Conflicting Visions: Canada and India in the Cold War World, 1946-76 0774829001, 9780774829007

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Conflicting Visions

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Conflicting Visions Canada and India in the Cold War World, 1946–76

Ryan M. Touhey

© UBC Press 2015 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission of the publisher, or, in Canada, in the case of photocopying or other reprographic copying, a licence from Access Copyright, www.accesscopyright.ca. 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14

54321

Printed in Canada on FSC-certified ancient-forest-free paper (100% post-consumer recycled) that is processed chlorine- and acid-free. Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Touhey, Ryan, author Conflicting visions : Canada and India in the Cold War world, 1946-76 / Ryan M. Touhey. Includes bibliographical references and index. Issued in print and electronic formats. ISBN 978-0-7748-2900-7 (bound). – ISBN 978-0-7748-2901-4 (pbk.). – ISBN 978-0-7748-2902-1 (pdf). – ISBN 978-0-7748-2903-8 (epub) 1. Canada – Foreign Relations – India. Canada. 3. Cold War. I. Title. FC251.I53T69 2015

2. India – Foreign relations –

327.71054009′045

C2015-900360-1 C2015-900361-X

UBC Press gratefully acknowledges the financial support for our publishing program of the Government of Canada (through the Canada Book Fund), the Canada Council for the Arts, and the British Columbia Arts Council. This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. UBC Press The University of British Columbia 2029 West Mall Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2 www.ubcpress.ca

Contents

Illustrations / vi Acknowledgments / vii Abbreviations / x Introduction / 1 1 Plain Tales from the DEA: Why India? / 9 2 Building a Bridge: Bilateral Relations, 1947–49 / 25 3 A Helping Hand: The Genesis of Canada’s Aid Relationship with India, 1950–51 / 47 4 In Close and Friendly Collaboration: Canada and India during the Korean War, 1950–53 / 60 5 A Special Relationship? 1952–57 / 77 6 Friendly but Not Close: The Diefenbaker Years, 1957–63 / 125 7 Mounting Problems, 1963–66 / 149 8 An Inability to Influence: Nuclear Cooperation and the NPT Negotiations, 1966–68 / 174 9 Old Hopes and a New Realism? Bilateral Relations, 1968–73 / 188 10 Choices Made: The Descent of Bilateral Relations, 1974–76 / 216 Conclusion / 242 Notes / 250 Bibliography / 289 Index / 296

Illustrations

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Map of India, ca. 1974 / xii Lucknow, Ontario / 116 W.L. Mackenzie King, Madras, India, 1909 / 117 Escott Reid and Lester Pearson plan their visit to the Colombo conference, 1949 / 117 Paul Martin and Krishna Menon, 1955 / 118 Lester and Maryon Pearson with High Commissioner Escott Reid to open the Massanjore Generating Station, 1955 / 118 The Massanjore Generating Station on the Mayurakshi River, West Bengal, 1956 / 119 Canadian, Indian, and Polish members of an ICSC team, North Vietnam, 1956 / 120 Lester Pearson with Jawaharlal Nehru in Ottawa, 1956 / 121 Chester Ronning, Canada’s longest-serving Canadian high commissioner to India, 1957-64 / 121 John Diefenbaker greeted at Palam Airport in New Delhi by Jawaharlal Nehru, 1958 / 122 Lester Pearson with Indian prime minister L.B. Shastri in Ottawa, 1965 / 123 Pierre Trudeau meeting Indira Gandhi in New Delhi, 1971 / 123 Pierre Trudeau and James George at an ashram, Varanasi, 1971 / 124 Duncan MacPherson cartoon lampooning Indian nuclear test, Toronto Star, 1974 / 124

Acknowledgments

This book began during a research visit to New Delhi, India, in April 2002. That unexpected and memorable visit led to many later adventures in India, to travel, study, and further explore archives. Throughout this project, my former adviser, John English, offered continuous encouragement, generosity, and mentorship. His good-natured guidance and advice continues to be profoundly appreciated. At the University of Waterloo, I benefited enormously from the kindness, advice, and, most importantly, friendship of historians Ken McLaughlin, Patrick Harrigan, and Jim Walker. Ken and Patrick were continual sources of support and light-hearted banter, and I benefited from listening to Jim’s colourful experiences in India as a former Canadian University Student Overseas volunteer. This book was made possible through numerous sources of support. I received generous funding from faculty research grants at St. Jerome’s University. A Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute doctoral fellowship allowed me to travel to India with an affiliation at Jawaharlal Nehru University. I also benefited from Ontario Graduate Scholarships and bursaries and scholarships from the University of Waterloo. As a postdoctoral fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APFC) in Vancouver from 2007 to 2008, I learned much from my directors, Yuen Pau Woo and Paul Evans, two of the leading experts on Canada’s relations with Asia. The APFC is an invaluable institution for promoting the study and understanding of Canada’s relations with Asia, and I enjoyed a wonderful time personally and intellectually expanding my interest, knowledge, and research connections to India, which improved the manuscript. A research fellowship from the Canada International Council provided me with the opportunity to return to India and to reflect and write on the contemporary state of Canada-India relations. In Ottawa, I prospered from continued conversations and friendships with Tim Cook, Laura Madokoro, Omar Khan, Hans Lo, Niall Cronin, Martin Auger, Serge Durflinger, Jeff Keshen, and Gunther Schonfeldt. Their company made the time spent researching and writing a far more pleasant experience. Along the same lines, I thank David Meren and Andrew Burtch for constant laughs during the many months (years?) spent at the archives and for exchanging ideas, tips, and quips, whether in Ottawa or, these days, on the phone from Waterloo.

viii Acknowledgments

Special thanks to Greg Donaghy, who gave frank and valuable advice based upon his extensive knowledge of Canadian foreign policy, and to Michael Petrou, who researched material for me at the British National Archives. In July 2008, I began my professional career as a historian at St. Jerome’s University at the University of Waterloo. I consider myself deeply blessed to have had the opportunity to return to the University of Waterloo and more specifically to be in the Department of History at St. Jerome’s. I have received superb research support from both colleagues and the institution as well as continual encouragement from Whitney Lackenbauer, whose exuberance and cheerfulness have made these early years at St. Jerome’s that much better. The support of my deans – Myroslaw Tataryn, Jim Frank, and Scott Kline at St. Jerome’s and Doug Peers at University of Waterloo – has meant a great deal to me as well. I am also grateful for the collegiality and friendship of colleagues in the University of Waterloo Department of History – Gary Bruce, Dan Gorman, Geoff Hayes, Ian Milligan, Bruce Muirhead, and John Sbardellati – and Kevin Spooner at Wilfrid Laurier University, all exceptional historians and teachers. The staff at Library and Archives Canada, the Diefenbaker Canada Centre Archives (University of Saskatchewan), Trinity College Archives, University of British Columbia Special Collections, the National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Maryland), the National Archives of India, and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library ensured that I had materials that I required when possible and patiently answered research questions. The library staff at St. Jerome’s helpfully obtained research resources, and I thank Deb Addesso, Lorna Rourke, and Becky Thompson for their assistance. Former Canadian high commissioners to India Joseph Caron, David Malone, and Lucie Edwards took a keen interest in my research and provided me with insights and the nuanced perspectives of diplomatic practitioners serving in India. Joseph and David were kind enough to host me in New Delhi on separate research trips, giving me a wonderful opportunity to wander around the grounds of the original High Commission on Aurangzeb Road and with it splendid memories. A number of prominent Canadian diplomats involved in India-related matters allowed themselves to be interviewed for the book. Sadly, Basil Robinson, Tom Delworth, and Arthur Menzies have passed away, but I am indebted to all of the interviewees for their rich and thoughtful recollections, which were invaluable. Dr. Ashok Kapur, distinguished professor emeritus at the University of Waterloo, offered a sage perspective on Indian foreign policy. The University of Toronto Press kindly permitted me to include excerpts from my Canadian Historical Review article “Dealing in Black and White: The Diefenbaker Government and the Cold War in South Asia 1957–1963.” UBC Press has been wonderful to work with. In particular, I have benefited from the wise counsel

Acknowledgments ix

and patience of senior editor Emily Andrew, who shepherded this project through the peer review and publication process. Similarly, Lesley Erickson cheerfully guided me through the production process. I also wish to thank the anonymous peer reviewers whose dedication and helpful suggestions improved this book considerably. The prose of the book improved with Jennifer Lackenbauer’s sharp eye and excellent editing skills. I also thank Jennifer for producing the map for this book. I reach the conclusion of this project thankful for all the support that I have received. Any errors are mine. Finally, I wish to thank my family. My brother Martin and his wife, Jennifer, have always offered me a comfortable place to stay while in Ottawa, and their grocery bills have suffered for it. Their twins, Jack and Maddie, add much joy and excitement to my Ottawa visits. My brother Brendan encouraged my interest in history from a young age through his own curious mind and love of reading. My wonderful fiancée, Breanna, has been a constant source of laughter, perspective, and encouragement. This book would not have come to fruition without the love and support of my parents. I can trace my interest in history and international affairs back to childhood discussions around the dinner table and the constant attention that my parents had in our education. I dedicate this book to Beatrix and James Touhey. Thank you for everything.

Abbreviations

AEC AECL AUSSEA CANDU CBC CCF CIA CIDA CIIA CIR DAE DCER DEA EDC FCO FO GOC GOI IAEA IAEC ICSC IMEA KGB LAC NAI NARA NATO NMML

Atomic Energy Commission Atomic Energy Canada Limited Assistant undersecretary of state for external affairs Canada Deuterium Uranium Reactor Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Cooperative Commonwealth Federation Central Intelligence Agency Canadian International Development Agency Canadian Institute of International Affairs Canada-India Reactor (also referred to as CIRUS) Department of Atomic Energy Documents on Canadian External Relations Department of External Affairs Economic Development Corporation Foreign and Commonwealth Office Foreign Office (United Kingdom) Government of Canada Government of India International Atomic Energy Agency Indian Atomic Energy Commission International Commission for Supervision and Control Indian Ministry of External Affairs Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (Soviet Foreign Intelligence Service) Library and Archives Canada National Archives of India National Archives and Records Administration North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nehru Memorial Museum and Library

Abbreviations xi

NPT NRU NRX PLA PMO PNE POW PRC RAPP RCAF SEATO SSEA TASS UN USSEA USSR

non-proliferation treaty National Research Universal Reactor National Research Experimental Reactor People’s Liberation Army Prime Minister’s Office peaceful nuclear explosion prisoner of war People’s Republic of China Rajasthan Atomic Power Project Royal Canadian Air Force South East Asia Treaty Organization secretary of state for external affairs Informatsionnoye agentstvo Rossii (Russian News Agency) United Nations undersecretary of state for external affairs Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Figure 1

Map of India, ca. 1974

Conflicting Visions

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Introduction

Settled in the late 1850s, Lucknow is a small farming community in Bruce County in southwestern Ontario. The rolling green countryside is lush, with fields that produce bounties of corn and strawberries. In winter, the fields are barren snowscapes. In the little town, streets are named Canning, Havelock, Outram, Rose, Ross, and Willoughby. At first glance, they seem to be common Anglo-Scotch settler names; closer inspection reveals a connection to a pinnacle moment in the history of Imperial India and the British Empire. The streets are named after the British generals involved in the Relief of Lucknow during the Indian Mutiny of 1857. A further imperial commemorative connection to India is that the town is located in a county named after James Bruce, the eighth earl of Elgin and the twelfth earl of Kincardine, the sixth governor general of the Province of Canada, and the viceroy of India from 1861 to 1863. The British consolidated their vast holdings across the Indian subcontinent in the years following the mutiny. As viceroy, Bruce administered British interests in this new era of the Raj. Oceans away, the colonies of British North America were on the cusp of unifying into a self-governing dominion. In the years after Confederation, generations of Canadians revelled in the glory of their empire, with India seen as the jewel of that empire. Lucknow, Ontario, emerged at the height of British rule of India. That rule proved to be short-lived. Imperial rule buckled in the 1930s as the Indian nationalist movement multiplied and the edifice of empire crumbled in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. A nearly bankrupt Britain lacked the military resources to control India and contain mounting sectarian tensions that it had long nourished between Hindus and Muslims. London acknowledged that it could not prevent India from obtaining independence. Britain haphazardly planned the partition of the subcontinent into two states, India and Pakistan. The British withdrawal from South Asia ushered in the first phase of Commonwealth decolonization as India and Pakistan gained independence in August 1947. This process led the Canadian government to craft foreign policy and despatch personnel to a region about which it knew little. Similarly, historians of Canadian international relations know little about Canada’s relations with India. A few important examinations exist of the bilateral relationship, primarily of the immediate post-independence era, but they tend

2 Introduction

to be narrow in scope or memoirs of former diplomats who served in India.1 This paucity reflects the predominant historiographical emphasis on Canada’s diplomatic relations with the North Atlantic world. A new generation of historiography, however, is situating the history of Canadian foreign relations beyond the traditional confines. Scholars are examining Canada’s international relations afresh, producing studies on Canada’s ties to Japan, Indonesia, and Africa and asking questions about how decolonization and immigration relate to Canadian international history.2 Some of these studies also pose new questions about how race, subnational actors, or even non-state actors intersect with the conduct of Canadian foreign relations. Much of the recent work sheds light on Canada’s relations with the Asia-Pacific world. This study follows in that direction, providing the first thorough examination of how Canadian governments engaged with India from 1946 to 1976, bringing to light their changing visions of the bilateral relationship. The Canada-India relationship encountered challenges that presented both opportunities and problems pertaining to decolonization, non-alignment, and non-proliferation within the broader context of the Cold War world. In dealing with the challenge of non-alignment, this study considers how religious and cultural assumptions of South Asia informed the views on India of key Canadian policy makers. Canadian nuclear cooperation with India shows the awkward balance between opportunity and challenge, best depicted by Ottawa’s decision to export nuclear technology while promoting international nuclear safeguards. India had distinct nuclear aspirations and its own views on international nuclear safeguards. This work provides the first detailed survey of how a fledgling but optimistic relationship with India became one of the most complex, controversial, and important diplomatic relationships for Canada in the Asia-Pacific region in the second half of the twentieth century. In 1947, Canadian officials pondered what a newly independent India meant. Unlike its longer-standing ties with Japan or China, Canada had a smaller missionary and trade presence in South Asia. The first high commissioner, John Kearney, travelled to Britain for briefings and was told what to expect upon arrival in India. Yet, in anticipation of decolonization, prominent Canadian policy makers, such as Lester Pearson and John Holmes, saw the opportunity for Ottawa to play a unique role in nurturing links between India and Pakistan and the West. Ottawa could be the bridge between East and West as the Cold War began. Pearson wrote to Prime Minister Mackenzie King in December 1941 about the possibility of sending a high commissioner to India, thinking that Canada could connect with a future independent India. It is doubtful that Pearson thought of Lucknow, India, or Lucknow, Ontario, but he noted that both countries shared an imperial heritage. India was a polyglot of languages,

Introduction 3

religions, and ethnicities. Pearson saw Canada as a nation of linguistic and religious minorities that flourished through accommodation. In a fine example of Canadian exceptionalism, Pearson reasoned that the Canadian experience might permit Ottawa to reach out to a newly independent India in a way that Australia, Britain, and the United States, all with colonial possessions, could not. Here was the genesis of the bridge thesis as applied to India: Canada could cooperate effectively with India and act as a bridge between the West and South Asia. On the eve of the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent, Mackenzie King pondered whether an independent India and Pakistan, with millions of impoverished citizens, would transform the Commonwealth for better or for worse. Two months prior to British withdrawal, King rebuked Louis St. Laurent, the secretary of state for external affairs, for being too eager in advising cabinet to consider India’s status in the Commonwealth. The prime minister lectured that Canada should not offer advice on a British mess in an area about which Ottawa was ignorant. King correctly deduced that his government knew little about South Asia. The lack of knowledge would have implications in the years ahead for Canadian policy making. But the conversation around the cabinet table in May 1947 reveals the gradual transition of the old order of Canadian foreign policy conduct to a new era. Mounting Cold War tensions and crushing poverty in India informed Canadian attitudes toward the country. In the spring of 1947, a small advance team of Canadian diplomats travelled to India to establish Canada’s third post in Asia – the only one in South Asia. The immediate question of India’s worldview following independence prompted the St. Laurent government to encourage dialogue and strengthen friendly ties with New Delhi. Fear of India succumbing to communism if the West ignored the considerable economic and political needs of the Indian subcontinent in the wake of decolonization continued to nourish this interest. The early years following independence brought about an unusual meeting of the minds between officials in Ottawa and those in New Delhi given the lack of substantive interaction between the political classes of the two countries. Canada was a firm ally of the two predominant Western powers, Britain and the United States, both of which India regarded with suspicion. Thinking that Canada was unencumbered by a colonial past, and far from being a great power, Canadian officials imagined a form of exceptionalism. Canada could build a bridge between a newly decolonized India and the West. And in doing so Ottawa could positively influence Indian foreign policy. Here was a vision of India in which historical, geographical, and considerable cultural, religious, and racial differences between Canada and India were not irreconcilable. Rather, the two

4 Introduction

former British colonies shared linguistic, judicial, and political commonalities that could draw Ottawa and New Delhi closer. The assumption that commonalities existed further sustained a vision of Canada as a bridge between the West and India. One way to build the bridge was to cooperate with Britain to find a practical solution that would keep India in the Commonwealth as a republic. As long as Ottawa’s interests were not affected, Canada could perform a notable role in the process that transformed the Commonwealth into a multiracial entity, with India remaining in it as a republic. In 1949, India’s prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, travelled to North America on his first visits to the United States and Canada. The visits differed dramatically. The American visit reflected an emerging divide between New Delhi and Washington over the perils of communism and American distrust of India’s non-aligned foreign policy. The Canadian visit led to a different outcome, for Nehru found a willing audience among Canadians, who seemed to be less Manichean toward communism in Asia, more restrained and reflective in their worldviews. Weeks later, in January 1950, a high-profile team of Canadian officials accompanied Lester Pearson on his first visit to South Asia to attend a conference of Commonwealth foreign ministers in Colombo, Ceylon. The visit sowed the seeds of the Colombo Plan – the first Canadian foray into development assistance. Over the next year, Ottawa committed a modest sum of financial aid to India and established a long-standing and substantial aid relationship. The decision to cooperate with the Colombo Plan occurred as the Korean War escalated. Mutual fear that the conflict would expand prompted cooperation at the United Nations. From 1947 to 1955, Canada and India worked consistently on matters related to decolonization and the spread of the Cold War beyond Europe. Leaders met frequently at multilateral forums, from Commonwealth meetings to the United Nations. During this era, senior policy makers in Ottawa viewed democratic India as the most important nation in Asia, if not the developing world, for the West. This era marks the first vision of Canadian officials of Ottawa’s purpose regarding India during the period 1946–76: that Canada could successfully negotiate the divisions between the West and an all-important India and that a “special relationship” existed between the two countries. Visions change. As the Cold War progressed, New Delhi’s pursuit of nonalignment prompted the Liberal and Conservative governments of Louis St. Laurent and John Diefenbaker to reassess their appraisals of India. An array of Canadian policy makers in the Department of External Affairs (DEA) also began questioning non-alignment. Others criticized key Indian diplomats whom they encountered at the United Nations, namely, Krishna Menon. A small group of officials countered that India mattered to Canada and that it was a beacon

Introduction 5

in the developing world. Both groups offered competing visions of where India should rank in Canada’s worldview. Unanticipated policy divergences emerged over issues such as the International Control and Supervisory Commissions (ICSC) in Indochina from 1954 to 1973, the Hungarian revolution in 1956, and nuclear proliferation in the 1960s, among others. India shifted from being the most important country in Asia to being at the periphery of Canadian diplomatic planning and governmental interest during the late St. Laurent years and the Diefenbaker era. But why was this? Had the commonalities ceased to exist? Were official Canadian attitudes toward India beginning to echo those of the United States?3 Other evaluations of the Canada-India relationship emphasize high policy to explain the peaks and valleys of the Canada-India relationship in the early to mid-1950s.4 It is difficult to disagree with the assessment that, as far as India was involved, Ottawa was only so willing to interpret East and West at the risk of alienating its relations with Washington. But other key factors subtly affected Canadian high policy toward India during the governments of Diefenbaker and Pearson. This study considers Canadian policy makers’ contemplation of cultural and religious dynamics to understand Indian actions. Those factors, in conjunction with opposition to non-alignment, informed policy making and official perceptions. Culture and religion must be considered along with the other traditional dynamics by which we assess changing perceptions of Nehru’s India. And such factors are not isolated phenomena in the broader history of Canadian foreign policy in Asia. Historian David Webster observes in his study on CanadaIndonesia relations that Canadian policy makers initially “imagined” that they could act as a linchpin between the West and a newly independent Indonesia. Perhaps Canada’s political evolution from colony to nation could be a model for a newly independent Indonesia. Webster notes that the same policy makers had limited knowledge of Southeast Asia and “plotted their approach to Asia geographically, on ‘mental maps,’ ways of picturing and trying to make sense of a complex world spatially.” A hazy knowledge of Asia, its peoples, boundaries, cultures, and history facilitated a policy-making approach in which “Canadian mental maps privileged Eurocentric concerns” such as the primacy of relations with the North Atlantic world.5 Indonesia’s pursuit of non-alignment and its authoritarian leftward tilt in the mid-1950s clashed with earlier Canadian and Western expectations. Subsequently, Canadian interest in Indonesia cooled as Jakarta ran afoul of Canadian Western alliance interests. Likewise, the emerging shift in Canadian visions of India by the mid-1950s can be attributed in part to how culture, religion, and geographic distance conditioned the shifting horizons of Canadian officials toward India.6 For their part, Indian politicians and policy makers had their own idiosyncratic perspectives on Canada. The bridge thesis

6 Introduction

spanned both shores. New Delhi harboured hopes that Canadian foreign policy might sympathize with, if not reflect, Indian foreign policy. By mid-1960, Chester Ronning, Canada’s high commissioner in New Delhi, perceptively expressed concern about bilateral relations in a dispatch to Ottawa. Vigorous efforts were required, he warned, lest ties with India waned further. Ronning boldly questioned conventional wisdom regarding the importance of the Commonwealth link. The diplomat sought a realistic perspective from which a bridge or special relationship seemed to be wishful thinking. Canada’s central foreign policy interests focused on the North Atlantic, specifically its relations with the United States and Britain, and it was through this lens that Canadian decision makers viewed South Asia. Ronning’s analysis coincided with the decline of the Commonwealth prime ministers’ conferences as a valuable forum in promoting bilateral relations. The meetings became more impersonal as the organization expanded in response to decolonization in Africa and the Caribbean in the late 1950s and 1960s. Ottawa paid close attention to the newly independent states of these regions. South Asia and its myriad of social and political ills fell into neglect. Following Nehru’s death, important changes occurred in Indian statecraft. India drifted closer toward Moscow under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. As the non-proliferation debate showed, India regarded itself as a regional power if not an emerging great power. For its part, Ottawa remained firmly aligned with the West, with NATO a pillar of its foreign policy. The era between 1955 and 1968 represents a struggle between proponents of the bridge vision and critics with misgivings about Indian foreign policy and a mounting sense that few ties bound Canada and India together. As political relations ebbed throughout the mid-1960s and into the 1970s, the governments of Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau followed their predecessors, continuing Ottawa’s lack of direct interest in India and South Asia. Still, Canadian officials debated India’s importance to Canada as significant amounts of aid money continued to flow to New Delhi – with little consideration of why that was – and the fate of nuclear cooperation presented challenging questions. The third and final vision of how Canadian policy makers situated the bilateral relationship occurred from 1968 to 1976. Canadian officials questioned the notion that a “special relationship” existed, and they revisited the merits of reengaging South Asia. Ottawa needed to adopt a realistic approach to India that included leveraging aid to create new trade opportunities for Canada. Attempts to establish bilateral ties along what policy makers considered more “realist” and “mature” lines came to an abrupt halt in May 1974 when India detonated a nuclear device that used plutonium extracted from a donated Canadian reactor intended strictly for peaceful purposes. India mattered again to Ottawa. That

Introduction 7

one event coalesced years of frustration with and resentment over Indian foreign policy, and it amplified long-standing grievances in Ottawa toward India. The Trudeau cabinet and officials in the DEA encountered an unprecedented and complicated diplomatic task. Any response from Ottawa, particularly on questions of nuclear cooperation and export policy, had bilateral and multilateral ramifications. Only since 2006 have both countries begun to move beyond the legacy of 1974 and re-engage with each other. India represented Canada’s first major foray into the decolonizing world and its first nuclear export market. Yet Canada’s diplomatic relationship with that country has received scant attention by scholars of Canada’s foreign policy. Surprisingly, there remains no substantial history of the bilateral relationship. This study, then, is the first survey to trace evolving Canadian visions, perceptions, and official debates of India in Canadian foreign policy between 1946 and 1976. The study draws on a range of Indian sources from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs at the National Archives of India. The papers of Jawaharlal Nehru are closed from 1947 to 1964, but correspondence with his sister/diplomat Vijaya Lakshmi Nehru and other prominent officials are accessible at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. The research also makes use of American and British records and draws extensively on Canadian archival sources, including the personal papers of prominent Canadian diplomats and politicians. Although consideration of Pakistan appears in certain chapters, it does so only when that country intersected with Canada’s bilateral relations with India. Canada’s relations with Pakistan never possessed the same import, or layers, as its relations with India. Ottawa wished to avoid involvement in the ongoing Kashmir dispute. Indeed, Canada’s unwillingness to take sides in the 1965 war between Pakistan and India prompted Islamabad to question its own relationship with the West. Organized chronologically, the chapters examine the conflicting visions that Canadian politicians and officials possessed of India’s place in Canadian foreign policy and consider how these visions and the bilateral relationship changed over time. The study begins with an exploration of Ottawa’s initial belief that Canada could bridge India and the West. Elements of the bridge philosophy were later projected onto other decolonizing Commonwealth countries, such as Ghana and Pakistan.7 The study then scrutinizes the equally important sense of exceptionalism as applied to India. Canadian governments expected India – newly decolonized, non-aligned, and the most populous member of the Commonwealth – to act in the midst of the Cold War in a manner amenable to Ottawa and its North Atlantic allies. The analysis then considers how cultural and religious assumptions intersected with, and shaped, the views and expectations of policy makers of India and non-alignment. Although such assumptions

8 Introduction

have long been neglected in the writing and analysis of Canadian foreign relations history, they are salient to the development and practice of diplomacy. Later chapters examine the contradictory impulses of Ottawa’s pursuit of reactor sales as political ties declined and wariness of India’s nuclear ambitions grew. Nuclear cooperation became a major problem that bedevilled Canadian foreign policy toward India. Paradoxically, Ottawa sought to market its civilian atomic/ nuclear technology with nascent safeguards to curb proliferation. New Delhi sought Canadian technology enthusiastically but disagreed with Ottawa over the validity of international safeguards and, later, the merits of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. How could tensions be negotiated? Decision makers balanced Ottawa’s aspirations to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the one hand and to establish Canada as a key exporter of nuclear technology on the other. This study seeks to understand the policy disconnect that had a profound impact on later Canadian nuclear export policies. Indian scholar M.S. Rajan suggested in a 1962 article that bilateral cooperation between the two countries was so intimate that it led to the “Indo-Canadian entente” or the “Ottawa-New Delhi Axis.”8 Canadian diplomat Escott Reid famously expanded this theme in his memoir Envoy to Nehru. Reid suggested that Canada and India shared a special relationship.9 Finally, this study refutes the perspectives of both. For a brief period, Ottawa and New Delhi shared some common ground, but Canadian ties with Washington, London, and NATO proved to be resilient over the long term. Accordingly, if a “special relationship” existed beyond the North Atlantic into South Asia, then it existed only in Canadian eyes, and even then only select individuals in Ottawa adhered to this view. In the end, neither country was able to develop a foundation for a cooperative bilateral relationship because of conflicting visions of what each expected from the other. After 1976, Canada’s interest in India, already weakened from decades of neglect and policy difference, entered a prolonged period of drift. Relations were not particularly friendly and certainly not close.

1 Plain Tales from the DEA Why India?

The bustling tropical port of Bombay could not have been farther removed from the harsh Ottawa winter when, on 16 January 1909, Deputy Minister of Labour Mackenzie King arrived for official duty. Two days later he travelled to the imperial bastion of Calcutta, the capital of the British Raj in India, on behalf of the Liberal government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. King sought limitations on Indian immigration to Canada. In Calcutta, he met with the viceroy, Lord Minto (a former governor general of Canada), to discuss the Canadian viewpoint and successfully obtained British support for the desired goal. A dinner party that evening allowed King to mingle with Minto and the cream of Calcutta’s Anglo elite. The Indians whom King interacted with during his journey were from the anglicized classes – affluent, powerful, and English speaking. That segregation did not prevent him from recording his racial observations of his experience in his correspondence to Ottawa: “What I have seen of India and the condition of the people convinces me that India was intended for the Indians, and that they were not intended by nature for other countries.” King concluded that “India can never be a white men’s country … that the policy of England should be to train the Indian to self-government and loyalty, [and] that the presence of whites in any number may not continue to be a necessity.”1 At the same time, poverty and aspects of Hinduism in particular caused King to recoil, buttressing his sense that the British civilizing mission in India remained necessary.2 By present-day frameworks, his view appears far more odious, yet he held liberal views for the era in suggesting Indian self-government. King’s perspective on self-government certainly ran contrary to that of many of the transplanted British officials, businessmen, planters, and traders residing in India.3 A clear racial and social divide existed between colonizers and the Indian populace, including the anglicized Indian elite, and King’s view must be considered in the context of its time. One can only imagine the impression that the sights, smells, poverty, and colours of the Indian subcontinent made on King. The vast influence, power, and pageantry of the British Raj would have impressed him but placed Canada in stark contrast to the complexity of India. Surely this was a baffling experience for the young man, and it is fascinating that in later years he rarely reflected on his extraordinary time visiting the subcontinent.

10 Chapter 1

King’s first and only visit to India took place when British control of the subcontinent remained at its zenith and Canada had few direct ties to India – beyond immigration concerns. Although a notable missionary presence existed in parts of India, it is uncertain what impact it had on domestic views, given that the majority of Canadians knew little about India. Negligible trade existed between Canada and the subcontinent. India remained shrouded in mystery or imagined through the imperially bullish and romantic writings of British authors such as G.A. Henty, Rudyard Kipling and E.M. Forster. Children learned of India from their school texts: like Canada, India wore empire red on the map. As adults, they likely agreed with the candid words of Forster’s character Mr. Fielding as he explains to two Indian colleagues why Britain governed India: “England holds India for her good.”4 Few officials governing in Ottawa disagreed with the wry statement or even gave it a second thought. Thirty-one years later, now prime minister of the senior dominion of the Commonwealth, Mackenzie King and his officials contemplated establishing formal diplomatic relations with the embryonic Indian state. Through the sacrifices made in the First World War and the concessions gained at the Commonwealth conferences of 1926 and 1930, Ottawa, slowly but firmly, took control of Canada’s foreign relations. A set of confident, remarkably talented diplomats and mandarins in the federal government enhanced the process.5 The Second World War continued the corrosive process of melting the British Empire’s economic foundations, thereby diminishing London’s ability to defend and maintain its overseas colonies. Meanwhile, Indian nationalism and political consciousness steadily developed. After the First World War, a new generation of nationalists emerged as a significant force despite Britain’s attempts to limit their progress. Despite the passionate statement of Winston Churchill that he had not become the king’s first minister “in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire,”6 it was clear that Britain possessed neither the military nor the economic capacity to maintain long-term control of the jewel of the empire. London considered the benefits of petitioning the senior dominions, particularly Canada, to become involved in India. Britain approached Canada about establishing formal relations with India in late 1940. Lord Amery, secretary of state for India, met with Vincent Massey, the Canadian high commissioner, in London to suggest that it would be very helpful if Canada and India exchanged high commissioners. Amery believed that such an exchange “would demonstrate to the Indian mind the true nature of the British Commonwealth of Nations and [that] it would be very gratifying to Indian pride to have the greatest of the younger nations of the Commonwealth prepared to exchange representatives with India on parity.”7 Massey, in his correspondence to King, did not indicate how Canada would benefit from this

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exchange, and the altruistic, perhaps disingenuous, phrasing of the British proposal failed to mention the potential benefits for London as it coped with Indian nationalists. In the new year, King’s undersecretary of state for external affairs (USSEA), O.D. Skelton, prepared a memorandum for King on the possible high commissioner exchange. Despite the turbulent political situation in India, Skelton cautiously believed that a Canadian gesture would be well received by the Indian public. At the same time, he cautioned that Canada’s exclusionary voting laws regarding Indians undermined the notion of equality in the British Commonwealth. Skelton thought that, if the franchise matter could be satisfactorily addressed and the right man found to go to New Delhi, then an exchange would be possible to “help in this difficult situation.”8 King’s instincts cautioned otherwise. In the margin of Skelton’s memorandum, a pencilled comment noted, “let sleeping dogs lie.”9 On 26 December 1941, less than three weeks after war had broken out in the Pacific, Mackenzie King received another memorandum on India drafted by Lester Pearson, an emerging star within the DEA. The memorandum drew attention to appointing a high commissioner to India. Pearson thoughtfully assessed Canadian interests in the postwar Indian subcontinent, concluding that India would emerge as a fully independent nation. He noted the necessity of encouraging the healthy political development of postwar India and that, like China, India could not be ignored. Canada could assist India to cope with “two major political problems: a) the attainment of satisfactory international status [and] b) the evolution of a political system which can combine respect for the appropriate autonomy of territorial and religious minorities within national unity.” Pearson suggested that Canada could assist India in meeting these objectives better than the United States, Britain, or Australia. Canada had evolved peacefully, its officials had experience dealing with minority rights, and it did not have an imperial past. Pearson feared the potential of “a great danger after the war or in its later stages of bitter racial feelings against [the] Japanese … expressed in ways which will alienate sympathies in China and India.” Assuaging the tensions clearly benefited Canada and its allies. It was vital to emphasize “the solidarity of civilized and ‘democratic’ peoples in such a crisis,” and India must have contact with other democracies apart from Britain. Perhaps recognizing Mackenzie King’s cautious nature, Pearson concluded that Ottawa could conveniently initiate this process without great expense “and without assuming any embarrassing responsibilities.”10 Why Pearson encouraged the matter is unclear. He lacked experience with India, and Asian affairs were not his strength. It is possible that he learned of British fears of India in a postwar world while in London and truly believed

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that Canada could play a constructive role. Indeed, his initial sense that India required attention persisted for many years, often to the exasperation of his American counterparts in the 1950s. Pearson’s memorandum reveals an assumption that later led many politicians and bureaucrats in Ottawa to sour on India. The idea that an independent India would naturally evolve in a Western democratic fashion, emulate the West, and be aligned with the West after the war ended ignored the country’s complexities and its nationalist struggle. It also ignored the critical role of the sharply different geographical, cultural, and religious norms that shaped Indian foreign policy in the post-independence period. Unsurprisingly, there were few bureaucrats in Ottawa who initially considered such factors as they conceptualized post-independence “India.” The significance of considering a representative in India was twofold. First, Canada placed diplomatic focus firmly on Washington and London, with Commonwealth ties also given priority. By the end of 1939, Canada had established High Commissions in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, and South Africa. In contrast, before 7 December 1941, only two Canadian legations existed in Asia, one in Tokyo (established in 1929) and the other in Chunking China (established in July 1941). With the outbreak of war in the Pacific, the Canadian legation in Tokyo closed, and its staff repatriated, shutting Canada’s main window on the Pacific. The Canadian mission to Chunking continued, but it operated in an isolated part of China constantly under threat of Japanese attack. Moreover, its minister, Major General Victor Odlum, was not experienced in Chinese or Asian affairs and ignored those of his staff who were.11 Second, Pearson’s memorandum deserves special consideration because it recognized the possibility of Indian independence before the Cripps mission led by Sir Stafford Cripps. The failed mission occurred after the fall of Singapore and Rangoon between March and April 1942, a watershed moment for the Indian independence movement. Facing cabinet pressure, Churchill grudgingly agreed to offer concessions to Indian nationalists through Cripps. The Cripps mission emblematized the dire straits of British rule in India. Effectively, the British cabinet offered India “the right to total independence after the war, in anticipation of immediate cooperation by the Government of India in pursuit of war.”12 India could either seek full dominion status once the war ended or leave the empire altogether. King appears to have considered Pearson’s prescient memorandum even before the momentous British action.13 In early March, Churchill informed King of the purpose of the Cripps mission. King welcomed “the statement of policy laying-down the steps [that London] has proposed to take for the earliest possible realization of complete self-government in India.”14 Echoing Pearson’s earlier point, the Canadian prime minister informed Churchill of Ottawa’s possible high commissioner exchange

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with India. An accommodating King offered that Canada “would be glad to make an early appointment of a High Commissioner” if London believed that doing so “would help to signalize India’s emergence as an equal member of the Commonwealth.”15 The usually cautious King went so far as to suggest that the Cripps mission might be given a boost if the self-governing dominions voiced “their readiness to co-operate at the time of peace negotiations in insuring immediate recognition of India’s status as one of equality with the other selfgoverning parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations.”16 Churchill replied unenthusiastically to King’s offer on 18 March, pointing out that the “grim” issues negotiated by Cripps had significant sectarian and military ramifications for both India and the British government. He coolly instructed King: “I should strongly recommend your awaiting developments till we see how the Cripps mission goes.”17 Churchill’s bluntness dampened the far more optimistic telegram that Leo Amery, the British secretary of state for India, wrote to King the previous day. Amery eagerly declared that “the interest that would be shown in India and the recognition of India’s status implied in an exchange of High Commissioners between India and Canada, would be of the very greatest help with a sensitive people like that of India.” Amery intended to raise King’s suggestion immediately with the viceroy, adding that, “when the peace negotiations come in sight, a lead from the senior Dominion in welcoming the Indian delegates [to the peace conference] would be immensely helpful.”18 A disconnect clearly existed between Amery and Churchill, with the former wondering if, “on the subject of India [particularly self-government], he is really quite sane.” Churchill’s firm response to King belied this fact as well as his ambition to maintain London’s grip on India.19 Amery cabled the viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, who expressed interest in the Canadian proposal and promised to give it consideration. But at the end of March, Canada made its own decision. The Cabinet War Committee met in Ottawa and, in light of Churchill’s rebuke, agreed that an appointment of a high commissioner to India should be deferred until the results of the Cripps mission became clear.20 In May, Amery received a positive response from the Viceroy, seemingly unaware of the March decision, asking Massey to inform King that the Indian government was now in a position to exchange representatives with Canada.21 The Canadians dropped the matter altogether until June 1943, when Norman Robertson, the USSEA, sent a copy of a letter from Odlum, in China, to King. Robertson reported that Odlum “would like to have someone in India with whom he could compare notes. I think that the establishment of our Legation in Chunking is indeed an additional reason for putting a High Commissioner in India. I wonder if we might not revive this question now.”22 Robertson pursued

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the issue on 28 August when he cleverly provided King with a copy of a flattering letter between Odlum and Canadian diplomat Hugh Keenleyside.23 Having spent a brief period in India, Odlum gave Keenleyside his impressions of Indian attitudes toward Canada. It was trusted among Indian parties more than any other part of the British Empire, Odlum wrote. The leaders of the Indian nationalist movement distrusted Churchill, and resentment toward the British ran deep, while King garnered high regard as “a great constitutionalist.” From Odlum’s vantage point, Indians saw King as the “one man in the British Empire who I think could exert a great influence if he were in any way to become associated with the settlement of the Indian problem.”24 While King likely enjoyed reading about his distinguished status, he chose not to pursue Robertson’s suggestion. Some officials in the DEA began to question the plodding nature of the denied requests and echoed Pearson’s early arguments about the importance of having a representative in India. John Holmes, a talented young diplomat, lobbied his senior colleague, Hume Wrong, for renewed consideration of appointing a high commissioner to India. Holmes noted that Australia had beat Canada to the punch by appointing its own high commissioner. Surely, Holmes argued, “if there is a question of priority it is more important for Canada to try to play a role for which she is peculiarly fitted, in settling one of the major world problems, than in worrying about the grievances of the Peruvians or the Cubans.” Wrong agreed but doubted Canada’s efficacy in settling India’s internal problems. Yet there remained a strong case for having a Canadian representative in India, and Wrong was “sorry Australia got in first.”25 Toward the end of 1943, King returned to favouring the idea of appointing a high commissioner to India. In a conversation with Robertson, King proposed Andrew McNaughton, a Canadian general, only to have Robertson urge caution.26 During the past year, Robertson had unsuccessfully contemplated the posting. Finding a willing, qualified candidate, preferably from outside their depleted department, had proven very difficult.27 Still, with powerful proponents in the DEA such as Pearson, Robertson, Wrong, and now Prime Minister King, a decision would soon be made. In November, Ottawa notified the British government and the Indian government of its desire to send a representative to India. Although the Indians maintained a representative in Washington throughout the war, a representative in Ottawa would be more than symbolic: it would strengthen the nationalist demands for independence. The British government also seemed to favour the proposal, requesting only one small concession. Malcolm MacDonald, the British high commissioner to Canada, informed Robertson in April 1944 that, if the Canadians wished to proceed with their initiative,

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then the British and Indian governments would be grateful if they could be informed in advance.28 As the war turned in favour of the Allies and the likelihood of independence increased, Indian officials expressed hope that Canada would play an active and influential role in the British Empire and within the Commonwealth. K.P.S. Menon, the Indian agent general in Chunking, communicated to Odlum in May 1944 that the Indians admired King and had great faith “in Canada’s good intentions.”29 Reflecting on Canada’s accumulated goodwill, Odlum echoed Pearson’s earlier observation, speculating that “perhaps it [India] thinks that Canadians have not become as biased in judgement as have certain British leaders if only because Canada has not been so close to or so obsessed with Indian problems.”30 Furthermore, Ottawa learned from London that the government of India was “anxious to appoint a High Commissioner to Canada as soon as possible.”31 The Indians proposed sending a representative to Canada even if Ottawa could not immediately reciprocate. The Canadian government delayed action because of the strained resources of the DEA and the ongoing search for the right individual. Even Pearson despaired that the rapid expansion of Canada’s emerging diplomatic presence hampered the hunt. The department was competing with other branches of the civil service for able talent.32 The year 1946 proved to be decisive in establishing Canada’s bilateral relations with India. In March, the British Labour government of Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced that his government approved of India’s complete independence and sought to repatriate British soldiers as soon as possible. King called this decision “the right course” in his diary, but he also betrayed a cautious whiff of the Cold War; he observed that, if Britain did not leave the Indian subcontinent peacefully, then “it is almost certain that India, sooner or later, would join with the other Eastern powers in helping to overthrow British rule.”33 Concern that the Cold War would extend to South Asia compounded a fear that the Soviet Union would come to control the “Oriental peoples; possibly the people of India as well before very long.”34 This is really the first hint that the impact of decolonization in Asia as well as the emerging Cold War influenced Ottawa’s interest in India. King’s tangible fear found purchase among other Canadian policy makers and their allies. By 1950, Ottawa and its allies employed concerted efforts to combat Soviet influence and communism in South Asia by promoting the virtues of the British Commonwealth “club” and through the innovative use of development aid. In the meantime, Canada required a representative in India now that independence loomed on the horizon. With Norman Robertson residing in London as the high commissioner, Pearson sought to put his own stamp on the

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position of undersecretary. He reiterated the importance attached to filling the New Delhi post in a memorandum to Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) Louis St. Laurent. Yet the problem of finding the right person “for this difficult and quite important post” remained. The ideal candidate required “a good understanding of the working of Dominion-Provincial relations and of Canada’s place in the Commonwealth and the international community.” General Andrew McNaughton remained a possibility, King’s suggestion, so too former politician and now diplomat T.C. Davis. Uninterested, the latter persuaded Pearson that the job called “for a younger man,” which then struck McNaughton from the list of possibilities.35 Throughout the autumn of 1946, the department continued to search. As late as 25 November, Pearson contacted potential candidates, only to be rebuffed repeatedly.36 Finally, Mackenzie King chose John Kearney to be the Canadian representative, believing that he would “make an excellent representative there.”37 Prior to 1941, Kearney practised law in Quebec, and like many in the Irish Catholic community he had ties to the Liberal Party. In July 1941, King invited Kearney to become the high commissioner to Ireland. Kearney remained in Dublin until the end of the war until his appointment as envoy to Norway and Denmark in February 1946. Ireland’s wartime policy of strict, albeit benevolent, neutrality raised tensions within the Commonwealth and the United States. Kearney’s experience in discreetly dealing with both a very divisive policy and Ireland’s anti-British politicians suggests that King’s choice was a considered one. On 18 December 1946, cabinet approved Kearney’s appointment as Canada’s first high commissioner to India.38 Pearson notified the government of India (GOI) the following day, and as 1946 ended the GOI welcomed the appointment, indicating its desire to reciprocate as soon as possible.39 Kearney became the first high commissioner after years of debate over numerous candidates; since he was not the first choice, the appointment represented a compromise for the DEA. Kearney was not “a younger man,” his wife was ill, and, like most other candidates, he admitted to being “pretty much in the dark about India.” After consulting with a physician, he and his wife concluded that they could go to India, “provided suitable residence can be found not only in Delhi but more particularly in hills where I understand Government retires during part of the year.”40 Much of his knowledge of India read right out of a Kipling story. Early in 1947, Kearney cabled Ottawa suggesting Simla as a residence, the former summer capital of the British in the foothills of the Himalayas, immortalized in Kipling’s Plain Tales from the Hills. He spent his last weeks in Norway meeting with anyone who had journeyed to India and reading any available books, such as India: A Restatement, by Sir Reginald Coupland, which Kearney described in his diary as an informative and up-to-date account of the

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British Raj in India. Written primarily by Westerners, the books frequently sympathized with the role of the British Empire in India.41 Coupland, speaking years earlier in Toronto, declared that “it is British statesmanship and British strength that has saved and is at this moment saving the three hundred and sixty million people of India from suffering the fate of China.”42 Given the dearth of knowledge on India within the DEA, Ottawa advised Kearney to learn from British officials in London. He eagerly did so, but it is debatable how helpful these talks were in shaping his understanding of a contemporary India. Indian nationalists found 1947 to be bittersweet. A nation was on the verge of being born, thereby fulfilling the hopes and dreams of India’s leaders. At the same time, a sense of uncertainty swelled over the socio-political stability of the subcontinent as Hindus and Muslims jockeyed for position. Mackenzie King too felt this sense of insecurity, exacerbated by the British decision to move up the date of independence to midnight, 14–15 August. Attlee telegrammed King with a dreary outlook on the British plans to transfer power to the Indian government. In response, King soberly reflected on the “possibility of very serious civil war there [India], so much so that the present govt. have decided to fix a definite date when they will hand over India to whatever authorities may have become constituted for carrying on govt. by that time.”43 Despite the potential for conflict, King believed that the British were “right in not trying to govern India by repression” and reflected that “we were passing through one of those great epochs of history when the British Empire itself was breaking up.” He feared a power vacuum on the subcontinent that “left open the way for India to run completely outside of the Commonwealth which she will probably do.”44 King was partially correct. The British Commonwealth underwent fundamental political and constitutional change during the final years of his leadership, yet King could take solace in having established the platform from which Canadian policy would help to create a new, vibrant, and racially inclusive Commonwealth. Just as Ottawa began to develop its newest post, the threat of political instability in India, whetted by sectarian strife, became increasingly worrisome. A skeleton Canadian High Commission opened at the stately Imperial Hotel in New Delhi in April 1947 with Alfred J. Pick as the second secretary. Pick set up the new post, dealing with the DEA’s inability to determine post needs for the tropics, such as clothing and furniture.45 Nonetheless, Pick did an admirable job despite poor logistics symptomatic of the growing pains that the DEA encountered during this period in establishing a South Asian presence. Pick’s initial report to Ottawa depicted India’s future as troubling. Drawing on Lord Durham’s famed depiction of race relations in Lower Canada, Pick reported that “in India two nations” were “warring within the bosom of a single

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state.”46 The administrative machinery, long the pride of the Raj, showed strain, and “even at this early stage there are signs of growing inefficiency, favoritism, and possibly even corruption.”47 Pick further observed that India’s minorities chafed at the prospect of rule by Hindus. Muslims increasingly believed that they would be disadvantaged if they remained in a Congress-led India, and these fears gave currency to the idea of a separate Muslim state. If anything, Pick mused, the cleavages among India’s communities grew wider. The Muslim League warned that it would not look favourably on Nehru becoming India’s first prime minister.48 The successes of the Muslim League in the 1946 general election coupled with the Congress Party’s desire for a strong, unitary, and nonsectarian state, and London’s zeal to leave the subcontinent as quickly as possible, pointed to a partitioned subcontinent. Pick cautioned that the “indications are that Hindustan at least will secede from the Commonwealth. Muslim India seems more sympathetic to the British connection.”49 With some foreshadowing, he noted finally that “peaceful transfers of power are not common in human history and it seems that India must go through a good deal of trouble before she becomes a well ordered, self governing and independent country, or more likely for some time at least two countries.”50 Sectarian riots occurred in some major cities in 1946, further embittering relations among India’s peoples. Pick’s superior, John Kearney, would arrive in India during a time of unprecedented sectarian strife. The future of an independent Indian state and its constitutional relationship with the Commonwealth preoccupied British policy makers; the topic vexed the Commonwealth member states into 1949. The Muslim League and the Congress Party finally accepted partition in June 1947. The Indian Congress leaders contemplated remaining in the Commonwealth, with the caveat that they “were willing to accept the Crown” but wanted reference to the emperor of India “deleted from the Royal Title.”51 London sought the views of the senior dominions on the future status of India within the Commonwealth. Canadian policy reflected caution, but King’s fear that India might bolt into the Soviet sphere remained. On closer examination, this matter revealed an emerging split between King and his SSEA, Louis St. Laurent. The ever wary prime minister did not share St. Laurent’s and the DEA’s desire to play a larger role in India’s transition to self-government. King apparently forgot his offer to Churchill five years earlier when he committed his government to assist efforts to keep India in the Commonwealth. King now feared that London schemed to promote Commonwealth centralization, so he forcibly rebuffed St. Laurent. Despite his reluctance to engage actively in the question of self-government for India, Mackenzie King wanted India to remain in the British Commonwealth. On 23 May, the secretary of state for dominion affairs wrote King an update,

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noting that the future of India within the Commonwealth and its current constitutional demands held consequences for all members of the Commonwealth. The willingness of Congress Party leaders to entertain Indian membership in the Commonwealth was unpopular among the party rank and file, and London urged “extreme secrecy on this matter because if it became known that Congress leaders had privately encouraged this idea the possibility of their being able to bring their Party round to it would be seriously jeopardized.”52 Ottawa notified London that it was best for all parties if India became a member of the Commonwealth and that partition would not preclude the future state from entry into the Commonwealth. Indeed, membership in the Commonwealth, Ottawa mused, might even alleviate difficulties raised by partition while augmenting good relations among the peoples and governments of India and those of the Commonwealth.53 Another communication followed on 30 May, in which King offered his support for London’s attempts to find a solution that would grant self-government and stability to India, but he did not commit Canada itself to the partition process. The intricacies of partition and British motives worried King. He fretted that events were moving too quickly, thereby making a measured response difficult. This is apparent in his diary entry of 28 May 1947. King recorded the details of a cabinet discussion on India that had provoked his suspicion that Britain was attempting to unload its problems in India onto the Commonwealth. During the discussion, he rebuked St. Laurent and the DEA for preparing a draft statement outlining Ottawa’s response to whether Canada would accept an independent India or other partitioned states into the Commonwealth following independence. The statement supported partition. In response, King came “out pretty strongly against pretending to advise on matters that we knew nothing about. I said quite openly that there was not a single member of the Cabinet who was in a position to advise in regard to India.” Not only did his colleagues not understand the situation in India, King continued, but also they did not “realize what implications there might be in tendering advice in a matter of this kind.” He mused about the outcome of a Canadian action alienating one of the newly partitioned states, forcing it to “join in with Russia to form a common cause with her,” and “we would be pulled into some of the civil war that may result from an action which may be taken at this time by Britain.” For the moment, Britain held responsibility for India, and “she should deal with the matter herself ” instead of placing its burdens onto the dominions. Ottawa would only “help bear burdens that were legitimate.” King believed that cabinet agreed with him, with the exception of St. Laurent, who, King scoffed, would loyally support the DEA.54 The Canadian prime minister assured the British that his government would not “impede or delay” an agreement outlining India’s “future political status,”

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as determined by the Indian people, even though such an arrangement might result in “the enlargement of the number of member states within the Commonwealth.”55 King also voiced open support for deleting “Emperor of India” from the royal titles and informed the British that his government had already “instructed its High Commissioners some time ago to consult with the other Commonwealth governments on the desirability of discussing the revision of the Royal Style and Titles” at the next Commonwealth prime ministers’ meeting.56 At that meeting, the Indian suggestion could be considered with any other proposed modifications. King’s carefully phrased despatch to London arrived after Lester Pearson learned of the prime minister’s admonishment to St. Laurent during the cabinet meeting concerning his draft telegram. Pearson sent King a tactful “clarification” of the DEA’s position on India and the changing Commonwealth; he indicated that, though the domestic situation in India concerned primarily London and New Delhi, the entry of one or more newly independent South Asian nations into the Commonwealth should be a matter of concern to all members. Pearson defended the DEA draft, arguing that it did not recommend Canadian intervention and would not make Ottawa vulnerable to a Commonwealth centralization scheme. Ottawa needed to consider “the principles which should govern additions to, or withdrawals from, the existing association of nations.” Pearson warned that “unfortunate results might occur if it were agreed that any one state in the Commonwealth could bring about the addition of new members without consultation with, and approval by, the others.” He understood that the addition of multiple Asian states into the Commonwealth would transform that institution. He suggested that two principles be established on the question of new member states: “1) there should be no new states added to the Commonwealth without the consent of the existing members; and 2) new states should be fully independent.” In the meantime, Ottawa could choose not to comment on the matter or “send a more noncommittal reply.”57 King chose the second alternative. A few weeks after these exchanges, John Kearney arrived in the sweltering heat of Bombay. In his diary entry on 19 June, he lamented that “it is difficult to sleep when one is dripping wet. The temperature has been around 100, and the humidity is almost equal to it.”58 The diplomat suffered equally on the train to New Delhi: “When we arrived at New Delhi and opened the door of our compartment, it was like going into a blast furnace. I could not realize that the weather could be so hot. There is a breeze but it is a detriment instead of an asset. It seems to blow the heat into one’s system, and besides carries dust with it.”59 Ironically, in the comfortable confines of the Imperial Hotel, Kearney needed to turn off the “Desert Cooler” since it gave him a headache.”60

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Ottawa’s expectations of Kearney were remarkably similar to those suggested by Pearson to King in 1941.61 Four directives drove the mission. The emphasis lay on maintaining and strengthening friendly relations, cultivating trade links, and keeping Ottawa posted on matters of interest concerning Indian internal policies and the exchange of views on external relations that might be of “common concern.” In other words, Kearney had to strengthen the profile of Canada and cultivate Western sympathy. The recommendation that he keep close watch on India’s relations with the Soviet Union illustrates that point and reflects the escalating Cold War tensions beginning to influence Canada’s India policy.62 Kearney’s first major test involved the brilliant and charismatic prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Sophisticated and cosmopolitan, Nehru moved seamlessly between East and West. The product of a wealthy and fairly anglicized family, he was educated in Britain at Harrow and Cambridge; his interest in and knowledge of foreign affairs were fed by travel and extensive reading in politics and history. He stood out among his senior colleagues in the Congress Party. Indeed, few Indian politicians had travelled beyond India or possessed a solid background in international affairs. As such, Nehru became “the major Congress authority on future foreign policy,” a position that he retained until his death in 1964.63 Kearney met Nehru for the first time on 26 June 1947. He used the introduction to draw Nehru out on domestic matters, with Nehru indicating his preference that India become a moderate “socialistic state.”64 Kearney also lobbied Nehru for a formal residence and offices, of which very little could be offered. The Canadians remained on the top floor of the Imperial Hotel. After an hourlong conversation, Kearney left suitably impressed, recording that Nehru “has a most engaging personality and has a wonderful command of the English language. The Indian character as evidenced in Nehru, reminds me of the Irish – a melancholy look, which in a flash changes into a bright smile.”65 Kearney used his experiences in Ireland to assist in conceptualizing his Indian interlocutors. Months after the meeting, he wrote to close friend J.L. Ralston, the former minister of defence in Mackenzie King’s cabinet, that “India has plenty of interesting characters. Nehru is a most lovable personality; his faults are just as attractive as his virtues. Mahatma Gandhi reminds me of a pocket edition of DeValera [the prime minister of Ireland] in diapers; but for the love of Pete, never quote me as having said so!”66 How the towering, bombastic DeValera reminded Kearney of the gnomish, mystical Hindu persona of Gandhi is uncertain. It serves as the first of many examples of the challenge for Canadian figures to situate India and its leaders outside an Anglo-imperial context. Nehru had good reason to appear melancholy at his first meeting with Kearney. Judith Brown notes in her biography of Nehru that “the coming of independence

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was an experience of tragedy as much as celebration. He witnessed the partition of his homeland (Kashmir), the horrific killings which preceded and accompanied it, and the violence which locked India and the new state of Pakistan in conflict.”67 The latter conflict(s) sorely bled the financial coffers of an already bare treasury, making Nehru’s hope of developing an impoverished state a Herculean task. Nehru faced colossal choices and tasks during the weeks leading up to independence in mid-August. Perplexing issues such as “the provincial choices about joining India or Pakistan, the setting up of a Boundary Commission to deal with the partition of Punjab and Bengal, the division of assets of British India, including the army, [and] the question of who should be GovernorGeneral of each of the new Dominions” demanded attention.68 Nehru and his colleagues attempted to deal with them pragmatically, lacking a blueprint that might help to guide them. For all the troubles, Nehru and his compatriots rejoiced as their ancient land prepared for its long-awaited entry into the community of independent nations at midnight of 14–15 August. (The date was chosen to prevent independence from occurring on an inauspicious day for Hindus). Salman Rushdie elegantly captured the feeling in his novel Midnight’s Children: the birth of India was greeted with gasps, fireworks, and crowds. The title of Rushdie’s novel was inspired by Nehru’s eloquent speech to the Constituent Assembly in New Delhi: At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance. It is fitting that at this solemn moment we take the pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people and to the still larger cause of humanity.69

Hearing the announcement on the radio, Mackenzie King revelled in the news of India’s birth. “A great moment in history,” King recorded in his diary, contemplating the “remarkable” fate that “Mackenzie’s grandson should have been the one to send Canada’s greetings & good wishes to India & Pakistan & receive as I have (Aug 15 replies from the two first Prime Ministers of India).”70 In contrast, Kearney felt disappointed with the whole affair: “When the clock chimed the witching hour of midnight, I felt quite worked up. I was waiting for a tremendous demonstration. I was greatly disappointed by its luke-warmness. I felt that such an event in Canada or even in London, would have been marked by an up-roar.”71 Kearney forgot to record that a monsoon had drenched New Delhi and ignored “the delirium of the thousands of ordinary Indians who

Plain Tales from the DEA 23

waited for the chimes of the clock to signal independence.”72 According to Brown and historian Denis Judd, the night of 14–15 August dazzled with pageantry and “electric excitement, with huge crowds participating in the capital’s celebrations: probably nobody, either British or Indian, had ever witnessed anything like it before.”73 The Union Jack fell from flagpoles throughout the subcontinent, and the remaining British regiments embarked for home from Bombay “while the bands on the waterfront played Auld Lang Syne.”74 Reporting his initial observations to Ottawa, a sanguine Kearney predicted that, if India avoided further misfortunes during the partition process, then it could “become a great power in the East, and that in the measurable future, in combination with other Asiatic countries, the future balance of power in the world will rest with her.”75 A maelstrom of horrendous violence, which Kearney witnessed, marred the celebrations and the nascent hopes and dreams of sectarian harmony. Within hours of partition taking effect, the Punjab “erupted into flames and violence.”76 Long-standing suspicions and fears sparked an unprecedented bloodletting as Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs attacked one another. This violence plunged the government of India into crisis as waves of ethnic cleansing swept across much of the north and into New Delhi, where there was a significant Muslim population. Approximately 15 million people were dispossessed of their homes and belongings, with rape and mutilation occurring systematically.77 The refugee crisis added to India’s list of staggering problems. A weekly churchgoer, Kearney was driven to Mass on 7 September and saw dead bodies littered throughout the streets and watched helplessly as a man was stabbed and set ablaze with gasoline in front of his church. Kearney could do little except retreat to the Imperial Hotel and report the violence to Ottawa. Even at the hotel, he encountered “Sikhs who are armed and drinking heavily.”78 To add to his unease, he came down with a case of “Delhi Belly.” Indian authorities imposed a curfew that had little effect; columns of smoke appeared across the skyline, and gunfire echoed throughout the city. The government suspended all mail, railway, and air services. By mid-September, the situation had improved slightly in New Delhi and other major cities, but Kearney reported intermittent gunfire and that the Muslim populace avoided straying onto the streets. In addition, disease broke out as “many thousands” were living in unorganized refugee camps.79 The Canadian mission planned for evacuation if the situation deteriorated, but fortunately Kearney and his staff outlasted this harrowing period. The situation did improve. Overcoming the relative inexperience of Ottawa’s chief policy makers regarding India, the Canadian government finally developed a post in a part of the world that it had long neglected. Over a period of five years, Canada’s interest in India matured despite Mackenzie King’s cautionary

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approach. The change from initial contemplation of whether to assist British aims in India to recognition of the importance of having a set of Canadian eyes and ears in New Delhi to the eventual establishment of a diplomatic post in New Delhi illustrates the profound shift in Canada’s external relations policy during the war and postwar period. The Canadians saw the value of ascertaining the Indian view on international affairs as well as the need to share their, and the West’s, perspective with New Delhi as Cold War tensions escalated in Asia. In particular, during the next seven years, Canadian policy makers dedicated a great deal of effort and committed significant financial resources to prevent India from succumbing to communism. Connected to this goal, Ottawa prepared to work closely with London and New Delhi to create the framework for a new, multiracial Commonwealth. The seeds of a potentially cooperative and fruitful relationship had been planted.

2 Building a Bridge Bilateral Relations, 1947–49

Historian Robert Bothwell notes that Ottawa’s attention during the formative years of the Cold War was predominantly on developments in Europe. The Cold War in Asia, he opined, “belonged to somebody else, usually the Americans.”1 To an extent, that assertion is true, but it is too casual a dismissal of Canada’s role in Asia at this juncture. In the case of India, the newly independent country remained an exotic land to both Americans and most Canadians. Yet independent India emerged as an impoverished state, reeling from crisis to crisis, with hundreds of millions of citizens to care for. India was of international import. The endemic poverty and economic instability, exacerbated by sectarian strife, also nurtured the potential for Soviet machinations, just as Mackenzie King had feared. Canada’s long-standing prime minister, the wily King, stepped down in November 1948, replaced by his protege, Louis St. Laurent, the former SSEA. Lester Pearson stepped up to fill the latter’s position. The changes effected a significant political transformation in Canada. King, in his later years, had been increasingly reticent about activist foreign policy, as illustrated by his displeasure with an expanded Canadian role in India, in his attitude toward Canadian membership on the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, and in his refusal to lend material and political support during the Berlin Airlift in 1948. St. Laurent argued that Canada must accept certain responsibilities to be a meaningful member of the United Nations. This juncture marks the sunset of King’s influence on foreign policy and the rise of an international activism championed by St. Laurent and Pearson.2 Their goals had significant impacts on Canadian foreign policy toward India and coincided with Jawaharlal Nehru’s own desire to have India pursue its own activist foreign policy. From 1948 to the electoral defeat of the Liberal Party in June 1957, St. Laurent and Pearson frequently met with Nehru and his officials to discuss foreign policy. St. Laurent and Nehru developed a notable degree of continuity and familiarity buoyed by their mutual political success. Reflecting on these years led retired diplomat Escott Reid to assert that a “special relationship” had developed between Canada and India.3 Also of note, during the autumn of 1949, Nehru paid his first visit to Canada, where he addressed Parliament and transfixed parliamentarians and diplomats alike with an eloquent speech to the House of

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Commons. Canadian officials considered his visit a resounding success, in sharp contrast to his near-disastrous visit to the United States, when the Indians and Americans talked past each other in their assessments of global events – particularly the threat of communism in Asia. In the early days of the Cold War, Ottawa and Washington drew different conclusions on the importance of India and Nehru. His Canadian visit marked the culmination of a successful year for both Canada and India and strengthened the belief that Ottawa could act as a bridge between India and the West. India decided to remain in the British Commonwealth, partly because of Canadian efforts. Ottawa earned the respect and admiration of one of the most important foreign leaders of the emerging postcolonial world. This was a politically advantageous move, especially during a time when Asia was beset by crises. John Kearney faced a unique challenge determining the direction of India’s nascent foreign policy. Early dispatches to Ottawa lacked an assessment of Nehru’s foreign policy because none existed. Nehru and his cabinet confronted daunting regional challenges after partition and pushed foreign policy beyond South Asia to the side. The months after independence required stamping out sectarian fires and focusing on nation building. Although Kearney struggled to understand the nuances of the environment into which he had been thrust, he felt sympathetic to the plight facing both India and Pakistan. He marvelled “that things are not more chaotic” given that “a nation of four hundred million people, geographically, politically, financially, and to a considerable extent racially,” had been rapidly partitioned, “something of a record in world history.” The aftermath “placed a colossal task on the two new governments.”4 One of the vital tasks involved creating a distinct foreign service. Under British rule, India did not have its own foreign service, though by 1946 the Imperial External Affairs Department began to plan and recruit for a new diplomatic service. The young Indian state quickly searched for and developed talent in areas of foreign affairs and intelligence to address this deficiency. One solution with obvious shortcomings plucked talent from other government bodies; India could afford to be represented only in countries central to Indian interests. Alternatively, Nehru looked to a diverse assortment of close friends and relatives, including the eccentric Krishna Menon, for key diplomatic tasks.5 Along with a small foreign service cadre, the nationalist elements of the Congress Party that wanted India to leave the Commonwealth constrained Nehru’s ability to move forward. Although personally unconvinced, Nehru maintained a delicate balance when articulating India’s policy on membership in the Commonwealth. The Indian government apparatus underwent a massive reorganization throughout the summer of 1947. Despite the merger of the Departments of Commonwealth Relations and External Affairs in July 1947, constitutional and

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foreign policy remained the preserve of Nehru. Within the new Ministry of External Affairs, the main emphasis of the Commonwealth Relations Wing was on the interests of Indians who had migrated to various parts of the British Empire rather than plotting policy for India’s role in the Commonwealth.6 Meanwhile, Kearney sought out India’s policy. During a reception at the American embassy four days after India’s independence, he discovered from Sardar Patel, the powerful minister of home affairs, that the constitution would be the main focus of the Indian assembly in the ensuing months. Patel predicted that a president would replace the retiring governor general in early 1948. Kearney reflected that “this, to all intents and purposes, means that they will be out of the Commonwealth by April [1948]. It is of course possible, that even with a president they might make some such arrangements to stay within the Commonwealth but I do not think this is as likely.”7 Similarly, the secretary-general for external affairs, Sir Girja Bajpai, informed Kearney that, though there was a “growing consciousness” in some sections of the Congress Party of the advantages of retaining dominion status, the majority favoured a republic. An Indian republic need not leave the Commonwealth. Bajpai added that Nehru leaned toward maintaining a connection to the British Commonwealth but would follow the majority in his party for fear of splitting it. Kearney considered press reports and conversations with these senior Indian officials and then suggested in a dispatch to Ottawa that India could “have her cake and eat it too”: that is, hypothetically adopt a republican constitution and attempt to maintain some linkage with the British Commonwealth. India’s decision would “ultimately depend on the attitude which we and the other members of the Commonwealth adopt.”8 This early assessment proved to be prescient. Yet Kearney failed to identify the hurdles, to consider the role of Indian public opinion on Britain, and to gauge how hated the symbol of the crown was by most Indian nationalists. Public opinion in India favoured leaving the Commonwealth, and one of Nehru’s biographers believes that Nehru initially shared this belief.9 Before 1947, a forthright Nehru stated that he saw no future for a free India in the Commonwealth largely because of the racial composition of its members and because Britain dominated the organization. Nehru and his colleagues gradually accepted the benefits of membership in the Commonwealth during the transfer of power.10 However, this presented a significant conundrum since Nehru could not foresee how, in the long term, India could become a republic and remain in the Commonwealth. He was reluctant to create a tempest among the Indian populace and within the Congress Party. Despite his cautiously guarded sentiments about membership in the Commonwealth, Nehru was pushed on the matter. In one instance, the Indian

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high commissioner to Canada, Sardar Malik, provoked a question on India’s status in the Commonwealth in the Lok Sabha.11 The Hindustan Times carried a report in early October that Malik, while speaking to a Canadian Club meeting in Ottawa, “expressed the hope that India and Pakistan would remain in the British Commonwealth. India, he said, might eventually be the country to bridge the widening gap between the East and the West.” Malik’s comment led one Indian opposition parliamentarian to ask Nehru “whether it is a fact that the High Commissioner represented the views of the government of India.” Nehru distanced himself from Malik’s comments, stating only that “I do know that a good many of us hope that conditions in India and other places will make it possible that India may continue to be a member of the Commonwealth of British Nations.” He concluded that Malik was not making a statement on the government of India’s policy.12 Not surprisingly, the Canadian government’s attitude toward India’s constitutional status within the Commonwealth remained unformed into early 1948. This was largely because the two key actors, the Indian and British governments, did not push the subject until March 1948. In a letter to Nehru, the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, suggested that a new stage in the Commonwealth’s development rendered constitutional “formulations” less binding on members of the Commonwealth than an adherence to common values such as faith in democratic institutions, belief in the rule of law, and acceptance of the need for tolerance. These values, Attlee continued, constituted a “way of life” and, despite local differences, provided a general sense of community. The central binding link, however, remained the common allegiance to the crown. Attlee concluded by urging Nehru to “think of the benefits of a head of state above section or community and to see how Commonwealth membership might promote Indian unity and help it to take a “right and natural” leading part in Asia.”13 Nehru made no commitment, and his careful manoeuvres left diplomats such as Kearney looking for hints to interpret India’s true sympathies. In a dispatch of 1 April 1948 to Ottawa on communist activities in India, Kearney observed that Nehru approached both the Soviet Union and the West with caution to avoid allying with either. Still, Kearney believed, recent world events, likely referring to the coup in Czechoslovakia, coupled with the activities of the Communist Party of India, which took orders from Moscow, led Nehru to look more favourably on the West. One positive outcome of such a shift, Kearney continued, would prompt Indian policy on a continued Commonwealth connection, and any wedge that might develop between India and the Soviet Union “would encourage maintenance of this connection.” Kearney could only speculate, however, on the future. Editorial opinions remained skeptical of the value of India’s continued membership in the Commonwealth, yet he believed that the “publicly silent” officials favoured some form of continued bond.14

Building a Bridge, 1947–49 29

In conjunction with their interest in India’s Commonwealth policy, senior officials within the DEA questioned the strength of communism in India and speculated on the degree of Soviet support for the Indian Communist Party. Laurent Beaudry, the acting undersecretary of state for external affairs (AUSSEA), distributed a memorandum to Escott Reid and Lester Pearson in late April 1948 citing a conversation between W. Bean, the secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and Kushwant Singh, the information officer in the Indian High Commission. The conversation clearly troubled Beaudry. Singh suggested that the Indian government greatly underestimated the political strength of the Communist Party in India. He further noted that communal strife must end and that India needed substantial economic progress to contain communism. On the latter point, Singh suggested that the North American countries could make the largest contribution to preventing the spread of communism. Foreshadowing the intent of the Colombo Plan, the Indian diplomat noted that India desperately required “machine-tools, factory equipment, locomotives, and industrial equipment.” He cautioned that, if the status quo remained, then a communist government would control India within five years.15 Shortly after receiving the memorandum, Escott Reid, who replaced Beaudry as acting USSEA, wrote to Kearney, highlighting a New York Times article about communist influence in Asia, particularly in India. The author of the article, R. Robert Trumbull, noted the opening of a new Soviet embassy in New Delhi under an “experienced” Soviet ambassador. According to Trumbull, this signalled that “the axis of Communist activity in this part of Asia has shifted to New Delhi from Bangkok. As regards eastern and western power bloc[s], India sits on the fence. Soviet diplomats are understood to be bringing pressure to bear on India but so far this has had a negative result.” Based upon the article and its conclusions, Reid encouraged Kearney to pay close attention to the activities of the Soviet embassy in New Delhi.16 Not surprisingly, the escalation of the Cold War in Asia affected Canada’s attitude toward India remaining in the Commonwealth. The department’s senior brain trust – Hume Wrong, Norman Robertson, Arnold Heeney, Escott Reid, R.A. MacKay, A.J. Pick, and Lester Pearson – met in preparation for the October Commonwealth conference in London. They noted the necessity of maintaining “some link however tenuous between India and the Commonwealth in the hope that this may make it more likely that India will remain attached ‘to the Western World,’ or at least, not drift into the Soviet camp.”17 In the time between Attlee’s letter to Nehru and the Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference in October, negotiations continued between London and New Delhi to develop a formula that permitted a republican India to remain within the Commonwealth. But on the eve of the conference, the outcome remained uncertain. Robertson, reporting from London as the high

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commissioner, informed Ottawa that the British believed that the Indians had not made up their minds and intended to use the conference to determine the advantages of remaining in the Commonwealth.18 In contrast, the Canadian ambassador in Washington reported a conversation with the newly arrived Indian ambassador, Sir Ramu Rau, who thought that the Indian government wanted to remain in the Commonwealth – “provided certain difficulties” could be rectified.19 Such conflicting views led policy makers in Ottawa to continue to watch the matter with interest but caution. The October prime ministers’ conference between 11 and 22 October, however, did not formally discuss India’s relationship with the Commonwealth, though the Indian press had initially believed that it would be a central topic on the agenda.20 In some ways, the Canadians and their cautious prime minister benefited from the omission. During his final Commonwealth conference, King was ill and remained mostly in his hotel suite. Nehru made a point of visiting King on 13 October and “made a most favourable impression” on his elder colleague.21 King expressed interest in Nehru’s prison experiences, attempting to bond with the Indian prime minister by offering details of his grandfather’s own rebellious past – a curious tactic.22 The ensuing discussions led King to reflect on the global state of affairs and the future. With the Berlin Blockade in its fourth month, the ideological cleavages between the Soviet Bloc and the West became further entrenched: “My own feeling is that members of the Commonwealth shall need all the friends they can have in what before long may be a test as to who is to rule the world. Great care will have to be taken not to repel either the Indians or the Irish.”23 King received daily reports via his advisers and despite his health remained very much in charge of Canadian policy. As he had done so often in the past, he sought a cautious approach that would protect Canadian interests. When St. Laurent expressed hesitancy over whether India could enter into the Commonwealth without allegiance to the crown, King countered that this symbol was “secondary to the substance” and that “there was no such thing as a Commonwealth – as an entity – with policies of its own”; rather, “there was a community of free nations held together by kindred ideas, etc ... The Crown was merely an outward Symbol.” Canada could “leave it to the others to work out their relations, to take the position we were quite satisfied [with the] relations which existed between ourselves and Britain and between ourselves and other parts of the British Commonwealth.”24 King also suggested to British officials that perhaps the “British” should be dropped from the “British Commonwealth of Free Nations.”25 Such a notable omission might assuage member states that had fought against imperial rule. King’s views aligned closely with those of Nehru.

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India’s role remained undecided despite the informal meetings held among Attlee, Nehru, and the other prime ministers at the conference. King could only say “that whatever decision India might make, Canada would always have a place for India.”26 It would be up to St. Laurent, who officially became prime minister on 15 November 1948, and his secretary of state for external affairs, Lester Pearson, to guide Canada’s Commonwealth policy vis-à-vis India. Appeasing the Indians and those members of the Commonwealth wary of diminishing the status of the crown proved to be difficult. In the case of Australia and New Zealand, allegiance to the crown with the king as head of the Commonwealth was just as paramount as it was anathema to the Indians, who believed that it negated the gains of independence and wanted no mention of the king. Still, Nehru left the conference sensing that a compromise could be reached. He appreciated what “Pearson and others have said about India’s association with the Commonwealth. I can understand their position and as desired by them I shall place their views before our Cabinet.” He returned home to argue the case that India should remain in the Commonwealth, yet he recognized that his country needed to become a republic.27 Nehru understood the significant advantages of retaining a link with the Commonwealth. Relations with Pakistan continued to deteriorate, and the Indians believed that Pakistan would drive a wedge between India and the other Commonwealth nations.28 In that case, India could find itself isolated, coping with an anti-India bloc. On the other side, the slightest whiff of perceived subordinate status raised the Congress Party’s opposition. Moreover, British foreign policy continued to rankle some in the Congress Party. Nehru expressed frustration, in a letter to Krishna Menon, that British attitudes toward Indonesia and the Kashmir dispute had hardened opinion among some Indians against India’s continued position in the Commonwealth. As the year ended, it was still uncertain what New Delhi would decide.29 A significant concession from London changed the debate. Early in 1949, the British government decided to accept “retaining India in the Commonwealth, even without a role for the crown in India’s constitution or legislation.”30 British thinking gradually sympathized with India’s constitutional aspirations, and the geopolitical concerns generated from the Cold War fed London’s desire to keep India in a Western-leaning club. This shift came in preparation for a second conference in London of Commonwealth prime ministers in late April 1949 to review relations between the members and India’s continued membership. Nehru expected little of the conference, stating in a letter to Sardar Patel that any outcome would likely be inconclusive.31 In March 1949, the British government sent Sir Norman Brook to Ottawa to meet with St. Laurent and Pearson to discuss India’s relations with the

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Commonwealth. The gathering lent focus to Canadian policy, though Ottawa’s initial view leading up to the April conference did not entirely echo London’s new flexibility. Ottawa comfortably supported the status quo “under which the Crown constitutes the basis of Commonwealth membership,” less so Nehru’s proposal for a common Commonwealth citizenship.32 Canadian officials rejected this suggestion outright. Senior adviser R.A. MacKay acknowledged the Indian perspective that any agreement must not imply any inferiority of status, yet he also noted that Canadian domestic opinion must be considered in determining Ottawa’s position. The Canadian public favoured India’s membership in the Commonwealth and “would probably not object to a special relationship for India, provided that this could be done without violating the public’s sense of constitutional proprieties” or result in a solution that did not “impair or cast doubt upon the validity of the Crown as the basic link for Canada with the rest of the Commonwealth.”33 Despite the apprehension of modifying Commonwealth principles, policy makers in Ottawa also needed to consider the international climate in formulating their policy. The discussion with Brook showed that Ottawa could support London as long as its own interests remained unaffected. A memorandum drafted for Pearson and presented to cabinet reflected this fact while also revealing the continued concern over Moscow’s influence in the region: “There is obvious value in India’s continued membership in the Commonwealth, from a political and strategic point of view, particularly in view of the present international situation.” The Soviet Union posed a menace in South Asia, and the Commonwealth could provide an “important link between the peoples of Asia and the Western countries.” It was unwise to drive India out of the Commonwealth by insisting on allegiance to the Crown as a fundamental condition “if a formula could be found which would not weaken the Commonwealth association or impair Canada’s link with the Crown.” With those considerations in mind, Ottawa prepared at the London conference to consult with its Commonwealth partners, including India, on how membership could be expanded if India was unwilling to accept a continued link with the crown.34 Both Ottawa and London understood the difficulties involved in coming to any agreement but believed that retaining India in the Commonwealth was paramount and that “every effort should be made at the London meetings to work out a mutually satisfactory solution.”35 The assumption that a continued Indian presence in the Commonwealth provided for an overt link with the West remained open to debate, particularly as the date for the prime ministers’ conference grew near. Nehru had acknowledged in the Lok Sabha that India’s foreign policy was still “rather vague, rather inchoate.” He was determined to craft an independent foreign policy based

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upon India’s interests and aimed at pursuing “world peace, and to combat racism and imperialism.”36 India also sought to emerge as a power in Asian affairs and redefine its relations with Europe. Most significantly, considering the deteriorating Cold War environment, India refused to align itself formally with either the West or the East. As the DEA prepared for the conference, Kearney informed Ottawa that Nehru’s recent remarks suggested that, despite recent lukewarm public statements, India would join the Commonwealth as long as doing so did not hinder the “republican character” of the constitution. Nehru’s indifferent domestic utterances could be attributed to his lingering wariness of disturbing the rank and file of the Congress Party. The surprising and disappointing aspect remained Nehru’s commitment to “the straddling policy which he has heretofore adopted, and to give some indication of his leanings towards the western powers.”37 Considering the recent rebukes from New Delhi of communist activities in India and the widely held belief that Moscow orchestrated communist activities in India, this puzzled Canadian observers. It appeared to Kearney that Nehru remained resolute, not visibly aligning with either bloc while maintaining amicable terms with both, with the hope that Moscow might curtail its machinations in India. But Kearney also observed that Nehru occasionally abandoned neutrality and could go “out of his way to criticize the west as representing ‘the symbol of the atomic bomb.’” Kearney illuminated a trait that eventually became deeply annoying to Canadian officials: namely, that Nehru felt sufficiently comfortable critiquing Western policies in the Cold War while appearing to be nonchalant to Soviet transgressions.38 Kearney concluded that Nehru believed he promoted peace at a time when the world sorely needed a rational perspective; however, in the event of a global conflict, he would likely side with the Western powers. Nehru’s delicate balancing act later became a source of tension in the bilateral relationship between Ottawa and New Delhi and in particular with Washington as the Americans allied with Pakistan. St. Laurent could not attend the London meeting set for late April since he was preparing to fight his first election as prime minister. Pearson took his place as lobbyist for remaining in the Commonwealth. In the meantime, St. Laurent appealed to Nehru. He instructed Kearney to deliver a letter to Nehru expressing “how much importance we attach to having India remain in the Commonwealth.”39 The letter outlined his hope that Nehru could find a way of “retaining some link between the sovereign republic of India and the Crown.”40 If the Canadians hoped to draw the elusive Nehru out, then the tactic failed; they received a friendly yet non-committal response. He stated that India remained committed to adopting a republican constitution but acknowledged

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that a majority of “thinking” Indians also wanted to retain an association with the Commonwealth. He promised St. Laurent that he would go to London with the “sole desire” for “a frank exchange of views based upon full and sympathetic understanding of each other’s difficulties” to work toward a solution that would meet India’s needs as well as those of the other members of the Commonwealth.41 Pearson and his advisers, including R.A. MacKay, the head of the Commonwealth Division, prepared their tactics in the weeks before the conference. Kearney joined them in London. Soon after delivering St. Laurent’s message to Nehru, he departed from New Delhi to begin a new posting as ambassador to Argentina. MacKay drafted a memorandum suggesting that “it is probably good tactics to leave the initiative to India to suggest a formula for India’s association with the Commonwealth, but it may be desirable for us to have suggestions ready to head off any formula which might be objectionable to us.”42 And it was this plan that the Canadians followed in London. On 18 April 1949, Pearson and his advisers, R.A. MacKay and Hume Wright, arrived in London; Kearney arrived from Bombay on 20 April. Brook updated Pearson on “a strengthening of [British] feeling in certain quarters that India must be kept in the Commonwealth, even as a Republic,” with the possibility that, “while Nehru is not willing to accept the Crown as the source of allegiance, he may be willing to accept the Crown as, to use Sir Norman Brook’s phrase, ‘Head of the Commonwealth.’”43 Pearson met with Nehru on the eve of the conference and concluded that Nehru would “do his part to make this Commonwealth conference a success by accepting the King in some form as the symbol of our association.” He was also impressed, describing Nehru as having “a very cultivated mind, a very subtle one, but [he] is not the sort of person one can get to know easily on first meeting.”44 Pearson’s initial description of Nehru is an accurate depiction of the relationship that the two came to share over the years. It was cordial and friendly but, as will be seen, never characterized by a casual or warm nature between the two statesmen. After months of consultations and planning, the conference convened on 22 April. Clement Attlee stated that the purpose “was to reconcile an Indian republic with Membership in the Commonwealth, which was united by the Crown.”45 The prime ministers each took a turn speaking, with Pearson opting to speak last. Nehru’s major contribution to the event, according to his biographer, came on the opening day, when Nehru “laid out the background to India’s hope to remain within the Commonwealth without altering the relationship of the Dominion to the Crown.”46 He suggested three possible elements that could provide a solution: “Commonwealth citizenship; a declaration of India’s continuing membership; and the acceptance by India of the King as symbol of the free association of the Commonwealth countries.”47 The last one was a significant

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concession, for many within the Congress Party were opposed to any mention of the king. The other parties around the table expressed a “keen desire” to continue on with the Commonwealth association as long as an agreement did not weaken their connections to the Crown, although Australia and New Zealand voiced concerns over admitting a republic into the Commonwealth. When Pearson finally spoke, he asked, “did the freedom enjoyed by each member include its right to declare itself a Republic and remain within the family?” He asserted that the nations of the Commonwealth enjoyed full equality of status, which precluded any notion of an “inner or outer circle of membership.”48 Canada, he declared, was satisfied with the relationship with the crown, and Canadians would be pleased if Nehru agreed to retain the crown as the symbol of the Commonwealth association. In this regard, Ottawa pursued a line similar to that of Canberra or Wellington. Earlier in the day, the Australians stressed that, as long as the link of allegiance with the crown did not diminish, they could support the Indian view. New Zealand echoed the views of its neighbour but with more reticence. Peter Fraser, the New Zealand prime minister, took great pains to emphasize the close ties between Wellington and London and suggested that “in addition to India recognizing the King as the symbol of Commonwealth unity they should recognize him as the Head of the Commonwealth.”49 A wry Pearson noted in a letter to St. Laurent that the older members of the Commonwealth understood the Indian position, while India’s neighbours took umbrage. It was odd, he wrote, “that the younger Dominions, namely Pakistan and Ceylon, gave the least support to Mr. Nehru’s suggestions and that South Africa with whom India is at loggerheads, should turn out to be its strongest supporter.”50 Nehru specifically noted the Canadian position. In his appraisal of the day, he wrote to Sardar Patel in New Delhi that Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Ceylon emphatically opposed any adjustment that they believed would weaken their own links to the crown. In contrast, the “United Kingdom, Canada and in particular Malan [the South African prime minister]” showed a clear and sympathetic understanding of the Indian position.51 Yet, after the first day of talks, neither Nehru nor Pearson dared to predict the outcome of the conference. Over the next few days, the prime ministers and their advisers generated and critiqued numerous draft communiqués. The stress of the situation showed; Pearson observed that the language of the various draft communiqués often “verged on the extreme.” With a sense of relief, he noted that he was “in a rather easy position because this was a battle that could be left to other delegations who took the extreme views on one side or the other.”52 Pearson sought a compromise between the extremes.

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The delegates reached a compromise on 27 April. The London Declaration provided for India to remain a welcome member of the Commonwealth, even as a republic, and New Delhi accepted the king as the “symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such the head of the Commonwealth.” The member states declared that they remained “united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress.”53 Like the Balfour Declaration, and the Statute of Westminster before it, the London Declaration illustrated the evolution of the Commonwealth. However, this agreement was arguably the most revolutionary, if not extraordinary, outcome of any Commonwealth conference, not only redefining the body but also welcoming three Asian states, one of which was about to become a republic. Pearson appeared on the BBC on 27 April and broadcast the following summary of the conference: Around the table at our meetings in historic 10 Downing St. and around the table when we dined together, sat the Prime Ministers from Australia and New Zealand, proud of their British stock and British traditions; sat also representatives of the new Asiatic countries of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, differing from the rest of us in race, steeped in another tradition, not all of whom were friendly in the past to the Commonwealth association when it did not seem to mean freedom for their countries. All three worked with us at this Conference in comradeship and goodwill. There was also the Afrikaans Prime Minister of South Africa, whose wise council was of great assistance in reaching our conclusions. Under the skilful, wise and patient leadership of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom we were able to cooperate for a good purpose.54

Ex post facto analysis indicates that the reality differed from the image of the men working side by side at a table. Perhaps the reality more closely resembled the synopsis of the conference provided by Nehru to Sardar Patel and his cabinet colleagues in New Delhi. Nehru noted that during the conference the Canadian attitude was “very favourable” to India. In comparison, Australia and New Zealand, while “very friendly,” were too “tied up with the old conception of British Commonwealth to like any change. Pakistan rather obstructive, Ceylon did not seem to understand what was happening. UK government generally helpful trying to steer middle course.” Overall, the Indian prime minister happily accepted the result: “India’s new status as completely independent republic fully recognised. At same time she is equal member of Commonwealth. No commitment in regard to internal or external policy.”55

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Far removed from London, in New Delhi, Morley Scott, the acting high commissioner, reported a “piece of gossip” to R.A. MacKay. An Indian official who saw many of the missives sent from London by the Indian delegation informed Scott that the telegrams “indicated that the major share of the credit for the successful conclusion of the Conference was due to the Canadian delegation.”56 Simple flattery perhaps, but in light of Nehru’s telegram to Patel there was likely truth to the “gossip.” No doubt Pearson left London satisfied with the outcome of “a momentous conference.” The Commonwealth had been preserved, and he believed that by forging the London Declaration “we certainly have established a new basis which may be the beginning of something very important and far reaching.”57 Once Ottawa opted to support the inclusion of a republican India in the Commonwealth, and India accepted the crown as the symbol of that body, “all that I had to do was to help with suggestions to meet the difficulties raised by Pakistan, South Africa and the ‘down under countries.’” He graciously added to his diary note that “no delegate had as advisors two people who knew more about the problem or how best to seek a solution for it than John Kearney and Bert MacKay.”58 Domestically, Canada praised the success of the conference. In the House of Commons, a proud St. Laurent intoned that “all Canadians will rejoice in this new demonstration of the traditional capacity of the commonwealth to strengthen its unity of purpose while adapting its organization and procedures to changed circumstances.” The declaration ensured India’s membership and would “continue for the peace of the world the association of those nations whose traditions give them the same concept of a proper way of living and of democratic processes designed to further the welfare of the men and women of their respective nations.”59 Both the leaders of the Conservative Party and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) parties expressed approval of the news. The Conservative leader, George Drew, observed that the “British Commonwealth takes on a new scope and meaning with this free and voluntary association of a great Asiatic nation of more than 400 million people.” Not to be outdone, James Coldwell of the CCF offered that the old British Empire had transformed into “something better than our forefathers could have conceived.”60 Nehru returned to India to defend the continued Commonwealth connection. He faced hostility from the Indian political left and from some colleagues. One old friend from the independence movement, J.P. Narayan, believed that Nehru had turned his back “on all they had stood for over many years, believing that Commonwealth membership would tie India to Britain and commit it to one of the two power blocs.”61 A survey of the Indian media indicates that the London Declaration received positive coverage generally but that some newspapers viewed

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the agreement with “considerable caution.”62 The bulk of the various political parties in the Lok Sabha supported the London Declaration, while the dominant opposition groups – the Communists, Socialists, and Hindu Mahasabha – denounced the outcome. Despite the opposition, Nehru achieved what many had thought unlikely. India remained in the Commonwealth as a republic, and Nehru had preserved interests vital to India’s national security: trade relations and access to defence supplies. For the Indian army, overly reliant on British materiel, and for a nation that feared isolation in an increasingly fractured region, these represented crucial gains. The Canadians had also obtained their main goals. Ottawa wanted India to remain in the Commonwealth without change to Canada’s relationship with the crown. Ottawa also avoided any concession on a uniform Commonwealth citizenship in an era when Asian immigrants attracted negative attention. Ottawa also believed that the new Commonwealth could serve as a bridge between the West and the newly independent democracies in South Asia. Maintaining this bridge, as the conference had achieved, would be vital if the West hoped to ward off Soviet machinations in the region. This East versus West worldview enhanced the importance of Ottawa’s relationship with India, and the friendly conference environment further fostered goodwill between the two nations and their statesmen during this period. Given their expanding attention to South Asia, and interest in coaxing India to align with the West, the Americans closely monitored the conference. Looking on from the sidelines, American officials took a less favourable view of the conference. One memorandum assessing the retention of India in the Commonwealth suggested that India’s continued membership “is not an unmitigated good or a source of strength so far as either the UK or the US is concerned.” The Americans suspected that the British would exercise excessive caution in their dealings with India for fear of “straining the Commonwealth ties.” Washington had hoped that Britain would lobby India toward a “pro-US, prodemocratic orientation.” But London would be of “little value” in this regard if its policy approach toward South Asia was predicated on whether a specific issue might strain India’s ties with the Commonwealth.63 Not surprisingly, the course of future relations with India and access to its resources influenced London’s intentions at the conference. Britain wanted to keep a modicum of influence on the Indian subcontinent, but financial constraints meant that London looked to Washington to take the lead in the region, especially financially, to contain communist and Soviet expansion.64 The Americans hesitated. Wary of Nehru and his foreign policy, Washington paused before making any substantial economic commitments to India. In comparison, Ottawa’s policies paralleled those of London more than those of Washington. The steadily growing geopolitical importance of India to

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Canadian policy makers coupled with Nehru’s meteoric rise as a world statesman showed mere weeks after the conference concluded. A.J. Pick of the Commonwealth desk suggested to Arnold Heeney that Nehru be invited to Ottawa. Pick saw some obvious benefits: “Apart from being Prime Minister of such an important country as India I think it is greatly recognized that Nehru is one of the great statesmen and intellects of our time.” Furthermore, Pick observed, “in the near future India will enjoy a rather special position in the Commonwealth.”65 Heeney, Reid, and Pearson all endorsed the suggestion and with it the notion that Ottawa could continue to act as a bridge. On 30 June 1949, the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi offered an invitation. Nehru accepted it immediately. In the meantime, India and Canada appointed new high commissioners. Ottawa selected Warwick Fielding Chipman to replace Kearney. Chipman had just returned from a posting as ambassador to Argentina, and the two swapped posts. Like his predecessor, Chipman had been born in Quebec, where he had studied and practised law, later teaching at McGill University. A founder of the League of Nations Society in Canada, serving as its president, he had also published two books of poetry. Appointed minister in 1943 and later ambassador to Chile, Chipman was held in high esteem by the DEA and attended the San Francisco conference of the United Nations in 1945 as a senior adviser and alternative delegate.66 The instructions that the DEA prepared for Chipman suggested a continued maturity in how Ottawa situated its relationship with India. Canadian officials recognized the need for bilateral policies that would tie India to the Western bloc. It is important to note that, while Indian policy baffled and irritated the Americans, in Ottawa there was a tactical acquiescence that India could, at least for the near future, remain non-aligned. Short of membership in the Western camp, the best option would be a partial connection to it. As a further show of Ottawa’s support for India, Chipman learned that Canada would support India’s bid over that of New Zealand in the forthcoming United Nations Security Council elections, for the two-year period commencing 1 January 1950. The choice of India over New Zealand was significant. In the aftermath of the Commonwealth conference, this decision further emphasized the importance that Ottawa placed on India in Asia over its traditional Commonwealth partners. Although Canada respected India’s declared policy of neutrality, Pick shrewdly advised Chipman that “we should miss no opportunity to encourage India to look to the Western world for support and understanding in the hope that in the event of a conflict, India’s sympathies would at least be on our side.”67 Directly connected to Pick’s instruction, Ottawa watched an emerging fissure between Washington and New Delhi. America’s rise as a global

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economic hegemon concerned India, while Washington thought India’s policy of neutrality naive. Chipman received instructions to mitigate any anti-American sentiment that he encountered in government circles by “pointing out the good neighbour relations between Canada and the United States,” and perhaps he could observe that Canada was not fearful of American “economic imperialism,” the veiled suggestion being that India had no reason to fear it either.68 Ottawa recognized that the West needed a partner in the region. And for Ottawa, India emerged “eminently as the leading country with a stable, and at least in some respects, democratic government. It is in our interests to reinforce this stability and to strengthen in any way we can, if only by example, democratic institutions in India.” Ottawa believed that it could appeal to India’s leaders because of their predominantly Western-based education and British-influenced upbringing. That assumption proved to be erroneous over time and became a significant source of friction when Indian foreign policy frequently failed to align with what Canadian officials predicted would be a “Western fashion.” The immediate hope, as expressed to Chipman, was that with the proper overtures India would come to “constitute a durable bridge between the West and Asia. The maintenance of links between India and the West is clearly in the interests of world peace and progress.”69 This “link” became progressively important as the strategic landscape of Asia shifted dramatically. Ottawa and London came to regard India as the main bulwark of democracy in the region. Washington remained unconvinced. Three weeks before Nehru was set to arrive in Canada, Hume Wrong in Washington sent an insightful letter to Arnold Heeney that demonstrates how important India was to Canada’s diplomats. Wrong, a brilliant and tough-minded diplomat, knew that American policy doubted India. He had a vast array of contacts, and his correspondence suggests an implicit worry that Nehru would not hit it off with his American interlocutors in Washington. Wrong believed that the disconnect could place Canada in a delicate and unique position, requiring Ottawa to act as the interpreter of Western values and ideals. His insights and recommendations are worth quoting at length: I have been thinking a little about the importance of Nehru’s visit to this continent, and the subject has also come up in conversations with Franks and Kennan. I believe that the impressions which he derives may well affect his attitude as chief of the Indian Government in a number of ways and for a number of years. While he has come out more clearly on the side of the West during the last year, he has kept himself, I believe, in a position in which he can remain at least neutral in some of the battles in the Cold War and in all the battles if we have to face a hot war. He is said to be deeply distrustful of the spiritual values – this is the sort of

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language one must use about him – of the United States. I think that this is his first visit to the continent. It seems to me that while he is in Canada he should have the opportunity for long, informal and general talks with people who can express to him their conceptions of the principles upon which our society is founded. No one can do this better than the Prime Minister himself. The danger in the U.S. and to some extent in Canada, is that he will go back to India with a personal impression that the society is materialistic. Such an impression would probably be in accordance with his preconceived idea, and he would be receptive to anything which would tend to reinforce it. He is a man who is concerned with spiritual values and what one hopes may happen is that in quiet he will have an opportunity of meeting some important people, both here and in Canada, who can express to him simply and articulately their conception of the democratic society. I suggest, therefore, that the big problems before us of defence, finance and trade should not occupy too large a place in discussions with Nehru. I hope that while he is here he may be able to spend some time with Dean Acheson, with whom I think he might establish a sympathetic understanding of the sort he established with Stafford Cripps when Cripps was in India.70

St. Laurent and Heeney agreed with this advice. Unfortunately, Wrong’s concerns about Nehru’s visits proved to be well founded. Suspicion and an unwillingness to search for a middle ground marked relations between Washington and New Delhi. The Americans struggled with what they saw as a menacing, expansionist Soviet state. American policy makers could not comprehend the Indian concept of non-alignment, especially in light of the ideological climate, and they viewed the Indians as being at best naive and at worst adhering to a “morally bankrupt position.”71 Washington believed that, “despite the hand of Moscow” in India, a general “lack of awareness of the problem (of Communism) in all its gravity and urgency” existed.72 Instead, the Indians expressed concern over issues of colonialism and racialism. Nehru’s attempt to treat both sides in the Cold War with equidistance, while appearing to claim moral superiority, especially grated on American sensibilities. As early as 1947, the Americans believed that Nehru failed to understand that the Cold War “was about values and morality, not just about power and influence.” The former American ambassador in New Delhi, Henry F. Grady, voiced his government’s displeasure over India’s non-alignment policy to Nehru himself, much to the annoyance of the fiercely proud Nehru.73 Conversely, the Indians suspected that economic motives drove American foreign policy, and this troubled Nehru’s sense of nationalism. The CIA lamented in September 1948 that “despite great admiration for many U.S. accomplishments and appreciation of the value of the U.S. as a friend a strong suspicion exists in

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India that the U.S. possesses the rapacious tendencies attributed to the British.” From this viewpoint, the Americans simply replaced the British on the world stage as the leading economic imperialists. Nehru and his colleagues believed that America’s “fixation with its economic interests coupled with its exaggeration of the Soviet threat to world peace” caused Americans to ignore more serious problems in world affairs, particularly the plight of Asian and African peoples and rising nationalism in these continents.74 The successful detonation of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in August 1949 and the demise of the nationalist armies in China deeply alarmed the United States. The establishment of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949 further enhanced India’s strategic importance and Nehru’s prestige. The strength of the communist insurrections in Burma, Indochina, and Indonesia added to Washington’s concerns over and hopes for India. On the eve of Nehru’s visit to the United States, the Americans remained uncertain over what to expect from their meeting with Nehru. Ambassador Loy Henderson encountered this indecision earlier in the year as he waited months for the State Department to consider an economic commitment to India; no action had been decided on when Nehru arrived.75 By all accounts, Nehru’s visit to the United States was a failure. T.N. Kaul, the first secretary at the Indian embassy in Washington, recalled that, “in his [Nehru’s] talks with the U.S. Government, not much headway was made because the two sides were talking at different wave lengths.”76 He believed that both parties expected too much of the other and that neither held respect for and understanding of differing points of view. According to Kaul, Indians naively believed that Americans would champion the underdog while fighting for democracy and freedom. American attempts to push them from their policy of non-alignment upset the Indian delegation, and the implication that India was a “weak, backward and under-developed country in dire need of financial resources” annoyed them further.77 Nehru alienated himself from his hosts by announcing that India planned to recognize the new communist government in China, insisting “that colonialism, not communism, posed the gravest danger to world peace.”78 Not surprisingly, he also disputed the American assessment of the Soviet threat. Secretary of State Dean Acheson recounted in his memoirs that he hoped a private talk after dinner would build rapport and ameliorate the policy differences that characterized the initial discussions. But rancour marred the easy relationship that Wrong desired. Acheson observed that Nehru could not relax, and “he talked to me, as Queen Victoria said of Mr. Gladstone, as though I were a public meeting.” The late-night talk accomplished little more than tiring both parties and left Acheson “a bit confused.” He respected Nehru and his intellectual faculties and understood just

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how important a figure he was becoming in the Cold War world; the meeting, however, had “made a deep impression,” and Acheson became “convinced that Nehru and I were not destined to have a pleasant personal relationship. He was one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal.”79 Likewise, Truman and Nehru lacked a friendly rapport. The sophisticated and urbane Nehru had little in common with the folksy and small-town demeanour of Truman. George McGhee, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs, described Nehru as arriving with a chip on his shoulder and the belief that American officials could not understand someone of his background, and “Nehru and Truman didn’t hit it off at all.” A rumour circulated that at the first meeting between the two leaders Nehru was subjected to a conversation between Truman and his vice-president on the merits of bourbon whiskey.80 Loy Henderson echoed McGhee’s view. He believed that Nehru had developed an anti-American streak during his childhood and schooling in Britain: “Nehru had developed a dislike bordering on contempt for American institutions, the American way of life, and Americans in general.”81 Accordingly, he looked down on Americans as crass and ill mannered, obsessed with the material trappings of the modern age and little else. The failure to find common ground combined with the incongruent personalities stymied both sides. The pace of the trip irritated Nehru; he travelled across the country with little downtime to reflect or gather his thoughts on America. Given that it was his first visit to the United States, it must have been a jarring journey. In later years, he quipped that “one should never visit America for the first time.”82 The trip had profound ramifications for bilateral relations. American policy makers, dogmatic in assessing friends and foes, concluded that India would not be a steadfast ally in the Cold War. Official debate about the value of India to the United States came to an abrupt halt. Two days before Nehru’s arrival in Canada, Louis St. Laurent received a brief on the state of Canada-India relations. Contrary to the Americans, the denizens of the East Block concluded that political relations were “very satisfactory,” and the Canadians consulted with their Indian counterparts on a number of questions. This approach let India “know of the importance we place on her strategic position as an active link between the Western point of view and the abnormally active and complex issues that are now emerging in the East.”83 Trade links showed signs of impressive development too. In 1938, Canadian exports to India totalled a meagre $2,863,000. A decade later this figure had increased to $41,473,000, with exports such as locomotives, railway rails, and automobiles leading the way. Other commodities, such as newsprint and metals, supplemented these figures.84 The Canadian government would have observed that the still budding relationship held much promise.

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Nehru arrived in Ottawa as evening fell to “cold and bracing” weather that he found to his liking. C.D. Howe, one of St. Laurent’s most important cabinet ministers, informed a close colleague that the government planned to “give him the works as far as hospitality is concerned.”85 St. Laurent, Pearson, King, and most of the cabinet greeted Nehru. A nineteen-round salute fired as 100 RCAF aircraftsmen came to attention accompanied by an army band playing both national anthems when the Indian leader stepped onto the Rockcliffe airbase tarmac. Informing the press of Nehru’s itinerary, St. Laurent crisply acknowledged that “we are beginning to realize what an important part of humanity is contained in that Asian sub-continent.”86 The national media, most of which prodded Ottawa to broaden its horizons and become engaged in Asia and its problems, welcomed Nehru warmly. The Montreal Gazette described his welcome as “the most glittering Ottawa has seen since the 1947 visit of President Truman.” The Edmonton Journal described Nehru as “one of the most remarkable men who has ever crossed our border … He has become the West’s best friend and interpreter in the awakening East.” The Globe and Mail urged Ottawa and Canadians to stop thinking “of India as utterly remote. We have to shake off that misconception and grasp the idea that this country really can be of service to the Indian nation.” The London Free Press echoed a similar view: Canadian help and friendship could prevent India from succumbing to a fate like China.87 By all accounts, the meetings between St. Laurent and Nehru were cordial and relaxed, which Nehru appreciated after his exhausting schedule in America.88 On the evening of 24 October, Nehru was the guest of honour at a dinner held by St. Laurent and his wife at the Ottawa Country Club. The following day St. Laurent, Pearson, and Nehru met for a formal discussion. St. Laurent complimented Nehru on his speech at the dinner, to which the latter replied that “the friendliness of his reception and the warmth of the atmosphere that existed had prompted him to speak more intimately and more from the heart than he had done in the United States.” During their conversation, the Indian prime minister hinted to the Canadians that his US visit had encountered some difficulties.89 The meetings afforded fruitful and candid policy discussions. The Canadians considered assisting India with technical help and equipment, germinating the seed of the future Colombo Plan commitment. When the conversation switched to the current international situation, Nehru asserted that a greater danger stemmed from Russian imperialism than from ideological communism and that “the greatest danger of all was the use by the Soviets of the latter in their imperialistic and expansionist plans.” But Nehru cautioned that it was not good enough simply to condemn communism as an economic and social doctrine. Communism, he argued, appealed to the masses of Asia since it provided optimism for a better way of life in a region mired in utter poverty. St. Laurent,

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Pearson, and Nehru each agreed that recent events in China could not be ignored, acknowledging that the communists had established control over the country. A meeting of the minds occurred in Ottawa, or so it seemed.90 Nehru left on 26 October overwhelmed by the extent of the welcome throughout his visit.91 He had enjoyed this visit. It was “odd and interesting,” he reflected, “to notice the marked difference between the U.S. and Canada in many ways.”92 The Canadians felt equally pleased with the visit. Pearson wrote a personal note to Nehru, declaring that “there is [a] real body of friendship and understanding between our two countries, and that we can work effectively together to advance the ideals and aspirations in which we both believe.”93 The continued sympathetic development of Canadian strategic and economic policy toward India in 1949 was in contrast to American policy. The US government opposed Loy Henderson’s proposal for a five-year, $500 million aid program for India. A report by the National Security Council on US policy in Asia (NSC 48/1) distributed on 23 December 1949 curtly concluded that “it would be unwise for us to regard South Asia, more particularly India, as the sole bulwark against the extension of communist control in Asia.”94 In the wake of the visit, American disdain for Indian foreign policy became increasingly strident, and Washington began to look for new allies in Asia. Ottawa did not share that sentiment. Rather, a week after the release of NSC 48/1, Escott Reid circulated a memorandum on the forthcoming Commonwealth conference to be held in Colombo, Ceylon, titled “What Are the Things which Canada Is Chiefly Interested in at the Colombo Conference?” Canada’s central goal for the conference, Reid outlined, must be to learn first hand the views on external affairs of the three new Asian members of the Commonwealth. Their views, he continued, will have matured since independence and adjusted “to the recent changes in the international situation, especially the Communist advance in Asia, and the conclusion of the North Atlantic treaty.” Reid believed that Canadian officials must be exposed to these views, especially now that India led the region. Canadians recognized “that events over the next few decades in that part of the world may be more important to the future of Western civilization than events in Western Europe.” Referring to the regional impact of the Chinese communist victory, Reid thought it essential for Canadian officials “to hear statements from the people on the spot on how they think these problems can best be solved.”95 Reid’s senior colleagues supported his logic. Arguably, the foundation for his thesis that Canada and India had a “special relationship” was born in 1949. The Canadians successfully worked with London to keep India connected to the West by modifying the Commonwealth. And the series of conferences and Nehru’s state visit had served important purposes in generating some familiarity

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and goodwill between the Canadians and Indians. Certainly, St. Laurent and senior officials in the DEA facilitated this goodwill by believing that India was the pre-eminent democracy in Asia and that Ottawa should continue to strengthen and develop their relationship. Ottawa understood that the West had a stake in India’s economic development, and this perspective emerged during the forthcoming Colombo conference, designed to ameliorate conditions that enhanced the appeal of communism in South Asia. Historian John English has noted that much of Canada’s immediate post-Second World War foreign policy was influenced by events in Asia, a region where very few of its North Atlantic–minded diplomats had any experience. “During Mike Pearson’s lifetime,” English suggests, “nothing ever worked out too well in the West’s efforts to contain Communism in Asia.”96 This assessment, however, neglects the success of Canadian policy on India during this era. The following two chapters examine the development of the “special relationship” between Canada and India through the early 1950s, when Canadian policy makers engaged with South Asia under the economic underpinnings of the Colombo Plan and Canadian and Indian diplomats cooperated to craft a compromise that tempered the Cold War power blocs on the Korean peninsula.

3 A Helping Hand The Genesis of Canada’s Aid Relationship with India, 1950–51

On the frigid evening of 2 January 1950, Lester Pearson, his wife Maryon, and a team of advisers boarded a Royal Canadian Air Force NorthStar at the Rockcliffe airbase destined for the tropical clime of Ceylon for the longest journey of their lives. The travellers had spent the previous three months preparing for the Colombo conference of Commonwealth foreign ministers. The uncomfortable voyage on the lumbering, and unpressurized, NorthStar took five days to complete, and a weary entourage disembarked in Colombo to discuss foreign and security affairs. The conference itself holds a unique place in history for inadvertently setting the stage for a future foreign aid plan that combined capital and technical assistance from the wealthier members of the Commonwealth while simultaneously encouraging mutual aid among the underdeveloped countries themselves. It also marked the first instance of Canadian involvement in what would become known as development assistance. A remarkably talented team of officials from the Department of External Affairs accompanied Pearson: Escott Reid, the deputy undersecretary and Pearson’s principal adviser in Colombo; Arthur Menzies, the head of the Far Eastern Division of External Affairs; and Douglas LePan, the senior Canadian economic official and adviser. Of the four, only Menzies, the son of missionaries, knew Asia first hand, making him a rare and valuable commodity. LePan reflected on his own lack of experience in his memoirs, noting that he “had travelled fairly widely in Europe and along the Atlantic seaboard of North America” but never outside “the circuit of Christendom. To see something of the Moslem and Hindu and Buddhist worlds was a great discovery and great liberation. It made me realize how parochial much of my education and reading had been.”1 Even Pearson, as SSEA, made his first trip to Asia, despite having been a prominent diplomat for over twenty years. Moreover, apart from Mackenzie King’s voyage to Asia forty-one years earlier, no other Canadian prime minister or minister had travelled to the region. The origins of the Colombo conference reached back to the October 1948 Commonwealth prime ministers’ meeting. One of the resultant agreements prescribed occasional meetings of Commonwealth finance ministers and foreign ministers. In July 1949, a Commonwealth finance ministers’ meeting in London

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briefly discussed the economic problems of the newly independent Commonwealth countries of Asia. The participants conceived a conference of Commonwealth foreign ministers to exchange views on the international situation, especially in Asia. LePan notes that the chosen location of Colombo reflected “the importance of the new Asian members of the Commonwealth” as well as aided “in focussing attention largely on issues arising in Asia.”2 At the conference, the representatives from Australia, New Zealand, and Ceylon proposed the adoption of a Commonwealth aid program for the countries of South and Southeast Asia to strengthen their ability to resist communism. In addition, a Commonwealth Consultative Committee to discuss aid further would meet in Sydney, Australia, in May. Having read a pre-conference brief stating that India’s standard of living “must be raised” if moderate, non-communist governments were to flourish in India, Pearson considered this proposal viable, with the caveat that “the recommendations should be scrutinized by the delegations’ economic advisers so that any ambiguities of phrasing might be avoided.”3 Pearson also thought that, with the proper steps in place, “a great deal may be done not only to solve the problem of the sterling balances but also to shore up our defences in this area against Soviet expansionism.”4 He acknowledged that there was some “danger” that too much importance might be attached to the Colombo meeting’s recommendations, particularly if they were regarded as the embryonic framework for an Asian Marshall Plan and then fell short of expectations. Pearson’s sense that the meetings might have “an immediately good psychological effect in South and South East Asia,” proving that the non-Asian members of the Commonwealth recognized the importance of bolstering the regional economies, balanced his concerns.5 In his reports to Ottawa, Pearson presented a successful conference. The main objective, providing the non-Asian members of the Commonwealth with the opportunity to become better acquainted with their Asian colleagues, had been met. The conference also provided an opportunity for Nehru and Pearson to advance their working relationship, their third meeting in less than a year, and it allowed Pearson to travel to India. Nehru impressed him again; he stood out as one of the leading participants. Nehru, Pearson recollected, “spoke with studied moderation at all the meetings and demonstrated that he is a master of the traditional diplomatic language of understatement.”6 Nehru’s elegant and worldly nature also impressed, if not charmed, Pearson’s advisers. Douglas LePan’s description of Nehru betrays some awe: Slim, handsome, beautifully cultivated. His position at the conference was partly due to his position as Prime Minister – as well as Minister of External Affairs – of India and by nature of that fact as the leader of the largest democracy in the

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world. But it was also due to his personal distinction. When he was not speaking he sat immaculately at ease, smoking cigarettes in a long black holder and blowing the smoke through his nostrils. Whenever he spoke, the elegance of his mind was as apparent as the elegance of his person.7

Likewise, Escott Reid left the conference and the subcontinent impressed with Nehru’s mind and with a budding interest in India.8 The Canadian delegation encountered the reality of the economies of South Asia on a visit to New Delhi on the way home. The Canadians, coincidentally, arrived for the last three days of what Pearson called the “old era.” The day after the Canadians left the subcontinent, the Indian republic came into being. A president replaced the governor general, but Commonwealth ties remained. Wishing to see beyond the urban sprawl of New Delhi, Pearson and his party toured villages outside the capital. He gained “a deeper understanding of the tremendous obstacles to be overcome before the people of India could be given a better standard of material living.”9 The impressions from this brief foray gave Pearson pause. He concluded that the Indians faced a difficult road ahead to overcome economic and development problems; otherwise, the communists would simply exploit these conditions. Pearson shared his views with senior DEA colleagues and prominent cabinet ministers such as Hume Wrong, Norman Robertson, Brooke Claxton, C.D. Howe, and the governor of the Bank of Canada, Graham Towers.10 To persuade Ottawa to make a financial commitment to South Asia, he needed the support of these individuals to influence cabinet. Likewise, in an essay titled “Round the World in 1,500 Words,” written for pleasure and distributed to his colleagues in Ottawa, LePan described the unprepared Canadian officials when they encountered India’s poverty first hand. While he acknowledged the stark beauty of India, he found the misery of the poor difficult to cope with. Nothing, he said, had prepared him for the “desperate poverty of Asia,” the hundreds of people sleeping on city streets, or the overcrowding of peasant villages not far from New Delhi that he found “appalling,” lacking sanitation, and sustained by primitive and ignorant methods of agriculture.11 In a region wracked by periodic bouts of severe famine, “food aid” – especially wheat – became a significant share of Canada’s future Colombo Plan aid contributions to India. Nehru recognized the importance of Pearson’s quick visit to New Delhi, believing that such visits were “very desirable because these Ministers of other Governments get an insight into our problems and get to know our own Ministers. Nothing is more important in the world today than understanding each other.”12 Indeed, Pearson marvelled at Nehru’s intellectual qualities and thoughtfully considered India’s emerging importance. But, as he recounted in

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his memoirs, an easy rapport never developed with Nehru during either these early years or afterward on the world stage. Religious and cultural factors nourished this divide and became more sharply pronounced as the decade progressed. Pearson described Nehru as “one of the most subtle and difficult men to understand whom I had ever met, an extraordinary combination of a Hindu mystic, who had become almost a Hindu god, and an Eton-Oxbridge type of Englishman. At times it seemed almost as if the Englishman predominated.” On other occasions, Pearson thought that there “were times when I was tempted to think: ‘This is really not a very nice man, rather second-rate.’ But when he began to talk about his philosophy of life or his philosophy of politics, I realized I was in the presence of someone truly great.”13 The understanding that Nehru desired never fully developed, yet the early days of their working relationship were characterized by personal optimism and flattery. Pearson gushed in a letter to Nehru the “greater interest” in Asian problems he possessed since returning from South Asia: “I hope I will not be accused of displaying the zeal of the convert, or the new boy at school, who assumes that because everything is now so important and impressive to him, it never existed previously!”14 Escott Reid also returned home with mixed impressions of what he had seen. Reid, the mercurial and insightful mandarin, supported the argument that to resist communism the standard of living of the masses on the Indian subcontinent had to be raised. He thoughtfully expressed concern to Pearson that perhaps emphasizing economic matters alone risked ignoring important political factors. In particular, the aging administrative machinery concerned Reid; inherited from the British Raj, it showed signs of decay and corruption. The preservation of an efficient, corruption-free civil service had to be paramount to improve economic conditions. Yet Reid also sympathized that, “in justice to the Indians, we must constantly remember the immensity of the problems with which they are faced.” The Indians attempted what no one had yet succeeded in doing: namely, “to give democratic government and social economic reforms to a country of 357 million people, only a few of whom are literate, and which has as yet no organized party system.”15 Reid, LePan, and Pearson had acquired some unsettling and visceral impressions from their visit to India. During the next year, they attempted to explain India to their departmental and cabinet colleagues to justify the role that Canada could play in fostering economic development in the region. On 14 February, Pearson’s cabinet colleagues received the Colombo recommendation of the Consultative Committee with tepid interest, referring the proposal to an Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy for study.16 Following the meeting, Pearson wrote to St. Laurent, providing the prime minister with the impressions that he had received from his trip outside

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the conference. From his account, one can detect that he had considered the merits of economic assistance to Asia and was developing a case for it. While Pearson cautioned against rash, general conclusions from his brief sojourns in Asia, he admitted that he had returned home “somewhat depressed about the situation in that part of the world, yet at the same time, very much impressed by the long-range possibilities of economic and social progress if the immediate problems that face the Asian governments can be resolved.”17 India, Indonesia, and Pakistan all had great futures, he observed, if only they could establish their governments upon solid foundations. Citing India specifically, Pearson suggested that the great problems were social and economic. There was no guarantee that New Delhi could solve the staggering problems of hunger or the desire of the masses for better lives while communist agitators sought to foment discontent across the country and capitalize on the endemic poverty unaided. Pearson concluded that, if the “free Asian governments” addressed these issues democratically, then they “may have to be encouraged and supported from abroad.”18 Not everyone agreed that Canada should send dollars to Asia, let alone India. The Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy met on 3 March to consider the Colombo recommendations. Comprised of officials from the Department of Finance and the Bank of Canada, the committee looked on the recommendations with marked reluctance. Their central argument was that Ottawa’s resources were already heavily committed.19 They suggested that Canada attend the Sydney conference without committing anything financially while working to secure American financial and political participation to augment any proposed aid program.20 Using these disingenuous tactics, Ottawa appeared to be an interested actor and assumed that Washington might react enthusiastically to an aid overture for India. Remembering that the US State Department vetoed Loy Henderson’s proposed five-year, $500 million program just four months earlier, and considering the National Security Council’s paper “The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia” (NSC 48/1), Washington did not see India as “the bulwark against the extension of Communist control in Asia.” Although the Americans believed that aid could prevent India from succumbing to communism, the authors of NSC 48/1 asserted that India could receive its financial aid from the International Bank. Washington’s Asia policy was still reeling from the Chinese revolution and Mao’s concomitant recognition of Ho Chi Minh as the legitimate leader of a unified Vietnam. American aid poured into Southeast Asian states willing to align themselves with Washington, an alliance that the Indians refused.21 The St. Laurent cabinet acted cautiously, reaching out to both proponents and skeptics of the Colombo recommendations by agreeing to send a delegation but also supporting the committee’s recommendation for fiscal prudence. The two lead

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members of the Canadian delegation reflected sides of the looming policy debate in Ottawa. When the time came for the May conference, the talented and proaid-minded LePan attended as the senior economic adviser along with the uninspiring and cautious Robert Mayhew, the minister of fisheries. Ottawa carefully instructed its delegation to cooperate in any “well conceived” plan yet avoid, “either directly or by inference, to extending financial assistance to the countries of South and South-East Asia” until a thorough examination of the problem and the region had been completed.22 The Colombo conference concluded with the directive for the Consultative Committee to meet again in London in September to flesh out a comprehensive program of economic development in South and Southeast Asia. In the meantime, a technical assistance scheme for the region concluded that the developed Commonwealth nations, including Canada, would consider contributing for an initial three-year period while each Asian country developed a six-year economic development program for the next meeting.23 On 12 June, the St. Laurent cabinet agreed to contribute $400,000 in technical assistance to the embryonic program as long as the Commonwealth scheme did not overlap with UN development activities.24 The minor contribution met the careful aims of the Canadian government. The decision to even provide this modest contribution, however, exacerbated disagreements between the DEA and the Department of Finance. Finance officials raised objections to the combined sums of assistance flowing to the Colombo scheme and a proposed contribution earmarked for a pending UN aid scheme. The DEA dismissed their concerns. In early June, the government reached a compromise that accommodated both contributions but that saw Canada’s offering to the technical assistance scheme slashed by 20 percent.25 Nonetheless, it was a notable step in expanding Canada’s presence in South Asia, by making a financial commitment to the stability and security of the region. Within a matter of weeks, events in Korea raised Asian security issues to an immediate and paramount concern for Ottawa’s policy makers, thus adding a new dimension to Indo-Canadian relations and a reappraisal of Canadian interest in the Colombo Plan. It was a quiet Sunday in Ottawa when the North Korean army smashed into the South Korean forces on the Korean peninsula on 25 June 1950. Poor American and South Korean intelligence allowed the invasion to occur with complete surprise and left the Americans scrambling to dispatch forces to South Korea. The Canadian government initially thought that there would be no American military response. Within a matter of days, however, the Americans sought out their NATO allies for political support and military assistance. Ottawa could support Washington but wanted the American action to fall under UN auspices.26 On 27 June, the United States manoeuvred a resolution through the United

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Nations Security Council stating that hostile force by Pyongyang broke the peace in Korea and that Seoul deserved assistance. Over the following weeks, the United Nations gradually established a force. Ottawa dispatched naval destroyers, immediately followed by airlift support and supplies. A proposal to deploy troops to Korea was approved in midsummer, and Ottawa began to raise a Canadian contingent, scheduled to arrive in Korea for combat in December. The invasion of South Korea led to a series of direct impacts on Canadian interests in Asia and India. More generally, the invasion led Canada’s policy makers to reassess their views on Asian security and subsequently broaden their focus outside Europe. More specifically, Canada’s involvement in the war added a new layer of cooperation with India, as will be seen in the following chapter. The conflict provided vital impetus for those championing Canada’s participation in the Colombo Plan taking form in Commonwealth meetings. The Canadian delegation arrived at the London conference with fewer cautionary restrictions than they had received in May. LePan recounted that the “influence of the Korean War on the smoothness and success of the conference was overwhelmingly favourable.”27 Ottawa directed the delegation to make it clear that Canada recognized the need for economic development in Asia and the importance of foreign aid in promoting this aim.28 The successful adoption of a draft report on a six-year program of economic development in Asia marked a central achievement of the conference. Written predominantly by LePan, showing a relaxation of the earlier caution exercised by Ottawa, the report estimated the total amount of assistance required to implement the plan at some $2.8 billion. LePan and his colleague from the Department of Finance, John Deutsch, recommended that Canada’s annual contribution be set at $25 million, in addition to the $400,000 agreed to in June. The easy part accomplished, the more difficult task of obtaining cabinet approval began. The influential minister of finance, Douglas Abbott, particularly wary of frittering away valuable dollars on what his officials considered impractical schemes, proved to be challenging. The significant financial resources being diverted to Canadian NATO forces in Western Europe only heightened his unease. The international situation in the second half of 1950 ultimately worked in favour of those who supported Canada’s contribution to the Colombo Plan. Events in Korea forced policy makers in Ottawa to broaden their focus beyond Europe; the Cold War demanded global consideration. A 1950 top secret memorandum drafted by Escott Reid on 9 December illustrates the point. In it, Reid argued that the war and possible defeat in Korea – now that hundreds of thousands of Chinese “volunteers” had entered the fray – marked the fifth major shock to the West in a series of events dating back to the spring of 1947. Each shock was a direct challenge to the Western democracies, which could no longer assume

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that the Marshall Plan and NATO were sufficient to hold the line on communist expansion. Communism threatened Indochina, Malaya, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia, he insisted, “thereby endangering the security of the whole western world.” Although the Colombo meeting of January prodded Western nations to reexamine their policies in Asia and gradually to accept that it was in the interests of the West to provide more economic assistance to South Asia, Reid noted that eleven months had passed since the first meeting, and aid to South Asia “was still in the process of gestation.”29 He urged that a combination of political, economic, military, and moral factors should drive future Western responses in combatting communism, giving Ottawa a blueprint for how to act in South Asia. With the support of LePan and Heeney, Reid’s views informed a memorandum prepared for and approved by both Pearson and Brooke Claxton, minister of defence. The memorandum, distributed to St. Laurent and cabinet, asserted that “the forces of Soviet imperialism throughout the world may be able to seize so many additional areas in Asia and Europe that the position of North America would eventually become very serious indeed.” The precarious setback of UN forces in Korea following China’s entry into the war in November 1950 made further communist probes in Asia more likely. If a full-scale attack on Indochina occurred, then “the position of India and Pakistan … in these events would become precarious.” In turn, this possibility bolstered the “political importance” of providing financial assistance for the economic development of these countries to strengthen the “desire and capacity to assist in the struggle against Communist imperialism.”30 Despite the clarity to Reid and LePan of the implications of the expanding communist threat in Asia and the linkage of Western security to the region, significant opposition remained within government circles to substantial Canadian funding of the Colombo Plan. The main source of opposition to Pearson and his department’s desire to participate in the Colombo Plan came from Douglas Abbott. In early January, Pearson turned to two of his most trusted colleagues, LePan and Heeney, the USSEA, for advice on how to overcome Abbott’s concerns that Canada’s participation in the Korean War and the burden of rearmament to support Ottawa’s NATO commitments placed enormous strain on federal finances. Other politicians supported Abbott in his opposition, but as the finance minister he wielded significant clout around the cabinet table. His recent comments in cabinet meetings, in which he suggested that Pearson acted unilaterally, unsettled the SSEA. Pearson wanted to address the matter in a formal letter, but Heeney cautioned against doing so, thinking that it would only add to a potential controversy. Pearson also wanted to correct Abbott’s mistaken impression that the British government was not contributing to the Colombo Plan in “any real sense.” Although Heeney “sympathized,” he reassured Pearson that recent

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domestic events suggested that “things seem to be shaping up reasonably well for a respectable Canadian contribution.” St. Laurent spoke to a Canada Club meeting on 8 January, indicating that he was “prepared to recommend a substantial Canadian contribution. Mr. Abbott may not be very happy about this; but as indicated he will concur, however reluctantly.” Furthermore, Heeney pointed out that even the Conservatives supported a contribution. The fiery Conservative orator John Diefenbaker had argued on the CBC for a $50 million contribution to South and Southeast Asia.31 Finally, Heeney advised that a letter sent to Abbott must be written persuasively rather than argumentatively. Convinced, Pearson charged LePan with drafting an appropriate response. When presenting the letter to Pearson, LePan cautioned that “it runs to considerable length. I am afraid. But there are so many gimlet-eyes in the Department of Finance waiting to find loopholes on a letter of this kind.”32 The letter crisply presented the central geopolitical reasoning behind the Colombo Plan, outlining how development aid was a critical tool in preventing Soviet subterfuge in South Asia. It acknowledged Abbott’s unease about aspects of the plan but emphasized its benefits not only for India and Pakistan but also for Canadian security. Ottawa must “retain some allies in Asia” if it hoped to “prevent the whole of the Eurasian land-mass from falling under Communist domination.” The Indian and Pakistani governments were “firm friends, notwithstanding their very natural efforts to avoid becoming too deeply involved in the struggle with the Soviet Union.” Both governments faced myriad problems and needed “external financial assistance if they are to have a chance of making some improvement in the appallingly low standard of living of their people” and sheltering them from communist propaganda. It was vital, therefore, that Canada work to “strengthen the will and capacity of these countries to assist in the struggle against Communist imperialism; and one of the very few ways we can do so is by showing a practical interest in their economic welfare.” Pearson further sought to assuage Abbott’s fears, emphasizing that the sum earmarked would be beneficial to the impoverished South Asian economies and that the capital could be directly absorbed. As a result, he continued, the recipient nations had developed realistic assessments of what they could genuinely put to good use. Pearson’s confidence in the Indian figures reflected his relationship with C.D. Deshmukh, the Indian finance minister, whose “shrewdness” and “honesty” he admired.33 Pearson predicted that, by the end of six years, the region would see significant tangible benefits, be able to resist communist agitation, and could likely absorb greater inflows of monetary assistance if granted immediately. Two weeks later Abbott responded. He admitted having “serious doubts” concerning the reports generated by the last meetings in London.34 His particular

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doubts revolved around two central issues. First, Abbott argued that the rate of economic growth in South and Southeast Asia could not possibly match the region’s population growth. Second, Abbott noted that the two central recipients of Canadian Colombo Plan aid would be India and Pakistan. Both countries, he argued, spent between 60 and 65 percent of their budgets preparing for a future conflict with each other.35 Would aid to these two countries be diverted to their militaries? Abbott voiced reasonable critiques. The DEA noted in January 1950 that the largest single factor in Indian spending was “the cost of defence which has now reached the extraordinary figure of nearly half the total budget.”36 Abbott questioned the prospects of the Colombo Plan, concluding that “it is probably too much to hope that money and supplies will be in sufficient quantity to carry out even the more limited objectives of the Colombo Plan.”37 Pearson might have thought the plan capable of a positive impact on living conditions, and ensuring continued loyalty to the West, but Abbott stood unconvinced. While appreciating the humanitarian aspects of the plan and acknowledging that it could, in the short run, “have some political effect in helping to hold South and South East Asia out of the Communist camp,” he thought that the West might be disappointed in the end.38 Then there were domestic political calculations to consider: to what extent should his cabinet colleagues support a contribution at the risk of a tax increase or a possible cut in expenditures to their respective departments? Nonetheless, he would support any option that cabinet chose to accept. Pearson persisted. On 1 February, Heeney prepared a draft memorandum to cabinet for his minister, placing considerable emphasis on the importance of India and its stability not only in Asia but also to the West in the Cold War. New Delhi would play an important role alongside Ottawa at the United Nations to prevent the Korean War from escalating – marking a new stage of the bilateral relationship. That interaction between the two countries strengthened the DEA’s argument for foreign aid to India. Heeney’s cabinet memorandum stressed the “very special importance” that Ottawa placed on relations with India and the intent to establish relations “as friendly and constructive as we could make them. We have realized that whatever we could do by ourselves and with others in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations, to assist in the strengthening of the democratic governments of India and Pakistan would be of great value to mankind.” It was impossible, Heeney concluded, to “measure in time” or “calculate with dollars” an objective that sought to “lay a foundation for the peace of Asia in the long run and possibly, if we were fortunate, even in the short run.”39 The last point built upon Pearson’s appeal to Abbott. The memorandum cited the international situation as the imperative for a substantial Canadian donation. Pearson stuck to the figure reached by LePan and economist John Deutsch –

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$25 million in the fiscal year 1951–52 in the form of bilateral grants.40 Given the ongoing struggle to convince Abbott, and the fact that this marked Ottawa’s first committed venture into development assistance, the sum was considerable. In the end, Pearson’s lobbying succeeded. Cabinet cautiously approved the dollar figure of Canada’s contribution to the Colombo Plan on 6 February. India experienced a series of crop failures between 1950 and 1951, and famine loomed. To help alleviate the potentially disastrous conditions, the Canadian government authorized the DEA to discuss providing India with a grant of between $10 and $15 million worth of wheat as part of its allotment of Colombo Plan aid for 1951–52.41 In New Delhi, Warwick Chipman supported this initiative and expressed hope that, through the Colombo Plan or unilaterally, Canada could make wheat, of any grade, available to India.42 Public opinion strongly supported increased aid to India, and both citizen and church groups actively lobbied Ottawa during this period.43 Cabinet waited to announce the aid figure formally to both the Consultative Committee meeting in Colombo and the House of Commons until negotiations finalized details of the gift of wheat. The government also cautiously observed what other countries, particularly the United States, were planning to contribute before making the Canadian arrangement public. Ottawa feared pursuing a course that might overcommit it if other donor nations reconsidered at the last moment; in the end, Pearson opted to move ahead with the announcement. Finally confident of the financial aspects, on 21 February 1951 he rose in the House of Commons to announce Canada’s first foray into foreign aid: Perhaps I might read to the House the last sentence of the Colombo Report which summarizes, so eloquently, our hopes for the success of the Colombo Plan. “In a world racked by schism and confusion it is doubtful whether free men can long afford to leave undeveloped and imprisoned in poverty the human resources of the countries of South and South-East Asia which could help so greatly, not only to restore the world’s prosperity, but also to redress its confusion and enrich the lives.”44

The decision to participate in the Colombo Plan and begin the flow of aid to South Asia took just over a year. Concerns about poverty, communism, Korea, and the positive impressions made by Indian officials had buttressed the views and arguments of proponents such as Pearson and LePan that Ottawa had a role to play in developing India. In agreeing to contribute to India’s future, Ottawa added another important layer onto a blossoming relationship. No one could tell at this early juncture, but India would become the largest recipient of Canadian aid over the next thirty years.

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Details regarding the wheat purchase lingered into the summer months. In late winter, Ottawa learned that the bulk of the wheat available for export was Class 5, a lighter and poorer quality wheat. In what marks one of the first misunderstandings of the distribution of Canadian aid, the Indians balked at the Canadians’ offer to provide this grade of wheat to India. Shortly after Canada’s announcement of fiscal commitment to the Colombo Plan, LePan met with the Indian high commissioner to Ottawa, P.K. Banerjee. Banerjee suggested that India did not want this wheat; though fine for human consumption, it did not travel well, and much of it would be spoiled in transit. In fact, Banerjee indicated, India preferred to obtain capital equipment from Canada and secure its wheat from other sources.45 LePan suspected that New Delhi had instructed Banerjee to refuse the wheat, yet in a note to the secretary-general of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (IMEA), Bajpai, Nehru expressed disbelief that the offer of Canadian wheat was rejected: “I think this matter should be investigated immediately. I just do not see why we should reject any offer of this kind, when we are so terribly in need of every kind of foodstuffs.”46 The Canadians, Heeney and LePan in particular, also unsure of the motives for the rejection, continued to explore the possibility of shipping some wheat to India.47 The Indians also appeared to be dragging their feet in letting Ottawa know what specific assistance they wanted under the Colombo Plan.48 With disbelief, Heeney remarked to Pearson that, insofar as the question of wheat was concerned, “there seems to be no doubt, on reviewing what took place earlier in the year, that the Indians have handled this question with ineptitude.”49 Chipman’s dispatches from New Delhi starkly described the famine conditions in parts of India, so the Canadians considered additional measures to assist India. An estimated 5 million Indians faced starvation in the coming year. In a late-May cabinet meeting, Pearson again linked Western aid to India’s strategic importance. He pointed out that a Canadian contribution might persuade other Western countries, particularly the United States, to make similar gifts and that the cumulative effect would enhance Canada’s stature in India.50 The cabinet and prime minister agreed, noting that in due course a firm offer of Canadian assistance could be made. By September, cabinet committed to grant India $15 million toward wheat under the Colombo Plan during 1951–52, contingent on New Delhi setting aside a fund equivalent to the Canadian grant. The money would be used for development projects undertaken in consultation with Canadian officials.51 During the next two decades, Canadian aid to India increased significantly and became a central and critical component of the bilateral relationship.52 Canada’s aid program eventually overshadowed all other aspects of the relationship. Participation in the Colombo Plan illustrates the profound shift that

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occurred in the practices and attitudes of Canadian diplomacy. Escott Reid commented to a colleague that five years earlier one could not have imagined Canada ever participating in a foreign aid plan for South Asia.53 Aid to India garnered attention internationally and was a popular domestic issue for the Liberal government. It exemplified the growing importance of India to Canada. Within the DEA, an emerging policy framework devoted to strengthening the links between India and the West gradually developed after the April 1949 prime ministers’ Commonwealth conference in London. The Colombo Plan, a direct offshoot of that conference, fostered the aid relationship. It also tangibly committed Canada to the economic stabilization of India and the improvement of socio-political conditions in India, and it enhanced regional security. The context of the Korean War would provide New Delhi and Ottawa with a chance to work together on a multilateral stage at the United Nations.

4 In Close and Friendly Collaboration Canada and India during the Korean War, 1950–53

The Korean War provided added impetus for Canadian participation in the Colombo Plan, and it brought senior government officials in Ottawa and New Delhi into closer contact as both governments sought to keep the conflict from expanding in East Asia. This period further illustrates Ottawa’s efforts to reach out to New Delhi – sometimes successfully, other times not. At the same time, the rift between Washington and New Delhi widened. On occasion, Ottawa attempted to tone down American policies that it thought could further enflame hostilities and damage the status of the West in South Asia. It also tried, when possible, to reconcile the differences between the policies of the US government and those of Asian governments.1 Similarly, India sought to use its diplomatic channels with China to transmit Western cables and interpret Western actions to the isolated communist regime and vice versa. It also attempted, with less success, to influence Chinese actions. Throughout this period, the United Nations provided a forum for Canadian and Indian cooperation. At times, the countries disagreed with each other. However, by working closely and engaging in a frank exchange of views, Pearson, St. Laurent, Nehru, and their officials developed important personal relationships, adding a new dimension to the budding bilateral relationship. The arrangement was enhanced by the Commonwealth conferences, Canada’s commitment to the Colombo Plan, and Ottawa’s realization that India’s stability and security were critical in Asia and to the Western world. Washington looked on the Indians with mounting skepticism, so as the St. Laurent government sent naval and ground forces to Korea the DEA found itself in a difficult situation. Ottawa supported the need to halt North Korean aggression, but Pearson and his colleagues often disagreed with American officials over the war. By midAugust, Pearson expressed his doubts to departmental colleagues about American policy. He feared that the war would expand beyond Korea’s borders and that Washington was inching toward war with China. Pearson understood the devastating ramifications that such an event would have for both American and Western reputations in the region, particularly for leaders such as Nehru. Nehru approved the 25 June resolution that blamed North Korea for an armed attack and supported the UN attempt to secure cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces. Yet, though he supported the initial decision,

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he did so with some unease and little enthusiasm. India prided itself on being non-aligned, and Nehru now faced public criticism across India and from trusted colleagues such as Krishna Menon, the talented but erratic high commissioner in London, and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, the ambassador to the Soviet Union.2 Nehru remained suspicious of Soviet policies, particularly in light of the mischief attempted in India through the local communist party, but he also fretted over American policies in Asia, especially Washington’s consistent and hostile efforts to block the seating of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the United Nations, which Nehru thought misguided. Hoping for a compromise, Nehru sent messages to both Dean Acheson and Joseph Stalin urging a conference on the Korean situation, but neither party appeared to be enthusiastic about his overture. In fact, the Americans thought his proposal naive and smacking of appeasement.3 This rebuke stung the proud Indian leader. As the war progressed into late summer and the North Korean forces disintegrated after the Inchon landings, Nehru, like Pearson, worried about the implications of the American pursuit of the communist armies into North Korea and possibly China. The advance of American and UN forces deeper into North Korea prompted the first stern warning from China. Transmitted through the Indian ambassador, K.M. Pannikar, to the United States, it indicated that China would resist any act of aggression.4 The Chinese message and Indian cautions fell on deaf ears. This was partly because of the derision that American officials – particularly Acheson – had for Nehru and their consternation over India’s non-aligned policies. The major powers believed that the Soviet Union controlled the puppet strings in North Korea, not China.5 The result was that few in Washington heeded the warnings of the messenger, particularly when that messenger was New Delhi. Ottawa’s first attempt to nudge India closer to the Western cause followed the successful American landing at Inchon. The United Nations considered whether its armies should cross the thirty-eighth parallel and forcibly unite the Koreas, and a UN resolution was drafted to react to the new military circumstances. Pearson supported the goal of securing a united and free Korea; the Indians were less enthusiastic. They believed that crossing the thirty-eighth parallel should be the last resort and would not support any settlement at the United Nations that permitted force to unite the Korean peninsula. A disappointed St. Laurent counselled Pearson “to go some distance toward meeting the Indian position and so preserve the united front to which we attach so much importance.”6 Pearson, historian Greg Donaghy observed, “went right to work, pushing India and the resolution’s principal sponsor, the United States, closer together,” suggesting to India’s ambassador at the United Nations, B.N. Rau, that “the time

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had come for India, having voted for peace and security in Korea, to accept its U.N. responsibilities.”7 Hume Wrong, an old friend of Acheson and the Canadian ambassador in Washington, met with Acheson and his officials to impress on him the Canadian view that it was essential to maintain a united front and to have India onside with the Western nations. Although skeptical of any action that would delay the advancement of military operations, Acheson agreed that the UN could issue a statement urging the North Koreans to surrender in the period between the adoption of the resolution and the UN invasion of North Korea.8 Pearson hoped that the Indians recognized the American attempt at partial accommodation. This hope was quickly dashed. The Indians decided to abstain from the vote on the ground that India could not condone the operation of UN forces north of the thirty-eighth parallel, which New Delhi cautioned would risk intervention by China and the Soviet Union.9 Pearson faced similar pressures from close colleagues Escott Reid in Ottawa and Norman Robertson, the Canadian high commissioner in London, to take a harder line against what they regarded as American militancy in the push to cross into North Korea.10 Pearson was in a difficult position. He valued his close contacts with the Americans, but he also understood the folly of a broader conflict in the region and the necessity to reconcile American and Indian attitudes.11 Pearson thought it laudable that the United Nations had taken “early and decisive action” on the Korean situation and was responding to recent developments. However, it was essential, as the conflict escalated, to limit division between the Asian states and the West so that the Asian countries would not turn to the East Bloc. Pearson therefore viewed the inability to carry Indian support as an “important set-back.” Although he lamented the often rigid nature of American officials, he also believed that the Indians could have done more to secure approval of the resolution.12 Pearson found the ongoing discussions “disheartening,” as evident in a dispatch that he wrote to Ottawa lamenting “the inability of certain people in Washington to realize that it is not enough to occupy North Korea; that it is more important to remove, if possible, the impression in Asia minds, especially Indian minds, that the policies and designs of the United States in this whole Korean question are not above suspicion.”13 Nonetheless, Pearson continued to try to bridge the opposing American and Indian positions on Korea, but his observation that the Indians “could have done more” gradually developed into deep-seated disappointment with facets of Indian foreign policy as the decade progressed. This era represents the apogee of hope in Ottawa that Canada could connect India to the West, and that spirit soothed the disappointment that figures such as Pearson felt with Indian policy.

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The Americans knew that their relations with the Indians were poor. Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee met with Vijayalakshmi (Vijaya) Nehru, the Indian ambassador to the United States and Nehru’s sister, on 26 October to discuss “the deep concern over the current deterioration of public attitudes of each country toward the other.” McGhee expressed bewilderment about why “Nehru himself should, as it appears he does, go out of his way to be critical of the United States.”14 The Americans would tolerate criticism to an extent, particularly when done privately and constructively, but they resented Nehru’s willingness to criticize American policy publicly. Following the conversation, McGhee prepared a memorandum for Acheson indicating that “our relations with India are to an unusual degree dependent upon one man – Nehru. We must understand this man.” The memorandum described Nehru as a “frustrated revolutionary” but argued in favour of redoubling American efforts to repair and improve bilateral ties. India, it argued, “is too important to us and Nehru too important to India for us to take the easy road of concluding that we cannot work with Nehru.”15 On this fact, Ottawa and Washington agreed. Unfortunately, the opportunities to repair relations between the United States and India proved to be elusive. In late November, events in Korea realized Pearson’s and Nehru’s worst fears. Pannikar’s warnings ignored, hundreds of thousands of Chinese “volunteers” attacked UN forces nearing the Yalu River, which divided China from North Korea. What many hoped would be a limited conflict now threatened to escalate dramatically. Pearson and his British counterparts worked closely with India to ensure that the Americans would not resort to atomic weapons. Pearson rallied support for a ceasefire followed by negotiation on the recognition of China; these actions complied with Nehru’s previous urgings. The adoption of a ceasefire would give direct negotiations between the United Nations and Peking a chance. Pearson also believed, as did the Indians, that an effort should be made to avoid any formal decision identifying China as an aggressor. American officials, however, began to push for exactly such a resolution, to the chagrin of the Canadians and the Indians. With the full support of St. Laurent, Pearson appealed to Nehru for help in the search for a solution. In a letter to the Indian prime minister, Pearson acknowledged that “our judgements have not always been the same” but stressed that Ottawa and New Delhi shared the same objectives and frequently found “that our views were usually pretty close together; especially on the paramount necessity of localizing and ending the conflict in Korea, in a way which will both discharge our obligations under the United Nations Charter and satisfy Asian public opinion.” Pearson asked Nehru to intervene with the hope that his voice might encourage a pause in the fighting that could create an opportunity

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for a peaceful settlement. Pearson impressed on Nehru that he occupied “a unique position as the most influential leader of Asian opinion, and at the same time you command a great fund of good will and admiration in western countries.”16 Nehru’s stature had risen because of his unyielding calls for a peaceful solution. Perhaps now, Pearson reasoned, Nehru could make a public appeal for a ceasefire. Nehru sympathized with Pearson’s proposal and found it heartening that countries were thinking “how best to save the world from the catastrophe of another major war,” yet he chose silence.17 He responded cautiously. One biographer believes that Nehru thought Pearson’s proposal impractical, explaining that he felt reluctant to make a public appeal without a reasonable chance of a favourable response from either side.18 He was doubtful that “in the present situation either Peking or Washington would take such an appeal in good part.”19 Nehru noted that the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, was undertaking his own peace mission to Washington, and he concluded that it was best to see how those discussions went. Perhaps he worried about being set up for failure as the Americans harangued yet another naive peace appeal and the Chinese viewed it with skepticism.20 A ceasefire, if it could be achieved, provided hope for negotiation and a settlement. On 13 December, the United Nations General Assembly created a committee to search for a solution. Pearson joined Rau and the Iranian representative, Nasrollah Entezam, on the three-man committee with the full support of St. Laurent.21 In his memoirs, Pearson reflected that he was not overly optimistic about the committee’s success, but he recognized that it presented an opportunity to search for peace.22 He also believed that, if given the chance, the commission could develop a ceasefire proposal. Regardless of acceptance, the savvy Canadian assessed another possible positive outcome: if the Chinese rejected it, then the Indians would have to support the UN efforts in Korea, thereby bringing New Delhi, albeit grudgingly, on side – a long-term strategic goal for Pearson and his Canadian contemporaries. In the meantime, the committee members worked in a complicated environment. China gave no official standing to the committee and insisted that any ceasefire discussions on Korea include the larger issues of a Korean political settlement, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the status of Formosa. Conversely, the Americans held that no negotiations on those issues could occur until a ceasefire was agreed upon and in place. Trying to obtain a compromise, however small, proved to be an arduous process for the committee. In the final weeks of a difficult year, during which Asia became the central battleground of the Cold War, Pearson pressed Washington to reconsider its stance. The Americans countered that any initial talks must deal specifically with Korea but

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could consider other topics, such as Formosa. Pearson arranged for news of this concession to be sent to Peking via New Delhi, stressing that this was an important concession to the Americans; it was time for China to follow suit. He hoped that the Indians could obtain a favourable response from Peking. It was soon clear, however, that the Chinese thought that the American proposal remained too vague. The 1951 Commonwealth prime ministers’ meeting in London positioned Korea at the top of the agenda. From the opening day, on 4 January, it was apparent that, despite working well together, India’s and Canada’s views diverged on how best to accomplish a peaceful settlement. This divergence stemmed from fundamentally different assessments of the Cold War and hinted at an emerging dichotomy in the bilateral relationship that intensified as the 1950s progressed. In his opening comments addressing the international situation, Nehru argued that China had emerged as a great power and changed the balance of power in Asia. People, he added, might not like China’s present relationship with Moscow, but this was the fact of the matter. China likely believed that it possessed few friends apart from the Soviet Union; it was New Delhi’s policy to show Peking that this was not so. Nehru admitted that pursuing amicable relations with its neighbour served India’s interests, given that the two countries shared a common frontier of over 2,000 miles. He then characterized American policy on China as “unrealistic and based on a false kind of sentiment.” India wanted to work with the United States but believed that Washington was following the wrong path in Asia. Nehru had learned of a planned US resolution that would brand China as an aggressor by the United Nations and was appalled by the idea, believing that it would bring the world closer to war. He suggested that the Chinese would not provoke a wider war, and he believed that China wanted to consolidate the gains of the revolution, while the United States played the role of provocateur. St. Laurent believed otherwise. He suggested that communist expansion in Asia appropriately concerned the West, especially if those seeking to expand communism across Asia exploited legitimate national aspirations. He also believed that the actions taken by the United Nations in Korea gave new hope to that organization. He did agree with Nehru that China’s emergence “had significantly altered the balance of power in the Far East,” but it had to be recognized that China had committed aggression in Korea.23 Branding the Chinese as aggressors raised a potential danger, but insisting that the Chinese simply served as volunteers in Korea was disingenuous. In New York City, Pearson and his committee colleagues prepared a draft statement of principles that detailed the basis for an end to hostilities. The draft called for a four-powers conference that included the United States, United Kingdom, USSR, and China to discuss the peaceful settlement of the issues of

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concern. Pearson again had to navigate tensions between American and Indian differences about how to address both Washington’s and Peking’s demands in the complex phrasing of any statement. The Americans expressed concern that delay and Nehru’s influence at the Commonwealth meetings might lead to a diluted statement and establish talks that situated the Americans and Chinese as “morally equal parties.” Although sensitive to the need to assuage American concerns, Pearson urged Washington to adopt a more accommodating policy on China and to approve a draft that promised a conference following a ceasefire to discuss the “peaceful settlement of Far Eastern problems, including among others, those of Formosa and the representation of China at the United Nations.”24 From London, Nehru balked at the statement of principles, stressing that Peking would not accept a draft that did not explicitly reference either its claim to Formosa or its claim to be represented in the United Nations.25 Instead, he suggested a revised statement indicating the intention of future discussions to proceed in conformity with existing international obligations and the provisions of the UN charter.26 Taking the Indian phrasing into consideration, Pearson urged the United States to accept a revised draft statement of principles and contacted London immediately with a caution: “If Nehru is not in a position to authorize Rau to sponsor our statement, even as now amended, then the United States would feel that they were freed from their commitment to support it.”27 The Canadian diplomat – with the support of his colleagues – worked tirelessly to secure a commitment from the Americans that they would vote in favour of the statement of principles and not abstain from the vote. Pearson thought that an abstention would likely result in the Chinese rejecting the document. Rau informed him that Nehru would sponsor the statement of principles. In a bid to maintain the momentum, Pearson asked St. Laurent to approach Nehru in London and request that Pannikar openly support the statement from Peking, hoping that this would assuage the Soviets and the Chinese.28 On 13 January, the United Nations endorsed the committee’s statement of principles, with both the United States and India voting in favour of it. The Canadians, for the time being, kept both Washington and New Delhi on the same page. Success proved to be fleeting, however, for within days the Chinese replied ambiguously, and Washington again prepared to sponsor a resolution declaring the Chinese aggressors. Ottawa’s leverage with Washington now largely weakened, Hume Wrong advised Pearson that, “in view of the reply of the Peking Government, my strong recommendation is that we should not support any move which may be introduced in New York for a further effort for a peaceful settlement in Korea and should vote for a resolution on the lines proposed by the United States.”29 Wrong, ever the realist, applauded his colleague’s “great efforts” but knew that they had failed. He believed that Canada could influence

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a number of other delegations to support the American initiative by voting for the resolution.30 An optimistic Nehru doubted that the Chinese completely rejected the committee’s proposals. In a letter to St. Laurent, he suggested that their reply was an amalgam of “partly acceptance, partly request for elucidation, partly counterproposal, and [it] leaves room for further negotiations.”31 Nehru did fear, however, that reports that the United States judged the Chinese reply unacceptable and planned to label China as an aggressor would shut the door to negotiation completely and make war inevitable. This, he added, “would be contrary to [the] policy which you and we decided to follow in the Commonwealth conference. I think there is room for negotiation and we should take advantage of this. I would request you strongly to urge Washington not to compound matters.”32 Pearson favoured this interpretation over the missive sent by Wrong, and St. Laurent asked Nehru to contact Peking for clarification. Nehru contacted Pannikar on 19 January, noting that “Canada shares our desire to follow path of negotiations and is working hard for this.” Nehru advised Pannikar of his intention to continue urging the Canadian prime minister “to prevent the U.S. [from] proceeding with its contemplated condemnatory resolution,” but St. Laurent “wishes you to get answer to his queries from Chou En-lai [the Chinese foreign minister]. Please arrange to see him urgently and tell him that I consider Canadian attitude helpful and ask him for elucidation of points raised.”33 Nehru remained confident in the possibility of negotiation and subsequent settlement of the Korean problem. In another message to Rau, he suggested that the Chinese “were deeply suspicious of American intentions, but are eager to find some way out. I am anxious that our position should be explained to the U.S. In spite of difference of opinion on this issue we want to be as friendly as possible to the U.S. and to cooperate with them.”34 It was far too late for friendly overtures. Frustrated by the protracted process and facing domestic pressure, on 22 January the Americans tabled a resolution that condemned China for aggression and recommended sanctions. The move surprised the Indians, and in the UN assembly Rau bluntly stated that India was “opposed to so disastrous a course.”35 Looking back on this time, one of Nehru’s diplomats characterized the US move as a shockingly poor tactic and believed that the Chinese act was not one of aggression but simply one designed to protect Chinese territory.36 From Ottawa, senior DEA officials Escott Reid and John Holmes argued against supporting the resolution, but in the end Pearson voted in favour of it while making it clear to the assembly that Canada questioned this course of action. The pressure from Washington could not be ignored, thereby demonstrating that bilateral and alliance matters remained the pillars of Canadian policy. If Canada had voted against the resolution, then it would have been the only member of NATO to

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have done so. Such a move would have had ramifications. It would have threatened allied unity, risked straining bilateral ties with the United States, and potentially caused Washington to sour on the United Nations as an international forum for debate and political process. Ottawa had little appetite for any of these possibilities, and Indian policy on this question became an afterthought. Nehru cabled Pannikar in Peking on 27 January, informing him that American pressure had carried the day. At the United Nations, Rau had received orders not to support the resolution or a revised proposal that Pearson had been circulating. Nor was Rau permitted to participate in Pearson’s proposed revival of the ceasefire committee. The best that could be done now, Nehru brooded, was to watch developments.37 He conveyed his weariness on the matter in a letter to his friend and confidant, Lord Mountbatten: the Americans had proved to be “too obstinate and strong for most countries.”38 While Nehru believed that his overtures to various governments had helped to tone down the tension, he clearly resented the Americans for having “swung back completely” and announcing “repeatedly that they would have no truck at all with China. They brought all their heavy guns to play and made it clear to the world that they would go ahead with their aggressor resolution in the U.N., single-handedly, if necessary.”39 This tactic had worked well, he confided: “Canada, which expressed itself pleased with the later Chinese attitude, is now almost fully supporting the U.S. resolution.” The failures of diplomacy mattered little when home needed urgent attention. Nehru closed the missive by noting that “all kinds of problems overwhelm us, the most difficult of them being that of food.”40 The Canadian decision to acquiesce to US pressure gave Nehru pause, causing him to question Ottawa’s ability to pursue a distinct foreign policy. Ottawa immediately sought to bridge the resultant fissure between Canada and India. In a candid and conciliatory letter to Nehru, St. Laurent expressed his regret that both “governments found themselves in opposing positions on the vote, [and] I am less disappointed by this circumstance than I am encouraged by the results of our joint efforts in the interests of a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern problems.”41 In the mind of St. Laurent, both countries had worked closely together and achieved some success in modifying the positions of both Washington and Peking on the ceasefire proposals. The United States indicated its intention to enter into a dialogue on basic Far Eastern issues, while Peking accepted the principle that a ceasefire had to precede other negotiations – significant achievements considering the heated emotions that followed China’s entry into the war. St. Laurent also impressed on Nehru that there were limits to the ability of both governments to pursue joint efforts in Korea. St. Laurent recognized the paramountcy of India’s relationships with Asian states and its role as a moral leader. Canada’s limits, he explained, “arose equally out of our

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attitude towards the collective security system and our relationships with our great neighbours. It has always been clear to us that once we were faced with the question of whether or not the Chinese had participated in aggression in Korea we could not do otherwise than answer yes.”42 Warwick Chipman believed that St. Laurent’s note was well received and inferred that the Indians understood Ottawa’s position. Although there was the possibility of a growing rift between East and West, Chipman thought that Canada “may have further opportunities to play an important role in helping to prevent this.”43 Still, St. Laurent’s message to Nehru signalled trouble ahead. Both Canada and India sought to restrain the Americans and the Chinese, but there were limits to how far Ottawa would push Washington and potentially jeopardize its interests to align with Nehru’s hopes. During the following year, efforts to end the war laboured on among American, Chinese, and North Korean officials. The Korean conflict became a stalemate as the war entered its third year. And, though South Korea had been liberated, the threshold to sustain further casualties – certainly among allied forces – diminished. Negotiations held in July 1951 failed, and discussions languished into 1952. Those negotiating the armistice also had to consider the divisive matter of repatriating prisoners of war (POWs). During the late summer of 1952, the Americans canvassed support among their Western allies for a UN initiative that sought the voluntary repatriation of POWs. This raised a controversial and embarrassing issue for the communists since the United States knew that a considerable number of communist POWs would refuse repatriation to their homelands. Believing that this resolution would be rejected by China, the Americans proposed a second possibility, which urged UN members to seek additional sanctions against China that would expand the conflict. Nehru disagreed with the American initiatives, and soon the Indians offered their own. The American and Indian initiatives coincided with Pearson’s presidency of the United Nations General Assembly, and Pearson soon found himself in the thick of things as Washington and New Delhi tussled, each attempting to craft a resolution to its own liking. And at this particular moment a new figure entered onto the stage as Krishna Menon, a senior Indian official, arrived in New York City. Menon, with a specific mandate from Nehru to work on Korea, was one of the most prickly and mercurial figures in the Indian civil service. Over time, he became a source of exasperation for Canadian diplomats who contended with his vanity and erratic behaviour. Menon had served as the Indian high commissioner in London since partition and by all accounts wielded a formidable intellect and showed great devotion to Nehru. His physical and psychological health, however, had deteriorated, resulting in a prescription of the drug Luminal, which caused him frequently

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to faint and speak incoherently in public.44 Unable or unwilling to delegate and often described as self-opinionated, Menon frequently succumbed to his temper, making him difficult to work with or for. He developed an infatuation with Nehru, and his correspondence to the Indian prime minister at times resembled that of a spurned lover. Menon became increasingly unpredictable – one historian believes that by spring 1951 he had suffered a nervous breakdown.45 Nehru attempted to coax him home to convalesce, but Menon resisted his overtures. In a January 1952 letter to Nehru, Menon went so far as to hint at possibly taking his own life rather than return to New Delhi.46 In addition to these numerous flaws and personal demons, Menon loathed Nehru’s sister, Vijaya, in charge of India’s UN delegation. She reciprocated in turn. Menon also, much to the astonishment and wrath of the Americans, frequently aired his anti-American views publicly. Not surprisingly, American officials were wary of Menon often in advance of dealing with him. His ability to seek diplomatic consensus for his ideas suffered. One young Indian diplomat described Menon as possessing a “biting tongue” and the ability to make “enemies out of friends.”47 Such was the man who arrived in New York City in late 1952 and with whom Pearson found himself dealing at the United Nations. By early September, Nehru, frustrated by the stalemate in Korea, reconsidered the available options for a solution, but he remained uncertain about which line to take. In a letter to B.G. Kher, his high commissioner in London, Nehru opined that “the first thing is somehow to get a truce in Korea.” He further pondered whether some common ground might exist among India, Britain, and possibly Canada on which to search for a solution. The alliance was contingent, however, on both Canada and Britain being willing and able “to check the USA.”48 And attempting to restrain Washington from recklessly antagonizing the Chinese was what Pearson sought. That August the Americans requested the support of their Western allies for a resolution that would intensify economic, diplomatic, and potentially military pressure against the Chinese. The initiative presented at the United Nations with twenty-one co-sponsors on 24 October became known as the twenty-one-power resolution. The Indians deeply opposed the move, and Pearson was concerned that this action would only drive Peking further away from compromise. During the autumn, Menon approached Pearson to discuss how an armistice could be reached, including the return of POWs. As president of the United Nations General Assembly, Pearson accepted Menon’s overture, which soon received the support and sympathies of the Canadian and British delegations at the United Nations. On 27 October, Menon met with Pearson and his cabinet colleague, Paul Martin, to begin the discussions. Pearson found the initial meeting to be a rambling affair, with Menon’s ideas vague and his reasoning “somewhat tor-

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tuous.”49 Pearson thought Menon well disposed to the Chinese point of view but also thought him sincere, and he thought that Menon should not be discouraged in his attempt to pursue an armistice. Yet he wondered whether Menon was too optimistic and thought it imperative that the Indian diplomat not misinterpret the information that he received from Peking. But the Canadian also realized that the Indian government was the central point of contact with China and that it was critical to make use of this contact while keeping expectations firmly grounded. Therefore, Menon received encouragement from both the Canadians and the British delegation, led by Selwyn Lloyd, with Pearson urging Menon to clarify his ideas and put them on paper.50 Menon proposed that the POWs should be repatriated as stipulated by the Geneva Convention but that neither side would immediately use force to repatriate them. On 7 November, he again asked to meet with Pearson to discuss his draft proposals. In the interim, Pearson learned that the British and Indians passed on information regarding Menon’s draft to the Americans, who were not pleased. Looking at the draft, Pearson could see why. The proposal had merit, but the document made no provision for the immediate transfer of prisoners who sought to be moved, which would delay repatriation for months. The second problem concerned Menon’s proposal for the creation of a neutral commission to oversee the transfer of POWs. This commission would be composed of four representatives, two communists, and members from Sweden and Switzerland. Pearson foresaw that such a commission could provide “the communists [with] endless opportunities for delaying tactics; that it will never come to agreement on anything.”51 When faced with these concerns, Menon conceded these points and agreed to seek improvements. The Americans scorned Menon’s proposal and were displeased with the support that it received from the British and Canadians. In his memoirs, Dean Acheson recounts that he believed that Pearson and Menon were dealing in sophistries, and he told Pearson that “his interest in these proposals bothered me a great deal and implored him to keep in very close touch with me.”52 Pearson again found himself attempting to reconcile the Indian and American positions. The Americans believed that Menon’s proposed four-power neutral repatriation commission, with its two communist members, could not be trusted. The Canadian saw this as a shame, for it was “of vital importance” to obtain “an Indian resolution which rejects the use of force in moving prisoners on the order paper. If the Communists accept such a resolution, even if it is full of risks, the fighting at least stops and the prisoners can begin to move.”53 If the opposite occurred and the communists opposed the resolution, then at least the Indians, followed by the Asian delegations, would finally be committed to the side of the West – a familiar aim of Canadian foreign policy.

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The following day, 8 November, a dejected Menon contacted Pearson, anxious to see him immediately. Menon thought the Americans to be obstructive and difficult, causing Pearson to suspect that he teetered on the verge of dropping his plan. The Canadian promised to look over a copy of the revised proposal and go over the points with Acheson. Pearson tried to reassure Menon, reflecting condescendingly that he “reacts warmly to a little praise and encouragement.”54 Pearson’s diary entries for his meetings with Acheson lack the acrimony and displeasure found in Acheson’s reminiscences of this period. When the two met on 9 November, Pearson found Acheson prepared and even attentive to the Indian resolution. In fact, Acheson informed him that he awaited a reply from Washington and that, if it came back favourable, they would accept the Indian ideas in principle provided that some changes were made to the draft. The Americans remained distrustful of the four-nation commission and recommended that it was best to wait before determining its membership. Pearson impressed on Acheson the need to adopt a sympathetic attitude to Menon’s proposal, for, in one form or another, it would likely be brought to the assembly for a vote. He also stressed the significance of the Indians’ sponsorship, “which all the rest of us could accept.” Should the Indians find their resolution received coolly, they would likely walk away, proclaiming their efforts sabotaged by the negative attitude of the United States – playing right into the hands of the communists. The next critical step for the Canadian remained to “bring this matter to a head so that the Indian delegation can make public its resolution, but in a form which the Americans can support. That is the one chance for success at this assembly so far as Korea is concerned.”55 A plan easier said than done. Acheson and Menon met formally to discuss the proposal, and the meeting floundered. The circulated Indian proposal was essentially unchanged from one that Pearson had helped Menon modify the previous day, but the Americans remained unconvinced of the merits and critical of the fact that the Indians had offered insufficient details concerning whether force could be used to repatriate POWs unwilling to return to China or North Korea.56 Pearson lamented that “there are no points of mental or spiritual contact between the practical, incisive, clear-headed Dean and the vague, metaphysical, missionary Menon. Acheson made a vigorous onslaught of the Indian ideas and said they were completely unacceptable to the United States.” Pearson’s diary entry provides another glimpse of the characteristics of Indian figures that troubled Pearson. In this case, the clarity of the Anglophile Acheson stood juxtaposed to Menon’s baffling, meandering “Hinduness.” Although Acheson could just as easily exasperate Pearson, his behaviour and personality could at least be understood. The same was not wholly true of how Pearson understood Menon.

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Pearson sought to understand and advance the Indian position where necessary, while Acheson urged his counterparts to support the original twenty-onepower resolution as the basis of UN action instead. If the American resolution stood, then it could be amended to meet Indian objections. Pearson disagreed, supporting the “valuable” Indian proposals at a meeting with Acheson and other Western officials. Pearson hoped that the assembly would take the Indian proposal as the basis of a resolution and then consider any necessary changes; he believed that the British and French supported this suggestion. The divide in opinion alarmed Acheson. In the attempt to bring the matter to a head, Pearson met with Selwyn Lloyd, the British minister of state for foreign affairs, and Menon to further review the draft, looking to address American objections. Menon appeared to be reasonable and willing to accept most of the changes, in particular a paragraph outlining that “prisoners who are not disposed of within ninety days of the armistice shall be turned over for disposition to the political conference, which must be called under the present draft armistice agreement.”57 Pearson believed the draft complete and thought it unwise to expect the Indians to accept any further changes of substance. The Americans, however, opposed both the timeline and a political conference as a mechanism in which to resolve the issue of lingering POWs. And they added pressure in their campaign to derail the Indian plan and promote the twenty-one-power resolution as the roadmap for UN action. Pearson questioned whether the Americans even wanted the Indian resolution aimed at securing an armistice to succeed. One American official pointedly informed Pearson that the Indian initiative was unwelcome in the United States, and that the Americans were “fed-up with India, as a result of its neutralist position over recent years.”58 The Canadians disagreed with Washington’s belief that India held only nominally pro-Western views, which certainly accounted for Ottawa’s considerable efforts to consult closely with New Delhi. The Americans, Pearson gathered, wanted to retain the initiative but not reward the Indians for their efforts. He suggested, to a depressed and agitated Menon, that they stand firm, thinking that the Americans might be assuaged by Menon’s agreement to repeat the prohibition of the use of force against POWs in his proposal. Menon thought this unlikely, believing that the British delegation would side with Washington, considering the pressure that they also encountered. The Americans wanted a paragraph stipulating that all prisoners who would not accept repatriation ninety days after an armistice be freed. Menon, knowing Peking’s position, balked at this amendment. Conversations between Pearson and Lloyd reveal that Acheson applied ferocious pressure on the British delegation to side with the Americans. Meanwhile, the British and Canadian delegations attempted to persuade Menon to add a reference to an upcoming speech

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clarifying that indefinite detention of POWs was not implied in his proposal and that the “disposition of remaining prisoners would have to be taken in hand as a U.N. responsibility.”59 Menon agreed, but he planned to talk without notes. Given his penchant for erratic speeches, this plan troubled Pearson and his British colleagues. Menon’s speech to the assembly went better than expected, and to Pearson’s delight Acheson returned from a weekend visit to Ottawa open to discussion. The Canadian soon learned that Acheson had met with the St. Laurent cabinet over the weekend and used the opportunity to criticize the degree of Canadian cooperation with India, implying that Canada was “siding with the less responsible and more disruptive elements in the United Nations.”60 St. Laurent and his colleagues listened politely, but Acheson, if he sought a change in Ottawa’s willingness to work with the Indians, left empty-handed. Pearson speculated that Acheson was “coming round to the necessity of not trying to push impossible amendments at the Indians or going too far in the ‘arm twisting’ of friends.”61 Personalities became important in solving these matters, he noted, and Acheson and Menon proved to be great challenges, jousting at times over what seemed minor phrasing. Patience thinned by a month of diplomatic wrangling caused Pearson to record in his 25 November diary entry that “I saw Menon, on further changes to paragraph 17. He wants to continue our talk tonight, but I have about reached the end of my resources with him, also our tea is running out, so I think I will leave him to Selwyn Lloyd.”62 After further rounds of exhausting discussions and consensus building, the United States and India finally reached a compromise on 26 November. The two parties agreed on a redraft of the particularly contentious paragraph seventeen, which stated that the post-armistice political conference would transfer remaining hardline POWs to the United Nations for their “care,” “maintenance,”, and “subsequent disposition.”63 Pearson, perhaps hoping to circumvent Menon, cabled Nehru on 27 November asking him to support the revised resolution and explaining that the recent revisions should not be seen as a retreat from India’s original position. Pearson worried that it “would be deplorable if there were any faltering now, irrespective of the reception in Peking.”64 In New Delhi, Nehru did support the compromises, believing that “any withdrawal of the resolution would not only result in some extreme Resolution representing American viewpoint to be passed but would destroy all peace initiative of Assembly.”65 Like Pearson, Nehru believed that the Indian resolution, if passed, could provide the basis for future negotiations and an opportunity for a settlement. On 3 December, the United Nations voted in favour, 54-5, of Menon’s revised resolution, with only the Soviet Bloc vigorously opposing it. Peking rejected the resolution in late December, dashing the optimism that stemmed from the November efforts. Despite the failure of

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the process, Pearson’s hope of bringing India and the West closer together, even for a little while, had been met. Pearson viewed the result as an “almost happy and satisfactory conclusion.”66 Even though Menon was “a difficult person,” he and Pearson had worked closely together, and Menon had kept his word throughout the negotiations; these were important criteria to Pearson in evaluating the success of the relationship.67 Nehru acknowledged the cooperation between the Canadians and Indians in a response to a generous letter from Pearson: “I appreciate what you have said very much and I am particularly glad that our Delegation at the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Canadian Delegation have worked in close and friendly collaboration.”68 Nehru understood the pressure that the Canadians faced in supporting the Indian initiative and the work involved in coaxing Acheson and Menon to compromise.69 Canadian policy on the United States and India during the Korean conflict was consistent in this sense. Ottawa understood that precious little room existed in which to deviate from its allies. On the other hand, it recognized the fundamental importance of ensuring that the West heard India’s voice, particularly where American policies were concerned. Cooperation had its limits, in particular Pearson’s patience with Menon. Given the Indian’s acerbic nature, and American disdain for him, Pearson hoped to restrain Menon from pursuing another solution to the Korean impasse. In a frank exchange with Nehru’s sister, Vijaya, at the United Nations, Pearson beseeched her that “Krishna must on no account be permitted to handle Korea … and unless he is restrained very firmly, he will start rushing around trying to provide a new solution.” In her account of the conversation, Vijaya admits to personal embarrassment by the emphasis on Menon’s influence, for she headed the Indian delegation at the United Nations. A divisive working relationship existed between her and Menon. The retention of Menon at the United Nations, despite his poor relations with the Americans and Vijaya, speaks to the unusual devotion of Nehru to his temperamental friend. Pearson apologized, stressing that the conversation was an “off-therecord one as between two friends,” and suggested that he would personally try to prevent Menon “from taking any false step.”70 The conversation reveals the difficult but unique role that Ottawa sought in soothing relations between New Delhi and the West. It also reveals a looming dissonance between Canadian officials and Nehru on the role and influence of Krishna Menon in Indian foreign policy. Finally, on 27 July 1953, a suitable formula that settled the lingering POW issue and brokered a ceasefire was reached. In the end, the formula resembled the Indian resolution of the previous December. Pearson and Menon continued to consult one another on Korea with the support of their respective prime

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ministers. In late August, when the time came to vote on a UN resolution to determine whether India should be a member of the Korean peace conference, New Delhi received strong support from Ottawa. Unlike the Canadians, who could stomach India’s non-aligned foreign policy, the Truman administration never came to terms with Nehru and Indian non-alignment. This affected its dealings with the Indians at the United Nations and with Pearson. The scene changed when a new republican administration stood ready to take over as Dwight Eisenhower became the next president. His choice of secretary of state was John Foster Dulles, who vehemently opposed communism and detested non-alignment. His appointment created even more tension between New Delhi and Washington, making Ottawa seem more moderate to India. The first American encounter to discuss foreign policy with Vijaya was frank but tense. The new American government thought its predecessors too soft on China and communism in general. New Delhi labelled the United States too hard and expressed concern over American interest in Indochina as France struggled in its fight against the Vietminh.71 The period from India’s independence to the Korean armistice found the DEA and Ottawa acknowledging the importance of India to the West in the Cold War and seeking to craft policies that reflected this sentiment. Ottawa’s attitudes toward the reorganization of the Commonwealth, its motives in participating in the Colombo Plan, and its respect for India’s views during the Korean War all stand as evidence. The times demanded that Canada work diligently to avoid a serious rift between New Delhi and the West, especially with Washington. Finally, the importance that Ottawa placed on India during this era showed in the choice of Warwick Chipman’s successor. On 17 November 1952, Escott Reid, the new Canadian high commissioner, arrived in New Delhi just as the POW resolution came to a head. Reid emerged as India’s largest booster in the Canadian Department of External Affairs. He developed a passion for India, often to the chagrin of his colleagues in Ottawa, who thought that he placed too much importance on the country and Nehru. Ironically, just as his arrival in New Delhi marked the high point in relations between the two countries, his last years in India were spent tirelessly addressing the emerging policy fissures between Ottawa and New Delhi as India’s pursuit of non-alignment led Ottawa to echo Washington’s frustrations. In doing so, Canadian officials began to reconceptualize their impressions of India and questioned the supposed bonds between the two countries. And, as Reid recognized in his memoirs years later, the subtle impact of cultural and religious assumptions among the policy elites amplified the disconnect between India and Canada.72

5 A Special Relationship? 1952–57

In mid-November 1952, Escott Reid arrived in New Delhi as Canada’s third high commissioner to India with the belief that, as India went, so did the rest of the developing world. More than Pearson and St. Laurent, Reid accepted India’s non-alignment stance. The importance, he argued, lay in cultivating India’s sympathy for and understanding of Western policies in the Cold War. In conjunction, the West must actively assist India’s economic development. The more developed the Indian state became, the less likely it would be to succumb to communism or disintegrate into myriad factions. To this end, Reid lobbied vigorously for massive aid increases from Canada and the West, and he emerged as the chief proponent of Canada playing a central role in bridging India and the West. Reid arrived in India at a delicate time. Suspicion, and at times condescension, characterized relations between the United States and India. The nations disagreed with each other’s conduct during the Korean War, and their views diverged on how best to resolve the POW dispute in that war, a substantial obstacle to achieving an armistice. When an armistice was finally reached, the Americans wanted to exclude India from any further role in the Korean negotiations, which meandered into 1954. Reid often opposed American policy, and he pressed Ottawa on India’s importance not only to Asia but also to the broader world as he sought to bring Ottawa and New Delhi closer together. Like Pearson years earlier, Reid believed that Canada could bridge the West and South Asia; he also believed that a special relationship had been established between Canada and India, beginning during independence in 1947 and dovetailing with his arrival. Within months of settling in India, Reid asserted, in a dispatch to Ottawa, that “my impression is that there is perhaps no western democratic country whose foreign policy is closer to that of India than Canada.”1 This “closeness” proved to be ephemeral. His thesis of the bilateral relationship between India and Canada should be viewed with the understanding that, for a very brief period, Ottawa and New Delhi simply found some common ground. It is the emergence of the cracks in the special relationship and the bridge thesis that this chapter explores. The announcement that Escott Reid would replace Warwick Chipman came on 10 July 1952. Reid had eyed the New Delhi post for some time and while

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serving as acting USSEA had lobbied behind the scenes for the job. Blessed with an astonishingly creative mind and a tireless work ethic, Reid could be overzealous on occasion, exasperating his colleagues. He was a star candidate for what had become an important diplomatic posting for Ottawa. Dana Wilgress, then the USSEA, suggested that Reid remain in Ottawa, hinting that he might eventually be his successor. Reid thought otherwise, and in fact Pearson advised that it was “essential that I [Reid] go abroad soon to head a diplomatic mission in order to round out my training. For my own part, I would be reluctant to become under-secretary without having served abroad as head of [a] mission.”2 For his first head-of-post mission, Reid chose India. He explained his decision to a surprised Wilgress: “I have for some years now been obsessed by the belief that … the problem of the relations between the white have nations and the coloured have-nots is as difficult and dangerous for the democracies as the problem of the relations between the Soviet world and the Western world.” Reid thought it “unlikely” that the West would “win the struggle against the Russians if we fail to deal adequately with the first problem. I would like to have some first-hand knowledge of the most important have-not nation on our side.”3 The DEA believed that Reid’s appointment came “at a time when it is as important as ever to maintain good relations between the West and Asia.” The spectre of communist successes in India remained a stark concern, read his briefing notes. Among an unstable Far East, India stood out “eminently as the leading country with a stable government devoted to democratic ideals.” It was in Canada’s interest to strengthen this stability, to bolster democracy in India “in any way we can,” and to enhance India’s links to the West. Although the British and Americans stood in a better position to “co-operate significantly with India,” the DEA believed that Canada held a unique advantage in pressing its own interests in India. London and Washington determined events to an extent that Canada did not.4 However, despite their vast knowledge of the subcontinent, India regarded the British with suspicion as colonialists and saw the Americans as single-minded anti-communists who readily dismissed Indian views. Occasionally, American and British views on the importance of India differed; London sought to have the Americans play a greater role in a region that Washington thought peripheral to its national interest.5 In contrast, the authors of Reid’s instructions thought that “Canada’s outlook on international issues has earned the admiration of India’s leaders and we perhaps have a better appreciation of Indian aims than some of our western allies, notably the United States.” In fact, “on some issues, particularly the Eastern issues, India looks to Canada for the enunciation in a western context of a point of view with which she herself is, at least partly, in sympathy.”6 Here was the bridge thesis at work in full splendour.

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The debate at the United Nations over the Indian-sponsored POW resolution immediately became Reid’s preoccupation on arrival in New Delhi. Later, in the summer of 1953, Reid enthusiastically championed India’s membership in the peace conference on Korea set to occur in Geneva in 1954. His department supported his views even in the face of American objection.7 He concluded early on that the Americans understood neither Nehru nor the idiosyncrasies of Indian policy concerning Korea and China. As the Eisenhower administration settled in, Reid began gently to counsel Ottawa that, if anything could be done to “lessen fear about foreign policy of the new administration in Washington,” then Indian foreign policy would likely move in the direction that Ottawa desired.8 A task easier said than done. The Eisenhower administration prioritized concerns other than massaging what it deemed Nehru’s inflated ego. The Korean War drastically changed America’s perceptions of strategically placed nations in Asia and the Middle East. If the Indians appeared to be unreliable partners in the struggle against communism, then the Americans would seek other strategic partners. This view became manifest in a sharp reduction of American aid to India; a proposed $200 million dropped to $140 million in the spring of 1953.9 In late 1953, shock waves rippled through New Delhi at the American announcement of military assistance to Pakistan – India’s arch enemy. Officials in Washington believed that they could do business with Pakistan, and it strategically and culturally straddled the Middle East and Asia. The Pakistanis encouraged the distinction between their own anti-communist convictions and India’s non-alignment policy. Even before learning of the proposed military aid to Pakistan, Nehru acidly commented on professional bilateral exchanges: “I dislike more and more this business of exchange of persons between America and India. The fewer persons that go from India to America or that come from the United States to India the better.”10 The complex nature of US-India relations was just one of the significant challenges that Reid faced. Yet he handled his first months as head of post with aplomb, quickly immersing himself in the nuances of Indian foreign and domestic politics and falling “in love with the Indian countryside.”11 Believing New Delhi a truly vital post, he lobbied for expanded resources for the High Commission. To his chagrin, pleas to Dana Wilgress for additional personnel, a deputy high commissioner, and a publicity man to focus on the Colombo Plan went unanswered.12 This was the first of many plans to secure greater resources for the High Commission that met with failure. The mid-August news of St. Laurent’s and Pearson’s re-election permitted the long-standing sense of political familiarity between Canadians and Indians to

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continue. Nehru invited St. Laurent to visit India in the new year. No Canadian prime minister had yet travelled to India, and Reid impressed on St. Laurent his hope that Nehru’s invitation would be accepted.13 St. Laurent agreed, prompting Nehru to write warmly: Your coming here will not only give us the pleasure of meeting a friend for whom we have respect and affection, but it will also give us an opportunity to express our goodwill to Canada with whom it has been our good fortune to co-operate in so many matters. It has made me happy to see this increasing co-operation in wider affairs between Canada and India.14

Reid thought the St. Laurent visit a key aspect of achieving his broader goal, to affix India firmly on Ottawa’s radar. Reid suggests in his memoirs that the nations reached “the high point in the special relationship between India and Canada and, indeed, in India’s relations with the West” in the autumn of 1953.15 His thesis that a “special relationship” existed must be carefully scrutinized. Reid, years after his passing, remains one of the few scholars/policy makers to have written a monograph on the CanadaIndia relationship, Envoy to Nehru, and his assessment that such a relationship existed lacks the critical attention that it deserves from historians of Canadian international relations. An early challenge to Reid’s hope for a special relationship came in the form of Krishna Menon. He continued to garner Nehru’s confidence to a considerable degree. Having personally met Menon and through chats with Pearson, Reid knew of Menon’s prickly nature. He also knew that little love existed between Menon and the Americans. The Indian disapproved of the close relationship between Ottawa and Washington. During an end-of-year chat, Menon expressed frustration with American policy, suggesting to Reid that “there was little difference between their expansionist policy and tactics and those of the Russians. He was only slightly less critical of Canadian policy.”16 Years later Menon expressed his naive hope that Canada would become an “aligned non-aligned country” and chastised Pearson for having brought Canada into NATO, which, in his mind, inexorably linked Canada to the Western powers.17 In a provocative generalization, Menon described Canada merely as “a protectorate of America,” ignoring the differences between Ottawa’s and Washington’s attitudes toward New Delhi, especially during the Korean War. His views, as will be seen, partly reflected Nehru’s analysis of the Canada-US relationship and partly the limits to which Canadian and Indian policies could dovetail.18 Menon made cavalier generalizations about Canadians, just as many Canadian officials who knew little about India and its peoples made generalizations about

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them. Few Canadian diplomats in India looked beyond the British influences on politics and society or contemplated India’s diverse cultures and mindsets to understand better how they affected Indian decision making. This reflected Ottawa’s recent establishment of a sprinkling of posts in Asia and the predominant “Europeanist” backgrounds of the diplomats. Specific language or cultural training for Canadian diplomats to India had not yet been established. Despite an eagerness to learn about the Indian subcontinent and its peoples, Canadian officials lacked sophisticated knowledge. In these early years, Canadian diplomats received instructional books on Indian society and politics from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. For an added layer of nuance, Reid asked Graham McInnes, a departing first secretary, to draft a memorandum of his impressions of India. In a document widely circulated within the department and to numerous Canadian posts, McInnes wrote “Whither India?”19 He sought to understand how Indian culture affected policy making and concluded that Indians differed from Westerners in many ways. He described Indians in broad terms as poetic in the widest sense and it is the poet in others that appeals to them. They are strong family people – much stronger than in the West; They are extremely hospitable; They are kind and affectionate if approached without ambivalency. This makes them very demonstrative and they say things which to Westerners seem exaggerated or untrue; The reverse of this is that they can also be very violent; They have little staying power except at the level close to the dust at which India has generally subsisted. These characteristics are in turn traceable back to the environment: isolation; terrific and permanent heat leading to physical inaction, immense tolerance and fine-spun metaphysical subtleties.

Non-alignment, for McInnes, reflected a struggle between the affinities of the Western-educated elites against Hinduism and colonialism that sculpted what he regarded as India’s ambivalent attitudes toward the West. This ambivalence flowed from the Hindu faith and “was conceived and arrived at its present character in a monumental isolation. This character is complex, subtle, withdrawn into itself and though not precisely xenophobic not particularly interested in contact with other peoples.” The summary delved the deepest of any official in the DEA in considering the confluence of India’s cultural past with its present policy making. However, in what would soon become de jure thinking in the DEA, McInnes bluntly concluded that Nehru’s desire to stay out of the Cold War was “pathetic” and resembled Britain’s “determination in the days before Munich to bury its head in the sand,” but as long as the Westernized classes ruled India it would be loosely aligned with the West.

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McInnes urged an understanding of present circumstances in India. Unlike the common perception found in the higher levels of the State Department, he attributed the policy of non-alignment to the following elements: “India is weak, poor and proud; because the succession to Nehru is in doubt, as well as because of the emergent strength of the Congress right, this wish to bury the head is very human.” He thought that it must be understood that the Indians had no obligation “to like Americans” and that Washington’s attempt “to contain Russia by a globe-girdling system of subsidiary alliances has increased India’s dislike and alarm at American methods. This is especially true of the proposed U.S.Pakistan military agreement.” Unless the Americans drove the Indians into the arms of the Russians by eliminating foreign aid or by drawing militarily closer to Pakistan, “India will remain in the Western camp. In that camp it will be a military liability but a moral asset.” McInnes recommended that Ottawa develop policies that demonstrated faith in India and compassion, since “affection and faith are what India values most from the West.” In fact, he believed that the Indians succumbed more to flattery, whereas “gifts of goods and money” meant little “if their purpose is to keep India from going communist for this implies, to an Indian, a latent right to interfere in his domestic affairs.” Those recommendations, especially the need for “faith” and the criticism of American military aid to Pakistan, resonated with Reid, who outlined his opposition to the latter initiative in correspondence with Ottawa. Arnold Heeney, Canada’s ambassador in Washington, also studied McInnes’s analysis, and he challenged McInnes and Reid. He believed that American public opinion was in “shock regarding India and Indians” and that the suggestion that the Americans did not “get” India or Nehru failed to consider the complexity of the relationship. The Americans were perplexed and outraged that the Indians failed to respond appropriately to their enthusiasm over India’s independence and their financial generosity. Why were they not rallying around the United States in the Cold War? Heeney therefore disagreed with Reid’s long-held belief that the Americans too quickly discounted India and its leader. Rather, he felt “satisfied that the more important elements of the State Department – in particular the Secretary and Under-Secretary – do not consider lightly either the present or potential influence of Nehru or the grave consequences which could flow from his hostility.” In particular, Bedell Smith, the undersecretary of state, believed that Nehru “and his neutralism are the best we can hope for in India.” The Indian reaction to a possible decision to “proceed with a modest programme of military assistance for Pakistan” surprised the Americans.20 The Americans did proceed with military assistance. Heeney’s use of the term “modest” marks one of the first clear disagreements between senior DEA officials

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on how Ottawa should interpret the policy divide relating to non-alignment between Washington and New Delhi. Heeney lacked Reid’s sympathy for India’s objections to military aid to Pakistan, understanding the revised assessment of South Asia’s importance in consideration of the PRC in October 1949, the outbreak of the Korean War, and French woes in Indochina. Pakistan’s willingness to ally with the West and its geographic proximity to both the Soviet Union and the Middle East increasingly impressed American policy makers, who made Pakistan a vital component of US Cold War strategy.21 Heeney’s counterperspective provides a fascinating example of how two Canadian representatives sympathized and lobbied based upon the views of their respective host countries.22 Heeney refused to believe that the Eisenhower administration wished to undermine Nehru. Despite ideological differences, the Americans would not ignore India, and Heeney rejected Reid’s “far-fetched” analysis that the Americans would use aid to Pakistan to force India’s hand.23 In a subtle barb at Reid, Heeney wrote to Pearson that Washington was “less likely than may appear from a distance to be blind either to the value of the role which Pandit Nehru is playing in India today or, whether they like it or not, to his present and potential influence through Asia.”24 Pearson agreed with Heeney’s interpretation. Although he praised Reid in a letter for drawing Ottawa’s attention to the issues, he fundamentally believed the direction of Indian foreign and domestic policy to be less ominous than McInnes or Reid depicted.25 He recognized the potential impact of the American initiative in Pakistan on US-India relations and that the choice illustrated the failure of the United States to appreciate properly the “complexities of the situation in South East Asia.” However, American military aid to Pakistan was not “altogether a bad thing, especially when viewed in relation to forces at work elsewhere.” Pearson regretted that Nehru had few day-to-day relationships with Westerners but counselled that St. Laurent’s forthcoming visit to India offered Nehru an opportunity to talk freely and confidently with a Western leader. Reid and Pearson would disagree on further matters of policy, and this communication hints at the hardening of Pearson’s views of the Cold War escalation in Asia. As winter lingered over the Ottawa Valley, Louis St. Laurent prepared for the first visit by a Canadian prime minister to India. St. Laurent arrived during a period when India was the leading democratic light in Asia. Friendly IndoCanadian relations continued from the post-1947 Commonwealth conferences and the draining sessions at the United Nations. India became the primary recipient of Canadian aid. By 1953, Canada had transferred $41,780,000 to India in Colombo Plan funding.26 Trade links slowly expanded, and Canada enjoyed a trade surplus with India. However, this dollar amount is deceptive since wheat shipments, partially financed by the Colombo Plan, formed the largest

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proportion of Canada’s exports to India between 1952 and 1953. Primary commodities made up the bulk of the trade between the two countries, reflecting India’s small manufacturing base and relative inability to purchase expensive finished goods. Academic exchanges were negligible, and emigration from India to Canada remained very small, restricted by the Canada-India Immigration Agreement of 1951.27 This agreement permitted 150 Indian citizens to immigrate to Canada annually provided that they met strict criteria based upon language ability and existing wealth. Reid’s view of a flourishing relationship obviously considered only high-level political ties. St. Laurent arrived in New Delhi from Karachi on 21 February. Nehru met the Canadian prime minister with a warm handshake and an honour guard, and the tarmac was flanked with vases of flowers while a band played “God Save the Queen” and “O Canada.” To the press, St. Laurent stated that “we … fully realise how important to the affairs of the world is the influence of these great Asian nations and we know that their objective is the same as our own. We want to do our small part to bring about more sanity in international relations and peace among people of goodwill.”28 Charles Ritchie, a senior and talented official in the DEA, accompanied St. Laurent as an adviser. In his diary, Ritchie describes a far different New Delhi than John Kearney had experienced years earlier: “The contrast between Karachi and New Delhi is overwhelming. Here is a garden city of broad streets and houses set back among green gardens. No refugees, as in Pakistan, no squalor, no stink, modern cars glide over the asphalt.” Yet, like Pearson before him, Ritchie was not entirely enamoured of, nor did he feel at ease with, the Indian persona: The Moslems in Karachi seemed straightforward, frank, simple, compared with the alien sophistication of the Hindu, a strangeness lurking just under the surface of the Oxford-educated civil servants with whom we associate. Then there is the mixture of morality and the Machiavellian in their politics, their vanity and subtlety in social relations, the insinuating intelligence, the charm which might just be disconcerting.29

Others in the DEA would echo in the ensuing years Ritchie’s sense that the Pakistanis were easier to relate to in diplomatic relations. According to Ritchie, St. Laurent had looked forward to the trip for some time and considered “his meeting with Nehru as the high point of his tour. He and Nehru have been conducting a tremendous pen-pal friendship for months. They have been exchanging interminable telegrams of mutual congratulations and esteem, but I am not at all sure how this love affair is going to prosper.” Nehru, Ritchie observed, played the role of the “Wise Man of the East” who “conversed in the

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style and language of Bloomsbury,” a style far from St. Laurent’s own patrician and courtly Québécois demeanour.30 Although there is little archival material that details the events of the first two days of the trip, Ritchie’s diary hints that the talks between Nehru and St. Laurent improved after a “shaky start.”31 Ritchie’s allusion might refer to the differences in personality of the two leaders or reactions to St. Laurent’s opening address to the members of the Indian parliament on 23 February.32 St. Laurent provided a frank and balanced statement of Canada’s foreign policy and its attitudes toward India and Asia. He spoke warmly of the achievements of post-independence India and of the active role that it played on the world stage, specifically its work in Korea.33 St. Laurent recognized the burgeoning importance of Asia and that Canadians, though increasingly attuned to Asia, had much to learn. He appealed to Indian nationalists, and to Nehru, by commenting that “we perceive that most nationalist movements in modern times are essentially a reaction against feudalism or foreign rule; and we understand the desire of Asian leaders to concentrate on developing a way of life which will answer their peoples’ needs in new conditions of national and individual freedom.” 34 Ritchie noted that the Indians received the compliments well, St. Laurent’s other comments less so. St. Laurent’s defence of collective security and NATO likely aggravated the audience. Nehru viewed NATO with a measure of skepticism, believing it a tool used by Washington to project its hegemony, and he thought that military alliances exacerbated international tensions. St. Laurent brushed these concerns aside, stating that NATO simply stood as an instrument of collective security. In praising American foreign policy, he committed a cardinal sin for many Indians in attendance. St. Laurent suggested that the “readiness of the United States to assume the responsibilities of a major power has been of very great benefit to the free world.” He depicted the United States as a great and dynamic nation, unselfish, with “no other ambition than to live and let others live in mutually helpful international intercourse.”35 The American press lauded St. Laurent’s comments. If Nehru entertained hope, as Menon had, of Canada separating its foreign policy from that of the United States or United Kingdom, then St. Laurent’s address to the Lok Sabha was a substantial blow to that hope. The comments reinforced Nehru’s suspicion that Canada acted as a US satellite. Nehru lamented America’s powerful influence on Canada in a fascinating letter written days after the meeting. Nehru wrote to his old friend Chakravarti Rajagopalachari that St. Laurent had listened “attentively and respectfully” to international questions ranging from Korea, the United Nations, and US military aid to Pakistan to the general situation in Asia and Africa, “though of course he did not necessarily agree to

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what I said.”36 Canada’s role puzzled the Indian leader. Nehru believed that Canada’s growing importance paralleled industrial progress and the role undertaken in the United Nations and international forums. However, Canadians were “a peculiar mixture of the British outlook and Americans,” adding to the complexity of Canadian attitudes. Following St. Laurent’s speech, Nehru believed that American influences dominated: “The United States presses in upon them and has a powerful influence. They cannot resist that influence and at the same time they do not wish to submit to it wholly.” Drawing on the memories of his 1949 visit, he conceded that clear differences existed between the two nations: “Even now the difference between the US and Canada is marked. As soon as one passes the border from US to Canada, the atmosphere changes. It is a quiet atmosphere with less of shouting and bustle – a more civilised atmosphere, if I may say so.” The Canadians, unlike the Americans, were “consistently friendly” to India, and “their point of view is that we know best about Asia in the East.” Nehru recognized that Canadians worked in the United Nations, albeit privately, to exercise “a restrained influence on the US,” but ultimately “they side with the US.” He reasoned that “dollar returns” dictated Ottawa’s support for Washington. Nehru concluded that, “generally speaking, Canada’s attitude in world affairs is peaceful and reasonable, though they are tied up intimately to the US and have to give in to them.”37 Although his comments lend some credence to Reid’s interpretation of a special relationship, the blunt comments betray a mounting dissonance in that each nation had diverging foreign policy expectations of the other. The Indians, as Nehru’s letter illustrates, generally assumed that Canada unfortunately would follow American policies. As St. Laurent’s tour of India neared completion, Ritchie became increasingly annoyed with the “extremely anti-American” sentiments of Indian officials: “The Americans can do no right in Indian eyes. At one moment they are accused of selfish isolationism and neglect of poorer countries, at the next of imperialist ambitions to dominate.” He found this strain of anti-Americanism vulgar.38 In an unexpected turn of events, new common ground between the two countries emerged. Nehru had appealed for a ceasefire in Indochina between the French and Vietminh, hoping to prevent further bloodshed and provide a basis for peaceful negotiations. During a press conference, a reporter seized on the issue and asked St. Laurent whether he would endorse Nehru’s appeal for the ceasefire. St. Laurent quickly announced his support, though he cautioned that there might be little Canada could do to settle problems in the region.39 During the following months, a framework was established that brought Canadian and Indian diplomats and military observers together again to implement a shaky ceasefire. Yet the cooperation that made this new endeavour possible ironically sowed the seeds of greater discord in the Indo-Canadian relationship.

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St. Laurent departed from India on 28 February. In his cheerful assessments of the trip, Escott Reid described the prime minister’s visit to Pearson as “an immense success and a personal triumph for Mr. St. Laurent. The mutual affection and respect between the two Prime Ministers deepened.”40 Reid acknowledged the initial reluctance to speak openly but noted that, once the ice was broken, Nehru arranged for two unscheduled private talks on the final two days of the visit.41 Moreover, Reid believed that St. Laurent had charmed the Indian media by not asking for questions in advance of press conferences and by speaking candidly without notes. Reid described this performance as a “tour de force.”42 Soon after, Reid polished his thoughts in a formal dispatch. He maintained that the successful visit depended on the understanding and friendship between the two prime ministers and that it brought Canada and India closer. The visit “strengthened Mr. Nehru’s friendly feelings towards Canada and Canadians generally. I am sure you will find that it has had a reciprocal effect on Mr. St. Laurent.” Canada gained much positive publicity, but Reid wondered about the impact of St. Laurent’s speech to the assembly, thinking “that we had laid on a bit too thick the friendly references to the United States.” Many Indians who had heard the speech thought that “the references to the United States were too effusive,” but St. Laurent’s press conference had thankfully counteracted this sentiment.43 In some ways, Reid appears to have been an apologist for the Indians, particularly contrasted with Ritchie. And it was this perceived trait that hampered his efforts to persuade his colleagues on the need to lead on the India file. Interestingly, one anecdote that has remained buried is that Nehru apparently fell into a light sleep during part of St. Laurent’s speech to the assembly. St. Laurent’s daughter, who accompanied her father on his journey, reported her anger to Reid, who brushed the matter off in his report, agreeing that the conduct was rude but charitably explaining that Nehru often looked asleep during other people’s speeches. Also, at times he worked more than eighteen hours a day, thus the need to “seize every minute he could during the day to relax in. He wasn’t actually half-asleep. He was relaxed but alert.”44 Nehru did work long days, often in excess of eighteen hours. However, no other study of Nehru or memoir corroborates Reid’s belief that Nehru would “relax” when a foreign leader was in the midst of addressing the Lok Sabha. Pearson appeared to be pleased with St. Laurent’s visit. The impression in Ottawa was that the visit had been “outstandingly successful.”45 Charles Ritchie, however, remained circumspect. Reid sent Ritchie a copy of his dispatch. For the most part, Ritchie agreed with Reid’s “good analysis,” with a caveat: “The only shade of difference of interpretation which my own impression suggests

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is that there never was, even at the end, quite the 100% admiration on Mr. St. Laurent’s part for Mr. Nehru which you describe.” Ritchie detected “a distinct reservation in his later references to Mr. Nehru after the visit – and he expressed quite strong disapproval in talking to me – of Mr. Nehru’s stand over the American U.N. observers [in Kashmir]. He commented that this attitude was unworthy of a statesman.”46 Personalities are such a central component of international relations, and St. Laurent and Nehru had little in common, moving in entirely different spiritual and cultural worlds. One cannot help, therefore, but question whether Reid’s assessment, based upon the available evidence, was too sanguine. The Indian high commissioner to Canada, R.R. Saksena, confirmed Ritchie’s assessment. Saksena awaited Ritchie’s return to relay that St. Laurent’s accolade to the Americans had produced the unfortunate impression that the Canadian prime minister played the role of an emissary for the United States. Ritchie rebuffed the comments and suspected that Saksena acted on instructions.47 Those few days in New Delhi had offered a cautionary indication that lofty expectations and friendly, albeit tangential, relationships at the highest level had fallen short of the genuine meeting of minds between Ottawa and New Delhi on Cold War politics. Nehru’s February plea for a ceasefire in Indochina coincided with an American, British, French, and Soviet agreement that the Geneva conference on Korea in April should include a similar conference to deal with the conflict in Indochina. This conference, also held in Geneva, took place in June and lingered into July. Ottawa expected to play a minor role, and the United States specifically sought to keep India on the sidelines. Pearson privately lamented the American protests against Indian participation.48 The conference ultimately worked out the conditions of France’s withdrawal from Indochina, the supervision of elections, and the establishment of independent governments for Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The Vietnamese communists agreed to withdraw to North Vietnam, and a provisional boundary was established along the seventeenth parallel between North and South Vietnam. Surprisingly, Canada, along with India and Poland, was invited to participate in what became the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The commissions were to begin their work in mid-August. Their tasks included monitoring the ceasefire agreements and reporting on the implementation of the settlement across Indochina. As a non-aligned Asian state, India would act as chair of the commissions. Ottawa hesitated, wondering whether it was in Canada’s interests to serve on the commissions given the lack of direct interest in the region.49 But after evaluating the appointment in the broader context of the Cold War, and the deteriorating

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security environment in Southeast Asia, Canadian policy makers consented. Certainly, the positive ties between Ottawa and New Delhi also influenced the Canadian decision. Reid initially assessed this period as another example of cooperation between India and Canada on foreign policy and evidence that a special relationship existed. Reid later acknowledged that “within six months the Geneva settlement on Indochina was collapsing and as it collapsed Indian and Canadian policy on Indochina began to diverge.”50 Indochina became a significant obstacle to the bilateral relationship and a critical reason for the “erosion of the special relationship between India and Canada.”51 The selection of Canada and Poland clearly represented two distinct ideological blocs, while the appointment of the Indians assumed a non-partisan Asian representative. Frustration set in among the Canadians serving on the commission when it appeared as though the Indians sided with the North Vietnamese, and the Poles, who chastised the South Vietnamese government for seemingly petty infringements of the ceasefire rules, added to the Canadians’ frustration. Over time, this became a significant irritant to Ottawa. Should this have been a surprise? From the outset, even Reid questioned whether India knew what it was getting into by serving on the ICSC. For that matter, it can be argued that Ottawa did not either.52 Reid advised that the good relations between Ottawa and New Delhi coupled with a lack of advanced preparation by the Indians meant that the sooner Canadian representatives arrived in Indochina “the better our chances of influencing the Indians to adopt sensible courses of action.” Whether this was feasible is less clear. In a conversation with Nehru, Reid expressed his fear that the commissions might strain bilateral relations: “I said at the end that I hoped our joint membership on the Commissions would not result in our ruffling each other’s feathers too much; he [Nehru] said he was sure it would have the opposite effect. I am not so optimistic myself.”53 Just as both countries prepared for the complexities of Indochina, a new Indian high commissioner received his briefing on the state of relations and the ICSC from Nehru himself. A graduate of Oxford, and a recent ambassador to Japan, Mohamed Abdul Rauf was described by Nehru as “a very well-read person and rather scholarly.”54 He impressed on Rauf that the advent of the commissions meant that India would be cooperating with Canada “rather intimately.”55 Nehru offered a detached yet friendly description of bilateral ties: “Generally speaking, our relations with Canada have been good and sometimes even intimate.” He drew simple comparisons in explaining Canada to his colleague: “It is strange how different the Canadians are from the Americans of the United States! They are quieter, better behaved and generally give an impression of

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restrained friendliness, unlike the boisterousness and rudeness of the Americans.”56 Perhaps his rather rosy caricature of Canadians prevented him from detecting the pitfalls that the ICSC might have posed and that Reid had contemplated. Then again, a prominent historian elegantly described the summer of 1954 as “the glorious summer of Indo-Canadian harmony.”57 On the surface, that characterization appeared to be true. Pearson had defined Canada’s goal in Southeast Asia as the promotion of security and stability. The 1954 agreement halted the fighting, and the ICSC hoped to maintain a state of peace. Pearson “expected full co-operation in that task” from the Indians. He noted in a letter to Sherwood Lett, the head Canadian commissioner, that, “in ultimate objectives, Indian policy does not differ radically from our own, in the sense that we both wish to avoid a general war and to see formerly dependent peoples achieve independence and free … as opposed to Communist self government.”58 Pearson misread New Delhi’s willingness to sympathize with Hanoi and underestimated the ability of the North Vietnamese to emphasize their regional and past colonial bonds with India.59 On 12 August 1954, just days after arriving in Hanoi while on a tour of the region, Subimal Dutt, the Indian ICSC chair, met with Pham Van Dong, the North Vietnamese foreign minister. Dutt assured him of India’s “absolute neutrality,” remarking “that as a people dominated by the British for many years we could appreciate the feeling of the Viet Minh people.” Dutt urged a pleased Van Dong not to repeat this reference to colonial domination, fearing that the French might learn of the remark and misinterpret it. Dutt’s comments would hardly have aligned with Pearson’s expectations. Ho Chi Minh shrewdly appealed to the sympathetic Indian representative during a lunch held to honour the three commission visitors, repeatedly referring “to Viet Nam being an Asian country and the necessity of Asian people keeping together” before toasting India first and Canada last. Dutt recorded in his diary that it would be some time before he could forget the positive impression that he had received that day.60 Time would not erode his sense of affiliation, and years later he wrote in his memoirs that Ho Chi Minh “was obviously happy at the arrival of the commission knowing fully well that the sooner the commission would complete its task, the quicker he could consolidate the victory which he and his people had won at such sacrifice and suffering.”61 Nehru shared Dutt’s sympathetic assessment of the North Vietnamese leader. When Nehru travelled across Indochina in October and met Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi in November 1954, he described him “as a very likeable person,” and the two became “friends immediately.” In contrast, South Vietnam left a less favourable impression. “Saigon was a mess,” Nehru curtly stated.62 And the Indian leader shared these views freely with the Canadians. At the 1955 Commonwealth

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prime ministers’ conference, Nehru showed St. Laurent and Pearson copies of a note that he had circulated to his colleagues following his visit to Indochina. Nehru considered South Vietnam and its leaders emblematic of Asia’s colonial past, whereas the Vietminh represented a new Asia. Ho Chi Minh impressed Nehru as an “unusually frank, straight forward and likable person” who seemed to be “a man of peace and goodwill,” while the Vietminh were “organized and disciplined.” This view stood in contrast to that of South Vietnam, which Nehru found “at sixes and sevens with hardly any dominant authority … It was generally estimated that if there was a vote now, 90 per cent or more of the population would vote for Viet-Minh.”63 This fondness remained. Years later Ho Chi Minh visited New Delhi, and Nehru recounted to his sister that Ho “has captured all hearts. He is a delightful and simple individual full of affection for everybody.”64 The partiality of their Indian counterparts observed by many Canadian officials caused dire repercussions for the Canada-India relationship as the ICSC continued its duties. Within months, it became clear that the three parties on the commission interpreted their mandate differently. In a letter to Jules Léger, the USSEA, Pearson confessed that recent telegrams from Indochina worried him.65 The Polish representatives no longer cooperated and appeared to be deliberately pursuing a prejudiced line: “There have already apparently been one or two cases in which they have deliberately attempted to obstruct action which seems to have been required under the terms of the armistice.”66 While the Canadians understood the benefit of a united commission, meeting objectives became a challenge as the Indians counselled delay and opted for indecision to avoid division. The delegation did so with the full support of Nehru, his cabinet, and Indian public opinion. Pearson observed that Ottawa was not so lucky. The Liberals expected to incur public disapproval and endure a difficult session in Parliament if the commissions continued to plod along. While New Delhi’s relations with Ottawa continued amicably, its relations with Washington approached their nadir. The decline worried Reid. He impressed on his superiors the need for Washington to temper its policies in Asia, particularly with regard to India. Hoping that Ottawa could use its ties with both countries, he sent dispatches to Ottawa solely with the purpose of looking at ways to ameliorate the growing rift between Washington and New Delhi on issues in Asia. It is evident, though, that Reid believed that the onus was on Washington to carry out a rapprochement: “It is clear that one reason why the relations between the two countries are as bad as they are is that the United States has given unnecessary offence to Mr. Nehru. In his pride and sensitiveness he reflects the pride and sensitiveness of India.”67 The United States needed to follow the British example of consulting the Indians on issues of joint

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concern.68 As far as Reid was concerned, the Americans failed to do so. The British approach implied that London was interested in and respected Nehru’s views, whereas the American course implied utter indifference. Reid counselled that Washington would be well advised to treat New Delhi as a potential ally. Confidence bred confidence, and, if Washington showed faith in India, then it could expect reciprocation from India. Reid suggested that the Americans consider giving India “the impression that it recognizes that the creation of specially close relations between India and China is in the interests of the West” rather than express scorn at Nehru’s meetings with Mao or Zhou En-lai.69 Without dramatically changing its foreign policy, Washington could remedy these ills, and the Americans could begin to discuss their concerns frankly with the Indians. In the analysis to the DEA, Reid sought little from New Delhi. Reid interpreted India’s non-alignment policy favourably, presenting the Indian argument that termination of non-alignment would only exacerbate global tensions while presenting a risk to national unity. The Indians understood that non-alignment was in their best interests. Non-alignment ensured that scarce resources remained for domestic concerns rather than being channelled into the military; the West also benefited. Besides, this policy put India in a position to be courted, albeit periodically, by Washington and increasingly by the post-Stalin Soviet Union. The stakes, according to Reid, were high, and no one knew this better than the Indian leadership. Shortly before Christmas, Pearson wrote to congratulate Reid “on a profound and valuable analysis of the situation.” If he “could get Mr. Dulles alone, relaxed before a cheerful fire, and soothed by a glass of bourbon, I would read every word of them to him!”70 Unfortunately, Reid’s admiration for Nehru and his distance from Washington distorted his judgment. Walter S. Robertson, Dulles’s assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, echoed the views of many in Washington, including his boss, when in mid-November he attacked Nehru’s foreign policy and criticized granting additional foreign aid to India since it would help an “unfriendly government.”71 Dulles needed more than a glass of bourbon to digest Reid’s dispatches lest he become apoplectic. Nehru loathed Dulles, and vice versa. Nehru confided to his sister his fear that Dulles would influence Ottawa to adopt Washington’s hard-line policies against China in the Far East.72 Nehru also held little regard for Eisenhower. In meetings with Mao Tse-tung two months earlier, Nehru had brusquely depicted the Eisenhower administration as dominated by hawks inching toward war, described Eisenhower as weak, and doubted his ability to understand politics. Nehru believed that the American president genuinely sought peace but that “he is so completely in the hands of third rate advisers

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that he moves from one opinion to another.” Nehru regarded Dulles as “a great menace. He is a Methodist or a Baptist preacher who religiously goes to Church and he is narrow-minded and bigoted. He thinks every one must agree with him and a man like him might take any move.”73 Nehru admitted that “we cannot directly influence America,” but he hoped that India could “influence her indirectly through countries like Britain, France or Canada.”74 Pearson possibly shared Nehru’s assessment that Dulles saw the world in simple terms. Pearson’s biographer, John English, observes that “Mike found Dulles difficult and increasingly believed that he was a clumsy diplomat.” Yet “neither [Pearson] nor Dulles made their differences personal. The result was that when the time came to work together, they could.”75 Pearson also recognized that he had limited ability to bridge the differences between Washington and New Delhi and that maintaining Ottawa’s relationship with Washington was paramount, a fact that would frequently obstruct Reid’s efforts to persuade Ottawa to champion India in the West. Still, there was discussion within the Commonwealth Division that Pearson should show Reid’s dispatch to Dulles personally. In the end, however, a simple scribble graced the margins: “Pearson never did give these papers to Dulles, or to anyone in Washington.”76 Pearson and his British colleague Anthony Eden tried without much success to persuade Dulles to tone down the rhetoric about the Far East. The amount of effort reflected Pearson’s willingness to go only so far in championing India to the Americans. Nehru could be equally strident, if not hypocritical, in his views, as Pearson’s diary entry from the 1955 Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference in London reveals: “Nehru was quite bitter about American policy, and resented, as an Asian, their bullying and threatening tactics. He obviously doesn’t feel the same resentment when Chou bullies and blusters, because Chou is not so much a Communist as an Asian.”77 Instead, the Canadian embassy in Washington proved to be the best messenger. Reid’s memorandums were provided to the State Department and relayed to the American embassy in New Delhi. Reid’s views received modest attention in Washington and New Delhi.78 But 1955 brought little change to the tensions between Washington and New Delhi. The Americans watched warily as Moscow stepped up its efforts to counter the US-Pakistani alliance by channelling increased aid to India, which resulted in a high-profile visit from Nehru to Moscow later that spring.79 Reid continued his campaign in early 1955. In a memorandum to the DEA, which the department distributed to cabinet, he suggested that the essential ingredient for improving relations was for the West to treat India as the most important country of free Asia.80 India had a good chance of remaining a democracy, and the West benefited from India’s increased influence across South

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and Southeast Asia. Only India and China could vie for influence in this region. The West’s unwillingness to foster a politically and economically strong India inevitably aided China. Reid outlined several concrete steps to improve relations, including proposals to make India the sixth permanent member of the United Nations Security Council; additional economic assistance; sympathy for India’s views on colonial matters; the promotion of public and cultural diplomacy; and a recommendation that the West stop fixating on the perceived threat of international communism.81 Ottawa could easily accomplish some suggestions; others required ambition and a commitment of scarce fiscal resources over a prolonged period. Colleagues within the DEA questioned both Reid’s analysis of Indian foreign policy and his policy prescriptions. Critics reflected the views of an emerging cadre who regarded India with mounting skepticism and began to obstruct Reid’s efforts to raise India’s profile in Ottawa. His dispatches were disseminated on the eve of the Bandung conference of non-aligned nations held in Indonesia that April. The Indian-led conference aimed to “promote understanding and goodwill” among the nearly thirty independent and non-aligned governments from Asia and Africa while they considered their roles in international affairs. It was clear that Nehru, the main advocate of the conference, disapproved of some invitees’ sympathy for American foreign policy. Writing to his sister mere weeks before the conference, Nehru rebuked American and Western foreign policy: “The fact is that we disagree with so-called Western politics at present, and we see no reason why we should slur over this disagreement. I am not impressed by being told that America is determined to go to war if others do not fall into line.”82 In his mind, then, was a desire to see the Bandung conference serve as an alternative to the American-led military pacts that created the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact. Understandably, many Westerners saw Nehru’s willingness to chastise Western imperialism while ignoring communist machinations as a double standard and further evidence that non-alignment was duplicitous. Yet, as will be seen below, during the early days of the Suez Crisis and the simultaneous crushing of the Hungarian revolution by the Soviets, Nehru believed that a genuine distinction existed in what characterized an imperialist act. This confirmed the suspicions of many in the DEA who had doubted India’s impartiality. Some of the leading foreign policy figures in Ottawa coolly monitored Nehru’s role at the Bandung conference, particularly Pearson and Marcel Cadieux. A young and devout Roman Catholic francophone diplomat, Cadieux had recently returned from serving as the Canadian deputy head on the ICSC. He was described as “very intense and hard working,” and his arrival in Vietnam marked his first sustained exposure to Asia.83 It was a bitter experience. He watched the

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North Vietnamese flaunt the ceasefire agreements and persecute their enemies. He witnessed Hanoi’s abuse of the Catholic communities in the north and numerous violations of the peace agreement. His inability to prevent these terrible actions led “his hair to turn white” before he left Vietnam because of ill health.84 In his diary, Cadieux wrote of a “devious side” to Indian politics and character. He recorded his impressions, writing bitterly about Indian foreign policy, particularly New Delhi’s predilection to pursue “neutralism” and ignore communist transgressions and the division between the West and India caused by incorrect assumptions about communism. Like McInnes and Ritchie, Cadieux questioned shared “Western values” in India, pondering the influence of Hinduism as a factor in non-alignment. The indignation over Indian actions recorded in his diary entries soon crossed over into official memorandums, challenging Reid’s positive assessments of India.85 Reid prepared to visit Ottawa in early July to consult with his colleagues and discuss his recent dispatches. In the meantime, select senior members of the DEA commented on his proposals. Cadieux delivered a scathing rebuke of Reid’s arguments for increased understanding of and funding for India. At the outset, Cadieux commented that “it is impossible not to agree with Mr. Reid that it is important to strengthen India, to develop relations between India and the West and to examine what particular steps could be taken within the next ten years to achieve this end.”86 However, Cadieux countered that there was a fundamental divergence between the West and India concerning communism and non-alignment. Recalling his experience on the ICSC in Indochina, Cadieux suggested that the Indians claimed to be neutral but turned a blind eye to many of the heinous acts carried out by the Vietminh. The Indians criticized the French for less serious faults. Cadieux thought that the Indians pursued an opportunistic policy “devised to secure the achievement of clearly national Indian objectives,” which called into question the morality of Indian behaviour on the ICSC. Indians did not “behave like Westerners or in accordance with Western standards,” nor did Cadieux believe that the Indians were “objective” or “neutral in the Vietnamese Commission.” He suggested that Reid’s argument for increased Western aid to India be studied cautiously in relation to the implications of India’s policy of non-alignment and relationships with communist countries.87 Cadieux wrote his memorandum based largely upon his Indochina diary. It provides a fine example of how cultural assumptions about India and Indians profoundly influenced the perspectives of the Canadians. His use of the phrase “behave like Westerners” demonstrates that assumptions of shared imperial bonds, Oxbridge education links, and the commonality of the English language fostered an expectation that Indian elites would act in a Western fashion.

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Cadieux was not alone. Arthur Menzies, then the director of the Far Eastern Division, recalled that the Canadians on the ICSC initially thought that their predominantly Oxbridge-educated Indian counterparts would adhere to a shared Commonwealth interpretation of international law. This proved to be an erroneous assumption. Instead, Menzies recalled that almost immediately “we [Canadian officials] became quite disappointed with the Indians on the ICSC in the sense that the Indians took new anti-colonial positions we had not expected in part because of how they were treated in the new Commonwealth.”88 Indian politicians, led by Krishna Menon, pushed this anti-colonial position and found sympathy among the Indian diplomats, such as Dutt, charged with interpreting the mandate of the ICSC. In the meantime, Cadieux and his colleagues created impossible expectations of Indian policy and behaviour. Among DEA officials, there were different levels of familiarity. Whereas Reid developed a romance for India, Pearson and Ritchie confessed to finding the subcontinent personally bewildering, and Cadieux concurred: I am inclined to think that on the whole it may be dangerous and perhaps unwise to look at the Indians as people like us, as people who are fundamentally influenced by Western concepts and who will try to achieve their ends by Western methods. While they used Parker Pens, and had their clothes cut out by the best London tailors, Indians in Vietnam were not averse to undertaking devious and, to us, objectionable horse-trading operations if they served their particular purposes, thus ignoring principles on which the West could not compromise. If this line of reasoning is warranted (and on this I naturally have to defer to the views of those who have much longer experiences than I of Indian ways), it seems to me that Indian “neutrality” or non-alignment may be the expression of basic Indian spiritual and moral attitudes which may be the result of geographical and historical factors, but which has the effect that the Indians do not approach problems in what we would consider a scientific, objective Western way but perhaps in what seems to us too “flexible” and idealistic a fashion.89

Through this lens, the Canadian saw India’s sympathy for Hanoi as perfidy rather than sympathetic assessment of a government recently freed from a colonial power. Just as Nehru had described the Chinese in November 1949 to Pearson and St. Laurent, so too he believed that the North Vietnamese were not necessarily communists but nationalists. The impact of this distinction on Indian attitudes toward and policies on Indochina should not be forgotten. Reid’s memoirs suggest that Cadieux’s views gained an audience that did not previously exist and that Indochina became a crucial factor in fanning discontent

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with India. Certainly, many of Cadieux’s colleagues in the DEA came to share his views rather than Reid’s, and as the commissions continued into the 1960s these attitudes created irreparable fissures in the bilateral relationship. On return home for leave, Reid provided a report about India for departmental officials in which he supported the Indian view that Vietnam would likely fall under Hanoi’s rule. The British and French, he added, already tacitly acknowledged this through their acceptance of the Geneva agreement. It was a fait accompli, therefore, that communism would dominate throughout Vietnam, but it “was possible to hold a line at the border between Laos and Cambodia on one side and Vietnam on the other.”90 Reid recalled the immediate reaction to his prophetic assessment: “The roof fell in on top of me. Officer after officer at the meeting attacked me for my callous, immoral proposal which would betray millions of anti-communist people in South Vietnam into the clutches of the communists of North Vietnam.”91 One official attending the meeting suggested that on this occasion Reid’s impressions were simply “ill informed.”92 Yet the discord created by Reid’s report and India’s championing of nonalignment did not immediately have an impact on policy making in Ottawa. Following the Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference in London, Canadian officials still concluded that “the Commonwealth as now composed is to a very considerable extent dependent on the importance the Indians attach to it.”93 Judging from the Indian annual political report prepared by the high commissioner, M.A. Rauf, the Indians also retained agreeable attitudes toward Ottawa. His report positively appraised the conduct of Canadian diplomacy in Asia, noting that it was “gradually becoming more realistic,” particularly in the recognition that “it was a mistake to regard every anti-colonial national or revolutionary movement in Asia as Russian-communist in direction or origin.” It is curious to note, especially considering that Rauf ’s year-end report came in July 1955, that his brief summary of the situation in Indochina ignored mention of any friction in or concern by New Delhi. Rather, Rauf cheerfully concluded that Canadians were “a peace-loving people,” which accounted for “their appreciation of our policy of non-alignment and the assistance they have given and will continue to give in putting it across” to Washington. After all, “destiny has cast Canada in the role of a bridge between U.K. on the one hand and U.S.A. on the other.”94 This role still compelled some prominent figures in Ottawa, in both the DEA and the government. The St. Laurent cabinet assessed its Asian position, particularly in regard to technical development assistance, that spring. From the deliberations, a dynamic new possibility in Canada’s aid relationship with India arose. The Canadians disagreed with Washington’s willingness to write the Indians off as unreliable and hypocritical. Rumblings in the DEA on matters pertaining

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to the ICSC and non-alignment gestated. So India continued to loom large in Canada’s calculus as the highest-ranking nation in Asia. This explains in large part why, in late March 1955, St. Laurent’s cabinet offered the Indians a National Research Experimental (NRX) atomic research reactor through the Colombo Plan, believing that it was in Canada’s interests to do so.95 The reasoning behind this decision was twofold. First, Ottawa believed the offer an important political move. Moscow’s cooperation with Beijing’s fledgling atomic energy program scored valuable propaganda points. Second, the St. Laurent government saw economic advantages. Since Canada was a non-nuclear power, the argument to cabinet ran, “most Asia countries would find it less difficult and embarrassing to receive direct assistance from us in this rather delicate field than from either of the larger atomic powers whose motives might be suspect.” The Canadian private sector and atomic industry would therefore gain a competitive advantage in an emerging field, and Ottawa could actively assist their “position for constructing various types of atomic units in Canada or abroad in later years.”96 The Canadians also believed that their technology was superior. The government instructed Reid to approach senior Indian leaders and inform them of the plan. Reid reported that the Indian secretary-general, Raghavan Pillai, confirmed Canadian logic: “He felt it would be much easier for India to accept this kind of assistance from Canada than from either the United States or the United Kingdom.”97 Reid favoured the “imaginative” proposal, predicting a considerable positive impact on Indian public opinion.98 Initially, Nehru politely demurred. He informed Reid that he needed to consult his head scientist, Homi Bhabha. An ambitious nationalist, Bhabha guided the creation of India’s nuclear research program and the quest to develop nuclear weapons. A brilliant physicist, Bhabha had studied at Cambridge University, where he had met and become friends with Canadian Wilfrid Bennett Lewis, who later became vice-president of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL). Evidence suggests that Bhabha wanted a more modern reactor, so the Indian government rejected the initial offer. A straightforward offer by Ottawa became mired in lengthy negotiations. By June, Pearson had written to St. Laurent and lobbied his ministerial colleagues C.D. Howe and Walter Harris, suggesting that there “are very strong political and commercial reasons for making a more definite and more liberal proposal to the Indian government.” Rumours floated that New Delhi quietly probed the Americans and British for a better deal. The Indians were more strategic than Ottawa had initially thought.99 And both London and Washington already cooperated with the Indians on atomic energy partnerships. Indeed, the Americans trained Indian scientists and engineers at the Argonne Laboratory School of Nuclear Science and Engineering in Illinois and other facilities across the country.100

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To sweeten the deal, Pearson proposed that $7 million be added to Canada’s Colombo Plan contribution. Although cabinet agreed, the Indians lobbied for the more technologically advanced National Research Universal (NRU) reactor. In a private letter to St. Laurent, Nehru outlined the Indian case, adding that India would absorb any extra cost related to receiving an NRU reactor. Hoping that the matter would be settled when both sides met in September, Nehru asked for “sketch plans and data sheets” for the NRX and, if possible, NRU reactors to be given to Bhabha.101 Pearson discussed Nehru’s request with the vice-president of Atomic Energy of Canada, W.J. Bennett, who balked at the notion of supplying the Indians with an NRU reactor. C.D. Howe, the powerful minister of trade and commerce, concurred. In a letter to St. Laurent, Howe asserted that the unfinished NRU reactor needed a highly skilled core of engineers and scientists to operate it. He thought that the NRX reactor would provide invaluable training for Indian scientists, given that Canada’s own atomic program had advanced largely through its use. Howe’s officials believed that the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) lacked sufficient high-calibre personnel to operate the NRU reactor. And it cost an estimated $30 million more than the NRX reactor, with an additional annual operating cost of $10 million– $8 million more annually than the NRX reactor.102 Would a cash-strapped Indian government be able to cover the difference? Finally, Canada needed to consider security concerns. A significant body of NRU-related information remained classified under agreement with the United States and Britain, and Indian security was notoriously porous. Howe advised that Ottawa supply only the information necessary for the NRX reactor. Bhabha relented and accepted the NRX reactor. Nehru wrote to St. Laurent thanking him for the generous offer, which he knew would “not only bring about close cooperation between the scientists of our two countries but also be another link between us.”103 On 16 September, Ottawa and New Delhi jointly announced the project – to be known as the Canada-India Reactor (CIR, soon after CIRUS after the United States agreed in 1956 to sell India heavy water for the reactor). The initial negotiations proved to be the easy part. The ensuing negotiations concerning control and use of the offshoot plutonium caused headaches and, over time, frustration for both parties. Atomic technology was a relatively new field, and the arms race between the Cold War powers prompted vigorous international debate on the need to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy from fissionable materials. No international guidelines or regulatory body existed that could provide rules and procedures for the handling and use of plutonium – the by-product of used fuel taken from a nuclear reactor that could then be converted into weapons-grade plutonium for nuclear weapons. The NRX reactor produced enough plutonium

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to make several atomic weapons, and Canada planned to provide the necessary fuel elements to the Indians. Who would control the plutonium generated by the NRX? As Ottawa negotiated the reactor transfer to India, the United States, United Kingdom, and USSR contemplated the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to account for and control plutonium production.104 Ottawa shared the concern that proliferation posed a serious long-term threat. The Indians, too, had an active interest in the negotiations. Bhabha and Nehru were determined that any future international atomic agency would not force developing countries, those most in need of electricity, Nehru argued, to take a role secondary to that of the great powers in determining their indigenous nuclear abilities. As the IAEA talks progressed, Bryce, Léger, and Bennett concluded that Canada “should furnish and India should undertake to obtain from Canada the fuel elements for this reactor.” They also believed that they had a solution to the problem of by-products generated by the NRX reactor. Until an agency along the lines of the IAEA became operational, Canada and India would craft a bilateral agreement outlining conditions for “furnishing the fuel elements.” The agreement simply stipulated that fuel elements would be returned to Canada. India would receive fissionable materials “in research quantities for research purposes and … Canada would undertake that the remaining fissionable materials would be held and used only for peaceful purposes.” If the agency existed when the fissionable materials became available, they would then be transferred to the agency “or disposed of in accordance with any existing controls.”105 The procedure for inspections would be determined at a later date. Bhabha visited Ottawa and the atomic facilities at Chalk River, Ontario, in early October. His hosts found him to be “extremely co-operative,” and he “made a good impression on officials and ministers in Ottawa.” However, the discussions concerning fuel arrangements became sticky. Canadian officials were prepared to lease to India the “initial fuel element required for the reactor and replacements for a three-year period.” Afterward, the irradiated rods from the reactor would return to Canada for the removal of plutonium and any other by-products. Because of an existing agreement, Ottawa first had to consult with Washington and London on the feasibility of transferring ownership and control of the fuel elements and by-products to India. Bhabha offered New Delhi’s assurance that fuel elements or by-products from Canada would only be used for peaceful purposes, but he pressed for India’s control of the fuel elements and any by-products.106 Although this significant aspect remained unsettled, the DEA informed Reid that either he or Pearson – set to visit India later in October 1955 – could formally exchange a note of agreement with the Indians on the transfer of the NRX reactor.

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The Americans and British took the early lead in voicing concerns about nuclear proliferation. They believed that an international agency could settle the issue by processing any materials at plants operated by the agency or by countries that already had established processing plants for plutonium byproducts. This would deter nations, such as India, that did not possess processing plants from developing them.107 Canada agreed that “the dangerous situation which would arise if there were no control system would be so serious that every effort must be made to develop such a system while the problem is still small enough to cope with.” Léger therefore cabled Pearson before his visit to New Delhi, suggesting that “it was important to convince the Indians that we must avoid establishing any precedents at this time which might jeopardize the possibility of an effective system.” Léger hoped that Bhabha’s views did not reflect those held by Nehru. Ottawa did not want to see the plan collapse and hoped that Pearson could find a solution.108 Reid had high hopes for Pearson’s impending visit. Although the reactor proposal fell far short of the extensive aid that he lobbied for, it reflected the type of cooperation that he wanted to see between the West and India. On 25 October, Pearson arrived in Calcutta. He came from travels to the Soviet Union and a stop in Singapore. Reid thought that the trip to the Soviet Union had put Pearson through the wringer and that Singapore had drained him; he looked exhausted. It is evident from his diary account that his travels might have caught up with him: “[I] was greeted by the Reids, sundry Indian officials and the press, before whom, of course, I had to perform. Drove through the city, with its heat, squalor and crowds, to Government House. Calcutta has now more than 7 million people to be looked after. So far as I could gather, most of them live on the streets.”109 Pearson knew that his spirits lagged, and he asked Reid to arrange a brief respite for him before conducting any official business. For four days of peace, Pearson and Reid along with their wives escaped into the calm, winding hills of Sikkim, the snow-clad peaks of the Himalayas providing a majestic vista. The rest soothed Pearson, and he recorded in his journal that he had been “enchanted by this remote corner of Asia.”110 The Indians, Pearson described in his diary, received him “with the greatest friendliness – as a Canadian. Our position is very high in India.”111 Canadian development assistance projects nurtured the cheerful environment. Before travelling to New Delhi, Pearson opened the Massanjore Dam, financed by the Canadian Colombo Plan, which spanned the Mayurakshi River in West Bengal and which the Indians dubbed the “Canada dam.” Afterwards, Pearson met officially with Nehru twice. At the first meeting, he raised a number of topics, including impressions of his recent trip to the USSR. The trip, according to his biographer, troubled him.112 Despite Nehru’s visit to Moscow earlier in the year,

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the Indian prime minister chose to say little, preferring to let Pearson take the lead, a tactic that Nehru had employed with St. Laurent. Although the talks were “extremely friendly and relaxed,” Pearson found Nehru difficult to “openup.” He described him as “subtle ... withdrawn ... abstract and metaphysical in discussion” while “given to thinking out loud and at random, rather than to a methodical discussion.” Pearson would describe his encounters with the Pakistanis in precisely the opposite manner. He found it difficult to pin Nehru down on matters since “he preferred to philosophize about the present state of the world and hear my impressions of the Russian visit. These tallied pretty closely with his own, though he is more optimistic about the nature and intentions of Russian and Chinese policy than I am; and more anxious about American [policy].”113 When the time came to discuss the NRX reactor, particularly the outstanding matter of nuclear fuel, Nehru balked, suggesting that the matter be discussed with Bhabha the following day. As had been the case in the past, Nehru became more animated during the next round of talks. Pearson appears to have found the discussion fruitful “in that we got down to cases – Indochina problems, etc.”114 Afterward, he and Reid met with Bhabha. Neither of them could sway Bhabha, who adamantly insisted that any fuel supplied should be made available, not leased, without restrictions. The Canadians listened to Bhabha’s arguments, but “the Minister and I confessed that we were out of our depth in a discussion of this nature.”115 In hindsight, it seems stunningly naive that Reid and Pearson put themselves in such a vulnerable position. Neither of them knew the first thing about the topic other than from the briefings that they had read. Their inexperience contrasted sharply with Bhabha’s knowledge in both the science and the politics of the negotiations. Reid was largely at the mercy of interpreting technical instructions from Ottawa and then engaging Bhabha in formal discussions. Perhaps out of insecurity or sheer hubris Reid never sought further clarification of his instructions. In a letter to his children, Reid understood that this presented a peculiar problem, admitting that he did not “understand the terms in my instructions and I have to ask [Bhabha] what they mean … I am ordering a book from England on ‘The Atom Made Easy’ or some such title.”116 Yet good faith carried the day. Although a decision was delayed, Pearson’s diary entry indicates that they received a verbal agreement from Bhabha that the final details should meet the regulations adopted by the proposed IAEA. Nearly a year passed before that institute came into being, in October 1956, and Bhabha stridently criticized safeguards during the IAEA statute deliberations. The trip to India appeared to generate goodwill and avoid controversy, unlike St. Laurent’s speech to the Indian parliament. Reid believed that Pearson “did a superb job in India” given the state in which he had arrived.117 Diary entries

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suggest that Pearson had a good impression of the trip, and he used the opportunity to extend to Nehru an invitation to visit Canada. How profound, though, was this impression? As Pearson arrived in Pakistan, his brief analysis of the differences between the two countries that he recorded in his diary illuminates the lingering unease that he experienced in negotiating India and Hindu culture: It is surprising, the difference in the atmosphere between India and Pakistan. The people of the latter country – or at least West Pakistan – seem much easier to talk to, more like ourselves, than the Indians. They seem franker and more straightforward, more vigorous. Of course, this apparent difference may be partly the result of “suggestion.” The British, with few exceptions, will tell you that the “Paks” are a better people, more “our type,” you know; so when you arrive here you subconsciously look for and find this difference. Another factor is that the people from this part of the sub-continent have provided such a large part of the old Indian army and are maintaining many of the old military traditions. Then, finally, the Pakistanis seek, and very often secure, your sympathy as the smaller state, divided into two far-separated parts, pressed hard by India and attempting, against terrific disadvantages, to build up a stable and united society. Anyway we seem to like the Pakistanis.118

Pearson and other prominent colleagues in the DEA found good reason to “like the Pakistanis,” and in doing so they increasingly echoed their American counterparts. Pakistani foreign policy continued to support Western aims – unlike Indian foreign policy, which treated the concept of NATO coolly. Pakistan joined the American-led SEATO in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in 1955, strengthening its military and political relationship with the Western world. Accordingly, Pakistan emerged as the central military and political ally for the West in the region – a position that, in previous years, the West had expected India to assume. Reid recognized Pearson’s friendlier disposition toward the Pakistanis and later concluded that it reflected perceived cultural and religious differences between Islam and Hinduism: “The leaders of Pakistan were Muslims, [and] western politicians like Pearson found them ‘more like ourselves’ than the Hindus they met in New Delhi. They found them more like themselves because the culture of Islam is much closer to that of the West than is the culture of Hinduism.”119 In short, Pakistanis appeared to be more like Canadians than Indians and the nebulous world of polytheistic Hinduism. Cadieux, McInnes, Ritchie, and Pearson had all commented separately on these perceived differences and on India’s unique way of understanding Western worldviews.

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Observations and distinctions of this sort became further infused in the Canadian policy-making process for South Asia, calling into question the assumptions of the bridge theory.120 In the meantime, Pearson approved the NRX reactor provisions, pending modifications insisted on by Canada. Officials thought it better to be flexible than to antagonize the Indians, with potentially damaging results. Bhabha suggested that fuel negotiations be delayed until the project neared completion in two years. And, because the agreement left out fuel arrangements, it could not technically violate or establish any precedent to affect the regulations or statutes of the proposed international agency. Pearson and the Canadian cabinet agreed that construction should advance but insisted that any agreement needed to state that “the reactor and any products resulting from it will be used by India for peaceful purposes only.”121 Safeguard arrangements remained prickly, and as the 1960s progressed Ottawa questioned whether the Indians had designs to develop an atomic weapons program. This problem moved to the periphery as questions of India’s non-alignment became a matter of contention. As discussions concerning the Canada-India reactor agreement neared completion, Nikita Khrushchev and a Soviet entourage travelled to India for a two-week visit in late November. Reid stood at the airport in New Delhi along with members of the diplomatic community as the Soviets disembarked. He was astounded by the size and discipline of the crowds: “About a million people lined the twelve-mile route from the airport to the President’s residence.” The following day another 600,000 souls attended a civic reception for the Soviets hosted by Nehru: “I had never seen such a mass of people in one place,” recounted Reid.122 In addition to encouraging the crowds to attend this function, Nehru egged them on, chanting Hindi-Rusk ek hai (“Indians and Russians are one”) and Hindi-Rusi bhai bhai (“Indians and Russians are brothers”). The Soviets responded in kind, peppering their speeches with references to brotherhood. They became, in the words of one of Nehru’s biographers, “box office hits.”123 The Soviets made a series of announcements promising to grant India economic assistance, particularly in the fields of technology and industrial development.124 Unlike much of Western economic assistance, which came in the form of donations or gifts, Soviet offers empowered the country with low-interest loans. This approach appealed to proud Indian officials who were sensitive about Western perceptions of India as a charity case or frustrated by negotiations with niggardly Western finance officials. Nehru revelled in the Russian visit, sensing that “it was a personal triumph for himself as a diplomat as well as a prime minister.”125 He found the new Soviet leadership far less doctrinaire and more pragmatic than Stalin, terms that he would not have used to describe Dulles. Unlike his dour predecessor, Khrushchev

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was animated and gregarious – the Soviet charm offensive aimed at reaching out to India and the non-aligned world. The Soviets scored propaganda points by supporting India’s claim to Kashmir and by expressing an interest in selling India advanced military aircraft. In light of the American military aid to Pakistan, this must have been music to the ears of many Indian nationalists. Tellingly, Nehru did not attempt to distance himself from the Soviet volleys directed at Western aggression. Pearson fumed at the Soviet performance. And the reception given to the Soviets made Nehru’s policy of non-alignment appear hypocritical. Sniffing at India’s “neutralism,” Pearson cabled Reid asking him to inform the Indian Ministry of External Affairs of Ottawa’s displeasure and to remind the Indians that they had done well by Western economic assistance without perhaps acknowledging it throughout the years.126 The Indians listened politely but changed nothing.127 Reid did not share Pearson’s concern that the Russians had “raised a tempest” and, undeterred, used the Soviet aid offers as incentive to lobby Pearson and Ed Ritchie, head of the Economic Division of the Department of External Affairs, to reconsider a $250 million line of credit to India.128 Moscow had confirmed that the “most effective way to get popular credit in India is to sell India goods at world prices but on easy credit. The Indians don’t like receiving open doles.”129 If the West and Canada hesitated, counselled Reid, then they faced being outmanoeuvred by Soviet overtures. Jules Léger agreed with some of Reid’s points and raised them in a memorandum to Pearson.130 Reid’s points, Léger thought, should be studied closely over the following months. While his colleagues in the East Block scrutinized his aid proposal, Reid proposed another initiative, “a western counter-offensive in India” that would combat Russian and Chinese efforts to expand their influence.131 His proposals remained focused on massive aid in the form of a line of credit or a development loan with a generous amortization period and interest relief included. Nehru’s ego also needed to be massaged. This could be done by recognizing India as a great power and by supporting a Soviet proposal to make India a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. This declaration followed by action would offset Moscow’s latest efforts, and the West could then cultivate India’s confidence by increasing consultations with New Delhi.132 Finally, it was imperative that Ottawa consider the gradual normalization of relations with China. On this point at least, some in the DEA supported Reid, such as Chester Ronning, who had long argued in favour of recognizing the Chinese regime. Pearson sympathized with the idea, but Ottawa remained unwilling to vex Washington for the sake of bringing India closer to the West. The proposals were ignored. The urgency that had propelled Ottawa’s policy makers to act on the Colombo Plan proposals dissipated. Meanwhile, American

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relations with India remained marred by antipathy. In fact, when Dulles arrived in New Delhi in March, the Indians had to take special precautions to ensure his safety lest the public get hold of him. The talks between Dulles and Nehru failed to foster mutual understanding.133 Reid faced an arduous year personally with little to celebrate after he and Nehru formally signed the NRX reactor arrangement in New Delhi on 28 April. His health faltered in the spring when he contracted hepatitis, and he suffered a bout of jaundice when the drinking water in New Delhi became contaminated with river water and raw sewage. His doctors advised Reid to take a rest, avoid alcohol, and above all else “no hurry, no worry, no curry.”134 His recovery lingered into the autumn. While convalescing, he received further proof from Pearson that things were not quite right in Ottawa. Krishna Menon continued to be an endless source of aggravation for many Canadians. In a letter sent to Reid during his convalescence, Pearson described recent attempts to talk business with Menon at the London Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference as “frustrating.” Relations with the rest of the Indian delegation were fine, and Pearson conceded that, though Menon had some “good qualities” and had been “very helpful” on recent occasions, the Indian diplomat “was inclined to be both ignorant and irritable in respect of the subjects, like Indochina, which we brought up.” There were times, Pearson vented, “when you wish he were far removed from the Indian Government, and especially from Nehru.”135 Menon had also badgered Reid on Canadian attitudes toward the ICSC. He had overtly criticized Ottawa’s failure to support a unified communist Vietnam, asserting that the St. Laurent government kow-towed to the Americans, “having no independent views or judgements of its own.”136 Such acidic comments eroded respect for Menon in Ottawa at a time when he played a prominent role on the Indochina commissions. Not surprisingly, Ottawa questioned the extent to which Nehru shared Menon’s views. Meanwhile, Arab and Israeli tensions escalated in the Middle East. The nationalist Egyptian leader, Gamel Abdel Nasser, exacerbated this tension. He antagonized the British, French, and Americans with increasingly anti-Western rhetoric and acceptance of Soviet arms. In late July, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, provoking a series of vitriolic outbursts from London. The British began to consider ways to remove Nasser with the support of Paris and Tel Aviv. In the months leading up to the Suez Crisis, Pearson explicitly opposed the use of military force, fretting that it could cause irreparable damage to the Commonwealth, weaken NATO, and enhance Moscow’s prestige. At a NATO meeting in September, Pearson suggested that the matter be brought up at the United Nations. Aware of the idea, the Indians thought that the United Nations might move too slowly. Despite their differences of opinion, Ottawa and New

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Delhi saw it as essential that conflict be prevented. Menon expressed to Reid his hope that Pearson could use his diplomatic skills on London.137 India had its own interests at stake. The canal was vital economically for India, and Nehru had to consider India’s significant Muslim constituency.138 Paradoxically, the crisis provided a renewed chance for mutual cooperation between Ottawa and New Delhi in the interests of international security, but their respective approaches to the crisis achieved the opposite effect. On 28 October, Israel attacked Egyptian border forces, and Israeli paratroopers moved toward the Suez Canal. When Egypt rebuffed a joint London-Paris ultimatum, British and French forces attacked and seized the canal. World opinion expressed outrage at the brazenness of the British and French. Khrushchev famously threatened to rain missiles down on London, and Pearson’s earlier foreboding proved to be warranted. Nehru was enraged by the attacks on a key non-aligned state. Not surprisingly, the events in Egypt revived memories across India of anti-colonial struggles. Many of Nehru’s colleagues argued that India should leave the Commonwealth in light of European colonialist gunboat diplomacy. Nehru viewed the attacks on Egypt as “naked aggression, a reversion to colonialism, a violation of the U.N. charter, and could not be tolerated.”139 In the midst of this staggering public relations debacle for the West, India initially ignored Moscow’s crushing of a popular uprising in Budapest. The reaction to the Suez Crisis underscored a significant weakness of Indian diplomacy and intelligence gathering. While Nehru was in constant contact with Cairo, Washington, London, and Ottawa (to a lesser extent), he had little information on Soviet intrigues in Hungary. His ambassador in Moscow, K.P.S. Menon, was ill and could only hazard a guess at events in Budapest. Nehru therefore appeared to be hypocritical in his attacks on Britain and France and vague in public announcements on events in Hungary. And, as shown at the Bandung conference, the Indians appeared to be unable to look past the colonial histories of the Western powers, especially Britain and France, initially refusing to accept the parallel between attacks on Suez and those in Hungary. The Suez Crisis proved to be the emotional low point of Reid’s time in New Delhi. Reid admitted in a letter to John Holmes that “I get tired easily. I get irritable even more easily.”140 Still recovering from jaundice, he worked frantically to ensure that Ottawa knew of Indian attitudes. Reid faced a mounting challenge. India rapidly condemned the Israeli attack on Egypt, making Pearson note that he had “no quarrel” with India’s decision, “but the contrast between its quick and strong denunciation of Israeli action with its complete silence over events in Hungary, and Russian intervention in these events, will have a very bad effect in this country.”141 Pearson had a point. Nearly two months after the

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Hungarian revolt had been crushed, M.A. Rauf noted the persistent outrage among Canadians: “Russia is extremely unpopular for having attempted to put down a national rebellion. Of course the average man, which includes 99% of Canadians, does not bother to go into the niceties of what happened in Hungary.” He advised the IMEA that “this enthusiasm for Hungary and the animosity to the communist regime must not be under-rated.”142 In the meantime, as Pearson outlined his concern to Reid, India’s silence provided those in the East Block who scorned non-alignment with added ammunition that it marked a bankrupt policy, noting that perhaps Ottawa should reconsider its view of India. Nehru wrote to Eden condemning the British actions and methods: “For us in India and I believe in many other countries of Asia and elsewhere, this is a reversion to a previous and unfortunate period of history when decisions were imposed by force of arms by Western powers on Asian countries.”143 The demands for India’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth came from a myriad of political parties, including Nehru’s Congress Party. His close friend, the former governor general and chief minister of Madras, Rajagopalachari, became a prominent figure supporting calls for India’s withdrawal. Reid recognized the international damage that could occur if Nehru remained silent on Hungary. He communicated constantly with the secretary-general of external affairs, Pillai, urging him to have Nehru condemn the Soviet actions. Initially, Pillai rebuked Reid for being the only diplomat to express criticism of Indian policy when Reid shared Pearson’s concerns over Hungary. Eventually, Pillai recommended that St. Laurent cable Nehru directly to provide his perspective. These meetings, Reid thought, followed by a barrage of dispatches to Ottawa counselling cooperation and consultation with the Indians, bore fruit.144 Pillai prompted Nehru to reconsider events in Hungary, pointing out the hypocrisy of condemning Britain and France for engaging in reverse colonialism in Egypt while remaining mute on Soviet violence in Hungary.145 For the first time since the Soviet invasion, Nehru signalled displeasure through K.P.S. Menon in Moscow over Soviet actions, followed by a tepid public condemnation on 5 November. St. Laurent personally wrote to Nehru: In these difficult days through which we are passing India has never been far from my mind. I hope that our friendship has given me some understanding of and sympathy for … India’s position in the present Middle East crisis, and I know that you appreciate our own situation here. For myself one of the most heartening developments was the mutual cooperation of our respective delegations in relation to two resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly on November 3. I also read with great interest the references in your statement at the opening session of UNESCO to the recent tragic events in Hungary.146

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Describing St. Laurent’s letter as banal, Reid had hoped for an overture to Nehru calling for “defined actions” that “might be taken within the U.N. on both Hungary and Suez.” While he stood disappointed on this front, his actions gained notice in Ottawa.147 Pearson thanked Reid for his efforts in highlighting to Nehru “the apparent discrepancy between his attitude to the situation in the Middle East and that in Hungary.” Reid, however, failed to adhere to Pearson’s subtle caution that “we should not, I think, press further at the risk of turning the Indians sour. You must protect your excellent position in Delhi. And not endanger it too much on the Hungarian question.”148 Pearson’s earlier critique of Indian policy resonated with Reid, who became alarmed at Nehru’s reversal – speaking against Soviet intrigues in Hungary only later to deliver a public speech in Calcutta that outlined the Soviet interpretation of events. The same day Krishna Menon voted at the United Nations against a resolution of the General Assembly calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Hungary and for free elections. With good reason, Reid believed that these two events could have disastrous consequences if India’s views did not dovetail with those of the West vis-à-vis Hungary. He redoubled his efforts and his dispatches, advising Ottawa to act patiently and give Nehru time and some sympathy. Reid forgot that Pearson and his colleagues were working feverishly in Ottawa and New York to craft a peaceful solution that eventually led to the dispatch of a UN peacekeeping force to Suez. Reid deluged his department with grand ideas deemed of secondary importance and created irritation. He was asked not to take any further initiatives without specific instructions.149 Adding to the admonishment, another dispatch suggested that Reid was placing too high a priority on his dispatches. These notes were copied widely in the DEA and would have been a form of humiliation, calling Reid’s judgment into question.150 His sense of mission continued unabated. Reid continued the dispatches and met frequently over a three-day period with Nehru to share Canadian reports and telegrams from the UN General Assembly. Finally, on 16 and 19 November in the Lok Sabha, nearly four weeks after the first uprisings, Nehru called on Soviet troops to withdraw from Hungary and for UN observers to visit that country – much to Moscow’s consternation.151 The same day Reid received a final caution. Jules Léger delicately censured Reid: “We must keep our heads cool even if we are tempted to reason with our hearts. You have already done much in this emergency but from now on you should concentrate on matters of direct and primary concern to Canadian-Indian relations.”152 Reid was stung. Shortly after, he wrote an achingly heartfelt plea to Pearson outlining the reasons for his actions and asking for the restrictions to be lifted. Reid believed that he had acted in Canada’s national interests and helped to prevent the cracks between

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India and the West from becoming a chasm. “No other Foreign Minister,” he continued, “has received as good reports from Delhi as you have.”153 This was an extravagant claim fuelled by emotion; the cold silence from Ottawa likely added to Reid’s anguish. In the end, India remained in the Commonwealth, and Egypt allowed the UN force to arrive on its soil with logistical support from Canada. Whether Reid’s efforts pushed Nehru to clarify his views on Hungary is uncertain. Nehru’s biographer noted that Pillai, G.L. Mehta (the Indian ambassador in Washington), and other politicians highlighted the inconsistencies of his initial condemnations. Even the wife of India’s UN representative, Arthur Lall, wrote to Nehru urging him to change India’s stance toward Hungary.154 On a personal level, Nehru became embarrassed by Krishna Menon’s actions at the United Nations concerning Hungary but still chose to retain Menon in cabinet despite the objections of many colleagues. With his belated critique of Soviet actions, he  partially restored India’s policy of non-alignment, but what of his reputation abroad? As Nehru prepared to leave for a tour of North America, Reid apparently tried a different tactic. There had been suggestions in the department that he had succumbed to Nehru’s charms.155 Following his reprimand, Reid immediately set out to show otherwise. He offered the same old message but in new packaging. In the lead-up to Nehru’s arrival in Ottawa, Reid drafted a series of dispatches aimed at reconsidering the impact of a post-Suez world on IndoCanadian relations. The British venture had created distrust in the Commonwealth, and it was unlikely that the Indians would trust London anytime soon. The eclipse of British prestige presented Canada with an opportunity to assume many of Britain’s responsibilities in India. Reid advised that Ottawa might now begin to share information on foreign affairs with India, something that he had pushed Washington to do two years earlier.156 Few Western European statesmen were highly regarded by New Delhi, and Australia and New Zealand had appeared as mere apologists for Britain during the Suez Crisis. Reid believed that only Eisenhower, St. Laurent, and Pearson had grown in India’s esteem.157 A long-term campaign could make use of this capital and firmly affix the “key” non-communist state in Asia with the West. Reid asserted that Ottawa needed to re-examine Canada’s “national interests in India” and to develop policies “best calculated to serve the interests of the Canadian people during the next decade of international crisis.” Doing so required a sense of proportion and a willingness to reconsider Canadian diplomacy: “We should be on the side of the big battalions if we want the big battalions on our side. In terms of our direct national interests India because of itself and its interests is more important to us than fifty South Africas or Portugals.”158 The

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two latter countries were irritants to India, in terms of racial and colonial grievances, but they fell safely on the side of the West. It was time, Reid argued, for Ottawa to put pressure both on apartheid in South Africa and on Portugal to transfer its possession of Goa, the last European colonial outpost in India, to New Delhi. Such moves would pay large dividends for Canada and the West. As officials prepared discussion points for Nehru’s visit, Reid’s ideas sparked intense consideration among a number of bureaus in the DEA. Nehru would find a different Canada on this trip. Dissenting views flowed through the department regarding Canada’s policy on South Asia, whether Canadian policies should be re-examined in light of Indian policies on China, and issues of colonialism being debated at the United Nations. In the United Nations Division, one officer argued that Reid had it right. India was really the only partner that the West had as far as non-communist Asia was concerned, and Canada had to put “nearly all our eggs in the India basket,” for “what other basket is there?”159 Another perspective noted darkly that India took advantage of the postcolonial vacuum in Asia to expand its influence in the region. And there was some truth to this, as proven by India’s leadership at the Bandung conference and its actions on the ICSC. Did it make sense for Canada to promote the establishment of Indian hegemony in Asia “when it is likely to reach full flower only under leaders who may be even more hostile to European civilization than Nehru and his advisors?” Recent events in Hungary suggested that there was little likelihood that India and Canada could cooperate fully at the United Nations on the question of colonialism until India stopped viewing the struggle against colonialism only when “questions of colour are involved.” J.H. Cleveland of the American Division went further: “Undiscriminating Canadian support for Nehru and India might lead to the imposition of a new type of imperialism in Asia and Africa. My personal impression is that India is expansionist.”160 Equally critical, another officer, Sinclair Nutting, argued that “an alliance or association between two nations is usually of more benefit to one nation than it is to the other. If we accept Mr. Reid’s proposals, we should realize that Canada would not necessarily gain more than India from such an association.” Questioning whether Canada’s interests coincided with India’s, the officer asserted that, on issues such as Chinese-Indian relations, Kashmir, Canada-US relations, immigration, and the Afro-Asian bloc, Canada shared little common ground with India.161 Other officers raised the importance of personalities. In particular, they commented on the negative impact of Krishna Menon on bilateral relations and suggested that, during the upcoming talks, his actions should be raised. One officer in the United Nations Division described Menon as one of the main “stumbling blocks” at the United Nations because of his “unpredictable

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egocentric behaviour.” Ottawa should not place “all our faith in India as the Asian leader. It would seem unfortunate to alienate Portugal at a time when NATO is being shaken by the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.”162 J.H. Cleveland of the American desk believed that Canada risked alienating a host of Asian nations that were well disposed to Ottawa if India were singled out as the central recipient of Canadian aid “in an obvious endeavour to buy the support of the Indian Government.” In fact, this action would imply that Ottawa considered the smaller nations of Asia less worthy of being saved. The Soviet Union could exploit this perception. Cleveland thought it dangerous to follow the American tendency to align too closely with individual leaders in Asia and accept “as infallible a single leader in certain countries such as Chiang Kai Shek, Syngman Rhee and Diem.” Nehru was no Rhee or Diem, but Cleveland cautioned that “a similar error could be made in identifying Mr. Nehru with India and assuming that there can be no alternative leader and no alternative point of view within that country.”163 Robert Louis Rogers, a senior official in the Far Eastern Division, believed that India was essential “in determining the way in which non-communist Asia will go.” However, he dismissed Reid’s sense “that India is literally the key.” The recent independence of Indonesia from Dutch rule, and its prestige in hosting the Bandung conference, raised its importance in Asia, and Ottawa “should be careful not to consider that India is the one country of Asia that must be carried along at all costs.”164 Marcel Cadieux supported this analysis, noting that Reid’s arguments were persuasive “but by no means an established fact.” Cadieux believed that Indian statecraft reflected Indian self-interest and was inconsistent, opportunistic, and disingenuous. He remained skeptical of India’s “moral firmness and capacity for purposeful international leadership.” Canada need not offer “bribes” when consultation between Ottawa and New Delhi was “a two-way street.” According to Cadieux, the Indians had a tendency “to regard cooperation as entailing the agreement of others without prior consultation to whatever they would like to be done.”165 Rather than fostering support, Reid’s dispatches revealed the breadth of bilateral irritants that troubled Canadian policy makers and bilateral relations in general. Reid later maintained that the Indochina commission in Vietnam primarily caused the decline in the special relationship, but it is evident that, on the eve of Nehru’s visit, a number of distinct political and cultural issues, when linked together, presented discernible bilateral fissures.166 Nehru arrived in Ottawa on 21 December for a two-day visit accompanied by his daughter Indira and Pillai. They stayed as guests of the governor general, Vincent Massey, at Rideau Hall. A cold spell gripped the capital, but despite the

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chill Nehru curled for the first time, on a frozen pond, before his meetings with St. Laurent and Pearson. A small party of Indian journalists accompanied Nehru, and The Hindu observed that there were no problems between Canada and India, “an almost unique thing in this age of nagging international problems. Canada has been closer to India than any other Commonwealth partner during the last six years.”167 A survey of Canadian newspapers suggests that editorial comments predominantly praised the Indian leader. The Toronto Star noted that, while India and the United States were beginning to develop a good understanding, Canada and India had already achieved it. The Ottawa Citizen and the Ottawa Journal showed enthusiasm, the former newspaper characterizing Nehru as a “Pillar of the Commonwealth.” Even in conservative Quebec, Nehru found favour with La Presse, which rated him as one of the few great statesmen in the world. As within the Canadian bureaucracy, he had detractors. The Globe and Mail questioned the importance of Nehru and criticized his silence during the Soviet invasion of Hungary. New Delhi, it concluded, “had gone along with Russia’s brutal suppression” of that country. The London Free Press attacked Nehru’s policy of non-alignment, deeming it “pure nonsense.”168 Cordial meetings marked Nehru’s visit, and discussions centred on East-West relations and regional trouble spots such as the Middle East and Indochina. Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, the Commonwealth became a vital subject of discussion. A dispatch to the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi detailing Nehru’s 22 December press conference described it as “smooth and constructive,” and happily it “produced no fireworks.” Nehru publicly acknowledged the sentiment that he had frequently stated in his correspondence dating back to the Korean War: “Canada has shown a greater appreciation of the reality of today in Asia.”169 Formal conversations with St. Laurent and Pearson described Nehru as “relaxed, forthcoming and show[ing] more than his usual interest in day to day problems.”170 However, little of the spark of the 1949 visit appeared. It is difficult to determine the trip’s impact on bilateral affairs. The monthly political report from the Indian High Commission in Ottawa only offered the suggestion that Nehru’s popularity had suffered in recent months in Canada.171 The Indian media printed a number of wire stories of the visit, but only one newspaper, the Times of India, commented editorially.172 Despite the prior debates on and critiques of Indian foreign policy following Reid’s dispatches, the DEA reported nothing controversial to Reid. But neither were there breakthroughs along the lines that he had advocated, and, arguably, the Canadians listened less attentively to Nehru’s views on foreign affairs. The visit lacked the tones of a special relationship sought by Reid.

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What had changed in the bilateral relationship? Reid received some support for his efforts from Paul Martin, the minister of national health and welfare, who occasionally sat in for Pearson at the United Nations. Martin visited India during the Christmas holiday and came away shaken by the squalor of the slums in Old Delhi but dazzled by the juxtaposition of daily life alongside the Mughal ruins. Martin shared Reid’s optimism that Canada could exercise valuable influence: “I am more than ever persuaded that we have been right in making every effort to understand the Indian point of view and work with them.”173 Whereas only a few years earlier Pearson had to shore up cabinet support for the Colombo Plan, now he disagreed with this accommodating assessment of his cabinet colleague. Martin was out of tune with the debates that had recently taken place within the DEA. Much, in fact, had changed but was kept quiet during the Nehru visit. In a letter to Reid, Pearson confided that “Asian membership and Asian policies” in the Commonwealth prompted “increased concern; a concern as to whether the Commonwealth can exist in its present form … and spirit when there are such growing divergences of policy and approach and feeling between the Asian and other members.” In particular, Pearson objected to India’s role at the United Nations: “India has, I think, played an ambiguous part there and one which has at times caused both irritation and impatience, even in friendly delegations like the Canadian. The tendency to indulge in moralizing at Western expense,” and the tendency to “adopt a double standard” while protecting their “national interests,” exasperated the SSEA. Krishna Menon continued to be an irritant at that forum, and Pearson thought that his “usefulness to the cause of good international relations has, so far as I am concerned, disappeared.”174 Reid’s fight to change the way in which Ottawa viewed India was finished. Within two months, Reid left India for good. Bilateral relations benefited from the familiarity that Nehru, Pearson, and St. Laurent had developed over five tumultuous years, but in the June 1957 federal election the Conservatives swept the Liberals from office. Reid had spent four and a half years in India, longer than either of his predecessors. It was time for new blood. The decision to replace Reid with Chester Ronning came days after Nehru departed from Ottawa.175 Ronning appeared to share Reid’s view of India’s paramount importance. In a letter, he praised Reid for his efforts in developing the New Delhi post and mildly rebuked skeptics in the DEA: “I am becoming more and more impatient with the failure of so many to understand India and the Indians.”176 Ronning represented a high-calibre candidate for the post and would now inherit the difficult file dealing with the ICSC and the sluggish debate over nuclear safeguards. An appraisal of Reid’s time in India is challenging but necessary given his imprint on the relationship between Canada and India, his seniority in the DEA,

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and his dedicated championing of Canada’s “bridging” role. That bridge suffered from mounting stress. Reid enthusiastically persisted in trying to persuade his department to play a more active role in India, with meagre results. Few of his proposals were implemented during or after his tenure. Ottawa remained unwilling to jeopardize relations with Washington to gain influence in New Delhi. Many of his colleagues believed that his passion and enthusiasm for all things Indian had got the better of him. Also, Canadian cultural assumptions distorted some early expectations that the Indians would act in a Western fashion, as illustrated by divergences of interpretation on the ICSC, the reception afforded to Khrushchev in New Delhi, and the surprise of senior policy makers at the Indian interpretations of acts of imperialism regarding the Suez Crisis and Hungary. For its part, New Delhi appeared to be unwilling to modify its own policies to placate Ottawa. Apart from the transfer of the NRX reactor, no significant increase in aid was forthcoming, certainly not the hundreds of millions of dollars for which Reid called. Finally, Ottawa avoided the expansive consultations with New Delhi that he desired. At the time of his departure, there were a number of India skeptics in the DEA who would, in a matter of years, occupy senior positions. The corrosive personality of Krishna Menon and the skepticism created by India’s foreign policy of non-alignment can be pinpointed as causes of the erosion of consensus on India. By 1957, the special relationship proved to be fleeting, and a new era characterized relations between Canada and India.

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Clockwise, from top: Figure 2 Departure sign leaving Lucknow, Ontario. The connection to British imperial India and the Indian Mutiny of 1857 still resonates, as the reference to “sepoys” attests. Photo taken by the author. Figure 3 W.L. Mackenzie King feeding monkeys at a Hindu temple, Madras (Chennai), 28 January 1909. A prominent Canadian official, King travelled to India with the purpose of restricting immigration to Canada. The juxtaposition of meeting anglicized Indian elites and encountering Hinduism struck a discordant –note with King, as was often the case with Canadian officials who later went to India. Decades later as prime minister, he encouraged formal diplomatic ties with a newly independent India. Library and Archives Canada C-055522. Figure 4 Following the successful state visit of Jawaharlal Nehru to Ottawa in October 1949, the Canadian government looked at ways to strengthen Western links with India. Here Escott Reid and Lester Pearson plan their visit to the Colombo conference that planted the seeds of the Colombo Aid Plan and decades of Canadian foreign aid to India. Library and Archives Canada/Duncan Cameron fonds/PA-121700.

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Figure 5 (facing page top) Paul Martin with Krishna Menon at a UN meeting to discuss peaceful uses of atomic energy, Manhattan, 10 October 1955. The prominent and controversial Indian diplomat fuelled the criticism of skeptics in the DEA and political circles who regarded Indian non-alignment as hypocritical. UN Photo/AC. Figure 6 (facing page bottom) Lester and Maryon Pearson with High Commissioner Escott Reid formally opening the Massanjore Generating Station on 3 November 1955. Despite Reid’s attempts to prod Canada closer to India, Pearson had growing reservations about how close the two countries actually were. Canadian Press/AP.

Figure 7 A view of the Canada Dam/Massanjore Generating Station on the Mayurakshi River, West Bengal, India, 16 December 1956. Along with food aid, and the exchange of nuclear technology, the dam was one of the major infrastructure projects funded with Canadian Colombo Plan aid in the 1950s. Library and Archives Canada/ Department of External Affairs/PA-127559.

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Figure 8 Canadians assumed that their Indian counterparts on the ICSC would view and interpret matters in Vietnam in a similar fashion. That assumption proved to be fleeting, and the ICSC emerged as a long-standing source of tension, eroding goodwill for India in the ranks of the DEA and political circles. Here ICSC senior military advisers – from left to right, Col. J. Bryn (Poland), Brig. M.S. Dunn (Canada), and Maj.-Gen. D.S. Brar (India) – discuss the location of team sites, Hanoi, North Vietnam, 16 July 1956. Library and Archives Canada/Department of National Defence fonds/PA-146524. Figure 9 (facing page top) Jawaharlal Nehru meeting with Lester Pearson in Ottawa, December 1956. Despite Pearson’s cheerful expression and the Christmas tree in the background, the visit did not spark the same ease and enthusiasm as did Nehru’s first state visit in 1949. Library and Archives Canada/Duncan Cameron fonds/PA-206457.

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Figure 10 Chester Ronning, Canada’s longest-serving high commissioner to India, 1957–64. Ronning helped to puncture the assumption that Canada and India shared a special relationship. National Film Board of Canada/Photothèque/Library and Archives Canada PA 141361.

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Figure 11 A garlanded John Diefenbaker greeted at Palam Airport in New Delhi by Jawaharlal Nehru, 18 November 1958. Diefenbaker and Nehru maintained a respectful relationship, but the Canadian prime minister abhorred non-alignment and felt more comfortable with the Pakistani leader, General Ayub Khan. University of Saskatchewan, University Archives and Special Collections. Figure 12 ( facing page top) Prime Minister L.B. Pearson and other members of Parliament with L.B. Shastri, the Indian prime minister, in Ottawa, June 1965. Library and Archives Canada/Duncan Cameron fonds/PA-213389.

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Figure 13 Pierre Trudeau meeting Indira Gandhi, New Delhi, 11 January 1971. The two leaders soon presided over the most divisive era in the bilateral relationship. Canadian Press/Peter Bregg.

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Figure 14 Pierre Trudeau and High Commissioner James George at Ma’s Ashram, Varanasi, 11 January 1971. One of the few Canadian officials passionate about India and its cultures, George hoped to revitalize Canada’s flagging political relationship with India. Canadian Press/Peter Bregg.

Figure 15 Duncan Macpherson’s editorial cartoon reflected the disbelief and anger felt by Canadian officials that, despite accepting massive sums of Western aid to alleviate systemic hunger and poverty, the Indian government had diverted scarce financial resources to test a nuclear device. The choice of imagery also reveals popular stereotypes about India and Indians in Canadian minds. Estate of Duncan Macpherson, reprinted with permission of Torstar Syndication Services.

6 Friendly but Not Close The Diefenbaker Years, 1957–63

After twenty-two years of Liberal leadership, the election of a minority Progressive Conservative government on 10 June 1957 came as a shock to a Canadian public that had largely assumed another Liberal majority government. Prior to the election, the Anglophile John Diefenbaker and his party lacked a firm foreign policy plank. Yet the new prime minister openly showed disdain for communism and wanted to exercise broader influence on the foreign policy decision-making process. During his first few months in office, Diefenbaker kept the external affairs portfolio himself. In spite of the mounting skepticism about relations with India preceding the election, that country remained the main pillar of Canadian interest in Asia, receiving significant aid and Canadian atomic technology. In many respects, the pivotal years during Diefenbaker’s time in office, between 1957 and 1963, determined whether initial expectations for Canada to be the central Western partner of India could be resuscitated or discarded. This chapter explores the struggle between these two possibilities. Diefenbaker’s worldview was shaped by a very different cultural, regional, and political heritage than the worldviews of Pearson and St. Laurent. It was a more black-and-white worldview than those of his two Liberal rivals. Historians John Hilliker and Donald Barry note that a number of competing and incongruent influences characterized Diefenbaker’s foreign policy interests – “concern for trade, especially agricultural exports; affection for the Commonwealth and the British connection”; “sensitivity to the support of Canadians for the United Nations; [and] a combative attitude towards pressure from the United States that could be portrayed as unfair to Canada.” Diefenbaker also detested the Soviet Union.1 During the Suez Crisis, his position mirrored the distress that many Conservatives felt as the party endorsed a UN solution on the one hand yet struggled with UN condemnation of British policy on the other. In addition, Diefenbaker strongly supported NATO as a deterrent to the USSR. The concept of neutralism or non-alignment as articulated by Nehru genuinely puzzled him. Hilliker and Barry shrewdly observe that Diefenbaker’s attitude toward foreign policy was the product of a mind that had been conditioned by formative years as a trial lawyer. Issues were black and white, and a position was right or wrong; shades of grey were elusive and best avoided.2 Accordingly, his flexibility could be restricted by these qualities.

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His religious beliefs also affected his worldview, especially when it came to communism and non-alignment. Diefenbaker kept his religious beliefs private, but he was a Baptist, and according to his biography his mother “favoured a career for John in the Baptist Church.” Certainly, his worldview, shaped in his youth, reflected “the family’s faith,” which “involved belief in the literal truth of the Bible … [and] absolute standards of right and wrong.”3 In the broad context of the Cold War, Diefenbaker believed that the West was “right,” and his religious views certainly influenced references to what he once described as “the pagan and diabolical advance of Communism.”4 Clearly, then, many of Diefenbaker’s views stood in stark contrast to those of Nehru. Yet, despite the apparent array of differences, both Diefenbaker’s foreign policy adviser and his biographer suggest that, on the eve of the June 1957 Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference, Diefenbaker hoped to maintain “Louis St. Laurent’s close understanding with Prime Minister Nehru of India. He intended to support ‘staunchly’ the idea of the Commonwealth and to urge the strengthening of trade and economic ties among its members.”5 The conference marked Diefenbaker’s first appearance as Canada’s leader on the international stage, and Diefenbaker “relished it with the enthusiasm of a schoolboy.”6 For him, the meetings represented a safe pool in which to wade into international diplomacy. On the heels of the Suez Crisis, the conference sought to heal the wounds left by months of highly emotional diplomacy. It also gave him the opportunity to learn from a diverse and multiracial group and to discuss East-West and North-South issues while exchanging views with his colleagues. The departure of St. Laurent disappointed Nehru, who thought the former prime minister “a fine, upright and conscientious man.”7 He found Diefenbaker “modest and shy,” recording that he “created something of a sensation in the Prime Ministers conference” when he openly lamented American economic domination of Canada.8 His candid remarks sent mixed signals to Nehru; Diefenbaker also bluntly criticized the Soviet Union and Moscow’s policies, and he ardently supported NATO. Personally, Diefenbaker felt pleased with the outcome of his first international conference.9 Indian politicians and bureaucrats were less sure of the new prime minister and his government. M.A. Rauf concluded in a dispatch to New Delhi that fundamental changes to Canadian foreign policy were unlikely, but he noted some possible exceptions: the Conservatives “may be more ready to listen to the U.K. Foreign Office with a somewhat less sceptical ear than has characterised Canada-U.K. relations in recent months.” And at the United Nations Ottawa “might be [a] slightly more ‘white Commonwealth’ government than its predecessor. Some feel that this may mean a somewhat less deferential view towards India e.g. whenever so-called ‘colonial issues’ arise at the Assembly.” Rauf also

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detected “that the Conservatives are likely to view with more jaundiced detachment the growing assimilation of Canadian-United States interests and the complexity of their relations that now results from this process.”10 Rauf made a prescient observation in that a Diefenbaker government might be less deferential to India than its predecessor. Krishna Menon, now Nehru’s defence minister, brusquely quizzed the newly appointed high commissioner to India, Chester Ronning, during their first meeting. Menon demanded to know what a Diefenbaker government meant for India. For his troubles, Menon received pat responses excerpted from Diefenbaker’s public statements: “The new government will in general continue the previous policy and attitude to the Commonwealth and to India.”11 Those in New Delhi who had only known a Liberal government in Ottawa remained circumspect. The Conservatives continued the appointment of the highly capable Ronning to New Delhi. One of the few Canadian diplomats to have extensive experience in Asian affairs, the Mandarin-speaking Ronning was the son of Norwegian missionaries whose call took them to China. Born in Hopeh province at Fancheng, Ronning later immigrated to Canada and became a college lecturer in Alberta. But China proved to be irresistible. He returned in 1922, and in the following years there he solidified his “Chinese identity” and sharpened “his appreciation of Chinese nationalism.”12 However, as a wave of anti-foreign sentiment rippled across China in 1927, Ronning returned to Canada with his young family to take a position as principal of Camrose Lutheran College. Shortly after, he became the first leader of the provincial CCF in Alberta, where opponents attacked him for being too Chinese and too socialist.13 Ronning came to the attention of the DEA during the Second World War. He represented a valuable and fascinating commodity: a Westerner, a social democrat with a deep understanding of China, knowledgeable about its politics, and fluent in Mandarin. As a prairie populist with socialist leanings, Ronning sympathized with the Chinese revolution. He entered the DEA in 1945 at the age of fifty-one and joined the Canadian legation in Nanking. Although he admired some members of the Kuomintang, he thought that China’s problems needed the communists’ quality of dedication. By October 1949, the communist armies had defeated the nationalists on the mainland, and, in the face of tremendous uncertainty, Ronning led the skeletal Canadian legation. He firmly believed that Chinese communism differed from Soviet communism.14 The Chinese form served as a vehicle for Asian nationalism, a view that Nehru shared. Throughout the 1950s, Ronning attempted to convince Ottawa of the importance of recognizing the new regime sooner, rather than later, to maximize possible benefits to Canada. Ottawa was cautious, and unfortunately for Ronning the strength of American political opinion and pressure from Washington

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limited his powers of persuasion. The Korean War exacerbated American opposition to the recognition of China. After the outbreak, Arnold Heeney, the USSEA, identified Ronning’s isolation in Nanking, his distance from the seat of the new government in Peking, as a possible reason for his unbalanced argument, a trait sometimes attributed to Reid in New Delhi.15 Ronning returned to Ottawa when the Canadian legation closed. His expertise made him an ideal fit for assignments in the Far Eastern Division in Ottawa and later at the United Nations. His final posting to India in 1957 placed Ronning front and centre in Canada’s most important window onto Asia and China. Less prone than Reid to emotional telegrams, and perhaps less idealistic, given his formative experiences in China, he settled into his new post with ease. Perhaps the tough-minded Ronning had the verve to convince his superiors in the East Block and the Prime Minister’s Office of what his predecessor could not. In September, Diefenbaker appointed Sidney Smith as SSEA. Coaxed from his post as president of the University of Toronto, the inexperienced Smith immediately faced a number of competing foreign policy issues with Diefenbaker looking closely over his shoulder. That autumn the UN General Assembly, NATO, and House of Commons committees all vied for Smith’s attention. India was not a priority. Ronning, though, believed that it should be. He strongly opposed a draft report commenting on Indian foreign policy prepared in early October by George Glazebrook, head of the Commonwealth Division. The report was to be circulated throughout the department and to select overseas posts. A history professor from the University of Toronto, Glazebrook had been seconded by the DEA during the Second World War, and his career had flourished. He had emerged as a critic of Indian non-alignment. He questioned India’s “supposed” neutrality and its views on decolonization, discounting Reid’s thesis that India could be wooed to the side of the West.16 Indian foreign policy, he argued, was based upon national interests, influenced by geography and domestic opinion. The independence movement combined with the “Indian character, the contemporary leaders in the government, and other circumstances” infused Indian statements on foreign affairs with considerable emotion and “idealism.” He took direct aim at Indian attitudes on colonialism, labelling them hypocritical. New Delhi simply regarded the concept of colonialism as the domination of “white over non-white peoples.” That logic, Glazebrook continued, explained the Indian response to Moscow’s actions in crushing the Hungarian revolution. India, unlike Switzerland, he continued, was not neutral in the Cold War – it associated more commonly with the Soviet Bloc “than the non-communist powers” – and, despite protestations to the contrary, its foreign policy criticisms were

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generally “directed westward and [its] encouragements towards Moscow.”17 Despite the common ground of shared Commonwealth ties, Glazebrook concluded that it would be too radical a break for the Congress Party to align with the West. A few select members of the department who had recently served in India, Bruce Williams and Klaus Goldschlag, and Ronning received the paper. John Holmes, an assistant under secretary of state, described Glazebrook’s draft as “first class.” He disagreed with Glazebrook’s deprecating assessment of the draft, that the analysis was “cold blooded,” insisting rather that “it is not at all unsympathetic because you recognize that the ambivalence of Indian foreign policy is attributable to historical and geographical causes and to native hypocrisy.” Ottawa needed to approach “Indian policies without excitement of one kind or another (except the legitimate desire to strangle K. Menon), and I think this paper is the best introduction to such state of mind.”18 Bruce Williams also supported much of Glazebrook’s assessment, adding that “the Indian field of influence and interest is in the Arab-Asian area. It would be so much better for all of us if the Indians would recognize this and restrict their activities to this area.”19 Ronning, however, disagreed with Glazebrook’s paper “on a number of points.” He used his extensive knowledge of Asian history and nationalism to deconstruct the analysis. Glazebrook suggested that India aspired to be a great power. To Ronning, India – at least in the area of the Indian Ocean – already stood as a great power. To him, the assertion that India was siding with the Soviet Union more than it was siding with the West required proof. He challenged whether India’s voting record in the United Nations had been studied. Were policy makers reading too much into the case of Hungary? Yes, Indian criticisms often pointed westward more than toward the USSR, and Ronning asked why: My major criticism of the paper as a whole is that it leaves out of account almost entirely the ideological basis of Indian foreign policy and treats the subject from a “realpolitik” point of view. I do not think you can do this and come up with valid conclusions. The memorandum admits at the beginning that there is a large element of emotion and idealism in Indian foreign policy and there certainly is. The present Indian leaders are the product of a generation of organized struggle for an ideal, they have in some respects a different view of the world and society than Western leaders, and, except for a handful of specialists trained by the British, they do not think in strategic terms. Mr. Nehru is not Bismarck and we will seriously miscalculate if we try to analyse his policies as if he were.20

Ronning applied his exceptional regional knowledge. The self-confidence of his  Asian knowledge over that of his colleagues is revealed in a glimmer of

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exasperation. Glazebrook turned to European geopolitics to explain Asian attitudes, and Ronning singled out his use of “emotion” to characterize Indian policy making not as a careful analysis but as a simple pejorative. Although he accepted a critique of Indian policies, Ronning challenged his colleagues to refine their thinking about India in a way that Reid had not. In light of Ronning’s critique, Glazebrook agreed to reconsider his analysis but not before lamenting to Holmes that he was “discouraged by Ronning’s comments.” Why was it that “everyone who has been to India seems to argue that there is something peculiar about Indian history and ideology? This is a kind of sacred cow which like other sacred cows tends to be a nuisance.” Whether or not Glazebrook deliberately made a bad Indian pun is unclear, but irritation bubbled to the surface as he observed the acceptability of analyzing the foreign policies of European or Middle Eastern states on the normal grounds of national interests but never India. Glazebrook’s original commentary, broad generalizations notwithstanding, proved to be prophetic and gathered momentum in following years. Glazebrook remained unconvinced by Ronning’s comments, asserting to Holmes that the “test of idealism in foreign policy is to find whether they have acted in particular cases because of idealism and counter to their national interest. I know of no such case.”21 To that particular assertion Ronning would later agree. In the wake of his March 1958 majority election victory, Diefenbaker announced his intention to go on a round-the-world tour to Europe and the Asian Commonwealth. The tour began on 28 October as he departed from Ottawa relaxed and jovial. The talented Basil Robinson accompanied him. Robinson was an emerging figure within the DEA and had worked closely on the Suez Crisis file. The Prime Minister’s Office seconded him soon after Diefenbaker’s election. Hardworking, likeable, and loyal, he soon earned the trust and admiration of Diefenbaker, who remained very suspicious of Pearson’s “department.” Robinson ensured that speeches and briefing materials were prepared before Diefenbaker’s departure, with specifications for the briefs to be concise, as the “P.M. does not like long briefs.”22 The first part of the tour took Diefenbaker to Western Europe, relatively familiar terrain for the prime minister. The Asian-Pacific countries on the second leg of his tour, barring New Zealand and Australia, were entirely new to him, and this concerned Robinson. He confided to T.W.L. MacDermot, the Canadian high commissioner in Canberra, that the trip could present “a big psychological strain for him as well as a big physical strain.”23 Diefenbaker’s penchant for sprinkling oratorical phrases such as “free world,” “the hearts of free men everywhere,” and “Western way of life” into his speeches prompted Robinson to advise his departmental colleagues preparing the briefing notes that Diefenbaker’s

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“Anglo-saxon outlook on the world will have to be adjusted if his words are to have a convincing ring in Asian areas.” Robinson questioned whether “a small glossary of phrases that are on no account to be used might be worth compiling” to provide to those preparing the speeches.24 Denis Smith rightly notes in his biography of Diefenbaker that, “in the Asian Commonwealth countries of Pakistan, India, Ceylon, and Malaya,” the prime minister “was on less certain ground than in Europe. Beyond a few stereotypes about the value of the Commonwealth, the dangers of communism, and a romantic perception derived from Kipling, he knew little of this side of the world.”25 Still, Diefenbaker sincerely desired first-hand experience “of the problems, and personal acquaintance with the leaders, of the non-white Commonwealth countries in Asia.”26 Diefenbaker’s itinerary included a chance to fly over the Mayurakshi hydroelectric project, funded in part by Canadian Colombo Plan contributions. By 1958, Ottawa had allocated $96 million in grants for Colombo Plan construction projects and for technical assistance, and $61.3 million had been granted in the twelve months prior to the tour. This latter sum illustrates the continued aid relationship between the two countries, but trade with India remained static at best – only $29 million in 1957 – with over half of Canada’s exports to India funded by the Colombo Plan.27 Flying in from Pakistan, the Canadians arrived at Palam airport in New Delhi on 18 November. The aircraft briefly circled over Amritsar in the Punjab so that Diefenbaker could view the splendour of the Golden Temple, the spiritual centre of Sikhism. Nehru, Ronning, and various members of the Indian cabinet, along with a tri-service guard of honour, warmly greeted Diefenbaker. A band played the Canadian national anthem as a modest crowd of a few hundred watched the ceremony. A cavalcade then whisked the Diefenbakers to the president’s house. The tour schedule left little time for meetings between the two leaders. Robinson and Ronning worried about the burdensome schedule of ceremonies arranged by the Indians.28 The day after his arrival, Diefenbaker, Ronning, and Robinson met with Nehru at his home, and over the course of ninety minutes the two leaders touched on a range of global issues from the Middle East to disarmament. Nehru sought Diefenbaker’s impressions of Pakistan, where a recent military coup had installed General Ayub Khan as leader. Diefenbaker became a footnote in that nation’s history as the first foreign leader received by the new Pakistani leader. During his time as prime minister, he developed a closer rapport with Khan than he did with Nehru. Diefenbaker and Khan were of the same mind in terms of the threat posed by communism, and the latter’s “frank,” “forthright,” and British military demeanour impressed the former; they remained in close contact during the Diefenbaker era.29 Ever wary about

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the volatility of Karachi’s politics and of having an estranged nation on India’s borders, Nehru pressed Diefenbaker for details on his trip. The latter largely, and wisely, demurred. The Canadian offered little other than his impression that “the need for a change was very widely felt.”30 In fact, Diefenbaker never condemned the coup.31 Nehru continued to ponder the impact of the coup on the politically and economically fragile nation, directing a few barbs at Pakistan and its new leader for added measure. The emphasis on Pakistan unsettled Diefenbaker. He shifted the conversation to learn of Nehru’s impressions of Soviet and Chinese relations. The talk on China prompted Nehru to critique American policy. In his memoirs, Robinson suggests that Diefenbaker sought to challenge subtly Nehru’s veiled criticisms of American Far East policy.32 Diefenbaker candidly acknowledged that China remained a sticking point in bilateral relations between Ottawa and Washington. Although support for the recognition of China gained popularity in Canada, the Americans would strongly “resent it” if Canada took a stand contrary to their position. Too much pressure on Washington might lead to a profound strengthening of isolationist tendencies, observed Diefenbaker. Implicit in this explanation was that Ottawa would not be moving closer to the Indian position anytime soon. Diefenbaker and Eisenhower developed a cordial relationship, and perhaps provoked by Nehru’s criticisms of Washington Diefenbaker stressed that the “Americans were going out [of] their way to remove unreasonable causes of friction” with Canada. Nehru merely responded that any policy for Canada should be predicated on “friendly approaches to the United States.” When talk turned to foreign aid, Diefenbaker again commented positively on the generosity of American assistance, only to receive a taste of Nehru’s tendency to withhold praise and extend critiques of how Americans delivered aid. The Indian prime minister remarked sharply that the Americans tended to give aid with strings, and “people don’t like to be bossed by large numbers of foreigners, no matter how generous” – an implicit critique of Canadian aid practices. Reid foresaw the critique, knowing that Western aid would be accepted but would not temper Indian criticism of the West. This would anger Ottawa to no end.33 The encounter lacked the warmth of earlier diplomatic meetings between Canadians and Nehru, as illustrated by the press conference that followed. To an impressive degree, Robinson and Ronning anticipated the questions from the Indian press corps. However, the sheer number of questions directed to Diefenbaker on his views of Pakistan and its status within the Commonwealth caught the Canadians off guard. Fortunately, Diefenbaker responded candidly, and his answers appeared to defuse a potentially awkward situation.34 Despite the “sour note” left by the press conference and its focus on Pakistan, Robinson

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informed Glazebrook that the early days of the trip had gone well. Diefenbaker had managed that situation well and been truthful about his positive assessment of Ayub Khan; though this aggravated many in New Delhi, Robinson reflected that “it does seem to me that in dealing with the Indians one ought not to run away from what one believes to be true, even though one knows it will be unpopular.”35 Diefenbaker left New Delhi for what was perhaps one of the oddest forays of his Asian tour: a tiger shoot hosted by the Maharajah of Kotah. Suggested to the Canadians as an entertainment, Diefenbaker and his advisers were not sure what to think of the idea. From a public relations perspective, what image would Diefenbaker send if he actually confronted and shot a tiger? Worse, what if he was “eaten” by a tiger? The “divisional expert on tiger shoots” gave inconclusive advice.36 In the end, the tiger hunt went ahead, and Diefenbaker and Ronning, both wearing pith helmets, joined the Maharajah. One hundred beaters marched ahead, banging pots and creating a din in the hope of drawing out a tiger spotted near the palace earlier that day. The day ended with no sign of the tiger. Provided with an opportunity to go panther hunting later that evening, Diefenbaker declined. He returned to New Delhi to give a speech at the Indian parliament that was well received. Robinson suspected that the effusive praise given to the Commonwealth might have created some resentment, but “the Prime Minister was determined to say what he thought, and I think they respected him for this.”37 The Canadian High Commission observed that the visit received full coverage in the Indian newspapers but less editorial analysis than expected. Although the Canadians perceived the coverage to be generally good, “the prominence given to most reports was not as great as we might have hoped.”38 Many stories placed emphasis on Diefenbaker’s views on the new Pakistani leadership. One Punjabi paper admonished Diefenbaker for even suggesting that there might be room in the Commonwealth for the “dictatorial” Pakistani regime.39 His statements on issues such as the Commonwealth, NATO, and relations with the United States received less coverage. When the Indian press mentioned his views on the Commonwealth, they placed them in the tumultuous context of Indo-Pakistani bilateral relations. In Diefenbaker’s memoirs on his first and only tour to South Asia, descriptions of the region’s main leaders are stark, rooted in British perceptions. Nehru is described as “a transplanted Englishman,” “a Harrovian” to the end, but someone who “would suddenly place himself in a kind of oriental box” if you disagreed with him. In contrast, Ayub Khan appears “as a British Sandhurst graduate” and “a soldier of distinction and a statesman who knew what he wanted to achieve for his country.” Diefenbaker acknowledged that he “came

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to admire Ayub Khan very much.”40 Indeed, he told Earl Drake, a young Canadian official at the High Commission in Pakistan, that he was impressed with Khan. Drake recalled that Diefenbaker regarded Khan as a “straight shooting, clear thinking, anti-communist.”41 Just as Pearson and Ritchie had reflected years earlier, so too Diefenbaker found that the worldview and attitude of Pakistan’s leaders toward communism in Asia were far more to his liking than those of Nehru. Accordingly, in their comparison of Pakistani and Indian foreign policies, Canadian policy makers, along with their political bosses, continued to conclude that the Pakistanis were more like people in the West, more “like us,” just as Pearson had written in his diary in 1955. Diefenbaker returned home wary of the inroads that communist propaganda had made. Shortly after arriving in Ottawa, he met with the American ambassador, Richard B. Wigglesworth, to provide him with his impressions of the trip. Wigglesworth reported to Washington that Diefenbaker “had found [the] United States as might be expected suspect in various countries; that he had endeavoured to dispel this feeling” in India, Ceylon, and Malaya. Diefenbaker also expressed his own concern that the “free world is not getting its message across to people of the world; that time and time again he had encountered those with no appreciation of what [the] United States or others in the free world have been contributing.” In comparison, he believed that the Soviet ambassadors in the region were extremely effective.42 Basil Robinson and Chester Ronning initially thought the Indian leg of the trip a success. The visit acquainted Diefenbaker with the leaders of the Indian subcontinent and their worldviews. Robinson believed that Diefenbaker was “very much impressed with Mr. Nehru and their personal relationship is obviously a very friendly one, in spite of their equally obvious difference of opinion on some important points of policy.” Robinson and Ronning also believed that the two leaders had “hit it off.”43 Indeed, a few weeks later Robinson wrote to Escott Reid to give him his thoughts of the world tour, describing Diefenbaker’s meeting with Nehru as “among the best meetings the Prime Minister had on the tour and Mr. Nehru went out of his way to be agreeable. The Prime Minister was very much impressed with him and I think that this must be counted among the major benefits of the tour.”44 Unfortunately, both Robinson and Ronning were wide of the mark and soon backtracked on their optimistic views. At some point, Robinson rescinded this view, for in the margins of a positive letter sent to Reid is written “this turned out to be a faulty diagnosis – PM was impressed but did not feel comfortable with Mr. N.”45 Diefenbaker and Nehru had little in common, and they disagreed over the threat of communism. The worldly, sophisticated Nehru likely made the already insecure Diefenbaker cognizant of the gulf – political and cultural – that separated them.

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The trip cemented in Diefenbaker’s mind which countries and which leaders could be regarded as pro-Western counterweights to Moscow’s efforts in South Asia. Even before arriving in India, Diefenbaker thought New Delhi lacking in this regard. The first secretary in New Delhi, Allan McGill, recalled that the High Commission had learned from Robinson that Diefenbaker “intended to take issue with Nehru’s position on alliances such as NATO.” Robinson and Ronning worked hard to keep Diefenbaker on a script so that both countries could agree to disagree on the question of neutralism. Diefenbaker delivered the words unenthusiastically.46 Reflecting back on the period, Robinson thought that Ayub Khan had tried to develop and maintain a relationship with Diefenbaker in a way that Nehru had not.47 Arthur Menzies, the Canadian high commissioner in Malaya during Diefenbaker’s tour, offered a similar, albeit harsher, view: “Diefenbaker didn’t like Nehru.” He concluded that Diefenbaker “was a Baptist and felt the Indians were not black and white enough about communism, unlike the Pakistanis.”48 The period following the Diefenbaker visit continued a cooling trend begun during the late St. Laurent era at the highest political and bureaucratic levels. Outright disappointment over Indian foreign policy partly explains this trend. Yet disappointment alone does not fully explain this evolution. Canadians expected India, in the aftermath of independence, to act in a pro-Western fashion because of the predominantly Anglo-educated elites and colonial ties. As that vision proved to be false, along with the notion of a bridge, Canadian politicians and bureaucrats looked to cultural and religious stereotypes to explain Indian non-alignment and the Indian character. The tensions gradually appeared in the language deployed to characterize Indians and Indian policy. In this vein, the polytheistic Indians were deemed mysterious, emotional, and unreliable, as the comments of Cadieux, Glazebrook, Diefenbaker, Pearson, and Ritchie suggest. The seemingly pro-Western manner and foreign policies of the monotheistic Pakistanis further cemented those stereotypes as they mirrored the views of the Christian West in scorning “Godless” atheism.49 These stereotypes came to a head in the wake of the 1958 tour of South Asia. That visit would be the only trip by a Canadian prime minister to India for over a decade. Relations showed signs of meandering aimlessly, and the trend continued relatively unchecked. Ironically, Canadian foreign and nuclear aid to India continued unabated even as political relations cooled. This illustrates the degree to which bureaucrats and politicians in Ottawa chose not to ask some pointed questions about Canada’s interests in India. For their part, the Indians were preoccupied with far more dire problems than the state of relations with a distant Western country. Nehru’s successful visit to China in 1954 and the gracious reception accorded to Chou En-lai on

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his visit to New Delhi in 1955 convinced Nehru that India had nothing to fear from its larger, more populous neighbour. Publicly, both countries expressed their friendship. This feeling of fraternity gradually changed. The halcyon days of the Indo-Sino relationship faded as, by 1957, the Indians became concerned with their border security. An official Chinese publication printed a map that showed significant tracts of India’s North-East Frontier Agency and Ladakh as Chinese territory. Diplomatic complaints ensued, and evidence mounted that Chinese soldiers had violated the border through a series of incursions. China annexed Tibet in 1950 and in 1958 crushed a revolt there. The Chinese sought reprisals, and the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, received asylum from New Delhi. Peking frowned deeply on the shelter given to the Dalai Lama and his entourage, and the PRC media publicly attacked New Delhi.50 Tensions remained high as the 1960s dawned. Despite a successful transition to independent statehood, Nehru also faced significant domestic problems. India truly had much to be proud of in the decade following independence. Unlike in Pakistan, democracy took root in India – supported by flourishing and vibrant media. India made impressive economic strides and substantial investments in schools and hospitals during this period that eclipsed the pre-independence years. However, beneath it all, India ran to stand-still. A dramatic increase in population threatened the social and economic improvements. Only toward the end of his life did Nehru and his government come to grips with the demographic tidal wave. Census figures for 1961 showed the population to be far higher than Indian planners had forecast. The rate of growth was alarming. In 1951, India’s population stood at 361.1 million; in 1961, it reached 439.2 million.51 Moreover, improvements in health care exacerbated the problem as Indians lived longer. Even improvements to education, particularly literacy, appeared to be hollow. Although literacy rates rose from 16.6 percent in 1951 to 24.0 percent in 1961, the number of illiterate people still increased by 30 million during this period.52 This growth stretched already scarce resources, and unemployment rose as the economy struggled to keep up. Following independence, Nehru chaired the newly established National Planning Committee to plot economic development. Influenced by the Soviet model, which held that the state must be the main driver for rapid industrialization and equitable growth, the Congress Party governments launched formal five-year plans, the first one in 1951. These plans had specific goals ranging from agricultural growth, to creating a modern transportation infrastructure, to implementing social services.53 By 1960, the ability to finance the five-year plans fell into question. India’s sterling balances, accumulated during the Second World War and used since independence to finance imports, were shrinking.

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As the decade progressed, India’s export-based economy suffered from a lack of competitiveness and challenges from foreign markets elsewhere in Asia and Africa. This coincided with the appreciation of import prices on food, steel, iron, and capital equipment. The Colombo Plan aid helped to offset this, but it was not enough. A severe balance of payments crisis resulted and, combined with unreliable crop production, forced India to look to the West for increased food and financial aid. In the hope of securing greater Western economic support, Braj Kumar B.K. Nehru, the Indian commissioner general for economic affairs and Jawaharlal Nehru’s cousin, travelled to Ottawa to meet with Norman Robertson, the USSEA. B.K. Nehru optimistically believed that within eight to fifteen years India would be independent of the need for direct government-to-government foreign aid. The third five-year plan, aimed at agriculture and rice production, required $20 billion, with $5 billion of it directed to foreign exchange needs. To achieve this, the Indians hoped that Ottawa would help New Delhi to lobby Bonn, London, and Washington to consider increasing their aid contributions. From the record of the meeting, Robertson appeared to be non-committal and informed B.K. Nehru that, while Canada “was of course sympathetic,” the government was overstretched financially.54 Shortly after Robertson’s meeting, Ronning learned that Ottawa was prepared to allocate $25 million annually to India over the next three years.55 However, Robertson’s cautious reply followed a pattern suggesting that policy makers hesitated to make extraordinary allowances in Ottawa’s aid allotments to India. The frustration of senior policy makers in the DEA with India’s leaders and their attitudes toward Canadian foreign policy also intensified. A survey of Indo-Canadian relations prepared within the DEA in the summer of 1959 noted signs “of a growing tendency among some Indian leaders, notably Krishna Menon, to regard Canada as becoming almost a ‘satellite of the United States’ and not a completely objective free agent in international affairs.”56 The available evidence shows that the Indians had thought this as far back as 1953, and the insinuation surely rankled the DEA. New pressures became manifest, particularly policy divergences on the ICSC. Canadian diplomats such as Marcel Cadieux had earlier expressed concern about Indian attitudes in Vietnam. Now the work of the commission in Laos became a topic of debate. The commission’s activities in Laos had ceased the previous July, and compared with Vietnam the situation in Laos was far less volatile. However, two battalions of communist militia refused to accept the terms of integration into the Laotian army, and North Vietnam continued to support the Laotian communists for its own purposes. This provoked the Soviet Union, Poland, North Vietnam, and the PRC to call for the ICSC to reconvene

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its commission in Laos. The Indians, despite the wishes of the Laotian government, agreed. The Canadian government considered the Laotian government’s reluctance reasonable. Diefenbaker stated in the House of Commons on 8 May that Canada could not support any commission action that infringed on Laotian sovereignty.57 Diefenbaker chose to convey his disapproval to the Indians through a personal letter to Nehru on 3 June, outlining the Canadian position in support of Laos and criticizing Chinese and North Vietnamese rhetoric. John Holmes in particular, in a memorandum to Norman Robertson, thought that “we do not see why Laos should be saddled with a Commission indefinitely simply because the neighbouring country of Vietnam has not been able to settle its problems.” Holmes stated that Ottawa needed to speak bluntly to the Indians, who “persisted in the belief that the attitude of the Laotian Government towards reconvening the Commission need not be considered as a fact on its own merits because it is merely a reflection of the ‘Western position.’” He found it “disturbing” that the Indians believed that the Laotians “would do what they were told” to do, and he found their position hypocritical, arguing that in the past New Delhi had sympathized with “the Arab dislike of foreign intervention even when it [was] under international auspices.” It was outrageous that the Indians should now “not merely assume that Laos is a satellite but demand that the Western powers treat Laos as such.” Of “all people,” he continued, the Indians “should understand the anxiety of a small Asian country, newly conscious of its sovereignty, to be rid of symbols of outside control.”58 As the decade closed, India’s non-alignment policy remained set on moralist principles and economic needs. Paradoxically, as Nehru’s faith in non-alignment intensified, India’s relations with China soured. Concomitantly, Western nations became further aggravated with the idiosyncrasies of a policy of non-alignment that frequently appeared to be far from neutral, and the Indian economy, if anything, slid backward. Western policy makers hoped that Nehru would reconsider non-alignment in the wake of Peking’s crushing of the Tibetan revolt in March 1959. Later that summer clashes occurred along the remote and mountainous borders of Ladakh and the North-East Frontier Agency, where the countries had competing border claims. The tensions with China troubled Nehru and his colleagues, but no substantial policy shift was forthcoming vis-à-vis non-alignment or to seek Western support.59 In a late-November foreign policy debate in the Lok Sabha, Nehru and the Congress Party reiterated their commitment to non-alignment. Diefenbaker was disappointed. Ottawa learned that the Chinese had built a highway across Indian territory along the Kashmir-Sinkiang border the previous June without any notice to New Delhi and that border clashes had occurred. Surely Chinese

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aggression illustrated that non-alignment would not inoculate India against threats. By reiterating his belief in non-alignment, Nehru “forfeited a good opportunity to associate India more positively with countries opposing the spread of communism.” Robinson reported to Robertson and Holmes that Diefenbaker remained unconvinced “that a policy of non-alignment is the only one on the basis of which Mr. Nehru could be assured of general parliamentary and public support.” The Canadian prime minister thought that “Nehru’s protestations of readiness to resist aggression against India will be regarded as hollow in Peking and elsewhere” given the “broad reaffirmation of support for a non-alignment policy. In the Prime Minister’s words, Mr. Nehru has once again allowed himself to be ‘Menonized.’”60 Nehru’s casual approach to the Chinese and the reiteration of non-alignment confirmed to the India skeptics in the DEA that little commonality existed between Ottawa and New Delhi. In a series of exchanges with George Glazebrook, Arthur Menzies of the Canadian High Commission in Malaya argued that India and Canada did have common ground. Menzies suggested that it lay in continued cooperation at the United Nations, and he suggested that the Indians were coming to terms with the threat of communism, particularly from China.61 Glazebrook questioned his examples. He acknowledged that cooperation at the United Nations had been noteworthy and useful, yet he observed that “a balance sheet would show differences as well as similarities in policies.” It was easy, he continued, “to make generalizations about the common traditions and a community of general interest between Canada and India,” but it was becoming difficult to identify the specific fields in which Indian and Canadian policies dovetailed.62 Glazebrook serves as a fine example of a senior policy maker whose disenchantment with non-alignment burgeoned. The days of relatively fluid cooperation between the two delegations at the United Nations became infrequent. Within days of the positive assessment by Menzies, the Canadian delegation at the United Nations wrote to Ottawa expressing frustration with the “irresponsible behaviour” of the Indian delegation at the UN emergency sessions and on matters concerning the law of the sea and independence for Cyprus.63 Holmes, effectively the second highest-ranking official in the DEA, observed that “the Indians, for reasons of personnel as much as anything, have lost the confidence of the Western Powers and are not much respected by the Soviet Union. Trusted by neither, their traditional role in the Assembly is undermined, to the disadvantage of themselves and the Assembly,” making compromise at the United Nations a difficult art.64 Where Glazebrook stressed the difficulty of identifying common ground on matters of foreign policy, Chester Ronning confirmed that the search would yield scarce results. In a memorandum on Indian foreign policy distributed to

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senior members of the DEA, Ronning concluded that it was unrealistic to expect Indian foreign policy to change. He correctly believed that policy would stay the course as long as Nehru remained prime minister, shrewdly reasoning that “this man is unlikely to change his basic policy of non-alignment in the eighth decade of his life.” The Indian elite that came of age struggling against Western colonialism supported him, and few Indians had any real experience with the Soviet Union, so they could not identify Soviet repression in the Baltic states or Hungary as a form of colonialism.65 As an aside to the report, Ronning added that the proof of Nehru’s commitment to “non-alignment ... is contained in the announcement that Mr. Khruschev has accepted Mr. Nehru’s invitation to spend four or five days in New Delhi.”66 Months later Ronning followed that assessment with a blunt analysis that serves as one of the most influential documents written on Canada-India relations. Having spent nearly three years in India, Ronning offered a sobering assessment of the trajectory of the relationship that essentially repudiated earlier hopes and thinking that underpinned the bridge thesis. In a memorandum to Ottawa, he concluded that flawed thinking fed the belief that the two nations were like-minded. The Indian public did not have a clue about Canada. The High Commission in India did little public diplomacy work that explained Canada to Indians; “generally speaking Canadian-Indian relations are cordial,” but “while relations are friendly it is a friendship based on ignorance rather than knowledge.”67 Ronning highlighted three recent issues underscoring fundamental disagreements. Canada and India disagreed over the ICSC in Laos, Ottawa insisted on wheat quotas as a component of its aid to India, and the Indians refused to support the Canadian-US compromise proposal regarding the law of the sea at the UN sessions in Geneva. Ronning found the last incident particularly irritating, as “India’s failure to support this proposal ultimately resulted in wrecking the Geneva Conference, when an affirmative vote (or even an abstention) by India would have resulted in the proposal receiving a twothirds majority.”68 On the first two issues, Canada appeared to be intransigent to the Indians.69 On the third issue, the Indians appeared to be equally stubborn, with the additional aggravation of the gadfly Krishna Menon. As Canada’s permanent representative at the United Nations from 1958 to 1962, Charles Ritchie joined the likes of Cadieux, Pearson, and Holmes among senior Canadian diplomats annoyed with Menon. Ritchie’s position required frequent meetings with Menon at the United Nations. From his arrival in New York, Ritchie found Menon irksome: “I lost my temper in a most un-Christian way with Krishna Menon, who is heading the Indian Delegation to the General Assembly, yesterday [27 October 1958].” Despite the fracas, Ritchie confessed to having “a grudging, suspicious admiration for the creature. I can’t help seeing

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that he has political imagination and kind of wild, malicious high spirits. When he comes into the Commonwealth delegation meetings he flutters the dovecotes just for the fun of it.” Conflicting sentiments aside, Ritchie’s suspicion remained: “Just how bad is Krishna Menon? Perhaps worse than we think.”70 Menon’s antics also wore thin for a new generation of Canadian diplomats. Lawrence Smith, a young Canadian diplomat working on the law of the sea file, recalls that during negotiations the DEA “thought we had everyone on side, including the Indians. And they blocked it.” A growing sense developed in the DEA that “the Indians never seemed to want to agree to anything.”71 Earl Drake, a colleague who had worked in the DEA’s United Nations Division, added that Menon annoyed just about everyone who worked at the United Nations. Menon “rubbed people the wrong way, he was a flamboyant Hindu intellectual.”72 That Smith and Drake developed such views in the early stages of their careers fed the debate that would occur in the 1970s in which the pro-Indianists were greatly outnumbered in the DEA. In the meantime, consideration of all the events flagged by Ronning illustrates that both countries placed national interests above all. Ronning now accepted Glazebrook’s earlier assessment. However, he believed that these events represented a confirmation rather than a setback since neither country had much influence over the other. He astutely observed that, “during the better part of the last decade, for a variety of reasons, our relations with India have superficially appeared closer and deeper than has actually been the case.”73 Part of that impression began with the active cooperation at the United Nations during the Korean War as well as the public relationship among St. Laurent, Pearson, and Nehru, which scrutiny reveals to have been ephemeral. Certainly, the missionary zeal of Reid added to the impression of bilateral dynamism, but Ronning left his colleague out of his analysis. Rather, he believed that those earlier events and memories had primarily distorted and nourished New Delhi’s mistaken belief that Canada could embrace a non-aligned role in the Cold War. Similarly, Ronning believed that Canada’s position – condemning Britain’s actions – in the Suez Crisis had bolstered the Indian perception of Canada’s “independence.” Colombo Plan aid had also coloured the impression of a closer relationship. It became an article of faith that Canada and India should have close relations. Ronning argued that “it now seems to me that relations between the two countries have always been basically thin and superficial.”74 Ronning had a strong case backing up his new hard-hitting analysis. Few Canadians, apart from missionaries, had directly experienced India and understood its history and position in Asia; likewise, few Indians had visited Canada. Although Canada gave significant and increasing aid to India, trade between the two countries was anemic, and immigrants to Canada were few. The examples of the Korean War and Suez

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Crisis suggested some common views, but this commonality carried less weight than Ottawa’s inability to influence New Delhi on matters affecting Canadian interests. The recent ICSC divergences and disagreements at the United Nations illustrate this point. Aside from the sobering analysis, Ronning asserted that India remained the most important uncommitted nation in the world and the most important democracy in Asia. It was imperative that Ottawa, within limits, “constantly endeavour to seize any opportunity of showing to the Indians that we are well disposed towards them.”75 This advice harkened back to telegrams from Escott Reid. Unlike Reid, Ronning left off policy prescriptions. Instead, he pressed for greater realism rather than wishful thinking in assessing bilateral relations. Obviously, Canada would not become non-aligned, leave NATO, or lessen its ties with the United States. Economic conditions made it difficult to bolster aid to India, trade patterns had been established, and Ottawa was unwilling to increase Indian immigration. The two countries therefore played secondary roles with one another. Relations were friendly and might even be improved but only if “we face the fact that they are in both cases overshadowed by more vital relations with other countries or groups of countries.”76 Ronning effectively argued for a realistic perspective stripped of a bridge or special relationship theory. In sum, Canada’s relations with India were predicated on Ottawa’s NATO commitments and close ties with London and Washington.77 This sober view set Ronning apart from Reid, who had envisioned so much more but struggled to accept the boundaries identified by his successor. Ronning’s call for greater attention went unheeded in Ottawa. Morley Scott, then with the Commonwealth Division of the DEA, reassured Ronning that his account of Indian-Canadian relations had impressed his colleagues. However, some had questioned whether the document was “sufficiently compatible with the views taken in the highest quarters to enable us to circulate it.” Although the memorandum had received wide circulation, it had skirted the Prime Minister’s Office.78 By October 1960, departmental briefing notes on India mirrored Ronning’s phrasing describing Indo-Canadian relations as friendly, but “our relations have often appeared closer than has actually been the case, for they are basically rather thin.”79 Ronning likely did not recognize just how prescient his observations were. The “Ronning dispatch” came to characterize Canada-India relations for the decade and into the 1970s. A study of the two SSEAs during the Diefenbaker period confirmed Ronning’s assessment of the two countries’ secondary importance to each other. Sidney Smith died on 17 March 1959. During his brief tenure as minister, India lacked profile. In June, Diefenbaker appointed Howard Green as minister. His last overseas voyage had occurred during his Canadian Expeditionary Force service in

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the First World War, but he demonstrated an interest in international issues – disarmament in particular. During his tenure, that file became a central priority.80 Neither Smith nor Green travelled to Asia during their time in cabinet. Although many policy makers and politicians still considered India the premier democracy, if not nation, in Asia, both ministers neglected cultivating ties between Canada and India. While Green closely followed the debate concerning the international commission in Laos, he limited personal involvement in the India file. This distance hints at the disenchantment that the Conservatives had with Indian foreign policy and the anti-Western rhetoric flowing from senior Indian officials. Indian foreign policy occasionally frustrated Green. Early in the new year, he met with Rudolf Duder, an officer from the Commonwealth Division, to discuss matters of interest at the United Nations. India factored considerably into the conversation, and Green’s comments to Duder deserve attention: “During our time together the Minister kept returning to the unsatisfactory behaviour of India at the United Nations General Assembly.” Green focused on Menon, giving Duder the impression that Green had “been hurt by Krishna Menon’s attack on the Canadian resolution on disarmament, an attack which Mr. Green considered a stab in the back from a friend.” Green wondered whether the intransigence occurred because the Indians were “a little jealous of Canada’s prestige and good works in the field of disarmament.” He spoke bitterly “against the group of neutrals, in which he included India ... a group which, although claiming to be non-aligned, was in fact … playing the Communists’ game while, at the same time, taking aid from the other side as well.” To counter the “neutrals,” Green mused about the possibility of encouraging “a grouping of rightminded nations, such as Pakistan, Malaya, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Canada to act as a counterweight.” He advised Duder that the Commonwealth Division should coax India to follow “a more reasonable path.”81 In contrast, the record of the meeting indicates that later Green spoke warmly of the Pakistanis. Pakistan’s eagerness to take sides in the Cold War caught Ottawa’s notice. Ayub Khan and Diefenbaker continued to correspond after the 1958 visit. The former stressed Pakistan’s concerns over communist encroachment on the developing world and drew attention to non-aligned India’s more accommodating attitudes toward the East Bloc and China.82 While this strategy failed to steer Canada toward Pakistan, as had occurred with American foreign policy in South Asia, Diefenbaker and Green both noted Pakistan’s alliance with the West in the Cold War. In fact, Green described the Pakistanis to Duder as “forthright, frank and willing to stand up and be counted.”83 Green reflected the sentiments of past senior officials in the DEA and government, notably Pearson, who had voiced similar opinions when contrasting Pakistani and Indian foreign policy and cultural characteristics.

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Chances for cooperation or enhancements of bilateral linkages rarely arose during the last few years of Diefenbaker’s term. By the early 1960s, even the important Commonwealth connection had faded.84 The Commonwealth experienced considerable changes; membership increased from eight in 1949 to seventeen in 1961, with the newly independent African states representing the bulk of new members. Not surprisingly, then, Morley Scott acknowledged to Ronning that the Commonwealth Division had neglected “the individual countries of the Commonwealth, outside of Africa.”85 Increased membership also meant that the prime ministers’ meetings lost a sense of intimacy. Ottawa and New Delhi found some common ground concerning South Africa’s membership in the Commonwealth. Even there, though, Canada hesitantly agreed with the Indian view. The apartheid regime caused tension in the Commonwealth for many Asian and African members, including India, for a significant Indian diaspora lived in South Africa and suffered under apartheid. Those involved with the issue in the DEA vacillated, some believing that the line of communication should remain open hopefully to moderate Pretoria’s stance, while others wanted South Africa forced out for its odious views. The Sharpeville massacre in March 1960 lent weight to those supporting a firmer line. Still, with no consensus, Ottawa’s position remained in flux when the Commonwealth heads of government met in March 1961. Robertson, Glazebrook, and Green sought a compromise in the DEA, while the Commonwealth Division prepared to accept South Africa’s expulsion from that organization. Diefenbaker met with R.K. Nehru, the Indian secretary-general for external affairs, in London. Nehru briefed him on the Indian view, which advocated a hard line against South Africa. Diefenbaker went so far as to suggest that the conference should firmly condemn apartheid.86 He indicated to Nehru that this “would probably cause South Africa to withdraw from the Commonwealth and so avert the need for direct action by other members.”87 This is precisely what occurred. Unwilling to compromise, the South Africans withdrew from the Commonwealth. It is uncertain whether Ottawa’s decision to support the Indian position won accolades in New Delhi, but Jawaharlal Nehru appreciated it, expressing his satisfaction with Diefenbaker’s stance to the American ambassador, John Kenneth Galbraith.88 If Canadian as well as Indian officials sincerely sought an issue of likemindedness, one on which Ottawa and New Delhi could reach a consensus or together spearhead a resolution, then South Africa was one. Basil Robinson recalled, however, that during and after the 1961 Commonwealth meetings neither Diefenbaker nor Nehru tried to establish closer relations despite their willingness to unite against South Africa.89 The Indian High Commission in

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Ottawa detected the malaise. The earlier positive political reporting from the Indian High Commission in Ottawa waned. The monthly report for February 1961 echoed Ronning’s earlier observations, noting that, “in the field of international relations, it has to be admitted, however, that the close co-operation between the two countries that existed during the period of Pearson’s stewardship of the Foreign Office did not continue to the same extent.”90 The Indians recognized that “in the United Nations, on many issues like the ... disarmament questions, Canada and India were not found on the same side.” Canada placed relations with Washington, London, and NATO as the cornerstones of its foreign policy. Still, the Indian High Commission thought it wrong to conclude that the two countries “have altogether drifted apart.”91 In mid-September, border tensions flared up as Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) units crossed over the northeastern frontier. For the first time since independence, India faced a critical threat to its sovereignty. The attacks came at a terrible time for New Delhi. The Indian military had planned for war against the far weaker Pakistani state, not the PLA. The Indian military was expected to expand and enhance border defences, and recruit new soldiers, with an evershrinking defence budget as government policy prioritized non-alignment and domestic development.92 Indian equipment became obsolete as the government directed scarce foreign reserves elsewhere, and Nehru would not jeopardize the cherished policy of non-alignment by seeking Western support. The Indians tried to counterattack, but the better-equipped and-trained Chinese infantry pushed back. Most Indian troops lacked proper equipment and clothing required for cold weather warfare needed in the mountainous and barren terrain that separated the two countries. By late October, the situation had severely worsened for the Indians. The Chinese launched large-scale attacks along the mountainous regions of Ladakh, in Indian-controlled Kashmir, and the North-East Frontier Agency overran Indian defences. The Indian army faced a rout. By mid-November, following another Indian counterattack gone awry, the Chinese advanced as far south as Uttar Pradesh, a state bordering New Delhi. Panic set in. The inexperienced Krishna Menon held the minister of defence portfolio and even feuded with the officer corps.93 His appointment to the defence portfolio was a terrible misjudgment by Nehru, leaving him no choice but to sack his friend in the face of the public and political demands for Menon’s resignation. In the midst of calamity, Nehru turned to the West for military assistance. Frantic calls for assistance were made to the Australian, American, British, and Canadian governments. Coincidentally, this event unfolded as the Cuban Missile Crisis came to a head, and Peking took advantage of the distraction of the West and Soviet Union. Despite the crisis on its doorstep and a history of tense

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relations with India, Washington offered immediate assistance. American policy makers saw the attack, along with Menon’s fall from grace, as an opportunity to secure India’s allegiance to the West.94 In addition, they believed that the Chinese invasion provided the West with a golden opportunity to drive a wedge between Moscow and New Delhi as the Soviets stumbled with their response. While Moscow had courted India in the wake of Stalin’s death, it carefully avoided taking sides in the Sino-Indo border dispute – annoying both Peking and New Delhi. Both countries expected Soviet support, and the Indians in particular lobbied the Soviets to mediate between the two sides. As the border clashes increased from 1959 to 1962, the Chinese pressed the Soviets to support their communist brothers in Peking. The Chinese had begun to challenge the Soviets for leadership of the communist bloc. Although Moscow had sympathy for New Delhi, it needed the support of the communist bloc, including China, during the Cuban Missile Crisis.95 Ultimately, caught off guard, the Soviets watched as the Indians retreated and did little. As the situation deteriorated in mid-November with a series of rapid Chinese advances, Nehru’s reserve cracked. Nehru had gratefully accepted initial American support of light infantry weapons and light equipment, and he now pleaded for further help and asked for the immediate dispatch of air support. Nehru asked President Kennedy on 19 November for direct American involvement, with a request that US personnel pilot the fighter jets. India, Nehru wrote to Kennedy, faced “a grim situation.”96 The war ended almost as quickly as it began, before the United States could respond to Nehru’s startling request. On 21 November, the Chinese unilaterally declared a ceasefire, and the PLA withdrew from much of the ground that it had seized. Canada’s role in this crisis was both limited and cautious. Menon informed Ronning on 19 October that Indian officials urgently wanted to procure Canadian Caribou aircraft.97 On 22 October, Diefenbaker advised Parliament that his government would consider any request from New Delhi. The following day Ottawa announced that all exports to China, except wheat, would be cut.98 Norman Robertson advised Howard Green that the DEA should facilitate the Caribou purchase by supplying export permits, which normally took months to process, between the Indians and the seller, de Havilland.99 However, Canadian military aid took time to arrive. Although the Indians officially requested further military assistance on 16 November, the DEA began to consider the request for forty-five Caribou, five Otter, and two Dakota aircraft as well as supplies “of Arctic clothing sufficient for 100,000 troops, and 500 tons of electrolyte nickel for small arms and ammunition production,” the day after China’s withdrawal.100 Determining the financial particulars took time, but on 19 November cabinet agreed that six Dakota aircraft, a relatively obsolete and surplus plane, would

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be given as a gift to the Indians provided that they reimburse Canada for the cost of preparing the aircraft and flying them to India.101 The bulk of the Canadian contribution, however, arrived in 1963. Canada had a vested interest in preventing the collapse of Asia’s largest democratic state. Yet Diefenbaker let London and Washington take the lead in buttressing India’s defences once the conflict ended. Reflection on Ottawa’s reaction to the conflict underscores the degree to which India had slipped in importance to the Diefenbaker government. Ottawa had sold wheat, albeit in inconsistent amounts, to China since 1958. Canada had a wheat surplus, and China provided a lucrative market. The Indians knew of Canada’s continued wheat sales, and Nehru implied to Ronning that Canadian wheat assisted the Chinese aggression against India. Ronning passed the critique on to Green. Likewise, under instructions from New Delhi, the Indian high commissioner pressed Green on whether Ottawa would cancel future grain sales to China. The unfavourable cabinet response revealed annoyance that “(a) Canada had received little thanks from India for assisting that country by building dams and otherwise. (b) India was still trading with China, and diplomatic relations were continuing.”102 Canada’s limited trade links with China already dwarfed bilateral trade with India. Sacrificing the lucrative Chinese market would antagonize wheat farmers, a significant part of the Conservatives’ western Canadian political base. India’s stagnant economy, combined with its penchant for appearing unappreciative of assistance, added to growing cynicism, if not weariness, toward New Delhi. To the surprise of the Indian high commissioner, C.S. Jha, Pearson seemed to be sympathetic but detached from the incident, whereas the “direct” and “brusque” Diefenbaker committed support.103 The DEA supported the views of cabinet. When one of Kennedy’s key advisers, McGeorge Bundy, asked whether the crisis might prompt Ottawa to reconsider wheat sales to China, Charles Ritchie, now the ambassador in Washington, quickly scotched any such proposal.104 The issue of India returned to the back burner for the Conservatives. On 5 February 1963, a non-confidence vote in the House of Commons defeated the government, and Canadians went back to the polls. On 8 April, the Liberals won a minority government. Lester Pearson became prime minister. Paul Martin returned to cabinet as SSEA. In broad terms, India, and Asia in general, fell from the list of priorities, and Diefenbaker and Green voiced cool comments on non-alignment and Indian foreign policy. Indeed, even Diefenbaker’s friendly relationship with Ayub Khan reflected the irritant that non-alignment posed. Cultural and religious factors added to the distance between Diefenbaker and the Indians. Khan did his utmost to fuel that distance, reminding Diefenbaker that the Pakistanis could be relied on in the fight against communism. Between December 1960 and December

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1961, Khan wrote to Diefenbaker three times to discuss with bold and direct rhetoric his concern about communist penetration in North Africa and Asia. Communist countries were only “too glad to exploit the situation to their advantage and to the loss of the free world,” as the example of India-China conflict showed. Khan depicted Canada and Pakistan as “partners in arms against Communist expansion,” urging Diefenbaker to use his influence to convince France to seek an early settlement to its colonial woes in Algeria. After all, Khan concluded, no one wanted to “see the area turned into an arena of bellicose Communist activities.” On the importance of development assistance to Pakistan, Khan observed that the “governments of this region are confronted with the gigantic task of raising the standards of living of the people from their present sub-human levels in order to meet the threat of the seductive promises of Communism.”105 Khan’s criticisms of Indian policy on Indochina clearly struck a chord with Diefenbaker. In an admission revealing the strong connection between the two leaders, Diefenbaker acknowledged that “we have had some seven years of experience in working with India on the International Commissions. Service on these commissions has been at times a thankless and frustrating task.”106 The two leaders exchanged views and continued to enjoy the company of the other. Diefenbaker successfully lobbied to have Khan visit Canada following the Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference in September 1962. Khan accompanied Diefenbaker to Ottawa on an RCAF flight for a state visit. The shared flight was a rare practice in Canadian diplomatic protocol.107 A growing number of officials in the DEA shared Diefenbaker’s bafflement with India and bristled at Indian foreign policy. This era cast the die for a slow retreat from the strategic importance that Ottawa had placed on India, and the vision that Ottawa could bridge India and the West faded. Ottawa largely ignored Ronning’s warnings of bilateral drift. Still, his one dispatch that scrutinized previous and current trends between Canada and India arguably had greater influence in Ottawa than Reid’s constant stream of missives. The countries agreed on few issues, a difficulty that both Ronning and his Indian counterpart relayed to their respective bureaucracies within a year of each other. Ottawa accepted that analysis. As will be seen, the Pearson era changed little. Policy makers in Ottawa gazed at Indian foreign policy with a jaundiced eye, and as the 1960s progressed this tradition continued unabated, particularly as divisions on the ICSC intensified. Ottawa continued to chafe at the self-righteousness of India’s policy of non-alignment, and New Delhi questioned Ottawa’s ability to act independently outside North America and NATO.

7 Mounting Problems, 1963–66

A tough spring election brought the Liberals and Lester Pearson to power in April 1963. Many senior figures in the DEA breathed a sigh of relief. They had found the Diefenbaker years difficult and hoped for better days ahead. Pearson’s departure from the diplomatic ranks to join the Liberals in 1948 had resulted in guilt by association for the DEA in Diefenbaker’s eyes, reaffirming his suspicion. Only half in jest, Diefenbaker had referred to the denizens of the DEA as “Pearsonalities,” believing that its leading figures had held long-standing relationships with and loyalties to Pearson. Among many in the senior ranks of the DEA, a general frustration had existed over the lack of clear direction from the prime minister on foreign relations.1 As SSEA in St. Laurent’s governments, Pearson had defined internationalism like no other Canadian before him. The Indians had appreciated his efforts, reflecting that he had “spectacularly presented the national policy” of Canada “to the outside world,” and they favoured his election victory.2 Hope that a Pearson government could reset relations to the more positive ones of the early 1950s were dashed. The bilateral fissures that appeared slowly in the late St. Laurent era became cracks as the 1960s progressed. Evolving differences in the ICSC discussions created a profound distaste for Indian foreign policy among many young Canadian diplomats serving in Vietnam. The entrenched attitude produced a long-term impact on bilateral policy as they returned home to Ottawa and their careers progressed. The countries continued to disagree over the question of nuclear safeguards, and later the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, at a time when Canadian-Indian nuclear cooperation intensified. Still, Ottawa sold two more nuclear reactors to New Delhi between 1963 and 1966. An interesting occurrence in light of the mounting dissonance between Canada and India on a number of global issues, these sales occurred at a time when Canadian policy makers appeared to be unwilling to scrutinize Canada’s interests in India, and political ties at the bureaucratic level corroded because of tensions on the ICSC. The end of the Pearson era saw Canada’s relationship with India move to the periphery of Canadian foreign policy interests, thereby completing the trajectory that had accelerated during the Diefenbaker period. Chester Ronning’s curt observation that the two nations were friendly but not close became the unquestioned official view.

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Ottawa’s international priorities became apparent to Canadian and foreign observers alike. Pearson met first with British prime minister Harold Macmillan, whom Pearson knew, and then with US president John Kennedy. In January 1964, Pearson travelled to Paris to meet Charles de Gaulle. No plans were made to travel to Asia or meet with his old acquaintance Nehru. At past Commonwealth conferences and bilateral visits, Pearson had observed the enigmatic demeanour and intellect of Nehru, characterized by a subtle blend of Eastern and Western influences. By 1963, Nehru’s striking presence had faded noticeably. Prominent American journalist Marquis Childs had met with Nehru shortly after the Chinese attacks and recalled a changed man. The charming and charismatic man of years earlier had weakened physically and appeared to be withdrawn.3 Still, Nehru warmly congratulated Pearson on his election victory and invited him to visit India. Pearson expressed “his sympathy and support for India in these difficult and dangerous times” but gently side-stepped the offer.4 The Sino-Indian border war revitalized Ronning’s view of India’s importance. Ronning once again became a fervent advocate of closer military and political ties between Ottawa and New Delhi. He recommended that Pearson visit India by the end of 1963. He also sought increased military support, going so far as to suggest that Canada make India the first non-NATO country to receive military assistance on a permanent basis and that a specific sum be allocated for military assistance to India. Ronning acknowledged the unorthodox nature of the request. That request certainly diverged from past policy. Canada’s significant aid relationship with India emphasized development, not military, purposes. Granted, Ottawa had exported surplus arms to India the previous decade, and Indian military officers had studied in Kingston at the National Defence College, but no formal and substantial defence ties existed between the two countries, nor had the Indians pressed for one until the shock of the border war with China. The other delicate aspect of Ronning’s recommendation related to Pakistan, which would undoubtedly object. However, India remained the major democratic power in Asia. Canada could justify extending special consideration in light of the Chinese victory and take the opportunity to solidify the ties between New Delhi and the West.5 In other words, India’s vulnerability presented a new opportunity to coax India closer to the Western camp, and defence ties could add a new dimension to bilateral relations with Ottawa. To build on that possibility, a further dispatch suggested again that Pearson travel to India. Ronning thought that Pearson should see the country “in a state of transition” and test the climate for himself. The significance of the visit would be noticed, Ronning appealed, since “no head of an important Western state or government has visited India since the advent of the emergency.” A visit would illustrate to the Indians their importance to the Commonwealth and the West

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without “rubbing sand into wounds sustained by the policy of non-alignment in recent months.”6 There would be no visit. Ronning’s recommendation, as well as New Delhi’s hope, for additional military support did not resonate in Ottawa. The Indian high commissioner in Ottawa, C.S. Jha, met with George Glazebrook shortly after Ronning’s dispatches. Jha “more than hinted that a public assurance of continued support would be appropriate and well received.” Yet the diplomat bluntly stated that, while India remained the sole Asian power resisting Chinese aggression, the West should not expect any fundamental change in Indian foreign policy; with or without Western support, India would increase its defence capacity. Jha’s comments rankled Glazebrook, who saw this as another example supporting Canadian officials’ belief that India readily accepted Western aid without appearing to be appreciative. Unmoved by Jha’s approach, Glazebrook concluded that, if Jha represented the Indian view, then “it appears that Canada and other Western countries are invited to sign blank cheques for an indefinite period and that cooperation with India is to be purely military and not involve discussion of policy which lies behind the military plans.”7 Norman Robertson, the USSEA, agreed with Glazebrook’s assessment. He advised SSEA Paul Martin that “the most important thing, before any decision on long-term military aid is reached, is to get a clearer idea than we have at present about what the Indian policies are which we would be underwriting.”8 Ottawa insisted that any further military aid not be used to tip the balance of power in the Indian subcontinent; the Canadians also refused to be dragged into the simmering feud between India and Pakistan. The latter had already voiced disapproval over the Canadian emergency aid. Martin simply advised Ronning that “we must make a strong effort to let the Indians know that we are with them and that they have our sympathy and understanding in their difficulties.” In general, Canada responded quickly to the Indian crisis, and the most severe situation passed. Ottawa would monitor the circumstances before dispensing further military assistance.9 While Ottawa carefully assessed the potential impact of military support, Canadian officials were more receptive to expanding nuclear links. Ottawa, pushed by the exuberant lobbying of Atomic Energy Canada Limited (AECL), willingly continued the potentially lucrative sale of reactors to India. Despite sporadic uncertainty in the DEA about the aims of India’s nuclear program, trade trumped concerns over proliferation in this matter. Ottawa remained interested in assisting India in developing its nuclear energy program by selling reactors and offering technical expertise in operating them. The Pearson Liberals agreed to continue the negotiations with New Delhi, begun under the Conservatives in September 1962, for a Canadian-designed

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heavy-water reactor constructed in Rajasthan. Negotiations for the CIR exasperated both sides, and negotiations for the Rajasthan reactor proved to be equally arduous, if not more so, as Ottawa pressed for stricter safeguards. The eventual disagreements became another chapter in a series of long-standing interpretive incongruities between the two countries. In the meantime, the CIR reactor went critical on 10 July 1960, yet questions remained concerning the application of IAEA safeguards, inspections, and the sale of uranium to India. In 1957, only a year after signing the CIR agreement, the Indians expressed annoyance with Canada’s attitudes toward attaching safeguards to future atomic energy cooperation. In the final days of the St. Laurent government, Ottawa developed the general terms on which it would negotiate bilateral agreements with “friendly” governments for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, covering in particular the supply of uranium. These terms reflected IAEA regulations that were not entirely included in the initial CIR agreement. However, provisions in the new export terms would apply to the sale of nuclear material or fuel from Canada to India, and the Indians found these provisions troubling.10 They believed that Ottawa “fully appreciates that the terms regarding inspection and reporting are distasteful to India and other sovereign countries,” and Homi Bhabha had clearly expressed this position. 11 A month later an Indian diplomat in Ottawa, Raghunath Sinha, met with W.D. Matthews, assistant undersecretary in the DEA, to discuss the Indian view. Sinha reported to New Delhi that he had made little progress.12 The ongoing construction frustrated the Canadians. The CIR had been slated for completion in October 1958, and the construction delays led some AECL officials to mutter about the incompetence of their Indian counterparts. Lorne Gray, the president of AECL, wrote to Bhabha on 11 November 1958 that “I have had a recent report from Bombay which disturbs me very much.” Gray learned that N.B. Prasad, the Indian project manager tasked to supervise the CIR construction site, had not been “spending any appreciable time on the CIR project as yet.” Equally bothersome reports emerged that Prasad recommended “the cladding of the CIR dome be delayed until after the next monsoon: this is also entirely unsatisfactory and will very seriously delay the job.” Gray thought that the Canadian staff assisting the project would be demoralized. He also had strong words on the stack design: I also understand that DAE [Department of Atomic Energy] is having some difficulty in getting the stack designed and built and that Prasad has again tried to unload detailed design of this item onto SECO. Our position must remain very firm on this matter, as there is no reason in the world – other than perhaps

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foreign exchange – why you cannot have a simple stack designed and built, based on the functional specifications which we have already provided through SECO.

Gray informed Bhabha that an AECL official was going to Bombay on a factfinding tour and would report to him. If the official concluded that the DAE could not complete the cladding before the next monsoon, then AECL would consider shutting down the Canadian work on the site for a “few months until you can get sufficient effort together to carry out your obligations.” Gray bluntly stated “the absolute necessity” that the DAE take the project seriously and assign “some competent Project Manager full-time. If we continue the way we are going – with decisions to delay cladding and to delay stack design and construction indefinitely – some of the staff are estimating that the job will not be finished until 1961 or 1962.”13 The Canadian’s blunt tone surely rankled Bhabha, the ambitious leader and proud father of India’s nuclear program. The Colombo Plan Policy Committee at the DEA shared Gray’s concerns. In a meeting in Ottawa, department officials suggested that Sen Gupta, the joint secretary in the Indian Ministry of Finance, meet with Gray to discuss the cost overruns and delays in building the reactor. C.S. Venkatachar, the Indian high commissioner in Ottawa, attended the discussion between Gupta and Gray. His record of the meeting shows that Gray reiterated his displeasure with the construction delays and warned that “his Engineers were extremely apprehensive of the decision of the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] of India to manufacture their own fuel for initial utilisation.” Gray warned the AEC officials that, “if as a result of the utilisation of this fuel a breakdown should occur, he would promptly withdraw all his personnel from the site.”14 Homi Bhabha dismissed Gray’s accusations. He made it clear that the rumoured postponement of the cladding was false. Nor was there truth behind the allegation that the Indians sought to offload the design of the stack. Indeed, the relay of “false information” “disturbed” him. He also wanted to address “the ridiculous suggestion that we were deliberately going slow on the CIR Project because we wanted a second Indian-built reactor to come into operation before CIR.” His direct tone then changed; perhaps a disgruntled party had deliberately sown these mistruths “in an attempt to spoil the excellent relations between AECL and ourselves.” Finally, Bhabha confirmed “the absolute necessity” of meeting the deadlines, for the Indians would be spending more than rupees ten lakhs per month if the work continued beyond the scheduled completion date of 31 December 1959.15 Following this discussion, Bhabha raised the exchange of correspondence with Gray as well as Gupta’s meeting in Ottawa with Subimal Dutt, the Indian foreign secretary: “I must confess that we are not happy at the way in which

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some of the Canadians on the spot mislead their principals in Canada.” He suggested that, if further “misrepresentation continues,” then the Indian government should make a formal complaint to the Canadians. The real thorn in his side, however, continued to be the question of safeguards, and the correspondence with Dutt, the senior diplomat in the IMEA, illustrates his uncompromising nature on that issue. Bhabha confidently expressed to Dutt that Gray and his predecessors knew his views from the outset. The Indians “have made it perfectly plain from the very beginning that we would be willing to take Canadian fuel elements for the first charge, provided they are supplied to us without any strings and conditions regarding inspection and control.” The IAEA still needed to clarify language surrounding safeguards and the supply of uranium fuel. Therefore, Bhabha advised, “if the Canadians cannot … supply us the fuel elements without any conditions attached, except the general undertaking from us that they will only be used in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy, we have no option but to provide our own fuel elements.” Bhabha believed his scientists capable of accomplishing such a task.16 His overconfidence in India’s ability to be self-reliant was mistaken – a lesson that the Canadians would learn soon enough. American observers corroborated Gray’s concerns; in fact, they had characterized the CIR as a battleground between the Indians and the Canadians since its announcement in 1955. The American consulate in Bombay reported to Washington in September 1959 that the CIR project would “take about twice as long and will cost about twice as much to build as the original estimates suggested. This large increase in time and expense is in part due to the organization of the project, personality clashes and Indian inexperience.” Tension developed since both sides had entered into the project in good faith, expecting to iron out any wrinkles later. Based upon frank talks with the Canadians, the American consul general in Bombay got the impression that “the Government of India Department of Atomic Energy is unable to carry out large understandings in an efficient manner.” Personality clashes were part of the problem; one Canadian official had been labelled incompetent and sacked by AECL even though the Indians liked his work. On the other hand, the Indians appeared to be unwilling or unable to jettison their own problem employees. A Canadian source reported that Prasad, the project manager, singled out by Gray for not showing up to work, had spent only 100 days on the construction site in eighteen months. The Canadian added that he had made twenty-nine appointments with Prasad to visit the construction site jointly, only to have him break every appointment; “it was the Canadians belief that Prasad refused to visit the construction site with him because he did not want to show his ignorance of the project.” The American report suggested a tentative future for the CIR. The authors doubted

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whether the Indians could operate the reactor after completion or manufacture uranium fuel. It looked as though the Indians had embarked on the project in 1956 without a full understanding of all that it entailed. A successful outcome appeared to be unlikely.17 The American report mapped Canadian concerns fairly accurately. The Canadians doubted the Indians’ ability to produce the necessary fuel rods, and AECL believed that the fuel rods should be sent from Canada, but the Indians remained adamantly opposed to the application of safeguards. After another round of discussions, both sides agreed in November on “watered down” safeguards for the CIR.18 The newfound Indian flexibility reflects Bhabha’s overestimation of the number of quality uranium rods that the Indians could produce rather than a great epiphany on the benefit of safeguards. The CIR required 192 uranium rods to act at full capacity. Canadian sources suspected that by the fall of 1959 the Indians had produced only one.19 With the grudging Indian concession, the wrinkles were smoothed out for the time being. Canada could supply fuel with guarantees that the reactor would be used strictly for peaceful purposes. Despite the contentious talks, Ottawa took pride in the fact that the CIR was the only Canadian-designed reactor operating in a foreign market. As Duane Bratt notes in his study of Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor exports, Canada had always expected to export its nuclear technology. Given the “small domestic market, it was realized early [by AECL] that Canada’s nuclear industry must have an international dimension.”20 Despite American, British, and French competition, the Canadians established a presence in and relationship with India. There was a second important factor driving Ottawa’s nuclear reactor export ambitions. Canada had an abundance of uranium required to fuel nuclear reactors. Through the promotion of civilian nuclear power and the construction of reactors globally, Canada’s uranium mining industry stood to benefit.21 AECL hoped that the example of India would cultivate new clients for its technology. It did. Once the CIR went critical the Indians expressed interest in a new advanced Canadian product, the CANDU nuclear reactor. New Delhi sought to accelerate its plans for nuclear power generation, and Bhabha wrote to Nehru that “the Canadians have been very keen to cooperate with us in building such a station in India,” and discussions between Bhabha and Gray meant “that a joint Indo-Canadian team should study the cost of building such a station in India.”22 A new round of discussions began in the summer of 1962. Fostering Ottawa’s interest, undoubtedly, were the successful talks between the Indians and the Americans to finance and supply a power-generating nuclear station at Tarapur.23

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Ottawa’s desire to export its technology, however, continued to clash with India’s need to protect its autonomy – how India chose to develop and utilize that technology once purchased. Again, the question of safeguards made for protracted negotiations. Ottawa had emerged as a key international supporter of nuclear safeguards, whereas Bhabha remained effusive in his disdain for them. India’s attitude toward the IAEA is a key example of this sentiment. The IAEA had been established between the construction of the CIR and the negotiations for a new Canadian reactor sale to India, and Nehru shared Bhabha’s wariness and consistently referred to the IAEA’s objective of establishing a system of effective nuclear safeguards to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy as constituting “atomic colonialism.”24 At the same time, Ottawa actively sought to strengthen the budding international safeguards regime by helping to form the “Ottawa Group” to support safeguards in the IAEA.25 Howard Green remained a passionate proponent of nuclear disarmament, and many of his officials in the DEA supported his zeal. Ironically, Green saw no conflict between exports to India and his views on disarmament. The IAEA established a framework for safeguards that likely reinforced Canadian convictions and those of Green. Still, India and Canada pursued complementary objectives. The Indians needed technology, and AECL wanted to sell technology. Ultimately, dollars trumped security concerns. Negotiations continued, and Nehru announced in the Lok Sabha in August 1962 his government’s intention to build a Canadian-designed heavy-water reactor in Rajasthan. Throughout this process, historian Robert Bothwell rightly notes, the DEA adopted a tougher approach on the question of safeguards than did AECL, motivated by sales and the subtle Indian threat that other suppliers existed.26 Bhabha travelled to Ottawa in May 1963 to lobby the newly elected Liberal government. Soon after, Ronning sent a signal to Ottawa that created doubt about India’s nuclear ambitions. The Indians doubled their defence spending for 1963–64. That alone did not suggest that India intended to develop a nuclear bomb, but the demands of the Hindu political right in the Lok Sabha for India to produce nuclear weapons changed the equation.27 Although Nehru refused to countenance such demands, the proponents of an Indian nuclear weapons program had grown both in number and in conviction in the wake of the Chinese victory. Ronning took Nehru at his word. He counselled that the Indians would keep to their peaceful nuclear purposes at least until after the Chinese signalled their intention or demonstrated their capacity to explode a nuclear device. However, he added a caveat: “I admit I was somewhat disturbed by my conversations with Bhabha and Khera and it is only after much soul-searching I have reached conclusion we should go ahead with project.”28

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Despite his wavering support, Ronning advised Ottawa to continue encouraging the Indians to accept IAEA safeguards. He suggested two alternatives if this approach failed. First, Ottawa should insist on a “completely satisfactory agreement” from New Delhi to prevent “any possible use of our equipment for war purposes.” Second, Ottawa could “accept flexibility involved in present Indian draft which may risk possibility of Indians using fissionable material from their fuel for non-peaceful purposes.” Ronning recommended that Ottawa choose, if necessary, the second alternative – fearing that the Indians might violate a rigid agreement if faced with a grave threat to national security. A violation would “have very bad effect upon our relations with India – especially after such lengthy negotiations.” Besides, if the Indians ultimately chose to use their own fissionable material, then the second option would allow “us to close our eyes to eventual disposition of that material particularly if at that time we are not prepared publicly to endorse possible change in India’s present attitude and intent.”29 Ultimately, the Canadians secured Ronning’s second alternative. Adopting a harder line achieved some important gains. New Delhi granted Ottawa the “right to inspect and verify disposition of product CDN fuel, right to inspect premises of reactor plant, right to obtain records of all fuel used in reactor and guarantee of prior notification of disposition of product of nuclear fuel.” But the lack of IAEA involvement meant that the agreed inspections fell purely within bilateral lines. The Indians refused to embrace the ambitions of the IAEA, and the safeguards applied only to Canadian uranium used in the reactor. Still, the concessions that the Canadians received numbered more than Ronning had thought Bhabha would allow considering that he initially determined “to give us even less than provided by CIR agreement.” Finally, blunt pragmatism permeated his analysis. If the Indians did not get the reactor from Ottawa, then they would get it from somewhere else, and he counselled Ottawa to “come to an early decision in favour of CANDU reactor in India whether or not” further concessions were acquired from Bhabha.30 Norman Robertson, however, demanded that the Indians abide by the above concessions for the deal to receive Ottawa’s approval. The recently signed Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the domestic debate over nuclear missiles for the Canadian Armed Forces heightened public attention at home and elsewhere on Canada’s atomic cooperation with India.31 Robertson informed Ronning that “there has already been press and radio comments to the effect that [Canada] has put India in a substantially improved position to build a bomb if they so desire.” It was imperative that, if Canada wanted to sign the Test Ban Treaty, then its position on safeguards should reflect the “spirit of the Test Ban

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Agreement and our determination to avoid to the extent we have influence the extension of nuclear military capability. It would follow therefore that we must continue to seek adequate safeguards.” If the Indians could be flexible on issues such as verifying the disposition of nuclear fuel and other audit procedures, then Ottawa could grant the Indians reciprocity, so that they could in turn inspect a similar Canadian reactor, soothing Indian feelings. Although “we had never anticipated that we could prevent the Indians from breaking or violating the agreement,” Ottawa merely asked Bhabha to accept the “rights” that Ronning had outlined.32 In the reflections of Robertson, one can easily glimpse the deftness that had made him one of the key Canadian international trade negotiators in the 1930s. He informed Ronning that both sides had approached an agreement but that now the ball was in Bhabha’s court. The DEA would send the deal to cabinet provided that it could assure cabinet that the agreement met Ottawa’s commitment to safeguards and its concomitant desire to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Indians blinked. On 21 November, the Pearson cabinet agreed to the deal. Canada would provide technical information and financing for the purchase of Canadian-supplied material, equipment, and fuel. The agreement ensured that the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP I) would be partnered with a Canadian reactor at Douglas Point, Ontario. The articles clearly stated that both stations would be used only for peaceful purposes.33 This appeared to be a superb deal for Ottawa. AECL strengthened its relationship with India and proved that Canada could carve out a niche for itself on the world nuclear market. Paul Martin cheerfully asserted in cabinet that “the success of the negotiations on the safeguards provisions made possible a major programme of collaboration going beyond the establishment of the CANDU power station.”34 Officials in the DEA negotiated a deal that not only respected their desire for safeguards but also forced the Indians to back down from their earlier position. Unlike the CIR deal, this agreement had some teeth to it. For the Indians, the deal ensured nuclear cooperation and guaranteed them access to advanced Canadian technology. The Rajasthan reactor deal was one of the final major initiatives in which Ronning played a key role. The other delicate issue of the ICSC often confronted him. During a brief respite between 1961 and 1962, the Canadians believed that the ICSC improved in the fairness of its reporting. During that period, the Canadians and Indians cooperated to produce a majority special report condemning Hanoi for “inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities” in South Vietnam. The unique report condemned the violations committed by the North Vietnamese and criticized American military aid to Saigon – which also contravened the ceasefire agreement. Robert Bothwell observes that the

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Canadians hoped that this report would inject a renewed sense of purpose and credibility into the floundering ICSC in Vietnam. While the Americans and South Vietnamese received the report well, Hanoi protested against it. Perhaps this cooperation marked “the emergence of an Indo-Canadian majority on the commission,” as had been hoped for from the beginning.35 Unfortunately, the split on the ICSC ushered in a period of inactivity, and the commission failed to produce regular reports for the next three years. Matters deteriorated on the ICSC after Pearson’s election. The new Canadian commissioner, Gordon Cox, sympathized with the Americans and became consistently irate with perceived Indian obstinacy toward fulfilling the ICSC mission to investigate subversion and prepare the requisite reports. Reporting to Ottawa, Cox bluntly revealed his angst: “Frustration is not ... a strong enough word.”36 With US encouragement, he strove to have the ICSC condemn Hanoi whenever possible while ignoring American trespasses on the ceasefire agreement. Cox’s actions merely added to mutual dissatisfaction of the ICSC members. His views antagonized the Indians, just as Indian practices of obfuscation antagonized the Canadians. In 1964, Blair Seaborn replaced Cox as the Canadian commissioner. Although he recalled having a good rapport with his Indian counterpart, he acknowledged that most of the Indian diplomats on the ICSC were “frustrating” to their Canadian colleagues, and it “seemed as though their role [that of the Indians] was to keep the commission from being useful.”37 ICSC relations simply festered, exacerbated by the inability to produce balanced reporting. The bilateral difficulties created from that commission escaped Ronning’s concern. In May 1964, his seven-year term as high commissioner ended. It had been an unusually long stint. His final dispatch revealed a guarded view of India’s future. The enthusiasm that Ronning exuded when he arrived in New Delhi had dissipated. Nehru publicly ailed, his leadership waned, and “the general trend is probably downwards.”38 No one appeared to be able to fill the void that Nehru’s departure would inevitably cause. In his final assessment of Indian foreign policy, Ronning concluded that since 1961 “in almost every aspect of India’s foreign relations – the important exceptions being relations with Moscow and Washington – rot has set in.” In South Asia, India feuded with Pakistan, China, Ceylon, and Nepal. In 1961, New Delhi abruptly seized the last colonial outpost on its soil by forcing Portugal from Goa. India’s tactics sullied its image in the West and undermined its ability to counsel emerging postcolonial nations. Yet other aspects remained unchanged: “Nehru has not one whit changed his practice of expecting higher standards of conduct from the West than from the East.” While the border war had led New Delhi to realize that the West offered greater prospects for military and economic

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aid than the Soviet Bloc, this realization would not prompt the Indians to make any palpable change toward the West in the Cold War. On the state of CanadaIndia relations, Ronning offered reserved comments: I believe that I can say that we have fared as well or better than any other Western country in Indian esteem. We are more involved with the Indians (in aid, in Indochina and in U.N. undertakings) than many Western and most Commonwealth countries, yet we are obviously not thought of by the Indians as approaching the importance of Britain and the United States. Our media position is therefore probably a protection against the sort of criticism which the Indians are fond of directing irrationally at their major benefactors. Expressions of appreciation for our aid and friendship tend, therefore, to be less clouded by extraneous considerations. Even so, there is a regrettable tendency, both official and nonofficial, to misrepresent directly or by innuendo Canada’s trade with Communist China. In general, however, I think our relations with India are good. Nevertheless, as I have previously reported, these relations are likely to remain satisfactory only to the extent that our respective interests do not seriously clash.39

Ironically, the Canadian position in India that Ronning spoke of benefited from the fact that, of the major Western countries, Canada ran one of the most anemic public diplomacy programs in South Asia. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Indian media and the elites remained widely oblivious to things “Canadian.” In January, just months before Ronning’s departure, Nehru suffered a slight stroke and was confined to bed. In the words of his biographer, “he made a bad patient” and reluctantly listened to his doctors.40 During an arduous convalescence, he suffered a ruptured aorta in the morning of 26 May. His doctors could do little, and he died that afternoon. His country mourned. Nehru had dominated India’s politics for decades and its foreign relations for nearly seventeen years. An entire generation of Canadian diplomats and politicians knew no one but Nehru as India’s leader and chief foreign policy architect. Between 1949 and 1953, New Delhi and Ottawa fashioned a partnership of sorts. The ebullient ties eroded as the Cold War heightened and neither country could be what the other wished. Ottawa and New Delhi disagreed many times over policy, but Canadian officials knew that they dealt with a thoughtful and highly intelligent figure. Nehru had sincerely tried to navigate the gulf between East and West and promoted a third way: non-alignment. What direction would India follow now? Nehru never appointed or groomed a successor. Whoever replaced him would deal with problems that ranged from

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chronic food shortages, to a sagging economy weighed down by corruption, to frayed relations with Pakistan and China. The Congress Party moved swiftly and unexpectedly chose Lal Bahadur Shastri to succeed Nehru. It is likely that the Congress elite regarded Shastri as malleable. A long-time Congress politician, yet unlike so many of the Oxbridge-trained Indian politicians and civil servants, he had quit school at seventeen. Standing barely five feet tall and possessing a soft, gentle demeanour, he offered a striking change from the cosmopolitan, aristocratic presence of Nehru. And, unlike Nehru, the new leader had absolutely no experience with foreign affairs; in fact, he had never been outside India save for a visit to Nepal in 1962. In cabinet, he served in domestic portfolios, but he carried a reputation for honesty and integrity, something direly needed for a party increasingly accused of corruption. Possessing a worldview not coloured or moulded by experiences in Britain or Europe, Shastri still wanted to pursue Nehru’s vision of non-alignment.41 As Shastri prepared to fill the substantial void left by Nehru, Ottawa chose Ronning’s successor. Rather than sending a seasoned diplomat to India during a pivotal time, in late June Pearson offered the job to Roland Michener, an old friend from his days at Oxford University. In many ways, Michener represented a good choice. A prominent and distinguished figure, a Rhodes scholar, he was athletic, intelligent, a successful lawyer, and a former federal Conservative politician and speaker of the House of Commons under Diefenbaker. Michener’s biographer suggests that Pearson informed his friend that “we would like to have a high commissioner with political experience because there’s a feeling that Nehru’s departure might lead to breakup or upheaval in India.”42 Michener had an abiding interest in foreign affairs and was a long-standing member of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA). He travelled to India and Pakistan on a visit sponsored by the CIIA in 1954, but his biographer glosses over his impressions of the region. It is fair to say, though, that Michener was the most inexperienced Canadian high commissioner to arrive in New Delhi since the establishment of the post. Michener agreed to arrive in New Delhi for September. Ronning’s detailed memorandum analyzing the state of bilateral relations from four years earlier and sundry briefing materials provided his background. The briefing notes on Canada-India relations prepared for Michener adhered to Ronning’s line of “friendly but not close” with a new twist: “Canada’s relations with India have always been friendly but were never close until the Canadian response to the Chinese attack in October 1962 brought about ministerial, official and editorial appreciation of Canadian efforts over the years to assist India.”43 The documents informed Michener of areas of past and continued cooperation, such as the

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ICSC, but cautioned not to expect concessions from the Indians on matters that directly affected both nations and required compromise. During Michener’s time in New Delhi, Ottawa’s frustration with the Indian presence on the ICSC bubbled to the surface. The ongoing annoyance with the commission’s “inefficiency and inaction” stretched Canadian patience to the breaking point. Between the autumn of 1964 and the summer of 1965, the commission took action on only three South Vietnamese complaints against Hanoi – largely because of the efforts of the Canadian delegation. In comparison, the commission issued twelve citations against Saigon.44 Marcel Cadieux, now the USSEA, raised his concerns with the Indian high commissioner in Ottawa and through Roland Michener in New Delhi. Cadieux retained his suspicion of Indian motives in Indochina. Earl Drake worked under Cadieux in the United Nations Division at the DEA from 1955 to 1956. Drake fondly remembered his director, but he recalled that after his return from Indochina Cadieux “was bitter about the Indians and the role they played on the Indo-China commissions.” However, Drake recalled, “almost everyone” whom he knew “was bitter about the role the Indians played in Indochina.”45 Basil Robinson and Blair Seaborn also recalled Cadieux’s dislike of the Indians on the ICSC, Seaborn observing that Cadieux “had no time for the Indians on the Indochina commissions” and Robinson noting that “Cadieux had very little time to discuss matters with the Indians.”46 Two key colleagues shared Cadieux’s views: Arnold Smith, assistant undersecretary, and Robert Louis Rogers, head of the Far Eastern Division and one of the senior officers dealing with non-Commonwealth Asian affairs in Ottawa. Rogers certainly became “exasperated” with the Indians as the year ended. Described by his colleagues as a “tough customer” and “not likely to be pushed around,” Rogers revealed the depth of his irritation with the Indians in a conversation with a British diplomat: “The Indians seemed to think that, as in the past, they would be able to ‘take the Canadians up and down the garden path’ but that this time they would find that the Canadians were in earnest … Throughout our conversation Rogers manifested the most extreme frustration towards the Indians.”47 Smith informed his colleagues in Vientiane that his office would not express Ottawa’s displeasure to New Delhi, noting that “we are less interested in further arguments with [the] Indians than in making [the] record show where responsibility lies for commission inaction.” Smith thought that an exchange of views with New Delhi would only “give ... further pretext for delay in getting on to the record respective attitudes of commission powers whatever these may be.”48 Months later, in discussion with Rogers, Smith wondered whether he should bring up critiques of Indian practices in Indochina with the newly appointed Commonwealth secretary in the IMEA, C.J. Jha. This period

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saw senior officials, such as Cadieux, Rogers, and Smith, choosing to express their displeasure with Indian actions on the ICSC rather than brooding. A commission report released in mid-February 1965 admonished South Vietnam for violations. While the Canadians acknowledged the contents of the report, they fumed at its speedy preparation. The report reinforced a longstanding belief in the DEA that the Indians moved quickly only when chastising Saigon or Washington but dithered if the matter involved Hanoi. The situation became so intolerable in March 1965 that senior officials in the DEA persuaded Paul Martin to direct Michener to deliver a letter to Swaran Singh, the Indian foreign minister. The annoyance of Martin and his advisers underscored the points prepared for Michener. Martin allowed his representative to severely caution the Indians on their “continuing unwillingness ... to have the Commission produce balanced reports and – more important – conclusive judgments reflecting what we all know to be shortcomings on both sides of the agreement.” The inability to achieve this objective reporting led Ottawa to question the impartiality and usefulness of the ICSC. Martin charged Michener with making it clear to Singh that such an outcome would “not be understood by Canadian public opinion, amongst whom there exists a considerable fund of goodwill and understanding towards India.”49 Canadian officials suspected that India would accuse Ottawa of kowtowing to the Americans. If this occurred, then Michener was to stress that “we are allies of the United States in Europe and, of course, we have a good understanding of the motives of the United States for many of the things they do,” but Ottawa remained objective on the commission. Martin emphasized to Michener that, “over the last ten years, India and Canada have been together on more than 90 per cent of the decisions which were not unanimous.”50 Michener in turn delivered an unusually blunt message from Martin to Singh that Ottawa was “deeply concerned” over and “puzzled by the differences which have manifested themselves in the International Commission in Vietnam.” Martin singled out his aggravation at how Indian representatives on the ICSC “have the Commission react promptly and in certain circumstances … publicly to complaints from the North, while complaints from the South, which are no less urgent in terms of their seriousness, are generally handled in such a way as to result in delays and inconclusive results.” Given the balanced “conclusions of the Special Report of 1962” that both countries endorsed, Martin found it increasingly “difficult to justify the different treatment accorded by the Commission recently to complaints received from the two parties.”51 Michener reported to Ottawa that Singh carefully read Martin’s message but appeared to be baffled by its content; the “GOI believed that it had always been impartial. He realized we had differed on the Feb 13 MSG. But that this was just

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one report.” Michener countered Singh’s claim with the assertion “that on [a] large number of items before commission it was not being impartial and that in fact it was not doing anything at all.” Michener thought that a “possible concern about offending Peking and Hanoi” tempered India’s approach.52 Following the 1962 border war, China became increasingly friendly with Pakistan, establishing enhanced political ties and trade and air links and then successfully testing a nuclear device in October 1964.53 China’s actions raised fears in New Delhi that China represented a nuclear threat and could, in conjunction with Pakistan, box India in. India had to tread more gingerly with other countries across the region, particularly with Vietnam. Hanoi relied heavily on both Chinese and Soviet support at a time when the two were increasingly at odds for primacy of the communist world. A fear of alienating the North Vietnamese and Moscow through the ICSC must have troubled the Indians and explained their reluctance to condemn Hanoi.54 Blair Seaborn thought as much.55 Although Ottawa agreed that India faced increasingly tense regional relations, this only nourished frustration that the Indians clung to non-alignment. Vietnam pulled Indian policy in opposite directions and pleased no one as a result. As American bombing intensified over North Vietnam, Shastri’s government publicly appealed for negotiations between Hanoi and Washington, to no avail. At the same time, New Delhi reflected on its mutual differences with the Canadians on the ICSC. A letter distributed to the Indian prime minister’s secretariat acknowledged that both countries “seemed to be speaking with different voices” where the ICSC mattered. Shastri planned to travel to Ottawa in early June, and Indian officials in the IMEA wanted the issue reviewed during the talks.56 B.K. Acharya, the Indian high commissioner in Ottawa, suggested to the IMEA that the subject of aid could also be a talking point for the Shastri visit. Acharya advised his superiors that Canadian aid and trade levels with India were likely to dip as Ottawa reached “beyond the Commonwealth.” This was an unwelcome development, but the Indians were coming to terms with new Commonwealth competitors and, perhaps more importantly, with the new bicultural face of Canadian foreign policy. The rise of Quebec nationalism in the early 1960s prompted the DEA to re-examine and broaden its donor practices, which in the post-1945 era had generally favoured the English-speaking Commonwealth. By the late 1950s, Commonwealth Asia had competed for Canadian aid with newly decolonized states in Commonwealth Africa. Now the Commonwealth competed with the African Francophonie for precious aid dollars. Acharya also observed that, “while Canada has been very anxious to develop its trade with countries like China, there have been repeated proposals

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of imposing special anti-dumping duty on Indian imports into Canada.”57 Aid had been an important, long-standing, and predominantly positive link between the two nations. Yet, while the topic appeared in Shastri’s briefing book for the forthcoming visit as a discussion point, more delicate matters wrought from the ICSC and the future of bilateral nuclear cooperation overshadowed the aid issue. Singh replied to Martin’s letter a week before Shastri’s arrival in Ottawa. The communication exemplifies how both countries interpreted the commission’s work differently. Singh disagreed “with the general impression of lack of cooperation and understanding between our delegations in the International Commission in Vietnam which your letter conveys.” He countered that “no undue delay [occurred] because of any action or views expressed by our Representative on the Commission.” Such delays in investigating Saigon’s complaints were attributable to “their inability to back up their complaints promptly with evidence,” perhaps because “the South Vietnamese Government in recent months have been in a state of crisis.” Admittedly, differences occasionally existed between Canada and India on the commission. Nonetheless, the Indians held their impartiality to a high standard, and “there has been, on the whole, very good cooperation between our two countries in the International Commission.” But the Canadians pushed too far in their objections: “Within its limited terms of reference, the Commission cannot, correctly speaking, attempt a general political commentary on the complicated situation in Vietnam.”58 Such were the diverging views between Ottawa and New Delhi concerning the work of the ICSC on the eve of Shastri’s first visit to North America. Nearly a decade had passed since Nehru’s last visit to Ottawa. The briefing material provided to Shastri described Canada as “a country which has been bound by deep ties of friendship with India.” Canadians “had an almost emotional attitude towards India” and had “taken keen interest” in India’s prosperity and the success of its economic plans. The briefing review of the relationship described the early years as a halcyon period “marked by extreme cordiality, close cooperation between Canada and India at the United Nations and in the International Commissions on Indochina as fellow members, and frequent exchange of visits by the Prime Ministers of the two countries.”59 The Indian officials who drafted the report described this earlier romance between the two countries as the “product of the great personal attachment” between Nehru and King and, later, between Nehru and St. Laurent. The rise of the Diefenbaker Tories began the second period of the relationship. “Dief the Chief ” was held in less regard compared with his Liberal predecessors. Neither Diefenbaker, the report opined, nor his party promoted the same

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international outlook that the Liberals had possessed. His visit in 1958 “did not succeed in establishing the personal rapport between him and our Prime Minister,” a view that bore out Basil Robinson’s personal belief. Bilateral ties mattered less between the two countries, and, though they “remained very friendly, they were no longer marked by the close understanding which prevailed during the earlier years.” Relations were “marked by a diminution from the earlier period in the close cooperation and understanding at the United Nations and in the International Commissions.” Differences crept in. Perhaps the authors of this brief thought change inevitable, particularly concerning the ICSC: “We do not have an identical outlook on the problem in Vietnam, and our position in the Commission as a neutral Chairman is different from that of Canada who are the nominee of the Western powers.” The Indians also suspected that Ottawa had become “partial” to Pakistan but expected Pearson to be objective on the issue.60 The Indian MEA liked Pearson and regarded him as a man of high character, integrity, and vision in international affairs. Perhaps the visit would initiate a third phase. The Indians hoped that “the personal rapport between the Prime Ministers, which formed such an important element of our relationship in period one, might be restored.” The IMEA also hoped that the visit would “start a new era of increased understanding and cooperation with Canada in the economic, commercial and other fields, and closer cooperation at the United Nations and in the International Control Commission.”61 Was it a realistic expectation that the third phase of the relationship could be akin to those “halcyon days” of the early 1950s? New Delhi essentially saw Canada as an American satellite, profoundly dependent on the Americans for defence and economic ties yet suffering “from an inferiority complex and a deep resentment arising from the realisation of their dependence on their great neighbour.”62 Despite its critical nature, the briefing assessment on bilateral relations prepared by the IMEA lacked the bitter tone of Krishna Menon’s past analysis of this bilateral “dependence.” The Indian commentary contained positive comments. It pointed to Canada’s Colombo Plan aid, military assistance during the Sino-Indo border war, and continued nuclear assistance. In fact, the Indians hoped to double bilateral trade within the next five years and recommended increased cultural exchanges. The novel idea later led to the genesis of the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute, which remains an integral foundation encouraging bilateral cultural and educational links. On the other hand, the IMEA disliked Pearson’s policy on China. Chinese military strength gravely concerned New Delhi, especially following the detonation of a nuclear device in October 1964. The Chinese action trans-

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formed regional security and led to much international wringing of hands, questioning how the Indians might respond. Internally, Indian policy makers launched a series of debates weighing the pros and cons of a nuclear weapons program. Shastri’s advisers noted that, since the Liberals were re-elected, “there has been no assistance – military or other – to us in the context of our difficulties with China.” They accused the Liberals of being “softer towards China” and pursuing a pro-Chinese trade policy. Wheat sales remained a sore spot. New Delhi believed that wheat sales inevitably helped the Chinese economy – the sale of spare truck parts also aided Peking. Increased Chinese exports to Canada also competed with, and displaced, Indian exports to Canada. Indian officials advised Shastri that, “depending on the atmosphere during the talks,” he might encourage Ottawa to adopt a more pro-India policy in the Sino-Indo rivalry.63 This meant permitting India to purchase defence materials on favourable terms and increase trade and aid. Shastri could coax Ottawa to sympathize with India in its ongoing dispute with Pakistan in light of that country’s increasingly close relationship with China, the two countries united by a common desire to isolate and weaken India. India expected nuclear proliferation to dominate the discussion, particularly in light of the successful Chinese nuclear test. Shastri was advised to encourage discussion. Ronning’s caution to Ottawa that a Chinese test could push the Indian nuclear program in a new direction had merit. The Chinese explosion on 16 October led to a subtle yet crucial policy shift in Indian strategic circles. The success of the test thoroughly rattled India and led to weeks of sharp debate in the Lok Sabha. Bhabha stated on All India Radio that “atomic weapons give a State possessing them in adequate numbers a deterrent power against attack from a much stronger State.”64 Some prominent Congress Party officials broke with the party line and advocated the development of a nuclear bomb. Following the explosion, Shastri sought to rally international support, particularly American and Soviet support, to find a solution to nuclear proliferation that assuaged India’s fears while publicly declaring that India would not make atomic bombs but seek their eradication. Pearson supported the Indian leader, writing to Martin that “we would not wish to do or say anything that would hinder the Indian Government in its efforts to hold the line against those in India who are advocating nuclear weapons as a reply to China.”65 At this point, Shastri could veto Bhabha. The weak state of India’s finances allowed him to rebuff his top scientist. Shastri faced increasing political fire, however, and within weeks he carefully retreated from his opposition to developing a nuclear weapons program. On 27 November 1964, a right-wing Hindu party, the Jana Sangh, introduced a

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motion in the Lok Sabha seeking the production of nuclear weapons. Shastri uttered a policy statement that had profound implications for bilateral nuclear cooperation. He reaffirmed India’s commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but for the first time an Indian prime minister publicly stated that “peaceful use” included the use of nuclear explosives to assist large-scale engineering initiatives such as having “to wipe out mountains for development parks.” 66 His statement eased the way for a potential nuclear weapons program. Whether Shastri understood the ramifications of his statement is unclear. His personal papers are devoid of any mention of the subject. It is reasonable to conclude that – given his limited education and his distance from the decision making of the Indian nuclear program prior to becoming prime minister the previous June and inheriting the atomic energy portfolio – he knew little about nuclear science. Bhabha, however, knew that there was no obvious distinction between a military and peaceful nuclear explosion. Seven months after the Chinese nuclear explosion, the Indians complained that the West offered little assurance to New Delhi. The United States, despite some early signals, did not provide decisive technical support or defence guarantees; instead, nuclear nonproliferation became a greater priority for Washington. Shastri’s briefing book suggests that the Indians weighed their security options, no longer believing that guarantees or offers of support from Washington or Moscow sufficed. Perhaps if both the United States and the USSR joined “in a nuclear guarantee not merely to India but all non-nuclear powers from nuclear attack, that might be something worthwhile.” The Indian public line held that the Disarmament Committee and the United Nations could best solve the problem.67 In addition to consulting his own briefing book, Paul Martin prepared for the Shastri visit on 10 June with a memorandum from Deputy Undersecretary A.E. Ritchie. The document outlined subjects in which bilateral interests appeared to be “essentially parallel.” This included broad themes such as UN peacekeeping views and Commonwealth administrative functions; although secondary issues, they would allow for a smooth exchange of views.68 On more substantial matters, Pearson and Martin were to emphasize Vietnam and the ICSC, Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia, and “the continuation of India’s policy of abstaining from a nuclear weapons programme with emphasis on your [Martin’s] June 3 statement on uranium policy and bearing in mind reports of Indian preparations for a ‘peaceful’ explosion.”69 Rain clouds loomed over Ottawa the Thursday morning of Shastri’s arrival, yet, in a sign of good fortune, the sun broke through. Official talks began the following day at the Centre Block of Parliament. On the Saturday, the Indians met with Mitchell Sharp (minister of trade and commerce), “Bud” Drury

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(minister of industry), and Walter Gordon (minister of finance) to discuss trade and aid issues. Like so many tourists, Shastri visited Niagara Falls before departing. A survey of newspapers indicates extensive coverage of the visit, but the articles depict little of the fanfare that accompanied Nehru’s previous travels to Canada.70 Shastri was unknown to the majority of Canadians on his first trip to the Western Hemisphere; much of the Canadian and Indian reporting emphasized the respective national views of the war in Vietnam whereby both Pearson and Shastri pressed for peace.71 Interestingly, none of the Canadian newspapers detected the underlying frustrations in the relationship. The trip ended inauspiciously: at a press conference on 14 June, Shastri blasted the Pakistani government, provoking the next day’s Montreal Gazette headline to admonish the Indian leader that this was “Not the Time or Place.” Behind the scenes, Canadian authorities reportedly felt “appalled” by the indiscreet comments.72 The fundamental changes that had occurred within Indian defence policy post-1962 and the subsequent idiosyncrasies of non-alignment dominated the prime ministerial talks. The leaders emphasized the Indochina commissions, nuclear assistance, and possible military sales to India. Pearson and Martin frankly discussed their misgivings about specific Indian policies on the ICSC as advised. The Canadians intended the blunt exchange to re-establish the close cooperation in the early days of the commissions, when both countries pursued “our common objectives.” Whether either nation had genuinely pursued such objectives on the ICSC is debatable. Nonetheless, the Canadians saw the commissions “as one of the most important ventures in international peace-keeping yet undertaken.”73 Officials in the DEA believed that three major reasons prevented the Indians from supporting commission action in Vietnam. First, Moscow pressured the Indian government to ease away from criticizing Hanoi in return for continued support in its struggle with China. Second, a long-standing complaint voiced among Canadian officials since the mid-1950s was that “like so many other neutralist countries India has found that it can criticize the United States and its allies with relative impunity but that criticism of Communist powers invariably produces a swift and unpleasant response.” Third, Indian policy remained wary of “ex” or “neo” (i.e., “white”) colonialist influences in the region. Knowing the reasons did not lessen the angst; rather, Canadian officials stewed over the ICSC. Indian non-alignment was viewed as a ruse. Ottawa continued to place most of its “emphasis on the wrongdoing of North Vietnam in our attempt to redress the balance.”74 Neither Ottawa nor New Delhi could ameliorate these differences without adopting a shift in its policy on Indochina. The angst continued unabated.

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On the topic of nuclear partnership, the Indians sought to purchase another CANDU reactor labelled the RAPP II. During the past months, informal exchanges had taken place between Bhabha and Gray, but the Indian scientist signalled that India might not agree to the same safeguard agreements as those of the RAPP I. The Chinese detonation and the unknown Indian objectives raised the importance of safeguards. At the least, Ottawa sought to retain the safeguards of the 1963 RAPP I agreement for any future atomic energy dealings with India. Ottawa’s long-term objectives saw all the Canadian reactors placed under IAEA inspections, with stricter safeguards on uranium fuel. In Parliament, cabinet sought to prohibit the export of Canadian uranium to any country that might use it for non-peaceful purposes.75 DEA officials urged Pearson and Martin to persuade Shastri and his advisers that differences over safeguards should eventually be settled under the auspices of the IAEA.76 During the Ottawa meetings, both sides outlined their views on nuclear nonproliferation. Shastri asserted India’s position as a nuclear power and relayed that the Indian public favoured nuclear weapons but that his government “had taken a categorically clear stand that its policy was not to make nuclear weapons,” and he hoped that “they could stick to it.” The Indian leader encouraged Ottawa to work with New Delhi to produce “substantial results” in the elimination of nuclear weapons.77 A closer look at this episode reveals some bewildering decisions by Canadian policy makers, particularly Paul Martin. In his memoirs, Martin claims that, since meeting Homi Bhabha at the United Nations in the mid-1950s, he “realized that he [Bhabha] intended India to produce its own atomic bomb. This was certainly not Nehru’s position, nor that of his successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri.”78 Martin’s recollection is bizarre and unsubstantiated; there is no evidence that Martin went to cabinet with his suspicions during the CIR negotiations or afterward. Admittedly, he and Norman Robertson fought hard for appropriate safeguards in the RAPP I, but Martin certainly did not object to the eventual sale of the RAPP I to India. Moreover, the briefing book prepared for Pearson and Martin noted that, while the majority of India’s nuclear infrastructure related to civilian objectives, a recently built plutonium separation plant raised eyebrows, and India’s geopolitical situation served as an additional red flag. The separation of plutonium is essential for a nuclear weapons program. The Indian civilian nuclear program had developed sufficiently to “ensure that a militarily significant scale in four to five years from now … could be initiated very quickly and without a prohibitive diversion of manpower resources.” No evidence suggested that the Indian government had approved a nuclear weapons program, but Ottawa knew “that the operation of the Canada-India Reactor (CIR) at Trombay has been oriented

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towards optimizing the production of weapons-grade plutonium since the summer of 1963.”79 The British defence minister, Denis Healey, also informed his Canadian counterpart, Paul Hellyer, that the Indians were “making all necessary preparations for a test explosion sometime before the end of the year, ostensibly in a form which could be justified as being for peaceful purposes.”80 Although the intelligence proved to be faulty, at the time the DEA believed that the British view was credible.81 An Indian nuclear explosion would have immense ramifications for Indo-Canadian relations since the plutonium used – from the CIR – would violate past Indian assurances. The Indians asked to discuss “defence aid,” but, unlike nuclear assistance issues, policy makers in the DEA’s Defence Liaison (1) Division successfully argued against undertakings that would lead to substantial military assistance or sales to India, and this advice was followed.82 Shastri’s advisers expressed interest in purchasing Canadian equipment, particularly Caribou aircraft, but Ottawa declined direct military assistance.83 Although the threat of another conflict with China had receded, tension between Pakistan and India had escalated. Canada refused to favour one Commonwealth country over the other. Doing so would threaten the meaningful aid that Canada had poured into the Indian subcontinent to support regional stability. Finally, Pearson and Martin could rightly argue that Canada’s substantial aid assistance and loans freed Indian funds for defence purchases.84 The bilateral talks appear to have been cordial and mostly candid, the illtimed comments from Shastri on Pakistan the only blot on the record. But the meetings did not solve the differences concerning the ICSC, and the irritants continued. Pearson and Martin chose a softer tone on the ICSC during the meetings with Shastri despite the departmental briefs recommending a firm line. A British official in Ottawa observed that “the bitter frustrations which the Canadians have been experiencing over Indian tactics in the Commission over the past year were not allowed to protrude above the smooth surface of this ministerial visit.”85 The decision to avoid a more confrontational tone provided an amenable meeting environment but simply let the tensions swell. R.L. Rogers revealed as much to his former colleague John Holmes in a letter: “I must frankly say that at the moment we are terribly pressed what with a dust-up in the Commissions and involving the Indians such as we have not had during your time on this subject.”86 Holmes, now director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, could sympathize with Rogers’s frustration. In the meantime, a steady stream of young Canadian diplomats arrived to work on the ICSC and developed their own – frequently jaded – perspective on Indian conduct.

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It is difficult to assess the broad outcome of the talks. The event barely rates a mention in Martin’s memoirs and is overlooked in the third volume of the Pearson memoirs, and there is scant mention in the DEA files or even in the papers of Martin, Michener, and Pearson. No Indian studies discuss this topic, and Shastri’s personal papers at the National Archives of India contain no mention of his trip. Roland Michener, in a letter to David Reece (a Canadian diplomat who served twice in New Delhi), thought that “the visit was a very substantial success. In fact, Mr. Shastri was so relaxed and exhilarated that he was able to withstand the Prime Minister’s Conference and return home last Sunday morning at 5 a.m. looking the picture of health.”87 Shastri certainly needed good health and a great deal of stamina to cope with a range of domestic ills. The following week Michener wrote to an old political colleague, J.M. Macdonnell, that India “muddles forward with more success in industrial production than with the problems of food and population.”88 The Canada-India relationship muddled forward as well. Tensions on the nuclear file and the ICSC continued, neither side willing to concede on matters of conviction and national importance. Ronning’s caution that neither country had much influence over the other on matters that affected its interests proved to be accurate during the Shastri visit. The visit illustrated a general policy ambivalence indicative of the lack of a long-term strategic assessment of Canada’s interests in South Asia that carried over from the Diefenbaker period. On the one hand, the Pearson government adhered to its policy of restricting military sales to India, fearing the impact on the subcontinent. Despite repeated warning signals, the Pearson government continued to consider nuclear assistance to India. The strategic assessment of this matter was utterly incongruent with the assessment of military sales to India. Ottawa found itself with little room to manoeuvre. If the Canadian government rebuffed Indian requests for nuclear assistance, then it risked aggravating the largest and most important democracy in Asia and jeopardizing a substantial market for the Canadian nuclear industry as well as other exports. Other Western countries, particularly France, would eagerly replace Canada as India’s nuclear supplier. Less than three months after Shastri left Ottawa, India and Pakistan fought another bloody but quick war over Kashmir. The Indians emerged victorious, and the conflict reinforced the belief in Ottawa that it should avoid supplying arms to either combatant. The Soviet Union speedily announced that it would mediate and hosted a summit conference in Soviet Asia at Tashkent in early January 1966. The dialogue resulted in an agreement between Pakistani leader Ayub Khan and Shastri, but Shastri died of a heart attack before flying home.

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Neither Pearson nor Martin had become familiar with the Indian leader, and Shastri had had precious little time to work with Ottawa to solve the bilateral problems inherited from Nehru. In turn, they remained for his successor to handle. Shastri had remained true to non-alignment, but India slowly tilted toward a more realistic assessment of its place in the region, as the domestic nuclear debate suggests. Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, assumed office, and bilateral relations between Ottawa and New Delhi entered into an entirely new and turbulent era.

8 An Inability to Influence Nuclear Cooperation and the NPT Negotiations, 1966–68

Tough, poised, resilient, and politically astute, Indira Gandhi received an extensive education with time spent in Switzerland and England, including a brief and troubled stint at Oxford. She travelled widely in her youth and later accompanied her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, on many of his prime ministerial trips, including to Canada. In February 1965, she made a brief stop in Ottawa to discuss aid while serving in Shastri’s cabinet. Despite a decades-long familiarity between Gandhi and Pearson, the trend of friendship without influence, identified by Ronning in 1960, continued, and the bilateral irritants of the late Nehru and Shastri eras remained. Experiences on the ICSC suggested that neither country could exert much influence over the other’s perceived national interest; the looming debate over India’s nuclear goals and guarded view of international negotiations to establish a non-proliferation treaty illustrated the extent to which Ronning’s analysis applied. The fact that both prime ministers were occupied with pressing domestic and international factors undoubtedly helped to maintain the status quo. Little did anyone suspect, then, that within eight years of Gandhi’s appointment relations would teeter on the brink of collapse. On 19 January 1966, Gandhi decisively defeated her main rival, Moraji Desai, in a quickly organized leadership vote. In some respects, it was a hollow victory. The country spiralled from one domestic plight to another. Severe droughts created food shortages, and numerous regions of India experienced famine conditions. The economy remained weak, and inflation increased uncontrolled, partly spurred by food shortages. National income declined, and the government increasingly diverted precious rupees into military spending.1 The nature of foreign affairs hung in equally perilous balance. Like her father, Gandhi firmly directed foreign policy but gave up the external affairs portfolio. Relations with the United States, which enjoyed a brief honeymoon following the Sino-Indo border war, soured as American arms continued to flow to Pakistan and the United States became further embroiled in Vietnam. In the wake of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, the United States suspended aid to both countries. India needed American aid, and Gandhi’s first foreign visit as prime minister was to the United States in March 1966. Canada was noticeably absent from the itinerary. On the surface, Gandhi and President Lyndon Johnson hit

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it off.2 The leaders decided that aid would be restored promptly provided that the Indians swallowed some hard economic medicine and devalued the rupee. Gandhi agreed and departed pleased. At home, she faced massive public outrage that Washington had “dictated” economic terms. The good tidings from the visit evaporated when Gandhi publicly opposed the American bombing of North Vietnam. Angered by her condemnations, the Americans retaliated by delaying food shipments. Bilateral goodwill waned, and India tilted toward the Soviet Union. After her American trip, Gandhi flew to Moscow to meet Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev in July.3 New Delhi responded to Washington’s reprisals by improving and expanding defence and technological cooperation with Moscow. This marked a new approach to Indian statecraft. Gandhi “believed that India’s foreign policy should be clearly and precisely related to the country’s evolving political, economic and security interests,” Indian foreign secretary J.N. Dixit later observed. India, the prime minister thought, must become “self-reliant and strong.”4 If the United States was unwilling to assist in this process, then the Soviet Union, embroiled in a political prestige struggle with China, eagerly awaited. The Cold War battles influenced Canada’s nuclear relationship with India. Instead of alleviating security fears, India’s victory over Pakistan nourished Indian anxiety and led to renewed demands for nuclear weapons.5 Nonproliferation discussions at the United Nations meandered into 1966, and Washington and New Delhi came to represent two distinct views between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots. Prime Minister Gandhi now presided over India’s nuclear initiative – Bhabha had perished in an airplane crash at the beginning of Gandhi’s tenure. A tough-minded, shrewd negotiator, Bhabha had impressively represented India’s interests in negotiations with the Canadians. This legacy, particularly his role in the negotiations of safeguards for the CIR, became apparent to Ottawa. It is unclear to what extent Indira Gandhi knew about India’s nuclear program. Bhabha was to have briefed her but died the day she took office. Responsible for filling his rather large shoes, Gandhi assumed the role of directing India’s nuclear program. Bhabha’s passing had no effect on India’s position that non-nuclear weapon states should be prohibited from testing nuclear explosions. In February 1966, V.C. Trivedi, India’s representative to the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) negotiations in Geneva, insisted that the nuclear haves treat the nuclear have-nots equitably and with mutual obligations. India, he asserted, wanted a treaty that compelled nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states to stop production of nuclear weapons and any related delivery mechanisms.6 India’s determined stance now advanced beyond believing in Shastri’s hope that American and Soviet security assurances offered sufficient protection.

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Observing the safeguard discussions at Geneva, officials in the Commonwealth and Disarmament Divisions of the DEA expressed skepticism that India would accept any agreement that restricted the right of non-nuclear nations to test a nuclear device. They disagreed with a quickly scuttled American idea that Ottawa and Washington approach New Delhi and offer India a nuclear device for a “peaceful” explosion. Now that China had acquired the “prestige” of being a member of the elite nuclear club, it was unlikely that India would accept limitations on non-nuclear powers. A departmental memorandum weighed the pros and cons of acting with the Americans, and its analysis illustrates Canada’s awkward position. The author concluded that Ottawa had no “real levers” to influence India despite being a principal supplier of nuclear technology and that any action would likely “cause resentment against Canada.”7 The fact that, in less than ten years after donating and transferring the first atomic reactor, Ottawa stood in such a vulnerable position, with “no real levers” to influence New Delhi, is emblematic of the policy drift. The Indians gave Canada written and oral assurances on both reactors. Therefore, “a direct approach” might have offended the Indians, suggesting that “we don’t trust your previous pledges to us.” Besides, A.G. Campbell, director of the Commonwealth Division, believed that the Indians knew that Ottawa would react unfavourably to any nuclear explosion. Campbell’s assumption that this knowledge alone would deter the Indians became the great hope among many DEA policy makers. In the meantime, Campbell urged Ottawa to restate the Canadian position in “the negotiations over safeguards for RAPP II when these move from the technical to the political sphere.”8 Negotiations for the second CANDU reactor, the RAPP II, coincided with the NPT discussions. The Gandhi government’s stance on safeguards continued to be problematic even with Bhabha gone. For example, the Indians sought to avoid Canadian safeguards “by procuring only the conventional parts of the reactor in Canada while making the rest in India.” Ottawa thought that the evasion opened the possibility for Canadian technology to be used directly in the pursuit of an Indian nuclear bomb.9 As bilateral negotiations continued on the RAPP II, China conducted its third nuclear test on 9 May 1966. The Indian parliament erupted as the hawks attacked the government’s inchoate nuclear weapons program policy. The response from Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh suggests the government’s willingness to listen to them. Singh publicly confirmed in the Lok Sabha that India would proceed “with development of nuclear energy for ‘non peaceful purposes’ unless there is progress in the direction of nuclear non-proliferation and a guarantee by the main nuclear powers to ‘all non-nuclear powers’ against nuclear blackmail.” Indira Gandhi supported Singh’s comments, agreeing that the “defence

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of our territorial integrity will be the paramount consideration guiding our policy in the field.”10 Yet the Indian government also hinted that any decision depended on the progress of the ongoing Geneva discussions, sending a signal that India still considered a multilateral option. Policy makers in Ottawa might have taken some solace later that summer when 253 members of the Lok Sabha signed a memorandum supporting an official government policy that India’s nuclear infrastructure be used for peaceful purposes only.11 When the question of India manufacturing a nuclear device arose again in the Lok Sabha, Michener informed Ottawa promptly. Singh’s words, though less strident than those of May, remained a warning: “We want to harness the nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But the world, especially the nuclear powers, should not take our self-abnegation as a part of our duty and their right. We should be assured of reasonable hope that an agreement on disarmament will be signed and signed soon.” Otherwise, Singh cautioned, if the nuclear powers “fail to agree to both non-dissemination and non-proliferation, India may be forced to reconsider her decision.”12 The limited assurances whipped up tension on the Indian subcontinent. The Pakistani government increased its lobbying efforts, urging Ottawa not to make the reactor sale and alleging that India intended to explode a nuclear device. The allegations, made in late July, occurred just as Ottawa began cabinet debate over the proposed RAPP II reactor sale. On 27 July, cabinet agreed to finance the second phase of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project provided that the Indians consented to appropriate safeguards as accorded to the RAPP I. Paul Martin wanted the government to press for more stringent safeguards even though he questioned the validity of the Pakistani allegations. The “best intelligence assessment,” Martin informed Pearson, “is that the Indians have no present intention to explode a ‘peaceful’ nuclear device.” Nonetheless, he and his advisers in the DEA believed it imperative that Ottawa push India toward accepting IAEA safeguards. Ottawa wanted success for the IAEA and wanted to obtain the most stringent safeguards possible. The government simultaneously developed its nuclear relationship with Pakistan. The Pakistanis, perhaps in the hope of driving a wedge between Ottawa and New Delhi, were willing to adhere to IAEA safeguards. Ideally, Martin hoped to push the Indians onto the same track, but Pearson remained circumspect. He agreed with his minister’s desire but wrote on the memorandum “how can we do this now – after having made other arrangements with India?”13 Martin prepared a response, outlining three reasons why Ottawa should press the Indians: a) We would substantially improve the chances of securing Pakistan’s assent to the transfer to the IAEA of responsibility for safeguards administration. b) In the

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same connection, success with the Indians would provide an impressive Canadian answer to the Pakistani diplomatic offensive regarding the Indian potential for making nuclear weapons. c) We will never have a better lever to apply with the Indians than their present application for credit financing of RAPP II.14

In addition, as discussed on the eve of the Shastri visit, the Pearson government sought agreement from the Indians that the IAEA would become responsible for safeguard monitoring at an appropriate time. In these ways, Ottawa linked financing of the RAPP II to a positive outcome rather than the outcome that many feared. Martin felt uncertain whether the Indians would accept this stricter approach; with Bhabha’s death, he surmised that the chances of successfully reaching an agreement improved. Pearson disagreed; he thought that the chances of India making a nuclear bomb had “probably improved,” his thinking assisted by Pakistani charges. He saw “little chance” of successfully linking financing of the reactor to the IAEA safeguards and cautioned that “if we persist now we are likely to get into serious trouble with India.”15 Martin’s memorandum responded in part to a letter that Gandhi had sent to Pearson in June. She had written to him hoping to exchange views on matters of bilateral interest and invited him to visit India. Martin strongly supported accepting Gandhi’s invitation, recommending that Pearson make the visit since “no Canadian Prime Minister has been in Asia since 1958 and visits of Canadian Cabinet Ministers have been few and far between.”16 Pearson again declined the invitation but agreed that a response concentrating on Indochina and the commission problems, atomic energy, and development assistance should be sent.17 The DEA prepared a draft letter, but in light of the recent emphasis on the Indian nuclear program Martin and his advisers decided that the letter would not discuss “controversial issues of interest to ourselves and the Indians,” such as “Vietnam and the Indochina Commissions.” The authors thought it best to emphasize relatively non-controversial problems, “except for the urgent matter of atomic safeguards.”18 This tactic suggests that the relationship between the two countries was far less open than many in the Canadian media, or public, would have suspected. The friendly letter to Gandhi delicately detailed Ottawa’s views on the RAPP safeguards. Pearson withheld his cabinet’s propensity to approve the RAPP II; instead, Ottawa sought cooperation from New Delhi on the Geneva initiatives and a future IAEA role. Both countries, he added, could “contribute a great deal to our mutual efforts to strengthen the international safeguards system and to persuade certain other countries (of interest to us both)” to follow suit. Canada and India played important roles in a pivotal debate. Despite possessing the technical ability to manufacture nuclear arms, both nations abstained and thus

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could work together to achieve an effective non-proliferation treaty.19 Pearson hoped that his correspondence would lead to further open exchanges. Gandhi stood firm, and New Delhi grudgingly granted concessions. In the end, the agreement fell short of what Martin desired. Bhabha’s replacement, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, travelled to Ottawa in late October to conclude the RAPP discussions with the DEA and officials from AECL. The AECL president, Lorne Gray, a supporter of the RAPP program, attended. The Indians thought that they had conceded too much in terms of the RAPP I safeguards. Therefore, they held to the same conditions as the RAPP I and objected to Ottawa’s push for additional IAEA safeguards on both technical and political grounds.20 The USSEA, Marcel Cadieux, also attended the meeting and pressed the position that any agreement must include the full application of IAEA safeguards before Ottawa could approve financing of the RAPP II. The parties agreed to treat the RAPP II reactor similarly to the RAPP I agreement, and Cadieux believed that the meetings led to “a rather extensive paper which incorporates the essential provisions of the IAEA safeguards.”21 The IAEA would be asked to implement safeguards to both stations no later than one year after a reactor in each station became critical, but there would be no safeguards on future Indian-produced fissionable materials. Cadieux regretted the Indians’ refusal to have safeguards apply to later generations of fissionable material but explained to Martin that the agreement resolved a critical bilateral issue, and Ottawa made “significant progress” in promoting “international safeguards” while associating “India with this policy to which they have been adamantly opposed since the early days of atomic energy. The benefits in terms of our bilateral relations with India and our international posture on such issues as the IAEA safeguards system and non-proliferation need no elaboration.”22 Cadieux and Ottawa could be pleased with the outcome. Although the Indians resisted full IAEA safeguards, the Canadians consistently and successfully defended gains made on the RAPP I and strengthened safeguards on the RAPP II despite Indian pushback. It is questionable whether this agreement would have been achieved with Bhabha as chief negotiator. It is also worth noting that, during the negotiations for both of the RAPPs, those at the table raised the spectre of the ramifications of either agreement collapsing; however, the DEA spent little time analyzing that question. New Delhi would surely express annoyance, which would be tempered by the significant flow of Canadian aid to India and the importance of the CIR to India’s atomic energy program. Moreover, New Delhi needed diplomatic support in its strained relationship with Pakistan and China. These points were assumed. Perhaps some in Ottawa thought the nation of Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi unlikely to pursue the

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development of nuclear weapons. Perhaps others still held on to the goodwill from the early days of the relationship and deemed India far too important to aggravate. The evidence, however, suggests that the number of skeptics in Ottawa outweighed the number of supporters. Martin agreed that Indian acceptance of the same safeguards for the RAPP II as existed for the RAPP I with limited IAEA inspections represented the best terms that could be secured.23 On 7 November, Basil Robinson wrote to Bud Drury, minister of industry and acting secretary of state for external affairs, to discuss the recent bilateral discussions. Robinson advised that “it is the judgement of Canadian officials, endorsed by Mr. Martin, that the proposed arrangements fulfil the condition for agreement established by Cabinet.” The safeguards were consistent with the IAEA parameters except in relation “to safeguards on the second and subsequent generations of nuclear material originally produced in the reactor, a point covered in the IAEA Safeguards System but not in the 1963 Agreement.” The Indians refused “to extend the latter’s provisions at this time to include this new element.” Despite this, Paul Martin agreed with his officials: having not fought to secure safeguards beyond the first generation of nuclear material during the RAPP I negotiations, “it would not be desirable now to demand Indian acceptance of this additional principle as a condition of our agreement to finance RAPP II.”24 Cabinet endorsed the RAPP II proposal on 10 November, and on 15 December the RAPP II agreement was passed by an order in council.25 Canada pledged $38.5 million to construction as well as technical support from Atomic Energy Canada. Robert Winters, the trade and commerce minister, later hailed the agreement: “The sale confirmed Canada’s position as one of the leading international suppliers of nuclear power stations.”26 The generous terms provided for a repayment plan with a twenty-year credit period, including five years of grace on the repayment of the principal with an annual interest rate of 6 percent.27 The Indian nuclear energy program continued to benefit enormously from Canadian cooperation and patronage. The Washington Post applauded the safeguard concessions, observing that “India has taken an important new step toward abandoning its opposition to international inspection of its weapons-potential nuclear power plants.”28 The major Indian dailies took the opposite stance. The Times of India accused Ottawa of pressuring New Delhi and attributed Canada’s pursuit of stringent safeguards to kowtowing to its Western allies and Pakistan. The Indian Express implied that New Delhi and Sarabhai sacrificed India’s nuclear independence in return for Western technology.29 The Indian government downplayed the media scrutiny, releasing a statement touting that Bhabha’s principles had not been betrayed, nor had Indians yielded to Canadians or the IAEA.30 The scorn emanating from

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the major English-language Indian dailies represented only one piece of an increasingly complex international puzzle concerning India’s nuclear policies. As the peace movement and youth counterculture captured imaginations and international headlines during the summer of 1967, the NPT negotiations in Geneva proceeded slowly and became factionalized; the Indians sat front and centre at these negotiations. If they could not persuade the nuclear powers to eliminate their weapons, then they hoped to level the playing field. Nuclear powers would stop acquiring nuclear weapons, and non-nuclear powers would be prevented from developing a nuclear weapons capacity. India’s main adversaries would be checked; China would no longer be able to threaten India by developing a nuclear arsenal, and Pakistan would be unable to develop a nuclear weapons capability. At the same time, New Delhi was open to guarantees from the major nuclear powers against the threat of a perceived Chinese, or future Pakistani, nuclear attack or blackmail.31 The Americans and Soviets balked at the first two suggestions, and neither offered security guarantees, much to India’s frustration. A united American and Soviet front on the NPT negotiations left India with little room to manoeuvre; it required foreign aid from Washington and political and military aid from Moscow. Sensitive to domestic criticism of caving in to the great powers, and still unreceptive to the direction of the NPT discussions, New Delhi insisted on its right to test a peaceful nuclear explosion. In the midst of international posturing and debate, Canada changed high commissioners. As Canadians celebrated their centennial in 1967, Roland Michener returned home to become governor general. In early July, James George, a career diplomat serving in Paris who had been high commissioner in Ceylon, transferred to India. Colleagues described him as “a brilliant and unusual man” with strong philosophical leanings that resonated with Eastern religions.32 While stationed at the United Nations in the early 1950s, he had met with members of the Indian delegation to discuss “Indian metaphysics.”33 He was energetic and passionate about the post while wary of its pitfalls. George pledged to give it his all and assured Martin that he had a rapport “with those people without being taken in by them.”34 George would indeed give “everything” that he had for a post that Martin described as one of Canada’s most significant.35 Throughout that summer, and into the autumn, the Canadian High Commission closely monitored Indian attitudes toward the NPT negotiations. By October, it became evident that, barring major concessions from the nuclear powers, India would refuse to sign the treaty. Swaran Singh announced as much to the UN General Assembly, noting that, while New Delhi favoured the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it strongly favoured “the proliferation of nuclear technology for peaceful

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purposes, as an essential means by which the developing countries can benefit from the best advances of science and technology in this field.”36 George reported his concern over the hardening position to Ottawa. In turn, Ottawa encouraged him to “make every possible effort to persuade the Indians to accede to the treaty” – to discuss it personally with Gandhi. Although Ottawa sympathized that the NPT draft article on safeguards discriminated against non-nuclear powers such as India, it was prepared to accept the draft. However, on the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions, Ottawa firmly disagreed with the views of New Delhi. There should be no room in the treaty for peaceful nuclear explosions since military and civil explosive technologies “are indistinguishable, and development of a so-called peaceful nuclear device would accord nonnuclear state[s] nuclear weapons.” Ottawa believed that the NPT draft resulted from a series of gradual compromises and that it would improve over the years. In the meantime, the DEA thought that it “enhanced security for all non-nuclear states,” which stood to benefit the most.37 Ottawa slowly pondered the ramifications of India’s refusal to sign the treaty. The thought of that possibility created consternation. R.D. Jackson of the Disarmament Division of the DEA thought that some arm-twisting was in order. He suggested to George that he give Gandhi the impression, on unofficial instruction, that at some point Canadians might not understand India’s unwillingness to sign the treaty – forcing the government to reconsider nuclear cooperation.38 Martin would be advised to take this line officially to cabinet. The threat, however, had little actual bite. Punishment would be delayed, for the DEA hesitated to bring the matter to cabinet and instead waited for the Indian decision before offering advice on the next steps. George’s meeting with Gandhi, predictably, had little impact on the Indian position, and the DEA warily scrutinized Gandhi’s public utterances. On 11 December, Gandhi proclaimed to the Lok Sabha that India did “not deem it proper at this time to go in for atomic bombs.” George reported this to the department but concluded that the comment “represents of course no departure from the government’s position as outlined a number of times in Parliament.”39 The office of the USSEA disagreed. D.M. Cornett replied to George that, “after checking our files, however, we have the impression that it might represent a subtle, but deliberate, departure.” The DEA observed that “nowhere in their earlier parliamentary statements can we find so clear a reservation about permanently closing the nuclear option.”40 The Disarmament Division of the DEA thought that there was little doubt “that key elements of Indian leadership have serious reservations about NPT” and that New Delhi would probably refuse to accede, “albeit with reiteration of its unilateral pledge to maintain [the] exclusively peaceful character of its nuclear programme.” Ottawa contacted a number

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of overseas missions, pressing them to inform their British and American counterparts of George’s discussions with Gandhi and senior Indian leaders. In turn, the DEA wished to know which approaches its allies were making. Ottawa contemplated a trilateral approach with London and Washington if the tactic might encourage the Indians to embrace the NPT. London and Washington pursued their own agendas. For the time being, the DEA continued to lobby New Delhi, but Ottawa doubted the eventual results.41 The Indians approached Ottawa for an additional loan of $6.5 million for completion of the RAPP I reactor. Considering the timeliness of this request, George suggested that Ottawa deliberately pause before deciding whether to grant the loan to send a signal to New Delhi. However, he counselled against openly tying India’s acceptance of the NPT to receipt of the funding. On the other hand, he observed that funding the Indians’ program might not serve Canada’s interests either.42 The Economic Division of the DEA disagreed, countering that Ottawa had “legal and moral commitments to fulfill terms of agreements and have reactors completed.”43 The Indians would jump on the fact that they already agreed on safeguards for the RAPPs that, arguably, would cause more harm than good. This response effectively ruled out one of the few “levers” that Ottawa might have used. Donald Munro of the Commonwealth Division supported this view, arguing to Ralph Collins, an assistant USSEA, that the “dominant opinion in the Indian Government at present is not to become a nuclear power.” Besides, Munro questioned, what would Canada do in the event that India still refused to sign the treaty? Would Ottawa continue to deny India the money, “with the consequence that India sends its business elsewhere?” He believed that Ottawa had little choice but to give India the money. India remained a non-nuclear power, and New Delhi considered adhering to the NPT. Furthermore, the optics of Canada giving the money once India had disavowed the treaty would be terrible.44 The Commonwealth Division asserted that Ottawa should rethink its strategy. It counselled approaching Moscow, London, and Washington to jointly persuade the Indians to sign the NPT, offering New Delhi something beyond military guarantees for a suitable inducement. Ottawa could act as a bridge between Moscow and Washington by approaching the Soviets. Any success would enhance international relations – provided that these adversarial parties could cooperate. Even if this failed, and the chance of success was slim, Munro noted, “we could never be accused of having lacked the imagination and courage to try every conceivable method of getting India to sign the NPT.”45 The strategy was certainly creative and idealistic – and it failed. The Canadians found the Soviets unwilling to antagonize the Indians, while Moscow sought to further develop its own “special relationship” with India.

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The Americans and Soviets cooperated to an extent, but they remained guarded on their concessions to countries such as India. They released another draft of the NPT in January 1968, but the Indians still balked. The revised draft did not meet their security concerns. China also denounced the working drafts of the treaty. Indian public opinion hardened against signing the treaty, and the issue actually unified a highly stratified country at a time of intense domestic discontent. Indians passionately believed that any draft treaty must be in their national interest. George witnessed the depth of this feeling first hand. At the end of January, he made a formal call on S.K. Singh, the deputy secretary and head of the disarmament desk in the IMEA. George wanted to learn the latest Indian thinking on the NPT draft and needed to reiterate Canadian concerns over the hardening of India’s NPT attitude. Singh believed that the new draft reflected a change in style but not substance, remarking that it would now “be extremely difficult for any Indian government to change its policy in light of strong public opinion against Indian signature.”46 George countered that public opinion could be shaped by firm government policy and by ensuring that the public had all of the facts.47 New Delhi prepared for the eventual outcry from “its friends.” George reported that Singh “launched into an emotional assertion of India’s right to decide on NPT on its own without outside pressures. India was a country of great potential and destiny and important decisions like this had to be made in Delhi and not elsewhere.” The tenor of the response startled George, who reassured Singh that the Canadian government understood the Indian position but hoped that New Delhi would judiciously weigh the facts and consider Ottawa’s view. His reflections on the meeting betrayed his frustration. “This conversation brought out clearly the underlying emotional basis for Indian resistance to NPT” since Singh made no effort to discuss the treaty “in terms of balance and advantages or even in terms of where Indian interest lay.” The Indians predicated their perspective “almost entirely on security problems vis-à-vis China” and felt a strong undercurrent of nationalism in the face of pressure from the great powers.48 It is also abundantly evident that the Canadian position mattered little to the Indians. At this stage, the archival evidence shows that neither Pearson nor Martin provided input on this file. One cannot help but wonder if they were simply swept along by the tide of events or whether the intricacies of a new Liberal leadership race, sparked by Pearson’s decision in December to retire, distracted their attention. The Disarmament Division received George’s dispatch and soberly noted that “there can now be no doubt at any level of Indian Government where we stand and how seriously we view the question of Indian accession.” In fact, some officials saw repeated approaches as “counter-productive in terms of Cdn-Indian relations and the Indian attitude to the NPT.” They asked George what Ottawa should do next.49

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His answer was blunt: the High Commission had lobbied to the extent possible.50 He and his officers spoke separately to Gandhi, Dayal, the foreign secretary, and Sarabhai. Only a press report from the prominent New Delhi paper the Statesmen, which stressed that Canada would react negatively to an Indian rejection of the treaty, offered a glimmer of hope that the Canadian view received consideration.51 Only the Americans and Soviets could persuade India to be a signatory to the NPT, but George concluded that, if Ottawa pressed ahead without support from both Washington and Moscow, “we risk arousing Indian resentment against what will be seen here as [an] overly tough Canadian posture.”52 India rejected another draft of the NPT in March. George met with Indira Gandhi again at the end of the month. This was the first formal meeting between the two since November, and he informed the DEA of her hardened position. The Indians, she told George, saw no advantage in signing the NPT, nor did she believe in outside guarantees of India’s security. In her eyes, the treaty merely consolidated the status quo. Both the United States and the USSR were unscathed by the treaty’s provisions, and France and China would simply ignore the NPT altogether. Gandhi then rebuked both George and Ottawa. She bluntly stated that he remained the only head of post in India to raise his government’s concerns on the subject. He insisted that he compared “notes with her” only because of the long-standing atomic collaboration, which he “hoped could continue in the spirit of confidence that would exist” if both nations were partners in an international control system held together by the NPT. Despite his reasoning, the Indian leader remained unmoved by the Canadian position. Following the meeting, George recommended that Ottawa continue to urge London, Washington, and Moscow to lobby New Delhi. In light of Gandhi’s abrupt criticism of Ottawa’s views, he sardonically noted that the Indians disingenuously considered discussions with those respective missions in New Delhi as merely “informal exchanges of views.”53 His comment reveals the extent to which the importance placed on Canadian views had declined in New Delhi since Nehru’s death despite the ongoing sale of Canadian reactors to India. India was simply not a priority for Pearson during his time in office; questions of the ICSC and NPT crossed his desk, but, unlike during his time as SSEA, he did not seek a meeting of the minds with the Indians. In one of his last formal decisions on the India file and NPT, however, Pearson read George’s dispatch and wrote that “I think we should be careful about bringing pressure to bear on this matter.”54 Canadian policy had been overtly careful. Canadians never used aid as a means to pressure the Indians to modify their position. Instead, Ottawa quietly pursued diplomatic channels, trying to persuade the Indians of

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the logic of signing the NPT. Security trumped Canadian reasoning. After all, from New Delhi’s perspective, the Canadians could afford to sign the NPT and act on their principles protected by geography and the American strategic umbrella. India was poor and largely boxed in by enemies that it had fought in two recent wars, and it had few allies. The Indian nuclear energy program had been constructed, in good part, for prestige and ambition when the nation had scarce financial resources. By 1968, New Delhi believed that it had ample reasons to ignore the NPT and develop nuclear weapon capabilities – fulfilling Bhabha’s long-awaited goal. On 5 April, Indira Gandhi confirmed in the Lok Sabha that India would not sign the NPT. If, she reasoned, some countries cut aid as a result, then it would lead to “the first real step towards self-sufficiency.” Self-interest and domestic considerations guided India. The pro-signature group, George reported to the DEA, numbered a handful of IMEA officials “who will of course now have to tow the line that has been laid down by the P.M. I therefore see nothing to be gained by beating our heads against a closed door. Public opinion here is now overwhelmingly against the treaty.”55 George’s initial promise to “give it everything” caused exasperation along the lines that Escott Reid had once faced. His persistent endeavours officially and unofficially to persuade the Indians to reconsider their views annoyed some officials in Ottawa. The Canadian ambassador to Moscow, Robert Ford, discussed the Indian position with the Soviets. One official in the Commonwealth Division offered that “Mr. Ford will do a good gist and we can hope Mr. George will not again go to bat for a while.”56 But George, unable to heed his own advice, sought one more meeting with the IMEA, provoking one departmental colleague to comment acidly: “Why don’t they leave well enough alone! Have they no sense for this, especially after what Mrs. G said in the Lok Sabha?”57 With this last effort falling flat, Ottawa resigned itself to India not signing the NPT. Countries besides India had qualms with the NPT and thought that it discriminated in favour of the great powers. Among them, Argentina, China, France, and South Africa initially refused to sign. But Canada focused on the Indian position because its nuclear cooperation and export program with India marked its most robust market, and the situation remained so into the 1970s. The irony lay in Ottawa’s increasingly active promotion of international nuclear safeguards. The topic became uniquely complex. Ottawa had to reconcile nuclear export goals with the desire to promote international safeguards, however imperfect, but what could be done with a nuclear partner who did not share Ottawa’s vision? For almost two years, every other aspect of the bilateral relationship had been shunted aside by this one problem, with broad implications for the relationship. Ronning’s thesis articulated nearly eight years earlier

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remained true: neither country would concede to the other on issues of paramount interest. The NPT split emerged as another example to substantiate his earlier analysis. The outcome of the NPT matter dovetailed with Pearson’s retirement from politics and the end of his long association with India. That country remained a puzzle to Pearson, much as it had during his first visit in January 1950. He possessed neither the academic nor the cultural inquisitiveness of a Ronning or even a Reid to become more attuned to Asia. He had witnessed a great deal of change over two decades. Under Nehru, non-alignment was intended to fulfill India’s moral and perceived geopolitical needs. After 1962, in the aftermath of the Sino-Indo border war, non-alignment made a less practical choice. India required outside political and military support, so Indira Gandhi sought policies that reflected an updated assessment, far less rooted in a Nehruvian worldview, of India’s needs. There was less commonality with Ottawa’s worldview than ever before. In India, Ottawa’s views mattered less. In the 1950s, New Delhi wanted Ottawa to recognize China. Nehru could not fathom that China should be ignored by the West. Now China became a fundamental reason why India refused to sign the NPT. The refusal of both India and China to sign the NPT, combined with the escalating war in Vietnam, harkened to the frustrating early days of Dulles and Molotov, when the Cold War in Asia tested Pearson’s mettle. Now the NPT negotiations stymied his diplomatic talents. Contrary to Robert Bothwell’s suggestion that good relations “were still a major consideration” for Pearson, the record shows his aloofness toward India from 1963 to 1968.58 He turned down offers to visit India. Compared with Howard Green, Paul Martin was a little more active on the India file. Most of Martin’s involvement, however, was reactionary. Apart from the nuclear reactor sale, there were few active initiatives. Tellingly, the DEA failed to conduct a strategic review of bilateral relations during these years, a period when India’s leadership changed thrice and the country fought two significant wars in three years. The Liberal Party chose Pierre Trudeau as its new leader. He replaced Pearson as prime minister on 20 April 1968. Trudeau became the first prime minister to have already travelled to India, simply for the sake of travel. In a vein similar to that of Indira Gandhi for India, Trudeau sought to change Canada’s foreign policy to reflect national interest. Gandhi and Trudeau would guide CanadaIndia relations into their most turbulent period, and Ottawa began to coolly reassess its national interest in India.

9 Old Hopes and a New Realism? Bilateral Relations, 1968–73

On 25 June 1968, Pierre Trudeau and the Liberals won their first majority government since 1953. The denizens of the East Block greeted the news warily. Robert Bothwell and Jack Granatstein observe that Trudeau “was almost an unknown quantity to the public, to politicians, and to the Canadian public service.”1 Many among the Ottawa policy establishment came of age under the pragmatic and cautious leadership of Mackenzie King and the internationalism of St. Laurent and Pearson. Trudeau served in cabinet for less than a year before Pearson resigned and the leadership race began. However, he exuded energy, an edgy charm, and an aloof confidence. Above all else, he possessed a sharp intelligence. He also came to the job with the least amount of political experience of any Canadian prime minister in the twentieth century and a vastly different worldview from his cabinet colleagues and advisers. Curiosity and affluence had permitted Trudeau to travel widely in his youth, and he would become the most travelled of Canada’s prime ministers. Only Mackenzie King and Trudeau had visited India before launching their political careers. But Trudeau revealed few thoughts on India in his memoirs. Rather, it appears that revolutionary China captivated the young Trudeau, and he opposed the political isolation of the PRC. Despite the horrendous suffering that Mao inflicted on his people, Trudeau found the enchantment and economic possibilities offered by recognizing communist China tantalizing. He openly expressed his disdain for the traditions and pride of place that the DEA maintained in Ottawa. Canadian foreign policy, Trudeau reasoned, should serve Canadian interests. He challenged conventional thinking, including multilateral pillars such as Canada’s role in NATO – the basis for much of post1945 Canadian foreign policy. He believed the philosophy of Pearsonian helpfulfixer diplomacy outdated. His thinking reflected a growing public demand to reassess Canada’s relationship in forums such as NATO and the bilateral relationship with the struggling United States, a country reeling from domestic political strife and the morass of the Vietnam War. During and after his leadership campaign, Trudeau made it clear that Canadian foreign and defence policies would be re-evaluated.2 In a new era of political change, the DEA regarded the appointment of Mitchell Sharp as SSEA days after the election positively. Sharp had been one of the

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mandarin elite before joining the Liberal Party. For much of the 1950s, he had served as C.D. Howe’s deputy minister. Shortly after the Diefenbaker election, Sharp had left the government for the private sector and a lucrative career as vice-president of Brazilian Light, Power, and Traction. In 1963, he had returned to the government as Pearson’s finance minister. Politically right of centre, sober minded, and trusting of the civil service, Sharp sympathized with those who questioned Trudeau’s examination of long-standing foreign policy wisdom as a review began in 1969. South Asia, as will be seen, did not factor into that process. India mattered little to Trudeau’s desire to forge new paths and question conventionalism on the world stage while emphasizing “realism” in the policymaking process. But the DEA noticed the change in approach, and officials questioned how well the Indian relationship served Canadian interests. At a time when the relationship was visibly fraying on questions stemming from the ICSC and non-proliferation, policy makers received little top-down direction from the Prime Minister’s Office. James George fought determinedly during the Trudeau era to place India back on the radar as it moved further to the periphery for Canadian policy makers, but he encountered the new selfinterested approach emanating from Ottawa. If Escott Reid ever had a disciple, it was George. The two men shared a passion for India, its culture, its peoples. Like Reid, George genuinely believed that India counted for far more than what Ottawa believed. With fervour, George sought to restore India to prominence in the calculus of Canadian foreign policy. A decade earlier Reid had left India tired and frustrated, having worn thin the patience of key colleagues such as Pearson and Cadieux. George gradually discovered that, while times, circumstances, and actors had changed, his efforts to enhance bilateral ties met with similar obstacles and outcomes as Reid’s. George’s ideas were creative, practical, yet infeasible. Almost none of his overtures entered into the DEA’s calculations of India and had no influence on official policy. The continuing stream of young Canadian diplomats who had served on the ICSC in Vietnam returning to the DEA with a deeply embedded antipathy toward India offset his overtures. In addition to these prejudices, the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi struggled to gain the attention of policy makers in Ottawa as new and old powers captured the foreign policy spotlight. India mattered less to Canada and to many in the government compared with the economic juggernaut of modern Japan and its growing demand for Canadian resources. At best, the times resulted in a predominantly ad hoc policy on India that sought a more realistic approach to determining shrinking Canadian interests in that country. At worst, a visible malaise struck the bilateral relationship.

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On 12 June 1968, the long-expected news arrived. In Geneva, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was finally created, and, as anticipated, India refused to be a signatory. Ottawa waited to respond, and two weeks later the new government initiated a foreign policy review process. In India, George welcomed the change, thinking that Canada had a vital stake in India’s progress as a democratic state and an important friend of Ottawa in Asia. A new government could be a tonic for the relationship, and “a review of old foreign policies (including aid) provides this mission with a timely challenge to take a fresh look at Canada’s relations with India.” Having lived in India for nearly two years, his prejudices acclimatized, George strove to “rise to the bait.”3 He conducted the first review of bilateral relations in over eight years by the High Commission, and it struck an alarmist note. George believed that Ottawa faced a turning point in its relations with India. If the DEA wanted to maintain and build on past efforts and investments, then Ottawa needed to boost and broaden its endeavours immediately. George cautioned that, if Ottawa failed, then “we are heading for trouble and much of the bread we have cast upon these waters may fail to return to us.” He clearly alluded to the fact that Canada continued to make a substantial investment in India despite its devalued political relationship. Over $645 million since 1951, nearly half of Canada’s total external assistance budget, had gone to India. Even now, George outlined, when approximately seventy countries received Canadian aid, India received over 40 percent annually. This sum created notable goodwill toward Canada in India; however, “looking even for a few months ahead, there are some worrying problems coming to the surface which will probably cause us to draw on our very considerable but not unlimited stock of goodwill in India.” Ottawa displayed signs of donor fatigue, giving the bare minimum to India, much to the chagrin of the Indians. The United States simultaneously cut its own aid program. George warned that this trend, coupled with the ongoing disagreement over nuclear policy, could cause a “serious disruption” in the relationship.4 New Delhi’s refusal to sign the NPT meant that both countries crossed into “the first phase of a delicate operation.” Uncertain of the ambitions of the Indian nuclear program, George questioned New Delhi’s definition of “peaceful purposes.” He suspected that the Indians would eventually test a nuclear device “for changing the course of rivers or creating new harbours.” A test would become a distinct possibility within the next three years, he concluded. His estimate of the date proved to be wrong, but his antennae proved to be accurate. It was necessary, then, to re-engage the Indians through a “properly applied diplomatic effort.”5 If they could not be persuaded to sign the NPT while insisting on testing a peaceful nuclear device, then maybe Ottawa could coax New Delhi to wait and use plutonium from one of India’s own reactors when it became operational.

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Then, though the technology of the Indian reactors would likely be Canadian, at least there would be no violation of the formal agreements with Canada. George feared that, as the 1972 general election approached, Indira Gandhi and her advisers might “be tempted to flex their nuclear muscle on what they will convince themselves is a ‘purely peaceful explosion.’” For the first time, a Canadian official contemplated the outcome: “Our nuclear cooperation with India, which has been the most spectacular and impressive part of our aid programme here, will be blown up too.” Obviously, Ottawa wanted to avoid this situation but had limited leverage, and “the old ‘special relationship’ of Mr. Nehru’s and Mr. Pearson’s time would be eroded and lost” if India proceeded.6 George provided remedies for the concerns that he raised. He believed that Canada could do what its allies had thus far failed to do – reach out to India and keep New Delhi from falling into the firm embrace of the Soviets. The American position in India quickly sank because of Vietnam and aid cuts. The British aggravated New Delhi with their handling of decolonization in Kenya and the attempt to limit Asian immigration from that country to Britain. Perhaps it was time, George suggested, for Canada to enter into an annual round of consultations with the Indians at the undersecretary level.7 Doing so would set a precedent for the bilateral relationship and send a strong signal that Ottawa sought to strike a new tone with New Delhi. Ottawa did not have such a mechanism even with major allies such as London and Washington. The meetings could develop a new relationship with India “founded less on the Commonwealth and on what the Indians would call sentiment, and more on a broad and intelligent review of our common interests.” George offered creative ideas reminiscent of an earlier era when Escott Reid sought to put India on the map.8 George’s colleagues lacked his enthusiasm, particularly for annual consultations. While the proposal circulated through the Economic, Disarmament, Far Eastern, and Defence Liaison Divisions, the Commonwealth Division thought that the Indians were already saturated with a plethora of annual talks. Besides, Ottawa had sent a stream of visitors to India in past years. Formal, high-level, bilateral talks would only enhance existing contacts between ministers or officials. Regular diplomatic exchanges sufficiently dealt with pressing problems, and raising the NPT would accomplish nothing. Ottawa also balanced a relationship with Pakistan. A newly institutionalized high-level Canadian delegation to India would affect Ottawa’s relations with Islamabad, which would lobby for the same treatment. Discussions with the Indians remained general affairs rather than formally set annual talks.9 Blair Seaborn, head of the Far Eastern Division, concurred with the Commonwealth Division’s assessment. His wealth of experience in Indochina left him unsympathetic to India.10 Joining Seaborn in the division was Tom

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Delworth, a young officer who had served on the ICSC in the mid-1960s and recently returned to Ottawa from Saigon. Described as a bright and able officer with fiercer views on the Indians than those of Seaborn, Delworth is an example of the impact of the ICSC on bilateral relations as young officers rose in seniority in the DEA.11 With Seaborn’s approval, Delworth drafted a reply to the Commonwealth Division tartly advising that “if we have detected in your memorandum under reference a certain lack of enthusiasm for Mr. George’s proposal … you may rest assured that you have the enthusiastic support of this Division for this lack of enthusiasm.” The reply noted that “our relations with the Indians derive chiefly from our shared membership in the International Control Commission in Indochina, a shared membership, I suggest, which may have done more than most things to strain relations between Canadian and Indian officials.” The commissions, and the high commissioners stationed in each capital, allowed sufficient contact. No series of high-level consultations would “bring about a harmony of views” when such a harmony had failed to occur during the past fourteen years of the commissions. “With all due respect,” Seaborn concluded, “I am doubtful that periodic high-level consultations with the Indians would do much more” than generate paperwork for the sake of paperwork. George, he concluded, could ably fill Canada’s needs in New Delhi.12 Not easily deterred, George pushed for the consultations. He believed that the Indians were interested in pursuing the meetings if Ottawa broached the subject, but the opportunity might be lost if the Canadians dithered. The renewed proposal met further derision. One senior official read George’s caution that the Indians might be unable to accommodate discussions if Ottawa hedged and wrote “good” in the margin of his dispatch.13 Seaborn again signalled his disapproval, and the voices of Donald Munro of the Commonwealth Division and Basil Robinson joined his. Munro questioned the usefulness of the proposed talks, cautioning Marcel Cadieux that they “would over-strain in an unwarranted manner our personal resources.” The facts, as Munro saw them, were that India was an established key player in the non-aligned movement and was the leading regional power in South Asia. New Delhi gave little consideration to countries outside the major Western and communist powers. Canada’s political and economic influence with India hinged on foreign aid, and Ottawa could only expect to have a “marginal effect” on Indian foreign policy.14 Cadieux agreed with Munro. He advised George to drop the matter, stressing that the upcoming Commonwealth prime ministers’ meetings would provide a “useful forum” in which to discuss a range of issues without the interference of the great powers.15 This was a realistic hope to a point, for the intimate setting of earlier years allowing for rapport to develop had given way to an expansive forum that included the newly independent members from Africa and the Caribbean.

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In a rare editorial on bilateral relations, the Globe and Mail noticed that Indira Gandhi had cancelled a tentatively set visit to Ottawa the previous October after speaking at the United Nations in New York. Since the Shastri visit to Ottawa in June 1965, the editorial observed, “top-level meetings have been scarce. And there have been awkward problems, such as whether Canada could be assured of India’s nuclear intentions after providing reactors, which have needed talking out.” The editorial hoped that Gandhi and Trudeau would use the forthcoming Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference to confer.16 Trudeau and Sharp attended their first Commonwealth meetings in London from 7 to 15 January 1969. Their briefing notes informed them that Gandhi was “astute and has a wealth of political experience,” was politically “well left of centre,” and did not “have the same romantic attachment to the Commonwealth as an institution, as did her father.” The remainder of the notes dealt with the ICSC, nuclear cooperation, and trends in Indian foreign policy. On the troublesome ICSC, both Sharp and Trudeau read, “India’s policies in the Indochina Commissions and the difficulties they have caused Canada are to a considerable extent the result of India’s desire not to offend or annoy the U.S.S.R.”17 New Delhi gravitated toward Moscow for strategic reasons as ties with the Nixon administration soured. Trudeau’s briefing notes cautioned that, since Canada had signed the NPT, Ottawa’s nuclear cooperation with India required sober consideration. Ottawa stopped urging the Indians to sign the NPT, and in general Cadieux described bilateral nuclear cooperation as “reasonably satisfactory, though Indian reluctance to place the CIR reactor under effective safeguards including the right of inspection gives us some concern.” He advised Trudeau and Sharp to refer to Ottawa’s treaty obligations should Gandhi broach the topic of nuclear cooperation at the meetings. These obligations need not preclude further cooperation, Cadieux noted, provided that “India’s nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful” and fell within the treaty guidelines.18 In general, the DEA believed that Gandhi and her advisers would be preoccupied with discussing their bilateral relations with Britain, and Ottawa advised Sharp that “no pressing bilateral matters” needed to be raised with his Indian counterpart.19 As it turned out, Trudeau and Gandhi did not hit it off. He describes the meeting in his memoirs as “very strange,” recalling that “she was if not sullen … at least very quiet and untalkative. Our first meeting was a series of silences between us.”20 In this sense, she resembled her father. Past Canadian prime ministers and officials commented on Nehru’s ability to withdraw inward and elude his interlocutors. During the ensuing talks, neither Trudeau nor Gandhi discussed the NPT, or other issues, in depth. Ottawa’s nuclear cooperation policy vis-à-vis India continued in an indeterminate state.

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The situation exasperated James George. In addition to his discarded proposal for annual meetings, he had asked for direction on the future of bilateral nuclear cooperation and whether Ottawa would continue training Indians, supply heavy water for the RAPPs, and provide future engineering information for the next generation of Indian nuclear plants. Nearly nine months after his first request, the DEA offered no direction. George wrote to Don Cornett, head of the Commonwealth Division, in late February: “You are, I am sure, well aware that the aspect of Canada-Indian relations which causes me most concern at the present time is the effect of India’s refusal to sign the NPT on our co-operation in the nuclear field.” George favoured continued collaboration, agreeing with the Commonwealth meeting briefs suggesting that Canadian nuclear cooperation could continue within the limits of the NPT. If Ottawa decided to end its links with the Indian nuclear program, then both Britain and France would fill the void, each having expressed interest in taking the Canadian market share. George also thought it unlikely that India would embark on a weapons program based on plutonium extracted from the CIR alone. Perhaps Ottawa could even renew its campaign for a signature on the NPT. At the least, he stressed, Ottawa needed to consider seriously what future nuclear cooperation with India might look like.21 A sluggish and confused response came nearly two months later. Cornett apologized for the department’s delay and lack of “comprehensive guidance to the numerous though fundamental and quite reasonable requests contained in that letter.” His response hinted at the lack of focus plaguing the DEA because of competing views on India and nuclear cooperation. Cornett admitted “that your queries straddle inter-divisional … not to mention inter-departmental lines; that the official answers aren’t obvious or easy to determine; that our few knowledgeable people are under continual pressure; that there have been several changes in personnel, etc., etc.” His response suggested that nuclear cooperation would continue. No firm evidence found the Indians acting in poor faith with Ottawa on the nuclear file. Ottawa prepared to exercise prudent cooperation with the Indians, though “some people in the Department would take an even more restrictive attitude towards nuclear cooperation with NPT non-signatories, but they have not yet carried the day.” However, Cornett could not clarify what form “prudent” nuclear cooperation would take, especially for a sticky matter such as training assistance.22 What stance Ottawa would take if India tested a “peaceful nuclear device” became the most difficult question. Cornett admitted to being at “a loss to know what we do about this situation.” Ottawa’s reaction would be “anybody’s guess, but my own feeling is that reaction in Ottawa would be quite sharp,” and likely bilateral cooperation “would be undermined at one stroke.” In the meantime, Cornett concluded that international pressure, especially from the nuclear

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powers, might be enlisted. This tactic had failed during the NPT negotiations to cause the Indians to reconsider, so it was doubtful that a similar tactic would work now. Cornett promised to follow up and acknowledged the clumsy, and fleeting, directions that Ottawa offered: “I’m afraid that’s about as far as my thoughts go at this stage. I would welcome your own views on this problem, and in particular what you think we might realistically try to do about it.”23 While the DEA mulled over its undetermined post-NPT nuclear policy on India, Indira Gandhi focused on consolidating her political hold on the Congress Party and the nation. In January 1969, she relinquished her role as minister for foreign affairs, which she had held since September 1967, but retained the atomic energy portfolio. A poorly fought general election in February 1967 led to a power struggle in the Congress Party that soon split the members along ideological lines. Always a myriad of different interests united by the cause of independence and dominated by Nehru until his death, the Congress Party became increasingly factionalized between its right and left wings. Matters came to a head in late 1969 when Gandhi defied the right-of-centre party bosses who fought to purge her from the party. She received heavy support from the younger socialist group in the party who favoured closer links with the Soviet Union and economic nationalism.24 The party formally split in November 1969, leaving Gandhi with a minority government supported by the communists. The split reinforced her gradual tilt toward the left. Her own political upbringing had certainly swung left of centre, and her exposure to Krishna Menon during her student days had nurtured this streak. Gandhi’s relationship with P.N. Haksar, her principal private secretary since May 1967, also influenced her political views. An old colleague from her days in London, Haksar came from a prominent Kashmiri family and had been drawn toward the mercurial Menon while studying at the London School of Economics. Nehru had persuaded Haksar to return and join the Indian foreign service, which desperately needed qualified and intelligent young staff. Haksar had fit the bill. He had returned to London to work with Menon at the High Commission and had risen through the Indian diplomatic ranks, serving as high commissioner to Britain before Gandhi asked him to return to New Delhi to be her adviser.25 Described as a “tough cookie” by George, Haksar replaced L.K. Jha, Shastri’s adviser, whom Gandhi believed to be too conservative.26 Regarded as an intellectual, a socialist, and a man of integrity, Haksar wielded immense influence in Gandhi’s government until his forced retirement in 1973. He played an important role in consolidating the power of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, which emerged as a central broker of political power and governmental authority that even overshadowed cabinet. Haksar supported both the shift in Gandhi’s foreign policy and her economic nationalism.27

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Haksar demanded that India’s civil servants, including its diplomats, be not only loyal to India but also ideologically in line with the government. Evidence of his direct influence was apparent in the staffing of India’s foreign posts. In the spring of 1969, he manoeuvred to pull the Indian high commissioner in Ottawa, General J.N. Chaudhuri, a Western sympathizer appointed by the Shastri government, for someone who would “promote India’s interests better than the General has done.”28 As 1969 ended, the minds of Canadian officials were elsewhere. The task forces in Ottawa charged with working on the foreign policy review began to submit their reports, and the policy makers responsible for the papers on the AsiaPacific regions ignored India. The omission neatly illustrated the entrenched malaise toward official relations and occurred despite the questions raised by India’s refusal to sign the NPT. The DEA ignored that India received $84 million annually or 36 percent of all Canadian bilateral development assistance, much to the chagrin of George. The general year-end review of India that occurred outside the broader foreign policy review process suggests a level of disenchantment, as in the case of the ICSC, and detachment.29 George planned to reverse this gap and reinject India into the foreign policy review process. Arthur Menzies, one of the most senior officials in the DEA, led the review of Canadian foreign policy on the Asia-Pacific region, which stressed the increasing importance of the Pacific and the need to recognize and establish broader Canadian relations with China. The report also emphasized the need to enhance ties with Japan and increase foreign aid to Indonesia. George read the tentative review, and his heart sank when India rated a brief mention, and he reasoned that any aid increases in other areas of Asia would almost surely come out of the current allocation to the Indian subcontinent. Although he charitably considered that Menzies’s report provided an excellent review, he argued that it did not go far enough. How, George asked, “can we consider our policy towards Asia (ESP. China and Japan) while omitting South Asia (ESP. India)? … where we have concentrated a large part of our aid, political and missionary efforts, for a generation.” The review was lacking since “our relations with the sub-continent are pivotal and not peripheral.” Unfortunately for George, few of his colleagues agreed with that assessment.30 An emerging China would disrupt regional security, and this development could not be underestimated. George doubted that Canada could gain the influence in a country such as Indonesia that it already possessed in India. The Soviet Union, India, and Japan were the only countries in Asia “capable of providing alternative poles of attraction and strength.” Canada’s interests could not be served by downgrading relations with the subcontinent while shifting development assistance to other areas. After all, successive Canadian governments “had

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invested around dollars 1.3 billion in a key area where we have a common language. We have won for CDA a reputation as the most generous donor.” If anything, Ottawa had failed to develop its potential influence in South Asia because its political effort had fallen short of its aid effort in terms of high-level visits or talks. George was absolutely correct in this observation. But his analysis that this situation had occurred because Ottawa had become “unduly depressed by our failure to carry India with us on Indochina and NPT, where their interests are very different from our own,” was only partly accurate. Rather, years of frustration had caused profound aggravation. But it could not be in Canada’s interests, George passionately asserted, to downgrade “our relations with countries that are either managing against all the odds to combine parliamentary democracy with a development program or aspire to return to a parliamentary system within a year.”31 He needed to convince his colleagues that India deserved to be at centre stage, not at the periphery. This became an increasingly difficult and burdensome task as Japan surged in economic importance and as successful cultivation of relations with China appealed to Trudeau and many in the DEA as a key priority of Canadian foreign policy in Asia. Before the department could respond to his lobbying, George wrote again, this time with a greater sense of urgency, to A.E. Ritchie, the recently appointed USSEA. George candidly explained that he did not want to sound “alarmist,” but he worried that all was “not well in what has previously been a rather easy and happy relationship.” T.N. Kaul, Ritchie’s equivalent in India, had recently taken George aside at a party to ask him when Trudeau planned to visit. George had demurred, prompting Kaul to respond that “I know you have downgraded your relations with India. We may have to reconsider our own priorities, but what do you think can be done about it?” George had pointed out the scale of  the Canadian aid program in India and promised that Trudeau would visit soon.32 George now urged Ritchie to conduct a proper review. Menzies promised one but had neither the time nor the scope of experience to cover all of South Asia. Canada needed to consider that India “is a pivotal area both in terms of the stability and security of Asia.” It remained, in light of Pakistan’s tumultuous political past, the only major parliamentary democracy in the region. George returned to his earlier proposal and lobbied for increased high-level consultations, arguing that the lack of ministerial visits and consultations was one reason that Ottawa had not leveraged the benefits of the aid relationship.33 Channelling  increased sums into aid while ignoring the political dimension had achieved little. If George can be seen as an echo of Reid, then Ritchie’s response was heavily influenced by the “Ronning thesis.” Ritchie disagreed with Kaul’s comments but

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acknowledged that “surely what has been happening in recent years is no more than a mutual recognition that on many issues … Canadian and Indian national interests are not identical or even similar, and hence our approach is bound to be rather different.” Looking back at his own long career in the department and experiences with India, Ritchie reflected on the remarkable warmth and level of cooperation that had characterized bilateral ties immediately after the post-independence period and extended through the “fifties into the early sixties.”34 Personalities of old had also facilitated a fruitful partnership, mused Ritchie. Pearson, St. Laurent, and Nehru had long departed the stage, and circumstances had changed. Ottawa found it increasingly difficult to find areas where it could positively influence India. A range of issues, including the NPT, ICSC, decolonization, law of the sea conference, and Indian invasion of Goa, exemplified policy divergences, some of which undoubtedly fostered enmity among Canadian officials. In short, Ritchie concluded, the “Canadian experience extending back over several years leads many of us to question just how much influence we can expect to have with the Indians on major issues where our interests do not happen to coincide.”35 He offered no solution. The proposal for annual consultations was scotched again. Yet it is revealing that Ottawa and Tokyo had initiated a similar high-level consultation arrangement in 1968. As for the foreign policy review, no apology came from the DEA to George. The review never intended to, nor could it, cover everything, Ritchie concluded. The new Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), he suggested, could cover India in its aid review.36 George disagreed with the analysis of his superiors. He opposed the view that Canada failed to influence Indian policies in areas that mattered to Ottawa and therefore that it was pointless to pursue such efforts. He countered that, if Ottawa had failed to impress on the Indians its views of the ICSC and NPT, then New Delhi’s views might have been much further from Canadian views. Reiterating India’s significance, George thought that Canada could influence Indian foreign policy in a number of fields, particularly at the United Nations on peacekeeping issues or legal matters. This required that the Canadian government engage New Delhi. Echoing Escott Reid, he believed that it was in Canada’s interest, and in the broader Western interest, “that we try harder.”37 These efforts to procure a review of bilateral ties, implement annual consultations, and even lobby for increased ministerial visits yielded limited results. In Ottawa, Cornett circulated George’s dispatch to the relevant divisions. Still deeming the annual consultations impractical, Cornett thought the analysis sound and worth careful consideration: “Certainly our lack of success in influencing India on some important issues such as NPT and the Indochina Commission is no excuse not to keep trying.”38

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Another optimistic sign that Ottawa gradually responded to George’s lobbying is that Mitchell Sharp officially met his Indian counterpart, Swaran Singh, in New York on 25 September 1970 as the UN General Assembly reconvened. In addition, Trudeau accepted Gandhi’s invitation to visit India en route to the Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference in Singapore early in the new year. The Canadians expected Singh to raise the question of continued nuclear cooperation, particularly the supply of heavy water for the RAPP I. A briefing prepared for Sharp’s meeting with Singh suggests that Canadian nuclear policy on India remained undetermined. Policy makers questioned the extent to which nuclear cooperation with India should continue given that previously negotiated bilateral safeguards on the CIR and RAPPs fell short of current international standards and Canada’s NPT obligations, which affected nuclear cooperation with an NPT non-signatory. The DEA prepared a memorandum to cabinet on the subject in July 1970, but it languished during the summer months.39 Four options existed for the Canadian government on this matter. First, Ottawa could ship equipment and Canadian-produced heavy water under existing bilateral safeguards that could raise the ire of the international community and Pakistanis. Second, Ottawa could withhold shipment of both heavy water and equipment in line with a strict interpretation of NPT obligations until the Indians and IAEA concluded a transfer agreement. Analysts believed that this approach would have profoundly negative consequences on bilateral ties. Third, Ottawa could continue to ship equipment for the RAPP II during a window referred to as the interim period before the treaty became fully binding. Under existing bilateral safeguards, Ottawa could claim a moral and contractual obligation to India assumed under its agreements predating the NPT. Fourth, the Indians could agree to trilateral safeguards on heavy water similar to IAEA safeguards in view of the legal uncertainty surrounding Ottawa’s obligation to provide it to India. Failure to reach an agreement in that sense would prohibit heavy-water supplies to India. No progress was made during this set of brief talks between Sharp and Singh, and the status of cooperation remained unchanged as Trudeau prepared to visit India. It must have been a peculiar document for George to approve. Finally, after four years, his post and India attained the long-craved attention. But on the eve of Trudeau’s first visit to India, it became evident that, beyond the question of nuclear cooperation, there were limited areas of common ground between the two countries. The synopsis of bilateral relations that George provided to Trudeau described just how differently the two countries viewed the Commonwealth. India saw that organization through the lens of its British relations, while since the 1960s Ottawa had refocused its attention less on

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Commonwealth Asia and more on Africa and the Caribbean. The ICSC remained a point of divergence since India “would not mind if Vietnam went communist provided it remained independent of China and left Laos and Cambodia more or less alone.” Contact on the ICSC, admitted George, had become abrasive and sometimes created “mutual distrust.”40 In contrast, P.N. Haksar provided focused notes to brief Gandhi for the meeting with Trudeau. The notes overwhelmingly emphasized the state of nuclear cooperation and revealed annoyance to have been discussing the NPT again with the Canadians. Ottawa was “one of the few governments who expressed through their High Commissioner in New Delhi the great concern at India’s decision not to sign the treaty”; in fact, Haksar pointed out, George “was the only diplomatic representative of a foreign country who called at the Prime Minister to express this concern.” India collaborated with Canada in “an intimate way, in the development of nuclear energy,” and Haksar believed that Trudeau should “have no doubt” that India remained “committed to development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” India stood by that policy. The NPT remained “far too discriminatory in a number of ways for us to sign it.” Haksar also stressed that China had not signed the treaty, nor had the NPT led to nuclear disarmament, a state in which “India continues to be deeply interested.”41 Haksar made positive reference to Indochina in his briefing notes. Interestingly, he omitted the ICSC troubles. Instead, he suggested that Gandhi inquire about the Canadian assessment of the security situation in Vietnam and Washington’s intentions. Judging from his points, the Indian position on Saigon had softened: Our own position is that any peace settlement in Indo-China can only be within the framework of the Geneva agreements which provide that the sovereignty, neutrality, independence and territorial integrity of the Indo-China states must be respected. This means that each people – and we now include South Vietnam as a separate entity – should be free to fashion their own destiny free of foreign interference. Foreign interference includes interference by Great Powers seeking spheres of influence as well as interference from neighbours.42

This statement reflected a balanced perspective, but Canadian officials who served on the ICSC might have smirked at Haksar’s reference to a “neutrality” that few in the DEA believed to be the case. During his brief stopover in India, Trudeau ventured outside New Delhi, visiting the Taj Mahal and the Hindu holy city of Varanasi, where he toured an ashram. These detours earned accolades from the Indian press, and George thought that Trudeau’s interest in religion and his genuine curiosity about Indian

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spirituality inadvertently upstaged British prime minister Edward Heath, concluding his visit as Trudeau arrived.43 Nuclear cooperation and talk of the NPT dominated the discussions. At a press conference, Trudeau cautioned the Indians that his definition of peaceful nuclear uses did not include peaceful explosions. The leaders made progress toward a tentative agreement that would apply IAEA safeguards to heavy-water supplies for the RAPPs. George recalled that this “took some doing” given the differences of opinion on the NPT, but the talks led to a formal agreement in September 1971 providing IAEA international safeguards on the RAPPs.44 Coming out of the talks, the Canadians believed that the Indians were determined in their pursuit of plutonium but that New Delhi accepted that its nuclear program was designed for peaceful purposes and would respect treaty obligations with Canada. Trusting in these guarantees, the Canadians agreed that heavy water – at least – would be shipped to the Indians. When the visit was finished, the Times of India ran a positive editorial, and George was convinced that the visit “was a great success.” He relayed the Indian government’s impression to the DEA. India genuinely meant something to Ottawa, and Trudeau held a place in the hearts of Indians. Relations had sagged partly because “the GOI felt in light of our foreign policy review that India was less important to us than it used to be and partly as a result of frictions arising out of our signature of NPT and consequent differences over RAPP safeguards and heavy water.” George revelled in the fact that the weeks preceding Trudeau’s visit included “more Canadians officially visiting than [the] sum of all previous official Canadian visitors put together.”45 Geoffrey Pearson, the deputy high commissioner in New Delhi, Lester Pearson’s son, noted a similar view of the meeting in a letter to Roland Michener. He indicated that the visit “put Canada on the map again,” erasing a sense following the foreign policy review “that South Asia had somehow escaped the attention it deserved.”46 This was hyperbole from both men. In particular, the comments show the extent to which George looked for positives. In later years, he reiterated his belief that Trudeau’s visit to India was “a great success,” suggesting “a restoration” of good bilateral relations “due to the 1971 visit.” However, while each leader appreciated the other’s intellect, George admitted a distance between the two despite a “cautious rapport based on a grudging mutual respect.”47 The glow from the visit faded soon after Trudeau’s departure, and Trudeau later acknowledged that he had never achieved a “close personal rapport” with Gandhi and that they had remained at loggerheads on the issue of nuclear proliferation throughout their time in office.48 Personalities aside, it is difficult to trace the breakthrough that George suggested occurred during this trip when the aftermath is carefully scrutinized.

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Critical divergences on the NPT and ICSC remained, and no new initiatives came forth to invigorate the fairly peripheral political ties. One can certainly conclude that George’s analysis, based on nearly four years spent in New Delhi, reflected his desire to see New Delhi “put on the map.” The Cold War remained a notable division. Andrei Gromyko, the dreary but highly capable Soviet foreign minister, arrived in New Delhi to sign the IndoSoviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation on 7 August 1971. His visit and the treaty accentuated the long-standing rift on the Indian subcontinent. Formalizing a strong bilateral relationship meant that India became closer to Moscow politically and militarily than at any point since independence. It also marked the daughter’s clear departure from her father’s policy of non-alignment that had been a hallmark of Indian statecraft. The treaty represented a significant accomplishment from the Indian strategic perspective. Articles 8 and 11 provided for defence cooperation and mutual defence assistance. Culmination of the Soviet effort to court India since the Khrushchev era also proved to be beneficial to Moscow. The Soviet KGB presence in New Delhi became one of the largest in a foreign capital, and Gandhi “placed no limit on the number of Soviet diplomats and trade officials” enabling a plethora of KGB cover positions.49 In comparison, relations with the United States deteriorated considerably as the Vietnam War escalated. They continued to decline with Richard Nixon’s arrival in the White House, and the new friendship treaty fed the antipathy: the joint communiqué issued by the Soviets and Indians announcing the treaty included a call for American forces to leave Vietnam. Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, came to loathe Gandhi: Nixon referred to her as “a bitch,” while Kissinger bitterly commented that “the Indians are bastards anyways.”50 Washington drew closer to Islamabad, recognizing that New Delhi pitched toward Moscow; the Americans understood that in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indo border war the Indians refused to serve as a regional check to China. That issue mattered far less after Washington and Beijing broke the Cold War ice with Nixon’s state visit to China in February 1972. This surprising rapprochement between traditionally hostile powers did little, of course, to endear the Americans to Indira Gandhi, and she became determined to keep her dealings with the Nixon administration as brief as possible.51 The Indo-Soviet treaty came on the eve of another war between India and Pakistan. Throughout the spring and summer, a simmering civil war between East and West Pakistan spiralled out of control, with accusations of gross atrocities conducted by the army, dominated by West Pakistanis, against the Bengalis of East Pakistan. Millions of refugees streamed into eastern India. Pakistan accused India of assisting the rebels and encouraging refugees to cross over for purposes of propaganda. Border clashes between Indian and Pakistani troops

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broke out along the eastern frontier, and by early December the Pakistanis had retaliated by bombing Indian air bases in the west. Pakistan declared war and launched surprise artillery attacks and airstrikes along the western border, targeting Indian airfields. The Indian army steamrolled into East Pakistan and pursued limited attacks into West Pakistan. The superpowers quickly took sides. The United States rallied behind Pakistan and temporarily cut off foreign aid to India. The Soviets consolidated their “friendship” position with India. The conflict ended in a matter of weeks with Pakistan’s decisive defeat and East Pakistan’s independence as the newly created state of Bangladesh. India stood as the dominant military power on the subcontinent. Victory came at a price, however. India had to care for millions of poor Bangladeshi refugees with less international aid. The freeze in American aid left a substantial void. An already vulnerable economy absorbed the overrun, adding inevitable domestic strain. Ottawa hesitated to be drawn into the dramatic events transforming South Asia’s geopolitical environment. The Canadians neither entered the conflict nor helped broker an end to it. But with this backdrop, and well after completion and public release of the government’s foreign policy review, A.E. Ritchie finally authorized an internal Canada-India general policy review headed by the South Asian Division. Nearly fifteen years had passed since the last formal departmental review, conducted on the eve of Nehru’s 1956 Christmas visit. The central questions were direct and long overdue for consideration: As a result of our historic and Commonwealth association it has generally been considered that a “special relationship” existed between Canada and India; Does it still exist; Could it do so in the future; To what degree do Canadian and Indian external policies coincide or diverge?; In international organizations do the Indians seek us out for co-operation, co-sponsorship of resolutions, and to what extent has it been possible to influence their approach to mutual problems, e.g. disarmament, peaceful nuclear explosions; What influence do we enjoy in Delhi and in what area of policy? Where is India going and do we want to be with her?; What advantages could be obtained from closer Canadian relations with India; what disadvantages may result from more distant relations?52

The two most important divisions dealing with India, the Commonwealth and Far East Divisions, responded quickly. R.G. Hatheway, director of the Commonwealth Division, submitted a stark assessment detailing the changes causing his bureau’s aloofness toward India. The special relationship based on mutual membership in the Commonwealth from the 1940s and 1950s was irrelevant, and he doubted “whether the Commonwealth” offered “much scope

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for the development of such a relationship in the future.” Certainly, the change in Ottawa’s focus from Asia to Africa hastened this process. Increasing membership diluted the Commonwealth forum, and Canadian policy makers felt less urgency in 1971 than their predecessors had in 1949 to ensure that India took a prominent seat at the Commonwealth table.53 But Hatheway was yet another DEA officer who had served on the ICSC in Vietnam during the tempestuous year from June 1964 to June 1965. It is reasonable to conclude that this experience informed his skeptical assessment of the merits of the Commonwealth connection for bilateral cooperation, and his comments further illustrate the obstacles that George encountered while trying to persuade his colleagues to identify areas of bilateral common ground. L.J. Wilder replaced Blair Seaborn as director of the Far East Division. Like Seaborn, he had served on the ICSC from September 1965 to November 1966. He began his blunt assessment by declaring that “there is certainly no ‘special relationship’ between Canada and India insofar as China and Indochina were concerned.” Conflicting interests across Southeast Asia affected bilateral ties for the worst. Wilder argued that Canada’s relations with China outweighed the importance of its relations with India: There was a myth that India was the champion of parliamentary democracy in Asia, offering an example – alternative to the godless and oppressive communism of China – to the rest of the peoples of Asia. It is time that that myth was relegated to fairyland, and time also to accept the fact that India in the foreseeable future at least … is not to be taken seriously as a candidate for the leadership of Asia.

Wilder asserted that, if the price of improving and developing relations with China had led to a souring of relations with India, then it was a price worth paying. Furthermore, the Canadian experience with India in Indochina had proven that Canada had little ability to influence Indian policy. He concluded that the consistently negative experience of the ICSC should make Ottawa wary when contemplating any future endeavours with New Delhi in supervisory or peacekeeping bodies.54 Like Cadieux, Delworth, Hatheway, Rogers, and Seaborn, a young officer forged by the ICSC shaped Canada’s Asia policy in the DEA. Despite earlier hopes that supposed commonalities of language, education, and legal heritage existed and would facilitate cooperation between Canada and India, the unpleasant legacy of the ICSC proved to be difficult to forget. Arthur Andrew, director general of the Asia-Pacific Division, described the frustrations of the Indian position in his memoir published decades later even though he had not served on the ICSC or even in India.55 Clearly, the impressions of his colleagues had sculpted his views. Countless others in the DEA met similar

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jaded opinions during the early to mid-stages of their careers. Sour memories of the ICSC lingered. George, from the other side of the world, contended with this resentment. He might have sensed something amiss in the review process and communicated his concerns to the DEA. He planned to visit Ottawa in early March to discuss the final product. The South Asia Division sought to placate George, wishing to put his “mind at rest about the notorious South Asia policy review.” The review consisted of only a few draft pages, but the direction was clear: the “outcome of review will suggest some change in our relationship with India.” For the foreseeable future, India would continue to be a major focus of Ottawa’s development aid program, but Ottawa informed George that the current, and relatively meagre, political ties would suffice even with “very friendly” relations. The contradictory tone hardly reassured him.56 The South Asia Division offered George a chance to provide formally an analysis of the relationship that he had submitted unsolicited for years. He acknowledged that the relationship in the 1940s and 1950s was “out of proportion to basic realities of our relations. There was limited trade, little cultural contact and not much CDN experience of India.” However, Ottawa’s continuous outpouring of aid came to overshadow actual political efforts. The situation struck George, rightfully, as anomalous. Between 1970 and 1971, Canada directed $90 million in aid to India, while Australia contributed only $3 million. Yet Canberra tried “harder for political contact with India than we do e.g. annual bilateral consultations, cultural agreement, consulates in Bombay and Calcutta, more visitors.” George saw great symbolism in Gandhi’s omission of Ottawa during her Western tour the previous fall. However, with Washington again on the “outs” in New Delhi, Ottawa could fill the vacuum: “There is still much good will for Canada and I hope we can take advantage of it.”57 The formal review meeting took place on 1 March 1972, with Arthur Andrew in the lead role. The review highlighted the core-periphery debate between policy makers in Ottawa and their chief diplomat in India.58 Andrew listened unenthusiastically while George requested more political involvement. Sensing Andrew’s aloofness, George chided those who held that Canada received nothing from India, insisting that Ottawa had simply not “made any concerted effort to share its viewpoint.” The experience of the NPT and ICSC negotiations suggested otherwise, a fact that many around the table knew first hand. But the exasperation felt by many in the DEA had undermined an already lacklustre policy-planning perspective at the bilateral level.59 George pressed for cooperation in areas of trade development, which he suggested could be expanded through increased aid levels.60 Linkages could also stem from cultural exchanges, cooperation on environmental issues, or ongoing

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deliberations concerning the Law of the Sea. George also singled out the recently established Indo-Canadian Shastri Institute as an instrument to enhance cultural exchanges: “Of all India’s strengths and weaknesses few would deny that her cultural heritage is one of the world’s richest. Canadians would surely benefit from knowing more about it.” The above niche topics in many ways were visionary, for they came to dominate the contemporary state of bilateral ties. At this particular moment, however, George’s pleas came from one who saw the writing on the wall. George also confronted a long-standing problem, the overwhelmingly onedimensional bilateral relationship singularly characterized by government-togovernment ties. Few “champions” beyond the government raised the profile of the bilateral relationship or assisted George in making his case. Funding, or lack thereof, coupled with the lack of departmental support, consistently constrained Ottawa from developing a robust public diplomacy strategy in South Asia. This failure set Canada apart from many of its allies operating in the region.61 Few Indians knew much about Canada, and the reverse held true even though Ronning had raised the matter in 1960. There was also a limited diaspora; no one lobby group in Canada pushed strongly or effectively for closer cultural ties. Granted, Canada accepted increasing numbers of Indian immigrants. By 1971, approximately 30,000 people of Indian origin lived in Canada, and India represented Canada’s largest non-European source of immigrants. Still, only 5,313 new immigrants of Indian origin arrived in Canada in 1971, and the minutes of the review meeting indicate that the Trudeau government was unwilling to increase the number. Nor would Ottawa try to fill the chasm created by the rift in Indo-US relations. Weeks after returning from consultations in Ottawa, George was notified by the South Asia Division that an increase in aid to Bangladesh meant that India would not receive additional funds to replace cuts made by Washington to its aid program.62 Ottawa thanked George for his insights, but after nearly five years in New Delhi he would not stay to see if they would be implemented. In the spring of 1972, Ottawa announced that Bruce Williams would replace James George as high commissioner to India in August. Williams had served in India under Escott Reid and then in Hanoi on the ICSC. He represented a knowledgeable choice with a wealth of experience. Described by one colleague as “a remarkable man” and a superb diplomat, he was shrewd, tough when necessary, but genial.63 Williams knew India and South Asia and had experienced first hand the highs and lows of the relationship – more so than any of his predecessors. Despite his best efforts, George encountered the same resistance as Reid. He was fascinated by his encounters with South Asia, but India, particularly its

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metaphysical worlds, captivated him. India to George “was the only country in the world that has a continuous, uninterrupted stream of spirituality going back thousands of years,” and he drank in the experience. This experience had limitations. He admitted that he had been unaware of the scale of the negative impact that the Indochina commissions had within the DEA that had frequently undermined his efforts. In retrospect, he believed that the fact that the “top levels of the DEA were filled with people who had been in London, Washington, and Paris” had affected his work. The majority of these officials “had not been posted to Asia, and this was reflected in their thinking and attitudes.” It is difficult to believe that George could have misread the situation given the diplomatic reports coming across his desk in New Delhi.64 The likely explanation is that his passion and distance from home had led him to underestimate the climate in Ottawa. George missed the lack of interest in the DEA in his proposals, such as annual bilateral meetings. Although he realized and pointed out to Ottawa the striking imbalance of an aid program that far outweighed the actual effort that Ottawa put into political relations, he was unable to bridge the policy chasm. Nonetheless, apart from Reid, no other high commissioner worked harder than George to recast the relationship. His efforts sometimes led his colleagues to believe that he had gone “native,” one colleague suggesting that he had gone “overboard in India” and another observing that he had become Escott Reid “mark two.”65 Unlike Reid, George acknowledged that much of the special relationship was an illusion. In the end, George’s arguments fell on deaf ears. India’s time had passed, or so policy makers in the DEA believed. The siren calls of China’s potential and the booming Japanese economy beckoned. Williams sought to put his own stamp on policy by focusing on the role of Canada’s development assistance to India and whether it could leverage increased trade volumes. Canada, he reasoned, retained a considerable stake in India. Although Ottawa’s interests had changed, a central link to India remained through the enormous bilateral aid program. Canadian aid to India since the early 1950s totalled over $1 billion, and the government earmarked $78 million in the aid budget for 1973, so India continued to be the largest bilateral aid recipient. Williams reasonably concluded that aid permitted a stronger trade and investment connection than Ottawa believed. He provided a number of examples of aid opening up opportunities in India for Canadian consultants in civil engineering, nuclear energy, mining, and agriculture. More Canadians in the private sector travelled to India, and this hinted at opportunities for future collaboration in a number of fields of benefit to each country. Aid could become trade, from which both nations would benefit. As a relatively stable and independent centre in Asia, India had an influence in the region and in world

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affairs that would sustain itself and possibly grow, which increased opportunities for Canadians. Perhaps, Williams continued, aid marked a new phase in the evolving relationship. Idealism had characterized the first phase, and the second had focused on aid and technology sharing. During the latter phase, the aid program had evolved from direct “gifts” in the 1950s to cooperation on more sophisticated projects. A third phase of the relationship, driven by aid linkages, would be “characterized by cooperation in matters of mutual interest and for the satisfaction and enrichment of both countries.”66 This sketch of the aid evolution reflected the broader metamorphosis of geopolitical visions that Canadian officials applied to India. The bridge thesis–inspired idealism of providing aid gave way to a new, more realistic, vision of the relationship predicated on consideration of how Canada could benefit economically from its extensive aid to India. Both Williams and the Indians proposed that Ottawa enter into annual talks with New Delhi with an emphasis on aid and trade matters. The Indian high commissioner discussed the idea in a meeting with Trudeau in late February. Trudeau appeared to be interested and speculated that the topic could be raised more formally during Gandhi’s anticipated visit to Canada in June. The DEA appeared to be listening, and the South Asia Division considered the proposal realistic and timely. The government dusted off George’s long-cherished proposal of high-level annual meetings, five years after it was first suggested, but with a more specific and less idealistic design. In Ottawa, an interdepartmental meeting considered proposals for the establishment “of a mechanism for regular economic consultations with India.”67 What had sparked this volte-face in the South Asia Division? Although Trudeau’s interest was a vital factor, a wider set of circumstances lent superficial optimism to the proposal. First, the nuclear safeguards issue appears to have “faded into the background.” Second, in January 1973, negotiations in Paris finally produced an agreement of sorts that the warring sides in Vietnam could sign. Effectively, after nineteen gruelling years, Canada’s excruciating experience on the commissions was to end – removing a burdensome bilateral irritant. The time came to look for new areas of pragmatic cooperation that could be advanced during Gandhi’s visit to Canada. The South Asia Division prepared finally to take the lead long championed by high commissioners in New Delhi.68 On 4 April in Ottawa, Michel Dupuy, representing the USSEA, chaired a meeting attended by a range of representatives from the Departments of Finance, Industry, and Trade and Commerce, CIDA and the Export Development Corporation (EDC), as well as the South Asia, Asia and Pacific, and Economic Divisions of the DEA.

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A.B. Roger, head of the South Asia Division, championed an Indo-Canadian Joint Economic Commission. India was industrializing, its development assistance needs were changing, and he deemed it a vital nation in Asia. The Canadian government had a chance to place its economic interests in India on a more solid footing. Arthur Andrew disagreed. These two men represented the cleavage that still existed in the DEA regarding policy on India. The director general of the Asia Pacific Division viewed New Delhi as a second-tier post. Under his watch, Andrew curtly stated that the Asia Pacific Division refused to lobby on behalf of India or seek special consideration for the proposed consultative mechanism. Not as quick as Andrew to object, Dupuy asked for further analysis: “What we have to decide is whether there is political advantage or disadvantage in falling in with the Indian proposal.” Dupuy surveyed the history of Canada’s bilateral economic relationship with India, concluding that Canada “received little return on her huge development assistance investment with India and we seem to have convinced ourselves and the Indians that, unlike other countries, we do not expect trade to follow aid.”69 The Department of Finance thought that commercial opportunities for Canadians were poor in India and that Williams had overestimated the prospects. Moreover, the heavily indebted Indians constrained normal and viable commercial relations. Andrew and the DEA’s Economic Division sided with this view. Their collective doubts also received support from the EDC representative, who believed that consultations would achieve little. Even the CIDA representative doubted the proposal. These assessments left Dupuy unconvinced. Did India really possess so few charms? He expressed regret “that an attitude of defeatism” appeared to colour Ottawa’s economic relationships with developing countries. He advanced the analysis of Williams, countering that it was “high time we recognized the strength of our position as a long term donor country which puts into Canadian hands considerable leverage which we have largely failed to use to date.” Ottawa must determine what “we want of the Indians in terms of future trade and not hesitate to use our aid investment in promoting reasonable commercial objectives.” Like Ronning, who had so convincingly articulated years earlier, Dupuy called for greater realism by either decreasing aid “or scaling up Canadian demands.”70 Arguably, the issue here was a genuine lack of interest in the ranks of the DEA rather than “defeatism,” as Dupuy believed. Andrew agreed with Dupuy’s assessment that Ottawa needed to pursue bilateral relations based on clearly defined interests but pressed that the Canadian view of India had changed “in that India has not turned out to be so important politically, in relation to the ‘third world,’”71 as many in the DEA once anticipated. Nor was there much evidence that the Indians lamented the passing of a special

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relationship. Rather, they appeared to seek a focused dimension to bilateral relations. Andrew’s reasoning carried the day. Dupuy summed up the discussion, noting that the meeting revealed an unsatisfactory relationship, that Canada perceived little opportunity for improvement, and that widespread skepticism created doubt that a bilateral consultative mechanism would be effective in improving the relationship. To hold out an olive branch to the Indians, the panel considered the possibility of a future exploratory meeting on a range of matters not specific to economic issues – without a firm commitment to continue the talks should the Indians desire something more substantial.72 The DEA decided on this course of action in the late autumn. Indira Gandhi’s forthcoming visit would provide an opportune time for Trudeau to raise this suggestion. As the DEA reassessed its objectives for India after a year of deliberations, it became evident that the pro-Indianists who favoured a sympathetic and openminded approach to New Delhi based on future prospects had lost ground to the skeptics. The latter group sought purely Canadian economic interests if Ottawa chose to become actively engaged in South Asia. This objective was apparent in the briefing notes prepared for both Sharp and Trudeau on the eve of Gandhi’s visit. The DEA briefing material prepared for the Gandhi visit suggests that the emphasis on leveraging aid ties found an audience in Ottawa. The highlights of the briefing hint that, though the advice from Williams registered, the DEA injected a harder tone in terms of what aid should deliver. The South Asia Division supported calls for “greater realism” in relations with India, with development assistance key to this goal. Economic relations would gradually evolve “from aid to trade and we are prepared to utilize the strength of our position as a long-term donor country to promote reasonable commercial objective[s].” If the distribution of future Canadian aid adopted a sharper, more calculating, edge, so did the “modest and limited” Canadian political objectives – as vague as they were.73 The author of the briefing material optimistically added that the Gandhi visit, the first from an Indian prime minister in eight years, provided Ottawa and New Delhi with an “excellent opportunity to review our extensive economic and political relations, and to renew them in a spirit consonant with each country’s policy objectives, political perspective and economic maturity.” Ideally, the talks, with aid and trade matters at the forefront, would usher in a new “mature” phase of the relationship predicated on cooperation in areas of mutual interest and benefit.74 The theme of the talks reveals the extent to which Canadian officials embraced a new but narrow trade-driven strategic vision of relations with India. Gandhi arrived in Ottawa on 17 June for an eight-day visit. She had travelled to Ottawa in 1949 and 1956 with her father and in 1965 as a minister in Shastri’s

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government. While in Ottawa, Gandhi stayed with the Micheners, who knew her from their time in New Delhi, at Government House. The visit appeared to be a success. David Reece, who served twice in New Delhi, prepared the arrangements for and guided Gandhi’s trip. He reflected that the personal and official aspects of the trip went well despite a number of security concerns because of protesters from the Pakistani community.75 Trudeau and Gandhi appeared to be more comfortable with one another compared with previous encounters. Trudeau even claimed to “enjoy” meeting Gandhi on this visit, though his official biographer emphasizes that he “disliked” his counterpart.76 During her address to Parliament, Gandhi praised Canada for its willingness to cooperate with countries with differing backgrounds to achieve common goals internationally and took a moment to express thanks for Canada’s aid. This was a smart gesture and intriguing timing given the debates in the DEA about the role of aid linkages. As anticipated, the desire to increase bilateral trade while lessening India’s dependence on aid dominated discussions. Gandhi wanted the Indian economy to wean itself from aid, and Ottawa wanted a viable market to sell Canadian products. Both sides appeared to be at ease and agreed to initiate a review and renewal of bilateral relations along the lines that the DEA sought. The Indians cheerfully believed that, after the first set of talks, “the two countries were going not only to establish rapport in international matters but also increase their bilateral economic cooperation.”77 Gandhi and her officials warmly received the proposed consultative talks envisioned by the DEA. Set for November, the talks would explore economic, cultural, scientific, technical, and commercial exchanges. The American embassy report of the trip also judged the visit a success while offering a third-party perspective on Ottawa’s new “realistic” approach. The visit provided “an opportunity to reinvigorate Canadian-Indian relations, which have been reduced, from Pearson-Nehru rapport in [the] ’50s to little more than [a] donor-receiver relationship.” But when the Indians pressed “for GOC intervention to promote peaceful resolution of India-Pakistani problems, Canadians refused, saying this [was] not in [the] Canadian interest.” Gandhi accepted this, and the tone of the discussions continued to be “friendly and informal.” In private discussions with the Americans, the DEA admitted to “some distinct differences,” likely related to the ongoing disagreements over the NPT.78 After a tempestuous spring of debate in the DEA, the pro-Indianists took solace from the meetings, which concluded positively with further exploratory talks planned. On the other hand, the skeptics could point to the fact that no agreements had been signed, discussions had been relatively anodyne, and the forthcoming November consultations were simply that – not entrenched annual

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meetings.79 In the meantime – perhaps recognizing the sluggish attempts of the Ottawa bureaucracy to deliver a policy review on India – Trudeau approved Barry Morrison, a professor at the University of British Columbia specializing in South Asia, to prepare a review with recommendations on Canada’s policy on the Indian subcontinent. Morrison’s review would be influential and, as will be seen, endorsed the perspective of the skeptics. Yet neither Morrison nor the disputing policy factions in the DEA predicted the events of the next year. Preparations for the bilateral economic consultations accelerated toward summer’s end. The meetings were set for 5–9 November in New Delhi, and Ralph Collins, an assistant USSEA, and Alan Rogers headed the Canadian team – though neither man specialized in South Asia. Williams awaited the arrival of the delegation with enthusiasm, writing to Ottawa that the consultations offered a “unique opportunity” to reassess bilateral ties, with both nations ready to inject “new dimensions [in]to their relations.”80 Williams, however, raised a caveat. If the consultations were to succeed, then clear and achievable priorities must be made in areas of trade and aid. The Canadian government should not expect rapid change in India, particularly in regard to loosening its statist economic policies. Old stereotypes, more prevalent in the 1950s, still coloured present perceptions, as illustrated by Williams: “We should … after twenty years experience have few illusions about the likelihood of the Indian changing his character and suddenly becoming a competent and imaginative administrator, planner or politician,” and it was difficult to be “bullish” about India’s economic prospects or the dynamism of its society. The best that the Canadians could hope for “is a little more realism in Indian policies.”81 Rogers stopped in London for consultations with officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The FCO knew of the Morrison-led review and the purpose of the Canadian meetings in India. He provided his interpretation to his British interlocutor, who recorded the following of the Canadian initiative: The following … is as much as I could make out of [Rogers’s] account of the Morrison doctrine. a) No Canadian interest was served by a Canadian political involvement in the problems of the subcontinent. b) None of the subcontinental countries had given any quid pro quo to Canadian commercial, trading or other interests in return for the massive aid which they had received: India was the principal culprit and did not appear to appreciate that Canada was a lot more important to India than the latter could ever be to Canada. c) Point (b) had to be brought home very quickly, and if necessary, brutally, to the Indians during the next year or so. d) The possible internal repercussions, both political and economic, for India of such a hard-nosed Canadian policy – particularly if it

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were also adopted by a number of other countries – were unlikely to have a significant effect on any Canadian national interest, or, so far as the Canadians could see, on any major Western interest.

Unknown to the Indians, Rogers revealed to the British that Canada had immigration in its sights. India provided the largest proportion of new immigrants to Canada, and “whether they came from east Africa, India itself, or via the UK they were lowering the over-all educational and social levels of Canada’s new immigrants making integration more expensive and difficult” during a period of already high unemployment.82 Ottawa considered the necessity of curtailing the number of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent and sought the cooperation of New Delhi, much as Mackenzie King had in 1909. Perplexed British officials questioned “how realistic in political terms this drastic change in traditional Canadian policy would be” and what the reaction of the Canadian populace and NGOs would be. Rogers’s response was “not much.”83 The aid aspects of the policy review would be implemented gradually. Rogers discounted the impact of public pressure groups as long as policy changes were not too dramatic. His frank response on public opinion reveals the nature of an era when Canadians still gave policy makers wide allowances to handle foreign policy. Rogers travelled on to New Delhi. The talks emphasized foreign aid, trade, and scientific cooperation. The Indians gave the Canadian delegation what it sought. Ottawa’s desire to transform the “almost wholly aid oriented relationship with India into a more mature economic relationship” that held advantages for both nations was well received by the Indians, who stated that Canada could look forward to improved trade opportunities.84 The report from the British high commissioner in New Delhi provides a more penetrating appraisal based on discussions with Canadian colleagues. Officials at the Canadian High Commission described the talks with British colleagues as important and shockingly “as the first comprehensive exchange of views since India became independent.” Despite its lack of regional experience, the Canadian team was described as well prepared and determined to push vigorously for greater trading opportunities that recognized Ottawa’s aid contributions, so much so that “the Indian team were apparently taken aback by this frank approach but promised to look into specific complaints” while seeking increased access for their own exports.85 Nuclear collaboration, though not specifically on the agenda, prompted “the most bitter exchanges.”86 This issue, buried during the past two years, remained divisive, and the policy differences between the two countries could not be disguised. The British high commissioner reported that the Canadians demon-

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strated willingness to compromise by suggesting that countries need not necessarily sign the NPT, but they must adhere to international safeguards. New Delhi thought that this was splitting hairs. The Canadians balked at resuming nuclear technology exports unless India complied, and the Indians retorted that they would shop elsewhere, refusing to be bound by safeguards. Summing up the talks, the Canadian officials expressed satisfaction with their general tactics. A clear focus on practical matters had avoided high generalities in which “the Indians could out-platitude them any time.” In the end, the British thought Rogers’s message clearly delivered, albeit in a milder fashion than Rogers had indicated in meetings in London. The Indian press coverage of the event, unsurprisingly, “has been thin and uninformative, mentioning some of the subjects discussed but not going any further.” The Indian public, therefore, remained relatively oblivious of the “new harder-nosed attitude of the friendly Canadians.”87 In Kabul, the British ambassador took a far less detached view in his reports of the Canadian mission, which also travelled to Afghanistan. He slammed Canada’s disengagement from the political problems of the Indian subcontinent and Canada’s determination to achieve a quid pro quo from its aid. Rogers and Collins described the talks with the Indians as very realistic and successful. The Canadians had put their message “across forcefully and it had been accepted.” They had made it evident to their interlocutors that “they were basically after a satisfactory trading relationship which did not drag them into the political problems of no concern to Canada.” This, he lamented, was problematic but unsurprising. The “new ‘realistic’ slant” that Ottawa pursued in the region was “depressing and selfish” and “part of a general pattern which was only too clearly emerging when I was attending the Canadian Defence College two years ago.” He lamented that “Lester Pearsonism is indeed dead. It is not my business to consider to what extent we should try to prod the Canadians into fulfilling their moral obligations towards the underdeveloped world.”88 This criticism was harsh but fair. A policy of neglect had long been assigned to South Asia. On New Year’s Eve 1973, Alan Rogers sat at his desk and reflected on the past year. He put his thoughts to paper in a letter to Bruce Williams in New Delhi. It had been a productive year, he wrote, “in dispelling the fantasies and increasing the substance of our relations with India. I have the feeling that it all began in your office; certainly that was when I began to focus on the facts that an ongoing relationship with India remains important for Canada and that something was very wrong in the relationship as seen from Ottawa at least.” The New Delhi consultations had not dispelled the malaise, “but the disenchantment has been confined and reduced.” A chance for pragmatic growth existed, with India accepted as the “pre-eminent country” in the region and an aid platform from

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which to develop and pursue greater trade ties. Perhaps the consultations, the initiation of Morrison’s study, and the passing success of the Gandhi visit were “enough for a year’s work.”89 Rogers’s suggestion that the events of the past year had led the DEA to recognize India as the “pre-eminent country” in an impoverished and conflictscarred region was overly sanguine. The languishing review process revealed just how peripheral India had become to Canada. And, while Rogers might have added that the ICSC in Vietnam no longer generated the furor that it had in years past, the few pro-Indianists in the DEA still coped with a number of colleagues with increased prominence who possessed a deep-rooted suspicion of India. For better or for worse, the end of the ICSC removed one more political forum from an already meagre political relationship. Canada’s relations with this “pre-eminent country” were reduced to a moribund nuclear partnership (clearly defined by the NPT restrictions) and the transfer of aid dollars to New Delhi, which officials believed generated little tangible benefit to Ottawa. The possibility of expanded trade links likely tantalized some, but there was no clear agenda on how to achieve them or how to spark private sector interest or on how Ottawa could use aid to develop trade. Immigration had steadily increased, but few in the DEA seemed to be interested in this aspect of the relationship. Essentially, save for Rogers’s acknowledgment, the skeptics won. Canadian foreign policy on India became predicated on political disengagement from the political ills of the subcontinent. Simply, policy makers in the DEA, with the support of the Liberal government, concluded that Canada had few strategic objectives in South Asia.90 The new year shattered this perspective.

10 Choices Made The Descent of Bilateral Relations, 1974–76

The news hit like a thunderclap. On 18 May 1974, as the early morning sun began to heat up the harsh Rajasthani desert, the earth trembled near the little village of Pokhran. Indian scientists and technicians successfully tested a nuclear explosive device 107 metres underground. Shortly after, New Delhi broadcast the news to the world, including a stunned Canadian government, declaring the test “a peaceful nuclear explosion experiment.” Gandhi cautioned a press conference that there was “nothing to get excited about. This is our normal research and study. But we are firmly committed to only peaceful uses of atomic energy.” The tests, she added, provided India with nuclear expertise and technology capable of economically advancing the nation. The Indian media applauded the test, rallying behind the government in a show of patriotic fervour. The most prominent English-language paper, the Times of India, proclaimed “Thrilled Nation Lauds Feat,” and the Sunday Standard cheered “Monopoly of Big Five Broken.”1 Gandhi enjoyed a dramatic spike in popularity. The test caught the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi unaware. Ottawa received few reports on the topic despite James George’s prophetic observation that a test was much more than a theoretical matter – a distinct possibility in fact. With an uninformed front line and no external intelligence capability in India, Ottawa was left unprepared, having had only a mild suspicion that the Indians might be working on a nuclear weapons program. Taken aback, Trudeau and his team condemned India’s decision. Domestic debate within Indian circles on nuclear policy intensified after the NPT came into effect. The successful Chinese launch in 1970 of a long-range rocket that put a satellite into space, however, catalyzed the discussions. This technological advance rekindled Indian fear of Chinese aggression; the launch raised concerns that a similar rocket could be armed and deployed against India. The test and its perceived threat revived the Indian hawks. Weeks after the Chinese test, Vikram Sarabhai, head of the IAEC, announced that India would not seek nuclear weapons but clarified that it had the right to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. This statement represented a noticeable departure from his previous dovish views, but Sarabhai was not Homi Bhabha. His statement was considered a tactic to assuage the hawks.2 Gandhi also allayed nuclear supporters’ fears in late August when she informed the Lok Sabha that

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her government was studying the economic and technical issues surrounding peaceful nuclear explosives. The comment only intensified the debate, fuelling the media and Lok Sabha. The debate continued into the autumn. Perhaps sensing the way the wind was blowing, and realistic about its difficult relations with New Delhi, the United States issued a firm caution to the Indians in November 1970 not to divert plutonium from CIRUS for use in a peaceful nuclear explosion lest the Indians wished to violate the US-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement signed in 1963. As 1971 progressed, Western sources reported that India worked toward making a bomb, and in response Gandhi publicly stated that her government had no such plan. Signs to the contrary persisted. Speaking at the Fourth International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in September 1971, in Geneva, Sarabhai cavalierly proclaimed that Indian scientists were “developing nuclear explosive engineering (i.e., peaceful nuclear explosives) as a top priority.”3 Whether Trudeau received Sarabhai’s comments is unclear, but within weeks the Canadian government delivered a similar caution to New Delhi – nearly a year after the one given by the Nixon administration. On 1 October, Trudeau wrote to Gandhi expressing Ottawa’s opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons once again. He warned that the “use of Canadian supplied material, equipment and facilities ... for the development of a nuclear explosive device would inevitably call on our part for a reassessment of our nuclear cooperation arrangements with India.”4 In other words, Canada did not distinguish between a test for military reasons and one for so-called peaceful purposes. Gandhi acknowledged the Canadian position, responding that a potential nuclear explosion by India was only hypothetical. Ottawa need not overreact since India had no plan to produce a bomb.5 However, at no point in her reply did Gandhi rule out a nuclear test. Still, the Canadian government felt reassured, and this exchange between the two leaders proved to be pivotal in understanding Ottawa’s eventual reaction to the Indian test in 1974. Four months after Gandhi’s vague assurance to Trudeau, officials of two divisions within the DEA advised A.E. Ritchie, the USSEA, that the DEA should support a “limited consultancy agreement” between AECL and IAEC.6 The agreement would permit AECL to maintain a presence in the Indian nuclear market, to the benefit of Canada’s nuclear industry. The consultations would provide design and future construction and maintenance advice for the RAPP II CANDU reactor and similar nuclear power plants for the Indians without requiring external assistance. The Transport, Communications, and Energy Division advised that “if, as a result of difficulties with the design of the 500MW reactor, the Indians were to abandon the CANDU system in favour of a competing nuclear power reactor system, it would be a blow to the prestige of the

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Canadian system.”7 As with the previous RAPP sales, financial factors exerted a preponderant influence on Ottawa’s decision to continue cooperation. The South Asia Division agreed with the assessment that discussions on a “limited consultancy agreement” proceed. But Thomas Wainman-Wood of that division posited that circumstances favoured tapering “off the extent of our relatively one-sided nuclear co-operation with that country.” Reflecting on the state of nuclear cooperation, Wainman-Wood realistically noted that “it is not believed that there is any likelihood of our succeeding in influencing India to move closer to the Canadian position and we must anticipate that they intend to keep their nuclear option open.” Both divisions raised the possibility that an Indian test could generate domestic public criticism of Canada’s nuclear cooperation with India. The DEA rarely considered public opinion in the policy process. Yet it reasoned that any outcry could be contained. In the meantime, the consultancy agreement that AECL contemplated would be brief and likely conclude with the final responsibility for the RAPP II obligations toward the end of the decade. This time frame permitted Ottawa to decide the degree of cooperation that it wished to have with the Indians, and “the risk of a PNE [peaceful nuclear explosion] before then is minimal.”8 The lack of hard knowledge of India’s nuclear capabilities tremendously hampered the recommendations of Canadian policy makers. Both the South Asia Division and the Transport, Communications, and Energy Division proved to be woefully wrong in their estimates of when India would be ready to test a device. They failed to devise a contingency plan in the event of a PNE with Canadian materials and technology. The Indian debate on the merits of constructing a bomb coincided with the continuation of a severe drought that spawned food shortages and inflation. Gandhi’s political and military victories were things of the past. Over 40 percent of the Indian population lived below poverty levels, yet inflation rose to nearly 30 percent in 1973–74 alone. Thousands of strikes and demonstrations occurred throughout the country, and corruption plagued the Congress Party. Despite domestic woes, the budget for the Department of Atomic Energy increased by over $20 million from 1971–72 to 1972–73.9 The Congress Party poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the AEC nuclear program, yet the economic and technological enhancements proved to be slim, especially for the average Indian citizen. The economy was in shambles, unemployment continued to escalate, and the monsoon failed for the third year in a row, exacerbating the severe food shortages. In early May 1974, weeks before the nuclear test, 1.4 million railway workers, “ten percent of the total number of people in the public sector,” went on strike.10 Certainly, a successful PNE would encourage patriotism and temporarily put

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Gandhi front and centre of public adoration for this achievement. In the months leading to the nuclear test, she considered the possibility of an underground nuclear explosion.11 The decision-making process behind the nuclear test remains muddied since written records of the internal policy debates among Gandhi, her advisers, and IAEC senior scientists remain classified. The best estimate is that Gandhi misled Trudeau in her October 1971 letter, for “support in principle for developing a nuclear explosive device was solidified by late 1971 … concentrated work on building the vital components began in spring 1972, and … formal prime ministerial approval to make final preparations for a PNE occurred in September 1972.”12 Gandhi’s political advisers, P.N. Haksar and P.N. Dhar, warned against possible international repercussions, but the senior Indian scientists involved in the decision-making process remained undeterred by these soft cautions. Moreover, Haksar was quietly pushed out of his position as chief adviser. Gandhi’s biographer observed that “Haksar was the last of Indira’s coterie prepared to question or stand up to her.”13 Gandhi listened to the cabal of Indian scientists cajoling for a nuclear device. Excluded from the decision-making process, the military acquiesced. As prime minister and minister in charge of AEC, Gandhi could make the decision, even though she knew of the international risks – especially from the NPT community. So influential were the scientists that Swaran Singh (minister of external affairs) knew nothing of the proposed test until just forty-eight hours before the deadline.14 Ottawa reacted with stunned outrage. Trudeau was “furious” with the Indian decision.15 Within hours of receiving news of the explosion, SSEA Mitchell Sharp publicly announced that Ottawa was “very disturbed by the announcement that India has exploded a nuclear device” and that the government was “carefully considering the implications.” The test, he added, represented a severe setback in the global effort to curtail nuclear proliferation and to prevent all nuclear testing. Ottawa remained adamant that no distinction existed between the nuclear explosions for “so-called peaceful purposes and explosions for military purposes.”16 On 21 May, Sharp submitted a memorandum to cabinet on the bilateral policy implications of the nuclear test and sought input from his colleagues. The DEA strongly suspected that the Indians had diverted plutonium from CIRUS despite Gandhi’s earlier reassurance and tested the bomb essentially for domestic consumption. The outpouring of public elation across India was not lost on the DEA. Ottawa questioned the Congress Party’s decision to spend “tens or hundreds of millions of dollars … a major diversion of scarce material, technical and managerial resources at a time when the Indian economy is in serious

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difficulties.”17 The comment reveals that a degree of paternalism intermingled with Ottawa’s sense of betrayal and shock over the Indian choice. But clearly the latter two emotions drove Ottawa’s response. Three weeks later, in a meeting with Henry Kissinger, Sharp asked rhetorically how the SSEA could justify to the Canadian public sending “them [India] hundreds of millions in economic benefit if they are putting hundreds of millions into peaceful nuclear explosions?” Kissinger added that it was “total nonsense” that the Indian test could stimulate industrial development, as New Delhi claimed.18 In the meantime, New Delhi’s decision required Ottawa “to reassess the remaining areas of nuclear cooperation with India and to suspend such cooperation” until a full review of the test had been conducted.19 Aside from public denouncements, the central tool that Ottawa could wield against India was aid. The general economic aid program remained a considerable sum despite attempts to decrease aid for trade. For 1974–75, Ottawa allotted $127 million to India, of which it intended $42 million as an emergency supplement to alleviate the food and energy crisis. Although the option of withholding funds earmarked for humanitarian purposes was politically unpopular, a proposed review of $16 million allotted to industrial purposes – particularly those relating to the Indian nuclear power and space programs – found cabinet support. In the days following the Indian test, Ottawa assessed the reactions of other countries, especially the United States. The US State Department suspected that the Indian desire to achieve “major power status” had motivated the decision. Washington appeared to be resigned to the Indian action, yet the State Department prepared a letter of “sharp criticism” of India for undermining international non-proliferation efforts. Kissinger thought that the draft went too far in its terse language, and New Delhi received a more benign note from Washington.20 Kissinger even met with T.N. Kaul, the Indian ambassador in Washington. From Kaul’s account, Kissinger informed him that the nuclear test would have “no adverse effect on Indo-American relations or the balance of power in South Asia.”21 This promise seems to have been carried through. Less than a month after the detonation, Western countries, led by the United States, increased economic aid to India, and Washington agreed to reschedule Indian debt payments of more than $29 million. The French government sent a congratulatory message to Homi Sethna, chairman of the IAEC. Like India, France had not signed the NPT, and the French nuclear industry could benefit from gaps created by any Canadian sanctions. The Soviet news agency TASS stressed the “peaceful nature of the explosion.” The support for or tepid condemnation of the great powers weakened the impact of the Canadian reaction. Although Japan, Sweden, Pakistan, and to some extent

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Britain supported the Canadian denunciation, Ottawa probably found little solace in tiny Albania, in a supportive gesture to Beijing, vigorously rebuking New Delhi.22 Over the following weeks, it became clear that few nations would publicly admonish the Indians. Canada’s inability to organize an international coalition of like-minded nations to criticize the Indian action was a great disappointment. The Trudeau government sat back astonished and frustrated at the lack of international support for its endeavour, especially from the West.23 On 22 May, Trudeau met with cabinet to plan their next steps and created a list of sanctions aimed at the Indian nuclear program. Ottawa finally came to terms with the need to reassess its nuclear cooperation with India. It suspended all shipments of nuclear equipment and material, including the outstanding heavy water for the RAPP I and RAPP II, and suspended AECL technical cooperation on the construction of a new indigenous reactor based on CANDU technology. Ottawa refused to continue in a multilateral rescheduling plan designed to help ease India’s commercial debt burden. The sum, $8.5 million, was almost entirely linked to Canadian financing for the RAPP I and RAPP II and targeted because of its relation to India’s nuclear program.24 The Canadian government projected its anger through the announcement of some additionally stern decisions. As expected, Sharp informed the Indian high commissioner of Ottawa’s plans and made public the decisions of the cabinet meeting, the letters exchanged by Trudeau and Gandhi, along with any other background documentation covering atomic relations with India. The government ordered the Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce to impose “appropriate controls on the export of nuclear technology in a physical form to India (i.e. blueprints) and subsequently warn the companies concerned that it was unlikely in present circumstances that export permits would be issued.” Foreign aid could continue only to the agricultural sector. All other aid commitments that might assist India, however indirectly, to pursue nuclear weapons capability would be suspended. Finally, cabinet instructed Sharp to inform New Delhi immediately that Ottawa wanted to hold talks to discuss the matter.25 Oddly, Sharp’s memoirs ignored this incident; Sharp had a challenging tenure, yet the nuclear issue remained one of his central policy trials. Trudeau, however, angrily recalled the “bitter dispute” in his otherwise minimalist memoirs and related the impact on his working relationship with Gandhi. He recalled their previous correspondence with shock and a sense of betrayal. Trudeau thought the Canadian position clear: “In no way should our aid in nuclear technology … be used to produce plutonium for an explosion.” He believed that [Gandhi] gave me her word that India was not doing anything like that. A shorttime later, in 1974, off went this thing that sounded an awful lot like a test of a

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nuclear bomb, but that the Indians called a ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosion. I guess that was how she was able to play with words and give me her assurance that there was no bomb in the making.26

Henry Kissinger, in correspondence with the US NATO mission, expressed that Canada needed to accept some blame: the “fact that India almost certainly acquired plutonium from unsafeguarded CIRUS reactor supplied by Canada points up importance of safeguard system and need to strengthen nuclear safeguards world-wide.” The Canadians were in no mood to accept involvement in India’s actions. To send this message, the DEA instructed its ambassador to Washington, Marcel Cadieux, to meet with the deputy secretary of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department and deliver an aide memoire outlining the history of Canadian safeguard arrangements with India.27 Indian sources suggest that the Canadian response shocked New Delhi. The Times of India defiantly reported that “Indian authorities were distressed that Foreign Secretary Sharp had asked India to send high officials immediately for an exchange of views. No sovereign country has to explain its decisions on policy matters to a foreign government.” The Hindustan Times noted in more conciliatory fashion that New Delhi was “likely to take steps to remove the Canadian concern,” but it also asserted that Canadian sanctions would not affect India’s nuclear program. The Hindu suggested that the tough Canadian stance was really political posturing for the summer election in which the Trudeau Liberals hoped to reclaim their majority and that the matter would soon be sorted out.28 On 1 June, Gandhi wrote to Trudeau emphasizing the peaceful nature of the bomb, hoping to persuade him that no bilateral agreements had been violated. Her letter failed to sooth Trudeau or cabinet. The test and her previous correspondence with him revealed her duplicity. Days later, on 4 June, the Canadian government received a bolder response in the form of an aide memoire to Sharp. The document evaded the degree to which plutonium from CIRUS had been used in the test: “The plutonium used in the device came from our own fuel fabrication plant by reprocessing Indian fuel irradiated in the CIRUS reactor.”29 Nothing in the nearly twenty-year-old CIRUS agreement prevented the Indians from reprocessing fuel in this fashion. However, Ottawa focused on whether CIRUS uranium, when diverted to the Indian test, violated the peaceful uses only clause – and believed that it did. The Indian government disagreed. It questioned the phrasing of the CIR and RAPP agreements, arguing that “the definition of the expression ‘peaceful purposes’ has not been specifically spelt out anywhere in these agreements. In the absence of such a clear-cut definition, the expression has to be understood

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in its internationally-accepted connotation.” Duplicitously, the Indian government chose to adhere to international precedents when it suited New Delhi: “The successive panel discussions conducted under the aegis of the IAEA since 1970, in which Canada also participated, have amply demonstrated that the international community has accepted the use of nuclear energy for an underground explosion as falling within the definition of development for peaceful purposes.”30 The Indians thus reasoned that they had broken no obligation – moral or legal – in testing the device. Furthermore, the document continued, the test was “another step India has taken in its quest for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and for the economic betterment of its people.” The Indian government clearly took umbrage with Canadian remarks that the Indians had recklessly spent precious funds on this project. New Delhi felt the need to claim in the aide memoire that the production of the device and the ensuing test had cost only US $400,000, “but a small fraction of the total budget of the AEC.” Finally, the Indians claimed, “nothing was done in secret.” 31 Historians know that only a select few in the Indian government knew of the test. The coy statements about keeping all options open, made in the Lok Sabha, should have warned Western watchers, but by no means did they represent official indications. The claims elicited further scorn in Ottawa. The director of the South Asia Division, D.B. Hicks, commented to A.E. Ritchie, the USSEA, that “you will note that the matter of secrecy has been dealt with in a disingenuous manner.”32 In New Delhi, the acting Canadian high commissioner, William Jenkins, collected his thoughts and wrote to the DEA: “Now that the Indians have reacted to our criticism of their nuclear explosion ... we are in better position to contribute usefully to Indian aid review.” Jenkins disagreed with Ottawa using its aid program to influence India’s nuclear policies. Rather, Ottawa should continue to provide aid, targeted at agricultural and rural sectors, and critically examine Indian aid priorities. His advice arose from two key factors. The first factor was that the “moderate and muted response to our criticism confirms Indian[s] value our relationship, and are concerned this relationship may be in jeopardy.” New Delhi likely feared losing Canadian foreign aid, but “Indians also value, possibly more than we do, ease and informality of our past relations.” The second factor was that the Indians would never renounce the test or admit the slightest fault since they believed that the “explosion is morally right” and that its “purpose is peaceful. Explosion is legally right because letter of an agreement has not been violated.” The Indians were extremely sensitive to criticism, “but they are also extremely insensitive to other people’s sensitivities, and then fail utterly to understand we are reacting to violation of spirit of relationship.” Jenkins believed that Ottawa could expect the Indian position to harden as New Delhi

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reacted in a pattern consistent with past criticisms: “India can do no wrong – those who criticise are misguided.”33 This analysis proved to be accurate. The American embassy in New Delhi monitored Gandhi’s public statements on the nuclear test and thought that Gandhi desired to drive a wedge between the developed world and the developing world by presenting the bomb as a step toward economic progress and the criticisms of the West as judgments made by those who wished to keep India weak. In speeches in Bhopal and Calcutta, she complained that the West singled India out for criticism of its nuclear explosion “while France, China and other countries went uncriticized for their blasts. She also reportedly said that ‘They’ (unexplained) could not stand competition from a ‘Poor and formerly enslaved country.’”34 Nearly thirty years after independence, Gandhi invoked India’s freedom movement and used the spectre of colonial demons to defend her government’s actions. Although aid proved to be an ineffective lever, Jenkins rightly noted that Ottawa had to determine in what capacity it could continue to assist the Indians. He thought it imperative, with so few choices, to “base additional aid to India more on merit than need.” Ideally, at Ottawa’s insistence, aid would be channelled into agricultural and rural development. In this sense, “the PNE has made these recommendations even more attractive than in past,” and Jenkins concluded that the “PNE offers opportunity to do something many [in Ottawa] would like to have done long time ago.”35 Trudeau crafted his response to Gandhi’s letter and the Indian aide memoire before reading the advice from Jenkins. Trudeau dismissed the Indian arguments; Ottawa saw no distinction between peaceful and military nuclear explosions since they used identical techniques. He reminded Gandhi of their past correspondence, namely his warning that the use of Canadian equipment or fissionable material from CIRUS or the RAPPs would lead to a Canadian reassessment of nuclear cooperation. The Indian response only heightened his government’s concerns that a Canadian-built facility had played a vital role in the Indian test, which prompted Ottawa’s sharp reaction suspending nuclear cooperation. Trudeau, however, offered a conciliatory gesture. He reiterated Mitchell Sharp’s offer to engage in dialogue to find a solution. Trudeau proposed discussions covering all aspects of bilateral nuclear cooperation as well as discussions on the direction of Canada’s foreign aid program in India. He extended the invitation for a delegation of senior Indian officials to travel to Ottawa in midsummer.36 The Indians consented. The foreign secretary, Kewal Singh, led the Indian team, assisted by the Indian high commissioner, Uma Shankar Bajpai. The fact that Gandhi dispatched Singh, ranking second highest in the Indian foreign service, suggests that, public appearances aside, she took the Canadian concerns seriously.

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The Arms Control and Disarmament Division and the Transport, Communications, and Energy Division of the DEA played a lead role in formulating policy at this juncture. Members from both divisions produced a working paper on “Canada’s Nuclear Export and NPT Policy in Response to the Indian Test.” The authors proposed a hard line. But they also glumly concluded that, though the Indian test was unlikely to lead to another non-nuclear weapon state exploding a nuclear device in the next five years, the Indians had effectively undermined the non-proliferation system leading up to the May 1975 NPT review conference. Barring a “vigorous reaction” from the international community, the damage had been done. The same policy makers doubted that such an international reaction would occur. Nearly forty days after the dust had settled, only Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Japan had reacted sharply to the Indian action. Although the frustrated Canadians sensed that additional support for their position existed, they were unable to coax it out publicly.37 In the interim, Ottawa had to act unilaterally and determine how to manage its response effectively and achieve its goals beyond the immediate cessation of nuclear cooperation. Despite the odds against Canada galvanizing international opinion, the authors of the paper concluded that, for any form of bilateral nuclear cooperation to continue, Ottawa needed “sufficiently binding commitments from India, significantly curbing India’s freedom to develop nuclear explosive devices, to justify our accepting India’s knowing disregard of Canadian policy in the present instance.” 38 If Canada resumed nuclear cooperation without commitments to peaceful use, then there would be adverse international consequences. Its reputation and the respect shown to it by other states would suffer. A week before the formal talks with the visiting Indian delegation commenced, USSEA A.E. Ritchie prepared a memorandum for Mitchell Sharp’s approval. Despite internal analysis that Canada had few “levers,” Ottawa expected India to acquiesce before resumption of nuclear cooperation. Although it was unlikely that India would retreat enough from its position for a breakthrough to occur, the Indians should be “left in no doubt about our concern about the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the adverse effect their explosion has had on the nonproliferation structure which Canada and others have sought to build.” The suggestion that the ongoing federal election influenced “our strong reaction” to the nuclear test should be disabused, Ritchie advised. The surprise and disappointment were genuine, and “the Canadian public and the international community are aware our views were disregarded.”39 Canada’s role as an exporter of nuclear material, equipment, and technology meant that Ottawa had a vested stake in maintaining international security and preventing nuclear dissemination.

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The key objectives for the negotiating team included securing India’s adherence to the non-proliferation treaty, no more nuclear explosions, acceptance of IAEA safeguards on India’s nuclear reactors and nuclear exports, and full safeguards on CIRUS and the RAPPs. Ottawa sought considerable concessions, tantamount to a complete reversal of Indian policy. As an incentive, Ottawa signalled its willingness to resume foreign aid, on a restricted basis, if the Indians would forgo further tests during the discussions.40 The meetings at the DEA spanned three days. The Canadians refused to yield their position, much to the consternation of the Indians, who questioned the Canadian resolve leading up to the talks.41 Singh declared, on the opening day, that India could not accept Ottawa’s view that “peaceful purposes” excluded the possibility of developing PNEs; nor would New Delhi sign the NPT “under discriminatory conditions.”42 The Indians indicated no intention to follow up the test; yet, when pressed to give public assurance on this, they demurred. In addition to seeking a public statement from the Indians, Michel Dupuy, a senior DEA official attending the meetings, suggested two proposals that might permit the resumption of nuclear cooperation. First, India would suspend all testing of nuclear devices until the conclusion of the NPT review conference. Second, controls should be established to prevent further nuclear material from CIRUS being used for another PNE. Singh countered that the Indians would consider the first proposal but not the second. He suggested that “it be put aside until question of test suspension is settled.” The US State Department reported on the meetings to the American embassy in New Delhi, observing that the Canadian negotiating team refused to accept Singh’s reply and that “Singh was left in no doubt that acceptance of both Canadian proposals was prerequisite to normalization of bilateral relations.”43 All that either side could agree on was that they should continue to talk.44 The joint press release masked the harsh tone of the DEA negotiators. The consultations, while cordial, accomplished little other than illustrating the depth of Ottawa’s determination. John Taylor, a British diplomat in Ottawa, met with Rodney Irwin, the India Desk officer in the DEA, to learn of the talks. Irwin, who had served in India at the High Commission, thought that the consultations had been “rough going,” especially for the Indians. He suggested that the Indian government failed to comprehend the Canadian position, in particular its High Commission in Ottawa. The Indians “believed that the Canadian reaction to the explosion, coming as it did in the midst of the Federal General Election campaign, was an Election ploy.” Uma Shankar Bajpai, the high commissioner in Ottawa, anticipated that the Trudeau government would soften its stance with a Liberal re-election. To the shock and embarrassment of Bajpai and the delegation, his instincts were wrong. The Indians “had not

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expected the strength of the Canadian reaction nor their insistence on guarantees and safeguards.” Indeed, Kewal Singh lacked the authority to commit the Indian government to specifics, possibly because it was still trying to determine its own policies in the wake of the test. The British High Commission reported one notable concession: the Canadians believed that they had obtained “something approaching private assurances” that India would not export their technology.45 In his concluding assessment of his talks with Irwin, Taylor stated that “the pressure is now on the Indians to determine their nuclear policy and to see whether they can go some way to meeting the Canadians.” The Canadians, however, “are under no illusions that the stick with which they have to beat the Indians is not large and that the Indians may well decide that they can learn to live without the Canadians.”46 Both the Canadian resolve and sanctions remained. The wrinkle proved to be impossible to iron out in three days, and the lack of early progress was prophetic. Taylor believed the events of 18 May a watershed. The test paradoxically provided “a salutary lesson to the Canadians. Previously content to let their aid determine their policy in India and the whole of the Sub-continent, there is now some serious thinking taking place in the Department of External Affairs on future Canadian policy to India.” Taylor identified precisely a long-standing problem, placing partial blame for the present conundrum on a lack of clear policy planning for the better part of twenty years. Quietly, the British acknowledged that, no matter the outcome, relations between the two countries would never be the same.47 Although Irwin recounted to Taylor Ottawa’s intention to send a strong signal, a report that Taylor received from Arthur F. Maddocks, the deputy British high commissioner, reveals that the Indians perceived the Canadian reaction as “emotional.” However, the Indians also believed that the consultations had “proceeded satisfactorily.” Maddocks’s source was Shamsher Singh, the first secretary in the Indian High Commission in Ottawa. Singh admitted that improving the bilateral relationship would take time. Maddocks asked him why the Canadians should seek to improve relations; “his reply was that Canada was interested in making useful friends round the world to moderate its dependence upon the United States and must gradually realise that India was an important country, unlike some others, and above all a democracy.”48 In suggesting this, Singh seriously misjudged the value that Ottawa placed on the relationship and India’s global standing. A source in the DEA provided a look at the harder edge of the Canadian position. Maddocks passed on the following elements: a) Feeling that the Indians have misled the Canadians even at the level of Prime Ministers; b) Disbelief of the argument that the use of nuclear power for peaceful

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purposes is cost-effective; c) Grave doubts of the consequences of the Indian explosion for international security; d) Contempt for the quality of political and economic judgement that could have led to the diversion into nuclear development of resources desperately needed in India for other purposes; e) A view that India is not important to Canada’s interests; f) A view that Canada should be less involved in other countries’ problems as givers of aid or as peacekeepers or in other ways; g) A keener interest in China than in India for good commercial as well as political reasons.49

Dwight Fulford, director of the Transport, Communications, and Energy Division of the DEA, provided the insights of Maddocks. Fulford was “scathing in his condemnation of the ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosion. He said that we could no doubt look forward to a ‘peaceful’ rocket launcher, a ‘peaceful’ re-entry vehicle and perhaps eventually a “peaceful’ nuclear war-head.”50 The Canadian embassy in Washington briefed the US State Department on 1 August that both sides desired progress to resolve the respective differences but found the talks “difficult.” Ottawa continued to suspend nuclear and other assistance except food, medicine, and fertilizer. The State Department assessment corroborated the Canadian belief that the Indians sought a solution. Washington informed the American embassy in New Delhi that “there was some indication [the] Indians were becoming concerned over international consequences of their nuclear explosion including possibility of permanent damage to Canadian-Indian relations.”51 In the weeks and months following the test, the Indian embassy in Washington played a key role in disseminating the government of India’s rationale to test the device and in responding to Canadian protests. New Delhi instructed one of its most accomplished diplomats and ambassador to Washington, T.N. Kaul, to press the Indian position in the media and in private meetings with American officials. And, just as the British High Commission reports from Ottawa captured the Indian impression that Ottawa was largely blustering, so too in Washington the Indians attempted to characterize Ottawa’s reaction as domestic political posturing. During a 17 July breakfast press briefing with members of the US media in Washington, Kaul directly referenced the Canadian federal election as a factor in Ottawa’s response.52 The Indian delegation from Ottawa exuded a confident air as they passed through Washington before returning to New Delhi. Kissinger met with Singh, T.J. Teja, the joint secretary of the IMEA, and Kaul. Kaul’s notes of the meeting indicate that Singh spoke briefly on his visit to Ottawa. He reiterated the Indian position that the PNE was “an internationally recognized concept,” that the Indian test had “no political or military implications,” and that the Canadians

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“agreed that we had not even remotely gone back on any bilateral or international agreements.”53 The US record of the same discussion highlights one significant difference: “Singh gave Canadians assurances of peaceful Indian intentions.” Kaul’s version omits this “assurance.”54 Careful consideration of the American version reveals that Kissinger privately accepted the legitimacy of the Indian test despite his indications to the Canadian government that Washington understood and sympathized with Ottawa’s plight. The cagey secretary of state looked beyond the aftermath of the test. Kissinger informed Kaul and Singh of his belief that a “PNE has different significance for developing countries than for [an] advanced country. For [a] country at [an] early stage of nuclear development, any nuclear explosion could have both peaceful and non-peaceful applications.”55 Kaul specifically noted the distinction between advanced and “less nuclear developed countries” and recorded that Kissinger wished to “have very private talks on how to prevent the spread of nuclear explosive technology beyond India.” The American diplomat recognized that India was “clearly in a dominant position militarily in the region” but that a nuclear race was not out of the question if other countries attempted to match India’s prowess.56 The discussions recognized India as a nuclear power, and Singh warmly welcomed the proposal and the recognition of India’s stature.57 Despite the positive reception in Washington, the continued hard-line stance adopted by Ottawa hurt the Indians when other key countries supported Canada. Kaul indicated to Kissinger that India would welcome additional US loans as countries such as Canada, Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom failed to reschedule India’s debt.58 Publicly, the Indians refused to yield. India’s parliamentarians avoided expressing dissent in the Lok Sabha over the impact of the test on relations with Canada. In fact, only two innocuous questions were raised on that matter in 1974.59 One of the more prominent voices to speak against the Canadian reaction was that of P.N. Haksar, now an adviser with IAEC. He had remained well connected to the Indian policy-making elite in the Congress Party since his departure from the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, and it is reasonable to assume that his perspective reflected that of Gandhi’s inner coterie. Haksar dismissed the Canadian condemnation of the Indian test. In an interview with the Indian magazine Blitz, Haksar observed that “the Canadians alone have taken upon themselves the sole responsibility to admonish India. Whether Canada is doing this in defence of its own national interests, howsoever defined, or for other considerations is an intriguing question.” He suspected that, despite Ottawa’s posturing, the Canadians would avoid “inflicting damage on long-standing Indo-Canadian friendship.”60 As autumn beckoned, neither side appeared to be willing to compromise. In the meantime, Mitchell Sharp left the DEA portfolio. A wily political veteran,

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Allan MacEachen took his place. Like Sharp, MacEachen had vast political experience. First elected in the mid-1950s, he had served in the St. Laurent government and later in Pearson’s and Trudeau’s cabinets. Arthur Andrew described MacEachen as a “political artist, less wedded to a routine while involved in everything of importance going on in Ottawa.”61 Basil Robinson joined MacEachen at the DEA a few months later. Robinson returned as undersecretary after having spent a brief period as deputy minister of Indian affairs and northern development. There was “general rejoicing in the department,” for Robinson was a long-time diplomat and familiar with India on a number of levels.62 Over the following year, MacEachen and Robinson oversaw a profound shift in the direction of Canadian policy on India. Sharp’s departure led some in the Indian High Commission to believe that the Canadian position might soften. According to Shashmer Singh, of the Indian High Commission in Ottawa, Sharp’s statements “had been tougher than anything said by Mr. Trudeau or any other Canadians.” MacEachen might “therefore help to improve Canadian/Indian relations.”63 During this lull in negotiations, T.J. Teja – the Joint Secretary of the IMEA – met with Jenkins in New Delhi to discuss where both sides stood. The Canadian decision to retain sanctions on aid projects falling outside agricultural development was beginning to have effects. Teja asked Jenkins to clarify the “grey area” – programs that were not nuclear, agricultural, or food related hung in limbo. The Canadian restrictions “were causing confusion and disruption and the economic ministry could not stall Canadian aid-receiving agencies indefinitely.” Jenkins deduced from the request that the Canadian tactics were forcing “Indian nuclear policy-makers [to] take our conditions seriously.” Teja’s comments provided one of the first glimpses for the Canadians that the Indians had not considered the consequences of their choice: the ramifications of a tough Canadian response.64 Teja offered little in return for relief from the Canadian penalties. The Indian public position remained rigid, arguably intended to save face. Privately, New Delhi offered assurances to Ottawa that India would not export its nuclear technology, but Teja hinted at a possible quid pro quo, with Canada providing heavy water. Jenkins confirmed that the Indians were unwilling to “turn [the] clock back on CIRUS and [Teja] could not see how India could meet our conditions.” The Indians proposed continued consultations. Jenkins agreed with Teja that the sanctions must end at some point, or Ottawa would find itself defending against charges of violated agreements and of deliberately disrupting India’s economy.65 For the time being, MacEachen steadfastly supported his cabinet’s policies. Within weeks of being briefed for his new position, MacEachen wrote to John Turner – the minister of finance – to prepare him for the Commonwealth finance

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ministers’ meeting. The DEA suspected that the Indians might approach Turner to discuss Canadian aid relations. MacEachen informed Turner that India had ignored Canada’s conditions for renewed nuclear cooperation for nearly two months since the consultations. If his Indian counterpart approached Turner and pressed “for some relaxation of the current review process which is causing them some difficulty you should tell him” that Ottawa would not act on aid matters “until we know more about their intentions in the nuclear field.” In MacEachen’s opinion, the onus rested on the Indians.66 No amount of coaxing persuaded the Indians that autumn. At the opening of the General Assembly at the United Nations in Manhattan, Swaran Singh asserted that the Indian nuclear explosion “must be seen in context of Indian endeavour to develop its natural resources and capacities to [the] fullest extent.” He reminded those present that the international community had long recognized “that nuclear explosive technology can be of great value in development process.” Canada remained unconvinced; the Indians offered few internal “development” examples. Singh did offer that India would not manufacture nuclear weapons.67 In his first ministerial visit to the United Nations, MacEachen sparred with Singh over his comments, reminding the Indian that Ottawa saw no distinction between peaceful and non-peaceful nuclear explosions.68 Frustration within DEA ranks regarding India became increasingly palpable to outside observers. Members of the South Asian Bureau of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office travelled to Ottawa in October to meet with their counterparts. The Canadians, led by R.L. Rogers of the USSEA’s office, bluntly outlined the current state of talks with the Indians. Ottawa had asked New Delhi to postpone any further tests until after a review of the NPT. Ottawa had also asked India “not to use Canadian technology and plutonium for another explosion.” The only Indian concession was “to offer a secret agreement not to transfer any Canadian technology to a third party and not to use Canadian plutonium.” The Canadians balked at this, but in the meantime “(i) food and agricultural aid will continue; (ii) all nuclear aid is suspended; (iii) industrial projects [will be] examined individually lest any be used to further the nuclear programme and in particular assist with any delivery systems.” The conversation provoked frank questions. Rogers questioned Canada’s assessment of India all along. Had the Indians, since 1947, followed a path of “big power ambitions,” particularly in South Asia? The British thought so. They feared that the Pokhran test “was only the first of a series of explosions, contrary to what the Indians had promised the Canadians.” Leaving the meetings, the British saw “evidence to suggest that there might well be pressure to cut Canadian aid completely, this being the price India would have to pay for joining the nuclear club.”69

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Chester Ronning’s thesis of self-interest continued to apply to the broader contours of the relationship as both sides refused to make concessions that could lead to a solution. A further example of this mutual inability to compromise occurred weeks later. On 16 October 1974, the new Canadian high commissioner, J.R. Maybee, met Indira Gandhi at her office. Before departing for India, Maybee darkly confided to his colleague, Arthur Menzies, that he was going “to preside over the deterioration of bilateral relations.”70 Maybee’s encounter with Gandhi is both amusing and illustrative of the climate causing the discussions to stall. At no time, Maybee recounted, did Gandhi attempt to direct the conversation. Rather, she responded to his initial comments about the nuclear test and then voiced her disappointment at Ottawa’s reaction. Gandhi briefly mentioned the “unlikelihood that India’s explosion would stimulate other countries to develop a nuclear capability, [and] she seemed uninterested in discussing the problem and even a little uncomfortable that I should continue to pursue it.” The situation was so uncomfortable that Gandhi began to discuss the weather, and, Maybee reported, “from this point on, we had something resembling a conversation, which went from weather to rain, to rain-making, to solar energy.” The meandering conversation at least “ended on a reasonably friendly note after a rather sticky beginning.”71 India’s test and subsequent intransigence prompted a thorough review of Ottawa’s nuclear export policies. A DEA memorandum to cabinet submitted in November sought to enhance nuclear export restrictions, including assessments of the “likelihood that a recipient country may choose to, or be forced to, develop nuclear weapons, despite agreements to the contrary.”72 Weeks later the Trudeau cabinet agreed to a list of comprehensive safeguards concerning nuclear exports and financing. To prevent more “Indias” from occurring, Ottawa would monitor the intentions of a potential nuclear technology–purchasing client and determine the likelihood of that nation developing nuclear weapons. Suspicious signals would prohibit sales. The government would scrutinize AECL’s advertising activities more rigorously than before, marking a distinct break from the past. Cabinet authorized the DEA to direct the negotiations necessary to ensure the administration of safeguard arrangements for Canadian nuclear exports.73 The list provided further evidence of the Trudeau government’s resolution that India should not take for granted future nuclear cooperation with Canada. Ottawa had learned from the incident. The new procedures became public on 20 December when Donald MacDonald, the minister of energy, mines, and resources, announced the measures. All safeguard arrangements would contain “binding assurances that Canadian-supplied nuclear material, equipment and technology will not be used to produce a nuclear explosive device, whether the development of such

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a device be stated to be for peaceful purposes or not.” MacDonald’s speech took aim at India. Ottawa was “more than ever conscious of its responsibility to ensure that Canadian nuclear resources do not contribute to nuclear proliferation.”74 As the suspension of nuclear cooperation carried into the new year, MacEachen submitted a memorandum to cabinet on 29 January 1975 seeking input from his colleagues. It was time to formalize the government’s approach to India “in the nuclear area.” The memorandum noted that, while Indian officials “were anxious to overcome differences with Canada and were conciliatory in tone, they were not prepared to meet all of the conditions” that Ottawa put forward. Nor would India rule out using CIRUS plutonium for another PNE even if Canada eliminated aid. New Delhi, however, was willing to discuss enhanced safeguards on the RAPPs. The memorandum observed that, for public consumption, “the easiest posture to explain would be the termination of nuclear relations with India” and abandoning outstanding obligations to the RAPPs. Cessation could still allow for cooperation with New Delhi in other areas, notably aid “directed to the non-agricultural sector.” But the question of whether to renew nuclear cooperation was complicated because of the unpalatable risks associated with either cessation or cooperation – however limited the latter may be. Any nuclear re-engagement might confuse the public, in light of Ottawa’s shrill reaction. The Canadian public could conceivably criticize renewed limited cooperation to complete the RAPP II reactor even with safeguards and if Ottawa had to abide by the original agreement. The criticism would certainly arise if the Indians continued testing. On the other hand, a possible strengthening of the safeguards on the RAPPs, even if it meant completion of work on the reactors, was “preferable to risking the loss of safeguards in India.” Besides, completion could also be explained to the public in terms of India’s urgent energy needs, which might garner some sympathy.75 Indeed, failing to complete previously negotiated deliveries for the RAPP II, including heavy water, risked India’s withdrawal from the trilateral safeguard arrangements negotiated in 1971 with Ottawa and the IAEA. Simultaneously, India could denounce the original bilateral safeguard arrangements that existed on the RAPP reactors. This path, cabinet learned, could give India “access to large volumes of plutonium for a weapons program four or more years earlier than would otherwise be the case.” And any decision to terminate CanadianIndian nuclear relations, MacEachen warned, would deteriorate general bilateral relations.76 Performing a delicate balancing act, the SSEA advised the government to continue negotiations while meeting Ottawa’s existing obligations on the RAPP  II agreement, provided that New Delhi accepted improved RAPP

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safeguards “covering duration, guarantees on peaceful, non explosive end use, pursuit, control on retransfers and IAEA administration.” Beyond the RAPP obligations, Ottawa would cease further nuclear cooperation, and India had to offer assurances regarding its role as a nuclear exporter and pledge cooperation with the international community to prevent nuclear proliferation. Significantly, Ottawa conceded a private guarantee sufficient, dropping its call for a public assurance, that India would cease any further PNEs, at least while Canada completed shipments to the RAPP II. If India met these conditions, advised the cabinet memorandum, then “the effect on non-nuclear aid flows resulting from the Cabinet decision of May 22 [1974] will be eliminated.” If, however, the Indians insisted on proceeding with additional tests, then all nuclear cooperation should end immediately regardless of previous agreements on the RAPPs.77 Nearly two months later, the cabinet Committee on External Policy and Defence deliberated on MacEachen’s memorandum and agreed with the recommendations. Negotiations would resume with cabinet support.78 When Gandhi and Trudeau met in Jamaica in May 1975 for a Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference, they exchanged a few sharp barbs but opted to let their advisers continue negotiations.79 Led by Michel Dupuy, the AUSSEA, another round of discreet talks occurred in Bombay while the prime ministers met in Jamaica. The Canadians focused on the RAPPs, abandoning the unattainable goal of enhanced controls on CIRUS. The negotiators made some headway, but the talks were arduous. The Indians accepted some improvements for safeguard coverage of the RAPPs, but the levels fell short of Canadian safeguard objectives. In particular, Ottawa wanted the Indians to forgo material and equipment from the RAPP reactors for any new explosions for the duration of the RAPP agreements regardless of whether Ottawa chose to halt cooperation. As the negotiations continued, conditions in India deteriorated. Unemployment and corruption remained endemic, and there were concerted calls for Gandhi’s resignation. A polarizing figure, Gandhi came under siege as elements of her party split and began to criticize her publicly. Matters came to a head on 12 June when the Allahabad High Court ruled that her 1971 election victory should be overruled because of corrupt campaign practices. Effectively, the ruling automatically revoked the election results, and Indian laws stipulated that Gandhi could not hold elected office for a period of six years. The country waited for her reaction. Less than two weeks later, she struck back forcefully with a series of draconian measures. She requested that the president proclaim a national state of emergency. In this state, Gandhi authorized mass arrests of journalists, labour and student activists, opposition leaders, and opponents within the Congress Party. Succumbing to what can best be described as para-

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noia, she went on All-India Radio to proclaim that she had acted in response to entrenched and mysterious conspiracies. “The Emergency,” as it became known, suspended all major individual rights and gave the Congress Party government unlimited authority. Gandhi heavily censored the press and banned a number of political organizations. This period is a blot on the rich fabric of Indian democracy and lasted until March 1977.80 In Ottawa, opponents of close ties with India noted yet another example of Indian perfidy and further reason why Ottawa should disengage from the Indian subcontinent. Frustrated by lack of progress with the talks and shocked by Gandhi’s dictatorial practices, Ottawa convened an interdepartmental meeting on 10 July 1975 at the Pearson Building to assess general bilateral relations. The candid discussions noted that the “emergency” coupled with the PNE left Canadians widely disillusioned with India. The participants concluded that, within the government, “many officials and a group of Cabinet Ministers continue to be ill disposed towards India. In general terms, the collective Canadian attitude towards India was described as one of indifference tinged with an element of hostility.” Nuclear talks were mired, and the discussion that day illuminates the delicacy of the situation: The Indians believe ... that a decision to continue nuclear testing would cost them aid (which is close to the mark so far). Our problem is that even if we only try to upgrade safeguards on RAPP so that RAPP II can be completed, and abandon everything else in the nuclear field with India, these improved safeguards must be every bit as tough as the ones being negotiated with Korea and Argentina now. If they are, they will be unacceptable to the Indians. If not, then they will be unacceptable to the Canadian public ... It was agreed that it would be best to put forward a tough proposal containing all our present safeguards requirements in the expectation that the Indians will refuse to meet them, rather than break off negotiations immediately.81

With the political relationship in tatters, a negligible trade balance, and relatively small immigration numbers, the participants studied the sole tangible link – aid.82 R.L. Rogers had returned to the DEA as the senior official responsible for Asian affairs after serving in Europe and the Middle East from 1965 to 1974. He supported a hard line against India and concluded that, if Ottawa decided “to drastically cut back our aid relationship with India after a conclusion of the nuclear issue, there remains virtually nothing else of significance in the relationship of the two countries. Each would go its own way.”83 This perspective garnered support across the DEA, in the South Asia Division, and in the office of the USSEA.

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Writing to J.R. Maybee in New Delhi days after the meeting, Douglas Hicks, seconded to the USSEA office, put a positive veneer on the outcome of the July discussions. Hicks had served in New Delhi a decade earlier and, though ambivalent toward India, suggested that Maybee should not “be unduly alarmed about the apparent lack of sympathy for India and the pessimistic outlook for the future of Canada-India relations.” No course of action had been determined, and the sentiments expressed at the meeting largely reflected the frustrations of policy makers. Those present concluded despite “the current suspension of democratic norms that India itself will survive, [and] no doubt Canada will continue to have some kind of relationship with India although on a more realistic basis than that which prevailed before May 18, 1974.”84 Hicks was unduly cheerful. The latest interdepartmental meeting in Ottawa displayed a palpable disdain for rehabilitating political ties with India outside the nuclear sphere. Likewise, the ascension of Allan MacEachen to SSEA had not tempered emotions, as the Indians had hoped. In fact, when MacEachen met his Indian counterpart in the autumn, he commented sharply that “India had punched Canada in the belly twice,” referring to the Indian PNE and the work of the Indian delegation at the United Nations to lead a charge against a Canadian proposal to postpone a congress on international crime.85 Ironically, the nuclear negotiations began to progress. The confident tone displayed by figures such as T.N. Kaul gave way to signs of compromise. In September, the Indians requested a meeting in New York to discuss Canada’s Bombay proposal: that the RAPPs be safeguarded in the event that Ottawa stopped deliveries following another Indian nuclear explosion. The Indians would agree to this but hesitated on committing to Ottawa’s demand for right of approval regarding the reprocessing of material from Canadian equipment.86 Still, even this one concession meant substantial progress and permitted negotiations to continue. The impetus for this shift had been detected a year earlier by Jenkins in New Delhi. It likely stemmed from the failed expectation that France would work with India on a future PNE, “but [the Indians] have now discovered this is not so … Suspect Indians assumed France would not be concerned with safeguards or proliferation but are now discovering French are not forthcoming in making their nuclear technology available to India.”87 In a memorandum to MacEachen in June 1975, Basil Robinson also observed that the Indians probably felt technological pressure to resolve their differences with Ottawa, but he cautioned against being overly optimistic.88 Robinson’s hunch that the Indians had misjudged both their ability to brush aside Canadian penalties and Ottawa’s resolve to secure substantial safeguards was reinforced in a discussion with the Indian high commissioner. The conver-

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sation revealed that economic penalties were having an impact. The Indian diplomat inquired whether Ottawa could rejoin the multilateral consortium providing debt relief to India. The Canadian government had withdrawn from the process aimed at reducing India’s debt burden after the nuclear test. Robinson refused to offer assurances. Ottawa directly linked debt relief to the progress in bilateral nuclear relations.89 By October, Robinson had informed MacEachen that India’s inability to secure new suppliers for its nuclear needs had brought its reactor program to a “virtual halt.”90 After nearly two arduous years of posturing and negotiating, a final round of talks occurred in New Delhi between 3 and 6 March 1976. P.N. Dhar, Gandhi’s senior adviser, sat at the negotiating table across from Michel Dupuy, leader of the Canadian delegation. Dupuy thought that Dhar’s involvement indicated political will in India to reach agreement. Certainly, the fact that Kewal Singh and the chairman and vice-president of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission also attended suggests that the Indians regarded the talks as critical. The Canadian delegation proceeded with the expectation that an agreement would be for a twenty-five- to thirty-year period and that its terms would rule out the explosive use of all material produced during that period. The agreement would guarantee a veto on transfers abroad of Canadian-supplied material and equipment, and India would not export explosive and reprocessing technology. When the talks concluded, the Canadians had achieved substantial gains.91 The agreement contained most of the key objectives originally sought by the Trudeau cabinet. The new accord covering the RAPP reactors reflected cabinet’s requirements for safeguards, and the duration of thirty-five years far exceeded the desired timeline. The language also removed a long-standing source of conflict between the two countries over the definition of “peaceful use.” The Canadians also achieved the right to prohibit the transfer of Canadian equipment and material to foreign nations. They attained a deal that had seemed to be entirely unobtainable a year earlier.92 The successful outcome represented no small feat considering the stance of the Indians in the months following the May 1974 test. Despite this foreign policy coup, the agreement fell apart on the cabinet table in May 1976. Pierre Trudeau and Ivan Head reflected in their quasi-memoir The Canadian Way that the negotiating team had returned with more than cabinet had sought. At first glance, the nuclear negotiations could only be considered a success, and cabinet merely had to lend its approval.93 However, as it came time to approve the deal in Ottawa on 13 May, the DEA and cabinet expressed misgivings. MacEachen successfully led a charge to scuttle the agreement, much to the surprise of Trudeau. MacEachen highlighted a report from the cabinet Committee on External Policy and Defence recommending that the agreement

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concluded in New Delhi be scrapped and that bilateral nuclear cooperation be terminated as soon as possible. He adamantly declared this the right course of action even if it meant not completing the shipments of material and fuel as stipulated under the RAPP II agreement with India. In doing so, MacEachen reversed his earlier position. Acknowledging his shift of opinion, he argued that he had changed it for several reasons. First, New Delhi was constructing a version of the CIRUS reactor over which there would be no safeguards, and it would be “another plutonium producing plant.” As such, the newly acquired enhanced safeguards on the RAPPs would have little impact on India’s ability to conduct future tests – which MacEachen thought likely – and its ability to develop nuclear weapons. Second, a group of international states formed the London Club of Nuclear Suppliers. The group, MacEachen reported, “had established new standards for safeguards” more thorough than those agreed to by Ottawa and New Delhi, thereby putting the Canadians in an awkward position. Third, “Canadian public opinion had certainly manifested itself clearly and there was of course the clear possibility of a further nuclear explosion from India in the near future.”94 The question turned to how Ottawa could abandon a deal that it had pursued for nearly two years. Surely the Indians, Trudeau stated, would accuse the government of having acted in bad faith. He grappled with whether cabinet was “prepared to let our relations with India suffer the inevitable blow that would result from a refusal to sign the agreement.” Trudeau appeared to be the solitary point of opposition, yet he raised the point more than once. MacEachen acknowledged that the Indians would argue that Ottawa had acted in bad faith and abrogated its agreement to finish developing the RAPP II, but he could accept this. He reminded his colleagues that the Indians could conduct future explosions at the end of an eighteen-month period during which Canada completed the shipment of supplies to the RAPP II. Donald MacDonald, the minister of finance, supported MacEachen, acidly remarking that “the Indian Government was less in a position than Canada to preach morality.” Alastair Gillespie, the minister of energy, mines, and resources, buttressed their comments, solemnly noting that India’s new plutonium-producing plant “was intended solely to produce weapons grade plutonium and that its development had been possible because of Canadian technology supplied in the CIRUS program.” Skepticism of India prevailed in cabinet.95 With three of the most important members of his cabinet opposing the agreement, Trudeau acquiesced. Twenty years after Escott Reid and Jawaharlal Nehru had officially signed the NRX deal in New Delhi, Canada decided to terminate nuclear cooperation with India. On 17 May, R.L. Rogers, director of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Division, warned Basil Robinson that “we do not know whether D-Day is Tuesday or

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Wednesday.” The cryptic reference referred to MacEachen and Trudeau finalizing the means and time to inform the Indians of the decision. To help prepare for what would be a profound shock, Rogers suggested calling in the Indian high commissioner the following day “to provide him with a minimum advance notification regarding the Cabinet decision with respect to nuclear cooperation.”96 On 18 May, two years to the date of the Pokhran test, Allan MacEachen wrote to Y.B. Chavan, the Indian minister of external affairs. The Canadian government had completed its review of bilateral nuclear relations. For almost two years, MacEachen continued, the Canadians had acted in good faith and made genuine and strenuous efforts to resolve a delicate and highly difficult matter. Further cooperation depended on the Indians renouncing the use of Canadiansupplied materials, equipment, and technology for nuclear explosions. Ottawa had concluded that this requirement conflicted with Indian policy, and, “given the very strong views held in Canada on nuclear matters, a settlement on any other basis does not seem possible.”97 At 11:26 a.m., on 20 May 1976, Chavan rose in the Lok Sabha to notify the Indian parliament of the Canadian decision. In an emotional statement, presenting India as the aggrieved party, Chavan stressed that the Indians had consistently “showed goodwill and negotiated in good faith with a view of resolving the differences.” New Delhi met Ottawa’s decision to “terminate nuclear co-operation and turn down the agreement negotiated and initialled by its own representatives” with regret and disappointment. The Lok Sabha, Chavan continued, would agree “that there is no ground for any suggestion that the government of India is in any way responsible for ending Indo-Canadian nuclear cooperation.”98 The only significant connection between the two countries remained development assistance channelled through CIDA. In a later statement to the House of Commons, MacEachen diplomatically referred to other ephemeral avenues of possible cooperation. In the aftermath of the decision, a distinct chill set in, and prime ministerial visits to either country became rare. Basil Robinson could claim some degree of influence on the final act of the demise of Canada-India relations. Drawing on his vast experience in the bilateral relationship (with the Suez Crisis, Diefenbaker’s visit in 1958, and issues pertaining to the ICSC), Robinson prepared a memorandum (widely circulated throughout the DEA) that would change the mind of his minister and arguably history itself. A masterful analytical study, the document situated the relationship in both the bilateral context and the global context. Events of the past year, it began, had transformed Canadian views of India. This change had been long coming, but “India’s nuclear explosion and recent curtailment of civil liberties have emphasized Indian foreign and domestic policy directions that are increasingly

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divergent from those we might wish to see India pursue or with which we might wish to be associated.” Given India’s disturbing refusal to accept safeguards, New Delhi’s aspirations in South Asia, and the complex strategic security situation with its neighbours, it “seems inevitable that India will decide to become a nuclear weapons state.” Canada’s relations with India were no longer broadly based “and apart from the nuclear relationship, which has become a negative factor, comprise aid, immigration and a relatively low level of trade.” Ottawa needed to recognize that the idea of “a traditionally close friendship between Canada and India is now dead.” The friendly relations to which some still subscribed were a product of a bygone era, based on Canadians’ sympathy for India as the first major country to emerge from colonial status into the Commonwealth after World War II, and on personal relations between Mr. Nehru and Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. Pearson. We believed that we shared attitudes towards the United Nations. We hoped that western economic support would prevent a “communist” India. We provided military assistance to India in 1962 during its war with China, even though the Chinese attack was provoked by Indian actions. The relationship was strained by our association with India on the International Commission in Indochina, when India, although meant to be a neutral chairman, almost invariably used its position to serve its perceptions of its own interests. This affected the attitude of all Canadian officials who served on the Commission over a period of 20 years, but the matter was  kept in a separate compartment from all other aspects of Canada-India relations and did not prevent a large expansion of our aid programme in India … The nuclear explosion called for a reassessment not only of our nuclear co-operation with India but also of our entire relationship. This reassessment must in turn be affected by the political crisis in India and the apparent turn towards increasingly authoritarian rule.

Although subjects remained on which Ottawa and New Delhi could cooperate, “neither common interests on international issues nor strictly bilateral items set India apart as a country for a special relationship with Canada, if indeed such a relationship ever existed.” In short, Robinson concluded, Canada’s “relations with India, if they ever were special, were so in Canadian perceptions only.”99 Robinson tightly summed up the voices of numerous Canadian critics of India. Years of disengagement, and ill will stemming from non-alignment, the ICSC, and disagreements at the United Nations or over the NPT, corroded the frame of the bilateral relationship. The bottom fell out in 1974 when relations hit their nadir as Indira Gandhi ordered the detonation of a “peaceful” nuclear

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device. The device relied on plutonium extracted from the CIRUS reactor, provided under a long-standing but awkwardly worded safeguards agreement detailing only peaceful use. Suddenly shaken from years of lethargy, Canadian and Indian policy makers attempted to engage in dialogue. The Indians were surprised at Ottawa’s anger. The talks became mired in semantics and lingered for nearly two years, injecting frustration and enmity into the relationship. The hope of ameliorating these differences evaporated as old habits persisted. Neither country could convince the other to find common ground or to compromise in the interests of the partnership. What little goodwill remained from the early 1950s could not maintain Ottawa’s trust in Indian promises. To place the breakdown of the relationship on the nuclear question alone is simplistic, just as it would be to say that the Indochina commissions were solely responsible for the level of antipathy toward India in the DEA. The PNE represents the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back, but there were numerous strains in the bilateral relationship that converged with global trends – such as the emergence of China – that influenced the rationale of policy makers in Ottawa. Nonetheless, the critical choices made in New Delhi and Ottawa between 1974 and 1976 ensured that the special relationship, if it had ever existed outside the minds of a few policy makers and academics, died.

Conclusion

Sour memories of non-alignment and nuclear proliferation coloured bilateral relations between Canada and India well beyond 1976. Not until 2006 did Ottawa actively re-engage with India. Three years later both countries announced their desire to bury the nuclear hatchet and resume cooperation. India’s dramatic economic rise, and growing strategic importance, spurred a belated Canadian recognition of the benefits of improved relations. The events of 1974 left few champions in the policy-making apparatus in Ottawa. Canada had moved beyond India, believing it devoid of economic charms and an untrustworthy nuclear partner. However, India has returned from the periphery to become a federal and provincial priority. One commonly hears Ottawa referring to the “long-standing bilateral relations” built on a Commonwealth bond and the shared values that exist between Canada and India. The message is simple: commonalities bind the two countries together, and few of the “world’s major developing countries have as many similarities to Canada as India” does.1 The old message has been refurbished in a twenty-first-century package. A buoyant expectation that the Nehru government shared “Western” interests in the early stages of the Cold War and decolonization marked the years immediately following India’s independence. India instantly achieved a unique status as the first British Asian possession to experience decolonization and gain independence. Ottawa believed that the shared imperial experience created commonalities. Canada also lacked colonies and great power ambition. These elements prompted Canadian officials, such as Lester Pearson and Escott Reid, to develop a vision in which Ottawa could play a unique role in bridging India and the West in a way that Australia, Britain, and the United States could not – the bridge thesis. This idea of Canada acting as a bridge between India and the West soon cast India as the pre-eminent nation in Asia and Nehru as a great statesman to be courted. The former jewel of the British crown retained a considerable measure of geostrategic importance for both Britain and the West. A burgeoning but largely impoverished population worried many in the West, and in Canada, as communism made considerable inroads throughout Asia. Canada’s efforts and policies needed to reflect an understanding of India’s place in the international system in the aftermath of decolonization.

Conclusion 243

Canadian policy on India between 1947 and 1955 was forward thinking, positive, and characterized by a range of components. At the 1949 Commonwealth conference, Ottawa assisted Britain in brokering India’s membership, creating a new multiracial Commonwealth organization less than two years after India’s independence from the British Empire. Soon after, the St. Laurent government extended an invitation to Nehru to visit Canada in late October 1949. The Indian statesman deeply impressed the Canadians with both his foreign policy assessments and his intellect. That meeting encouraged further interest in Indian views and fostered dialogue between Canada and India at Commonwealth forums and the United Nations. Canada’s decision to provide limited foreign aid following Lester Pearson’s first visit to Asia stemmed from the belief that Ottawa needed to provide financial and technical assistance if India was to succeed as a stable democracy in a troubled region. During this period, Canadian policies reflected the special role that Ottawa envisioned for itself. Ottawa dispatched Escott Reid to India at the apogee of the special relationship. A prominent senior diplomat, Reid sat as Canada’s third high commissioner to India. Captivated by Nehru and India, he emerged as the most vocal champion of India in the Department of External Affairs. He fervently believed in the bridge thesis and sought to link Ottawa and India as closely as possible. He proposed a range of means to strengthen the bond, including enhanced public diplomacy programs, increased aid, and annual consultations. His greatest efforts encouraged Ottawa to ameliorate tensions between the United States and India, particularly over questions pertaining to China and India’s nonaligned foreign policy. The cleavages at the high policy level and in terms of personalities deeply disturbed Reid. And he regularly lobbied Pearson to mediate – to bridge – their differences. Ottawa, however, was only willing to go so far to place India ahead of its own close relations with Washington. Reid and the exceptional vision of the bridge failed. Years later he believed that his time in India had represented a unique era between Ottawa and New Delhi, an era that he described as a special relationship. By 1955, his advice met an audience who considered him too sympathetic to Indian foreign policy. A second phase of the bilateral relationship began to emerge that defined relations from 1955 to 1968. In the twilight of Reid’s time in India, a growing pool of his senior colleagues questioned India’s charms and posed questions about nonalignment. Canadian officials muttered at India’s, and Krishna Menon’s, conduct at the United Nations on issues of decolonization. Collaboration on the ICSC produced tension as the countries interpreted their roles through different political, geographical, and historical lenses. This tension escalated throughout the 1960s. It is not without irony that the Vietnam War undid much of the early goodwill in the Canada-India relationship. India’s tendency to treat Hanoi with

244 Conclusion

less scrutiny than Saigon led Canadians on the ICSC to cast aspersions on Indian non-alignment. The failure of Reid’s colleagues and supervisors to accept his advice – much of which was creative and insightful – belies the level of distrust of India that officials throughout the DEA developed in a fairly brief period of time. It represents a fascinating transformation in which Canadian foreign policy shifted from being influenced by Britain to reflecting American attitudes toward India. The emerging high-policy fissures help to explain the change. However, early Canadian attitudes toward India relied on a hopeful expectation that the ties of empire fostered some form of common ground. Perceived Anglo-Saxon links of language, higher education, legal codes, and parliamentary democracy could foster felicitous relations. Canadian officials were part of a North Atlantic world: they inherited a worldview based predominantly on Christian faith, were schooled in the canon of Western literature, and usually received a higher education focused on the study of North American and Western European history and society. They projected that world onto India and used terms and phrases such as “bridge building,” “commonalities,” and “we expected the Indians to be like us” when characterizing India and Indians, be it in interviews, official documents, diaries, or personal letters. When efforts to coax Indian foreign policy toward Western interests failed, Canadian policy makers and politicians wondered why. In searching for answers, a notable group of DEA officials looked past perceived commonalities to perceived differences. The documents and personal correspondence of the mid-1950s contain a different set of phrases and intentions to explain Indian actions and the Indian persona. Common descriptions included “alien,” “vague,” “duplicitous,” and “non-Western.” Pivotal figures such as Marcel Cadieux and Lester Pearson openly questioned the Indian “character.” In the DEA, early optimism that a bridge existed gave way to a sense that the complexities of Hinduism, coupled with Raj-era cultural stereotypes, explained why the Indians proved to be less accommodating to the West than Pakistan. Canadian policy makers turned to cultural and religious considerations to understand why once confident expectations unravelled. A gradual realization dawned that the perceived commonalities between Canada and India counted for far less than originally presumed and fed the befuddlement, and subsequent aggravation, expressed by officials and politicians, such as Howard Green, regarding India’s commitment to non-alignment. A careful consideration of those nuances juxtaposed against high-policy issues better illuminates how a once vaunted relationship became not so special for Ottawa. Ottawa’s frustration and disillusionment with India set up the conditions that Chester Ronning observed from New Delhi. Ironically, Ronning, a China hand,

Conclusion 245

influenced Ottawa’s burgeoning apathy toward India the most. His analysis of the relationship, sent to the DEA in May 1960, inadvertently captured the attention of a generation of mandarins. Ronning never intended for Canada to become politically distant from India. Rather, his analysis suggested that Ottawa approach its relationship with greater realism, and to this end he offered prescriptions. More specifically, Ronning advised Ottawa to accept that it exercised limited influence in shaping Indian policy and vice versa. He drew on a host of examples, including the United Nations and ICSC, to illustrate the lack of convergence between the two states. If both countries wished to maintain and nurture their bilateral relationship, then they should have realistic expectations. Romantic ideals of special relationships simply proved to be insufficient. Ronning’s dispatch found an audience among figures who loathed Krishna Menon, viewed India as an ungrateful recipient of Western aid, and deemed non-alignment perfidious. Indeed, the depth of this acrimony is evident when a respected senior figure such as John Holmes wrote of a playful desire to strangle Menon. The same officials, increasingly aggravated by the decision making of successive Indian governments, following the departure of Nehru and Menon, took a tougher stance with New Delhi. The Indians, they asserted, happily accepted Canadian and Western aid while shrilly denouncing the West in the Cold War. The views of India held by senior officials and politicians, including Cadieux, Diefenbaker, Glazebrook, Pearson, Ritchie, and Robinson, became heavily influenced by New Delhi’s non-alignment, which conflicted with Ottawa’s initial expectations of how postcolonial India should act in the Cold War. Ronning’s views informed the departmental briefs that presented ties with India as thin and superficial. Instead of sparking a wide-ranging debate, the opposite occurred. India skeptics drew from Ronning’s thesis what they saw fit to take, and their ranks mushroomed. The ICSC plodded along, and relations with India became increasingly peripheral despite the continuation of aid and nuclear cooperation during this era. Although Ronning’s analysis went largely unchallenged, as the decade progressed his call for “greater realism” in the relationship eventually met with the Trudeau government in 1968. Political relations with India, once deemed to be the most important democracy in Asia for Canada, continued to decline in importance. The ICSC remained tempestuous, Canada unable to persuade India to adhere to the NPT, yet Ottawa channelled considerable foreign aid to India, and nuclear cooperation continued. India shifted to the periphery of Canadian interests, much to the chagrin of those who countered that the relationship still mattered. James George, cut from similar cloth as Escott Reid, brooded over that disconnect during his time in New Delhi from 1967 to 1972. While prompting Ottawa to re-engage with India, to recognize the importance of cultivating

246 Conclusion

healthy ties, George encountered a new attitude as a third era unfolded in the bilateral relationship. Ottawa envisioned a new relationship, one more advantageous and profitable for Canada. If Ottawa provided considerable financial aid, should it not receive something in return – enhanced trade opportunities? The bolder and more assertive tone reflected the findings from the 1973 policy review of relations with South Asia, the first such review in over a decade. The linkage between aid and trade took on neo-imperialist overtones as Ottawa regarded India as the weaker partner. The review did not consider how nuclear cooperation should proceed. This cooperation came into question following India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” or PNE. Although Ottawa consciously distanced itself from India, after Ronning’s dispatch, as the lack of bureaucratic and political engagement suggests, development aid and the exchange of nuclear technology continued to flow smoothly. A fair amount of blame rests on Pearson’s government, which finalized the sales and financing of two CANDU reactors between 1963 and 1967. The latter sale coincided with India refusing to sign the NPT despite the importance that Ottawa placed on India’s accession to that treaty. The failure of Canadian policy makers, and their political bosses, to examine carefully Canada’s nuclear relationship with India on a consistent basis, coupled with AECL’s desire to sell its products abroad, accounts for why Canada continued to follow the contradictory policy of selling nuclear reactors to India. Ottawa missed the signs of India’s untrustworthiness in efforts to curb nuclear proliferation. The allure of being a niche player in the export of nuclear technology, a market dominated by greater powers, certainly charmed and subsequently blinded AECL and the Canadian government. For their part, the Indians willingly accepted Canadian nuclear technology and, as the exchange of letters between Gandhi and Trudeau suggests, acted in what can be described as a duplicitous manner as far as their assurances of peaceful purposes. India held great promise as a nuclear market and partner in the spring of 1955. After May 1974, the utterly worthless promise finally forced the Canadian government to reassess both its nuclear relationship and its political relationship with India as well as its nuclear export policies. Ironically, the reactor that New Delhi used to help produce the 1974 PNE was the first Canadian reactor, the CIR. That reactor was provided to India in part because of the bridge thesis. India’s choice forced a sober assessment of where relations with India had stood and where they now stood in the aftermath of the test. Canada rejected pursuing a more restrained but realistic relationship, despite having the opportunity to do so in the wake of Indian nuclear concessions. The majority of the Trudeau cabinet, with the support of senior DEA

Conclusion 247

policy makers, concluded that, for the immediate future, India could be neither a political ally in the region nor a suitable market for Canadian nuclear trade, ending the awkward attempt to balance profit and non-proliferation. It is wrong, though, to consider the Indian nuclear test as precipitating the long era of bilateral neglect that followed after May 1974. It is right, however, to view the test as the final blow to the decrepit structure of the bridge. The study of this period calls into question how Canadians perceived themselves beyond the North Atlantic world and illuminates the expansion, development, and contradiction of the DEA as its officers coped with decolonization and its aftermath in South Asia against the backdrop of the Cold War in a region in which they had negligible experience. Pearson’s and St. Laurent’s internationalist, open-minded approach to the early Cold War in Asia – an approach abetted by the confluence of events and personalities – allowed Ottawa and New Delhi to develop an early rapport. In retrospect, that hastily built relationship sowed the seeds for future discord, and the relationship became the victim of its own early success and miscalculations. The frame of that relationship cracked under the strain of false expectations of the other. The discord illuminates the extent to which Ottawa’s initial sense of exceptionalism regarding India gave way to attitudes more in league with American perceptions of India. The Indians harboured their own misplaced expectations. They believed that Canadians could be persuaded to distance their foreign policy from that of Washington, as the example of Korea, and even that of the ICSC, suggest. Nehru began to question Ottawa’s ability to act independently, just as Ottawa began to question India’s stance of non-alignment. Nehru initially underestimated Canada’s commitment to Atlanticism and the primacy of relations with Washington. He also likely underestimated the antipathy to communism within Canadian elite policymaking circles. Connected to the sundering of bilateral ties is the impact on foreign policy that can occur when bureaucracy and government fail to engage with a particular country file. Cooperation between the two spheres explains the early success of Canada’s bilateral policy on India from 1947 to 1955. A relatively small core of elite mandarins and politicians influenced policy. That core included senior officials such as John Holmes, Douglas LePan, Escott Reid, and Hume Wrong and politicians such as Lester Pearson and Louis St. Laurent. They possessed similar views of the need to build ties with India, engage Nehru, and identify India as a partner in nuclear cooperation. The ensuing cooperation, however, relied on misplaced expectations at the bureaucratic and political levels of the influence of Canadian overtures on India’s foreign policy. Conversely, the evidence reveals how a disengaged prime minister, an SSEA, or even a bureau/ division within the DEA could impact policy. The case of India also shows the

248 Conclusion

extent to which policy was contemplated and scrutinized as Canadian diplomats debated internal conflicting visions of how Ottawa should engage, or not, with New Delhi. Tracing vibrant policy discussions among decision makers shows that the roots of Canada’s disengagement began toward the end of the St.  Laurent-Pearson era. The gradual impact of that disengagement became apparent by the 1960s, particularly during James George’s tenure in New Delhi. Ottawa’s political disengagement gathered strength under Diefenbaker and continued unchecked under Pearson only to be mildly addressed, but not adjusted, during the early 1970s under Trudeau. The formulation of Canadian policy on and interest in India suffered, with profoundly detrimental consequences as subsequent prime ministers, their SSEAs, and the DEA neglected India. Divergent worldviews combined with cultural and religious elements accounted for the neglect that crept in as policy makers and politicians became disillusioned and disenchanted with India’s foreign policy as the Cold War progressed. This dissonance revealed that the two countries had far less in common than initially believed through the optimistic lens of the bridge metaphor. Policy makers looked to Hinduism or Raj-era stereotypes to interpret the allure of non-alignment to New Delhi. The Canadians sought to rationalize hastily and poorly founded assumptions that initially underpinned the bridge concept. Additional factors facilitated Ottawa’s disengagement from India. The rapid expansion of the new Commonwealth in the 1960s, the emergence of new markets in China and Japan in the 1970s, and changing political relationships in Asia coincided with the relative decline of India as a democratic and economic attraction. A lack of engagement between Ottawa and its High Commission in New Delhi also proved to be problematic during key periods of the relationship. The severity of this aspect ranged from Reid’s inability to obtain further clarification of his instructions during the NRX negotiations to George’s repeated unsuccessful efforts to have Ottawa undertake a thorough review of bilateral relations. If a high commissioner lost the ear of the department, as in the case of Reid, or never had it in the first place, as in the case of George, then his role could be frustrating. All too often, as the example of the ICSC showed, the disconnect between diplomats and Ottawa policy makers reflected the difference between the importance that the post placed on the bilateral relationship and the priority that the DEA accorded it. As a result of the above factors, the much-vaunted special relationship of the 1950s wasted away into indifference and distrust by the mid-1970s. The deterioration culminated in Canada’s strong sense of betrayal and embarrassment following detonation of the Indian nuclear device. This event led cabinet to

Conclusion 249

place political relations with India at the periphery, but it also created a vacuum in Canadian interest in and policy on India that remained for three decades. From the mid-1970s to the end of the twentieth century (when India tested nuclear weapons), Canada and its foreign policy establishment recoiled from a serious evaluation of relations with India. Few policy makers in the senior ranks of the Department of External Affairs could remember, or were willing to rekindle, the flame of friendship and mutual trust that had once existed. As the case of India reveals, building bridges outside traditional Western foreign policy circles proved to be far more complex than Ottawa had expected in the broader context of the Cold War. Ultimately, the distance between expectation and reality was too great.

Notes

Introduction 1 No monograph based on archival research by a Canadian historian exists on Canadian foreign relations with India. This particular topic has been dominated by retired Canadian diplomats and political scientists, the most notable work being that of Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1981). Former diplomat David Chalmer Reece’s memoir also includes an examination of his time in India: see A Rich Broth: Memoirs of a Canadian Diplomat (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993); see also J.S. Grewal and Hugh Johnston, eds., The India-Canada Relationship: Exploring the Political, Economic, and Social Dimensions (New Delhi: Safe Publications, 1994). There are, however, some excellent chapters and articles on specific historical aspects of the bilateral relationship. See, for example, Mary Halloran, “Mrs. Gandhi’s Bombshell: Canadian Reactions to India’s Nuclear Detonation, 1974–1976,” in Canada’s Global Engagements and Relations with India, ed. Christopher Raj and Abdul Nafey (New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2007); Greg Donaghy, “‘The Most Important Place in the World’: Escott Reid in India, 1952–57,” in Escott Reid: Diplomat and Scholar, ed. Greg Donaghy and Stéphane Roussel (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004); Hector Mackenzie, “An Old Dominion and the New Commonwealth: Canadian Policy on the Question of India’s Membership, 1947–49,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27, 3 (1999): 82–112. A useful survey piece is Arthur G. Rubinoff, “Canada’s Re-Engagement with India,” Asian Survey 42, 6 (2002): 838–55. However, it eschews archival sources and provides little insight into why relations soured over time. Likewise, few Indian studies exist on Indo-Canadian relations. The most recent monograph is by S.D. Gupta, IndiaCanada Relation [sic], (Jaipur: Jaipur Publishing House, 1990). This study suffers from numerous factual errors and unsubstantiated generalizations. More importantly, the author did not utilize Canadian or Indian archival sources, relying instead on memoirs and secondary sources. Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb (London: Zed Books, 1998), examines the Indo-Canadian relationship in developing India’s atomic infrastructure. However, his Canadian research is extracted overwhelmingly from an MA thesis published in 1989. See Iris H. Lonergan, “The Negotiations between Canada and India for the Supply of the N.R.X. Nuclear Research Reactor, 1955–1956: A Case Study in Participatory Internationalism,” MA thesis (Carleton University, 1989). Meanwhile, Ramesh Thakur’s pioneering study on Canada’s and India’s roles on the Indochina commissions in Vietnam remains the most useful, if outdated, work on that topic. See Ramesh Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984). 2 See Ruth Compton Brouwer, Canada’s Global Villagers: CUSO in Development, 1961–86 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013); Laura Madokoro, “‘Slotting’ Chinese Families and Refugees, 1947–1967,” Canadian Historical Review 93, 1 (2012): 25–56; John Meehan, The Dominion and the Rising Sun: Canada Encounters Japan, 1929–1941 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); David Meren, With Friends like These: Entangled Nationalisms and the Canada-Quebec-Triangle, 1944–1970 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012); John Price,

Notes to pages 5-11 251

3

4

5 6

7

8 9

Orienting Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011); Kevin Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960–1964 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009); David Webster, Fire and the Full Moon: Canada and Indonesia in a Decolonizing World (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009). See, for example, H.W. Brands, India and the United States: The Cold Peace (Boston: Twayne, 1990); Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies 1941– 1991 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press Publications, 1993); Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Andrew J. Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Andrew J. Rotter, “Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and U.S.–South Asian Relations, 1947– 1954,” Diplomatic History 24, 4 (2000): 593–613. See, for example, Donaghy, “‘The Most Important Place in the World,’” 67–84; Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World 1945–1984 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 77–78, 123. See Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 6–7, 194. Canadian officials were not unique. Rotter’s studies on American relations with India suggest that American officials tended to share a similar experience in conceptualizing India and Indian foreign policy. Although Canada recognized independent Pakistan following partition in August 1947, both countries waited to exchange representatives until 1949 because of Pakistani financial constraints. Whereas Canada’s ties with India progressed in the interim, Canadian officials began to consider the relationship with Pakistan in the early 1950s. M.S. Rajan, “The Indo-Canadian Entente.” International Journal 17 (1962): 358–84. Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1981).

Chapter 1: Plain Tales from the DEA 1 LAC, W.L.M. King Papers, Series J4, Vol. 22, Memorandum re: Emigration from India to Canada, 5 February 1909, c 15302–09. 2 I wish to thank Julie Gilmour for letting me know of the gap that exists in the LAC version of King’s diary entries while in India. W.L.M. King Diaries (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, microfiche v. 109), 25 January 1909, 262. For an engaging view of King’s visit to India, see Julie Gilmour, Trouble on Main Street: Mackenzie King, Reason, Race, and the 1907 Vancouver Riots (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014). 3 See David Gilmour, The Ruling Caste: Imperial Lives in the Victorian Raj (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2005); Judith Brown, Nehru: A Political Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003). 4 E.M. Forster, A Passage to India (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1924), 97. 5 See John English, Shadow of Heaven: The Life of Lester Pearson Volume One: 1897–1948 (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1989); J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins 1935–1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982); John Hilliker, Canada’s Department of External Affairs Volume I: The Early Years, 1909–1946 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990); Doug Owram, The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State, 1900–1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986). 6 Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (London: Allen Lane Publishers, 2002), 346. 7 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3323, File 11004-40 pt. 1, Letter from Vincent Massey to King, 5 November 1940. 8 Ibid., Memorandum from O.D. Skelton to King, 20 January 1941.

252 Notes to pages 11-15

9 Ibid. 10 LAC, King Papers, Series J4, Vol. 281, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, HFA/LP, 26 December 1941, c 193155–58. 11 Hilliker, Canada’s Department of External Affairs Volume I, 266. 12 Brown, Nehru, 148. 13 See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3323, File 11004-40 pt. 1, Letter from Massey to King, 1 January 1942. 14 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4479, File 50017-40 pt. 4, Telegram No. 73 from the SSEA, Ottawa, to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, 6 March 1942. 15 Ibid. The formal decision to appoint a Canadian high commissioner to India was made on 5 March 1942 at the cabinet War Committee Meeting. See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3323, File 11004-40 pt. 1, Note to File “Relations with India,” n.d. 16 Ibid., Telegram No. 79 from the SSEA, Ottawa, to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, 15 March 1942. 17 Ibid., Telegram No. 63 from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the SSEA, Canada, 18 March 1942. 18 FO 954/12 A, Vol. 12, Folio 105, Lord Privy Seal Foreign Office to Graham Spry, Washington, Dispatch No. 5154, 17 May 1942 (includes text of private letter from Amery to King, 17 March 1942). 19 Arthur Herman, Gandhi and Churchill: The Epic Rivalry that Destroyed an Empire and Forged Our Age (London: Bantam Books, 2008), 99–100. 20 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4479, File 50017-40 pt. 4, Note to File “Canadian High Commissioner for India,” 26 March 1942. 21 Ibid., Massey to King, Telegram No. 1353, 19 May 1942. 22 LAC, King Papers, Series J4, Vol. 281, Note for Prime Minister from Norman Robertson, 21 June 1943, c193195. 23 See LAC, King Papers, Series J4, Vol. 281, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 28 August 1943, c193199. 24 LAC, King Papers, Series J4, Vol. 281, Letter for Hugh Keenleyside from Victor Odlum, 24 July 1943, c193200–01. 25 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3323, File 11004-40 pt. 1, Note from J.W. Holmes to Hume Wrong, 3 November 1943. Wrong’s comment appears in the marginalia of the note. 26 See LAC, King Diaries, J 13, 14 November 1943, 7 February 1944. 27 Ibid. See also LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3323, File 11004-40, pt. 1, Memorandum for Robertson from Keenleyside, 13 February 1942. 28 LAC, King Papers, Series J1, Vol. 364. Letter from Malcolm MacDonald to N.A. Robertson, 17 April 1944, c316003. MacDonald’s letter confirms that in November 1943 Robertson and MacDonald had discussed the topic. 29 K.P.S. Menon (not Krishna) became a prominent diplomat in the Indian foreign ministry, serving as ambassador to the Soviet Union during the Suez Crisis and the crushing of the Hungarian rebellion by East Bloc forces. 30 See LAC, King Papers, Series J4, Vol. 281, ARM/JH India Looks for Increased Canadian Influence in the Commonwealth (summary of secret Dispatch No. 260 of 20 May 1944 from the Canadian Ambassador in Chunking), c193208, and Dispatch No. 260, 20 May 1944, from Odlum to the SSEA, Subject: Mr. K.P.S. Menon, Indian Agent-General, c193209–11. 31 LAC, King Papers, Series J1, Vol. 386, Letter from Malcolm MacDonald to N.A. Robertson, 25 September 1945, c346153. 32 A note had been inscribed in the left margin of the letter – “still trying to secure the right person – hope to find soon.” See LAC, King Papers, Series J1, Vol. 412, Letter from L.B. Pearson to H.S.L. Polak, 28 October 1946, c371888.

Notes to pages 15-20 253

33 LAC, King Diaries, J 13, 15 March 1946. 34 Ibid., 31 October 1946. 35 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 31, File External Affairs Dept. Administration – 1946, Memorandum from Pearson to SSEA, 16 September 1946. 36 Candidates in October 1946 included cabinet ministers Brooke Claxton and J.M. Macdonnell. In November, Pearson phoned Colonel Allan Magee asking him to consider going to New Delhi. He politely declined. See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3323, File 11004-40 pt. 1, Letter from Magee to Pearson, 25 November 1946. 37 LAC, King Diaries, 12 December 1946. 38 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3566, File Appt. of Mr. John D. Kearney as Canadian High Commissioner to India, 18 December 1946. 39 Ibid., Dispatch No. 10865, from the Secretary to the Government of India, External Affairs Department, New Delhi, to the SSEA, Ottawa, 25 December 1946. 40 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 663, File New Delhi Staff File, Kearney to Pearson, Oslo, 9 December 1946. See letter from Kearney to Pearson, 10 December 1946. 41 LAC, Kearney Diaries, MG 30 E 215, Vol. 1, 1 January 1947. 42 See The Empire Club of Canada Speeches 1933–1934 (Toronto: Empire Club of Canada, 1934), 166–75. 43 LAC, King Diaries, J 13, 14 February 1947. 44 Ibid. 45 For instance, the Treasury Board balked at the DEA’s request for a tropical clothing allowance of $250 when Canadian army officers stationed in a tropical environment received only $50. The DEA dropped the request in frustration. See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 663, File New Delhi Staff Letter from W.C. Ronson, Treasury Board, to Lester Pearson, 21 April 1947; Letter from W.D. Matthews (DEA) to W.C. Ronson, 24 April 1947. 46 LAC, King Papers, Series J1, Vol. 421, Letter from A.J. Pick to the DEA, 1 May 1947, c382215. 47 Ibid. 48 Whereas the Congress Party, led by Nehru, was the main political vehicle for Hindus, the Muslim League spoke for India’s minority Muslim population and was led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Relations between the two bodies had been plagued by worsening bouts of political discord and sectarian violence across the subcontinent from the mid-1920s. 49 LAC, King Papers, Series J1, Vol. 421, Letter from A.J. Pick to the DEA, 1 May 1947, c382215. Pick observed that “the Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly last January 22nd clearly called for the creation of an ‘independent sovereign republic.’ Nehru is the great intellectual leader of Congress and from his recent writings and speeches it is quite clear where he stands. He is for the Republic.” 50 Ibid. 51 LAC, RG 2, Privy Council, Vol. 81, File India I-13 1943–49, Dispatch No. 469, Subject India, from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the SSEA, Canada, 23 May 1947. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid., Telegram from the SSEA, Ottawa, to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, 27 May 1947. 54 LAC, King Diaries, J 13, 28 May 1947. 55 Ibid. 56 LAC, RG 2, Privy Council, Vol. 81, File India I-13 1943–49, SSEA to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, 30 May 1947. 57 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3883, File 9193-40 pt. 2, Memorandum for the Prime Minister from L.B. Pearson, 30 May 1947.

254 Notes to pages 20-27

58 59 60 61

62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

73 74 75 76 77 78 79

LAC, MG 30 E 215, Vol. 2, John Kearney Diaries, 19 June 1947. Ibid., 22 June 1947. Ibid., 23 June 1947. See LAC, King Papers, Series J4, Vol. 281, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, HFA/ LP, 26 December 1941, c 193155–58, and LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3660, File 4900-E-40 pt. 1, Memorandum from St. Laurent to Kearney, 21 April 1947. See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3660, File 4900-E-40 pt. 1, Memorandum from St. Laurent to Kearney, 21 April 1947. Brown, Nehru, 244; T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War: Recollections and Reflections (Sahibabad: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), 83. LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3566, File 1617-A-40 pt.1, Dispatch No. 5, Kearney to the SSEA, 26 June 1947. This comment did not seem to generate any immediate concern in Ottawa. LAC, MG 30 E 215, Vol. 2, John Kearney Diaries, 26 June 1947. LAC, MG 27 III B 11, Vol. 24, Letter from John Kearney to J.L. Ralston, 14 October 1947. Brown, Nehru, 157. Ibid., 173. LAC, MG 30 E 215, Vol. 2, John Kearney Diaries, 14 August 1947. LAC, MG 26 J 13, King Diaries, 14 August 1947. LAC, MG 30 E 215, Vol. 2, John Kearney Diaries, 14 August 1947. See Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 2; Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), 286–90. See Brown, Nehru, 176; Denis Judd, Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1996), 323. Judd, Empire, 323. LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3883, File 9193-40 pt. 2, Dispatch No. 60, Kearney to Ottawa, 27 August 1947. Brown, Nehru, 176. Ibid. LAC, MG 30 E 215, Vol. 2, John Kearney Diaries, 7 September 1947. LAC, King Papers, MG 26 J1, Vol. 425, High Commissioner for Canada in India to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 12 September 1947, c386155.

Chapter 2: Building a Bridge 1 See Robert Bothwell, “Eyes West: Canada and the Cold War in Asia,” in Canada and the Early Cold War 1943–1957, ed. Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 1998), 60. 2 See John Hilliker and Donald Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs: Volume II, Coming of Age, 1946–1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), 41–42. 3 See Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1981). 4 LAC, J.L. Ralston Papers, MG 27 III B 11, Vol. 24, Letter from John Kearney to J.L. Ralston, 14 October 1947. 5 Judith Brown, Nehru: A Political Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 247. 6 Subimal Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office (Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1977), 7. 7 LAC, John Kearney Diaries, MG 30 E 215, Vol. 2, 19 August 1947. 8 Ibid., 4 September 1947; LAC, King Papers, MG 26, Series J1, Vol. 425, Dispatch No. 76, Kearney to the SSEA, 6 September 1947. 9 See Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography Volume II 1947–1956 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 47.

Notes to pages 27-33 255

10 Brown, Nehru, 252. 11 The Indian equivalent to the House of Commons. 12 LAC, King Papers, MG 26, Series J1, Vol. 425, Dispatch No. 162, Kearney to L.S. St. Laurent, 22 November 1947. 13 Cited in Brown, Nehru, 252. 14 LAC, National Defence, RG 24, Series C-1-6, File 712-114, Dispatch No. 114, Kearney to the SSEA, 1 April 1948. 15 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3883, File 9193-40 pt. 3, Memorandum for File, 22 April 1948. 16 Ibid., Letter from Reid to Kearney, 23 June 1948. 17 LAC, RG 2, Vol. 107, File U-10-11, Note to File, 21 September 1948. 18 LAC, RG 2, Vol. 107, File U-10-11, Dispatch No. 1584, Robertson to the SSEA, 13 September 1948. 19 Ibid., Hume Wrong to Escott Reid, 20 September 1948. 20 Hector Mackenzie, “An Old Dominion and the New Commonwealth: Canadian Policy on the Question of India’s Membership, 1947–49,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27, 3 (1999): 89. 21 See LAC, King Diaries, J 13, 13 October 1948. 22 Ibid. King also repeated this ancestral tale at the conference to Sir Girja Bajpai, the Indian secretary-general of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. See LAC, King Diaries, J 13, 14 October 1948. 23 Ibid., 15 October 1948. 24 J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record Volume IV 1947–1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 408–09. Pickersgill later wrote that, once St. Laurent became convinced of this, “he became an even more effective advocate of this new concept of the Commonwealth.” See J.W. Pickersgill, My Years with Louis St. Laurent: A Political Memoir (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 53. 25 Mackenzie, “An Old Dominion and the New Commonwealth,” 89. 26 LAC, King Diaries, J 13, 25 October 1948. 27 Nehru Memorial Museum and Library [hereafter NMML], M.O. Mathai Collection, File No. 28, Part XIV, Dispatch from Nehru to Krishna Menon, Girja Bajpai, 19 November 1948. 28 Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 45. 29 See the letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Krishna Menon, 12 January 1949, in Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50 Volume VIII, ed. Durga Das (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1970), 2. 30 Mackenzie, “An Old Dominion and the New Commonwealth,” 93. 31 See the letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Sardar Patel, 14 March 1949, in Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, 3. 32 LAC, RG 2, Vol. 248, File India I-13, Memorandum for the SSEA, 16 March 1949. 33 LAC, R.A. MacKay Papers, MG 30 E 159, Vol. 2, Memorandum from MacKay to the SSEA, 10 March 1949. 34 LAC, RG 2, Vol. 248, File India I-13, Memorandum for the SSEA, 16 March 1949. 35 LAC, RG 2, Vol. 127, File India I-13, Memorandum for File Re: Commonwealth Relations – India, 19 March 1949. 36 Brown, Nehru, 245. 37 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4479, File 50017-40 pt. 2, Dispatch No. 117, Kearney to the SSEA, 10 March 1949. 38 Ibid. 39 LAC, RG 2, Vol. 127, File India I-13, Memorandum for File Re: Commonwealth Relations – India, 19 March 1949.

256 Notes to pages 33-39

40 LAC, R.A. MacKay Papers, MG 30 E 159, Vol. 2, Personal Message for Pandit Nehru from Mr. St. Laurent, 31 March 1949. 41 Ibid., Nehru to St. Laurent, 5 April 1949. 42 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4479, File 50017-40 pt. 2, Memorandum by Head, Commonwealth Division, 12 April 1949. 43 Ibid., Memorandum by Secretary of State for External Affairs, 19 April 1949. 44 Ibid., 21 April 1949. 45 Mackenzie, “An Old Dominion and the New Commonwealth,” 99. 46 Brown, Nehru, 253. 47 Mackenzie, “An Old Dominion and the New Commonwealth,” 99. 48 LAC, R.A. MacKay Papers, MG 30 E 159, Vol. 2, Telegram No. 838, Pearson to St. Laurent, 22 April 1949. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 See the telegram from Jawaharlal Nehru to Sardar Patel, 23 April 1949, in Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, 12. 52 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 23, File Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting April 1949, Diary Note for 25 April 1949. 53 Brown, Nehru, 253. 54 The broadcast was received in time for St. Laurent to read the declaration in Ottawa that afternoon. See LAC, R.A. MacKay Papers, MG 30 E 159, Vol. 2, Text of Broadcast by Hon. L.B. Pearson, 27 April 1949. 55 See the letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to Sardar Patel, 27 April 1949, in Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, 23. 56 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4479, File 50017-40 pt. 3, Letter from Morley Scott to R.A. MacKay, 3 May 1949. 57 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 23, File Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting April 1949, Diary Note for 30 April 1949. 58 Ibid. 59 See Hansard, Vol. III, 1949, House of Commons Debates, 5th Session, 20th Parliament, 2654–55, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC2005_03/734?r=0&s=1. 60 Ibid. 61 Brown, Nehru, 254. 62 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4479, File 50017-40 pt. 3, Dispatch No. 235, Scott to DEA, 13 May 1949. 63 NARA, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Records Relating to South Asia, Miscellaneous Lot Files No. 57 D 373, Box 2, General Subject Files of the Officer in Charge of India-Nepal-Ceylon Affairs, April, File Memo Book, 1949, Memorandum from Matthews to Sparks, “Significance of India’s Retention of Its Commonwealth Membership,” 8 July 1949. 64 Dennis Merrill, “Indo-American Relations, 1947–50: A Missed Opportunity in Asia,” Journal of Diplomatic History 11, 3 (1987): 216. See also NARA, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Records Relating to South Asia, Miscellaneous Lot Files No. 57 D 373, Box 2, File Official/Informal April 1949, Letter from Loy Henderson to G. Lewis Jones, 18 April 1949. 65 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3983, File 9908-Y-2-40 pt. 1, Memorandum for the USSEA, Subject Visit of Pandit Nehru to Washington, 11 May 1949. 66 See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6185, File 1617-B-40 pt 1 F.P. 67 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3566, File 4900-E-40 pt. 1, Letters of Instruction for Chipman by A.J. Pick, 8 September 1949.

Notes to pages 40-45 257

68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid., Letter from Hume Wrong to Arnold Heeney, 28 September 1949; see Memorandum for the Prime Minister from Heeney, 4 October 1949. 71 Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 40. 72 NARA, RG 84, Lot No. 58 F58, Box No. 2 – India, New Delhi, Embassy, Subject Files 1949, Memorandum to Loy Henderson from Graham Parsons, Subject: Comments on British Memorandum on Southeast Asia, 10 June 1949. 73 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 40. 74 Ibid., 41. 75 Ibid., 54. 76 T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War: Recollections and Reflections (Sahibabad: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), 22. 77 Ibid., 23. McMahon’s account of the American perspective on the meetings is similar; see McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 55–56. 78 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 55. 79 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 335. 80 George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World: Adventures in Diplomacy (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), 47. 81 Cited in McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 41. 82 Cited in ibid., 56. 83 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3984, File 9908-Y-2-40 pt. 2, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 20 October 1949. 84 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 34, File India-Canada Relations 1947–1957, Memorandum from Escott Reid to Jules Léger, L.B. Pearson, A.D.P. Heeney, 20 October 1949. Imports from India had also risen dramatically, but there was a slight deficit in favour of Ottawa. In 1938, the Indians exported $8,181,000 to Canada. By 1948, the figure had risen to $34,706,000. The bulk of these imports were jute fabrics, tea, vegetable oils, and peanuts. 85 LAC, C.D. Howe Papers, MG 27 III B 20, Vol. 175, File 17, Letter from Howe to R.G. Powell, 23 October 1949. 86 Ibid., Montreal Gazette, 24 October 1949, 1. 87 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3984, File 9908-Y-2-40 pt. 2, see Montreal Gazette, 24 October 1949; Edmonton Journal, 22 October 1949; Globe and Mail, 26 October 1949; London Free Press, 25 October 1949. 88 See Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 13, ed. S. Gopal (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Fund, 1992), 398. Note to Vallabhbhai Patel, 24 October 1949, File No. 49-GG/49, President’s Secretariat. 89 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3984, File 9908-Y-2-40 pt. 2, Memorandum for the Prime Minister by Pearson, 26 October 1949. Pearson concluded that Nehru seemed to be genuinely moved by the warmth of his reception in Ottawa. Wrong reported to Ottawa that the minister at the Indian embassy in Washington remarked that Nehru “had encountered a more stable and better balanced outlook in Canada than in the United States during his visit.” See the letter from Wrong to Heeney, 8 November 1949. 90 Ibid. 91 See Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 13, 398. Note to Vallabhbhai Patel, 24 October 1949, File No. 49-GG/49, President’s Secretariat.

258 Notes to pages 45-51

92 Ibid., Letter to V.K. Krishna Menon, 24 October 1949, 410. 93 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 10, File Nehru, J. India – 1949, Letter from Pearson to Nehru, 3 November 1949. 94 Cited in McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 59. 95 See LAC, Escott Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 7, File 15, Colombo Conference Memorandum: What Are the Things which Canada Is Chiefly Interested in at the Colombo Conference?, 30 December 1949. 96 John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson Volume 2, 1949–72 (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 31. Chapter 3: A Helping Hand 1 Douglas LePan, Bright Glass of Memory (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979), 146. 2 Ibid., 155. Some of the issues included the question of recognition of communist China, the drafting of a peace treaty with Japan, the volatile situation in Indochina, and political instability in Burma. 3 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 22, File Commonwealth Foreign Ministers’ Conference – 1950 Colombo Conference Pt. I, Meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers at Colombo 9 January, 1950; Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson Volume II, ed. John Munro and Alex Inglis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 108. 4 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 22, File Commonwealth Foreign Ministers’ Conference – 1950 Colombo Conference Pt. III, Dispatch to DEA from Canadian Delegation to Foreign Ministers’ Conference, Colombo, 17 January 1950. The Second World War led India to become a significant creditor to Britain, and it had accrued substantial sums of British currency from which it wanted to draw. However, the fragile nature of the postwar British economy led to a series of agreements that regulated how India would draw its funds, and these restrictions frustrated the Indians since they relied heavily on these precious reserves during the early years of post-independence economic distress. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, 172. 8 Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1981), 6–7. 9 Pearson, Mike Volume II, 117–18. 10 See LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 22, File Commonwealth Foreign Ministers’ Conference – 1950 Colombo Conference Pt. III, Note of 10 February 1950. 11 LAC, LePan Papers, MG 31 E6, Vol. 7, File 72, Colombo Conference; LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, 147. 12 See Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 14, ed. S. Gopal (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Fund, 1992), 394–95. Note to Chief Minister, 2 February 1950, File No. 25(6)-50-PMS. 13 Pearson, Mike Volume II, 118–19. 14 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 34, File India-Canada Relations 1947–1957, Letter from Pearson to Nehru, 13 April 1950. 15 Ibid., MG 26 N1, Vol. 22, Letter from Reid to Pearson, 13 February 1950. 16 John Hilliker and Donald Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs: Volume II, Coming of Age, 1946–1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), 83. 17 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 34, File India-Canada Relations 1947–1957, Letter from Pearson to St. Laurent, 17 February 1950. 18 Ibid.

Notes to pages 51-58 259

19 Hilliker and Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs Volume II, 83. 20 Ibid. 21 Dennis Merrill, “Indo-American Relations, 1947–50: A Missed Opportunity in Asia,” Journal of Diplomatic History 11, 3 (1987): 224–25. 22 Pearson, Mike Volume II, 109. 23 LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, 199–200. 24 Hilliker and Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs Volume II, 83–84. 25 LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, 205. 26 Pearson, Mike Volume II, 147. 27 LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, 207. 28 See Hilliker and Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs Volume II, 84. 29 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 35, File Korea: Canadian Policy – 1950–1951, Memorandum by Escott Reid, 9 December 1950. 30 See LePan, Bright Glass of Memory, 219–20; LAC, LePan Papers, MG 31 E6, Vol. 2, File 13, Memorandum for Cabinet, 28 December 1950, Subject: Deterioration of International Situation. This document was also submitted as part of the briefing for the Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, January 1951. See LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 23, File Pearson, L.B. Commonwealth – Prime Ministers’ Meeting 1951. 31 LAC, LePan Papers, MG 31 E6, Vol. 2, File 13, Memorandum from Heeney to Pearson, 11 January 1951, Re: Colombo Plan. Heeney conceded that “the Department of Finance may have some very slight grounds for grievance arising from your statement in the House of Commons of February 22 (1950). You did perhaps somewhat anticipate developments when you stated on that occasion, ‘when a further meeting is held in Canberra, probably shortly, to discuss this matter, the Canadian Government will of course be represented.’” 32 Ibid., Memorandum for Pearson by LePan, 17 January 1951. 33 Ibid., Letter from Pearson to Abbott, 17 January 1951. 34 LAC, LePan Papers, MG 31 E6, Vol. 7, File 73, Letter from Abbott to Pearson, 30 January 1951. 35 Ibid. 36 See LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 22, File Commonwealth and Foreign Ministers’ Conference 1950, Colombo Conference Pt. 1. 37 LAC, LePan Papers, MG 31 E6, Vol. 7, File 73, Letter from Abbott to Pearson, 30 January 1951. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., Memorandum to Cabinet: Colombo Plan, 1 February 1951. 40 See LAC, LePan Papers, MG 31 E6, Vol. 2, File 14, Memorandum for Mr. Pearson from LePan, 7 February 1951. 41 See Document 548, Extract from Cabinet Conclusions, 6 February 1951, in Documents on Canadian External Relations [hereafter DCER] Volume 17: 1951, ed. Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1995). 42 Ibid., Document 550, Memorandum from Heeney to Pearson, 12 February 1951. 43 See LAC, RG 2, Vol. 164, File I-13 pt. II, 1951. Canadian churches, Roman Catholic and Protestant alike, approved of the government’s involvement in the Colombo Plan. 44 LAC, LePan Papers, MG 31 E6, Vol. 7, File 73, Statement Made in the House of Commons by L.B. Pearson, 21 February 1951. 45 LAC, LePan Papers, MG 31 E6, Vol. 2, File 14, Memorandum for Pearson from LePan, 8 March 1951. 46 Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 16, ed. S. Gopal (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Fund, 1994), 73–74. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, 11 April 1951, JN Collection.

260 Notes to pages 58-62

47 Heeney noted that there could be considerable difficulty in explaining to cabinet “why the Indians did not come forward to take No. 5 wheat when it was available. As you know, our grain experts do not regard No. 5 wheat as technically unmillable for Indian purposes as has been alleged in some quarters and as implied by Banerjee’s public statement at the time No. 5 wheat was declined. Nevertheless, in view of its rejection I think we must conclude that in effect, No. 5 wheat is unsuitable for India’s use. It may even be that they feel ‘too proud to eat’ if it means accepting grain which Western people are accustomed to feeding to their animals.” See LAC, LePan Papers, MG 31 E6, Vol. 7, File 74, Memorandum for Pearson by Heeney, “Proposal for New Offer of Wheat to India,” 4 May 1951. 48 LAC, LePan Papers, MG 31 E6, Vol. 2, File 14, Memorandum for Pearson from LePan, 12 May 1951. 49 LAC, LaPan Papers, MG 31 E6, Vol. 7, File 74, Memorandum for Pearson by Heeney, “Proposal for New Offer of Wheat to India,” 4 May 1951. 50 LAC, RG 2, Vol. 2648, Cabinet Conclusions, 24 May 1951. 51 LAC, RG 2, Vol. 161, File G-70-1-S Grain 1951 Wheat – Shipment of Wheat to India, Record of Cabinet Decision No. 112, Meeting, 12 September 1951. 52 There are few Indian sources on this subject. C.D. Deshmukh, the Indian finance minister at the time, speaks warmly in his memoirs of Canada and Canadians. But he did not provide any perspective on what Canadian aid meant or contributed to India or bilateral ties. See C.D. Deshmukh, The Course of My Life (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1974), 212, 312. 53 See LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 7, File 15, Memorandum from Reid to Soward, 9 August 1951. Chapter 4: In Close and Friendly Collaboration 1 See L.B. Pearson, Memorandum to the Cabinet, 11 September 1950, in DCER Volume 16: 1950, ed. Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1994), 105–09. 2 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography Volume II 1947–1956 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 101. 3 See Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 83–84. 4 Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru Volume II, 104. 5 See John Lewis Gaddis, We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), and the Cold War International History Project, “Documents on the Korean War, 1950–1953,” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/50 /korean-war-1950-1953. 6 Cited in Greg Donaghy, “Pacific Diplomacy: Canadian Statecraft and the Korean War, 1950–1953,” in Canada and Korea: Perspectives 2000, ed. Rick Guisso and Yong-Sik Yoo (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and Centre for Korean Studies, 2002), 86. See also Ottawa to New York, Telegram 67, from Heeney to Pearson, 4 October 1950, in DCER Volume 16: 1950, 170–73. 7 See Donaghy, “Pacific Diplomacy,” 86. 8 See Washington to Ottawa, Telegrams WA-2398, WA-2400, WA-2402, Wrong to Pearson, 5 October 1950, in DCER Volume 16: 1950, 174–77. 9 LAC, RG 2, Vol. 164, File India I-13, 1950–51, Subject: India, Memorandum from Heeney to St. Laurent Re: UN Assembly, 4 October 1950. See also Donaghy, “Pacific Diplomacy,” 86; Geoffrey Pearson, Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), 72–73.

Notes to pages 62-66 261

10 See LAC, RG 2, Vol. 164, File India I-13, 1950–51, Dispatch No. 144, Reid to Pearson, 18 October 1950. 11 For discussion on Ottawa’s “diplomacy of constraint” toward Washington, see Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973); John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson Volume II 1949–1972 (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Publishers, 1992); Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949–1954 (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995). See also Robert Prince, “The Limits of Constraint: Canadian-American Relations and the Korean War, 1950–51,” Journal of Canadian Studies 27, 4 (1992–93): 129–52. 12 Pearson believed that the Indians had made no effort to develop their vague concerns into a formal approach with “concrete terms.” See New York to Ottawa, Dispatch 53, Pearson to Heeney, 9 October 1950, in DCER Volume 16: 1950, 182–83. See also Donaghy, “Pacific Diplomacy,” 86–87. 13 New York to Ottawa, Telegram 92, Pearson to Heeney, 9 October 1950, in DCER Volume 16: 1950, 179–82. 14 NARA, RG 59, State Department Files CDF 611. 91 (1950–54), Box 2857, Memcon Conversation between Madame Pandit, Ambassador of India, and George McGhee, 26 October 1950. 15 Ibid., Letter from McGhee to Acheson, Subject: Nehru’s Attitude toward the United States and Vice Versa, 3 November 1950. 16 Ottawa to New Delhi, Telegram 165, Pearson to Nehru, 30 November 1950, in DCER Volume 16: 1950, 245–46. 17 New Delhi to Ottawa, Telegram 278, Nehru to Pearson, 2 December 1950, in DCER Volume 16: 1950, 246–47. 18 Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru Volume II, 109. 19 New Delhi to Ottawa, Telegram 278, Nehru to Pearson, 2 December 1950, in DCER Volume 16: 1950, 246–47. 20 The Americans learned of Pearson’s overture from the American ambassador in New Delhi. Loy Henderson met with Bajpai on 2 December: “Bajpai told me in utmost confidence (and I request that this statement be rptd to no other govt and be guarded carefully) that GOI had just turned down suggestion from Pearson of Canada that it join in appeal for immediate cease fire. It feared that such action on its part would be misunderstood. He asked me not repeat this to my Govt but I feel I must violate this injunction.” NARA, RG 84, Lot No. 58 F 58, Box No. 1, File India – New Delhi Embassy, Subject Files 1944–50, Telegram No. 1381, Henderson to Secretary of State, 2 December 1950. 21 Geoffrey Pearson suggests that “St. Laurent noted that Canada’s relations with India were a factor in favour of acceptance.” See Pearson, Seize the Day, 76. 22 Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson Volume II 1948–1957, ed. John Munro and Alex Inglis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 166. 23 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 23, File Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting 1951, Minutes of Meetings and Memoranda, 4 January 1951. 24 See New York to Ottawa, Telegram 34, 7 January 1951, in DCER Volume 17: 1951, http:// epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international.gc.ca /department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=5440; see New York to Ottawa Telegram 46, 9 January 1951, in DCER Volume 17:1951, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca /100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international.gc.ca/department/history -histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=5442.

262 Notes to pages 66-71

25 See Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 15, ed. Sarvepalli Gopal (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Fund, 1997), 468–69. Nehru to Clement Attlee, 10 January 1951. 26 The phrase “existing international obligations” referred specifically to the 1943 Cairo Declaration, which identified China as one of the major powers and stipulated that Formosa (Taiwan) was the sovereign territory of China. The problem, however, was that, following its victory in the civil war, the People’s Republic of China claimed Taiwan, while the nationalist Chinese who fled to Taiwan following the civil war argued that they represented China. 27 Pearson, Mike Volume II, 293–94. 28 Ibid., 295. 29 Washington to New York, Telegram WA-223, Wrong to Pearson, 17 January 1951, in DCER Volume 17, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www .international.gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=5453. 30 Ibid. 31 Ottawa to New York, Telegram 78, Heeney to Pearson, 19 January 1951, in DCER Volume 17: 1951, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www .international.gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=5457. 32 Ibid. 33 See Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 15, 481–82. Cable to K.M. Pannikar, 19 January 1951. 34 Ibid., 483. Cable to B.N. Rau, 20 January 1951. 35 New York to Ottawa, Telegram 92, Pearson to Heeney, 22 January 1951, in DCER Volume 17: 1951, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www .international.gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=5467. 36 See Subimal Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office (Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1977), 84. 37 See Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 15, 498. Cable to K.M. Pannikar, 28 January 1951. 38 Ibid., Nehru to Mountbatten, 28 January 1951. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. On 31 January 1951, Nehru wrote to Krishna Menon in London informing him that the aggressor resolution had passed at the United Nations: “All our efforts to induce the U.K., Canada, etc. failed in the end before the big stick of the U.S.A. Well we have the satisfaction of having done our job. The future will have to look after itself.” 41 Ottawa to New Delhi, Telegram 26, St. Laurent to Nehru, 3 February 1951, in DCER Volume 17: 1951, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www. international.gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=5488. 42 Ibid. 43 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6185, File 1617-40 pt. 1, Chipman to the SSEA, Dispatch No. 179, 7 February 1951. 44 See Gopal, Jawaharlal NehruVolume II, 141; Judith Brown, Nehru: A Political Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 248. 45 Brown, Nehru, 248. 46 Gopal, Jawaharlal NehruVolume II, 141. 47 See T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War: Recollections and Reflections (Sahibabad: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), 53. 48 Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 19, ed. S. Gopal (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Fund, 1996), 630–32. Note to B.G. Kher, 9 September 1952, JN Collection. 49 LAC, Pearson Diaries, MG 26 N8, Vols. 1 and 2, 27 October 1952. 50 Ibid.

Notes to pages 71-77 263

51 Ibid., 7 November 1952. 52 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 700. Acheson candidly added that “Menon’s attempt was to transfer the writing of the armistice terms from Panmunjon and the United Nations Command to New York and the General Assembly under the leadership of India and the Arab-Asia bloc with British and Canadian support. We were determined to prevent this” (701). 53 LAC, Pearson Diaries, MG 26 N8, Vols. 1 and 2, 7 November 1952. 54 Ibid., 8 November 1952. 55 Ibid., 9 November 1952. 56 Ottawa to New Delhi, Telegram 281, Pearson to SSEA, 14 November 1952, in DCER Volume 18: 1952, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www. international.gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=3654. 57 LAC, Pearson Diaries, MG 26 N8, Vols. 1 and 2, 13 November 1952. 58 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 35, File Korea Discussions at 7th UN General Assembly 1952–1953, New York to Ottawa, Telegram 291, Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly, to the SSEA, 17 November 1952. 59 LAC, Pearson Diaries, MG 26 N8, Vols. 1 and 2, 19 November 1952. 60 See Wilgress to Pearson, Telegram 165, 22 November 1952, in DCER Volume 18: 1952, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international .gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefId=4375. 61 LAC, Pearson Diaries, MG 26 N8, Vols. 1 and 2, 22 November 1952. 62 Ibid., 25 November 1952. 63 See Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 20, ed. S. Gopal (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Fund, 1997), 441. Cable to N. Raghavan, 28 November 1952, JN Collection. 64 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 35, File Korea: Discussions at 7th UN General Assembly 1952–1953, Ottawa to New Delhi, Pearson to Reid, 27 November 1952. 65 See Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 20, ed. S. Gopal, 441. Cable to N. Raghavan, 28 November 1952, JN Collection. 66 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N8, Vols. 1 and 2, 3 December 1952. 67 Ibid., 26 November 1952. See also LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 35, File Korea: Discussions at 7th UN General Assembly 1952–1953, Ottawa to New York, Dispatch No. 385, Pearson to the SSEA, 27 November 1952. 68 Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 20, 443. Note to Escott Reid from Nehru, 28 November 1952, JN Collection. 69 In a cable to the Indian ambassador in Moscow, K.P.S. Menon, Nehru noted that “tremendous pressure has been brought on US by UK and Canada and many other countries allied to them.” See Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 20, 444. Cable to K.P.S. Menon, 28 November 1952, JN Collection. 70 NMML, V.L. Pandit Papers, 2nd Installment, Subject File No. 4, Interview with Mr. Lester Pearson, 2 February 1953. 71 Ibid., Report of Meeting with General Bedell Smith, 23 March 1954, 3 April 1953. 72 Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1981), 94–95. Chapter 5: A Special Relationship? 1 Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1981), 26. For Reid’s analysis of how the special relationship developed, see Chapter 2. An excellent study of Reid’s time in India is Greg Donaghy’s “‘The Most Important Place in the World’: Escott Reid in India, 1952–57,” inEscott Reid: Diplomat and Scholar, ed. Greg Donaghy and

264 Notes to pages 78-84

Stéphane Roussel (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 67–84. 2 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 37, File Wilgress, L. Dana (3) 1952–1967, Letter from Reid to Dana Wilgress, 8 April 1952. 3 Ibid. 4 LAC, RG 25 Vol. 3660, File 4900-E-40 pt. 1, Letter of Instruction from Dana Wilgress to Escott Reid, 12 November 1952. 5 For studies on Anglo-American approaches to India, see Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American Relationship, 1947–56 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993); Ayesha Jalal, “Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East Defence in the Cold War, 1947–1955,” International History Review 11, 3 (1989): 409–33. 6 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3660, File 4900-E-40 pt. 1, Letter of Instruction from Dana Wilgress to Reid, 12 November 1952. 7 See Reid, Envoy to Nehru; Escott Reid, Radical Mandarin: The Memoirs of Escott Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989). 8 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 7, File 17, Reid to SSEA, Dispatch No. 277, 12 December 1952. 9 Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 157. 10 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography Volume II 1947–1956 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 189. 11 Reid, Radical Mandarin, 273. 12 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 7, File 18, Letter from Reid to Dana Wilgress, 20 July 1953. 13 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6651, File 11563-5-6-40 pt. 1, Letter from Reid to St. Laurent, 24 August 1953. 14 Ibid., Nehru to St. Laurent, 15 September 1953. 15 Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 100. 16 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 7, File 18, Reid to Pearson, Dispatch No. 318, 28 December 1953. 17 Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 11, 181. 18 Ibid., 49. 19 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8247, File 9193-40 pt. 6.1, Reid to Pearson, Dispatch No. 1260, 23 December 1953, Subject: “Whither India”: A Memorandum by Mr. Graham McInnes. 20 Ibid., Heeney to Pearson, 29 January 1954. 21 See Robert J. McMahon, “U.S. Policy toward South Asia and Tibet during the Early Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 8, 3 (2006): 135–36. 22 For Reid’s appraisal of American military support to Pakistan, see Envoy to Nehru, 99–116. 23 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8247, File 9193-40 pt. 6.1, Heeney to Pearson, 29 January 1954. 24 Ibid. 25 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 10, File 34, Personal Correspondence with L.B. Pearson, Letter from Pearson to Reid, 6 February 1954. 26 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6651, File 11563-5-6-40 pt. 1.2, India, 20 January 1954. 27 See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6652, File 11563-5-6-40 pt. 2, Canada-India Immigration Agreement, 9 February 1954. 28 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6652, File 11563-5-6-40 pt 2.2, Daily Indiagram: Canadian Prime Minister Warmly Welcomed in New Delhi, 22 February 1954. 29 Charles Ritchie, Diplomatic Passport: More Undiplomatic Diaries, 1946–1962 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1981), 63.

Notes to pages 85-89 265

30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., 64. 32 After one of the first awkward talks had concluded between the two leaders, one Canadian diplomat lamented that “these two men haven’t got anything to say to each other at all.” See Dale Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967), 364. 33 Ritchie thought that the speech was not well received. See Ritchie, Diplomatic Passport, 67. 34 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6652, File 11563-5-6-40, pt 2.2, An Address by the Prime Minister of Canada to the Members of the Parliament of India, 23 February 1954. 35 Ibid. 36 Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 25, ed. Ravinder Kumar and H.Y. Sharada Prasad (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Fund, 1999), 499–500. Letter to C. Rajagopalachari, 25 February 1954, JN Collection. 37 Ibid. 38 Ritchie, Diplomatic Passport, 67. 39 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6652, File 11563-5-6-40 pt. 2.2, Bruce Williams, Canadian High Commission, New Delhi, to SSEA, Dispatch No. 87, Subject: Prime Minister’s Visit to India, 26 February 1954. See also Times of India, “Canadian Premier’s Statement: Support for Cease-Fire Move in Indochina,” 25 February 1954. 40 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6652, File 11563-5-6-40 pt 3.1, Reid to Pearson, Dispatch No. 95, Subject: Prime Minister’s Visit, 3 March 1954. 41 Ibid., Reid to Pearson, Dispatch No. 96, Subject: Conversations between the Two Prime Ministers, 3 March 1954. 42 Ibid., Reid to Pearson, Dispatch No. 95, Subject: Prime Minister’s Visit, 3 March 1954, and Personal Letter from Reid to Pearson, 8 March 1954. 43 Ibid., Personal Letter from Reid to Pearson, 8 March 1954. 44 Ibid. 45 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 10, File 34, Letter from Pearson to Reid, 12 April 1954. 46 Ibid., Confidential Memorandum from Reid to Bruce Williams, Subject: Prime Minister’s Visit to India, 26 April 1954. 47 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6652, File 11563-5-6-40 pt 3.2, Memorandum from Charles Ritchie to John Holmes, 1 April 1954. 48 Pearson confided to Reid that “I kept thinking while I was there what a loss it was not to have India or Pakistan, or both, at the conference. But then, the Americans are almost pathological on this subject, at least in so far as India is concerned; due in part to their feeling that India and Krishna Menon are the same thing at international conferences.” See LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26, Vol. 12, File Escott Reid, Pearson to Reid, 2 June 1954. 49 See LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 34, Pearson to St. Laurent, 6 May 1954; LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4625, File 50052-40 pt. 31, SSEA to Heeney, 22 July 1954. 50 Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 69. 51 Ibid. 52 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 8, File 205.1 pt. 5, Reid to Pearson, Dispatch No. 243, 23 July 1954. 53 Ibid., Reid to Pearson, Dispatch No. 836, 2 August 1954. 54 NMML, V.L. Pandit Papers, 1st Installment, Subject File No. 61, Nehru to Vijayalakshmi Pandit, 3 April 1955. 55 See Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 26, 531–32. Note to M.F. Rauf, 29 July 1954, JN Collection (extracts).

266 Notes to pages 90-93

56 Ibid., 531. 57 John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson Volume 2, 1949–72 (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 94. 58 Robert Bothwell, “The Further Shore: Canada and Vietnam,” International Journal 56, 1 (2000–01): 93. See also LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4629, File 50052-A-40 pt.1, Letter from Pearson to Sherwood Lett, 22 August 1954. 59 See Mark Atwood Lawrence, “The Limits of Peacemaking: India and the Vietnam War, 1962–67.” India Review 1, 1 (2002): 39–72. 60 NMML, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File No. 114, Diary Correspondence 8–12 August 1954. 61 Subimal Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office (Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1977), 66. 62 NMML, M.O. Mathai Papers, Subject File No. 35, Letter No. 1465-PMH/54, Jawaharlal Nehru to Krishna Menon, 6 November 1954. 63 See LAC, St. Laurent Papers, MG 26 L, Vol. 185, File India I-17 1954–1955, Letter from Nehru to St. Laurent, 29 January 1955. 64 NMML, V.L. Pandit Papers, 1st Installment, Subject File No. 61, Jawaharlal Nehru to V.L. Pandit, 8 February 1958. 65 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 34, File Indochina 1954–1957, Memorandum from Pearson to the Undersecretary, 10 November 1954. 66 Ibid. 67 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8230, File 9126-40 pt. 6.2, Reid to Pearson, Dispatch No. 1377, Subject: How Indian-United States Relations Might Be Improved, 1 December 1954. 68 Reid and his American colleagues in New Delhi established an informal channel to exchange reports that might interest the other party. See NARA, RG 59, Miscellaneous Lot Files No. 57 D 373, Box 4, Memo File 1954, Jernagan to Raynor, 27 October 1954. 69 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8230, File 9126-40 pt. 6.2, Reid to Pearson, Dispatch No. 1377, 1 December 1954. 70 Ibid., Pearson to Reid, 23 December 1954. 71 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 222–23. 72 NMML, V.L. Pandit Papers, 1st Installment, Subject File No. 61, Jawaharlal Nehru to V.L. Pandit, 14 April 1955. 73 See Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 27, ed. Ravinder Kumar and H.Y. Sharada Prasad (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Fund, 2000), 32–34. Minutes of Talks with Mao Tse-tung, Beijing, 23 October 1954, JN Collection (extracts). 74 Ibid., 38. 75 English, The Worldly Years, 92–95, 120–21. 76 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8230, File 9126-40 pt 6.2, Letter from D.M. Cornett to Escott Reid, 10 January 1955. 77 For further details on Anglo-Canadian cooperation in restraining Dulles, see English, The Worldly Years, 120–21. See LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 23, File Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference Diary 1955. 78 NARA, RG 59, Lot File No. 57 D 373, Box 6, File 513.3 Laos 1955, Letter from Tom Eliot Weil (American Embassy, New Delhi) to William L.S. Williams (South Asian Affairs State Department), 24 February 1954. 79 McMahon, “U.S. Policy toward South Asia and Tibet during the Early Cold War,” 139. 80 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7127, File 9126-40 pt. 7.1, Confidential Brief from Commonwealth Division, “Some Measures for Improving Relations between India and the West,” 15 April 1955. See also Reid to SSEA, Dispatch No. 338, 28 March 1955, Re: My Dispatch No. 1318 of 18 November 1954.

Notes to pages 94-98 267

81 Ibid. 82 NMML, V.L. Pandit Papers, 1st Installment, Subject File No. 61, Nehru to Vijayalakshmi, 3 April 1955. 83 UBC Archives, Herbert Norman Papers, Letter from Herbert Norman to His Brother, 10 September 1954. 84 Arthur Menzies, interview with author, 10 September 2006. 85 LAC, Marcel Cadieux Papers, MG 31 E 31, Vol. 12, File 8, Six Mois a Hanoi, 68–69. 86 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7127, File 9126-40 pt. 8.1, Note to File, DEA Memorandum from Cadieux, 29 June 1955, Re: Mr. Chapdelaine’s Memorandum of 16 June, Subject: Relations between India and the West. Mr. Reid’s Dispatch No. 338 of 28 March 1955. 87 Ibid. 88 Arthur Menzies, interview by Ryan Touhey, 10 September 2006. 89 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7127, File 9126-40 pt. 8.1, Note to File, DEA Memorandum from Cadieux, 29 June 1955, Re: Mr. Chapdelaine’s Memorandum of 16 June, Subject: Relations between India and the West. Mr Reid’s Dispatch No. 338 of 28 March 1955. 90 Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 83. 91 Ibid. The Indians were aware of the increasing antipathy in the Canadian media toward the ICSC and India. Sir Raghavan Pillai, the secretary-general of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, discussed with Canadian diplomat Bruce Williams a scathing Globe and Mail editorial and an editorial cartoon in the Montreal Gazette, both on 5 May: “Sir Raghavan was, I think, a little upset by the severity of the criticism of India in the Globe and Mail. It may, however, be salutary for the Indians to learn that one part of the Canadian press at least is not fully satisfied with India’s role in Indochina.” See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6185, File 1617-40 pt 1.2, Dispatch No. 584, Williams to USSEA, 12 May 1955. 92 Arthur Menzies, interview by Ryan Touhey, 10 September 2006. Menzies had a good deal of respect for Reid’s abilities. 93 This view was circulated to the heads of posts abroad by the SSEA, Document No. A 35/55, Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting − 1955, 8 March 1955, in DCER Volume 21: 1955, ed. Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 2001). 94 National Archives of India [hereafter NAI], Indian Ministry of External Affairs, File No. F.2-2/54, Memorandum from M.A. Rauf, High Commissioner for India, to Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, M.E.A., 20 July 1955, Subject: Annual Political Report, 1954. 95 See Memorandum from Léger to Pearson, Subject: Atomic Energy and the Colombo Plan, 21 March 1955, in DCER Volume 21: 1955, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301 /faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international.gc.ca/department/history-histoire /dcer/details-en.asp@intRefId=1153. 96 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 9551, File 8-A-India-2-1970/1, Briefing Book for Canada-India Talks on Nuclear Safeguards, March 1976. See Memorandum to Cabinet, 29 March 1955, Subject: Atomic Energy and Canada’s Colombo Plan Contribution. 97 Reid to SSEA, Dispatch No. 218, 1 April 1955, Subject: Atomic Research Reactor, in DCER Volume 21: 1955, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www .international.gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=348. 98 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 8, File 205.1 pt. 4, Reid to Pearson, Dispatch No. 204, 29 March 1955, Subject: Atomic Reactor. 99 Memorandum from Pearson to St. Laurent, 14 June 1955, in DCER Volume 21: 1955, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international .gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=343. 100 See George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 30.

268 Notes to pages 99-104

101 Nehru to St. Laurent, 31 July 1955, in DCER Volume 21: 1955, http://epe.lac-bac.gc .ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international.gc.ca/department /history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=347. 102 Howe to St. Laurent, 4 August 1955, in DCER Volume 21: 1955, http://epe.lac-bac .gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international.gc.ca/department /history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=1325. 103 Nehru to St. Laurent, 2 September 1955, in DCER Volume 21: 1955, http://epe.lac-bac .gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international.gc.ca/department /history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=1328. See also Memorandum from R.B. Bryce, Secretary to Cabinet, to P.M. Dwyer, Office of the Privy Council, 24 August 1955, Subject: Discussion on Indian Reactor and Related Matters, in DCER Volume 21: 1955, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international .gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=1326. 104 There were three pillars of the agency’s work: nuclear verification and security, safety, and technology transfer. 105 Memorandum from R.B. Bryce to P.M. Dwyer, 30 August 1955, in DCER Volume 21: 1955, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international .gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=1327. 106 SSEA to Reid, Telegram E-662, 7 October 1955, in DCER Volume 21: 1955, http://epe .lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international.gc.ca /department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=1330. 107 The Indians argued that the atomic powers were trying to restrict non-white and developing countries from developing their own independent nuclear programs. 108 Léger to Reid, Telegram DL-721, 27 October 1955, in DCER Volume 21: 1955, http:// epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international.gc.ca /department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=1340. See also Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 29. 109 LAC, Pearson Diaries, MG 26 N8, Vols. 1 and 2, File 6, 25 October 1955. 110 Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 87. 111 LAC, Pearson Diaries, MG 26 N8, Vols. 1 and 2, File 6, 3 November 1955. 112 English, The Worldly Years, 98–105. 113 See LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 35, File Lester B. Pearson 1948–1973, 25 October–6 November 1955. 114 Ibid. 115 Reid to SSEA, Telegram 771, 9 November 1955, in DCER Volume 21: 1955, http://epe .lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international.gc.ca /department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=1342. 116 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 21, File Family Correspondence 1955, Letter to Pat, Morna, and Tim Reid, 13 November 1955. 117 Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 92–93. 118 Ibid., 93. Also see LAC, Pearson Diaries, MG 26 N8, Vols. 1 and 2, File 6. 119 Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 94–95. 120 See Ryan Touhey, “Dealing in Black and White: The Diefenbaker Government and the Cold War in South Asia 1957–1963,” Canadian Historical Review 92, 3 (2011): 429–54. 121 For further details of the agreement, see Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Cabinet, 5 December 1955, in DCER Volume 21: 1955, http://epe.lac-bac .gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international.gc.ca/department /history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=1338.

Notes to pages 104-10 269

122 Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 134. This was topped by a turnout of 2 million people in Calcutta who mobbed the Soviet visitors. 123 Judith Brown, Nehru: A Political Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 250. 124 See McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 216–17. 125 Ibid. 126 Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 138–40. 127 See Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office, 240. 128 Reid had initially suggested a line of credit in Dispatch No. 333 of 2 March 1955. See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7127, File 9126-40 pt. 7.1. 129 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 8, File 4, Letters from Reid to Ritchie and Pearson, 13 December 1955. 130 See LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 12, File Escott Reid, Léger to Pearson, 11 January 1956. 131 See LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 8 pt. 5, Reid to SSEA, Dispatch No. 32, 11 January 1956. 132 Ibid. 133 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 224–25. 134 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 12, File Escott Reid. See the letters from Pearson to Reid, 17 July 1956, and Reid to Pearson, 5 September 1956. 135 Ibid., Pearson to Reid, 17 July 1956. 136 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 8, File 205.1 pt. 7, Reid to SSEA, Dispatch No. 353, 1 June 1956. 137 Ibid., pt. 8, Reid to SSEA, Dispatch No. 526, 11 September 1956. 138 Brown, Nehru, 262; Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office, 161. 139 Brown, Nehru, 263. 140 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 8, File 205.1 pt. 8, Reid to Holmes, 10 October 1956. 141 Ibid., Pearson to Reid, Dispatch M-604, 31 October 1956. 142 NAI, File No. F.2-2(11)/56, Political Report for November 1956, Rauf to Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 3 January 1957. 143 Ibid., Nehru to Eden, 31 October 1956. 144 Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 152. 145 See Brown, Nehru, 264; Benjamin Zachariah, Nehru (London: Routledge, 2004), 222–23. 146 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 8, File 205.1 pt. 8, St. Laurent to Nehru, 7 November 1956. 147 Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 165–66. 148 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 8, File 205.1 pt. 8, Pearson to Reid, 9 November 1956, Subject: Hungary. 149 Ibid., Vol. 35, File Lester B. Pearson 1 of 2 (6) 1948–1973, Included in a Letter from Reid to Pearson, 19 November 1956. 150 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, Vol. 13, File Robertson, N.A. 1946–1957, Robertson to Pearson, 13 November 1956. 151 Brown, Nehru, 265; Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru Volume II, 295–96. 152 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 8, File 205.1 pt. 7, Dispatch No. G635, SSEA to Reid, 16 November 1956. 153 Ibid., Vol. 35, File Lester B. Pearson 1 of 2 (6) 1948–1973, Included in a Letter from Reid to Pearson, 19 November 1956. 154 Brown, Nehru, 264. 155 Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 10.

270 Notes to pages 110-25

156 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6185, File 1617-40 pt. 1.2, Reid to SSEA, Dispatch No. 1679, 24 November 1956. See also Dispatch No. 1770, 5 December 1956. 157 Ibid., Reid to SSEA, Dispatch No. 793, 17 November 1956. 158 Ibid., Reid to DEA, Dispatch No. 807, 20 November 1956. 159 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6091, File 50349-1-40 pt 1.1, Memorandum by E.H. Gilmour to United Nations Division (Mr. Campbell, Miss Ireland, Miss Osbourne, Mr. Houde), 29 November 1956. 160 Ibid., Campbell to Gilmour, 29 November 1956. See J.H. Cleveland to Commonwealth Division, 30 November 1956. 161 Ibid., Nutting to Commonwealth Division, 29 November 1956. 162 Ibid., handwritten note addressed to Gilmour, Subject: Mr. Nehru’s Visit, n.d. (it is unclear who the author was, but it appears to have been from Houde in the United Nations Division). 163 Ibid., J.H. Cleveland (American Division) to the Commonwealth Division, 30 November 1956. 164 Ibid., R.L. Rogers to Commonwealth Division, 28 November 1956. 165 Ibid., Marcel Cadieux to Commonwealth Division, 3 December 1956. 166 Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 258–60. 167 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6092, File 50349-1-40 pt. 2, The Hindu, 23 December 1956, front page. 168 Ibid., DEA to New Delhi, Dispatch KK-184, 27 December 1956. 169 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 8, File 205.1 pt. 7, Dispatch 37/423, External Affairs to New Delhi, 22 December 1956. 170 Ibid., Dispatch 41/423, External Affairs to New Delhi, 24 December 1956. 171 NAI, File No. F.2-2(12)/56, Political Report for December 1956, Rauf to Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 15 January 1957. Rauf described Nehru’s visit in the following terms: “Except one or two very pro-British papers, the reception was satisfactory. As is usual on this continent, there had been created a great deal of prejudice which was cleared up. The Canadians expressed some surprise that one whom they had come to regard as a supporter of communists and one who had been built-up as anti-western was really nothing of the sort. The people of Canada have been greatly impressed by the genial manner of the Prime Minister, by his obvious sincerity and by his intellectual eminence. He was kindly and patient. His good relations with President Eisenhower and Prime Minister St. Laurent have finally convinced the north Americans [sic] that he is not an enemy and that his views as one of the greatest statesmen of the world must be listened to with respect.” 172 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6092, File 503491-40 pt. 2, Reid to SSEA, 16 January 1957. The Times of India editorial is from 25 December 1956. 173 LAC, Paul Martin Papers, MG 32 B 12, Vol. 23, File 1, Asian Tour – diary to L.B. Pearson, 1956–1957, 6 January 1957. 174 LAC, Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46, Vol. 10, File 34, Pearson to Reid, 8 March 1957. The Americans shared Pearson’s assessment of Menon. 175 LAC, St. Laurent Papers, MG 26 L, Vol. 185, File I-17-2 pt. 1, Memorandum from Léger to St. Laurent, 26 December 1956. 176 Ibid., Vol. 35, File Ronning, Chester, Letter from Ronning to Reid, 26 February 1957. Chapter 6: Friendly but Not Close 1 John Hilliker and Donald Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs: Volume II, Coming of Age, 1946–1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), 137.

Notes to pages 125-32 271

2 Ibid. Hilliker and Barry suggest that Diefenbaker “was ill at ease with the leaders of countries whose ideological position was not always easy to identify.” 3 Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker (Toronto: Macfarlane, Walter and Ross, 1995), 11–13. 4 Ibid., 173. 5 See Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 10; Smith, Rogue Tory, 247. 6 Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 250. 7 See Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume 38, ed. Mushirul Hasan (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Fund, 2007), 787. Nehru to Chief Minister, 12 June 1957. 8 Ibid., 634–35. Nehru to T.T. Krishnamachari, 4 July 1957. 9 Smith, Rogue Tory, 251. 10 NAI, File No. F.2-2(6)/57, Rauf to Ministry of Indian External Affairs, Subject: Political Report for the Month of June, 15 July 1957. 11 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6741, File 1617-E-40 pt. 1, Ronning to SSEA, Dispatch No. 731, 26 June 1957. 12 Brian Evans, “Ronning and Recognition: Years of Frustration,” in Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People’s Republic of China 1949–1970, ed. Paul M. Evans and Michael Frolic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 149. 13 Ibid., 150. 14 See Chester Ronning, A Memoir of China in Revolution: From the Boxer Rebellion to the People’s Republic (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974); Brian Evans, The Remarkable Chester Ronning: Proud Son of China (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2013). 15 Evans, “Ronning and Recognition,” 154. 16 See Ryan Touhey, “Dealing in Black and White: The Diefenbaker Government and the Cold War in South Asia 1957–1963,” Canadian Historical Review 92, 3 (2011): 429–54. 17 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7128, File 9126-40 pt. 10.1, Draft Report on Indian Foreign Policy by Glazebrook, 16 October 1957. 18 Ibid., Memorandum from Glazebrook to Holmes, 17 October 1957. 19 Ibid., Memorandum from B.M. Williams to Glazebrook, 22 November 1957. 20 Ibid., Ronning to USSEA, Dispatch No. 1255, 12 November 1957. 21 Ibid., Memorandum from Glazebrook to Holmes, 10 December 1957. 22 LAC, Robinson Papers, MG 31 E 83, Vol. 1, File 1-16, File Preparations for Diefenbaker Tour, “Speeches and Briefing Material.” 23 Ibid., Vol. 1, File 1-20, Letter from Robinson to T.W.L. MacDermot, 14 October 1958. 24 Ibid. See Smith, Rogue Tory, 303. 25 Smith, Rogue Tory, 303. 26 Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 71. 27 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6790, File 1617-40 pt. 2.2, Briefing Notes on India and Its Relations with Canada, 26 June 1958. 28 LAC, Robinson Papers, MG 31 E 83, Vol. 1, File 1-21, Letter from Robinson to Glazebrook, Peshawar, 17 November 1958. 29 See Touhey, “Dealing in Black and White,” 450–51. 30 Diefenbaker Centre Archives, JGDP XIV/D/25, Memoirs World Tour 1958, Vol. 10, Record of Prime Minister’s Conversation with Mr. Nehru, New Delhi, 19 November 1958. (Note: researchers can examine the same record in the Basil Robinson Papers, LAC, MG 31 E 83, Vol. 1, File 1-21.) 31 See Touhey, “Dealing in Black and White,” 444.

272 Notes to pages 132-38

32 Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 75. 33 Diefenbaker Centre Archives, JGDP XIV/D/25, Memoirs World Tour 1958, Vol. 10, Record of Prime Minister’s Conversation with Mr. Nehru, New Delhi, 19 November 1958. 34 See LAC, Robinson Papers, MG 31 E 83, Vol. 1, File 1-21, Letter from Robinson to Moran, 22 November 1958. 35 Ibid., Robinson to Glazebrook, 22 November 1958. 36 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7826, File 12687-F-40 pt. 1, Memorandum from Stanfield to Robinson, 2 October 1958. 37 LAC, Robinson Papers, MG 31 E 83, Vol. 1, File 1-21, Robinson to Glazebrook, 22 November 1958. 38 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7826, File 12687-F-40 pt. 1.3, Ronning to SSEA, Dispatch No. 1010, 28 November 1958. 39 Ibid. The paper was the Tribune. 40 John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker; The Years of Achievement 1956–1962 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), 106. 41 Earl Drake, interview with Ryan Touhey, 20 August 2009. Also see Earl Drake, A StubbleJumper in Striped Pants: Memoirs of a Prairie Diplomat (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). 42 NARA, RG 59, State Department Files, Box No. 2482, CDF 611.42, Wigglesworth to Secretary of State, Dispatch No. G-150, 28 December 1958. 43 See LAC, Robinson Papers, MG 31 E 83, Vol. 1, File 1-21, Ronning to DEA, Dispatch No. 658, 25 November 1958. Ronning’s appraisal can be found in the Diefenbaker Centre Archives, JGDP XIV/D/25, Memoirs World Tour 1958, Vol. 10, Ronning to SSEA, Dispatch No. 1014, 29 November 1958. See also Ronning to USSEA, Dispatch No. 142, 4 December 1958, for a detailed account of Diefenbaker’s trip. 44 Ibid., Vol. 2, File 7, Robinson to Reid, 7 January 1959. 45 Ibid.; Arthur Menzies, interview with Ryan Touhey, 10 September 2006. 46 LAC, Robinson Papers, MG 31 E 83, Vol. 27, File 13, Oral History Interview of Allan McGill. 47 Basil Robinson, interview with Ryan Touhey, 6 September 2006. 48 Arthur Menzies, interview with Ryan Touhey, 10 September 2006. 49 See Touhey, “Dealing in Black and White,” 437–38. 50 Ramachandra Guha, India after Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 180–81, 306–13. See also Judith Brown, Nehru: A Political Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), Chapter 16. 51 Brown, Nehru, 300. 52 Ibid., 301. 53 See Guha, India after Gandhi, 212–14; Zachariah, Nehru, 192–93. 54 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6790, File 1617-40 pt. 3.1, Conversation between Mr. B.K. Nehru and the Undersecretary Regarding Economic Assistance for India, 15 April 1959. 55 Ibid., DEA to Ronning, Dispatch No. 352, 24 April 1959. There was a catch. Cabinet advised that, under the 1959–60 aid program, “efforts be made to ensure that recipients take as much wheat and flour as possible.” 56 Ibid., Stansfield to Delworth, Brief on “Indo-Canadian Relations,” 2 July 1959. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., Holmes to Robertson, 13 June 1959. 59 See Robert J. McMahon, “U.S. Policy toward South Asia and Tibet during the Early Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 8, 3 (2006): 141; see also Guha, India after Gandhi, 306–24.

Notes to pages 139-42 273

60 LAC, Robinson Papers, MG 31 E 83, Vol. 2, File 14, Memorandum from Robinson to Robertson, Holmes, Campbell, Far Eastern Division, 30 November 1959. 61 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7128, File 9126-40 pt. 10.2, Menzies to Glazebrook, Dispatch No. 395, 7 November 1958; Glazebrook to Menzies, Dispatch L-275, 24 November 1958. 62 Ibid., Glazebrook to Menzies, Dispatch L-275, 24 November 1958. 63 Dispatch 2045, from Chairman, Delegation to United Nations General Assembly, to Secretary of State for External Affairs, New York, 27 November 1958, in DCER Volume 24: 1958, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international .gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=6446. 64 Ibid., Draft Memorandum by Assistant Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, 27 January 1959, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-03/www .international.gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefId =6452. 65 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7128, File 9126-40 pt. 10.2, Ronning to SSEA, Dispatch No. 47, 13 January 1960. 66 Ibid., Ronning to Glazebrook, 15 January 1960. 67 Ibid., Ronning to SSEA, Dispatch No. 461, 19 May 1960. The Indians felt similarly; in an October 1956 report to the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi, the Indian high commissioner in Ottawa noted that “India receives larger coverage in Canadian press as time goes on although the ignorance that exists even amongst journalists and circles where one would expect a little more appreciation of facts is surprising. Only the most trivial matters or the most exciting events are taken for comment. The main anxiety of the press seems to be our loyalty to the Commonwealth and that we should not go into the communist camp. Most of the items are taken from American Press.” See NAI, File No. F.2-2(10)/56, Rauf to Ministry of Indian External Affairs, Subject: Political Report for the Month of October 1956. 68 Ibid. Canada’s insistence on wheat quotas stemmed from its surplus stocks. See Hilliker and Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs Volume II, 218–21, for further details on the Law of the Sea initiative. 69 Krishna Menon asserted, in 1967, that “the trouble in Laos is due to Canada. At one time, about five or six years ago, the Laotian Government came totally under the influence of the United States. They took the view, ‘we are independent, why should the Commission be here’; Canada played up to it, and I had great difficulty in finding a formula with Ronning to prevent the Commission from being fully terminated … After Diefenbaker’s Government came in, it was quite hopeless.” See Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 48. 70 See Charles Ritchie, Storm Signals: More Undiplomatic Diaries, 1962–1971 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1983), 141. 71 Lawrence Austin Hayne Smith, interview with Ryan Touhey, 7 September 2006. 72 Earl Drake, interview with Ryan Touhey, 20 August 2010. 73 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7128, File 9126-40 pt. 10.2, Ronning to SSEA, Dispatch No. 461, 19 May 1960. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 UBC Special Collections, Morley Scott Papers, Morley Scott to Chester Ronning, 7 July 1960.

274 Notes to pages 142-46

79 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6790, File 1617-40 pt 3.2, Briefing Notes Prepared by David Stansfield for Protocol Division, 11 October 1960. 80 Hilliker and Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs Volume II, 151. See also Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 97–105. 81 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6790, File 1617-40 pt 3.2, Note for File by R. Duder, 16 January 1961. Robinson recalled that the Canadian delegations at the United Nations perceived Menon as “a menace.” Basil Robinson, interview with Ryan Touhey, 6 September 2006. 82 See Diefenbaker Papers File MG 01/XII/A/270, Correspondence with Field Marshall M.A. Khan 1960–1961. 83 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6790, File 1617-40 pt 3.2, Note for File by R. Duder, 16 January 1961. Menon did not look warmly on Diefenbaker or Green. Under Diefenbaker, Menon believed, Canada did not figure as much in the United Nations, and Green was described as “difficult but nice. He was not very close to us, polite and all that – while Pearson, until a later stage, wanted to get on.” See Brecher, India and World Politics, 40–41. 84 See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4479, File 50017-40 pt. 4, Ronning to USSEA, Dispatch No. 247, 1 March 1960, Dispatch No. 304, 9 May 1962. 85 UBC Special Collections, Morley Scott Papers, Box 4, Folder 7, Morley Scott to Chester Ronning, 7 July 1960. 86 LAC, Robinson Papers, MG 31 E 83, Vol. 4, File 4.6, Memorandum for Record: Re: Indian Attitude on South African Questions, 12 March 1961. 87 Ibid. See also Hilliker and Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs Volume II, 163–66; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 174–89. 88 See John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), 86. 89 Robinson added that “Diefenbaker didn’t want to establish special relations with Mr. Nehru at the later Commonwealth conferences.” Basil Robinson, interview with Ryan Touhey, 6 September 2006. 90 NAI, File No. F.4(2)-P/61/A-60, C.S. Venkatachar to Ministry of Indian External Affairs, Subject: Political Report for the Month of February 1961. 91 Ibid. 92 Brown, Nehru, 322. 93 Ibid., 325–26. 94 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 287. 95 Brown, Nehru, 324; George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 44–45. 96 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 292; Diefenbaker Centre Archives, JGDP XII/A/305, Correspondence – Nehru, Jawaharlal Vol. 9, Text of Message of 19 November 1962 from Nehru to Kennedy. This was passed to Diefenbaker on 20 November by the Indian high commissioner in Ottawa. 97 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 5034, File 1617-40 pt. 5, Ronning to DEA, Dispatch No. 772, 22 October 1962. 98 This was not a grave loss for Canada since only $2.6 million of Canada’s $122.8 million in export trade to China was not composed of cereal grains. See Patrick Kyba, “Alvin Hamilton and Sino-Canadian Relations,” in Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People’s Republic of China 1949–1970, ed. Paul M. Evans and B. Michael Frolic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 176–77. 99 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 5034, File 1617-40 pt. 5, Memorandum from Robertson to Green, 22 October 1962.

Notes to pages 146-53 275

100 Ibid., Memorandum from Robertson to Green, 22 November 1962. Ottawa did not approve of this request in full until 8 January 1963. 101 LAC, RG 2, Vol. 6193, Cabinet Conclusions, 19 November 1962. 102 Ibid., 20 November 1962. See also NARA, RG 59, Box 1334, File 641.91, Rusk to Johnson, 29 December 1962. 103 The following year Jha returned to India as Commonwealth secretary in the India MEA. See C.S. Jha, From Bandung to Tashkent: Glimpses of India’s Foreign Policy (London: Sangam Books, 1983), 343. 104 LAC, Robinson Papers, MG 31 E 83, Vol. 6, File 6-13, Charles Ritchie to DEA, Dispatch No. 3561, 6 December 1962. 105 See Diefenbaker Papers File MG 01/XII/A/270, Correspondence with Field Marshall M.A. Khan 1960–1961. 106 LAC, MG 31 E 83, Robinson Papers, Vol. 11, File 1, Diefenbaker to Khan, 10 January 1962. 107 See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 5581, File 12850-P-2-2-40 pt. 1. Chapter 7: Mounting Problems 1 See Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); John Hilliker, “The Politicians and the ‘Pearsonalities’: The Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct of Canadian External Relations,” Canadian Historical Association Papers 19, 1 (1984): 152–67; Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker (Toronto: Macfarlane, Walter and Ross, 1995). 2 NAI, File No. F.4(2)-P/60/A-59, C.S. Venkatachar to Ministry of Indian External Affairs, Subject: Annual Political Report for the Year 1959, Ottawa, 25 February 1960. 3 M.W. Childs, Witness to Power (New York: McGraw Hill, 1975), 142–43. 4 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 5034, File 1617-40 pt. 5, Nehru to Pearson, 17 June 1963. 5 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 5449, File 11384-G-40 pt. 2, Ronning to DEA, Dispatch No. 764, 24 July 1963. 6 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 5034, File 1617-40 pt. 5, Ronning to DEA, Dispatch No. 762, 24 July 1963. 7 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 5449, File 11384-G-40 pt. 2, Memorandum from Glazebrook Distributed to the Commonwealth, Defence Liaison, and Economic Divisions, 6 August 1963. 8 Ibid., Memorandum from Robertson to Martin, 6 August 1963. 9 Ibid., Martin to Ronning, Dispatch K-101, 6 August 1963. The Indians were also lobbying for Canadian assistance in building a small arms ammunition plant, but Ottawa declined to become involved. 10 See NAI, Memorandum No. FSC/C-4/57, Department of External Affairs Canada Aide Memoire, 5 February 1957. 11 NAI, Letter No. FSC/U-1/57, from Shri Raghunath Sinha, Office of the High Commissioner for India, Ottawa, to Shri M.A. Husain, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 16 July 1957. Sinha had met with Kenneth Kirkwood in the DEA. 12 Ibid., Letter No. FSC/U-1/57, from Sinha to Leilamani Naidu, Deputy Secretary (AMS), Ministry of External Affairs, 30 August 1957. 13 NAI, D. 506 AMS/58, Letter from J.L. Gray to Bhabha, 11 November 1958. 14 NMML, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File 56 No. FSC/C-17/57, C.S. Venkatachar, High Commissioner for India, Ottawa, to S. Dutt, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, New Delhi, 5 December 1958.

276 Notes to pages 153-61

15 Ibid., DAE/R/11-C/2783, Bhabha to Gray, 12 December 1958. 16 Ibid. 17 NARA, RG 59, Box 2610, File 642.9197/945, Dispatch D-183, from American Consul General, Bombay, to State Department, 14 September 1958. 18 Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 357. 19 NARA, RG 59, Box 2610, File 642.9197/945, Dispatch D-183, from American Consul General, Bombay, to State Department, 14 September 1958. The dispatch was circulated to Ottawa, London, New Delhi, and the CIA. 20 Duane Bratt, The Politics of CANDU Exports (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 16. 21 Ibid., 51. 22 NAI, AMS 1961, Letter from Bhabha to Nehru, 2 August 1961. 23 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 37. 24 Bratt, Politics of CANDU Exports, 98–99. 25 The Ottawa Group, as it was informally known, was comprised of Australia, Britain, South Africa, and the United States and sought to support safeguards using the IAEA. See Bothwell, Nucleus 359. 26 See ibid., 362–65. 27 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 46–47. 28 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 5034, File 1617-40 pt. 5, Ronning to DEA, Dispatch No. 776, 26 July 1963. This was also circulated to the PCO. Khera was an influential cabinet secretary in Nehru’s government. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Signed in August 1963, the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty prohibited nuclear weapons tests or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water but not under ground. The domestic debate concerned whether Canada would accept BOMARC missiles with nuclear warheads. 32 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 5034, File 1617-40 pt. 5, Robertson to Ronning, Dispatch No. E-1273, 29 July 1963. 33 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10049, File 20-1-2 India pt. 1.1, P.C. 1963-1725, 21 November 1963. See also Memorandum from O.G. Stoner to DEA Legal Division, 5 December 1963. In particular, Articles VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIIII, XIV, and XV suggest that the Canadians had extracted significant concessions from the Indians. 34 LAC, RG 2, Vol. 6254, Cabinet Minutes, 14 November 1963. 35 Robert Bothwell, “The Further Shore: Canada and Vietnam,” International Journal 56, 1 (2000–01): 103. 36 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10122, File 21-13-VIET-ICSC pt. 1.2, Cox to SSEA, 4 May 1964. 37 Blair Seaborn, interview with Ryan Touhey, 7 September 2006. 38 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 9013, File 20-India-2-1 pt. 1, Rettie to Ottawa, Dispatch No. 350, 15 May 1964. 39 Ibid. 40 Judith Brown, Nehru: A Political Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 334. 41 See Harish Kapur, Foreign Policies of India’s Prime Ministers (New Delhi: Lancer International, 2009), 77–81. 42 Peter Stursberg, Roland Michener: The Last Viceroy (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1989), 149.

Notes to pages 161-68 277

43 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10049, File 20-1-2 India pt. 1.2, India and Its Relations with Canada, 2 July 1964. 44 See John Hilliker and Donald Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs: Volume II, Coming of Age, 1946–1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), 374. 45 Earl Drake, interview with Ryan Touhey, 20 August 2009. 46 Basil Robinson, interview with Ryan Touhey, 6 September 2006; Blair Seaborn, interview with Ryan Touhey, 7 September 2006. Both Robinson and Seaborn believed that, while the ICSC hurt bilateral relations, its impact can be overstated. For instance, Seaborn cautioned that the Canadians who had served in Indochina had a very limited view of India, while Robinson concluded that, though some Canadian diplomats returned to the DEA with anti-Indian sentiments, “many remained rather neutral to India.” 47 Basil Robinson, interview with Ryan Touhey, 6 September 2006; Blair Seaborn, interview with Ryan Touhey, 7 September 2006. Quote cited in Bothwell, “Further Shore,” 107. See also A.S. Fair, British High Commission, Ottawa, to C.F. Hill, FO Far East and Pacific Department, 30 December 1964, FO 371/180217. 48 LAC, Arnold Cantwell Smith Papers, MG 31 E 47, Vol. 81, File 18, Smith to Vientiane, 26 February 1964. 49 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10098, File 20-1-2-India pt. 2, R.L. Rogers (Far Eastern Division) to USSEA, 19 March 1965. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. See also Hilliker and Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs Volume II, 227. 52 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N3, Vol. 279, File No. 845/I41V666, Michener to DEA, Dispatch No. 298, 23 March 1965. Michener’s dispatch was seen by Pearson. 53 See Dennis Kuk, Disenchanted Allies: The United States and Pakistan 1947–2000 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), Chapters 5 and 6. 54 Mark Atwood Lawrence, “The Limits of Peacemaking: India and the Vietnam War, 1962–67,” India Review 1, 1 (2002): 51–52. 55 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10123, File 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4 pt. 2.2, Seaborn to SSEA, 9 June 1965. 56 NAI, File 315-Dir.(AMS)/65, L.K. Jha, Secretary to the Prime Minister, to C.S. Jha, Foreign Secretary, 21 April 1965. 57 Ibid., Letter No. OTT/105/1/64, B.K. Acharya to Rajeshwar Dayal, Commonwealth Secretary, Indian MEA, 26 April 1965. 58 NAI, Indian MEA, AMS Div. 1965, Letter from Swaran Singh to Paul Martin, 30 May 1965. 59 See NAI, Indian MEA, File 873.Div(AMS)/65, Prime Minister’s Visit to Canada, 1 June 1965. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Homi J. Bhabha, “All India Radio Address, October 24, 1964,” in Nuclear India, Volume 2, by J.P. Jain (New Delhi: Radiant, 1974), 159. 65 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N6, Vol. 8, Memorandum from Pearson to Martin, 17 November 1964. 66 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 82. 67 For the Indian proposals, see NAI, Indian MEA, File 873.Div(AMS)/65, Prime Minister’s Visit to Canada, 1 June 1965.

278 Notes to pages 168-75

68 LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N3, Vol. 269, File 818.1/I39, Shastri Conference, Memorandum for the Prime Minister/Paul Martin, by A.E. Ritchie, 4 June 1965. 69 Ibid. 70 The Ottawa Citizen reported that, “although the tiny leader of the world’s second largest population body must be considered among the great leaders of the day, popular demonstrations have been conspicuously absent since he arrived Thursday.” Ottawa Citizen, 12 June 1965. 71 In particular, see the Globe and Mail coverage from 10 to 15 June and for the same period the Ottawa Journal, Montreal Gazette, The Hindu, The Statesman, Times of India, and the Hindustan Times. LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10081, File 20-India-9 F.P. 3. 72 Ibid. See the Montreal Gazette, “Not the Time or Place,” 15 June 1965, 1. The Globe and Mail reported that “Canadian authorities were appalled that Mr. Shastri had taken up the Rann of Kutch dispute publicly.” Globe and Mail, 14 June 1965, 1. 73 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3494, File 18-1-H-IND-1965/1, Visit of Prime Minister Shastri of India, Briefing Book. 74 Ibid. 75 Bothwell, Nucleus, 366. Pearson made the official announcement of this decision in the House of Commons four days after Shastri left Canada. 76 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3494, File 18-1-H-IND-1965/1, Visit of Prime Minister Shastri of India, Briefing Book. 77 Ibid., Vol. 10417, File 27-20-5 pt. 2, DEA to CDN Embassy, Washington, DC, Dispatch K-146, 16 June 1965. 78 Paul Martin, A Very Public Life: So Many Worlds, Volume II (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1985), 284. 79 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 3494, File 18-1-H-IND-1965/1, Visit of Prime Minister Shastri of India, Briefing Book. 80 Ibid. The Americans believed that India could manufacture a bomb within one to three years after a decision to do so had been made. 81 See John Starnes, Closely Guarded: A Life in Canadian Security and Intelligence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 107–08. 82 See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10417, File 27-20-5-India pt. 2, Memorandum from A.R. Menzies to Basil Robinson, 4 June 1965. 83 See LAC, MG 26 N3, Vol. 264, File 802/I39, Martin to Pearson, 16 August 1965. 84 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10417, File 27-20-5-India pt. 2, Memorandum from A.R. Menzies to Basil Robinson, 4 June 1965. Also see RG 25, Vol. 3494, File 18-1-H-IND-1965/1, Visit of Prime Minister Shastri of India, Briefing Book. 85 Quoted verbatim from Bothwell, “Further Shore,” 108–09. See also A.S. Fair (Ottawa) to C.F. Hill, 23 June 1965, FO 371/180550. See also LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10123, File 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4 pt. 4.2, Cadieux Interview with Acharya, 28 June 1965. 86 Trinity College Archives, John Holmes Papers, Vol. 56, File 4, R.L. Rogers to Holmes, 13 July 1965. 87 See LAC, Michener Papers, MG 32 A4, Vol. 76, File Correspondence – “R” 1965–1966, Letter from Michener to David Reece, 29 June 1965. 88 Ibid., Michener to J.M. Macdonnell, 7 July 1965. Chapter 8: An Inability to Influence 1 P.N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency,” and Indian Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 109. 2 Katherine Frank, Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), 297.

Notes to pages 175-80 279

3 See Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive Vol. II: The KGB and the World (London: Penguin Books, 2005), 312–24. 4 J.N. Dixit, Across Borders: Fifty Years of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Picus Books, 1998), 91–93. Dixit retired as the Indian foreign secretary in February 1994. 5 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 111. 6 Ibid., 114–15. 7 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10098, File 20-1-2 pt. 2, Memorandum from A.G. Campbell to Blair Seaborn, 11 March 1966. 8 Ibid. 9 Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 366. 10 LAC, RG 20, Vol. 1672, File 3-51-1 pt. 2, “The Indiagram” Office of the High Commissioner for India 29/66, 13 May 1966. 11 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 125. 12 Lok Sabha Debates, Question No. 877, 1 August 1966. 13 LAC, Martin Papers, MG 32 B 12, Vol. 225, File 225-4 Commonwealth 1965–67, Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 29 July 1966. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10098, File 20-1-2 India pt. 2, Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 11 July 1966. 17 Ibid. See Pearson to Indira Gandhi, 2 August 1966. 18 LAC, Martin Papers, MG 32 B 12, Vol. 225, File 225-4 Commonwealth 1965–67, Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 29 July 1966. 19 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10098, File 20-1-2 India pt. 2, Pearson to Indira Gandhi, 2 August 1966. 20 Bothwell, Nucleus, 365–66. 21 LAC, Martin Papers, MG 32 B 12, Vol. 225, File 225-4 Commonwealth 1965–67, Memorandum from Marcel Cadieux to Paul Martin, 4 November 1966. 22 Ibid. 23 Although there had been reference to “levers,” there was scant mention of using aid as a bargaining tool. Gandhi wrote to Pearson in mid-November asking for additional food aid because of a drought that had ravaged the Indian countryside, affecting 70 million people. Gandhi asked for 500,000 tons of wheat to reach India by January. Pearson committed to seek additional funds from Parliament “which would permit shipments of up to $21 million worth of foodstuffs from Canada over the next few months.” There were strings attached, though. Four million dollars would be used to purchase Canadian-produced flour. See LAC, Pearson Papers, MG 26 N4, Vol. 237, File 802/I39, Letter from Gandhi to Pearson, 16 November 1966, and Pearson to Gandhi, 30 November 1966. 24 LAC, Martin Papers, MG 32 B 12, Vol. 225, File 225-4, Commonwealth 1965–67, Memorandum from Basil Robinson for Drury, 7 November 1966. 25 LAC, RG 2, Vol. 6321, Cabinet Minutes, 10 November 1966. 26 LAC, RG 20, Vol. 1672, File 3-51-1 pt. 2, Department of Trade and Commerce News Release 24/67, 28 February 1967. 27 At the same time, the United States, IAEA, and India entered into a tripartite agreement for the supply of a small amount of US plutonium for Indian research purposes. See Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 131.

280 Notes to pages 180-5

28 See LAC, RG 20, Vol. 1672, File 3-51-1 pt. 2, Washington Post, “India to Allow Check at A-Power Station,” 23 December 1966. 29 Ibid., Canadian High Commission to USSEA, Dispatch No. 68, 31 January 1967. See also Times of India, “Sarabhai Defends Pacts with Canada,” 19 January 1967, and “Inspection,” 21 December 1966; Hindustan Times, “No Foreign Inspection of A-Reactors,” 19 January 1967; Indian Express, “Pact on Atomic Station ‘Not Modified,’” 19 January 1967. 30 Ibid., Press Information Bureau of the Government of India, “Expansion of Rajasthan Atomic Power Project,” AEC Chairman’s Statement, 18 January 1967. 31 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 134. 32 David Chalmer Reece, A Rich Broth: Memoirs of a Canadian Diplomat (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), 84. 33 James George, interview with Ryan Touhey, 7–8 September 2009. 34 LAC, Martin Papers, MG 32 B 12, Vol. 225, File 225-8, Letter from James George to Paul Martin, 4 July 1967. 35 Ibid., Letter from Martin to George, 11 July 1967. 36 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 139. 37 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10098, File 20-1-2-India pt. 2, R.D. Jackson to George, Dispatch N-265, 17 November 1967. This dispatch was also distributed to AECL and the PCO. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., Vol. 10098, File 20-1-2-India pt. 3.1, George to DEA, Dispatch No. 996, 12 December 1967. 40 Ibid., D.M. Cornett to George, Dispatch N-22, 2 January 1968. 41 Ibid., R.D. Jackson to London and Washington, Dispatch N-311, 20 December 1967 (the dispatch was also sent to Geneva, New Delhi, Rawalpindi, Tokyo, NATO, the United Nations, Rio di Janeiro, Mexico, Stockholm, Moscow, and Vienna). 42 Ibid., George to DEA, Dispatch No. 3110, 22 December 1967. 43 Ibid., R.V. Gorham to George, Dispatch E-112, 2 January 1968. 44 Ibid., Memorandum from Donald Munro to Ralph Collins, USSEA, 3 January 1968. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid., George to DEA, Dispatch No. 264, 26 January 1968. 47 Ibid. This was in reference to a Times of India editorial of 22 January 1968 that harshly opposed the NPT but contained factual inaccuracies about what it meant for Indian security. Singh suggested flippantly that the Canadians write a letter to the editor. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., R.D. Jackson to George, Dispatch N-51, 30 January 1968. 50 Ibid., Vol. 10098, File 20-1-2-India pt. 3.2, George to DEA, Dispatch No. 382, 7 February 1968. 51 See Vol. 10098, File 20-1-2-India pt. 3.1. The Statesmen ran an article on 5 February entitled “India Not to Sign Nuclear Treaty.” Whether or not it reflected government sentiment is uncertain, but it observed that “abstention (from the NPT) will raise a problem with Canada which has shared its nuclear technology with India. Canada, a strong advocate of agreement on non-proliferation, may consider itself debarred under the provisions of the treaty from continuing to cooperate with an abstaining nation. Indian experts recognize the difficulty Canada is placed in. They hope, however, that the objections against cooperation can be overcome by reaffirming the safeguards – already provided in bilateral agreements between the two countries – to ensure that nuclear materials are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.” 52 Ibid., Vol. 10098, File 20-1-2-India pt. 3.2, George to DEA, Dispatch No. 382, 7 February 1968.

Notes to pages 185-94 281

53 Ibid., Vol. 10099, File 20-1-2-India pt. 4, George to DEA, Dispatch No. 1186, 5 April 1968. 54 Ibid., Pearson’s comments are written on the dispatch. 55 Ibid., George to DEA, Dispatch No. 1187, 6 April 1968. 56 Ibid., RAD Ford (Moscow) to DEA, Dispatch No. 650, 8 April 1968. 57 Ibid., George to DEA, Dispatch No. 1195, 8 April 1968. 58 See Robert Bothwell, “The Further Shore: Canada and Vietnam,” International Journal 56, 1 (2000–01): 108. Chapter 9: Old Hopes and New Realism? 1 Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 6. 2 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945–1984 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 287–88. 3 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10099, File 20-1-2-India pt. 4, George to Cadieux, 1 July 1968. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. George had explored this option in a separate dispatch, No. 2020, sent to the department on 8 June 1968. He noted that a number of Western countries, as well as Japan, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, had annual bilateral talks with New Delhi. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., Memorandum to Economic Division, Disarmament Division, Far Eastern Division, DL(1) Division, from M.O. Dench, Commonwealth Division, 2 July 1968. 10 Years later Seaborn recalled a stopover in New Delhi in November 1965 while Michener was high commissioner: “I saw something of New Delhi, Fatehpur Sikri, and Agra and the Taj Mahal to counter my rather negative view of India and the Indians which, as in the case of so many colleagues, had stemmed from serving on the Commission.” See Arthur Blanchette, ed., Canadian Peacekeepers in Indochina 1954–1973: Recollections (Kemptville, ON: Golden Dog Press, 2002), 110. 11 Blair Seaborn, interview with Ryan Touhey, 7 September 2006. Also see Robert Bothwell, “The Further Shore: Canada and Vietnam,” International Journal 56, 1 (2000–01): 89–114. 12 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 10099, File 20-1-2-India pt. 4, Memorandum from Seaborn to Commonwealth Division, 4 July 1968. Blair Seaborn, interview with Ryan Touhey, 7 September 2006. 13 Ibid., File 20-1-2-India pt. 5, George to DEA, Dispatch No. 2995, 10 September 1968. 14 Ibid., Donald Munro, Commonwealth Division, to Cadieux, USSEA, 11 September 1968. 15 Ibid., Cadieux to George, Dispatch K-415, 11 September 1968. 16 Globe and Mail, 16 October 1968, in File 20-1-2-India pt. 5. 17 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8740, File 20-1-2-India pt. 6, Briefing Notes Prepared by Cadieux for Trudeau, 17 December 1968. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., A.S. McGill to Mitchell Sharp, 6 January 1969. 20 Pierre Trudeau, Memoirs (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993), 213–14. 21 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8740, File 20-1-2-India pt. 6, Letter from George to D.M. Cornett, 27 February 1969. George’s initial letter on the subject was Dispatch No. 605, 28 June 1968.

282 Notes to pages 194-204

22 Ibid., Cornett to George, 14 April 1969. 23 Ibid. 24 See P.N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency,” and Indian Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 134. 25 Katherine Frank, Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), 313–14. 26 James George, interview with Ryan Touhey, 7–8 September 2009. 27 Frank, Indira, 314–15. See also Harish Kapur, Foreign Policies of India’s Prime Ministers (New Delhi: Lancer International, 2009), 128–29. 28 See NMML, P.N. Haksar Papers, Subject File No. 41, Mission Postings, 29 April 1969. 29 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8740, File 20-1-2-India pt. 7, Notes on India, 9 December 1969. 30 Ibid., James George to DEA, Dispatch No. 171, 15 January 1970. 31 Ibid. 32 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8740, File 20-1-2-India pt. 7, George to A.E. Ritchie, 28 January 1970. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., A.E. Ritchie to George, 9 February 1970. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., George to USSEA, Dispatch No. 519, 2 June 1970. 38 Ibid., D.M. Cornett to GFE, OAD, CIDA, GAF, OUN, FIS, ECD, ECT, London, Washington, DC, 28 July 1970. 39 Ibid., Memorandum for the Minister, Re: Meetings with Swaran Singh, 21 September 1970. 40 Ibid., File 20-1-2-India pt. 8, George to DEA, Dispatch No. 3815, 2 December 1970. 41 NMML, P.N. Haksar Papers, III Installment, Subject File No. 163, Haksar to Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Subject: P.M.’s Conversation with the Prime Minister of Canada – Some Points, 11 January 1971. 42 Ibid. 43 Interviews, James George with Ryan Touhey, 7–8 September 2009. 44 Ibid. 45 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8740, File 20-1-2-India pt. 8, George to DEA, Dispatch No. 188, 15 January 1971. 46 LAC, Michener Papers, MG 32 A, Vol. 74, File 74-15, Letter from Geoffrey Pearson to Michener, 1 February 1971. 47 James George, interview with Ryan Touhey, 7–8 September 2009. 48 Trudeau, Memoirs, 213–14. 49 See Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive Vol. II: The KGB and the World (London: Penguin Books, 2005), 321. 50 See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969, Office of the State Department Historian, Conversation among President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Washington, 5 November 1971, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments /frus1969-76ve07/d150. See also Frank, Indira, 335. 51 Kapur, Foreign Policies of India’s Prime Ministers, 139–41. 52 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8740, File 20-1-2-India pt. 10, Memorandums from Michel Dupuy to GPP, 15 October 1971; T. Wainman-Wood to DFR, GPE, UNO, DFD, FLO, ECT, ECD, ECL, PAG, FCC. 53 Ibid., R.G. Hatheway, Commonwealth Division, to South Asia Division, 29 October 1971. 54 Ibid., Memorandum from L.J. Wilder to South Asia Division, 5 November 1971. 55 Arthur Andrew, The Rise and Fall of a Middle Power: Canadian Diplomacy from King to Mulroney (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1993), 113.

Notes to pages 205-12 283

56 Ibid., T. Wainman-Wood to George, Dispatch GPS-66, 24 January 1972. 57 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8740, File 20-1-2-India pt. 11, George to South Asia Division, 18 February 1972. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid., Minutes, Future Relations with India, 2 March 1972. 60 Ibid. Trade between Canada and India in 1970–71 amounted to $187 million, with Canada exporting $142.4 million to India. Approximately $90 million was through the aid program. George claimed that this balance was not insignificant. But since 1961, actual trade had only grown by approximately $35 million or $3.5 million a year over ten years. In contrast, Canadian exports to Japan were $828.8 million in 1970–71. 61 Ibid. See George to USSEA, Dispatch No. 159, 24 March 1972. 62 See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8916, File 20-India-1-3-USA pt. 1, H.P.G. Fraser to George, Dispatch GPS-157, 11 April 1972. 63 Arthur Menzies, interview with Ryan Touhey, 10 September 2006; David Chalmer Reece, A Rich Broth: Memoirs of a Canadian Diplomat (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), 46. 64 James George, interview with Ryan Touhey, 7–8 September 2009. 65 Arthur Menzies, interview with Ryan Touhey, 10 September 2006; Earl Drake, interview with Ryan Touhey, 20 August 2009. 66 Ibid., Williams to USSEA, Dispatch No. 63, 29 January 1973. 67 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8740, File 20-1-2-India pt. 13, Memorandum from A.D. Morgan to PDE, PDF, GPP, ECD, ECL, ECT, GEA, FCF Divisions in DEA, 16 March 1973. 68 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8740, File 20-1-2-India pt. 13, South Asia Division Diary Notes, 6 February 1973. 69 Ibid., Summary Record, Indo-Canadian Economic Consultations, 4 April 1973. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid., briefing note from H. Ezrin, 17 May 1973. 74 Ibid. 75 Reece, A Rich Broth, 113–14. 76 Trudeau, Memoirs, 166. See also John English, Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau 1968–2000 (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 376. 77 Ram Shana, ed., Indian Foreign Policy Annual Survey: 1973 (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1977), 267. 78 Prime Minister Gandhi’s Visit to Canada, 25 June 1973, from US Embassy, Ottawa, to Secretary of State, Washington, DC (1973Ottawa01453); Electronic Telegrams, 1973; Records of the US State Department, RG 59, http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid= 67750&dt=2472&dl=1345. 79 The US embassy in New Delhi reported to Washington that the Canadians had agreed to the discussions “to accommodate India’s frequent requests for annual economic consultations … Canada does not want to institutionalize bilateral consultations to this extent, but did agree to one-time talks in an effort to meet the Indians part way.” IndoCanadian Economic Talks, 27 June 1973, from US Embassy, New Delhi, to Secretary of State, Washington, DC (1973NEWDE07518); Electronic Telegrams; Records of the US State Department, RG 59, http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=68050&dt=2472 &dl=1345. 80 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8740, File 20-1-2-India pt. 13, Williams to DEA, International Trade/ Commerce, Finance, CIDA, PCO, EDC, Dispatch No. 2946, 6 September 1973. 81 Ibid. See Williams to DEA, Dispatch No. 3436, 16 October 1973.

284 Notes to pages 213-20

82 NA FCO 82/233, File Political Relations between Canada and India, 1973, Memorandum from G.B. Chalmers, South Asian Department, to Peter J.E. Male, New Delhi, 30 October 1973. Copies were distributed to Islamabad, Kabul, Dacca, Colombo, and Ottawa. 83 Ibid. 84 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8741, File 20-1-2-India pt. 15, Outcome of Indo-Canadian Economic Consultation, New Delhi, 5–9 November 1973. 85 NA FCO 82/233, File Political Relations between Canada and India, 1973, Letter from L.V. Appleyard, New Delhi, to G.B. Chalmers, South Asia Department, FCO, 15 November 1973. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid., Letter from John Drinkall to G.B. Chalmers, 20 November 1973. 89 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8741, File 20-1-2-India pt. 15, Letter from A.B. Rogers to Bruce Williams, 31 December 1973. 90 Ibid., Indo-Canadian Relations Background Briefing, n.d. Chapter 10: Choices Made 1 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 177–78. 2 Ibid., 151–52. 3 Ibid., 159. 4 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 9551, File 8-A-India-2-1976/1, Letter from Trudeau to Gandhi, 1 October 1971. 5 Ibid., Letter from Gandhi to Trudeau, 12 October 1971. 6 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8740, File 20-1-2-India pt. 11, Memorandum from T. Wainman-Wood to A.E. Ritchie, 2 February 1972. 7 Ibid., Memorandum from A.P. Smyth to T. Wainman-Wood, 31 January 1972. 8 Ibid., Memorandum from T. Wainman-Wood to A.E. Ritchie, 2 February 1972. 9 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 170. 10 Katherine Frank, Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), 359. See also Ramachandra Guha, India after Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 476–80. 11 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 173. 12 Ibid., 172. One prominent Indian analyst, K. Subrahmanyam, put the date at October 1972. See K. Subrahmanyam, “Indian Nuclear Policy 1964–98: A Personal Recollection,” in Nuclear India, ed. Jasjist Singh (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), 30. 13 Frank, Indira, 353. 14 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 174. 15 John English, Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau 1968–2000 (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 376. 16 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 11090, File 23-1-India pt. 1, “Indian Nuclear Explosion,” Statement by Mitchell Sharp, 18 May 1974. 17 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 9551, File 8-A-India-2-1970/1, Memorandum from Sharp to Cabinet, 21 May 1974. 18 NARA, Department of State Records, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Box 8, June 1974, Memorandum of Conversation, “Indian Nuclear Explosion,” 18 June 1974, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb467/. The conversation between Sharp and Kissinger reveals that Kissinger and the American government were not surprised that the test had occurred, and now that it had happened it was “an accomplished fact.”

Notes to pages 220-24 285

19 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 9551, File 8-A-India-2-1970/1, Memorandum from Sharp to Cabinet, 21 May 1974. 20 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 183. 21 Ambassador Kaul’s Meeting with the Secretary (Indian Account), 8 June 1974, Daniel Moynihan to Secretary of State, Washington, DC (1974NEWDE07623); Electronic Telegrams, 1974; Records of the US State Department, RG 59, http://aad.archives.gov /aad/createpdf?rid=119599&dt=2474&dl=1345; Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 184. The Americans concluded “that the Indian test did not violate any agreement with the United States.” 22 Ibid., Reaction to Indian Nuclear Explosion, 20 May 1974, from Secretary of State, Washington, DC, to Geneva (1974STATE104653); Electronic Telegrams, 1974; Records of the US State Department, RG 59, http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=94389& dt=2474&dl=1345; Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 183. 23 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 9551, File 8-A-India-2-1976/1, Memorandum from Sharp to Cabinet, 21 May 1974. Further cabinet memorandums acknowledged the lack of international condemnation on India’s decision. 24 Ibid., Record of Cabinet Discussion, 22 May 1974. 25 Ibid. 26 Pierre Trudeau, Memoirs (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993), 214. 27 Allied Assessment of Indian Nuclear Test, 5 June 1974, from Kissinger to US Mission NATO/All NATO Capitals/New Delhi/Moscow (1974STATE117817); Electronic Telegrams, 1974; Records of the US State Department, RG 59, http://aad.archives.gov/aad /createpdf?rid=131868&dt=2474&dl=1345. Kissinger used the international media as a stick with which to rap Canadian knuckles. On 17 June, Kissinger, while in Jerusalem, “criticized Canada for not providing adequate safeguards in its foreign nuclear assistance program,” adding that “India’s recent detonation of a nuclear device was inadvertently aided by Canada.” Similar comments rippled through the United States, annoying the DEA. A day later in Ottawa, Kissinger distanced himself from these statements, saying to Sharp that he never meant to “imply that Canada was remiss,” merely that Canadian safeguards were “lousy, but so were ours.” See NARA, Department of State Records, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Box 8, June 1974, Memorandum of Conversation, “Indian Nuclear Explosion,” 18 June 1974, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb467/. 28 See Canadian Reaction to Indian Test, 24 May 1974, from US Embassy, New Delhi, Moynihan to Secretary of State, Washington, DC (1974NEWDE06901); Electronic Telegrams, 1974; Records of the US State Department, RG 59, http://aad.archives.gov/aad /createpdf?rid=108927&dt=2474&dl=1345. 29 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 9551, File 8-A-India-2-1976/1, Aide Memoire from the Government of India, 4 June 1974. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., Memorandum from D.B. Hicks to USSEA, 5 June 1974. 33 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 11090, File 23-1-India pt. 1, W.J. Jenkins to DEA, Dispatch No. 2144, 11 June 1974. 34 See “Neighbours Need Have No Fears: Mrs. Gandhi,” Times of India, 26 May 1974, 1. Such rhetoric continued for months afterward. See The Indian PNE and LDC Rhetoric Summary, 23 July 1974, from US Embassy, New Delhi, to Secretary of State, Washington, DC (1974NEWDE09768); Electronic Telegrams, 1974; Records of the US State Department, RG 59, http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=158685&dt=2474&dl=1345. 35 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 11090, File 23-1-India pt. 1, W.J. Jenkins to DEA, Dispatch No. 2144, 11 June 1974.

286 Notes to pages 224-29

36 Ibid., Letter from Trudeau to Gandhi, 11 June 1974. 37 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 9788, Revised Working Paper on Canadian Nuclear Export and NPT Policy in Response to Indian Test, 27 June 1974. 38 Ibid. 39 See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8714, File 20-1-2-India pt. 16, Memorandum from A.E. Ritchie, USSEA, to Mitchell Sharp, 22 July 1974. 40 Ibid. The other objectives are outlined in the memorandum. 41 See NA FCO 82/367, File Canadian/Indian Political Relations [Indian Nuclear Test] 1974, Memorandum from John Taylor, British High Commission, Ottawa, to L.V. Appleyard, British High Commission, New Delhi, 6 August 1974. 42 Canadian-Indian Consultations on Nuclear Matters, 1 August 1974, from Secretary of State, Washington, DC, to US Embassy, New Delhi (1974STATE167869); Electronic Telegrams, 1974; Records of the US State Department, RG 59, http://aad.archives.gov /aad/createpdf?rid=181040&dt=2474&dl=1345. 43 Ibid. 44 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 11090, File 23-1-India pt. 1, Joint Press Release on the Canada-India Consultations July 29–31, 2 August 1974. The Canadians were led by Dupuy, Ritchie, both USSEAs from the DEA, and Paul Gerin-Lajoie, president of CIDA. Singh also met with Trudeau, Sharp, and Alistair Gillespie. 45 See NA FCO 82/367, File Canadian/Indian Political Relations [Indian Nuclear Test] 1974, Memorandum from John Taylor, British High Commission, Ottawa, to L.V. Appleyard, British High Commission, New Delhi, 6 August 1974. 46 Ibid. 47 NA FCO 82/367, File Canadian/Indian Political Relations [Indian Nuclear Test] 1974, Memorandum from J.J. Taylor, British High Commission, Ottawa, to L.V. Appleyard, British High Commission, New Delhi, 6 August 1974. It was also distributed to South Asia Department, Foreign Commonwealth Office. Also see NA FCO 82/367, File Canadian/Indian Political Relations [Indian Nuclear Test] 1974, Memorandum from A.F. Maddocks to J.J. Taylor, British High Commission, Ottawa, 9 August 1974. 48 NA FCO 82/367, File Canadian/Indian Political Relations [Indian Nuclear Test] 1974, Memorandum from A.F. Maddocks to J.J. Taylor, British High Commission, Ottawa, 9 August 1974. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Canadian-Indian Consultations on Nuclear Matters, 1 August 1974, from Secretary of State, Washington, DC, to US Embassy, New Delhi (1974STATE167869); Electronic Telegrams, 1974; Records of the US State Department, RG 59, http://aad.archives.gov /aad/createpdf?rid=181040&dt=2474&dl=1345. 52 NMML, T.N. Kaul Papers, II Installment, File 2, Correspondence – Ambassador to USA, Breakfast Press Briefing, 17 July 1974. 53 NMML, T.N. Kaul Papers, II Installment, File 2, Correspondence – Ambassador to USA, Kaul to Kewal Singh, Notes of Discussion with Dr. Kissinger, 2 August 1974. 54 Summary of Secretary’s Conversation with Kewal Singh, 6 August 1974, from Secretary of State, Washington, DC, to US Embassy, New Delhi (1974STATE170818); Electronic Telegrams, 1974; Records of the US State Department, RG 59, http://aad.archives.gov /aad/createpdf?rid=170754&dt=2474&dl=1345. 55 Ibid. 56 NMML, T.N. Kaul Papers, II Installment, File 2, Correspondence – Ambassador to USA, Kaul to Kewal Singh, Notes of Discussion with Dr. Kissinger, 2 August 1974.

Notes to pages 229-35 287

57 Summary of Secretary’s Conversation with Kewal Singh, 6 August 1974, from Secretary of State, Washington, DC, to US Embassy, New Delhi (1974STATE170818); Electronic Telegrams, 1974; Records of the US State Department, RG 59, http://aad.archives.gov /aad/createpdf?rid=170754&dt=2474&dl=1345. 58 Ibid. 59 See Lok Sabha Debates, 5th Series, Vol. 41, 26 July 1974, 83–84; Vol. 43, 29 August 1974, 83. 60 NMML, P.N. Haksar Files, File S.No-8 Speeches, Blitz, 10 August 1974. 61 Arthur Andrew, The Rise and Fall of a Middle Power: Canadian Diplomacy from King to Mulroney (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1993), 124. Andrew was AUSSEA during this period. 62 Ibid., 124. 63 These comments were made by Shashmer Singh, the first secretary in the Indian High Commission in Ottawa, to a British colleague. These hopes were short-lived. See NA FCO 82/367, File Canadian/Indian Political Relations [Indian Nuclear Test] 1974, Memorandum from A.F. Maddocks to J.J. Taylor, British High Commission, Ottawa, 9 August 1974. 64 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 11090, File 23-1-India pt. 1, Jenkins to DEA, Dispatch No. 2888, 13 August 1974. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid., MacEachen to Turner, 18 September 1974. 67 Ibid., CDN Mission, United Nations, New York City, to DEA, Dispatch No. 1605, 27 September 1974. 68 External Affairs Secretary MacEachen’s Address to Commons, 18 October 1974, from US Embassy, Ottawa, to Secretary of State, Washington, DC (1974OTTAWA03414); Electronic Telegrams, 1974; Records of the US State Department, RG 59, http://aad .archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=234536&dt=2474&dl=1345. 69 NA FCO 82/367, File Canadian/Indian Political Relations [Indian Nuclear Test] 1974, Minutes of a Meeting Held at the Department of External Affairs, 7 October 1974. 70 Arthur Menzies, interview with Ryan Touhey, 10 September 2006. 71 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8714, File 20-1-2-India pt. 16, J.R. Maybee to DEA, Dispatch No. 691, 16 October 1974. 72 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 9551, File 8-A-India-2-1976/1, Memorandum to Cabinet, “Nuclear Policy Review,” 13 November 1974. 73 Ibid., Memorandum from R.C.D. Looye, O/USSEA, for ECP, ECT, 9 December 1974. The memorandum includes a record of the cabinet decision on nuclear policy, 5 December 1974. 74 Ibid., Statement by the Honourable Donald S. MacDonald, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, 20 December 1974, to the House of Commons. 75 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 9551, File 8-A-India-2-1976/1, Memorandum to Cabinet, “Nuclear Cooperation with India,” 29 January 1975. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. See Cabinet Committee on External Policy and Defence, Record of Committee Decision March 12, 1975. The decision was confirmed in a full cabinet meeting on 20 March 1975. 79 Pierre Trudeau and Ivan Head, The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada’s Foreign Policy 1968–1984 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995), 126. 80 See Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 192; Frank, Indira, 371–414; P.N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency,” and Indian Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000). 81 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8714, File 20-1-2-India pt. 16, Confidential Brief, 14 July 1975. The participants included representatives from CIDA, Finance, Manpower and Immigration, International Trade and Commerce, and DEA.

288 Notes to pages 235-42

82 Ibid. Despite the lack of formal discussion or analysis of Indian immigration during these meetings, there was a gradual increase in Indian immigrants to Canada. From 1946 to 1972, 39,804 Indians arrived in Canada. The majority arrived during the midto late 1960s. See http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20060126125328 /http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/index-2.html#statistics. 83 Ibid. Ironically, Rogers would be posted to India the following year. 84 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8714, File 20-1-2-India pt. 16, Hicks to Maybee, 15 July 1975. 85 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8741, File 20-1-2-India pt. 17, USSEA to J.R. Maybee, 30 October 1975. See also Maybee to USSEA, Dispatch No. 747, 16 October 1975. 86 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 17111, File 65-3-1-India pt. 41, Memorandum for the Minister, 11 September 1975. 87 See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8714, File 20-1-2 India pt. 16, Jenkins to USSEA, Dispatch No. 2663, 24 July 1974. 88 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 9551, File 8-A-India-2-1970/1, Robinson to MacEachen, 4 June 1975. 89 LAC, Robinson Papers, MG 31 E 83, Vol. 21, File 2, Memorandum for GPS, 6 June 1975. 90 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 17112, File 65-3-1-India pt. 42, Robinson to MacEachen, 15 October 1975. 91 Mary Halloran, “Mrs. Gandhi’s Bombshell: Canadian Reactions to India’s Nuclear Detonation, 1974–1976,” in Canada’s Global Engagements and Relations with India, ed. Christopher Raj and Abdul Nafey (New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2007), 286–87. 92 Ibid. 93 See Trudeau and Head, The Canadian Way, 127. 94 LAC, RG 2, Vol. 6495, Series A-5-a, Nuclear Cooperation with India, 13 May 1976. 95 Ibid. 96 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8741, File 20-1-2-India pt. 17, Memorandum from R.L. Rogers to Basil Robinson, 17 May 1976. 97 Ibid., Letter from MacEachen to Y.B. Chavan, 18 May 1976. 98 Lok Sabha Debates, 5th Series, Vol. 62, 20 May 1976, 14–15. 99 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 9551, File 8-A-India-2-1976/1, Memorandum from Basil Robinson to Allan MacEachen, 23 July 1975. Just how influential Robinson’s memorandum was in shaping MacEachen’s vision of bilateral relations is underscored by one of its detractors over two years later. David Reece, in an exchange with a colleague, suggested that “you might be interested to read the attached .. Memorandum to the Minister of July 23, 1975 which impressed the then SSEA, Mr. MacEachen, according to the memorandum from the MIN dated September 15, 1975.” See LAC, RG 25, Vol. 8741, File 20-1-2-India pt. 17, D.C. Reece to GPP, India in Perspective: Relations with Canada, 20 October 1977. Conclusion 1 See http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/india-inde/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada _india-inde.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=9; http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/11/02/canada -must-turn-the-page-on-challenging-relationship-with-india-stephen-harper/; http:// www.pm.gc.ca/eng/node/35052.

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Index

Note: “(i)” after a page number indicates an illustration; ICSC stands for International Commission for Supervision and Control; NPT stands for non-proliferation treaty; all references to Gandhi in the index refer to Indira Gandhi. Abbott, Douglas, 53–57 Acharya, B.K., 164 Acheson, Dean, 61–63, 71, 74, 263n52; meeting with Nehru, 41, 42–43; meeting with Pearson, 72–73 aid: Australian, 205; for Bangladesh, 206; Canada-India aid/trade talks, 207–15, 246; Canadian, 4, 6, 83, 164–65, 190, 196, 205–6; Colombo Plan, 47, 49, 52–58, 83; sanctions on India, 220, 223–24, 228, 230–31; Soviet, 93, 104–5; US, 45, 51, 132, 203; Western, 137, 245. See also military aid American policy, 41, 60, 80, 93, 132; China and, 61; on financial aid, 45; Nehru’s view of, 61, 63, 65 Amery, Leopold, 10, 13 Andrew, Arthur, 204–5, 209–10, 230 anti-American sentiments, 40, 43, 70, 86 apartheid, 111, 144 atomic energy: partnerships, 98–99; peaceful uses of, 152, 154, 156, 168. See also nuclear cooperation (CanadaIndia); nuclear proliferation Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) of India, 153, 218–19, 223 Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), 151–53, 156, 158, 246; consultancy agreement, 217–18 Attlee, Clement, 15, 28, 34, 64 Australia, 14, 31, 35–36 Bajpai, Girja, 27 Bajpai, Uma Shankar, 224, 226 Banerjee, P.K., 58, 260n47 Bangladesh, 203, 206 Barry, Donald, 125

Beaudry, Laurent, 29 Bhabha, Homi, 167, 168, 170; criticism of nuclear safeguards, 102, 154–56; death, 175; exchanges with Lorne Gray, 152–53; role in India’s nuclear program, 98–99; trip to Chalk River (ON), 100 Bothwell, Robert, 25, 156, 187, 188; on ICSC reporting, 158–59 Bratt, Duane, 155 bridge thesis: aid and, 208; Canada’s role, 2–4, 7, 77, 115, 148, 242; Commonwealth membership and, 38; foreign policy and, 5–6; Indian nuclear testing and, 246–47; India-West connection and, 39–40, 45–46, 78; Ronning’s assessment of, 140 British Commonwealth. See Commonwealth British Empire: economic struggles, 10; Indian independence and, 15, 17–19, 38; rule in India, 1, 9–10, 12; transformation of, 37 British government, 14, 28, 31, 54 Brook, Norman, 31–32, 34 Brown, Judith, 21–22, 23 Bruce, James, 1 Cadieux, Marcel, 112, 192; on India in the ICSC, 95–96, 162; on nuclear safeguards, 179, 193; in Vietnam, 94–95 Campbell, A.G., 176 Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU), 155, 217. See also Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP I); Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP II) Canada-India Reactor (CIR/CIRUS): construction delay, 152–54;

Index 297

negotiations and agreement, 99, 152, 222–23; safeguards, 155; weaponsgrade plutonium, 170–71, 194, 217, 219, 222, 238 Canada-India relations: aid/trade talks, 207–15, 246, 283n60; British influence on, 10–11; building of, 2–3, 23–24; commonalities, 3–4, 8, 139–40, 242, 244; Commonwealth goals, 37–38, 144, 199–200; cultural exchanges, 205–6; decline of, 8, 76, 115, 147–48, 149, 189, 247–48; demise of, 240–41, 249; diplomatic relations, 2, 7, 10, 40, 77–78; disengagement and reengagement, 6–7, 214–15, 242, 248; foreign policy review, 203–5, 212–13; Indian officials’ report on, 165–66; policy divergences, 5, 198, 239–40; studies on, 1–2, 250n1; during Suez Crisis, 106–7, 110 Canada-US relations, 40, 80, 115, 137; dependence, 166, 227, 247; Nehru’s criticism of, 85–86, 89–90 Canadian High Commission, 17, 133, 181, 213, 216; struggle with policy makers, 189, 248 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 198, 208, 209, 239 Canadian policy: on China, 167–68; Commonwealth and, 17, 18, 32; on India, 185, 225, 230, 243, 247–49; Korean War and, 53, 75; on South Asia, 111. See also under foreign policy Chavan, Y.B., 239 Childs, Marquis, 150 China: attack on India, 145–46; Canada relations, 60, 105, 132, 166–67, 187, 204; India relations, 65, 135–36, 138–39; in Korean War, 61–64; People’s Liberation Army, 145; power in Asia, 65; reaction to NPT, 184; rocket launch (1970), 216; Tibet annexation, 136, 138; US relations, 42, 61, 65–70, 92, 132; Western relations, 94; wheat exports to, 146–47 Chipman, Warwick Fielding, 69, 76; as ambassador to India, 39–40, 57 Churchill, Winston, 10, 14; correspondence with King, 12–13 Cleveland, J.H., 111–12

Cold War: Asia and, 25; Canada’s approach to, 247; India’s stance during, 40–41, 81, 82, 128, 245; Pakistan and, 83; South Asia and, 4, 15; Soviet-India relations during, 202 Coldwell, James, 37 Collins, Ralph, 212, 214 Colombo Plan: atomic research funding, 98, 99; Canada’s participation in, 49, 53–57, 60, 131; conference, 4, 45, 47–49; economic development plan, 46, 52; recommendations for, 50–51; wheat contributions for, 58 colonialism: “atomic,” 156; French, 108, 148; Indian attitudes on, 41, 81, 111, 128, 140 Commonwealth: aid contributions, 48, 164; Canada-India cooperation in, 203–4, 243; Colombo conference, 4, 45, 47–49; decolonization, 1; Diefenbaker’s support for, 126, 133; equality in, 11, 13, 35, 36; Indian membership, 3, 18–19, 26–35, 97, 108, 110; Korean War talks, 65; London conference, 29–31, 33–36, 59; London Declaration, 36–38; political and constitutional changes, 17; prime ministers’ conferences, 192–93, 234; South African withdrawal, 144; US views on, 38 communism: Canada’s view of, 4; Chinese, 45, 127; Diefenbaker’s view of, 126; expansion in Asia/South Asia, 46, 54; financial aid and, 51; Indian neutrality to, 95; Laotian, 137–38; Nehru’s view of, 44; Pakistan’s view of, 134; threat of, 26, 94, 134, 139, 148; US opposition to, 76, 79. See also Soviet Union; Vietnam War Communist Party of India, 28–29, 61 Congress Party: and Commonwealth membership, 18–19, 27; economic plans, 136–37; Gandhi’s influence on, 195, 234–35; nuclear development, 167, 218; opposition to the Crown, 35 Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), 37, 127 Cornett, D. M., 182, 194–95, 198 Coupland, Reginald, 16–17 Cox, Gordon, 159 Cripps, Stafford, 12, 41 Cripps mission, 12–13

298 Index

Crown, allegiance to the, 31, 32, 34–35 Cuban Missile Crisis, 145–46 Dalai Lama, 136 Delworth, Tom, 191–92 democracy: Indian, 40, 46, 78, 136, 142–43, 227; parliamentary, 197, 204, 244; Western, 53 Department of External Affairs (DEA): attitude on nuclear cooperation, 194; concern with nuclear safeguards, 156, 158, 177; Defence Division, 171; Disarmament Division, 176, 182, 184, 225; disinterest in India, 203–7, 209; foreign aid discussions, 56–57; high commissioner appointments, 15–17, 253n45; India skeptics in the, 115, 139, 210–11, 215, 244; India’s foreign policy and, 94, 148; Indo-Canadian relations survey, 137; non-alignment and, 97–98; Pearson loyalties, 149; policy makers, 248–49; position on the Commonwealth, 20; South Asia Division, 203–6, 208–10, 218, 235 Department of Finance, 52, 55, 208–9, 259n31 Deshmukh, C.D., 55, 260n52 Dhar, P.N., 219, 237 Diefenbaker, John, 55, 122(i), 274n83; meeting with R.K. Nehru, 144; political and religious views, 125–26; support of Laos, 138; tour of Europe and Asian Commonwealth, 130–31, 134–35; trip to New Delhi, 131–33; view of Pakistan, 131–33, 147–48 diplomats: Canadian, 2, 3, 81, 140–41, 189, 248, 250n1; Indian, 4, 159; Soviet, 29, 202. See also individual names Donaghy, Greg, 61 Drake, Earl, 134, 141, 162 Drew, George, 37 Duder, Rudolf, 143 Dulles, John Foster, 76, 106; Nehru’s dislike for, 92–93 Dupuy, Michel, 208–10, 226, 237 Dutt, Subimal, 90, 96, 153–54 Eisenhower administration, 79, 83, 92 elites, 9, 81, 95, 135, 160

English, John, 46 ethnic cleansing, 23 exceptionalism, 3, 247 expansionism: Indian, 111; Soviet/ Communist, 38, 48, 54, 65, 148 exports: Canada-India, 43, 84, 131, 257n84, 283n60; Chinese, 167; to Japan, 283n60; nuclear, 8, 155–56, 214, 221, 230, 246; uranium, 170; wheat, 58, 146–47 famine, 49, 174; aid, 57, 58, 279n23 Ford, Robert, 186 foreign policy: British, 31; Canada-India internal review of, 203–5, 212–13; Canadian, 1, 3, 6–7, 46, 71, 77, 137, 247; Canadian government review of, 196, 198, 201; of Diefenbaker government, 125–27; Gandhi’s, 174–75, 195; Indian, 6–7, 40, 95, 115, 128–30, 139–40; King’s influence on, 25; Nehru’s, 25–27, 32–33, 92; Pakistani, 103, 143; Trudeau’s, 188–89; US, 41, 62, 94; Western, 94, 249 Formosa, 64–65, 66, 262n26 Forster, E.M., 10 Fraser, Peter, 35 Fulford, Dwight, 228 Gandhi, Indira: American opinion of, 202; Congress Party and, 195, 234–35; exchanges with Trudeau, 22, 123(i), 193, 201; at London Commonwealth conference, 193; NPT stance, 185–86; nuclear testing decision, 216–19, 224, 232; political background, 173, 174; request for aid, 279n23; state of emergency proclamation, 234–35; visit to Canada, 210–11; visit to the US, 174–75 George, James, 124(i), 181; aid/trade analysis, 205–6, 283n60; on CanadaIndia relations, 189–92, 196–98, 245–46; NPT negotiations, 182–86, 194; passion for India, 207; on Trudeau’s trip to India, 200–1 Gillespie, Alastair, 238 Glazebrook, George, 139, 151; Indian foreign policy report, 128–30

Index 299

Globe and Mail, 44, 113, 193, 267n91, 278n72 Goa, 111, 159, 198 Granatstein, Jack, 188 Gray, Lorne, 152–55, 170, 179 Green, Howard, 142–44, 147, 156, 274n83 Gromyko, Andrei, 202 Gupta, Sen, 153 Haksar, P.N., 195–96, 200, 219, 229 Hatheway, R. G., 203–4 Healey, Denis, 171 Heeney, Arnold, 54–56, 128, 259n31; on America’s view of India, 82–83; on India’s rejection of Canadian wheat, 58, 260n47; letter from Wrong, 40–41, 257n89 hegemony: Indian, 111; US, 40, 85 Henderson, Loy, 42, 43, 45, 51, 261n20 Hicks, D.B., 223, 236 high commissioners: appointments, 16–17, 39, 76–78, 181; deliberations over, 11–16, 252n32, 253n36. See also individual names Hilliker, John, 125 Hinduism, 81, 95, 103 Hindustan Times, 28, 222 Ho Chi Minh, 51, 90–91 Holmes, John, 14, 129, 130, 138–39, 171 Howe, C.D., 44, 98–99 Hungarian revolution (1956), 107–10, 128 immigration, 2; Asian, 38, 191; CanadaIndia Agreement (1951), 84; Indian, 9, 84, 142, 206, 213, 288n82 imperialism, 111, 115; American economic, 40, 42; Soviet/Communist, 44, 54, 55; Western, 94 independence, Indian: British withdrawal, 1, 10, 15; Canada’s role in, 2–3, 11–12; celebrations and violence, 22–23; poverty and economic instability, 25, 49–50; preparation for, 1, 10, 15; selfgovernment, 12–13, 17–19; ties with Britain, 38, 258n4 India: British rule of, 1, 9–10, 15, 26; Canadian attitudes toward, 3, 5, 10, 23–24, 80–81, 244; Chinese invasion of, 145–46; communist influence in, 29,

33; debt, 220–21, 229, 237; economics, 77, 136–37, 174, 211; population growth and literacy rates, 136; power, 6, 231; race relations, 17–18; Western assumptions of, 95–96, 115, 135, 244. See also Canada-India relations; independence, Indian; US-India relations Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), 99, 217, 219 Indian High Commission, 144–45, 230 Indian Ministry of External Affairs (IMEA), 26–27, 164, 166, 186 Indian Mutiny of 1857, 1, 116(i) Indian policy, 90, 169; Canada’s inability to influence, 204, 245; on Commonwealth connection, 28; criticisms of, 108–9, 148; US and, 39, 79; Vietnam and, 164 Indochina: Canada-India friction on, 89–91, 96–97, 169, 200, 204; ceasefire, 86; France in, 76, 83; Geneva settlement, 88–89, 265n48; ICSC in, 5, 95, 162, 192–93, 198 Indonesia: British attitudes toward, 31; foreign aid, 196; independence, 5, 112; non-alignment, 5 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, 202 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 100, 102; safeguards and regulations, 152, 156–57, 170, 177–80, 201 International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC), 106, 115, 120(i); balanced reporting, 158–59, 163; Canada-India friction on, 88–90, 149, 164–66, 169, 192, 200; India’s behaviour on, 95–96, 111, 159, 162–65, 171, 267n91; in Laos, 137–38, 140, 273n69; in Vietnam, 88, 112, 158–59, 162–66, 215 Irwin, Rodney, 226–27 Islam, 103 Israel, 106–7 Japan, 189, 196–97 Jenkins, William, 223–24, 230, 236 Jha, C.S., 147, 151, 275n103

300 Index

Jha, L.K., 195 Judd, Denis, 23 Kaul, T.N., 42, 197, 228–29 Kearney, John: Indian Commonwealth membership and, 27–28, 34; on India-Pakistan partition, 26; meeting with Nehru, 21; on Nehru’s political positioning, 33; posting to India, 2, 16, 20–21; reaction to Indian independence, 22–23 Keenleyside, Hugh, 14 Khan, Ayub, 172; friendship with Diefenbaker, 131, 133–35, 147–48 Khrushchev, Nikita, 104, 107, 115 King, Mackenzie: Cold War concerns, 15; exchanges with Churchill, 12–13; exchanges with Pearson, 11–12, 20; foreign policy, 25; high commissioner deliberations, 12–14, 16; on India in the Commonwealth, 3, 17, 18–19, 30–31; on Indian independence, 22; India’s admiration for, 14, 15; letter from Massey, 10–11; memorandum from Skelton, 11; partition concerns, 19; St. Laurent and, 18–19; trip to India, 9–10, 116, 117(i); view of British Empire, 17; visit with Nehru, 30 Kissinger, Henry, 202; response to Indian nuclear testing, 220, 222, 228–29, 284n18, 285n27 Korean War: armistice, 75–76, 77; Canada-India relations during, 53, 60–62, 68–69, 141; peace negotiations, 63–68 Lall, Arthur, 110 Laos, 137–38, 140, 273n69 Law of the Sea, 139–41, 206 Léger, Jules, 91, 101, 105, 109 LePan, Douglas, 47–49, 53–55, 57–58 Lewis, Wilfrid Bennet, 98 Liberal government, 59, 91; election defeat (1957), 125; majority win (1968), 187, 188; minority win (1963), 147, 149 Lloyd, Selwyn, 71, 73, 74 London Club of Nuclear Suppliers, 238 Lucknow (ON), 1, 2, 116(i)

MacDonald, Donald, 232–33, 238 MacDonald, Malcolm, 14 MacEachen, Allan, 230, 288n99; on Canada-India nuclear cooperation, 231, 236–39 MacKay, R.A., 32, 34, 37 Maddocks, Arthur F., 227–28 Maharajah of Kotah, 133 Malik, Sardar, 28 Martin, Paul, 118(i), 119, 147, 151, 163; meeting with Shastri, 168–69, 171–73; role in India’s nuclear program, 158, 170, 177–80, 187; trip to India, 114 Massanjore Dam, 101, 119(i) Massey, Vincent, 10–11, 13, 112 Maybee, J.R., 232, 236 McGhee, George, 43, 63 McInnes, Graham, 81–83, 103 McNaughton, Andrew, 14, 16 media: Canadian, 44, 113, 169, 193, 267n91, 273n67; Indian, 37, 87, 113, 132–33, 160, 216; on India’s nuclear program, 180–81; response to Canadian sanctions, 222; stereotyping, 124(i); on Trudeau’s visit to India, 200–1 Menon, K.P.S., 15, 107, 108, 252n29, 263n69 Menon, Krishna, 4, 26, 61, 118(i), 119, 273n69; meeting with Ronning, 127; as minister of defence, 145; opinion of Diefenbaker and Green, 274n83; personality and health, 69–70, 106, 111–12, 140–41, 245; POW resolution proposal, 70–73; at the UN, 73–75, 110; view of Canada, 80, 137 Menzies, Arthur, 47, 96, 197, 232; on Canada-India commonalities, 139; Canadian foreign policy review, 196; on Diefenbaker and Nehru, 135 Michener, Roland, 161, 172, 181, 211; ICSC concerns, 163–64 Midnight’s Children (Rushdie), 22 military aid: Canadian aircraft, 146–47, 171; for defence, 167, 171; to India, 104–5, 146–47, 150–51; NATO, 52; to Pakistan, 79, 82–83, 85, 105, 174; to Saigon, 158; Western, 151 Montreal Gazette, 44, 169, 267n91 Morrison, Barry, 212, 215

Index 301

Munro, Donald, 183, 192 Muslim League, 18, 253n48 Muslim population, 23 Narayan, J.P., 37 Nasser, Gamel Abdel, 106 National Research Experimental (NRX) reactor, 98–100, 104, 248 National Research Universal (NRU) reactor, 99 nationalism: Chinese and Asian, 127, 129; Gandhi’s economic, 195; Indian, 10, 184; Quebec, 164 NATO: Canada foreign policy and, 6, 80; Diefenbaker’s support for, 125, 126; financial resources, 53, 54; Indian foreign policy and, 103; military assistance, 52; Nehru’s view of, 85 Nehru, Braj Kumar, 137 Nehru, Jawaharlal: atomic energy negotiations, 99; attitude on Suez and Hungary, 108–10, 113; on CanadaUS relations, 85–86, 89–90, 247; on Canadian wheat, 58, 147; at Colombo conference, 48–49; commitment to non-alignment, 33, 138–40; Commonwealth membership and, 27–28, 31, 33–37; criticism of US, 43, 63, 68, 79, 132; death, 160; independence speech, 22; Korean War efforts, 60–65, 70; meeting with Kearney, 21; meeting with King, 30; meeting with St. Laurent, 80, 84, 87–88, 265n32; meetings with Diefenbaker, 126, 131–32; photos, 120, 121(i), 122(i); relationship with Ho Chi Minh, 90–91; relationship with Pearson, 34, 45, 48, 49–50, 63–64, 75; UN statement of principles and, 66–67; visit to the US, 4, 26, 40–43; visits to Canada, 4, 25–26, 39, 44–45, 112–13, 243, 270n171 Nehru, R.K., 144 Nehru, Vijayalakshmi (Vijaya), 63, 70, 75–76 New Zealand, 31, 35–36, 39 Nixon, Richard, 202 non-alignment: Bandung conference, 94, 107; Canada’s reaction to, 39–40, 97, 169, 245; cultural and religious

stereotypes and, 135, 218; Gandhi’s departure from, 202; Indian economy and, 138; India’s reasoning for, 81–82, 92, 95, 138–39, 187; US reaction to, 4, 40–42, 76 non-proliferation treaty (NPT): Canada’s failure to persuade India on, 198, 245; “Canada’s Nuclear Export and NPT Policy in Response to the Indian Test,” 225; China’s refusal to sign, 187, 200; France’s refusal to sign, 220; India’s refusal to sign, 181–86, 190, 200, 246; negotiations in Geneva, 175, 181 North Vietnam: communist withdrawal to, 88; ICSC and, 158–59, 162; India’s attitude toward, 89–90, 95–97, 164, 169, 175 nuclear cooperation (Canada-India): concessions, 231–32; handling of by-products, 100–1; NPT differences, 8, 193–95, 199, 213–14, 246; nuclear testing, 217–20; opportunities and challenges, 2, 98, 152–56, 172; reaction to nuclear explosion, 220–23, 227–29; reactor negotiations and sales, 98–99, 149, 151–52, 156–57, 236–38; safeguards, 177–80, 201, 233, 236–37; talks in Ottawa, 224–27; termination of, 237–40. See also Canada-India Reactor (CIR/CIRUS); Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP I); Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP II) nuclear proliferation: Canada’s stance, 225, 233, 246, 280n51; India’s considerations, 167, 176–77; for peaceful purposes, 181–82, 224; US and British concerns, 101 nuclear safeguards: Bhabha’s criticisms of, 102, 154–56; Gandhi government and, 176; India’s concessions to, 157–58, 179–80; international, 8, 178, 201, 214; Ottawa’s promotion of, 2, 156, 158, 178–79, 186, 222 nuclear testing: cartoon on, 124(i); Chinese, 166–67, 176; Indian, 171, 190–91, 216–220, 222–24; international reaction to India’s, 220–21, 225,

302 Index

285n27; non-nuclear weapon states and, 175–76, 201; for peaceful purposes, 181–82, 218–19, 222–24, 228–29; Soviet, 42 nuclear weapons: Canada’s attitude toward, 217, 224; India’s attitude toward, 156, 167–68, 170, 216; plutonium diverted for, 99–100, 170–71, 194, 217, 219, 233, 238 Nutting, Sinclair, 111 Odlum, Victor, 12, 13–14, 15 Ottawa Citizen, 113, 278n70 Ottawa Group, 156, 276n25 Pakistan: Canada relations, 7, 143, 147–48, 251n7; China relations, 164; Diefenbaker’s view of, 131–33; financial aid, 56; foreign policy, 103; government, 55; independence, 1, 203; India tensions, 22, 31, 171, 172, 202–3; protests, 211; US military aid, 79, 82–83, 85, 105, 174; Western relations, 103, 134 Pannikar, K.M., 61, 63, 66–68 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 157–58, 276n31 partition of India, 18–19, 22–23 Patel, Sardar, 27, 31, 35, 36–37 Pearson, Geoffrey, 201 Pearson, Lester (as prime minister): aloofness toward India, 185, 187; election victory (1963), 147, 149–50; IMEA and, 166; India’s nuclear program and, 177–78; meeting with Shastri, 168–73; retirement, 184 Pearson, Lester (as secretary of state for external affairs): atomic energy negotiations, 98–99; Colombo Plan efforts, 47–48, 50–51, 54–58; Dulles and, 93; on fostering Canada-India ties, 2–3; on Indian foreign policy, 83, 90; Indian high commissioner search, 15–16, 252n32, 253n36; Indian/Asian Commonwealth membership and, 20, 33–37, 114; Korean War efforts, 61–65; memorandum to King, 11–12; photos, 116, 117(i), 118(i), 119, 120, 121(i), 122, 123(i); relationship with Deshmukh,

55; relationship with Menon, 70–75, 106–7; relationship with Nehru, 34, 45, 48, 49–50, 63–64, 75, 102; trip to Pakistan, 103; trips to India, 49, 101–3; work on UN statement of principles, 65–66 People’s Republic of China (PRC). See China Pick, Alfred J., 17–18, 39, 253n49 Pillai, Raghavan, 98, 108, 110, 267n91 Poland, 88–89 policy. See American policy; Canadian policy; foreign policy; Indian policy; policy makers policy makers: American, 41, 43, 83, 146; for Asia-Pacific regions, 196; bilateral relations and, 6, 112; Canadian, 2, 149, 170–71, 189, 204–5, 244, 246–49; Colombo Plan and, 46, 52–53, 105; cultural and religious assumptions of, 5, 7, 76, 81–82, 244; financial aid and, 24, 137; Indian, 167, 241; non-alignment and, 97, 138; on Pakistan and the West, 134; views on India, 2, 4–5, 6 poverty, 9, 49, 218 Prasad, N.B., 152, 154 prisoners of war (POWs), 77, 79; repatriation of, 69–73; UN responsibility for, 69, 74 Progressive Conservative government, 4, 125, 147 public opinion: American, 82; Asian, 63–64; Canadian, 32, 57, 218; Indian, 27, 91, 184, 186 racial segregation, 9 Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, 61 Rajan, M.S., 8 Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP I), 179, 183, 221; negotiations, 152, 156–58; safeguards, 170, 201 Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP II), 180, 221, 238; safeguards, 170, 176–80, 201, 233–35 Rau, B.N., 61, 66–68 Rauf, Mohamed Abdul, 89, 97, 108, 270n171; on the Diefenbaker government, 126–27 Reece, David, 172, 211, 288n99

Index 303

Reid, Escott, 29, 59, 83, 106, 248; on Canada-India relations, 8, 25, 45, 80, 89, 94, 111–15, 189; on communist expansion, 53–54; impression of Nehru, 49, 92; on India’s economic conditions, 50; India-West campaign, 93–95, 105, 109–10; on Khrushchev’s visit to India, 104; memo on Colombo Conference, 45; and Nehru’s attitude toward Hungary, 108–9; photos, 116, 117(i), 118(i), 119; posting to India, 76–79, 114–15, 243; on St. Laurent and Nehru meeting, 87–88; on US-India relations, 91–93, 243; on Vietnam, 96–97; visit with Pearson in Calcutta, 101–3 Ritchie, A.E., 203, 217, 225; on CanadaIndia relations, 197–98 Ritchie, Charles, 84–88, 147, 265n32; meeting with Menon, 140–41 Robertson, Norman, 13–14, 29, 137, 151; on India’s nuclear concessions, 157–58 Robinson, Basil, 139, 180, 230; CanadaIndia nuclear negotiations, 236–37; on the demise of Canada-India relations, 239–40, 288n99; Europe and Asian Commonwealth tour, 130–31, 133–35; on India on the ICSC, 162, 277n46; meeting with Nehru, 131–32 Rogers, A.B., 209, 212–15 Rogers, Robert Louis, 112, 231, 235, 238–39; frustration with Indian practices, 162–63, 171 Ronning, Chester, 105, 121(i); on CanadaIndia relations, 6, 140–42, 160, 161–62, 244–45; on Diefenbaker and Nehru meeting, 134–35; on Indian policy, 129–30, 139–40, 159; India’s nuclear program and, 156–58; military aid efforts, 150–51; political background, 127–28; posting to India, 114, 128 Rotter, Andrew J., 251n6 royal titles, 20 Saksena, R.R., 88 Sarabhai, Vikram, 179, 180, 216–17 Scott, Morley, 37, 142, 144 Seaborn, Blair, 191–92, 204, 281n10; on the ICSC, 159, 162, 277n46

security: Asian, 52–53; Canadian, 55, 186; Indian, 38, 60, 99, 185, 280n47; NATO, 85; Western, 54 Sharp, Mitchell, 193, 199, 229; political background, 188–89; response to Indian nuclear testing, 219–21 Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 122, 123(i), 161, 172; nuclear weapons program and, 167–68; visit to Canada, 164–66, 168–73 Singh, Kewal, 224, 226–29, 237 Singh, Kushwant, 29 Singh, S.K., 187 Singh, Shamsher, 227, 230 Singh, Swaran, 199, 219; on nuclear testing for peaceful purposes, 176–77, 231; reaction to ICSC criticism, 163–65 Sino-Indo border war, 145–47, 150, 166, 202 Skelton, O.D., 11 Smith, Arnold, 162–63 Smith, Bedell, 82 Smith, Lawrence, 141 Smith, Sidney, 128, 142–43 South Africa, 144 South Asia: aid and economic development, 52, 54–58; Britain and, 1, 38; Canada relations, 3, 6, 197; Canada’s policy review on, 111, 203–6, 215, 246; Commonwealth membership, 20, 48; communism in, 46; religious and cultural assumptions of, 2 South Vietnam, 158–59, 162–63, 200; government, 89, 165; Nehru’s view of, 90–91 Soviet Union: atomic bomb testing, 42; Diefenbaker’s criticism of, 125, 126; economic and military aid for India, 104–5; embassy in New Delhi, 29; expansion, 41, 44, 48, 54; friendship with India, 202–3; Gandhi’s visit to, 175; Hungarian invasion, 94, 107–9, 128; KGB, 202; Nehru’s attitude toward, 28, 61; in Sino-Indo border dispute, 146 St. Laurent, Louis, 31, 43, 55, 61, 65; on India’s Commonwealth membership, 37; relationship with Nehru, 25, 33–34, 44, 67–69, 84, 87–88, 108–9;

304 Index

as secretary of state for external affairs, 3, 18–19; visit to India, 80, 83–87 St. Laurent government, 3, 4, 60, 106; development assistance for Asia, 97–98 Stalin, Joseph, 61, 104, 146 stereotypes, 124(i), 135, 212, 244, 248 strikes, 218 Suez Crisis, 106–7, 110, 115, 141; Diefenbaker’s position on, 125; Nehru’s reaction to, 107–8 Taylor, John, 226–27 Teja, T.J., 230 Tibet, 136, 138 Times of India, 113, 180, 201, 216, 222 trade relations: Canada-China, 146–47, 164–65, 167, 207–8, 274n98; CanadaIndia, 43, 83–84, 131, 283n60 Trudeau, Pierre: bilateral aid/trade interests, 208; election victory, 187, 188; exchanges with Gandhi, 123(i), 193, 201, 211, 221–22; nuclear negotiations, 237–38; political ideals, 188; reaction to Indian nuclear testing, 219, 224; trip to India, 124(i), 199–201 Truman, Harry, 43, 44 Trumbull, R. Robert, 29 Turner, John, 230–31 United Nations, 4, 52, 64, 86, 111; aggressor resolution, 67–68, 262n40; Canada-India cooperation at, 60, 74, 111, 139–40, 145; forces in North Korea, 52–53, 54, 60–63; Korean peace conference, 76, 79; objections to India at, 114, 143; responsibility for POWs, 69, 74; Security Council, 39, 52–53, 94, 105; statement of principles, 65–66; Suez Crisis and, 109, 110, 125; twenty-onepower resolution, 70, 73

United States: China relations, 42, 61, 65–70, 92, 132; Cold War strategy, 83; Commonwealth and, 38; economic interests, 42; Gandhi’s visit to, 174–75; in Korean War, 52–53, 60–64; military aid to Pakistan, 79, 82–83, 174; Nehru’s visits to, 4, 26, 40–43; Pakistan alliance, 33, 93, 203; in Vietnam War, 164–65, 174–75, 202. See also Canada-US relations; US-India relations uranium, 152, 154–55, 157, 170 US State Department, 51, 220, 226, 228 US-India relations: aid, 45, 51, 79; decline of, 191, 202; foreign policy, 79, 251n6; Korean War struggles, 63, 66, 71–76; military assistance, 146; nonalignment policy concerns, 39–42, 76, 82; nuclear cooperation, 217, 220; public opinion on, 82; Reid’s appeal on, 91–93 Van Dong, Pham, 90 Vietnam War, 169, 187, 208, 243; provisional boundary, 88; US in, 164–65, 174–75, 202. See also North Vietnam; South Vietnam Wainman-Wood, Thomas, 218 Webster, David, 5 wheat: aid, 57, 140, 279n23; exports, 83–84, 146–47, 167; India’s rejection of, 58 Wigglesworth, Richard B., 134 Wilder, L.J., 204 Wilgress, Dana, 78, 79 Williams, Bruce, 129, 206, 214; bilateral aid consultations, 207–8, 212 Winters, Robert, 180 Wrong, Hume, 14, 62, 66–67; letter to Heeney, 40–41, 257n89

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