Confucius and the Modern World 9781351268929, 9781138576766

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Confucius and the Modern World

This book represents the cutting edge of theoretical works on Confucianism. Starting from Confucianism’s comeback in modern China and ending with the proposal of the new philosophical concept of “multiple universality” in the face of the world culture, the author conducts an in-depth analysis and discussion of many facets of the relationship between Confucianism, Confucian traditions and modern world culture. It has a focused theme and a strong sense of contemporaneity, and responds to the current challenges confronting Confucianism from the perspective of modern culture. The chapters not only elucidate the Confucian position in the face of challenges of global ethics, dialogues on human rights and ecological civilization, but also provide a modern interpretation of classical Confucian ideas on education, politics and ritual politics as well as an analysis of the development of modern Confucianism. All in all, this work is a comprehensive exposition of the Confucian values and their modern implications. Chen Lai, Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Tsinghua University, is dean of the College of Chinese Ancient Studies at Tsinghua University. His research focuses on Chinese philosophy, especially Confucianism, covering the period from the Pre-Qin Dynasty to modern times. Some of his major works include Ancient Religion and Ethics, Pursuing Modern Chinese Philosophy, Study on Wang Yangming’s Philosophy, and Benevolence Ontology.

Routledge Studies in Contemporary Chinese Philosophy Series Editor: Bryan W. Van Norden Vassar College, USA

Yong Li

Wuhan University, China

It is widely recognized that in science, industry, and technology China is a modern superpower. However, there is still a common stereotype that Chinese philosophy consists of nothing but the earnest repetition of quaint sayings from long-dead sages. In actuality, philosophy in China today is vibrant and intellectually diverse. The aim of this series is to publish translations of the best and most representative works by contemporary Chinese philosophers. The books in this series include contemporary studies of the history of Chinese or Western philosophy, as well as original works of research in ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, and other areas. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Chinese Philosophy seeks to fill the large gap that currently exists in the study of Chinese philosophy by providing high-quality translations to English-language scholars. Titles in this series currently include: Confucius and the Modern World CHEN Lai Between Deontology and Justice WU Genyou Secret Subversion I: Mou Zongsan, Kant, and Original Confucianism TANG Wenming Secret Subversion II: Mou Zongsan, Kant, and Original Confucianism TANG Wenming For more information, please visit www.routledge.com/Routledge-Studies-inContemporary-Chinese-Philosophy/book-series/RSCCP

Confucius and the Modern World Chen Lai

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Chen Lai Translated by Wang Xiaohua The right of Chen Lai to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Published in Chinese by Peking University Press, 2011 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Chen, Lai, 1952– author. Title: Confucius and the modern world / Chen Lai ; translated by Wang Xiaohua. Other titles: Kong fu zi yu xian dai shi jie. English Description: New York : Routledge, 2019. | Series: Routledge studies in contemporary Chinese philosophy | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018039382 (print) | LCCN 2018043295 (ebook) | ISBN 9781351268929 (ebook) | ISBN 9781138576766 (hardcover) Subjects: LCSH: Philosophy, Confucian. | Philosophy, Chinese— 20th century. Classification: LCC B5233.C6 (ebook) | LCC B5233.C6 C4281613 2019 (print) | DDC 181/.112—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018039382 ISBN: 978-1-138-57676-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-26892-9 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Foreword to the Chinese editionvii   1 Confucius and modern China

1

  2 Whose justice and what ethics? Confucian ethics and a global ethic

11

  3 Confucianism and power discourse

17

  4 The Confucian tradition and public intellectuals

29

  5 Ecological orientation and modern interpretation of the Confucian doctrine of benevolence

45

  6 Confucian ritual study and modern society

56

  7 The Confucian views on the dialogue between Confucius and Jesus – noumenon and origin

72

  8 Confucianism and modern East Asia

92

  9 Confucian ethics and China’s modernization

101

10 Modern Chinese culture and the predicament of Confucianism118 11 The three themes on early Chinese political philosophy

132

12 On moral politics – the idiosyncrasy of Confucian political philosophy

146

vi  Contents

13 On the educational thought of Confucianism

157

14 Towards real world culture – multi-element universalism in the era of globalization

172

Postscript

186

Index189

Foreword to the Chinese edition

Tsinghua University series of studies of Chinese ancient civilization In modern China, “studies of Chinese learning” mean Chinese people’s study of Chinese national culture with respect to its content. Chinese culture boasts a continuous history of thousands of years and an extensive and profound system. Having had exchanges with foreign civilizations for over 100 years, Chinese culture has witnessed new development and updating. Today, with its ongoing modernization process and wave of globalization, China has become a significant mission in this new era to understand Chinese civilization and its historical development and promote fine traditional Chinese culture in a more comprehensive and in-depth manner. Against this backdrop, the reestablishment of the Academy of Chinese Learning, Tsinghua University aims to do its bit for the great rejuvenation of Chinese civilization, the going-global of Chinese culture, the outstanding development of Chinese academic research and Tsinghua University’s reinvigoration of the study of Chinese culture. In the history of Tsinghua University, the Tsinghua Institute of Chinese Learning was established in 1925. It was then renamed the Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning. For various reasons, it was closed down in 1929. During the four years, nearly 70 students majoring in studies of Chinese learning graduated from the Academy, of which nearly 50 became eminent scholars in China’s humanities circles. Wang Guowei (1877–1927), Liang Qichao (1873–1929), Chen Yinque (1890–1969) and Zhao Yuanren (1892–1982), four professors who supervised students specializing in studies of Chinese learning, were called Four Great Mentors. As a matter of fact, study of Chinese learning conducted by the Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning represented the highest level in China’s studies of Chinese ancient civilization in that period. Moreover, its achievements in the cultivation of talents have been a much-told tale in China’s modern history of education. Talking about the tenet and spirit of the former Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning, Wu Mi (1894–1978, a famous man of letters) explicitly pointed out in

viii  Foreword to the Chinese edition his book Tenet and Process of Tsinghua University’s Founding of Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning: By Chinese learning, it means the whole academic culture of the Chinese nation. In terms of its approaches of study, it attaches great importance to correctness and accuracy and bases its study on the achievements in studying oriental languages and Chinese culture conducted by European and American scholars. This is precisely the difference between Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning and other organizations in this field. As a matter of fact, there had been many usages of the concept of “studies of Chinese culture”. Wu Mi’s wording for “studies of Chinese culture” represented the usage of many scholars then. Later, teaching and research at Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning also indicated its understanding of “Chinese learning” and studies of Chinese learning. As a matter of fact, Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning has always taken Chinese learning as an academic and educational concept, defining its object of study as traditional Chinese academic culture and taking studies of Chinese learning as a system of academic research. In terms of research methods, it emphasized absorbing the achievements and approaches in studying Chinese culture conducted in Europe and America at the time. This indicates that the former Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning was based on studying traditional Chinese culture. Nevertheless, it was not conservative at all from the beginning. Instead, it pursued innovation and excellence. Academically, the Academy was not confined to the traditional academic forms and approaches but oriented to the new, modern and world-wide academic development. So, such a world vision for innovation was one of the root causes of the great achievements of Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning. As a matter of fact, during the 1920s, Tsinghua was not the first university which established academies of Chinese learning. Others included the Academy of Chinese Learning of Peking University (1922) and the School of Chinese Classics of Southeast University (1924) in the early years and the Research Institute of Chinese Learning of Xiamen University (1926) and the Institute of Traditional Chinese Culture of Yenching University (1928) later, to name just a few. Among them, the Academy of Chinese Learning of Peking University was the earliest and most prestigious one and boasted the largest team of scholars of Chinese learning. However, Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning, a late comer, as it was, surpassed the formers. With its reputation and achievements incomparable to others, it became a symbol of modern Chinese academic history. Apart from Wang Guowei and the alike who were themselves great masters of Chinese learning, there were two reasons. One, Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning, based on the cultural perspective featuring the integration of Chinese and Western cultures, had stood firm for its conviction and had never been swayed by the cultural concept of radicalism. Two, it had taken Chinese people’s studies of Chinese learning and study of sinology and orientalism as an organic whole. With international academic vision, it was

Foreword to the Chinese edition ix dedicated to innovation and seeking perfection and placed itself to the front of the study of worldwide Chinese culture. Although the former Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning cannot be reproduced, its spirit and tenet still have indelible value today. Today, Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning has inherited the understanding and use of the concept “Chinese learning” held by the former Academy. We will, “taking China as principal part and having a global vision” as its purpose, inherit the academic spirit of the former Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning. “Studies of Chinese learning” focuses on studying the history and culture of the Chinese nation by Chinese scholars. So, the subjectivity of Chinese culture must be highlighted. However, the highlight of cultural subjectivity does not mean closing the country to international intercourse and talking to ourselves. Instead, it means to establish our own status in studying world culture and cosmopolitan Chinese culture. The Academy of Chinese Learning, Tsinghua University has always stuck to the spirit of the former Tsinghua Institute of Chinese Learning. It follows the tradition of the humanistic studies of Tsinghua University since the 1930s and 1940s and takes part in restoring and reinvigorating the liberal arts of Tsinghua in the New Period, striving to develop the “Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning” into a research centre of Chinese culture with global influence and to provide the study with a first-rate international platform. The Academy will take advantage of the multidisciplinary conditions of its existing humanities and follow with interest the progress in the study of China worldwide. Featuring a combination of the research results in China and the Western world and interdisciplinary studies, it has not only attached great importance to the overall development and features of traditional academic studies but also conducted in-depth multi-dimensional study on Chinese philosophy, Chinese historiography, Chinese aesthetics and literature and world sinology. Featuring high-end results, lectures, periodicals and series of books, it aims to make its due contribution to pushing forward the internationalized study of Chinese culture. Tsinghua Series of Chinese Learning is one of the high-end series sponsored by the Academy of Chinese Learning, Tsinghua University. It mainly includes the research achievements of professors and visiting scholars of the Academy and research project achievements it has initiated. After these projects have been completed, they are sorted out and included in this Series and published by Peking University Press. The Academy of Chinese Learning, Tsinghua University January 2011

1 Confucius and modern China

In the past century, China has made an in-depth criticism on its own cultural tradition in an all-round way, which wins wide attention in the world’s history. Perhaps it is because of this that the current phenomena concerning the rejuvenation of traditional culture have aroused general concern. This seems to indicate that all changes in history and culture since China entered into modern times are tightly bound to issues of “tradition”. As a matter of fact, whether people like Confucius and the Confucian School or not, over the past 2,000 years and more, the Confucian School has taken a prominent position in China’s society and culture and played a dominant role in the formation of Chinese culture so much that sometimes Confucian tradition is viewed as the representative of Chinese culture and Confucius as a symbol of cultural identity. Another fact is that the revolutionary movements and the modernization drive in the 20th century brought about great changes to the image of Confucius and the fate of the Confucian School. For example, the introspection and criticism over Confucius and the Confucian School played a dominant role in the cultural movement in the 20th century. Entering the 21st century, as China’s economy has developed fast and its status on the international political and economic arena has been uplifted, there has been a great clamour for rediscovering Confucius and the ideology and culture of Confucianism. In this era of calling for “cultural self-consciousness”, we expect to evaluate Confucius and Confucianism against a backdrop featuring development of time-honoured civilization in modern times, analysing the issue in the realistic situation of globalization, pushing forward the pondering over this subject to a deeper level by combining theoretical thinking with practical concern. Let’s first illustrate the three interpretive modes for the intellectual history concerning the topic of “Confucius and modern China” and then try to describe the realistic situation concerning “Confucius and modern China”.

One The topic “Confucius and modern China” is easily associated with a famous work entitled Confucian China and Its Modern Fate written by Joseph R. Levenson 40 years ago. Particularly, the book contains a chapter which is entitled

2  Confucius and modern China “Confucius’ Status in Communist China”. At the end of the chapter, Levenson said, Confucius was stricken down in the first revolutionary wave in the 20th century. The precious historical continuity and sense of identity seem to have been cut off and oblivious. Many schools have tried to reintegrate Confucius and the continuity and identity of history. In this regard, Communists have played their role in searching for the bygone age and have wise strategies and methods of their own, i.e., to restore the true colors of history and Confucius and to view him in historical background.1 Then, what does it mean by “viewing Confucius in historical background”? Some part of the book is entitled “Walking into History”. This means that Confucian ideology and culture, as far as the author is concerned, had lost their actual existence and function in China and became a “past” and a history during the period of the 1950s and 1960s. While commenting on the cultural policy in China then, Joseph R. Levenson said: “Communists may nationalize Confucius and make him separated from the existing society and the coming history and let him return to the past and view him as a figure in the past”.2 Different from the subsequent “Cultural Revolution” (1966–1976), in an interval at the beginning of the 1960s, an academic discussion on Confucius was made in a dispassionate manner, although it was just a transitory occurrence. Levenson had such a comment on this: Alike to these historical remains, there is no need for the Communist Party to cast off Confucius once for all. In this sense, Confucius may be protected to some extent and has his value of existence. The Communist Party does not intend to deprive of the significance of his existence but to take the place of its cultural function. To put it simple, protecting Confucius does not mean that the authorities of the Communist Party intend to rejuvenate Confucianism. Instead, it means to take Confucianism as a collection in the museum. The aim is to evict it out of the realistic culture.3 Of course, Confucius was a figure in the past. However, by making Confucius return to the past, here it means looking at him as “a dead man living in the past”. It means to make Confucian doctrine a thought in the past so that it has neither any influence or functions in modern times and that Confucius and his doctrine are nothing but a historical relic preserved in a museum. From this angle, by putting Confucius in history, it means “properly locking Confucius in the display window of the museum”. It must be admitted that while Levenson commented on China’s cultural policies in the 1960s, his remarks showed no sign of being influenced by Cold War ideology. Rather, he felt somewhat sympathetic about China’s cultural policies and methods in that period. This is an indication of his simplicity and sober-mindedness as a historian. From this we can see that Levenson’s famous metaphor of “collection of museum” is, as a matter of fact, not his cultural proposition. Rather, it is, first

Confucius and modern China 3 of all, his summary of China’s cultural policies during the period between 1950s and 1960s as an on-looker. Next, such a summary includes his perception for and judgement of the social reality of China, i.e., the Confucian School has “stepped into history”. In this sense, Confucius, who has also gone into history, should neither be worshipped nor denounced. So, he is no longer a target to be beaten back.

Two Levenson died in 1969. Although he did not live long enough to see the movement smashing Confucianism in the early 1970s, “museum collection” was obviously subject to impact and confusion under the slogan of “holding high the banner of getting rid of the traditional ideology and culture” during the Cultural Revolution. Could it be said that collections in the museum, although having become history, have to be fiercely mauled? However, for Li Zehou (born in 1930), there is no such puzzle. In 1980, he published his article Revaluation on Confucius, written in the late 1970s. Li’s thought is featured by taking Confucius and Confucianism as “a culture which has had great influence on the Chinese nation – a mental structure”. He takes it as an approach to interpret Confucius. According to this interpretation, Confucius has not “become a history”. Instead, he has always played his role in history and reality. Li Zehou pointed out: The cultural thoughts initiated by Confucius have infiltrated into the concepts, behaviors, customs, beliefs, modes of thinking and affective states of the public. They have, consciously or unconsciously, become the guiding principle and basic means for people to deal with affairs, relations and life, and constituted the common psychological state and traits of character of the Chinese nation. It should be noted that the thoughts and theories of Confucianism have evolved into a culture, i.e., a mental structure. Whether you like it or not, it has been a historical and realistic existence.4 As far as Li Zehou is concerned, this mental structure has converted into national wisdom. It is the internal existence and civilization accumulated for the survival and development of the Chinese nation. With its great power of succession, enduring function, and relative independence, it has, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, influenced, governed or even dominated people today from contents to form, from code of ethics, concept of truth to thinking model and aesthetic taste, etc.5 Although cultural psychology and national wisdom are not transcendental existence, which is beyond time, space and history, they are, obviously, not a mummy in the 20th century which has entered into history. Nor is it a ghost which has nothing to attach to. Rather, it is a lasting, continued, living and deep-seated existence.

4  Confucius and modern China According to Li Zehou, historically, Confucianism used to rely on the traditional educational, political and family systems, all of which, however, disintegrated and became history altogether in the 20th century. Nevertheless, Confucianism itself has not entered into history altogether in that it has developed into a national disposition. In this sense, Confucius and Confucianism are, without doubt, not collections in museums. Instead, they exist and play their roles in the real life and mind of the public, intellectuals and politicians. Even today, no one can deny Li’s view in this regard. So, it must be admitted that Confucianism’s influence on the behaviour and psychology of Chinese people is the reality of China and a fundamental national condition which all scholars who study the social sciences of modern China must face and deal with earnestly.

Three It is equally obvious that Confucianism cannot be summed up as remains in history. Its significance which transcends history is not limited to the existence of the structure of cultural mentality. As a matter of fact, it has a broader significance of cultural tradition and resources. This has been revealed in Benjamin I. Schwartz’s metaphor in a sense. Schwartz (1916–1999), a famous modern sinologist, in dealing with Levenson’s metaphor which sees Confucius and Confucianism as a museum, compared these to a library. According to Schwartz, intellectual history is not a museum but a library. From the perspective of the tradition and resources of intellectual history, this is of vital significance. Hegel (1770–1831) once said, The initial presentation of ideological activities is, in the first place, a historical fact and a thing in the past, which seems to be spared from the reality. As a matter of fact, however, we are ourselves in that we have history. Or, to be more correct, just in the field of intellectual history, things in the past are just one side which leads to the present of ours. The element which has intercommunity and permanency are integrated with and inseparable to our historicity.6 That is to say, things in the past in intellectual history exist in our real life. From the perspective of ontology, “past” is something that determines what we are “we” now. Here, the “we” may refer to individuals, an ethnic group or a nation. In this sense, the “library” metaphor is far from enough. From the perspective of intellectual history, Hegel held that the life of intellectual history lies in activities. “Its activities take an existing material as its premise. Its activities are done to deal with these materials. Not only does it have some materials added but also mainly have them processed and transformed”.7 Traditions in the past pass on the pioneer undertakings of previous generations, and the cultural achievements of each generation are the human spirit’s recipient and conversion of the heritages of bygone ages. So, tradition is the premise for the mental activities of each era. Leo Strauss (1899–1973) also stressed that doctrines of great ancient philosophers have not only vital historical significance but also practical significance. To have

Confucius and modern China 5 a good knowledge of both the ancient and modern societies, we have to have a good command of but also learn from these doctrines because the problems they raised still exist today.8 He even affirmed that the wisdom of ancient thinkers was superior to that of modern wisdom. Of course, opinions differ in this regard. The significance of Confucianism as a cultural resource or intellectual history refers to the fact that its thinking on morals, politics and human nature still plays a role and has its significance in modern thinking.

Four Talking about cultural tradition, we naturally refer to Tradition, a classic by Edward Shils. It should be noted that a special chapter, entitled “Social Sciences’ Ignorance to Tradition”, is included in its preface. Edward Shils held that modern social sciences are influenced by the concepts of the Enlightenment and take in the attitude of suspecting tradition and the “social” concept which cannot accept tradition. According to him, Reading about the analysis made by modern scientists on what took place in special situations, we may find that they may mention the pecuniary interest of the participants and their irrational fear and will to power. They interpret the internal solidarity of the groups on the basis of irrational recognition or stake. They also mention the strategies for group leadership but talk little about the intimate connection between tradition and great events. Realistic social scientists do not mention tradition.9 He held that social sciences persevere in “realistic and on-the-spot” study but neglect the “historical dimension” of time. Therefore, he continues: The aims and norms of actions, the basis and motivation of accepting these aims and norms as well as the tendency of the repeated appearance of faiths, conventions and systems (we call them ‘tradition’) are, more often than not, regarded as no problem. The more theoretically developed the branches of social sciences, the less attention the traditional factors in society are paid to.10 According to the analysis by Hills, social sciences’ negligence over tradition is, in the final analysis, attributed to many reasons, the ultimate of which is that social scientists have taken in the ideas of progressivism. For this reason, they feel an aversion to tradition and see it as backwardness and even something reactionary. They hold that modern society is moving towards no tradition and that “stake” and “power” will dominate man’s behaviour. He illustrated his point by saying: Max Weber, the greatest sociologist, surely is not so wild about progress. However, he holds a general viewpoint. According to Max Weber, in the final analysis, there are two kinds of society. One is a society which is caught in

6  Confucius and modern China tradition. In the other society, the selection criterion for behavior is rational calculation to realize the maximum satisfaction of interests. . . . Deduced from this viewpoint, modern society is marching towards a traditionless state in which the main basis for action is to chase after interests with reason and tradition is a remnant which is antipathetic to the style of modern society. While expounding on the modern society, Max Weber obviously left little room for tradition, though he showed somewhat tragic eloquence in the course of his illustration of this point.11 Hills’ criticism over modern social sciences is perhaps too severe. In the field of Chinese social sciences, quite a few scholars dedicated to social sciences are engaged in the study in Confucianism-related fields such as sociology, the science of law and psychology. In particular, scholars from Hong Kong studying social sciences are the first who are subject to criticism in this regard. However, Hills’ criticism has definite objects, targeting directly at disciplinary habits in economics and political science as well as the new dogmas in social sciences like the “rational economic man assumption”. On the other hand, it also aims at the mental state of most scholars engaged in social sciences in contemporary Chinese society. As a matter of fact, scholars dedicated to humanity and social sciences should pay close attention to and think about the issues concerning society and culture as well as other public spheres including tradition. On the other hand, Hills also pointed out that in the 20th century people had reflections on modern civilization. Modern civilization is scientific, rational and individualistic as well as hedonistic. “One of people’s blames against the bourgeois society is that it has made people break away from order on which there lies significance of existence”. Tradition is precisely a constituent part of this order of significance, and tradition is its guarantee, the source of significance and the guarantee of the quality of civilization. Modern society, while experiencing rationalization and eradication of a spirit of evil, has lost the significance great religions have provided. So, he criticized Weber, saying that the latter underestimated the authority of tradition and the resistance of the mode and system of traditional authority against the development of modern society. As far as he is concerned, with respect to various forces in modern society such as bureaucratization, respect to substantive traditions and existing things, religious beliefs, charisma routinization systems, accumulated practical experience and wisdom, sense of genealogy and blood relations and sense of belonging towards the locality and nations are still powerful in modern society. He pointed out that substantive traditions do not dominate the centre of society any more as they used to do. “However, they still exist. This is not because they are the external expression of the habits and superstition which have survived but because most people need them since the moment they were born. They could not survive without them”.12 Against this horizon, Confucianism is, of course, what he called “substantive tradition”. In the age of market economy, a period in which the demand for moral reconstruction and social justice becomes more outstanding, we need to consider more seriously the functions and significance of traditions in modern society.

Confucius and modern China 7

Five Since the beginning of the 21st century, traditional culture has been universalized and developed with each passing day, and people have become more enthusiastic about traditional culture including Confucianism. According to a report by the International Confucian Association, popularization of enlightening education and The Four Books (Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, Analects and Mencius) has gained momentum in kindergartens and middle and primary schools throughout China. It is estimated that around 10 million children take part in this activity. In addition to this, at least 20 million parents and teachers have participated in this popularization. These activities have been done voluntarily and mainly among the common people. The popularization, centering on cultivating social values and traditional virtues, aims at moral construction and personality cultivation and an active attitude towards life, hence winning the attention of society. For example, non-governmental organizations of Confucianism like Yidan School in Beijing and Mingde School of Chinese Learning, taking “public benefit” as their principle, organize volunteers to earnestly take part in the activities, which has had a favourable reception. These Confucianism popularization organizations, called “grass roots”, have played a significant role in the new craze for traditional Chinese learning. Moreover, in educational and cultural circles, People’s University, which has been known for its adherence to the principle of Ideology First, took the lead in founding School of Guoxue (Chinese Learning) in 2002. From then on, centres of Confucianism study have sprung up like mushrooms one after another in universities, and commentaries of Confucian classics like Analects by modern scholars can be found everywhere. It is estimated that 2007 witnessed the publication of over 100 books on the interpretation of Analects, with the amount of printing reaching a record high. What’s more, elites in business circles were increasingly enthusiastic about learning about traditional Chinese culture. College classes on Chinese classics oriented to enterprise managers have gained momentum, which echoes the situation of the booming development of China’s private economy. What’s more, there have appeared non-profit schools and academies which are sponsored and funded by people from business circles. These schools and academies mainly engage in studying traditional Chinese culture. So far, dozens of websites have been established which take Confucianism as their main content. The appearance of Internet blogs has become a fairground for enthusiasts and researchers of traditional culture among the common people. This has further stimulated the interest of the public in studying traditional Chinese culture.13 All this is, undoubtedly, indicative of the enhanced self-confidence and cultural confidence of the Chinese nation brought about by the rapid development of the Chinese economy and the so-called “rise” of China since the mid-1990s. On the other hand, people’s enthusiasm about traditional culture shows the urgent need for spirit, and the root cause lies in the huge void brought about by the resigning the old consciousness in people’s minds. This space needs to be made up, especially the reconstruction of national spirit and ethics and morals, which has become a strong demand of the public.

8  Confucius and modern China Grass-roots enthusiasm about traditional culture (Confucian culture in particular) has become a great impetus to this fever for Chinese culture. Its appearance and scale have far surpassed the expectation of intellectual elites, and its strength far eclipses that of academic intellectuals. Although it is somewhat blind in some aspects, it undoubtedly demonstrates that “the culture field” is no longer dominated by scholars. Thus, both the social and folk cultural value orientations will become an important element to which intellectual elites must attach importance. As the populace suffers from little foreign and indigenous dogmas, they, according to their own social and cultural experience, express their own cultural preferences and air their views in this age of cultural democracy. It should be noted that national psychology has undergone some changes, which will not be transient but lasting. Pitifully, we lack in-depth study of this cultural phenomenon from the perspective of sociology. Today, the “Confucius Institutes” have brought the symbol of Confucius to all corners of the world. In a sense, Confucius’ status as the symbol of Chinese culture has been resumed. This indicates that the rehabilitation of Confucius and Confucianism since the “Cultural Revolution” (1966–1976) has entered a new stage. Seemingly, this is a gratifying change for the Confucian School. However, as far as I’m concerned, it is more of a challenge. What I would like to point out here is not that some people are taking advantage of the change out of different motivations but that in the past decades Confucians, to protest against unreasonable criticism, more often than not focus on cultural self-defence and philosophical self-discovery. Now, as there is no need to concentrate on self-defence, the social practice of the Confucian School, apart from its continuous efforts in cultural education, moral construction and cultural and ideological progress, has to stand new tests on how to voice its opinions in the face of the modern world.

Six The history of China (Chinese mainland) in the second half of the 20th century may be divided into two stages. The first stage was the continuation of revolution while the second stage was the beginning of reform. At the turn of the century, China had witnessed enormous changes in its social, economic, political and cultural development compared with the 20th century. Culturally, just as the Chinese economy, we are now in an era which is quite different from the May Fourth period (starting from May 4 of 1919), the period of the Revolutionary Civil War (1924–1937), the period of the Cultural Revolution and the initial period of the reform and opening up to the outside world. Revolution finished and economic reform completed, the theme of this era is no longer “revolution and struggle”. Nor is it “reform and development”. In a traditional term, this is an era of administering state affairs well and ensuring national security. Culturally, China has developed from the “criticism and enlightenment” of the last century to the “creation and rejuvenation” of the new century. Correspondingly, Confucianism is not an ideology propagating revolution. Nor is it a spiritual source to launch reform. Therefore, Confucianism was left

Confucius and modern China 9 out, which was inevitable. In contrast with the relatively short-period of revolution and reform, Confucianism is precisely an ideological system of pursuing the strategy of “administering state affairs well and ensuring national security and guaranteeing long-term stability of the state”. Such a transformation has found its expression in the concept of the leading party. In recent years, the concept of “governing party” has been widely used and embodies the transformation of the leading party in self-consciousness from the “revolutionary political party” to the “governing party”. This should be affirmed. As a matter of fact, the duty of a governing party is to shift its attention to the theme of administering state affairs well and ensuring national stability. Correspondingly, its political culture has had remarkable changes. For example, Jiang Zemin’s speech at Harvard University, Hu Jintao’s speech as Yale University and Wen Jiabao’s speech at Harvard undoubtedly reveal the trend of “Re-sinicization” of the political culture of the governing party. Speeches of Chinese leaders since the 21st century have taken as their core such concepts as constantly striving for self-improvement, taking people first, harmony as most precious and making all nations live together peacefully. All this reveals the Chinese style, interprets the cultural background of Chinese policies and presents the development orientation of China in the future from the perspective of Chinese civilization. Moreover, the governing party’s political idea and slogan for domestic politics with “harmony” as the core is also a reflection of similar efforts, that is, seeking to construct a common value, consolidate the cohesive force of the nation and promote cultural and ideological progress on the basis of Chinese culture. A great amount of Chinese cultural resources has been put into active use to reconstruct and consolidate political legitimacy, which has become a characteristic of the governing party in the early 21st century. Looking to the future, we may find that this development trend which keeps up with the times will be strengthened rather than weakened. This is in sharp contrast with the attempt of the Taiwan authorities’ “Desinicization” since the 1990s. “Re-sinicization” does not mean that Chinese politics and culture in the previous stage and the second half of the 20th century lacked “Chinese style”. Instead, it means consciously absorbing the mainstream value resources of Chinese culture and positively declaring the inheriting of Chinese civilization and more sufficient Chinese style to cope with the complex challenges inside and outside China. On no account does such Re-sinicization mean rejecting various “good things” from outside China, for it is but one part of contemporary China’s political culture linking tradition. It does not represent the whole. Re-sinicization focuses on expressing different attitudes towards “breaking from tradition” and affirming that modern China must develop itself on the basis of its original Chinese civilization, which is a reflection of the cultural awareness of rejuvenating and developing Chinese civilization. All this is a background which we cannot afford to ignore while discussing “Confucius and modern China” today. As for cultural diversity and autonomy against the backdrop of globalization, here I would not like to go much into detail. It is beyond doubt that revitalization of tradition does not mean going back to the past. If the criticism against “restoring ancient ways” during the period of

10  Confucius and modern China the New Culture Movement (around the time of the May Fourth Movement in 1919) has some political pertinence, any concern now about tradition is a remedy and supplement to reality. After all, no one wishes to return to the ancient ways politically, economically and culturally. As a matter of fact, China historically experienced many movements of “returning to the ancient ways”, most of which were a form of transformation. The fact is that people strive to “make the past serve the present”. On all accounts, indispensable as it is, tradition is not perfect. Moreover, tradition is continued but not changeless. It has to be accepted and revised. As a matter of fact, development, change and transformation run through the whole process of inheritance of tradition. Moreover, the continuation of tradition depends largely on interpretation, which always reflects the new changes of the times and contains new development. What we expect is that humanists and scholars of social sciences have intensive exchanges and make in-depth exploration of various subjects concerning relations between Confucianism and contemporary China with a rational attitude and open mind and in accordance with the scientific principle so as to adapt to and promote the development of the social culture of contemporary China. In a manner of speaking, thorough criticisms of Confucian ideas and culture from the perspective of enlightenment and modernization were made in an indepth and comprehensive way in the 20th century. Similarly, response to these criticisms found deep and all-round expression in the 20th century. Therefore, what is important is not to simply repeat the discussions and viewpoints on Confucian culture made in the 20th century. Nor is it to superficially pursue the hotspots of culture. Instead, what is of primary importance is to adapt to the changes of the times and to face the reconstruction of culture, value and order on the basis of the social reality of modern China with a view to cultivating a new consciousness of problems and seeking new solutions. In this regard, we expect humanists and scholars of social sciences to have in-depth communication and comprehensive cooperation. July 26, 2007

Notes 1 Joseph R. Levenson: Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy, p. 343. 2 Ibid, p. 336. 3 Ibid, p. 338. 4 Li Zehou: Historical Essays on Ancient Chinese Ideologies, People’s Publishing House, 1985, p. 34. 5 Ibid, p. 297. 6 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 7. 7 Ibid, p. 9. 8 Leo Strauss, “Preface to the First Edition” of History of Political Philosophy, Vol. 1, Hebei People’s Publishing House, 1993, p. 1. 9 E. Shils: Tradition, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1991, p. 9. 10 Ibid, p. 10. 11 Ibid, p. 12. 12 E. Shils: Tradition, p. 406. 13 Refer to Journal of International Confucian Association 2007 (6).

2 Whose justice and what ethics? Confucian ethics and a global ethic

In the 1990s, a movement of Towards a Global Ethic and promoting Declaration toward a Global Ethic gained momentum. However, why should we conclude a “Declaration toward a Global Ethic”? What is the relationship between this declaration toward a global ethic and declaration of human rights? The various existing discussions indicate that this question remains unclear. So far, movement “Towards a Global Ethic” has been committed to pursuing and searching for “the existing minimal common ground in ethics of religions in the world”. Obviously, the similarities that can be found in over 100 religions are, possibly, far fewer than their differences. On the one hand, this will not only lead to an empty ethic of “minimumism”. On the other hand, and more importantly, even though some similarities are found and some more will be developed in the future, what can be done? It should not be forgotten that Christianity and Islam are homologous. They have more common ground than any other religions in the Declaration. In spite of this, aren’t the conflicts between Christianity and Islam more severe than those of Christianity and Buddhism? Wasn’t it a fact that the two World Wars took place among the countries which traditionally believe in Christianity? Wasn’t this the conflict within civilization? Such being the case, what is important is, perhaps, not how many common grounds there are among religious beliefs and religious ethics. Rather, efforts should be made to develop pacifism and tolerance within religions, eliminating the impulse of rejecting heresies within the religion so as to promote unity in diversity in the secular world. Searching for common grounds is, as a matter of fact, a monistic way of thinking. Can’t we envision a mentality with Chinese characteristics featuring “harmony but not sameness”? There is no need to expect that all religions will eventually come to convergence and that conflicts may be settled on the basis of such convergence. Such an expectation is a denial to multi-culture. After all, common grounds in beliefs and ethics can’t ensure peaceful coexistence, and more common grounds do not mean that it is easy to realize coexistence. Consider the following question about what the Declaration toward a Global Ethic means: In what scope of question does this Declaration intend to correspond? Does it refer to the moral crisis, inappropriate conduct within religions and national states or the conflicts and oppression between religions and national

12  Confucian ethics and a global ethic states? In other words, what is the responsible subject the Declaration on Responsibilities is faced with? In 1995, led by Brandt, a “global civic ethic” was advocated so that it could be taken as the “basis to settle global issues through cooperation between different countries and cultures”. As it has maintained, the Declaration sees from the angle of relation maxim between nations and cultures. The principal part of its ethics is the principal part of conflicts, namely “nations” and “cultures” (Huntington says it is “civilization”). The motivation of Dr. Hans Kung (born in 1928) starting the world ethic movement was based on such a faith: “There would be no peace without peace between religions”. Later, it developed into “There would be no fine global order without a global ethic”. This seems to say that the “world ethic” corresponds to the “world order”. Here, the “world” refers to the world composed of national states. So the world order is the order between nations. Hence, a global ethic is the code of ethics for acts between nations or countries. Morals have a restraining effect on international affairs and diplomatic activities. However, as a matter of fact, acts of modern states do not depend on the conscience and honour of the individual any more but are in the control of political parties and groups and voters. In case of conflict between universal ethics and the interests of national states, the latter, more often than not, prevails. Modern history shows that normative systems such as international law, international moral code and world public opinion can hardly regulate the act out of sovereign states’ will to power. This is owing to the fact that the “international community” is quite different from the society of a realistic national state and that the present world is still without a world government and society. Such being the case, regulating their acts can hardly have an effect. All morals are desires of entities and restrictions on the will to power. However, in the international sphere, remarks on morals cannot play a useful part in that they are nothing more than a sugar-coat to cover up the real profit motive. Feng Youlan (1895–1990) pointed out long ago that the behaviour and ethics of a group or society are based on the basic requirements specified by its higher-lever group or society and that as there is no higher-level society above it, the act of a state is not so apt to be restrained by code of ethics as the act within the state. Therefore, in Declaration toward a Global Ethic or Declaration on Responsibilities, there is no need to focus on the codes of ethics of the acts of states. Instead, efforts should be made to expound not only the discontent of the ethic traditions of major religions over the current situation of the world’s ethics and to remould the popular feelings and views but also the causes of moral crisis so as to fundamentally change the spiritual life of human beings. In the Declaration on Responsibilities and the Declaration toward a Global Ethic, there is an overcautious attitude towards the discourse of human rights: We, people of all ethnic groups of the world, hereby stress those commitments which are made in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that is, acknowledging that people have their dignity, that they have inalienable freedom and equality and that they have shared interests. Every man and woman

Confucian ethics and a global ethic 13 in the world should acquire by learning the awareness of these responsibilities and increase their acknowledgement of these responsibilities. (Declaration on Human Responsibilities) What does this mean? Does it mean that a declaration on human responsibilities means to recommit the freedom, esteem and rights of men affirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? For another example, at the Paris Conference convened in March 1997, Conventioneers agree that the present relevant documents concerning general rights, values and standards such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant treaties should become the starting point of this pursuit of a universal ethic. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been accepted in more and more cultures. It has become the pioneer of a universal ethic of some significance. . . . The universal ethic aims to define the basic ethics and principles in the global community and the human rights and responsibilities listed in the human rights-related documents will play an important part in this process. If the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has become the starting point and important contents of the Declaration toward a Global Ethic, what are the necessity and particularity of the Declaration on Responsibilities? Next, “Perhaps, one day, a declaration toward a global ethic may be formulated by the United Nations. It will provide moral support to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which is often ignored and brutally broken”.1 “Is providing moral support to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” the ultimate goal and essence of the Declaration toward a Global Ethic? Or, doesn’t the Universal Declaration of Human Rights include its own moral ideas so that it needs other moral ideas as support? Finally, Küng and Kuschel continue: It reminds us of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. It declares something from the perspective of rights. Here, we hope to affirm and deepen the rights from the angle of ethics. Here, something refers to: full fulfillment of the inherent dignity of men, freedom and equality which, essentially, nobody can alienate, and solidarity and coexistence of all human beings.2 Does this mean that Declaration toward a Global Ethic is to affirm the contents of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from the perspective of ethics? As a matter of fact, responsibilities and rights differ so appreciably that even Hans Küng (born in 1928) admitted: Negatively speaking, what should a Declaration toward a Global Ethic not be? Broadly speaking, it should not be a repetition of the Universal Declaration

14  Confucian ethics and a global ethic of Human Rights. If religions just repeat the words of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, it would do without the Declaration. However, ethic means something more than rights. Besides, such a Declaration toward a Global Ethic cannot exempt from such a criticism, namely, it is a typical document of the Western World.3 Ethic means not only something more than rights, but also something different from rights. On one hand, I am in favour of a declaration toward a global ethic. As far as I’m concerned, this declaration should not serve the Declaration of Human Rights. Rather, it is a supplement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the soliciting of comments on the power discourse, a reflection on the moral of modernity, a spiritual response to enlightenment and the rational acceptance of all religious traditions and values. It should not be a re-argumentation of the existing contents of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Instead, it should commit to putting forward the moral attitude which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ignores and does not involve. The central principle of the moral of liberalism is the precedence of the rights of the individual. Everyone has the right to take action according to his/her values, thinking that it will go against the basic freedom of the individual to ask all citizens for a concept of common good. As a matter of fact, the Confucian School, together with major religious ethics of the world, stresses the common good of the society, social responsibilities and virtues which are beneficial to public benefits. “Responsibility” and “right” are two different languages of ethics, which embody two different standpoints on ethics and apply to different fields of values. In view of this, the Declaration toward a Global Ethic or Declaration on Responsibilities must clarify its position: whether it is based on responsibilities or on rights? While claiming that it sticks to the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it should unequivocally declare that it is not in favour of the standpoint on ethics held by power discourse. Undoubtedly, we must stick to and defend all the requirements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and strive for their realization. However, this does not mean that the Declaration toward a Global Ethic just provides support to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It should be pointed out in the Declaration of Human Rights that ethics, power discourse and power thinking have their limitations and are far from enough. The generalization of power-centred thinking is one of the causes of numerous problems in contemporary world. Power discourse, more often than not, is associated with individualism. The fundamental assumption of the attitude of precedence of individualism is to put the rights of the individual first, thinking that it must proceed over the group goal and the common good of society. With this standpoint, personal obligations, responsibilities and virtues can hardly be established. The right-first proposition is just to guarantee the negative freedom of men. It cannot prompt the individual’s attention to public good. Nor can it make people face up to the conflict between public good and personal interests. The Declaration on Responsibilities is expected to promote the cultivation of an attitude of value which has positive meaning.

Confucian ethics and a global ethic 15 According to the mainstream understanding in Western culture, human rights are the rights an individual asks the country for. Human rights are everyone’s need and the political and moral requirements they ask for from the government. Here, as individual’s claim of rights is the responsibility and obligation of the government, and the concept of human rights only involves the responsibility and obligation of the government but cannot define the individual’s obligation and responsibility towards society, family and other people. Such a concept of rights has been the core of Western liberalistic philosophy since modern times and the product of the modern market economy and the process of political democracy. However, as the focus is on the individual’s requirements for society and the protection of the rights of the individual, the individual’s responsibilities for society have been ignored, as well as the individual’s responsibility to respect the rights of others. To put it simple, the view on the Asian value may be used as a reference point of the value of Confucian ethics. The wording of the Asian value is likely to be questioned by the cultures of West Asia and South Asia. However, according to the interpretation of the proposer, the Asian value mainly refers to the value embodiment of East Asia under the influenced of the Confucian culture. The Asian value is the attitude and principles of the value developed in the fusion of horizons of the traditions and modernity of Asia. On the one hand, these principles stem from the historical development of Asian culture, religions and spiritual traditions. On the other hand, they are formed in the modernization of Asia in the process of dealing with global challenges, eliminating the unreasonable factors of tradition and acclimatizing Asia to the experience in modernizing the continent. The Asian value is construed as five principles: One, society and the state are more important than the individual. Two, the state is based on families. Three, the state should respect the individual. Four, rather than conflicts, harmony is conducive to maintaining order. Five, religions should complement each other and pursue peaceful coexistence. It can be seen that these principles are provided within Confucian ethics. These five principles may be, so to speak, the applicable value in the contemporary culture of East Asia. Therefore, they not only contain the traditional values of Asia but also new values which have been developed in the process of absorbing Western civilization, establishing a market economy and embracing democratic politics such as respecting individuals. In this sense, the so-called “Asian value” does not mean that all the elements of its value system have only Asian characteristics. The value of modern Asia is quite different from the Western value. This does not mean that all elements are different. The fact is that they differ from each other in structure, sequence and the main part of the value. Put bluntly, this is a non-individualistic value conception system. However, it is a value featuring Asian modernity. This is also a new, modern value of Confucian civilization. Its core is not the priority of the freedom and rights of the individual but the primacy of ethnic groups and society. This attitude towards value, which prioritizes the interests of social groups, cannot be used as an excuse to suppress human rights. It protects human rights through the democratic system and respect for personal value. The Asian value differs from modern Western value in that the former, as an attitude towards value, requires the individual to fulfil his/her obligations and

16  Confucian ethics and a global ethic have a sense of responsibility to others and the group. Such an obligation and sense of responsibility are consistent with the basic consensus and shared value of the collective. This attitude towards value requires men maintain traditional virtues, which are not only the embodiment of human nature but also the sublimation of the general interests of society.

Notes 1 Hans Küng: Preface to Global Ethics, reproduced in A Global Ethic: The Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions, edited by Hans Küng & Karl-jose Kuschel, translated by He Guanghu, Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 1997. 2 Hans Küng & Karl-jose Kuschel: The Parliament of the World’s Religions towards Declaration of a Global Ethic: Principles of Global Ethics, reproduced in A Global Ethic, p. 11. 3 The History, Significance and Methods toward a Global Ethic, edited by Hans Küng & Karl-jose Kuschel, reproduced in A Global Ethic, p. 56.

3 Confucianism and power discourse

The modernity scheme developed in modern Europe has, through centuries of expansion, become a global model to a large extent. However, historical development has indicated that the world, as Huntington pointed out, is becoming more modernized and less Westernized. The basic cause is that although all countries take modernization as their goal, the non-Western societies do not indiscriminately imitate the concept and system of the modernity scheme of the Western world. Instead, the non-Western societies start from the reality of their society and culture, hence forming a cultural and political scheme for their modernity which is a quite different from that of the West. As a result, both have their own patterns of ideologies and institutional arrangement. Such development is called by sociologist Eisenstadt the formation of multiple modernities. Nevertheless, there is always a dialectical relationship between globality and aboriginality, between universality and peculiarity. Therefore, to non-Western societies, the problem is neither to simply reject Western modernity nor to utterly deny the universal elements in Western modernity. Rather, the problem is how to reinterpret in its own culture the concepts and systems developed in the West and to reconstruct the mutual relations between these concepts and systems developed in the West and its own concepts and systems. The concept of human rights is an example of multiple modernities. On the one hand, there is no denying that the concept of human rights has universal meaning to modern society. On the other hand, in terms of how to understand the concept of human rights and their status, different choices are available in different civilization backgrounds. Is there any cultural distance between the concept form and its actual appeal of Western human rights theory? Does the Western concept of human rights go beyond the special philosophical assumption of its actual appeal? Does Confucian tradition contain any analogue of Western human rights thoughts? If it does, what does it focus on and emphasize? How is it compatible to modern human rights thoughts? Will the Confucian School acknowledge a modern scheme which affirms human rights but is quite different from that of the West? These are what this article hopes to discuss.

18  Confucianism and power discourse

One The concept of “human rights” was developed in Western culture in modern times. The concept of “human rights” is, in essence, an expression of a rightsoriented culture. For this reason, it is no wonder that a concept which is similar to the concept of “human rights” can hardly be found in traditional Chinese culture, which is obligation or responsibility oriented. However, in terms of the ideological implication (rather than its concept) that modern “human rights” are concerned about, it is not true that there is no such counterpart and similar concern in ancient Chinese culture, especially in Confucian culture. The difference is that the similar concern it has is often expressed in different forms and has a different emphasis and direction. Good knowledge about this is not only conducive to understanding the difference in culture and value orientation between China and the West, but also stimulates us to think about how to guide and enrich the Western concept of human rights with ancient Confucianism. Therefore, although there was no concept of “rights” in ancient Chinese culture, this chapter still tries to examine, within the framework of the argumentation on “human rights”, the questions mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. We know that the concept of “human rights” has many definitions. Among them, some are suitable for the discussion here on Confucianism, such as “Human rights are the ethic rights of the individual when faced with the state” (Verman, the US) and “Human rights are the moral and political requirements for which the individual asks his society and government or which are considered to be asked” (Louis Henkin, the US). Meanwhile, human rights are generally divided into “civil and political rights” and “economic and social rights”. In the literature in the West since the beginning of modern times, civil and political rights are, in most cases, expressed as “the basic rights the individual enjoys”. Economic and social rights are, however, expressed with the wordings like “act of state” rather than “non-individual rights”.1 As a matter of fact, these two supplement each other in that the individual’s rights over the state are, on the contrary, the state’s obligations to the individual. If interpreted as “the minimum rights the government should guarantee to the people”, “human rights”, in essence, is not an ethical but a political concept, although it is backed by some moral idea. Therefore, although we cannot find any concept in ancient Confucianism which is similar to “human rights”, similar concerns will be found everywhere in the political thoughts of Confucianism if the focus of the aforementioned ideas is shifted to the obligations the government or ruler should undertake. In a manner of speaking, in classic Confucianism, the concept of “government’s obligations” rather than “individual rights” was used to express certain requirements of modern human rights concept and these requirements mainly concentrate on the basic subsistence rights.

Two In early Chinese political culture, the ideal pattern of the relation between the ruler and the ruled was “parents–whole-hearted-son”. According to Hong Fan

Confucianism and power discourse 19 (Great Plan) of Shangshu (The Book of Documents), “the Emperor is parent of the common people”. Kang Gao (Announcement to the Prince of Kang) says “taking good care of the subjects and the common people so that they have good health and live a peaceful life”, which is a typical example of this pattern. Therefore, as is known to all, one of the core political thoughts of the Zhou Dynasty (11th century–256 BC) was “taking good care of the people”, which is the theme frequently repeated in The Book of Documents, such as “the core political issue is to bring up the people” (from Yu the Great Making a Political Plan), “he will be respected if giving peace to the people” (from Gao Tao Discussing State Affairs), “being lenient towards the people” (from Charge to the Count of Wei) and “protecting the people generations after generations” (from Announcement of the Duke of Shao). In contrast to all this is the fierce accusation of “maltreating the people”. It was in this spiritual temperament of such a political culture that the thought “the people are the foundation of the state” (from Yu the Great: Making a Political Plan) was formed. Taking the guaranteeing of affluent life and bringing peace to the people as the greatest responsibility and the basic obligation of the ruler, the thought, after evolving in the political culture of remote ages, has gradually been intensified as the keynote of the political thought of Chinese Confucianism. Changed into the language of this chapter, the keynote is that the government or the person in charge takes guaranteeing an affluent and peaceful life of the people as its fundamental obligation. The connotation of “guaranteeing an affluent life of the people” is “providing for” and “bringing peace”. “Providing for” refers to satisfying the basic needs of the people while “bringing peace” means meeting the people’s requirement for peace. This political thought is based on the recognition that the people have their “desires”. So that’s why it is thought that “it is natural that people have wishes and desires” and that “people have desires and Heaven must satisfy them”. The theory of harmony between man and Heaven in The Book of Documents indicates that Heaven is the ultimate supporter and the highest representative of the will of the people. As people’s will of power has a strong moral foundation and ultimate theological foundation to reflect the will of Heaven, the will of the people has, theoretically, priority to the monarch because the purpose of Heaven crowning the monarch is to let him act on its behalf to love and protect the people. In such a thought and faith, people and the monarch are unequal before Heaven and the people have priority to and are more important than the monarch. People have no obligation to unconditionally obey the monarch and put up with his oppression. On the contrary, with Heaven as the ultimate supporter, people have the right to ask the monarch to adopt benevolent rule. If the monarch does not implement benevolent governance but “tyrannizes the people”, it is legitimate for the people to regard the monarch as a foe.

Three Confucius had advised making people wealthy before educating them, which stipulated the primary obligation of the ruler was to “making people wealthy”.

20  Confucianism and power discourse However, it was Mencius (about 372–289 BC) who comprehensively inherited the political thought of The Book of Documents. Just as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was made after the two World Wars, Mencius’ thought was a humane appeal against the war during the Warring States Period (475–221 BC). He asked kings to guarantee that people refrain from war and hunger. Mencius said, Your dogs and swine eat the food of men, and you do not make any restrictive arrangements. There are people dying from famine on the roads, and you do not issue the stores of your granaries for them. When people die, you say, “It is not owing to me; it is owing to the year”. In what does this differ from stabbing a man and killing him, and then saying: “It was not I; it was the weapon”? Let your Majesty cease to lay the blame on the year, and instantly from all the nations the people will come to you. (from The Works of Mencius: King of Hui of Liang Part I) Therefore, according to Mencius, an ideal society is one whose primary goal is to guarantee the survival of its people who are free from hunger. He had a famous remark, Let mulberry trees be planted about the homesteads with their five mu, and persons of fifty years may be clothed with silk. In keeping fowls, pigs, dogs, and swine, let not their times of breeding be neglected, and persons of seventy years may eat flesh. Let there not be taken away the time that is proper for the cultivation of the farm with its hundred mu, and the family of several mouths that is supported by it shall not suffer from hunger. . . . It never has been that the ruler of a State, where such results were seen – persons of seventy wearing silk and eating flesh, and the black-haired people suffering neither from hunger nor cold – did not attain to the royal dignity. (from The Works of Mencius: King of Hui of Liang Part I) Here, this means that the legality and the actual possibility of his rule rely entirely upon whether there is the condition to guarantee people’s material life. Then, Mencius added, “The love and protection of the people; with this there is no power which can prevent a ruler from attaining to it” (from The Works of Mencius: King of Hui of Liang Part I). In The Works of Mencius, there is a dialogue between Mencius and King Xuan of Qi: Mencius said to king Xuan of Qi, “Suppose that one of your Majesty’s ministers was to entrust his wife and children to the care of his friend, while he himself went into Chu to travel, and that, on his return, he should find that the friend had let his wife and children suffer from cold and hunger, how ought the minister to deal with his friend?” The king said, “He should break up with the friend”. Mencius proceeded, “Suppose that the chief criminal judge could not regulate the officers under him, how would you deal with him?” The king said, “Dismiss him”. Mencius again said, “If within the four borders of your

Confucianism and power discourse 21 kingdom there is not any good government, what is to be done?” The king looked to the right and left, and spoke of other matters. (from The Works of Mencius: King of Hui of Liang Part II) This dialogue makes it plain that when people entrust something to someone, the entrustee should implement his commissioned obligation. Likewise, a government official who takes a post must assume the responsibilities and duties he shoulders. So does a ruler. Like other person entrusted, if the ruler fails to honour his responsibilities and duties, he should be cast off. In The Works of Mencius, there is a similar story. Mencius criticized a government official: If there is a man who accepts flocks and herds and agrees to graze them for him. Then, the trustee will have to search for pasture and forage. If he cannot find pasture and forage, then, should he return them to the truster or stand there and watch the flocks and herds starved to death? (from The Works of Mencius: Gongsun Chou Part II) Moreover, Mencius tried to persuade the king of Qi implicitly and politely with this remark. All this shows that according to Mencius, both the king and the government officials were entrusted managers who must fulfil their obligations of and responsibility for management perfectly. If they prove to be incompetent, they should return their power to the people. Therefore, according to the political thought of Confucianism, “being parents of the people” is not unconditional. Mencius said: For the monarch, as the parent of the people, even the people labor extremely hard year in and year out, but they are too poor to support their parents. They have to take out loans to hand in land tax and other levies. Consequently, the old, the weak and the young are at their last gasp in the gullies. If so, how could he be a parent of his people? (from The Works of Mencius: Tengwengong Part I) Therefore, the most important and basic duty of the monarch is to “stipulate the production of his people”. Of course, what Mencius talked about was “making people wealthy with benevolence”. He objected to the idea of “making people rich without benevolence”.

Four In terms of political legitimacy, Mencius expressed it in two aspects, both of which carry forward and develop the political thought in The Book of Documents. One is: There are ways to conquer the world. He who wins the support of the people will flourish. There are ways to win the support of the people. He who knows

22  Confucianism and power discourse the popular feelings will win their support. There are ways to know the popular feelings: give them what they need and let them gather what they need. Don’t impose on them what they resent. That’s all. (from The Works of Mencius: Lilou Part I) Here, the will of the people is taken as the source of political legitimacy. The other is: People who kill benevolent men of virtue are called “evil doers” while people who kill righteous men are viewed as “persecutors”. Both evil doers and persecutors are impertinent and brutal fellows. I have heard of killing King Zhou of Shang, but I have never heard of regicide. (from The Works of Mencius: King of Hui of Liang Part II) Here, the ethical principle is regarded as the basis of political legitimacy. On all accounts, if the ruler runs counter to the will of the people and ethical principle, people will have a legitimate right to revolt and start a revolution. Whether this point is acknowledged or not is one of the major differences between Chinese Confucianism and Japanese Confucianism. The latter denies people’s legitimate rights of revolution and takes loyalty to the monarch as priority, which is distinctive from the former. Although Mencius did not object to freedom of speech and belief and attached great importance to personal dignity, he thought, generally, that the primary responsibility and obligation the ruler assumes for his people are not to guarantee freedom and equality but to guarantee his people’s basic needs for food, clothing and a peaceful life. In ancient China, the requirements that modern thought expresses on human rights were to express not the rights the individual asks the government for but the fundamental obligation and responsibility the ruler must assume for the people. Meanwhile, compared with modern Confucian political thought, traditional Confucian political thought proposes the ruler give guarantee to “the people”, which, however, did not refer to an individual but to the collective of the people. Great Learning quotes the lines from Book of Songs, “How much to be rejoiced in are these princes, the parents of the people!” and “When a prince loves what the people love, and hates what the people hate, then he is what is called the parent of the people”. The popular sentiments Mencius referred to are the likes and dislikes discussed in Great Learning. In the political thought of classical Confucianism, parent of the people meant first that the ruler must undertake the responsibility to protect the rights of his people just as parents undertake the obligation to safeguard the rights of their children. Its basic principle is “benefiting the people with what is beneficial to them” and “loving what the people love, and hating what the people hate”. The “benefit” and “love and hate” refer to, in their direct meaning, the requirements for survival, peace and tranquility of the collective of the people. For this thought, we might say, if put in the modern language of human rights, what Confucianism stresses is the economic and subsistence right of the “people”,

Confucianism and power discourse 23 namely, basic human rights. This does not involve political rights (rights to participate in public affairs) and cultural rights. In Mencius’ argumentation, “stipulating the production of his people” is always put in the first place of benevolent government, that is, the primacy of governmental responsibility. This is a view of prioritizing economic rights. Therefore, this discussion shows that if “human rights” actually refer to the right for which an individual asks his government, there is no concept of human rights in Confucianism. However, the appeal to “human rights” may correspondingly be interpreted as the obligation of the state or the government. The contents of human rights, if interpreted from the perspective of people’s rights the government should guarantee, involves some analogues that may be found in Chinese Confucianism. Compared with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Confucianism in the classical period attached importance to the economic and social rights of the people but never envisaged the rights to participate in political affairs. The political rights Confucianism cared about were limited to right of revolution, which belonged to natural law and heavenly principles rather than the rights the state affirmed in normal conditions. Moreover, rights of cultural thoughts were not mentioned in Confucianism. The obligation Confucianism requires the government and the ruler guarantee for the people has its emphasis, namely, emphasizing the satisfaction of the basic right of survival.

Five As a matter of fact, in the ancient Western world and the middle ages, there was no concept of human rights, and neither slaves nor peasants enjoyed human rights. It was not until the 17th and 18th centuries that human rights thought appeared in Europe, which meant to resist church dictatorship and feudal privileges. Later, influenced by John Locke (1632–1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), declaration-like literature on human rights appeared one after another in Europe and America. This had much to do with the propelling of the rising bourgeoisie. However, ever since human rights thought came up, it has been a general catchword which does not belong to any specific class but to all nations and classes to safeguard their own interests. Most apparently, in the course of historical development, human rights are not merely a general banner. In fact, through development from the first generation of human rights to the third generation, the ideal and requirements of socialism have become an important content of the human rights system. However, human rights are a value ideal. This is because it is an ideal that, so to speak, is bound to have a long and difficult way to go for its realization. In other words, it is because of the permanent reality that human life deviates from the concept of human rights that the significance of the ideal of human rights is revealed. The ideal of human rights originated in Europe. However, during the 200 years from the French Revolution (1789–1799) to the present, the Europeans imposed prolonged colonial rule over Asia, Africa and Latin America and the European continent witnessed the havoc of Fascism and anti-Semitism, which

24  Confucianism and power discourse led to two World Wars, and hence the worst destruction of human rights. The United States of America became the most economically developed democratic state after the Second World War. However, the human rights situation in the United States revealed during the black civil rights movement and the Vietnam War in the 1960s indicated that it is hardly an easy job to make progress in human rights. The United States, which regards itself as the best advocate and defender of human rights, has not joined in to this day the two most important human rights conventions and international covenants of human rights concerning race and women approved by the United Nations. In terms of human rights, the US, developed and democratic as it is, acts this way, let alone other countries. It can be seen from this that worldwide realization of the ideal of human rights cannot be expected in the near future. In view of this reality, pushing forward worldwide improvement of human rights should not be idealistic but realistic. The primary goal of the human rights movement should be making all groups acknowledge (in both theory and concept) that human rights are an ideal of universal value which transcends cultural concreteness. The focus should not be on specific acts because the phenomena of human rights violation can never be eradicated in any country.

Six In discussion about the relations between Confucian civilization and human rights, so far, theoretical discussion often focuses on such a question, namely, “whether there is the concept of human rights or its sprout in the Confucian tradition”. Focusing attention on the question of whether the Confucian tradition contains the concept of human rights is, to a large extent, out of this consideration: If there is the concept of human rights or its beginnings in the Confucian tradition, Confucian civilization will easily accept modern theories on human rights. If not, it will be very difficult to accept the concept of human rights. It seems that this is theoretically true. However, for any tradition, there is something that it does not have and will find difficult to accept in the future. There is also something that it does not have but will accept later or in the future. Therefore, “don’t have” does not necessarily reject “have later”. In the historical development of Confucianism, it has continuously accepted and absorbed thoughts from other resources which it did not have but later takes in. For example, Confucianism took in some ideological and cultural elements from Taoism and Buddhism, which was, at least, a tendency after the Tang (AD 618–907) and the Song (AD 960–1279) dynasties. As another example, Confucianism itself did not have the concept of “science”. However, since the late 19th century, Chinese people have found not a single barrier in accepting the concept of “science”. In this sense, the problem, perhaps, lies not in whether the Confucian tradition has the concept of human rights but in whether the former is likely to accept the concept and absorb it. On the other hand, the theory of human rights is a language of rights which is actually a language of Western culture. Therefore, in terms of concepts only, traditionally, Confucianism does not have the concept of “human rights”. Actually, it

Confucianism and power discourse 25 does not have the concept of “rights” at all. In this sense, the concept of “human rights” is a typical concept which emerged in the Western cultural context, although it appeared in modern times in the West and was a product of civil society and democratic development. However, if we do not stand on the concept but pay attention to the contents and requirements in the form of the concept of “human rights” (especially the human rights theories and international writs formed since the 1960s) and figure out whether the Confucian tradition affirms these contents and requirements from this perspective, we will have a good knowledge of the mutual relations between Confucian culture and the theory on human rights. This requires we restore the theory on human rights in the first place. We should restore, in all forms of the concept of “human rights”, its specific proposals and requirements so as to know whether Confucianism can accept the proposals and requirements on human rights.

Seven The Foreword of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stresses the value of human rights on the basis of four principles: free speech and belief, freedom from fear and want, personal dignity and value and equality of men and women. These four principles involve different aspects of the requirements of human rights, namely, citizens’ political rights, economic rights, legal rights and social rights. As previously mentioned, the second and the third points of the four are values advocated in Confucianism. This indicates that it is absolutely incorrect to say that the existing literature on human beings and Confucianism is incompatible with Confucianism. With respect to equality of men and women, we know that although conjugal relations and the way of yin and yang are valued in Confucian culture, the concept and order that men are superior to women are basically affirmed in Confucian tradition. In this sense, few resources about gender equality can be found in Confucian tradition. However, over the past decades, China has made the greatest progress in the world in equal rights for men and women and emancipation of women (at least in East Asia). In most city families, it is a common phenomenon that the wife guides the husband. This is an example that “don’t have” turns to “have later” in the cultural circle of Confucianism. On this point, I’m afraid it might not be merely attributed to the introduction of the socialist concept and the practice of the socialist idea of equality. Personally, I feel this still has much to do with masculinity brought up with “benevolence” as the core principle in the Chinese Confucian tradition. According to Paine, the first three articles of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) are a summary of all its contents. That is: 1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. 2. Liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression are innate rights of man. 3. The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. These thoughts on rights of property, security, resistance to oppression and that nationals are the source of sovereignty, although different from the form of expression of the people-oriented doctrine of the Confucian tradition, are in common in their contents. The Universal

26  Confucianism and power discourse Declaration of Human Rights gives more specific stipulations on human rights protection. For example, stipulations in items that everyone has the right to life, right of free migration, marital rights, property right, right to education, right to social security, right to work and receive remuneration, right to participate in cultural life, mother and children’s rights of protection and the sick, handicapped, widow and the elderly’s rights of receiving guarantee are obviously affirmed by and accepted in Confucianism. The Human Rights Convention differentiates the ideal of the Declaration of Human Rights, developing “freedom from fear and want” into the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and “freedom of speech and belief” into the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is more comprehensive than the stipulations in the Declaration of Human Rights. None of the 31 articles in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is incompatible with the standpoints of Confucianism. On the contrary, they are what Confucianism actively promotes.

Eight As far as the West is concerned, the greatest controversy between the East and the West is in the aspects of civil and political rights. For historical reasons, special attention to civil rights has become the basis of the state-founding of the United States of America. What’s Confucianism’s position on the concept of “freedom of speech and belief”? Compared with the Legalists who advocated thought control over the people, Pre-Qin Confucianism (Pin-Qin, a historical period before 221 BC) was quite similar to the liberal. For example, Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BC, a thinker in the Western Han Dynasty) had such ideology as “proscribing all non-Confucian schools of thought and espousing Confucianism”, which, however, only held that the court should have one orthodox state ideology. It did not mean to prohibit other thoughts and beliefs of the people. In this connection, the tendency of combining three religions after the Song Dynasty (AD 960–1279) indicated that Confucianism did not oppose freedom of belief and speech. In spite of the restrictions on thoughts, monarchical power, authority and fame were of primary importance. This was because in the feudal age the authority and fame of the monarch stood for the order of the state. However, this does not mean that Confucianism objected to criticizing the monarch. On the contrary, it not only took criticism against the monarch as its moral obligation but also fulfilled it at the cost of life. According to the stipulations and expression in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, man has the freedom of thoughts, beliefs and religions and the freedom to express his freedom of religions or beliefs. Actually, these two freedoms should serve to “guarantee national security, public order, hygiene and morals and manners as well as respecting the reputation and rights of others”. This is acceptable to the spiritual standpoints of Confucianism without any barrier. However, as Confucianism is not an organized religion itself, it does not, traditionally, oppose freedom of thoughts but always favours unitary moral publicity

Confucianism and power discourse 27 and education (“enlightening by education”) and the cultivating activities with the state as the main body, hence “a unanimous moral and uniform customs”. Therefore, in modern society, Confucianism does not object to civil and political rights. Nor does it oppose freedom of political thoughts. However, it still, undoubtedly, opposes freedom and relativism of morality and ethics and favours the cultivation and guidance behaviours of the government in morality and ethics (but not in ideologies).

Nine Communicating the contents after the restoration of the language of human rights with Confucian thoughts, one may find that none of the existing contents of the international convention on human rights is unacceptable to the spiritual standpoints of Confucianism. Therefore, it is not a fundamental problem that the Confucian tradition does not have human rights thought. As a matter of fact, it is not a problem whether the countries of non-Western civilization can accept the idea of human rights. However, if “human rights are the requirements and rights for which the individual asks the society and the government”, if the core principles of Western political thoughts are priority of personal rights and freedom and if requiring all citizens with a common good is thought to go against basic personal freedom, Confucianism can never accept this attitude of rights priority. Confucianism and Western religious ethics stress a common social good, social responsibility and virtues for public benefits. Therefore, the spiritual standpoints of Confucianism may accept all the contents in the ICESCR and the ICCPR, but affirm the contents under the background and framework of responsibilities, obligations and the collective. From this perspective, Confucianism and Western culture differ from each other in the arrangement of the logical layer of citizens, politics, economics and various social rights in the order of the realization which is closely related to historical circumstances and, more importantly, in the fundamental relations between responsibilities and rights. The standpoint of Confucianism is surely not priority of rights but priority of the individual. Human rights have become a value and ideal that is universally acknowledged worldwide. However, the value and status of the concept of human rights differ with different cultures. For example, in education in Western countries, the US in particular, human rights have become a primary content. China has had neither a background of escaping from religious persecution nor a history of winning independence through fighting against colonists. Nor has it had a history of the struggle between the citizen class and the nobility. That’s why, since ancient times, China, especially the Confucian tradition, has never put first the requirements and rights for which the individual asks the state. Although Confucianism involved the obligation of the ruler and the government to guarantee people’s rights, it mainly focused on economic and social rights. For thousands of years, Confucianism was used as the thought of scholar-officials, who were intellectuals and government officials. Therefore, Confucianism always took inherently as the primary

28  Confucianism and power discourse requirement responsibilities and virtues assumed to society and concern over public affairs. The people-oriented concept of Confucianism required scholarofficials to have high concern for people’s livelihood. So, “being concerned about his country and the people” has become the spiritual tradition and inherent concern of Confucian intellectuals. Chinese history since the mid-19th century was a history of fighting against foreign invasion and oppression, which enhanced the spiritual tradition of the intellectuals. Therefore, Chinese intellectuals in the developing society, under the influence of the Confucian tradition, take delight in approving human rights thought. However, such acceptance and approval will not transcend the inherent social consciousness of concern over the state and the people and the ethic attitude of the priority of the responsibility concept. Therefore, the concept of human rights will not unconditionally become their first principle. Instead, the concept will have an intricate interaction with their traditional cultural value orientation. As a matter of fact, this is true for all major religious traditions of the world. This is an embodiment of multi-culture, which is the precondition and background that merit our attention and respect in our current efforts in pushing forward global ethics and dialogue among civilizations.

Note 1 The above refers to Shen Zongling’s Evolution of the Western Doctrines on Human Rights after World War II, on Human Rights, Contemporary China Publishing House, 1993, pp. 126, 127, 131.

4 The Confucian tradition and public intellectuals

In the contemporary world, whether in China and foreign countries, “intellectuals” mean, in most cases, “people with professional knowledge”. Accompanying this popular terminology is that there are some thinkers who stress the non-specialized meaning of “intellectuals”. There is a case in point. Apart from early times, as least after the publishing of The Last Intellectuals by Russell Jacoby, “public intellectuals” have gradually been included in important discussion in the recent public domain of discourse. Different from the fact that discussions in other cultural circles in the West differ from Chinese indigenous discussions in level of excitement, “public intellectuals” is a topic which is easily introduced by contemporary Chinese cultural forum. This is because “intellectuals”, as a discourse itself, has not only been the means of releasing the “anxiety of identity” and ways of exploration of the intellectual stratum in China’s post-Cultural Revolution age but also the cultural presentation of China’s modernization drive.

One After the “anti-rightist” movement, Chinese intellectuals were the object of ideological remoulding by and large. The totality of intellectuals could not be affirmed as an active revolutionary force. They were either at the margin of the revolutionary forces or the opposite side of revolution. They lay between the two. Their status swayed and was always pushed towards the latter. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the ethical image and social attribute of intellectuals were belittled so much so that they were nearly classified into such social reactionary forces as “landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, the Right Wing, traitors, spies and capitalist roaders”. After the Cultural Revolution, general repression against the intellectuals was suddenly cleared up. In the preliminary stage of Deng Xiaoping’s day, intellectuals were defined officially as “part of the working class”, hence restoring them to a status equal to that of other social stratums. As ironic as this wording looks, it is surely a reaffirmation to the largest extent which can be given under the current ideology. We still remember that in that historical condition and in that era, intellectuals were very sensitive to the social position given by officialdom.

30  Confucian tradition and public intellectuals If we say that the centre and impetus of “intellectuals” discourse before 1980 was always made on the basis of official positioning, then their discourse since 1980 has stemmed from the repeated reflection of intellectuals themselves in the environment of reform and opening to the outside world. This, undoubtedly, reflects the political progress of Chinese society and the collective selfconsciousness of Chinese intellectuals. For the past 30 years, intellectuals’ reflection on “intellectuals” has become a remarkable cultural image of each stage of social transition. However, it is not surprising that in the early stage of the reform and opening up, the direct result of the emancipation of the status of intellectuals was that they threw themselves into the development of the state and professional work enthusiastically, which, however, did not trigger themselves to engage in humanistic reflection on “intellectuals”. Reflections on intellectuals in the 1980s took place on the eve of the “cultural craze”. With the propagation of Western academic culture and ideologies in the 1980s, the Russian-style definition of intellectuals not only gradually influenced the selfidentity of intellectuals and triggered the earliest thinking about “intellectuals”, but also made the “study of intellectuals” one of the focus issues in the “cultural craze”. Moreover, such understanding towards “intellectuals”, together with the enlightenment ideological trend, played its role in the social unrest in 1989. The intellectuals in the 1980s had reflections about themselves. On the one hand, their reflections were based on whether they were “reformative” or “conservative”. On the other hand, they stressed the distance from and criticalness against real politics, and “free intellectuals” became the self-definition of quite a few intellectuals in that period. Different from the “politicized” character of the “intellectuals” discourse in the 1980s, the “intellectuals” discourse in the mid1990s was aimed at “marketization” and discussions on so-called “humanistic spirit”. Today (the first 10 years of the 21st century), the discussion on “public intellectuals” should, based on the logic of its occurrence in the West, be aimed at “professionalization” and technological reason on the one hand and was likely to be directed at the “petty bourgeoisie” in the life of the contemporary Chinese intellectual group. All this obviously confirms the course of China’s in-depth modernization. As a matter of fact, intellectuals had an embarrassing reputation as “Stinking Old Ninth” in China. Likewise, they are not always held in esteem in the West. Edward W. Said even had such claim, “By the 20th century, the English words ‘intellectuals’, ‘Intellectualism’ and ‘Intelligentsia’ mainly had negative meanings”.1 The term “public intellectuals” means those intellectuals, apart from their own professional activities, who use their professional knowledge in public activities or participate in public activities with professional knowledge as a background. These public activities involve such fields as politics, society and culture. Such use and participation are the major public way (such as modern mass media) for people to voice their opinions in words and speech. Undoubtedly, the concept of public intellectuals is put forward to stress that while devoted to academic study, professional intellectuals never forget to think about public issues and participate in dealing with public issues.

Confucian tradition and public intellectuals 31 Different from the professional restrictions on intellectuals in the past, some scholars stress that one of the important characteristics of “public intellectuals” is that their occupational identities can be varied. In terms of such activities as “caring about politics, participating in social activities and throwing oneself into cultural activities” (by Tu Wei-ming), the places where intellectuals stay and survive are where they play their roles. Therefore, although they are likely to stay in such fields as academic circles, political circles and business circles and various social organizations and even social movements, and although they differ from each other in their public concerns and the ways they participate in public activities, they jointly construct a space for public fields and have influence on public affairs. As public intellectuals in this sense do not have a unified political stand and cultural standpoint, it is impossible for public intellectuals to be interpreted as a group which has the same opinion. In most cases, their views on political, social and cultural issues are different or even opposite. This is true in both reform and revolutionary eras. Intellectuals may be either people who propose to criticize the current situation or people who insist on returning to the traditional spiritual value. Intellectuals need neither to bring into correspondence with politics nor to deliberately keep distance from political structure.2 Just as public intellectuals in the same society have different propositions and viewpoints, intellectuals in different cultures and social traditions often have distinctive features. Tu Wei-ming, the first who advocated public intellectuals in Chinese culture, pointed out that intellectuals in tsarist Russia were the main embodiment of remonstration while in the United States intellectuals find expression mostly in efforts in building up a civil society, and social criticism in the UK and cultural introspection in France, and a knowledge group of Confucian temperament in China and so on.3 This arouses our interest in the following points: Is there any cultural resource in ancient China for modern public intellectuals’ emphasis on publicness and varied public character? What cultural functions and influence on modern Chinese public intellectuals does Chinese cultural tradition (especially the Confucian tradition) have? In a descriptive sense, can we, in light of the intellectuals in Russia, the UK, the US and France, summarize Chinese intellectuals as an outstanding reflection in some aspect?

Two Discussions on public intellectuals are a modern problem. However, the publicness of intellectuals is not a unique phenomenon of modern society. According to Antonio Gramsci, traditional intellectuals also had publicness. “Scholars”, “Confucianists” and “Scholar-Officials” in ancient China were not only scholars themselves but also members or alternate members of the bureaucrat. Therefore, in this sense, Confucian scholars in ancient China naturally had their publicness. Although the difference in the scopes and ranks of assuming administrative duties resulted in discrepancy in publicness, it, generally speaking, was never a problem to Confucian scholars in ancient China by and large. In terms of either the existence or the significance of technology, the unfolding and expression of modern

32  Confucian tradition and public intellectuals intellectuals is incomparable to those in ancient times. As the public issues that the ancient Confucian scholars were faced with concentrated on handling affairs of state and local issues by transcending their own interests, the approaches and ways of political expression were either reporting in person their political views in court or presenting memorials on government affairs to the throne in areas under their jurisdiction or issuing moral principles and prohibitions. These public issues were different from the public sphere with mass media as the main body which modern intellectuals survive on. Remarks on political comments of ancient Confucian scholars were not “an open and rational discussion” (Jürgen Habermas) but circulated within the intellectuals. On the other hand, in terms of value orientation, public intellectuals in modern China are surely influenced by the tradition of the Chinese intellectual group. In direct meaning, there was in ancient China no discussion which was commensurate with the issue of modern public intellectuals. However, this does not mean it provides no resource to our present discussion on public intellectuals. Nor does this mean that ancient ideological tradition has little influence on the value orientation and self-identity of contemporary public intellectuals. The situation is quite the reverse. The significance that classical resources give us, more often than not, lies in understanding and interpretation. From this perspective, in fact, there is no need to search for other literature. For public intellectuals, the existing study on the history of ancient Chinese intelligentsia, if understood from another point of view, may become discussions on relevant resources concerning the publicness of intellectuals. In 1987, Yu Yingshi pointed out in the preface to his collection of essays on the study of ancient intellectuals, If reckoned from Confucius, Chinese tradition of “scholars” has lasted at least for 2,500 years and it has had its surviving influence till now. This is a unique phenomenon in the history of the world culture. Today, westerners often call intellectuals “the social conscience”, thinking that they are the defenders of the basic values of human beings. . . . Here, the word “intellectual” does not refer to all that have “knowledge” in general but has its special meaning in the West. Such an “intellectual” with special meaning must, first of all, specialize in knowledge and skills in some field. He may be a teacher, a journalist, a lawyer, an artist, a man of letters, an engineer, a scientist or a mental worker of any other trade. However, if all his interests are always limited to his professional scope, he still does not have the sufficient condition for an “intellectual”. General understanding in the Western academic circles holds that so-called “intellectuals”, apart from being dedicated to his professional work, must show great concern about his state, society and even everything in the world concerning public welfare. What’s more, such a concern transcends his personal self-interest. Unexpectedly, the basic character of “intellectuals” portrayed by Western scholars is very similar to that by Chinese “scholars”. That “a scholar’s mind is set on truth” already stipulated that “scholars” are the defenders of basic

Confucian tradition and public intellectuals 33 values. Zeng Shen (505–435 BC, a disciple of Confucius) made it clearer, “A scholar may not be without breadth of mind and vigorous endurance. His burden is heavy and his course is long. Perfect virtue is the burden which he considers it is his to sustain; is it not heavy? Only with death does his course stop; is it not long?” This fundamental doctrine has exerted far-reaching influence on the “scholars” of later generations. Moreover, it generates greater force especially in the era of “moral chaos”. For example, history has such comments on Li Ying (AD 110–168), leader of the suppression of the conspiratorial cliques at the end of the Han Dynasty, that “(Li Ying) was strict with and had very high expectations to himself in moral character, and took enlightening and education of the people as his own duty”. Take Chen Fan (AD ?–168) and Fan Pang (AD 137–169) as another example. Both “had the ambition to put politics in order and eliminate traitors and bring peace to the state”. As the social conduct in the Northern Song Dynasty (AD 960–1127) and the Five Dynasties (AD 907–960) was corrupted, Fan Zhongyan (AD 989–1052) proposed that “scholars should be concerned about the state and the people before anything else; they should be the first to bear hardships and the last to enjoy themselves”, which eventually stimulated the ideal and passion of men of letters of the generation. The Donglin School in the late Ming Dynasty advocated “concerning ourselves with everything under Heaven” has pulled at the heartstrings of contemporary Chinese intellectuals till recently. In accordance with the standard of the West, “scholar”, a special stratum that has the cultural mission on their shoulders, has played the role of “intellectuals” in Chinese history.4 Yu Yingshi’s discussions are not directed against so-called “public intellectuals”. However, all that he discussed is applicable to the explanation of the origin of the ancient forms and mentality of public intellectuals. The “intellectuals” he spoke of refers to people with knowledge who “concern with the state and society and even everything concerning public interests in the world”. The publicness here is in contrast with selfishness and professionalism. We may analyse further the discussion of Yu Yingshi. First, the word “scholars” is used far more often than the word “Confucians” in Yu Yingshi’s study on ancient intelligentsia. As a matter of fact, under the scope and significance of his discussion, “scholar” and “Confucians” may be shared and exchangeable. More obviously, if we make a comprehensive review over the history of the past 2,500 years, we will find that it was, undoubtedly, the Confucian School that inherited and carried forward the spiritual tradition of “scholars”. Confucian scholars and Confucianism are the main body of the inheritance, propagation and practice of this spirit. Therefore, in the following exposition and argumentation, we continue to use the expressions “Confucianist” and “Confucian scholars”. Another point to be noted is the significance of the publicness that the concept of “Heaven” has in the exposition and argumentation about ancient intellectuals. The limited materials Yu Yingshi quoted indicate that both the ideological resources about public intellectuals contained in Chinese history and culture and

34  Confucian tradition and public intellectuals the public concerns of Confucians over politics, society and culture are expressed, more often than not, in modes of exposition such as Tao (the Way) and State, and “Heaven” in particular. Let’s push this issue further based on these two points.

Three Seen from the history of the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 BC), “scholars” in the Hundred Schools of Thought were converted from government officials of the king. In this sense, with the “breakthrough of philosophy”, “scholars” (not the scholars of the lowest rank of the nobility in the Spring and Autumn Period) were new intellectuals who appeared from various professional government hereditary officials and pursued universal values. Confucian scholars had maintained the character which was similar to that of public intellectuals from their appearance to the later period of the Chinese Empire. The first character of a Confucian scholar is “based on Confucianism, taking going into the society as his bound duty and dedicated to social progress”. As this is what everyone knows at least since it was put forward in Yu Yingshi’s works, several examples are enough here. Here are celebrated dictums by Confucius and Mencius: A scholar’s mind is set on truth. (from Analects of Confucius: Neighborhood) A scholar seeks for the truth rather than food. (from Analects of Confucius: Prince Ling of Wei) A scholar concerns himself about the truth rather than poverty. (from Analects of Confucius: Prince Ling of Wei) A scholar, poor yet as he is, does not lose his righteousness. When he has attained a purpose, one does not depart from one’s right path. (from The Works of Mencius: Jinxin Part I) All this emphasizes that all a scholar concerns with transcends the gains and losses of himself or his family and is oriented to “Tao” (the truth). Truth is the universal principle of the world and the spirit and ideal of human beings. If we know that the hereditary system since the Western Zhou Dynasty (11th century–771 BC) was characteristic of passing on through generations a certain field of knowledge, we may know that the “set on truth” in the Axial Period (in China, the Axial Period refers to the period of the Hundred Schools of Thought during the Pre-Qin Period) was precisely the transcending of the will of professionalized hereditary officials. Besides, the appearance of such Confucian scholars during the late Spring and Autumn Period was not accidental but a group phenomenon.

Confucian tradition and public intellectuals 35 The second character of Confucian scholars is “taking upon themselves the heavy charge of the kingdom”. For this, more materials are needed for its explanation. In ancient China, the word “public” meant universality in most cases. According to Shiming (Interpretation of the Terms, by Liu Xi in the late Han Dynasty), “by river, it means ‘shared’. Streams flow into the river and the river is the shared streams”. In ancient political documents, statements like “law is obeyed by both the Monarch and the common people” are quite common. In the philosophies after the Song Dynasty, there were many statements like “reason is shared by all people under Heaven” to stress the universality of rationalism.5 However, for present issues about publicness, there are some examples which use the word “public”, such as “participating in policy-making discussions” in the Song Dynasty.6 Scholars in the Song Dynasty criticized the then scholars as saying, “hindering the publicness to make it narrow and he who seeks private gain feels self-righteous”.7 In the Ming Dynasty, some scholars proposed “That conscience is applied to the public affairs is the intrinsic quality of Confucian scholars”.8 Therefore, the word “public” was widely used in ancient China, but its use was quite different from its use today. In ancient times, the word “Heaven” was often used, which is quite close to “publicness” (which today’s concept of so-called “public intellectuals” stresses) in meaning. Obviously, this is a general concept of “public”, and it reflects the general framework of ancient Confucianism. For example, the ideological structure of Great Learning, i.e., “studying the phenomena of nature, seeking truth, good faith, rectification of heart, cultivating moral character, regulating the family, maintaining the state rightly and making all peaceful”, means that “studying the phenomena of nature, seeking truth, good faith and rectification of heart” are the foundation while the rest are not only the natural extension of them but also their final completion. Home, the state and the whole world were the inevitable development and end result of the study of the disposition doctrine of Pre-Qin Confucianism. According to The Doctrine of the Mean, if one knows the significance of cultivating his own moral character, “he will know how to govern the state”. Therefore, cultivating moral character is listed in “the nine ways of governing the state and the whole world”. From this we can see that “the world and the state” were the concern with purpose and meaning by classical Confucianism. Of course, in The Doctrine of the Mean, concerns of classical Confucianism also included “ranked with the Heaven and Earth” and “embracing Heaven and Earth for gestation”, which are of a much higher level. In any case, “Self-improvement is not all of good faith. It means improving things” and “the norm of integrating self and foreign bodies”. A man of noble character can by no means be satisfied with cultivating himself. He must help others in cultivating so that Tao may be practiced in the whole world. As men of noble character are concerned about “the whole world”, “acts of a man of noble character may be the common way for people of the world, his behaviours may be an example for people from generation to generation to follow and his remarks may be the code of conduct for people from

36  Confucian tradition and public intellectuals generation to generation” (The Doctrine of the Mean). Here, “the whole world” is, of course, a common world. So, although the ancient Confucian School did not propose the problem of publicness, its exposition and argumentation on being supra-mundane and mundane, and Tao and benefits, contained its value standpoint on publicness, i.e., people’s and the public’s interests of “the whole world” have always been the concern of ultimate meaning of the Confucian School. Mencius’ words may be taken as a representative of this standpoint, “He thought that among all the people of the kingdom, even the private men and women, if there were any who did not enjoy such benefits as Yao and Shun conferred, it was as if he himself pushed them into a ditch. He took upon himself the heavy charge of the kingdom in this way” (from Mencius: Wan Zhang Part I). Although Mencius’ words did not discuss professionalism and publicness, his “taking upon himself the heavy charge of the kingdom” undoubtedly stipulated the basic value orientation for ancient intellectuals. The connotation of such “taking upon himself the heavy charge of the kingdom” was featured by being “concerned about the country and the people”. What we read in the works of later generations like “taking upon himself the heavy charge of the kingdom” and “taking putting into force the Confucian ethical codes and distinguishing right from wrong as his own responsibility”9 are explicit manifestations of the tradition upheld since Mencius. As for the specific examples of this spirit on ancient Confucian scholars, they were too numerous to be mentioned one by one. After Mencius had the words that “when a ruler rejoices in the joy of his people, they also rejoice in his joy; when he grieves at the sorrow of his people, they also grieve at his sorrow” (from King of Hui of Liang Part II), there were many similar remarks. For example, as early as in the Han Dynasty, scholar-officials said that “every morning I talked about the current affairs of the state, we would burst into crying”,10 and Fan Zhongyan recited himself his ambition that “I am concerned about the country and the people before anything else; I should be the first to bear hardships and the last to enjoy myself” and wept over the state affairs.11 Such examples are numerous: Gu Xiancheng (1550–1612), a member of the Donglin Movement in the Ming Dynasty to Deng Tuo (1912–1966), a Communist in modern times, held that “we must not only concern ourselves with personal affairs but also the affairs of the state and the world”.12 All this is sufficient to show the deep influence of the spirit of “taking upon himself the heavy charge of the kingdom” upon the ancient Confucian scholars and modern intellectuals. This influence makes modern intellectuals not forget their deep concern over public issues while seeking personal professional development. Nor is the reflection of this spirit limited to intellectuals in academic circles. The following are some statements and expressions by Confucian scholars in the Song and Ming dynasties. For example, while talking about Fan Zhongyan, Song Yuan Xue An (History of Academic Ideas of Song and Yuan) says, Fan Zhongyan took upon himself the heavy charge of the state. . . . Once, he expressed to himself his ambition that ‘he was concerned about the country and the people before anything else; he was to be the first to bear hardships

Confucian tradition and public intellectuals 37 and the last to enjoy themselves’. Every time he talked about the state affairs, he would weep. For a time, scholar-officials were vigorous in work, which was attributed to Fan.13 Commenting on Chen Guling, the book says, “He is of classical elegance and has noble character and takes up himself the heavy charge of the state”.14 Similar statements and actions can be found in Ming Ru Xue An (History of Academic Ideas of Confucian Scholars of Ming), such as “our generation takes upon ourselves the heavy charge of the world and the state”.15 All this indicates that “taking the whole world as his own responsibility” has become a value spirit which has deeply rooted in the hearts of Confucian scholars in modern times. The publicness of society, people’s livelihood and customs have priority in contrast with any personal concern. For example, “public discussion has a bearing on the strength of the state and the peace and prosperity and turbulence of the world”.16 Ancient Confucian scholars regarded public discussion on truth, especially discussion on political issues, as an important field which has bearing on the peace and chaos, survival and downfall of the state. Of course, after the Song and Ming dynasties, influenced by Buddhism, NeoConfucianism had its inward-looking development. Some Confucian scholars attached importance to spiritual cultivation and objected to the idea of caring only for home, the state and the whole world but ignoring personal cultivation. They stressed that personal cultivation should advance together with concern about home and the state, saying that “now, people only pay attention to the state affairs but neglect self-cultivation”.17 Some people even emphasized self-moral, cultivation-based determinism, thinking that once the problem of self-cultivation has been settled, all issues concerning the home and the country will be resolved. So, some people said that “people often say that sages often worry about the world and the later generations, so they have many illusions and make a fuss about an imaginary illness”.18 Of course, such statements might have been made by Confucian scholars in late Ming Dynasty who lost confidence in political autocracy and corruption. Therefore, internally, although the Confucian tradition has some complexity, its mainstream and dominating value orientation are undoubtedly the priority of the state.

Four Tu Wei-ming, a scholar who studies Confucianism, has vigorously advocated the concept of public intellectuals in recent years. As far as he is concerned, he firmly believes, from the aforementioned concept of Confucianism, that Confucianism is likely to provide public intellectuals with many resources. Obviously, he thinks that the idea of scholars and the practice of Confucianism support and reflect his understanding of public intellectuals in a broad aspect. According to him, public intellectuals are a new image of intellectuals. In contrast, in Western culture, resources of public intellectuals in modern sense are very weak.19 This is because public intellectuals in a modern sense are neither Greek philosophers who lived

38  Confucian tradition and public intellectuals alone nor Hebrew prophets who stood for the voice of God. “Nor are they the monks and priests class or presbyters in Western culture and intellectuals developed in Russia in the 19th century”. Taking the Russian intelligentsia in the 19th century as an example, “all of them were nobility who particularly opposed their government. Those who did not go against the government were not intellectuals. Andrei Sakharov was an intellectual, but neither Mikhail Gorbachev nor Boris Yeltsin was. This viewpoint is quite different from the development of the group of intellectuals in the U.S, the U.K, Germany and France”. Moreover, this definition does not conform to the phenomenon of China’s contemporary in-system intellectuals.20 In other words, the extensional scope of public intellectuals he understands is fairly extensive. Both the occupational identities of the so-called public intellectuals and the ways of their expressing public concerns are various. Such a concept of public intellectuals far surpasses the concept of the Russian intellectuals who just consider themselves to be dissidents. Based on such understanding and interpretation of “public intellectuals”, Tu Wei-ming thinks that what is the closest to such a personality image of intellectuals, which is full of rich humanistic spirit, is “scholars” in the Confucian tradition. Confucianism has abundant resources for such a type of intellectuals. Under the influence of the Confucian tradition, public intellectuals with Confucian nature find expression in “caring about politics, participating in social activities and valuing culture” and have rich historical feeling and moral self-consciousness. The generalized publicness of ancient Chinese Confucian scholar-officials (particularly the publicness of political participation) is self-evident. According to Levenson, “Chinese bureaucrats did not keep distance from the throne (or its tension with the throne), but served the throne as government officials and thought about the society on behalf of Confucianism. Whether realistically or spiritually, they never proved of no use”.21 On the other hand, the personality ideal and the professional requirements of Confucianism have never matched. “The Confucian School holds fast to its non-professional ideal, namely, opposing professionalization and vocational training which takes man only as a tool”.22 Therefore, the Confucian concept of “a scholar of noble character” has never taken criticism against realistic politics as its sole content, although Confucian scholar-officials always take political criticism as their own moral obligation. In view of the cultural belief and responsibility ethics of Confucianism, it attaches great importance to cultural development and changes in morality, customs and cultural influence so that it gets involved in political affairs in most cases within political circles (not beyond politics). According to Boggs, historically, most Western intellectuals “do not fulfill a definite political responsibility”. In comparison, traditional Chinese Confucian scholar-officials fulfil a definite political-administrative responsibility while maintaining cultural identity as scholars and men of letters. In my opinion, the significance of our discussion today on the issue of public intellectuals at least provides an opportunity to sort out various ideas concerning the self-confirmation of “intellectuals” since the 1980s. Taking the rebellious spirit of intellectuals in the czarist times as the self-identity of intellectuals was an incomplete self-identity of the intellectuals under the historical condition in

Confucian tradition and public intellectuals 39 China in the late 1980s. Admittedly, this self-identity had its positive significance in promoting the historical transition of understanding of “intellectuals” walking out of the Cultural Revolution and developing criticalness. However, if compared with the spirit of scholar-officials featuring the tradition of Chinese intelligentsia and the Confucian tradition, such a self-identity is somewhat narrow. Besides, it cannot meet the varied needs in the development of Chinese society and culture. Therefore, on the part of me, participating in the discussion on “public intellectuals” does not result from any moral preference to this concept. Instead, I would like to take this as an opportunity to absorb the abundant resources in recent years and to have a better knowledge of the relations between the understanding of intellectuals and the development of contemporary Chinese society. Essentially, both Max Weber and Joseph. R. Levenson held that the “utensiltype” Confucian intellectuals (Confucius said, “A supernal man is not a utensil which is just of one single specific use”, from Analects of Confucius) are people who have no professional skills but acknowledge that value comes before technology. Therefore, the culture of Confucian intellectuals is different from the culture of specialists. On the other hand, in the scope of the discussion of this article, “value priority” in Confucian culture finds its expression in that the concern about public issues is viewed as an important value. Some people think this value orientation of Confucianism had its influence in the debate over being socialist-minded and professionally competent in the 1950s and 1960s. Naturally, “socialist-minded”, although a symbol of Pan-politicization and ideologicalization, was undoubtedly of public character. In this sense, the dispute may, as it were, have the shadow of Confucianism. However, value priority of Confucianism is the priority of Tao, reason and righteousness, which is different from the undertone of the political ideology of “socialism”. This point should be clearly discriminated. Levenson even thought that compared with the Communist Party, Confucianism is more opposed to professionalization so as to distinguish the practice of Confucianism from that of Communism. Although this is true in some sense, seen from the happenings between 1949 and 1978, we should say that the Confucian School opposed politicization more resolutely. As a matter of fact, intellectuals in the Confucian tradition often have two tendencies. One is that they pay close attention to state and world affairs, hence a pattern of value priority will lower the tendency of professionalization and degrade the status of experts. For the other tendency, it should be admitted that the tradition of anti-intellectualism within the Confucian School is not influential enough and in its essential aspect it stresses that morality cannot deviate from knowledge. What’s more, the Confucian tradition contains a great amount of professionalized research on humanistic knowledge, which makes it easier to accommodate professionalization than other religious traditions. In ancient China, for scholar-officials, “command of academic study” and “command of politics” did not conflict with each other. Instead, they came to a natural unity. This was because as far as scholars were concerned, they may respond to the command of academic study. On the part of government officials, they served for the command of politics. Such a dual character of scholar-officials and

40  Confucian tradition and public intellectuals the professionalized system of modern society have quite different requirements for intellectuals. Long ago, Weber pointed out that modern social differentiation, which is based on rationalization, has brought about reasonable development of professionalization, which is one of the developmental conditions for modernization. However, the development of instrumental reason has “turned us passively into professionals”. The intellectuals it has created are likely to be “spiritless experts”. As a result, there is a conflict between the social structure and cultural value of modern society which can hardly be removed. It is under the background of professionalism that the exposition and argumentation on “public intellectuals” in the modern sense is generated. It means to stress breaking away from the limitation and dominance of profession in the academic sense. However, the concept of public intellectuals does not mean to fundamentally oppose the reasonable and progressive significance of professionalization in social and professional division. Therefore, those should be respected who resist becoming public intellectuals and are dedicated to studying humanities and professionally acknowledge academic study. The specialization or professional development of learning is an inevitable expression of modern society or social modernization. As a matter of fact, specialization of scientific research and specialization of intellectuals of natural science had been gradually established in the course of the founding of modern universities in the early years of the Republic of China (1912–1949). However, the professionalization or specialization of humanities and social sciences travelled a tortuous road from the 1950s to the 1970s. The discussion on “red” and “expert” and the following statements like “both red and expert” (both politically sound and professionally competent) and “to be expert first and red later” were the principal mode of self-identity about intellectuals around 30 years before and after the Cultural Revolution. This mode was certainly influenced by ideology. If “red” stood for politicization and “expert” meant professionalization, we may say that during the 30 years from 1949 to 1978, both professionalization and specialization were hindered. Moreover, due to the close relevance between ideology and humanities and social sciences, the professionalization of humanities and social sciences were seriously impeded, as a consequence of which China’s humanities and social sciences lagged behind greatly. If the politicization of “red” was the publicness of that “you should concern ourselves with state affairs and carry the Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the end”, professionalization of the post-Cultural Revolution period in China precisely developed by denying and dissociating pan-politicization. It was not only consistent with the national goal of China as a national state in “the primary stage of socialism”, but also an inherent constituent part of China’s modernization process. Since China adopted the reform and opening-up policy in 1978, China has experienced huge development in the professionalization system of education and scientific research, which is one of the important conditions to promote the tremendous development of humanities and social sciences of the country. Presently, the construction of this professionalization system is still at its developmental stage. In this sense, the Confucian tradition is of great significance to the discussion on public intellectuals. On the one hand, Confucian ideological tradition justifies the value of

Confucian tradition and public intellectuals 41 maintaining their public concern over politics, society and culture. On the other hand, it should be admitted that Confucian ideological tradition cannot provide more support to the development of professionalization.

Five As Carl Boggs pointed out, as intellectuals are absorbed into the modern system network, including big businesses, political parties, interest groups, the education system and state institutions, they have become members of large-scale scientific management and their functions have become more toolized. Occupationalization becomes more and more important while publicness weaker and weaker. Such a condition is adaptable to the “dominance of technological reason”, a new ideology developed from modernity. Professionalism has become the environment for intellectuals to survive in modern times.23 On the one hand, intellectuals are not only conditioned by technological reason. On the other hand, the expression of the publicness of intellectuals is restricted by fortune and power groups owing to the fact that mass media is more subject to the control of private companies and government powers and that mass media is the major channel for intellectuals to express their publicness. Although corrosion of such fortune and powers over publicness does not relate to the intentional state of intellectuals, it may deteriorate the ecology of public intellectuals. On the other hand, as expected by Fabians, intellectuals with scientific and technological, cultural and academic knowledge can still play a role of public conscience in modern society, which is greatly restricted by the aforementioned dominance of modern technological reason and corrosion of fortune and powers. Moreover, more extremists like Alvin Gouldner think that as modern intellectuals have been an independent class, they are not likely to be a public conscience. According to them, intellectuals differ from capitalists in that what the former occupy is cultural capital and that what they put forward in the public field is nothing but the special interests of their class. As a matter of fact, such a view can hardly avoid being satirized as Vulgar Materialism. Compared with Mencius’ interpretation of the concept about intellectuals “without any property but having a steady thought and mental state”, it is slightly inferior. However, in the opinion of scholars who advocate the public role of intellectuals, the principal aspect which leads to the danger of loss of publicness of intellectuals comes not only from professionalization but also from the internal damage which professionalization brought about to the self-identity of intellectuals. On the one hand, modernity has social fields formatted in the forms of technology, large-scale organizations and the standard of professionalism. Universities are the concentrated reflection of such forms. On the other hand, modernity has brought about the educational system in the rationalized form, and universities and education play a decisive role in modern society. No feeling is more intense than the feeling of influence of modernity in the higher education system. In the higher education system, traditional intellectuals, as classicists, philosophers, clergymen or men of letters, have been

42  Confucian tradition and public intellectuals replaced by intellectuals featuring technocracy. Their job is organically connected with knowledge industry, economy, state and the army.24 “This resulted in mass propagation of disconnected and irrelevant disciplines and sub-disciplines. In terms of their specialized academic network control, they are featured of stratification. This network has its own narrow themes, jargons and social groups”.25 Scholars who strongly criticize professionalization worry that stratification-based professionalization development has made experts replace traditional intellectuals, namely, intellectuals who are dedicated to political, cultural and social themes of human society. Consequently, creative and critical discussions have gradually disappeared and academic problems in the humanistic field have become more and more narrow. They hold that due to the belief that the road to knowledge lies in the data accumulation of patience and impartiality, efforts are made to make academic problems more strict and objective. So, pursuing significance and views and having philosophical reflection “are inevitably lost in a dilemma of professional skills and empirical materials”, as a result of which big problems such as war, peace, revolution and good and evil are obscured.26 Jacoby thinks that when intellectuals become university professors, they do not need to write public articles. They don’t write and will not eventually.27 If intellectuals are academic, they will not do creative learning. On the contrary, this professionalized stratum is divorced from the history and society outside universities. All the aforementioned views are not only a reflection of the adversity consciousness with humanistic spirit but also a deep self-examination over modernity, which merits the vigilance of the intellectuals in the society which is being modernized. However, “public intellectuals” are not a symbol of morals. They do not have moral rights. Edward Said also pointed out that public intellectuals may be produced before mass media. Likewise, Cheng Yichuan, a Confucian scholar in the Song Dynasty, also said, “Even if it is a public affair, it would become a private issue if dealt with for personal interest”.28 Richard A. Posner, former federal judge of the US, pointed out in his work on public intellectuals that before 1970 people who had not received any professional training could become public intellectuals. But now, it is much more difficult to do so. In an era when modern knowledge is specialized and professionalized, a genius in some field, once expressing his views on some aspects of the public field, is likely to make plenty of errors and speak many layman terms. This makes public intellectuals’ proposals more “public” than “knowledge”. Posner (a federal judge) pointed out sharply that American public intellectuals now have poor performance in disseminating information and offering opinions and that misjudgments frequently occur. In addition, they have made little contribution to improving the understanding of the public and have very superficial understanding over the facts of major issues.29 On the other hand, based on China’s actual social development, professionalization is not much. Instead, it is far from enough. Therefore, by no means can publication be in opposition to professionalization in China. Rather, under the premise of vigorously pushing forward professionalization, publication should be advocated by intellectuals of liberal arts with their majors as background (so

Confucian tradition and public intellectuals 43 much so that potential development in the future is that the main body of public intellectuals is not the leisure activities of academic intellectuals any more but becomes an activity independent from professional scholars.) After all, publication is not an inevitable obligation of academic intellectuals. Nor is it necessary to encourage natural scientists to develop towards public intellectuals. For example, Posner does not include John Rawls in public intellectuals because the former has never consciously written for the public. However, who can ignore his huge influence on the United States of America and even on world academic circles (whether in the humanities or in social sciences) and knowledge and cultural circles? Faced with wide need for humanities and social sciences researches which appear in the course of China’s accelerating modernization, internationalized academic competitions and discipline development, we are in urgent need of John Rawls-type scholars in all disciplines. However, in view of our tradition, we have never lacked writers of public character (this is particularly true of young intellectuals of literature majors). The fact is: due to modern marketization, professional scholars with systematic achievements who are ready to sit on a cold stool will hardly appear. In contrast, large-scale expansion of media provides a deadly temptation and a large market for commercial and non-commercial publication (popularization) writing and expression. As a consequence, vulgar intellectuals emerge at the right moment. On the part of social scholars of the humanities, they should be vigilant against avoiding professional work by doing public writing and clearing up social concerns or public participation with professional work.30 Of course, on the other hand, China’s mass communications industry is rapidly developing and expanding, hence a great social need of media intellectuals. How to define the relations between media intellectuals and professional scholars remains an unclarified problem.

Notes 1 Edward Wadie Said: Representations on the Intellectuals, SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2002, p. 2. 2 Refer to The Collected Works of Tu Wei-ming, Vol. 5, p. 601. 3 Ibid. 4 Yu Yingshi: Scholars and Chinese Culture, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1987. 5 Such as Zhu Xi: Analects of Zhu Xi, Vol. 18, 20. 6 Refer to remarks during the reign of Emperor Zhezong and Emperor Huizong of Song in History as a Mirror: Continued. 7 History of Academic Ideas of Song and Yuan: History of Academic Ideas of Shuixin Part II. 8 History of Academic Ideas of Song and Yuan: History of Academic Ideas of Ganquan VI. 9 Like the discussion on Zhang Yang In “On Teachers” in History of Academic Ideas of Confucian Scholars of Ming. 10 History of Later Han Dynasty: Yuan An. 11 Refer to Collected Works of Fan Wenzheng, Vol. 7, On Yueyang Tower. 12 Deng Tuo: Concerning About Everything, published in Night Talk at Yanshan, 1979, p. 156.

44  Confucian tradition and public intellectuals 13 History of Academic Ideas of Song and Yuan, Vol. 3 (History of Academic Ideas of Gaoping). 14 History of Academic Ideas of Song and Yuan, Vol. 5 (History of Academic Ideas of the Four Masters of the Guling School). 15 History of Academic Ideas of Confucian Scholars of Ming, Vol. 4 (History of Academic Ideas of Chongren), Vol. 11, 14, 23. 16 History of Academic Ideas of Confucian Scholars of Ming, Vol. 54 (History of Academic Ideas of Confucian Scholars II 2), Vol. 15, 9, 25 (Records and Narration of Xue Fangshan), Vol. 53 (History of Academic Ideas of Confucian Scholars II 1). 17 History of Academic Ideas of Confucian Scholars of Ming, Vol. 31 (History of Academic Ideas of the Zhixiu School). 18 History of Academic Ideas of Confucian Scholars of Ming, Vol. 29 (History of Academic Ideas of the Wangs in the North). 19 As a matter of fact, just as Levinson said that the aim of Greek-style education is to cultivate non-professional gentry, the ideal of Oxford and Cambridge in the 19th century was to cultivate men as gentry to resist Victorian professionalization. As we see, in terms of non-professionalization, Western culture has its own resources (refer to Confucian China and Its Modern Fate, pp. 16, 196). What Tu Wei-ming said means that in view of the fact that public intellectuals may play their role in political, business and media circles, the Confucian tradition may offer more concepts and examples of this image to intellectuals. 20 He also pointed out that the concept of intellectuals should also include men who return to the traditional values. The government departments are also an important stage for public intellectuals. Raymond Aron might more fully reflect the ethical obligation public intellectuals undertake than a Sartre or Foucault. Collected Works of Tu Wei-ming, Vol. 5, pp. 520, 601, 606. 21 Levenson: Confucian China and Its Modern Fate, China Social Sciences Press, 2001, p. 220. 22 Ibid, p. 175. 23 Carl Boggs: Intellectuals and the Crisis of Modernity, Jiangsu People’s Publishing Ltd, 2002, Preface, pp. 11, 80, 100. 24 Ibid, p. 121. 25 Ibid, p. 140. 26 Ibid, pp. 144–147. 27 The Last Intellectuals, English Version, p. 7. 28 History of Academic Ideas of Song and Yuan, Vol. 15 (History of Academic Ideas of Yichuan). 29 For Posner’s views, please refer to Focusing on Public Intellectuals (J), Qian Mansu, Panorama, Vol. 4 (8), 2002. 30 Tu Wei-ming also pointed out: It is noteworthy that only a small number of humanists tend to become public intellectuals and that the rest, due to their dedication to the research in humanities itself, are not ‘inspired by politics’ at all as appealed by Weber. This inspiration, as a matter of fact, brings their spiritual life to some profession. This recognition towards the academic work has no difference from the attitude of the colleagues in the field of natural science. Perhaps, they do not feel it necessary to defend their academic interest before the public. They do not want, and have never wanted to be public intellectuals. However, a very important point is that their research and teaching is of critical nature to the sound development of higher educational mechanism and benefits the whole society. (Collected Works of Tu Wei-ming, Vol. 5, p. 604)

5 Ecological orientation and modern interpretation of the Confucian doctrine of benevolence

One In Western philosophy, construction of the concepts began long ago that “existence” was abstracted from nature and “spirit” from self. Such abstraction and separation were certainly progress over the primitive view of nature as an organic whole. However, it sowed the seeds of separating man from nature. Since the beginning of modern times, philosophy has experienced several diversions: from metaphysics to epistemology, from epistemology to language and then to the existence of man, hence highlighting a human-centered philosophical standpoint step by step. As a result, man’s subjectivity won more and more attention, and casting away the old nature-centered philosophical concept has characterized modern philosophy. Moreover, the view of nature is no longer the theme of modern philosophy. Scientific development and division of knowledge have led to belittling nature-centered philosophy. Philosophy has shifted its attention from what nature is to what man is, thus ignoring both nature and the relations between man and nature. However, in late 20th century, environment and sustainable development became a life-and-death issue concerning the survival and development of human beings. This reality requires modern philosophy to re-criticize its attitude towards nature since the beginning of modern times and develop a new view of nature fit for the current global situation. This makes us reexamine the ecological implication of the oriental classical traditional view of nature so as to expand the spiritual resources of constructing a modern ecophilosophy. As a matter of fact, the primitive view of nature was more a concept of mannature oneness than a view of nature. For example, Cassirer pointed out that this primitive view of nature was a concept of the “oneness of lives”, thinking that all life forms have kinship and that between individual life forms are a whole of communication and that man does not have a privilege in nature.1 Oneness of lives means the integral unity of nature and “reconciliation” in unity is the basic trend. The primitive feeling of the life unity of nature was defeated through cultural progress. However, in Chinese history and culture as well as in the continuous development of social culture, primitive clan organizations and bonds are, as agreed upon by historians, reserved in the following development, and the

46  Interpretation of the doctrine of benevolence primitive disposition of oneness of lives is inherited by the following philosophy that man is an integral part of nature. In ancient Chinese philosophy, as the Taoist School proposed the proposition of “The Tao [Way] follows nature”, researchers have all along attached importance to distilling ecological thought from the cultural resources of the Taoism but had no eye for views on the relations between man and nature in the resources of Confucianism. For example, Capra said, As far as I’m concerned, among all the great traditions, Taoism provides the most profound and perfect wisdom on ecology. It emphasizes in the cyclic process of nature, all phenomena of individuals and society and the phenomena of the potentials are almost the same.2 However, Tang Tong commented on the whole Chinese tradition, saying, Chinese tradition is quite different. It neither struggles to conquer nature nor studies and understands nature. Its goal is to conclude an agreement with nature and to realize and maintain harmony . . . such a wisdom, combining the subjective and the objective bodies into one, guides man to harmonize the relationship between human and nature. . . . Chinese tradition is humanistic in the integral sense.3 Obviously, the humanistic view of nature here obviously includes Confucianism. To meet the needs of global sustainable development in the 21st century, recent efforts have been made in the world to search for a new ecological worldview and to establish a more rational view of nature and practical spirit. Ancient oriental cultural traditions have become one of the important resources to develop new ecosophy. The Taoist school seems to have won more attention in this regard. This chapter aims to illustrate the ecological orientations of Confucianism, especially those included in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, as well as the idiosyncrasy it involves.

Two Early representative figures of New Confucianism had a special feeling and concern over nature in which the lives of living beings go on without end. For example, Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073), a government official and a Neo-Confucianist in the Northern Song Dynasty, was the earliest ancestor of Neo-Confucianism. Historical records show that by the window of his residence weeds grew in wanton profusion, but he never had them mowed. When asked why, he replied, “Outside the window the grass is as vigorous as my heart”. This remark recorded in Er Cheng Yi Shu Part III (The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi) not only expresses a thought, namely, the life of an individual is akin to other natural lives, but also embodies his ambition of integrating man with ever-lasting nature. The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi has it that “observing all manifestations of

Interpretation of the doctrine of benevolence 47 nature (read by Zhou Maoshu)” (from The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, Volume 6). This must be a recorded utterance of Cheng Hao which explains Zhou Dunyi’s “not mowing the grass by the window”: Zhou Dunyi meant to place himself in the growing grass and experience the life and growth of nature. Cheng Hao (1032–1085) was the founder of Neo-Confucianism. In his youth, he became an apprentice to Zhou Dunyi. Later, Cheng Hao said, “I used to learn from Zhou Maoshu. He often asked me to explore how Confucius and his disciple Yan Hui always kept spiritual happiness” (from The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi Part II), which became the basic requirement of the spirituality of Neo-Confucianism. However, Cheng Hao himself did not give an answer to the question of “how Confucius and his disciple Yan Hui always kept spiritual happiness”, but he disclosed, while narrating something else, the relevance between the question and the interest and charm of nature: “After seeing Zhou Maoshu again, I sing of the moon and the wind. This is similar to what Confucius agreed with Zeng Dian” (from The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, Volume 3). “Singing of the moon and the wind” means “happiness”, which came from his experiencing Confucius “agreeing with Zeng Dian”. According to The Analects of Confucius, Confucius asked about the ambitions of his disciples. Most disciples said that they would like to be government officials. Only Zeng Dian said that he would like to sing and dance, go sightseeing in beautiful nature and live a carefree and leisurely life. Hearing this, Confucius said with a sigh, “I agree with Zeng Dian”. Analects of Confucius: Those Who First Learn shows that Cheng Hao’s opinion on “Confucius and Hui’s Cheerfulness” was Zeng Dian’s happiness: interwovenness of man and nature. It is because of this that Cheng Hao had a special interest in animals and plants in nature. By the window of Cheng Hao of the Song Dynasty grew lush grass. Some people advised him to cut the grass. Cheng Hao said “No” because he wanted to see the vigor and vitality of the divine force. Moreover, he bred some small fish in a pool and often watched them. Asked why, he gave the reply that he would like to watch the leisure and content of all things on earth. (from The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi Part II) He said, “Watching the chickens, I see benevolence”. (from The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, Volume 3). Zhang Zai (1020–1077), another philosopher in that time, often “watched and listened to donkeys braying”. In Song-Ming NeoConfucianism, animals, plants and the natural world were viewed as an embodiment of life and significance of the universe, so one should experience the “life” of the universe by “watching”. Such a life-based inclination to nature is closely related to “benevolence”. So, “life” was of vital significance to Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism. Commentary on the Yi Jing in Zhou Yi (The Book of Changes) has it that “the biggest moral of Heaven and Earth is giving life” and “Yi, in essence, is the principle of life and growth in endless succession”. Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism equates “life” in nature with “benevolence” in morals. “Life” is not only given cosmological

48  Interpretation of the doctrine of benevolence significance but also is regarded as the source of the principle of human morality. Cheng Hao said, All things on earth have their time full of vigor and vitality. (from The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi Part II) Mou Zongsan (1909–1995) said, “All living things have exuberant vitality”.4 Cheng Hao also said, The sight of growing things on earth is most worth appreciating, and “The common people as mentioned in the Qian Diagram mean putting the overwhelming majority of the common people in the first place”. This is what is called “benevolence”. Actually, man and nature are united as one. However, man has it belittled. Why? (from The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi Volume XI) Man is selfish and sees things from a narrow perspective and feels satisfied with man’s own way of thinking. (from The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi Part II) Keeping the whole world in view, one will find himself one part of the universe and see the oneness in all things.5 Neo-Confucianism takes the meaning of life in nature as the essence of the universe and the source of morality. This thought merits our close attention. Moreover, Neo-Confucianism holds that man and all things on earth are an “organic whole”. It is because man and all living things are “one” in terms of existence that man must have the spiritual realm of “oneness of all things”. Those who only care about man’s physiological needs and see everything just from the perspective of man are nothing but “having their own way of thinking”.

Three However, from the subjective point of view, the aforementioned practice of “watching things” of Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai and Cheng Hao is like what Tang Junyi said is “nothing but an artistic realm for watching”.6 It is not a realm of morals. Realm is an attitude. A realm for watching is a kind of aesthetic attitude and realm. Aesthetic and artistic realm for watching are included by (but not peculiar to) Confucianism. As a matter of fact, both Taoism and Chinese Buddhism also have such a realm. Therefore, if the view of nature of Confucianism is just an artistic or aesthetic realm, although it may become one of the resources of new ecological view of nature and has its significance, after all, it is impossible to distinguish it either from the view of nature of Taoism or from the appreciative attitude towards nature by litterateur and poets.

Interpretation of the doctrine of benevolence 49 As far as I’m concerned, the distinctive features of Confucianism lie in the doctrine of man-nature oneness which has been developed from Confucian “benevolence” since the Song Dynasty. Cheng Hao said, The benevolent see all things as a whole and do not take them as its own. For example, if hands and feet have no feeling of ache and itch, breath will not be smooth. As a consequence, both will not belong to the man. (from The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi Part II) By “the benevolent”, it means Confucians who have reached the realm of “benevolence”. Cheng Hao’s statement transcends the interpretation of ethic – society. But, interpreted from the perspectives of nature – ecology, all living things are all in one. This means that we should view not only everyone else but also all living things, i.e., all living things in the natural world, as one part of ourselves. Here, “oneness” means the wholeness of the natural world. From this prospective, everything in the natural world is one part of our body and is closely related to ourselves. Man and nature make one body. This wholeness of existence requires Confucians make a oneness consciously and sincerely so that they can take a “benevolent” attitude towards all things. This is not only a support to Mencius’ “loving all people and animals” but also extends “benevolence” to all living things. In such a world outlook and attitude, all things in the natural world are not “others” against ours. Nor are they others that are an antithesis and irrelevant to us. Instead, they are one part of us. In this world outlook, “self” is no longer a minor self of the “outer form” but has become an organic whole of the natural world. Meanwhile, the oneness of the man-nature existence and the self-awareness of this oneness must be established through the concept of qi (breath). For example, Cheng Hao said, “If hands and feet have no feeling of ache and itch, breath will not be smooth. As a result, men will not feel that hands and feet are parts of the body”. This tells that numbness over limbs in that “breath” is not smooth. For this reason, men cannot feel that hands and feet are parts of their bodies. This is what is called “self-secluded”. Therefore, the necessity of the concept of “breath” is both ontological and of sensualism. Zhang Zai, on the basis of breath, put forward in Ximing (Western Inscription) a thought which was similar to that of Cheng Hao: Qiangua in I Ching (The Book of Changes) is the profound mystery of the creation of natural law, called father of all things on earth. Kungua refers to the material principle and structure principle of the generation of all things, called mother of all things. Insignificant as I am, I have gathered on myself the Tao of Heaven and Earth and lie between Heaven and Earth. Seen from this, the breath of female principle between Heaven and earth is my body. What guides all things and makes them change is my innate quality.7

50  Interpretation of the doctrine of benevolence Qian refers to Heaven and Kun refers to Earth. Heaven is father and Earth is mother. Combined, it means the natural world is the parents of human beings. Divided, it means Heaven, Earth and man are three. As Qi of Heaven and Earth makes all things and man, and the Qi which makes man is also qi which makes up all things. Therefore, from the personal view of a Confucian, Heaven and Earth are parents of mine, the common people are my brothers and all things on earth are my friends. What Ximing (Western Inscription) talks about explicitly indicates that what Zhang Zai proposed was not to reach the aesthetic realm for watching but to have a deeper understanding of the morals and obligations an individual should fulfil towards others and all things in nature in this way. Actually, this philosophy views the whole universe or nature as a whole. Family, as far as ancient people were concerned, was a system in which the members shouldered mutual obligations and had emotional contact. The result of taking all things as members of one family is that men should treat all things in the way they treat their family members. In other words, man should have a moral obligation to all things in the way he does to his family.

Four Obviously, Cheng Hao’s and Zhang Zai’s world outlooks and views of nature developed from an aesthetic attitude towards nature to an ethic attitude towards nature and became a view of nature which contained value orientation. Interpreted from the ecological perspective, this, compared with the past Chinese views of nature, undoubtedly symbolized a new attitude towards nature. This thought was further developed in the philosophy of Wang Yangming (1472–1529): When asked “the human heart and objects are consubstantial, as blood and breath circulate in my body, they are seen as consubstantial. However, for the body, blood and breath are different from the body, not to mention birds, beasts, grass and trees. Then, what is consubstantial?” Wang Yangming said, “Your knowledge is still tentative. As a matter of fact, not only beasts, grass and trees, but also Heaven and Earth and I are an integral part. Even ghosts and gods are consubstantial with me”. “What do you think of it?” Wang Yangming said, “What do you think is the heart of Heaven and Earth between them?” The answer was, “I have heard that Man is the heart of Heaven and Earth.” “What then is heart of man?” The answer was, “It is but a spirit.” “Do you know that there is only the spirit between Heaven and Earth? Man is but self-secluded by body. My spirit is the governor of Heaven and Earth, ghosts and gods. Without my spirit, who would feel the Heaven high? And who would feel the Earth deep? Who would bother to practice divination? And there would be no Heaven and Earth, ghosts and gods without me. On the contrary, without Heaven and Earth, ghosts and gods, there would be no

Interpretation of the doctrine of benevolence 51 my spirit at all. So, all things and I are an organic whole. How can they be separated?” (Discourse on Confucianism Part II) According to Wang Yangming, by “breath circulation”, one cannot see it just as “circulation of the animal spirit of the body”. If we only understand the “consubstantiality of things”, it will be hard to build up a concept of “consubstantiality” of the individual and other beings. According to Wang Yangming, we should have a correct understanding on the basis of “response”, i.e., “resonating”. Only in this way can we understand that all things on earth, nature and man, the individual and others, are not “distanced” but a consubstantiality and organic whole of “breath circulation”. Here, by so-called “response”, it means the mutual resonating between man’s mind and body and all things on earth, especially the heart’s perceptibility to all things on earth. Zhu Bensi asked “Man has soul so that man has conscience. Do other things like grass, trees, tiles and stone have conscience, too?” Wang Yangming said, “Man’s conscience is the conscience of grass, trees, tiles and stone. If they had no conscience as man does, they could not be grass, trees, tiles and stone. The same is true of Heaven and Earth. Without conscience like man’s, they would not be Heaven and Earth at all. After all, all things on earth and man are consubstantial. The most subtle is the soul of man’s heart. Wind, rain, dew, the sun, the moon, stars, beasts, grass and trees, mountains and rivers, trees and stone are consubstantial with man.” (Discourse on Confucianism Part II) From this perspective, man and all things on earth are an organic whole. This wholeness is, one the one hand, composed of qi, and man’s heart is the most subtle in the qi-made universe on the other hand. Therefore, man’s heart may be seen as the “spirit” of the qi-made world, i.e., its reason, mind and conscience. The spirit and conscience, as a constituent part of the universe, is not only man’s conscience but also the conscience of grass, trees, beasts and even tiles and stone. In this sense, the wholeness of Heaven, Earth and man is organic. Without man or man’s conscience, Heaven and Earth together, if its primitive organic wholeness is damaged, are not the Heaven and Earth of the original sense. From this we can see that this thought is based on the cosmology of an organic whole. Wang Yangming said in Ba Ben Sai Yuan Luan, Sages view all things as one. . . . Sages are in great anxiety. So, they strive to promote “benevolence” of oneness of all things between Heaven and Earth to educate people of the world so as to restrain everyone from selfishness and rid of deception, hence resuming the consubstantiality of mind and body. (Discourse on Confucianism Vol. II)

52  Interpretation of the doctrine of benevolence “Viewing things as one” is an attitude. This attitude and realm are that “they are broad-minded without differentiating each other, and the matter and me”, and “As man is full of vim and vigor and blood circulates freely and smoothly, his sense organs will feel well and he will have miraculous reaction. This is an ineffable wonder” (from Discourse on Confucianism II). Here “miraculous reaction” refers to the aforementioned “response”, and “full of vim and vigor” refers to “blood circulation” as mentioned prior. All this emphasizes reaching the realm of not differentiating oneself from others and separation between other things and self. In Great Learning, apart from the view that all things are in one, Wang Yangming proposed the concept of “all things are in one family and all people under heaven are one man”. He said, Great men are those who regard all things under Heaven as a whole. They see people under Heaven as one family and all Chinese people as one man. If someone tries to differentiate you and me on the basis of physique, he is so-called a “mean man”. (from Complete Collection of Wang Yangming Volume 26) In Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, “great learning” was interpreted as “learning of great men”. Based on this, Wang Yangming illustrated the difference between “great men” and “mean men”. According to him, “great men” are those who “regard all things under Heaven as a whole. They see people under Heaven as one family and all Chinese people as one man”. “Mean men”, however, “try to differentiate you and me on the basis of physique”. “Mean men” are those who are “self-distanced” and “self-secluded” as mentioned prior. Ethically, the doctrine that “all things between Heaven and Earth are in one” is oriented to “love”. For this, Cheng Hao pointed out long ago: A man of great benevolence thinks of Heaven and Earth as one. All things in different forms under Heaven are his arms, legs and other parts of the body. How can a man not love his arms and legs? (From Analects of Cheng Hao Part II) The realm of great benevolence is to see all things under Heaven as “one body”. That is to say, man should see himself and all things on earth as one body and different forms of things as his arms and legs. In this way, he will love all things under Heaven like his body. If one takes his body as non-self (“you”), he is not benevolent. Benevolence means realizing “oneness” and having love. In this realm, man, all things on earth and nature not only “coexist” but also are “one part”. Man not only views things in nature as organs of his body that have closeness but also has moral obligations and responsibilities for them. The view of nature that “the benevolent see themselves and all things on earth as one” is of great significance: in this “oneness”-based view of nature, the relations between man and nature, between man and all things on earth, change from “I and nonself” to “I and myself” just as Martin Buber said “you and I”. In this view of

Interpretation of the doctrine of benevolence 53 nature, the relation between man and nature is by no means the relation between man and non-self but changes into the relation between man and himself. In Great Learning, Wang Yangming made further explanation on “oneness” and “response”: So, seeing a child falling into a well, one will feel apprehensive and have a sense of compassion because he is benevolent and sees the child and himself as one. When he hears birds and beasts lamenting or so frightened and trembling, he will not have heart to hear and no mood to watch. This indicates that his kindheartedness and that of birds and beasts are in one. Birds and beasts are intelligent animals. When he sees flowers, grass and trees trod on or broken off, he will surely have compassion. This shows that his benevolence and that of the plants are in one. Flowers, grass and trees are living plants. Likewise, when he sees tiles, bricks and flagstone dropped and broken, he will feel regretful. This shows that his benevolent and that of tiles, bricks and flagstone are in one. . . . That’s why men who are dedicated to great learning are those who rid block of selfish desires and promote bright dharma and restore the natural kindheartedness for all things on earth. (from Complete Collection of Wang Yangming Vol. 26) Therefore, all things on earth and man have original association featuring breath circulation. Moreover, resonating and sympathy for all things on earth are human nature and the innate nature of heart. Therefore, “oneness” not only has objective and substantial significance but also is an attitude and realm through which the universe is seen as an organic system so as to highlight the inseparability of man and nature.

Five The doctrine of oneness of all things on earth held in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism is the doctrine of benevolence. Its core theory is its proposal that oneness of all things is benevolence. “Oneness” means “one body”, “one family” and “one person” (all things are in one, all people in the world are in one family and all Chinese people are one person). Both Cheng Hao and Wang Yangming thought that only those who have seen the oneness of all things are the benevolent and that only those who have given love because of the benevolence featuring all things in one can reach the realm of benevolence. The usage of “all things” rightfully indicates that nature and various existing things are the objects of “benevolence”. Therefore, the doctrine of benevolence is not only doctrine of man but also learning how to deal with nature. Therefore, no one can deny that the doctrine of benevolence in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism involves an ecological orientation. Following this direction, we may develop a unique ecological philosophical system and ecological world outlook. The ecological world outlook of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism is an ecological theory of an “organic whole”. In terms of its characteristics, it may be seen

54  Interpretation of the doctrine of benevolence as “Moral Ecology”. Here, the use of “moral” started from Mou Zongsan, who distinguished “metaphysics of morals” from “moral metaphysics”. According to him, “metaphysics of morals” refers to study of metaphysics about morals while “moral metaphysics” refers to entering through morals which leads to metaphysics. Therefore, the key to “moral” is “entering through moral”.8 The ecological theory included in the doctrine of oneness of all things or doctrine of benevolence of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism as mentioned earlier is an ecological world outlook which is peculiar to Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism and which is different from the aesthetic realm for watching and enters through morals. The view of nature of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism has the feature that it does not aim to conquer nature but stresses that man and all things on earth are an organic whole. In terms of the relations between man and nature, it changes from “I and it” to “I and myself” or “I and you”. Moreover, it transcends the aesthetic attitude towards nature, taking nature not only as an aesthetic object but also as an ethnic object and a family member of itself. Furthermore, it emphasizes the concept of community which is not the community of human beings but includes human beings into the community of nature. What’s more, it is also different from what Karl Marx said in the early phase that “nature is the inorganic body of man”.9 Neo-Confucianism’s view of nature requires man see nature and all things in nature as related to himself and cherish them as one part of his body. Furthermore, it holds that man should have a sense of moral obligation to all things in nature. The basis of this philosophy transcends the view on the organic whole of primitive witchcraft and a mythology-based world outlook. It does not include the mysticism of witchcraft. Nor is it simply naturalism. As a matter of fact, it realizes “benevolence” through “breath response”. Moreover, it strives to link an ecological ethic with “can’t bear” (conscience) to seek a reason for nature of mind for ecological ethic so that the doctrine of “benevolence” is not only humanitarianism but also becomes a more popular cosmology which accesses through morals. In the words of Karl Marx, such doctrine of “oneness” or doctrine of the community of nature is a “thorough naturalism or humanitarianism which is different from idealism and materialism but a truth which combines the two”.10 “As a completed naturalism, it is equal to humanitarianism. As a completed humanitarianism, it is equal to naturalism. In this sense, it is a real solution to the conflicts between man and nature and between men”.11 At the end of the 20th century, men became more and more aware that the biggest difference between human beings in the past and men in the 20th century is that the latter already had the capacity to radically damage the global ecosystem. Human activities in the 20th century have realistically and partly greatly destroyed the natural ecology and posed a great threat of human activities on the environment. The higher the level of human civilization, the more sensitive human beings are to the threats. For the lasting survival of human beings themselves, man must abandon the old anthropocentrism which aims to “conquer and extort from” nature and adopt an attitude towards nature which is more suitable for the coexistence of human beings. In terms of this issue, the view of nature promoted by Confucian tradition can offer a kind of reference.

Interpretation of the doctrine of benevolence 55 Reflection on modern Western philosophy and worldview on ecology, more often than not, requires establishing man’s moral attitude towards nature on the basis of the concept of equality, fairness and rights such as advocating acknowledging senseless things have moral rights and extending the attitude of fairness and equality to the natural world. In comparison, what Confucian tradition provides is another view which proposes seeing man and nature as a whole system. According to Confucian tradition, man is not only included into the world but also must have organic relations with all parts of the natural world. Moreover, it requires taking all things in nature as one part of the self or seeing them as a family member of oneself so as to set up a moral obligation to all things in nature and remain friendly to them. The contradiction between man and nature and between the subject and the object is incomprehensible to the Confucian School. According to Confucian philosophy, although man is still the centre or base point in some sense (man is the centre of the world), the acknowledgement of this central position of man does not mean to make man take advantage of his advantageous position and take the natural world as others for arbitrary claim and exploitation. Man’s central position as assumed by the Confucian School lies in the rational (spirit, conscience) trust towards man and trust of man’s self-consciousness of the organic characteristic of all things on earth. This standpoint is likely to strike a balance between the old anthropocentrism and the contemporary requirement for a thorough abandoning of anthropocentrism.

Notes 1 Ernst Cassirer: An Essay on Man, Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1986, pp. 105–107, 111. 2 Quoted from Dong Guangbi: Modernity and World Significance of Taoism, Research of Daoist Culture, Vol. 1, p. 71. 3 Ibid. 4 Mou Zongsan: Nature of Mind and Physic, Vol. 2, Taipei Center Bookstore, 1968, p. 139. 5 History of Academic Ideas of Cheng Hao, Vol. 14 (History of Academic Ideas of Song and Yuan), Zhonghua Book Company, 1986, p. 578. 6 Tang Junyi: The Original Thesis of Chinese Philosophy: Fundamentalism, New Asia Institute of Advanced Chinese Studies, 1977, p. 139. 7 Collected Works of Zhang Zai, p. 62. 8 Mou Zongsan: Nature of Mind and Physic, Chapter Three of Review “Moral of SelfDiscipline and Metaphysics of Moral”, Taipei Center Bookstore, 1990. 9 Karl Marx: The Manuscript of Economics and Philosophy, 1844, People’s Publishing House, 1985, p. 52. 10 Ibid, p. 124. 11 Ibid, p. 77.

6 Confucian ritual study and modern society

Li (rites) is a tradition of East Asian culture. In modern Eastern Asian society such as in Japan and South Korea, the distinctive features and huge influence of “ritual culture” still can be seen. In Taiwan and even the Chinese mainland which have undergone revolution, although there has been little emphasis on ceremonies and rites, the spirit of ritual culture is still carried out in almost all aspects. The influence of ritual culture finds its expression in the emphasis on the etiquette of interpersonal communication and the difference in leader-member relations as well as restraint and regulations, hence traditional factors in the modernity of East Asia. These factors not only function as a tool which is conducive to modernization but also create a cultural atmosphere which makes people in East Asia play their contented roles, forming the ethos of East Asian culture. It is true that ritual culture is related to the system tradition of East Asia, but this relevance is not absolute. For example, Japan has not accepted the clan system but has obvious features of valuing etiquette. This indicates that “rite” has already become a spiritual tradition of East Asian culture. Li is a system of rules and an ideal pattern for the Confucian School to organize the society. But does Li have significance to modern society? What is the significance? These questions are worth in-depth exploration in the modern world where multi-culture has become a trend. It should be mentioned that the history of the 20th century has proved that in the 21st century where the capitalist economic impulsion hangs over the world and market economic laws dominates the globe, it is impossible to build up an orderly and harmonious society just depending on law and democracy. To improve the quality of spiritual life, carry forward moral values and guide the direction of life, various explorations need to be made. One of the tasks for these explorations is that it is necessary to apply the ritual culture in the East Asian tradition to, selectively and beneficially, the implementation of humanistic education, the settlement of social problems and the adjustment of interpersonal relations in order to elevate the value of humanity, establish healthy personality and jointly create a harmonious order.

One: modern cultures’ attitudes towards “rites” One of the themes of the May Fourth New Cultural Movement in 1919 was to lash out at the “feudal ethical codes” of Confucianism. It focused on criticizing the old

Confucian ritual study and modern society 57 family’s interference with love and marriage between young men and women. As a result, the “anti-feudal ethical code” became the loudest voice of the New Culture Movement in modern China. For example, Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), a representative of the anti-feudal ethical code movement, said, “Rites are the focus in the social morality and life of the Confucianism”. He held that “the core of Confucianism is feudal code of ethics and the foundation of China’s ethics and politics of China”. Likewise, people who safeguard feudal ethical codes view them as the foundation of the Confucian School. For example, Xie Youwei (1905–1976) said, “Confucius attached great importance to rites while educating others. . . . All is based on rites. According to Confucius, as rites are heavenly principles, they are ethical standards”.1 It can be seen from this that people, whether opposing to or advocating feudal ethical codes, think that rites are of vital significance to Confucianism. During the May Fourth New Cultural Movement, criticism against the “feudal ethical code” was sympathized and affirmed by modern Confucian thinkers. For example, He Lin (1902–1992) said in the early 1940s that “the greatest contribution of the Movement was to break and clear away the form and minor details of the outer form of the rigid parts of Confucianism and the traditional corrupt parts which constrain man’s individuality”. Moreover, Confucian thinkers held that the ideology and culture of Confucianism did not equate with the so-called “feudal ethical code” and that the feudal ethical code could not represent the essential ideas of Confucianism. Moreover, criticism against the feudal ethical code was likely to free Confucianism from the feudal ethical code and promote its healthy development. Therefore, “the criticism has no real spirit, ideology and academic spirit of Confucius-Mencius doctrines and Neo-Confucianism but has the function of washing off so that the true features of them were laid bare”. In this sense, The May Fourth New Cultural Movement, so to speak, was a good favorable turn for the promotion of the development of Confucianism. Seemingly, the New Culture Movement was a movement against the obsolete Confucianism and to overthrow it. But, actually, it had its importance and contribution to promoting the new development of Confucianism which far exceeded the advocation of Confucianism by Zeng Guofan (1811–1872) and Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909).2 Then did He Lin think that Confucianism should remove the part of its feudal ethical code for new development? The answer is no. As far as he was concerned, the feudal ethical code of Confucianism contained some reasonable parts. Besides, the reasonable parts may be substantiated by absorbing the essence of Western religious culture. He said, “Confucianism itself contains three aspects: Neo-Confucianism for investigation and research of things and probing the principle to seek wisdom; feudal ethical code to temper people’s will and regulate behavior; poetry teaching to mould a person’s temperament and cultivate aesthetic taste”. So, he had his proposal. First, developing Neo-Confucianism on the basis of Western philosophy. Second, absorbing the essence of Christianity to enrich the feudal ethical code of Confucianism. Third, appreciating Western art to

58  Confucian ritual study and modern society promote poetry teaching of Confucianism.3 The feudal ethical code refers to the religious orientation in the Confucian system. Its function is to make people kind inwardly and have appropriate conduct and morals outwardly. In contrast to He Lin who viewed the feudal ethical code as the religious orientation of Confucianism, Feng Youlan (1895–1990) attached importance to the unreligious idiosyncrasy of “rites”. According to Feng, “Santayana held that religions should give up their superstition and arbitration and compare themselves to poetry. But, seen from the interpretation of Confucianism on funeral and sacrificial rites, Confucianism had long ago changed ancient religions into poetry”. Therefore, according to Confucianism, funeral and sacrificial rites “are not religions but poetry and art. Confucian attitude towards the deceased is poetic and artistic but not religious”. It “gives consideration to both sense and sensibility”, just as “we may find emotional consolation in poetry and art without hindering the development of sense”.4 As a matter of fact, both He Lin and Feng Youlan had their own opinions. This indicates that rites not only have functions similar to religiousness and functions similar to religions but also are quite different from ordinary religions. Liang Shuming (1893–1988) interpreted the “feudal ethical code” as “ritual music enlightenment (music education)”. His social ideal was the whole world as one community, not using criminal law and “promoting ritual music enlightenment; starting from man’s temperament to cultivate a lively and peaceful mental state”.5 He thought that the ideal of ritual music was an ideal social pattern for human beings.

Two: significance of “rites” in classical Confucianism Of course, today, it is impossible for us to totally resume the Confucian ritual system, etiquette and customs and ceremonies. We must, actually, distil the essence of the spirit, structure, qualities, principles and normal form of the ancient rites of Confucianism in accordance with the principle of creative transformation and critical inheritance and development with a view to accommodating the needs of modern society and solving the problems of the modern world. However, as mentioned in the previous section, modern Confucian thinkers have different opinions on the feudal ethical code of ancient Confucianism. Some attach importance to its religious character, some value its poetic and artistic idiosyncrasy and some interpret it as a social model. Indeed, “rites” have very rich contents. Then, in the intellectual history of Confucianism, what do “rites” refer to? This needs to be analysed and explained. In a matter of speaking, “rites” have at least six different meanings in Confucian culture: 1 Ethical principle 2 Culture 3 Rite and ceremony 4 Courtesy and etiquette 5 Institution 6 Code

Confucian ritual study and modern society 59 Our discussion today on ritual culture of Confucianism must be based on the aforementioned analysis. According to the Confucian ideological tradition on rites and in understanding the significance and changes of rites, the most important is to distinguish “rites” from “ceremony”. Or, our discussion should be based on another analysis which was used by the Confucian School later, namely, emphasizing the difference between “essence of the rites” and “principle of rites”. Confucianism is the representative of the axial civilization of East Asia. Confucianism in the Axial Age, in a manner of speaking, had a close affinity to the civilization of “rites”. Ritual and music civilization is the parent body of Confucianism. Confucianism in the Axial Age was featured by its emphasis on “rites”. The importance of “rites” may find its expression in a passage from Li Ji (The Book of Rites compiled by Dai Sheng): Morality and benevolence cannot be reflected without rites. Nor can education and disciplining, rectifying customs be fully carried out without rites. Nor can distinguishing truth from falsehood, and deciding cases be done without rites. Nor can the relations between the status of the monarch and his subjects, superior and subordinate, father and son as well as the elder and the younger brothers be established without rites. If one secures an official position or pursues his learning, he cannot have a close relation between teachers, seniors and disciples without rites. Nor can one build prestige for the position of the court, army organization, taking government posts and enforcing the law without rites. Nor can he show his sincerity and gravity without rites while praying for blessings or offering sacrifice to ghosts and gods. Therefore, a man of noble character succeeds in showing appropriate respect for the elderly and love for the young, making concession so as to clarify the meaning of rites. (from The Book of Rites: Summary of the Rules of Propriety) Rites are moral standards, the means of rectification of manners and the principle for distinguishing between truth and falsehood, as well as the place-assigning system of both political relations and human relations. Rites have the function of showing majesty and dignity and making people respectful and reverent, retiring and yielding. However, the pioneering Confucian thinkers during the Spring and Autumn Period took notice of the difference between “rites” and “ceremony”, which is well illustrated in Zuozhuan (Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals by Zuo Qiuming). In Confucian classical culture, rites and ceremony have close relevance. The Book of Songs shows examples of the combined name of “rites and ceremony” (etiquette). While explaining “rites”, The Book of Rites often quotes the wording “impressive and dignified manner” from The Book of Songs. Therefore, rites, essentially, are related to ceremony, and they are inseparable. However, with the progression of our times, the pioneers of Confucian scholars gradually realized that only if rites were differentiated from ceremony

60  Confucian ritual study and modern society could rites be prevented from being narrowed down to ceremony. According to Zuozhuan: Duke Zhao of Lu went to State of Jin. He appreciated their services and presented gifts from the outskirt and did not breach etiquette. Duke Ping of Jin said to Nü Shuqi that “Doesn’t Duke Zhao of Lu has propriety?” Nü Shuqi replied, “He has no propriety at all!” Duke Ping of Jin asked, “Why do you think he has no propriety? He appreciated their services and presented gifts from the outskirt and did not breach etiquette. How can you say that?” Nü Shuqi replied, “What he did was not rite but ceremony. Rites are used to safeguard the state, carry out government decree and have the common people. Now, the government decrees are made by private ministers and cannot be taken back. Though Duke Zhao of Lu has a famous politician Zi Jiaji, his talents are not made full use of in governing the state. Besides, it violate its treaty of alliance with big powers, bullies small states and takes advantage of others’ calamities but has no idea of its own dangers and disasters. What’s more, his state army was divided into four and the common people rely on the three senior officials. Now, the common people do not support the monarch and the latter gives no heed to the consequences. As a monarch, when danger and disasters are about to fall upon him, he shows no concern about his situation. The fundamentals and details of rites are obvious but he is eager to learn and practice ceremony. Here, you said he has propriety, aren’t you going a little too far?” A man of noble character thinks that “Nü Shuqi knows about rites.” (Zuozhuan: The Fifth Year of Duke Zhao of Lu) This means that the behaviours of bowing with hands clasped and giving precedence to the other in ceremony are done in accordance with the established etiquette, which is not “rite” but “ceremony”. Ceremony is just the nonessentials of rites. It is not the essentials but the trifles of rites. The essentials of rites must be reflected in sound political order and the advocacy of the people and in mutual trust between states and not bullying small states. If one fails to do so but merely devotes particular care to some ritual etiquette, he cannot be regarded as one who “has propriety”. In Zuozhuan: The Twenty-Fifth Year of Duke Zhao of Lu, there is a discussion on this issue: One day, Zi Dashu from State of Zheng went to visit Zhao Jianzi from State of Jin. The latter consulted the former about what “rites” are. Zi Dashu replied, “This is not rite but ceremony.” Jianzi asked, “What is rite?” Zi Dashu replied, “I have heard Zi Chan (? – 522 BC), his predecessor, said long ago that, ‘rites are the norm of the Heaven and the principle of the Earth and the guide to the action of the people.’ ” Zi Dashu said, “I think rites are the social order and law for the superior and the subordinate, norm of Heaven and Earth and the basis of the survival of the people.” Zhao Jianzi paid Zi Dashu a very charming compliment on his views. As it is the norm of the Heaven, the common

Confucian ritual study and modern society 61 people will have to follow it. The brilliance of the Heaven and the nature of the Earth give birth to six qis and the Five Elements. This allusion indicates the ceremony and etiquette of bowing with hands clasped and giving precedence to the other (a form of courtesy between guest and host). This is not rite but ceremony. Rites are rules indicative of the way of Heaven and Earth. It may be said that the essence of rites is reason. Obviously, Confucius inherited this doctrine. He proposed the doctrine of “benevolence”, which was a moral spirit precisely distilled from propriety and music culture: “It is according to the rules of propriety”, they say. Are gems and silk all that is meant by propriety? It is music, they say. It is music, they say. Are bells and drums all that is meant by music? If a man be without the virtues proper to humanity, what has he to do with the rites of propriety? If a man be without the virtues proper to humanity, what has he done with music? Rites and music are not merely the external form of sacrifice and music and dance. As a matter of fact, rites should be the moral principle with benevolence as representative. This doctrine is developed in The Book of Rites: The deceased emperors formulated etiquette which has both essentials and principles. Loyalty and sincerity are the essence of rites. Codes of conduct are the principle of rites. They cannot be enacted without the essence. Nor can they be carried out without the principle. (from The Book of Rites: Sacrificial Vessel) It also says, Governing the country without rites is just like ploughing the land without using farm tools. Likewise, having rites in hand but act not according to the rules is just like ploughing the land but not sowing seeds. (from The Book of Rites: Evolutions of Rites) “Loyalty and sincerity are the essence of rites”, which emphasizes morality is the foundation of rite and ceremony. Its foundation refers to the “law and discipline and moral principle” of having rites according to the rules. “Code of conduct is the principle of rites”. Here, “principle” is the form while the “moral principle” is the specific programme. Just as Evolutions of Rites says that “rites are the dividing line of talents and skills and the moral standard of benevolence”, this differentiating of rites and ceremony and the difference between “the essence of rites” and “the principle of rites” has become the fundamental principle of Confucian doctrine on rites. Therefore, even Wu Yu (1872–1949), known as a hero of antifeudal rites, said that “what we attack today is the feudal ethical code, not rite and ceremony”.

62  Confucian ritual study and modern society Obviously, what we should carry forward today is not the principle of rites but the essence of rites.

Three: spirit of “rites” If rites cannot be summarized as ceremony and the etiquette of bowing with hands clasped and giving precedence to the other and a sense of propriety, what are the essence of rites and the principle of rites? Although the essence of rites is neither ceremony nor etiquette, the moral spirit rites embody does not equate the entirety of Confucian morals. As a matter of fact, rites have their scope and specific aspects. Evolutions of Rites has it that, Rites surely stem from Heaven and model themselves on Earth and learn experience from ghosts and gods and find expressions in funerals, sacrificial rites, archery, rites for folk drinking, capping ceremony, wedding, watching and betrothal presents. Here, it means that rites are based on the way of Heaven and Earth and cooperate with ghosts and gods and are manifested in the ceremony and etiquette of human beings. It puts it further that, Therefore, Confucius wants to adjust the mood of a person, carry out ten moral standards, have people keep their word, maintain peaceful co-existence. How can all this be realized without rites? What are “human feelings”? They are pleasure, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred and desire. What are “the codes of conduct of man”? They are loving father, filial children, kind-hearted and respectable brothers, faithful husbands and obedient wives, kind seniors and pious juniors, benevolent and kind-hearted monarch and loyal officials. These 10 aspects are virtuous qualities of human behaviours. The purpose of rites is to control man’s feelings and cultivate man’s righteousness. The purport of controlling and cultivating man’s feelings is “having faith and promoting good will, cement peaceful relations by upholding good faith, upholding polite decline and abstaining from contention”. The gist of respect and humility and good faith are the essence of rites and ethical principle. So, it says, “ethical principle is man’s fundamental characteristic”. Now, let’s make a summary of the spirit and essentials of rites: 1

Rites propose to be reverent and modest.

Zuozhuan has it that “modest decline is the main aspect of rites”. The Book of Rites: Different Teaching of the Different Kings also has it that rites are “the way of respect and humility”. 2

Rites propose intercourse on an equal footing.

Confucian ritual study and modern society 63 The Book of Rites: Summary of the Rules of Propriety says that “courtesy calls for reciprocity”. 3

Rites pursue a kind of order which is not maintained by law.

The Analects of Confucius says, “If the people are ruled by injunctions and restricted by penalty, they may try to evade the punishment without developing the sense of shame. If they are guided by morality and regulated by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame and become disciplined”. 4

Rites propose unity of harmony and order.

Rites are the collective name of rites and music. Rites focus on order while music harmony. So, rites are unity of order and harmony. 5

Rites emphasize respecting others.

The Book of Rites: Record of the Dykes says, “A man of noble character respects others while belittle himself and put other people’s interest ahead of his own. As thus, there will be a fashion of self-effacing among the people” and, “If there is any achievement, a man of noble character will attribute it to others. If a mistake is made, he will put the blame on himself. As thus, people will not vie with each other”. The Book of Rites: Record on Example has it as such: A man of noble character is respectful and frugal with the hope to promote benevolence; sincere and honest with hope to promote rites; never exalts his position and status. Moreover, he is humble in his position and tries his best to constrain his desires. He relinquishes his post in favor of others better qualified. He belittles himself and respects others. He is prudent and holds moral principles in awe and veneration. Therefore, we may say that: The moral spirit “rites” reflect is respecting others and modesty. The social ideal “rites” pursue is order and harmony, and order in particular. The essence of “rites” is to realize a social organization mode which is not maintained by law. “Rites” are embodied in culturally advanced conduct and spirit.

Four: character and expressions of “rites” In terms of the character of “rites”, we may study it in terms of three groups of judgement. These three groups of judgement are expressed in the pattern of “is . . .” or “is not”, which may help present many idiosyncrasies of ritual culture

64  Confucian ritual study and modern society from the macroscopic view. Of course, rites may be expressed in the pattern of “not only . . . but also” in some aspects. Nevertheless, this chapter does not involve this case for the sake of highlighting the major characters of rites. Group One: Rites are not deiform but humanistic; not supra-mundane but mundane; not barbarous but civilized; not self-centered but communicative; not ice-cold but warmhearted; not violent but rational; not high-handed but kingly. In this group of judgement, the active humanistic significance of rites is greatly highlighted. These idiosyncrasies needn’t be proved with materials. Nor need they be explained. However, it has to be clarified that “rites are humanistic”. It should be pointed out that in the Pre-Qin Period, some parts of rites and the music system were closely related to religions of the early stage. Besides, although rites and music culture were the result of the course of humanistic culture evolved from ancient religions, they retained some sacred elements. Although Confucianism in modern times has further gotten rid of the influence of ancient religions, it has retained religious content concerning Heaven and Earth and offering sacrifice to relatives so much that Roger T. Ames (1947–?) called it “an atheistic religion”. This is the main reason why He Lin lays emphasis on religious orientation. Group Two: Rites are not democratic but educative; not critical but normative; not free but disciplinary; not self-disciplined but heteronomous; not rights-based but voluntary; not for individual but for group. We should say that although rites are democratic, the enlightening function of rites does not go against democracy. On the contrary, rites may become a constraint condition for and an active supplement to democratic society. Although rites are not critical, rites make an active contribution to normalizing society. Besides, the normative and conservative functions may interact with the criticoriented elements of other cultures. Rites are heteronomous, which, however, also has positive significance. So, we cannot say that self-discipline is the only way of moral perfection. All elements which contribute to the establishment of moral sense and habits and social order should be recognized. Rites attach importance not to individual-centered rights but to the interest and obligations of social groups, which is precisely the characteristic of ritual culture. This characteristic strikes a balance with the system culture of the modern society in which the individual rights are encouraged. Therefore, one must overcome the unitary view before having a correct understanding of the second group of judgements so that a dialectical view of a balance of yin and yang is set up. If one does not just formalistically require that one value satisfy all values simultaneously but rather holds a theory of unity of opposite, he will not find it difficult to understand that values of modernity just highlight democracy, freedom, criticism and rights but neglect enlightenment,

Confucian ritual study and modern society 65 standardization, obligation and social group, which requires rites or analogues of rites as a supplement. Therefore, “rites” in the 21st century do not act as a unitary and all-inclusive institutional system as in ancient East Asia. Instead, rites may be imagined to act as a pole in the pattern of “one yin and one yang as the way” in the modern cultural system. On the one hand, rites create a modern society which has conflicts without losing harmony, changes without losing order, values democracy without losing enlightenment, has critical spirit without losing traditional norms, upholds rights without losing obligations and values the individual without neglecting the social group. Moreover, a cultural structure may be set up to highlight obligations, responsibilities and social groups. Group Three: Rites are not for social equality but for social hierarchy. Rites are not for gender equality but male-centered. Since modern times, there has been much criticism against the rites of Confucianism. Principally, the criticism points out the rites’ feature of equality of rites which seems to be divided into two points. One is social inequality and the other is gender inequality. Although Roger Ames recently argued that hierarchy and the concept of democracy are not necessarily as incompatible as fire and water, we still think that this group of judgements points out the weakness and limitations of the ritual culture produced in ancient society. Such being the case, the development of ritual culture in modern society must undergo creative transformation which not only inherits but also criticizes traditions. As a matter of fact, rites, inwardly, have contradictions. On the one hand, rites are hierarchical and differential. On the other hand, rites have the spirit of equality in their extent of application. The Book of Rites: Summary of the Rules of Propriety states that “courtesy demands reciprocity”, which obviously reveals that rites require equality in human communication. We should, one the one hand, develop what is useful or healthy and discard what is not in the rites and ceremony of Confucianism, as well as develop etiquette adaptable to modern social interaction. On the other hand, we should wipe out the system of hierarchy possession of wealth in ancient rites and carry forward the spirit of equality featuring courtesy demanding reciprocity. As a matter of fact, that courtesy demands reciprocity is passive equality while valuing and respecting others and humility reflects active equality.

Five: historical changes of rites Compared with ancient Confucian ritual study, ritual study after the 11th century has its own features. For example, ritual study in the Song, the Ming and the Qing dynasties was not only closest to our tradition of ritual study but also directly influenced the tradition of ritual study in modern East Asia. Both the creative transformation and critical inheritance of ritual study have to be based on the ritual study of this era.

66  Confucian ritual study and modern society Take China as an example. In a manner of speaking, rites after the Song Dynasty were mainly family rituals in clan life. In this period, rites for pilgrimage and diplomatic visits were only followed in the imperial court and their intercourses with the outside world. In social culture, rites after the Song Dynasty were mainly observed for offering sacrifice, funerals and weddings but rarely for community drinking ceremonies. Rites after the Song Dynasty, rites for funeral and offering sacrifice, were mainly practiced to clarify fatherly grace and respect for seniority while capping ceremony for wedding was a ceremony for the beginning of adult life. On the other hand, rites’ function of moral reclamation was realized by reading about sages and men of virtue and being close to teachers and friends, which was quite different from that in the Pre-Qin Period. As far as I am concerned, in terms of the changes Confucian ritual study has experienced from ancient times to modern times, the ritual culture of ancient Confucianism was of holism, covering politics, system and culture. In contrast, the ritual culture modern Confucianism emphasizes is dedicated to “family rituals” and “rural ceremony and etiquette in the countryside”. This is explicitly stated in Sima Guang’s Shu Yi (Letter Formalities) and Zhu Xi’s Jia Li (Family Rituals). Zhu Xi (1130–1200) said in his Preface to Family Rituals, Rites have their essence and principle. On the one hand, rites, if followed by family, mean the maintenance of the status of family members and the situation of love and respect. This is the essence of rites. On the other hand, capping ceremony, wedding, funeral, offering sacrifice and ceremonial protocol are the principle of rites. . . . All rites are completed in three generations of the family. However, what have been left behind today are just rituals for palace life, instrument and costume and etiquette for daily life, all of which are behind the times. Here, “principle” is a form which is changeable. It changes with the times and the environment. The “essence” is the constant basic spiritual principle. Therefore, Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals focuses on the essentials. According to him, family rituals fall into five parts, namely, popular ritual, capping ritual, wedding, funeral and sacrifice offering. Popular ritual has “miscellaneous household rituals” which stem from Letter Formalities by Sima Guang (1019–1086). In Letter Formalities, miscellaneous household rituals rank after wedding. However, they were listed among the popular rituals. This was well-founded in that, arranged in this way, the part of “popular rituals” becomes popular family rites which are different from capping ceremony, wedding, funeral and others. The contents of popular rituals focus on general discussion on respecting the elderly and loving the young, the obligations and code of conduct of sons and women. The essentials are the differences between superiors and inferiors, between the older and the younger and between men and women. This part does not belong to ceremony and etiquette for life but rather an ethical norm, which has a direct bearing on the “ethical code for status” and “loving and respecting people”.

Confucian ritual study and modern society 67 Therefore, ritual study conducted by Confucian scholars after the Song Dynasty, apart from the academic level, concentrated on the design and practice of family rituals at a practical level. However, the view of Song-Ming NeoConfucianism on “family rituals” was different from that in the ancient times. During the Song and Ming dynasties, as the system of rites and music had already been established as a national fundamental law, it need neither be discussed nor preached and proved, which confined Confucianism to the scope of patriarchal clan system and family. For Confucian official-scholars, capping ceremony, wedding, funeral and offering sacrifice meant self-identification and maintenance of their status as official-scholars, just as official-scholars needed literary accomplishments, indicating that this cultural stratum had a set of modes to support the elderly and attend upon a dying parent or other senior member of the family, which was different from that of the common people. Perhaps Confucians in the Song Dynasty weren’t inclined to believe these four rites had a direct effect on morals. So they worked out a set of rules as popular household rites to emphasize the righteousness of the difference between superiors and inferiors and between the older and the younger. Of course, in modern society where the scholar-official culture plays an exemplary role, the popular household rites and other rites such as wedding and funeral objectively play the role of promoting people’s cultural and ideological progress in transforming social traditions. The Confucian school in the Pre-Qin Period was devoted to studying how to deal with problems concerning the integration of politics and culture with the integrated rites. In contrast, Confucianists after the Song Dynasty such as Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming were confined to “rites used in family”, which was evidently different from Xunzi’s view on rule by rites. This embodied the comprehensive transition to the norm of daily life.

Six: social patterns of rites The original implications of rites include etiquette and customs, namely, customs and habits. Later, rites are transformed into a normative system, a code system and a ceremonial system. Rites are not law. Nor are they equal to morals. It is true that rites have the function of law and the implication of morals and rites. However, as a pattern of social organization and management style, rites help realize social order and harmony through customs and ceremony. Or rather, ceremony and rites are transformed into etiquette and custom for the realization of some social function. In explaining the functions of rites, The Book of Rites: Different Teaching of the Different Kings points out: Therefore, rites, if used to worship and offer sacrifice in ancestral temples, he will show his respect. If used in court, noble and humble are differentiated. If used in family life, father and sons will love each other, brothers live in harmony. If used in neighborhood, respect for seniority will be shown. . . . So, rites and ceremony for pilgrimage are used to clarify the status of the

68  Confucian ritual study and modern society monarch and his subjects, rites and ceremony for diplomatic visits are used to make the vassals respect each other. Rites and ceremony for funerals and offering sacrifice are used to clarify the gratefulness of sons and daughters. Rites and ceremony for drinking are used to clarify the respect for the seniority. Rites and ceremony for marriage are used to know the distinction between men and women. This indicates that rites in pilgrimage, visiting a friendly nation, funeral and offering sacrifice and drinking rites in the ritual study of Confucianism are a set of customs and ceremony. The ideal of Confucianism was to cultivate a concept of relations between people and between groups through these ceremonies and customs, namely, an ethical concept. Such a mode of organizing society and pattern of civilization must have originated from the traditions of the clan society in the ancient times. The Confucian School developed this tradition, enhancing and civilizing the ceremony and customs and giving clear explanation of ethical morals so as to realize its social ideal. Although Zhou Dynasty’s rites includes political systems, Confucian theory of rites did not mainly refer to political and administrative system but to the civilized conventional and ceremonial system. Customs and ceremony are to adjust interpersonal relations in a form which is neither law nor morality. Compared with moral cultivation, ceremony and customs lay more stress on social function rather than the individual’s function. As mentioned prior, rites are great righteousness and statecraft. If rites were but the “right principles and behaviors” and “spirits”, they would be a general value system which does not make much difference from the value systems of general Confucianism or other cultural traditions. Obviously, “rites” do not just mean a classical system but also are a practical system and tradition. Therefore, interpreting “rites” as “right principles and behaviors” and “spirits” can neither bring out the features of “rites”. Nor can it differentiate “ritual study” from its “study on benevolence” in Confucianism. Then, what are the particularities of rites? In a manner of speaking, rites are a concrete, workable and specifically practical way in the implementation of Confucian moral ideas and ethical spirit. In books such as Analects of Confucius, Mencius, Great Learning and Doctrine of the Mean, the Confucian School offers a set of concepts to express social relations and social ethics. However, to carry out these concepts in the living world, a set of workable specific forms and means should be available. The Confucian School has developed the pattern of ancient culture in a creative way and taken representative ancient customs, etiquettes and ceremonies as the specific approach of practice with the hope to convert the core spiritual ideology in the long-time internalization into ethical concepts and non-legalized and non-institutionalized norms which are binding upon people. Therefore, the ways of practice of the ritual study of the Confucian School are social management of “regulating the society with propriety” and the ethical order

Confucian ritual study and modern society 69 of “cultivating them and making them attain virtue”. This is the true essence of rites, so “the educational function is reflected in some minor issues. Rites may prevent evils from happening so that people unconsciously enjoy the luxury of doing well and abstain from vice”. In The Book of Rites: Different Teaching of the Different Kings, in terms of degree of “ritualization”, in the history of Japan and South Korea, ritual culture has been universalized to a large extent. In contrast, ritualization in ancient China was mostly confined to the stratum of scholars. It did not go deep into civil life to become a norm. From the perspective of comparative culture, the sociality of rites is outstanding. In Aristotle’s form of virtue, or even in the whole history of Western ethics, there is no such emphasis on “rites” as that in China. In the scope of ancient Western virtue ethics, “rites” were never viewed as a virtue. In contrast, “rites” in ancient Confucianism were not only rules for ceremony but also requirements extended to the appropriateness of behaviours in daily life. In a sense, the classical Confucian School thought that one would not attain a noble quality like “benevolence” without training in “rites”. Obviously, rites are formed in social relations. Or, rather, “rites” are an association structure which constitutes man’s social relations. Based on this, MacIntyre came to such a conclusion: Giving up and ignoring rites involves nothing short of abandoning political and social relations. In that case, one would not be a man. Nor would he be a member of a clan and a political community. Therefore, only in virtue of rites can one become a member of society and make it possible to communicate with each other in social relations. In this sense, rites are, in a manner of speaking, a means for us to have social relations as individuals. Moreover, rites enable us to have access to the coding of social relations because this society is rites-structured. As classical Western society was not structured by rites, rites were not highlighted. In contrast, as ancient Chinese society was rites-structured, rites were stressed as one of the virtues.

Seven: significance of “rites” as the principle of international communication The practice of “rites” involves mutual respect. Confucianism lays particular stress on “rites” as the norm of group relations, international relations in particular. From the perspective of Confucianism, phenomena of breaching are prevalent in the modern world. Applied to relations between countries, the ritual study of Confucianism proposes “the rich should be highly cultured and steeped in propriety while the poor should observe the rites”. Therefore, The Book of Rites: Summary of the Rules of Property says, By rites, it means that one should be modest himself and respecting others. One should respect those who do business by carrying a load with a carrying pole, not to mention to the rich. On the other hand, if the rich know the importance of observing rites, they will not indulge in sensual pleasures. If the poor and lowly know of rites, they will be strong-willed.

70  Confucian ritual study and modern society “Poor though he is, he is cheerful; rich though he is, he loves the rules of propriety” (Record of the Dykes). Rites advocate peace. “Rites, instead of force, should be resorted to in settling a dispute with the other state” (Zuozhuan: The Fourth Year of Duke Xuan of Lu). Zuozhuan has it that Duke Zhuang of Zheng followed the duke of Qi to attack the state of Xu. However, the former did not allow the latter to annex the state of Xu. Duke Zhuang of Zheng asked a senior official of Xu to welcome Xushu to settle in the eastern part of the capital of Xu and asked other officials of Xu to station in the western part of the capital. Moreover, Duke Zhuang ordered that no one be allowed to stay long in the capital of the state of Xu. Talking about this, Zuo Qiuming (556–451 BC) said, A man of noble character would think that Duke Zhuang dealt with the matter in accordance with the rites. Rites are the rules to govern the state, bring peace to the state and enable the people to live a prosperous and contented life and bring benefit to posterity. (Zuozhuan: The Eleventh Year of Duke Yin of Lu) Rites are the rules to adjust the relations between ancient vassal states. The spirit of rites is the opposite of imperialism and hegemonism. For one thing, rites do not advocate “power” but value “good reason”. For another, rites are not to rule by force but in a kingly way. Although rites tolerate and acknowledge suzerain-type inequality, they value/stress on peace and reason and non-ideology. Compared with the behaviours of modern national states, rites seem to be more civilized. With the impact of modernity featuring democracy and egalitarianism, it is doubtful whether the rites pattern can draw the attention of modern people. In the 21st century, human beings are faced with the challenge of new modes of civilization. The mode of Western culture with “freedom” as the lead has its advantages while the rites mode of Confucianism takes “order” as the lead, which restricts man’s abuse of freedom. Laissez-faire and unrestricted freedom are enough to destroy society. The ritual cultures of Japan and South Korea have already been universalized, and ancient Chinese rites failed to go into civil life as a norm but were only limited to the stratum of scholars. In conclusion, the original meaning and function of rites are to constrain man’s laissez-faire and to form an up-down order and left-right civility. As Confucianism after the Song Dynasty did not take rites as the institution of governing the country, the establishment of the modern state institution, i.e., the democratic system, has little influence on the original orientation of rites. Moreover, the community orientation of rites is also not in conflict with the political system of the state. On the contrary, it may play a better role in social culture under the circumstance of social division. What rites require is neither legal order nor general order but the order of self-constraint, which is cultivated through customs, etiquettes and ceremony. Through this mode, we may find some resources for human beings to deal with the challenges in the 21st century.

Confucian ritual study and modern society 71

Notes 1 All are quoted from Cai Shangsi: History of Chinese Thought on Ethical Code, Chung Hwa Book Co., 1991, pp. 267, 293. 2 All the prior refers to He Lin: Culture and Life, The Commercial Press, 1988, p. 5. 3 Ibid, pp. 8, 9. 4 Feng Youlan: Views on Funerals and Sacrificial Rites of Confucianism, Academic Essays of San Song Tang, Peking University Press, 1984, p. 69. 5 Liang Shuming, Mind and Life, Collected Works of Liang Shuming, Vol. 3, p. 596.

7 The Confucian views on the dialogue between Confucius and Jesus – noumenon and origin

Just as the classical systems of many religions have experienced changes and development, the classical system of Confucianism has, historically, experienced three obvious development stages. Simply put, the first system of Confucian classics is “the Five Classics”, namely, The Book of Songs, The Book of Documents, The Book of Rites, I Ching (The Book of Changes) and The Spring and Autumn Annals, whose contents constituted primitive Confucianism. They focus on the political thoughts and propriety and music culture prior to the Spring and Autumn Period. These systematic classical texts were compiled by Confucius. During the Western Han Dynasty, they were established as the “classics” of Confucianism. The second system is “the Four Books”, namely, Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, Analects and Mencius, which are the reflection of the ideological development of early Confucianism. Among them, The Analects of Confucius attained the status equal to the Five Classics during the Han Dynasty. The other three were highly valued after the Northern Song Dynasty (AD 960–1127) and were systemized in the Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279). The classical contents of this system are mainly Confucian ethical thoughts and the system of virtues and personality. After the Song Dynasty, they became Confucian classics more popular than the Five Classics. The third system is works on “Neo-Confucianism”. After the 12th century, the representative personages of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism were gradually honoured as sages in the genealogy of the Confucian School. Actually, their works were used as classics for discussion and study by the Confucians during the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. The contents are more extensive, including such new frameworks ranging from ontology to epistemology. The historical development of the Confucian classics system not only enables Confucian spiritual traditions to continuously absorb new resources but also naturally facilitates the development of thinking about and attitude towards the origin and noumenon of the universe together with the development of history. Therefore, when we attempt to present the expression of the theory of originality or ontology in Confucian classics, it is far from enough for us just to list the ideas of Confucius. Actually, we inevitably make various discussions on some diachronic classics system before its origin and source, and some inherent complexity and variation are presented by and large. This is the same as what happens to religions like Christianity and Buddhism.

The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus 73

One: origin and ultimate source Wizard culture in prehistorical times in China was quite advanced. Wizard culture evolved from individual witchcraft to public witchcraft and gradually gave birth to the concept of “god”, which led to the development from natural witchcraft to deity witchcraft. At the initial stage when sacrifice and war were “great events of the state”, public witchcraft melted into sacrificial culture and became one constituent part of the former. Sacrificial culture showed that deity belief and nature worship were very popular in the Xia (about 21st–16th century BC) and the Shang (about 16th–11th century BC) dynasties. In the late period of the Shang Dynasty, spirit concepts fell approximately into three categories: heavenly gods, earth gods and ghosts. Heavenly gods included God, Sun-God (Phoebus), Aeolus and Rain God (Tlaloc), etc. Earth gods included Kitchen God, the gods in four orientations and gods of mountains and rivers, etc. Ghosts included deceased emperors and dukes of the Shang Dynasty, etc. Bone-shell inscriptions found in the ruins of Yin (capital of the Shang Dynasty) show that “the Celestial Ruler” was the highest god the people of Shang believed in. It was believed that the Celestial Ruler had the highest authority and governed the celestial phenomena and secular affairs on the earth. The most important power of the Celestial Ruler was to control time and harvest. This indicates that the people of the Shang Dynasty had the concept of a supreme being and that the supreme god originated from God of Farming, who is in charge of the seasons and climate. The Celestial Ruler not only issued orders like emperors on the earth but also had imperial court and ministers, and the deceased emperors and senior male figures were able to come to the court to pass on terrestrial requests to the Celestial Ruler. Therefore, polytheism in the Shang Dynasty reflected the dependence on natural forces. However, it can be seen in the Five Classics that people in the Zhou Dynasty had some changes in religious beliefs. These changes became the dominant attitude of the Five Classics System. The highest god in the religious beliefs of the Zhou people was “Heaven” and “the mandate of Heaven”. The theme “Heaven”, which is repeatedly emphasized in the Five Classics, was mostly interpreted as the dictator of history and the fate of nations. The significance of the mandate of Heaven leads to some concept of the fate of the universe. In spite of these changes, the Five Classics obviously retain belief in the Celestial Ruler and Heaven, which is a salient feature different from that of the Four Books (Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, Analects and Mencius) and works on Taoism. The Five Classics, representing primitive Confucian classics, were closely related to ancient Chinese culture. On the one hand, they not only reflected ancient religious concepts, but, on the other hand, their status as classics made these religious concepts recognized in the primitive Confucian system. Moreover, these concepts, by virtue of the force of the Five Classics, have become conceptional resources which the Confucian tradition must take account of and interpret in the following periods. Among the Five Classics, The Book of Songs and The Book of Documents lay special emphasis on religious belief in the Celestial Ruler. (Determined by the features of this chapter, here, no difference is made between the modern and ancient

74  The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus versions of The Book of Documents. Rather, both versions are seen as Confucian classics).1 The major expression is the following: Great is God. Beholding this lower world in majesty.2 The Celestial Ruler is furious.3 The angry terrors of Compassionate Heaven extend through this lower world.4 That Heaven sends down death and disorder? Famine comes again and again.5 The Celestial Ruler stands high above the masses and overlooks the people. He is a willed god personified and has heavenly power. He can put punishment on people. Not only that: The Celestial Ruler ordered the mysterious bird to have Qi born and founded the Shang Dynasty.6 The Heavenly Ruler sent his son to establish Shang.7 The ruler of Xia was tyrant and stood condemned by the Heaven.8 The Heaven puts the people under its protection surreptitiously.9 The appointment of Heaven is not constant.10 In the Five Classics, the expressions “Heaven” and “the Celestial Ruler” are often interchanged without any essential difference. The Celestial Ruler not only manipulates nature but also determines and gets involved in terrestrial affairs. On the one hand, the imperial power or authority on the earth is derived from “Heaven” and “the Celestial Ruler”. On the other hand, the power and decree Heaven confers to terrestrial monarchs are not constant but always changeable. The requirements for this change are closely related to “people” and “virtue”: Heaven will definitely meet the wishes of the people.11 Heaven sees as the people see; Heaven hears as my people hear.12 Great Heaven has no affection; – it helps only the virtuous.13 And the way of Heaven blesses the good and punishes the evil.14 Obviously, all this indicates that the will of Heaven is ethical. Heaven is not a moody tyrant but a judge who distinguishes good from bad. It should be pointed out that in the records of primitive Confucianism about the belief in the Celestial Ruler and Heaven the Celestial Ruler’s role as the master of nature and history is highlighted. However, these records neither recognize nor deny his role as a creator of life. In other words, although the Celestial Ruler and Heaven have feelings and personality, and although he has supervision over the people on the earth, discovers the minutest detail in everything and gives rewards and punishment to the people, he is not the creator of the universe. What such a concept of the Celestial Ruler values is not “creating life” but “dominating”. This not only has something to do with the fact that there is no myth on genesis in ancient China but also has some influence on ontology, which emerged later. Dominating means regulating and control, which are interlinked with laws (rules). For this reason, The Book of Documents has it that “Great Heaven has

The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus 75 no affection; – it helps only the virtuous”, which can easily be developed into the concept of “Heaven blesses the good and punishes the evil”. On the other hand, the will of Heaven is infiltrated in the thought of Heaven-People Oneness in the Five Classics. As a result, the concept about the Celestial Ruler and Heaven gradually weakened in the Axial Period the nature of personality dominance. The classics of the Four Books were composed against this background. Confucius and his disciples still believed in the existence of gods and supernatural beings, which is evidenced clearly from the quotations from Doctrine of the Mean that “How abundantly do spiritual beings display” and “By the ceremonies of the sacrifices to Heaven and Earth they served God”.15 However, in Confucianism, “Heaven” and “the mandate of Heaven” are more impersonal. This is evident especially in a poem from Doctrine of the Mean: The ordinances of Heaven, how profound are they and unceasing!16 The doings of the supreme Heaven have neither sound nor smell.17 In the poem, Heaven becomes a miraculous entity without any form and image, and it runs unceasingly. These two lines became the classical language to describe the metaphysical entity by Neo-Confucianism. In terms of the origin of the universe, some new important concepts have been put forward since Yizhuan (Commentaries on The Book of Changes). In the history of Confucianism, Commentaries on The Book of Changes has been viewed as embodiment of the thought of Confucius. It was contemporaneous with the Four Books. Commentaries on The Book of Changes provides an important conception foundation for the early cosmology of the Confucian School, especially the concepts of “element” and “pole”. The Commentary on the Hexagram Text takes the Qianyuan (Qian is first of the Eight Trigrams, denoting the principle of Heaven, the sovereign, the male, and strength; yuan means element) and Kun yuan (kun is symbol for earth in the Eight Trigrams) as the root of the universe. Qianyuan is the source of yang while Kunyuan refers to the source of yin. This is something dualistic: Heaven has great merits and virtues. It gives birth to all things and dominates them and makes them grow. Heaven arranges clouds and rain which make all things change and have their forms.18   Kun has great virtues. All things live on kun, and kun acts according to the will of Heaven. Kun is profound and is of one mind and principle with Heaven. It gives endless blessings and nurtures all lives on earth.19 This means that Qianyuan is the ultimate source of the all things while Kunyuan is the foundation of the growth of all things. The former is the nature of Heaven while the latter is the nature of the Earth. Qianyuan and Kunyuan (Heaven and Earth) jointly become the origin of all things. So, Xici (Copulative) has it that: Qian (symbolizes Heaven) directs the great beginning of things; Kun (symbolizes Earth) gives them their completion.20

76  The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus Comparatively, Qianyuan is the “beginning” of all things. Therefore, Qianyuan, in a manner of speaking, is the fundamental origin of the universe. So, Xici explicitly puts forwards monism, which takes Taiji (the Great Ultimate) as the source of yin and yang: I (or Change) have Taiji, which gives birth to two states. Two states are then developed into four images, and the four images give rise to eight hexagrams.21 Here, I refers to the general process of the changes of the universe. The source of changes is Taiji. Ji means “extreme” or “ultimate”. Taiji refers to the very beginning. Taiji gives birth to two states, namely, yin and yang. Yin and yang lead to the four changing seasons which give rise to eight hexagrams: Heaven, Earth, water, fire, wind, thunder, mountain and moor. Since then, the world comes into being and develops. From then on, Taiji, yin and yang have become the most important concept of Confucianism on cosmism. Particularly, it had huge influence on Neo-Confucianism. Between Commentaries on The Book of Changes and Neo-Confucianism, the cosmology of the Confucians in the Han Dynasty still had some significance. For example, Dong Zhongshu, a great scholar in the Western Han Dynasty who not only carried forward the concept of “element” in Commentaries on The Book of Changes, but also pushed forward the connotation of “Heaven” as the ruler in primitive Confucian classics, said: Heaven is the originator of all things which cannot be created without Heaven.22 It is because of Heaven that man was created. So, Heaven is man’s greatgrandfather. That’s why man acts as Heaven does. . . . The Emperor rules by the grace of Heaven.23 Heaven gives birth to all things. It not only creates all things but also nurtures them.24 Here, Heaven is not only the origin of all things in nature but also the ancestor of human beings and the ruler of human society. As Heaven is the forefather of all things on earth, nothing could have been created without Heaven. Moreover, as Heaven is the root of human beings, man and Heaven are homogeneous and similar. Sometimes, Dong Zhongshu took “Heaven and Earth” as the origin of the universe: Heaven and Earth are the source and the forefather of all things.25 In Dong Zhongshu’s doctrine, Heaven is not only the ruler but also the creator. This is a doctrine that the Five Classics lack. Dong Zhongshu put forward yuan (element) as the source of the universe: Only sages can see all things originate from one element. . . . “Element” is “origin”. . . . So, origin is the root of all things. Then, what is the origin of man? Man originates from Heaven and Earth.26

The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus 77 Here, yuan (element) is given its source meaning that it existed before Heaven and Earth. This yuan is actually Taiji and the Qianyuan (male element) in Commentaries on The Book of Changes. It is not only the source of all things in the natural world but also the origin of human beings. Yuan in Commentaries on The Book of Changes is called xuan by Yang Xiong (53 BC–AD 18) in the Han Dynasty. This xuan means not only ultimate source but also transcending all existences:27 Xuan, invisible as it is, generates all things from nothingness and quietly nurtures all things. It is from xuan that Heaven and Earth, yin and yang are created.28 Here, xuan refers to the source of all things and the reason for all existences. It is omnipresent and transcends all. Both qi and all things on earth stem from xuan. It is particularly noteworthy that a big difference between xuan and “pole” and yuan is that xuan is not only the origin but also the “Tao” (the way), namely, the underlying principle and law of the universe: By xuan, it means the principle and law of Heaven, Earth and Man.29 Thus, the significance of “Tao” of Heaven, Earth and Man is put together with the significance of the origin of the universe. This was greatly developed in philosophy of Yi-ology of the Neo-Confucianism of the Song Dynasty. For example, An Explanation of the Taiji Diagram by Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073) of the Northern Song Dynasty developed the cosmology of the system of Taiji theory in Commentaries on The Book of Changes: At the birth of the universe there was no pole and it evolved into the Supreme Pole. The universe develops from infinitesimal to infinity. This process is called “movement”, and infinite movement is yang. Extreme movement gives rise to motionlessness which creates yin. Supreme motionlessness leads to movement. Movement and motionlessness generate each other, hence division of yin and Yang and Heaven and Earth. Yin and Yang integrate, creating the Five Elements, i.e., water, fire, wood, metal and earth. The Five Elements are arranged in their due order, hence four seasons, i.e., spring, summer, autumn and winter. The Five Elements derive from yin and yang, and Yin and yang from the Supreme Pole, and the Supreme Pole from non-pole. The Five Elements differ from each other for their different nature. The truth of Non-pole, yin and yang and the Five Elements result from ingenious integration and condensation, i.e., subtle combination. Qian is male and Kun is female. The combination of Qian and Kun gives birth to all things. Life and growth in nature come in an endless succession. Combination of all things in nature gives birth to all things with endless variation.30

78  The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus In Almanac, he said that: Yin and Yang and the Five Elements give birth to all things. All come from Taiji and are different in size.31 According to Zhou Dunyi, non-polar refers to be intangible and imageless. Taiji, as the origin of the universe, although intangible and imageless, has motion and quietness. The motion and quietness of Taiji give birth to yin and yang. The polarization of yin and yang produces Heaven and Earth. The converging of yin and yang brings about the Five Elements. So, the four seasons and five qi turn around. Yin and yang give birth to all things. Therefore, in this universe schema, the Five Elements come from yin and yang. Yin and yang originate from Taiji. Taiji is “one” and gives birth to “all things”. So, “one” is the origin of “all things”. While Zhou Dunyi reestablished traditional Taiji cosmogony of Commentaries on The Book of Changes, Cheng Hao (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi (1033–1107) were dedicated to integrating the concept of “reason”, which has value and significance with the concept of “Heaven”: “By Heaven”, it means reason. When it comes to “gods”, it means that all things grow and change miraculously.32 Qian means Heaven. Heaven is the body of Qian. Qian is the temperament of Heaven. Qian means vigor. Being vigorous and unceasing means Qian. Heaven means the Way and Heaven does not go against it himself. Specifically, Heaven is the body and the dominator of Heaven is Supreme Being. All things grow and change miraculously, hence “gods”. Heaven, like man, has its temperament, which is called Qian.33 Asked “how is the Way of Heaven”, “Reason is Way of Heaven. For example, ‘The Heaven is enraged’. It does not mean that someone is enraged but that Way of Heaven operates like this”.34 According to Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, “Heaven” is the highest origin and noumenon. However, “Heaven” does not mean the ruler with a personality. The connotation of “Heaven” is entirely equal to “reason”, from which concepts of “heavenly principles” and “the Way of Heaven” were produced. The concepts of “heavenly principle” and “the Way of Heaven” of the Confucians in the Song Dynasty, which were quite different from those of the ancient times, were “the substance of Tao”, namely, a concept of the origin and noumenon of the universe. It interpreted the primitive Confucian classics from this perspective: in the Five Classics, qian refers to a quality; “god” refers to a wonderful function; “the Supreme Being” refers to the function of dominating and regulating; and Natural Heaven is the material form and structure which the heavenly principle relies on. “Heaven” in the ultimate meaning must be interpreted as “reason” and “Tao”. “Reason” is the highest source of value.

The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus 79 It was through Zhu Xi’s thought that Confucian classical and modern cosmology found a comprehensive expression. Zhu Xi explicitly pointed out that “Taiji is a way of metaphysics” and is “the pivot of Creation and the root of all varieties of things”.35 Taiji is not only the reason of yin and yang and motion and motionlessness, but also certainty of supreme good. According to Zhu Xi, “Taiji is a principle of supreme good”.36 The following is his discussion on Taiji’s original meaning of the origin of the universe: Between Heaven and Earth there are two ends, i.e., motion and motionlessness. Motion and motionlessness alternate constantly which is called “change”. There is a principle that objects move and persist in its state of motionlessness. This principle is Taiji. Sages gave it a name on the basis of its meaning and King Wen of Zhou drew a diagram of the universe. Taiji is given a name and interpreted as infinite. The Supreme Pole is named after its meaning of pivot and the Great Ultimate. Sages called it Taiji because it is the origin of all things between Heaven and Earth. Master Zhou Dunyi called it non-pole in that it means “soundless and odorless”.37 He also said: By non-pole, it means the Supreme Pole (the Great Ultimate) as diagram of the universe. So, it is clear that superficially there is nothing in the universe but actually it is the origin of all things.38 All this shows clearly the cosmologic significance of Taiji as the “root of all things”. Taiji itself is “reason”. The concept of “root” in Zhu Xi’s philosophy is frequently used. It fully acknowledges the significance and status of Taiji as the root of the universe. Moreover, he used metaphors to illustrate the significance: Taiji is like a tree with branches and leaves. From the branches and leaves grow flowers and new branches, hence incessant life. Once the tree bears fruits, they give new births, hence continuous reproduction breeding in an endless succession.39 As Taiji is reason, Zhu Xi used “reason” directly to illustrate his point on the origin of the universe: The natural law gives birth to all things. Yin and Yang and the Five Elements are the Creator. In terms of yin and yang, reason comes before qi.40 Yin and Yang and the Five Elements stem from Heaven to give birth to all things. Traced to its source, the Five Elements are created out of yin and yang; and yin and yang are born out of reason.41 In terms of the development of Theory of Originality of Confucianism, both “Heaven”, a concept which was of great religious significance in Confucianism,

80  The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus and Taiji, for which early Confucianism gave significance as the ultimate source, were eventually integrated into the concept of “reason” in Zhu Xi’s doctrine. As a result, “reason”, whose original meaning was rationality and law, obtains the greatest significance and meaning as ultimate source in Confucian philosophy.

Two: reality and nothingness Is the essence of the universe reality or nothingness? Such a question did not appear in the development of early Confucianism. In mediaeval times, Buddhism, which spread to China from India, and Taoism, which emerged and developed in China, developed at an unprecedented rate. Both Buddhism and Taoism advocated nothingness. Although the two religious beliefs differed in creed and although Buddhism had a complex explanation of nothingness, the doctrines of Buddhism and Taoism that the noumenon or root of the universe is nothingness posed a great challenge for Confucianism. For this reason, the works of Confucians after the Song Dynasty not only often had discussions concerning nothingness and reality but also took the theory of Buddhism and Taoism (especially Buddhism) as its contrast and background. For example, Zhang Zai (1020–1077, a great Confucian scholar in the Northern Song Dynasty) opposed the Buddhist and Taoist creed about “nothingness” and “void”, but his thought may be thought of as directed at Taoism: As there is qi in the universe, nothingness does not exist.42 The great nothingness is qi (qi is the ultimate source of the universe). So, “have” and “have not”, visible and invisible, deify and life are of oneness. Moreover, gathering and parting, coming in and going out, both the visible and the invisible can reflect the origin.43 “Deducing its origin” means studying its origin in the field of cosmology. As far as Zhang Zai’s concerned, there is neither real void nor real nothingness. Generally, void is but an existential state of qi. The universe is an infinite reality in which there is only the difference between “the visible and the invisible” but no difference between “having” and “having not”. He added: If we say all things are visible objects in the universe, objects and nothingness cannot coexist, for the objects have their forms and quality just as Heaven and man have. This is just as a man who is ignorant of this principle but knows that nothingness is the nature of the universe. As a matter of fact, he does not know that this is the Way of Heaven.44 Zhang Zai regarded qi as the fundamental entity of the universe. According to him, qi can make everything, on the basis of which he denied the existence of void. In other words, he acknowledged the reality of the noumenon of the universe. This ontology, which takes qi as the existence basis of the universe, was often found in Confucian thinkers after the Song Dynasty.

The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus 81 Hu Hong in the Southern Song Dynasty also pointed out: Living, it gathers and may be seen as “existence”; dead, it disperses and is invisible and may be seen as “nothing”. Things that can be seen are “physical”. However, the reason of things always exists.45 A stream has its source, so it flows on unceasingly without stopping. Trees have roots, so they are full of life. Likewise, qi has its character, so it runs endlessly.46 Both “origin” and “root” are the basis of ontology. Only the substantiality of the root can guarantee the endless succession of life and movement. Both the existence and movement of qi are based on “character”. The character Hu Hong referred to is Li (reason) in ontology that Zhu Xi talked about: Character is the mandate of Heaven and the basis of all things. All reasons are out of character.47 Character or principle, the ultimate source of the universe, is an ever-lasting ubiquity. This doctrine had its reflection in the thought of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi: No object would exist without Tao; and no Tao would exist without the existence of objects.48   The hidden principle and the distinct image are of oneness without any gap.49 This indicates that in the universe there is either the Way or objects in the universe and that there is no nothingness at all. The Way and the objects coexist and there is something of each in the other. The Way and reason are the fundamental reality. For this, Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi explicitly stated: Then, talking about the great Universe, Master said, “There is no Universe at all.” Then, he talked about “nothingness”, “Both are reason.”50 Someone viewed the Great Universe as “nothing”. Master said, “The Universe is also reason and only reason is real.”51 This makes it plain that the fundamental reality of the universe is reason. The essence, noumenon and ultimate source are not nothingness but reality. Zhu Xi inherited Cheng Hao’s and Cheng Yi’s doctrine that only reason is reality. He also assimilated the theory of Zhang Zai on qi. Moreover, while criticizing the practice of Buddhism and Taoism, he further explained the substantiality of “reason”: Non-pole means having reason but having no form. So, why should character have a form? Taiji is the reason of the Five Elements, yin and yang. All are not nothingness but have reason. If it is nothingness, it is like what Buddhism believes.52

82  The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus “The mandate of Heaven is character”. Does this mean that all is nothingness? . . . As a matter of fact, this is reason.53 When asked why Buddhism is wrong, Master said, “It is wrong from the very beginning. For example, ‘the mandate of Heaven is character’. However, Buddhism regards it as nothingness. All that we Confucian scholars see is reality. In contrast, as far as Buddhism is concerned, all is nothingness.”54 This indicates that Confucianism insists that Taiji is not nothingness but real existence, that reason is not nothingness but reality, that all things are not nothingness but reality and that human nature and morals may be seen not as empty but as real. Zhu Xi has much exposition and argumentation on this point: Confucians hold that reason can neither be created nor destroyed while Buddhism believes that consciousness cannot be created and destroyed.55 Buddhism pursues void while Confucius seeks reality. Buddhism holds that one should have a heart of reverence to set right the private thought which is void and nothing. Besides, it fails to regulate his conduct with morality and virtue. In contrast, Confucius believes that one should have a heart of reverence to be extremely open-minded and have reason, by virtue of which he can regulate his conduct with morality and virtue.56 Buddhism believes in void. No matter whether there is void or not, a reason should be given. If no reason is given but just emphasizing void, what is the use?57 Buddhism sees heart as nothingness but no reason while I (Zhu Xi) see nothingness and reason is real.58 Someone asks him (Shakyamuni) why he just talks about nothingness. Shakyamuni said, “Both nothingness and void.” Nothingness means emptiness while void has material things. This is somewhat similar to Confucianism.59 Character is not fake, so it is unnecessary to distinguish the true from the false. Character does exist, so it is unnecessary to judge whether it exists. For character is the reason by which Heaven gives birth to all things. “How the mandate of Heaven favors; how solemnly and unceasingly”, “Heaven has great merits and virtues. It gives birth to all things”. All this shows that character does exist.60 Zhang Zai opposed the idea of nothingness with the theory of non-production and non-extinction of qi. Zhu Xi objected to the idea of nothingness with the nonproduction and non-extinction of reason. Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi’s doctrines were indicative of the efforts of Neo-Confucianism in its insistence that the noumenon of the universe is reality. As far as Zhu Xi’s concerned, there is no nothingness without “reason” and “the Way”. Reason and the Way, as the root of “all living things”, have never been nothingness but have always been reality and in real existence. In terms of the internal response of Confucianism to the concept of nothingness in Buddhism and Taoism, Zhan Ruoshui (1466–1560), a great Confucian scholar in the Ming Dynasty, insisted:

The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus 83 Up and down and in the four directions constitute Yu (space) and the ancient and modern times are Zhou (general term for time), hence Yu Zhou (the Universe). In the universe there is nothing but qi and is together with Tao (the Way). Even though all human beings are destroyed, this qi and the Way still exist. The Way exists before the beginning of Heaven and Earth and has neither beginning nor end.61 Confucians after the Song Dynasty often used “filled with and popular” to express the omnipresence of reason or qi. This concept itself is a negation to the nothingness-based ontology. This view shows that Confucians in the Ming Dynasty also insisted that as “Tao” has neither beginning nor end, the universe is “having never been (nothing) empty”. The universe and its principle “Tao” are always in real existence.

Three: transcending and intrinsic Undoubtedly, “Heaven” in the system of the Five Classics is applicable to Western religions and “transcendence” in philosophy. However, the doctrine of “HeavenMan Oneness” in the times of the Five Classics had a special meaning such as, “Heaven sees as the people see; Heaven hears as my people hear”, which has had huge influence on the development of Confucianism in the following ages. As a matter of fact, such a “Heaven-People Oneness” has linked the transcending “Heaven” and the “people” in the mortal world together. Mencius developed this thought: Wan Zhang asked his master, “Then, Shun won the country. Who granted him the power?” Mencius replied, “It was given by Heaven.” Wan Zhang asked, “When Heaven gave Shun the right, did it exhort Shun over again and again?” Mencius said, “No, Heaven did not speak but gave him the divine right with its action and events. . . . Once, Yao recommended Shun to Heaven and Heaven agreed. Later, Shun was introduced to the common people openly and they accepted him. Therefore, Heaven does not speak but give him hints with actions and events. . . . Tai Shi (Great Oath) has it that ‘Heaven sees as the people see; Heaven hears as my people hear’ ”.62 Not only this, but Mencius’ doctrine on mental constitution and nature reveals the relevance between man’s mind and Heaven: He who has exhausted all his mental constitution knows his nature. Knowing his nature, he knows Heaven. To preserve one’s mental constitution, and nourish one’s nature, is the way to serve Heaven.63 Man will know of Heaven once he knows well his nature. This reveals that although Mencius did not recognize the unity and sameness of man’s nature and Heaven, he obviously presupposed their close relevance so that one will know

84  The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus Heaven if he knows his nature and that to preserve one’s mental constitution and nourish one’s nature is the way to serve Heaven. In this sense, the external idiosyncrasy of transcendence of Heaven has come close to internal nature to a large extent. Mencius’ doctrine that he who knows his nature knows Heaven is a backstepping and reversed way of stating his ideas. It is not a forward-direction expression just like starting from the origin in ontology. For this, a forward-direction expression is developed in The Doctrine of the Mean: What Heaven has conferred is called THE NATURE; an accordance with this nature is called THE PATH OF duty; the regulation of this path is called INSTRUCTION.64 This positive-direction expression for the way of Heaven in The Doctrine of the Mean is generally interpreted in Confucian tradition as: Heaven confers man and objects with “nature”, and nature man gets from Heaven is the nature of Heaven. Although Mencius and The Doctrine of the Mean are generally viewed as the origin of the “transcending the inherent” tradition in Confucianism, as a matter of fact, the thought and expression of Commentaries on The Book of Changes cannot be ignored. This is what Xici says: Inheriting the Way is goodness and achieving the Way is nature.65 The Way of Heaven is everchanging and has goodness. Goodness endowed with such changing Way of Heaven is the nature of Man. Later, Zhu Xi’s doctrine of transcending the inherent is, to a large extent, an inheritance and continuation of the doctrine of Xici. Noumenon not only transcends but also is inherent. The real development of this doctrine is closely related to the expansion of the Buddhist thought of mediaeval times. Chinese Buddhism, from Mahayana-sraddhotpada-sastra (awakening of faith in the mahayana) to the Huayan School and the Chan Sect, proposed ideologically the existence of the noumenon of Dharma and thought that the noumenon of Dharma also appears and exists in everybody’s heart like noumenon. Therefore, if one pursues satisfaction and perfection, he only needs to comprehend inwardly. As a matter of fact, Buddhist philosophy does not adopt cosmology of linear reduction but develops the mode of construction featuring the coexistence of presence and absence and no obstruction between reason and phenomena, which acts as a driving force for Confucianism to develop the train of thought of Mencius and Doctrine of the Mean. For example, the philosophical thinking model of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi gave evident expression to such characteristics: Metaphysics has no body, so it is called the Way. The physics is material bodies, so it is called qi (object). Nevertheless, qi is the Way while the Way is qi.66 The material cannot exist without the Way and vice versa.67 The hidden is reason while the prominent is the image. The Body and the function are in unity without any gap.68

The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus 85 The most prominent is the image while the most hidden is reason. As a matter of fact, body and function are of the same origin while the prominent and the hidden have no distinction.69 This indicates that dividing the world into “metaphysical” and “physics” is the need in analytic thinking. However, in terms of real existence, the Way and the image are inseparable, which means that noumenon and the phenomena or matters are not disconnected. “Reason” or “the Way” is the most subtle noumenon but makes “no distinction” from “function”, i.e., without any separation. Noumenon exists in the phenomena and is not independent from phenomena. This philosophical thinking and contents, which are transcending and inherent, are still fully developed in Zhu Xi’s philosophy. The most prominent is Zhu Xi’s doctrine of Tai Ji: Taking all things in the universe as a whole, Taiji is the noumenon of the universe. Taiji means oneness. Taiji is the reason and basis of all the existence of all things. Moreover, all things are endowed with a reason as nature and body. Therefore, Taiji exists in everything.70 Zhu Xi also said, On the whole, the noumenon of the universe is Taiji. Meanwhile, the everything contains a Taiji (which is identical with the Taiji of the noumenon of the universe) as its nature.71 Zhu Xi said while explaining such a relation of existence: Asked: “Rational Life has the annotations, ‘From the origin to its end, everything exists out of reason and everything is noumenon. So, everything has Taiji’. Does this mean that Taiji is also divided?” Zhu Xi replied, “There is only one Taiji but everything has it in different ways and a complete form of Taiji. This is something like the moon which, hanging above in the sky and may be reflected in rivers and lakes. As a result, it can be seen everywhere.72So, we cannot say that the moon is subdivided.”73 Here, Zhu Xi quoted the metaphor from Buddhism without hesitation that “The moonlight brightens mountains but it looks round wherever you are” to illustrate his concept of “sharing of the whole”. In addition, Zhu Xi tried to justify his doctrine: All things are created out of Taiji. However, they have their respective and distinctive features. As a matter of fact, everything has a complete heavenly principle, each belonging to its own species and element. In this sense, each has Taiji.74 Therefore, from the perspective of ontology, Taiji is not only the noumenon of the universe but also the body of everybody’s nature.

86  The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus The noumenon of Heaven and Earth is the noumenon of man, and the heart of Heaven and Earth is the heart of man. Therefore, in the first chapter of The Doctrine of the Mean, Zhu Xi explained by saying, The principle of the Way comes from the Heaven and cannot be changed. The entity of the Way comes from the inner self and cannot be separated.75 Here, “coming from Heaven” refers to transcendence while “coming from the inner self” refers to internality. By then, Mencius’ so-called “All things under Heaven are being prepared for me” had developed into the concept of “The entity of all things come from the inner self”. Based on such an ideological position, Zhu Xi, while arguing with Lu Xiangshan (1139–1193) on non-pole and Taiji in his letter, claimed: Though yin and yang are phenomena, they are the image of the substance of Tao (a concept of the origin and noumenon of the Universe). So, the extreme of the substance of Tao is called Taiji (the Great Ultimate; Supreme pole). The popularity of Taiji is called the Way. It has two names, which do not mean two bodies. Zhou Dunyi called Taiji as non-pole in that Taiji had neither location nor shape. According to Zhou, Taiji might exist before nothingness and still exist after the emergence of the entity; it exists within and outside yin and yang. Moreover, Zhou held that Taiji is omnipresent and runs throughout the body. It has neither sound nor smell.76 He also said: Taiji gives birth to yin and yang while reason produces qi. Yin and yang have been borne and Taiji exists within, and reason lies in qi.77 Taiji exists “before nothingness” and “outside yin and yang”. Both mean that Taiji has its transcendence. On the other hand, Taiji exists “after the emergence of entity” and “between yin and yang”, which indicates the internal side of Taiji. Such a doctrine, which is “both of transcending and internal nature” and which reveals itself as the internal nature constitution of man with the noumenon of the universe, has its conscious reflection in modern Neo-Confucianism. Xiong Shili (1885–1968) insisted that “the entity exists in the innermost being”. He said: Only the heart can be found in all things.78 Nothing would exist without the heart.79 This indicates that the heart of the individual is the entity of the universe at the same time. The noumenon is not an outsider that is away from my heart in that the complete work (Note: the complete work is so-called the noumenon) does not

The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus 87 stand in the way of division. As a matter of fact, each divided part is a complete work. If Dick is essentially a complete work, he cannot be away from his inner being and pursue it from outside. The same is true to Harry. After all, the universe of everyone is a direct overall reflection of the complete work.80 The complete work is the entity and noumenon of all things, and the noumenon of all things is in my heart. In the final analysis, it is in my heart, i.e., the true nature of the universe. Therefore, the noumenon and the complete work are not an independent existence which is detached from the individual. The complete work may exist inherently. Mou Zongsan was the most representative modern interpreter of the doctrine of “being transcendence and inherence”. He thought: The Heaven stands high above the masses and is of transcending significance. While the Way of Heaven runs through the human body, it exists in his heart, hence man’s nature. In this sense, the Way of Heaven is immanent. Therefore, we may use the words which Kant favored, saying that the Way of Heaven is transcendent on the one hand and immanent on the other hand. Now that the Way of Heaven is both transcendent and immanent, it is of both religious and moral implications. Religion pays particular emphasis on “transcendent” while moral highlights “immanent”.81 From this, he expounded the religiousness of Confucianism so as to make a contrast with the concept of transcendence in the complete religious otherness of Christianity in the West: Though the human relations Confucian affirms are certain, they are neither a doctrine nor a theory. It is true that the human relations in real life are not enough to be a religion, they must be closely related to human relations and thereby verify and affirm the “truth of divinity” or “origin of value” in the true, the good and the beautiful, namely, the universal moral entity before they become a religion. For this universal moral entity, I do not call “way of standing aloof from the mortal world” but address it as transcending the entity. The truth is that transcending is also immanent and the two are not mutually exclusive. The same is true to the intrinsic and the extrinsic.82 Modern Neo-Confucianism holds that Confucian tradition acknowledges a universal moral entity as the origin of value. However, it transcends not only the entity but also the immanent, which is the characteristic of the religiousness of Confucianism. Mou Zongsan further expounded the idiosyncrasy of the metaphysics of Confucian morals, i.e., the transcendent existence theory built up in accordance with the Chinese tradition and based on the transcendent and moral infinite mind: The Unholding Ontology is also the metaphysic of moral in which “the infinite mind” is not objectified and individualized as a personified god. Instead,

88  The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus it is but a transcendent and universal moral entity (summarizing works of the Heaven) which may be a rational being of man or all reason. As a matter of fact, the “transcendence” of this infinite mind is different from that of the personified god in that the latter is not immanent but transcendent while the latter is both transcendent and immanent. Separately speaking, it has an absolute universality which is above every one and object but cannot be reached by perceptual experience, hence transcendent. On the other hand, it is immanent in that it is the entity of all men and objects. (Some people argue that the transcendent and the immanent are contradictory and incompatible. This is what is called “No common goal, no common cause to cooperate”.) Therefore, its creativity is quite different from that of God, so we cannot make comparison blindly and misinterpret it.83 Unholding Ontology refers to the existence theory about noumenon. Moral metaphysics refers to the metaphysical construction of entering the ultimate source of the universe through morals. The noumenon is the infinite heart which is not only the universal transcendent noumenon but also may be embodied by man. Therefore, Mou Zongsan added: This physics and mental body, which is definitely real, is not only the nature of man and results in the neat and pure moral behaviors but also passes on to the metaphysical cosmological significance, hence the nature of the Heaven and Earth and the noumenon and the entity of all things of the cosmic inventory.84 This doctrine explicitly holds that man’s physics and mental body is the origin and entity of the universe and that the entity of the ultimate source of the universe is also embodied as the nature constitution of man. Although Mou Zongsan did not use the metaphor of “The moonlight brightens mountains but it looks round wherever you are”, obviously, as far as he was concerned, the appearance of the noumenon and the entity of the universe in man’s heart is still an integral direct manifestation. It should be pointed out that quite a few schools of thought with distinctive developmental characteristics have emerged in the long historical development of the Confucian tradition. Therefore, not all Confucian doctrines only approve the idea of “the transcendent and immanent” or “immanent transcendence”. For example, primitive and early Confucianism obviously accommodated the concept of “Heaven” of religious hypostasis. Even after the Song Dynasty, interpretation on Heaven was fairly rational, but Heaven was still the highest scope of noumenal significance. Therefore, on the whole, Confucian doctrine cannot be ambiguously summarized as “intrinsic transcendence”. From the perspective of noumenon, the theory of “transcendent and immanent” of modern Confucianism, while inheriting the spiritual orientation of early Confucianism, intentionally or unintentionally, drew or was influenced by Buddhism and affirmed that the noumenon of the universe is manifested wholly as the innate mind of the individual. The sum up of this ontology lies in the introduction of devising the proposition that the

The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus 89 innate mind and noumenon are in one in the doctrine of self-cultivation. “Transcendent and immanent” in ontology is the logical precondition for the “immanent and transcendent” of self-cultivation. Additionally, the answer to the issue of “transcendent and immanent” is closely associated with the mode of thinking and the orientation of the world of Confucianism. Therefore, generally speaking, the issue of “immanent transcendence” of Confucianism is a multi-dimensional topic which involves ontology, the theory of human nature and the doctrine of self-cultivation. This is what we should point out in the discussion in this section.

Notes 1 In Confucian classics, The Book of Documents is generally divided into two versions, i.e., one is in modern characters while the other is in ancient characters. Debates have never stopped over the time of their compilation and whether the version in ancient characters is a counterfeit since the Qing Dynasty. As far as this book is concerned, anyhow, at least since the Tang Dynasty, both versions have been universally acknowledged as Confucian classics, as a result of which their contents have jointly become an important constituent part of the spirit and traditional of modern Confucianism. What this chapter values is to present the standpoints and attitudes of Confucian classics on the ultimate source of the universe and many relevant issues. Therefore, our concern is not whether the states in Confucian classics were made in the Western Zhou Dynasty or the Eastern Zhou Dynasty but what is stated in Confucian classics. For this reason, we would not like to clarify the time of their compilation and whether the version in ancient characters is a counterfeit. As a matter of fact, we use both versions as the materials of primitive Confucian classics. 2 The Book of Songs: Greater Odes of the Kingdom: Decade of King Wen: Huang Yi. 3 The Book of Documents: Great Plan. 4 The Book of Songs: Minor Odes of the Kingdom: Decade of Seaou Min: Xiaomin. 5 The Book of Songs: Greater Odes of the Kingdom: Decade of Tang: Yunhan. 6 The Book of Songs: The Sacrificial Odes of Shang: Mysterious Bird. 7 The Book of Songs: The Sacrificial Odes of Shang: Changfa. 8 The Book of Documents: The Speech of Tang. 9 The Book of Documents: Great Plan. 10 The Book of Songs: Greater Odes of the Kingdom: King Wen. 11 The Book of Documents: The Speech of Tai. 12 Ibid. 13 The Book of Documents: Charge to Zhong of Cai. 14 The Book of Documents: The Announcement of Tang. 15 The Doctrine of the Mean, chapters 16, 19 (subchapters according to Zhu Xi’s Sentences and Phrases from The Doctrine of the Mean. 16 The Doctrine of the Mean, chapter 26. 17 Ibid, chapter 33. 18 The Book of Changes: The Tuan Commentary: Qian. 19 The Book of Changes: The Tuan Commentary: Kun. 20 The Book of Changes: Xici (Part I). 21 Ibid. 22 Dong Zhongshu: Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals: Shunming (Chapter 70). (Luxuriant Dew of The Spring and Autumn Annals is a work on political philosophy by Dong Zhongshu). 23 Dong Zhongshu: Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals: Weirenzhetian (chapter 41).

90  The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus 24 Dong Zhongshu: Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals: Wangdaotong (III, chapter 44). 25 Dong Zhongshu: Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals: Guande (chapter 33). 26 Dong Zhongshu: Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals: Wangying. 27 Refer to Zhang Dainian: Outline of Chinese Philosophy, China Social Sciences Press, 1982, p. 32. 28 Yang Xiong: Grand Mystery: Chi. 29 Yang Xiong: Grand Mystery: Diagram. 30 Zhou Dunyi: An Explanation of the Taiji Diagram. 31 Zhou Dunyi: Almanac: Principles. 32 Cheng Yi: The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, Vol. 11. 33 Cheng Yi: Cheng Yi’s Annotations on The Book of Changes. 34 Cheng Yi: The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, Vol. 22 (Part I). 35 Zhu Xi: Illustration on Diagram of the Universe. 36 Zhu Xi: Analects of Zhu Xi, Vol. 94. 37 Zhu Xi: Collected Works of Zhu Xi, Vol. 45, Reply to Yang Zizhi. 38 Zhu Xi: Collected Works of Zhu Xi, Vol. 80, On the Ancestral Temple of Master Lianxi of Prefecture Shao. 39 Zhu Xi: Analects of Zhu Xi, Vol. 75. 40 Zhu Xi: On Great Learning, Vol. 1. 41 Zhu Xi: Notes and Annotations on Master Zhou Dunyi’s Almanac. 42 Zhang Zai: Correcting Benightedness: Supreme Harmony. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Hu Hong: Analects on Learning: Qi, Vol. 1. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Cheng Hao: The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, Vol. 4. 49 Cheng Hao: Collected Words of Yichuan: Preface to Commentaries on the Book of Changes. 50 Hao: The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, Vol. 3. 51 Cheng Hao: Miscellanies of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi. 52 Zhu Xi: Analects of Zhu Xi, Vol. 94. 53 Ibid, Vol. 31, Replay to Zhang Jingfu. 54 Zhu Xi: Analects of Zhu Xi, Vol. 126. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid, Vol. 42, Reply to Li Bojian. 61 Zhan Ruoshui: Collected Works of Ganquan, Vol. 7, To Master Wang Yangming. 62 Mencius: Wan Zhang, Part I. 63 Mencius: Jinxin, Part I. 64 The Doctrine of the Mean, Chapter I. 65 The Book of Changes: Xi Cai, Part I. 66 Cheng Hao: The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, Vol. 1. 67 Ibid, Vol. 4. 68 Cheng Hao: Collected Works of Yichuan: Preface to Commentaries on the Book of Changes. 69 Cheng Hao: The Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, Vol. 25. 70 Zhu Xi: Notes and Annotations on Master Zhou Dunyi’s Almanac.

The dialogue between Confucius and Jesus 91 Zhu Xi: Illustration on Diagram of the Universe. Zhu Xi: Analects of Zhu Xi, Vol. 94. Ibid. Zhu Xi: Interpretation of Taiji. Zhu Xi: The Doctrine of the Mean, chapter I. Zhu Xi: Collected Works of Zhu Xi, Vol. 36, Reply to Lu Zijing (5). Records of Zhu Xi’s Remarks, compiled by Yang Yuli. Xiong Shili: On New Vijnanavada, Zhonghua Book Company, 1985, p. 44. Ibid. Ibid, p. 247. Mou Zongsan: Idiosyncrasy of Chinese Philosophy, Taipei Students’ Press, 1974, p. 263. 82 Mou Zongsan: Knowledge on Life, Taipei Sanmin Press, 1970, p. 71. 83 Mou Zongsan: On the Perfect Good, Taipei Students’ Press, 1985, p. 340. 84 Mou Zongsan: Physic and the Mental Body, Vol. 1, Taipei Zhengzhong Press, 1968, p. 137.

71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

8 Confucianism and modern East Asia

East Asia is one of the earliest cradles of human civilization. Before the 16th century, cultural development in East Asia not only created a system of its own but also took the lead in the world and made great contribution to world civilization. During the past hundreds of years, modern culture, characteristic of science and great industrial productivity, developed first in the West. Its achievements of civilization, ridden by the impulse of capitalism, have successfully launched a worldwide conquest through colonization and hegemonic expansion. Consequently, the traditional culture of East Asia was greatly influenced on an unprecedented scale. In terms of its formation and development, East Asian Civilization prior to modern times centred on the East Asian continent and expanded eastward towards the Japanese chain islands via the Korean Peninsula. People in China, Korea and Japan and other countries made their own contributions to the development of the regional cultures of East Asia. The basic pattern of cultural transmission was continent-centered and along the islands. From the 7th to 17th centuries, a fairly stable cultural system took shape in East Asia featuring great commonality. Although at different levels ranging from utensils and spirit, the homogeneity of the regional culture in East Asia decreased progressively in sequence (namely, the traditional culture of East Asia had high homogeneity in terms of utensil craft, but there were great difference in national characters), some common cultural qualities took shape in such fields as utensils, systems and spiritual culture in spite of the discrepancies in cultural character between different cultures.1 In this sense, we have good reason to see East Asia as the same cultural community (cultural circle). Since the second half of the 19th century, East Asian countries rose vigorously and strove for modernization. The process of modernization is just the opposite to mediaeval times in terms of the regional pattern. The modernization drive was initiated in Japan and expanded westward. Prior to the First World War, Japan had already realized its dream of becoming a modern country to a certain extent. Although frustrated during the Second World War, Japan rapidly completed its modernization and became the centre of modernization in East Asia. South Korea, Singapore and China’s Taiwan and Hong Kong took off in economic development in the 1970s under the special historical condition of the Cold War and also completed their basic construction for modernization. In this new development

Confucianism and modern East Asia 93 pattern, however, China’s mainland was marginalized. Having tried industrialization of the Soviet Union and East Europe pattern, China began its market-oriented economic reform in the late 1970s. From then on, the country has striven for modernization on the basis of the pattern similar to that of other areas in East Asia. China’s development in the early 1990s showed that the development direction of the Chinese mainland, marked by reform and opening to the outside world, was irreversible, and China’s economic growth stepped into a fast track. Moreover, reform in Vietnam turned out to be effective. However, it will take some more time for North Korea to reform and open to the outside world. On the whole, through development over 100 years, the prospect of modernization in East Asia has settled, and the transformation of East Asian from a traditional society to a modern society is certain. After the Cold War, the disunity of East Asian culture created a new situation: the homogeneity of social-economic structures in East Asia will increase with each passing day, and economic and cultural exchanges will inevitably be closer. Meanwhile, new problems have emerged in East Asian societies. Under such a circumstance, we may unhurriedly think deeply about the value of East Asian traditional ideology in modern times, Confucianism in particular. This is not only of vital significance to regional cultures and relations in East Asia in the 21st century but also an unshakable obligation of the intellectuals of the region.

One: tradition and modernity Modernization of East Asia over the past century has unfolded in a high-stress environment of “tradition” and “modern”. Specifically, Japan departed from Asia for Europe in the 20th century. Since the 21st century, China has witnessed several intense movements against tradition. Both are inevitable phenomena in the course of unsuccessful modernization. On the one hand, the intense criticism against traditional thinking in East Asia is a cultural manifestation of meeting with difficulties in the course of modernization. On the other hand, the attitude towards “tradition” is based on the understanding of the intellectuals and the leadership in this period on the idea of “modern” (and modernization). As modernization was related to the survival of nations from the very beginning, national states focused on the national function of “making the country rich and its military force efficient” from the outset. In this sense, East Asian countries in modern times have had the same starting point regardless of their path of state capitalism or socialism. In other words, in early times, they interpreted modernity as “strong military power” at the earliest, namely, military capacities based on modern science and technology and industry. It is understandable that national states have a nationalism consciousness. However, this understanding of modernity could neither cultivate communicative rationality that can benefit maintaining regional relations nor help establish a rational regional culture and relations in spite of the demonstration of the “big powers” in the 19th century. This was well illustrated in the regional relations of East Asia during the Second World War. As a matter of fact, all late-developing countries after the Second World

94  Confucianism and modern East Asia War understood the implication of modernization from the perspective of economic development. This understanding is consistent with Western modernization theory. According to Weber, the core of Western modernity is “rationalization”. In contrast to the West, he thinks that East Asian ideological culture (China as a representative) lacks “rational spirit”.2 We know that the “rational spirit” Weber speaks of here refers to “instrumental reason”. Its main aspects are technological rationality and economic rationality. The early train of thought for the industrialization of East Asia was to develop science and technology and industrial and commercial capitalism. Import of modern science has met with little resistance in East Asia, and industrialization was seen as the essence of modernization long ago. However, after the Soviet “October Revolution”, underdeveloped countries were provided another mode of industrialization. Soviet experience in socialist construction led to diversified understanding of modernization, i.e., the economic organization of rationalized capitalism Weber referred to was no longer viewed as the sole means to modernization. In the mode of socialist industrialization, “value rationality” was interpreted as a factor of modernization and modernity, but this value rationality, more often than not, rejected instrumental rationality in the forms of state planning and the state-owned property right. However, people then were not aware of its serious consequence. Originally, these two modes offered more choices and experience to human beings, but they conflicted extensively on the basis of ideological confrontation. After the Second World War, under the global landscape of the Cold War, a Japan-centered market industrialization mode and a China-centered planning industrialization mode took shape in East Asia, behind which were the global confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, the Cold War was not only a conflict in value but also an economic competition. By the end of the 1980s, it had been proved that competition in economic growth and social development showed the disadvantage of the planning mode in instrumental reason, which eventually led to the end of the Cold War. As a consequence, the hegemony of instrumental reason re-dominated the understanding of “modernity”, and the market economy system was accepted as the only means to modernization once again. Undoubtedly, the end of the Cold War and the convergence of development modes represent the progress of human cognition and avoid conflicts which threaten human beings in some aspect. However, problems constrained and covered by the Cold War were released, which perplexed human beings as much as the Cold War had. The disastrous effects of the expansion of modern instrumental reason spread further, but resources of human criticism decreased with each passing day. Weber pointed out long ago that all achievements and problems of modern civilization derive from the tension between value rationality and instrumental rationality.3 On the one hand, formal rationality brings about science in rational form, rational law, the administration system and rational capitalist labour organization. On the other hand, civilized life in modern times is, in essence, instrumental reason oriented. It is strongly dominated by utilitarianism, which results in a common problem of modernization, that is, the rationality of form and non-rationality

Confucianism and modern East Asia 95 of essence, or instrumental rationality and non-rationality of value. Specifically, environmental pollution, disorientation of life and moral degeneration have something to do with the one-sided domination of instrumental reason. In terms of national and regional relations, modernization, which is instrumental reason oriented, can neither automatically clear up the conflict between nations and cultures nor put an end to war. The transnational and regional relations in the post–Cold War era require construction of cultural reason. The modern intellectual history of East Asia has some salient features. On the one hand, it makes light of its own traditions. On the other hand, even if it affirms tradition, it only searches for tradition in the significance of Western modernity and just acknowledges the factors that are worth acknowledging. For example, culturally, it only attaches importance to the factors in its traditional culture which are similar to Western factors and are conducive to the growing of capitalism or the development of instrumental reason. However, the experience of East Asia, as represented by Japan and the “Four Little Dragons”, shows that the modernization of East Asia has its own features or modernity, such as valuing groups and authority, education and worldliness, all of which are related to the traditions of East Asia. More importantly, facing the future, East Asia should further distil nutrition from traditional spiritual resources to deal with the problems of the times and build up a more harmonious modern world in East Asia. In terms of the significance of the traditional value of East Asia to the world, in the latest discussion, it seems that scholars pay much attention to the value orientation shared due to the social and economic success of East Asia. All this is, of course, one part of the modernity of the region, but the value issue is treated in the coordinate of economic function. Transcending the instrumental reason level and facing the problems of the contemporary world, we need to stress the whole needs of East Asia. Just as Benjamin Schwartz pointed out, as a matter of fact, the value of Confucianism need not be a barrier to the late-coming modernization of East Asian countries, but the concept orientation of the modernization drive of East Asia which benefits from Confucian ethics is not the core essence of Confucian ethics.4 To break away from the Weber-type understanding of the instrumentality of modernity and build up a rational modern East Asian culture (reasonable not only instrumentally but also in value), we must focus on the universal value of the cultural practice, social ideal and cultural orientation which really represent the core of Confucianism.

Two: harmony for use Faced with the chaotic world in the 1990s, what first occurred to us was the Confucian concept of “harmony”. “Harmony” is an important value in Confucian tradition. In terms of its contents, harmony may be divided into five different levels: the first level: Heaven and man, that is, harmony between man and nature. The second level: harmony between nations, i.e., peace between countries. The third level: harmony between people, i.e., harmonious social relations. The fourth level: personal spirit and mentality, namely, a peaceful mind. The fifth level: culture

96  Confucianism and modern East Asia or civilization, i.e., coordination and understanding between different cultures. These relations have been basic human relations since the beginning of history. Moreover, major challenges modern people are faced with in their environment and quality of their living are still reflected in these relations. As far as Confucianism is concerned, harmony between man and nature is built up on the basis of “unity between man and heaven”. For one thing, nature is the nurturer of human beings. For another, all things in the natural world are partners of human beings, and man is an integral part of nature. Therefore, man cannot see nature as an object which may be ceaselessly exploited. Instead, man should establish a harmonious relation with nature. However, since modern times, early capitalism, which had a Faustian spirit, aimed to pursue profit and capital accumulation, as a result of which protection of the ecological environment naturally was ignored. Under the demonstration and pressure of industrialized countries, the post-war developing countries, taking nations as the main body and working together with business owners, pursued development speed at all hazards to join the industrialized countries. The consequence is serious. Waste of manmade materials can hardly be absorbed in the cycle of matter in the natural world. Large-scale resource exploitation has upset environmental balance, and scientific development has brought about unexpected ecological damage. For almost half a century, deterioration of global environmental conditions, ranging from partial public hazards to environmental pollution, atmospheric contamination, marine pollution, deforestation, and land desertification, has been an unsuspecting reality. It is true that environmental improvement cannot be done solely through a cultural concept, but its ultimate solution is surely based on a cultural concept. The “peace” concept held by the ancient Confucian School meant, first of all, “harmony” between man and Heaven. It held “harmony between perfect music and Heaven and Earth”, “Harmony prevents all things from losing their original nature” (The Book of Rites: Music), thinking that Heaven and Earth are naturally in peace and man’s activities should be in harmony with Heaven and Earth. “Harmony makes all things live and multiply” (The Book of Rites: Music). Human activities aim to promote harmony of the whole universe. “Harmony” (sometimes referred to as “music”), as a cultural concept, has a second meaning: peace between nations and between ethnic groups. Confucianism proposes taking “harmony” as a guide so that “no meeting on the battle ground, there is no use of criminal penalty and the people have no sufferings” (The Book of Music). It holds that “all the influences of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract remote people to be submissive” (The Analects: The Head of the Ji Family) and celebrates the benefits of “having faith and promoting good will” (The Book of Rites: Liyun). It advocates kindheartedness and justice and values benevolent government and claims that “people who start wars should be severely punished” (Mencius: Lilou Part I). In the post–Cold War era, frequent wars reveal the anomie of the political culture between nations. Samuel P. Huntington predicted that future international conflicts will evolve from conflicts between nations into conflicts between civilizations. He has a point. However, he took Confucian civilization as one of the causes of the conflicts, which was,

Confucianism and modern East Asia 97 obviously, out of his ignorance. Weber rightly pointed out long ago the character of pacifism in Confucianism. Liang Shuming (1893–1988) pointed out that the rational pre-maturity of Confucian culture the duke of Zhou and Confucius initiated was, in essence, peace and civil culture.5 The Confucian concept of “harmony” is conducive to deriving principles of communication featuring peaceful coexistence between nations. This is of great significance to the establishment of a new international order for the contemporary world. The third meaning of “harmony” is harmonious interpersonal relations. Confucianism proposes “harmony and respect” between the senior and the junior and “harmony and amenity” of neighbourhood and affinity of the family. Although the scope of interpersonal relations classical Confucianism dealt with was narrower than in modern society, the principles of interpersonal relations Confucianism dealt with had universality. In modern industrial society and the post-industrial era, phenomena that people are alienated, families are disintegrated and senior citizens are not provided for are commonplace. Thanks to its tradition, the situation in East Asian society is slightly better than in the West. However, changes in social and family structures worsen social pathology. Modern social structure, supported by law, makes well-aligned order, but the relations between the senior and the junior and neighbourhood relationship and other relations are not so harmonious. After all, what “harmony” advocates is not a mono-directional act but mutual respect, understanding and concern with the individual as the main body. This provides a foundation for the correction of the interpersonal relationship of modern hierarchical bureaucratic society. The fourth meaning of “harmony” is harmonious and happy personal spiritual life. The Book of Rites has it that “once one feels disharmonious and unhappy for a little while, he will have a state of mind of sordidness and hypocrisy”. So, to be “even-tempered and good-humored calm”, one should “have a peace in mind by seeking harmony”. So, “harmony” is not only “delightedness” but also “happiness”. In this sense, Confucian culture is a culture of harmony. Or rather, harmony is the basic orientation of Confucian culture. The spirituality of Song-Ming NeoConfucianism, with “seeking the Confucian optimistic attitude to life” as its core, centred on this subject. In modern society where an individual’s anxiety, loneliness, void and tiredness cannot be dispelled, it is of some significance to promote an optimistic and active mental state. The fifth meaning of “harmony” is the attitude of being lenient and compatible to different cultures. As a matter of fact, the controversy over “harmony” and “diversity” existed in ancient China. “Harmony” does not require uniformity. It advocates neither unary domination nor imposing one’s views on others. For “harmony without uniformity”, “harmony” assumes diversity as a premise. For “things are born from He (harmony), but do not continue from Tong” (which means accommodating different cultural elements with broad mind). It encourages multi-component concord and coexistence, proposes peaceful coexistence of and competition between different cultures and means understanding of alien cultures and respect for different cultural views. In terms of political culture, the Cold War mentality means that different ideologies cannot compete in tolerance

98  Confucianism and modern East Asia but have implacable hostility. In the post–Cold War period of the 1990s, there appeared some phenomena of close relations between many local cultures such as European integration and North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). On the other hand, in some regions, cultural conflicts were intensified, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Middle East. Against this backdrop, the Asian-Pacific Region is in urgent need of a new regional culture to replace the Cold War ideology. On this point, the cultural resources of East Asian tradition should be fully used.

Three: taking “benevolence” as basis Harmony is the basic orientation of Confucian culture. However, in terms of the value structure of Confucianism, “harmony” is not their ultimate principle. “Harmony” is not basis but function. Following “harmony” there is a basis, that is, “benevolence”. “Benevolence” is basis while “harmony” is function. The cultural practice structure “taking benevolence as basis and harmony as function” reveals Confucianism and Western culture differ in spirit features. It is impossible to build up a sound regional culture in East Asia without a universal moral principle as the basis. “Benevolence” in Confucian tradition may be taken as the ethical basis for the common concept of human beings in the contemporary world. Interpretations of “benevolence” have varied among Confucians since ancient times. Here, only two of them are selected: one is Confucius’ interpretation of “the benevolent loves others” (from The Analects: Yan Yuan). Later, Han Yu (AD 768–824) interpreted benevolence as “universal love”. Zhu Xi illustrated benevolence as “knowing the reason of loving others”. The second is that Liang Shuming explicated the concept of benevolence with “reason”. Liang’s interpretation is more significant today. “Benevolence” has broad meaning. Staring from “benevolence”, many norms including “harmony” may be deduced. For example, Neo-Confucian scholars held that “the benevolent takes Heaven and Earth as a whole” and “the benevolent blends himself and other things into one harmonious whole”, which directly affirmed harmony between man and nature. As a humanitarian principle, “benevolence” may deduce principles of national engagement of peaceful coexistence, becoming a moral force to restrain aggression. Since the Second World War, moral forces have become an indispensable force to safeguard world peace. Today, the Cold War has ended, but the world is featured by lost international order and unbalanced regional culture. Under such a circumstance, it is urgent to build up a common ground for morality in regional relations and contact. Likewise, social life within national states is faced with crisis of losing subjectivity and increasing disorderedness. The materialization of man has not been a prediction of philosophers but a severe case of modern society. Epicurean-based consumer culture has made man lose ideals with each passing day. The Book of Rites says, Things get men moved in inexhaustible ways but men’s likes and dislikes are excessive. So, men are melted into the things while getting involved in them.

Confucianism and modern East Asia 99 Once melted into things, men will be utterly devoid of conscience and greedy. In this way, men will have such states of mind as disobedience, hypocrisy and fraud and indulge in carnal pleasures and conspiracy. The strong bullies the weak and the big bullies the small, and the cunning bullies the retarded, and the courageous bullies the timid. The sick receives no care, and the old, the young and the lonely cannot be properly provided for. All this is a manifestation of violent upheavals. Human history is a history of the constant development of reason. As far as the Confucian School is concerned, reason should merely refer to intellectual elaborative faculty. Liang Shuming distinguished reason from sense, thinking that reason is an attitude towards contact and a mindset of mutual understanding and intercommunication, namely, benevolence. Such interpretation is similar in some aspects to communicative rationality which Habermas talked about. On the other hand, reason in modernity should not be narrowly interpreted by Weber as instrumental rationality. Instead, it is necessary to break with the opposite thinking of “tradition and modern” and to accommodate value rationality in the understanding of modernity. “Benevolence” may be viewed as the representative of value rationality of Confucianism and the concentrated reflection of substantive tradition. In the reflection of intellectuals in East Asia in the early 20th century, peace was seen as weakness, tolerance as incompetence, harmony as an obstacle to conquer nature and traditional moral ideals and value as the stumbling block to constrain the steps of modernization. However, the regrets and tragedies human beings have witnessed over the past century, in a manner of speaking, have resulted from the deviation of these traditional values. Over the past decades, influenced by Western modernity, East Asian society has put the development of instrumental reason in first place. What scholars take seriously is the facilitation of secularized Confucian ethics in the economic development of East Asia and the experience orientation of the real learning thinking of Confucianism. Particularly, universal values in Western and Eastern spiritual traditions are rejected, but empirical concepts and specific operable rules are advocated. Consequently, scholars mistakenly think that only specific and experiential matters can link up modernization and that universal values have nothing to do with modernity and have no capacity of transformation into modernity.6 All this is the product of the misguiding of the opposite thinking of “tradition and modernity”. Today, we live in the 1990s. We must jump out of this old way of thinking and stand higher to reexamine the cultural issues of East Asia in modern times.

Notes 1 For such a discrepancy, please refer to Jin Zhonglie: Confucian Ethic of Coexistence published in Self-Criticism and Prospect of Chinese Culture – Collected Academic Papers for the 50th Anniversary of New Asia College (editor-in-chief: Liu Shuxian), Bafang Cultural Business Corporation, May 2001. 2 For Weber’s theory and analysis, refer to Rationality and Its Limitation by Su Guoxun, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1988.

100  Confucianism and modern East Asia 3 Refer to Su Guoxun: Rationality and Its Limitations, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1988, p. 89. 4 The Confucian World Observed, edited by Tu Wei-ming, University of Hawaii Press, 1992, p. 16. 5 Refer to Weber’s Chinese Religions: Confucianism and Taoism, translated by Jian Huimei, Yuan-Liou Publishing Co., Ltd, 1989; Liang Shuming, Outline of Chinese Culture, Taipei Liren Press, 1982. 6 A new generation of Japanese scholars have some ideas in this regard. Refer to Talking about Civilization from the Perspective of Confucianism, p. 552, included in The Scholar, Vol. 3, Jiangsu Literature and Art Publishing House, 1992.

9 Confucian ethics and China’s modernization

NICs (newly industrialized countries) is a term which appeared in academic literature in recent years. It is used to refer to the rising of Japan, South Korea, Singapore and China’s Hong Kong and Taiwan.1 Confucian ethics and the economic modernization of East Asia have been in discussion for over 30 years in the US In the 1980s, the discussion aroused more concern and became a universally acknowledged serious academic issue. In recent years, views about this discussion have spread in a scattered way to China. As some scholars have little knowledge about the history and current situation of this discussion, they indiscreetly link the argument which integrates Confucian ethics with the industrial development of East Asia to the “rejuvenation of Confucianism”, thinking that it is the “wishful fiction of Neo-Confucianism”. Moreover, they criticize and reject the point. To participate in this international academic discussion conscientiously, we must, first of all, have an open mind about the academic train of thought and history of this discussion. Moreover, on the basis of earnest analysis, we must distil the essence useful to the modernization and cultural development of China.

One: Confucian culture and modernization In the 1960s, led by Talcott Parsons, successor to Weber, modernity theory came into fashion. In the early 1960s, some US historians, sociologists and politicians began to study the relations between Confucian culture and the modernization of East Asia. That this issue was put forward had a direct inheritance relationship with Weber’s study on Protestant ethics and the birth of Western capitalism as well as his study on Chinese religious ethics and China’s modernity. At that time, most scholars held that just as Weber maintained, Confucian ethics and modernity (as rationalization) are irreconcilable by and large. He had some points. First, Confucianism lacked emphasis on individualism and a strong motive to transform society and was too group-oriented. Second, it attached too much importance to education in shaping the perfect personality and lacked the form of aggressive personality which dominated the world. Third, it laid emphasis on experienced wisdom but not experiential and quantitative knowledge. It should be noted that 15 years later these scholars turned the other way around. They interpreted the

102  Confucian ethics and China’s modernization economic take-off of East Asia and its challenge against the West with these values they used to criticize.2 Referring to the development of Japan since the 19th century, some US scholars stress that both Chinese and Korean Confucianism stood in the way of modernization of the two countries. Moreover, they hold that the Japanese Confucian tradition contributes to its modernization. The question is why Confucianism can play a role in Japan’s modernization to some extent. Robert Bellah (a brilliant disciple of Talcott Parsons) pointed out in his famous work Tokugawa Religion – Cultural Origins of Modern Japan that Japan’s modernization is attributed to Wang Yangming’s attitude towards life featuring the confluence of philosophy of practice with earnestness and Bushido spirit. In History of Japanese Political Thought, Japanese scholar Masao Maruyama holds that Japanese criticism against ancient study inherited Zhu Xi’s philosophical thought and integrated with Shintoism, hence constituting the spiritual force of Japanese modernization and paving the way for the Meiji Restoration.3 Weber’s theory on sociology of religion has had a huge influence on academic circles since the 1950s, especially his modernization theory. According to Weber, the rise of capitalism in the West was much related to the religious ethics of Christian Protestantism. In Protestantism, as believers don’t know whether they can be the chosen people of God and achieve redemption, they are in very high tension. As a result, on the one hand, they are frugal by suppressing their sensual passion. On the other hand, they glorify God by achieving prosperity through hard work to prove they are the chosen people of God in a secular profession. This provides a “spirit” for the development of capitalism. Furthermore, Weber held that the reason why capitalism, or modern industrial civilization, is not developed in traditional China is that China lacks a special mentality. The dominant value system of Chinese society is the Confucian ethic, which is, according to Weber, optimism. The Confucian ethic lacks the inherent anxiety and tension by virtue of which Protestants are rescued by God through hard work. The Confucian ethic and the Protestant ethic belong to rationalism. However, the former is rational adaptability to the world while the latter is rational dominance over the world. As far as Weber is concerned, this is the fundamental reason why traditional Chinese society could not spontaneously step into modern industrial civilization. It is hardly difficult to see that the discussion in the 1960s about Confucian culture and modernization was based on Weber’s theory. Although scholars then approved the function of Japanese Confucianism, they highlighted only the characteristic Japanese spirit of Japanese Confucianism but denied the universal significance of Confucianism in East Asia. As far as Weber’s theory is concerned, logically, the conclusion is that Confucian culture and modernization are incompatible. Moreover, it is the consistent conclusion of Parsons and his colleagues in the 1960s that Confucian culture is a barrier against modernization. This conclusion, if used to account for the failure of capitalism in ancient China, is very persuasive. However, it is not exactly so if it is quoted to explain history after the collision between East Asia and the West, thinking that modernization would be possible only if Confucianism as a

Confucian ethics and China’s modernization 103 “barrier” could be eradicated. In particular, Weber’s view on Confucian ethics has met with huge challenges from empirical phenomena since 1970s, that is, the amazing economic take-off of East Asia countries after the Second World War, especially Japan, South Korea, Singapore and China’s Hong Kong and Taiwan. As a matter of fact, Western scholars in the 1960s noticed Japan’s success in economic development. In the 1970s, almost all Western scholars were amazed at the Japanese miracle. However, Japan’s success was still believed to be the product of its implementation of special economic policies rather than the common experience of the whole of East Asia. In his famous work entitled Japan As Number 1, even Ezra Vogel does not take Confucian culture as one of the causes of Japan’s high-speed development. In 1985, Center for East Asian Studies held a seminar entitled “Industrial East Asia: The Role of Culture”. It was at this seminar that Ezra Vogel acknowledged that the East Asian traditions, especially Confucianism, included some factors which contributed to industrialization. Although he still insisted that constitutive factors were more important, his changed view is consistent with the development of the discussion in the 1970s about Industrial East Asia. In the late 1970s, the economic take-off of the “Four Asian Tigers” amazed the whole world. Over the past 20 years, Japan and the Four Asian Tigers have become the fastest-growing regions in the world, which is obvious to all. How to explain this phenomenon became a great concern of academic circles in the 1980s. Actually, there have been two representative explanations for the “advantages of East Asia”: a “structure-based explanation” and a “culture-based explanation”. R. Hofheinz and K. E. Calder coauthored Advantages of East Asia. They, as well as other people who support a “structure-based” explanation, think that the development of East Asia benefits mainly from political environment and economic policies. As far as they are concerned, politically, East Asia is featured by parenting-style leadership, bureaucrat management and attaching importance to education. Economically, it depends on US assistance, technical import, export orientation, high savings and low labour cost. Some scholars even lay stress on business administration and the labor-capital relationship of East Asia. They have discovered that the group harmony principle is an important feature of East Asia: collective unity, working discipline, dedication to study, sense of loyalty, pragmatism and empiricism, etc. In one word, non-individualism infiltrates into the enterprise spirit of East Asia, which is totally different from the relation between individualism and modernization which Weber and Western academic circles take as the pattern. People who used to accept Weber’s theory naturally come up with his method, i.e., “explanation based on cultural ethic”. Although their conclusion is totally different from Weber’s conclusion, as a matter of fact, as early as 1975 Japanese economist Michio Morishima brought forward the relations between Confucianism and Japan’s economic development, thinking that the Confucian ethic played its role in Japan’s economic modernization in the same way as what Weber said of the role of the Protestant ethic to the Western world. Michio Morishima put forward the concept of “Confucian capitalism”, thinking that Confucianism does

104  Confucian ethics and China’s modernization not encourage individualism and that “Confucian capitalism” is a rational collectivism. According to him, Japan’s development owes partly to education in Confucian doctrine. Michio Morishima’s view has led to a series of rethinking about Weber’s proposition. Nevertheless, the Confucianism he discussed is not the Confucian culture shared in East Asia. He differentiated Japan’s Confucian culture (which centres on “loyalty”) from Chinese “benevolence-centered” Confucian culture, thinking that only Japanese Confucianism could promote modernization. However, over the recent decades, scholars have not accepted his view because it is not only Japan but also the whole of East Asia that has posed a challenge to the West. R. Hofheinz and some others also lay emphasis on the concept of Industrial East Asia. H. Kahn, a futurist, is the first who put forward the active role of Confucian culture in the whole of East Asia. In 1979, he proposed that the East Asian communities belong to post-Confucian culture. According to him, that East Asia is organizationally successful is mainly due to the fact that most countries in this region have some common idiosyncrasies as a result of the influence of Confucian tradition. In addition, he put forward the concept of “new-Confucian century”.4 In 1980, Roderick MacFarquhar, a political scientist and then an MP of the British Parliament, published an article entitled “The Post-Confucian Challenge” in the magazine Economists. According to him, Industrial East Asia takes Confucian culture as its background. He also called Industrial East Asia a region of postConfucian culture. He thought that for the West, the great challenge in the 1990s and the 21st century will be neither military challenge from the Soviet Union nor economic challenges from the Middle East but the extensive challenges from East Asia, ranging from economic pattern to basic values. MacFarquhar, a professor from Harvard University and director of the Research Center for East Asia, had a very influential proposal.5 Then, what Confucian values are shared by Industrial East Asia? According to the definition given by Kahn, these values are: one, outstanding education; two, need of accomplishments; third, family responsibilities; fourth, dedication to work; fifth, not emphasizing self. He pointed out that a member who has received appropriate education in Confucian culture will work hard, have a sense of responsibility, value skills, have enterprising spirit and creative power and attach importance to interpersonal concordance in organizations. In The Myths of Japan’s Economic Miracle, Frank Gibney (1924–2006) pointed out that Shibusawa Eiichi, called “the conscience and spiritual mentor of Japan’s business circles”, developed Confucian labour morals. He often took the Analects of Confucius along and emphasized legitimate interpersonal relations and opposed greed and currying favour with somebody in authority for personal gains. Moreover, J. P. Hodgson, former US ambassador in Japan and South Korea, thought that in the Pacific Ocean, the work ethic of Genevan in North America already met and integrated with Confucian principles and intensified each other.6 For all this, Peter Berger, a celebrated sociologist from Boston University, put forward “vulgar Confucianism” to illustrate the point. Berger held that what really influences economic behaviours is not the doctrine of Confucian theory but

Confucian ethics and China’s modernization 105 Confucian ethics, which dominate the behaviours of common people—namely, a set of moral rules which infiltrate the daily life of common people. He pointed out that the Confucianism which Weber thought of as a barrier to China’s modernization refers not to Confucianism about the daily ethics of the common people but to the theory as the ideology of the Chinese empire. He called the everyday ethic of the common people as reflected in Confucianism “vulgar Confucianism” (or translated into “secularized Confucianism”). Here, neither “vulgar” nor “secular” is derogatory. Both refer to the expression that a theory infiltrates into the daily life of the common people. He believed it was this “vulgar Confucianism”, such as sense of stratum, unconditional commitment to the family, sense of discipline and frugalness, that promoted the industrial development of East Asia. Moreover, Weber failed to foresee that Confucianism, emancipated from the conservative force of the traditional empire, has become the work ethic of the common people and played its role in modernization. Therefore, he thinks there are two forms of modernization. One is Western modernization with the Judeo-Christian ethic as its root and the other is East Asian modernization, which takes the Confucian ethic as one of its roots. Borg’s proposal won the support of anthropologists, sociologists and historians of the Chinese society in the study of the economic development of the Southeast Asian region: Chinese people who receive the same cultural education may make wonderful economic performance after they leave China’s political and social environment for Southeast Asia or other regions. This has something to do with their cultural psychology and values.7 In the world of the Chinese language, Jin Yaoji (Yeo-Chi King), a sociologist from Chinese University of Hong Kong, was the first to respond to this problem. In 1983, he published his article entitled “Confucian Ethics and Economic Development: Rediscovery of Weber’s Doctrine”. Based on his life experience in East Asia, he thinks the proposal that Confucian ethics are conducive to economic development may at least be viewed as a reasonable assumption. A great number of phenomena show that compared with Christian ethics, the relations between Confucian ethics and economic development are not necessarily weak. Later, a series of symposium-based articles appeared in the world of the Chinese language, hence becoming a remarkable modern theme in academic circles. It must be added that a “culture-based” explanation includes positive explanation and passive explanation. Positive explanation refers to the aforementioned view that Confucian ethics are facilitative to the modernization of East Asia while passive explanation refers to the view that Confucian ethics are neither a barrier to the modernization of East Asia nor a relevant factor to promote the modernization of the region.

Two: cultural explanation and system explanation The prior review of history enables us to have a clear idea of the origin and development of the discussion on Confucian ethics and Industrial East Asia. It is observed that in this academic discussion, which evolves with the historic development of East Asia, there is no illusory exaggeration of “rejuvenating Confucianism” and

106  Confucian ethics and China’s modernization “wishful thinking about new Confucianism”. People with such a view show nothing but their ignorance about the history and origin of this issue. As a matter of fact, in the heated discussion which lasted from 1979 to 1985, almost all scholars who were called “the New Confucian School” and who showed sympathy for Confucian culture did not take part in this discussion. As a matter of fact, it was not the New Confucian School but Western political scientists who raised this issue and promoted discussions. Professor Tu Wei-ming from Harvard University is considered an active advocate of contemporary Confucianism. He made this clear in his statement, As a researcher of Confucian philosophy, I am certainly encouraged by the possible relevance between Confucianism and the spirit of modernization. However, in terms of my study on Confucianism and the training I received from my learning on Western social sciences, I wish to see solid experiential study on this issue. I do not want to publicize this viewpoint in a comprehensive way. Nor will I rashly give it up without any self-criticism. The ideological trend of anti-Confucianism since modern times has made us very weak and sensitive so that we will turn pale at the mention of Confucianism. For example, a professor, who was an overseas Chinese, expressed his opinion on Confucian values while paying a visit. Immediately, his view incurred the “vigilance” of many scholars, who resisted it jointly by taking the creative transformation of Confucian tradition as a great danger. Moreover, some are even subjected to satire in newspapers and personal attacks. This, obviously, is an expression of the immaturity of cultural psychology. Some scholars, who do not study philosophy or sociology and have little knowledge about international academic development, indiscreetly scolded “Confucian capitalism” and the issue concerning the Confucian ethic and Industrial East Asia as “talking idiotic nonsense”. This resulted from their ignorance of the theoretical origin and realistic basis of this issue. Objectively, this has something to do with our unfamiliarity with Weber and the modernization theory as a result of our decades of self-seclusion. More importantly, due to various emotional influences, we lack the open mentality to embrace multi-element knowledge about various views of different disciplines. Strictly speaking, what Weber discussed was the issue of whether the Confucian ethic could not give rise to capitalism, which is not identical to the issue of the association of the Confucian ethic and the establishment of capitalism discussed in the 1980s. However, Weber’s theory at least logically involves the idea of coordination of the Confucian ethic and modernization. Therefore, the idea that the Confucian ethic may coordinate with capitalism so as to become a successful pattern of modernization has been in discussion over the past nearly 10 years. This does not mean that it poses no challenge to Weber’s theory. If we affirm that the Confucian ethic does not inevitably conflict with capitalism or modernization, the main factor to hinder China’s capitalist development may not be the Confucian ethic, as Weber asserted, but other factors (such as politics). Anyway, the discussion concerning Confucian ethics and Industrial East

Confucian ethics and China’s modernization 107 Asia stemmed from Weber’s proposition of a “Protestant ethic and capitalism”. It is not talking idiotic nonsense but has profound theoretical background. Actually, Peter Berger’s wording on the “vulgar Confucian ethic” does not go against Weber’s principle. Instead, it amends the inconsistency of Weber’s approach. In the book The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber pointed out, What we care about is not what knowledge is passed on in the then theory and the official ethic outline. However important the actual function is, be it through the commandments of the church, functions of or preach of priests, we are only interested in another problem which is quite different from this one, that is, the influences of psychological constraining force caused by religious beliefs and activities. These influences in turn guide daily behaviors and condition behaviors.8 So, Weber does not dogmatically study the correlation between Protestantism and capitalism but explores the specific ethic faith and attitude of Puritans. However, while undertaking his study on Chinese religions, he made judgements and criticized against the social functions of Confucianism only in terms of religious doctrines. Compared with Weber’s approach on the Protestant ethic, this seems not so faithful as that of Berger, who judged the connection between the Confucian ethic and economic behaviours by grasping the general codes of conduct and work ethic in Confucian culture. In addition, the first chapter of The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism has it as such: For any country with mixed religious beliefs, if one takes a look at the statistical figures of profession, one will, without exception, find such a condition: the majority of leaders of the business circles, capital possessors, senior technicians in modern business circles, especially managers who have received training about high technology and business, are Protestants. (According to Weber’s data, this condition is not limited to Germany. In fact, it is true in Hungary, Bavaria and other countries). This is very similar to the condition of the Chinese people in today’s Southeast Asia in countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. This well demonstrates that from the viewpoint of Weber’s theory, it is permissible and reasonable to put forward the relevance between the background of ethnic Chinese (mainly Confucian culture and some others) and successful economic behaviour. There is another opinion which goes against the proposition that the Confucian ethic contributes to the modernization of Industrial East Asia. This opinion holds that the proposition is but a “fiction” which cannot be verified by empirical materials. Although empirical materials are important, neither The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism nor Chinese Religions: Confucianism and Taoism contain such empirical materials as required by the objectors. However, this does not prevent a great number of Western scholars from acknowledging the value of

108  Confucian ethics and China’s modernization this theory. In this sense, if one objects to the viewpoint similar to Weber’s proposition in philosophy and sociology just because of having no “empirical materials”, he may not overturn and cancel the significance and value of viewpoints of this kind. If we acknowledge that Weber’s theory may be good (although we may not agree), we cannot censure the point of affirming the function of the Confucian ethic in Industrial East Asia just because of “having no empirical materials”. Several years ago, Yang Guoshu (Kuo-shu Yang), a psychologist from Taiwan University, hosted a large-scale social psychological survey with the support of Chinese Academy of Sciences. The survey aimed to offer a persuasive conclusion for the being-discussed issue of “Confucian ethic and Industrial East Asia” through the means of experience in social science. The respondents involved a wide range of social sectors, including large enterprises and small- and mediumsized enterprises. Neither Professor Yang Guoshu, the sponsor of this survey, nor the Chinese Academy of Sciences agreed to the viewpoint that the Confucian ethic is helpful to Industrial East Asia. This survey result showed that the design of the questionnaire by no means had any preference to Confucianism. However, the final result of the survey completely ran opposite to the anticipation of the host. In fact, the result showed an obvious connection between Confucian ethic and the organizational behaviour of enterprises. The example I give here does not mean to affirm that this survey is persuasive enough to reach a conclusion on this discussion. What I mean is that this is an issue which is not so simple as some people readily take as “talking idiotic nonsense”. As a matter of fact, in the discussion on “Confucian ethic and Industrial East Asia”, culturalism and theory-based views are emphasized to some extent. After all, they are by no means in absolute mutual exclusion. Undoubtedly, people of culturalism acknowledge the function of the institutional structure, while the people who hold theory-based views admit the function of cultural factors. Unfortunately, some scholars just simplify this issue. On the one hand, they criticize by either taking people of culturalism as fundamentally denying the institutional factor or taking cultural factors as the only cause. On the other hand, quite a few scholars believe that the development of Industrial East Asia is nothing but a natural result of the implementation of the capitalist economic system. It should be understood that the capitalist economic system of Industrial East Asia is the incontrovertible prerequisite commonly acknowledged by both culturalism and system-based theorists. System-based opinion holders do not mean that the economic take-off of Industrial East Asia is brought about by the Western capitalist system. Instead, they propose that the success of Industrial East Asia relies on certain system factors which are different from Western capitalism, such as bureaucracy, political leadership and uniform education. Both institutionalism and culturalism are faced with the following question: among all the developing countries which do not implement socialist economic system in Asia, Africa and Latin America, why has Industrial East Asia realized economic take-off in spite of a shortage of natural resources? This is quite different from the fact that we often consider issues from the point of view of an imperfect socialist system. Besides, it is of worldwide significance. Another fact should be pointed out that in spite of different opinions on

Confucian ethics and China’s modernization 109 the function of the Confucian ethic for the economic development of East Asia, be it culturalism believer or system-based believer, neither thinks the Confucian ethic is a cultural form which is absolutely repulsive to the modernization drive. This, in fact, surpasses the modernization theory of the 1960s. Moreover, it is theoretically wide apart from the anti-Confucianism which we repeatedly push forward. In recent years, Beira has amended his point that only Christianity has special relations with modern civilization, thinking that Neo-Confucianism may be a form which also has functions of creation and transformation. As a matter of fact, “cultural explanation” for economic development and its “system-based” explanation are not antagonistic to each other. As far as I can see, establishment of a system and its assorting are of vital significance. Culturally, apart from the Confucian ethic, Western values in modern times have played an important role in the economic development of China and even the whole of East Asia. Therefore, only through a complex framework can we have a thorough knowledge of the development of this area. In terms of the proposition on “Confucian ethic and Industrial East Asia”, people influenced by practical reason might raise such questions as “What conclusion of practical significance may be made?” and “Is it to propose developing Confucianism to promote modernization?” The answer to both questions is no because this is just an academic consideration which has no conclusion at all. As far as I’m concerned, the motive to attach importance to this discussion lies not in how to specifically promote economic reform but how to promote cultural reform. The reason is that even though we affirm the Confucian ethic is conducive to the development of Industrial East Asia, it does not mean the Confucian ethic has this function in any cultural space and time. Tu Wei-ming pointed out that businessmen who are not influenced by politics can mobilize the initiative of the Confucian ethic, but Confucian enterprises which are government-supervised and merchant-managed have a negative role in modernization. According to him, the Confucian ethic may play an active role of creativity in a free and open environment. However, once combined with some political culture, it will have negative functions. The empirical fact offered by Industrial East Asia and a direct revelation from the rethinking of Weber’s proposition is: it is considered incorrect that the concepts of Confucian tradition and modernization are absolutely repulsive. People who grow up under the influence of Confucian culture and get in touch with Confucian values through various means may create outstanding economic achievements in a free and open environment. Indeed, the propositions that modernization can be realized only by criticizing Confucianism and that modernization can be achieved only by overthrowing traditions have their own grounds for argument. However, both are ineffective in the face of the experience of East Asia. Therefore, what is important is not to criticize Confucian culture but to deepen structural reform and promote creative transformation of spiritual resources so that the Chinese people can make full use of their abilities and wisdom and expedite the modernization of the Chinese nation. This discussion does not mean that I without reservation accept Weber’s theory and that I believe the Confucian ethic promotes the modernization of East Asia.

110  Confucian ethics and China’s modernization In fact, I just mean to illustrate that if we work on Weber’s theory conscientiously and seriously, we should study carefully the discussion on Industrial East Asia which is born out of Weber’s theory, especially the Weber-style culturalism viewpoint, so that our discussion on tradition and modernization may be furthered. Here, I would like to point out that in this chapter questions are only put forward within the framework of Weber’s theory, that is to say, the discussion is made in the “function system”. In other words, discussion is made in the narrow scope of whether traditional culture contributes to modernization (especially economic development). As a matter of fact, as a humanistic value, the Confucian ethic, even though it neither promotes nor hinders economic development in modernization and has nothing to do with modernization, still has value. The reason is that the yardstick to judge a humanistic culture is not the function of some political economy.

Three: generation and assimilation Seen from the angle of historians, Weber’s aggressive proposition that “China would not have spontaneously stepped into capitalism without the influence of the West” is an untrue statement which cannot be verified. The reason is that we cannot make sure whether China would have begun what is today’s capitalism if the Western influence had come 1,000 or longer years later. Therefore, seriously speaking, the question of why capitalism has not begun in China has its significance only within the time scale determined by the development of modern Western countries. That is to say, we can reasonably answer the question why the mature Chinese civilization had not rapidly developed into capitalism as what had happened in the west but only slowly changed in the pre-industrial society in contrast to the development of the Western world after the 16th century. Of course, “rapid” or “slow” may be blamed for taking Western development as the standard and non-Western culture as a special case. However, restricted by the aforementioned factors, whatever standard is used, even though we assume that China could spontaneously have evolved into capitalism, its process would have been undoubtedly more sluggish than in the West. If we go further and start from the viewpoint of contemporary times and firmly believe that since the emergence of capitalism in the West, the modernization drive which developed from the Industrial Revolution to the information society has become an inevitable development orientation, then Weber-style study (namely, analysing the positive or negative function of Chinese culture, especially the religious ethic, in this process) is still of great significance. Generally, knowledge about Weber’s ethics is based on his Chinese Religions: Confucianism and Taoism, especially on its last chapter, “Confucianism and Puritanism”. According to Weber, seen from Chinese history and compared with the West, China had quite a few external conditions which were facilitative to the emergence of capitalism. Moreover, the institutional obstacles, which are generally believed to have existed in the West, were not so obvious in China. Therefore, the deciding factor that capitalism did not appear in China is more “mentality”

Confucian ethics and China’s modernization 111 than “institution”.9 In contrast, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber tries hard to demonstrate that the Protestant ethic provided the condition of “mentality” for the emergence of capitalism. Confucianism and Protestantism differ in “mentality”. According to Weber, “mentality” lies in three aspects. First, although both are rational ethics and both belong to “utilitarianism”, Confucianism lowers its tension with this world to a minimum. It is characteristic of “adapting to the world”. In contrast, as Puritans have great tension towards the secular world, they attempt to transform the existing world in a rational way.10 Second, Confucians’ mentality of worship towards wealth is different from the asceticism of Puritans. To be specific, Confucians’ attitude towards wealth may be compared to this-world spirit during the Renaissance. No country has taken material welfare so high as Confucians. However, this is not the economic mentality to create capitalism.11 After all, China’s incomparably careful calculation and strict budgeting are not the same as the methodic management concept of capitalism, and the petty dealer-style desire for profits has no relevance with modern capitalism. Desire for profits, valuing wealth, calmness and frugality alone can never represent the “capitalist spirit” found in practitioners who emerge from the modern economy.12 Finally, modern capitalism is a functional enterprise while Confucianism implants men into patriarchal clans or families. As a result, the trust of all Chinese groups, including enterprises, is based on the relations of individuals, families and quasi-families, namely, the “personal relationship principle” plays a dominant role. Different from this, Protestantism breaks the knots of clans and establishes a community of beliefs. It proposes that trust be based on non-individual coexistence ethic which is different from blood relationship community. Weber emphasizes that all community behaviours in China are overwhelmed and conditioned by the individual-relative relations. In contrast, Puritanism reasons all into rational business relations and replaces traditions with rational law and agreements.13 It was Jin Yaoji who started rethinking Weber’s proposition in 1983 in the Chinese-language world.14 Undoubtedly, Weber’s study focused on the issue concerning the “emergence” of capitalism. This differs in emphasis from the discussion on the functions of the Confucian ethic in the modernization of East Asia. In 1986, Fu Yongjian put forward the difference between “internal emergence” and “external learning”. The former refers to self-growth naturally while the latter refers to learning from the outside.15 Moreover, in 1988, Lao Siguang emphasized that “creation” and “simulation” should be distinguished. He pointed out that the Confucian ethic has no such function as “creation” for capitalism but is likely to have the function of “simulation”.16 All this has been continuously developed with the stimulation of the rethinking of the “challenges of Neo-Confucianism” in the West while faced with the empirical phenomena of the economic miracle of East Asia after the 1970s. This indicates that we cannot unconditionally use Weber’s criticism against the Confucian ethic in the “creation” period to direct at the Confucian ethic in the “simulation” process. Nor can we use it to indiscriminately criticize Weber, who mainly deals with the issue of “creation”, just in terms of the empirical phenomena in the “simulation” process.

112  Confucian ethics and China’s modernization It should be noted that in terms of the relations between the Chinese religious ethic and capitalism, Weber himself has distinguished “creation” from “assimilation”. At the end of Chinese Religions: Confucianism and Taoism, he, on the one hand, comes to the conclusion that “compared with the West, China boasted various external conditions which were in favor of the establishment of capitalism. However, these conditions are not enough to have it emerge”. On the other hand, he pointed out that if not in terms of the issue of “creation”: Capitalism in modern cultural field has fully developed both technically and economically. Chinese people might have (compared with Japan) the ability of assimilation. This is, obviously, not a problem whether Chinese people ‘have no natural endowments’ to adapt to capitalism.17 Weber’s brilliance lies in that he often took into account the complexity of important issues in multiple dimensions. According to what he says here, the ability of assimilating the capitalism of Chinese culture and the Chinese people is unimpeachable. However, he does not make clear whether the assimilation “ability” here includes the Confucian ethic, which is taken as the spiritual condition of social changes. We know that rethinking about Weber’s theory in the 1980s was made for the popular understanding of Weber (Confucian ethic hinders the development of capitalism) and the Parsons’ interpretation of Weber (Confucian ethic impedes modernization). Now that Weber himself has distinguished “emergence” from “assimilation”, does it mean that his criticism and distinction between “emergence” and “simulation” are unnecessary and not corresponding? Not entirely. This is because Weber himself often sways among different views. Take one of his many statements as an example. He stated that “Puritan worldview is conducive to the development of a rational bourgeoisie economic life”.18 This may be interpreted as true not only to the emergence of capitalism but also to assimilating capitalism. Therefore, it may be inferred logically from many of his discussions that in terms of assimilating and simulating establishing capitalism, only Protestant ethics are a suited spiritual condition to capitalism and that the Confucian ethic can neither promote the emergence of capitalism nor match the assimilation process of capitalism. Therefore, it was not without reason that the rethinking of Weber’s theory in the 1980s was triggered based on the experience of Industrial East Asia.

Four: the mundane Confucian ethic and the primary stage of the modernization of East Asia Having had the prior discussion, we may focus on the discussion on the issue of “assimilation” or “simulation”. Although Weber differentiates various types of capitalism, he takes the desire for wealth and greed only as the disposition of traditional capitalism, firmly believing that the ascetic ethic of Protestantism is the normative condition of the

Confucian ethics and China’s modernization 113 creation of rational capitalism. However, standing on the footing of the fact that modern capitalism has existed for over 300 years and that late-developing countries strive for assimilating modernization, what we are concerned about is: Even though we agree on Weber’s view that the spiritual condition for the emergence of capitalism is the spirit of asceticism, what is the spiritual condition for assimilating and simulating capitalism? As a matter of fact, Weber has not given an answer to this but pointed out vaguely that although capitalism has not emerged in China, it is capable of assimilating the existing capitalism. Reversely, he often sways between different trends. We are mostly impressed by his seeing the Protestant ethic as the only spiritual condition for the emergence and assimilation of capitalism. The economic miracle of Industrial East Asia during the post-war period has significant challenges. In the course of assimilating the existing modern culture, at the first stage at least, the indigenous traditional ethic may become the normative factor adapting to this course. For example, these remarks appear at the beginning of the first chapter of The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, which read, In any country with miscellaneous religions, with a glimpse of the statistical figures about its occupations, one may find, almost invariably, such a condition: the majority of the CEOs and capital owners of the business circles, senior technicians in modern business circles, especially managers who have received higher technical training and business training, are Protestants.19 If this may be seen as a method of Weber and if this method is transferred to today’s Southeast Asia, as long as we change the word “Protestants” in Weber’s remark into “Chinese”, this statement is still true. This, obviously, is in conflict with Weber’s proposition we generally know. Therefore, if we convert explicitly “emergence” into “assimilation” and thoroughly put Weber’s method into use in the course of exploration, i.e., with an eye to the Confucian ethic reflected in daily life, we may have a very positive comment on the role of the Confucian ethic in the success of the industrialization of East Asia. This is precisely what Weber has done.20 In terms of the exploration of oriental society, Berg’s doctrine on the “mundane Confucian ethic” is more faithful to Weber’s approach and accords with the differentiation of major and minor traditions in anthropology. Particularly, it is based on empirical phenomena and is fairly persuasive. The standpoint of the “mundane Confucian ethic” enables us, from the perspective of sociology of religion, to look at the Confucian doctrine and life ethics with actual constraining force in real life so that we may interpret directly the empirical phenomena and make rational comments on the role of the Confucian ethic in the economic modernization of the Chinese economy. In terms of the life ethic of an individual, we may, as people living in Chinese society, intuitively understand many attitudes, motivations and qualities, etc., which show up in behaviours. Major ethical norms reflected in economic life include diligence, thrift and tolerance, which are exceptionally evident in south

114  Confucian ethics and China’s modernization China. In particular, attitude of diligence, although not based on religious asceticism, precisely “takes labor itself as the aim of life” just as Weber said. Another empirical fact is that a person who has had a fine Confucian education gives natural expression of such qualities as self-restraint, commitment and teamworking, respecting justice and abiding by the law and being capable of learning. Moreover, the high savings as a result of frugalness in East Asian society is well-known. Of course, this does not mean the Chinese have no desire for earning money due to the influence of Confucianism. Instead, they have a strong desire for money. Facts have shown that the motive of pursuing wealth is the lowest-level principle of all market economies. This is the basic principle of Adam Smith’s liberalist economics, which is true to both the emergence and assimilation of capitalism. Weber’s statement that Chinese people have great capacity of assimilation implies the desire for earning money is one of the factors of this capacity. Seen from Weber’s method of stressing the differentiation between ethic and desire, there is no lack of the form of ethicizing achievement motivation in Confucian culture. Confucianism in the Ming Dynasty had already tolerated and regulated in theory the pursuit of wealth and other achievements with familism, and even the individual’s activities of self-protection and treasuring life were explicitly and ethically legitimized. This was most evident in the Taizhou School. As a matter of fact, the Taizhou School “deviated from” orthodox Confucianism, which was by no means the political protest of the common people but developed into the mundane form of the Confucian ethic.21 As the mundane Confucian ethic includes some individualism and utilitarianism, it still plays an active role in the primary stage of modernization. In the course of assimilating modern culture, familism in the secular Confucian ethic not only means that it provides the individual with a legitimate motive to conduct economic activities but also may offer early modern enterprises a community ethic which is practical now, i.e., the interrelationship ethics within the community. It is very justifiable that Weber stressed that China has made little effort in developing non-personal relationships. However, proceeding from China’s actual national conditions, “the cooperation order based on personal contact”, may still be the order of business organizations.22 Due to the fact that at the primary stage when China steps into the modern market economy, as the scale of enterprises is relatively small, there are a number of social opportunities, but the relevant law is not sound and the psychological standard of employees can hardly be stable. Under such a circumstance, familial or quasi-familial staff structure and family ethic adapt precisely to it. In an atmosphere of family culture, the proprietor will take the interest of the employees into due consideration while the latter readily subordinates his personal interest to that of the collective. As a result, the enterprise may lower the internal transaction cost to the greatest extent, ensure a stable internal order and relieve the contradiction and conflicts between labour and capital. Therefore, it is justifiable that the early modern family corporations in Taiwan were thriving and that many township enterprises in China’s mainland ran in quasi-familial operation mode.

Confucian ethics and China’s modernization 115 In addition, relations between the communities (although sometimes overlapping with interpersonal social ethics) at this stage also need to be standardized with the help of traditional secular Confucian ethics. This is because, from the perspective of social behaviour, in terms of efficiency, whatever the norm is, it is better than normless at all. After all, only some standard normative structure can make men’s behaviour an orderly one. Also, it is through some standard normative structure that men can make definite choices and decisions in accordance with reliable predictions in social and economic activities. Undoubtedly, the modern market economy requires a sound market system and a legal system. However, comprehensive and rational construction of a system is a quite long process. For example, a group of the industrial and commercial enterprises, apart from requiring the labourers of the work ethic of “diligence”, requires the employees have internal unity of “harmony” and a dependable environment of “faith” for external communication. In the primary stage of China’s development of a market economy, these three aspects often need the aid of a traditional ethic or take it as a substitute. Therefore, in terms of the interior of the community, the “harmony” of Chinese ethical tradition is an essential resource of the internal unity of the enterprise. This is true to both family and non-family businesses and of normative significance to both the proprietor and the employees. If used properly, “harmony” may lower the cost of transaction expenses within the enterprise. In terms of interrelations between the communities, both “sincerity” and “faith” in traditional Chinese secular society and “righteousness” with strong valorous colour are the external norms which are commonly seen in developing Chinese society. In particular, the latter is, more often than not, a binding cultural reality. Although “righteousness” has some irrational elements, it is a normative resource which is closest to and easy to use or has to be used. Besides, its reflection is closely related to the moral and reputation of the individual or groups and influences the image of the business contact of the enterprise, hence related to the cost of its operation and transaction. The prior analysis may explain the function of the Confucian ethic in the early period of the economic development of Industrial East Asia. Moreover, it can be seen from this analysis that in the three levels of ethic, i.e., the individual’s work ethic, the ethic within the community and the ethic between communities, with the predominating mentality of anti-tradition, it is harmful to readily damage the traditional ethic in a comprehensive way in the course of modernization, especially its early period. However, if used properly and transformed progressively, it is rewarding (as a matter of fact, on the Chinese mainland, for reasons well-known over the past 40 years, the traditional ethic has suffered much havoc; as a result, speculation mentality spreads, which has become a major issue at present). However, in the further development stage, familial corporations are no longer adaptable to the situation, and the secular Confucian ethic needs to be transformed into a rational modern market economic norm. The Confucian ethic still has its role to play in corporate culture. Specifically, Confucian culture may inject a spiritual temperament into the modern market economy which is different from Western corporate culture so that management attaches importance to the adjustment of interpersonal relations and the employees value the interests of the group, hence forming an enterprise spirit with human appeal.

116  Confucian ethics and China’s modernization It should be pointed out that the aforementioned “modernization” runs along the train of thought since Parsons. Along this lineage, “modernization” is merely a concept with emphasis on economic functions. As a matter of fact, the value of culture cannot be judged on the basis of economic function. Therefore, although Christian and Confucian ethics have nothing to do with the emergence and assimilation of capitalism, this does not mean that both Christian and Confucian ethics have lost their values in “modern” society. Of course, although the Confucian ethic plays a role in promoting economic development, this does not mean it can be immune from criticism from its other aspects. On the other hand, the aforementioned Confucian ethic is, more often than not, consistent with the level of Weber’s discussion. However, if set against the secular Confucian ethic, the Confucian value system which is the core of Chinese culture can hardly be discussed in a comprehensive way. Therefore, “Chinese culture and modernization”, or “Chinese cultural tradition and modernization”, is a subject which surpasses the issue of economic development. However, influenced by the ever-radicalizing ideological trend of anti-Confucianism since the May Fourth Movement (1919), I would like to emphasize my point: Standing on the reflective cultural position of modernization and focusing on modern people’s spiritual need for ultimate concern, value ideals, the meaning of life and social interaction, the inheritance and transformation of Confucian culture and values are still of vital significance to the society dominated by Chinese culture. Therefore, for humanists, the most important task is not only to interpret the phenomena which have taken place, but also to reflect on the reality and think about the future. As a matter of fact, the diversion of the market economy is, in the final analysis, the “rationalized” development towards instrumental reason. The rationality of instrument does not necessarily lead to rationality of value. Instead, it may result in non-rationality of value. Faced with the perversion of speculative capitalism and the overall loss of value rationality in the transition period, and various malpractices of developed society, we need to, when supporting market economy transition and improving its rationalization degree, reflect on. As a matter of fact, all religious traditions are in conflict with modernization, and they inevitably criticize such negative factors as the desire for material welfare, value disintegration, alienation of human nature, alienation of interpersonal relations and commercialization of culture in the course of modernization. On the other hand, we must admit that modernization is inevitable. In such a circumstance, religions, which have strained relations with the secular world, seem inadaptable. Confucianism, which strives for sacredness and lays stress on adapting to the world and values the system of morals and culture in the secular world, is likely to have rational tension with the market instrumental reason in the course of assimilation.

Notes 1 Liang Yuansheng: Ash Transforming into a Dancing Phoenix, Asian Culture, October 1987. 2 Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Ethics Today, Singapore: Federal Publications, 1984.

Confucian ethics and China’s modernization 117 3 Tu Wei-ming: New Tendency of Confucian Study – from the Side Views of the World Ideological Trend, Chinese Culture Quarterly, 1986. 4 Refer to H. Kahn, World Economic Development: 1979 and Beyond, London: Groom Heim, 1979. 5 Refer to R. MacFarquhar, The Post-Confucian Challenge, Economist, London, 1980, p. 2. 6 Jin Yaoji: Confucian Ethic and Economic Development: Rediscovery of Weber’s Doctrine, Ming Pao Monthly, August 1983. 7 A Forum on The Role of Culture in Industrial East Asia: The Relationship between Confucian Ethics and Modernization, Singapore, 1988. 8 Weber: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Yu Xiao and some others, Joint Publishing, 1987, p. 73. 9 Weber: Chinese Religions: Confucianism and Taoism, translated by Jian Huimei, Yuan-Liou Publishing Co., Ltd, 1989, p. 317. 10 Ibid, pp. 294, 308. 11 Ibid, pp. 304–305. 12 Ibid, pp. 314–315. 13 Weber: Chinese Religions, pp. 304, 309. 14 Jin Yaoji: Social Texts of Jin Yaoji, Taipei Youshi Cultural Industries Company, 1985, pp. 253–275. 15 Tominaga Kenichi: Sociological Principles, translated by Yan Lixian and others, Social Sciences Academic Press, 1992, pp. 300–301. 16 Lao Siguang’s speech at International Seminar on Confucianism, Singapore. 17 Weber: Chinese Religions, pp. 315–316, 132. 18 Weber: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Yu Xiao and others, p. 36. 19 Quoted from Frank Parkin: Max Weber, translated by Liu Dong, Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 1987, p. 55. 20 Peter Berger, Secularity: West and East, Cultural Identity and Modernization in Asian Countries, Kokugakuin University, 1983. 21 Chen Lai: Neo-Confucianism, Liaoning Education Press, 1991, pp. 378, 398. 22 Wang Dingding: Talking about Mathematically Manageable Capitalism, Reading, June 1993.

10 Modern Chinese culture and the predicament of Confucianism

It is generally believed that transformation in the 20th century brought about radical changes to the Confucian doctrine or Confucianism. Although modern Confucian philosophy is a philosophical response to the modern dilemma with which Confucianism is faced and even plays a very important role in the domain of discourse of modern philosophy, it cannot change its embarrassing situation at the social and cultural level of modern China. Stepping into the 21st century, we cannot deny such a fact that the 20th century is a history in which Confucian culture as a whole has experienced disintegration and dissociation, and it has become faded and fallen in the pre-modern world. It should be pointed out that what is to be discussed in the following part of this chapter is based on the situation of the Chinese mainland and does not include Taiwan and Hong Kong, with which the author is not familiar. In the 20th century in which the pre-modern social system has changed, why does Confucianism remain a hot topic which is always mentioned? In modern Chinese society, is it possible that Confucianism exists beyond philosophy? This is the focus of this chapter. For lack of chapter, this article mainly involves statements on history and phenomena.

One The orthodox, extensive and absolute influence of Confucianism in pre-modern society had much to do with the support of rulers since the Song and the Yuan dynasties, the educational system and the social foundation of the family system. That is to say, Confucianism was conferred the status as an orthodox ideology in successive dynasties, and Confucian classics (including interpretation of SongMing Neo-Confucianism) were stipulated as contents for the imperial examinations. The construction of such a system was the political and educational base of flourishing Confucianism. On the other hand, the clan system, as well as the township ruling order thus formed, was the deeper social and historical base of the well-established and vigorously developing Confucianism. All this constitutes the whole of Confucian culture or Confucian society. However, since the mid-19th century, Chinese culture, Confucian culture in particular, has suffered a huge impact from modern Western culture. Colonialism and imperialism presented their advantages in industrial civilization (against the

Modern Chinese culture and Confucianism 119 background of modern capitalism) before China. Consequently, the profound traditional Chinese civilization suffered a crushing defeat before the gunboats of the West and had to be transformed. Having experienced the Westernization Movement (1861–1894) and the Hundred Days’ Reform (June 11, 1898–September 21, 1898), modern natural science and process manufacturing were introduced to China, and the political structure of modern Western rationalism was introduced by advanced intellectuals. Moreover, the Qing government began progressive reform. However, frustrated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Confucian China was far gone in a crisis and hardly alleviated. Confucianism in the late 19th century was in a situation that the knowledge hierarchy and political institutions of Confucianism were greatly challenged. However, this substantive challenge did not target Confucianism nominally. Nor was the institutional basis of Confucianism fundamentally disintegrated. In all, the crisis of Confucianism was not manifested. However, this situation was changed in the 20th century. In the late period of the Westernization Movement, the reformists began to establish new-type schools in various regions and even in some old-style private schools, and new and old curricula began to coexist. In 1899, the Qing court issued an imperial edict to abolish the writing of eight-part essays and poetry and prose. In 1901, the Qing government issued the Imperial Edict of Establishing Schools, officially requiring schools be founded throughout China. All these measures were a radical challenge to the traditional imperial examination system and the old-style educational system which aimed to cultivate Confucian scholars. Since 1899, academies of classical learning in China were transformed into schools. Therefore, by 1905, traditional “Confucian schools” had been virtually abolished. Most decisively, in 1905, the Qing government decided to abolish the imperial examination system and stipulated that while maintaining the study of Confucian classics and selfcultivation, natural science should be in the school curricula. By then, whether legally or in reality, Confucianism’s status in traditional education eventually collapsed. However, the Educational Aims issued in 1905 specified the provision of “respecting Confucius” and stipulated that the new terms begin in spring and autumn and sacrifice be offered to Confucius at his birthday. Obviously, these measures and retaining the study of Confucian classics aimed to maintain the Charismatic Authority and ethical order, especially the ethical authority of Confucius. However, after the Revolution of 1911, the educational aims of the Qing government were modified. In 1912, Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940), secretary of education, took charge of the discussion about the Education Act. He proposed “abolishing respecting Confucius” and “abolishing the ceremony of offering sacrifice to Confucius”; study of Confucian classics was cancelled in the curricula so that Confucian classics were no longer offered from primary to secondary schools. Moreover, Confucian classics were excluded from education on the whole. Confucianism was no longer an indispensable content in education, nor was it an essential means for the promotion of government officials. By then, the industrial base for producing Confucian scholars was completely eliminated.1 Consequently,

120  Modern Chinese culture and Confucianism within several years after the Revolution of 1911, Confucianism stepped down as a whole from the political and educational stages. Moreover, Confucian classics were no longer the foundation of ideology and institution of the state, nor were they required classics for intellectuals. For the first time, Chinese people’s spiritual and political lives lack classics over the past 2,000 years. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of Confucian classics from the political and educational fields did not mean the natural loss of the inherent spiritual authority of Confucius. Nor did it mean Confucianism lost all its persuasion of the ethical value of Confucianism. In the early period of the Republic of China (1912–1949), Liang Qichao (1873–1929) and some others opposed reading Confucian classics while advocating respecting Confucius. This was a typical example in this regard. As far as they were concerned, Confucius’ moralization was the ethical basis, the national spirit of China and the core of Chinese culture over the past thousands of years.2 Therefore, in spite of Confucianism’s withdrawal from the political and education fields, it still existed in the ethical and spiritual realms. However, The Greater China sponsored by Liang Qichao, although it proposed that “Confucius should be respected but it is unnecessary to read the Confucian classics”, opposed restoration of the dethroned monarch through worshipping Confucius. At that time, people even appealed to “reform the family system”. The Youth, which was started several months later and renamed New Youth later on, refuted comprehensively the old culture and morals under the banner of “new ideas, new culture and new morals”. Its criticism directly targeted the Charismatic Authority of Confucius and the value of Confucian ethics. In this sense, this was nothing short of a movement of criticizing Confucius and Confucianism. Chen Duxiu (1879–1942) summarized the Confucian ethic as “three cardinal guides”, thinking that “Those who honor and worship Confucius will propose to enthrone a king” and advocating vigorously “ethical revolution”.3 As a matter of fact, this was to eliminate Confucius and Confucian ethic. Yi Baisha wrote an article entitled “Comments on Confucius” which picked faults of the doctrine of Confucius. Wu Yu echoed Lu Xun in claiming that “to speak bluntly, Confucius’ doctrine is nothing but a murderer and homicide” and that “Confucianism has had, and will continue to have a pernicious influence for tens of thousands of years”. Both argued that “If Confucianism is not eradicated, there will be no new thought and new doctrines”.4 It is justifiable that the organ for the New Culture Movement was later summarized as “Knocking Down the Confucian Store”. The New Culture Movement played a gigantic role in the ideological emancipation of cultural and social fields. Seen from the perspective of the rise and fall of Chinese Confucianism, the New Culture Movement pushed the movement of banishing Confucianism before and after the Revolution of 1911 to the fields of ethics and spirit. Within 10-odd years of abolishing the Imperial Examination System and the New Culture Movement, Confucianism was sent into exile in a comprehensive way in the pattern of Chinese culture, hence shrinking from the cultural centre to the margin.

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Two Within the 20-odd years from the beginning of the 20th century, Confucian culture was disintegrated in a comprehensive way. In addition, having undergone the New Culture Movement, Confucianism lost its authority among young people. However, during the period of the National Government, the dilemma of Confucianism was not worsened, which owed to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who stuck to developing the national spirit of the Four Anchors and Eight Virtues (the Four Principles and Eight Virtues were the moral foundations of society; the Four Principles were propriety, righteousness, a sense of honour and a sense of shame while the Eight Virtues were loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, love, faithfulness, justice, peace and harmony) and vested traditional Confucianism with a new spirit. After Chiang Kai-shek established his regime in Nanjing, he explicitly proposed “sense of propriety, justice, honesty and honor” as the foundation underlying all the efforts to build the country. In 1929, the National Government explicitly pointed out in its Educational Aim and its Implementation Policies that “loyalty, filial piety, kindheartedness, good faith and peace” were the educational content of the moral of the nationals. In 1934, Chiang Kai-shek launched the New Life Movement. The Movement required a “sense of propriety, justice, honesty and honor” to be carried out in the daily life of everyone. Moreover, it gave new interpretation of the important ethics of moral education and increased many social ethics of modern society. The New Life Movement failed to coordinate with the popularization of knowledge education and technological development. Moreover, as political and agrarian problems remained unsolved, it had little effect but quite a few problems. Nevertheless, its social and ethical significance should be analysed in a practical manner. Anyhow, the educational practice and social movements in the period of National Government consciously maintained the contents of the Confucian ethic to a large extent.5 It should be noted that during the eight years of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (1937–1945) the attitude towards Confucianism adopted by the government, intellectuals and all the common people had an obvious change compared with that of the early period of the Republic of China. To win independence and emancipation of the Chinese nation and to resist foreign invasion, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China, the National Government and all sectors of Chinese society extensively mobilized all forces of the country to inspire the army and the people to fight against foreign invasion. Confucian morals may set great behavioural models, improve social ethos, enhance troop morale and patriotic feeling and build up self-confidence. As a result, the Confucian ethic became an essential spiritual resource and moral power during the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression. This was also a consensus of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China and the intellectuals. In 1939, the Supreme Defence Council promulgated The Guiding Principle for General Mobilization of National Spirit and Measures for Its Implementation, which explicitly put forward “eight virtues” as the moral for saving the nation such as “to be loyal to the country and do filial duty to the nation”. The Communist Party of China

122  Modern Chinese culture and Confucianism immediately expressed its support for the Guiding Principle and called upon all Party members to carry forward and inherit the traditional virtues of the Chinese nation.6 As a matter of fact, Confucian doctrine on ethics and morals was not only one of the important contents of education of various disciplines in the rear area in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression but also the national spirit and fundamental virtue which were affirmed in the guideline for the founding of the country of the National Government. In the early period of the Republic of China, much discussion was made on whether the Constitution should include such clauses as honouring Confucius and determining Confucianism to be the state religion. As the two times of restoration of monarchy in 1915 and 1917 respectively held up the banner of honouring Confucius, the status of Confucianism was not affirmed eventually. As a result, Confucianism failed to have a guiding role in the fields of politics and national education. During the reign of the National Government, especially during the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the role of the Confucian ethic as the guiding principle of national spirit and national education was resumed in some form, but Confucian principles could hardly be carried out in the social aspect. After 1949, great change took place. The fate of Confucianism suffered many twists and turns politically, socially and ideologically. In the National Government period, although Confucius and Confucianism were not explicitly advocated, the ethical principles of the Confucian ethic were viewed as the inherent virtue of the Chinese nation and the Four Anchors and Eight Virtues as the guiding principle of the country, which, as a matter of fact, meant to take Confucian principles as the source of the Three People’s Principles (Nationalism, Democracy, the People’s Livelihood). Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China has striven to build up a new socialist culture in an all-round way with the posture of thorough anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism and has explicitly declared its guiding principle is Marxism. Consequently, Confucianism quietly withdrew from the stage of China’s mainland, which it occupied during the period of the Republic of China. Moreover, the Criticizing Confucius Campaign launched in the 1970s throughout China inherited in an all-round way and far surpassed the radicalism in the campaign during the May Fourth New Culture Movement. Consequently, the Charismatic Authority of Confucius had nothing left, and the Confucian ethic suffered the largest destruction in the social aspect in the 20th century. On the other hand, after the Revolution of 1911, the change of the social structure of China’s rural area, the collapse of the traditional bureaucrat-educational system, tangled wars between warlords, the tension of agrarian relations and class relations and the contention between Kuomintang and the Communist Party damaged the self-function of organizations of rural social traditions, which gave place to local tyrants and evil gentry and hypo-function grass-roots village safeguards. Liang Shuming (1893–1988) intended to resume the etiquette and customs of the rural area through “rural construction” and introduced science and technology so as to create a social basis for the rejuvenation of Confucianism. However, he could hardly succeed. After 1949, having undergone land reform, Rural Cooperatives

Modern Chinese culture and Confucianism 123 and the People’s Commune, China established a new social organization structure of collective ownership featuring “group is the base and three-level ownership”. As a consequence, the force of religions was thoroughly disintegrated due to land reform and class struggle. The Party’s policies were carried out to the villages through the People’s Commune, administration of the production brigades and the Party Organizations. On the other hand, the lineage of the social organizations got through. As a result, apart from kinship, traditionalism passed out of existence. Although the technical relation between man and land remained unchanged, the inherent social organizational structure underwent radical changes, laying the foundation for modernization. Furthermore, apart from families, traditional Confucianism lost its prop in social infrastructure.

Three Levenson said that Confucianism “became a shadow after the society in which it was born and needed collapsed, and it just inhabited in the innermost being of a few people. As a result, it was cherished like an antique, attempting and accomplishing nothing”.7 However, whether Confucianism has a reason and value for its existence in modern society does not entirely depend on the institutional foundation of the pre-modern society. For example, Confucianism had a history of around 1,000 years before the appearance of the imperial examination system; Japan had Confucianism but no imperial examination system. From the Spring and Autumn Period to the Six Dynasties (AD 222–589, Kingdom of Wu during the Three Kingdoms Period, the Eastern Jin Dynasty, Song, Qi, Liang and Chen of the Southern Dynasties), the existence of Confucian doctrine existed not on the premise of the admiration of dynasties. In traditional Chinese society, patriarchal clans and the patriarchal clan system did not necessarily play a dominant role in every period or region and stratum. Although the arrangement of the social organizations influenced the means of expression and the theoretical structure of Confucian doctrine, the value of the Confucian ethic has its universality which transcends specific political systems and social organizations. As Tu Wei-ming said, Seen from the embryology, Confucianism has much to do with agricultural economy, bureaucracy and family community and it is deeply rooted in traditional Chinese economy, politics and society. However, on the one hand, Confucianism may neither be simply restored to family community, bureaucracy and mercantilism. Nor can we think that Confucianism has lost its significance in humanistic care and ethical religions due to the destruction of the social base. All these concerns and significance are still related to the modern world.8 As early as in the late period of the Westernization Movement, Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909) proposed “Chinese Learning for Fundamentals, Western Learning for Practical Application; Chinese learning aims at cultivating men’s mind and

124  Modern Chinese culture and Confucianism body while Western learning handles affairs of human life”.9 According to Zhang Zhidong, Chinese learning as the fundamental structure means that the traditional ethic on mind and body need not have fundamental changes just because of learning from the West in handling the affairs of human life. As a matter of fact, enlightened intellectuals of Zhang’s times had similar opinions. The social condition after the overthrowing of the autocratic monarchy led to more such voices. “China is founded on the basis of such human virtues as filial piety, faith, sense of propriety, justice, honesty and honor. Though regime has changed, the cardinal principle remains”. As a matter of fact, this was the opinion of quite a number of people held in that period. For example, Kang Youwei (1858–1927) required Confucianism be stipulated as the state religion, which was based on the fact that “propriety is disintegrated and the society is morally bankrupt and law means nothing”.10 Kang Youwei took as his own duty to cope with the moral crisis in the transitional period. Chen Huanzhang (1880–1933) proposed, “With the abolishing of Confucianism, men have lost its conscience altogether”. “Chinese moral, in a word, is Confucianism”.11 This is exactly the same as the crying of Christianity that “God is dead”. Therefore, Liang Qichao drafted the “Declaration of General Policy” in which he explicitly advocated that “on the one hand, freedom of beliefs is respected; on the other hand, Confucianism is taken as the foundation for morals and manners”.12 All this aimed at indoctrination and affirmed the positive side of Confucian doctrine. Later, in the discussion on the draft constitution, on the part of Confucianism, it was advocated that “Confucian ethics should be taken as the foundation of cultivating moral character in national education”.13 The debate over oriental culture and Western culture in the New Culture Movement (a nationwide anti-imperialist patriotic movement from the criticisms of traditional Chinese culture around the time of the May Fourth Movement in 1919) was centred on controversy over Confucianism. From the perspective of “conservatism”, it still insisted on the applicability of Confucian morality and ethics. Zhang Shizhao (1881–1973) held the view on Reconciliation of New and Old (which was a continuation of the theme since Zhang Zhidong), which meant to “be open-minded in material pursuit and restore ancient ways morally”.14 This did not mean to oppose independence of character and emancipation but rather to strive for the maintenance of normal ethical order in the society. Likewise, Zhang Junmai (1887–1969) repeatedly stressed in “Controversy Between Science and Metaphysics” that science could not solve the problems of life and morals and that cultural and ideological progress in inner cultivation “only relies on the resurgence of New Song Studies”.15 Although inveighed by Chen Duxiu, Du Yaquan (1873–1933) insisted that “I  firmly believe that the inherent moral code in my society is the purest and the most centered”.16 In particular, as they had a good knowledge of Western learning, their proposals in political and social reform were by no means conservative. However, they kept resisting the revolution of ethics and Confucianism in the New Culture Movement. Not only that, generally speaking, cultural conservatives, who seem not so concerned about ethics, include this aspect more often than not. For example, when Liang Ji committed suicide in 1918, most people thought of him as dying for love.

Modern Chinese culture and Confucianism 125 However, he stated the reason was that “as a matter of fact, I do not take the ethic of the Qing Dynasty as the standard but view what I learned when I was young as the standard”. Here, “what I learned” referred to the traditional ethic. He killed himself to warn people of the general social mood. Wang Guowei (1877–1927) drowned himself in the Summer Palace. The then president of Tsinghua University said that “it was because Mr. Wang had a deep affection towards the Qing Dynasty”. However, Wu Mi (1894–1978) said that “people of our generation have always safeguarded Chinese feudal ethical code. We could do nothing but admire and lament the death of Mr. Wang”.17 Later, Chen Yinque (1890–1969) composed an elegiac couplet which read, “The essence of our Chinese culture lies in the principle of feudal moral conduct. Its significance is the highest state of abstract ideas just like what is called IDEA by Plato in Greece”.18 Both Wu Mi and Chen Yinque were immersed in Western education. Obviously, the “feudal ethical code” and “the three cardinal guides and the five constant virtues” as specified in the feudal ethical code they cherished referred to the universal ethics principles and the value idea of Confucianism. In terms of moral life, intellectuals who were inclined to embrace Westernization had no exception. For example, Fu Sinian (1896–1950) acknowledged that although he was entirely ideologically Westernized, this did not jeopardize him to be a traditional Chinese in settling down and getting on with his pursuit. Evidently, his statement about “settling down and getting on with his pursuit” was for codes of ethics and attitude towards life.19 The same was true of Hu Shi (1891–1962), who was famous for his “new culture and old moral”. As a matter of fact, the heads of the administration and the orthodox party intellectuals during the period of the Republic of China were consistent in giving consideration to morality and modernity. For example, Dr. Sun Yat-sen vested “the Eight Virtues” with new interpretations such as loyalty to the country, the people, unswerving and universal love and benevolence, and he attached great importance to promoting traditional morals. For this reason, Cai Yuanpei (1868– 1940) regarded Sun Yat-sen as a man who “advocated learning the strong points of foreign countries on the one hand and proposed restoring the establishing morals and wisdom on the other hand. This is a compromise of the quintessence of Chinese culture and Europeanization”.20 After the death of Sun Yat-sen, the National Government explicitly included the Four Anchors and Eight Virtues into the Education Aims, proposing to vest the Five Cardinal relationships with new implications and carry forward its spirit. Later, Chiang Kai-shek in his Fate of China held that industrialization was the highest priority of China on the one hand; on the other hand, culturally, the National Government proposed sticking to the spirit of morality and ethics, which was consistent with the view of Feng Youlan (1895–1990) and He Lin (1902–1992). In discussion on current affairs in the early period of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, Feng Youlan proposed that industrialization was the road to freedom for China. On the other hand, he thought that the “unchanged moral” in traditional morals may be used to organize society and adjust spiritual life. He said, “The moral to organize society is what Chinese people inherently

126  Modern Chinese culture and Confucianism have. What is added now are knowledge, technology and industry of the West. Therefore, ‘Chinese Learning for Fundamentals, Western Learning for Practical Application’ is justifiable”.21 He Lin’s proposal was of most cultural implication in the Neo-Confucianism of the 1940s. He not only strove to reinterpret the three cardinal guides and the five constant virtues as specified in the feudal ethical code but also made differentiation and analysis (as a philosopher) on the attack of the New Culture Movement against Neo-Confucianism. Moreover, he proposed to draw the essence of Western philosophy, religions and arts to give play to NeoConfucianism, the feudal ethical code and poetry teaching and strive for the development of Confucianism. He even cried the slogan “taking Confucian culture as the fundamental and Western culture as practical application”.22 The cry (voice) from the beginning of the Republic of China to the end of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression by no means meant that these thinkers attempted to apply indiscriminately the morals of Pre-Qin or the Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties to the settlement of moral decay in modern cultural crisis. It was a moral obligation for the scholars who had a thorough knowledge of both Western and Chinese learning to adjust, criticize and supplement the traditional morality and ethics in accordance with social needs. Within the Communist Party of China, Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969) encouraged moral spirit and self-cultivation in the late 1930s when he naturally and inevitably quoted a lot of resources of Confucian culture. This made his book win the high recognition of youth and the public in the 1950s and the 1960s, and it even became more influential than Mao Zedong’s (1893–1976) in the first half of the 1960s. Since the 1980s, most of the scholars who are dedicated to affirming and promoting the modern value of the Confucian ethic in China’s mainland, out of their strong humanity and moral concern, have shown great concern over the significance of the moral resources of Confucianism in modern times. Since recent years, the government side is devoted to reform, and leaders in charge of economy, trade and education have begun to take notice of this pragmatically. All this indicates that modern analytical affirmation towards Confucian doctrine is not out of the rejection to social reform but of the concern over the damage of the ethical order and the awareness of the universal value of the Confucian moral character in the course of social transformation. The pertinence of the value world of Confucianism and the modern world has not faded away despite the radical change of the traditional society. It was because of this that in the change of Chinese society and culture in the 20th century, Confucianism was still an issue which continued to be the focus of attention. Every time when the society was entangled with moral crisis, the voice for traditional value would be higher. Therefore, after the Revolution of 1911, not only Kang Youwei adhered to Confucianism, but also Liang Shuming strove to argue in favour of Confucius in the same way in the New Culture Movement. It was inconceivable during the time of the May Fourth Movement that He Lin interpreted and publicized Confucian ethical code and three cardinal guides and five constant virtues. Moreover, Feng Youlan had no objection to “Chinese Learning for Fundamentals, Western Learning for Practical Application” in 1940s while insisting on “abstract

Modern Chinese culture and Confucianism 127 inheritance” in the 1950s. Disputes concerning the Confucian value system have been one of the focuses of cultural controversies. This was true not only before and after the May Fourth Movement but also true to the core issue of the cultural craze on the Chinese mainland in 1980s. To understand this phenomenon, the existing pattern of the study of Chinese culture in the 20th century, whether it was “reformation and returning to the ancients”, “enlightenment or saving the national from extinction” or “radical or conservative”, was not properly applied to the controversy about Confucianism in the 20th century. As a matter of fact, understanding the profound origin of the controversy over Confucianism in the 20th century was, in most cases, of formal significance. The wording of “cultural identity” or “structure of cultural mentality” lays emphasis on culture psychology but loses sight of objective social needs. Actually, if one carefully experiences and observes the outcry for safeguarding Confucian value, which was vulnerable but tenacious in the 20th century, it is easy to understand that it is inevitable that the Confucian ethic has been a focused topic after the transformation of modern society. This inevitability is rooted in the split between “morality” and “modernity” in the course of modernization transformation and the requirements for overcoming this split. Therefore, the Confucian value in the 20th century was continuously affirmed. In essence, it was not the manifestation of the so-called post-colonial discourse in China, still less an affirmation to the ideological significance of the hegemonic discourse of global capitalism or the modernity of capitalism.23 Instead, it was a theoretical approval to the value of multi-culture and a practical cure for the course of modernization. It was an expression of the deep concern over the value rationality and an embodiment of persevering pursuit of the ideal life and ideal personality. Moreover, in China, it was a scream for national culture identity and human introspection to the moral of the enlightenment narration.

Four The history of Chinese culture of the 20th century indicates that the crisis of Confucianism stemmed not only from the change of the foundation brought about by social transformation but also from the fact that the Chinese people judged in the functions of coordinates that Confucianism can neither help to make the country rich and its military force efficient nor save the national from extinction and realize self-improvement, as well as the fact that intellectuals, influenced by the enlightenment, did not acknowledge the value of the Confucian ethic. Therefore, the crisis of Confucianism in the 20th century was, in the final analysis, the crisis of culture and values and norms. From this perspective, although modern Confucian philosophy of scholars like Ma Yifu, Xiong Shili and Feng Youlan may be viewed as the existence of Confucianism in modern culture at the academic and philosophical level, they do not stand in the face of the cultural crisis Confucianism has encountered since the May Fourth Movement. As a matter of fact, their philosophies were created under the condition that the heritage of the anti-Confucius movement since the May Fourth Movement has not been cleared

128  Modern Chinese culture and Confucianism up and in the atmosphere of national crisis in a special era. In essence, the cultural crisis of Confucianism is brought about by “modernization”. However, this basic theme was temporarily trivialized by the Chinese people’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression. Therefore, problems have arisen, i.e., What criticisms the New Culture Movement laid against Confucianism are rational? What are irrational? Do Confucianism and its value tradition have significance in modern society and culture? If these questions remain unsolved, Confucianism can survive only in the brains of a few thinkers. Nor can it be carried out in the space of society and culture and personal spirit and personality of the individual so that the social disorder and value chaos brought about by anti-traditionalism and the trend of anti-Confucianism cannot be altered. This is the predicament of Confucianism we had to experience in the 1980s and still had to face in the 1990s. As a matter of fact, this is not only a predicament of Confucianism but also a predicament of Chinese culture. Therefore, “Confucianism as a philosophy” differs from “Confucianism as a culture”. The former is the existence of an academic idea while the latter is the integrated cultural pattern which has been socialized, institutionalized and secularized. In recent years, Ma Yifu, Xiong Shili and Feng Youlan have made a great number of studies on the Chinese mainland, which has a great contribution to philosophic study in his introduction to contemporary Neo-Confucianism. In this sense, “Confucianism as a philosophy” may not be said to be “declining” in the 20th century. Instead, it is quite active. Nevertheless, such Confucianism, in terms of influence on society and culture, is hardly comparable to Confucianism since the Song and Yuan dynasties. The main reason is, apart from the difference in the foundation of institutions, that it lacks “Confucianism as a culture” as its foundation. Moreover, as intellectuals reject Confucian value, the public and youth lack a stable moral authority and values and norms, and a “uniform vigorous and promising national spirit for self-discipline and social commitment” can hardly be formed. Consequently, symptoms of cultural illness and moral crisis have become more and more serious in the period of market economy development and social transformation. Therefore, if we remove the confusion due to the frequent use of the concept of “the hidden principle and the distinct image” in modern China which is quite ambiguous, in terms of what should be and whether anything needs to be kept by the main body of tradition in the course of modernization, and what is drawn from the West, the most striking source of the controversy over Confucianism in the 20th century, as it is, has been centred on the issue of civil virtues, ethical order and the worldly ideal in modern society. Neither Sakuma Shōzan’s “Japanese moral and arts of the Western world”, Zhang Zhidong’s “Chinese learning cultivating the body and mind while the Western learning dealing with daily affairs” nor the aforementioned views of Feng Youlan and He Lin are by no means nostalgia towards tradition in culture and emotion. Rather, they express a precaution against faith in the universal character based on traditional morality and the encroaching of morality caused by the experience in modernization. The divergence between so-called cultural conservatism (or moral conservatism)

Modern Chinese culture and Confucianism 129 and cultural radicalism lies not in whether social reform is necessary or whether modern Western civilization should be drawn upon. Instead, both cultural radicalism and liberalism require thoroughly abandoning tradition so as to embrace modernity with the contents of market industry and commerce, urban civilization, individualism, freedom, democracy, capitalist competitiveness and utilitarianism. However, so-called conservatism has always assumed that science, democracy, market economy and democratic politics can neither spontaneously give rise to civil virtues and lead to ethical order of community nor satisfy the need of value of life. Moreover, it thinks that individualism, which is not much constrained in modern society, and utilitarianism are strong enough to jeopardize group living and social morality. Modernity is a factor which differentiates modern society from traditional society. However, the real modern society cannot function only based on the concept of modernity. Since modern times, the cry for proposing positive understanding of Confucian value has unanimously believed that safeguard and faith of civil virtues and ethical order in modern society can by no means be realized through anti-Confucianism and criticizing Confucius. Instead, value tradition and moral authority must be safeguarded so as to give expression to the affirmation of and outcry for the universal moral value of Confucianism in various forms and in different periods. All this means developing the social-cultural foundations of Confucian philosophy in the philosophical dimension. On the Chinese mainland, for a long time, the force which has hindered correct understanding of the historical value and modern significance of Confucianism comes not only from the radical denial of liberalism to Confucianism but also from “pseudo-Marxism”, which is “ultra-left”. As a matter of fact, “ultra-left” pseudo-Marxism has played a very crucial role in the movement of criticizing Confucianism over the past decades. Such criticism was given full and typical expression in the remarks of the “Gang of Four” during the period of “criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius”. However, the “ultra-left” cultural view during this period was not thoroughly eradicated after the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) so that its influence still finds expression to this day. The total anti-Confucianism trend in the 1980s mainly stemmed from cultural radicalism with liberalism as its background while a rising and small-scale criticizing Confucianism movement in the mid-1990s mainly came from dogmatism and “pseudo-Marxism”. They held that Confucian doctrine was a doctrine of much feudal significance, thinking that Marxism and Confucian doctrine were two opposing systems and that their relation should be critical denial. Both viewed Confucianism as an ideology of the landlord class which safeguarded the feudal autocracy. To make Marxism and Chinese culture antagonistic to each other, if put in a visional way, It will be much too pedantic if we naively think that we may find from ‘studies of ancient Chinese civilization’ the foundation for building the country or the pillar of reconstructing national spirit while Marxism as a foreign culture may be put aside. . . . We cannot exclude the possibility that some people attempt to achieve their goal of discarding socialist new culture out of the

130  Modern Chinese culture and Confucianism Chinese culture with the doubtful concept of ‘studies of Chinese ancient civilization’.24 Dogmatism and “pseudo-Marxism” ignore the historical subjectivity of the Chinese nation and the national interest and future and the actual challenges in its historical transformation. The authority of pseudo-ideology indiscriminately stuck a label on the proposal to have correct understanding of Confucianism and require making rational use of traditional resources to deal with actual problems. By doing so, the authority of pseudo-ideology attempted to strike a heavy blow on the different academic views with politicized discourse. This is, undoubtedly, a manifestation of reversion in the trend of reform and opening up in the 1990s. Meanwhile, it is thus clear that in view of the fact that Confucianism was viewed as “agriculture civilization” and an “authoritarian ideology”, both dogmatism and cultural radicalism were seized by a kind of discourse of enlightenment. As a matter of fact, Confucianism has not died out. After dispersion, Confucianism still unconsciously exists as a cultural psychology in culture and man’s behaviours in an implicit manner. However, because it is fragmentary and implicit, its expression cannot be complete and healthy. Currently, the ways of the world and the cultural illness of China result from this. Only by wiping off the out-of-date contents of Confucianism and positively approving its valuable spirit and principle to modern social life confidently and making it play its lawful role in national education and cultural development can a uniform national morality and steady national spirit be reconstructed on the march towards a rational modern society. To clear away the politicized obstacle and overcome the unified mode of thinking and one-sided enlightenment mentality, and have a dialectical understanding of the interaction between morality and modernity, to redress various prejudices against Confucianism in the cultural dimension, is the basis and precondition for the healthy development of the positive spirit of Confucianism. June 1996

Notes 1 Refer to History of Chinese Education (Book Two), the Sixth Edition, The Commercial Press, 1938. 2 Refer to Liang Qichao: What Benefits does Confucian Doctrine Bring to Chinese People? What Methods Does It Offer to Make China Flourishing? Comments on the Trend of Restoring Ancient Ways, published in The Greater China, 1915: 1, 7. 3 Chen Duxiu: Restoration and Respecting Confucius, New Youth, Vol. III, No. 6). 4 Refer to his On Filial Piety, published in Essays by Wu Yu, East Asia Library, 1929. 5 Refer to Confucianism in Modern China by Song Zhongfu and some others, Zhongzhou Ancient Books Publishing House, 1991, p. 206. 6 The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Instruction on General Mobilization of National Spirit, April 1939. 7 Levenson: Confucian China and Its Modern Fate, translation here refers to quest for Authentic Existence by Tu Wei-ming. 8 Tu Wei-ming: On the Modernization of the Confucian Traditions, China Radio and Television Publishing House, 1993, pp. 517–518.

Modern Chinese culture and Confucianism 131 9 Zhang Zhidong: The Acquisition of Knowledge, Dalian Publishing House, 1990. 10 Kang Youwei, On Saving the Chinese Nation, included in Collected Works of Kang Youwei’s Political Commentaries, Book Part II, Zhonghua Book Company, 1981. 11 Collected Essays on Statecraft of Republic of China, Vol. 40, edited by Shanghai Publishing House of Essays on Statecraft. 12 Ibid, Vol. 2. 13 Refer to Article 19 of the Draft Constitution by the Constitution Drafting Committee of the Congress in 1913. 14 Zhang Shizhao: Youth in the New Times, The Eastern Miscellany, Vol. 16, No. 11. 15 Zhang Junmai: Re-discussing Outlook on Life and Science and Reply to Mr. Ding Zaijun, Science and Outlook on Life, East Asia Library, 1923. 16 Du Yaquan, Compromise between Post-War Civilizations of the East and the West, Vol. 14, No. 4. 17 Refer to Sun Dunheng: Chronicle of College of Guoxue in Tsinghua University, Tsinghua University Chinese Studies, Vol. I, pp. 321–322. 18 Quoted from Poetry Anthology of Chen Yinque, Tsinghua University Press, 1993, p. 10. 19 Refer to Hu Shi’s Diary compiled by Modern History of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, diary of April 27, 1929, China Book Company, 1985. 20 Cai Yuanpei: The Chinese Nation and The Doctrine of the Mean, Complete Works of Cai Yuanpei, Vol. 6, China Book Company, 1985. 21 Feng Youlan: Discussion of Current Affairs, Complete Works of Sansong Tang, Vol. 4, Henan People’s Publishing House, 1986. 22 He Lin: Culture and Life, The Commercial Press, 1988, pp. 6–17. 23 For Confucianism-based global capitalist discourse, please refer to Arif Derick: Specious Confucius: Global Capitalism and Reconstruction of Confucianism, included in Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly, Vol. 13, November 1995, pp. 158–183. 24 Refer to Li Hongyan: Trends of Confucian Studies at Chinese Mainland in Recent Years, published in International Confucian Studies edited by International Confucian Association, 1995: 1, People’s Publishing House.

11 The three themes on early Chinese political philosophy

One: introduction There have been a great number of examples of nations with ties of blood of patriarchal clan in the world. However, the isomorphism of patriarchal clan and political power seen in early Chinese civilization is rare. In ancient Chinese civilization, the location of the ancestral temples became the centre of the settlement while the inheritance of political identity and the transmission of suzerain identity became the outstanding feature of civilized society and nation in the Shang and Zhou dynasties. The combination of political identity and the identity of patriarchal clan or the reliance of the former on the latter developed into a political formation and tradition featuring the integration of regulating the family and governing the country. Culturally, propriety and music culture became the overall characteristic of this era. In the Western Zhou Dynasty and the Spring and Autumn Period, the governance structure of the vassal states was a multi-level system of enfeoffed aristocrats with “lords–dukes–senior officials” as the main body. In this structure, lords, dukes and senior officials were posts in power. As a matter of fact, this structure included not only the relations between different authoritative posts but also the possessive relationship of each post concerning the people and land. The alternating system referred to the institutional arrangement about how to fill vacancies in a proper order and inherit the posts of each authoritative position in the governing structure. In the Western Zhou and the Spring and Autumn Period, both the governing structure and the alternating system fell into the scope of “rites” or “the ritual system”. Likewise, the moral rules, which were adapted to these structure systems, also belonged to this scope of “rites”. Before the mid-term of the Spring and Autumn Period, the social system was the relatively stable “feudal suzerain system under the patriarchal clan system”. “Patriarchal” refers to the patriarchal kinship which commonly existed between dukes, ministers, senior officials and shi (a social stratum between senior officials and the common people). Here, “duke” here refers to the monarch (his actual rank might be marquis, earl or viscount). The position of authority of the monarch was hereditary within the family, i.e., younger brother succeeding to the throne after the death of the elder brother or succession by the eldest son. Generally,

Three themes on Chinese political philosophy 133 succession to positions of ministers and senior officials was subject to the hereditary system within the clan. The positions of ministers and senior officials represented not only some political and administrative power but also the possession of the manor estate granted by the monarch and its people. Therefore, possession of both political and economic resources was succeeded within the clan. The patriarchal feudal system was one of the dominant systems in the system of the Rites of Zhou. The patriarchal clan system was a kinsfolk system, and feudalism was a system of possessing wealth and labour force and the distribution of political power.1 The patriarchal feudal system was established in the course of the feudalistic colonization in the early period of the Zhou Dynasty. According to Zuozhuan, The Emperor founded the country, the dukes and the princes formed their cabinets, ministers set the positions for ministers and other senior officials and senior officials established sub-officials, scholars set up their subordinates and the common people were graded in different ranks. In this way, the common people obeyed their superiors and the subordinates did not pretend to the high positions.2 Here, the words “founded”, “formed” and “set up” meant the downward redistribution of wealth and population. The emperor founded the country, which meant that the emperor of Zhou enfeoffed the dukes and princes. The dukes and princes formed their cabinets, which meant that they set the positions for ministers and other senior officials. The senior officials had sub-officials, which meant that they appointed their subordinates. Senior officials had their subordinates as their government officials. As a matter of fact, such a concept of “founded”, “formed” and “set up” was not a pure official appointing system. Just as the emperor of Zhou enfeoffed the land and population of a district to the duke or prince, the feudal dukes and princes appointing their ministers meant that while they vested them with management authority, they gave them the power to possess the land and manage the people. The ministers appointed senior officials, and senior officials had their subordinates, and their authority also included distribution of wealth and people of the same kind. From that, a top-to-bottom feudal system of enfeoffment took shape. During the Western Zhou Dynasty, according to the ideal stipulation of the patriarchal system, the first descendant of the vassal succeeded to his position of authority and the other sons were appointed ministers. The first eldest son of the minister may inherit his post while his other sons were appointed to other sub-posts. All of them had the same surname. However, since the late period of the Western Zhou Dynasty and the beginning of the Spring and Autumn Period, sometimes people of different surnames who had military merit were appointed senior officials, and the descendants of these newly appointed officials with different surnames succeeded to the posts and interests in accordance with the patriarchal principles. The social change during the Spring and Autumn Period found expression not only in the growth and decline and rise and fall of the status between the family of princes and the senior officials, but also in general patriarchal relations.

134  Three themes on Chinese political philosophy Although the vassal states during the Western and Eastern Zhou dynasties acted of their own free will, all of them acknowledged that Zhou was the shared monarch of the country and took the Zhou culture as their model of shared culture. In spite of the alternating hegemony of the five overlords in the Spring and Autumn Period, political unity in a greater domain transcending the vassal states represented by Zhou was still respected. Although this unity was gradually nothing but a form during the late Spring and Autumn Period, this formal unity still influenced the political imagination of the era and the times of later generations. For example, in spite of the ritual collapse during the times of Confucius, Confucius still stuck to the idea that “ceremonies, music, and punitive military expeditions proceed from the son of Heaven”. In the times of Mencius, the political view of scholars was not limited to vassal states. Instead, they took claiming the throne as their political goal. Tianxia meant a unified world binding upon all vassal states. Although this unification was loose, it was still of significant value. Therefore, although Qin’s unification of China made the previous vassal states into counties and prefectures of the Qin Empire, no fundamental change was brought about in terms of political philosophy. This was entirely different from the change in political philosophy due to the fact that after the disintegration of the independent city-states in ancient Greece they became one of the provinces of Macedonia. Chinese society from the Western Zhou Dynasty to the Spring and Autumn Period was basically patriarchal society. Here, “patriarchal society” is a descriptive concept. It refers to a type of society with kinship as its structure and which adjusts society with the principles and norms of kinship. In a patriarchal society, all social relations were of family style, and the relation of the patriarchal clan system was political relation and vice versa. For this reason, political relations, as well as other social relations, were standardized and adjusted in accordance with kinship. On the other hand, its nature was similar to what Liang Shuming called “ethics-centered society”. Ethic relations were featured by the existence of equal difference, order, ties of friendship and mutual affection in ethic relations. Therefore, in a society with such relations, the dominating principle was not law but ties of friendship and what’s valued were not rights but obligations. Liang Shuming held that the Chinese ethics-centered society was born out of the ancient patriarchal society. This is true by and large.3 Since the later period of the Spring and Autumn Period, the norm for the patriarchal clan system in the political field was seriously broken up, but patriarchal relations in the social dimension still existed, and the civilization temperament and cultural spirit of the patriarchal society were copied. Political practice and political philosophy developed under this background laid stress on the functions of “virtues” in political leadership and the significance of “rites” as a political norm and the form of governance as well as the needs and interest of the ruled as “people”, hence becoming the gene of the development of political philosophy of later generations. Political issues were the subjects of philosophical thinking in the early period in all nations and civilizations. Nevertheless, in different civilization systems, the consciousness of problems and styles of discussion in political philosophy are quite different. For example, the city-state-based political thought of ancient

Three themes on Chinese political philosophy 135 Greece highlighted the concept of “justice” and took juice as the pursued goal. From the Homeric Age to Plato and Aristotle, justice was viewed as the crucial issue and the highest virtue in the political field. As far as ancient Greeks were concerned, justice was not only the moral code to adjust interpersonal relations but also an appropriate limit and measure. Moreover, fate, Logos and the thought of early natural law were discussed in ancient Greek, becoming important concepts of early political philosophy. In China, especially from the Western Zhou to the Spring and Autumn Period, no “justice”-centered discussion was made. Instead, some special discussions were made such as the relations between Heaven and the people, between Heaven and rites and between Heaven and virtues. Although all this did not form the system of political philosophy, they were, undoubtedly, discussions and propositions of political and philosophical significance. All these discussions and propositions have constituted the background and prerequisite of the classical political philosophy of Confucianism, which contrasts with political philosophy at the earlier stage in ancient Greek.

Two: Heaven-People Oneness From the perspective of political philosophy, the Theory of Heaven and Destiny proposed in The Book of Documents was the most important resource of ancient political thinking. Emperors of the Shang Dynasty like King Zhou of Shang were devout believers of the mandate of Heaven, claiming that “the Shang Empire will long live”. So, he led a luxurious and dissipated life and did all manner of evil. Consequently, the state of Zhou, small as it was, defeated the state of Shang. The victory made people of Zhou change their views on the mandate of Heaven—that is, that the mandate of Heaven was not immutably in favour of the monarch. The duration of Heaven’s favour depended on the morality of men. This cognition the people of Zhou got from historical experience became the creed as a warning for them. As a matter of fact, the common people of Zhou were different from the people of Shang. This lay not in whether there was the theory of Heaven and destiny or similar views but in the fact that the people of Zhou had a different interpretation of the mandate of Heaven. The Book of Documents mainly records the thought of Zhou Gong (the duke of Zhou). As an ancient political document, The Book of Documents is quite different from oracle inscriptions of the Shang Dynasty on tortoise shells or animal bones in that the former records beliefs in the emperor of Heaven prior to the Shang Dynasty. This belief does not emphasize it not as the governor of nature but as a dictate of human history and destiny. Therefore, the difference in worldview between Shang and the Western Zhou did not lie in whether people of Shang took Heaven as the supreme god. The reason was that if “Heaven” was a personalistic Heaven which “could be enraged”, in the essence of the belief, it was no different from the concept of “the Supreme Being”. As a matter of fact, the two are identical or interchangeable in many literatures, and it is difficult to distinguish one from the other. The fundamental difference between

136  Three themes on Chinese political philosophy the world outlooks of Shang and Zhou was that there was no content about ethics in the belief of the people of Shang in “the Supreme Being” or “Heaven” and that it was not up to the level of religious ethics on the whole. On the other hand, as far as the people of Zhou were concerned, “Heaven” and “the mandate of Heaven” had a definite moral connotation which was characteristic of “the virtue of reverence” and “protecting the people”. The divinity of Heaven gradually receded and the status of “man” and “people” relative to “god” ascended. This was the development orientation of the ideas of Zhou. From the perspective of religious studies, the world outlook of the people of Shang featured “natural religion” while the Theory of Heaven and Destiny of the people of Zhou had the character of “ethic religion”. Since then, people began to interpret nature and gods from the perspective of ethics. Therefore, just as the new things provided at the birth of Judaism were not religious but of ethic significance, the new things put forward by the people of Zhou were not religious but the moral significance of Heaven it interpreted. Taishi (The Great Declaration) of The Book of Documents is of vital significance. Three articles of Taishi are extant. Only the first article is available in modern Chinese while the second and third articles are available in classical Chinese. The articles in classical Chinese reflect the thought of the Western Zhou Dynasty. Taishi made public the accusations against the king of Shang in four aspects. First, the king had little knowledge about the impermanence of the mandate of Heaven; “and still he says, ‘The people are mine; the decree is mine’.” Second, “the King of Shang does not reverence Heaven above”, “not serving God or the spirits of Heaven and earth”, and “abandons himself to wild idleness and irreverence”. Third, “the King did not offer sacrifice to the ancestral temple”. Fourth, “the king tyrannically abused his power by cruelly injuring or killing the common people” and even “ripped up pregnant women”. The four guilts summed up is that “he says that his is the decree of Heaven; he says that a reverent care of this conduct is not worth observing; he says that sacrifice is of no use; he says that tyranny is no matter” (Part II). The most outstanding element of Taishi is the doctrine of “protecting the people”. This doctrine was even reflected as a declaration of philosophical significance: Heaven and Earth is the parent of all creatures; and of all creatures man is the most highly endowed. The sincere, intelligent, and perspicacious among men becomes the great sovereign; and the great sovereign is the parent of the people. (Part I) This means that as “man” is the measure of all things, man is the most precious between Heaven and earth. “Man” in social relations is reflected as “people”. According to Taishi, Heaven protects the people. “Now Heaven, to protect the inferior people, made for them rulers, and made for them instructors, that they might be able to be aiding to God, and secure the tranquility of the four quarters of the empire”. Heaven chooses rulers and instructors to protect the people.

Three themes on Chinese political philosophy 137 Therefore, the monarch should assume the task of protecting the people like a parent so as to fulfil the will of Heaven. If the monarch maltreats his people, he will run counter to the will of Heaven, which will make “Heaven enraged” and be “executed by Heaven and destroyed by Earth”. Taishi also points out the following: Heaven loves the people.

(Part II)

Heaven compassionates the people. What the people desire, Heaven will be found to give effect to. (Part I) Heaven sees as the people see; Heaven hears as my people hear. The people are blaming me, the one, for my delay. (Part II) The ancients have said, “He who soothes us is our sovereign; he who oppresses us is our enemy.” (Part III) The gist of this doctrine is that Heaven cares for the people and gives ear to the voice of the people. Heaven takes the will of the people as his will of governing the world. Heaven has no other will except the will of the people. This “HeavenMan Oneness” doctrine is unique in the history of world culture, which is called the Theory of Heaven and Destiny or the “theory of popular will”. The will of Heaven lies in the people, that is, the will of the people is the will of Heaven. In this theory of popular will, which is similar to pantheism in structure, the will of the Supreme Ruler of Heaven intangible before the Shang Dynasty was remoulded by the will of the people, which was projected by human society. As a result, the will of Heaven was no longer moody but was thought of as having a definite ethic connotation and became the ultimate supporter and the highest representative of the will of the people. As the will of the people had a solid moral foundation and an ultimate theological foundation to reflect the will of Heaven, it has, theoretically and in terms of value, its priority to the divine rights of kings in that the divine rights of kings required the monarch take good care of and protect his people on Heaven’s behalf. In this thought and faith, people and the monarch were not equal at all before Heaven. The common people had priority to and were more important than the monarch from the perspective of ontology and axiology. The common people had no obligation to obey and bear oppression unconditionally. Instead, they, with Heaven as the ultimate supporter, had the right to require the monarch to implement benevolent rule. If the monarch governed and rule the country not by benevolence but by tyranny, the common people justifiably viewed the latter as a foe. In this case, Heaven, as the representative of justice, would exert divine punishment against the monarch or deprive him of divine rights as king.

138  Three themes on Chinese political philosophy Similar people-based thought finds extensive expression in other articles of The Book of Documents: Heaven’s appointments are not constant. (from Kanggao, The Announcement to the Prince of Kang) Let not men look only into water; let them look into the glass of other people. (from Jiugao, The Announcement about Drunkenness) Heaven hears and sees as our people hear and see; Heaven brightly approves and displays its terrors, as our people brightly approve and would awe. (from The Counsels of Gao-yao) People are the foundation of a country.

(from Songs of the Five Sons)

The traditional Theory of Heaven and Destiny experienced a diversion to the “doctrine of people’s will” in the Western Zhou Dynasty. This diversion was of vital significance and influence that no one can afford to ignore. The doctrine of the people’s will indicates that in the political thought of the Western Zhou Dynasty, the will of Heaven was given an implication of the people’s will. Although the mandate of Heaven still had its theological features, it presented a political people-centered doctrine in terms of its contents, which kept the politics of the Western Zhou Dynasty away from thearchy. Admittedly, the Theory of Heaven and Destiny in the doctrine of the people’s will was directed at the ruling class in the Western Zhou Dynasty, but this does not mean that it provided a realistic legal belief and moral force for the common people to resist the tyranny of the monarch. However, this doctrine of the people’s will created by the Zhou people gave a set of definite regulative principles to the unconstrained monarchy through which the rulers of the Shang Dynasty considered themselves to have the divine rights of kings. Although these principles were not legally binding, they would become a moral constraint once they became a political and cultural tradition. As a matter of fact, after the Western Zhou Dynasty, the doctrine of the people’s will became the tradition of ancient Chinese political culture and was inherited by the following political thought of Confucianism. It was closely related to this tradition, be it the introspection of the monarch or the rebellion of the common people. As a matter of fact, it was through this political culture and political thought that the religious and ethical ideas of the Western Zhou Dynasty progressed. Some of the remarks in the literature listed prior were frequently quoted in books of the Pre-Qin Period, such as “What the people desire, Heaven will be found to give effect to” in Taishi, which is quoted not only in Zuozhuan but also in Zhouyu and Zhengyu from Guoyu (the earliest country-based work on the speeches, debates and anecdotes of the aristocrats and legends in the Western Zhou Dynasty). This indicates that the Theory of Heaven and Destiny of the doctrine of the will of the people, namely, the doctrine of Heaven-Man Oneness, was

Three themes on Chinese political philosophy 139 very popular in the Zhou Dynasty. For example, Mencius: Wan Chang (Part I) has the quotation that “Heaven sees as the people see; Heaven hears as my people hear”. This remark is found in the extant Taishi (Part II). During the 13th year of Duke Xiang’s reign, Lu Mushu said, “Taishi says, what the people desire, heaven will be found to give effect to”. During the first year of Duke Zhao of Lu, Zheng Ziyu also quoted this remark from Taishi, which is also found in Taishi (Part I). The doctrine of Heaven-Man Oneness involved political legitimacy. Ancient political philosophy centred on the issue of governing and submission. To maintain the ruler’s governance, the monarch-subject relationship was always valued. If the issue of the monarch-subject relationship was something concerning the way of governance, the issue of the monarch and the common people was not only an issue of how to rule, but an issue involving ultimate political legality. From this point of view, the legality of the ruling of any monarchy or dynasty came from the mandate of Heaven, which took the will of the people as its substantive connotation.

Three: Heaven-Virtue Oneness During Zhou Gong’s regency, Caishu (younger brother of Emperor Wu of Zhou) staged an armed rebellion. After the death of Caishu, his son, Cai Zhong, was wise, able and had the virtue of reverence. He was appointed as the monarch of the state of Cai by King Cheng of Zhou. The Charge to Zhong of Cai was an article on conferring the title of monarch to him. It reads, The king speaks to this effect, “My little child, Hoo, you follow the virtue of our ancestors, and have changed from the conduct of your father; you are able to take heed to your ways; – I therefore appoint you to be a prince of the empire in the east. Go to your country. Be reverent! In order that you may cover the faults of your father, be loyal, be filial. Urge on your steps in your own way, diligent and never idle, and so you will hand down an example to your descendants. Follow the constant lessons of your grandfather, King Wan, and be not lie your father disobedient to the royal orders. Great Heaven has no affection; – it helps only the virtuous. The people’s hearts are not constant; – they cherish only the kind. Acts of goodness are different, but they contribute in common to government. Acts of evil are different, but they contribute in common to disorder. Do you be cautious!” The Charge to Zhong of Cai puts forward the thought of hard work and frugality and prudence, which is, undoubtedly, the essential element of Confucianism. “Great Heaven has no affection; – it helps only the virtuous” sums up clearly the new Theory of Heaven and Destiny of the people of Zhou. Many thoughts in the Book of Zhou were found in books written by the Pre-Qin thinkers. For example, according to Zuozhuan: The Fifth Year of Duke Xi, Gong Zhiqi of the state of Yu said, “Great Heaven has no affection; – it helps only the

140  Three themes on Chinese political philosophy virtuous”. This remark is recorded in The Charge to Zhong of Cai. This remark means that Heaven takes virtue as its will and that Heaven favours influences human beings on the basis of “virtue”. In The Book of Documents, the virtue of reverence is laid much emphasis: Make virtue illustrious and be cautious in the use of punishments. (from Numerous Regions) Diligently employ the illustrious virtue.

(from The Timber of the Tsze Tree)

For want of the virtue of reverence, the decree in its favor prematurely felt to the ground. (from The Announcement of Duke of Zhao) The honoring the virtuous belongs to their descendants who resemble them in worth. (from The Charge to the Viscount of Wei) As a matter of fact, the books on Xia and Shang in The Book of Documents have many discussions on the relations between “Heaven and virtue”. These discussions, in fact, were the manifestation of the thoughts of the Western Zhou Dynasty and must have been the result of the combination of the ideas of the archaic literature and the thoughts of that period made by the historiographers of the Western Zhou Dynasty. For example, Make the able and the virtuous distinguished.

(from The Canon of Yao)

The way of Heaven is to bless the good and punish the bad. (from The Announcement of Tang) The ways of God are not invariable; – on the good-doer He sends down all blessings, and on the evil-doer he sends down all miserable. (from The Instructions of Yi) Heaven has no affection; – only to those who are reverent does it show affection. The people are not constant to those who they cherish; – they cherish only him who is benevolent. (from Taijia Part III) Although the doctrine that God blesses the good and punishes the evil in The Announcement of Tang and The Instructions of Yi cannot be found in extant Book of Zhou, the doctrine of the Heaven highlighting virtue was available in the Western Zhou Dynasty. Transfer of the way of Heaven is, inevitably, based

Three themes on Chinese political philosophy 141 on good and evil, which, therefore, originated from the doctrines of the Western Zhou Dynasty. In the development of the culture from the Shang Dynasty to the Zhou Dynasty, ideologically, although the natural religious beliefs of the people of Shang were still contained in the Zhou culture through the sacrificial system, the overall belief of the people of Zhou transcended the stage of natural religion and entered a new stage. This new stage was similar to the ethic religion as stated in religious studies, i.e., ethic character is vested with “Heaven”, hence becoming the definite connotation of “the will of Heaven” or “the mandate of Heaven”. In addition, “Heaven” and “god” differ from each other in that Heaven can not only transcend godship but also represent an omnipresent natural existence and a cosmic order covering everything. With the belief of godship becoming weaker, interpretation on Heaven is likely to shift to nature and order. With the appearance of this concept, in terms of the social life of human beings, man no longer needs to blindly prostrate himself in worship or offer sacrifice to Heaven for blessings. Now that Heaven is a knowable existence with ethical rationality, what man should do is focus on his moral behaviour. Specifically, man must be responsible for himself and the consequence of his behaviour, namely, responsible for his own fate. Therefore, rulers of the society must know this: the mandate of Heaven is the manifestation of people’s desire. “Great Heaven has no affection; – it helps only the virtuous”, and “What the people desire, Heaven will be found to give effect to”, are both motifs developed from the political culture of the Western Zhou Dynasty to Confucian doctrine. However, the thoughts of Confucius and Mencius appeared later. The former attaches importance to the virtue of reverence while the latter to protecting the people. Both are different from the core doctrine of the duke of Zhou, who advocated protecting the people. This was, however, because of the duke of Zhou was a great politician. His thought was put forward in the form of political thought. This precisely determined the special mode of the establishment of the value rationality of early Chinese culture, i.e., value rationality was established through political thought. Confucians later stated the concept of “exercising government by means of virtue”, which gave expression in a more explicit form to the ancient Chinese political tradition. Morals and virtue became the base point of politics. In preConfucius times, this standpoint that morality was placed in the centre of politics was realized by virtue of the authority of “Heaven”, which was stipulated by “virtue”.

Four: Heaven-Rite Oneness In contrast to the concern over “justice” in ancient Greece, we may say that political thinking in the Spring and Autumn Period was featured by its highlighting of “rite” and taking “polite” and “impolite” as the principle to judge political affairs, according to which rites became the goal of political pursuit. Knowing rites was the primary political virtue. The Spring and Autumn Period here refers to the late period before the Confucian doctrine took shape.

142  Three themes on Chinese political philosophy To illustrate this point, we will take as an example “Doctrine of Rites” (from Master Xun) by Zi Dashu from the state of Zheng in the Spring and Autumn Period: Zi Dashu went to visit Zhao Jianzi. Zhao Jianzi consulted Zi Dashu on the rites of bowing and making way for each other and dealing with others. Zi Dashu replied, “This is not rite but ceremony”. Zhao Jianzi answered, “Would you please tell me what rite is?” Zi Dashu answered, “I heard Zichan, the previous minister, said that rite meant the norms set by Heaven and the principle of Earth and the guide to action for the people. Since it is the norm of Heaven, people will follow. They will follow the illumination of Heaven and produce the six qis in accordance of the original nature of Heaven and use its Five Elements. Qi means the five flavours which appear in five colours and five sounds. Overdoing will lead to confusion and the people will lose its nature. Therefore, rite is set for them to follow. Moreover, the six domestic animals, five draught animals and three pure-colour oxes are offered for five tastes. Moreover, nine patterns for the imperial robe, six colours (green, white, red, black, dark and yellow) are stipulated. Furthermore, The Nine Songs, eight styles, seven sounds and six rhythms are set as the five sounds. What’s more, the relations between the Monarchy and the subjects and between the Supervisor and the subordinate are set by following the principle of Heaven. Also, relations between husband and wife and between the internal and external affairs are formulated to regulate two things. Relations between father and son, between brothers, between a woman and her brother’s wife, between uncle and the nephew, between father-in-law and son-in-law and between husbands of sisters are set to symbolize the brightness of Heaven. Policies and regulations are set to meet the needs of four seasons. Also, laws and prison are set to make the people awed by following lightning stroke. Also, mild and kind measures are formulated to follow the growth of living things endowed by Heaven. The people have their likes and dislikes, joy and anger, grief and happiness. As all this stems from the six qis, they have to follow cautiously and imitate appropriately and constrain their six moods (likes, dislikes, joy, anger, grief and happiness). They will cry when in sorrow, dance while feeling happy, donate in joy and fight while in anger. Joy comes from likes, anger from dislikes. Therefore, they must act cautiously and honor their commitment. Also, reward and punitive measures are available for life and death. Life is what people like while death is what they dislike. They love what they like and feel sorrowful over what they hate. Whatever it is, be it sorrow and joy, they will not breach etiquette. In this way, the original nature of Heaven may be coordinated and will last long.”4 Zhao Jianzi said, “It seems that rite is extremely great.” Zi Dashu replied, “Rite is the morale and law of Heaven, the principle of Heaven and Earth. It is rite that the common people live on and that is why the previous kings revere rite. Therefore, men can learn rite well by

Three themes on Chinese political philosophy 143 transforming their characters and this is called adult. Isn’t the greatness of rite appropriate?” Zhao Jianzi said, “I will keep what you said in mind and follow it throughout my life.”5 Zi Dashu’s remark on rite is of vital significance. As a matter of fact, his argument is very orderly. First, in terms of uniformity, “rite” is the universal law for Heaven, Earth and man. In a broad sense, rite means the truth of Heaven and the guide to people’s action. Second, in terms of diversity, the “way of Heaven” and the “principle of Earth” represent the law of universe and nature. “Rite”, as the guide to the “action of people”, is a social norm set by human society by imitating the law of nature. In a narrow sense, rite means “the norm and principle of Heaven and Earth and the fundamental conduct of human beings”. They are right and unchangeable, and people take them as law. Third, the peculiarity of rite’s “following the way of Heaven” is manifested in that various stipulations of rite correspond to the form and degree of natural existence. For example, there are six qis, five elements, five tastes and five sounds, etc. Correspondingly, rite has various rules set for “five tastes, five colours to follow the principle of Earth and the illumination of Heaven”. Fourth, the essence of rite is not ceremony and degree but the relations between the senior and the junior and the responsibility concerning human relations. Simply, rite is the product of following the principle of Heaven and earth and the manifestation of god’s truth and the law of political and ethic relations. This speech was, as a matter of fact, an outstanding thesis on political philosophy, which plays a vital role in the history of philosophy. Zi Dashu’s speech was made during the 25th year of Duke Zhao when Confucius was 34 years old (generally, a man should be independent at the age of 30). It is thus clear that in the late Spring and Autumn Period, differentiating rite and ceremony was more and more important. The differentiation of rite and ceremony, in the words of traditional language, is the differentiation between rite and morality and etiquette. Etiquette is a set of ceremonies such as chariots, flags and ceremonies while rite and morality mean the relations between the senior and the junior and the rule concerning human relations. To be specific, it refers to the principle of the ethic relations between monarch and subject, between husband and wife, between father and son, between elder brother and younger brother and between uncle and son-in-law, etc. The aforementioned differentiation between rite and ceremony is based on the base point of rite and politics. It is the political principle in the system of ritual system including such ruling measures as politics, administration and penalty. The differentiation between rite and ceremony is expressed in The Book of Rites as the difference between “essence of the rites” and “principle of rites”. The “essence” refers to the fundamental principle while the “principle” refers to the concrete form on which the principle is manifested. Rite, as discussed by Zi Dashu, lays special emphasis on its significance in political order and norms. “Heaven” in Zi Dashu’s Discussion on Rites is quite different from the “Heaven” in The Book of Documents which is regarded as the lord in a religious sense. The

144  Three themes on Chinese political philosophy former is the “Heaven” of nature as opposed to earth. The changed meaning of Heaven was a manifestation of the gradual weakening of the religious meaning and the rise of humanistic thought during the Spring and Autumn Period. From the perspective of political philosophy, Zi Dashu’s assertion on rites has the significance of concept of natural law. According to Zi Dashu, the “rites” concerning the order and principle of human society come from nature (Heaven and earth) in the broader sense and accord with the original nature and order of the natural world. This is because “rites” are set by imitating the structural attribute of Heaven and earth, the Five Elements and the six qis. This fact, obviously, indicates that the social world of human beings is one part of nature and dominated and constrained by the universal law of yin and yang, the Five Elements and the six qis. Therefore, man should consciously live by formulating systems through imitating the essence and rhythm of the natural world. The natural law, represented by Heaven and Earth, the four seasons and the Five Elements, is the highest, the most universal and dominating all. This universal law, which began to be called natural law in the late period of ancient Greece, was called “the way of Heaven” in ancient China. The political norm, ethic principle and conduct of the human world should accord with the way of Heaven, namely, the principle and norm of Heaven and Earth. If rites of human beings and conduct of men can consciously accord with the principle of Heaven, man’s behaviour will play a “coordinating role” in the whole of nature. Of course, such a political thought in ancient China was not based on the concept of “law”. Instead, it has been developed by later generations as discussions on the way of Heaven and heavenly principles. However, there is no denying that it included thought which was similar to the concept of natural law in ancient Greece.6 It should be noted that this thought of Heaven-Rite Oneness is a proof and support of thinkers to the rites of the human world concerning the principle of Heaven and Earth. In ancient China, the actual effect of this thought did not mean to make Heaven and Earth, nature and man antagonistic to each other. As a matter of fact, it meant not to criticize man’s behaviour with nature but to make nature support human behaviour. Therefore, the relation between man and nature is not tense at all. Conceptually, human behaviour should accord with nature and have a harmonious relation with nature. After the Axial Period, this became the philosophical keynote which dominated political thinking.7

Notes 1 The word “feudal” here, which is different in meaning from the commonly used meaning in contemporary history, is used in its original meaning as a word. 2 Annotations on The Spring and Autumn Annals edited by Yang Bojun, China Book Company, 1981, Second Year of Duke Huan, p. 94. 3 The idea of Liang Shuming may refer to his Outline of Chinese Culture, Taipei Liren Press, 1982, p. 81. In addition, Ferdinand Tonnies divided social types into “group” and “society”. Features of group are “emotion” while features of society are “non-emotion” (refer to Elias: The Course of Civilization, p. 7).

Three themes on Chinese political philosophy 145 4 I think that the remarks quoted from Zichan may be summed up as “action of people”, and the following is the explanation of Zichan. 5 Compiled by Yang Bojun, Notes on the Spring and Autumn Annals, the 25th year of Duke Zhao, pp. 1457–1459. 6 Ancient Chinese natural law, especially the natural law of the Confucian School, was principally close to the concept of natural law of Stoicism in late period of ancient Greece. The modern European concept of natural law is different in development and way of stating. 7 This chapter refers to the paper at 2006 Beijing International Forum on Political Philosophy held at Capital Normal University. This chapter is the result of the revision of relevant contents of Ancient Religions and Ethics and The World of Ancient Culture of Western Zhou by the author. If readers feel interested in this part, please refer to these two books.

12 On moral politics – the idiosyncrasy of Confucian political philosophy

Dr. Sun Yat-Sen said early that “politics means everybody’s business and governance means administration. So, administering the business of all is politics”. Likewise, in ancient China, Zuozhuan has it that “politics means governing the people”.1 In this sense, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen’s interpretation is consistent with Chinese tradition in this regard. In other words, his remark was a new interpretation and development of the idea in ancient times. However, in ancient China, “governing the people” was, more often than not, interpreted not as handling the issue of people but as managing the people. It meant ruling the people. Therefore, although the doctrines of Heaven-Man Oneness and Heaven-Virtue Oneness in The Book of Documents have become the foundation of following Confucian political thought, the actual political operation and implementation since the Shang and Zhou dynasties gradually formed their own traditions, namely, “politics means governing the people”. How to govern the people means how to govern the country. It involves not only the methods of political operation but also the understanding of the essence of politics. In short, politics is managing the state affairs of a country. Political philosophy means expounding the political value and its foundation and source through philosophic means. As a matter of fact, political philosophy studies what political value is worth pursuing,2 and it pushes forward actual politics and conducts political evaluation based on this value so as to explore an ideal political life. The concept of political philosophy may not only be elaborated independently but also finds its expression through political discussion. The Analects of Confucius talks much about politics. Particularly, there are many examples of Confucius answering questions about political affairs. Generally speaking, these questions were about political practice and administrative measures. Naturally, in most cases, consulting Confucius about political affairs centred on the questions asked by the ministers (such as Ji Kangzi and Zilu, who were ready to engage in political affairs) on “how to exercise government”. As a matter of fact, exercising government means executing administration, i.e., engaging in state affairs. In the Spring and Autumn Period, “government” was hierarchical. For example, the emperor handled the affairs of the whole country, the vassal states had their own state affairs to deal with and the government officials

On moral politics 147 had their own local affairs to deal with. The ruler may be the monarch himself or the minister who assisted the monarch in administrating the people. Actually, Confucius gave different answers to these “political consultations” depending on the types of questioners. Confucius gave instructions on exercising government in accordance with the features of the questions. Confucius’ remarks on these political questions showcased not only his perception on the key to political practice but also his basic thinking on political issues and the fundamental presupposition of his thinking. Political philosophy is moral-and-value-based introspection and defining towards the essence of politics and political activities. Confucian political philosophy is the principal part of the political thinking of ancient Chinese philosophy. Such a position results not only from the large number of Confucian works but also from the fact that it directly influences and has much to do with the political practice of ancient China for the past 2,000 years, and based on this it has become the major normative tradition of Chinese political thought. Talking about the theme of political thinking which is hailed by Confucianism as the Six Classics, we summed it up as “Heaven-Man Oneness”, “Heaven-Virtue Oneness” and “Heaven-Rite Oneness”.3 On the part of Confucius, he, acknowledging the ideological authority of the Six Confucian Classics, did not focus on the relation between politics and Heaven. Instead, he developed direct thinking on politics in an attempt to influence the actual political tradition more directly. Apart from the Six Confucian Classics, the most influential political thinking in early Confucianism was made by Confucius and Mencius. After the Song Dynasty, Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Means had wide influence. Here, this chapter begins its discussion mainly on the thought of Confucius.

One The following arguments made in the early period of Confucianism were most representative: First, “governing with the power of virtue”: Ruling a state by means of morality will gain its great centripetal force. (from Governing: The Analects of Confucius) Exercising government means political governance and leadership. “By means of morality” is likely to have two literal meanings: moralizing and model role. Seen from the whole sentence, ruling a state by means of morality does not refer to governing the country with morality in a general sense. Instead, it means that the administrator sets a good example before the people with his own moral character. So, it is followed by “will gain its great centripetal force”, which means that if the administrator can set a moral example, the people will naturally submit to his authority just as all the stars twinkle around the Polaris. This remark of Confucius talks about the significance of political virtue.

148  On moral politics Second, “guided by morality”: If they are guided by morality and regulated by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame and become disciplined. (from Analects of Confucius: Governing) Here, “morality” refers to guidance and leadership. The basic function of politics is to achieve leadership. The society and people are led through “virtue”, and people are regulated with “rite”. In terms of “guided with morals”, its purpose is what is called “ruling the country by virtue” by later generations. Ruling the country by virtue means realizing political leadership through morality. This has its pertinence in that era, meaning opposing ruling by corporal punishment. A ruler who governs the country through government decrees and penal law certainly will extort excessive taxes and levies over the people and engage in cruel torture. Therefore, ruling the country by virtue not only expresses the insight of Confucianism on the strategy of governing the country but also reflects the deep concern and care of Confucianism for the people. Moreover, it presupposes that politics should take guaranteeing people’s basic needs for food, clothing, social stability and peace as the goal. “Having the sense of shame and become disciplined” indicates that as far as Confucius was concerned, the political goal was not only to pursue an orderly society but also to realize a society with kindness and moral spirit. “Guided with morals” is supposed to refer to pushing forward moral education and uplifting people’s level of consciousness and stimulating people’s kindheartedness. This remark talks about the significance of moral education. Third, to govern means to act rightly. When Ji Kangzi asked Confucius about government, Confucius said, “To govern means to act rightly. If you take the lead on the right way, who else dares to go astray?” (from Analects of Confucius: Yan Yuan) First, “act rightly” means regularizing behaviour. “To govern means to act rightly” means that the essence of politics is to regulate and manage social behaviours. Second, regularization of social behaviour should start from the monarch. If the monarch takes the lead on the right way, no one dares to go astray. Therefore, if we say that “to govern means to act rightly” was likely to be the general understanding of the ministers about politics in the Spring and Autumn Period, Confucius, on the basis of this, had such a remark to emphasize that the monarch should act rightly. As a matter of fact, Confucius made a creative conversion here. Therefore, Confucius differed from the previous rulers in interpreting “to govern means to act rightly”. Confucius focused on the right way of the ruler. So, his concept of acting rightly presents its great importance in his political thought. Acting rightly is the requirement for political leaders. For the political leader, “his acting rightly” is far more important than “people’s acting rightly”. This remark of Confucius aims to stress the importance of self-cultivation.

On moral politics 149 To govern means to act rightly. This, in a manner of speaking, expresses Confucius’ understanding and proposition over “politics” in the form of dentition. This is rare in the presentation of Confucian thought. Defining “governing” with “acting rightly” is not to define the meaning of politics in a dictionary. On the one hand, it reflects his understanding of the essence of political activities. On the other hand, it points out the key to political practice. Moreover, it was not only a summary of the mainstream political concept since the Western Zhou Dynasty but also a development and advancement of the interpretation of politics since the Western Zhou and the Spring and Autumn Period. As a matter of fact, the proposal “to govern means making the people act rightly”4 is found in Zuozhuan, which represented the mainstream political standpoint of that era. This proposal points out that politics is the activities of the ruler. It values the relevance between politics and making the people act rightly. However, it did not explain how to make the people act rightly. Generally speaking, here “act rightly” means standardization and correction. Therefore, “to govern means making the people act rightly” was liable to be confused with the following proposition of legalism. Legalism proposed to administer society and regulate the people with penal law. Morality took no position at all in the legalist thought of making the people acting rightly. For example, Guanzi, a legalist literature at the early stage of legalism, proposed “ruling the country by regulating the people”. And it even mentioned that “to govern means regulating the people”.5 In contrast, Confucius held that “rightly” means that the ruler should act rightly himself and stressed the right virtue of the ruler. As far as Confucius was concerned, the key point of politics is that the ruler should play his role of acting as a moral example to realize and promote the “right act” of the whole society. Therefore, “acting rightly” shifts from the significance of pure political norm to the significance of morality and virtue. It represents not only the legitimate social order (including political order) but also the upright virtue of the emperor and the ministers. Here, Confucius shifted the focus of “acting rightly” from “the people” to the ruler. This was, as a matter of fact, a significant change in ancient political thought. It not only presupposes, both ideologically and conceptionally, Confucius’ fundamental trust towards the role of morals as an example, but also sets up the fundamental relevance between politics and morals. As everyone knows, Confucius explicitly pointed out his objection to the way of governance, that is, “ruling the people by injunctions and restricting them by penalty”. As a matter of fact, the thought of “governing the people by regulating them” is close to “ruling the people by injunctions”, and “governing by regulating the people” has similar meaning. The transformation from “ruling the people by injunctions” to “instructing people through good moral examples” requires that shift be made from government decree to political moral education on the one hand, and that the ruler set a moral example on the other hand. Therefore, Confucius said on another occasion, “He who stands rightly himself will inspire an action even before he gives the order”; “If he makes himself upright, what difficulty will he have in government? If he cannot make himself upright, how can he make others upright?” (from The Analects of Confucius: Zilu) Making the people upright by making himself upright precisely embodies Confucius’ unique

150  On moral politics understanding and detailed description that “the ruler should make himself right”. In this sense, such an interpretation on exercising government answers the question “What should be done in order to win obedience from the people?”,6 namely, people’s simple obedience to the ruler. As a matter of fact, what it pursues and attempts to realize is the guiding function of morality and virtue to the whole society. Here “himself” refers to conduct. Therefore, “cultivating one’s moral character” was prioritized in ancient times. It is in this sense that Confucianism thinks that politics should be based on “self-cultivation”. “King Yao and King Shun ruled the state through benevolence, so their people were also benevolent”. And “The virtue of the superior is like the wind while that of the inferior is like grass”. After all, political practice boils down to the virtue of political leadership. Four, “being the parent of the people”: The Monarch who makes people submit willingly may be the parent of his people. He likes what his people like and hates what they hate, then he may be their parent. (from Great Learning) This remark is about the responsibility ethic of politics. This thought in The Great Learning derived from antiquity. For example, The Book of History: The Great Plan proposes that “the Son of Heaven is the parent of the people”. Mencius inherited the political thought of The Book of Documents, saying repeatedly of the responsibility ethic of “being the parent of the people” and always defining the ruler’s great responsibility for the people. This concept of being the parent of the people was supposed to be relevant to the ancient political thought that “home and state are in one”. If the basic relation of the family is parent and children, this concept indicates that Confucianism thinks that the social and political relations outside the family may be compared to the relations between parents and children of a family. In other words, the relation between the monarch and the people was like the relation between parents and children. Therefore, the obligations, responsibilities and virtues of the parent-child relation are applicable to all parties in social and political relations. After all, politics is a field which is outside of family life and which most people feel unfamiliar with. However, with the concept that “home and state are in one”, the fundamentals of political operation are easily grasped. Under the feudal system in ancient times, family was a system concerning land and people which was lower in hierarchy than the state. Family was in a lower level compared with the feudal system of the emperor, the feudal princes and the ministers. The structural homogeneity of family and the state facilitated the emergence of the concept that home and state are one. In ethical ideas, even the requirements of families of the common people, in terms of moral requirements about filial piety and fraternal duty, were highly consistent with those of the families of the ministers and the feudal princes. Therefore, the Confucian concept in this regard is that “no one can teach others without regulating his own family”. The virtue which is held in esteem in the family is consistent with the virtue needed for life outside the family. Therefore, a man who upholds family virtues is

On moral politics 151 regarded as one who can carry forward the virtue needed in political life outside the family. It should be noted that what Confucianism values politically is the ruler’s responsibility ethic of being the parent of the people rather than putting the people’s responsibility for the government first.

Two It can be seen from this that Confucianism does not lay stress on the distribution and realization of political power. Nor does it lay emphasis on innovation of the arrangement of the political system. As a matter of fact, as far as Confucianism is concerned, the ideal politics is virtue-based politics, emphasizing that political affairs could not be divorced from virtue. The thought that political leadership must highlight moral sand be lenient towards the people was continuously emphasized since the Western Zhou Dynasty, and it gradually became an important branch of political tradition and was carried forward by Confucianism consciously by the late Spring and Autumn Period. Observing Confucius’ views and documents on political issues in The Analects of Confucius, one may see the fundamental presuppositions towards his political understanding, the core of which was “politics and virtue are inseparable”. As far as Confucius was concerned, emphasis on highlighting morality was not only an administrative approach but also had bearing on the fundamental understanding of politics. Although some of Confucius’ understandings were expressed explicitly, some were not. In terms of the relations between politics and morality, the Master thought that politics could not be separated from morality, because of which there was no political neutrality. Politics must take ethic principles as its foundation. Once divorced from ethical and moral concepts, politics would not exist. In a word, politics must be grasped in terms of good and evil of value. The Confucian School such as Confucius was not confronted by the issue of institutional reform. The institutional arrangement represented by “rite” since the Spring and Autumn Period determined the norm and system of the whole of political relations, social relations and kinship. As a result, Confucius did not have to be faced with the issue of establishing a system. As a matter of fact, what he was faced with was not the new institutional innovation and system conception but the destruction and resumption of the system. Therefore, on the one hand, Confucius required restoring the rites, namely, restoring the stabilization function of the system. On the other hand, he highlighted the requirement for the virtue of the leaders to ensure the operation of the system. Of course, without politics, the virtue of men of noble character has its independent moral significance. However, while talking about political issues, Confucius put political virtue first. My definition is “the virtue of power executor” or “the virtue of the power executor in political field”. Valuing political virtue led to the Confucian ideal that persons of virtue engage in politics. Therefore, “ruling the country by virtue” involves two aspects. First, guiding the people with morals objects to ruling by corporal punishment and advocates moral education and guidance. Second, exercising government by

152  On moral politics means of virtue highlights the virtue of political leaders, which was, as a matter of fact, what Confucius valued most. Confucianism in the early period emphasized the inseparability of politics and morality which has the following grounds: First of all, the political thought of the Zhou Dynasty since The Book of Documents firmly believed that “Great Heaven has no affection; – it helps only the virtuous”. Therefore, neither the mandate of Heaven nor the Way of Heaven is neutral in value. Instead, both take goodness as the fundamental principle. “Heaven is the greatest and only King that Yao could model himself on the greatness of Heaven”. Therefore, realistic politics which is based on the mandate of Heaven is dominated by the mandate of Heaven and the Way of Heaven and takes it as the object of law. It cannot be separated from morality, good and evil. Politics cannot be divorced from the good and evil of morality. Its mission is to punish the wicked in order to exhort others to goodness, and following the examples of men of virtue so as to honour the mandate of Heaven and the Way of Heaven. The relationship that politics cannot be divorced from morality indicates that politics itself is a practice which has its value goal as “promoting and carrying forward good virtue and benevolent rule, being ready to experience and have an understanding of public feelings and submitting to public opinion so as to achieve the goal of supreme good”. This is not only the educational goal but also the goal of politics. The responsibility of the state is to guide the whole society and the people to “supreme good”. Seen from the whole universe, the political order of human beings is one part of the order of the Way of Heaven. As the Way of Heaven is not neutral between good and evil, politics of human beings, of course, cannot be separated from good and evil. Second, politics cannot be isolated from good and evil. Politics, as a matter of fact, is most likely to give rise to the greatest evil-doing. Based on historical experience, ancient Chinese political thought paid particular attention to criticism against tyranny and tyrannical government. As a result, political good and evil became the most significant good and evil. Its standard lay in what the government brought about to the people. If the state brought about misery, hunger and cold to its people, it was evil. If the state guarantees people’s basic needs for food, clothing and shelter, it was good. Likewise, an extravagant and dissipated monarch and government were evil while an industrious and frugal government and monarch were good. In addition, it also involved whether the government could maintain traditions and beliefs. In ancient Europe, it was believed that “politics was about state affairs”. In contrast, in ancient China, especially in Confucian concept, the concept of “politics” laid more emphasis on issues concerning “the people”. After all, politics is arranged and going on around people’s lives. Therefore, contrary to the “non-moral political view” of Niccolò Machiavelli, Confucianism in ancient China held the “moral outlook on politics”, always believing that politics was good or evil in nature and that good and evil should be taken as the evaluation criteria to ensure the continuous improvement of politics. Moreover, politics could not transcend moral value, and politics isolated from good and evil did not exist. Besides, political society must take the mainstream moral belief of the society

On moral politics 153 as its base, foundation and guarantee. As mentioned earlier, this interpretation of politics has a deep background of the Way of Heaven and natural law. Third, ancient Confucianism already realized that “group” was the basic characteristics of man as political animals. Different from what Aristotle believed that man is not only a political animal, ancient Confucianism did not define other animals as a “group”. Instead, it regarded that only man “can be grouped”. This meant that an individual had the quality and temperament of living in a group. Obviously, ancient Confucians realized that any good system and social norm could not accomplish practical activities without the virtue of man and that only when men with political virtue have the system operated and carried out can politics operate in an orderly and efficient way. “Riots take place despite good legal institution. However, it has never been heard that a state with a wise sovereign is in turmoil” (from Xunzi: Wangzhi).

Three As mentioned prior, political philosophy discusses political value, its foundation and its source with philosophical methods. Political philosophy studies what political value is worth pursuing and on the basis of this pushes forward real politics and conducts political evaluation as well as explores an ideal political life. Then, what was the political value which the ancient Confucian School valued most? After all, political value is poly-basic. For example, liberalism lays emphasis on freedom and democracy while socialism stresses justice and equality. Although differences exist within Confucian political philosophy, on the whole, in a manner of speaking, ancient Confucianism emphasized “order and stability” represented by “just”, and virtue and culture represented by “goodness” and justice and great harmony represented by “fairness”. On the other hand, “benevolence” and “the Way” were taken as the fundamental of political operation. “Benevolence” is not only the value of life but also political value. So, Confucius said, “To be able to follow five virtues everywhere in the world will mean benevolence”. “What are the five virtues, may I ask?” “They are dignity, lenience, faithfulness, diligence and kindness”. These five virtues are associated with political behaviours. From this we can see that “benevolence” is also a value pursued by politics. “If a truly virtuous king were to arise, it would need a generation’s time before he could govern by means of morality”. This indicates that benevolence is the goal which politicians with these five virtues strive to achieve. “The whole world as one community” is the political realization of “benevolence”. Later, Mencius developed “benevolence” into the thought of “benevolent government”, hence fundamentally opening the political dimension of “benevolence”. In Confucian thought, “the Way” is not only the goal of sublime virtue (such as “Scholars are devoted to the Way”; “A man can glorify the Way”; “one is even willing to die in the evening if he could hear the truth in the morning”), but also a political goal (such as “if my Way is to be carried on, it is destiny that has decided it”). This indicates that the Way is carried out in the political field. The Way is carried out through politics, so “if my [Confucius’] doctrine cannot be carried out, I will get on a raft and

154  On moral politics float about on the sea”. The Way is carried out with political significance, which is reflected in “good government”. “Good government” is a political concept. Confucius often spoke of “good government” and “bad government”. “Bad government” reflected his severe criticism against the political situation. “When good government prevails in a kingdom, the decrees of proprieties, music, and wars are issued by Son of Heaven”. “Good government” is an ideal political order and the rational realization of the political ethic. Therefore, “good government” is not only a good political situation but also an ideal political civilization. Therefore, “Once changed, Qi will reach the level of Lu; once changed, Lu will have the great Way prevail in the state”. Modern scholars of political thought have criticized the Confucian idea of rule by man, thinking that Confucianism shows no concern about the establishment and reform of the system. Nor does it care about the position and function of law. In terms of value, indeed, in the political philosophy of Confucianism, man has a greater value than the system, and morality has greater value than law. With this people-oriented political view, the political view of Confucianism seems to lay particular stress and has obvious inclination. For example, consider “when a man dies his administration will be cast away”, which shows that political operation must rely on the administrative efforts and moral quality of the man, namely, the power executor. As another example, “Virtue alone is not sufficient for the excise of government; law alone cannot carry themselves into practice”. This shows that the good of morals alone cannot constitute politics and that law cannot be put into force only on its own initiative. Only through law can morals constitute political practice, and only through men’s efforts can law be enacted. Xun Zi said, Only sovereigns are likely to mess the state up but no state becomes turbulent itself. There are people with ability to govern the country but no legal institution can govern the country voluntarily. Houyi’s superb archery is still extant but he could not ensure that people of later generations could shoot with great accuracy. Likewise, the legal institution of Yu the Great is still there, but his descendants could not maintain the throne forever. This indicates that legal institution cannot score an achievement alone, and laws, statutes and precedents cannot automatically be carried out. If there are people with the ability to manage state affairs, law exists. In contrast, such people are lost, law will no longer exist. In this sense, legal system is the beginning of politics while men of noble character are the soul of legal system. (from Xunzi: Virtue of Men of Noble Character) According to the Philosophy of Right, political universals may be divided into two aspects: a subjective aspect and an objective aspect. The subjective aspect refers to the conscientiousness of men of noble character while the objective aspect refers to state institution and law. As a matter of fact, Hegel mentioned the subjective aspect of politics as the free and act-by-itself universal. According to Hegel, the duty of public servants requires they not egoistically pursue

On moral politics 155 subjective goals but sacrifice their own interests. “To make it a habit selflessness, respecting justice and abiding by law and being honest and sincere, one needs to receive education on morality and sense”.7 Hegel also talked of “cultured” bureaucrats. As a matter of fact, Aristotle also said, “People learning about political issues should start from what they know and from a good training on their own habits and characteristics and morals and from ethic”. Undoubtedly, the political view of Confucianism lays emphasis on the subjective aspect of politics. This, however, does not mean that Confucianism, in essence, shows no concern over the objective aspects, such as the political system. The main reason is that historically, especially in the times of Confucius, Confucianism existed in the established institutional system without encountering any significant institutional reform. Nor was it faced with challenges posed by the new system conception. Under such a circumstance, the objective aspect of politics would, naturally, be less prominent. Instead, the objective aspect found expression in how to perform its normal functions within the established institutional framework. For this reason, the subjective aspect of politics was highlighted. In terms of modern Confucianism, it doesn’t regard the political and legal systems of modern society as insignificant. Instead, it is based on Confucian views, and it always keeps in mind the construction of the ruler and the officials’ political virtue and the significance of moral conduct to political practice in the course of institutional improvement. Modern political philosophy holds that politics is independent of morality. That is to say, political views, systems and principles may be separated from the moral culture of the society. The government should not propose any moral and ethical rule.8 This is, as a matter of fact, hypocritical. Political demoralization is, in reality, very dangerous, for it turns politics into a game of votes featuring “one man one vote”. As a consequence, politics promises nothing to society, order, ethics and morality, resulting in moral absence in social and political life. If there were no traditional morality force as the mainstay, politics is likely to lead society to moral chaos. Perhaps a government needs not to bind itself up with some school, sect or religious sect, but it is essential that it explicitly identify and promote the fundamental norms of social life, men’s virtue and basic traditional values. Failing to do this, political rightfulness would be out of the question, and politics itself would be a problem. In his Democracy and Leadership, Irving Babbitt mentioned Confucius and Aristotle in the same breath. According to Babbitt, Confucius could provide leaders of democracy with the most needed quality. The spirit of “setting oneself an example to others” in Confucianism is not merely a justice in the abstract; as a matter of fact, it may create a “just man”. This is what Confucianism may contribute to modern democracy.9 To sum up, “guided by morality” and “exercising government by means of virtue” were a significant transformation of Confucius for “politics means governing the people” and “to govern means making the people act rightly”. Ancient Confucianism laid emphasis on the importance of political moral conduct to political process. It believed that the essence of politics was moral education and insisted that virtue be the basis of politics, taking beneficence as the political goal with

156  On moral politics benevolence running through political practice. All this is still of such great significance that no one can afford to ignore it in the conditions of political systems in modern society.

Notes 1 “Politics is used to govern the people while corporal punishment to redress evil” (from Zuozhuan: the Eleventh Year of Duke Yin). 2 Refer to Yan Jirong: Fifteen Lectures on Political Science, Peking University Press, 2004, p. 11. 3 Chen Lai: Three Themes on Ancient Chinese Political Philosophy, Tianjin Social Science, 2007 (2). 4 “Rite reflects political affairs while political affairs regulate the people” (Zuozhuan: The Second Year of Duke of Huan). 5 Guanzi: Implementation of Statutes. 6 The nineteenth chapter of The Analects of Confucius: Governing: “Prince Ai asked Confucius, “What should be done in order to win obedience from the people? The Master said, “Promote the upright officials and position them above the crooked, then the people will obey. If you promote the crooked officials and position them above the upright, the people will not obey”. 7 Refer to Karl Marx: Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Vol. I, People’s Publishing House, October 1965, p. 290. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, pp. 307, 314. 8 Refer to Wan Junren: Horizon of Political Philosophy, Zhengzhou University Press, 2008, pp. 152–153. 9 Yu Yingshi: Confucianism and Daily Life, which is included in his On Modern Confucianism, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1998, p. 249.

13 On the educational thought of Confucianism

Chinese educational thought has a long history. Take Confucius as an example. He lived around 2,500 years ago. He was regarded as a great educationist before and after his death. Confucian thought is, in a broad sense, a set of thoughts on the education of man. Confucius’ humanistic educational philosophy and practice has had the most significant influence on the traditional education of China. This chapter is devoted to the educational ideal of Confucianism, centering on the concept of “learning” and taking Confucius as the core. First, it states that Confucius attached great importance to education and knowledge acquisition and then points out that Confucius-style education not only values “learning the classics” but also lays stress on “receiving edification” in virtue. On the other hand, it points out the concept that “one can become a sage through learning” is of great significance to interpreting the distinctive features of Confucian educational philosophy and particularly points out that Confucianism lays special emphasis on the importance of the concept of self-learning. Finally, it expounds on the educational concept and goals of Confucianism.

One: the love of learning In the West, ancient Greeks took the love of wisdom as the spiritual feature of philosophy, which has had great influence in the moulding of Western culture. Classical Chinese philosophy surely did not stress the love of wisdom as its distinctive feature. As a matter of fact, many scholars took “making virtue illustrious” as the characteristic of Chinese philosophy, which is in contrast to “the love of wisdom”. It stands to reason in terms of Confucian philosophy. If “love” means “being fond of” or “like”, and if “wisdom” is related to education or learning, then, compared with the orientation of “the love of wisdom” in Greece, Confucianism, the philosophy of Confucius himself in particular, contains another concept which merits more attention. That is “the love of learning”. “The love of learning” is by no means a common concept of Confucianism. We can affirmatively say that “the love of learning” is a fundamental concept which has core meaning in Confucianism. It occupies an important place in not only his educational thought but also his whole philosophy. This seems to have not been given much attention in the past.

158  On the educational thought of Confucianism For example, Confucius said, In a hamlet of ten families, there may be found one honorable and sincere as I am, but not so fond of learning.1 This means that people of loyalty and sincerity are not rare but people fond of learning are very rare. “Loyalty and sincerity” were the basic virtue during the Spring and Autumn Period. This remark of Confucius shows that according to Confucius “being fond of learning” is a character trait which is much more praiseworthy than “loyalty and sincerity”. Although I can’t say that in all the genealogy of Confucius about virtues, the level of “being fond of learning” is much higher than that of “benevolence and loyalty”, the quality of “being fond of learning”, in Confucius’ opinion, is obviously oriented to a practice different from morals, namely, the activities of education. Another example is a dialogue between Prince Ai of the state of Lu. The latter asked Confucius, saying, “Which of your disciples loves to learn best?” “Yan Hui did”, the Master replied. “He neither vented his anger on others nor repeated his errors. Unfortunately he died young. Now there is none. I hardly know one who loves to learn now.”2 Confucius had 70 disciples, and all were persons of virtue. However, he just praised Yan Hui for his love of learning. Apart from him, “I hardly know who loves to learn now”. This shows once again that Confucius viewed “being fond of learning” as a very important and rare character. Another remark from The Analects of Confucius has it that, Ji Kangzi asked Confucius, “Which of your disciples loves to learn best?”3 “Yan Hui loved to learn,” said the Master, “but unfortunately he died young. Now there is none.” Carefully pondering the aforementioned three remarks by Confucius, we may know that it is by no means fortuitous that the remark, “Isn’t it a pleasure to learn and constantly practice what is learnt?” is put at the very beginning of the book The Analects of Confucius. This is because Confucius attached exceptionally great importance to “learning” and “fondness of learning”. It is thus clear that “setting my mind on learning” in his remark, “At the age of fifteen I began to set my mind on learning; at thirty I began to stand firm I had come to apperceive destiny,” is of vital significance and uncommon. “Setting my mind on learning” means being fond of learning. Therefore, “learning” and “being fond of learning” are not only the starting point of the embryology of Confucianism but also the logical starting point of the life of his thought and the important footstone of his thought. The question now is whether “being fond of learning” is a moral character or virtue. Seemingly, being fond of learning, which is different from moral characters

On the educational thought of Confucianism 159 such as benevolence, wisdom and courage which Confucius mentioned, does not belong to morality. However, how does this account for the fact that Confucius said that Yan Hui was the only disciple of his who was fond of learning but classified him into the category of “virtues”?4 If being fond of learning belongs to moral character, what is the difference between moral character and benevolence, wisdom and courage? In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle held the following, Moral character falls into two categories. One is intelligence and the other is ethic. Intelligent moral character is mostly generated and cultivated through instruction. So, it requires experience and time. Ethical moral character is produced through edifying of customs. . . . None of our ethical moral characters is generated naturally because nothing that naturally exists can be changed by habits.5 Cultivation of intellectual moral character has something to do with education, and being fond of learning is supposed to belong to the category of education. In this way, in terms of its relevance with education, being fond of learning and intellectual moral character have something in common. It is without doubt that intellectual moral character is a moral character which applies to reason in an appropriate way, which is quite different from fond of learning, which is taken as an outstanding ability. Moreover, Confucius did not think that ethical moral character had nothing to do with education. Anyhow, Confucius viewed “being fond of learning” as an important quality and activity which differed from “ethical moral character”. “Being fond of learning” is of vital significance in Confucian thought. This is highlighted in his discussion on “six characters that may lead to six faults”: The Master asked Zhong You, “Zhou You, have you heard of the six characters that may lead to six faults?” “Not yet, Sir,” replied Zhong You. “Take your seat,” said the Master, “and let me tell you. Loving to show benevolence without loving to learn may lead to being fooled; loving to show wisdom without loving to learn may lead to random actions; loving to show sincerity without loving to learn may bring about harm; loving to show straightforwardness without loving to learn may lead to acerbity; loving to show courage without loving to learn may lead to rampage; loving to show staunchness without loving to learn may lead to arrogance.”6 This remark is very important. In terms of the view of moral character, it means each individual moral character is not independent but plays its role with other characters by supplementing each other. The supplementing of all moral characters may result in a personality of the man of noble character or sage featuring neutralization and impartiality. In this supplementary structure of moral character, “being fond of learning” undoubtedly occupies an outstanding position. The six moral characters, namely, benevolence, wisdom, faith, straightforwardness,

160  On the educational thought of Confucianism courage and firmness, are all ethical moral characters. However, Confucius stressed that the pursuit of ethical moral character can’t do without being fond of learning. All ethical moral characters, attempting to play their active roles in a neutral way, are heavily reliant on the character of being fond of learning. Nor can they get away from its practice. Otherwise, all these ethical characters will play their roles in a partial way. As far as this view is concerned, all moral characters are supposed to work in coordination and constrain and supplement each other in that each individual moral character is likely to have its drawbacks in practice. Moreover, it can be seen that being fond of learning is not only an outstanding ability and a strong point but also an orientation of the mind. Such ability and orientation refer obviously to the process of knowledge acquisition and education.7 In this way, ethical moral character and intellectual moral character are integrated; so are ethical moral character and educational (learning) activities. Regardless of whether Confucius’ remark has its specific pertinence, contrasting with the highlight of Confucius on being fond of learning throughout his life, we may see that the view on “six characters that may lead to six faults” was not his adventitious view but an expression of his comprehensive and balanced understanding of ethics and reason, moral characters and learning. If one has the characters of benevolence, wisdom, courage and firmness but is not fond of learning, his character will be incomplete but is liable to deviate. Therefore, every ethical moral character must be associated with the intellectual moral character of being fond of learning and must supplement to each other. Besides, they should be helped in the practical achievements of learning. Otherwise, in practice, this character will lead to deviation. It is thus clear that Confucius attached great importance to education and knowledge acquisition. Naturally, “being fond of learning” in this structure is not independent and selfsufficient. However, with benevolence and faith but without “being fond of learning”, Confucius would not have been Confucius at all. Nor would he have been an educator and the Confucius who “had an insatiable desire to learn”. “Being fond of learning” has all along been an important profile of the image of Confucius left behind, which was without doubt in the Confucianism prior to the Tang Dynasty.

Two: receiving edification Being fond of learning is not only an important value but also a moral character in Confucian thought. Being fond of learning finds its expression in the endless process of a man’s life. This also indicates that learning is a lifelong practice and supports Confucius’ ideal about lifelong learning. If Confucius called for “being fond of learning”, what did his disciple learn? The Confucian School in the Song Dynasty raised this question. Cheng Yi said, Confucius had as many as three thousand disciples but he regarded Yan Hui the only disciple who was fond of learning. The disciples could not have had a good command of the Confucian classics and the Six Classical Arts without

On the educational thought of Confucianism 161 practice. In view of this, as Yan Hui was the only disciple fond of learning, then what did he learn?8 History books show that Confucius taught his disciples about the Six Classical Arts (“Six Classical Arts: rites, music, archery, riding, writing, arithmetic”). Confucius was devoted to sorting out the Six Classics (The Book of Songs, The Book of Documents, The Book of Changes, The Book of Rites, The Book of Music and The Spring and Autumn Annal). According to The Book of Zhou Rites and The Book of Rites, the Six Classical Arts and the Six Classics had already been the basic contents in the education of aristocrats in the late Spring and Autumn Period.9 According to Records of the Grand History, “Confucius had three thousand disciples and seventy-two of them were skilled in the Six Classical Arts”. Confucians after the Han Dynasty interpreted the Six Classical Arts as the Six Classics. In the era of Confucius, he expanded the Six Classics and the Six Classical Arts for the education of aristocrats to universal education, which made no social distinctions in teaching. As a result, they became the general contents of education of the Confucian School, hence greatly pushing forward the liberation of knowledge. However, the Six Classical Arts were quite different from the Six Classics. The latter was completely education about classics while the former was about practical skills. Between the two, Confucius himself attached greater importance to education about classics. The object of “being fond of learning” certainly covered these contents. This indicates that Confucius regarded as the basic content of education humanistic cultivation and cultural inheritance with classics as the core. However, the Six Classical Arts and the Six Classics were just the scope of the knowledge education of Confucius. They were not all the connotations of Confucius’ education. Even almost all the edifications of Confucius in The Analects of Confucius are contents outside the Six Classical Arts and the Six Classics. According to The Analects of Confucius, Confucius’ disciples were taught in these four aspects: “cultural knowledge, conducts, faithfulness and creditability”.10 Later generations call “morality, eloquence, administrative talents and letters” in “Those Who Learn First” as “Quadrivium”.11 It seems that the Six Classical Arts (technical) were the foundation courses while the Six Classics were professional courses. Virtue was the core of liberal education. The wording of Four Aspects and Quadrivium, compared with the wording of the Six Classical Arts, reflected the theory and practice of Confucius’ education in a more comprehensive way. More importantly, Confucius was quite unique. His education was quite different from the education for the nobility which focused on the rites of Zhou and the Six Classical Arts. Confucius not only expanded education of the Six Classical Arts to universal education, but also his educational idea transcended the Six Classical Arts of the rites of Zhou and even the classical education of the Zhou Dynasty. As a matter of fact, Confucian education was based on humanistic knowledge and developed into a comprehensive free personality education. In The Analects of Confucius, “What personality should one cultivate?” becomes the core consciousness of education. This never occurred in the Spring and Autumn Period. It was

162  On the educational thought of Confucianism based on this that Confucius put forward the educational concept of “receiving edification” with the concept of “a superior man” as the core. What did education or receiving education mean to Confucius? In a manner of speaking, this question was mostly raised in the form of “learning”. That is to say, in Confucian thought, “learning”, as a concept, not only means study but also has the significance of “education” on the part of Confucius. In other words, in Confucius’ thought and Confucianism, “learning” has its meaning both in broad and narrow senses. “Learning” in the narrow sense, which is opposite to “thinking”, refers to study. Therefore, “Master said, ‘I once spent days and nights racking my brains without food or sleep. It was not helpful. Better to take to learning instead’.”12 This is also opposite to “cultivating morality” (“My worry is that many people do not try to refine their character, do not make academic researches, do not bother to do what they know is right, and do not correct their wrongdoings”.).13 On the other hand, “learning” in the broad sense, so to speak, is the comprehensive education on men. “Learning” in the narrow sense is also called “learning the classics, i.e., acquiring academic knowledge”. Therefore, Confucius gave the instruction that men should begin by practicing “filial piety and fraternal duty, and faith and benevolence”. Confucius advocated, “When there is energy to spare, they may set out to learn the classics”.14 Learning in the broad sense is not only knowledge acquisition but also is based on virtues. Therefore, just as Zixia said, If a man withdraws his mind from the love of beauty, and applies it as sincerely to the love of the virtuous, if he does his utmost in serving his parents, if he dedicates himself to serving his prince, and if he is faithful among the friends, I certainly consider him a man of learning, though others might think otherwise.15 In a manner of speaking, this is a reflection of Confucius’ thought. “Learning” here is supposed to refer to learning the classics. “Learning” about loyalty and filial piety does not refer to “learning the classics” but to moral education and personality education. This indicates Confucius’ comprehensive concept of “learning”. Therefore, Confucius said, A man of virtue does not seek to eat to his heart’s content, or dwell in coziness. He is diligent in work and cautious in word. He keeps company with men of principle so as to rectify himself. Such a man may be said to love to learn.16 A man who does not pursue creature comfort but seeks spiritual perfection and personality perfection and who is diligent and cautious and learns from those who know truth may be said to be a man fond of learning. Here, “being fond of learning” does not refer to learning the classics in the narrow sense but learning to be a man of virtue who pursues a perfect personality and has a good spirit and a noble ideal. From the perspective of education, “learning” here is significant in terms of humanistic education. It is not limited to learning the classics. With respect to

On the educational thought of Confucianism 163 learning in both narrow and broad senses, “being fond of learning” is supposed to have dual significance. In terms of learning the classics, learning refers to knowledge acquisition, and knowledge about rites, music and classics in particular. Confucius’ disciples did their learning through “classics” and “reading”, both of which refer to such knowledge acquisition.17 So does “learning” in “learning much to be acquainted with social reality” proposed by Confucius. In addition, “keep broadening his learning” refers to learning about classics.18 “Learning” in “being insatiable in learning” is also supposed to refer to learning about classics. “Learning” in “do not make academic learning”, which is opposite to “do not try to refine their characters”, is also supposed to refer to learning about classics. In The Analects of Confucius, learning about classics is mentioned on many occasions such as learning about The Book of Changes, poetry and rites. As a matter of fact, Confucius attached great importance to learning about and inheritance to classics. “Learning about the classics” is a symbolic connotation of learning and fondness of learning. This has not only become the major features of Confucianism of later generations but also influenced the practice of Chinese education. However, as mentioned prior, this does not include all the learning advocated by Confucius. As a matter of fact, apart from learning classics and knowledge acquisition, it also includes “restraining oneself with rites” and “refining one’s characters” as well as achievement in success in virtue and administrative affairs. Therefore, while replying to Duke Ai, the Master said, “Yan Hui was fond of learning. He neither vented his anger on others nor repeated his errors”.19 In this sense, being fond of learning refers to receiving edification and virtue. “Learning” means obtaining and upgrading moral characters. Therefore, such learning is also called “receiving edification”. Both men of noble character and men of vile character need to receive edification. Compared with learning about skills, Confucius stressed, “Just like artisans who complete their work in their workshops, a superior man seeks to master the Way via learning”.20 Therefore, the key point of the learning of men of noble character lies in receiving the Way. In The Book of Rites, it is called “cultivating morality and receiving the Way”.21 Of course, learning in this way does not value special skills (such as gardening). Therefore, “A superior man is not a utensil (not just of one single specific use)”.22 What a superior man represents is a complete personality instead of a specific skill or technique. Such learning, more often than not, refers to learning about leadership. Learning of this kind does not mean to see leadership as a skill. Instead, it aims to obtain the quality and abilities of leaders by learning that one “loves the rules of propriety, righteousness and creditability”.23 Seen from the whole ideological system of Confucius, the most important is that the goal of “learning” is to be a man of noble character. This is the tenet of The Analects of Confucius. Later, Han Yu (AD 768–824), a Confucian scholar and educator in the Tang Dynasty, explicitly pointed out that the primary task of an educator is to “propagate the doctrine”, the second one is to “impart professional knowledge” and “resolve doubts”. In this sense, from the perspective of teaching,

164  On the educational thought of Confucianism “propagating the doctrine” is of primary importance. From the perspective of learning, “receiving edification” is the first priority. According to Confucius, both men of noble character and the common people should receive edification, and receiving edification and learning classics are just the opposite. Politically speaking, a man of noble character receives edification just to become a good leader while the common people do it just to become good citizens.24 Learning classics is the supplement to receiving edification. Men can have loyalty and filial piety. “When there is energy to spare, they may set out to learn the classics”.25 Possibly, this is, more often than not, true to the common people. On all accounts, the Way (edification) is of vital significance. Therefore, “he who heard the truth in the morning might die content in the evening”.26 One of the significances of being fond of learning is “holding on even to death in order to perfect one’s virtue”27 to safeguard the justice of truth. Therefore, the primary task of learning is “to let the will be set on the path of duty” and then “let relaxation and enjoyment be found in the polite arts”.28 “The superior man learns in order to reach to the utmost of his principles”.29 Pursuit of the Way has always been the purpose of learning of the superior man. The Book of Rites: Xueji also has it as such: If jade is not polished, it cannot become a thing of use. If a man does not learn, he cannot acquire virtuous qualities of human behaviours. That’s why emperors since the ancient times had teaching before founding and ruling their states. This remark also stresses that the goal of learning is to “know the truth”. Learning aims to make a man of noble character while the example set by the man of noble character may be used to influence the people and form moral customs. In other words, it has its sociopolitical functions. In this sense, the educational concept of Confucianism is associated with social politics. This is close to the views of pragmatism.

Three: one can become a sage through learning Knowledge about facts can be taught. However, knowledge about moral character and personality is quite different. In Meno, Plato raised the question, “Can virtue be taught?” through a dialogue between Socrates and Meno.30 This question surely involves two aspects. One is whether the teacher can teach virtue to his students. The other is whether the student can learn virtue from his teacher. As far as Plato was concerned, initially, Socrates stressed that those who had no idea of what virtue was could not teach virtue to others, but later, he held that virtue could not be imparted. His argument was made from the perspective of teachers, i.e., educators. If this question were asked to Confucius and the Confucian School, what would the answer be? This is a question hard to answer. However, although we cannot answer it simply by saying “virtue can be taught”, we may get the explicit

On the educational thought of Confucianism 165 answer that “virtue can be learned”. This is explicitly expressed in Almanac by Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073) of the Song Dynasty: “Can one become a sage through learning? The answer is Yes”. Likewise, Cheng Hao (1033–1107) also said, “Can the sage be learned from? The answer is Yes”.31 “Can one become a sage through learning?” means the virtue of the sage can be learned. Besides this, one may become a sage by learning the virtues of the sage. Therefore, for the question “Can virtue be taught” raised by Socrates and Plato, the ancient Chinese Confucian School tended to express their consciousness of problems by asking, “Can one become a sage through learning?” So, in a manner of speaking, the Confucian School, through the concept of “one can become a sage through learning”, acknowledges that “virtue can be learned”. Naturally, teaching is different from learning, but both fall into the scope of “education”. Therefore, if the question “Can virtue be taught” raised by Socrates and Plato is translated into the question “Can one obtain virtue through education”, the Confucian School’s acknowledgement of “virtue can be learned” and “one can become a sage through learning from the sage”, in a manner of speaking, affirms the association of moral character and education. After Plato, Aristotle gave an answer to this question that intellectual moral character may be obtained through education while ethical moral character is not obtained through education. Contrarily, the Confucian School holds that ethical moral character may be acquired through “learning”. The concept of “one can become a sage through learning” was mature as early as in the Pre-Qin Period. For example, Xun Zi (298–238 BC) said, How can one proceed with learning? The answer is that in terms of its way, learning should start by reading classics such as The Book of Songs and The Book of Documents and ending with The Book of Rites. In terms of its significance, learning should start as a scholar and end as a sage.32 “Learning” refers to the stage of curricular while “significance” is the educational objective. As far as Xun Zi was concerned, “learning” aims to make one become a sage and acknowledged that one can become a sage through learning. If it is mathematical calculation, then it can be taught. Obviously, neither Confucius nor Xun Zi thought moral character could be obtained through the instruction of teachers. As a matter of fact, the ability of mathematical calculation requires students’ practice. The acquisition of any mathematical calculation needs not only teaching but also learning and practice (to learn and constantly practice). In this sense, virtue cannot be obtained only through teaching. On the other hand, however, Confucius and the following Confucian School took giving lectures as their bounden duty, which means nothing but teaching students to learn about the personality and moral character of men of noble character. In reality, the Confucian School has repeatedly discussed many questions on moral character in their pedagogical practices. In this sense, the acquisition of virtue is related to “teaching”. It is without doubt that acquisition of a complete moral character does not depend merely on the “teacher” but on the continuous process of “teaching-learning”.

166  On the educational thought of Confucianism Seen from the perspective of education, the concept “one can become a sage through learning” means developing moral character through learning. Men of noble character were used by Confucius to refer to the concept of an ideal personality. Seen from the ideological system of Confucius, what is most important is that the objective of “learning” is to become a man of noble character through learning. Learning is done with his attitude towards personality. This is the tenet of The Analects of Confucius. Prior to Confucius, the phrase “man of noble character” referred to the ruling class. Confucius, however, changed it into a name of the ideal personality. This was the fundamental contribution of Confucius to ancient humanistic education. The educational concept that one can become a sage through learning is much related to the mainstream theory of human nature of the Confucian School. Mencius’ concept of good human nature became a more influential theory of human nature after the Song Dynasty. According to this theory of human nature, the nature of human beings, whatever their social class, occupational difference and degree of education, is kind by nature. Goodness means the fundamental difference between man and animals. Besides, goodness is also an inherent reason for man’s self-education and self-development. If one is not good, it is not determined by his nature but by the social environments and habits. With faith in the good of human nature, the educational thought of the Confucian School does not take distrust as its attitude towards man. Instead, it believes in man’s ability of selfeducation and self-improvement. Therefore, guiding people’s conduct towards goodness relies not on cruel torture and harsh laws but on the awareness of human nature to break through the loss caused by social contamination. This means an acknowledgement of human dignity.

Four: learning for oneself Obviously, the concept that “one can become a sage through learning” is oriented not to educators but to learners. Its focus is not on how the educator teaches but on how the learner studies, how he obtains virtue and how he becomes a sage through learning. This also indicates that the educational thought of the Confucian School values more learning than teaching. This is the feature of the educational thought of the Confucian School. Seen from the text of The Analects of Confucius, the word “learning” is frequently used. In contrast, the word “teaching” is seldom used. This contrast indicates that Confucius took educational process as the primary factor. Accordingly, virtue is mainly acquired through “learning”. Education, as far as Confucius was concerned, means not only teaching but also learning, and education, from the final analysis, is a process of man’s self-pursuit. According to Confucius, “The ancient learners learned for themselves; the present learners learn for others”.33 By “learn for others”, it means let others see. By “learn for themselves”, it means learning aims to develop and improve one’s own personality and spirit. From this perspective, the subjectivity of education finds its expression in learning for oneself, which means that one learns actively for oneself.

On the educational thought of Confucianism 167 The spirit of education is to make the educated learn actively. “You can only strive to be benevolent through your own efforts. Can you count on anyone else to do it in your stead?”34 The concept that one can become a sage through learning not only defines the humanistic nature of education in educational objectives but also makes “education” focus not on teaching but on learning. Although “learning” might include studying from the teacher, i.e., content of courses, it stresses that the learner should study and practice on his own initiative. Particularly, such learning is conscious learning of the learner, a lifelong pursuit and education. This consciousness naturally depends not only on the inspiration, guidance and examples of the educator but also on the learning of the learner himself. As a matter of fact, “learning”, in Confucius’ opinion, includes practice. The personality of a man of noble character may be acquired through learning and cultivation and continuous self-training in moral character. As the learner plays a primary role in education, learning is the primary factor in the educational process because the process of education is mainly a process of self-study and the continuous study of the learner. Although teaching plays an important role, comparatively, the learning of the learner is more important. In terms of education on moral character, the basic responsibility of the educator is to enlighten the educatee (particularly the adolescent whose world outlook is taking shape) with an ideal moral character of personality and arouse the admiration of the learner so that he expresses his desire to be such a man of noble character, hence making the moral character of an ideal man of noble character a lifelong choice of his own character and quality. Nevertheless, strictly speaking, whether one becomes a sage or a virtuous man depends not on the teaching of the teacher. Knowledge about moral character means knowing what, but to acquire knowledge about moral character, one must fulfil it in practice and accomplish it on one’s own. The educator has the responsibility to tell the learner who a man of noble character is and in what circumstance and what moral character a man of noble character will present so that the learner can have an “inspiration” in the educational process and an admiration for the noble personality. In this way, the learner will hope to follow the example in his life and regard pursuit of noble personality as an important task. However, what the teacher teaches is to “obtain it by means of wisdom”. “A position gained by means of wisdom will be lost again if it is not held fast with virtues”.35 It is the teacher who teaches but it is the learner who practices it on his own. In a manner of speaking, the Confucian School, more often than not, interprets “learning” as an independent, lifelong and practical activity of the learner. As for moral character, by no means can it be taught like the knowledge about equations in class. As a matter of fact, learning is an ability to arouse man’s moral sense and life choices through continuous education in right and wrong, noble and vulgar, and urge people to reflect it in daily life. Therefore, the most important issue of the Confucian School is not to define and discriminate benevolence and virtue in that it thinks that such discrimination is of little practical value to the cultivation of moral character. What Confucian education concerns is how to act to be a

168  On the educational thought of Confucianism benevolent virtue, what practice benevolence refers to, what people may be called men of benevolence, what virtue a man of noble character should have, what their practice principle is, what virtue a man should have if he wants to be a man of noble character, what principle of conduct is, what spiritual realm a man of noble character and principle (the wise won’t get bewildered, the virtuous are not anxiety-ridden and the courageous are fearless) can reach, what a man of noble character chooses and discards. Patterns such as “a man of noble character . . . not. . . ” or “a man of noble character . . . a base person. . . ” are frequently used in The Analects of Confucius to relate the living condition and attitudes of men of noble character. As education is the independent learning of the learner himself, Confucius and the early Confucian School stressed that “the ancient learners learned for themselves; the present learners learn for others” and “a virtuous man finds faults with himself while a base man finds faults with others”. Learning means becoming a man of noble character by learning. “Finding faults with himself” means learning for the development of his own spirit and personality. The consciousness of Confucianism and Chinese philosophy is: what is an ideal personality, how is human nature, what is the way of cultivating one’s moral character for human nature? Such a consciousness of problems dominates the educational concept and practice of Confucianism.

Five: cultivation of ideal personality Then, from the perspective of Confucianism, what is the function of “teaching”? Apart from knowledge imparting, edification of the teacher is to point out the moral example and encourage and lead to students’ progress in moral character through moral evaluation of men and affairs. The task of the educator is to instruct the learner and cultivate him into a man of noble character by telling him what the great spirit is and what noble personality is. This is the tenet applicable to all classical education, which is closely related to ancient nobility education. As a matter of fact, Confucian educators do not attempt to tell the learner why he should have to learn to be a man of noble character. Nor do they try to prove what benefits becoming a noble man will bring about. The reason is that this, to them, is a selfevident presupposition. The succession of teachings from masters to disciples of the ancient Confucian Scholars just tried to explain what a man of noble character is and what specific moral character he has and how a man should cultivate himself to acquire these moral characters (or bring these moral characters into play) so as to reach the realm of the sage. Therefore, Confucius did not focus on specific knowledge about rites in his education. Nor did he concentrate on knowledge imparting on classics. Instead, he took rites as the general principle of norms to evaluate men’s conducts. Rites here become the principle of moral conduct which plays a role in evaluation of moral character and conduct. As for classics, what Confucius was concerned about was how to use the authoritative resources of classical discourse to take classics as a normative lesson and to extend their meaning, hence bringing their function of ethics lessons into play. On the other hand,

On the educational thought of Confucianism 169 the Confucian School’s inheritance of classics surely values the knowledge significance of literature. However, compared with its value significance, knowledge significance is in second place. In this sense, it is acceptable that the “teaching” Confucius talked of means his focus on imparting knowledge about morals. For Confucian, it is an important aspect of “teaching” to affirm and establish the ideal of personality from theory and image. For this reason, contents concerning the discussion on the moral character of men of noble characters take a large proportion in The Analects of Confucius. Through praising and degrading, the book aims to cultivate men with the moral sense of justice and the spirit of public service. However, whether it is a scholar or a man of noble character, learning in the Confucian School means cultivating a noble character, a complete personality and a personality with fine many-sided qualities. Cultivating men who pursue a noble personality and a complete personality with moral character as the centre is not only the educational objective and ideal of Confucianism, but also the historical practice of Confucian education over the past 2,000-odd years. The ancient Chinese educational concept was “conducting oneself”, becoming a man of noble character and a sage through learning. This indicates that “what personality a man should have” has been a fundamental question of the educational concept of the Confucian School. Both Confucius and the following Confucian School defined the highest ideal of education as making the learner a sage. In terms of ancient education and learning, what was the most important was to set a moral example. In reality, however, this could only be realized through the image of the sage in humanistic culture. In China, though it has specific personality, such as the genealogy of the ancient goddess, in most parts, it is the upholding and expression of “gentlemen’s personality” and “gentlemen’s quality” in Confucian culture, through which it brought about a moral inspiration for the educatee and urged him to study hard for such a personality. Among the personality and moral character, benevolence was much valued by Confucius. Benevolence was the central concept of the moral education of Confucius. According to the interpretation in the following Confucianism for The Analects of Confucius, benevolence is a comprehensive virtue of men. That is to say, benevolence is not a virtue in some aspect but represents the whole of quality and virtues. Benevolence in the narrow sense differs from rites, wisdom and creditability while benevolence in the broad sense includes righteousness, rites, wisdom and creditability. As such benevolence is the comprehensive virtue of men; this indicates that the educational concept of Confucius and Confucianism attaches great importance to cultivating men with comprehensive virtues. “Adults” in ancient rites referred to grown-ups. However, Confucius transformed the concept of “adults” into the concept of perfect personality: men with multiaspect virtues such as knowledge, non-desire, courage, rites and music and the Six Classical Arts. “He can be called a perfect man all the same if he can examine the justice before a gain, if he is ready to give his life at a critical moment”. A man of this kind is an “adult”.36 According to Guanzi (Book of Master Guan Zhong), “those who are both benevolent and wise are adults”.37 This also illustrates this point. Later, Xun Zi also explained that people with morality are adults and people

170  On the educational thought of Confucianism with perfect personality are “grown-ups”. In this sense, “a man of noble character should become a man of perfect personality”.38 Shao Yong (1011–1077), a scholar of the Neo-Confucianism of the Song Dynasty, called a person with comprehensive morals as “a holistic man”.39 The base point of such education was to serve the overall spiritual growth of the man and his whole life of moral conduct. It could not be reflected with a single skill, surely, nor did it intend to cultivate a man into a professional. In this sense, if there were “Confucianism” prior to Confucius, such Confucianism failed to establish such a concept of holistic education. It was Confucius and the following Confucian School that established such a concept. “A superior man is not a utensil (not just of one single specific use)”, in a manner of speaking, is an indication of such a concept. In education, “the Way”, the objective and ideal of education, represents the character building of comprehensive and perfect personality with moral character as the core. This has been emphasized in the practice of Confucian education initiated by Confucius. In ancient Chinese education, “learning to be human” has been stressed. It is the fundamental goal of Confucian education to cultivate people who value personal integrity most and who pursue noble personality, despise vulgar living and disdain material gains. Education, which establishes the integral life goal with the sage and which moves and inspires with admonitions and examples, is called moral-charactercentered education or quality-characteristic-based education in philosophy. In Confucianism, virtue and character are the core of education, requiring men be voluntarily faithful to their moral responsibilities and joyously seek to become a sage through learning. Therefore, what is most important in philosophy is not the “truth” in ontology but the “virtue” in ethics. What is important is not only “knowing” but also “doing”. The philosophical theory of the original goodness of human nature is devoted to illustrating that human nature may develop into the source to cultivate all qualities and moral characters. To sum up, the educational concept of Confucianism attaches important to humanistic quality on classics. It takes the example of men of noble character as the model of learning, taking virtues first before knowledge. It takes the personality of the sage as the training objective of education, stressing the educational concept of adults or holistic man, highlighting the significance of “learning” and men’s own initiative in the educational process, aiming to develop men into noble men with comprehensive development. The educational thought of Confucianism is not only the perception of education in the narrow sense but also implies the understanding of “man” in the whole classical age.

Notes 1 The Analects of Confucius: Gong Yechang, 5:28, for the following quotations from The Analects of Confucius, only the titles and number of the texts are indicated. The number of the chapters refers to Translation and Annotation of Analects of Confucius by Yang Bojun. 2 Yongye, 6:3. 3 Those Who First Learn, 11:7.

On the educational thought of Confucianism 171 4 The Analects of Confucius has it that “Morality: Yan Yuan, Min Ziqian, Ran Boniu and Zhonggong. Etiquette: Zai Wo and Zigong. Administrative talents: Ran You and Jilu. Letters: Ziyou and Zixia”. (from Those Who First Learn). 5 Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Miao Li, China Social Sciences Press, 1992, p. 25. 6 Yang Huo, Chapter 17:8. 7 aRete is translated today into moral character in the ancient Greek language. Originally it meant strong points and abilities. 8 The remark of Cheng Yi may refer to What Was Fond of Learning, from Collected Works of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, 1980, p. 577. 9 Rites of Zhou has it that “By the Six Classical Arts, they are rites, music, archery, riding, writing, arithmetic”. Interpretation of Zhou Rites, Zhonghua Book Company, 1987, p. 756). The Book of Rites has it that “The official in charge of music had faith in four learnings and set up four subjects. He continued to use The Book of Songs, The Book of History, The Book of Rites and The Book of Music which were formulated by the former kings to cultivate talent personnel. The Book of Rites and The Book of Music were used in spring and autumn while The Book of Songs and The Book of History were used in winter and summer (from Interpretation of The Book of Rites), Zhonghua Book Company, 1989, p. 364). 10 I Am a Transmitter. 7:25. 11 Those Who First Learn. 11:3. 12 Prince Ling of Wei. 15:31. 13 I Am a Transmitter. 7:3. 14 To Learn and . . . 1:6. 15 Ibid, 1:7. 16 Ibid, 1:14. 17 Those Who First Learn. 11:25. 18 Ran Yong. 6:27. 19 Ibid, 6:3. 20 Zizhang. 19:7. 21 The Book of Rites: Yanyi. 22 Governing. 2:12. 23 Zilu. 13:4. 24 Yang Huo . . . 17:4. 25 To Learn and . . . 1:6. 26 Neighborhood . . . 4:8. 27 Taibo . . . 8:13. 28 I Am a Transmitter . . . 7:6. 29 Zizhang . . . 19:7. 30 Plato Complete Works, Vol. I, translated by Wang Xiaochao, Zuo’an Public Cultural Undertakings Co., Ltd, p. 474. 31 Zhou Dunyi’s remark refers to Chapter 20 Learning from the Sage from Almanac, Collected Works of Zhou Dunyi, Zhonghua Book Company, 1990, p. 29. Cheng Hao’s remark refers to “What Was Yan Hui Fond of Learning?” from Collected Works of Cheng Hao and Cheng Xi, Zhonghua Book Company, 1980, p. 577. 32 Xunzi: Encouraging Learning. 33 Yuan Xian asked . . . 14:24. 34 Yan Yuan. 12:1. 35 Prince Ling of Wei. 15:33. 36 Yuan Xian asked . . . 14:12. 37 Book of Master Guanzhong: Shuyan. 38 Xunzi: Encouraging Learning. 39 History of Academic Ideas of Song and Yuan: History of Academic Ideas of Baiyuan.

14 Towards real world culture – multi-element universalism in the era of globalization

In the historical philosophy of ancient Confucianism, the analytic framework of “reason-tendency” was often used to observe history. By tendency, it means becoming a realistic tendency. By reason, it refers to rules, principles and ideals. Tendency, more often than not, is related to reality and inevitability while reason is often associated with rationality. The two have both division and integration. One would be marginalized by history if deviating from the developmental reality of history and indulging in empty talk on ideals and justice. However, if “reasontendency oneness” is unconditional, it means that “all that is realistic is rational”. As a result, we lose the strength to criticize and guide history and modern times and obliterate man’s active participation in and transformation to history. Therefore, in terms of its original meaning, the appearance of “reason-tendency” analysis emphasizes not only man’s awareness of the trend of historical development but also man’s and man’s moral ideal’s function towards criticism and transformation of history. As people often said in the past, “historical trend is irresistible”. Here, historical trend is tendency. As a matter of fact, tendency or historical trend has its historical inevitability. However, it is not necessarily completely reasonable and able to be guided. However, if one acts against the historical trend, he will inevitably be doomed to failure. The appropriate attitude should be “giving consideration to both reason and tendency”. This chapter will analyse the issue of globalization on the basis of this view.

One: the end and the beginning of history The late 1980s to the early 1990s saw the end of the Cold War. Fukuyama claimed the “end” of history in haste. Meanwhile, the word “globalization” appeared timely, which seemed to declare the “beginning” of another history. As a matter of fact, these two events did have some relevance. Since the end of the Cold War, the modern market economy has eventually brought the whole world under its domination, and many politicians have seen the prospect of global convergence of political systems. In this sense, the end of the Cold War was indeed the basis of the popularity of the concept of “globalization”. Globalization in this sense is the evolution of the world system from “differentiation” to “convergence”.

Towards real world culture 173 Another impetus to the popularity of the concept of globalization came from the new technological revolution. In the 1980s computers were popularized throughout the world, and Internet technology and application have developed since the 1990s, bringing about fundamental changes in ways of communication of the contemporary world. Information technology develops with each passing day, causing a series of revolutionary changes. With the networked updating of modern communication technology, financial and trade means, various information flows freely at super speed in a large-scale between the countries. Moreover, the time and space people experience are more greatly compressed than ever before. In the information age, the world is lined together at a higher speed. Every corner of the world has a better knowledge about other parts of the world than ever before. In this information age, the distance from “center” to “the margin” is rapidly shortened.1 In the contemporary world, political and technological factors have changed to a large extent. From now on, capital can flow freely and appreciate globally without any fundamental obstacle.2 Division of labour in production and the world market of products formed since the 19th century have more deeply and more closely linked not only economic manufacturing and consumption at this new stage but also and even people of different countries. Economic globalization is an indisputable fact. It was under this condition that Secretary General BoutrosGhali declared in 1992 that “the era of globalization has come true”. The aforementioned three aspects constitute the general “tendency” of globalization of the contemporary world. It has the following implications. The integration of economic globalization and the linking of information make the world more integrated as a whole. In the contemporary world, the economic, technological and political development of any country cannot be divorced from the web of the world. In other words, any effort in development, if isolated from the world, would be in vain and doomed to failure in the contemporary world. Today, faced with economic and technological globalization and the requirement for propelling political democratization thus incurred, we must adopt the attitude of “overall sustaining”, comprehensively enhancing communication with the world, accelerating progress in scientific civilization and learning modern enterprise systems and management systems and pushing forward the continuous improvement of political civilization. We must, starting from the fundamental interest of the Chinese nation, take full advantage of the opportunities brought about by globalization, draw on the advantages and avoid disadvantages and vigorously develop productivity. We must promote the modernization drive with the help of globalization to establish, while actively integrating into the trend of globalization, a society which adapts to the development and trend of the world and promote the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. This is our basic attitude towards globalization. However, this is not the focus of this chapter. The key point of this chapter is not to discuss the “tendency” of globalization but also to analyse the “reason” within it, particularly the cultural orientation of globalization, so that we not only become the participants of

174  Towards real world culture globalization but also always carefully analyse globalization and bring into full play the strength of the East and push forward globalization in an ideal orientation.

Two: course of globalization: universal contact and interdependence If we expand our historical field of vision and set so-called “globalization” (which has come up during the past few years) against the development of modern world history and see it from the perspective of the evolutionary process of the “modernization drive”, in a manner of speaking, globalization is actually a new stage of the modernization development of world history and a new stage of the integrative process of different regions of the world. Of course, globalization is also a new state of global capitalist development.3 In this sense, discussions on the word “globalization” took place in the 1990s, but analysis on the trend of globalization may be at least traced back to the theory on “the world history” which was created in the mid-19th century by Marx and Engels.4 Admittedly, globalization has become an explanatory theme. The various interpretations it incurs cover many fields concerning the social practice of human beings. Therefore, if we view the concept of globalization which rose and became popular since the 1990s as globalization in the narrow sense (namely, referring to the new development period of the world based on the information technological revolution since the end of the Cold War), we must reflect on and respond to the idiosyncrasy of the globalization movement and turn back to the concept of globalization in the broad sense (namely, theoretical thinking concerning the deepening contact of the world since the 19th century). The most important of this was Marx’s thought on “globalization”. As early as in The German Ideology, Marx pointed out that as the seclusion of national contacts was eliminated with each passing day, the existence of human beings was no longer “regional existence” but “existence” in the sense of world history. “History” is becoming a “world history”. That is to say, “history” in the past was a history in which people in different regions had no contact or little contact. The world in that era existed not as integrated one, namely, it existed not as a unified world in which people had close contact. Therefore, there was no history of the integrated world featuring close contact. The history of an integrated world with close contact was called “world history” by Marx. Therefore, in contrast to the history in which contact was undeveloped in the past, “world history” is a history of existence featuring the integration of all parts of the world. As far as Marx was concerned, historical development of modern times is a process through which “history” in the past featuring insufficient contact marches towards “world history” featuring universal contact. He pointed out that this “transformation of history into world history” is not abstract but may be clarified with empirical facts. If Britain invents a machine, it will rob numerous Indian and Chinese laborers of their rice bowls and give rise to a change in the whole means of survival

Towards real world culture 175 of these countries, then this invention has become a reality in the sense of world history.5 Surely, technological inventions cannot bring about this result alone. As a matter of fact, its revolutionary function is associated with the formation of the world market. As the bourgeoisie have tapped the world market, production and consumption of all countries have become cosmopolitan . . . the establishment of new industry has become an issue which is of vital importance to all civilized nations. What the industry processes is no longer local materials but materials from remote areas. Moreover, their products are supplied not only to customers of the country but also to other parts of the world. The old needs which were satisfied by domestic products have been replaced by new needs for the products made in very remote countries and areas. The previous selfsufficiency and self-seclusion of a region and a nation have been replaced by the exchanges and interdependence between different nations and places.6 Marx views the essence of this history in the sense of world history as the “universal contact on the basis of the interdependence of mankind”.7 It is thus clear that the “cosmopolitan” development revealed by Marx in the mid-19th century was essentially consistent with the globalization we face at present. The main point of the former was to point out the “universal contact” and “interdependence” between countries and people of the world in this era.8 However, Marx himself did not use the word “globalization” but in most cases used concepts like “world history” and “in the sense of world history” so as to point out the worldlization of history and the worldlization of contact. In this sense, Marx himself was more inclined to accept the concept of “worldlization”. As far as he was concerned, in essence, both 19th century “worldlization” and today’s socalled “globalization” are “the universal contact and interdependence of human beings”. In this regard, today’s globalization, in a manner of speaking, is “the comprehensive expansion and deepening of universal contact and interdependence of the world”.

Three: the trend and structure of “globalization” Observed from this perspective, globalization, as we see, is actually a new development stage and a form of “worldlization” spoken of by Marx. Historically speaking, the prosperity of modern European commerce and trade could not spontaneously lead to a world market but only required a world market. None of the discovery of the new continent, the opening of new sea-route and the development of great industry and the commercial revolution could spontaneously lead to a world market. It was through modern tools of war used by colonialists and imperialists that the door of the non-Western world was opened, forcing the countries involved into modern civilization and facilitating the formation of the world

176  Towards real world culture market. This was what is known as the earliest globalization movement. So, while the world market was taking shape, the worldwide relation of subordination took shape. As Marx said, “Just as it made the countryside subordinate to the city, it made uncivilized nations subordinate to civilized countries, peasants’ race to bourgeois race and the East to the West”.9 The globalization we face today still intensifies this subordinate structure and power relations in the sense of world history. The “subordination” phenomenon Marx pointed out not only vividly reveals the historical features of global contact for more than a century but also is the general trend of modern history. The reality of history always develops through “tendency”. However, “tendency” is the reality of history, but reality is not equal to rationality. After all, reality is unity of opposites and often includes rationality and irrationality. The development course of world history over the past 100-plus years is realized in a “subordinate” structure historically formed. This subordinate structure, in terms of its worldlization, is featured by “making the East subordinate to the West”. Therefore, whatever it is, be it worldlization or globalization, has never been abstract but happens and goes on in some historical condition, a power relation in and some pattern of conflict of interests. The four “subordinatetos” Marx spoke of were such a historical reality. “Globalization” has become an interdisciplinary word most frequently used in our times. However, its definition varies greatly. Among various wordings about “globalization”, the most widely used is the term “economic globalization”. In this sense, “globalization means that various production factors or resources freely flow worldwide to realize the optimal allocation of production factors or resources worldwide”, hence becoming a frequently used definition. The terms “freely” and “global” are used as compared to the unit of a national state. However, globalization is a historical course. It is developed in some subordination structure and the pattern of conflict of interests between national states. As a matter of fact, globalization which is real and takes place in history is as far from as free as what neo-liberalism preaches. The flow of resources, technology and management are, in essence, the flow of capital. At present, the world witnesses economic integration. Flow of these production factors is much faster than ever before and takes place at all corners of the globe. However, free flow of labour force has always been a fantasy due to the licencing system of national states. In the age of globalization, developed countries become more and more rejective to an immigrant labour force. Flow of energy is globally monitored by the US hegemony. The United States not only controls oil resources in the Middle East but also restricts oil transportation at sea with its global naval supremacy. Although China has entered into the World Trade Organization (WTO), access to Chinese goods has been under heavy pressure from Europe and the United States. Europe and the United States have never given up their policy of trade conservatism to protect their national interests. This is especially true in the trade of military products. For example, the trade between Israel and China has always been thwarted by the United States. It is thus clear that Western developed countries have always prohibited globalization from hindering their national interests. Here,

Towards real world culture 177 the interest of national states is always “here”. If we say that Western developed countries do not stress national states somewhere, there are surely some other regional or international organizations which represent their collective interests. In this sense, freedom under globalization is developed in the given international political and economic order. The rules of this order, as a matter of fact, are set up by the Western developed countries, and its framework is a framework which takes their interests as the cardinal principle. “Free” is possible only when flow of capital and other production factors takes place on the premise of neither influencing this pattern nor reducing the vested interest of the developed countries. Therefore, the result of globalization is not that all countries on the globe can gain benefits. It is owing to this that what we see from the result of globalization is, more often than not, “capital spreads at every corner of the world and profits flow to the West”. Just as all liquids will flow with the function of potential energy, free flow of production factors is realized in some actual subordinate structure. The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 is a reminder that the expansion of globalization does not bring about benefits to all countries. As a matter of fact, non-developed countries are apt to become victims. The “September 11” terrorist attack in 2001 resulted in a change in the national security policy of the United States, which is sufficient proof that the era of “post national-states” and “post-sovereignty era” is pretty remote. As a matter of fact, the United States pushes forward and plays a leading role in globalization. This requires the globalization of the production mode of the United States and other Western developed countries as well as that economic relations be suitable to their mode of production. The United States strives for thorough globalization of the US-dominated world economic order. Moreover, it includes the globalization of their political values and politic system so as to “make the East subordinate to the West”. In the 1990s, the world did not become a unitary whole, and conflicting races and religions still existed. National states were much more powerful than transnational corporations, and war and conflicts, rather than peace, were characteristic of this era. However, this realistic clairvoyance does not mean to reject globalization but rather make us more aware of the general trend of the past century and understand that globalization brings about not only benefits but also risks. Moreover, we must have a clear idea of the dual-sidedness of globalization and actively get a clear understanding that globalization provides us with an opportunity to catch up with, participate in and share the latest achievements of civilization created by the world. Capital has no motherland. The activeness of multinational companies in the era of globalization has proved this.10 The nature of capital is to pursue profits. Therefore, capital has always striven to combine with a low price labour force. In the 19th century, newly developing Western capitalist countries took “low price products” as heavy artillery to destroy all the “Great Walls” in the East. Since the 1960s, the investment of multinational companies has been oriented to the Third World, which features the development of capitalism in this period. It is true that settlement of capital in the Third World is to earn profit, but it is multifunctional. First, it is a capital source to tackle the issue of the shortage

178  Towards real world culture of capital of the late-developing countries. Second, it creates job opportunities for local labour forces. Third, it taps the international market for the products of these countries. Fourth, it provides a condition for the internationalization of local technology, market and management. As a result, late-developing countries gain the opportunity to increase their strength and develop their productive force through extensive participation in a globalized division of labour and connecting to the advanced achievements of civilization. The active flow of transnational capital provides backward countries with an opportunity to enter the competition in industrialization, which can, in most cases, hardly be accomplished independently by national states themselves. However, in determining the policy and development strategy on whether to actively participate in the course of globalization, the role of national states does not disappear but plays an essential role in the globalization process.

Four: cultural globalization: changing “Westernization” into “worldlization” As a matter of fact, this chapter focuses not on globalized economy, technology and politics but on culture, namely, cultural relations in the era of globalization. From the perspective of the practice of globalization, economy and culture may be discussed separately.11 For example, the wave of economic globalization has swept all over the world and has met little objection in the Third World. However, culturally, an increasingly louder call for laying emphasis on local, national and indigenous features has arisen. Moreover, these calls come not only from non-Western countries but also from European countries.12 In a theory on reason and qi in ancient China, there existed the views of “strong qi but weak reason” and “resisting the tendency with reason”.13 Provided that qi may give expression to the concept of reality and inevitability as “tendency” does, and if “reason” may express the concept of rationality, in a matter of speaking, if globalization is observed from this perspective, qi is strong but reason is weak in the global economic field. In contrast, in the global cultural field, reason may resist this tendency and the guiding function of concepts to reality may be more expressed in the cultural field. Reflecting on the close contact between the history of all nations of the world since the 19th century, the process of the cultural communication and integration of different parts of the world from the perspective of culture, namely introspection on the course and features of globalization from the cultural perspective, there have been quite a few explanations in this regard in recent years with Roland Robertson as a representative: However, let’s go back to Marx: Local and national self-efficiency and self-seclusion in the past has been replaced by the interchanges and interdependence between nations in all aspects. So have material and intellectual production. The intellectual products of all nations have become public property. Moreover, one-sidedness and

Towards real world culture 179 limitation of nations have become increasingly impossible. Therefore, various national and local literatures have become world literature.14 Here, “one-sidedness and limitation of nations” is not only true in the East but also applicable in the West. Obviously, culturally, what Marx advocated was by no means that “the East belongs to the West”. As a matter of fact, what he affirmed was “the intellectual products of all nations have become public property” and “various national and local literatures have become world literature”. This viewpoint, in a manner of speaking, not only refers to literature but also represents his cosmopolitan view on the whole field of humanities. From this standpoint, world literature, world historiography and world philosophy not only cover the distinctive features of different parts and nations of the world but also transcend the cultural scope of a confined single place and nation. By no means do they cover the cultures of all nations and regions with European paradigm and features. From philosophical perspective, in the era of globalization, cultural understanding, based on the West-centralism since modern times, must be changed. The view that only Western philosophy is philosophy has become a view which falls behind the experience of the frequent contacts between oriental and Western cultures. In the era of worldlization, we should interpret philosophy as culture. In other words, “philosophy” is “universality”, a concept of “family similarity”, a theoretical thinking on the universe and life in the Western, Indian and Chinese civilizations. Moreover, it is the collective name of the theoretical thinking of all nations on the universe and life and a concept of world philosophy. In this sense, Western philosophy is not the standard of philosophy but a particularity of philosophy and an example. Therefore, the name of “philosophy” should not be something with special meaning in the Western tradition but an all-inclusive universal concept of the multicultural world. On the one hand, Chinese philosophy differs from Western philosophy in scope. On the other hand, the former’s problems are different from those of the latter. This does not hinder itself from being Chinese philosophy but precisely serves as a reflection of the unity of universality and particularity. Therefore, one of the major tasks of philosophers of non-Western countries is to initiate a “philosophy” concept in a broad sense and promote it worldwide and deconstruct the standpoint of West-centralism on the basis of the understanding of the concept of “philosophy”. Only in this way can cross-cultural philosophical dialogues be promoted and philosophical wisdom of human beings be developed in the 21st century. If philosophical understanding in the future is still subject to the European tradition or a narrower tradition of “Anglo-American analysis” and if humanistic wisdom of philosophy and value guidance cannot be reflected, the future of human beings in the 21st century will not be better than in the 20th century.15 The word “globalize”, if used as a verb, should refer to the fact that a certain factor is carried out, popularized and accepted in all parts of the world. In this sense, the word has its subject. For example, in “globalization of the market economy”, its subject is “market economy”. Another example: In “globalization

180  Towards real world culture of American culture”, the subject is “American culture”. However, as a matter of fact, the word “globalization” is used by numerous politicians, media and scholars, most of whom are not in favour of this subject-based interpretation of globalization. Culturally, the reason is obvious. Globalization with a subject is monistic, which means that unitary things are used to assimilate, cover and replace global cultural diversity. Moreover, it means homogenization, simplification and complanation. This is extremely culturally harmful. On the other hand, globalization with a subject is generally known as Westernization, or even viewed as using US political and economic systems, values and cultural ideology as its subject. Inevitably, this will give rise to its tension with national identity and cultural traditions of different parts of the world. Such a tendency and trend do exist in the globalization process of the real world. In particular, globalization dominated and pushed forward by the United States has always developed towards this direction. This naturally arouses the vigilance and query of people from most European and Asian countries.16 Based on this viewpoint, more people agree to regard cultural globalization as a process of “inter-infiltration and integration” of different cultures on the globe and even as a process of mingling.17 Such a concept of globalization more represents a state of globalization instead of the fact that a certain single centre melts others. It is thus clear that the word “globalization” may be either qualitative or postural. That is to say, globalization may be interpreted as a global state which needs no subject. Adapting to this era, some new and multielement concept of cosmopolitan culture and interpretation must be developed. Finally, in practice, globalization and localization are complementary. This is true to glocalization. From this perspective, globalization should have multi-subjects so that plural globalization is formed. As a result, many efforts for globalization compete and influence each other, hence a colourful picture of exchanges in the era of globalization. In this sense, globalization is a competition platform and a technology mechanism. Anything may have what it desires globalized with the help of the technology mechanism of the contemporary world.

Five: multiple-universality of value Globalization offers new opportunities to oriental civilization, bringing about a fundamental change in the imbalance between oriental culture and Western culture. Therefore, we cannot view globalization as an exterior objective process. Instead, globalization should be seen as a participating, actively selective and changing practice process. This, as a matter of fact, involves the issue of cultural identity. In China, the issue of cultural identity has all along been inextricably tied up with the disputes between ancient and modern times and between the East and the West. Globalization gets much involved in the issues between ancient and modern times and between the East and the West. Discussion on globalization and discussion on modernization are somewhat similar. The two differ only in forms and angles. For example, in the Enlightenment Movement in the early period of China’s modernization, such discussions were featured by the West versus

Towards real world culture 181 the East. In theories on modernization, the discussions are characterized by tradition versus modern. In the exposition and argumentation on globalization, the discussion features globalization versus endemicity. These discussions are related to a fundamental concern, i.e., the fate of tradition in modern times and how to treat tradition and how to deal with cultural identity. The local tradition we here talk of does not refer to the places of small tribes and regions which anthropologists often deal with but to the traditions of non-Western traditions such as Indian civilization, Chinese civilization and Arabian civilization. In a manner of speaking, globalization has presented a trend and made this question tougher, that is, in the present world of globalization, those who have political and economic strength are likely to cover other cultural and civilization creations. Moreover, as the idea of economic globalization is most persuasive, in this sense, what globalization highlights is still the global development of instrumental rationality. It is precisely because of this that the challenges encountered in globalization are the same as those in the modernization drive such as the issues of the imbalance between instrumental rationality and value rationality. For example, Schmidt, a senior German politician, pointed out that the issues of moral degeneracy brought about by non-globalization merit our attention. Philosophically, the globalization of a thing or a factor in a certain historical process indicates that it has an idiosyncrasy that can be universalized itself and that such an idiosyncrasy receives external realization. As the early modernization process was historically featured by Westernization, from Weber to Parsons, ethically, Western culture is viewed as universalism and oriental culture as particularism. This means that only Western culture and its value have universality and can be universalized and that oriental culture and its value have only particularity and cannot be universalized. Consequently, the relationship between Eastern values and Western values is reduced to a contradiction between “universalism” and “particularism”. This view, used in globalization, means making the globe Westernized so as to realize “globalization”. Thus, the discussion on globalization is linked up with the discussion on modernization. “Modernization” requires the process from ancient times to modern times. It means moving from ancient to modern times and highlights the contradiction between “the ancient” and “the modern”. In contrast, “globalization” requires “being applicable everywhere”. It means the four directions, up and down, and highlights the contradiction between the “East” and the “West”. Advocates of modernization in the 1960s highlighted the opposition between “tradition” and “modern”, requiring late-developing countries and regions abandon their traditional cultural values and embrace modernization. Globalists in the 1990s emphasized the antagonism between “the global” and the “the local”, striving to cover locality with globalization. It is thus clear that the issues ranging from modernization to globalization, and from ancient to modern times, have always been the central issue of culture. From the perspective of Confucianism, directing at the modernization theory, we stress that ancient wisdom is still of modern significance. In terms of globalism, we emphasize that oriental wisdom boasts universal value. As a matter of fact, both pertinences stress

182  Towards real world culture the universal meaning and permanent value of cultural tradition—non-Western cultural tradition in particular. The only difference is that one emphasizes time while the other emphasizes space. First of all, with the help of the concept of locality, it must be seen that whatever age of industrial technology human beings live in, their direct order of life is parochial. Living outside modern life, man requires moral life, spiritual life and heart-to-heart talk. Moral order is undertaken by local cultures. So are religious beliefs. After all, from ancient to modern times, there has never been, and there is not likely to be, a global religion that may replace all local religions and become a common religion observed by all human beings on the earth. A diversified moral system and religious system is the reality of the world, and no change is likely to take place in the coming centuries. On the other hand, local cultures may have their universality and can be universalized. Take Buddhism as an example. Buddhism is a world religion. However, it still has its locality. This same is true to Confucianism. It is thus clear that globalization and localization are not completely separated but inter-penetrating. As a matter of fact, neither religion, be it Buddhism or Confucianism, was, historically, a pure local culture but spread with the possibility of spreading. Both achieved worldliness in East Asia in modern times and developed worldliness on a larger scale. Such wide spreading itself indicates that Buddhism and Confucianism in the East have the property of universalization and that their contents are of universal significance. Therefore, we must try to establish a concept of “multiple-universality”. In his book entitled Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, Robertson, an American sociologist, pointed out that “specialization of universalism” and “generalization of particularism” are the dual process of the complementarity of globalization. Specialization of universalism refers to “the integration of universal truth and (local) specific reality”. Universalism, according to the book, refers to the modern economy, political system, management system and basic values which the West developed first. It may also be called “global localization”. In contrast, generalization of particularism refers to the fact that the value and identity of particularity are more and more of global universality. As long as the national groups or aboriginal groups give up various essentialism of various special forms and integrate into the globalization process with an open mind, their ethnic cultures or local knowledge may obtain the universal significance of globalization. This is what “local globalization” means.18 This view of Robertson’s is of much significance, but his view is far from sufficient to illustrate the universality of oriental civilization. As far as we’re concerned, such “general” and “special” concepts differ from each other only in time. As a matter of fact, the West had itself realized in the general sense while the East is still at the initial stage of having its locality realized as universality. The inherent universality of spiritual value is not determined by the degree of external realization. As far as we’re concerned, both Western and oriental spiritual civilizations have universality intrinsically. This may be called “intrinsic universality”. However, whether the intrinsic universality can be realized depends on many external and historical conditions. What is realized may be called “realized universality”.

Towards real world culture 183 Therefore, seriously speaking, in the spiritual and value levels, we must acknowledge that both oriental and Western civilizations have their universality and universalism except for their differences and different degrees realized in different historic periods. This is what is called “multiple-universality”.19 Justice, freedom, rights and reason individuality are the value of universalism. So are benevolence, equality, responsibilities, sympathy and associations.20 In The Cultures and Philosophies between East and West, a work in his early period, Liang Shuming was devoted to revealing this view. Today, only by establishing the concept of multi-element universality in globalization can all cultural types of the world be relativized and equalized.21 In this sense, if the transition of culture was featured by Westernization at the first stage of globalization, it is likely that in its second stage the West goes back to the West, hence Western culture returning to the relativization status which is identical with oriental culture. In this sense, with respect to the fact that the Western standpoint of pluralism highlights politics of recognition,22 we, in terms of the cultural relations against globalization, stress “cultures of recognition”. This means recognizing the multi-universality of culture and civilization and dealing with the relations between different cultures and civilizations on the basis of such a principle. Naturally, such a standpoint is a standpoint of a cosmopolitan cultural pluralism, proposing the decentralization of global cultural relations and advocating polycentrism, namely, cosmopolitan multiculturalism. Philosophically speaking, past habits suggest that universality is unitary and that multi-element means particularity. As a matter of fact, multi-element does not necessarily mean being particular or special. Whether multi-universality is possible and how to make it possible should become a question for discussion and philosophical reflection in this era of globalization. Let’s go back to Confucian philosophy. In terms of globalization, some scholars have used “reason-differentiation” in Neo-Confucianism to explain that all religious traditions of the East and the West are special forms of expression of the universal truth. Besides, all have values of their own and shared possibility, which is used to promote dialogues between civilizations. This is of great value.23 What I would like to add is from the perspective of Confucian philosophy three levels serve to illustrate the point. First, “one qi is for one reason while ten thousand qis is ten thousand reasons”. Here, qi may be interpreted as the entity of civilization (and places and regions), and reason refers to the value system. In fact, every special entity of civilization has its own value system. The values of all entities of civilization are reasons with their own uniqueness and universality.24 The second one is “harmony but not sameness”. Different civilizations and religions on the globe should have a “harmonious” relation. “Harmonious” does not mean oneness but coexistence featuring diversity, pluralism and distinctiveness. “Sameness” means oneness, homogeneity and unity. This is the most ideal global cultural relation at present. The third one is “reason-differentiation”, which means seeking agreement in discrepancies and striving for the common ideal of human beings on earth. In his Variorum on the Four Books (the four books refer to Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, The Analects of Confucius and Mencius), Zhu Xi held that

184  Towards real world culture “reason and tendency are certain” and “reason and tendency are inevitable”. Seen from this view, globalization is “the tendency of nature”, and man may and should capitalize on the trend. Only by combining the certainty of reason and qi with their inevitability can history progress towards the ideal direction man desires.

Notes 1 In the 1960s, McLuhan put forward in accordance with the development of communication information “the world as a global village”, which is universally acknowledged as the origin of exposition and argumentation on globalization. 2 During the Asian Financial Crisis, John Kenneth Galbraith (1908–2006) claimed in a news interview that Americans invented the concept of globalization to make their overseas investment respected and promote international capital flow. Discourses of Globalization, Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2002, p. 207. 3 Roland Robertson believed that the early state of globalization may be traced back to Europe in the early 15th century. This may refer to his thesis entitled “Locating Globalization: Globalization as the Central Concept”. This article was published in Perspective, Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2002, p. 14; it may also refer to his work Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, translated by Liang Guangyan, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2000. 4 Refer to Feng Ziyi & Yang Xuegong: Marx’s “World History” Theory and Globalization, People’s Publishing House, 2002. This article quotes Marx’s literature, all of which comes from this book. So, no notes will be given below. 5 Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, pp. 88–89. 6 Ibid, p. 273. 7 Ibid. 8 Modern scholars have an interpretation of globalization similar to that of Marx. “Globalization” may be defined as the enhancement of social relations worldwide. This relation means connecting other remote areas in the way one thing is influenced by what happens in another remote area. From Perspective, p. 107. 9 Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, pp. 266–277. 10 Robert Cox said, “Multinationals and banks are the major media of globalization”. Refer to his article “Seeing Globalization from Different Perspectives”, which is included in Perspective, p. 19. 11 Roland Robertson also thinks that the political and economic expansion of the world system is not symmetrical to culture. Refer to Pedigree of Theory on Globalization, Human People’s Publishing House, 2002, p. 126. 12 Leslie Sklair said, “The competition appeal of local culture resisting the strength of globalization has put itself to sociology worldwide and the agenda of cultural and political study”. Refer to his article “Competing Concepts of Globalization”, which is included in Perspective, p. 41. 13 The view of strong qi and weak reason was initiated by Zhu Xi of the Song Dynasty; the view of resisting tendency with reason started from Lü Kun of the Ming Dynasty. 14 Communist Manifesto, Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. I, People’s Publishing House, 2001, p. 276. 15 Refer to Chen Lai: Pursuit of Modern Chinese Philosophy, People’s Publishing House, 2001, p. 359. 16 Jonathan Friedman: Culture Identity and Global Process, The Commercial Press, 2003, p. 294. 17 Jean Ned Pieters: Globalization as Mingling, published in Perspective, Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2002, p. 103. 18 Refer to Pedigree on Globalization Theory, p. 131.

Towards real world culture 185 19 From the perspective of sociology, Lin Rui questioned the contradiction between universalism and particularism created by Weber-Parsons, thinking of the Confucian ethic as “contextualized universalism”. Refer to Lin Rui’s article “Confucian Ethic under Globalization”, which is included in Confucian Ethics and Legal Culture, China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2002, p. 187. 20 Tu Wei-ming conducted a survey among students in his course “Confucian Humanism” at Harvard on which of these two groups of values are important. According to Tu, students 10 years ago and students now make different choices. At present, more and more people agree that public benefit is more important than freedom, and sympathy than reason. For analysis on these two values, please refer to two papers of Tu Weiming’s: Globalization and Diversity; Globalization and Dialogue among Civilizations, Jiangsu Education Publishing House, 2005, and Global Ethics in the Era of Cultural Diversity (Confucian Tradition and the Enlightenment Mentality, Jiangsu Education Publishing House, 2005). 21 Refer to Pedigree on Globalization Theory, p. 129. 22 Refer to Charles Taylor: Politics of Recognition included in Cultures and Publicity, Joint Publishing Co., 1998. 23 Liu Shuxian: Global Ethics and Dialogues between Religions, Taipei Lixu Culture Company, 2001. 24 Seemingly, this runs the risk of relativism. However, in terms of opposing culture hegemony, it can yet be regarded as a foundation. The key is domain of discourse. In the domain of discourse of the world’s cultural pattern, what is concerned about is which is the major danger, cultural hegemony or cultural relativism? In a manner of speaking, hegemony is the main hazard in the relations between the world civilizations. It is without doubt that in the case of different domains of discourse, in terms of the cultural condition of a country, issues concerning relativism and nihilism merit our attention.

Postscript

Confucian culture has a profound history. Confucius, together with early Confucian thought, inherited three generations of civilizations, and the dominant values of the Xia, the Shang and the Zhou dynasties, establishing in the Axial Period a set system of thoughts and cultures concerning Heaven, the Earth and man. The history of Chinese culture indicates that Confucianism is the main body of Chinese culture in that it has not only laid a foundation for the core value of Chinese culture but also historically played an active role in inheriting and developing Chinese civilization. China has a history of over 2,000 years. Numerous politicians, thinkers and intellectuals have been dedicated, at the cost of their lives and energy, to participating in the construction, inheritance and development of this great tradition, playing an irreplaceable role in forging Chinese civilization and character. In this sense, Confucianism and Confucius have become a spiritual symbol of Chinese civilization. Since modern times, Confucian culture and Confucian values have been comprehensively criticized by the Chinese people who have been pursuing prosperity and progress. Consequently, while Confucianism has suffered from the most severe ordeal in culture and history, it has ushered in a new opportunity for the development of Confucian ideology and culture. Specifically, the developmental history of East Asia after the Second World War and the history of the 30-year reform on the Chinese mainland have shown that Confucianism has stood the impact of modernization and Western culture. Undergoing creative transformation, Confucianism has been vibrant with life in modern times and ushered in a new prospect for development. In particular, with the continuous deepening of China’s modernization since the late 1990s and the fast development of the country, the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games was a symbol of the success of China’s modernization of its initial stage. Throughout the world, the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been an indisputable fact. As China has developed in depth and breadth in its modernization drive, the great rejuvenation of Chinese civilization is no longer a distant dream. Today, the Chinese nation, in the surge of craze for traditional Chinese culture, has re-embraced its own traditional culture. Now, the Chinese people, with their own culture, value and confidence, go to the world with head high and chest out. Under this background and situation, it is of vital and self-evident significance to have in-depth study on Confucianism.

Postscript 187 Since the mid-20th century, Confucianism has been carried out in its interaction with modern culture. Various thoughts concerning modern culture have stimulated and challenged Confucian philosophy, ideology and culture. Such being the case, modern Confucianism must respond to and reflect on these challenges. While meeting the challenges and reflecting, it should, on the one hand, show solicitude for its cultural responsibilities and develop the modern thinking of Confucianism on the other hand. Although the chapters of this book feature intrinsic consistency in train of thought, they were completed in different periods catering to different specific needs. The following is an introduction to the writing of the chapters. “Confucius and Modern China” was the plenary lecture presented by me to the executive chairman of the meeting of The Third Forum of Chinese Culture Forum in the summer of 2007. It was published in 2007 in the magazine Reading (11). “Whose Justice and What Ethics? – Confucian Ethics and a Global Ethic”, published in Reading (10) in 1998, is a response to the Confucian political ethics provided in accordance with Declaration toward a Global Ethic, a text by Kong Hansi and some others. “Confucianism and Power Discourse” was written on the basis of the paper presented in my two-time (1995 and 1996) participation in the Sino-US Seminar on Confucianism and Human Rights held at Fragrant Hill, Beijing. This paper is included in Dialogue Two: Confucianism and Taoism and Christianity. “The Confucian Tradition and Public Intellectuals” was a paper for the symposium Public Intellectuals and Modern China held at East China Normal University in 2002. It is included in the book entitled Publicness and Public Intellectuals edited by Xu Jilin in 2003. “Ecological Orientation and Modern Interpretation of the Confucian Doctrine of Benevolence” was my paper for the symposium, The Fourth Session of International Conference on Confucian-Christian Dialogue, I attended at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1998. This paper was published in periodical History of Chinese Philosophy (1999:2). “Confucian Ritual Study and Modern Society” was a paper for the International Conference on Study of Confucian Rituals held in Chonnam National University in 1999 and published in Study on Confucius (2001:1). “The Confucian Views on the Dialogue between Confucius and Jesus – Noumenon and Origin” was included in the book Dialogue: Confucianism, Taoism and Christianity edited by He Guanghu and Xu Zhiwei in 1998. “Confucianism and Modern East Asia” was a paper for the International Seminar on East Asian Traditional Thoughts held in Fukuoka, Japan, in 1994, and it was published in the magazine The East (1994:3) in 1994. “Confucian Ethics and China’s Modernization” is adapted on the basis of a paper for the Fourth Conference on Chinese Culture and Modernization. Parts of the paper were published in the magazine The 21st Century (1994:2). “Modern Chinese Culture and the Predicament of Confucianism” was a paper for the Academia Sinica the Second International Conference on Sinology held in

188  Postscript Taiwan. It was included in the book Confucianism and the Modern World by Liu Shuxian and published in 1997. “The Three Themes on Early Chinese Political Philosophy” was a paper for the Symposium on Political Philosophy held in Capital Normal University in September 2006 and was published in Tianjin Social Sciences (2007:2). “On Moral Politics – The Idiosyncrasy of Confucian Political Philosophy” was a paper for The International Conference on Chinese Philosophy held at Fu Jen Catholic University in 2009 and was published in Tianjin Social Sciences (2010:1). “On the Educational Thought of Confucianism” was a paper for The Ninth Oriental and Western Philosophers Conference I attended at Hawaii in 2005 and was published in Journal of Peking University (2005:5). “Towards Real World Culture – Multi-element Universalism in the Era of Globalization” was a paper for the Annual Alumni Association of Harvard-Yenching Institute in 2005 and published in Literature, History and Philosophy (2006:2). In the course of writing, much retort, stimulation and help from friends of mine triggered my thinking. Writing of some chapters of this book and adaptation, revision and editing of the chapters of this book received subsidies from Kai Feng Foundation, for which I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks. Chen Lai January 8, 2011

Index

academic intellectuals 8 acting rightly 148 – 149 adult(s) 66, 143, 169 Advantages of East Asia (Hofheinz and Calder) 103 Aeolus 73 all things are in one 52 – 53 Almanac (Zhou Dunyi) 78, 165, 171n31 Ames, Roger T. 64 – 65 Analects of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, The 46 – 49, 90n32, 90n34, 90n48, 90n50, 90n66, 90n69 Analects of Confucius, The 146, 149 ancient and modern, east and west 5, 83, 180 ancient Confucianism 18, 153 anti-Confucianism 106, 127 anti-feudal ethical code 57 anti-rightist movement 29 anti-Semitism 23 anti-traditionalism 128 Aristotle 69, 135, 153, 155, 159, 165 artistic idiosyncrasy 57 asceticism 111, 113 – 114 Asian modernities 15 Asian value 15 assimilation 110, 112 – 114, 116 awakening of faith in the mahayana 84 Babbitt, Irving 155 Ba Ben Sai Yuan Luan (Theory of Extirpating the Root of an Evil) (Wang Yangming) 51 Bellah, Robert 102 benevolence: as basis 98 – 99; Confucian culture centered on 104; early Chinese political philosophy and 153, 156; educational thought of Confucianism and 158 – 160, 162, 167 – 169; existence

45 – 46; multi-universalism and 183; nature 46 – 48; oneness 53 – 55; rule by 137, 150; value orientation 50 – 53; as virtue 121, 125; watching things 48 – 50 Berger, Peter 104, 107 Boggs, Carl 38, 41 Book of Changes, The 47 – 49, 72, 75 – 78, 84, 89nn18 – 20, 90n65, 161, 163 Book of Documents, The 19 – 21, 72 – 74, 89n1, 135 – 140, 143, 146, 150 – 152, 161, 165 Book of Rites, The 59, 61 – 65, 67 – 69, 72, 96 – 98, 143, 161, 163 – 165, 171n9, 171n21 Book of Songs, The 59, 72 – 73, 89n2, 89nn4 – 7, 89n10, 161, 165, 171n9 Brandt, Willy 12 breath circulation 51 – 53 Buber, Martin 52 Buddhism 82 bureaucratization 6 Caishu 139 Cai Yuanpei 119, 125 Cai Zhong 139 Calder, K. E. 103 capital 177 capitalism 112 – 113; Protestant ethic and 107, 110 – 111 Capra, Fritjof 46 Cassirer, Ernst 45 Charge to Zhong of Cai, The 139 – 140 charisma routinization systems 6 Chen Duxiu 57, 120, 124, 130n2 Chen Fan 33 Cheng Hao 46 – 53, 78, 81, 84, 165, 171n31 Chen Huanzhang 124 Chen Yinque 125

190 Index Chiang Kai-shek 121, 125 China-centered planning industrialization 94 Chinese political philosophy 132 – 135; Heaven-PeopleOneness 135 – 139; Heaven-Rite Oneness 141 – 144; Heaven-Virtue Oneness 139 – 141 Chinese Religions: Confucianism and Taoism (Weber) 100n5, 107, 110, 112, 117n9 civil and political rights 26 – 27 code of conduct 61 Cold War ideology 2 collection of museum 2 collectivism 104 Commentaries on the Book of Changes 75 – 78, 84 Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals by Zuo Qiuming 59 “Comments on Confucius” (Yi Baisha) 120 communicative rationality 93, 99 Communism/Communists 2; distinguished from Confucianism 39 Communist Party of China 2, 126 community: East Asian culture and 92; global 12 – 13; modern Chinese culture and 114 – 115, 123, 129; moral politics and 153; Neo-Confucianism on 54; Protestant 111; ritual culture and 69 – 70; social ideal of world 58 complete work(s) 87 “Confucian capitalism” 103 – 104, 106 Confucian China 1, 44n19, 119 Confucian China and Its Modern Fate (Levenson) 1, 44n19, 44n21, 130n7 Confucian civilization 24 – 25 Confucian culture 186; China’s modernization and 101 – 104, 106 – 107, 109, 114 – 116; education thought of Confucianism and 169; global ethic and 15; modern China and 8, 10; modern Chinese culture and predicament of Confucianism and 118, 121, 126; modern East Asia and 97 – 98; power discourse and 18, 25; public intellectuals and 39; ritual culture and 58 Confucian ethics 185n19, 187; China’s modernization and 101 – 116; dialogue between Confucius and Jesus and 72; global ethics and 11 – 16; modern Chinese culture and predicament of

120 – 124, 126 – 127; modern East Asia and 95, 99 “Confucian Ethics and Economic Development: Rediscovery of Weber’s Doctrine” (Jin Yaoji) 105 Confucianism/Confucian school: China’s modernization and 106; dialogue between Confucius and Jesus and 72, 75, 99; early Chinese political philosophy and 145; educational thought of 160 – 161, 164 – 170; global ethic and 14; modern China and 1, 3, 8; modern Chinese culture and 119; moral politics and 151, 153; power distance and 17, 26; public intellectuals and 33, 36, 38 – 39, 55; ritual culture and 56 – 59, 67 – 69 Confucian scholars 31 – 48, 59, 67, 80, 82, 98, 119, 163, 168 Confucian tradition see traditions Confucius: birth of 157; education of 161; as figure returned from the past 2 conscience 12, 32, 35, 41, 51, 54 – 55, 99, 104, 124 conservatism 129 cosmology 51, 54, 75 – 77, 79 – 80, 84 countryside, rural ceremony and etiquette in the 66 courtesy and etiquette 58 Cox, Robert 184n10 cultivation: of morality and receiving the way 163; of people and making them attain virtue 69 cultural circle 7, 25, 29, 43, 92 cultural conservatism 128 cultural crisis 126 – 128 cultural democracy 8 cultural development in East Asia 92 cultural globalization 178 – 180 cultural identity 1, 38, 127, 180 – 181 cultural imperialism 122 cultural mentality 4 cultural policies 2 cultural psychology 3 cultural radicalism 129 – 130 Cultural Revolution 1 – 3, 8, 29 cultural self-consciousness 1 cultural tradition 1, 5 culture: benevolence and 45; China’s modernization and 101 – 107, 109 – 110, 112 – 116; early Chinese political philosophy and 132, 134, 137 – 138, 141; educational thought of Confucianism

Index  191 and 157, 169; global ethic and 15; modern China and 1 – 3, 6 – 10; modern East Asia and 92 – 98; moral politics and 153, 155; multi-element universalism and globalization of 172 – 183; power discourse and 17 – 19, 24 – 25, 27 – 28; predicament of Confucianism and modern Chinese 118 – 130; public intellectuals and 30 – 34, 37 – 39, 41; ritual 56 – 59, 61, 63 – 71 culture-based explanation 103 Cultures and Philosophies between East and West, The (Liang Shuming) 183 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 25 Declaration on Responsibilities 12 Declaration toward a Global Ethic 11 dedicated to, concept of 6, 32, 34, 40 42, 53, 66, 78, 126 Democracy and Leadership (Babbitt) 155 Dharma 53, 84 dialogue between Confucius and Jesus 72; origin and ultimate source in 73 – 80; reality and nothingness in 80 – 83; transcending and intrinsic in 83 – 89 doctrine of oneness of all things on earth 53 doctrine of people’s will 138 doctrine of the Heaven highlighting virtue 140 Doctrine of the Mean, The 7, 35 – 36, 68, 72 – 75, 84, 86, 89n15, 90n64, 147, 183 doctrine on mental constitution and nature 83 dogmatism 129 – 130 Dong Guangbi 55 Dong Zhongshu 26, 76, 89n22 Duke Zhao of Lu 60 Du Yaquan 124, 131n15 Earth gods 73 East Asia, modern 92 – 93; benevolence and 98 – 99; culture-based versus structure-based explanation of 103; harmony in 95 – 98; tradition and modernity in 93 – 95 East Asian Civilization 92 ecological philosophy 53 edification 160 – 164 Educational Aim and its Implementation Policies 121 educational systems 4

educational thought of Confucianism see learning Eight Trigrams 75 Eight Virtues 125 Eiichi, Shibusawa 104 Eisenstadt, Shmuel 17 Engels, Friedrich 174 entity 75, 80, 86 – 88, 183 epistemology 45, 72 equal, concept of: benevolence and 54; dialogue between Confucius and Jesus and 72, 78; early Chinese political philosophy and 134, 137; multi-element universalism and globalization and 176; public intellectuals and 25, 29; ritual culture and 62, 67 essence of rites 61 – 62, 66, 143 ethic: global 11 – 16, 28, 185n20, 187; as standard 57 ethical principle 22, 58, 62, 122 ethical revolution 120 ethics-centered frame 134 Evolutions of Rites 61 – 62 exercising government by means of virtue 141, 155 Explanation of the Taiji Diagram, An (Zhou Dunyi) 77, 90n30 faith: China’s modernization and 107, 115; dialogue between Confucus and Jesus and 84; early Chinese political philosophy and 137; educational thought of Confucianism and 159 – 160, 162, 166; global ethic and 12; modern Chinese culture and 121, 124, 128 – 129; modern East Asia and 96; power discourse and 19; public intellectuals and 35; ritual culture and 62 family: similarity in 179; systems of 4 Family Rituals (Zhu Xi) 66 – 67 Fan Pang 33 Fan Zhongyan 33 Fascism 23 Fate of China (Chiang Kai-shek) 125 Feng Youlan 12, 58, 71n4, 125 – 128 feudal ethical code 56 – 58, 61, 125 – 126 feudal suzerain system 132 Five Cardinal relationships 125 Five Classics 72 – 76, 78, 83 Five Elements of nature 77 Four Anchors and Eight Virtues 121 Four Asian Tigers 103

192 Index Four Aspects (cultural knowledge, conducts, faithfulness and creditability) 161 Four Books 7, 72 – 73, 75, 183 French Revolution 23 Fukuyama, Francis 172 fundamentalism 55n6 Fu Sinian 125 generate 33, 40, 77, 159 German Ideology, The (Marx) 174 Gibney, Frank 104 global ethics 11 – 16, 28, 185n20, 187 globalization 1, 9, 188; course of 174 – 175; cultural 178 – 180; defining 172; multiple-universality of value in 180 – 184; technological advances and 173; trend and structure of 175 – 178; universal contact and interdependence in 174 – 175 Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (Robertson) 182 global localization 182 glocalization 180 goodness 84, 139, 152 – 153, 166, 170 Gouldner, Alvin 41 governing party 9 Gramsci, Antonio 31 grass root enthusiasm 7 – 8 Greater China, The 120 Great Learning: benevolence and 52 – 53; dialogue between Confucius and Jesus and 72 – 73; globalization and 183; modern China and 7; moral politics and 147, 150; power discourse and 22; public intellectuals and 35; rite and 68 Guanzi 149, 169 guided by morality 63, 148, 155 Guiding Principle for General Mobilization of National Spirit and Measures for Its Implementation, The 121 Habermas, Jürgen 32, 99 Han Dynasty 33 Han Yu 98, 163 harmony: benevolence and 46; China’s modernization and 103, 115; global ethic and 11, 15; globalization and 183; modern China and 9; modern Chinese culture and 121; modern East Asia and 95 – 99; moral politics and 153; power discourse and 19; ritual culture and 63,

65, 67; for use 95; without uniformity 97 Heaven: benevolence and 47, 49 – 52; early Chinese political philosophy and 134 – 144; mandate of 73, 75, 81 – 82, 135 – 139, 141, 152; modern East Asia and 95 – 96, 98; moral politics and 146 – 147, 150, 152 – 154; power discourse and 19; public intellectuals and 33 – 35; ritual culture and 60 – 62, 64 heavenly principles 23, 57, 78, 85, 144 Heaven-Man Oneness 83, 137 – 139, 146 – 147 Heaven-People Oneness 83, 135 – 139, 146 – 147 Heaven-Rite Oneness 141, 144, 147 Heaven-Virtue Oneness 139, 146 – 147 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 4, 10n6, 154 – 155 He Lin 57 – 58, 64, 123, 125 – 126, 128, 173 Henkin, Louis 18 History of Academic Ideas of Confucian Scholars of Ming 37, 43n9 44nn15 – 18 History of Academic Ideas of Song and Yuan 36, 43nn7 – 8, 44nn13 – 14, 44n28, 171n39 History of Japanese Political Thought (Maruyama) 102 Hodgson, J. P. 104 Hofheinz, R. 103 – 104 holistic man 170 home and state are in one 150 Hong Fan 18 – 19 Hu Hong 81 human nature 5, 16, 82 human rights 11 – 15, 17 – 18, 20, 22 – 28, 187 Hundred Schools of Thought 34 Huntington, Samuel P. 12, 17, 96 Hu Shi 125 ideal personality 168 – 170 ideological remoulding 29 – 31 ideology 186 – 187; China’s modernization and 105; modern China and 1 – 3, 7 – 8; modern Chinese culture and 118, 120, 129 – 130; modern East Asia and 93, 98; multi-element universalism and globalization and 174, 180; power discourse and 26; public intellectuals and 29, 39 – 41; ritual culture and 57, 68, 70

Index  193 idiosyncrasy of Confucian political philosophy 146 – 147; moralizing 147 – 151; political philosophy 153 – 156; political power 151 – 153 Imperial Edict of Establishing Schools 119 individualism 14, 101, 103 – 104, 114, 129 Industrial East Asia 103 – 110, 112 – 113, 115 institution 58, 70, 111, 120, 153 – 154 instrumental rationality 94 – 95, 99, 181 instrumental reason 94 – 95, 116 intellectual history 1, 4 – 5, 58, 95 intellectual moral character 159 – 160, 165 intellectuals 31 internal existence and civilization 3 International Confucian Association 7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 26 – 27 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 26 – 27 intrinsic universality 182 Jacoby, Russell 29, 42 Japan, success of 103 Jesus see dialogue between Confucius and Jesus Jin Yaoji (Yeo-Chi King) 105 Jin Zhonglie 99n1 Kahn, H. 104 Kang Gao 19 Kang Youwei 124, 126, 131n10 Kant, Immanuel 87 Kenichi, Tominaga 117n15 kindness 148, 153 Korean Peninsula 92 Küng, Hans 12 – 13, 16nn1 – 2 Kuschel, Karl-jose 16n2 language of human rights 27 – 28 Lao Siguang 111 Last Intellectuals, The (Jacoby) 29, 44n27 learning: becoming a sage through 164 – 166; cultivation of ideal personality and 168 – 170; love of 157 – 160; receiving edification through 160 – 164 Letter Formalities (Sima Guang) 66 Levenson, Joseph R. 1 – 4, 10n1, 38 – 39, 123 Li (ritual culture) see ritual culture Liang Ji 124

Liang Qichao 120, 124 Liang Shuming 58, 97 – 99, 122, 126, 134, 144n3, 183 Liu Shaoqi 126 Liu Shuxian 99n1, 188 Li Ying 33 Li Zehou 3 – 4, 10n4 local globalization 182 Locke, John 23 love of learning 157 loyalty and sincerity 61, 158 Lu Xun 120 MacFarquhar, Roderick 104 MacIntyre, Alasdair 69 making people wealthy 19 – 21 mandate of Heaven 73, 75, 81 – 82, 135 – 139, 141, 152 man is an integral part of nature 46, 96 man-nature oneness 45 – 46, 49 man of noble character 35, 59 – 60, 63, 70, 159, 163 – 164, 166 – 170 Mao Zedong 126 market-oriented economic reform 93 Maruyama, Masao 102 Marx, Karl 54, 174 – 176, 178 – 179, 184n8 May Fourth Movement 10, 116 Ma Yifu 127 – 128 Meiji Restoration 102 Meng Zi (Mencius): benevolence and 49; dialogue between Confucius and Jesus and 72 – 73, 83 – 84, 86; early Chinese political philosophy and 134, 139, 141; educational thought of Confucianism and 166; globalization and 183; modern China and 7; modern East Asia and 96; moral politics and 147, 150, 153; power discourse and 20 – 23; public intellectuals and 34, 36, 41; ritual culture and 57, 68 Meno (Plato) 164 mentality 111 metaphysics 84 Mind and Life (Liang Shuming) 71n5 mind is set on truth 32, 34 Ming Dynasty 114 “minimumism” 11 modern China 1; Confucian China and Its Modern Fate on 1 – 3; cultural psychology and national wisdom on Confucius in 3 – 4; cultural tradition in 5 – 6; significance of Confucianism in history of 4 – 5; stages in 20th century

194 Index history of 8 – 10; traditional culture including Confucianism in 7 – 8 modern Chinese culture 118; Confucianism in pre-modern society 118 – 120; crisis of Confucianism 127 – 130; institutional foundation 123 – 127; New Culture Movement 121 – 123 modernity 125, 127, 129 – 130; China’s modernization and 101; global ethic and 14 – 15; modern East Asia and 93 – 95, 99; power discourse and 17; public intellectuals and 41 – 42; ritual culture and 56, 64, 70; tradition and 93 – 95 modernization 1, 10, 101, 186 – 187; China’s 101 – 116; Confucian culture 101 – 105; cultural explanation and system explanation 105 – 110; East Asian 92 – 95, 99; generation and assimilation 110 – 112; global ethic and 15; globalization and 173 – 174, 180 – 181; mundane Confucian ethics 112 – 116; power discourse and 17; predicament of Confucianism and 123, 127 – 128; public intellectuals and 29 – 30, 40, 43; ritual culture and 56 modernization drive 1 modern society and Confucian rituals 56; attitudes towards ritual culture 56 – 58; character and expressions of ritual culture 63 – 65; historical changes in ritual culture 65 – 67; ritual culture in classical Confucianism 58 – 62; significance of ritual culture 69 – 70; social patterns of ritual culture 67 – 69 monarch-subject relationship 139 moral character 33, 35, 124, 126, 147, 150, 158 – 160, 163 – 170 moral crisis 12 moral cultivation 68 moral ecology 54 morality and benevolence 59 moral politics 146 – 147; distribution and realization of political power and 151 – 153; governing with the power of virtue in 147 – 151; political value in 153 – 156 moral reconstruction 6 Morishima, Michio 103 – 104 Mou Zongsan 48, 54, 87 – 88 multi-culture 56 multi-element universalism 172 – 174; cultural globalization 178 – 180;

globalization 175 – 178; multipleuniversality of value 180 – 184 multiple modernities 17 multiple-universality of value 180 – 184 museum collection 3 Myths of Japan’s Economic Miracle, The (Gibney) 104 natural law 23, 49, 79, 135, 144, 145n6, 153 nature: benevolence and 47 – 48, 50 – 53; Celestial Ruler’s role as master of 74; Confucian 38, 48; doctrine on mental constitution and 83 – 84; Five Elements in 77; Great Learning on 35; of Heaven 75 – 76; human 5, 16, 82; humanistic view of 46; and man as whole system 55; man-nature oneness 45 – 46, 49; New Confucianism on 46 – 47, 54; Taoist view of 46, 48; traditional view of 45; in Western philosophy 45; worship of 73 nature-centered philosophy 45 Neo-Confucianism: benevolence and 46, 53 – 54; China’s modernization and 101, 109, 111; dialogue between Confucius and Jesus and 72, 75 – 77, 82; doctrine of oneness in all things on earth in 53 – 54; “great learning” in 52; harmony and 97; holistic man in 170; inward looking development of 37; meaning of life in nature in 48; modern 86 – 87; modern Chinese culture and 118, 126, 128; representative figures of 46 – 47; ritual culture and 57, 67; Taiji and 86; Unholding Ontology and 87 – 88; Yi-ology of 77 New Culture Movement 10, 57 New Youth 120 Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle) 159 non-Western civilization 27 non-Western societies 17 Northern Song Dynasty 33, 46, 72 nothingness 77, 80 – 83, 86 noumenon and origin 72; reality and nothingness 80 – 83; transcending and intrinsic 83 – 89; ultimate source 73 – 78 occupationalization 41 – 43 October Revolution 94 oneness of all things on earth 53 oneness of lives 45 On New Vijnanavada (Xiong Shili) 91n78 ontology 4, 72, 74, 80 – 89, 137, 170

Index  195 order: dialogue between Confucius and Jesus and 77; early Chinese political philosophy and 132, 134, 139, 141 – 144; educational thought of Confucianism and 164; globalization and 177, 182; modern China and 6, 10, 12, 15; modern Chinese culture and predicament of Confucianism and 118 – 119, 124, 126, 128 – 129; modern civilization and 6; modern East Asia and 97 – 98; moral politics and 149 – 150, 152 – 155; power discourse and 25 – 27, 33; ritual culture and 56, 60, 63 – 65, 67 – 68, 70 others, rights of 187; benevolence and 49 – 55; China’s modernization and 104, 107; early Chinese political philosophy and 142; educational thought of Confucianism and 158, 162 – 164, 166, 168; globalization and 180; modern China and 15 – 16; modern Chinese culture and 120; modern East Asia and 97 – 98; moral politics and 149 – 150, 155; power discourse and 26; public intellectuals and 35; ritual culture and 57, 59 – 67, 69 Outline of Chinese Culture (Liang Shuming) 100n5, 144n3 Outline of Chinese Philosophy (Zhang Dainian) 90n27 pacifism 97 Paine, Thomas 25 “parents–whole-hearted-son” 18 – 19 Paris Conference 13 Parsons, Talcott 101 – 102, 112, 116, 181, 185 patriarchal feudal system 133 patriarchal society 134 philosopher politics 4, 37, 41, 47, 98, 126, 179 Plato 125, 135, 164 – 165 political legitimacy 9, 21 – 23, 139 political philosophy, Confucian 146 – 147; distribution and realization of political power in 151 – 153; governing with the power of virtue in 147 – 151; political value in 153 – 156 political philosophy, early Chinese: Heaven-People Oneness in 135 – 139; Heaven-Rite Oneness in 141 – 144; Heaven-Virtue Oneness in 139 – 141; introduction to 132 – 135 political systems 4

politics as governing the people 146, 155 Posner, Richard A. 42 – 43, 44n29 post-colonial discourse 127 “Post-Confucian Challenge, The” (MacFarquhar) 104 power discourse 17; civil and political rights 26 – 27; Confucian civilization 24 – 25; human rights 18, 23 – 24; language of human rights 27 – 28; making people wealthy 19 – 21; “parents–whole-hearted-son” 18 – 19; political legitimacy 21 – 23; Universal Declaration of Human Rights 25 – 26 Pre-Qin Confucianism 26 Pre-Qin Period 67, 138 principle of rites 61, 62, 66 professionalism 41 professionalization 30, 38 – 42, 44n19 progressivism 5 Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, The (Weber) 107, 111, 113, 117n18 Protestantism 102, 111 pseudo-Marxism 129 – 130 public intellectuals 4, 44n20, 44n30, 187; discussion on 31 – 34; ideological remoulding 29 – 31; in modern system network 41 – 43; occupationalization 41 – 43; philosophy scholars as 34 – 37; professional development of 37 – 41 publicness 31 – 33, 35 – 48 qi 74, 77 – 86; benevolence and 49 – 51; early Chinese political philosophy and 142; globalization and 178, 183, 184n13; modern Chinese culture and 123; moral politics and 154; power discourse and 20 – 21; ritual culture and 70 Qian 50 Qiangua 49 Qianyuan 75 Qianyuan and Kunyuan 75 Qing Dynasty 125 Quadrivium (morality, eloquence, administrative talents and letters) 161 Rain God (Tlaloc) 73 “rational economic man assumption” 6 rationalism 35, 102, 119 rationalization 6, 40, 94, 101, 116 Rawls, John 43 reality and nothingness 80 – 83

196 Index reason: benevolence and 98; concept of Heaven and 78, 82; distinguished from sense 99; as essence of rites 61; globalization and 178, 180; “good” 70; instrumental 94 – 95, 116; Li 81; as not destroyed or created 82; phenomena and 84 – 85; in qi-made world 51; as reality 81; Taiji as 79 – 80, 86; technological 30, 41; tendency and 172, 184; value priority of 39 reason-differentiation 183 reason-tendency 172, 184 receiving edification 160 – 164 regulating the society with propriety 68 religious beliefs 6 Re-sinicization 9 respect to substantive traditions 6 response 10, 14, 51 – 54, 82, 118 Revaluation on Confucius (Li Zehou) 3 Revolutionary Civil War 8 revolutionary movements 1 righteousness 34, 39, 62, 67 – 68, 115, 121, 163, 169 “rise” of China 7 ritual culture: attitudes towards 56 – 58; and ceremony 58, 61, 143; character and expressions of 63 – 65; in classical Confucianism 58 – 62; dialogue between Confucius and Jesus and 72; early Chinese political philosophy and 132 – 135, 141 – 144; educational thought of Confucianism and 161, 163 – 165, 168 – 169; historical changes 65 – 67; modern East Asia and 96 – 98; moral politics and 151; significance 69 – 70; social patterns 67 – 69 Robertson, Roland 178, 182, 184n3, 184n11 root 7, 75 – 76, 79 – 82, 105 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 23 ruling the country by virtue 148, 151 rural construction 122 sacrificial culture 73 sage 157, 159, 164 – 170 Said, Edward W. 30, 42, 43n1 Schmidt, H. 181 scholar-officials 27, 31, 36 – 39, 67 scholars 34 – 37 Schwartz, Benjamin I. 4, 95 self-cultivation 148, 150 Shangshu 19 – 21, 72 – 74, 89n1, 135 – 140, 143, 146, 150, 152, 161, 165; see also Book of Documents, The

Shao Yong 170 Shen Zongling 28n1 Shils, Edward 5 Shiming (Liu Xi) 35 Shõzan, Sakuma 128 Sima Guang 66 simulation 112 sincerity 59, 61, 115, 158 – 159 Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) 119 Six Classical Arts 160 – 161, 169, 171n9 Six Dynasties 123 Sklair, Leslie 184n12 Smith, Adam 114 social and folk cultural values 8 social sciences 6 society: patriarchal 134; Weber on two kinds of 5 – 6 Socrates 164 – 165 Song Dynasty 26, 35, 66, 83 Southern Song Dynasty 72 spirit of “rites” 62 – 63 Strauss, Leo 4, 10n4 structure-based explanation 103 structure of cultural mentality 4, 127 substantive tradition 6, 99 Summary of the Rules of Propriety, The 59, 61, 63, 65, 70, 148, 163 Sun-God (Phoebus) 73 Sun Yat-sen 121, 125, 146 superior man is not a utensil (not just of one single specific use) 163, 170 Supreme Being 78, 135 – 136 Taiji (the Great Ultimate) 76, 79, 85 – 86 Taishi (The Great Declaration) 136 taking “benevolence” as basis 98 “taking good care of the people” 19 Tang Dynasty 89n1 Tang Junyi 48 Tang Tong 46 three cardinal guides and five constant virtues 125 – 126 Tianxia 134 Tokugawa Religion – Cultural Origins of Modern Japan (Bellah) 102 Tradition (Shils) 5, 10n9, 10n12 traditional intellectuals 31 – 34 traditions 1, 186 – 187; China’s modernization and 102, 104, 106, 109 – 110, 115 – 116; dialogue between Confucius and Jesus and 73, 84, 87 – 88; early Chinese political philosophy and 132, 138, 141; ecological orientation

Index  197 and 46, 54 – 55; global ethics and 15; modern China and 1, 4 – 6, 9 – 10; modern Chinese culture and 128 – 129; modern East Asia and 93, 95, 97 – 99; moral politics and 146 – 147, 151; multielement universalism and globalization era 179, 181 – 182; power discourse and 17, 24 – 25, 27 – 28; public intellectuals and 29 – 43; rituals and modern society 56, 65, 68 – 69 transcending the inherent 84 Tu Wei-ming 123, 185n20; China’s modernization and 106, 109, 117n3; on public intellectuals 31, 37 – 38, 44nn19 – 20, 44n30 ultimate source 75, 80 – 81, 88, 89n1 “ultra-left” 129 Unholding Ontology 87 – 88 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 12 – 14, 20, 23, 25 – 26 universal ethics 12 – 13, 125 upright virtue 149 utilitarianism 111 value: multiple-universality of 180 – 184; priority 39; rationality 94, 99, 116, 127, 141, 181 Variorum on the Four Books (Zhu Xi) 183 view of nature 45 – 46, 48, 50, 52, 54 vigor and vitality 47 – 48 virtue: China’s modernization and 102; dialogue between Confucius and Jesus and 73 – 74, 82; early Chinese political philosophy and 135 – 136, 139 – 141; educational thought of Confucianism and 157 – 158, 161 – 170; governing with the power of 147 – 151; modern Chinese culture and 122; modern East Asia and 97; moral politics and 146 – 155; power discourse and 22; public intellectuals and 33; of reverence 136, 139 – 141; rituals and 66, 69; of sage 164 – 166 Vogel, Ezra 103 void 7, 80, 82, 97 “vulgar Confucian ethic” 107 “vulgar Confucianism” 104 – 105 Vulgar Materialism 41 Wang Guowei 125 Wang Yangming 1, 50 – 53, 67, 102 War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (1937–1945) 121

Warring States Period 20 Way, the: benevolence and 50; China’s modernization and 102; dialogue between Confucius and Jesus and 74, 77 – 78, 80 – 87; early Chinese political philosophy and 139 – 140, 143 – 144; educational thought of Confucianism and 163 – 164, 168, 170; modern Chinese culture and 130; moral politics and 149, 152 – 154; power discourse and 25; public intellectuals and 31, 34, 38; rituals and 61 – 62, 65, 68 Weber, Max 5 – 6, 99n2, 101, 103 – 104; on Confucian ethics 105, 111; distinction between creation and assimilation 112; modernization of East Asia and 112 – 114; on pacifism in Confucianism 97; on Protestant ethic and capitalism 107, 110 – 111; on rationalization as core of Western modernity 94; on tension between value rationality and instrumental rationality 94 – 95, 99; theory on sociology of religion 102 – 103, 106 – 110 Westernization 178 – 180 Westernization Movement 123 Western Zhou Dynasty 132 – 133, 138, 141 Works of Mencius, The 20 – 22, 34 world, the: benevolence and 46, 51, 53, 55; China’s modernization and 101 – 103, 105, 111, 116; Confucian rituals 56; dialogue between Confucius and Jesus and 76, 85; global ethic and 11 – 14; modern China and 8; modern Chinese culture and 130; modern East Asia and 92, 95, 98; moral politics and 153; multi-element universalism and globalization era in 172 – 180, 182 – 183, 186; power discourse and 17, 21, 25, 28; public intellectuals and 32 – 37; three themes on early Chinese political philosophy and 132, 136 – 137 “world history,” theory of 174 worldlization 175 – 176, 178 – 180 Wu Mi 125 Wu Yu 61, 120 Ximing (Western Inscription) 49 – 50 Xiong Shili 86, 127 – 128 xuan (source of all things) 77 Xunzi 67, 153 – 154 Xun Zi 154

198 Index Yang Guoshu 108 Yang Xiong 77 Yi Baisha 120 yin and yang 25, 64, 76 – 79, 81, 86, 144 Yi-ology 77 Yizhuan 75 yuan (element) 76 – 77 Yu Yingshi 32 – 34 Zeng Shen 33 Zhang Dainian 90n27 Zhang Junmai 124, 131n15

Zhang Shizhao 124, 131n14 Zhang Zai 47 – 50, 80 – 82 Zhang Zhidong 57, 123 – 124, 128, 131n9 Zhan Ruoshui 82 Zhou Dunyi 46 – 48, 77 – 79, 86, 165, 171n31 Zhou Dynasty 68, 152 Zhou Gong 139 Zhu Xi 66 – 67, 79 – 82, 84 – 86, 98, 102, 183, 184n13 Zuo Qiuming 70 Zuozhuan 59 – 60, 62, 70, 133, 139, 146