. 4, c). His conception of the act is neither intellectual nor volitional, a fact remarked on by Woroniecki (idem, op. cit., vol. 1, op. cit., 18-31). 439 Thomas remarked on this in S.th., II-II, q. 58, a 2, c, where he wrote: “Actiones autem sunt suppositorum et totorum, non autem, proprie loquendo, partium et formarum, seu potentiarum [...]”. We find the same idea in De verit., q. 10, a 9, ad 3, and in: S.th., I, q. 29, a. 1, c; q. 39, a. 5, ad. 1; q. 40, a. 1, ad. 3; q. 57, a. 2, c, etc. 440 On the subject of the separateness of will and intellect, see De verit., q. 22, a. 10, and S.th., I, qq. 78-82.

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act, the intellect and the will embrace each other in their acts, because the intellect knows and the will wants the intellect to know441. The intellect defines the will’s purpose or end, thereby shaping the final and formal cause of the act. Deciding to pursue the end, the will constitutes itself as the efficient cause. In the Summa theologiae we read: “the act of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence; and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intelligent subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper subject”442. The connection between acts of intellect and will in the realisation of an act is necessary because in acting, every person must act in agreement with themselves, i.e. in a rational and free way. Hence every act (actus humanus), as opposed to mere activity (actus hominis) is necessarily constituted by the will and the intellect, since human potencies as human are realised in the act (actus). In the order of causes, primacy is due to the will, since in order for anything to come about (that does not have to come about, including “my act”), it has to be willed. At the same time “being willed” cannot arise otherwise than in accordance with its own nature. And by nature only that can be willed which appears to me in a “cognitive” manner. The medieval adage, “nil volitum quod non praecognitum” (nothing can be willed which is not foreknown), indicates that in the natural order primacy is held by the intellect. Let us underline that the passive past participle (praecognitum) in the Latin adage indicates that the will follows anticipation, and so knowledge of what might happen. The act of decision is of decisive importance to the realisation of an act. The word play contained in this formulation is not accidental. The act of decision concludes the phase of “deliberation” and ushers in the phase of “doing something”, thus an act, precisely. The decision is the ontic reason for the emergence of an act. Krąpiec describes the act of decision as the real source of human ac-

441 “Ex his ergo apparet ratio quare hae potentiae suis actibus invicem se includunt: quia intellectus intelligit voluntatem velle, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere”. S.th., I, q. 82, a. 4, ad 1; cf. Ibid., q. 16, a. 4, ad 1. 442 “[…] actus voluntatis nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam consequens formam intellectam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem. Inclinatio autem cuiuslibet rei est in ipsa re per modum eius. Unde inclinatio naturalis est naturaliter in re naturali; et inclinatio quae est appetitus sensibilis, est sensibiliter in sentiente; et similiter inclinatio intelligibilis, quae est actus voluntatis, est intelligibiliter in intelligente, sicut in principio et in proprio subiecto”. S.th., I, q. 87, a. 4, c.

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tion and action as such443. For it is in decision, where the choice of a specific practical judgment is effected, that the efficient cause of the act, the concrete source of the action, is formed. The act is thereby no longer in actu primo: a qualitatively novel entity has arisen in man. Krąpiec concludes that the act of real decision, to act or not to act, the “merging of the cognitive act with the act of will”444, is ultimately what constitutes an act, whereas all else is either the preparation or the execution of an act. As such, the act of decision is also a moral entity on account of its necessary and inseparable ordainment to the rule of human conduct, the content of the last practical judgment that determines me to action. The act of decision contains all that determines moral action. Internally merged with morality, acts of decision constitute the moral face of man 445. Decision is the final phase of the process of “deliberation”, encompassing intention, choice and the first phase of execution. The execution of a decision usually involves the corporeal sphere. In the act, Aquinas distinguishes between the internal action of the will (actus interior voluntatis) and the external action (actus exterior). Each of these acts has its own object446. For the external act, the object of the internal action of the will (the end) constitutes the formal cause, whereby in the act the will is the governing factor, and the body the governed447. This can be illustrated by an example which Thomas takes from Aristotle: if someone steals in order to commit adultery, he is an adulterer rather than a thief. This example speaks of a complex action, in which the simple act is a means to the achievement of a superior end. Nonetheless, the distinction made between the internal action of the will and the external action is not only limited to complex acts, but applies equally to simple ones, especially those which manifest themselves in the body. It indicates that the full meaning of the action manifest443 Krąpiec addresses this issue in a number of his works (e.g.: Akt ludzki, in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, vol. 1, Lublin 2000, 142-145; Ja-człowiek, op. cit., 312-317; Ludzka wolność i jej granice, Lublin 20002, 31-56; U podstaw rozumienia kultury, op. cit., 99-117). 444 M.A. Krąpiec, U podstaw rozumienia kultury, op. cit., 112; cf. idem, Ja-człowiek, op. cit., 262-298. 445 Idem, U podstaw rozumienia kultury, op. cit., 113-120. Krąpiec also indicates concurrence with K. Wojtyła’s position on self-determination, as manifest in the experience of “I want”. Cf. K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, op. cit. 193-228. 446 This question is addressed, amongst others, by C.H. Moonen, op. cit., 54-56; Ch. Ripperger, The Morality of the Exterior Act, Ang 76 (1999) 2, 183-219; 76 (1999) 3, 367-410. 447 “[...] quod est ex parte voluntatis, se habet ut formale ad id quod est ex parte exterioris actus, quia voluntas utitur membris ad agendum, sicut instrumentis; neque actus exteriores habent rationem moralitatis, nisi inquantum sunt voluntarii. Et ideo actus humani species formaliter consideratur secundum finem, materialiter autem secundum obiectum exterioris actus”. S.th., I-II, q. 18, a. 6, c.

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ing itself externally in the body is constituted both by the act of the will and by bodily actions. It also explains the gap that sometimes occurs between the internal action of the will and the external action. The distinction we find in Ingarden between the purely internal act and that which manifests itself externally in the body, is not identical to the one above448. Following Thomas, purely internal actions would be reducible to internal actions of the will, directed by reason, while actions manifesting externally in man’s bodily behaviour would complete the internal action of the will with an external. In phenomenological terms, one should say that internal actions are effected in my stream of consciousness, and when they do not manifest themselves externally in my corporeal behaviour, they can be said to exhaust themselves in it, remaining within the bounds of that stream. These “psychic” (in the strict sense) actions, which Ingarden describes as states or functions of the spirit or soul449, such as love, hate, contempt, admiration, humility, contrition, regret, etc., are not explicitly situated in the body, and are in no way extended in it, although they often occur against the underlying background of various internal impressions, as in emotional or emotionally-tinted acts (love, hate, anger, outrage). Analogously to acts of pure theoretical thought or acts of prayer, they might accordingly be described as phenomena without extension and usually without a proper corporeal or sensitive substratum450. Next to purely internal acts, there are also actions that not only can but must manifest themselves externally in the body, such as helping another, consolation, good counsel, but also theft, murder, treason, etc.451. The bodily moment is both vital and necessary for them, although it is not sufficient. Without it, none of these acts could come to pass: they would not be acts, but intentions. In speaking of the act as manifesting itself externally in the body, we indicate that it is necessarily constituted by something incorporeal, intellectual and related to consciousness, the actus interior voluntatis precisely, which is the formal cause of the external, material action. In spite of this, the action externalised in my body is given as a certain whole of which I am the author. In the act 448 This distinction is found in the Bible, which distinguishes between sins committed in thought, which, because they are deliberate, are even more reprehensible than those committed by the body. 449 Like Husserl, Ingarden, sometimes distinguishes spirit from soul, although he never explains the basis of this distinction. 450 Cf. R. Ingarden, Spór o istnienie świata, vol. 2, part. 2, Warszawa 19873, 201-202. 451 In speaking of actions manifesting themselves externally in the body we mean not only those which externalise themselves in my body as the body of the subject of a given action, but also those in the bodies of other people and other living creatures or inanimate things that co-act with me or that I use as tools.

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which adequately externalises the decision of the will in the body, the intellectual-conscious and the corporeal moment are homotelic.

5.4. The human act as a process and as an event The above analyses of the human act demonstrate that action, in the broad sense, can be spoken of as the realisation of an act, while in the narrow sense - as the decision crowing the process of deliberation and ushering in the process of execution. For an understanding of the act as such, and even more so for an understanding of the process by which an act is known in or by conscience, it is imperative that we consider the analyses of the process, event and object enduring in time, which Ingarden carried out above all in his work Spór o istnienie świata (The Controversy over the Existence of the World)452. The realisation of an act is a process. This process is on the one hand a continuous whole made up of phases, which grows continually as the process unfolds, and on the other hand, a “whole” which forms itself in these phases. The process is stretched out in time. In a simple process, all phases pass into one another in a continuous manner. But in a complex process453, there must be some kind of discontinuity in the whole, caused by a sudden change in the unfolding of the process or by a cessation of it. In each case, the phases of the process pass

452 Ingarden regarded ontology as first philosophy, concerned with a priori analysis of the content of ideas. This analysis consists in a pure grasping of ideal properties and the necessary relations which obtain between them, and extends into the analysis of pure potencies that follow from the analysis of these properties for an individual being. Ingarden divided ontology into existential, formal and material, which corresponds to three aspects that can be discerned in all objects. At the basis of this division are three groups of questions belonging to potential analyses of being. Ingarden’s concept of existence is close to the classical one, whilst his concept of form and matter differs. In the Aristotelian opposition between matter and form, matter is understood as that which can be formed by essential or accidental properties, while form is understood as an ontic factor, actualising and organising the potencies of matter. By form (or more specifically form I) Ingarden understands that which is radically property-less, in which that which has properties (in the broadest sense, i.e. matter I) “stands”. These differences must be kept in mind in the application of Ingarden’s ontology to an analysis of action, defined in the Thomistic manner. 453 Ingarden understands a complex process as that made up of many processes, separated from one another, yet for some reason related and ordered within the complex process as a whole (cf. idem, Spór o istnienie świata, vol. 1, op. cit., 194). The complex act is understood similarly in the Thomistic ethics (cf. T. Ślipko, Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit., 179-181).

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in a continuous manner, which is their distinct mode of being. Only one phase is actual at any given moment in time, yielding to the approaching phase and thereby losing its actuality and falling off into the past, all in a continuous manner. Neither earlier nor later, approaching phases exist actually, since they have either already arisen or will yet arise when they turn actual. When the final phase reaches actuality, the process is past454. Adopting a concept of time where the present differs from the past and future (and these are not nothing in the absolute sense) by virtue of its actuality, Ingarden states that what is actual distinguishes itself by virtue of its direct activity, its action-ness – it is to a certain extent creative: able to give rise to another entity, e.g. a different phase of the same process or a particular event. The future is distinguished by heteronomy, a heteronomy it must lose in coming to be in the present. Being present and already autonomous, it does not lose its ontic autonomy when fading into the past, even though it loses its actuality. It becomes radically transcendent with respect to the present. The past, as Ingarden says, “exists in its own particular – if one can say so – washed out way, only by virtue of the fact that some other actual object proceeding from it is just then present, i n a c t u e s t ”455. The past exists as a “retroactively derivative” being. In actuality, meanwhile, is contained a moment characterised by a particular “fullness” of being. Ingarden also emphasises – and this is of interest to us – that it belongs to the essence of the future that it does not have to be actualised in the present. Meanwhile the past can be imagined in no other way than as something that has been actualised456. The process as a whole exists differently than do its phases. Its existence is notably its own becoming, grounded in the ceaseless passage of all its phases, and its becoming as a fully defined subject of properties, where its full definition achieved only in the last moment of the process457. In the initial moment, as a process it exists as a “naked” subject of the properties it inherits in the subsequent phases and based on them: because of the way in which these played themselves out. While still unfolding, the process is always incomplete. It is only fully equipped with properties when its last phase reaches actuality - and it is at that same moment that it ceases to be actual. From then on it exists only as 454 Ingarden adds that not every process has a final phase. One can then speak of an unfinished process. This is also the case for an act that cannot be realised if a decision is not made. 455 R. Ingarden, Spór o istnienie świata, vol. 1, op. cit., 201. 456 In footnote 22, Ingarden states that not every actualisation leads to passage, which is the case only for actualisations related to reality. Idem, Spór o istnienie świata, vol. 1, op. cit., 197. 457 Idem, 204.

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a retroactively derivative being, but derived not from the next phase just then becoming actual (since this no longer is), but from the consequences of the finished process. The ontic basis of the process is objects enduring in time. Ingarden differentiates two types of relation between a process and an object enduring in time: when the process takes places within the bounds of such an object, and when such an object takes part in the process. The second case is of more interest to our analyses. The object (or objects) taking part in the process, is the ontic basis of that process. We say that it performs a given action or realises a given process, producing its consecutive phases. The properties with which the given object is endowed determine the existence and course of the given process as well as its type and properties. In spite of this – Ingarden observes – the process and its bearer remain autonomous, since remaining in this special relation, one we may call a causal one, does not erase the separateness of the subject of action and the process actualised by it. The properties of the process remain its own properties, and not the properties of the bearer, and vice versa. Nonetheless, it is precisely because the process belongs to its bearer that certain properties begin, retroactively, to belong to the bearer by virtue of the unfolding and the properties of the process458. The act, narrowly understood as the act of decision, should be considered an event rather than a process. By an event, Ingarden459 understands the “entry into being” of some state of affairs or object situation. Events have no duration: they happen and immediately cease to be. They are “actual” in the strict sense, and this is their mode of being. They do not extend beyond the expanse of a single, specific “now”, regardless of how one interprets this “now” in light of different conceptions of time. As such, they crown processes, as their consequence, initiate them or “occur”, or yet – as Ingarden says – “happen” at their intersection. No events can occur without a prior preparation in processes, just as none can be without consequences, be these short-lived and insignificant, either in the form of a certain enduring state or some kind of new process or even a plurality of processes460. An event is also impossible without the existence of objects enduring in time and other events which cause them. This explains the ontic inseparateness of events with respect to processes and objects enduring in time, which are the direct (as the basis or substratum of processes) or indirect bearers of events, and also with respect to other events, which are their cause or consequence. In accordance with the concept of time adopted by Ingarden, events, 458 Ibid., vol. 2, part. 1, op. cit., 407-414. 462-472. 459 Ibid., vol. 1, op. cit., 189-193; vol. 2, part 1, op. cit., 404-407; 458-462. 460 Ibid, vol. 1, op. cit., 190.

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having come into being, do not endure, yet in spite of this they belong, as past, to the world and its history, while their consequences determine the subsequent state of the world. An event is an object in which the existential side, the said “entry into being”, emerges in the foreground, while that which happens, the material features of the state of affairs, remain, as it were, in the background. This is evident in the difficulties which present themselves when it comes to formulating a cognitive definition of the event. From the formal ontological point of view, an event has the structure of a state of affairs, which can be described as the correlate of categorical propositions461. The act, understood broadly, as a process, and narrowly, as an event, therefore needs an ontic basis of its own. This is none other than man, who is a distinct type of being enduring in time462. As such, man is able to endure across discrete moments, remaining the same. He does not become in time, but exists in it from the first moment of his existence, as a fully formed object. He remains unconditionally the same through ever new “presents”, and as long as he exists, maintains the actuality of his existence. If he changes in any respect, it is because of processes or events, ontically related to him, which can give rise to novel properties in him or modify those existing. These properties are acquired and relative; meanwhile, the absolutely own properties together with the defining nature remain the core of the object. An object enduring in time does not demand a bearer for its existence. It is characterised by autonomy and individuality. For an understanding of the interaction that occurs between an object enduring through time and a process or event, Ingarden makes an important distinction between three distinct types of objects enduring through time. The first is the material thing. It is impervious to the flow of time and at the same time the most vulnerable to the influence of its surroundings. The second is the live individual (organism). Its defining nature is to develop while maintaining its dynamic identity. The organism – as opposed to the material thing – can by nature defend itself against the external world, but it is not impervious (insensitive) to it463. Unlike the thing, the living individual moves beyond actuality into an ever renewed present. Everything that has happened in its past life forms itself into a significant, comprehensible (of itself) whole within its every present moment. 461 Ingarden devoted attention to the form of the state of affairs in Spór o istnienie świata (vol. 2, part 1, op. cit., 250-261), and earlier in: O dziele literackim. Badania z pogranicza ontologii, teorii języka i filozofii literatury (transl. M. Turowicz, Warszawa 19882, 199-212). 462 Ingarden, Spór o istnienie świata, vol. 1, op. cit., 207-232; vol. 2, part 1, op. cit., 250290. 314-457. 463 Idem, Spór o istnienie świata, vol. 1, op. cit., 228.

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The third type of object enduring in time is man as a conscious individual. As this type of organism, man can cross the boundary of the present in acts of remembrance, retention, protention and expectation, and obtain a view of the entirety of his life across time464. These remarks about temporally defined objects help in grasping the eventual and processual nature of action and its dependence on man as an object enduring in time. The act reveals itself as a specific temporal object, an event or process, which will be reflected in the manner in which an act is known. It also follows from the nature of process that an act, tending to actualisation, does not have to be realised. In the absence of its final phase, it remains incomplete 465. Every act is related to an object enduring in time as its ontic substratum – the agent subject. This means that on the one hand the act discloses the potencies of its author (a particular person), and forms its maker, on the other466.

5.5. Summary It is sufficient for epistemological study for the object of the knowledge analysed to be strictly defined and schematically characterised. The above analyses of action have shown that it is a structure defined by activity as such, an object of action and an agent subject. Activity as such, which manifests itself in the foreground when we consider an act, is essentially a specific behaviour on the part of a given person with respect to some object (a good or value). The act and its meaning are constituted in the process of deliberation and attain fullness in the decision. The decision then realises itself in the execution of the act. Among the many moments coming together to form an action, a special place is occupied by acts of the will and of reason (cognition). The action of the will, directed by reason, is the core of an action. This makes every action either intellectual, as in the case of internal actions, or intellectual in its core, as in actions externalised in the body. The distinct nature of action as a special object of cognition to a certain extent conditions its being known. If it is known by conscience, then a question arises as to its peculiarity, correlated with the peculiarity of its object.

464 Idem, 232. 465 An act can remain unrealised for two reasons: either due to an internal obstacle or due to a decision to refrain from it. 466 This fact became the basis of K. Wojtyła’s study Osoba i czyn.

Chapter Six Conscience and Cognition of the Human Act

The human act is the subject of conscience. The previous section presents its characteristic. Thomas expresses the most briefly the essence of the human act in the following words: it is such a human action, of which man is master. Therefore, how does conscience recognise the human act understood in such a way? Etymology of the term and the way of its use indicate that conscientia (as ) has two basic meanings. In some lanits Greek equivalent: guages, e.g. in English, they are expressed through two terms: “conscience” and “consciousness”. In articles about conscience (conscientia) written by Thomas, the morality aspect comes to the fore and tightly covers the purely conscious layer of conscientia467, if it does not exhaust it. Phenomenological research reveals this layer. It enables better understanding of cognitive operation of conscience, explained metaphysically by Aquinas. The complementing of Thomas’s science about conscience with phenomenological analysis of consciousness assumes basic consistence in understanding of conscientia and consciousness (Bewußtsein), which we want to prove. In this section, we focus on essential topics for the cognitive character of conscience, indicating detailed problems that require separate consideration.

6.1. Conscience as consciousness of the human act It is generally believed that consciousness is something original, nondefinable468, in the sense of classical definition. The notion of consciousness is 467 We will try to show that conscience is some kind of consciousness of the human act. Thus, the above-mentioned statement should be understood as follows: in conscience, one can differentiate a layer that is purely conscious (axiologically neutral) and a moral (axiological) layer founded on it. 468 In the mid nineteenth century, W. Hamilton wrote in Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic (ed. H.L. Mansel, J. Veitch, vol. 1, Edinburgh 1859, 191): “Consciousness cannot be defined: we may be ourselves fully aware what consciousness is, but we cannot without confusion convey to others a definition of what we ourselves clearly apprehend. The reason is plain: consciousness lies at the root of all knowledge.”

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expressed through synonymous words: awareness, sense of experience or feeling, presence or occurrence of something. Consciousness is compared to the light, because as light it brings something to light, discloses something, while revealing itself as occurring just now469.

6.1.1. Conscience and consciousness according to Thomas Aquinas When considering the ambiguity of the term conscientia470, he indicates that in the actual and superior meaning it is (1) the act of applying knowledge to action. Metonymically (in a further and secondary meaning), it means also (2) the thing realised in the act of conscience: the thing itself of which one is conscious (res conscita), content of one’s consciousness (id est quod est in conscientia mea) or (3) principle of consciousness as an act471. As we know, it is a specific habit (synderesis) and power (intellect) improved by this habit. Thomas justifies the priority of conscientia as the act through stating that some act is necessary to know something, while the subject, habit, power and the act itself are considered “around the act”472. This priority is manifested when we pay attention to a product of conscience, i.e. what is created because of coming about of the act of conscience as a specific activity473, which as such is actual realisation of defined potentialities of human suppositum474. It is (1) the act 469 See: A.B. Stępień, Wstęp do filozofii, op. cit., 116-117. 470 Peripatetics see the ambiguity of the term only seemingly as a purely linguistic problem. In fact, it is always a material problem. 471 Ambiguity of the term conscientia and its double translatability into English creates some terminological difficulties, especially when one wants to emphasise the actional character of conscience or consciousness. According to Thomas’s teaching, conscience is an act (see 3.2.1). The phrase "act of conscience” only emphasises the actional character of conscience: realisation of potentiality and/or operation of the subject, its activity. In the phenomenological apprehension, an act is a conscious psychic activity, distinguishing itself in the stream of somebody’s consciousness with special coherency due to the moment of intention, i.e. orientation towards some object. The act of conscience is contrasted with the non-actional process. Despite differences, Thomist and phenomenological terms of the act have some shared content. 472 De verit., q. 17, a. 1, c.; see: 3.2.1.2. 473 See: K. Twardowski, O czynnościach i wytworach, op. cit., 113. J. Kalinowski, Teoria poznania praktycznego, op. cit., 48-53 refers to him; see: 5.1. 474 I.a. K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, op. cit., 114-115. notices that the action being actus humanus is primarily a realisation of specific human potentialities.

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of conscience itself, i.e. becoming aware of committed good or evil475, (2) the product of this act transcendent against this act: consciousness of committed good or evil, which takes the form of judgement, and (3) change in the subject operating in this way, in the conscious subject consisting in realisation of its potentiality, occurring due to implementation of this act. Therefore, awareness of something (committed good or evil) is the first thing that reveals itself as conscientia and to what this name is primarily assigned. This name is assigned secondarily to the realised thing and to habitual content of the subject of consciousness476. Due to becoming aware of something (the act), w e b e c o m e a w a r e o f s o m e t h i n g : firstly, the thing we become aware of (object), secondly, that we become aware of something (the act), and finally, the t h i n g d u e t o w h i c h we become aware of something (habit and power). A relation among these three designata of the term conscientia is manifested only if the Latin term is translated as “consciousness”, instead of “conscience”. It enables perceiving in conscience a variety of consciousness and a type of human cognition. The object is the first thing that we recognise. Secondarily, we recognise the act itself, while through the act we recognise just habits, intellect as a cognitive power of the soul and the matter of the soul477. In addition, functioning of conscience as the act indicates the conscious dimension of conscience. Let us remember that for Aquinas conscientia is “cum alio scientia”, knowledge concomitant with something else or the application itself (applicare) or the relation of knowledge to something (ordinem scientiae ad aliquid), while more carefully – noticing (notitia) something. This application or relation occurs in three ways, distinguished with regard to a triple objective purpose of conscience’s functioning: recognition that we have done or have not done something (conscience is said to witness), judgement that something should be done or should not be done (conscience is said to incite or bind), as

475 In Twardowski’s terminology, this would be “objectively apprehended action” (action apprehended as an object, not activity). 476 A. Anzenbacher thinks that Thomas’s term conscientia is consciousness (Bewußtsein) in its neutral meaning against the opposition of consciousness-conscience. However, it is hard to agree that the text he analyses De verit., q. 17, a. 1 indicates three meanings of the term “consciousness”: reflection, habitus being terminus a quo of reflection (see: idem, op. cit., 41-44). Conscientia as the act is reflexio in actu exercito or in actu signato. 477 “[...] id quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est huiusmodi obiectum; et secundario cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur obiectum; et per actum cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cuius est perfectio ipsum intelligere. Et ideo Philosophus dicit quod obiecta praecognoscuntur actibus, et actus potentiis.” S.th., I, q. 87, a. 3, c.

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well as judgement that something done is well done or ill done (conscience is said to excuse, accuse or torment). These three types of conscience’s functioning are not of the same kind. Firstly: judgement (iudicare) in its two varieties (i.e. reference to what can be done and what has already been done) is added to cognition and recognition (recognoscere) of the act478 and its specificity. Therefore, the basic function of conscience constitutes witnessing that necessarily founds two other functions. It is not its specific function – in it, conscience is simply consciousness of something: the occurrence or non-occurrence of a specific act479. Secondly, Thomas clearly indicates two types of judging the act in conscience and through conscience, according to whether the object of judgement constitutes an intended act or committed act. The result of an intended act’s judgement is obligation (norm) or stimulation/incitement (order). This judgement consists in derivation of conclusions from principles, otherwise known, and consulting about what should be done in their light. However, we judgement a committed act through the reduction of conclusions to principles. This judgement’s result is justification or accusation (evaluative judgement) and pangs of conscience are its implication (conscience torments). Obligation or stimulation, as well as justification or accusation, are what they are only if they are conscious. Here we should remember the statement of Thomas that conscience is not only the act of synderesis, although synderesis maintains a central meaning for functioning of conscience – all other habits and powers in the practical area derive their effectiveness from it. Conscience is not only the act of synderesis as the habit of the first principles of human action from two reasons. Firstly – numerous cognitive powers and habits direct a man in operation, and numerous powers and habits participate in cognition of the act. Aquinas clearly enumerates the sensitive powers (sense and sensory memory) and the intellectual habits (or virtues): wisdom and science. These habits and powers are proper to the speculative intellect. Moreover, when considering explaining the functioning of conscience in its judgemental function through reference to practical syllogism, it should be noticed that the only major premise is obtained due to synderesis. A minor premise is delivered by the lower or higher reason480. Secondly – syndere478 Although Thomas expressis verbis refers this “recognition” to implemented or omitted action, it seems that it should be referred also to intention. Conscience concerns real action, intended or implemented. Purely hypothetical consideration of possible actions, which we can find, e.g. in ethics as science about morality, is not a task of conscience. 479 K. Wojtyła probably considered that function when he wrote that reflection is a fundamental function of consciousness. See: idem, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, op. cit., 89-91. 480 See: 3.1.1. and 3.2.1.2.

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sis improves conscience only in judgement of the act as morally good or wrong, when, having an intended act as its object, it obliges, stimulates or enhances its performance or omission, or when it justifies or accuses while judging the act481. Synderesis does not improve or it does not have to improve conscience in its witnessing function, when conscience only becomes aware of a committed or intended act. In addition, one should consider Aquinas’s statement that the act of conscience adds to science the application of science or notice (notitia) of something to the specific act482, which is known due to consciousness or conscience in its witnessing function. Therefore, due to judging conscience, we do not acquire new ethical knowledge concerning norms of conduct, nor actual knowledge concerning a specific act, but only secondary (in relation to them) knowledge of how the specific act, of which one becomes aware in some way, is in relation to a common norm of conduct, and eventually to the first principle of human acts that we recognise and obtain due to synderesis. That is why Thomas ascertains that the validity of conscience is based on norms (order), which conscience applies to the specific act, not on this application itself. In Thomas writings, the concept of consciousness is only outlined and obscured with the science of moral consciousness, i.e. conscience. Conscience cannot be reduced to consciousness483 or separated from it. According to Aqui-

481 It is clearly discussed in De verit., q. 17, a. 1, ad 1. 482 See: De verit., q. 17, a. 2, ad 2. It was discussed in 3.2.2.1. 483 E. Kaczyński emphasises it, writing as follows: “Cosa non è la coscienza morale e perché? Non è semplice consapevolezza psicologica. Non basta che la persona sia cosciente di un atto; si esige che essa lo consideri alla luce della verità sul bene, in concreto alla luce della norma morale, domandandosi se ciò che sta qui ed ora per compiere sia il vero bene. Non è semplice applicazione passiva e meccanica di norme morali ai singoli casi di vita della persona, pur restando sempre un’applicazione attiva e dinamica di esse nell’agire concreto della persona. Altrimenti non si potrebbe parlare del giudizio personale della coscienza. La coscienza non è sollo intenzione retta o convinzione retta, esse si deve confrontare con la verità sul bene espresso nei precetti positivi e negativi della legge di Dio decifrata dalla ragione pratica. Ridurre la coscienza all’intenzionalità o alla convinzione é farne una presentazione parziale ed unilaterale. Essa non è opzione fondamentale, né come visione (fede) né come decisione (amore); bensì ingloba tutte e due queste virtù teologali. Non è, infine, potere normativo creativo »ex nihilo« ed indipendente dalla persona, dalla sua verità, dai suoi valori o dai suoi doveri. La maggiore manipolazione della coscienza si ha quando si scambia la sua concezione conoscitiva valutativa con quella decisionale. Non si parla più del giudizio ma della decisione della coscienza” (E. Kaczyński, Punti fermi nella formazione della coscienza cristiana, Semin 1 (1994) 109-110). Author refers here to the encyclic of John Paul II Veritatis

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nas, in the basic and source meaning, conscientia is only becoming aware of something (which is then described as “one’s own act”); it is an act in the sense of realised potentiality and in the sense of specific operation484. In reference to the act, this awareness concerns either occurrence or non-occurrence of specific act, or moreover its moral good or evil (judgement). Due to such awareness, we do not acquire any new “objective” or “material” knowledge of the act or moral norms, but only knowledge of the specific act in the light of acquired general knowledge485. Thomas’s concept of conscientia is functionalist. In its first meaning, conscientia is not the subject of operation, but a feature of specific human operation. When Aquinas talks about it as an act, he considers mainly realisation of specific mental potentialities of man, and in the background – specific cognitive actions.

6.1.2. Consciousness according to phenomenologists Consciousness has multiple meanings in studies by phenomenologists, just like conscientia in the treatise of Thomas Aquinas. In Logische Untersuchungen, Edmund Husserl finds the foundation of ambiguity of the term Bewußtsein in the phenomenon of consciousness, which is given directly as consciousness486. The thing that appears as consciousness ensplendor (55, 61), as well as to his own article La coscienza morale nella teologia contemporanea (Ang 68 (1991), 65-94). 484 Thomas bases explanation of the ambiguity of the term conscientia on metaphysical categories of possibility and act, as well as cause and effect. 485 Maybe considering this, K. Wojtyła states in Osoba i czyn (op. cit., 80-82) that conscientia is not cognition in the strict sense. Its cognitive reason of being is not penetration of the object, objectification, which brings understanding or constitution of the object with itself. Consciousness only reflects, i.e. what has been recognised in this way, keeping thus a cognitive character. The following authors, among others, refer to the concept of consciousness proposed by K. Wojtyła: A. Półtawski, Człowiek a świadomość (W związku z książką kardynała Karola Wojtyły „Osoba i czyn”), in: idem, Realizm fenomenologii, op. cit., 318-331; first printing: ACr 5-6 (1973-1974), 159-175; A.B. Stępień, Fenomenologia tomizująca w książce „Osoba i czyn”, in: idem, Studia i szkice filozoficzne, ed. A. Gut, vol. 2, Lublin 2001, 399-403; first printing: ACr 5-6 (19731974), 153-157. 486 E. Husserl in Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft (hrsg. W. Szilasi, Frankfurt am Main 19652, 35-36) says: “Ein Phänomen ist also keine »substanzielle« Einheit, es hat keine »realen Eigenschaften«, es kennt keine realen Teile, keine realen Veränderungen und keine Kausalität: all diese Worte im naturwissenschaftlichen Sinn verstanden.” See: J.

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ables him to distinguish three concepts of consciousness, materially related to each other. Thus, consciousness is: (1) combining mental processes in the unified stream of consciousness, identified with the phenomenological ego manifesting as the entire real (reelle) content of the stream of consciousness; (2) the inner awareness of one’s own mental (psychic) processes; (3) comprehensive designation for “mental act” or “intentional process or experience” of all sorts487. The second concept is the most source and “earlier in itself”. In this meaning, consciousness accompanies all currently present conscious processes and discloses them. The first concept is perceived as related to the definition of psychology as the science of real, concrete processes of some psycho-physical subject, as well as – if interpreted in the light of Husserl’s later views – to the definition of phenomenology as the science of transcendental subjectivity. The third concept constitutes the basic notion of Brentano’s descriptive psychology and Husserl’s phenomenology, at least at its earlier stages488. The inner awareness is a constitutive moment of all conscious processes. It is responsible for clarity or dimness, obscurity of states and experiences of consciousness. The scale of this clarity reaches from full clarity to its lack, i.e. unconsciousness. Ingarden differentiates the inner awareness (“to live through”) being consciousness of the mental act (Durchleben) from experience as consciousness of objective content (Erleben). He calls the inner awareness extremely cleared up and clearing up experience as “intuition of inner awareness”. Its completely unclear, dark, inattentive variety, close to unconsciousness, is not distinguished with its own name. Intuition of inner awareness in advance excludes the possibility of any illusions. It is a specific kind of “cognition” 489, unKrokos, Fenomenologia Edmunda Husserla, Aleksandra Pfändera, Maxa Schelera, Warszawa 19922, 30. 487 “1. Bewußtsein als der gesamte reelle phänomenologische Bestand des empirischen Ich, als Verwebung der psychischen Erlebnisse in der Einheit des Erlebnisstroms. 2. Bewußtsein als inneres Gewahrwerden von eigenen psychischen Erlebnissen. 3. Bewußtsein als zusammenfassende Bezeichnung für jederlei »psychische Akte« oder »intentionale Erlebnisse«” (E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Bd. 2, Teil 1., Halle 19132, 346). In the first edition, Husser uses the following term: “das phänomenologische Ich”, while in the second edition: “das empirische Ich” 488 See: L. Blaustein, Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia, ArTNL 4 (1929) 3, 24 et seq.; A. Półtawski, Świat, spostrzeżenie, świadomość. Fenomenologiczna koncepcja świadomości a realizm, Warszawa 1973, 39-44. 489 While applying the term “cognition” to intuition of awareness, Ingarden explains that it is not actional cognition. Thereby, it does not have its object, which the ray of intention would reach. It is the inner awareness of the conscious process, which not only informs on something, but also acquaints with the currently implemented process. Thus, it is a misunderstanding to treat the intuition of awareness as cognition in the strict sense, as

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questionable, adequate and complete, absolutely guaranteeing the existence of a thing that is being recognised: because it is impossible not to be internally aware of the thing that is internally aware or to be aware of it to a lesser or greater degree than it is being aware490. The inner awareness that is not the act enables consciousness to orient a separate act towards itself: reflection, internal or immanent experience491. Mental process has actional or non-actional organisation. The inner awareness itself, feeling of hyletic data, mood and consciousness of background constitute non-actional kinds of consciousness. Due to intention, actional consciousness (act of consciousness) refers to something or concerns something, creating a specific distance in relation to its object. The moment of intention causes that the act of consciousness distinguishes with special content among processes of the stream492. Division into actional and non-actional consciousness should not be treated as dichotomous or disjunctive. E.g. in Logische Untersuchungen, on the one hand, Husserl sees the substance (Bausteine) of acts in non-actional consciousness, to which intentional processes are added. On the other hand, he considers some real (reelle) parts of the act (the presenting ones) as intentionality holders, although they are not consciousness of something or the object of perception (like e.g. hyletic data)493. According to Ingarden, the process is some specifically equipped mental unit (entirety): superficial phenomenon, appearance, something that is completely exhausted in phenomenal moments. In this meaning, it is “immanent” creation494, as opposed to the subject that has some “existential depth”, exceeding phenomenal moments, disclosing ego as being the subject of particular men-

490 491

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A. Chrudzimski (W sprawie Ingardenowskiej koncepcji intuicji przeżywania, Pr 15 (1996), 137-152) and R. Ziemińska (Intuicja przeżywania PF-NS 2 (1993) 2, 71-87) do. While considering that simple consciousness of something precedes any reflection, Husserl thinks that it is not capable of any cognitive grasping (Erfassung) of the object (see: E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923/24), Bd. 1, Kritische Ideengeschichte, hrsg. R. Boehm, Den Haag 1956, 261-263). R. Ingarden, U podstaw teorii poznania, Warszawa 1971, 377. More about the intuition of awareness, ibidem, 368-380. K. Wojtyła emphasises very strongly a difference between consciousness, whose basic function is reflection, self-knowledge and reflectivity, which are actional cognition as opposed to consciousness understood in such a way (idem, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, op. cit., 80-94). See: A.B. Stępień, Wstęp do filozofii, op. cit., 116. E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Bd. 2, Teil 1., op. cit., 366-370; 383-384; 387397; see: idem, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch, JPPF Bd I, 1913 (cited hereinafter as Ideen I), 65-66. Ibidem, R. Ingarden, Spór o istnienie świata, vol. 2, part 2, op. cit., 176.

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tal processes and whole stream. Each mental process is existentially dependent on the stream of consciousness as entirety, on other processes and on the subject, which fulfils these processes495. Mental processes of a specific ego that follow each other constitute the stream of consciousness as a particular time object. The “stream of consciousness” is a metaphor that demonstrates processual form of consciousness, its diachronic aspect. Ingarden explains that consciousness is not something that flows, changes its location like a water particle in a stream against its bed and other particles, although it lasts the same in time in different places. Consciousness is the flowing itself, the occurrence of something that appears as a process in a present slot and then leaves it immediately, keeping its place in the stream of processes forever, but only constantly recedes from “now”. Ingarden emphasises that a process is constituted not only by the stream of consciousness as entirety, but also by each particular stage, each mental process occurring in the stream. The stream of consciousness and any process constitute pure process, which in itself has nothing that would not be occurrence, becoming and passing by. However, while being a process, both the particular mental process and whole stream “is something more than simple occurrence”496. While accepting this characteristic, in the light of our analyses concerning the act, one should add that in the stream of consciousness, apart from processes, also such momentary mental processes should be placed that are conscious events. The act of decision is such an event. Processes arrange in one sequence, one “own” stream of consciousness. Thus, they disclose their various contents in two ways. Firstly, many various contents are disclosed at the same time in each currently fulfilled process. Secondly, subsequent processes disclose new contents, which do not replace the previous ones, or at least not always replace them, but somehow arrange themselves next to them. While recognising something, desiring something, enjoying something or deciding on something, one is aware of what one is aware as surrounded by the horizon of other aware content, which is earlier, present or just expected. Entirety of this content constitutes one’s life-world (Lebenswelt)497, which fills the field of consciousness498. The metaphor of “field” indicates that 495 Ibidem, 141-244. 496 R. Ingarden, Spór o istnienie świata, vol. 2, part 2, op. cit., 147. 497 Lebenswelt becomes one of basic categories of the last stage of development of Husserl’s view, stage indicated by Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, hrsg. W. Biemel, Den Haag 1954 – for the first time, that work was published in 1936 in Belgrade in the journal “Philosophia”). 498 A. Gurwitsch, late disciple of Husserl, while accepting the timely character of consciousness as the stream, decides to describe it as the field, referring to works of his

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content of consciousness occurs in it in an organised mode. The thing in the centre of the field is a topic of currently fulfilled act of consciousness. The thematic field is located around the topic – data co-represented with a topic and constituting its background. Other co-represented data not in material relation with the topic constitutes the field’s margin. Thus, the “field of consciousness” metaphor demonstrates the way of organising the thing, of which somebody is made aware. While considering Thomas’s science about conscientia and phenomenology of consciousness, we perceive that the issue of conscience “doubly” corresponds with the issue of consciousness. Firstly – the object of conscience, act, especially when narrowly understood as a decision, constituting itself in co-operation with intellect and will, is a conscious process. Secondly – conscience as materialisation of specific mental potentialities of man is a conscious process or moment of such a process. The process of act materialisation up to the act of decision is being aware, i.e. the inner awareness co-constitutes it, which in turn enables orienting the act of reflection towards the act as a mental process. This inner awareness of the act and the act of reflection are conscience attesting to the act belonging to the same stream of processes. The act is always oriented towards its object (purpose), so it can be only an actional process. Conscience can have actional or non-actional organisation. Therefore, my act and my conscience are immanently included in the stream of consciousness. An object of the act and the act as the object of conscience are given as surrounded by the horizon of other processed content.

6.2. Epistemic status of the human act and conscience Co-constitution of the human act by the act of will and intellect causes that each act has a mental nature (internal act) as whole, or it is mental in its root (act manifesting itself in a body). In addition, conscience being the act consciousness has a mental character. Thus, act and conscience have a distinguished epistemic status499. Their special way of being given is significant for the way of recognising the act in conscience or through conscience and for cognition of conscience.

master and the Berlin school of Gestalt psychologists (M. Wertheimer, K. Koffka, and W. Köhler). The metaphor of the “field of consciousness” apprehends the synchronous aspect of consciousness. Main work of A. Gurwitsch about this is Das Bewußtseinsfeld (Berlin 1975). 499 Distinguished epistemic status of the action is fundamental for functioning of the conscience in the personal life of each human being. In everyday life, it is less noticed,

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6.2.1. Metaphysical and phenomenological explanation of a distinguished epistemic status of the human act and conscience In philosophy, distinguished epistemic status of mind, mental acts and objects has always been noticed500. The foundation of Parmenides’ identification of thinking and being, thinking and the thought, constitutes perception of one object of thinking that can be consequently contemplated in thinking to the end. Aristotle, followed by Thomas Aquinas, considers that intellect is the form of ) and indicates that it is given in the most direct and obvious forms ( way. We recognise mind (intellect), free from all material proprietas, and concepts related to it (highly intelligible) directly as they are in themselves, without the agency of sensual objectification. For Aristotle, what thinks and what is thought are identical in the case of objects involving no matter501. It applies eminently to the divine mind ( ), whose way of existence is thinking about itself. Divine thought is the most excellent of all things, thus it thinks of itself and is a self-thinking thought: thinking on thinking or thinking of thinking )502. ( Aquinas considers Aristotle’s statement about identity of the thinking subject and mental object of its thought true as referring commonly to each intellect503. Thomas considers whole cognition (not only human) the real contact of the one who recognises with the one who is recognised, the real relation 504. The specific connection of the one who recognises and the one who is recognised is

500

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504

while it is significant for philosophy and psychology of conscience. Thomas’s statements about conscience are based on its distinguished epistemic status. However, one concentrated on cognitive activities, omitting or just mentioning appetitive activities. Nevertheless, certain arrangements concerning cognitive acts have their mutatis mutandis application to the acts of will. De an. 429 a-430 a. Met. 1074 b 34; see: 1072 b 18. “Et ideo intellectus humanus, qui fit in actu per speciem rei intellectae, per eandem speciem intelligitur, sicut per formam suam. Idem autem est dicere quod in his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, ac si diceretur quod in his quae sunt intellecta in actu, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, per hoc enim aliquid est intellectum in actu, quod est sine materia.” S.th., I, q. 87, a. 1, ad 3. Thomas states i.a.: “[...] ad scientiam non requiruntur nisi tria: scilicet potentia activa cognoscentis, qua de rebus iudicat, res cognita, et unio utriusque.” (De virt., q. 2, a. 1, sc. 3) Reference books present in detail the cognitive process and its metaphysical explanation.

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explained as “contact” of two beings505 or union of a form of the one who recognises with a form of the one who is recognised506. The thing that belongs fully to the Absolute, being the Pure Act, belongs to the human mind as far as it is actualised507. In the case of human cognition, the object proper to it – material being508 – affects receptive, sensitive-intellectual cognitive powers, organs of sense. It throws the passive intellect (intellectus possibilis) from passivity, adjusting itself to it due to operation of the agent intellect (intellectus agens), which abstracts or extracts509 from sensations and phantasms

505 M.A. Krąpiec, Realizm ludzkiego poznania, op. cit., 405. See: W. Chudy, Refleksja a poznanie bytu. Refleksja “in actu exercito” i jej funkcja w poznaniu metafizykalnym, Lublin 1984, 27-28. 506 “[...] cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius, nam species cogniti est in cognoscente.” (S.th., I, q. 14, a. 1, c.; por. De verit., q. 10, a. 4, c). Metaphysical explanation of cognition as “connection” of two existences emphasised by existential Thomism precedes the apprehension of cognition as reception of a form. Cognition is always cognition of being in actu, while being’s esse and form is in actu in it. Somehow the matter of priority of the an est question before the quid est question (see: 2.1). Aristotle’s concept of cognition is limited to reception of a form. Thomas does not reject it, but complements it with the concept of “connection of two existences”. The foundation of this differentiation constitutes a different concept of being, especially the concept of esse (see: E. Morawiec, Odkrycie metafizyki egzystencjalnej. Studium historycznoanalityczne, Warszawa 1994, 171-187) 507 Distinguished epistemic status belongs only to the acts of the human mind (intellect and will). Only they are given directly, aware. Habits and powers, as well as intellectual soul, are recognised in two ways: directly as present in the act as their principle, while their “quiddity” and nature indirectly through investigation. 508 Following Aristotle, Thomas considers the “quiddity” of a material thing the proper or adequate object of human intellectual cognition (S.th., I, q. 86, a. 1; De verit., q. 10, a. 6). He sees in sensual experience the only source (principium) of our cognition: “[...] principium nostrae cognitionis est a sensu” (S.th., I, q. 84, a. 6, sc), but he is far from sensualism. Sensual cognition is concrete and detailed, while intellectual cognition exceeds borders of the concrete thing and apprehends everything that is general (De verit., q. 10, a. 5, sc). However, it does not mean that human cognition exhausts itself in cognition of bodies. Aquinas ascertains clearly that intellect recognises also its cognitive and appetitive acts, while indirectly also its own essence (De verit., q. 10, a. 8, c.; S.th., I, q. 87). However, cognition of own acts is secondary against cognition of their objects: “Nullus autem percipit se intelligere nisi ex hoc quod aliquid intelligit: quia prius est intelligere aliquid quam intelligere se intelligere” (De verit., q. 10, a. 8, c. Thomas refers here to Nic. Et., 1170 a 31). 509 Referring i.a. to the below-mentioned text from Summa theologiae, some Thomists (e.g. Krąpiec) say that active intellect “produces” the object of current intellectual cognition, i.e. forms of knowledge. However, it may lead to misunderstandings. The verb facere

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the forms, intelligible species, being the current object of intellectual cognition510. The abstracting process does not occur when the object of intellectual cognition is constituted by own acts of intellect and will, existing due to the existence of their subject: mental cognitive and appetitive powers, and eventually – soul and whole human being as compositum of soul and body. It is the same with the human act. It is realisation of mental cognitive and appetitive power, i.e. being, whose efficient cause is will, and final and formal causes – intellect511. An act’s purpose indicated by intellect is its form. It means that the thing recognised by intellect in the act is the thing it “created”. Cognition of the act in conscience means cognition of voluntarium as mental entity, whose distinguished epistemic status is metaphysically explained by Thomas in his science. Since Descartes, the opinion about distinguished epistemic status of the mind or intellect has been explained cognitively, not metaphysically512. Descartes accepts cogito, ergo sum as the first principle of philosophy, because it

has many meanings. It emphasises the subject's activity, but production of something does not have to be a result of this activity. 510 “Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis, et intellectus possibilis, quia respectu eiusdem obiecti, aliud principium oportet esse potentiam activam, quae facit obiectum esse in actu; et aliud potentiam passivam, quae movetur ab obiecto in actu existente. Et sic potentia activa comparatur ad suum obiectum, ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia, potentia autem passiva comparatur ad suum obiectum e converso, ut ens in potentia ad ens in actu.” S.th., I, q. 79, a. 7, c. 511 According to Thomas, a thing happens to be recognised as it is realised (secundum quod est in actu), not as in what potential it is (non secundum quod est in potentia). Realisation of human intellect is its activity (operatio), which is cognition that stays at the active person as its perfection and act. The act of will is some disposition accompanying the intellectually recognised form. It resides in the intellectually recognising object as in its principle and in its appropriate object in the way that is proper to it. The thing that is intellectually in some intellectually recognising object should be recognised intellectually by this object in consequence (S. th., I, q. 87, a. 3-4). 512 Since Descartes, the "consciousness" category has started to replace the metaphysical category of "mind" indicating the existential reason and principle of specific realisations, which include the acts of intellect and will. Referring to modern research concerning the issue of relation of the mental and physical sphere (mind-body problem), it can be said that the so-called “phenomenological mind” was in the centre of interest of the Cartesian trend, the surface layer of consciousness. Everything that is unconscious, that is proper mind, is not only beyond the area of interest, but it is unavailable for research tools applied in this trend. The issue of nature of this “proper mind” is considered by e.g. S. Judycki, Umysł i synteza. Argument przeciwko naturalistycznym teoriom umysłu, Lublin 1995, and U.M. Żegleń, Filozofia umysłu. Dyskusja z naturalistycznymi koncepcjami umysłu, Toruń 2003.

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does not undergo questioning and it is vivid and clear513. Franz Brentano, master of Husserl, ascertains that due to self-consciousness, one’s thinking, judging, presenting, listening, imagining, etc. as well as what is realised in these processes, is available directly in a certain and non-correctable way. Thus, he claims that the mind is understandable in a complete and extremely clear way 514. From the phenomenological point of view, distinguished epistemic status of the human act and conscience manifests itself in – as Husserl says – the fact that “own” consciousness in general is originally and absolutely given not only with respect to its essence (Essenz), but also with respect to its existence (Existenz) in immanent perception515. It excludes mistakes at least concerning the existence of the object of perception, the currently occurring mental process. The thing that is really (reell) immanent in the stream of mental processes, is unquestionable, thus apodictically evident. However, what is inherent in the stream of consciousness and to what does a distinguished epistemic status belong because of this? First, these are unambiguously particular mental processes in their complete, phenomenally given 513 R. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia. Méditations métaphysiques, Paris 1978, II, 33. 514 F. Brentano, Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom , Darmstadt 1967, 136. 515 E. Husserl, Ideen I, 85-86. Immanent perception is a perception of own mental process occurring within the framework of transcendental reduction. It consists in leaving the natural attitude, i.e. excluding the real world positing, including also real existence of the object of consciousness. As a result, a horizon of transcendentally purified phenomena given absolutely and indubitably reveals itself. Pure consciousness revealed because of transcendental reduction is not a consequence of speculative structure, but it is a specially apprehended psychological, real consciousness. It causes that results of research concerning pure consciousness apply mutatis mutandis to global consciousness. The phenomenological school deals with the problem of significance and need of phenomenological reduction, as well as proper understanding of pure consciousness. I present the issue of reduction, as it is present in works of Husserl and other phenomenologists in my study Fenomenologia (op. cit.). The following studies concerning reduction can be indicated: J. Tischner, Ingarden-Husserl: spór o istnienie świata, in: Fenomenologia Romana Ingardna, Warszawa 1972, 127-143; D. Gierulanka, U źródeł relacji między filozofią Ingardena a Husserla: ustosunkowanie się do redukcji, in: W kręgu filozofii Romana Ingardena. Materiały z konferencji naukowej Kraków 1985, ed. W. Stróżewski, A. Węgrzecki, Warszawa-Kraków 1995, 11-19; J. Seifert, Realizm Romana Ingardena a motywy, które przywiodły Husserla do przyjęcia transcendentalnego idealizmu. Uwagi krytyczne o zasadności i granicach Ingardenowskiej krytyki transcendentalnej fenomenologii Husserla, transl. M. Maciejczak, in: W kręgu filozofii Romana Ingardena, op. cit., 21-34; S. Judycki, Intersubiektywność i czas. Przyczynk do dyskusji nad późną fazą poglądów Edmunda Husserla, Lublin 1990, 23-50.

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structure, and the stream of consciousness as a sequence of these processes, i.e. everything co-constituted by the inner awareness. Being aware of the mental process means being aware of all moments co-constituting this process, including its content. Thus, one may say about these moments that they are really (reell) included in the stream of processes. While transforming the inner awareness into the act of inner or immanent cognition, the mental process and all moments constituting it become the object of this cognition. The subject of consciousness, more strictly: pure ego, is immanently present in the stream of mental processes516. The stream of consciousness and its particular mental processes occur always as “mine”517 to such an extent that Husserl, entering the path of phenomenological research, in the first edition of Logische Untersuchungen calls the stream of consciousness “phenomenological »ego«”518. However, immanency of ego is not as unambiguous as immanency of mental processes. Therefore, Husserl considers that “ego” is not constituted “transcendence within immanency”519, which in spite of this is entitled to the special status of original and absolute given-ness in the immanent perception, just like the whole stream of consciousness. Such a definition of the subject is based on the fact that in the immanent perception first a mental process spreading in time is

516 The problem of subject is discussed broadly and multi-aspectually by E. Marbach (idem, Das Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls. Den Haag 1974) and A. Węgrzecki (idem, Zarys fenomenologii podmiotu), Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1996). 517 In his formal-ontological research, Ingarden ascertains necessary relation of consciousness with its subject, identical with itself in spite of time lapse and changing processes. Ego and mental process are distinguished formally, but they are so connected with each other that there is no strict border or gap between them. As contrary to processes, their subject – as Ingarden states – radically exceeds immanence of the stream. It is transcendent against it, because it is not a moment or component of the process and has “existential depth”, which exceeds the phenomenal surface. It does not exhaust itself in being the source of acts or identical pole of the stream of consciousness. As opposed to the object of consciousness, which is not necessarily related to cognitive processes (it could not exist and still nothing would change in the course of consciousness), ego is necessarily connected with own processes as their carrier and foundation. See: R. Ingarden, Spór o istnienie świata, vol. 2, part 2, op. cit., 176-177. 518 In the footnote in the second edition, Husserl writes: “In der ersten Auflage war überhaupt der Bewußtseinsstrom als »phänomenologisches Ich« bezeichnet” (idem, Logische Untersuchungen, vol. 2, part 1, op. cit., 353). Then he explains: “Das phänomenologish reduzierte Ich ist also nichts Eigenartiges, das über den manigfaltigen Erlebnissen schwebte, sondern es ist einfach mit ihrer eigenen Verknüpfungseinheit identisch." These statements cannot be maintained, however they attest to special “unity” of mental processes and their subject. 519 E. Husserl, Ideen I, 109-110.

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given, then the subject manifests itself secondarily in the fulfilled process as a pole of mental processes, as a source of acts manifesting in the course of the stream of consciousness, as pure X without any qualities, from which these acts originate. In more recent works, Husserl modified this position from the period of Ideen. He indicates there that the very course of pure processes discloses also habitualities (Habitualitäten) belonging to pure ego, and adds these habitualities to it520. They should not be identified with real qualities of a person’s character as a global entity, but also they should not be claimed as pure structures, as they are only uncovered due to reduction of ego qualities manifesting themselves in the simple making of mental processes. As a result of conducting constitutive research, Husserl starts to more clearly perceive in ego an active, creative subject with permanent properties, own style of operation and own history. It includes completely real and potential conscious life. In addition, it undergoes specific “self-constitution” (Selbstkonstitution), and the whole intentional system of consciousness starts to undergo the process of constitution together with it521. While becoming aware of own mental processes or recognising them actionally in inner or immanent perception, they are revealed to one not only as their own, but also, or maybe mainly, as fulfilled by it522. The subject of these mental processes, which Husserl understands as pure ego, reveals its depth in a mental process of which it is aware. It is not only a non-content process-maker, but also the subject equipped with relatively permanent habitualities, which it acquires

520 These ascertainments are equal with statements in Aquinas’s teaching. He states that cognition, whose object is conscience, secondarily against the thing itself of which one is aware, occurs either directly in reflection when a given act is recognised as proper to them (per praesentiam), or indirectly, when their nature is recognised, while eventually the nature (essence) of the soul as the subject of these acts. Moreover, as we have already mentioned, habit (habitus) is the principle of the act (synderesis as habit is the principle of conscience) and it is realised in the act, but also improved due to the act. It explains why among the first principles of activity inscribed in synderesis Thomas mentions not only the principle “do good and avoid evil”, but also general principles of the natural law and the assent of faith. 521 See: E. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen, §§ 31-33. Phenomenologists understand ego in various ways. E.g., Ingarden differentiates: 1. so-called pure ego (performer of the acts of consciousness, identical ego living in the whole stream of consciousness); 2. ego as specifically structured centre of human being; 3. ego as the thing that includes whole human being. These three terms can be presented as concentric circles. Pure ego is in its centre, as it constitutes the axis of human being (R. Ingarden, Spór o istnienie świata, vol. 2, part 2, op. cit., 170). 522 See: the problem of self-agency in K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, op. cit, 109-149.

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together with making own processes, as well as – Ingarden523 and MerleauPonty524 show – ego is the incarnated subject. Husserl situates the transcendent object in the meaning of Ingarden’s radical transcendence beyond real (reelle) content of the stream of consciousness525. It does not mean that it is unavailable for consciousness. Due to intention, the act opens consciousness for the transcendent world. That is why Husserl calls the object reached by the ray of intention as the intentional object. Therefore, world and particular transcendent objects need to be reached by the ray of intention to be aware, while the thing really included in consciousness is aware in itself (self-aware). In the broad sense, intentional objects are correlates of intentional mental processes. Following Ingarden, we should differentiate “purely intentional” objects and “accidental intentional” objects. The first are created directly or indirectly by the act of consciousness or by the multitude of such acts o n l y due to intentionality immanent to them, so that in these processes objects owe their existence and essence to consciousness526. Among them, one should distinguish objects that are primarily and secondarily purely intentional. Primarily intentional objects depend on consciousness for their existence and essence. They last as long as these processes are fulfilled and pass with them. They are completely dependent on them. They are transparent for cognition to the same extent as processes creating them. Secondarily intentional objects are correlates of processes, which are not exhausted in the creation of these objects, but they cause something. Some of them aim at fixing intentional objects created in them in an existentially stronger basis, as occurs in the case of artworks. Their eventual existential source is in mental processes, but their direct source of being and content is in forms with a given intentionality, such as, e.g. semantic units of various ranks. They are heteronymous, dependent on intentional acts, but they enjoy relative independence. They last longer than the acts themselves and they are intersubjectively available for various subjects of consciousness. Other acts do not exhaust themselves in the creation of intentional objects; they treat them down as patterns of some existentially autonomous objects. They aim at “realisation” of these patterns through actions, which are based on creative intentional acts and are directed by them, but they radically transcend the area of pure consciousness. Instances of such patterns include designs of machines or buildings, but also intention of own acts. Implementation 523 524 525 526

R. Ingarden, Spór o istnienie świata, vol. 2, part 2, op. cit., 229-236. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception, Paris 1945. R. Ingarden, Spór o istnienie świata, vol. 2, part 1, op. cit., 207-211. Ibidem, op. cit., 179-247.

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capability limits the freedom of the acts creating them. Implementations are to provide a permanent existential foundation for patterns as intentional objects. Objects that are “accidental intentional” include objects towards which imitative acts are oriented. For such objects, it is entirely a c c i d e n t a l that an act or acts of consciousness is/are oriented towards them; thus they become secondarily “accidental intentional” objects527. These objects are characterised with radical transcendence in relation to the act, in which this object is given or only meant – neither through any of its moments, nor through the fact of its execution, can this act of consciousness cause any change in such an object, which is autonomous because of this. As such, it is completely unambiguously determined in every way. It is cognitively non-transparent in itself, but it becomes relatively transparent when the ray of intention reaches it. Cognitive activity of the subject causes the creation (by this act) of a specific intentional object, which is to adjust itself and reproduce an object given in the act alone in order not to cover it, but enable it to present in whole. Intentional product of cognitive acts preserves transparency of own acts, when a radically transcendent object, also accidental intentional, illuminated with the ray of intention, is transparent only to some degree. It will never achieve full transparency as an object characterised with transcendence of the fullness of being. The above-mentioned analyses indicate that acts of the mind (intellect and will) or conscious processes have a distinguished epistemic status. This status belongs also to the subject of conscious processes, having relatively permanent habitualities, as far as such an object reveals itself in the course of processes. In addition, purely intentional objects created by intentions of acts are characterised with a distinguished epistemic status. Everything that is included within the limits of immanency has a distinguished way of giving: it is cognitively transparent and known to the subject because of its existence. The thing that is radically transcendent, while being also an intentional object, does not have a distinguished epistemic status. It causes determined results in cognition of my act in conscience and of the moment constituting it, as well as in cognition of acts of the second ego.

6.2.2. Significance of a distinguished epistemic status of the human act and conscience for science about conscience Distinguished epistemic status belonging to consciousness characterises the human act in the narrowest sense, i.e. act of decision together with process of its 527 R. Ingarden, O dziele literackim, op. cit., 180.

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constitution, as well as conscience as consciousness of the human act. Ego reveals itself in the human act and conscience as its maker having its own existential depth and habitual content. Habitual content of the act subject includes its moral habits, virtues and faults. Habitual content of the subject of conscience, which is identical with the act subject, is mainly the habit of first principles of action (synderesis) and the virtue of prudence528, as well as – proper to theoretical cognition – the habit of first principles of knowledge, wisdom and science. Practical cognition is founded in theoretical cognition, which results in disclosure in conscience per praesentiam not only of habits of practical reason, but also of theoretical reason. While considering Thomas’s science about conscience, let us only observe that common opinion that synderesis always incites to good and murmurs at evil is based on the permanent principle that one should do good and avoid evil, which is non-thematically given in each act of conscience. This principle has apodictic evidence. In Thomas’s system, apodictic evidence of this rule of human actions, as well as first principles of knowledge, is intellectual intuition of first principles529. According to the phenomenological position, the principle of synderesis could be apprehended thematically only in eidetic intuition founded in cognition of individual human act, which seeing is a priori cognition530. First

528 See: 3.1.1. The habit of first principles of action (synderesis) and the virtue of prudence constitute qualities of the practical reason. Thus, some authors wrongly identify syn. The term is broader: it includes the deresis with Aristotelian thing that is usually called as reason, prudence, practical wisdom and permanent disposition of activity based on the right consideration of what is good or bad for the man (see: Nic. Et. 1134 b - 1137 a; 1140 a - 1145 a). This semantic proximity leads sometimes to obliteration of differences between synderesis, conscience and prudence. This problem is discussed by S. Rosik, Sytuacjonizm etyczny a chrześcijańska roztropność, Poznan 1986, especially part two. 529 Apodictic certainty would belong also to standards resulting directly from the first principles (see: 3.2.2.1). 530 Considering the legitimacy of Thomas’s belief that the principle of synderesis is present in whole cognition of individual good as the habit, it should be assumed that nonthematic apprehension of the essence of something founds the apprehension of fact. It would constitute a modification of phenomenological position concerning eidetic cognition, which should be carefully analysed. The above note would enable also one to look differently at so-called practical syllogism applied by Thomas to explain the functioning of conscience. It is not only a description of the actual functioning of conscience (which does not mean that conscience never thinks syllogistically), but also a systemic (in the spirit of the Aristotelian concept of science) explanation of the functioning of conscience.

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principle of practical cognition manifests itself in conscience, but in this case, apodictic evidence is motivated by eidetic intuition. In addition, cognitive apprehension of a decision of the will in conscience due to so and so recognised specific good is obvious and unquestionable531. Conscience cannot err whether one wanted to do good or evil when making some decision. In this case, apodictic evidence would be motivated by immanent experience, which we can consider conscience (with some stipulation). Distinguished epistemic status does not belong to all these moments of human act that are radically transcendent against consciousness and as such are “accidental intentional” objects. They are objects of various kinds of transcendent perceptions, such as, e.g. sensory perception, reminding, etc. Differentiation of the interior action of the will and the external actions532 in the act manifesting itself in a body is corresponding on the side of conscience with differentiation of direct immanent and transcendent cognitions, as well as reasoning, including syllogisms and enthymemes. Based on Thomas articles, conscience could be understood broadly as the process of recognising the act, including a sequence of sensual and intellectual cognitions (here a mistake can be made) or narrowly as immanent perception of the act of decision (here a mistake is impossible)533. Becoming constituted by the cognitive sense of human act accompanies the process of act realisation up to the action of decision534. As opposed to cognition of the act of another ego, cognition of the human act begins with cognition of the decision, with cognition of the interior action of the will, which somehow 531 See: 3.2.2.2. 532 See: 5.3. 533 Arguments for this proposal are as follows: Thomas clearly states that 1. conscience is formed by numerous cognitive powers and habits, among which significance of synderesis should be distinguished; 2. the act of conscience does not occur without participation of senses; 3. conscience never errs when it accuses the will of its proceedings against the judgement of conscience (knowledge about immanent object). It can err when it states (generally or particularly) about what should be done and what should not be done (knowledge about transcendent object). 534 Husserl’s notion of constitution as the process of synthesis of objective sense in consciousness, due to which objects occur in consciousness as given, would be complemented with constitution understood not as “producing” sense, but as production of being in its mental root. In this statement, we diverge from Husserl’s concept of constitution and constitutive research. Just like the whole phenomenology of Husserl, also his concept of constitution has cognitive inclination. Nevertheless, a metaphysical outline can be perceived in it. See: R. Ingarden, Z badań nad filozofią współczesną, Warszawa 1963, 543-547. Basic study for the issue of Husserl’s constitution is R. Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution, op. cit.

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screens cognition of the external action. If the external and interior actions are not harmonious, we realise that the interior action of the will is sometimes complemented with the external action and that transcendent cognitions (including sensory cognitions) occur in cognition of the action next to immanent experience. As Thomas ascertains, they are not harmonious when a form of the act of will is not a form of external actions. Other man’s act is a radically transcendent object for the cognitive subject. As such, it is insensitive to the intended act of consciousness. It is characterised with transcendence of the fullness of being, but it cannot be cognitively exhausted in one cognitive act or in a closed sequence of acts. Other man’s act is directly cognitively available only if it is manifested in a body. If it is interior action, it needs to express itself somehow in a body – in bodily behaviour, gesture, face or in language. Cognition of other man’s act is always inadequate. If it is obvious – then only assertively. Cognition of other man’s act is reduced to taken actions, when cognition of own activity includes the whole process of the act’s realisation in cooperation with intellect and will. Contrary to the cognitive sense of one’s own action, sense realised in a body of another’s action has at its foundation a material body (Körper) as the lowest structural layer, to which new existential layers are added: – animate organism as a bearer of localised sensations (sensing)535; – “other man” as analogon of one’s ego and life-word, but also as a psychophysical individual that is the element of animal nature536; – other man as a person537, i.e. as somebody who belongs to the surrounding world, who fulfils cognitive acts, operates, uses tools, evaluates things in his surrounding from the esthetical, ethical or useful point of view, and finally – who communicates in different way with his fellow men and with one and relates with them to take common actions,

535 See: E. Husserl, Ideen II, § 36. See: A. Węgrzecki, O poznawaniu drugiego człowieka, Kraków 1992, 19. 36). 536 E. Husserl, Ideen II, § 46. 537 Husserl, Idee II, op. cit., 247-262. Constitution of other man as a person requires transition from the naturalistic attitude to the personalistic attitude. Węgrzecki notices that Husserl does not consider the way of implementing this transition or the thing in which modification of empathy would consist, which would enable one to constitute not only other man’s body and psychology, but also personal life (see: A. Węgrzecki, O poznawaniu drugiego człowieka, op. cit., 25). Having regard also to other statements of Husserl concerning attitude, it should be noticed that the change of attitude is motivated by redundancy of appercepted content in relation to content actually apprehended in a given attitude (see: E. Husserl, Ideen II, § 62).

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other man as a moral person, i.e. as a part of personal relation, in which the moral world is constituted538.

According to Husserl, constitution of such an objective sense in my consciousness occurs due to “introjection”, i.e. empathising connected with external primarily presenting perception539. For Husserl, empathy is also cognition, in which another’s interior action would be given. Ingarden criticises this theory together with three others, trying to answer the question about the empirical foundation of knowledge about other man’s psychology540. He ascertains the occurrence of cases of recognising specific psychical states of other man in an intuitional (based on his bodily image) and direct way, i.e. without any inference, imitation or empathy. However, the scope of perceiving another’s psychology is limited to things expressed in directly given phenomenon, based on factors expressing it. It depends also on circumstances in which direct psychical relations of two persons occur. Other man can hide his psychical state from one or even mislead him. In each case, there is the intimacy sphere, which is available cognitively only to oneself, which is narrowing or expanding depending on whom we have to do with. In the possible changeability of the actual scope of experience of other people’s psychic states, Ingarden perceives the difficulty in answering the question of cognitive value of results obtained due to this experience. Moreover, our own psychical state or permanent qualities of our personality can facilitate or hamper, or even make impossible, experience of other man’s psychic state, making us blind or deaf541. Direct perception of other people’s psychic states as external is radically different from perception of one’s states or conscious processes, which are given in reflection as experienced by one. It is also hard to answer here the question whether direct cognition of other man’s psychology, including states, 538 E. Husserl, Ideen II, §51. 539 Ibidem, 170; see: ibidem, 163; A. Węgrzecki, O poznawaniu drugiego człowieka, op. cit., 21; M. Theunissen, Der Andere. Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart, Berlin-New York 19772, 59. 540 They include the theory of inference by analogy seen, e.g. in J. St. Mill, theory of association presented e.g. by P. Stem and J. Volkelt, theory of imitation proposed e.g. by C. Groos and T. Lipps. See: R. Ingarden, O poznawaniu cudzych stanów psychicznych, in: idem, U podstaw teorii poznania, op. cit., 410-420. These theories, as well as the theory of Scheller and Munsterberg’s theory of experience of foreign consciousnes, are analysed also by E. Stein in the study: Zum Problem der Einfühlung. 541 R. Ingarden, O poznawaniu cudzych stanów psychicznych, art. cit., 420-427. Last note is legitimate; however, it is not specific for perception of other man’s psychic states. Each cognition is subjectively conditioned, although these conditions can be qualitatively different. E.g., lack of sight does not enable one to recognise colours, etc.

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facts and psychic acts, is enough for cognition of other man’s interior actions. If yes, only some other man’s interior actions could be recognised in an inadequate way – these expressed in a body. Ingarden’s position is convergent in this matter with Thomas. Aquinas ascertains that even angels do not know “the thoughts of the heart”, unless they are accidentally manifested in human body or “character”. Only God can know intentions of the human heart, while they are accidentally available for other man542. The distinguished epistemic status of one’s own act concerns decision and a process of getting to it. It is the only thing which one can discuss as a purely conscious object of conscience, as a purely intentional object. The immanence sphere can be exceeded by sensual and bodily moments of one’s own act and other man’s act, which is cognitively constituted as a radically transcendent object. Nevertheless, even it is cognitively available for conscience due to inten542 In De verit., q. 8, a. 13, c., while answering the following question: “utrum angeli possint scire occulta cordium”, Thomas writes: “[...] angeli cogitationes cordium per se et directe intueri non possunt. Ad hoc enim quod mens aliquid actu cogitet, requiritur intentio voluntatis, qua mens convertatur actu ad speciem quam habet [...]. Motus autem voluntatis alterius non potest angelo notus esse naturali cognitione, quia angelus naturaliter cognoscit per formas sibi inditas, quae sunt similitudines rerum in natura existentium; motus autem voluntatis non habet dependentiam nec connexionem ad aliquam causam naturalem, sed solum ad causam divinam, quae in voluntatem sola imprimere potest [...]. Sed per accidens potest cognoscere cogitationem cordis quandoque; et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum ex cogitatione actuali resultat aliquis motus in corpore, dum aliquis gaudio vel tristitia afficitur ex his quae cogitat, et sic cor quodammodo movetur. Per hunc enim modum etiam medici quandoque possunt passionem cordis cognoscere. Alio modo inquantum ex actuali cogitatione aliquis meretur vel demeretur; et sic mutatur quodammodo status agentis vel cogitantis in bonum vel in malum. Et hanc dispositionum mutationem angeli cognoscunt. Sed tamen ex hoc non cognoscitur cogitatio nisi in generali; ex multis enim diversis cogitationibus eodem modo aliquis meretur vel demeretur, gaudet vel tristatur.” In S.th., I, q. 57, a. 4, c. answer to the question: “Utrum angeli cognoscant cogitationes cordium” sounds as follows: “[...] cogitatio cordis dupliciter potest cognosci. Uno modo, in suo effectu. Et sic non solum ab angelo, sed etiam ab homine cognosci potest; et tanto subtilius, quanto effectus huiusmodi fuerit magis occultus. Cognoscitur enim cogitatio interdum non solum per actum exteriorem, sed etiam per immutationem vultus, et etiam medici aliquas affectiones animi per pulsum cognoscere possunt [...]. Alio modo possunt cognosci cogitationes, prout sunt in intellectu; et affectiones, prout sunt in voluntate. Et sic solus Deus cogitationes cordium et affectiones voluntatum cognoscere potest. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas rationalis creaturae soli Deo subiacet; et ipse solus in eam operari potest, qui est principale eius obiectum, ut ultimus finis; et hoc magis infra patebit. Et ideo ea quae in voluntate sunt, vel quae ex voluntate sola dependent, soli Deo sunt nota.”

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tion. Even it can be judged by one’s conscience, which is consistent with etymological connotations and Aquinas’s teaching.

6.3. Non-actional and actional consciousness of the human act For Aquinas, b e c o m i n g a w a r e of something (committed good or evil) is the first thing revealing itself as conscientia and to which this name primarily belongs. For Husserl, Bewußtsein is mainly inner a w a r e n e s s of one’s own psychic processes. In spite of differences, both philosophers have on their mind: firstly – this a w a r e n e s s of something, secondly – awareness of s o m e t h i n g t h a t h a s m e n t a l o r c o n s c i o u s c h a r a c t e r i n i t s e l f (one’s own act or psychic process). Becoming aware of something plays a key role in constitution of all types and kinds of consciousness and conscious objects. Inner awareness mentioned here is constitutive for conscious processes. An ontically conscious process is the act of intellect. Thus, we can say about such intellectual acts as cognition and wanting or desiring something that they are conscious, because they include the inner awareness. It is present also in the act, because all human actions include intellectual elements as actions of the intellect and the will are intellectual actions in the strict sense. Therefore, we know something about own conscious processes and about the action in two ways: when taking the action due to inner awareness we are conscious of it and when we orient the act of reflection towards this action, reaching it with the ray of intention like the object of cognition that is transcendent against the act. Simple consciousness, non-reflexive reference to something, precedes any reflection and is its necessary condition.543 Husserl states that properties of theoretical attitude and its theoretical acts include the fact that in them we somehow in advance find objects544, which are pre-theoretically constituted before they are theoretically acquired, meant or determined. He immediately adds that the same concerns axiological and practical attitude and acts proper to these attitudes545. These ascertainments allow the careful formulation of a thesis that only a previously non-thematically known thing can be thematically conscious (recognised). About both (non-actional and actional) ways of becoming aware of own 543 See: E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie, vol. 1, op. cit., 263. 544 E. Husserl, Ideen II, 6. 545 Ibidem, 7.

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processes one may say that they bear witness about one’s acts (Thomas’s conscientia testificari). Thomas does not distinguish these two ways in his theory of conscientia. However, in De veritate, he uses the term scientia in the nominal definition of conscientia, while the term notitia – in the real definition. Therefore, he signalises that in the act of conscience it does not have to be about science in the strict sense, but about noticing something, i.e. such a “knowledge” that is possessed by a person who just “knows” about something. Having regard to the first of them, in the scholastic tradition one discusses reflexio in actu exercito, while the latter is called reflexio in actu signato546. When conscience becomes aware of a fulfilled act, it “locates” it in the field of consciousness: in its centre or on the margin. Clear thematic apprehension of the act puts it in the centre of the field. Then, conscience in its function of witnessing from unclear noticing (nosse, notitia) becomes cognition in the strict sense (cogitare, cognitio)547. The inner awareness is a necessary moment of mental process, thus it cannot be annihilated: experienced process cannot be made non-conscious or more or less conscious. When it is already being fulfilled or fulfilled, it can occur in the whole range of distinctness, from dark, barely noticeable548, to fully illuminated. The process cannot be annihilated, but it can be “not allowed to speak” by another act of consciousness (act of the will), the thing revealed by processing can be laid aside (conscientia deponi potest)549. Reflection that is actional consciousness, in spite of making a process be its potential object, can be laid aside and cannot be undertaken. However, if it is undertaken, it can be oriented only towards the intended process or (even if just now) fulfilled, because the subject of consciousness cannot live in two acts simultaneously: in the act being the object of reflection and in the act of reflection. Any reflection is always and neces-

546 For more about this, see: W. Chudy, Refleksja a poznanie bytu, op. cit. passim. In this context, one should pay attention to another book of his: Rozwój filozofowania a “pułapka refleksji”. Filozofia refleksji i próby jej przezwyciężenia, Lublin 1993. 547 A. Anzenbacher (idem, op. cit., 95-98) wrongly connects pre-reflective consciousness only with habitual cognition of the first principles and identifies Thomas’s “act of conscience” with reflection. This problem is more complex, which can be noticed in our analyses. 548 We say about such actions that they are not fully conscious. However, incomplete consciousness of actions can be at fault when somebody took some sedative or when he/she is so concentrated on accomplishing a purpose that he/she does not care about anything else (we say then that he/she is conscienceless). 549 S. th., I, q. 79, a. 13, sc.

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sarily a consequent perception550. Thus, Thomas says about conscience (conscientia) as the act that it is oriented towards what can be done or what was done, not towards what is currently being done551. In non-actional awareness of one’s own act, ego as the subject of the act is also the one who is aware of this act. While being aware of this action, one experiences it as "its" and entirely solidifies with it as with its act. In the act of reflection, one’s own action belongs to its stream of consciousness, but it becomes specifically transcendent against the act of reflection meaning it. In addition, primary solidarity with one’s own act is suspended, because ego reflecting an action and ego of a reflected action separate from each other, while numerically they constitute the same subject552. Husserl calls the phenomenon perceived here as the phenomenon of “splitting of the ego” in reflection (Ich-Spaltung). Reflected process and its subject are thematically given as the object of reflection, while reflecting ego and the act of reflection are “anonymous” (Husserl’s term), it is processed only non-thematically553. It enables understanding why conscience is defined sometimes as some transcendent “voice”, as the “voice” of some transcendent judgement (God)554, who objectively recognises and assesses one’s own act and one as its author.

550 L. Landgrebe defines reflection as Nachgewahren. See: idem, Der Weg der Phänomenologie. Das Problem einer ursprünglichen Erfahrung, Gütersloh 1963, 201. 551 Having regard to this, in relation to the object of conscience in Thomist ethics, we distinguish conscience of antecedent actions (conscientia antecedens) and of past actions (conscientia consequens). This differentiation is known to Thomas, but we owe technical terms of this differentiation to Suárez. 552 Here it is about suspension of this solidarity of ego with one’s own act, which occurs when one implements its action as its own. It should not be mistaken with “moral” negation of solidarity with one’s own act, when one does not accept its act even if already fulfilled, as happens when one fulfils some act with disguise, disapproval, agreeing on to it against one’s own beliefs. 553 See: E. Husserl, Ideen II, 101-102; idem, Erste Philosophie, vol. 1, op. cit., 262-263. This subject is discussed also by e.g. G. Brand (Welt, Ich und Zeit. Nach unveröffentlichten Manuskripten Edmund Husserls, Den Haag 1955), J.M. Broekmann (Phänomenologie und Egologie. Faktisches und transzendentales Ego bei Edmund Husserl, Den Haag 1963, 119-137) and K. Held (Lebendige Gegenwart. Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik, Den Haag 1966). In relation to the problem of putting the stream of consciousness in time in actuations, the problem of “Ich-Spaltung” is discussed by S. Judycki (Intersubiektywność i czas, op. cit., 187-204). 554 Also among phenomenologists, conscience is defined as “voice”. Hildebrandt defines conscience as follows: “geheimnisvolle Stimme in unserer Seele, [...] die unerbittlich zu uns spricht, zerstört den Frieden unserer Seele und bürdet uns eine mit nichts vergleichba-

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However, the metaphor of “voice” of some subject, transcendent against recognised action, can blur appropriate understanding of conscience in its witnessing function. The metaphor of “word” would be a complement555. Unclear, non-thematic witnessing of conscience about one’s own act can be called “voice”, while conscience “words” would be clear (actional) cognition of the action in reflection. Some type of transcendence, defined by Ingarden as structural transcendence, occurs between the reflected and reflecting processes that are egoistically oriented. Two processes create the whole, but as with the reflected and reflecting processes, they are two subjects of properties. One process against another process is like an object against the act of consciousness in which it is meant, although the first constitutes the existential foundation of the latter. That is why they are transcendent against each other, but only structurally and in a weaker form. If the object constitutes a separate whole against the act that means it, then it is structurally transcendent against this act in a stronger form 556. Inner awareness itself and the mental process that is aware in it are not structurally transcendent against each other, because they are one subject of qualities. We said that non-actional notice (notitia) of the action is a condition of actional cognition, reflection to some degree. Before the ray of intention of the act of conscience reaches the action, it is initially known: it manifests to one’s consciousness as determined existing content. Speaking Husserl’s language, action given non-thematically stimulates us, entraps, seizes, determines557. However, what causes knocking out conscience from passive realisation and transformation of being aware into the act of reflection? In everyday life, it is non-thematic apprehension of disharmony occurring in the field of consciousness between a taken action and possessed moral or ethical

re Last auf” (idem, Ethik, op. cit., 181). This issue is discussed more broadly by A. Siemianowski (Sumienie, art. cit., 37-77), seeing in conscience also emotional process. 555 At Augustine, we see differentiation of “voice” and “word” in a different context (Sermo 293, 3). Having regard to the biblical statement that Christ is “Word” and John the Baptist – “voice” of a person calling on a desert, Augustine considers the relation of “voice” and “word”. Voice is an empty sound, which has no meaning in itself (in the semiotic sense). Word being born in one’s heart is the fullness of sense. It needs to be carried by voice (sound) to be accepted by other man (penetrate one’s heart). The sound of voice passes by but the sense of word lasts. 556 One’s own act can be considered as creating the whole with the act of conscience reflecting it (i.e. as structurally transcendent in a weaker form) or as constituting separate whole against the act of conscience (as structurally transcendent in a stronger form). 557 See: E. Husserl, Ideen II, 105.

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knowledge558. Disharmony experienced in the field of consciousness causes wonder, which for Aristotle is the beginning of philosophising559. Wonder indicates ignorance or doubt, which according to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas constitutes a condition of posing a question560. These comments referring to theoretical attitude can be mutatis mutandis referred to practical cognition, including to conscience as consciousness of the human act. Disharmony in the practical area causes anxiety, which stimulates conscience to reflection561. All actional cognition, thus conscience as the act of reflection, is directed by questions posed clearly or not clearly by the recognising subject. Non-thematic giving of the human act in the inner awareness causes that questions about the existence of the act that one is aware of562 and about its attributes (of which one is aware) are redundant. Other questions mentioned by Aristotle and Thomas, i.e. questions about the nature of the action and its cause, are still in force. Answering these questions requires crossing the borders of what is directly given563. Actional cognition of the act in conscience is directed by a whole series of more detailed questions. First, these are questions concerning material content of the action564. The first is, “what have I done?”565 that we pose when one knows about perceived action, although it is unknown for it. The second is, “what is the thing that I have done?”566 It concerns the type of this action567. The answer to

558 We regard “knowledge” in the broadest meaning of this word as the thing that we know about something, not thematic or scientific knowledge. See: 3.2.2.1. 559 Met. 982 b-983 a. 560 See: 2.1. 561 Sometimes this anxiety identifies itself with conscience, as A. Siemianowski does it (Sumienie, art. cit.). It does not seem right. 562 Ingarden considers the existential question the direct question concerning existence of something, to which existential judgement is an answer, understood like, e.g. existential Thomists do this (e.g. “whether God exists?”), but all decisive questions starting from the interrogative particle (e.g. “whether God is omniscient?”) to which a predicative judgement is an answer. Existential questions do not include any material unknowns, only an existential unknown. See: R. Ingarden: Z teorii języka i filozoficznych podstaw logiki, Warszawa 1972, 333. 563 See: 2.1. 564 R. Ingarden analyses these questions in the study O pytaniach esencjalnych (art. cit., 327-482). They include the following questions: What is this?; What is x? 565 It is the equivalent of the question “what is this?” We pose the question: “what have I done?” when we have done something not fully consciously or when performance of an action (external act) does not fulfil completely the act of decision. 566 It is the equivalent of the question: “what is x?”

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these questions is a necessary condition of posing further questions: about value and moral assessment of the action. Apart from witnessing, Thomas assigns to conscience judgement of intended actions or action taken in the light of moral principles, including principles of synderesis. The question whether the action is good or bad is the leading one 568. A scheme of reaching an answer to this question (scheme assessing functioning of conscience) is known. It is a practical syllogism569, whose major premise is the judgement of synderesis and minor premise is the judgement of reason. Aquinas says also, what the consequences of the judgement of conscience are. When it concerns an intended action, they are incitement, persuasion or urging. When its object is taken action judged as morally wrong, accusation, anxiety or torment appears. If it is judged as good – defence or excuse. Thus, judgement of action should be differentiated from its result and the consequences arising on its foundation. In phenomenology, the judging functioning of conscience can be clarified by referring to differentiation of a judgement about value, evaluative judgement and assessing judgement570 and questions corresponding with these judgements. The mentioned questions about the “what” of an action and its type can be considered identical with questions about the moral value of an action, i.e. its specific qualification. These questions are answered by conscience in its witnessing function. Conscience can pose a further question without resigning from this function. Evaluative judgement, being an answer to the first of them, is added to cognition and recognition of an action as morally qualified. It apprehends an action as implementing to some degree a specific type of value (perfect value). Evaluative judgement apprehends an action in the light of some criterion (morality standards), which are known to the evaluating subject regarding its content

567 I think that questions in the type of “what is x?” (e.g. “what is a murder?”) are not appropriate questions of conscience, but of ethical knowledge. These are questions about the essence of some kind of action, or – as Ingarden would say – about content of the idea. Conscience uses this knowledge, motivates its acquisition, but it does not acquire it. 568 “[...] an actus sit rectus vel non [...].” De verit., q. 17, a. 2, c. 569 Let us remember that syllogism is a theoretical scheme explaining the judgement of conscience, not a description of its actual functioning. 570 This differentiation was proposed by W. Stróżewski (idem, Wartościowanie a ocena, in: idem, Istnienie i wartość, Kraków 1981, 112-118). Judgement about values would constitute any descriptive judgement saying something about values. Evaluative judgement is a judgement in which a value proper to a given object is apprehended in its individual essence in the light of the perfect value determining it. Judgement assessing value or valuable object apprehends assessed object with regard to external criterion of assessment (e.g. standard).

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and justification (reason)571. The sense of this criterion occurs in the same field of consciousness as the sense of evaluated action. In spite of fundamental differences in the very way of cognition (I recognise my own action in interior or immanent perception accompanied by interior and external sensory perception, while other man’s action – in special external cognition), actional, thematic cognition of one’s and other man’s act is directed by the same questions. Regardless of the way of recognising one’s own act and other man’s act, and of its cognitive value, the sense of recognised actions finds its place in the field of consciousness. It can be evaluated in the light of moral standards, accepted by the recognising subject. That is why, in accordance with , one can say that in own conscience it etymology of the Greek knows about other man’s act based on own co-awareness, which in turn justifies validity of references seen in Thomas’s works that conscience concerns also other man’s act. A difference between cognitive reference of conscience to one’s and other man’s act is noticeable not only in the way of its cognition, but also – especially strongly – in reactions to so and so recognised and evaluated one’s and other man’s act. According to the proposal of Hildebrand, we can talk here about a response to value572. While perceiving anger of another ego’s act, one disapproves it. This act (sometimes also its author) can cause one’s reluctance or indignation. In relation to one’s own act, just intended, one feels an obligation to its implementation or omission. In relation to implemented action, if one recognised its iniquity, there appears pain, worry, accusation, regret573. A piece of conscience is the answer to fair action. In works by Thomists, especially in textbooks of ethics, one discusses conscience mainly as clear cognition of good or evil of intended or fulfilled actions, while functioning of conscience is explained through practical syllogism. In modern philosophy, descriptions of conscience as non-thematic realisation of committed evil (rarely: good) comes to the fore. This “realisation” is identified with an emotional process. In Thomist ethics, conscience is defined as a judgement of practical reason, which causes a purely intellectual interpretation of 571 Justification or the reason of assessment criterion known to the assessing subject can be purely subjective and false. It is only about the fact that while applying some criterion, the subject realises (although non-thematically) what is the reason of applying it. Somebody can apply the standard that has material justification because one believes that custom indicates it. Hence, the necessity of acquiring ethical knowledge mentioned by Thomas. 572 See: D. von Hildebrand, Ethik, op. cit., 201-253. 573 Siemianowski presents a description of emotional reaction to one’s performed iniquitous action (idem, Sumienie, art. cit.)

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conscience. In trends of modern philosophy, the cognitive function of conscience, mainly as clear cognition, is questioned.

6.4. Summary An encounter of Thomas’s science about conscience and phenomenology is possible due to “becoming aware” or “awareness”. Aquinas and Husserl indicate it as a fundamental meaning of the term conscientia and Bewußtsein. Thanks to this, one’s own act has a distinguished epistemic status. Due to the inner awareness that co-constitutes it, one knows it together with the process of the act’s realisation occurring in the field of consciousness. This non-actional and non-thematic “knowing” of one’s own act can be transformed into actional, thematic cognition, when one orients the act of reflection towards its action. Actional cognition is directed by questions posed silently or clearly. The logical order of posing them indicates a sequence of founding layers of a sense of act, from stating the fact to assessing it in the light of accepted moral standards. Cognition and recognition of the human act in conscience and its assessment is possible because the content of consciousness occurs in an organised way. This way is called the field of consciousness. The thing currently becoming aware is surrounded with a horizon of sense, among which one can find moral standards and colloquial or systematic moral science. This enables apprehending the act of which one becomes aware as a unit of a specific species or genre, having moral value and belonging to a specific moral standard. Actional cognition of an act, especially its assessment, can be intuitive or discursive. Practical syllogism explains the internal structure of intentional cognition of one’s own act in conscience, while it describes discursive cognition of the act and its moral assessment. Cognition of other man’s act does not occur in conscience. However, when it is recognised, it can be judged in one’s conscience. The mechanism of judging other man’s act is the same as of one’s own act.

Conclusion Conscience as cognition, i.e. some form of source of knowledge about something, constitutes the topic of our study. We have realised various apprehensions of conscience found in the history of human thought, hence we have considered the legitimate basing of our analyses on the initial point of the science about conscience discovered in the treatise of Thomas Aquinas. Two reasons have favoured this choice: Thomas clearly treats conscience as cognition and to this day, his concept of conscience has been inspiring research about conscience, conducted also beyond the Thomistic trend. The theological and metaphysical character of the treatise of Aquinas suggests that also his science about conscience would have such a character. Its complementing with phenomenology is to visualise the informational aspect of conscience, which was adopted by Thomas, but insufficiently explicated. We have acknowledged that the theoretical consideration of the cognitive aspect of conscience should be conducted on a historic-philosophical basis. In this study, historic-philosophical analyses and their results have played the ancillary role. They are to support clear grasping of the cognitive aspect of conscience. Such initially determined research assumptions have required validation. In the first chapter, the matter is to realise the character of Thomas’s science about conscience. Its occurrence in theological and didactical works indicates that we would have to do with theology of conscience taught in accordance with the scholastic didactical paradigm. This paradigm has reversed the order of research. According to Thomas’s apprehension, theology in its research heads from God to things. The systemic solution of the question (quaestio) requires a reference to that which is first by nature, not to that which is first to us. In Aquinas view, that which is given is covered by systemic explanation, constituting metaphysical explanation. The purpose of our analyses has consisted in revealing that which is given, which Thomas often only signals. Locating the essential core of syneidesiology in these parts of three treatises by Aquinas (Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, Quaestiones disputatae De veritate and Summa theologiae), where the man, his cognition and moral behaviour are discussed, has favoured the cognitive character of conscience and significance of conscience for human moral life. A set of contents of these treatises and the order of the lecture about conscience have also indicated that the role performed by conscience in moral life results from its cognitive function. Those conclusions have enabled us to take another step, i.e. analysis of Thomas's question about conscience. We have dealt with it in the second chapter. It was supposed to lead to the specification of issues, on which Aquinas con-

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centrates in science about conscience, as well as to indicate the assumptions that he adopted. The theory of questions outlined by Aristotle and Thomas has appeared to be useful not only in accomplishing these purposes, but also in understanding Aquinas's philosophical system and the course of cognition itself. The is based on knowledge has statement that strictly scientific knowledge with been important for further analyses. Connection of knowledge is conveyed by the scholastic question “utrum p”, which introknowledge duces the considered issues. The conducted analysis of questions posed by Thomas in science about conscience has indicated that it includes two groups of problems. The first one concerns synderesis and concentrates on the kind of its being, its place in the human existential structure, on the way of its functioning and its qualities. The second group considers conscience (conscientia) and includes three topics: the way conscience exists and its structure in the human existential structure, the way conscience functions and the way the man proceeds with regard to judgements of conscience. Doubts, which are the reason for posing those questions, and assumptions of questions are based on previous (i.e. earlier) knowledge about the fact and functioning of synderesis and conscience, about mistakes occurring in judgements of conscience, as well as on knowledge about the fact of being guided by judgements of conscience in proceedings. This knowledge concerns that which is given before any theory and which constitutes the object of phenomenological analyses. While solving issues designated by title questions of scholastic articles, Aristotle refers also to anthropological (metaphysical) knowledge about the structure and functioning of the human brain, rational soul and the man as psychophysical compositum. Chapter Three includes a presentation of Thomas's science about synderesis and conscience, with emphasis on statements significant for epistemological analyses. The analysis of solutions of particular issues undertaken by Aquinas has showed that the existence of conscience (conscientia) is a primary initial datum. It is not problematic, that is why Thomas does not pose a question about the existence of conscience. He answers quaestio quia by saying that conscience witnesses, binds or incites, and accuses, torments or rebukes. In addition, he states that sometimes conscience errs and can be laid aside, as well as that the object of conscience is constituted by a particular act, mostly one’s own act of the subject of conscience, and – in a different way – another man’s act. These conclusions , reflect direct data and are based on conscience viewing. They are knowledge for which – according to Aristotle’s concept of science – Thomas searches for ). causative explanation (knowledge An answer to quaestio quid est conscientia is constituted by the definition of conscience, which is variously phrased by Thomas. These phrasings can be re-

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duced to the following: conscience is applying or application (applicatio) of knowledge or notice (notitia) of something to something else, which is constituted mostly by one’s own act. This definition results from reasoning based on systemic knowledge concerning the functioning of the intellect. One assigns to conscience only the examination of conclusions extracted from premises, which are provided by the act of synderesis, reason or the assent of faith. Therefore, conscience is not always a primary source of knowledge or noticing something, but only applies or allocates knowledge or notice of something acquired from somewhere else to a specific act. However, conscience needs to know this act. It is known firstly as the occurring one, and then as morally good or bad. Having regard to this, conscience has assigned three functions: to witness, to bind or to incite, and also to accuse or excuse. While performing the last two functions that can be called axiological, conscience is not a source of moral dictate, but it reveals knowledge about it, which is why a dictate is binding. In that way, conscience becomes a means that reveals knowledge about moral dictates and their “justifications” to the operating subject and that co-constitutes the act by binding or inciting the will to do good or avoid evil. Such a way of functioning of conscience indicates that it is the act: specific activity, realising intellectual potentialities of the human soul. While answering the question about the ontic reason of conscience (quaestio propter quid), Thomas indicates habits and intellectual powers. He also emphasises that, although numerous cognitive habits and powers (also sensual) can shape conscience, the first place is occupied by synderesis, as it gives effect to all other powers and habits in the practical area. Synderesis never sins or errs, because it is never mistaken of the fact that one should do good and avoid evil. Conscience can err, because it based on the false premise of reason. However, it is important that in the theory of synderesis as habit, Thomas bases not only on systemic knowledge concerning functioning of powers of reason, but also on that which is given directly: existence of reasoning proper to the practical reason and the fact that synderesis inclines only to good and opposes evil. That which is given directly and to which Thomas refers in science about conscience is revealed only due to self-consciousness. Therefore, conscience is also some process of consciousness. Chapter Four includes a presentation of etymology and the way of using the terms “conscience” and “consciousness”, as well as their equivalents in Greek, Latin and modern European languages. Therefore, we discovered their shared etymology and semantic proximity, which does not mean their full synonymy, however. In the fifth chapter, the human act, being the object of conscience, has been analysed. Human act (actus humanus) is a conscious and free act of the man, thus it is entitled to moral classification. Thomas understands the act integrally.

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Morality of the act is founded on the nature of the act’s subject and its relation to the end (act’s object). First, the object of the act decides on its moral value. Circumstances can change the act’s moral classification only within some limits, causing that a good act per se is not like this. However, they cannot make a bad act per se a good act. Phenomenologists make the act’s moral classification dependent on the value of the object, to which man’s action is directed, as well as on motivation of the subject that undertakes such an action. In spite of this difference, these are not opposed concepts of the human act and morality. For gnosiological (epistemological) analyses, it is important that the act as the object of conscience is a mental being (at least in its root), and that its peculiarity (uniqueness) indicates the activity in itself, intended purpose or value and circumstances. In the strict sense, the human act is the act of decision, in which the will decides on something that is allocated to it by the intellect. In the broad sense, the act may refer to the process including various stages of reaching constitution of the act of decision and its realisation. It enables differentiating in the act, after Thomas, the interior action of the will and the external action, which have their own objects. It constitutes the basis for Ingarden’s differentiation of purely internal act and the act manifesting itself in a body, although those two differentiations should not be identified with each other. Therefore, cognition of the act in conscience needs to have a diachronic and synchronic dimension (character). It needs to involve the complete process of constitution of the act of decision and its fulfilment, as well as all moments that co-occur and determine the act in its specificity. Therefore, how does cognition of the act in conscience occur? Chapter Six includes an answer to this question. Thomas’s teaching about conscience, which is the object of our analyses, enables one to state that conscience is consciousness of the human act, which is a mental being and as such, it has a distinguished epistemic status. First, we obtain knowledge about the fact and moral value of our proceedings (act) non-thematically, together with constitution of the act as a fully personal action, i.e. the action as the author of which we feel and whose sense we determine through intellectual operations. The act’s good appears as adequate (proper, appropriate) to our appetitive powers, while evil appears as the one that causes disapproval, dissatisfaction, rejection. Constituting of the act is at the same time constituting of its cognitive sense. It happens in the course of the stream of mental processes in the horizon of other conscious contents, which fill the field of consciousness. All our acts, having been revealed to us due to being lived through, are lived through as similar or different in relation to already experienced acts or those known from somewhere else. They are lived through as belonging to the specific kind of acts and specific moral standard. Therefore, each act is lived through in the horizon of one’s personal moral knowledge, which one real-

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ises to a various extent, as well as one realises the reason of acknowledging it. Such a living through of one’s own act means the closest thing, i.e. conscience. In this meaning, conscience is axiological consciousness, living through morally valuable things. Such an act of one’s own, so lived through, can become the object of actional cognition. The act of reflection, added to the inner awareness, orients the ray of intention towards the act lived through by somebody. Then it becomes the object of inner or immanent perception or reminding. If they include also the moral value of the act, instead of only its fact and content, we call it conscience according to the word’s etymology and the way of its use. Structural transcendence occurs between the act as perceived or reminded and perception or reminding of the act. Phenomenologically, the given splitting of the ego occurs between the subject of the act and the subject of reflecting consciousness. In this meaning, conscience is axiological actional consciousness. An actional becoming aware of the act in conscience can be intuitive or discursive. Cognition of the act as morally valuable can be intuitive or discursive, while assessment of the act in light of accepted moral standards is always a discursive cognition. Practical syllogism found in Thomas’s teaching describes the course of discursive cognition of the act and explains the order of founding intuitional cognition. In conscience as the axiological consciousness of one’s own act, the human act reveals itself in its structural fullness, therefore also the subject of the act as its author (i.e. as the author of the act), equipped with relatively permanent habits and virtues. Therefore, cognition of the act in conscience is also cognition of its author, which is why moral classification of the act refers secondarily to a person fulfilling the given act. Another man’s act can also be the object of conscience, which we refer primarily to one’s own act. One “judges according to own conscience” not only itself, but also other man. It means that after reliable cognition of one’s own act or other man’s act, one judges it in light of standards it accepts. A significant difference consists in the fact that only one’s own act has a distinguished epistemic status, while other man’s act does not have this epistemic transparency. Cognition of one’s own act or other man’s act as morally good or bad causes one’s specific reaction with regard to such and such a recognised act, one’s response to recognised value. Significant difference in cognition of one’s own act and other man’s act is the fact that one, when recognising its act as its own, feels fully responsible for it, and causes that also one's response to one’s own act and other man’s act is significantly different. In Thomas’s metaphysics and in other analyses of conscience, only reactions to one’s own act coming into being in

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conscience and through conscience are discussed. Analogous reactions are caused by other man’s act that we recognise as good or bad. The nature of these reactions is interesting more for psychology than for the theory of cognition. It is important that these reactions occur spontaneously as a response to actional and non-actional cognition of the act in conscience. They cause also pushing out the subject from passive living through the act and orientation of the ray of intention towards it, especially when the act that is lived through stays in disharmony with accepted moral standards. Conscience functioning in such a way should be considered as the thing that co-constitutes the act and as non-actional realisation or actional cognition of the act transcendent against this act. Metaphysical problems meet here with gnosiological problems. The issue of presence of the apprehension of generally important moral standards, including first principles of action, in cognition of a specific act in the conscience requires separate study. Having regard to the Aristotelian-Thomistic position concerning the origination of all cognitive contents (genetic empiricism and anti-nativism), first principles of knowledge and action should not be regarded as innate or infused. They are non-thematically recognised together with cognition of the concrete. Such a state of affairs would require correction of arrangements concerning eidetic knowledge. If eidetic knowledge, which is cognition of first principles, is a clear (actional) cognition, it is founded on cognition of something individual. Non-thematic eidetic knowledge founds cognition of the fact, which is always apprehended as the existing one, unambiguously determined, consistent, and different from something else. If it is the act, it is apprehended as proper or iniquitous. The problem of the intellectual or emotional nature of conscience requires separate discussion. In order to solve this problem, one should analyse Aristotelian-Thomistic cognition of theoretical cognition and its specificity, as well as the cognitive function of feelings and its relation to purely intellectual cognition. It is important that both for Thomas and for phenomenologists, conscience is a specific cognition, different from theoretical cognition because it apprehends its object as good or bad, as positively or negatively valuable. Aquinas locates feelings in the sensual sphere and considers conscience the intellectual act. However, the intellectual inclination for good, which, according to genetic empiricism, begins with sensual inclination, starts from sensual feelings. According to phenomenologists, we recognise values through feelings, to which the cognitive function is assigned. The fact of conscience and its functioning enables one to pose a metaphysical question about its existential reason. Thereby, we enter the area of interest of philosophical anthropology, for which cognitive functioning of conscience is a

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datum requiring ontic explanation. Conscience reveals the way of human existence proper to the man and indicates its ontic structure. The way conscience functions and its existential reasons provide a task for ethics to determine fair proceedings with regard to the specific functioning of conscience. Conscience is man’s way of being as a human being, which enables him to be master of himself and his acts. This conscientious being the man includes entire human activity, any realisation of human potentialities. Conscience, which reveals to the man his own life, illuminates, analyses and determines more accurately, cannot be reduced to one moment, its one indication or one function. While defining conscience as the axiological conscience of the human act, mainly one’s own act, one cannot limit itself to a specific difference, which only specifies the closest genre. In the classical definition, definiendum is identified not with genus proximum in itself, but with specifically differentiated (differentia specifica) genus proximum. The closest genre for conscience is consciousness, while the specific difference – its axiological-moral character. The path we set out for ourselves in complementing Thomas’s science about conscience with phenomenological research is not identified with the way we have come to it. As on every path, we have come across obstacles and places that are difficult to face. We wanted to show how consideration of the cognitive function of conscience, and additionally – the complementarity of a Thomistic and phenomenological way of philosophising, has primary importance for the problem of conscience. If we managed to do this, then we have accomplished the purpose of this study.

Abbreviations The Works of Plato Sym. Rep.

The Symposion (Symposium, Convivium) The Republic (Res publica)

The Works of Aristotle An. hist. De an . El. soph. Herm. Met. Nic. Et. Phys. Poet. Post. An. Pr. An. Ret. Top.

The History of Animals (Historia animalium) On the Soul (De anima) On Sophistical Refutations (De sophisticis elenchis) Hermeneutics or On Interpretation (De interpretatione) Metaphysics (Metaphysica) Nicomachean Ethics (Ethica Nicomachea) Physics (Physica) Poetics (De arte poetica) Posterior Analytics (Analytica posteriora) Prior Analytics (Analytica priora) Rhetoric (De arte rhetorica) Topics (Topica)

The Works of Augustine of Hippo Conf. De doct. christ. De Gen. ad litt. De Trin. En in Ps. Ep. Sermo

Confessions (Confessiones) On Christian Doctrine (De doctrina christiana) The Literal Meaning of Genesis (De Genessi ad litteram Librii duodecim) On the Trinity (De Trinitate) Expositions on the Psalms (Enarrationes in Psalmos) Letters (Epistolae) Sermons (Sermones)

The Work of Averroes In De anima

Commentary on De anima (In libros De anima)

The Works of Origen In Rom. In Ez. Hom.

Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (Commentarium in Ep. ad Romanos) Homilieson Ezekiel (Homiliae in Ezechielem)

The Work of Jerome In Ez.

Commentary on Ezekiel (Commentarium in Ezehielem)

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Abbreviations

The Works of Thomas Aquinas Contra Gent. De malo De pot. De verit. De virt. In De an. In Et. nic. In Hieremiam In Isaiam In Job In Met. In Post. Anal. In Sent. In Trin. Q. de an. Quodl. S.th. In Herm.

The Summa contra Gentiles (Summa contra gentiles) Disputed Questions on Evil (Quaestiones disputatae De malo) Disputed Questions on the Power of God (Quaestiones disputatae De potentia) Disputed Questions on Truth (Quaestines disputatae De veritate) Disputed Questions on the Virtues (Quaestiones disputatae De virtutibus) Commentary on De anima (Sententia super De anima) Commentary on the [Nicomachean] Ethics (Sententia libri Ethicorum ad Nicomachum) Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Jeremiah (In Jeremiam prophetam expositio) Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Isaiah (Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram) The Commentary on the Book of Job (Expositio super Job ad litteram) Commentary on the Metaphysics (Sententia libri Metaphysicae) Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (Expositio libri Posteriorum Analyticorum) Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (Scriptum super libros Sententiarum) Commentary on Boethius’ On the Trinity (Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate) Disputed Questions on the Soul (Quaestiones disputatae De anima) Quodlibetal Questions (Quaestiones de quodlibet) The Summa theologica (Summa theologiae) Commentary on De Interpretatione (Expositio libri Peryermeneias)

The Bible 1 Cor 1 Pet 1 Thess 2 Cor Acts Eccl Heb Jn Mt Rom Wis

The First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians The First Epistle of St. Peter The First Epistle of St. Paul to the Thessalonians The Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians The Acts of the Apostles The Book of Ecclesiastes The Epistle to the Hebrews The Gospel according to John The Gospel according to Matthew The Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans The Book of Wisdom

Journals and Serial Publications ACr AK Ang

“Analecta Cracoviensia” “Ateneum Kapłańskie” “Angelicum”

Abbreviations APhD ArTNL BMS ComP DTh E Ep Erk Eth Fen JPPF MSt NSch PF NS PG PhJ PL Pr PrzTom PsR RF RT RThom RTSO RuF Semin SF SG SPCh SSem STHSO STNW II STV Th WST Z ZN KUL

199

“Archives de Philosophie du Droit” “Archiwum Towarzystwa Naukowego we Lwowie” Biblioteka Myśli Semiotycznej “Communio” Międzynarodowy Przegląd Teologiczny “Divus Thomas” (Fr.) “Etyka” “Episteme” “Erkenntnis” “Ethos” “Fenomenologia” “Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung” “Mediaeval Studies” “The New Scholasticism” “Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria” J. Migne, Patrologia Graeca “Philosophisches Jahrbuch” J. Migne, Patrologia Latina “Principia” “Przegląd Tomistyczny” “Psychologische Rundschau” “Roczniki Filozoficzne” “Roczniki Teologiczne” (or: „Roczniki Teologiczno-Kanoniczne”) “Revue Thomiste” “Rocznik Teologiczny Śląska Opolskiego” (from 1973 “Studia TeologicznoHistoryczne Śląska Opolskiego”) “Ruch Filozoficzny” “Seminarium” “Studia Filozoficzne” “Studia Gnesnensia” “Studia Philosophiae Christianae” “Studia Semiotyczne” “Studia Teologiczno-Historyczne Śląska Opolskiego” “Sprawozdania Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego” Wydział II “Studia Theologica Varsaviensia” “The Thomist” “Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne” “Znak” “Zeszyty Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego”

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