Conditional Structures in Mesopotamian Old Babylonian 9781575066806

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CONDITIONAL STRUCTURES IN MESOPOTAMIAN OLD BABYLONIAN

L A N G UA G E S O F TH E A NC I E N T N E A R E A S T Editorial Board Gonzalo Rubio, Pennsylvania State University Editor-in-Chief James P. Allen Gene B. Gragg John Huehnergard Manfred Krebernik Antonio Loprieno H. Craig Melchert Piotr Michalowski P. Oktor Skjærvø Michael P. Streck

Brown University The Oriental Institute, Univ. of Chicago Harvard University Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena Universität Basel  University of California, Los Angeles University of Michigan Harvard University Universität Leipzig

1.  A Grammar of the Hittite Language, by Harry A. Hoffner Jr. and H. Craig Melchert Part 1: Reference Grammar Part 2: Tutorial 2.  The Akkadian Verb and Its Semitic Background, by N. J. C. Kouwenberg 3.  Most Probably: Epistemic Modality in Old Babylonian, by Nathan Wasserman 4.  Conditional Structures in Mesopotamian Old Babylonian, by Eran Cohen

Conditional Structures in Mesopotamian Old Babylonian

by

E ran C ohen The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Winona Lake, Indiana Eisenbrauns 2012

© 2012 by Eisenbrauns Inc. All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America www.eisenbrauns.com

  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cohen, Eran Conditional structures in Mesopotamian Old Babylonian / by Eran Cohen.    p.  cm. — (Languages of the ancient Near East ; 4) Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ISBN 978-1-57506-222-8 (alk. paper) 1. Akkadian language—Conditionals.  2. Akkadian language—Modality.  I. Title. PJ3251.C64 2012 492′.156—dc23 2012024476 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. ♾ ™

‫לגדעון גולדנברג‬

‫ אלא גם מה שיכול היה לקרות‬,‫ לא רק מה שקורה באמת‬.‫גם אלו החיים‬ (531 ′‫ עמ‬,2011 ‫ זמורה ביתן‬,‫ נוילנד‬,‫)אשכול נבו‬ “That’s life too. Not only what actually happens, but also what could have happened.” (Eshkol Nevo, Neuland, Zmora-Bitan 2011, p. 531)

Contents Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ix 1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 1.1. Conventions  2 1.2. Method  5 1.3.  General linguistic view of conditionals  9 1.4.  Other Semitic languages  15 1.4.1.  Biblical Hebrew  15 1.4.2.  Contemporary Hebrew  16 1.4.3.  Gəʿəz (Ancient Ethiopic)  18 1.4.4.  Classical Arabic  19 1.4.5.  Ancient Semitic CSs: concluding remarks  22 1.5.  Conditional structures in Akkadian: literature review  23 1.6.  Corpus definition  25 1.7. Aims  27 2.  The Letter Corpus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29 2.1.  šumma conditionals  29 2.1.1.  Syntagmatic characteristics  30 2.1.2.  Paradigmatic characteristics: protasis and apodosis  36 2.1.2.1.  The protasis  36 2.1.2.2.  The apodosis: internal paradigmatic characteristics  60 2.1.3.  Conditional structures with different value  72 2.1.4.  Summary of šumma conditionals  77 2.2.  Paratactic conditionals  78 2.2.1.  The -ma conditional pattern  78 2.2.2.  Precative conditionals  90 2.3.  Conditional constructions with modal particles  93 2.4.  Conditional constructions with asseverative forms as protasis  97 2.5.  ištūma clauses  98 2.6.  Counterfactual conditions  101 2.7. Conclusions  109 2.7.1.  Summary and conclusions  109 2.7.2.  The syntactic nature of the protasis  111 3.  Conditional Structures in the Law Collections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 3.1.  Various strategies and paradigmatic constitution  123 3.1.1.  šumma structures  123 3.1.1.1.  The protasis in the law collections: literature review  125 vii

viii

Contents

3.1.1.2.  iprus versus iptaras 128 3.1.1.3.  lā iprus and iptaras 130 3.1.1.4.  iprus and iprusu 132 3.1.1.5.  Referential environments in the laws  133 3.1.1.6.  The functions of iparras 136 3.1.1.7.  The apodosis paradigm  141 3.1.2.  Precative protasis  143 3.1.3.  “Indicative” protasis  144 3.1.4.  inūma clauses  145 3.1.5.  ūm clauses  145 3.1.6.  ša clause 145 3.2.  Additional characteristics  146 3.3.  The nature of the conditional constructions in the law collections  147 3.4. Conclusions  151 4.  Conditional Structures in the Omens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 4.1.  Distinctive characteristics of omens  153 4.1.1. Markers  154 4.1.2. Protasis  154 4.1.2.1.  paris versus iparras 157 4.1.2.2.  paris versus iprus 157 4.1.3.  The omen apodosis  159 4.2.  The syntactic nature of omen CSs  163 4.2.1.  The epistolary omen report  163 4.2.2.  Other semiotic systems  164 4.2.3.  The omen apodosis paradigm  166 4.3.  Concluding remarks  169 5.  General Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 5.1.  The procedure  171 5.2.  Comparative perspective on the patterns in each genre  172 5.2.1.  The hypotheticality scale  174 5.2.2.  Conditional types  175 5.2.3.  Lack of hypotheticality  176 5.2.4.  Similar types cross-genre  178 5.3.  Cross-genre comparison of šumma structures  179 5.3.1.  Modality, tense, and aspect  181 5.3.2.  šumma structures across the OB genres  182 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Indexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 Index of Texts Cited  193 Index of Topics  197

Preface The seeds of this monograph are quite old: the issue of conditional patterns was wisely taken out of my Ph.D. research proposal back in 1997 by my supervisor, Gideon Goldenberg. This made the scope of research for my dissertation more manageable and helped carry out the task in a considerably shorter time. Collecting the epistolary material began in 2004, stopped for three years for practical reasons, and then resumed. By then, other genres were brought into the investigation—laws and omens—to complete the portrait of conditional structures in Old Babylonian. Research was slow and time consuming: the amount of raw data was truly immense (as it is in any work on syntax); the fact that conditional structures interface with many other issues made the task of analysis a complex one. Furthermore, there is a difficulty of interpretation inherent to the study of ancient languages that does not exist with modern languages. Accordingly, one needs to be very careful not to stretch meaning to suit one’s analytical purposes. The results of this research involve much more than just conditional structures: they have interfaces with many syntactic and macrosyntactic issues in Old Babylonian, such as tense, mood, phoricity, clause-combining strategies, and other issues as well. Emerging from this work are several solutions both for the description of Akkadian and for some general linguistic issues such as the syntactic relationships within conditional structures, the importance of genre and context in understanding conditionals, and the characterization and description of conditional patterns. The book is aimed at two types of audience: readers versed in Akkadian as well as linguistic typologists. The conclusions of every chapter are intended to be accessible to general linguists. Quite a few people have taken part along the way, and I want to express my deepest gratitude to them: Gideon Goldenberg, who read the manuscript at an early phase and made many crucial remarks; John Huehnergard, for his good advice that this should be a book; my students and colleagues Yaʾar Hever and Michal Marmorstein, two young linguists and experts in Semitic languages, for their linguistic perception and keen eye; Eitan Grossman, with whom I engaged in endless conversations about linguistic matters through the years; Guy Ron-Gilboa, who helped at the advanced stage of corrections, for his attention to details as well as for his ability to see the entire picture; and Sergey Loesov, my colleague, for his perceptive comments on the manuscript. In addition, I wish to thank Gonzalo Rubio (editor-in-chief of the LANE series) and and Michael P. Streck (board members of LANE) for reading the manuscript and accepting the monograph, as well as for their advice and constructive remarks, and Jim Eisenbraun, for his patience, expertise, and devotion. ix

x

Preface

Last but not least, I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation to my family—my wife and friend Ruth and my children, Yonatan, Noga, Omri, and Yael—who have always been my constant source of energy and inspiration.

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION The phenomenon of conditional structures (henceforth, CSs) in natural language constitutes a coded abstraction of the relationship between two related states of affairs. Considering the principles of structural linguistics, where a linguistic sign is the relationship obtaining between form (signifier) and content (signified), one faces some complex form—namely, a construction—that is the exponent of conditional relationships. However, conditional constructions are special in that they often have other functions that are not strictly conditional and, in some cases, even functions that are strictly not conditional. On the other hand, a clearly conditional function is many times signaled by structures that a priori seem to have nothing to do with conditionality. The issues raised by this complex situation are at the center of many linguistic discussions of conditionals. CSs have captivated the attention of scholars mainly in three domains: philosophy, psychology, and linguistics. Each discipline (in fact, even each subdiscipline) has dealt with the aspects it considers most important, often covering different territories with little overlap: philosophers have been concerned with, for example, the truth values of protasis and apodosis, thus formalizing the implicative relationship between them. Psychologists are interested in the cognitive dimension—acquisition, production, and reasoning of various types of CSs. Some of these are included in linguistic research of conditionals as well. Linguists investigated this phenomenon first in specific languages and later tryied to isolate some features that show cross-linguistic validity. It is worth noting that a monograph-long linguistic typology treating this phenomenon cross-linguistically does not yet exist. 1 This situation obtains because conditional structures are very complex and are expressed by many structures (see Xrakovskij 2005: 6–12, where some twenty-odd strategies of expressing conditionals in Russian alone are listed). There are relatively few full-scale descriptions of specific languages’ con­ditional systems. A comprehensive typology must rely on individual language descriptions, but the space usually dedicated in grammars to this system is more often than not very limited. In each individual description, many issues of typological import arise, such as modality, functional sentence perspective, ultra-clausal syntax, and seman­tic relationships. Accordingly, the objective of this description of the Old Babylonian (henceforth, OB) conditional system is twofold: first, to further the knowledge of this subsystem within the OB linguistic description (which up to this point has been given only very 1.  Xrakovskij 2005 is an attempt at such typology, but it mostly consists of language-specific descriptions, rather than trying to depict a cross-linguistic view of this phenomenon.

1

2

Introduction

short references); and second, to extract and discuss the issues deemed salient for a typologically-oriented understanding of this linguistic pheno­menon. This introduction includes the following issues: 1. The conventions used to refer to various predicative forms and their place in the system; 2. An explanatory background of the set of methodological principles used throughout this monograph; 3. A selective survey of the general linguistic literature about conditionals; 4. Some background material pertaining to conditionals in the other Semitic languages; 5. A survey of the literature pertaining to OB conditionals; 6. A definition of the corpora used throughout this work; 7. The aims of this work. 1.1. Conventions The Semitic languages are considered inflecting languages, but unlike most IndoEuropean languages, which are also inflecting, the number of morphologically distinct predicative forms is relatively limited. Old Babylonian, too, has a limited form inventory. However, this inventory is regularly combined with various negative as well as other particles, which increases the number of predicative forms that are morpho-syntactically distinct. Nonetheless, some of these predicative forms seem to have more than one function. This means that the same shape, or external form, may have different functions and possibly need to be regarded as distinct linguistic entities. Only when considered in their specific syntactic context can one be certain of the identity and function of each form. 2 In other words, the form in itself does not mean much; only together with its environment can it be examined and tagged. So, for instance, the particle -ma, which is often taken in Assyriology to be a single polysemous particle, may be regarded as constituting different entities when considered together with its syntactic environment: occurring immediately after a verbal form, it essentially interconnects the verbal form forward (“connective -ma”), whereas following a nonverbal entity it marks the nonverbal entity as focal or rhematic (“focusing -ma”). Both cases could co-occur in the same clause. An exponent, whether simple or complex, must be defined together with its environment as well as its special characteristics. The forms in this framework are not labeled by their traditional names (which are given based upon their most prominent function) for the simple reason that this may yield oxymorons such as “the negative preterite form functioning as a future perfect.” Therefore, they are called by their basic stem forms (iprus, iptaras, etc.), attempting to avoid a priori judgment. 2.  This is a somewhat simplified account. In reality, there are further neutralizations in forms due to various endings (pronominal as well as the ventive suffixes). This explains why the precise syntactic setting is so important. Morphological categories are dependent on syntactic analysis.

1.1. Conventions

3

The table below is devised to provide some orientation for the uninitiated in Old Babylonian in this maze of forms that often look alike, followed by several comments about the designation of forms and groups of forms throughout this study. The table takes into consideration the syntactic context, the basic form, and the particles deemed to be part of it. In the table, the forms are thus arranged by groups according to their syntactic setting. Table 1.1 a

b

c

independent clauses

pronominal question

attributive clauses

neg.

aff.

1

modally unmarked

ul+form

iprus iptaras iparras paris

2

precative (deontic modality)

lā iparras lā taparras lā paris ayyiprus

3

lā iprusu assever­ative lā iptarsu (responsive lā iparrasu insistence) lā parsu

liprus purus lū paris lū iprus a lū iptaras lū iparras lū paris

neg.

aff.

lā+form

iprus iptaras iparras paris

lā iparras lā paris

liprus purus

none

neg.

aff.

lā+form

iprusu iptarsu iparras parsu

none

none

a.  There are variant forms for the affirmative, which are identical to the affirmative attributive forms, namely, iprusu, iptarsu, iparrasu, etc.

The following remarks refer to entire groups, rather than to individual forms; note that the represent­ative forms are normally 3cs. The designation throughout this study is usually by form (e.g., ul iparras, iptarsu) and only in a few cases by a group name (e.g., precative, asseverative). 1a.  Forms denoting either indicativity or modality (e.g., when occurring in protases of paratactic conditionals, see §2.2.1): [1] aššum elepp-ēt-im . . . nadān-im ašpur-akkum elepp-ēt-im about boat-fp-obl inf-give-gen 1cs-write-pst-dat.2ms boat-fp-obl ul t-addin neg 2ms-give-pst ‘I wrote you about giving the boats . . . you did not give the boats’ 10, 66:4–6 3 3.  The locus of examples is given for the primary corpus chosen for each genre, only by numbers—that is, the AbB volumes (the epistolary genre) are designated by volume, letter:line(s). The laws in the LE law

4

Introduction

1b.  Forms occurring in pronominal questions: [2] ana mīn-im lā t-addin to what-gen neg 2ms-give-pst ‘Why did you not give?’ 2, 129:8–9 1c.  Forms that occur only as clausal attributes of nuclei (that is, entities in the construct state, as well as conjunctions). These forms are traditionally refered to as “subjunctive” or “subordinative”: [3] ištu . . . kasp-am lā t-addin-u since . . . silver-acc neg 2ms-give-pst-subj Since . . . you did not give the silver. . . .’ 10, 198:20–21 Two points may be raised about these forms: first, they are not modal, in the sense that the label “modal” is used in, for example, the Romance languages. They merely denote subordination and attribution. Second, these forms never occur without a preceding nucleus, which could be a conjunction, a pronoun, or a substantive in the construct state. In all these cases, this subordination cannot be considered to be asyndesis, because there is always an explicit “subordinating” agent, to wit, the entity in construct state. 2a.  A complex group 4 consisting of several subgroups (directives, wishes, etc.). The entire group is designated by the denomination precative, which in Assyriological terminology simply represents 3rd-person forms; 5 in this study, it represents the entire group of forms, including purus (the imperative), luprus (1cs), as well as the negative forms (lā iparras). Occasionally, an individual form is meant, and in this case it is designated by its individual form—for example, purus or liprus: [4] ana PN l-i-ddin to PN juss-3cs-give ‘Let him give to PN’ 2, 116:13 2b.  This group consists of precative forms (to the exclusion of the impera­tive purus) which figure in a pronominal question: [5] ša kīma yâti ana kâšim mann-um l-i-[dd]in pron.nuc like obl.1cs to dat.2cs who-nom juss-3cs-give ‘Who would give you one like me?’ 9, 141:5–7 collection are given by § only. The omens from YOS 10 are noted by tablet (column): line(s). Other sources are given in full. 4.  See Cohen 2005a: chap.t 4. 5.  In this terminology, 1cp iniprus is termed cohortative, the 2nd person is termed imperative, but the forms denoting the negative counterparts of these forms are all termed prohibitive, regardless of person— hence the preference of having one cover term, backed up syntactically as well as semantically (see n. 4).

1.2. Method

5

3a. The asseverative group consists of forms whose chief function is the expression of responsive insistence (or in other terms, emphatic assertion or denial). They are designated by form (e.g., lū iprus) only rarely: [6] ana errēš-im lū iddin . . . to cultivator-gen ptcl 3cs-give-pst ‘(if) he did give (it) to the cultivator. . . .’ 14, 163:18 It needs to be mentioned that the forms at play in the various conditional patterns are not included here for the obvious reason that they receive an extensive discussion below. 1.2. Method The linguistic descriptive methodology followed throughout this work is structural, as initially brought together, based upon older sources, in de Saussure (1995) and implemented first and foremost in the works of H. J. Polotsky (e.g., 1957, 1965, 1976), as well as in Frei (1968), Shisha Halevy (e.g., 1986, 1995), and in my own work (most notably Cohen 2005a, 2006, Izre'el and Cohen 2004:62–115). The following paragraphs constitute an explanation and illustration of the most important principles of this method. A.  The inquiry is synchronic in nature, describing a defined corpus (see corpus definition, §1.6 below) that ideally comprises a single language phase. The primary material, which is the concrete manifestation of language (the parole, or message), is studied in order to be able to to get at the system (the langue, or code) behind it and formulate it. B. The message vs. code dichotomy is universally recognized in the differentiation between phonetics (which describes the message, the primary material) and phonology (which describes the discrete units pertinent to the code system). This dichotomy is here considered relevant to all levels of analysis. Consider the following cases: Morphology: the formation iptaras, considered for a long time to be a single linguistic entity, has eventually been analyzed as two different linguistic entities, thanks to rare iptatras forms 6 that showed that the morpheme t(a) is compatible with another t(a). This finding proved beyond any doubt that the form iptaras is the actualization in the message of one of two linguistically different entities (which have the same external form) in the code system—one is the form traditionally termed perfect, while the other is a t stem whose value is essentially reflexive, reciprocal, or passive. One (external) form in the message, then, may re­present more than one linguistic entity. The opposite may occur as well. Syntax: the concrete manifestation of language, the message, presents us a priori with two different syntagms: 6.  The form iptatras stands for all stems; Streck (1995 and 2003:3–16) claims that there are hardly any such forms and that, at any rate, they are negligible. However, there are enough forms (see list in Streck 1995: 222–28) to deduce that there are two different types of -t(a)- formative.

6

Introduction

[7] awīl-um aḫ-ū-ka man-nom brother-nom-gen.2ms ‘the man is your brotherʼ [8] aḫ-ū-ka anāku brother-nom-gen.2ms nom.1cs ‘I am your brotherʼ Although these two instances have different element order, after analysis, it becomes apparent that they are in fact allo-syntagms (that is, syntactic alloforms) of the same pattern: the bipartite nonverbal clause (Cohen 2005b: 258–64). They are actually found in com­plementary dis­tribution with each other: when the theme is a substantive (awīlum), the first syntagm is used, but when it is a personal pronoun (anāku), one finds the second. Both allo-syntagms in fact constitute only a single pattern in the system. The message contains many pieces of information that are not pertinent in the actual system—that is, they have no independent functional load. The internal organization of what is pertinent constitutes the description of the system, namely, its scientific representation. C.  The system consists of twofold entities, termed signs, where there exists a relationship between some kind of form (occasionally termed exponent, or signal, or signifiant) and content (a certain function or value, or signifié). Because the function is not apparent a priori, it is to be discerned in the analytic procedure and formulated as precisely as possible. This is true not only in the case of morphology (where, e.g., the values of the two forms t  (a) are determined) but also in syntax. For instance, consider the following syntagm: [9] anāku aḫ-ū-ka nom.1.cs brother-nom-gen.2ms ‘I (rather than anyone else) am your brother’ This example shows the opposite order of entities from the example above. Huehnergard (1986: 225 n. 34) isolates this order of elements as a different case and formulates its function: in contrast to the example above, in this case, anāku is the emphasized or, better, contrasted element. D.  The message is basically produced as a horizontal linear axis. This axis is referred to as the syntagmatic axis—that is, where entities follow or precede each other. These relationships are termed syntagmatic relation­ships. The method of structural analysis provides us with yet another axis, which is the next step of the analysis: the paradigmatic axis. This axis is formed by the different entities that may occupy, in posse, the same slot in the chain of entities. These entities form a paradigm. 7 These two axes are 7.  Note the marked difference from the traditional use of the term “paradigm.” The structural paradigm is different in that it is not based on morphological similarity. For instance, whereas case markings of the

1.2. Method

7

at the heart of the structural method; they are the device par excellence used to uncover the various groups in the system and their interrelationships. E.  The way to determine the functional value of entities is by opposing them, in the same syntactic slot, with other members of the paradigm. The same paradigm necessarily presupposes the same syntagmatic conditions. The following illustration consists of the OB temporal clauses (henceforth TCs). 8 When trying to establish the relevant paradigm for the TCs, it must be done in the same syntagmatic environment—namely, where the main clause exhibits the same tense or mood across our compared cases. This is done so that there would be only one difference between the compared syntagms. The following table compares several types of TCs. It is possible to see that in the same syntagmatic environment, which in this case has to do with semantic issues—the fact that the contents of TCs are closely related to the temporal reference of their main clause. Therefore, they are examined in two specific environments, one which is prospective (a precative form in the main clause, that is, purus/liprus forms) and one past (marked by iprus/iptaras). Each main clause (MC) syntagmatic environment is examined separately. The first is the prospective MC sphere: Table 1.2 TCs in non-past sphere conjunction lāma ‘before’ adi ‘until’ inūma ‘when’ ištu ‘since’

TC

MC

iparrasu

unmarked vs. perfect

iprusu iparrasu parsu iparrasu iptarsu

functional opposition

negligible/lexeme dependent purus/liprus unmarked vs. perfect

iptarsu

temporal clause

iprusu

causal clause

Under TC is found the paradigm of predicative forms compatible with each temporal conjunction. Note that, despite the fact that temporal conjunctions form a distinct group, their paradigms are not the same: lāma ‘before’ occurs with either iparrasu or iprusu, adi ‘until’ occurs with iparrasu and parsu, while the default of most TCs is the opposition substantive traditionally are a paradigm, they do not form one, structurally speaking, in Semitic, because they never co-occur in the same syntactic environment (where a substantive marked as nominative figures, one never finds any substantive marked as accusative). 8.  The illustration is based on data issuing from a survey of the syntactic behavior of temporal conjunctions in OB. Thus, the abstracted paradigms are based on actual occurrences in the letter corpus. Neither examples nor loci are given here; I hope to publish these data along with the analysis on another occasion.

8

Introduction

iparrasu vs. iptarsu. The words ištu ‘since’ and kīma ‘as’ are different because they signal other adverbial clause types as well. The different sets of oppositions in the TC paradigms result in several functions in each paradigm. In lāma clauses, the opposition is between unmarked, or (linguistic) non-perfect (iparrasu), and (linguistic) perfect (signaled here by the form iprusu). 9 The same (or very similar) opposition is usually found between iparrasu and iptarsu (as in the case of inūma ‘when’). The term adi is attested only with iparrasu and parsu and shows no temporal opposition at all. The most curious case is the paradigm of ištu ‘since’, where we find no iparrasu at all. In this case, the opposition between the forms iprusu and iptarsu is not temporal but more fundamental: it differentiates between causal and temporal values. 10 The past MC sphere is presented in the following table: Table 1.3 TCs in past sphere conjunction

TC

ūm ‘(the day) when’

iprusu

lāma ‘before’

iparrasu

inūma ‘when’

iprusu

MC

functional opposition —

iprus

parsu

— minor

The first thing to be noted is that a change in the syntagmatic environ­ment (main clause is iprus, in this case) entails different forms and oppositions in the TC paradigms. For instance, the (linguistic) perfect category is not found in past-sphere TCs. Second, not in all cases is there a paradigm: inside ūm and lāma clauses, only one form is attested. Because no opposition exists, we cannot determine any functional temporal value for these forms. This becomes obvious when one looks at the way iparrasu in a TC headed by lāma is rendered: [10] ward-um šū lāma abul GN servant-nom dem.nom.ms before gate.nuc GN i-p-pett-û illikam 3cs-pass-open-npst-sbjv 3cs-come-pst ‘This servant came before the gates of GN were opened’ 1, 82:9–11 9.  The equivalent of what Huehnergard (2005a) refers to as “anteriority” (§26.2) and GAG terms “Futurum exactum” (= future perfect). Note in this connection that only one case of lāma iptarsu is attested in the corpus, perhaps in analogy with other temporal clauses, and this example may count as a curiosity. 10.  In this case, perhaps it would be reasonable to refer to a paradigm that would include not only the verbal form but also the conjunction together with the verbal form—the entire adverbial clause: type

adverbial clause

temporal clause

ištu iptarsu

causal clause

ištu iprusu

MC purus/liprus

1.3.  General linguistic view of conditionals

9

Despite our preconception of ippettû as “present-future,” it is rendered exactly as a form iprusu would be with other temporal conjunctions—that is, by the past tense. This example demonstrates especially well the mutual dependence between opposition and value. Temporal clauses have been introduced merely as an illustration for structural linguistic analysis. The principles discussed are implemented throughout this book. However, these principles are often applied to larger, more complex entities, that is, to entire structures. The difference is one of scale and of the ensuing complexities. Other terms often used in this monograph are those related to Functional Sentence Perspective, an important subsystem that formalizes the status of information. The most basic functional units of this subsystem are: 1. The theme, which is the given information in a clause. 2. The rheme, which is the new information in a clause. These terms do not fully correspond to the terms “subject” and “predicate”; they are determined strictly in relation to the givenness or newness of the information and, hence, a verbal form in the clause (traditionally referred to as “predicate”) may turn out to be the theme. For example, consider the question–answer pair “Who did it?” “I did it”: in the answer, the rheme is I, whereas the verbal form did is the theme, the given information. Both terms basically function at clause level. Above clause level, one finds the following units: 3. The topic, which is a discourse anchor, containing presupposed or backgrounded information, which has two functions: to maintain cohesion between parts of the text but also to serve as theme (“what is being discussed”) for further information contained in the comment. 4. The comment is the term referring to the new information, above clause level, that is said in reference to the topic. 5. Focus is literally an informational peak, not because the information is new but for other reasons: because it is contrasted, exclusive, restricted, etc. 1.3.  General linguistic view of conditionals The perspective offered by the general linguistic literature on CSs is somewhat confusing. Different directions are pursued, and various similarities between CSs and other structures are discussed. Traugott (1985: 290–92) discusses the diachronic sources for conditional markers, such as (1) particles of epistemic modality (an example is OB pīqat ‘maybe’); (2) interrogatives or markers of indirect questions (e.g., the verb-first order in West European languages); 11 (3) topic markers (Middle Egyptian ı͗r ‘if, as to’) and 11.  Consider a unique example from literary OB: mannum anzam linēr-ma ina kullātim lušarbi šumšu ‘Should anyone kill Anzu, let me make his name great everywhere’ (Anzu A:9–10). Note that what we actually have is a pronominal question (mannum is an interrogative rather than an indefinite pronoun) that is interconnected with another clause. This example can only be interpreted as conditional. See also n. 37 below.

10

Introduction

(4) temporal conjunctions (Arabic ʾiḏā, German wenn, possibly Canaano-Akkadian inūma 12). Not surprisingly, the idea behind each of these sources is found to be associated with CSs in other ways as well: 1.  The epistemic scale: Ordinary conditionals are complex forms, or constructions, that denote epistemic modality. This is their distinctive feature vis-à-vis all other phenomena that follow. As such, they reflect various points on the epistemic scale, representing different degrees of reality ascribed to the situation (Akatsuka 1985). In other words, they are analogous to epistemic particles such as perhaps, probably, etc. that are found on that scale as well. Taylor (1996) refers to a similar (or parallel) dimension, polarity—that is, the distance between affirmative and negative. 13 Dancygier (1998: 72, 82) notes that if marks the protasis clause as unassertable and, consequently, the apodosis is unassertable as well, both regarded as assumptions (for a similar view, see Palmer 1986: 18). In other words, neither the protasis nor the apodosis are a statement of fact. 2.  Protasis and question: There is an occasional link between questions and the protasis—that is, a polar question can function as a protasis (but see n. 11, where a pronominal question has this function as well). 14 This issue is discussed by Haiman (1978: 70–71) and mentioned occasionally as a source for conditional protases. Bravmann (1953: 18) follows the Arab grammarians in stating that the protasis is a question and the apodosis its response. Thus the link between a polar question (being the given part of the whole construction) and the topic (for which see immediately below) is created. However, a question, apart from being sometimes topical, 15 is first and foremost a modal expression of incertitude, containing in addition to this epistemic factor a built-in deontic factor—that which is demanding an answer. 3.  Protasis and topic: Haiman (1978) claims conditional protases to be topics—that is, viewed as given. Akatsuka (1986) opts for another view, subject to context and different types of topic. One point she makes (1986: 342) is that identifying conditionals with topics does not explain their nature. In a more abstract conception, which also views some circumstantial clauses as topical in the wide sense (e.g., Ford and Thompson 1986; Ramsay 1987; and Schiffrin 1992)—that is, in constituting the informational background to what follows them—this is of course true. This view is far from new; see below, §1.4.4, for the view of the Arab grammarians. 12.  Rainey (1996: 3.191–92) suggests that inūma functions as a conditional marker in a few Amarna instances (peripheral Akkadian). 13.  Note that CSs in natural languages differ from the logical material implication, the latter being an evaluation of both parts of the structure in terms of either true or false. 14.  For instance: “Are you tired of standing outside taking a smoke when it’s pouring down rain or when it’s blistering hot or freezing cold? Are you tired of standing outside the restaurant while everyone else is still enjoying their meal? Are you tired of smelling like smoke and paying through the nose for cigarettes? It’s time to quit” (www1.va.gov/vhapublications/ViewPublication.asp?pub_ID=1845, January, 2010). 15.  Well, only a polar question, provided that it occurs without an interrogative exponent. The latter is rhematic by nature, because it represents, as it were, the answer. Note that polar questions also occur in the apodosis of conditional constructions, but this does not mean that they are topical. In fact, they apply to the link between the protasis and the apodosis (see §2.1.2.2.7 below).

1.3.  General linguistic view of conditionals

11

The fact that apodoses are often marked by various pro-forms (e.g., then) or begin with an explicit pronoun that resumes the entire protasis (this means that . . .) further substantiates the CS as similar to topical constructions, where the topic is in fact resumed in the comment. 4.  Protasis and temporal clauses: Some languages occasionally mark both temporal and conditional clauses using the same exponents so as to make it impossible to distinguish between them formally (German wenn clauses and Yiddish ven clauses are both conditional and temporal). Conditional protases are also deemed subordinate, circumstantial clauses (Podlesskaya 2001: 998). The circumstantial factor is given some consideration under topicality. All these relationships between CSs and other structures do exist, since all, or most of these categories have something to do with CSs. Yet, the fact that in many languages CSs are easily distinguished and identified means that they are nevertheless distinct from all the other structures. Subordination:  The issue of subordination is a problematic characteristic, because not only are there many languages where explicitly nonsubordinate protases exist but also judging many conditional markers as subordinating seems to be unfounded. One can only say that protases may be subordinate. Haiman (1986), discussing the constraints on conditionals, provides a typical perspective on this issue: in the second part of his paper, he explains why the protasis should be analyzed as subordinate (using criteria such as embeddedness, non-finality, relatively free position, and reduction). The third part of his paper shows that CSs are nevertheless often coordinated. The analogy between conditionals and particles expressing epistemic modality is mentioned above. There seems to be further correlation between (non)subordination of the protasis and the way in which epistemic particles are integrated in the clause. Epistemic expressions are similar to the conditional protasis in several ways—both mark their scope as nonfactual and both exhibit several potential strategies of integration. The following examples are taken from contemporary written Hebrew: [11] . . . hay-a me’orav kanir’e be-tixnun be-pst-3ms involve-pass.ptcp-ms probably in-planning ha- pigúa def terrorist_attack ‘. . . was probably involved in planning the terrorist attack’ 16 [12] kmo xen, kanir’e še- hay-a me’orav similarly probably that be-pst-3ms involve-pass.ptcp-ms be- hitnakšut in assassinating ‘Additionally, he was probably involved in assassinating. . .’  17 16.  Haaretz (January 28, 2009). 17.  http://www.news1.co.il/Archive/003-D-20931–00.html (May 1, 2011).

12

Introduction

The term kanir’e ‘probably’ (lit., ‘as seems’) occurs in both cases. In [11], it is a particle located inside the clause, whereas in [12] it looks like a conjunction (še‑ is the general subordinator in Hebrew). However, unlike temporal conjunctions (e.g., lifne(y) še‑ ‘avant que’), which normally co-occur as part of a main clause, a phrase introduced by kanir’e še- can occur independently, as a main clause. Syntactically both strategies are not different then, despite the external dissimilarity, except the fact that kanir’e še‑ explicitly shows that the entire following clause is in its scope. The following examples have the expression yitaxen ‘it is possible’: [13] . . . yitaxen še- hay-a me’orav be- ziyuf possibly that be-pst-3ms involve-pass.ptcp-ms in faking ha- mismax-im def document-pl ‘it is possible that he was involved in faking the documents’ 18 [14] yitaxen ve- tguvat šaršéret kaz-o t-igrom possibly conn reaction.nuc chain such-fs 3fs-cause-fut le-picuc gadol to-blast big-ms ‘It is possible that (lit., and) such a chain reaction will cause a big blast’ 19 This expression is not a particle and it is joined to the clause in its scope either by še‑ (ex. [13]) or via the general connective ve- (ex. [14]). In either case, as in ex. [12], the entire clause is independent. Note that, in case of subordinate structures (e.g., the French peut être que), the epistemic expression is not necessarily the rheme (the new information) or the focus of the sentence. 20 The context is of immeasurable importance in analyzing CSs. It may look trivial nowadays, but this principle was explicitly addressed by Akatsuka (1986) and Ford and Thompson (1986). Some issues cannot be solved without taking into consideration not only the immediate textual context but also the wide context—whether it is narrative or dialogue, what kind of genre it is, and so forth. A good example for implementation of this view pertaining to conditionals is provided by Schiffrin (1992), who spots various kinds of protasis topicality in different types of discourse. Another fundamental issue is the data. In dealing with ancient languages, one usually does not use constructed examples, but in modern languages, unfortunately, it is done extensively to this day. For example, Ford and Thompson 1986 is the only work in Traugott et al. 1986 that is based on examples from a corpus. Fortunately, a better and more recent work on conditionals in English (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005) is based almost entirely on corpus data. 18.  Haaretz (March 17, 2007). 19. he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ ‫ליזה_מייטנר‬. 20.  Unlike the expressions discussed by Tobler (1902), which seem to be the focus of the constructions (e.g., bien sûr que ce sera un très grand bonheur. . . ; 1902: 62).

1.3.  General linguistic view of conditionals

13

The semantic relationship between the protasis and apodosis is often described as causal—the one found between cause and effect. This is another point where conditionals in natural languages are different from logical material implication, where no such relationship needs to exist. Indeed, causality underlies what is called here “ordinary conditionals” (see the end of this section). It is sometimes mixed with sequentiality, since both require some kind of logical ordering of both parts. Causality is nevertheless a secondary trait in conditionals constructions, for two reasons: 1. The modality that ordinary conditionals often express is more significant and is a distinctive feature vis-à-vis causal constructions, which exist independent­ly of conditionals; 2. Causality exists only in some conditional types. For instance, it may not be found in inferential conditionals. 21 According to Denz (1971: 38–39), in genuine conditions (basically what is termed here “ordinary” or in Dancygier 1998 “predictive”), the cause temporally precedes the effect. 22 The diagram drawn by Denz (1971: 38) dictates a future-pointing protasis/cause and even-further-future-pointing apodosis. Note, however, that the state of affairs described in the protasis may refer, notwithstanding, to the past, present (provided that the informa­tion in question is not yet known, of course; see n. 21 below), or future. The syntactic relationship between the protasis and apodosis is difficult to determine. Syntactic relationships and their number are a matter of dispute among linguists. According to one model, which is especially suitable for the Semitic languages, there are three basic syntactic relationships that correspond almost perfectly to the three cases in OB as well as in Arabic. This tripartite scheme is presented first by Becker (1841: §60, without any affinity to the Semitic languages) and discussed, with reference to the Semitic languages, by Goldenberg (1987 = 1998: 138–47), where the linguistic literature pertaining to these relationships is adduced and given due systematic review. These syntactic relationships constitute the principle of the description of clause-level syntax in literary OB (Izre'el and Cohen 2004: 62–85). These basic relationships are: 1. The predicative relationship (= nexus) obtains between any theme (the given, or known, entity in the clause) and rheme (the new information part of the clause, which is predicated on the theme). This relationship is symbolized by the nominative case, as is clear from ex. [7] above, where the nominative is 21.  šumma kīma PN1 šū iqbû 3 būr eqlam ša ina ekallim kankušum PN2 ištu 4 šanātim ilqē–ma ikkal elīša awātum maruštum ul ibašši ‘If, as that PN1 said, for 4 years PN2 took and feeds off a field of 3 būr that was sealed for him in the palace, there is nothing worse than that’ (4, 79:14–21). In this example there is neither causality nor sequentiality. 22.  The following examples reflect causality; it is quite clear that the clause containing the cause in principle precedes: (1) ana GN gerrum ul imqut–ma ul allik ‘No caravan arrived in GN, so I did not go’ (2, 177:5–6). The absence of a caravan and not going both belong to the same temporal sphere; a similar situation obtains in the following example as well: (2) mamman ul īkimanni–ma (ikkimanni–ma? lit., iTE-m[a]-an-ni-ma) etbiam–ma attalkam ‘Nobody took (was taking?) (anything) away from me, so I rose and went away’ (5, 193:8′–9′). The cause begins before the effect takes place but is also co-temporaneous, because it tends to depict a fixed state. This does not require us to ascribe a different tense to each clause.

14

Introduction

marked on the theme awīlum ‘man’ and the nominal rheme aḫūka ‘your brother’. This relationship is found in morphological expressions of a clause—that is, in all predicative forms. It is especially transparent in the paris formation, where the endings of the 1st and 2nd persons are in fact clitics whose origin is the nominative personal pronoun. 23 For the best historiographic survey, explanation and syntactic proof for the existence of this relationship, see Goldenberg 1985. 2. The completive relationship, found between the nexus and the complements; it is symbolized by the accusative case, which marks, in Semitic, both adverbial and object complements; 24 3. The attributive relationship is the one found, for example, in genitive constructions between the nucleus and its attribute. This relationship is found, in addition, at the basis of any case of subordination in OB (see Goldenberg 1995 for Semitic; and Cohen 2008a for Akkadian), since the attribute could be a verbal form as well as a substantive. 25 These three relationships cover the entire spectrum of relationships at clause-level syntax. Through this prism of syntactic relationships, if the protasis is topical, and the apodosis is predicated, as it were, on the protasis, one could think of the predicative relationship. On the other hand, if it is analyzed as a circumstantial clause, one would think it is the completive relationship, the relationship found between various complements and the nexus. However, these particular relationships work at clause-level syntax. Above this level, we may need another set of relationships. This is apparent in conditional constructions in which the protasis and the apodosis are explicitly interconnected asymmetrically. At this level, obvious neutral­izations arise; one is the duality existing between the topical~ circumstantial nature of the protasis or in the syntactic nature of the background in 23. Compare marṣumms nom ‘sick’ and anāku ‘I’ to marṣāku ‘I am sick’, or wašbum ‘sitting’ and attunu ‘youmpl’ to wašbātunu ‘you are sitting’, etc. 24.  For example, mīnamacc tugarranni ‘why do you sue me?’ (6, 41:10) vs. elīya mīnamacc tīšu ‘what do I owe you?’ (2, 101:22). 25.  The attributive relationship is demonstrable in the following syntagms: nucleus type

nucleus

subst.

bīt house

pron.

adverb

ša

kīma as

attribute ab-ī-šu father-gen-gen.3ms

gloss ‘house (of) his father’

īpuš-u 3ms-make-pst-subj

‘house (that) he made’

ab-ī-šu father-gen-gen.3ms

‘that (of) his father’

īpuš-u 3ms-make-pst-subj

‘that (which) he made’

ab-ī-šu father-gen-gen.3ms

‘as his father’

īpuš-u 3ms-make-pst-subj

‘as he made’

1.4.  Other Semitic languages

15

narrative (see §2.7.2 below). Yet another situation is where it becomes difficult to separate, from a typological point of view, between interclausal connection and subordinate adverbial clauses (for instance, Givón 2001: 2. chap. 18). So this question remains a problem. Dancygier (1998: 72) adds, in this connection, that “the only assertion that is made in a conditional construction is about the relation between the protasis and the apodosis.” This assertion is best felt when its existence is shaken by a modal particle in whose scope is the entire construction: [15] I just want someone to hear what I have to say. And maybe if I talk long enough, it’ll make sense. 26 [16] Maybe if we send her to camp she’ll shape up. Maybe if I work with her every night she’ll be OK. Maybe if she goes to visit her grandparents she’ll pick up. 27 In both examples, the epistemic modal particle maybe precedes an ordinary condition. Since both protasis and apodosis are deemed nonfactual and epistemic to begin with (in fact, they are quite similar to maybe), it seems reasonable that maybe in these circumstances refers to the relationship between the protasis and the apodosis, de-asserting it. The issue is that modal particles such as maybe tend to modify the nexus, 28 the relationship linking the theme and the rheme. In this case, the relationship between both parts of the conditional construction is similar to a nexus in being a mutual dependency. The working definition for conditionals is not always the same. In this study, ordinary conditionals are structures containing two domains of events or states of affairs, both found somewhere on the epistemic scale; in other words, neither domain can be confirmed or denied at the time of utterance, and the likelihood of one domain (the apodosis) to take place depends directly on the realization of the other domain (the protasis). Any structure that consistent­ly signals an ordinary condition is regarded as a conditional pattern. Similar forms in other genres are considered as well but are concluded not to be ordinary conditionals. 1.4.  Other Semitic languages In the Semitic languages, there are but a few full-scale descriptions of the individual conditional systems. This survey is conducted first in order to show the main points that are raised in connection with those descriptions, and second, to be able later to point out the differences among the individual conditional subsystems in Semitic. Despite the relative similarity among the individual Semitic languages, their con­ditional systems are different from each other at some crucial points. 26.  Ray Bradbury, Fahrenheit 451 (New York: Ballantine, 1996) 82. 27.  Frieda A. Lang, Parent Group Counseling: A Counselor’s Handbook and Practical Guide (New York: Lexington, 1988) 193. 28.  It also seems to refer to the rheme or the focus of the clause.

16

Introduction

1.4.1.  Biblical Hebrew The linguistic treatment of CSs in Biblical Hebrew (henceforth, BH) is scattered among grammars (as far as I know, there is no modern monographic description devoted to this issue). The viewpoint is descriptive but does not consider the theoretical issues discussed, for example, with regard to Classical Arabic (see below, §1.4.4) or in the general linguistic literature (most of the monumental grammatical literature of BH was written during the 19th century). The clearest and most comprehensive description so far is found in Driver (1892: 174–94), who depicts the system concisely but in a clear manner. In the table below, the information regarding this system is summarized. The category realizable/unrealizable is marked by choice of conditional marker: the particle lū introduces a counterfactual condition: Table 1.4 marker

protasis

yiqṭolind

ʾim

divider

apodosis wəqāṭal/ yiqṭolind yiqṭoljuss / qəṭol qāṭal qōṭel

alloforms certainty / suddenness immed. fut.

(yeš / ʾeyn) qōṭel

wəqāṭal / yiqṭolind yiqṭol juss / qəṭol qōṭel similar to P = yiqṭol

qāṭal

wəqāṭal (qəṭol) qāṭal yiqṭol

hypothetical

yiqṭolind yiqṭol

habitual? irrealis

qāṭal lū

remarks

(kī ʿattā, kī ʾāz) qāṭal

still possible?

qōṭel

asyndesis

wəqāṭal

wəqāṭal

past = habitual, fut. = regular condition

qāṭal

wayyiqṭol

general truth

yiqṭoljuss

yiqṭolind/juss

qəṭol

yiqṭol / qəṭol

neutralized?

The diversity of possible patterns, which suggests a great systemic complexity, is not unusual. As is shown below, a similar level of complexity is found in Classical Arabic as well as in OB. The pattern wəhāyā ʾim yiqṭol . . . wəqāṭal is described as analogous to the asyndetic wəqāṭal pattern, with two options, habitual or prospective. The particle ʾim seems to be found with laws, and kī (‘when’) clauses are not considered by Driver to be hypothetical. Note that Paul (2005: 43) mentions a functional distribution between kī and ʾim, a distinction originating in Alt (1959: 286–88): the former is for primary

1.4.  Other Semitic languages

17

legal clauses, the latter for subsidiary ones. This issue becomes relevant for OB below, in chapter 3. When ʾim occurs only with a protasis clause, the ensuing structure signals oath or asseveration (as rarely occurs in OB as well). 1.4.2.  Contemporary Hebrew CSs in Contemporary Hebrew, based on a wide corpus, have most recently been described by Bar (2003). Several interesting issues come up in this discussion. Bar claims that, save for two very specific patterns that involve resumption, the protasis is never topical, arguing that the protasis is adverbial and hypothetical. However, resumption of the protasis is very common (e.g., by the pro-clausal particle az ‘then’, or the expression harei še- ‘then’). Another place where the protasis is no doubt topical (or thematic) is when the apodosis consists of an interrogative pronoun, namely, im. . . , ma az? ‘if. . . , then what?’ or ma im. . . ? ‘what if. . . ?’ Adverbiality and topicality may be compatible; one prominent example would be grounding temporal clauses in the narrative of many languages (e.g., Ramsay 1987). This very circumstantial quality of conditional protases is what, among other factors, initially motivated viewing them as topical. The view presented by Bar largely excludes mutual dependency between protasis and apodosis, intraclausal adverbiality being basically incom­patible with such mutual dependence, and unidirectional dependence is usually advocated. The adverbial status of the conditional protases is backed up by showing their regular interchange with other expressions that look adverbial (belo / be-ein ‘without’, bemiqre še(l) ‘in case that/of’). Bar is right, of course, that ordinary conditionals are first and foremost characterized by hypotheticality (which she terms “possibility” or “supposition”), rather than topicality or causality, which never fail to be mentioned in any discussion about conditionals. An interesting case presents itself in Bar’s examples, where the apodosis is a dependent infinitive: [17] x iyem lehitpaṭer im lo y-emune x threaten-pst-3ms inf.resign if neg 3ms-pass-appoint.fut ‘x threatened to resign if he is not appointed’ (Bar 2003: 63) The protasis remains intact, while the apodosis takes the infinitive form, as required by the matrix verb iyem ‘(he) threatened’. The entire conditional construction functions as a complement clause. These examples corroborate the assumption that the protasis is indeed subordinate in Contemporary Hebrew. Another interesting case is in the following example: [18] im t-eaxer ani yodéa še- t-icta’er if 2ms-be_late-fut nom.1cs ptcp.act-know-ms that 2ms-be_sorry.fut ‘If you are late, I know you will regret (it)’ (Bar 2003: 65) 29 29.  Compare the Biblical Hebrew example: wəʿattā hāšeḇ ʾešɛṯ hāʾīš . . . wəʾim ʾē  ynḵā mešīḇ daʿ kī mōṯ tāmūṯ ʾattā wəḵol ʾ ašɛr lāḵ ‘Now therefore restore the man his wife; . . . and if thou restore her not, know

18

Introduction

These cases are analogous to the one above: the main clause verb (‘I know’) is not part of the CS. The fact that the protasis occurs initially, outside of the subordinate structure, is significant; this is deliberate extraposition, possibly to mark the protasis as topic. An important point presented by Bar is the use of the paʿal verbal pattern, usually used to denote the past, as having yet another function, especially in both protasis and apodosis—that of a linguistic (future) perfect. 1.4.3.  Gəʿəz (Ancient Ethiopic) There is very little on conditional clauses in Gəʿəz, apart from what is found in Dillmann (1907: §205), Weninger (2001; adducing some fresh examples), 30 and Tropper (2002: 244–48). Dillmann classifies these structures as “reciprocal sentences”—that is, as mutually dependent biclausal constructions, bound by supposition. The table below summarizes the main possibilities: Table 1.5 marker ʾəmmä(-ssä) (la)ʾəmmä sobä

protasis

divider

qätälä qätälä qätälä

(wä ‘and’, ʾənkä ‘so’)

yəqättəl qätälä

ʾəm (‘apod. introducer’)

apodosis remarks yəqättəl

pf. = past (verif. cond) [past ref.]

yəqättəl

pf. = future perfect [future ref.]

qätälä

apod. = past

yəqättəl

prot. = present-future

qätälä

irrealis

Several issues seem to be both special and important: 1. The conditional marker is often followed by the enclitic particle -ssä, the contrastive topic marker. Topicality is discussed with regard to Classical Arabic and Contemporary Hebrew, but only in Gəʿəz is it occasionally marked directly in the protasis. 2. The interrogative markers -hu and -nu may occur in the protasis, as well as the topic marker -ssä, without denoting a question. The typological link with thou that thou shalt surely die, thou, and all that are thine’ (Gen 20:7). The imperative daʿ ‘know’ is the matrix clause of the entire condition, rather than the apodosis, and the protasis is extraposed as well. 30.  Weninger (2001) writes using the same Noetic theoretical framework used by Denz (1971) and in the second part of Streck (1995), all focusing on tense and aspect. It provides scattered information about the conditional system of Gəʿəz that is less instructive than what is offered in a concentrated, continuous form by Dillmann (1907) and Tropper (2002). The essence of the Noetic theory is that cross-linguistic conceptual categories underlie grammatical categories, some of which are grammaticalized while others are not (Weninger 2001: 24–26). It seems to deal mainly with tense, which is deemed universal, external to the language. The means of description apparently is to create a grid that contains these universal categories and fill in the blanks when possible. This often creates situations of “no data,” as if something were amiss. On the other hand, a language might have some category for which no place in the grid was predesignated (either because this category did not exist in the world or because it was unanticipated).

1.4.  Other Semitic languages

19

question marking is discussed (e.g., Bravmann 1953:18; Podlesskaya 2001:1004) and could perhaps be exemplified by the verb-first structure in both German (all asyndetic conditional patterns) and English (counterfactual condition, were you . . . or had you been . . .). 3. The counterfactual apodosis is marked by ʾəm, which actually dis­tinguishes it from temporal clauses headed by sobä (otherwise ‘when’). 1.4.4.  Classical Arabic The array of conditional clauses in Classical Arabic (henceforth, CA) is discussed by Peled (1992). His comprehensive and detailed description rests, on one hand, on the fruit of the medieval grammarians’ work and thought and, on the other, on attempts to examine the system through a modern prism. The very first descriptions of CA, in the 8th century a.d., are concerned with questions that have remained salient to this day: whether the protasis is subordinate and the apodosis is its main clause, or whether the protasis is topical, or adverbial. The first question is answered by pointing out the forms in the most basic conditional pattern: Table 1.6

ʾin

protasis

apodosis

qatala yaqtul

qatala yaqtul

The forms used in both parts are either qatala (called “perfect”) or yaqtul (the “apocopate”). The latter cannot occur alone in CA except in the apodosis of a conditional pattern (including the structure known as jawāb al-ʾamr, which is considered by many to be a conditional pattern as well; see Peled 1987). 31 This means that the apodosis is unlike any main clause in CA. The form qatala, on the other hand, does occur alone but never with the (temporal and modal) meaning it has here, which is generally a conditioned present–future. 32 This state of affairs has great cross-linguistic importance: it proves that the conditional apodosis is positively distinguished from any main clause, a difference that, in cross-linguistic consideration, is often ignored, because most languages do not mark realis conditional apodoses any differently than a main clause (markers such as then, which are considered in the linguistic literature, are not unique to conditional apodoses). 33 Of course, from a structural viewpoint, the difference, however small, can be brought to light: there is often a difference in the paradigmatic constitution between an apodosis and a main clause: the apodosis paradigm is not the same as the main clause para31.  It occurs as jussive with the proclitic particle li- (e.g., li-yakun ‘let him be . . .’) or as a negative preterite with the negative particle lam (lam yakun ‘he was not . . .’). 32.  The form qatala can also function to express a wish, but this is not the case here. 33.  Irrealis apodoses, on the other hand, seem to be well marked cross-linguistically (cf. Lazard 2001).

20

Introduction

digm. Peled (1992: 9) regards this paradigm as marking conditional modality (see table above), as well as mutual dependency, in contrast to the structure with fa-. The clauses are thus concluded to be two mutually dependent clauses. Peled (1992: 3) quotes Ibn Yaʿīš (a medieval grammarian), who wrote that ʾin (the regular conditional marker) links the two sentences, originally with the indicative yaqtulu forms, into one construction with two yaqtul forms. In (modern) Western treatments, the clauses are considered a sequence (Vordersatz and Nachsatz, juxtapposées plutôt que liées, etc.; see Peled 1992: 1–2). The second issue is the topicality of the conditional protasis, as explained by Haiman (1978). In addition to the basic CA conditional pattern shown above, there is yet another very common pattern: Table 1.7

ʾin

protasis

divider

apodosis

qatala yaqtul

fa-

nom. clause, qtul qad qatala, yaqtulu, etc.

This pattern has the same conditional particle and paradigmatic constitution of the protasis as the former pattern. However, the apodosis is here intro­duced by the (connective or segmenting) particle fa- and the paradigmatic constitution of the apodosis is now more extensive; in fact, unlike the apodosis in the former pattern, this paradigm is virtually unrestricted (but note that it does not include the bare forms qatala or yaqtul). The particle fa- is generally an asymmetric connective, like the OB particle -ma: [19] ḍarabtuhū fa-bakā ‘I hit him and (then) he wept’ (Fischer 1987: §329) However, fa- has more functions, including one that particularly interests us: it occurs between topic and comment: [20] waʾanā fa-štari minnī dīnī ‘And (as for) menom, [ fa-] buy my belief from me’ (Brockelmann 1913: §273) [21] fa-nafsuka fa-ḥfaẓhā ‘And (as for) your soulnom , [ fa-] (you should) guard it (Khan 1988: 16 ex. 91, Reckendorf 1921: 372) and even, more typically, in the topical construction ʾammā . . . fa- ‘as for. . .’: [22] ʾammā ʾaḫūka fa-ʿlam ʾannahū māta ‘As for you brothernom, [ fa-] (you should) know that he (has) died’ (Fischer 1987: §336) In addition, fa- sometimes even occurs between focus and the rest of the sentence (in a similar manner to the focusing -ma in OB): [23] bal-i llāha fa-ʿbud ‘rather, (it is) Godacc [ fa-] (you should) worship (Fischer: 1987 §222 n. 3)

1.4.  Other Semitic languages

21

Table 1.8 protasis 1

qatala yaqtul

1a

x-kāna/kāna/ yakun + comp ʾin

divider apodosis none

qatala yaqtul

nominal clause qtul qad qatala yaqtulu etc.

fa-

3

kāna (qad) qatala

fa-

4

yaqtul qatala

yaqtul qatala/yaqtulu +other forms without fa-

qatala

la (qad) qatala qatala (la) mā qatala lam yaqtul

5

iḏā

law

ordinary condition (modal interdependence) no tense-aspect oppositions equivalent of nom. clause

qatala yaqtul

2

remarks

ordinary condition as well as special types (modally split) ­– tense-aspect oppositions in apodosis verification, perfect value of protasis (rather than preterite) –temporal or conditional –often generic (in this case, just a main clause)

counterfactual conditions

[24] ʾiyyāyā fa-ttaqūni ‘Meacc (alone) [ fa-] (you should) fear’ (Q2/41) 34 Khan (1988: 57) mentions that this fa- in extrapositional structures is to be identified with the fa- separating protasis and apodosis. This was the view of the Arab grammarians as well. 35 Actually, this is exactly what triggered the connection made between the two different a priori functions of fa-: the similarity between the CS with fa- and structures such as ʾammā . . . fa- (see [22] above). At any rate, this analogy was carried over by some grammarians to the CSs without fa- as well, which were then analyzed as analogous to the relationship between theme (given) and rheme (new information), the protasis being the theme. Yet other grammarians (Sībawayhi, al-Mubarrad) claim that fa- forms a special link between the protasis and the apodosis, linking an answer to a preceding question (which again reminds one of the theme – rheme relationship) or a consequence with its cause. 36 34.  This example was pointed out to me by my student, Guy Ron-Gilboa. The issue is discussed in Khan 1988: 16–17, 57–58. 35.  The idea that the conditional protasis may be topical is therefore more than a millennium older than Haiman (1978). 36.  A nonspecialist might have asked why the connective function of fa- is abandoned in these frameworks, especially in view of various sequence-marking exponents in the other Semitic languages (such as -ma in Akkadian and the consecutive form wəqāṭal in Biblical Hebrew). It seems, however, that both the use

22

Introduction

Peled devotes chapter 4 (1992: 66–98) to CSs where the protasis and the apodosis are separated by fa-. In this group are ordinary conditions—that is, hypothetical conditions—as well as nonhypothetical conditions: in some, the protasis is factual and in others, the apodosis. This description agrees with the apodosis paradigm after fa-, which shows tense-mood-aspect oppositions (much like an independent clause) while the apodosis paradigm of the pattern without fa- does not. The particle fa‑ allows for more independence on either side of the conditional structure. Peled’s sixth chapter is devoted to other constitutent orders, such as when the protasis either follows or is embedded in the apodosis. He considers these cases, following the work of the Arab grammarians, to be nothing more than adverbial modifiers—that is, they are not deemed conditional. Several points discussed by Peled (1992) are of special importance to the following discussion of OB CSs: 1. Unlike OB, the CSs (mostly ʾin qatala—qatala) do occur in subordination. 2. Like OB, the conditional patterns of CA turn out to have a rigid order, since the order apodosis – protasis is not considered conditional. 3. Generic or habitual CSs in CA are introduced by a different paradigm of particles, which includes {ʾin ‘if’, ʾiḏā ‘if, when’, and kullamā ‘whenever’} (see Peled 1992: 25, ex. 33). 4. CA, like the rest of the West Semitic languages, regularly differentiates between counterfactual conditionals and the rest by a special exponent (law). The table on p. 21 summarizes the data provided by Peled (1992). 1.4.5.  Ancient Semitic CSs: concluding remarks This brief survey has focused mainly on ancient Semitic languages in order to have a general picture, as a source for comparison with the following description of the CSs in OB. The following points have come up: 1. Topicality of the protasis is explicitly marked in Gəʿəz (by the contrastive topic particle -ssä); in CA the analysis of the function of the particle fa- as segmentateur is practically equivalent to topic—and com­ment—marker. 2. The notional relationship between the protasis and a question is explicitly marked only in Gəʿəz (the interrogative particle -nu and -hu). Otherwise, a question that is equivalent to a protasis is only marginally attested in BH. 37 In addition, the marginal use of the conditional particle to introduce indirect nexus question (BH and Gəʿəz) is perhaps also relevant.

of fa- as connective and its use, as it were, to divide between topic and comment or protasis and apodosis are all viewed as one function. Larcher (2006), following Bally, uses the term “segmentation” for marking the boundary between theme and rheme, whether the theme is a simple or complex entity (e.g., conditional protasis). 37.  Jer 13:23, mentioned in Joüon and Muraoka 2006: 594.

1.5.  Conditional structures in Akkadian: literature review

23

3. Explicit connection (or is it separation instead?) between a protasis introduced by a particle and the apodosis seems to be found in BH, CA, and Gəʿəz. The difficulty is with BH, in which the sequential form wəqāṭal is often used as apodosis. This form contains the connective element wə- and is incompatible with another connective. Such connection, regardless of its actual frequency, suggests that the syntactic relationship between the clauses of the CS is unlike the one obtaining between, for example, an adverbial clause and its main clause. 4. Apodosis marking is apparent in CA. In the pattern ʾin yaqtul yaqtul, the apodotic form yaqtul is unique for the apodosis. In the pattern with fa-, the fact that fa- follows a clause introduced by ʾin (the particle fa- occurs with other clause types as well) is enough to mark the apodosis. Another case of apodosis signal is the Gəʿəz particle ʾəm, which introduces the counterfactual apodosis. 5. Paratactic conditionals occur rather frequently in BH, in several patterns. CA has the jawāb al-ʾamr, a pattern consisting of the imperative followed by the jussive, which is deemed by the grammarians to be conditional. 6. Counterfactual conditionals are found in all three languages, but hardly any common features seem to have persisted: Table 1.9 language

marker protasis

apodosis

qāṭal BH

lū

qōṭel

qāṭal

yiqṭol CA

law

qatala

(la (qad)) qatala mā qatala, lam yaqtul

Gəʿəz

sobä

qätälä

qätälä

The marker in Northwest Semitic is lū~law, but in Gəʿəz sobä ‘when’ is used. The paradigms are simple in Gəʿəz (qätälä in both protasis and apodosis) and CA (qatala in the protasis and qatala or lam yaqtul in the apodosis), but BH has a rich protasis (qāṭal, qōṭel, and yiqṭol). The otherwise past-denoting forms in the apodosis seem to be the common feature of all these patterns (which, incidentally or not, conform with OB). With these issues in mind, we now embark upon the CSs system(s) of OB. 1.5.  Conditional structures in Akkadian: literature review Old Babylonian conditionals are referred to first and foremost in GAG §§160–161. It is important to remember that the statement in GAG is pan-corporal—that is, it often refers to OB as a single uniform block. Interestingly, the discussion of all CSs is classified under “Koordinierte Hauptsätze,” perceived predominantly as a link between two

24

Introduction

main clauses and marked either by -ma or by the particle šumma preceding the entire construction. This is reminiscent of the way these two clauses are analyzed in the Arab grammatical tradition. The first type (with -ma) is made up of two interconnected present forms (but in GAG §173c a preterite protasis is discussed as well). 38 Yet another type consists of a precative form as protasis. The second type, introduced by šumma, has the following chara­cteristics: 1. The verbal forms are not marked as subjunctive; nevertheless, the negative particle is lā; 2. The preterite form in the protasis is rendered as present or past; 3. There is a consecutio temporum (preterite . . . perfect); 4. The perfect form is temporally like the preterite but has, additionally, potential or hypothetical meaning; 5. The present form, rarely, denotes the present habitual; otherwise, it signals modality or the future; 6. Statives and nonverbal clauses (henceforth NVC) denote states; the latter can sometimes occur in a partial manner (that is, rheme only; see Cohen 2005b: 254–55). Buccellati (1996: §86.2) regards CSs as two conjoined sentences, since the protasis, unlike other sentence constituents (e.g., adverbial clauses), is not reducible. 39 In fact, the CS with šumma is discussed along with the interconnection using -ma. The preterite, the most common form in the protasis, does not necessarily denote the past but instead a general hypothesis without regard to temporal values. The perfect (form) is used for conditions contingent upon a primary condition expressed by the preterite. Buccellati’s statement reflects a problematic mix of data from different genres as well as from various historical stages of Babylonian, which was written throughout a span of 1,500 years. Huehnergard (2005: §17.3), like GAG, mentions two types: 1. The “unmarked” type, interconnecting the protasis and apodosis, where the protasis can be the preterite, the present, or the precative (in the last option, there is a concessive force); 2. The šumma type, in which one finds the preterite (most common, presenting the action as already having taken place), the perfect, the present (habitual activity or modality), as well as the stative and a nonverbal clause in the protasis. The apodosis contains a form that denotes present or future. Other than these grammars, CSs are discussed as part of other core issues, primarily tense. Maloney (1982) describes iptaras, but also dedicates a chapter to verbal usage in 38.  In this review, the sources’ terminology is employed; see §1.1 above (pp. 2ff.). 39.  “Reduction” pertains to the interchangeability with a simple entity (e.g., adverbial clause with a simple adverb; see Goldenberg 1987­–88). This is probably the most important criterion for subordination and functions in Semitic at all levels.

1.6.  Corpus definitio

25

šumma clauses in the letter corpus (1982: 214–61) as well as in the laws (supplement, pp. 262–361). Leong (1994: 58–61; 118–22; 218–24; 288–90; and 333–37) examines the tense values in CSs (as well as anywhere else) in the AbB corpus; Streck (1999) discusses the value of iptaras forms in the Ḫammurabi correspondence, including conditional clauses. Metzler (2002: 33–298) examines tense use in laws and omens, taking into consideration the apodoses as well. Loesov (2004), describing iptaras, pays attention to its use in šumma conditionals (pp. 140–47) and adds an excursus on verbal usage in the laws (pp. 147–62). Other studies related to conditionals are by Cohen (2005a: 144–60; devoted to precative protases; pp. 161–79, describing the paratactic conditional with “indicative” forms; 2008c: §2.5.1, briefly discussing other conditional patterns). The material in these studies is elaborated and discussed below. 1.6.  Corpus definition The primary material used throughout the current inquiry consists of several different corpora, each representing one type of genre: letters, law collections and omens. These genres may seem alike in certain points: this is no surprise, since they are all manifestations of Old Babylonian, made up of the very same building blocks. However, syntactic and textlinguistic analysis produce results which show deep differences between them in the domain of CSs. Epistolary materials: much of what we know about everyday OB comes from several thousands letters uncovered throughout greater Mesopotamia. These letters are usually business and administrative letters, and written, as far as we know, by skilled scribes. The advantage of these texts is that they had been written with the purpose of communicating information rather than to serve as a monument (compare to the prologue and epilogue of the Ḫammurabi law collection). This means that they were written with minimal copy-editing and reflect a relatively spontaneous scribal language. The corpus chosen consists of all fourteen volumes of the AbB letter corpus, coming basically from mesopotamia proper, which is a large (almost 3000 letters), relatively diversified corpus, extending over a couple of centuries and a rather large geographical area. 40 Since this monograph is linguistic in nature, rather than philological, not each and every different text interpretation in the Assyriological literature is taken into account. The judgements made hereunder are never based on single occurrences, so the potential damage of a local miscom­prehension is very small. Nevertheless, the published reviews pertaining to the different AbB volumes are consulted as well. There are several reasons leading to this choice of corpus: Despite the diversity, long period of attestation and the general lack of extra-linguistic information about the provenience of these letters, this corpus has been given a diversified linguistic con­sideration. This is crucial when dealing with a topic which relates to many other issues (e.g., functional sentence perspective, tenses and syntax in general). The Mari letter corpus is not included. Despite its many 40.  For an evaluation and explanation of this material as a valid corpus see Cohen 2005a:6–8.

26

Introduction

virtues—shorter span of time, a much better understanding of contextual information, excellent text commentaries, etc.—it presents several problems: 1. the letters are written in a language somewhat different than the one we find in Mesopotamia proper, which is attested in the three chosen genres; 2. it is perhaps too diversified, an example in point is the issue of “lettres barbares” (Charpin 1989), where there seems to be interference from another language or dialect; 3. The language of the Mari archives seriously suffers from paucity of linguistic consideration beyond the preliminary grammar, Finet (1956) and the comments, which are mainly dispersed throughout the editions. 41 Having made inquiries into the Mesopotamian corpus concerning various syntactic issues (e.g., Cohen 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2008a, 2008b and 2008c), it is safe to state, on the basis of the results of these studies, that the corpus chosen certainly constitutes a system, albeit diversified and complex. The AbB volumes are designated by numbers only, namely, by volume, letter:line(s). Other epistolary sources are given in full. Law collections: 42 Old Babylonian has two law collections: the complex, well known, and much-studied Ḫammurabi code, and the much shorter and less-discussed code of Ešnunna. The two collections, each in its own way, contribute to our understanding of the syntactic nature of the laws. The code of Ešnunna, although shorter, is much more diverse in the types of constructions it uses but nevertheless presents good linguistic consistency. Diversity is a crucial factor in uncovering the syntactic and semantic nature of the legal CS. The Ḫammurabi code presents several problems that have not, to this day, been overcome. These problems have to do with the consistency of the functions of verbal forms. Many descriptions have attempted to cope with these problems, but with only limited success (see below, chapter 3). An example of this problem is Maloney’s study (1982: 262–361); he often admits that the use of the iptaras forms in the protasis seems to have to do with legal, rather than linguistic, con­siderations. However, most of the linguistic literature pertaining to this genre refers to the code of Ḫammurabi. Moreover, since this law collection is considerably larger and the laws themselves are syntactically more complex, investigating various complicated issues must be based on study of this law collection. In addition to the codes, important and highly pertinent details are found in royal edicts, which constitute a kind of addenda to the law collections. For this reason, the edicts are considered as well. The laws in the LE law collection are given by sections only. The laws from codex Ḫammurabi are designated by CH and the relevant section number. 41.  Finet’s grammar is an excellent work in itself, but it is based merely on the first six volumes of Mari letters and some more material. Since it appeared, the volume of published letters, along with their commentaries, has enormously increased, and there is no doubt that such large quantities of new material may challenge Finet’s description. Ever since Finet, however, there have been very few linguistically oriented studies which describe these texts. 42.  The term “law collection” suits these corpora better than “legal codes,” because they are not mentioned in actual judgements from the time and it is not clear to what degree these laws were mandatory. See, for a summary of this issue, Rubio 2007: 31–34.

1.7. Aims

27

Omen literature: Divination in ancient Mesopotamia was an important practice. It was practiced on a variety of media: house animal behavior and exta, the patterns of smoke, oil, as well as other media. Divination was carried out with a specific aim, such as to reveal the success of a planned army maneuver. The collections available to us are a result of an ancient compilation of the various cases, possibly for future use. The omen corpus is very large but also rather uniform. The corpus chosen in this study is found in YOS 10, which is apparently quite representative. This corpus also has been given consideration in the literature, with regard to its linguistic nature, its structure, and and its contents. The omens from YOS 10 are noted by numbers only: tablet (column): line(s). Other sources are given in full. 1.7. Aims Most of the literature relevant to CSs in OB is atomistic, discussing this or that point (which often comes down to tense). 43 What is missing is a systemic description of CSs that would take into consideration every parameter that may turn out to be pertinent. Various parameters, taken together, allow us to depict the system of these structures: 1. The co-text: the CSs in the letters (unlike other genres) are special in that they often have a textual context (or co-text), which has indeed been taken into consideration in the literature when tense was described. In other words, the CSs are related to a certain hic et nunc, a specific location and time. Note that co-text is not only tense-related; there are other issues at stake, such as, for instance, information structure—whether the protasis can be considered topical—or the nature of the syntactic link between the context and the protasis, which testifies to the syntactic whereabouts of the latter, etc.; 2. Another parameter is the syntactic relationship between the protasis and apodosis, which may be different in cross-genre perspective; 3. The paradigmatic constitution of protases and apodoses in various conditional structures in each pattern and genre: what forms figure in each, and the conclusions that may be drawn; 4. The various types of CSs; 5. Some conditional groups seem to have a value other than conditi­onality (e.g., šumma libbaka ‘if you want’, when followed by a precative form, alters its otherwise directive function), 44 etc. In short, an attempt is made here to consider every possible variable, hoping that at least some of them will turn out to be pertinent in the description. All of these parameters have been mapped for the entire collection of CSs in the AbB corpus, where we have a reference point in the context. The same approach, albeit with 43.  A notable exception is Krebernik and Streck 2001, who describe counterfactual conditionals within the framework of irrealis expressions. 44.  The term “directive” refers to the expression of will. See Cohen 2005a: 89–100.

28

Introduction

fewer parameters, has been applied to the legal (LE/CH) and divination (YOS 10) corpora, again arriving at a picture simply by displaying the data. The aim, in addition to providing a description of the various structures in each genre, is also to be able to state whether a syntactic and semantic difference exists between the CSs in the different genres, based on these variables, and just what that difference is. Treating the genres separately at the initial phase is therefore absolutely necessary. Hence, in the following sections, the CSs in each genre/corpus are described separately. A comparative statement is provided at the end. This division is not made here for the first time: Maloney (1982) used this same method, distinguishing between letters and laws. Actually, there is general agreement that the laws are a part of scientific literature, as are the omens (Metzler 2002: chapter 2, describing tense in literary OB, is very clear about this issue, describing these two genres under “Wissenschafts-literarische Texte”). The terminological issue is complex: not every structure that seems to be conditional ( judging by external form) turns out to be so. 45 On the other hand, we know of perfectly legitimate conditional patterns that do not seem to be conditionals based on their mere appearance. In the letter genre, the term conditional structures (CSs) is used to denote anything suspect as conditional. Examining the letters eventually allows us to reject whatever is not ordinary conditional and treat the rest as conditional patterns—a complex form that consistently signals ordinary (that is, hypothetical or modal) conditionality. In the other genres, although these structures are often externally similar, they prove to have different values and are accordingly termed, namely, legal CSs and omen CSs. 45.  For instance, šumma bāʾerū ša ušēbirū[š]unū[t]i nišpīšunūti–ma ‘We asked them whether (it was) fishermen who helped them cross . . .’ (3, 53:14–15), which is in fact a rare occurrence of an indirect question (and of a cleft pattern).

Chapter 2 THE LETTER CORPUS The letter corpus is apparently composed almost entirely in a formulary scribal language, perhaps restrained by the influence of scribal schools. This can be inferred from the relatively slowly rate of change of this language: between the 19th century b.c. (early OB) and 16th century b.c. (late OB), the development is not as signi­ficant as one might expect. As a result, these letters can be treated as a single corpus. The data presented below and their systematic analysis necessitate constant observation to avoid overlooking any potential or unexpected correlations between various types of data, as described in §1.7. The description is subdivided first into several types of CSs in the corpus: (1) šumma conditionals; (2) paratactic conditionals; (3) modal particle conditionals; and (4) a marginal pattern whose protasis is an asseverative form, in addition to other structures. Each structure is scrutinized and is presented in paradigms: the protasis and the apodosis. Each paradigm is examined separately, and the oppositions between the forms in each of the paradigms are analyzed. The conditional patterns that emerge have common characteristics that are the hallmark of the conditional constructions found in the letter corpus. These conditionals, to the exclusion of only a few subtypes, all signal ordinary conditions (see §1.3) that syntactically differentiate three levels of hypothetical status. A pattern is defined here as the syntactic equivalent of a morpheme—a complex form that has a consistent value. The idea of the pattern is especially important when one needs to character­ize syntactically the paratactic conditionals, which at first appear to be identical to any other chain (see below, §2.2.1). 1 2.1.  šumma conditionals Conditionals introduced by šumma are the most common form of conditionals in the letter corpus—a little less than 500 cases. The particle itself has been assigned various etymologies. 2 The conclusion that šumma is the cognate of the West Semitic versions 1. A chain in OB refers to two or more forms that are ordinarily interconnected by the particle -ma. This interconnection creates what is referred to as “asymmetric connection,” a connection where the order is linguistically pertinent. 2.  Ungnad (1903–5: 362–63) suggested that it originated in the permansive of the root √šym; Speiser (1947) thought it was composed of the demonstrative pronoun (šū–ma); AHw (1272a) related it to Arabic ṯumma ‘then, later’; and finally, Haldar (1950) considered it to be cognate to the other Semitic conditional markers (Hebrew ʾim~hēn, Arabic ʾin~ʾimmā, Ethiopic ʾəmma, etc.).

29

30

The Letter Corpus

of the conditional particle (with the addition of -ma, 3 which we also encounter in Gəʿəz ʾəmmä and Classical Arabic ʾimmā), seems to be generally accepted. The remaining question is how to explain the isolated cor­respondence between š and h~ʾ. 4 This particle in itself has several ad­ditional functions: 1. It functions as a disjunctive conjunction, like ū, to mark alternative: [25] šumma anāku annikīam ana abīšu luddin ‘or let me give it to his father here’ 6, 79:24–25 (see also ex. [43] below) 2. It may signal an oath (see §2.1.2.2.7, p. 70 n. 65 below); 3. In rare cases, it introduces an indirect question; see the example in chap. 1, p. 28 n. 45. Differentiating homonymy and polysemy is sometimes difficult. Based on these cases, šumma could be considered a single particle with several functions or several particles that are synchronically different (and probably diachronically related). The resolution of this matter has to do with the theoretical framework chosen, but the solution lies in our ability to describe the syntactic circumstances in which a given function occurs and thus to differentiate it formally from other functions. Accordingly, the structure that signals a conditional function needs to be distinguished syntactically from other functions. This syntactic characterization leaves us, ideally, with a distinctive pattern, since the particle šumma itself is not enough to tell us whether this pattern is conditional or not. In the conditional pattern, there is mutual dependency between the protasis domain and the apodosis domain. This interdependency makes it clear that šumma without two domains has no conditional function, while the two domains without šumma are possibly not conditional either. For instance, if šumma occurs preceding a precative form (as in ex. [25]), we know it is not conditional (1) because the latter is not part of the protasis paradigm and (2) because there exists only one domain, rather than two. The data concerning šumma conditionals in the letter corpus are presented, in line with the methodological principles explained above (§1.2), in two axes: the syntagmatic axis (i.e., horizontal relationships) and the paradigmatic axis (vertical relationships). 2.1.1.  Syntagmatic characteristics The syntagmatic compatibility of entire šumma CSs is very similar to that of the precative: they occur either independently or chained but neither in subordination 5 nor inside another šumma condition. 3.  In a few cases, the exponent is šum (10, 145:15; 10, 189:9; 6, 48:19, and 9, 252:19), rather than šumma, which further corroborates the relationship of šumma with ʾim and ʾin. 4.  Voigt (1995) explains this correspondence as a general sound shift that works only in two or three morphemes. Another explanation, suggested by Speiser (1936: 28–29), traces back the different forms to a single historical pair: the pronouns *šīʾa and *hūʾa. 5.  Except for the unique case kīm[a] šumma la kâti pāris warkātim lā īšû ul tīdî ‘Do you not know that if not for you I have no handler of cases?’ (9, 63:5–7).

2.1.  šumma conditionals

31

The syntagmatic compatibility inside šumma clauses is as follows: 1. Verbal forms are never marked as subordinative in the way that they are in attributive clauses 6 (= GAG’s Genitivsätze); 2. The negative particle is always lā, as in pronominal questions; 3. Inside the protasis, multiple verbal forms are seldom interconnected by the particle -ma; 4. The verbal form in the protasis is never interconnected with the apodosis via the connective -ma; 5. When this nevertheless appears to happen, it is actually the focusing function that occurs when -ma follows nouns and adverbials (simple or complex), rather than independent clauses. It is then marking the protasis as focus (see exx. [29]–[30]). Conditional clauses in the letter corpus potentially have two types of context: the immediate context and the general context. The former has repercussions for understanding the syntactic nature of the CS in general and of the protasis in particular. The latter is indispensable if one needs to determine such factors as tense values, givenness of information (that is, whether the information is presupposed), etc. The immediate context involves the clauses that immediately precede the CSs. In certain cases, these clauses are explicitly interconnected, via -ma, to the CS: [26] qibī–ma šumma illiam līliam ‘Order that (lit., ‘and then’) if he (intends to) come, let him come’ 2, 100:22–23 (and similarly: 1, 17:26–29; 1, 67:6′–8′; 1, 105:16–17 ; 1, 115:7′–9′; 4, 16:15–20; 4, 18:15–19; 4, 38:15–24; 4, 39:12–17; 4, 64:16–19; 6, 79:20–23; 10, 29:11–13; 13, 43:19–23) [27] nīdi aḫim taraššiāšim–ma šumma eleppum šī imtūt ḫamuttam–ma ša kīma šâti nirtêb ‘Should you be negligent toward it, then in case this boat should sink, would we be able to replace it for ourselves 7 soon with one just like it?’ 3, 35:26–28 (and similarly: 7, 110:27–29; 10, 178:26–30; 12, 121:8–14) [28] 3 kur šeʾam ušabbala[kku]m–m[a] šumma alākam taqabb[ī–ma] lulli[k] ‘Should I send [you] 3 (kor) barley, 8 [only] if you order to go I am willing to go’ 5, 151:6′–9′ (and similarly: 3, 2:18–23; 13, 120:11–17) In most of these cases, the preceding clause is modally congruent with the apodosis (as in exx. [26], [27], and similar cases), which is discussed below. In OB, the boundaries of verbal clauses (including paris forms) 9 are most clearly marked by the connective particle -ma, which signals the end of one clause and the beginning of the following clause, while leaving out the protasis (as explained, it is not interconnected to the following 6.  For a description of attribution in OB, see Cohen 2008a. 7.  Interpreting the -t- in nirtêb as reflexive. 8.  An explanation for this interpretation is given below, §2.2.1. 9.  Not, however, the predicative state of the substantive (e.g., aššat ‘she is a married woman’), which has the same endings but different syntax.

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clause by -ma; see further on this point and its repercussions in §2.7.2 below.) From this fact, one may infer that the protasis is formally embedded in, or is a part of, the apodosis domain within which it is located. This conclusion may lead us to regard the apodosis as a main clause. Another indication of embedding is the focusability of the šumma protasis by the particle -ma. Focusing with this particle occurs in OB only with sentence constituents, either simple or complex, but never with a main clause: [29] 2 šiqil kaspam šūbilaššu {[š]umma lā tušaršam}–ma 1 tušabbalam ‘Have him send me two sheqels (of) silver. Only {if you cannot supply me}, you (can) send me (only) one’ 7, 79:7–9 [30] aššum kallatini {šumma umma abū[ni–m]a ina bītini lišib iqabbī}–ma uššerši–ma ma[ḫr]īšu lišib ‘Concerning our daughter in law, only {if [our] father says thus: ‘Let her dwell in our house’}, release her and let her (or: so that she) dwell wi[th] him’ 2, 142:6 –11 Another argument in support of embeddedness is the fixed order in šumma conditionals: they always are protasis-first. This is the usual behavior of sentence constitutents, including adverbial clauses. There is only a single exception to this order: [31] 5 nūnī šūbilam ana PN šumma ibaššû ‘Send me 5 fish for PN, if there are (any)’ 12, 180:16–18 Note, however, that the syntax of this example (as well as that of the letter) is different in another respect, the place of the syntagm ana PN ‘to PN’, which occurs after the verbal form in the clause. Embedding of this kind is reminiscent of the syntactic functions of adverbial clauses. However, despite the obvious indications of embedding, the relationship between the protasis and apodosis is nevertheless different from the adverbial relationship (see §1.3 above) which obtains between an adverbial clause and its main clause. This is demonstrable paradigmati­cally (see below, §2.1.2.1 below) but can be conceived syn­tagma­ti­­­ cally as well. First, šumma protases are compatible with temporal clauses. This compatibility means that conditional protases and temporal clauses do not belong in the same paradigm and are hence distinct syntactic functions: [32] šumma awātum lā imtagrakka adi allakam šeʾam 1⁄2 qâ lā ilappat ‘If the matter has not met your consent, let him not touch (even) half a liter (of) barley until I come’ 14, 27:15–18 [33] adi allakaššu [šum]ma puḫādum šīmšu [ad]īni lā išakkan qāssu lā ubbal rēšī–ma [l]ikīl ‘Until I come to him, if (as for) the lamb, he has not yet set its price and has not yet begun, let it be at my disposal’ 6, 173:18–22 Second, compare the following syntagms:

2.1.  šumma conditionals

33

[34] warkassunu purus–ma wuššeršunūti ‘Investigate their case and then release them’ 1, 76:9–10 [35] warkat ḫiblētišu purus–ma {lāma ana ṣēr bēlišu illikam–ma bēlšu ulammidu} libbašu ṭīb ‘Decide in the matter of his damages and satisfy him {before he has (= will have) come to his master and notified him}’ 4, 134:17–22 [36] [w]arkatam purus–ma {[šu]mma eqelšu . . . ḫabil} eqlam . . . tēršum ‘Investigate the [c]ase and {[i]f he has been deprived of his field} . . . return the field . . . 13, 43:19–23 Exx. [34], [35], and [36] seem to consist each of two interconnected purus clauses. The question is whether the šumma clause in ex. [36] is merely an informational addition to the second purus clause (as is the adverbial clause in ex. [35]) or whether it exerts more decisive influence. The context of ex. [34] is a claim by the writer of the letter that nothing was found in the hands of two of his servants who are suspected as thieves, and he therefore expects that his addressee will look into the matter and then release them unconditionally, being certain that nothing incriminating is found. In ex. [35], the purus forms also are not conditioned and the adverbial clause adds a temporal specification to the second purus form but does not change its nature either (it is the syntactic and semantic equivalent of the simple adverb arḫiš ‘quickly’). In both exx. [34] and [35], the second purus form is a plain directive in function, expressing the will of the speaker, telling the addressee what he should do. In contrast, the context for ex. [36], as in many Ḫammurabi letters, is a complaint of somone deprived of his field (as well as other possessions, not listed here). Ḫammurabi expects his addressee to look into the matter, but what looks like a precative form that has a directive function, asking the addressee to return the field to the person who complained, turns out to be not absolute but instead hinges on the results of the investigation. This all sounds trivial and self-evident, since the sentence is a CS. But more often than not, it is easy to forget that the form occurring as the apodosis of an ordinary condition is conditioned; in our case, the value of tēršum ‘return to him’ is not just a directive but a conditioned directive. In case of “indicative” form in the apodosis, the difference is even more pronounced: compare tušabbalam ‘you send me’ in the apodosis of ex. [29] above, to the truly indicative form tušabbalam occurring alone (e.g., 3, 65:11). The latter is plain indicative, making a factual statement, whereas the former is not. Being conditioned, it is a nonfactual statement. This special semantic status (the syntactic difference is discussed below, in the following section) is not marked morphologically, but it must not be overlooked. A case analogous to this modal effect on the functional value of the forms can be found with modal particles such as midde ‘perhaps’: [37] ṣuḫārum tidūkum–ma ul illikam ‘The servant, (because) there was combat, has not come’ 7, 55:12–13

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[38] midde awātum–ma ul illikam ‘Perhaps (because) there was some matter, he has not come’ 8, 99:13 These two examples are almost identical, both containing, in addition to the clause ul illikam ‘he has not come’, a unipartite NVC termed “causal existential.” 10 However, they are not identical, even though ul illikam in both clauses is presented as factual (in ex. [38], the example is preceded by aššum lā tallikam ‘because you did not come’). The reason for not coming is different in each case, not only by virtue of content (combat vs. matter) but also in their epistemic status. Whereas the reason in ex. [37] tidūkum ‘combat’ is referred to as factual, in ex. [38], awātum ‘matter’ is not; it is, instead, a supposition, unverifiable at the moment of utterance because it is within the scope of midde. Since not coming is a given in ex. [38] and, as a result, is the theme (that is, the known part), the existential is the rheme of the clause (that is, the new information) and the particle midde in fact refers to the link between the theme and the rheme (the nexus). The effect that the particle midde has on the factuality of the clause falling within its scope is comparable to the effect of the conditional pattern on the apodosis clause. Put differently, whereas an adverbial clause imposes some circumstantial limitation but does not change the nature of the main clause verbal form (temporally, aspectually, and so on), the existence of a conditional protasis does have this effect. The implications of this are that the conditional protasis is not a mere addition to or specification of a main clause verb, which we can consider separately. Instead, a conditional protasis forms, together with the apodosis, a construction whose parts are mutually ­dependent on each other, which is different from adverbial clauses, where the dependency is not mutual but unidirectional: the adverb(ial clause) depends on its main clause, but not vice-versa. So, despite the embeddedness discussed above (and see further §2.7.2), we still regard conditionals as constructions whose protasis and apodosis form a mutual dependency. Having ruled out the adverbial syntactic relationship, at least in principle, we need to examine two more relationships: the attributive and the predicative (for which see §1.3). The attributive relationship is the relationship between nucleus and satellite, or head and its expansion. Because this relationship is largely a unidirectional dependency, it is ruled out as well, and we have to look elsewhere. We are left with one remaining potential relationship: the predicative relationship. This relationship is no doubt a mutual dependency, but other criteria need to be considered. The first is topicality, the topic being the parallel entity, above clause level, to the theme, the given entity. Haiman (1978) suggests that conditional protases are given topics—that is, topics in which the information is presupposed. However, conditional protases in the letter corpus cannot be regarded as this kind of topic. By this definition, topic is an ultraclausal anchor in discourse that contains presupposed information, which has two functions: to maintain cohesion with previous parts of the text and to serve as the theme (“what is being discussed”) for further information contained in the comment. 10.  See Cohen 2005b: 251–52.

2.1.  šumma conditionals

35

Upon examination of the nature of the givenness of the information inside the protasis, it turns out that the information can be mostly new or partially new. In no case is it entirely presupposed. All-new information is found in conditionals that have no explicit link with the context: the circumstances described in the protasis are not previously discussed and hence constitute new information: [39] u 300 kur šeʾum ša GN šumma ana iprim innandin arḫiš lillikūnim–ma . . . limḫurū ‘As for the 300 kor barley of GN, if it is to be given for rations, let one come quickly and receive (it) . . .’ 14, 55:11–15 This is an especially clean case; in many other examples, some elements in the protasis are new whereas others are previously mentioned. Even in the extreme case in which the protasis repeats information given earlier in the text (in fact, this is one of the characteristics of “indicative” paratactic conditionals; see §2.2.1 below), there is nevertheless one new element—the condition itself: [40] 1 kur šeʾam . . . šūbilā[nim]-ma . . . šumma šeʾam lā tušāb[il]ānim ṭēmka šupram–ma kīma anaṭṭalu lūpuš ‘Send [me] 1 kor (of) barley . . . if you have not sen[t] me the barley, send me your report so I can do as I see (fit)’ 1, 142:15–23 Note that the information that occurs in the context is repeated in the protasis. The conditioning factor is new, then, as well as the opposite polarity (that is, the possibility that the directive might not be carried out); both constitute the core of conditional possibility. The following case is a direct continuation of ex. [39]: [41] šumma lā kīam ana bītim lušābilaššu ‘If not, I want to have it sent home’ 14, 55:15–16 The phrase lā kīam (lit., ‘not so’) is an expression that occurs exclusively in šumma protases in which the function is to represent a nexus and negate it, at the same time. What is new in this case, then, is not even the conditioning (which occurs earlier) 11 but merely the opposite possibility, that the barley is not to be given for rations. This is the absolute extreme, where, as we can see, there still is something new. So, if one regards topicality as related to presupposed information, then not all šumma protases are topical. The “aboutness” factor, common in discussions about topicality, is problematic as well. This can be illustrated by comparing a šumma protasis to a topical aššum clause (‘as to . . .’); the difference stands out immediately: the apodosis is generally not said about the protasis, unlike the comment, which directly pertains to the topic (in this case marked by aššum). The preceding discussion covers given topical entities. Other, more relevant types of topics are discussed in the conclusions (§2.7.2 below). 11.  In some cases, lā kīam refers to a preceding directive (rather than a protasis). In these cases, the conditioning factor is of course new.

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2.1.2.  Paradigmatic characteristics: protasis and apodosis The paradigm in structural analysis is the linguistic parallel to a mathematical matrix. 12 A matrix is an ordered array of numbers that obeys certain rules referred to as matrix algebra. The numbers inside the matrix are called “entries.” For two matrixes to be equal, they must have the same size and all their corresponding entries must be identical. The paradigm is an array of entities that figure in the same slot inside the same syntagmatic environment and commute with each other. Unlike the mathematical parallel, the order of entities is not important, but the issue of equality is similar: for two paradigms to be equal, there must be an equality in the number and identity of the entities. The paradigm is a form—just like a morpheme, in principle—although it is more complex than the latter. As a form, or an exponent, it has some functional value that is common to all of the entities in the group; this functional value is called category. This group function does not exclude individual values for each entity. The respective paradigms of the protasis and apodosis of a given conditional pattern (that is, the group of forms that can figure in each of them) are part of its complex syntactic form. Each pattern is characterized differently by its various potential combinations of forms. 2.1.2.1.  The protasis There are two potential paradigms pertaining to the protasis. One is the group of forms that interchanges with the entire protasis (namely, šumma . . . iprus), the other is the interchange of forms inside the protasis—those forms that can figure inside the protasis and their functional value in the paradigm. A third, very significant paradigm is the one in which entire con­ditional patterns interchange, and this is to be a prime facet of this work. Externally, a conditional šumma protasis can interchange with ulašūma ‘otherwise’, without affecting the syntagmatic relationships. 13 However, there are only a few examples of this particle in the corpus: 14 [42] amtam . . . šāmam ulašūma šamaššamī . . . [u]l inaddinūni ‘Buy for me a . . . maid, otherwise they will not give me the sesame . . .’ 12, 32:19–26 This form is very similar, structurally and semantically, to the entire protasis šumma lā kīam ‘if not’ (for which see §2.1.2.1.7 below). A similar example is found in Goetze 1958: 56, 30:16–20. Two other, somewhat more challenging occurrences are found in Goetze 1958 as well: [43] šumma 1⁄3 mana kaspam šuqul šumma ulašūma 30 kur šeʾam mudud inanna šumma kaspam šūbilam šumma ulašūma meḫer ṭuppiya šūbilam– ma 30 kur šeʾam lumdud ‘Either pay 1⁄3 mina silver or otherwise, measure 12.  Compare Seiler 1967: 65–67. 13.  Compare Biblical Hebrew wāloʾ. 14.  According to AHw:1408a, the examples mainly occur at Mari (cf. ARM 15:190).

2.1.  šumma conditionals

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30 kor barley. Now, either send me silver, or otherwise send me an answer to my tablet so I shall measure 30 kor barley’ Götze 1958: 45, 21:8–14 [44] ulū attunu ana ṣēriya alkāni ulū šumma lā kīam kiṣrum ginû šū lillikam ‘Either you come to me or if not, the dough, it is a regular offering, it should come’ 1, 81:40–44 In ex. [43], the function of all of the occurrences of šumma are not conditional but disjunctive, syntactically equivalent to ulū ‘or’. This conclusion is inferred from the second occurrence of šumma in ex. [43], šumma kaspam šūbilam: the conditional šumma is not compatible with the imperative purus; the latter is never part of the conditional protasis. This explains how ulašūma ‘otherwise’, the equivalent of a conditional šumma clause, is compatible with a preceding šumma. The same idea is repeated, with other exponents, in ex. [44]: ulū ‘or’ corresponds to šumma in disjunctive function, while šumma lā kīam corresponds to ulašūma. The few examples of ulašūma do fulfill the limited function of šumma lā kīam but do not really contribute to our understanding of how the conditional clause is to be classified syntactically, since ulašūma is not a simple entity but originally a sentence (*ula šū–ma ‘(it is) not this’). The paradigm often helps clarify the status of various entities vis-à-vis one another— that is, which are more transparent. For instance, consider the following paradigms: Table 2.1 ?

clause

const. state

īpušu ‘he made’

inūma . . . iptarsu ūmam ‘today’ urram ‘tomorrow’

?

alkam ‘come’

bīt ‘house’

awīlim ‘man’ ṭuppim ‘tablet’

In the first paradigm, we must evaluate a clause (iptarsu) headed by an abstract inūma. We know that the more concrete adverbials ūmam ‘today’ and urram ‘tomorrow’ are in the same paradigm. The concrete entities make it possible for us to decide that inūma . . . iptarsu ‘when he has decided . . .’ is a temporal adverbial clause. In the second paradigm, we must assess the verbal syntagm īpušu ‘he made’. Based on our knowledge of the more tangible genitive substantives in the same syntactic position, we can reach the conclusion that the clause has the same function as the substantives in genitive; all function as attributes of bīt. Hence, bīt īpušu can be glossed ‘the house of his having built’ 15 and translated ‘the house he built’. This indeed is one of the problems of a conditional clause: it is sui generis in many respects, one of which is its unique paradigm. Other potential candidates, such as ina lā and balum ‘without’, turn out to be unproductive, because they do not interchange with a conditional. 15.  Suggested by Hugo Schuchardt (1913: 466); see Goldenberg 1993: 298.

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One case is that of the modal particles discussed above (exx. [37] and [38], pp. 33–34). Despite the fact that they are semantically similar to šumma conditional protases, they are not syntactically inter­changeable with the latter. (The comparison is conducted between the paradigm of forms following a modal particle and the apodosis paradigm, which is modal as a result of its interrelationship with the protasis.) Table 2.2

pīqat / midde

paradigm

apodosis paradigm

iprus

precative

iparras

vs.

paris

šumma protasis

iparras paris

The reason is that these modal particles ( pīqat and midde ‘perhaps’) have within their scope a diverse paradigm that includes, inter alia, iprus forms but not precative forms. Iprus forms, however, do not normally function as the apodosis of a šumma conditional, whereas precative forms are the most common form in the apodosis. The semantic relationship is not corroborated by syntactic equivalence. Because the direction of evaluating the syntactic status of the entire protasis seems to be unfruitful thus far (the discussion is resumed in §2.7.2), we shall now turn to the main task, to examine the internal paradigm of the protasis and its members and attempt to arrive at a statement about the different values of the various forms. These statements are based on all of the occurrences (to the best of my knowledge) of conditional šumma clauses in the letter corpus. As is mentioned above, the textual context—or co-text—is paramount for our understanding and formulation of these values. The values of these forms have been discussed by Maloney (1982), Leong (1994), Streck (1995, 1998b, 1999), and Loesov (2004). Loesov has arrived at the best results so far, and the description here basically concurs with his results, with some occasional refinements. The forms found in the protasis are iprus, iptaras, iparras, paris, and NVC. The temporal values of the forms correspond to the values they exhibit outside šumma clauses, except for a few points discussed below. 2.1.2.1.1. Affirmative iprus forms The form iprus in epistolary šumma protases is discussed separately by Maloney (1982: 219–30, 251–54). Maloney (pp. 229–30) cannot decide between past and present-future and resorts to saying that the form signals that the condition is real. This of course is also true when iparras is in the protasis. Leong (1994: 118–22) cites, for the functional value of iprus, two kinds of anteriority: one relative to the present and the other to the future. It is Loesov (2004: 141–44) who provides the ultimate solution: The non-negated Preterite in šumma-clauses denotes facts anterior to the coding time, while the negated Preterite can have both past and future reference (2004: 141, my emphasis).

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These affirmative iprus forms indeed have past value, just as they do outside of šumma clauses, as is observed by Loesov (2004: 141–44), based on the examples reported in the literature. This can be best illustrated by cases where the context and the protasis are co-referential, using ideally the same lexemes as well as participants. This key protasis type is here called verificational protases. It is mostly attested in the Ḫammurabi letters subcorpus (hence­forth ḪL), 16 though not exclusively there: [45] ina GN ṭātum ibbašī–ma (ib-ba-ši-ma) awīlû ša ṭātam ilqû u šībū ša awâtim šināti īdû ibaššû (i-ba-aš-šu-ú) (. . .) 20warkatam purus–ma šumma ṭātum i[b]baš[i] kaspam u mimma ša ina ṭâtim i[lq]û kunkam–ma . . . [š]ūb[i]l[a]m ‘   “In GN bribery took place and the people who took bribe and witnesses who know this matter exist”. . . look into the matter and if bribery too[k p]lace, seal the silver and whatever one to[ok] as bribery and s[en]d me . . .’ 2, 11:7–13, 20–24 (ḪL) This is almost a textbook example. A crime is reported and presented in the report (lines 7–13) as a complex occurrence in the past. In the royal letter, a sequence of directive purus forms follows the protasis, the sole purpose of the entire conditional construction being the verification of the report. Acting on these directive purus forms in the apodosis depends on the results of the report. Explicit co-referentiality between the report in the context 17 and the verificational protasis compels us to recognize the past value of iprus in the protasis. 18 A similar example can be found in 4, 40:6–28 (treated below, ex. [51] and 4, 38:6–13, 15–24 (although the exact form is somewhat debateable). The following example is very similar, except that it contains in addition a unique paronomastic infinitive construction (for which see Cohen 2004): [46] mārū PN1 kīam ulammidūninni umma šunu–ma 1 amtum ša bītini qadum mārātiša udappir–ma ina bīt PN2 ina GN ibašši (. . .) 22šumma amtum šī [š]a mārī PN1–ma [dupp]urum–ma udappir [amtam] šiāti [qadum m]ārātiša [ana mā]rī PN1 tēr ‘The sons of PN1 have brought the following to my attention, saying: “A maid of our family escaped with her daughters and is now at the house of PN2 in GN” (. . .) If this maid, who (actually) [bel]ongs to the sons of PN1 (and not to anyone else), did escape, return this [maid with h]er daughters [to the s]ons of PN1’. 13, 18:4–12, 22–28 (ḪL) 16.  For a list of these letters, see Streck (1999: 103 n. 13). 17.  The letter does not contain a narrative (Loesov 2004: passim) but does contain a report. For the syntactic and semantic characteristics of OB narrative, see Cohen 2006. For example, the narrative has an aspectual rather than temporal system, it is constructed impersonally, etc. 18.  Streck (1995: 200 n. 455) mentions seven occurrences of iprus that, according to him, signal “Vor­ zeitigkeit in der Zukunft”; four cases, all cited by Maloney (1982: 1, 91:4–13; 1, 142:15–23 = ex. [97]; 2, 129:10–19 = ex. [63]; and 3, 44:4–10) are in fact lā iprus, described in §2.1.2.1.4 below. Another example (3, 33:9–10, our ex. [192]), is counterfactual, and the form is īšu—that is, it is a functional stative. The last two cases cited as future anterior by Streck are 3, 39, 16–24 (presented and discussed below, p. 41 n. 23), and 2, 11:4–24 (our ex. [45]). The identification of the form iprus with lā iprus makes it impossible to reach a definite conclusion: they are not the same form.

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The maid in question, her owners, and her escape are co-referential between the report and the protasis. The paronomastic infinitive construction is in this case a response to a doubt regarding the veracity of the report. 19 The clause referring to the ownership of the maid in the protasis corroborates this view. In the following example, the report is a chain (iprus-ma iptaras) where the final form of the report is resumed as iprus in the protasis: [47] PN ušēṣīšunūti–ma 2 nukaribbī wēdum kaššû ilteqēšunūti (. . .) 25šumma kīma iqbûnim wēdum ilqēšunūti x qadu 1⁄2 mana kaspim ana maḫrīya šūbilam ‘“PN rented them and a single kassite took the two gardeners”. (. . .) If, as they told me, a single person took them, send me x with 1⁄2 mina (of) silver’ 13, 79:19–20, 25–28 This is not a royal letter, but the case is nevertheless similar. The iptaras form ilteqē­šunūti, which closes the chain, cannot appear in the protasis except in the form ilqēšunūti—that is, in any formation other than iprus—if past reference is meant. Note that chain-ending iptaras forms are not a part of the protasis paradigm in this corpus, in contrast to the law collections or the omens. The co-referentiality of both lexeme and participants does not have to exhibit the identical tense. The report may consist of events and states from the reporter’s own time frame, which, by the time the tablet has reached the addressee, are viewed as past: [48] PN1 ra[biānum] eqlam ša . . . ṣabtā[ku] ibtaqranni (. . .) 14ana mīnim PN1 rabiānum PN2 eqlam ibqur warkatam purus–ma šumma PN1 PN2 ṭēʾinam (or ararram) iḫbu[l] ḫibiltašu tēršum ‘  “The m[ayor] PN1 has claimed the field which [I] hold. . .”.  Why did the mayor PN1 claim the field from PN2? Investigate the matter and if PN1 deprived the miller PN2, repay him his damages’ 2, 6:6–9, 14–20 (ḪL) Here, despite the fact that there is no exact resumption of the complaint, the relationship between the complaint and the verbal lexeme ḫabālum ‘deprive’ is close enough. Note that the complaint is made with the unchained iptaras form, which, after various syntactic boundaries, has a value of a linguistic (present) perfect. 20 When the king responds, it is presented in the question merely as something that took place in the past, 21 and this temporal view is continued in the protasis. The following case is an example of a very approximate resumption of lexemes, which is somewhat confusing: 19.  Hirsch (1995–96: 137–39) offers a preterite interpretation of ex. [46] as well as of ex. [48], ascribing it to Ḫammurabi’s spoken OB. Note, however, that there are examples of this in letters from other people as well. 20.  Examples of syntactic boundaries of this kind are the direct speech converter (umma x–ma), discourse particles (inanna), a shift between syntactic domains (indicative to precative and vice versa), etc. 21.  Regarding the iprus form in the pronominal question, according to Maloney (1982: 172), there is but one example of iptaras in real (non-rhetorical) questions in his corpus (AbB 1–7). That may well explain why iptaras is not chosen. At any rate, iprus is chosen over iparras—that is, past reference.

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41

[49] 3 būr eqlum ša ina kanik bēliya kankam ištu 4 šanātim PN1 īkimanni–ma šeʾšu ilteneqqe (. . .) 14šumma kīma PN2 šū iqbû 3 būr eqlam ša ina ekallim kankušum PN1 ištu 4 šanātim ilqē–ma ikkal elīša awātum maruštum ul ibašši warkat awātim šuāti damqiš pursā–ma eqlam ša pī kanīkim ša ina ekallim ikkankušum ana PN1 ter[r]ā ‘“Four years ago, PN1 deprived me of a field of 3 būr which was sealed for me in my lord’s seal and has been taking its barley” (. . .) If, as that PN2 said, PN1 took, four years ago, a field of 3 būr which was sealed for him in the palace and he feeds (off it), there is nothing worse than that. Investigate this matter well and return the field according to the sealed document which was sealed for him in the palace’ 4, 79:6–11, 14–26 (ḪL) The actual semantic correspondence is between īkimanni and ilqe (deprive~take something away) on the one hand and between ilteneqqe and ikkal (regularly taking the barley~feeding off it) on the other. Note that there are no changes in the basic tense formations (iprus–ma iparras in both cases). 22 Some of the examples are not strictly verificational, but, nevertheless, there is an implicit link between the context and the protasis: [50] eqlum šū ana rîtim esḫanniāšim (. . .) 23šumma lā idam idbubū šērtam bēlī līmissunūti ‘  “ This field is assigned to us for pasture” (. . .) If they spoke without a reason, let my lord impose punishment on them’ 6, 6:10, 23–25 This example contains a cited claim, and the protasis refers back to this claim, implicitly resuming it with idbubū. It is important to note that when an event occurs in the context and is marked as past but is resumed in the protasis with iparras, we do not have past reference (except perhaps with the adverb adīni; see below). Some iprus forms occur in the protasis but do not have a context, and claiming, based on the CS alone, that it has a preterite value is rather speculative. However, in view of several full examples, it is reasonable to conclude that the suggested value is valid for all of the cases (none of them defy this value, not even the examples cited by Loesov [2004]). 23 2.1.2.1.2.  lā iprus forms The lā iprus form is unique in having two distinct values in šumma protases: it serves as the negative form of both iprus and iptaras. Maloney (1982: 219–30) treats 22.  Cf. discussion by Loesov (2004:142–43), which runs along different lines. 23.  Loesov (2004: 144 and n. 134) mentions two examples that might contra­dict the past value of iprus in the protasis: šumma qātka tatbal–ma šeʾam itti mamman telqē–ma še PN lā ḫašḫāta [š]upram–ma ašar tašapparam šeʾam luddin ‘If you lay/laid your hand and take/took barley from someone and (consequently) do not need PN’s barley, write me and let me give you barley, wherever you write me’ (3, 39:20–24), which indeed can be read, due to lack of context, in any way we like (but for this very reason it cannot constitute a counterexample). The other example is: [šum]–ma šāpirī išpuram ṣ[āb]am nušeššer–ma ṭēm ṣābim ana šāpiriya utarram (13, 37:16–19). Due to lack of context, plus the fact that the broken šumma could be read as kīma or lāma, we can exclude this example as inconclusive.

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The Letter Corpus

both affirmative and negative preterites under the same heading, without any finer distinction. Loesov (2004: 141) observes that the lā iprus can have both past and future reference. lā iprus forms are usually regarded as the negative allomorph of iptaras, but there are enough examples which show that these forms negate the form iprus as well. The following example is a key example for this value of lā iprus: [51] a. PN1 ša ḫumāšim kīam ulammidanni umma šū–ma 7eqel bīt abīya ša ištu ūmī mādūtim ṣabtānu PN2 sukkukum mār PN3 ibquranni–ma PN4 ālum u šībūtum izzizū warkat eqlim šuāti iprusū–ma kīma PN3 abi sukkukim eqlam šuāti lā iṣbatu eqlum šū ṣibitni–ma ubirrūnim–ma ṭuppam iddinūnim u ina ṭuppim ša iddinūnim PN3 abi sukkukim [ana] šībūtim šaṭer inanna sukkukim mār PN3 eqlī ibtaqranni 20u šê inaṣṣar kīam ulammidanni ‘The wrestler PN1 informed me thus: “My family’s field, which we possess for a long time, PN2 the deaf, son of PN3 claimed (it) and PN4, the town and witnesses served, they investigated the matter of this field and established that PN3, father of the deaf did not possess the field (and that) this field was our possession and they gave me a document and in the document which they gave me, PN3, father of the deaf, is registered [as] witness. Now the deaf, son of PN3, has claimed my field and (additionally) he holds my barley”. Thus he informed me’ 4, 40:5–21 b. šumma kīma PN1 ša ḫumāšim iqbû warkat awâtim ša eqlim šuāti PN4 ālum u šībūtum iprusū–ma eqlam ana PN1–ma ubirrū u ina ṭuppim PN3 abi sukkukim ana šībūtim šaṭer 28eqlam u šeʾam ana PN1–ma terrā ‘If, as the wrestler PN1 said, PN4, the town and witnesses (themselves) investigated the matter of the field and established the field (as belonging) to PN1, and (additionally) in the document PN3 the father of the deaf was registered as witness, return the field and barley to PN1’ 4, 40:22–28 c. šumma warkat eqlim šuāti lā ipparis PN4 eqlam šuāti lā ubīr–ma ana PN1 lā iddin kakkum ša ilim ana eqlim lirid–ma attunu ālum u šībūtum awâtim ša eqlim šuāti maḫar ilim birrā–ma eqlam ana dūrišu idnā ‘If the matter of the field was not investigated, PN4 did not establish this field and did not give (it) to PN1, may the divine emblem descend to the field and you, town and witnesses, establish the matter of this field in front of God and assign the field its permanent status’ 4, 40:29–36 The letter has three parts: (a) the complaint (lines 7–20), (b) a verification clause (lines 22–27) and the related directives in the apodosis (lines 28), and (c) the alternative (lines 29–36). The last part is, of course, the negative of the verification clause, which means that lā iprus forms here negate iprus—and not iptaras—forms, all having past value. The resumption discussed above occurs here most clearly between the report and the rest of the letter. The following example is similar, but requires some explanation: [52] šumma PN eqlam ana ēdikī lā ip[l]uk–ma ēdikū uwattûn[i]m–ma ulammidūni[n]n[i] ē[dik]ī arnam em[i]d ‘If PN did not divide off a field for

2.1.  šumma conditionals

43

the basket menders and the basket menders misinformed m[e], 24 impose punishment on the basket menders’ 13, 15:19–26 (ḪL) There is another verifying condition earlier in this letter (line 7: šumma kīma ulammid[ū­n]inni; compare šumma kīma PN . . . iqbû in ex. [51]), which precedes our example, ending with the directive tēr ‘return’ (line 18; most of the lines in between are fragmentary). This is the usual sequence: if the complaint is found to be true, the property is to be returned; but if the complaint is a lie, there is punishment. The context establishes that lā iprus, interconnected with other iprus forms, is not the negative allomorph of iptaras but instead the negative of iprus. Actually, the mere fact that lā iprus is interconnected with a following iprus form is enough to testify to its true nature (the sequence *iptaras–ma iprus is untypical for OB in general). The same considerations hold for the first example in n. 23, where the form tatbal (potentially either iprus or iptaras) is interpreted as iprus. The third and last example’s apodosis is broken, but the syntactic setting is nevertheless similar to ex. [51] above: [53] šeʾam ana fPN ina GN ukillū–ma ul imḫur u PN ana šībūtim ṭuppašu ušābilam šumma šeʾam ana fPN lā ukillū–ma P[N] ina bīt DN [ina šeʾ]im kullim lā ub[t]īr [. . .] ‘“In GN they held the barley for fPN’s disposal, but she did not accept (it),” but PN sent me his tablet as evidence. If they did not hold the barley for fPN’s disposal and PN was not proven to hold the barley in the temple of DN . . .’ 9, 19:21–27 The resumption of ukillū and the participants makes it clear that this is an event that took (or did not take) place in the past. This form is hereafter referred to as lā iprus1, in contrast to lā iprus2 (see below, §2.1.2.1.4). 2.1.2.1.3.  iptaras forms The form iptaras in šumma clauses has received ample scholarly con­sideration. The results of the various scholarly investigations most relevant to our discussion (which currently pertains to the letters only) are summarized below: • GAG §161e–f refers to OB en bloc. There is consecutio temporum (iprus–ma . . . iptaras). The perfect (iptaras) corresponds to the German present; but unlike the preterite, it marks the condition as potential or hypothetical. • Maloney (1982: 231–48) uses AbB 1–7 as his corpus. In his summary (p. 247), he notes that several oppositions were examined (past~non-past, real~hypo­ thetical, near future~remote future) but none could account for all of the occurrences of iptaras in the protasis. Maloney particularly disagrees with the futurum exactum interpretation (pp. 236–38).

24.  Lit., ‘misled me (lit., ‘led me to find’) and informed me’; we can only guess at the meaning from the rare D stem of √uta. Streck (1997: 147) suggests that wuttûm in this context means ‘invent’.

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The Letter Corpus

• According to Leong (1994: 218–23), on the basis of AbB 1–13, iptaras in the protasis denotes either present perfect or future perfect (in other words, it is anterior to the moment of speech or to a future moment; p. 219). Further partition is made between real and hypothetical conditionals. • Describing both the laws of Ḫammurabi and his letters (ḪL), Streck (1999: 106– 8) tells us that anteriority in the future is expressed by iptaras (affirmative and negative) as well as by negative iprus in šumma protases. The time-frame of the protasis is considered to be future. Note that the examples are rendered (in parentheses) as future perfect. Another category, according to Streck, is the occurrence of iptaras in a chain following iprus (von Soden’s consecutio temporum). Streck (1999: 112–13) states that the protasis with iptaras is anterior to the apodosis (but this would be true for all ordinary conditions). The sole example provided is from the laws, not from the letters, in which there is not one example of this kind of chain (see below, §2.1.2.1.9). 25 Earlier, Streck (1995: 200; 1998b: 305) claims that iptaras in conditional protases basically has the same function that it does in relative clauses. It is to be noted that at least some of these examples (see Maloney 1982: 184–95, 208 n. 14, as well as Leong 1994: 208–10) no doubt show a present perfect value. • Loesov (2004: 144–46) refers to the entire corpus of OB letters. He states (p. 144) that the perfect denotes both present perfect (like its “normal” function in main clauses) and future perfect (as in temporal clauses) by being temporalized both before and after the moment of speaking. As above, the point of departure is cases in which there is enough co-text for us to depend on. Note that the views of the scholars cited differ, sometimes considerably, and several potential solutions have been proposed and discussed. The following semantic issues, with one additional potential explanation, may prove relevant to the description of iptaras: (1) future notion; (2) polar relationship with the co-text; 26 (3) (un)likeliness or hypotheticality; and (4) linguistic perfect notion. The following survey of examples intends to single out the most plausible solution. The following example illustrates the various characteristics (semantic as well as syntactic) of iptaras forms in šumma protases: [54] kušurša linakkir–ma eleppum lā i[m]ât nīdi aḫim taraššiāšim–ma šumma eleppum šī imtūt ḫamuttam–ma 27 ša kīma šâti nirtêb ‘Let him change its x 28 so that the boat does not sink. Should you be negligent towards it, if this boat has sank, will we be able to replace it for ourselves soon with one just like it?’ 3, 35:25–28 25.  The lack of examples is not accidental: it is serious corroboration of the claim that the šumma protasis varies across genres. 26.  Polarity refers here primarily to the contrast between affirmative and negative. Occasionally, this opposition is also to be found between these extremes and uncertainty. 27.  An underline of an individual vowel is a mark of a functional lengthening to signal, e.g., a question. 28.  li-na-ki-ir ‘er soll beseitigen!’ (von Soden 1969: 361).

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Three of the issues presented above are found in this representative example. 29 First, in the context, the same verbal lexeme occurs as in the protasis, but unlike the cases of iprus discussed above, there is a difference in polarity between the context and the protasis: the lexeme mâtum ‘die’ occurs in the context as a negative precative (lā imât), following measures to be taken in order to prevent the boat from sinking. The possibility of sinking is resumed inside the condition (imtūt). This polarity difference compels us to feel a strong insistence (‘if the ship does sink’). 30 Second, the temporal realm of the event is future (but we have to take into consideration that there are other forms whose function is to cover this semantic sphere). Third, the šumma construction is viewed as hypothetical (that is, since all ordinary conditionals are nonfactual, showing a higher degree of unlikelihood), as is reflected in the interpretation of the text (see the edition as well as Maloney 1982: 235, ex. 8). 31 Each of these characteristics occurs in some of our examples, and needs to be examined. These issues are reexamined in the following example: [55] aw[ât eqli]m [gum]ur kanī[kam] šūzim–ma ṭ[ēm eqlim š]upram 10[kīam] unaḫḫid–ma 11[x­–x–n]im ištu talliku ṭēm eqlim ša awâtušunu lā gamrā ša unaḫḫid[u]ka šapārum–ma ul tašpuram 14awât eqlim ša lā gamrā tagdamdar kanīkam tuštēzi[b] šumma awât eqlim ša lā gamrā tagdamar [k]anīkam tuštēzib [k]anīkam šuāti ana ṣuḫārtim idim–ma . . . ana ṣēriya šūbila ‘“Con[clude the neg]otiations over the [fie]ld, have a sealed docu[ment] drawn up and send me a re[port about the field]”. [This way] I instructed (you) but [     ] 32 since you went, as to sending, you did not send me a report concerning the field over which negotiations were not concluded, (about) which I instructed you. Have you concluded the negotiations that were not concluded? Have you had a sealed document drawn up? If you have concluded the negotiations which were not concluded (and if) you have had a sealed document drawn up, give this sealed document to the maid and have it brought to me . . .’ 12, 18:7–26 This example has a few instructive features. First, it is different from the rest of the examples in the temporal framework of iptaras in that it is clearly not future. There are other examples that show explicit future reference:

29.  Incidentally, the fact that the šumma structure is additionally an apodosis of a paratactic conditional (§2.2.1), however interesting, has nothing to do with these issues. 30. The polarity difference is probably what triggers translations of these forms by wirklich (e.g., 4, 65:17–21; 4, 80:4–8). 31.  When reading a text edition, the translation supplied is often the only way for a reader to get at the editor’s interpretation of a given passage. This makes it a valuable piece of information that should be taken into consideration when analyzing a dead language, precisely in the way that input from the speaker of a modern language is essential for analyzing a spoken language. 32.  An interrogative (AbB 12, 18:11 has [am-mi-n]im ‘why’) does not fit in very well, as testified to by the use of ul.

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The Letter Corpus

[56] fPN ištu 3 warḫī marṣat murussa ītarik–ma alākam ul eleʾʾi inanna awīltum ummaki uddid ul ikkir ištu inanna 10 ūmī šumma ummaki ittapuš allakakkim ‘fPN is ill for the past 3 months, her illness dragged on and I could not come. Now, the lady your mother(’s state) did not change quickly. 33 10 days from now, if your mother(’s state) has eased off, I will come to you’ 5, 255:7–16 In addition to the clear cases of futurity (exx. [54] and [56] and non-futurity (ex. [55]), there are a couple of examples in which the temporal sphere is indeterminate: [57] u aššum alpim ša šâmam aqbûkum šumma taštām–ma alpam šūriam–ma kaspam lušābilakku[m] ‘As to the bull which I ordered you to buy, only 34 if you have bought (it), have it sent to me and let me send you silver’ 9, 84:25–30 (see also 10, 74:13–20, where the protasis could point to either direction). Thus, despite the fact that the majority of the examples are clearly prospective, a minority of them either points to the past (ex. [55]) or is indecisive (ex. [57]); 10, 74:13–20, adduced by Leong (1994: 219) as ex. [509]; and 8, 101:5–16 (adduced below as ex. [95]). This compels us to drop the direction of future function altogether (rather than future perfect, as is explained below). This is in line with the fact that iparras forms already cover futurity in the protasis. Returning to ex. [55], two more issues require further discussion. One is the polar contrast first raised in discussing ex. [54], where there is a difference in polarity between the context and the protasis: Table 2.3 ex.

first occurrence

contrasting occurrence

[54]

. . . lā imât ‘so that it does not sink’

imtūt ‘(if) it does sink’

[55]

[gum]ur . . . šūzib ‘[Concl]ude . . . have(it) drawn up’

tagdamar . . . tuštēzib ‘Have you concluded. . . ? Have you had (it) drawn up?’

In the three examples, the occurrence in the protasis shows a polarity that differs from the context: in ex. [54], the negative directive is resumed as affirmative; in ex. [55], the affirmative directives are resumed as a question having negative implications. This situation may result in the sort of values we generally get from the asseverative paradigm (see §1.1 above) or certain paronomastic infinitive constructions: ‘if you do /did buy’—that is, some insistence on the predicative link. 35 Note that with iprus forms in 33.  Cf. Wilcke (1987: 89 and 101 n. 98) translates: ‘Now the lady, your mother, did not change by one single grain (uṭ-ṭe-et). If your mother will have been able to breathe again in ten days from now, I shall come to you. Don’t worry’. 34.  The exclusive focus value (‘only if’) is due to the particle -ma at the end of the protasis. 35.  For a full description of the asseverative as a complex syntactic mechanism, see Cohen 2005a: 17–68. See also ex. [46].

2.1.  šumma conditionals

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the protasis this difference in polarity between context and protasis does not exist. Polar contrast with the co-text is basically consistent: whenever we have a co-text related to iptaras in the protasis, 36 it is polar. Another example: [58] aššum 62 inītī ša maḫrīkunu kalû-ma ana n[a]s[ā]ḫišunu ašpurakkunūšim m[išš]unu 37 lā innassaḫūnim (. . .) 10šumma alpī ana GN tattasḫānim 38 terrāšunūti–ma šipiršunu liṣbatū ‘As for 62 plow oxen which are held with you and (which) I wrote you to take them away, why are they not taken away? (. . .) If you have taken the oxen away to GN return them so they can take on their work’ 10, 10:5–7, 10–13 Here, the order to take the oxen away is given but not carried out, and the form iptaras in the protasis refers back to this order and thus may be interpreted ‘If you do /did take the oxen away’. Ex. [57] above is no exception to this: we (as well as the writer) do not know whether buying took place or not, and the polar contrast is between this doubt and the affirmative in the protasis. The consistent polar contrast found with iptaras forms in the protasis whenever there is a related context may lead to the conclusion that the value of these forms inside šumma clauses is similar to the value of asseverative forms, which do not figure inside šumma protases. However, two points make it difficult to accept this value as a solution: first, compared with the cases of the asseverative in the letter corpus, which are truly rare, there are many cases with this contrasting polarity (including cases with lā iprus2 39 and lā iptaras) within šumma clauses. This rules out any special emphatic insistence, for the simple reason that a ubiquitous exponent cannot really signal special emphasis. Second, polar contrast is very common in paratactic conditionals as well (see §2.2.1 below), where it is not thought to mark any emphasis. 40 This solution is therefore ruled out as well. The last possibility raised in connection with ex. [54] was hypotheticality (because all ordinary conditions are essentially hypothetical, this term refers to a higher degree of hypotheticality than ordinary conditions). Von Soden (GAG §161f) states: “Das pf. in Beding.–S . . . bezeichnet . . . die Bedingung als potential oder hypothetisch.” This idea is sometimes implemented in translation (see p. 45 n. 30), 41 but not always. 42 However, 36.  In ex. [56], the mother’s state remaining unchanged is semantically polar to having eased off in the protasis. In ex. [57], there may be a hint that the writer thinks that his directive has not yet been performed. 37.  Compare Kraus’s reading in line 7 m[i-š  ]u-nu ‘was ist es mit ihnen’ (which works better with the following context) with u[l!-l]a!-nu ‘von dort’ (von Soden 1986: 734). 38.  Instead of it-ta-as-ḫa-nim, see AbB 10, 10 note d. Since ašpurakkunūšim refers to 2mp, it is reasonable that this form does so also. 39.  For which see the following section. 40.  For a comparison between two types of polar contrast, see Cohen 2005a: 169–73. 41.  E.g., ‘Wenn ihr euch ihm gegenüber nachlässig zeigt [= real condition], würden wir, wenn dieses Schiff draufgehen würde [hypothetical], bald ein (Schiff) wie dieses ersetzen können?’ [hypothetical] (3, 35:26–28, ex. [54] above). 42. The idea is implemented in the following cases: 3, 35:26–28 [see n. 41 above]; 3, 38:28–29; 3, 82:19–21; 8, 19:26′–31′; 10, 16:13′–14′; and possibly 5, 207:16–21; all are translations to German.

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The Letter Corpus

Maloney (1982: 231) states, regarding hypotheticality, that “in the majority of cases . . ., no such nuance is provable”. Streck (1995: 200) similarly states that the idea cannot be verified, and on p. 200 n. 456 he adds that iptaras cannot be hypothetical since the condition itself already is. What is meant, he specifies, are conditions whose truth value is put in question by the speaker. In that case, any conditional structure in a question should fit in this subcategory, but this works only in some of the cases (see §2.1.2.2.7). This hypotheticality, felt by many, is not a mirage: the formal common denominator of all cases with iptaras forms denoting hypotheticality is the fact that they all occur in a question (either rhetorical or not; this is perhaps what Streck means by “questioning the truth value”); but this is not enough—the form iparras must also be present in the apodosis (see ex. [54] above, which is representative of the entire group). In other words, only when the pattern is #[šumma iptaras+iparras]?# 43 is a hypothetical interpretation consistent, which certainly makes hypotheticality a valid value in opposition to other sequences, but not for every case of iptaras in the protasis. To summarize: iptaras in itself does not signal hypotheticality. After all of the various conjectural notions of the function of iptaras in the protasis have been (re-)considered and, for various reasons, rejected (or delimited, as in the case of hypothetical conditions), we may now turn back and consider the idea of linguistic perfect. The latter is a category that exhibits double temporal deixis—relating a preceding event to the state it brought about, from the perspective of this resulting state. Kouwenberg curiously defines this notion semantically: Free t-perfects . . . convey notions such as involvement of the speaker/writer, urgency, and actuality; the events in question arouse strong feelings in the speaker, are recent or relevant to the present situation and/or the people involved and often as yet unknown to the addressee.” (Kouwenberg 2010: §6.3.1, p. 142; emphasis is mine)

The problem with this statement is that it results in the inherent link between present perfect and future perfect being disconnected. Note that the term futurum exactum, used to refer, inter alia, to the use of iptaras (actually, iptarsu) in temporal clauses, is nothing but future perfect—denoting a state in the future that is related to an event that has taken place prior to that future point. This, of course, is not the only case of perfect in OB, but it is the only one on which there is full consensus. 44 Another case that denotes a linguistic (present) perfect in OB is discussed primarily by Loesov (2004: 91–130, for the letter corpus) and independently by me (Cohen 2006: 50–52, for epic OB). Loesov shows that this function is often found after inanna. Streck (1999: 113–14) discusses cases of “isoliertes iptaras” following the direct speech marker, which, although he SLB:234–35 specifically mentions hypothetical interpretation. Other examples with these characteristics could be translated as hypothetical in English but are not: aw[ī]l[a]m i[n]a ṣ[ib]ittim taka[l]l[a] šumma awi[l]u[m] šū imtūt pīḫāt awīlim šâti ina mu[ḫḫika] ul išakkanū ‘You hol[d] this ma[n] i[n cu]stody. If this [m]an has died (or: were to die), will (or: would) they not hold y[ou] responsible for this man?’ (13, 125:7–13), as well as 14, 168:13–17. 43.  I consider the interrogative function to refer to the entire construction. 44.  Almost; Buccellati (1996: 87, 108–12) does not accept the existence of this morphological category at all.

2.1.  šumma conditionals

49

does not consider it to be linguistic perfect (1999: 118), nevertheless conforms perfectly with this function. This linguistic perfect occurs in OB after several syntactic boundaries, such as inanna, as shown by Loesov; after the direct speech marker, as illustrated by Streck; and one can think of other such boundaries as well (see p. 40 n. 20). Loesov (2004: 144–46) considers the protasis to have these two rather similar functions: (1) future perfect, as in temporal clauses and, more rarely, (2) present perfect, similar to the form occurring after a syntactic boundary (šumma may serve as a syntactic boundary as well). The solution arrived at by Loesov is the most plausible, although one cannot prove it directly for the protasis. A retrospective note pertaining to the translation of these iptaras forms in the protasis: the English present perfect (= has done) is used throughout. Note, however, that after conditional ‘if’ in English, this form is normally used for both present and future perfect—in fact, in complete agreement with OB, as is shown below. We cannot posit a consistent exponent that marks present perfect in contrast to future perfect, and hence the two are considered to be a single category ( just as present and future generally constitute but one category in OB). The meaning of linguistic perfect is illustrated in the following examples: [59] u šīmum ul ibaššī–ma ul attalkam (. . .) 26anāku ana rēš ēribti ša irrubam uqā/uqqa šumma šīmum imtaqtam arḫiš attallakam ‘There was no merchandise and (therefore) I did not come. (. . .) As for me, I (will) wait for the coming caravan. If merchandise has come in my share, I will come quickly’ 12, 53:21–22, 26–31 Put differently: ‘if (at some point in the future) I will be in a state of having merchandise as a result of its coming in my share prior to this point in the future, I will come quickly’. [60] 10 kur šeʾam . . . atta–ma tuḥtalliq mār bīt ṭuppim kurummatam eṣirakkum šumma annītam a[w]ātam GN išteme apālam teleʾʾi ‘You have lost 10 kor barley . . . the state clerk noted for you the food ration. If GN has heard of this matter, will you be able to answer (to them)?’ 3, 38:26–29 45 Put differently: ‘if the city GN (at some point in the future) will know about this matter as a result of hearing it prior to this point in the future, will you be able. . . ?’ These cases are confronted in the Table 2.4 (p. 50), with the unique ex. [55] discussed above. We have one exponent, iptaras, that has two temporal meanings: in exx. [59] and [60], the event is prior to the future, whereas in ex. [55] it is prior to the present. There is no consistent distinctive feature that could account for this. Three alternative solutions may be proposed: 1. iptaras functions as a linguistic perfect relative to any temporal point with which it occurs, be it the present or the future, as the case may be. 45.  This example belongs to the hypothetical pattern; it is uncertain whether iptaras forms still signal a linguistic perfect function in this pattern or merely play a part in its hypotheticality.

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Table 2.4 temporal axis [59] [60] [55] [57]

prior to present

point of utterance

ex.

prior to future

future

receiving merchandise →

1. having merchandise 2. coming

hearing →

1. city knowing 2. problem to answer

concluding, issuing (= prerequisites) → buying the ox →

1. prerequisites in hand 2. sending the documents 1. having the ox at hand 2. having it sent

2. Comrie (1985: 70) claims that future perfect indicates “a situation prior to a reference point in the future, allowing the situation to be located after the present moment, at the present moment, or before the present moment” (my emphasis). Although not everyone agrees with assigning a wide temporal span to the future perfect (compare Declerck 2006: 503–4; 518–20), his formulation allows us to explain the differences inside šumma protases but not the entire picture: there are no grounds to consider the linguistic perfect in main clauses as denoting future perfect; instead, they clearly signal present perfect. 3. From a structural point of view, the methodological framework followed here, tense categories (unlike notions) derive from formal oppositions and are hence binary in OB—past vs. non-past—and any further distinction (such as present vs. future) is merely notional, namely, not marked by any consistent exponent. 46 Consequently, iptaras functions as linguistic perfect only relatively to the non-past sphere. In other words, instead of distinct forms for present perfect and future perfect, which we know from other languages, OB has just one: nonpast perfect—that is, a perfect corresponding to the sphere covered by nonpast (= iparras). This conclusion is further corroborated by the fact that the form iptarsu in temporal clauses only occurs with non-past sphere while it is incompatible with past sphere (see §1.2 in the introduction, pp. 7–9). Table 2.5 compares several systems with perfect tenses. The four languages represented in this table show different partitions for perfect expression: A.  English has full representation; each tense has its corresponding perfect formation: the past has a past perfect, the present has a present perfect, and so on. 46.  Actually, there is an exponent for the future, but it occurs in special slots only: for example, in the asseverative paradigm, where lū iparras consistently refers to the future, or in the apodosis of the omens (§4.2.3 below).

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Table 2.5 language

tense

example

corresponding perfect

English

past

he did

he had done

present

he does

he has done

future

he will do

he will have done

past

il a fait

il avait fait

present

il fait

—

future

il fera

il aura fait

past

faʿala

kāna (qad) faʿala

non-past

yaf ʿalu

yakūnu (qad) faʿala

past

īpuš

—

non-past

ippeš

ītepuš

French

Arabic OB

remarks

no pf. corresponding to the present

no pf. corresponding to the past

B.  French, in non-narrative discourse, has a partial correspondence. Although past perfect and future perfect exist, there is no present perfect (whose formation, the passé composé, has acquired past value). C.  Arabic, at least in principle, has a binary opposition similar to OB. Each member of this opposition has its corresponding perfect formation. 47 D.  OB, despite the binary opposition, has only one linguistic perfect, which corresponds to the non-past sphere. This discussion is an attempt to account for the range of iptaras as linguistic perfect, which includes future perfect (as in temporal clauses) and present perfect (as in main clauses following a syntactic boundary) or both (conditional protasis). An interesting question raised by Loesov (2004) pertains to the relation­ship between iptaras and lā paris. There is one (almost) minimal pair: [61] šumma sarriš āt[a]pal PN bēlī l[ū] appal ‘If I have answered falsely, I will answer to my lord PN’ 9, 227:5–8 [62] šum[m]a [ūm]āt ušbu 2 šiqil kaspum lā apil ūm [. . .] PN ippalšu ‘If 2 sheqels (of) silver for the time he dwelled are not paid, at the time of [. . .] PN will pay him’ 10, 122:18–21 First, the apodoses do not have the same form (asseverative lū iparras vs. iparras), and second, the lexeme (apālum) in OB is the same, but this is not reflected in the English translation. At any rate, ātapal in ex. [61] is non-past perfect, deictic to two temporal points: the point of the event (answering) and a subsequent point, where a resultative 47.  For Classical Arabic, see, for example, Wright 1967: 2.5–6 (pluperfect) and 2.22 (future perfect); for Modern Standard Arabic, see Badawi et al. 2004: 367–71.

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state exists. The phrase lā apil in ex. [62], on the other hand, refers to the resultative state only—that is, it does not have a double temporal reference. 2.1.2.1.4.  lā iprus2 48 and lā iptaras as negative linguistic perfect This section shows the explicit paradigmatic relationships between most of the lā iprus forms (a small but signicant group comprising lā iprus1 is described above, §2.1.2.1.2), lā iptaras forms, and affirma­tive iptaras forms in the protasis. The first example features lā iprus in the protasis: [63] aššum ipir fPN nadānim lū ašpurakkum ammīnim lā taddin ipir PN a[n]a ma[t]ī tanaddi[n] idin šumma lā [t]addin a[š]apparam–ma ipir [š]attiša ina bītika tanaddin ‘I did write to you about giving PN’s ration, why did you not give it? When do you intend to give PN’s ration? Give (it)! If [you] have not given it, I will write and you will (have to) give her yearly ration out of your house’ 2, 129:4–19 This example shows maximal resumption: both general and immediate context, protasis and apodosis, all have the same lexeme (nadānum ‘give’), which refers to the same event. The event has not yet taken place at the time of the utterance, as is testified to by the imperative idin in the same utterance. This resembles the various iptaras forms we have seen above: PN is expected to have her ration by a certain time in the future, as a result of the addressee giving it to her at a moment prior to that point in the future. Incidentally, in this example, we have two externally identical forms, lā taddin. Their syntactic environment is different, however: the first is in a pronominal question, with either a past or a present-perfect value, 49 and the second, which occurs in the protasis, has (non-past) perfect value. This is important to note: the fact that two forms are homographs does not mean that they are identical. More syntactic information, such as the syntagmatic environment and the paradigmatic constitution (the forms that can figure interchangeably in the same slot), is needed to be able to tell two allegedly identical forms apart. The following pair of examples brings together the forms iptaras and its negative counterpart, lā iprus2: [64] šumma mû ana GN1 u GN2 ittabšû ina pī nārātim ša aqbûkum šiknam lā tašakkan šumma mû ana GN1 u GN2 lā ibšû 50 [i]na pī nārātim ša aqbûkum [š]iknī šukun–ma mû–ma . . . libbašû ‘If water has become available to GN1 and GN2 do not make arrangement(s) in the mouth of the canals of which I spoke to you. If water has not become available for GN1 and GN2, 48.  lā iprus1 is the negative counterpart of iprus, whereas lā iprus2 is the negative counterpart of iptaras. 49.  iptaras does not appear after interrogative pronouns, and iprus consequently carries the entire functional load. 50.  The forms bašûm and nabšûm are not from the same lexeme (‘be’ vs. ‘become’). Note, however, that *ibtaši is unattested, which might explain the choice of ittabši and testify to the importance of choosing iptaras to denote non-past perfect.

2.1.  šumma conditionals

53

make arrangements in the mouth of the canals of which I spoke to you, so that water . . . may become available’ 4, 80:4–17 (ḪL) (and similarly 4, 161:21–31 and 10, 145:15–19) [65] eqel PN . . . šumma eqlam šuāti gameršu ana ṣītim lā tušēṣi ina eqel kurummatišu pānītim 20 būr eqlam . . . ugārišam šuṭram–ma šūbilam [šu]mma eqel PN gameršu ana ṣītim tuštēṣi ina eqlim makrim ša ina qātīka ibaššû 20 būr eqlam ugārišam šuṭram šūbilam–ma ‘PN’s field . . . if you have not distributed this entire field, describe in writing, district by district, a field of 20 būr from his former subsistence field . . . and send me. If you have distributed PN’s entire field, describe in writing, district by district, a field of 20 būr from an irrigated field which is under your hand (and) send me . . .’ 9, 196:3–19 (ḪL) These two examples each comprise a symmetric structure where the difference between the two protases is polar: one protasis is affirmative and the other negative. These types of examples constitute local proof of the polar relationship between iptaras and lā iprus2 in šumma protases. Neither example has a preceding context, which means that the second CS in each of them has the first for context, but not vice versa. To rule out any inequality (which might have something to do with the choice of forms) exx. [64] and [65] represent two different orders: the former has iptaras first and lā iprus2 second, and the latter is built the other way around. This reversibility establishes syntactic equality between the two orders. These examples can also contradict whatever thoughts one might have about another potential meaning of iptaras forms in šumma protases, namely, unlikelihood. In many of the examples with iptaras, this potential meaning is tempting, but it is ruled out simply because of these symmetric structures, since an event and its negative cannot both be equally unlikely. In addition to lā iprus2, which is the more common exponent in the epistolary corpus, one comes across cases of lā iptaras forms as well: negative iptaras is attested almost exclusively in šumma protases. The following is an example of lā iptaras: [66] aššum bilat eqliya ša šaddaqda lā uqattia (. . .) 13u ⟨ša⟩ šatti annītim 6 kur 1 pān bilat eqliya našparu ša illikam lišaddinšu–ma libla šumma bilat eqlim ša ina qātišu lā ugdammer–ma lā ittadin nipûssu ana GN lilqeam– ma anāku u šū ina GN i nidīn ‘As for (the fact that) he did not pay me in full the rent for my field last year (. . .) let the messenger who came collect from him 6 kor and 1 pi (of) barley, the field’s rent of this year, and bring me. If he has not paid in full the rent of the field which he holds, let him take his pledge slave to GN so that I and him can litigate in GN’ 2, 96:6–7, 13–21 The protasis is resumptive de facto (quttûm ‘pay in full’ in the context is semantically equivalent to the hendyadic chain gummurum–ma nadānum ‘give/pay in full’). The precative forms that immediately precede the protasis make it plain that paying in full

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has not yet taken place at the moment of utterance—that is, at least temporally, this form in the protasis is analogous to most of the cases of iptaras. The following example has both affirmative and negative iptaras forms in symmetric conditional constructions: [67] anumma PN aṭṭardakki šumma īterbakki ša iqabbûki epšī šumma lā īterbakki ša ṭuppi annîm epšī ‘I have now sent PN to you. If he has reported to you, do what he tells you. If he has not reported to you, act according to this tablet’ 9, 16:9–14 This example is unique, comprising two symmetric CSs, which are opposed in their polarity. However, it suffices to show that in principle lā iptaras is a second negative counterpart of iptaras. The relationship between lā iprus2 and lā iptaras is illustrated in the following example: [68] ina kanīkātim aḫ[iā]tim . . . kanīka . . . liweddī–ma lilqe 15šumma ina kanikātim aḫiātim lā ītamar kanīka liweddī–ma ina pišanni kunukkātim kanīkšu liweddī–ma lilqe kunukku 51 22šumma ina kanīkātim aḫiātim lā uwe⟨ddī⟩–ma [l]ā īmur pišan⟨na⟩ liptē–ma kanīka liweddī–ma lilqe ‘He should identify the sealed document . . . among the surrounding sealed documents . . . and take it. If he has not found (it) among the surrounding sealed documents, he should identify the sealed document and identify his seal in the box of seals and take (it). As for the seal, if he has not identified (it) and has not found (it) among the surrounding sealed documents, he should open the basket and identify the sealed document and take (it). 12, 200:9–26 In this example, both forms are found in an almost identical context, being syntactically and semantically equated. Note that mu in i-mu-ur is written over an erased sign, possibly ta (AbB 12, 200 remark e), perhaps testifying to the initial inclination of the writer to use lā iptaras (in this case, i-ta-ma-ar, as in line 17), rather than the more common (and perhaps normative) form, lā iprus2. It is impossible to determine a difference in value between the two forms. Two facts may explain the non-conditioned variation of the forms lā iprus2 and lā iptaras. First, the fact that lā iptaras occurs almost exclusively within šumma protases, though elsewhere iptaras is negated by a negative iprus form, may suggest that lā iptaras (unlike iptaras) is a relatively new form, diachronically. Second, in šumma protases, lā iprus has two distinct functions in the same syntactic environment. It is plausible that lā iptaras emerged in this syntactic slot in order to establish morphological distinction between these two functions and is, at the time of OB, in the process of replacing lā iprus2. 51.  See AbB 12, 200 remark d.

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55

2.1.2.1.5.  iparras forms The form iparras is the most common, unmarked form occurring in the protasis: there are 101 affirmative cases and 32 negative (133 cases in all) covering roughly the same temporal range as the form does outside of šumma clauses: it normally signals non-past: [69] šumma abūni urram illakam ṭuppā[t]i [šināti] lilqûniāšim ‘If our father comes tomorrow, let them take [these] tablets for us’ 1, 131:22–23 [70] šumma inanna tusakkapanni bēl šukūsim . . . illakam–ma ‘If you (intend do) keep me away now, the owner of the subsistence field . . . will come. . .’ 1, 29:21–24 (the full text is found in ex. [212] below, p. 114) These two examples are rare instances of a temporal adverb occurring with the clause, thus creating a specific reference point. A special case occurs when iparras follows adīni ‘till now’: 52 [71] umma anāku–ma kīma erēbika kaspam qāti awīlim usuḫ kaspam qāti awīlim ul tassuḫ (. . .) 10šumma kaspam qāti awīlim adīni lā tanassaḫ kaspam qāti a⟨wī⟩lim u[s]uḫ ‘I (said) as follows: “As soon as you come in, take the silver from the man.” You did not take the silver from the man (. . .) If you have not yet taken the silver from the man, take the silver from the man’ 12, 53:5–8, 10–12 (and similarly 6, 173:16 [6, 173:20 is dubious]) It is clear that, following adīni, a regular present notion is not possible, and the form in this case covers the temporal sphere of “up to this point.” Other than that, iparras in the protasis never has past reference in the letter corpus. It appears that negated iparras forms have the same temporal value: [72]

tallikānim (. . .) 8′šumma lā tallakānim ṭēmam gamram arḫiš šuprānim–ma (. . .) 13′šumma tallakānim ana aḫātikunu qibiā–ma ‘You have/did not come (. . .) If you do not come, quickly send me the full report (. . .) If you come, tell your sisters. . .’ 11, 114:6′, 8′–10′, 13′–14′ 6′ul

Note that, unlike other tenses discussed above, the fact that the same lexeme is mentioned in the context (ul tallikānim) has no bearing on the temporal value of iparras (ex. [73] immediately below). Von Soden (GAG §161i) states that iparras forms in šumma protases generally denote some kind of modality (“entweder das Tun-Wollen oder seltener-Sollen”). 53 Von 52.  The particle adīni ‘until now’, denoting direct deixis, occurs outside šumma protases with either iparras or iprus, and it is difficult to tell the difference between the two options. It is a fact, however, that iparras following adīni anywhere has a different temporal value than iparras alone. 53.  For some reason, Streck (1997: 144) insists on interpreting three cases of iparras in the protasis (13, 85:29–32; 13, 111:11′–13′; and 13, 200:2′–4′) as modal. The mere option of translating iparras as modal does not make it modal. Compare another example: u šumma ana maḫrīk[a x-x-x] lā allak ina aḫītim šulumk[a aš]âl ‘Even if I do not/cannot come to you [. . .], [I will in]quire after your health’ (7, 80:9–10).

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Soden is right about this value of iparras in the law collections (especially the LE), but not in the letter corpus. Here are some particularly clear cases of this modal nuance, followed by an explanation: [73] adi esrīšu aštaprakkum–ma . . . 10ul tāliam (. . .) 14šumma talliam arḫiš [u]ddidam–ma aliam 17šumma lā talliam arḫiš ṭēmam gamram šupram–ma (. . .) 22ana fPN qibī–ma šumma illiam līliam ‘I have written you ten times, but . . . you have/did not come up here. 54 If you wish to /intend to /must come up here, come up quickly. If you do not (wish/ intend/have to) come up here, send me a full report quickly. . . (. . .) Tell fPN and if she wishes to /intends to /must come up here, let her come up here’ 2, 100:8–10, 14– 19, 22–23 [74] šumma tanaddinam idnam ‘If you want to give me, give me’ 10, 180:9′ [75] šumma ina sūt GN innaddin ina sūt GN linnadin ‘If it must be sold according to the seah measure of GN, let it be sold according to the seah measure of GN’ 12, 70:5′–8′ (and similarly 9, 19:7–8, with iparras in the apodosis) Note that all of these cases are very restricted syntactically: both the lexeme and the morphology expressing person/number/gender must be identical across both protasis and apodosis. Otherwise, it is hard to predict where iparras may have a modal nuance (cf. ex. [72] above). No doubt, in these restricted syntactic circumstances, we are compelled to accept a modal nuance. The explanation for these nuances is that in the paradigm of the protasis we do not find any forms that are specialized for the expression of modality. For this reason, iparras forms are not opposed to such forms (as they are in independent clauses, where we find precative forms) and consequently are not marked as indicative. It can be said that they are neutralized with regard to the distinction between modal and non-modal and for this reason may express either. The value of iparras in šumma protases is then a-modal. The following table illustrates this idea: Table 2.6 independent clause: modal oppositions

protasis: no modal oppositions

forms

value

forms

value

iparras

indicative

iparras

precative

deontic modality

none

no modal opposition, i.e., no value; hence a-modal

This means that iparras could denote either modal or non-modal nuances and consequently has no fixed modal value. Incidentally, physical ability is not always considered modal, and in OB it is part of the semantic range of the indicative iparras (see Cohen 2005a: 92). 54. This chain immediately follows a syntactic boundary (a topical aššum clause) and consists of #iptaras–ma ul iprus–ma ul iprus#. There is no argument about the first clause (aštaprakkum) signaling a perfect. The two following ul iprus forms are better interpreted as ul iprus2, namely, as present perfect.

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Some iparras forms are special in that they have no temporal value; the most typical example is the existential lexeme ibašši, which generally has no temporal opposition. 55 This case is very similar to lexemes such as išûm and edûm, which have no opposition either (this may well be the reason they are traditionally classified as syntactically “stative,” although morphologically they are iprus forms). These cases in fact cover the entire temporal spectrum for the same reasons iparras in the protasis can convey modality. 2.1.2.1.6.  paris Paris is the second most common form in the protasis: 53 affirmative and 22 negative cases (75 cases in all, including išûm and edûm). There is not much to be said about paris in šumma protases; it is not different here than in other syntactic environments. paris is viewed as a-temporal (although it basically denotes present and past states). The opposition with iptaras is exemplified above by exx. [61] and [62] (p. 51), showing the resultative factor (which is occasional, rather than constant). The following example is a verification condition in which a state reported in the past remains a state at the moment of utterance: [76] 20 nuḫatimmū . . . eqlam ul ṣabtū kīam iqbiam šumma kīma PN iqbiam 20 nuḫatimmū . . . eqlam [l]ā ṣab[tū] . . . eqlam idiššunūšim ‘“20 cooks . . . do not own a field,” thus he told me. If, as PN said, 20 cooks . . . do not own a field . . . give them a field’ 4, 88:6–20 (ḪL) (similarly, 4, 79:7 vs. 17) paris is attested once with a past-denoting adverbial: [77] šumma eqlum šaddaqdam lā eriš–ma nadi . . . ‘If the field was not plowed last year and is/was lying fallow . . .’ 2, 92:15 The negative form of paris is lā paris: [78] šumma eqel bīt a[bīšu] labirtašu nadiat–ma mamman lā ṣabit ina eqel bīt abīšu–ma 2 būr eqlam pulukšum šumma eqel bīt abīšu lā nadi ašar ibaššû eqlam pulu⟨k⟩šum ‘If his family’s field, his longstanding property, lies fallow and nobody holds it, allocate for him a field (of) 2 būr only from his family’s field. If his family’s field does not lie fallow, allocate for him a field wherever it may be’ 4, 51:20–28 2.1.2.1.7.  Non-verbal clauses Non-verbal clauses (NVCs) are abundant only in the special conditional expressions described below (§2.1.3). Otherwise, one finds very few of them, and they constitute a special class within the variety of NVCs, because in this environment they tend to have a peculiar behavior, such as occurring as unipartite clauses (for this phenomenon in 55.  Except for very rare cases, in the negative: lā bašû (6, 102:7), lā ibšû (4, 80:11). See also ex. [65] (p. 53) and p. 52 n. 49.

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general, see Cohen 2005b: 249–58) and even more specifically, an infinitive for protasis (for which see Cohen 2008c: §2.2.6): [79] šumma šūrûm ana GN lušārīšunūti ‘If (it is possible) to direct, let me direct them to GN’ 10, 29:12–13 This pattern, #šumma inf (x)nom precative (x)#, is an exponent of a modal expression glossed ‘if possible’. 56 It is, however, not quite clear whether the infinitive even constitutes a clause. The particle kīam ‘thus, so’ is capable of representing either an adverbial expression (‘in this way’) or a clause. In other words, it is pro-adverb and pro-clause. It is hardly ever used as rheme and occurs for the most part as such only in šumma protases, and then, only in negation (see §2.1.2.1, pp. 36–37): [80] šumma tanaddinam idnam šumma lā kīam–ma būram ul ušeṣṣe ‘If you (intend to) give (it to) me, give (it to) me. (Only) if not so, I will not bring out the calf’ 10, 180:9′–10′ [81] alkam–ma warkatī purus šumma lā kīam–ma abī aṣabbat ‘Come and investigate my matter; if not (precisely) so, I will hold my father responsible’ 12, 89:29–32 The adverbs ‘only’ and ‘precisely’ constitute the English parallel of the focusing particle -ma. It is interesting to note that lā kīam represents and negates the clausal contents of a previous protasis (ex. [80]), as well as a previous precative form (ex. [81]), but no other clause types. 57 Another peculiar case is libb- ‘heart’ with a bound genitive pronoun: [82] šumma dabābam libbaka . . . anāku u atta i nidbub ‘If you wish to talk (lit., your heart to talk), . . . let us talk, you and I’ 10, 198:17–19 (and similarly 6, 170:7) This and similar expressions (such as digilka [lit., ‘your opinion’] and niṭilka [lit., ‘your view’]) are discussed below, with special conditional expressions (§2.1.3.2). Note that these expressions outside of šumma clauses basically do not constitute a clause but merely a genitive construction. A prepositional syntagm can occur in the protasis as unipartite NVC, whose single part is always the rheme (i.e., the new information): [83] šumma ana kaspim ana kaspim liddin ‘If (it is) in return for silver, let it be sold in return for silver’ 1, 46:11 56.  X stands for the lexeme, which is the same in both clauses. See Cohen 2008c: §2.2.6. 57.  A unique case of anniam ‘this’ as rheme is somewhat similar: alpī rībaššu–ma ša tašpuram linneriš (. . .) š[um]ma anniam arḫiš šupram–ma eqlum linneriš ‘Replace the oxen for him, so that which you wrote be plowed (. . .) If so, write to me quickly so that the field be plowed’ (5, 212:28–34). However, it is suspected to be, as in the case of some of the šumma protases before an apodosis containing šupram ‘write me’, an indirect question (write to me quickly whether [this is] so . . .’).

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It is not easy to explain why here, of all places, there is a convergence of unusual types of syntactic behavior. It is, however, a fact from which a conclusion may be drawn: the syntactic environment in šumma protases is sui generis. In details, it occasionally resembles other environ­ments, but the entire package of paradigmatic characteristics no doubt stands out as unique. 2.1.2.1.8.  Summary: the protasis paradigm The complex picture discussed in the preceding sections is represented in the following table: Table 2.7 affirmative

negative

value

iprus

lā iprus1

past

iptaras

lā iprus2~lā iptaras

non-past perfect

iparras

lā iparras

non-past

paris

lā paris

NVC

category

tense

a-temporal

The salient linguistic conclusions arrived at so far are: 1. lā iprus1 is shown to be the negative of iprus, both forms denoting the past; 2. The value of iptaras is chosen, among several other options, to be a linguistic non-past perfect; when paired with the iparras form for an apodosis marked as a question, the resulting secondary pattern signals a higher degree of unlikelihood, or hypotheticality; 3. The value of iparras is different from its value in independent clauses with regard to the deontic modal component, which is less obvious in inde­pendent clauses and possible inside šumma clauses due to the absence of opposition with a form whose value is deontic modality. In other words iparras is a-modal; 4. NVCs in šumma clauses behave uniquely and show a special group of unipartite clauses. 5. The salient category in the protasis (in contrast to protases of other patterns), as becomes apparent from the oppositions between the forms, is tense. Aspect is found in the opposition between paris and other forms; the opposition perfect vs. non-perfect between iptaras and other forms may exist independently of aspect and tense; it is a category of its own. The last two opposition types (namely, aspect and perfect vs. non-perfect) are very common in protases of various kinds. There is really no significant difference between the values of these forms outside šumma clauses. A detail that should certainly be corrected in the reference literature is that affirmative iprus forms in the letters denote only past events inside šumma clauses.

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2.1.2.1.9.  Chains in the protasis In šumma protases, -ma chains are, relatively speaking, a rare occurrence. This fact is sufficient to show that these protases are different from other domains (e.g., indicative or precative): Table 2.8 chain

number chain

number

iprus–ma iprus

4

iptaras–ma paris

2

iparras–ma iparras

1

iprus–ma iprus–ma iprus 3 iprus–ma iprus–ma paris 2

10

paris–ma paris

2

iprus–ma iparras

1

paris–ma iparras

4

lā iprus–ma iptaras

1

paris–ma iptaras

1

lā iptaras–ma lā iptaras

1

total number of chains

22

total number of connective -ma

27

 7

The sequence that epitomizes this rarity is one dubious case of the chain lā iprus–ma iptaras. It is dubious because the form lā iprus in this case (5, 207:16–21) is suspected to be lā iprus2 (the entire structure seems to conform to the hypothetical pattern). Other than this case, the otherwise ubiquitous chain iprus–ma iptaras is not attested in the entire collection of epistolary šumma protases, comprising around 500 cases. For instance, in LE, in 43 šumma clauses, there are 22 such chains, a ratio of 1:2. To illustrate this point, one very long letter may have nearly as many occurrences of connective -ma as the entire collection of conditional šumma protases in the corpus. Among other distinctive features of epistolary šumma protases, this detail is especially significant when claiming that this contextual CS is an entirely different entity than the legal šumma protasis, where these -ma chains are the rule. Most of the chains in epistolary šumma protases begin with either iprus or paris forms (shaded gray in Table 2.8). This may be due to the fact that these forms are found in verification protases that tend to resume a reported state of affairs as close as possible to its original chained form. Despite the fact that these chains are rare, the observation that the protasis consists of a domain rather than a clause is still valid (see further §§2.3 and 2.7.2). 2.1.2.2.  The apodosis: internal paradigmatic characteristics The apodosis paradigm is shown above (see discussion in §2.1, p. 33) to be conditioned, despite the fact that this function is marked not morphologically but syntactically. It is less complex than the protasis paradigm as far as tense is concerned, although some questions remain unresolved. The default form is a domain made up of one or more precative forms (more than 80%), which are often interconnected via -ma (the scarcity of -ma is a feature of the protasis only). Compared to the protasis, iparras forms (13.5%) are less frequently attested. The rest of the forms occurring in

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the apodosis are curiosities: iprus (7 cases), paris (6 cases), iptaras (4 cases), NVC (2 cases), and asseverative (1 case). The cases of iprus and iptaras are curious, because they are the only forms that defy the non-past nature of the apodosis. Most of the cases can be explained; a few cannot. The following description of the apodosis is an attempt to be exhaustive: some details are more evident (such as the temporal value of the forms, which is merely a part of this study) and some are not (distribution, internal complexity, etc.). The full picture has never been presented thus far, and this lack is rectified immediately below. 2.1.2.2.1.  iprus and iptaras forms in the apodosis The following cases are rare occurrences that fall into various groups: one group in which these forms constitute a remark that is related to the CS and is inserted between the protasis and the apodosis; another group consists of cases that may belong, for several reasons, with the counterfactual pattern; and one case that is resolvable by emendation. The first group is shared by iprus and iptaras, as well as by other forms. It consists of a protasis, a related remark, and an apodosis. The remark is not part of the protasis or the apodosis. The following group of examples is characterized by a protasis that has a special pragmatic function (elaborated below, §2.1.3.1), similar to French s’il vous plaît. The epistemic status of this group of šumma structures is dubious, since the apodosis is not conditioned by the protasis. This may well explain the peculiar behavior of the forms iprus and iptaras in the context of this formula. Note, however, that the external structure basically matches that of the ordinary conditional structure—that is, protasis and apodosis. The first two examples have iptaras forms: [84] šumma bē[l] napišti[ya a]tta uštamri[ṣ]ūninni PN kaspam šāmaššum–ma ṭurdaššu ‘If you are the one in char[ge] of [my] livelihood, they have made me sick, (so) buy PN silver and send him’ 1, 122:29–33 [85] šu[m]ma ina kittim [m]ārī atta anumma PN māraka 6 mana kaspam uštābilakkum 2 bilat šīpātim igizaggî ša lubbušika idnaššum ‘If you truly are my son, I have hereby had PN your son bring you 6 mina (of) silver, give him 2 talents of ornamental wool needed to dress you’ 3, 72:14–23 Ex. [84] is the clearest case: the precative form in the apodosis, typical of this pragmatic group (whether containing a remark or not), follows what seems to be the motive for the entire structure (‘they have made me sick’). This motive, marked by the iptaras form, is definitely factual and is not a part of the protasis or the apodosis. In ex. [85], the performative clause anumma . . . iptaras (‘I have hereby . . .’) is factual as well but still relevant to the apodosis. The remark is not part of the protasis because the latter consists exclusively of formulas such as ‘if you are my father/son/brother’, etc., and not part of the apodosis because the latter is always characterized by a precative form. The following pair of examples features iprus forms:

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[86] šumma ina kitt[im] aḫḫūa attunu x x x ul arši [?] 58 šūbilānim ‘If you are truly my brothers, I did not obtain [. . .], (so) send me [. . .]’ 1, 81:30–34 [87] šumma in kittim abī atta atta–ma taddī[š]unūt[i x] x [. . .] ‘If you are truly my father, you threw them’ [rest broken] 5, 165:17–20? As mentioned above, this special group of CSs has a precative form in the apodosis. Therefore, although exx. [86] and [87] are not complete, what is missing is a precative form. This pair of examples belongs together with the preceding pair. Similar cases are found in exx. [109] (p. 68), which has an inserted NVC, and [123] (p. 75) below, in which in the same pragmatic conditional type a very long remark is inserted between the protasis and apodosis. An analogous case is the following example, although it belongs to another pragmatic group (§2.1.3.2): [88] šumma niṭilka alpī šunūti an[a m]aṣṣartim–ma tušābilam alpū šunu anaṣṣar–ma rēška ukallū ‘If you see fit, you sent me these oxen for safekeeping, (so) these oxen, should I guard (them), they will be at your disposal’ 12, 68:27–31 It is suggested (AbB 12, 68 remark a) that the iprus form tušābilam is a mistake for iparras. However, the usual apodosis for this kind of protasis (digilka ‘your view’, libbaka ‘your wish’, etc.) consists, again, of precative forms. This iprus form can be presumed, on these grounds, to be the motive for the apodosis. Note that the apodosis here is not a precative form, probably because the apodosis is actually a paratactic conditional pattern (see §2.2.1). This inserted remark (at AbB 12, 68:28–29) makes an exceptionally clear case inside this type of CSs, whose members are not hypothetical (see §2.1.3 below), due to good examples. These examples make it possible to show that, where iprus and iptaras forms seemingly occur in the apodosism they actually are not part of the apodosis paradigm. Moreover, a few more remarks are found inserted in ordinary conditionals as well, in none of which does the remark have anything to do directly with the protasis. A full and convincing example of this is ex. [108] (p. 68) below (where the remark is a NVC), as well as the partially broken ex. [104] (p. 67) below. The following case does not belong to any special group, but the iprus form in what seems like the apodosis may be explained as a motive, too, which is outside the apodosis: [89] šumma PN taṭarradam ipram akal tumrim nadānšu abūšu iqbiam. . . (the apodosis is basically broken) ‘If you send me PN, his father promised to give me a ration (of) ash-bread [. . .]’ 11, 26:16–20 The remaining example is difficult: 58. Von Soden 1966: 54 offers the following reading: “7 ši-in mu-ša!-ar ‘7 Garteneggen’. šin(ni) mu­šā­r   (im) ‘Gartenzahn’ ist ein verkürzter Ausdruck für maškakāt mušārim šinnē rabiātim oder ṣeḫrētim ‘Garten­egge mit grossen oder kleinen ‘Zähnen’.”

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[90] šumma abī kaspam lā iddinakku u anāku ašpurakku iqqablit GN ṭuppa annêm iqqablit GN ḫipīšu–ma u atlak ‘If my father will not have given (it) to you, I wrote you, in the middle of GN, break this tablet in the middle of GN and leave’ 12, 133:12–17 The clause u anāku ašpurakku (lit., ‘and I wrote you’) could in principle be a part of the protasis, but if so it would have to refer to a past event (see §2.1.2.1.1). Since, however, lā iddinakku already refers to a future event and accordingly is analyzed as lā iprus2, it is not very likely: different temporal references do not tend to mix within a single protasis. Analyzing it (as was done in the edition) as a performative is a problem, because performatives do not exist either in the protases or in the apodoses of the letter corpus. Interpreting the clause u anāku ašpurakku as an apodosis raises another problem: apodoses do not, as a rule, begin with u in this letter corpus. The only remaining option is to see it as an inserted factual statement. Two important arguments support this analysis. First, the lack of any logical link with the protasis (which is in fact one of the characteristics of ordinary conditionals) defies identifying these remarks as the apodosis. Second, the factuality of all of the inserted motives stands out and implies that they are not part of the apodosis, which is always hypothetical in ordinary conditions. In addition to the inserted remarks, two cases of iprus and iptaras forms in apodoses are suspect as potential (albeit defective) candidates for the counterfactual conditionals (§2.6 below): [91] šumma lā kaspim šuāti ana ṣibûtika ana 10 šiqil kaspim taštapram epēšam ul eleʾʾi ‘If not for this silver, you (would) have written for 10 sheqel silver for your needs, (but) I could not (have) help(ed)’ 14, 205:20–21 Syntagms such as šumma lā kaspim šuāti ‘if not for this silver’, with the (pro)noun in genitive, are typical of counterfactual conditionals with šumma and are practically non-existent with šumma. The apodosis clause normally consists in this case of either iprus or iptaras. Nonetheless, an important component is missing here: the counterfactual particle -man. The following example is translated by the original editor as counterfactual: [92] šumma kaspum maḫrīya ušābil[akkum] ‘If (there had been any) silver with me I (would) have sent (it) [to you] 12, 149:18′ This example comes from a badly broken letter. Here, too, we are missing the particle -man. Nevertheless, the apodosis is typical of counterfactual conditions. One more potential example of an iprus form in the apodosis is discussed under interrogative apodoses (§2.1.2.2.7, p. 70 n. 65); the discussion there concludes that it is an oath. The last example could be explained by emendation:

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[93] šeʾam . . . liqî–ma (li-qé-e-ma) idnī šumma tappî lā iddinakki eqel aḫīya alqē–ma (al-qé–ma) umma atti–ma ‘Take the barley. . . and sell. If my associate did not give (or: has not given) you, take (it) and you (should say thus)’ 12, 129:12–16 Correction of al-qé–ma to li-qé-ma is reasonable, because it probably resumes the form in the immediate co-text, and this decision is further corroborated by the direct speech marker (its characteristics are discussed under §2.3), whose contents are prospective: what should be said rather than what has been said. 2.1.2.2.2.  iptaras in pleonastic conditionals Several of the cases of iptaras in the apodosis are discussed above, together with iprus. Two cases of iptaras in the apodosis are given an interesting interpretation in the editions: [94] 1 amta piqdānim–ma (. . .) (writer again) 15šum ittadnūnikkum ittadnūnikkum šumma lā iddinūnikkum 1 amta piqid–ma lā iḫalliq ‘“Entrust one servant. . .” (. . .) If they have given you, fine (lit., they have given you). If they have not given you, entrust a maid so she does not get lost’ 10, 145:10–11, 15–19 [95] aššum ša ina āl GN kaliātunu–ma ina qāt sutê etēqam lā teleʾʾā–ma tašpurānim šumma tattaṭlā–ma ana rēš eqlikunu etēqam telteʾā tētetqā šumma lā [t]ē[t]etqā . . . terrānim–ma ‘As for (the fact) that you are being held in the town of GN and cannot move away from (under) the hand of the Suteans and (that) you wrote me, if you have seen that (lit., and) you have been able to move to your point of origin, fine (lit., you have moved). If you have not moved, (. . .) return here . . .’ 8, 101:5–16 These examples are similar to ex. [75] and to another example (9, 19:7–8): the same lexeme occurs in the protasis and the apodosis, accompanied by very little new information or none at all. One result of this kind of construction has been shown (above, §2.1.2.1.5) to produce modal notions. Here, the result is different: the sequence denotes contentment or acceptance. 59 This type is labeled “pleonastic conditionals” by Declerck and Reed (2001: 359–60), and other than the examples mentioned here, there are no other instances of it in the corpus. The acceptance expressed in the pleonastic apodosis seems to be dependent upon the realization of the protasis. This is transparent in the symmetric conditionals in ex. [94], where the CSs are the opposite of each other. 59.  In contemporary Hebrew, one comes across both this case, where a clause devoid of new information signals contentment (“fine, don’t do anything else”), as well as affirmative confirmation (instead of just using the pro-clausal ‘yes’). The former, which is relevant here, is shown by the following example: kibalta kibalta lo kibalta az lo ‘(if) you received, fine (lit., ‘you received’), (if) you did not receive, then you did not (lit., ‘then not’)’ (http://www.psi.co.il [April, 2008]); similarly, kibalta kibalta lo kibalta lo nora ‘(if) you received, fine (lit., ‘you received’), (if) you did not receive, never mind’ (http://sf.tapuz.co.il/ shirshur-30-141504537.htm [Decem­ber, 2010]).

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2.1.2.2.3.  iparras The second most attested form in the apodosis is Iparras (around 60 cases). Its temporal range is essentially similar to the precative forms: both forms cover the time from the point of utterance onward, and the difference between them lies in the semantic component expressing will, which is absent from iparras forms in the apodosis (unlike those forms in the protasis). The latter forms express a conditioned, usually prospective, event. The pragmatic function is often a threat or a promise, which are in the range of iparras forms outside the apodosis as well: [96] ūmam uqā–ma šumma libbi 60 urram awīlam lā tušarriam ša ina mātim lā ibaššû eppuška ‘I will wait a day, but if during tomorrow you do not direct (or, if lā tušāriam you have not directed) the man to me, I will do you (something) which does not exist in the country’ 10, 178:25–30 This is a representative case showing the pragmatic function of iparras forms in the apodosis, in this case, a threat. The following example has a precative form in the apodosis that is set in opposition to this iparras form: [97] šumma šeʾam lā tušāb[il]ānim ṭēmka šupram–ma kīma anaṭṭalu lūpuš ‘If you have not sen[t] me the barley, send me your report and let me do as I see (fit)’ 1, 142:20–23 The opposition between eppuš ‘I will do’ and lūpuš ‘let me do’ is clear: the indicative denotes determination and the directive precative expresses the will of the speaker. The following minimal pair is similar: [98] šum[m]a [ūm]āt ušbu 2 šiqil kaspum lā apil ūm [. . .] PN ippalšu ‘If 2 sheqels (of) silver for the time he dwelled are not paid, at the time of [. . .] PN will pay him’ 10, 122:18–21 [99] šumma ina ṭuppiša wardum šaṭer kimrīšu u ḫibil[tam] līpul–ma ‘If in her tablet the servant is registered, let her pay his costs and damage(s). . .’ 5, 213:30–33 Here, too, ippal ‘he will pay’ assures payment and līpul ‘let her pay’ is a directive. There are two curious cases of iparras in the apodosis, in which the iparras forms are interpreted with a modal nuance that is quite convincing. These two examples have already been presented and discussed above with respect to other features. They are repeated in full here because the context is crucial for the modal interpretation: [100] aššum ipir fPN nadānim lū ašpurakkum ana mīnim lā taddin ipir fPN a[n]a ma[t]ī tanaddi[n] idin šumma lā [t]addin a[š]apparam–ma ipir [š]attiša ina bītīka tanaddin ‘I did write to you about giving PN’s ration, why did you not give it? When do you intend to give PN’s ration? Give (it)! If [you] 60.  Von Soden (1986: 736) expects i-na immediately before libbi, although libbi could be interpreted as construct in the accusative: libbi urram ‘within tomorrow’.

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will not have given it, I will write (OR: should I write) and you will (have to) give her yearly ration out of your house’ 2, 129:4–19 [101] 2 šiqil kaspam šūbilaššu [š]umma lā tušaršam–ma 1 tušabbalam ‘Have him send me two sheqels (of) silver. Only if you cannot supply me, you (may) send me (only) one’ 7, 79:7–9 In the first case, tanaddin ‘you will give’ is the second clause in a chain of iparras forms and therefore cannot occur in its purus formation. Moreover, the imperative purus does not fit in semanti­cally. In the second case, on the other hand, a purus form would have been the more sensible choice. These two cases may be accounted for by the concept of markedness: inside the opposition between the forms iparras and liprus, the former is the unmarked term. This means that the form iparras may occasionally represent a broader domain than is stated above about its functional value, thus including the functional value of liprus. The following example is somewhat different, being an inferential conditional: [102] šumma kīma PN1 šū iqbû 3 būr eqlam ša ina ekallim kankušum PN2 ištu 4 šanātim ilqē–ma ikkal elīša awātum maruštum ul ibašši warkat awātim šuāti damqiš pursā–ma ‘If, as that PN1 said, for 4 years PN2 took and feeds off a field of 3 būr that was sealed for him in the palace, there is nothing worse than that. Investigate this matter well . . .’ 4, 79:14–23 (ḪL) In this case, Ḫammurabi himself is shocked at the injustice expressed in the complaint (the full context is in ex. [49], p. 41, above). He merely expresses his opinion, which is the logical consequence inferred from the case described in the protasis. The validity of the protasis depends on the results of the verification. Note that this case is one of very few in the entire corpus where the protasis is explicitly resumed in the apodosis (elīša ‘more than that’). Also note that the form ibašši is in fact a syntactic stative (see §2.1.2.1.5). Unlike liprus and purus, iparras in the apodosis may occur as part of a question, for which see below, §2.1.2.2.7. When it is part of a question, if preceded by iptaras in the protasis, it has, as a pattern, a hypothetical value. 2.1.2.2.4.  paris In the apodosis, paris forms are extremely rare (fewer cases, in fact, than iprus forms), and furthermore, all but two of the examples occur in interrogative apodoses (for which see below). One is clearly prospective, and the other lies in a rather broken context and therefore is difficult to analyze: [103] šumma lā iddinūnikki[m a]rḫiš kašdākki šūbilī(š)šunūti ‘If they will not have given you, I will arrive quickly. Send them (to me)’ 12, 129:19–20 The adverb arḫiš primarily occurs with directives, non-past, and infinitive constructions—that is, exclusively in the prospective sphere of which paris is not normally a part. Here, arḫiš emphasizes the prospective meaning of paris.

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In the following example, it appears that the existential clause with šakin is actually a remark inserted in the apodosis: [104] šumma kaspam irrišūka a[nu]mma 2 mana kaspum šakin [x]-šu-ú ù du?bu-b[a?-x] [l ]ā teggi iḫid ‘If they ask you for silver, there are two minas (of) silver, [. . .], do not be lax, be careful’ 12, 42:7–10 This existential clause is implausible in OB as a part of the apodosis, because in this case the condition would be the only example of a type otherwise unattested in OB. This type is referred to as “speech act conditionals,” and an example in English is “should you be hungry, there is plenty of food in the fridge”: note that the apodosis is not conditioned. The existence of silver does not depend on somebody asking for it, and hence this is not really a condition. If the (somewhat broken) remainder constitutes the apodosis, then the existence of the silver is an inserted remark, a construction that is discussed at length above (§2.1.2.2.1) and is further exemplified in exx. [108] and [109] in the following section. 2.1.2.2.5. NVC NVCs are for some reason rare in šumma apodoses (they are not in the apodoses of the paratactic conditional pattern). There are several potential examples, of which only two seem to be genuine NVCs: [105] [š]umma ekallum–ma lā iqbi ṣuḫāru šū ana wuššurim ‘If the palace itself did not order (or: has not ordered) (it), (then) this servant is to (be) release(d)’ 1, 74:23–25 This example is unique; it should be noted that this is the only infinitive construction with ana that is modal and also functions as the rheme (this is normally achieved by using the syntagm ša parāsim). This use is explained by the fact that this, like ex. [102] above, is an inferential conditional: releasing the servant is a conclusion inferred from the protasis. Since the inference cannot be expressed by a precative form; the writer had to resort to another expression that would denote the desired deontic nuance, expressing an obligation. The following example is also an inferential conditional: [106] šumma alpī tīšâ ana uttur alpī leqiam ul libbakunu ‘If you have oxen, you do /will not want to take (anymore) in order to increase (the number of) oxen’ 14, 123:9–10 The conclusion in the apodosis—that the addressees do not want any additional oxen— stems from a premise in the protasis—that the addressees already have oxen. In the case of ex. [105], it is not known whether the palace ordered anything or not, and in ex.[106], the writer is not sure whether the addressees already have oxen or not. Hence, in both cases, the premise is nonfactual and bears accordingly on the inference made in both apodoses, which depends on the realization of the supposition made in the premise.

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Another case, analyzed by the original editor (AbB 12, 52:17) as NVC, is: [107] dīn DN annûm epēšum ša tēpušu šumma awīlum awīlam–ma lā īde kīam ippeš (i-pí-iš) awīlum ‘The deed you did (deserves) a sentence of DN. If a man does not know a(nother) man, does a man behave this way?’ 12, 52:13–17 The edition interprets kīam epēš awīlim! and translates ‘is that an attitude of a gentleman?’ where kīam ‘thus’ is analyzed as the rheme. However, kīam ‘thus’ is not attested as rheme in OB (see Cohen 2005b); the only exception is in the syntagm šumma lā kīam ‘if not so’. For this reason, I analyze i-pí-iš here as ippeš ‘he does’—that is, as a verbal clause rather than a NVC. The digression from the common element order (in which the verbal form occurs in final position) is in fact a consistent signal of rhetorical questions (see Cohen 2008c: §2.6.1). In the rest of our examples, the NVC is an inserted remark for the following directive precative form: [108] šumma ṣēnīka ašaršana tanassaḫ ṣēnū šina kattun warki ṣēnīka–ma lissuḫa ‘If you take your sheep somewhere else, (after all) these sheep are yours, (it is) after your sheep (that) he should take (them) away’ 10, 159:21–24 [109] šumma ina kittim abī atta šeʾum ša maḫrīk[a] ula mādum–[ma] išariš limḫurū ‘If you truly are my father, the barley which you have is not much, let them have it properly’ 9, 88:12–16 Here, too, the small amount of barley is a fact, an insertion, rather than an element influenced by the conditional strucure surrounding it. 61 This meager distribution of NVCs in apodoses—two cases of genuine NVCs and two cases of inserted, non-conditioned NVCs (not conditioned but instead stipulated as a valid fact, like the iprus and iptaras forms in §2.1.2.2.1 above and possibly also ex. [104] above)—is not quite analogous to the case of iprus and iptaras forms in the apodosis. Although the latter do not occur in any other conditional pattern (to the exclusion of the counterfactual conditionals, which are sui generis; see §2.6 below), NVCs do occur as apodoses in other conditional patterns, so this distribution does not have general implications. 2.1.2.2.6.  Precatives (liprus/purus) Precative forms are by far the most common form in the apodosis. Their nature is discussed above (§2.1.1), together with the syntagmatic characteristics of the šumma conditional pattern. The claim is that they are conditioned, rather than plain, directives. This is the point where the value of the form can be determined vis-à-vis the other forms occurring in the apodosis paradigm. Given that all of the forms in the apodosis 61.  Another possibility is that, this being a special type of conditional (see §2.1.3.1 below), the NVC may be a circumstantial clause for the apodosis: ‘(since) the barley that you have is not much. . .’.

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describe nonfactual events and states, dependent upon the eventual (non)realization of the protasis (and counting out the insertions discussed above), all that remains is to oppose precative to iparras forms. Leaving aside the nonfactuality common to the entirety of the apodosis paradigm, precative forms express various degrees of the will of the speaker, and this directive value is shown to be opposed to iparras forms in §2.1.2.1.3. There is no temporal opposition in this paradigm. In some of the cases where precative forms are preceded by special pragmatic formulas, then, too, they do not have the value of regular directives (see below, §2.1.3.2) but instead some other value. In the apodosis, precative forms are very common, and they represent the practical and real character of šumma CSs. Leong (1994: 289) even claims that injunctive forms (our directive precative forms) in the apodosis transform the conditional into the sphere of real (in contrast to irrealis) conditionals. Note that the default form in the apodosis does not have to be precative; it is obligatory in the modal particle conditional pattern (§2.3 below) but not, for example, in the paratactic conditional (§2.2.1), where it is less common, and it is absent altogether in the other corpora (both the law collections and the omens). 2.1.2.2.7.  Interrogative apodosis The interrogative expression in a CS is somewhat confusing; the actual marking of the interrogative is found (when present) in the apodosis, but the effect is often relevant to the entire CS rather than to just one part of it. However, since the actual marking is in the apodosis, it is dealt with here. Interrogative CSs with iparras forms in the apodosis and iptaras forms in the protasis are discussed above (§2.1.2.1.3). The conclusion reached there is that this pattern signals hypothetical value. The examples that belong to this pattern consist of both real and rhetorical questions. Other than in hypothetical conditionals, interrogative apodoses occur mainly with paris forms. The interrogatives are of various types: [110] šumma ina sūt DN innaddin ana 0,0.1 še gur.ta mīnam maṭi ‘If it should be sold according to the seah measure of DN, by what is it less than 1 seah per kor of barley?’ 12, 70:9′–12′ [111] šumma ṣābī u narkabtam aṭarradakki [. . .] ša maḫar DN [k]unn(ū) mala mīnim epēši maṣiāti ‘If I send you troups and a chariot [. . .] which is/are established in front of DN, is a number (of people) as much as needed to work enough for you?’ 62 14, 53:19–23 The foregoing pair of examples constitute real questions that expect an answer. In the following group of examples, still with paris in the apodosis, the question seems to be rhetorical, which means that it is more like a disguised statement than a question. It is important to note, however, that a distinction between question types is not marked here (but see ex. [107]): 62. For mala with an infinitive, see Aro 1961: §§2.98–2.100. The example is very difficult, and the translation is dubious, treating mīnum as ‘number’ (√mnu) rather than as an interrogative.

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[112] šumma anāku aḫūka kaqqadka ul kabit ‘If I am your brother, are you not respected?’ 6, 139:5 In this example, 63 it appears, the question is not about whether the addressee is being respected or not but about the link between two potentially disconnected issues: whether, on the one hand, the writer is the brother of the addressee (the protasis) and, on the other, whether the addressee is being respected. The rhetorical question seems to invalidate this link. This case is tightly connected to the assertion made regarding the link between the two clauses of a CS (Dancygier 1998: 72; see end of §1.3, pp. 14–15). The link between the protasis and the apodosis is discussed below in §2.7.2. The following example is similar: [113] šumma ebbu nakarum ašariš izzaz ṭēmšu ula–mi sadir ‘If a foreign trusted agent serves there, is his report not in order?’ 4, 151:4′–6′ The next example, the last one with paris, is different in that the apodosis is itself a condition (see the next section) made up of both iparras and paris forms: [114] šumma bēlī atta amât–ma ṭābkum ‘If you are my lord, should I die, will/ would it please you?’ 9, 232:21–22 Few examples have iparras in an interrogative apodosis: [115] šumma atḫānu i[t]tīya ul tamtallik ‘If we are partners, do you not confer with me?’ 10, 188:10′–11′ Ex. [114] is rhetorical; another one, ex. [107] discussed in §2.1.2.2.5 above, is positively marked as rhetorical. Ex. [115] is very similar to ex. [112], de­asserting, as it were, the link between being partners and consulting each other. The following example is possibly not rhetorical: [116] šumma anāku lā wašbāku atta kīma yâti ana awīlê dabābam ul teleʾʾi šum 64 at lā tadbub aḫātī daba⟨b⟩am ul ileʾʾi ‘If I am not present, can’t you speak to the men instead of me? If you have not spoken, can’t my sister spea[k]?’ 10, 189:5–10 Only iparras and paris are attested in an interrogative apodosis. Other candidates, translated as questions in the editions, have been eliminated from this group for various reasons. 65 63.  See Huehnergard 1986: 225 n. 34 as well as Cohen 2005b: 265–66. 64.  The text has šum for šumma and at for atta. The first might be a case of crasis. 65.  mīnam tēpušanni–ma ṭaplātika [sic] adabbub šumma maḫar awīlê ṣabī ṭapultaka aqbi awīlû šunu inaddûninni iṭpul[ū]ninni u anāku šumma aššumika lā šī ina pīya uṣiam ‘What did you do to me that I should slander you? (I swear:) I did not slander you in front of these men! These men disobey me (and) they slandered me. (I swear:) I did not emit unseemly things about you from my mouth!’ (5, 138:12′–21′).

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2.1.2.2.8.  Complex forms: chains and domains In contrast with the protasis, where chains are not very common, the apodosis may consist of complex forms: chains and paratactic conditionals (as in ex. [114] above and [119] below): [117] šumma inanna tusakkapanni #bēl šukūsim . . . illakam–ma . . . immar–ma . . . tadabbubā# ‘If you (intend to) keep me away now, #the owner of the subsistence field . . . will come and . . . inspect and (then) you (can) speak . . .#’ 1, 29:21–27 The term “complex forms” in fact refers to syntactic domains (see §2.1 and §2.7.2), namely, supraclausal syntactic entities that are characterized by formal common features. In this case, the apodosis domain consists of iparras forms interconnected by the particle -ma. The following example exemplifies the apodosis domain with precative forms: [118] šumma šamnum ša PN lā damiq #suḫur–ma šamnam damqam šāmam–ma liqea# ‘If PN’s oil is not good, #look for and buy me good oil and take (it) for me#’ 2, 144:22–25 On several occasions, I have stated that the apodosis (as well as the protasis) is a domain rather than a clause. This fact is crucial in order to understand the nature of the conditional patterns in the letters. It is the entire domain, rather than its first clause, that constitutes the apodosis. The final example is interesting in that the apodosis of the šumma CS is analyzed as a paratactic conditional: [119] ana dayyānī i nisniq awâtini līmurū–ma šumma ša PN iqīšanniāšim mār[ū]šu leqûm kašid #dayyānū iqabbûniāšim–ma amtam nutār# ‘We should go to the judges, let them look into our affairs and, if it is fitting 66 for his sons to take what PN gave us as present, #should the judges tell us, we will return the maid#’ 3, 2:18–23 Despite the fact that the apodosis consists just as in ex. [117], of iparras forms, these forms function together as another, second CS. This CS has its own characteristics as well (described at length in §2.2.1 below), one of which is its syntagmatic compatibility with precative forms. Both of these šumma clauses are interpreted as oath. Another example is šumma lā abī–ma atta u aḫātī ina bītika u mīnum ša umma atta–ma ‘(I swear:) You are my father, and my sister is in your house, so what is it that you (say:). . .’ (3, 7:16–18). Both examples are better interpreted as oaths. SLB:28 explains the structure of the second example as a syndetic parataxis and u mīnum ša umma atta–ma as an apodosis with u. This u is not found otherwise in our epistolary corpus (except 3, 64:3f., where it is an infinitive construction). 66.  SLB:9–10 translates kašid as “wenn es so weit ist, dass. . .”. As for the double nominative, see SLB:8–9.

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2.1.2.2.9.  The apodosis: concluding remarks The apodosis of the šumma conditional pattern constitutes a syntactic domain that consists of one or more clauses. The common denominator of the entire apodosis group of forms is the fact that they are nonfactual: their validity is always contingent on the eventual actualization of the protasis. Nonfactuality in the apodosis is the token characteristic of ordinary conditionals in general. Precative forms are the most common form in the apodosis and signal the conditioned will of the speaker. Considerably less common is the group of iparras forms whose value is nondeontic, basically denoting (conditioned) threats and promises that are normally covered by the indicative mood in OB. The apodosis may seemingly consist of pronominal as well as nexus (or polar) questions, rhetorical or not. The rhetorical questions seem to pertain to the relationship between the protasis and the apodosis. Such interrogative apodoses are attested with iparras forms and constitute the majority of paris forms in the apodosis. The nonrhetorical questions are here considered an expression of modality as well. In addition, the apodosis is occasionally composed of a CS. Other than these groups, there are some cases where the apodosis consists of marginal groups: NVC is very rare in the apodosis of šumma conditionals, and so is the assevera­ tive. Another group consists of iprus and iptaras forms, which, we have concluded, function as an insertion between the protasis and the apodosis. This insertion, unlike the parts of the conditional pattern, is factual. Two examples of NVC are analyzed in a similar manner. The last group is iptaras forms that constitute the apodosis of a pleonastic conditional in which the apodosis is conditioned and signals contentment or acceptance. The apodosis paradigm is hypothetical, depending on the realization of the protasis. In addition, modal opposition exists among the various forms that constitute this paradigm. The categories arrived at by opposing these forms inside the apodosis are (1) indicative (including threats and promises); (2) interrogative; (3) deontic modality, and more specifically, the expression of speaker’s will; and (4) conditional. Consequently, unlike the protasis, tense is not a category in this environ­ment (there is no consistent marking for such differences), but modality certainly is. Precative forms do occur in pronominal questions outside this environment, 67 but questions are not attested with precative forms in the apodosis (there is one example of this kind of precative in the paratactic conditional pattern). Table 2.9 summarizes these conclusions. These data turn out to be very significant when compared with šumma CSs in the other genres, which have a different characterization. 2.1.3.  Conditional structures with different value Some CSs are formulaic, hinting at a pragmatic purpose other than expressing epistemic modality, which ordinary conditions express, by definition: the form is conditional, but its value is not, at least not primarily. This explains why they are set apart in 67.  See Cohen 2005a: 105–8 (for pronominal questions) and 108–12 (for nexus questions).

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Table 2.9 šumma apodosis: nonfactuality exponent

value

liprus

directive

category

iparras paris (rare)

indicative

NVC (rare) iparras+? paris+? conditional pattern

modality interrogative conditional

the description. Their semantic value is relevant, because it helps us understand better the semantic boundaries of conditionals. Two groups are discussed, polite requests and suggestions. In both groups, the apodosis is a precative form. As is shown below, the conditionality of the precative in the apodosis in both groups is doubtful, but they differ in the value of these precative forms: in the first group it is a directive, while in the second it is something different. This may be the result of the different degrees of mutual dependency with the protasis. These two groups are discussed at length by Sallaberger (1999). 2.1.3.1.  Polite requests Politeness in the OB letters is a delicate matter: it is very difficult to distinguish among the reasons for which the sender wishes the addressee well—whether the wish is sincere, merely polite, or even saying one thing and meaning precisely the opposite. The most common exponent is the particle appūtum ‘please; it is urgent’ (Sallaberger 1999: 159–63). This particle occurs primarily with precative forms; 68 especially when it occurs with negative precative forms (lā iparras), it cannot quite mean ‘it is urgent’ but rather ‘please’: [120] ūm u[n]ned[u]kkī [t]ammaru [l]ā tabittam appūtum l[ā] t[u]ḫḫ[a]ram ‘Do [n]ot stay overnight the day you see my le[t]ter, please, do n[ot] de[la]y’ 9, 35:6–10 The preceding statement covers many cases of this particle but not all of them: one notable case is 12, 169:15, where appūtum stands between precative forms, followed by explicit threats made by the writer of the letter. Politeness and blunt threats are not quite compatible with one another. 68.  In 11, 178:33, it occurs after indicative forms.

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In addition to this particle, there are approximately 70 occurrences of one member of the following group (ina kittim) abī/aḫī/mārī/bēlī atta ‘you are (truly) my father/ brother/son/master’ or tarammanni ‘you love me’ in the protasis. This group is described by Sallaberger (1999: 185–91). It is interesting to note that this type is compatible with and occurs with appūtum: [121] šumma ina kittim abī u bēl napištiya at[t]a ina annītim eṭranni–ma lū waradka ša dar[i]ātim a[n]āk[u] appūtum ‘If you are truly my father and protector, help me in this and let me be your eternal servant, please!’ 12, 175:11–15 The apodosis in these cases consists first and foremost of 2nd-person precative (i.e., the imperative and prohibitive); cases of 3rd person are less common. The 1st person occurs only rarely, never directly following the protasis, but instead as a consequence of the first clause, 69 as is clear from ex. [121]. 70 This direct association with 2nd and 3rd persons distinguishes this group from the following group. This formula, then, has to do directly only with the actions of the addressee as well as somebody else but not the speaker him- or herself. The precative forms occur in the affirmative as well as in the negative. To the cynical modern eye, protases such as ‘if you really are my father/brother/son/ lord’ look guilt-inducing, intended to soften any possible reluctance on the part of the addressee. Another way to look at this is that the protasis reminds the addressee of the relationships binding him/her to the writer. Be that as it may, the same effect is achieved by ‘please’, as well as politeness in general. These cases compare pragmatically with the French expression “s’il vous plaît,” which is in fact a lexicalized protasis: both have a similar function, and both, in fact, do not condition the utterance that goes with this protasis. In other words, the precative form that follows this particular type of protases in OB letters is not conditioned: the request holds unconditionally and hence has the value of an independent directive, perhaps a bit more polite. One example, where the protasis occurs (again) without the apodosis at the end of the letter, is very instructive: [122] šumma māru atta šullimanni ana zitti PN u yâttin mamman lā iṭeḫḫi appūtum šumma mārī atta ‘If you are a son, you should keep me well, no one should approach the part of PN and mine. Please, if you are my son’ 8, 108:12–18 (= Sallaberger 1999: 186, ex. 128f–g) As analyzed by Sallaberger (1999:189–190), this example proves that the link with conditionality is lost and that this formula has become partially frozen. By current standards, 69.  These are the cases: 8, 100:18–23; 9, 214:6–8; and 14, 106:14–17. 70.  Digressions from the precative form in the apodosis are attested in a few cases that, like the cases treated above (§2.1.2.2.1), are viewed as remarks (e.g., ex. [109], 10, 207:10–12 as well as exx. [84]–[87]). Another unique digression occurs in 9, 232:21–22 (ex [114] above), where the apodosis is a paratactic condition, a case that is a legitimate ordinary conditional.

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this example merely corroborates the view that these cases are not really conditionals: first, because the ordinary conditional protasis never occurs alone; and second, because the directives in the apodosis are not really conditioned. Another special occurrence is the following example (mentioned by Sallaberger 1999: 189, ex. 129o): [123] šumma abī u bēlī atta ištu 8 šanātim ša mārat PN1 5 šiqil kaspum itti PN2 ibaššī–ma ana awīlim ula ippallas siniqšu–ma kaspam u ṣibtašu šuddiššum ‘If you are my father and my lord, it is for 8 years that 71 the daughter of PN1 has 5 sheqels (of) silver with PN2 and (she) does not look at the man. Reach him and collect the silver from him and its interest’ 14, 221:3–14 In this case, the distance between the formulary šumma clause and the precative forms testifies to the relative independence of the šumma clause. This case seems to be very similar to the cases discussed above, in §2.1.2.2.1, exx. [84]–[87]. Note, however, that in ex. [123], the so-called insertion in fact constitutes most of the letter, whereas in the cases discussed above, the insertions consisted of not more than a clause or two. The diachronic distribution of this politeness formula is interesting. It is curious to note that, in Whiting’s (1987) collection of 55 letters written in archaic OB, most šumma CSs (17 out of 20 cases) have this formula. In other words, šumma CSs in Whiting’s corpus primarily have this function. 2.1.3.2. Suggestions The common value of the precative group of forms in OB is expressing the will of the speaker (Cohen 2005a: 89–100): they have a directive value. However, in certain syntagmatic environments, their value is different. A most-relevant analogous situation is when these forms occur in a pronominal question (Cohen 2005a: 105–8). In this case, the precative forms show a different paradigm (e.g., the affirmative 2nd person purus form does not figure in it; see Table 1.1 on p. 3, group 2b), and, as far as function is concerned, the forms in this environment do not reflect the will of the speaker but instead appeal to the will of the addressee: [124] anāku mīnam lūpuš ‘As for me, what should I do?’ 8, 130:8′ The form lūpuš, which otherwise signals the will of the speaker, does not reflect this component in these syntactic circumstances. The group that is discussed in this section is similar in that the modal component of the speaker’s will is weaker or absent from the value of the precative in the apodosis. In other words, it does not have a strictly directive value. The semantic outcome is very much like a polite suggestion. The expressions in the protasis belonging to this group are unipartite NVCs such as digilka, niṭilka ‘(it is) your view’, libbaka ‘(it is) your wish’, as well as predicative forms such as īnka maḫrat ‘it pleases you’ and taqabbī ‘you order’; 71. The ša is written but has no continuation (no subjunctive forms); the letter is peculiar in its opening formula as well: ana x umma y.

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all specifically refer to the will of the addressee. The final effect might be similar to the preceding group (Sallaberger [1999: 179–80] sees this group as very similar to the former but mentions that the order in this group is weaker), but the means and the grammatical effect are different. The precative in the apodosis generally occurs in all persons in the affirmative: [125] inūma allikam kīam taqbiam umma atta–ma ištu inanna 10 ūmī akaššadakka inanna ištu allikam–ma aṣṣēr lā talli[kam] u ṭēmka–ma ul ta[špuram] šumma niṭilka ṭ[ē]m[k]a šupram–m[a] ‘When I came you told me thus: 10 days from now I will reach you. Now, ever since I came, in addition to (the fact that) you did not co[me], you also did not even [send] me your report. If you see fit, send me [yo]ur re[po]rt. . .’ 12, 196:4–11 [126] inanna fPN u ṣuhārātim ul taṭrudīm inanna šumma niṭilki fPN ṭurdīm ‘Now, you did not send me fPN and the maids. Now, if you see fit, send me fPN’ 1, 31:12–15 Exx. [125] and [126] show a regular sequence in the letters: something has not been done, and the letter is written in order to (try to) get it done. The kind of protasis we currently discuss does not really condition the directive. Another expression of this kind is šumma īnka maḫrat ‘if it pleases you’: [127] šumma aw[ā]tum īnka maḫrat ṭupp[ak]a ana awīlim šūbilam–m[a] ‘If the matter pleases you, send [you]r tablet to the man . . .’ 12, 69:29–30 Yet another expression is šumma taqabbi ‘if you order’: [128] umma atta–ma 1⁄3 mana kaspam šuqul–ma wardam taklam šāmam 1⁄3 mana kaspam ašqul–ma ula imḫurūninni šumma taqabbi 1⁄2 mana lušqul–ma wardam taklam lušāmakku ‘You (said): “Pay 20 sheqels and buy me a reliable slave”. I paid 20 sheqels but they did not accept (them) from me. If you order, I could pay 30 sheqels and buy you a reliable slave’ 11, 176:7–16 This, no doubt, is a nice way to say to one’s superior that prices of reliable slaves have gone up. Unlike the former group, here the apodosis is only rarely negative: [129] [šumma niṭ]ilka [kull]im šumma [lā] niṭilka lā tukallam ‘[If it is] your [wi]sh, [sho]w (them), if it is [not] your wish, do not show them’ 11, 184:4–7 [130] šumma libbi PN lā amatti ‘If PN wishes, let me not die!’ 10, 4:39–41 To summarize: the two groups discussed heretofore are signaled by CSs that are not ordinary conditionals: the expression is not found on the epistemic scale because the apodosis, unlike other apodoses, is not conditioned. There still is some kind of interdependence between the protasis and apodosis (especially in the polite-suggestion

2.1.  šumma conditionals

77

group). The two apodosis types have other effects: (1) pragmatic—that is, politeness; and (2) modal—that is, marking the precative as a nondirective suggestion by shifting the component of will from the speaker to the addressee. 2.1.4.  Summary of šumma conditionals Conditionals with šumma, the most copiously attested type (in the letter corpus as well as in the other genres), have their own characteristics (which are distinctive from šumma oaths and indirect questions), answering to specific syntactic criteria. The main category inside the protasis, arrived at by opposing the forms with each other, is tense. The apodosis, on the other hand, shows modal oppositions between indicative forms, precative forms, and interrogatives, all conditioned. The following table summarizes these oppositions: Table 2.10 Epistolary šumma structures: no aspect protasis (uncertainty) exponent

value

iprus iptaras paris NVC iparras

apodosis (conditioned) exponent

value

past

liprus

directive

non-past perfect

iparras

a-temporal non-past

categories

tense

paris

indicative

question

interrogative

CS

conditional

categories

modality

The šumma conditional pattern is nonfactual. The exceptions are the formulas discussed in §§2.1.3.1–2, both of which can be regarded as different patterns, and a few cases that are analyzed as concessive-conditionals, where the apodosis is factual (see exx. [157]– [159], p. 91 below). On the other hand, the subpattern #šumma iptaras iparras?# shows a higher degree of hypo­thetical status. The apodosis is occasionally interrogative. When the question is rhetorical, it seems to pertain to the relationship obtaining between the protasis and the apodosis, somewhat similar to a nexus question that refers to the predicative link of the clause. Compared with the rich variety of conditional types found in English (as described in Declerck and Reed 2001), OB is much more monotonous. This could be ascribed to the practical nature of the letters and the fact that they are written in a formulary scribal language. The šumma conditional pattern is the exponent of an ordinary condition. Other than this, inferential conditions are rather rare; and cases of rhetorical questions in the apodosis, which are similar to inferential conditionals, are few as well. The pattern that signals hypo­thetical conditionals is not very common either, nor is the counterfactual conditional (see §2.6 below). This relative monotony is compensated for by the clarity of oppositions between the forms in each paradigm, by several other conditional patterns (of which the šumma

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pattern is only one; see below), and by other features that aid in getting closer to the nature of the link between both parts of the conditional pattern. 2.2.  Paratactic conditionals The paratactic conditional is a construction where two interconnected, or juxtaposed, clauses consistently show a conditional value. However, to ensure that these structures are not like any other biclausal structure, their distinctive syntactic as well as other characteristics need to be explored. A relatively full treatment is found in my study (Cohen 2005a: 144–79), focusing on modality. In the following sections, our main concern is conditionals rather than modality in general. 2.2.1.  The -ma conditional pattern This conditional pattern is the second-best attested CS in the letter corpus after šumma CSs. The protasis of this pattern consists of forms that, when occurring in other environments, have indicative values. In this pattern, however, they are to be viewed differently, since their value seems to be clear-cut conditional. Akkadian syntax has a special means of creating asymmetrical connections between clauses, the connective particle -ma. It marks a logical or temporal sequence between the clauses (GAG §§123a, 156a, c). The order it creates is linguistically pertinent, because the sequence is not reversible (Buccellati 1996: §86.3). These -ma chains are characterized by a concrete unity common to all of the forms in the chain—for example, they are all subjunctive forms, or all precative, etc. This feature is called “modal congruence” (Cohen 2005a: 123). It serves, among other things, as the cohesive factor of a syntactic unit higher than clause level, which may be called “domain” (Cohen, forthcoming). The semantic extent of these chains ranges from neutral sequence (ex. [132] ‘he would seize my house and put me out to the gate’), through final notion (GAG §158f; ex. [136]50] ‘Supply PN with cargo boat workers so that he can build’), indirect command (ex. [171] ‘or[d]er that (lit., ‘and’) n[o on]e should complain to him’), condition (dealt with below), and, finally, circumstantial function (GAG §159; ex. [151] ‘the daughter-in-law of PN being taken as pledge . . .’). Each of these semantic groups could be upgraded to a solid linguistic entity if it were possible to characterize it formally, thereby ascribing a specific form (by way of syntactic data) to a given meaning. So if we were to collect all of the examples deemed circumstantial, it would be possible to see what is special about these examples in contrast to other sequences, thus setting them apart syntactically. 72 This technique is applied to the -ma chains that seem to have a con­ditional meaning. The purpose is to characterize what looks like any -ma chain with a tentative conditional notion in such a way that these chains could be regarded as a pattern. The latter is a complex form that corre­sponds to a morpheme by having a fixed function. 72.  For instance, one known feature of the circumstantial group is that one expects an initial paris form, but this may not be enough: initial has to be defined; perhaps other forms have similar functions in a similar environment, etc.

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A similar case is the modal particle conditional pattern treated below (§2.3): conditional meaning is found to exist in certain syntactic circum­stances, which are studied and described. The following discussion describes several parameters that appear to be patternspecific and hence distinctive. 1.  Preceding polar precative: polar lexical resumption The most instructive feature of the current paratactic conditional pattern is polar lexical resumption. This is a phenomenon in which in the immediate co-text preceding the protasis there exists a precative that has the same (or a related) verbal lexeme as the form in the protasis. This precative form and the protasis following it exhibit opposite polarity: [131] ina 4 ūmī daltī lū kamsat . . . ina 4 ūmī daltī ul kamsa[t]–ma lū [t]īdeā ‘Let my door be complete within four days. . . . (If) my door is not complete within four days, be warned’ 3, 34:19, 37–38 (and similarly 2, 59:14–21; 6, 207:13–19; 7, 67:13–18; 7, 168:5′–10′; and 9, 192:10–17) [132] rēqūssu lā illakam [r]ēqūssu illakam–ma [b]ītī iṣabbat–ma ana bābim ušeṣṣeanni–ma ilam muterram ul arašši ‘Let him not come emptyhanded; should he come [em]pty-handed, he would seize my [hou]se and put me out to the gate and I will have no God who returns (me)’ 6, 140:20–25 (and similarly 12, 53:17–20; and 12, 64:31–33) The examples illustrate both points: in ex. [131], one lexeme (kamāsum ‘be complete’) occurs twice, and the same is true in ex. [132] (‘come’). The first example has an affirmative directive (lū kamsat) and a negative resumption (ul kamsat), and the second has a negative directive (lā illakam) and an affirmative resumption (illakam). This polarlexical resumption, although not found in every case of the pattern, is the heart of the mechanism that allows this condition. The preceding precative generally assumes the execution of the demanded action. There is, hence, a plain logical incompatibility between the two forms in the same utterance (for instance: do not go, you go. . .) that is resolvable only by interpreting the structure as an unequivocal conditional. The part containing the opposite polarity to the precative form opens up a channel of likelihood that the command may not take place as originally expected. This likelihood is at the basis of every nonfactual expression. This part is the protasis of the construction. 2.  Scale-reversing contexts (negative expressions and arḫiš ul) “Scale-reversing contexts” are environments in which certain expressions have the curious tendency of occurring only in negative or negative-implying environments, such as a question or a conditional structure. The expressions themelves are often called “negative polarity items.” An example of this phenomenon in English is the behavior of

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the indefinite pronoun 73 anyone: One could compare the occurrence of #you see anyone# alone (which is very irregular) with its normal occurrence in negation, question or condition: #you do not see anyone# #Do you see anyone?# #If you see anyone. . .#

Two groups of similar items exist in OB: one with certain expressions that primarily occur negated: aḫam nadûm (be negligent), nīdi aḫim rašûm (be negligent), and idam šuršûm (‘be careless, raise objections’). In our pattern, these expres­sions conspicuously occur in the affirmative: aḫam nadûm: As if to maintain the connection with the previous section, the first example exhibits, in addition, polar resumption: [133] ana ša ašpurakkum aḫka lā tanaddi → aḫka tanaddī–ma di⟨ḫ⟩tika ašâ[l] ‘Do not be negligent regarding what I wrote you; should you be negligent, I will inqui[re] after you’ 12, 64:31–33 The prohibitive form of this expression (aḫka lā tanaddi ) is the most common form of this lexeme, and its affirmative form is typical in this very pattern and marginally in questions (1, 29:16; 1, 53:26; 4, 137:7), which constitutes yet another scale-reversal context. nīdi aḫim rašûm: In the following example, the co-textual precative occurs after the apodosis: [134] nidi aḫim taraššê–ma eqel kurummatim . . . ul tukammasā ana êm kummusim nīdi aḫ[i]m lā taraššiā ‘Should you be negligent, you will not (be able to) gather (the yield of my) subsistence field. Do not be negligent regarding gathering the barley’ 1, 135:8–12 In the rest of the cases this co-textual precative does not occur: [135] nīdi aḫim taraššiāšim–ma šumma eleppum šī imtūt ḫamuttam–ma ša kīma šâti nirtêb ‘Should you be negligent towards it, if this boat were to sink, would we be able to replace it for ourselves soon with one just like it?’ 3, 35:26–28 The expression nīdi aḫim rašûm ‘be negligent’ is otherwise (approximately 80 cases) used in the negative: nīdi aḫim lā tarašši ‘do not be negligent’. 74 Together with the former expressions (aḫam nadûm ‘be negligent’, idam šuršûm ‘be careless, raise objections’), it is used affirmatively almost exclusively in this pattern. This can be interpreted 73.  Indefinites are a prominent group within these polarity items; see, e.g., Haspelmath 1997: 33–37; 113–15. 74. One more affirmative example is located in a conditional apodosis, possibly in a question (11, 94:15–16).

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as implicitly responding to the commonly negative expression, which is missing (since its occurrence as a protasis is enough), as is clear from ex. [135], or it could be conceived as a special mark for a conditional environment. idam šuršûm: [136] ana ša ašpurakkum idam tušaršā–ma ina GN apāliya ul teleʾʾi ‘Should you object to what I wrote you, you will not be able to answer to me in GN’ 7, 172:15–18 Another group consists of a single item, the adverb arḫiš ‘quickly’, which occurs approximately 200 times in the letters. This adverb generally occurs with prospective verbal expressions (iparras, liprus, and infinitives). Von Soden (AHw: 67b) notes that it occurs mainly with liprus, less often with iparras, and seldom with iprus. It is compatible with negation only rarely 75 and when it occurs with negation, it yields, as expected, ‘not quickly’ (= slowly). 76 The syntagm #arḫiš . . . ul taparras# is generally found only in the protasis of this paratactic pattern. It is therefore considered to be yet another distinctive characteristic. The best example of this is ex. [150] (discussed below, pp. 84–85), which exhibits other characteristics. Other examples: [137] kanikkam arḫiš ul tušezzibšu–ma lū tīde ‘Should you not have him make out a document quickly, be warned’ 12, 25:19–20 [138] rakbī arḫiš ul tappalā–ma . . . pānūkunu ul ibbabbalū ‘Should you not satisfy the(se) riders quickly, you will not be forgiven. . .’ 4, 11:29–33 The rest of the examples containing arḫiš ul are less well characterized as such, but they are nevertheless clearly conditionals: [139] [aš]šumika wašbāku [a]rḫiš ul tallakam–ma [t]attal⟨la⟩kam . . . [x man]a kaspam ušadd[a]nka ‘I am staying [for] your sake; should you not come [q]uickly and (instead) go away . . . I will collect the [. . .] silver from you’ 12, 194:14–18 The rest of the examples occur in broken contexts; 77 the mere occurrence of [arḫiš ul iparras] identifies them as conditionals. 3.  Special semantics: The temporal value of ul iprus The forms occurring in the protasis are iparras (in most of the examples), rarely paris (ex. [131] above), and iprus, which, however, is attested in the negative only (ul iprus): [140] ištu inanna ana 5 ūmī ina maḫrīka wašbāku adi allakam ul tukillaššu–ma PN1 u PN2 tappal ‘Within 5 days from now I will be with you. If you have 75.  One example diverges twice from this model, occurring with a negative iprus: awīl šarrim arḫiš ul ikšudanni–ma ultappitam ‘the king’s man did not reach me quickly, and I was delayed’ (14, 118:5–7). 76.  Two examples: arḫiš lā tanaddinī ‘Do not give it quickly (= give it slowly)’ (4, 161:24–26) and aššum šeʾi arḫiš lā kamāsim ‘Regarding the slow collection of barley’ (12, 31:3). 77.  The cases are 12, 67:38 and 12, 68:22–24.

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not prepared him by the time I come, you will (have to) answer to PN1 and PN2’ 6, 73:10–17 (mentioned in GAG §173g) The example makes it clear that the ul iprus form does not have a past or even present perfect value, as it does in main clauses, 78 but instead something else: there is an explicit temporal frame (‘five days from now’) in which preparation is to take place in the realm of the future. In §2.1.2.1.4 above, the form lā iprus2 inside šumma CSs is discussed and shown to be the negative counterpart of non-past perfect iptaras. What we have here is a similar form, with a similar value to the value it has in šumma CSs, namely, linguistic non-past perfect. Note, however, that the affirmative form iptaras is not attested in this pattern. In fact, unlike šumma protases, there is no form in this protasis that is capable of referring to past events. This point is very important: the value of ul iprus in the ‑ma conditional pattern is considerably different from its value in other chains: [141] . . . alkam–ma PN apulli [sic] → ul tallikam–ma nāq mê ina bītika ul izzibūni ‘. . . Come and pay PN; if you have not come 79 they will not leave a water pourer in your house’ 7, 67:13–18 In ex. [141], the form ul iprus has, again, a future-perfect meaning, because it is expected to have occurred after the imperative to pay (apulli ). The form ul tamḫur in ex. [146] below is a good case in point: the mere fact that it is located in the chain interconnected with a preceding purus form tells us that it is expected to take place after the imperative idin (this is the nature of the ‑ma chain: events are interconnected according to their order, conceptual or otherwise). A similar frame is found in the following pair of examples as well: [142] aššum eqel šamaššammī ša GN mamman ul taškum–ma šamaššammū immaššaʾ [sic] ‘Regarding the sesame field of GN, if you have not appointed anyone, the sesame will be stolen’ 11, 168:7–10 [143] ipirka mamman ana ummika ula iddin ula taḫmuṭam–ma šipātika itabbalū ‘Nobody gave your ration to your mother. If you do not hurry, 80 they will take away your wool’ 4, 145:31–35 In the last two examples, we cannot specify the exact temporal framework: the protasis could be pointing forward, to future anteriority, or be equivalent to a present perfect. 4.  Diverging from modal congruence One of the prominent syntactic phenomena of OB is modal con­gruence (see Cohen 2005a: 123, 132–37). Modal congruence means that forms that are chained, or interconnected via the connective -ma, form a domain that consists of one group of forms: precative forms, indicative forms, attributive (sub­junctive) forms, etc. These forms, in principle, do not intermix within a single -ma chain. 78.  For example [k]as[p]am ana qātišu uttēr 1 uṭṭet [k]as[p]am ul ukī[l] ‘I have returned to him the silver, I did not (even) keep (or: have not even kept) one grain (of) silver’ (7, 145:8′). 79.  The translation of these ul iprus forms aims to show the idea of perfect or anteriority. 80.  Literally, ‘if you have not hurried. . .’, which is very awkward in English.

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83

However, the following pair of examples has a peculiar sequence, iparras–ma precative, which definitely contradicts modal congruence: [144] pīḫātī apālam u[l] e[l]eʾʾī–ma ana mi[mm]ûya [sic] kīma ibaššû lā teggî ‘Should I no[t] be [a]ble to meet my obligations, do not be negligent toward my pro[per]ty, as much as there is’ 6, 148:27–29 [145] ūmam eleppētum [š]a ana GN [aṭru]du is[a]nniqā–ma [u]rra[m] ina GN šuṣēnšināti ‘Should the boats that [I se]nt to GN arrive today, load them [to]morrow in GN’ 9, 132:10–12 In both exx. [144] and [145], we we see that an otherwise “indicative” form (iparras) is interconnected via the particle -ma with a precative form. Such interconnections occur, by and large, only in or around conditional patterns (the exceptions are discussed in the following section). 81 In addition, the preceding precative is, in several cases, interconnected with the protasis: 82 [146] ina nār CN nārta muḫur–ma eqlam ša PN mê mullī–ma ana errēšim idin–ma nāram šâti {ul tamḫur–ma} (ta-am-ku-ur-ma) ul awātī ‘Draw off a canal from the CN canal and fill PN’s field with water and give (it) to the cultivator; {if you have not drawn off the canal}, (it will) not (be) my affair’ 11, 175:5–10 In this example, a chain of purus forms (belonging with the precative group) interconnects with the protasis form, ul iprus. This is yet another case where precative and indicative forms interconnect. The cumulative number of these cases makes it possible to state that this digression from the otherwise obligatory modal congruence in OB is one of the typical characteristics of the paratactic conditional pattern. 83 This digression may be explained by the fact that the otherwise indicative forms have, in this pattern, not indicative but instead conditional value—that is, they signal modality and consequently have no trouble interconnecting with either indicative forms or precative forms. From another angle, this digression is a corroboration of the modal value of these “indicative” forms. 5.  The forms found in the pattern and its structure The protasis and apodosis are mostly interconnected via ‑ma. The particle is occasionally absent (its unmarked equivalent is here marked by →): [147] maškana ša 5 mana idîši–ma kilîši amtum uznāša anni[š]–ma iḫalliqki → maškanu libattiqši ‘Put her in fetter(s) of 5 mina and detain her; the maid is intelligent—should she (try to) escape from you, let the fetter(s) hinder her’ 1, 27:24–28 81.  Additional cases are 3, 14:5–6; 3, 34:19, 37–38; 5, 171:33–35; 6, 89:25–27; 6, 120:7–10; 6, 207:13– 19; 9, 19:35–36; 9, 270:10–15; 10, 206:16–17; 11, 27:12–17; 12, 117:19–21; and 12, 25:19–20. 82.  Other cases are 3, 2:18–23; 8, 93:14–21; and 11, 137:12–19. 83.  A similar case is discussed at the end of §2.2.2.

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The absence of -ma is not an obstacle, and it is occasionally attested in other chains as well. Note, however, that connective u does not, under any circum­stances, occur between the protasis and the apodosis: [148] umma anāku–ma kīma erēbika kaspam qāti awīlim usuḫ # kaspam qāti awīlim ul tassuḫ u kaspum ṣibtam uṣṣab ‘I (said) as follows: “As soon as you come in, take the silver from the man.” You did not take the silver from the gentleman and the silver (now) bears interest’ 12, 53:5–8 This example is not a conditional (note that usuḫ ‘remove’ and ul tassuḫ ‘you did not remove’ are not in the same utterance) and illustrates very well the different nature of connection using u: the mere occurrence of u between the clauses is enough to rule out a CS. The sequences attested with this pattern are as follows: iparras–ma iparras (passim) iparras–ma NVC (two candidates with ul awāti for apodosis: 5, 26:3′–7′; 13, 62:14–16) [149] anāku aššu[m] ṣētim adi inanna uḫḫir mušītam arakkam–ma šērtam–ma ina pī nār DN anāku 84 ‘As for me, I have been delayed until now because of the heat. If I travel by night, then by morning I will be at the mouth of the DN canal’ 12, 11:16–19 iparras–ma paris (exx. [153] and [154]) iparras–ma liprus (see category 4 above) ul iprus–ma iparras (see category 3 above) ul iprus–ma NVC (ex. [146]) ul paris–ma liprus (ex. [131]) In addition, it may be worth mentioning that all of the cases featuring a negated 2nd person iprus or iparras that connect forward (namely, cases of both ul taprus–ma and ul taparras–ma), which come with the apodosis form to match (that is, not iprus or iptaras forms; see below), are always a part of this pattern. In conclusion, the following example illustrates several peculiarities of this pattern: [150] ṣāb našpakātim PN apul–ma našpakātim ša qātišu līpuš arḫiš ṣāb našpakātim ul tappalšu–ma pīḫatum šī ana muḫḫika iššakkan ‘Supply PN with cargo-boat workers so that he can build the cargo boats that are in his charge; should you not supply him quickly with cargo-boat workers, the responsibility will be yours’ 2, 59:14–21 The biclausal sequence ul tappalšu–ma . . . iššakkan (iparras–ma iparras) is the core of the pattern, the protasis and the apodosis, respectively. The directive apul ‘supply’ is 84.  The example is translated as purpose (‘so that I . . .’) in the edition.

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85

the co-textual precative that precedes the protasis and has a tight connection with the form in the protasis, where it is in fact resumed: it has the same lexeme (apālum) but the polarity is opposite, namely, the directive is affirmative but the protasis is negative. The second feature found here is that a precative form is interconnected via the particle ‑ma to the iparras form in the protasis in a way that contrasts with the otherwise obligatory modal congruence. Yet another peculiarity found in ex. [150] is the compatibility of the adverb arḫiš ‘quickly’ with the negative particle ul and with the iparras form. Again, this occurs only in the protasis of the paratactic pattern in question. The foregoing description is a full characterization of a syntactic pattern. The pattern nevertheless clashes with a fundamental principle of OB syntax. The issue of domains has been briefly discussed on several occasions above, from two conflicting angles: 1. The domains are explained as supraclausal syntactic entities made up of one or more clauses, all consisting of similar predicative forms (indicative, precative, attributive, etc.) interconnected by the particle ‑ma. These forms do not intermix with other form groups on a chain and thus create a clearly definable syntactic unit (see Cohen forthcoming). Both the particle -ma and modal congruence function as the cohesive factors of their domain. Hence, domain shift occurs when the absence of ‑ma co-occurs with a shift in form (indicative → precative, attributive → indicative, etc.). 2. As is shown below (§2.7.2), both protasis and apodosis consist in fact not of clauses, as one would tend to think, but instead of domains. This fact stems from a comprehensive examination of several conditional patterns (šumma, modal particle, and various paratactic patterns), where apodosis, protasis, or both in fact constitute multiclausal domains. This issue is further elaborated and illustrated in §2.7.2. In view of these facts, the digression from modal congruence in the paratactic pattern creates an anomaly in which two distinct domains, protasis and apodosis, are nevertheless interconnected by the particle ‑ma; even further, they may be connected to the preceding clause as well. Let us examine two representative cases: [151] u kallat PN napiat–ma ina nakkamtim tu⟨ še⟩ṣṣîši–ma maḫrīki lišib ‘Furthermore the daughter-in-law of PN is taken as pledge so should you release her from the storehouse, let her stay with you’ 9, 270:10–15 The first clause, kallat PN napiat–ma ‘the daughter-in-law of PN is taken as pledge. . .’ reports crucial background information for the conditional pattern: because she is a pledge, releasing her from the storehouse does not mean that she can go anywhere she wishes. The shift from one domain to another (“indicative” → precative) here signals the beginning of the apodosis. In the following example, on the other hand, it is the boundary that signals the beginning of the protasis that is clear beyond any doubt:

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[152] aššum muruṣ libbika ša taqbiam luzziz–ma dayyānūtam lišāḫizū–ma awīlam tašaṭṭar–ma . . . [l]aqiašu mamman ul ileʾʾi ‘Concerning your bad feeling of which you told me, let me insist that they provide judicial procedure and should you register the gentleman, nobody will be able to take him . . .’ 11, 137:12–19 Here, as well as in ex. [146] above, the shift between the precative form preceding the protasis and the protasis itself (precative → ‘indicative’) signals the beginning of the latter. The problem, of course, is that these shifts are not always present (namely, not in all examples is there a shift precative ↔ ‘indicative’). These data are summarized in the Table 2.11. Table 2.11 exx.

domains 1. pre-domain

2. protasis

3. apodosis

[151]

. . . napiat–ma

. . . tu⟨še⟩ṣṣîši–ma

. . . lišib

[154]

. . . īšūka–ma

šaniam ešeʾʾī–ma

ṭābkum

[146]

. . . idin–ma

. . . ul tamḫur–ma

ul awātī

[152]

. . . lišāḫizū–ma

. . . tašaṭṭar–ma

. . . ul ileʾʾi

[132]

. . . lā illakam → . . . illakam–ma

[156]

. . . iṣabbat–ma . . . ušeṣṣeanni–ma . . . ul arašši

inandinūšunūšim–ma

. . . uṣṣī–ma . . . ul nileʾʾi

Note that each column in the table conforms to a different function: Column 1 is the form preceding the paratactic pattern; it could be either an indicative form (circumstantial) or a precative form (polar or not): Table 2.12 form

function

±paris–ma

circumstantial

±liprus(–ma)

preceding directive

Column 2 is the protasis, consisting of a restricted group of “indicative” predicative forms (see the following table): Table 2.13 form

function

ul iprus–ma

perfect

ul paris–ma

resultative

±iparras–ma

dynamic

2.2.  Paratactic conditionals

87

Column 3 is the apodosis: the paradigm of the apodosis houses indicative (including NVC) and precative forms. In fact, the paradigm is actually identical to the paradigm found with šumma patterns: Table 2.14 forms ±paris ±iparras ±precative

±question

±NVC

values (conditioned)

conditional

indicative directive conditional

In exx. [132] (p. 79) and [156] below (p. 90), the apodosis consists of a couple of clauses among which there is modal congruence. If one proceeds accordingly, it is evident that the boundaries between the different para­digms, or the domains, cannot possibly be signaled by the particle -ma in this case. What nevertheless marks these boundaries are occasional domain shifts (indicative ↔ precative) and other known features of each paradigm. For instance, it is clear beyond any doubt that an affirmative iprus form is attested as part of neither the protasis nor the apodosis. A precative form cannot, in this pattern, be part of the protasis, and so forth. In summary, the paratactic conditional pattern challenges the standard domain boundaries, and the particle -ma occurs both inside domains (e.g., the apodosis of exx. [132] and [156] in the table) as well as between them, tying them together into a conditional mutual dependency. This is illustrated in Table 2.15. Table 2.15 domain 1 clause

-ma

clause

boundary -ma

clause

-ma

domain 2 clause

-ma

clause -ma

clause

In other patterns, for example, the modal particle strategy (§2.3), -ma never serves as a buffer between different domains. The apodosis of this pattern consists of iparras (e.g., exx. [132]–[133], [135]–[136], [138], [140]), paris (ex. [154]), NVCs (e.g., ex. [146]), and precative forms (exx. [145] and [147]). These forms in the apodosis, like the forms in the apodoses of the šumma conditional pattern, are conditioned, depending on the actualization of the protasis. An interrogative conditional is attested in ex. [135] as well as in the following examples. They all seem to be rhetorical: [153] šumma bēlī atta amât–ma ṭābkum ‘If you are my lord, should I die, would it please you?’ 9, 232:21–22

88

The Letter Corpus

[154] kâti (MA-ti-i) īšūka–ma šaniam ešeʾʾī–ma ṭābkum ‘I have you, but should I look for someone else, would it please you?’ 9, 226:4–6 The following example has a unique precative in an interrogative apodosis: [155] ša lā izzazzu mim⟨ma⟩ ulileqqe [sic] . . . 7 mana aklam išdudūnim ulazzaz–ma [sic] mannum litēršu ‘He who does not serve does not take anything . . . they provided me with seven minas of food; should I not serve, who would pay it back?’ 11, 27:12–17 Values Note that the values are determined exclusively by looking at the oppositions between the forms inside each functional slot. The nature of the opposition is in fact the dominant category of this functional slot. For instance, the oppositions among the negative forms in the protasis are rather aspectual (perfect vs. resultative/stative vs. dynamic): Table 2.16 form

function

ul iprus-ma

perfect

ul paris-ma

resultative

±iparras-ma

dynamic

paradigmatic function aspect

Table 2.17 summarizes the data related to the paradigmatic constitution of the clauses in the entire pattern, following the same principles. Table 2.17 protasis forms

values

ul iprus

(non-past) perfect

iparras ul paris

dynamic resultative (non-perfect)

category

connective

apodosis forms

values

category

NVC aspect

-ma (or →)

paris

indicative modality

iparras question

interrogative

precative

directive

The protasis is different from šumma protases in a few important forms. The absence of affirmative iprus and iptaras means that the oppositions are different: there is no strictly temporal opposition but, instead, perfect:non-perfect opposition, and within the non-perfect, the usual distinction between a resultative/stative and dynamic. These oppositions exist only in the negative (iprus and paris forms are only attested in the negative). In the affirmative, iparras has no opposition and hence no special functional value. There is no NVC for technical reasons; ordinarily, it does not interconnect forward by use of the particle ‑ma. On the other hand, the apodosis paradigm is in

2.2.  Paratactic conditionals

89

principle identical with the apodosis paradigm of šumma conditions, showing modal oppositions only. The differences between the patterns lie in the distribution of the forms: in this pattern, NVCs are attested somewhat more and iparras forms are more common than precative forms. The šumma conditional pattern and the paratactic conditional pattern are compatible with each other. An interesting phenomenon is observable in this interaction. In ex. [135] above, the entire šumma conditional pattern constitutes the apodosis of a paratactic conditional pattern; in exx. [119] and [153] above (pp. 71 and 87, respectively), the paratactic pattern constitutes the apodosis of a šumma condition (see Table 2.18). Table 2.18 ex.

first protasis

apodosis second protasis

second apodosis

[135]

nīdi aḫim taraššiāšim–ma šumma eleppum šī imtūt

ša kīma šâti nirtêb

[119]

šumma . . . mār[ū]šu leqûm kašid

dayyānū iqabbûniāšim–ma

amtam nutār

[153]

šumma bēlī atta

amât–ma

ṭābkum

A similar phenomenon occurs in the LE corpus as well. When a double condition is desired, this is the only way to do it, since two šumma protases are not compatible (in the epistolary corpus; this restriction does not apply in the laws of Ḫammurabi). It appears that the two conditional patterns are often interchangeable semantically, unless past reference is needed in the protasis (the so called “verificational conditions”), which cannot be signaled by the paratactic pattern. In fact, this past reference is the most prominent characteristic of the šumma pattern when compared with other conditional patterns in the letter corpus. To summarize: the importance of this common conditional pattern is that, despite the fact that it has no transparent conditional form (in effect, it looks on the outside very much like many chains), it nevertheless has a clear, mostly uncontestable conditional value. This value is supported by several features, distinctive vis-à-vis other chains. These features are shown to constitute the pattern’s syntactic and semantic characterization. One last matter, partially discussed from the perspective of domain boundaries, is how to identify the protasis when it occurs in a chain longer than two clauses. It seems that, in this pattern, the protasis domain consists of one clause only, 85 whereas the apodosis may consist of several clauses. This clause primarily consists of iparras forms, while paris and ul iprus forms are much less common. Following the discussion above, the first form conforming to the protasis paradigm that immediately follows the characteristic directive is always the protasis, as in exx. [150] and [146]. When this directive is absent and other forms are chained together, it is the first iparras form that constitutes 85.  There is one possible exception to this rule: see ex. [187] and n. 101 (p. 100). Note the complete lack of ‑ma throughout the construction.

90

The Letter Corpus

the protasis (as in exx. [151] and [154]), whereas the rest of the forms constitute the apodosis, as is evident from ex. [132] (p. 79) and from the following example: [156] ipir šattišunu gamram inandinūšunūšim–ma ṣābum ina qātim uṣṣī–ma ana pīḫat ṣābim ša ina qātim uṣṣû bēlni apālam ul nileʾʾi ‘Should we give them their yearly ration, the group (of workers) will go out of hand and we will not be able to answer our lord regarding the liability for the group which will go out of hand’ 11, 194:21–26 2.2.2.  Precative conditionals In a previous study (Cohen 2005a: 144–60) I described, within the framework of modality, a paratactic pattern having a first member that is a precative form and a second member consisting of a variety of forms. I analyzed the value of this pattern essentially as concessive-conditional (‘even if’), with conditional fringes. Despite the fact that this monograph revolves around what is conditional, in order to investigate a structure, it is necessary to explore its boundaries—that is, the structures that are similar in form but functionally different. This pattern is a case in point. Conditionality is discussed above and defined there as two interconnected domains where one domain (the protasis) conditions the second (the apodosis) and where both domains signal epistemic modality rather than a fact—that is, both are nonfactual. It is now time to review the notion of concessivity (found, e.g., in even though). The main clause is, as usual, asserted, while the concessive clause describes a situation which would ordinarily lead to a negative implication about the main clause. The function of the concessive clause is to say that in spite of the negative implication, the main clause assertion stands. (Bybee et al. 1994: 225)

Kjellmer (1989) stated that even if denotes nonfactuality whereas even though denotes factuality. Even if (in contrast to even though) implies that the concessive-conditional clause is not asserted (I’ll go for a swim even if the water is freezing, namely, the water may or may not be freezing; Kjellmer 1989: 259) or, in other words, it is in this respect like a conditional protasis, which denotes nonfactuality. The opposition if vs. even if is discussed by Fraser (1971: 158): Even if sentences are not normally conditional in the sense that the subclause determines the truth conditions of the sentence; the pro­position of the main clause is valid irrespective of what is contained in the subclause. [my emphasis]

Whereas the conditional apodosis is nonfactual, depending upon the eventual (non-) actualization of the protasis, the concessive(-conditional) apodosis is valid no matter what—that is, it is factual (as far as the construction is concerned, for it could be modal in its own right, if, for example, it is a precative form). CSs with šumma may be interpreted as concessive-conditional when there is an identity between the immediate context and the apodosis:

2.2.  Paratactic conditionals

91

[157] urram apālam ul eleʾʾi šumma ana bīt ilim išap⟨pa⟩rū­ninni apālam ul eleʾʾi ‘I will not be able to pay tomorrow. (Even) if they send me to the temple of god I will not be able to pay’ 6, 4:12–15 [158] u šūmī šūbilam u šumm[a] a[t]ta [t]ul[a]pp[a]tam šūbilam ‘So send me garlic, even if yo[u] ar[e b]usy, send me (garlic)’ 9, 152:26–29 [159] u nīnu ul niṭeḫḫiakkum(–ma) umma anaku–ma šumma pīḫātum ittabši ul teṭeḫḫênim ‘  “And we will not approach you (. . .)” and I (said): “(even) if a liability were to rise, would you not approach me?”  ’ 14, 168:13–17 Ex. [157] is a textbook example of a concessive-conditional: a man claims that he cannot pay, and the šumma clause provides some extreme circumstances that are the hallmark of concessive expressions—namely, that even in the extreme circumstances of him being sent to the temple (presumably for a reprimand), he will nevertheless not be able to pay. In ex. [158], the particle u precedes the protasis and may possibly function as an additive particle (compare German wenn auch as well as CA wa-ʾin, wa-law ‘even if’). Ex. [159] is more complicated: the immediate co-text is not originally uttered by the same person—it is merely cited; the structure answers to the hypothetical pattern, and the question (marked on the apodosis) is rhetorical. What are regarded as conditional clauses with the precative as protasis in GAG §160c are actually concessive-conditionals, which comply with the characteristics enumerated above: the protasis is nonfactual but the apodosis keeps its face value; it is nonconditioned: [160] [šeʾ ]um šakin ina lā rīqūtim–ma ul ušābilakkim (a) kaspam lušābilakkim–ma šeʾam šāmī → šeʾum ša tašamm[ī] kīma yāʾim ul d[ami]q (b) u pūḫātim liddinūnikkim → ul damiq kīma taḫabbatī hubtī lā tātana[šš]ašī–ma kīma artīqu šeʾam damqam ana rēšiki lublakkim–ma lā tanazziqī ‘There is [bar]ley. 86 I did not have it sent to you only due to scarcity of time. Even if I have silver sent to you so that you buy barley, the barley you will buy will not be as g[oo]d as mine. And even if they give you substitutes, it is not good. Borrow (as much) as you (need to) borrow, do not keep being wo[rr]ied, and as soon as I have become free, let me bring you good barley, so that you do not worry’ 11, 40:9–21 This example contains two instances of the concessive-conditional pattern, one with a precative form in the 1st person (followed by a 2nd-person form); the other example 86.  For the preceding lines (6[at-ti ti]-KI ki-ma ša še-um-ma 7[la i]-ba-aš-šu-ú 8[a-wi]-lu[m] ú-za-abba-[a]l-ki  ), the translation in the edition (AbB 11, 40:6–8) is ‘6you know that 7no barley is available. 8The man keeps you waiting’. It could, however, be interpreted differently: ‘8The [ma]n keeps you waiting 6as if there were [no] barley’. The second interpretation spares us the need to interpret šeʾum šakin as an ad hoc counterfactual conditional (had there been. . .), as the edition in fact does. This example does not belong in Krebernick and Streck’s corpus (2001: 74, ex. 80; nor does ex. 81, for that matter).

92

The Letter Corpus

has a precative form in the 3rd person. The apodoses are similar, and both signal factuality. The pattern has only about 20 examples attested throughout the entire OB corpus, around 10 of which are found in the letter corpus. They are characterized in Table 2.19. Table 2.19 protasis

connection

apodosis

luprus liprus ētaprus

→/-ma

iparras, paris, liprus, purus, (lā taparras), NVC, lū aparras (lā aparrasu)

Only 5 or 6 examples out of the entire group are conditional (rather than concessiveconditional). The letter corpus of this monograph has only 1 occurrence: 87 [161] lamassam ša PN atma īkam šuāti ētudannin → [b]īt abīka [k]alâšu lū ušmāt ‘I swear by the protective spirit of PN, should you not strengthen this ditch, I will put to death your entire father’s family’ 12, 169:20–26 This example is from an early OB letter. The protasis consists of a form, ayyiprus, that otherwise functions as a negative wish. The apodosis has an asseverative form, which here signals an oath. Two similar examples are found in the legal corpus (which is, unlike the law collections, syntactically very similar to the letter corpus): [162] šaptīya lā inaššiqu–ma ša zikarim u sinništim lā amaggarušu–ma ana utūl sūnī liqrianni → šībūt ālim u rabiānam lū ušedde ‘He shall not kiss my lips and I will not consent to sexual relations and should he call me to lie in (my) lap, I will notify the city elders and the mayor’ BM 13912:8–12, Anbar 1975: 121 [163] eqlum ša pī kunukkišu līter limṭi → lā aturru–ma lā abaqqaru ‘Should the field according to his document be more (or) should it be less, I will not claim (it) again’ VAB 5, 156:1′–3′′ (side 1–2 and rev. 1–3) Each precative form in ex. [163] could be analyzed as a conditional clause, but the overall effect of the protasis is nevertheless concessive-conditional. What is common, then, to these three examples is a special precative form (which has a negative form form ayyiprus, usually called “vetitive”) in the protasis and an asseverative form in the apodosis. The evidence for a special pattern is, therefore, borderline. There is another related sequence consisting of a purus form (i.e., the imperative) connected via the particle ‑ma to an iparras form. One case that is attested outside our corpus seems to be conditional: 88 87.  There are 4 additional examples, of which one is broken, in the LE corpus, referred to separately below in §3.1.2. 88.  The case is identified as conditional not without reservations because this is a universally valid saying that, like the laws, can be paraphrased by a relative clause construction such as *iṣṣūrum ša ibbarru ēšam illakū watmūšu ‘a bird that is captured, where would its chicks go?’

2.3.  Conditional constructions with modal particles

93

[164] iṣṣūram bār–ma êšam illakū watmūšu ‘(If you) hunt a bird, where would its chicks go?’ Gilg Ishchali:15′ Yet another example outside our corpus is basically concessive-conditional: [165] ina ḫumāšim eleʾʾīka šitpuṣum šitpaṣ–ma ina šitpuṣim eleʾʾīka ‘I overpower you in the wrestling ring. 89 (Even if you) prefer wrestling, 90 (then) I will overpower you in wrestling’ ARM 26, 207:15–17 This concessive-conditionality should probably be attributed to the near-identity between the immediate context and the apodosis (compare exx. [157]–[159] above), rather than to the paronomastic infinitive (which seems to be the focusing type: ‘(it is) wrestling (that) you wrestle’). The same sequence (purus–ma iparras) is attested several times in the corpus, but it probably cannot be interpreted as conditional: [166] ripqātišu šudud–ma ša mānaḫātišu anāku appalšu ‘Measure his dug-up land, then I will pay him for his labor’ 3, 2:43–45 [167] [k]īam qibīšum–ma arḫiš ippalka ‘Tell him thus, then he will pay you quickly’ 9, 1:25–26 91 Due to the inconclusive interpretation of the examples from the corpus, and despite the more conclusive examples from the Mari corpus and the epic, this group is rejected as a conditional pattern, despite the fact that it is similar in a few points to ex. [161] (ayyiprus → lū iparras) as well as to the paratactic conditional pattern. For both this group (purus–ma iparras) and the group in exx. [161]–[163] (liprus → lū iparras) to be included in the same group, we need to have, in addition to the formal similarity (which we already have), an identity in value, which we do not. Therefore, the deviation of the group purus–ma iparras from modal congruence remains unexplained. 92 The second group is a group with a clear-cut conditional value, but one example in the corpus stricto sensu (two examples come from a legal corpus) is too scanty for us to rely upon as evidence. 93 2.3.  Conditional constructions with modal particles One of the strategies to signal conditionality is a construction involving one of two modal particles. This strategy is especially instructive with regard to the diachronic development of particle-based CSs. 89.  See AHw: 1412b and Durand 1997–2000, vol. 3:323. 90.  For the paronomastic infinitive constructions, see Cohen 2004. 91. The rest of the cases are: 1, 65:7–10; 3, 90:24–28; 6, 133:9–12; 7, 90:3′–6′; 9, 86:15–19; and 9, 130:10–13. 92.  A somewhat similar problem is encountered with the pattern termed jawāb al-ʾamr. It is analyzed by some as a conditional pattern (based on structure—that is, the yaqtul form in the apodosis) but not by others. 93.  The precative protasis condition is a regular pattern within Akkadian, since many examples of this pattern are attested in Old Assyrian; see Hecker 1968: §§133b, 135e, and especially 135g.

94

The Letter Corpus

Two modal particals, pīqat and midde, are rendered in the dictionaries as ‘maybe’ or ‘perhaps’: [168] midde awātum–ma ul illikam ‘Perhaps because there was (some) matter 94 he did/has not come’ 8, 99:13 [169] pīqat uštabīš–[m]a ul išpuram ‘Perhaps he was shamed and (hence) did not write/has not written’ 4, 152:16–17 However, in the AbB corpus, many (if not most) of the occurrences of these two particles are markedly associated with a double-domain construction (each domain, as seen with the šumma pattern, may consist of more than one clause), each of these domains with its own specific characteristics. These constructions are alternately rendered either with their dictionary meaning or, in other cases, in keeping with what the context clearly requires, namely, as a CS. Curiously, even when the given dictionary meaning is ‘perhaps’, the examples are in certain cases still translated as conditionals (‘should. . .’; a case in point is CAD P 386a–b). Indeed, there is a semantic relationship between the two notions ‘maybe’ and ‘if’, but it is not self-evident. The following examples illustrate the conditional function of these particles: [170] pīqat kaspam irrišūka lā tanaddiššu ‘If they ask you for silver, do not give it’ 1, 139:9′–10′ [171] pīqat mamman illakam–ma [. . .] [uda]bbab qi[b]ī–ma ma[mman l]ā udabbabšu ‘If anyone comes and [com]plains [. . .], or[d]er that (lit., ‘and’) n[o on]e should complain to him’ 12, 13:14–18 [172] u midde annikīam ibaʾʾūka–ma alpī ana ālim ayyim–ma inassaḫū–ma būrtum iḫalliq alkam–ma būrtam purus–ma taru ‘But if they pass you by here and move the oxen to some town and (as a result) the cow may perish, come here, separate the cow and lead (it) away’ 9, 83:18–24 Ex. [171] contains uniclausal domains, ex. [171] biclausal domains, and ex. [172] triclausal domains. The clauses in each domain are interconnected by -ma, which is strictly observed here. The protasis and apodosis domains are demarcated by the absence of -ma between them as well as by the shift from iparras forms to precative forms. Close examination of the conditional cases of these modal particles vis-à-vis the nonconditional cases reveals that only cases showing a very specific structure—or more precisely, a pattern—have a consistent conditional value. This pattern has the following features: (1) the particle is either midde or pīqat (without any appreciable difference in value); (2) the following domain (to be identified as the protasis) is made up of one or more iparras form(s); and (3) the last domain (to be identified as the apodosis) is made up of one or more precative(s). The pattern is presented in Table 2.19.

94.  The construction includes awātum–ma, analyzed as a causal existential, ‘because there was (some) matter’, for which see Cohen 2005b: 251–52.

2.3.  Conditional constructions with modal particles

95

Table 2.19 particle pīqat/midde

protasis

apodosis

verbal form(s)

verbal form(s)

iparras (one or more)

precative (one or more)

When pīqat or midde do not occur with these characteristics, they generally have the basic, modal particle value: [173] luṭṭul pīqa[t] eleppum imaqqutam–ma šeʾam anniam ušarkab [ele]ppum ul imqutam ‘“Let me see, perha[ps] a ship comes my way and I can load this barley.” (But) a ship did not come my way’ 6, 125:19–22 In this example, there is a domain made up of iparras forms, but what might have been the second domain has a single iprus form, which does not conform with the specific characteristics of the pattern. In a few cases, we find a block of direct speech (henceforth DS) introduced by the exponent umma x–ma, which functions instead of the precative in the apodosis. This calls for an explanation: the DS marker is actually a converter that, in addition to the actual marking of DS as such, also functions as an adapter that allows the DS segment to function in any syntactic environment where it is needed (note that otherwise a DS segment is rather limited syntactically). For example, DS can function in this way inside a topical clause: [174] aššum umma attunu–ma . . . ‘Concerning (what) you (say): . . .’ 9, 106:5 Here, it occurs instead of the attribute (which is either a noun in genitive or a clause marked by the subjunctive). It can occur instead of a main clause: [175] aššum lā tallikam umma anāk[u–m]a midde awātum–ma ul illikam ‘Because you did not come I (said): “perhaps because there was (some) matter he did/has not come”’ 8, 99:12–13 The slot of the main clause is here filled by the DS marker. In the same vein, this marker can take the slot of a clause whose characterization is made more specific by its syntactic environment: [176] aššum PN . . . ašpurakkum–ma umma atta–ma . . . ‘I wrote to you about PN . . . and you (replied): . . .’ 2, 1:3–8 (ḪL) Generally, the particle -ma follows an indicative iprus with a preterite value, and, accordingly, another indicative clause is expected to follow, 95 usually with preterite value. 95.  This can be decided on the basis of the obligatory modal congruence found between clauses interconnected via ‑ma.

96

The Letter Corpus

In ex. [176], this slot, now taken by the DS marker, implies both indicative and past. The same replacement occurs with a precative: [177] meḫer unnedukkiya šūbilīm–ma umma atti–ma . . . ‘Send me a response to my letter and you (should say): . . .’ 11, 178:24–26 A precative normally interconnects with a precative, so the DS marker is in fact the syntactic equivalent of a precative, because it interchanges with the precative in this slot. The last example is of the DS marker taking the place of the apodosis: [178] šumma PN1 ittalkam–ma šīpātim naši umma atta–ma 5 bilat šīpātim ana PN2 uṣur ‘If PN1 went away (OR: will have come) carrying wool, you (should say): “Save 5 talents of wool for PN2”’ 12, 50:23–26 To summarize: the conditional pattern in question allows the DS marker to occur as the apodosis in place of the precative form: [179] midde PN ill[akakku]m–ma ṣubātišu irriška umm[a att]a–ma ina eleppim[–ma] ‘If PN co[m]es [to y]ou and asks for his textiles, y[ou] (should say): “(they are) in the boat”’ 12, 38:26–27 In a single example, this principle is stretched to the extreme: here, both protasis and apodosis are DS markers: [180] [p]īqat aššu[m] PN1 umma šū–ma [p]ūḫam attadin [u]mma atta–ma šeʾum [sic] 96 ša PN2 ul anaddinakkum ‘[I]f, as regards PN1, he (says) “I have given a [su]bstitute,” you (should say): “I will not give you PN2’s barley”’ 3, 39:12–15 This example corroborates the soundness of the pattern: despite the obvious absence of explicit forms, conditionality is clear and sound. In addition, this behavior of the DS is also an indirect corroboration to the domains that in fact dictate the nature of forms (and meanings) that may occur in them. The AbB corpus has more than 30 clear-cut conditionals, 97 two-thirds of them with pīqat, the rest with midde. These conditionals never occur with any form other than iparras in the protasis (excluding the curiosity in ex. [180]). The scope of the particle, as in the case of šumma, is the entire construction—not only the protasis, which is marked as such, but also the precative form(s), which is (are) now different in nature

96.  SLB: 136 expects šeʾam as the object of ul anaddinakkum. 97.  pīqat: 1, 51:23–26; 1, 51:29–32; 1, 51:33–36; 1, 68:4–9; 1, 71:18–22; 1, 135:25–27; 1, 139:9′–10′; 4, 50:8–10; 4, 150:33; 7, 42:15–18; 9, 31:15–22; 9, 150:6–11; 10, 56:23–25; 12, 13:14–18; 12, 40:12–18; 14, 112:39–42; 14, 114:25–27; 14, 145:12–19; 14, 145:21–25; and 14, 164:29–33. midde: 1, 39:6–15; 3, 11:46–47; 6, 129:20–24; 6, 162:12–14; 8, 109:9; 9, 83:15–24; 10, 166:7–12; 10, 170:17–20; 11, 84:17–19; 12, 38:25–27; 12, 63:22–25; and 12, 113:17–19.

2.4.  Conditional constructions with asseverative forms as protasis

97

from other precative forms that function as directives. Their validity is now narrowed and depends, as in any conditional apodosis, on the actualization of the protasis. Unlike šumma conditionals, the protasis of this conditional pattern always refers to the non-past sphere, and the negation in the protasis is ul, rather than lā. The difference between the modal particles in this function and conditional šumma (other than seniority) is the degree of grammaticalization: the latter is more grammaticalized. This, in fact, is an illustration of how a conditional pattern may emerge: a particle that conveys uncertainty as well as potentiality changes its scope from one domain (= maybe) to two domains (= if . . . then . . .). It turns out that in the corpora examined in this framework, when there are several competing strategies, one is representative of the entire group. The modal particle conditional pattern is the token of the ordinary CSs in the letter corpus. Because it is unique to this corpus, it represents the essence of the epistolary conditional type: the modal particle transparently shows the most elementary semantic components of ordinary conditionals—namely, uncertainty and potentiality; it seems to join together the two domains, and the domains are clearly distinct because each consists of different forms. The protasis and apodosis of this pattern always consist of a single form-type (namely, iparras forms in the protasis domain and precative forms in the apodosis domain) and, consequently, there is no paradigm: both domains show no further subcategorization other than being protasis and apodosis. This state of affairs is similar to the situation observed in the basic conditional pattern in Classical Arabic (see §1.4.4 above). 2.4.  Conditional constructions with asseverative forms as protasis A statistically marginal, but interesting, conditional pattern is the one that consists of asseverative 98 forms as protasis and purus forms as apodosis: [181] kaspam ū šeʾam likillūnikkum–ma lā tamaḫḫar u lū maḫrāta tēr ‘Even if they have silver or barley available for you, do not accept. But if you did accept 99 – return (it)’ 14, 37:13–17 The first construction in this example (likillūnikkum–ma lā tamaḫḫar) belongs to the concessive-conditional pattern (§2.2.2 above), and the second construction (lū maḫrāta tēr) constitutes the pattern in question. A standard para­tactic condition would have been tamaḫḫar–ma (‘should you receive . . .’)—that is, iparras forms. Here, however, we have an asseverative, which adds polar insistence to the protasis, ‘if you did accept’. This form is responsive to and contrasted with the preceding lā tamaḫḫar ‘do not accept’. Emphatic polar contrast is an essential characteristic of the asseverative group of forms. Two more examples seem to belong to the same basic pattern: [182] ina bītim mimma lū illeqqe wakil tamkārim lū udabbibka šaknum lū udabbibka šupr[am]–ma ‘(If) anything will be taken from the house, (if) a 98.  See §1.1. For a comprehensive description of this group, see Cohen 2005a: 17–68. 99. Asseverative lū paris has non-future value.

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creditor did make claim to you, (if) the governor did make claim to you— write [to me] . . .’ 14, 104:8–11 If lū maḫrāta in ex. [181] could, at least in principle, be interpreted as precative, the forms in exx. [182] and [183] cannot; they must be interpreted as asseverative (lū iprus and lū iparras are always asseverative): [183] šeʾam ana PN nadānam aqbīšum–ma umma šū–ma šeʾam attadin (. . .) 16šamaššamī . . . ana errēšim lū iddin šū lū īriš ša leqêni u leqêšu šūribam–ma ‘I told him to give (the) barley to PN and he (said) “I have given (the) barley” (. . .) (If) he did give the sesame . . . to the cultivator, (if) he did cultivate (it)—bring in what we ought to take and what he ought to take . . .’ 14, 163: 8–11; 16–21 The issue is mentioned in advance (attadin ‘I have given’), which is one of the syntactic characteristics of asseverative forms. Note that the apodosis is prospective (as always), but the protasis may refer to the entire temporal spectrum. In its temporal opposition, this conditional pattern is similar to the šumma conditional pattern: it is able to refer to past events in the protasis. A different option is to analyze lū in the preceding pair of examples as a disjunctive conjunction (like ū or ulū ‘or’). This lū occurs in OB but not between clauses. Moreover, a conjunction generally precedes the entire clause, which is the case neither in ex. [182] nor in ex. [183], where lū immediately precedes the verbal form. This conditional pattern is summarized in Table 2.20. Table 2.20 protasis forms lū iprus lū paris lū iparras

boundary value

past non-past

emphatic polar response

shift between forms

apodosis purus forms only

Note that the shift between forms (asseverative → precative) is a boundary between the protasis and the apodosis, but at the same time it is also a cohesive agent between them. 2.5.  ištūma clauses In the early grammatical literature on Akkadian, ištū–ma was viewed as a causal conjunction (‘da’, GAG §§116c, 176c, 176e), and later it was interpreted as a conditional conjunction (‘wenn wirklich’; AHw 402b), 100 and the addition (in the revision) to GAG §162d claims that “Dafür ist ištū–ma nach erneuter Überprüfung der jetzt vorliegenden Belege meist durch “wenn wirklich” zu übersetzen. . .”. However, in the Mari letters 100.  There is no hint anywhere whence the indeed factor was introduced.

2.5.  ištūma clauses

99

ištū–ma is interpreted as causal. In this section of our discussion, the entire collection of ištū–ma in the AbB corpus is examined. The only example that absolutely requires a conditional interpretation is ex. [184]: 101 [184] mīnum awātum–ma mimmû aḫīya [t]eleqqē–ma [t]akannak [i]štū–ma [m]immû­k[a] [sic] aḫī lā īpuluka 2 tamkārī ša itti aḫīya illikū–ma a[w]âtim mūdû [ana m]aḫ[r]īya [ṭu]rdaššunūti–ma [in]a maḫa[r] bēliya [l]ušālšunūt[i–m]a šeʾam u kaspam ša [. . .] tanappû–ma [. . .] anāku appalka ‘What is this matter, (that) [you] take my brother’s property and seal it? If my brother did not pay you (for) you[r p]roperty, sen[d over to] me the two merchants who went with him and know these ma[tt]ers, so I can ask them [in f]ront of my lord, and I will pay you [. . .] (for) the barley and silver which you take as pledge [. . .] 13, 96:16–32 Whether the writer’s brother did or did not pay the addressee is yet to be established by the men who went with the brother, and the interpretation therefore calls for a condition. On the other hand, there are a couple of examples where conditionality is out of the question: [185] ištū–ma tuštaklilu–ma misarram tuštepšam misarrum ana qabliya ḫamiš ubānātim arik ‘After you have finished making a belt (lit., you have completed and you have had a belt made), the belt is five fingers long for my waist’ 14, 116:25–29 It is impossible to interpret this example as a conditional or as causal. It is, instead, a temporal clause. The following example appears to be causal: [186] a[n]āku–ma wašbāku aḫḫī abiya laššû ištū-ma abī rēmušunūti–ma lā iṭr[ud]ušunūti u kīma yâti lā ušb[ū] 102 šeʾam kaspam u qemâm kīma šarrum iqbû liṣeddûninn[i] ‘Only I am present (here), my father’s brothers are not here. Since my father had pity on them and did not se[n]d them, and [they] were not present like/instead of me, let them provide me with barley, silver and flour, like the king ordered’ 13, 104:8′–14′ The last clause inside the scope of ištū–ma repeats facts that are stated before by the same speaker in the same utterance (i.e., his being alone). It is not likely that he would take these facts and state them again as an uncertainty. In the last example of this group, the contents of the clauses after ištū–ma are repeated in the scope of a subsequent causal aššum clause: 101.  M. P. Streck suggests to me that, even here, conditional interpretation is not necessary: according to him, the writer knows that the addressee has not been paid and wants to ask the merchants not about this fact but about the details of the pledge. In addition he suggests that in the other examples a translation ‘after’ is possible as well. 102.  See AbB 13, 104 remark a to the translation and also Charpin’s explanation (1997–98: 342).

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[187] anniam epuš–ma (. . .) 12ištū–ma aqbīkum–ma [sic] lā tamguranni šarrum ana GN illakam iṣabbatka ul awātī aššum aqbûkum–ma lā tamguranni ana ša imērī lā tallak ‘Do this (. . .) Since I told you but you did not agree with me, should the king come 103 to GN (and) catch you, it is none of my business. Since I told you but you did not agree with me, do not go to the donkey drivers’ 13, 62:9, 12–20 The rest of the examples 104 can be interpreted as either conditional or causal: [188] ana šamnim šâ[mi]m ušābila[kk]um–m[a] ṭuppaka ša t[uš]ābilam eš[me] ištū–ma šam[nam] tasḫur[u–ma] lā tāmuru kaspam šuāti ina qātika–ma uṣur ‘I sent (it) to [y]ou to b[u]y oil an[d] heard your tablet which you s[e]nt me. If/since you looked for o[il] but did not find (any) keep this silver in your hand’ 9, 11:5–10 The criteria used to determine what is conditional are basically semantic at this stage (although syntactic criteria are often decisive). What should count is the behavior of the entire group, not just single items. Some groups (e.g., šumma conditionals or paratactic conditionals) consistently require this interpretation, but the current group shows mixed behavior 105 that has nothing to do with any consistent signal such as tense. In contrast, the forms in both parts of the structure are somewhat different from that of šumma CSs: the protasis consists mainly of iprusu~iptarsu forms (their corresponding forms in šumma CSs are comparatively less common). The main clause paradigm is, on the other hand, quite similar (the forms in bold type are the most common in this structure): Table 2.21 ištūma clauses protasis forms

apodosis forms

iprusu iptarsu iparrasu parsu

precative iparras paris

This group of structures is therefore judged not to be a conditional pattern, because it does not consistently signal conditionality and hence cannot be considered a pattern with a constant functional value. 103. The iparras chain (without -ma) is interpreted, not without reservations, as the paratactic conditional pattern, and this is corroborated by the phrase ul awātī; the latter, for some reason, occurs only with this pattern: 5, 26:7′; 11, 175:10; 12, 78:33; and here. 104.  1, 117:13–15; 2, 173:12–15; 5, 79:7′–9′; 6, 96:4–6; 6, 177:26–31; 6, 188:32′–35′; 8, 28:11–15; 8, 108:4–11; 11, 62:16′–20′. In one example (2, 157:11–13), ištū–ma is prepositional, occurring with kīam as its attribute (kīam is never an entire clause when affirmative). 105.  Compare German wenn clauses (Paul 1955: IV §462), which are either conditional or temporal (or both).

2.6.  Counterfactual conditionals

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2.6.  Counterfactual conditionals Counterfactual conditionals are conditionals that show the lowest degree of likelihood of actualization. 106 Nevertheless, they are not equivalent to factual statements, and they still express conditional relationships between protasis and apodosis where there is mutual dependency between the two parts. The expression is modal in that it continues to entertain the (im)possibilities expressed in the condition, and it may be contrasted with the corresponding factual statement. 107 In this type of conditional, the apodosis is very well marked cross-linguistically by special morphology or by specialized agreement marking in both protasis and apodosis. This might be due to the fact that in many languages this type does not allow any temporal or modal oppositions (e.g., deontic modality vs. indicative) in the apodosis, which leaves room for special counterfactual exponents. Counter-factual conditionals are described within the context of various irrealis expressions by Krebernik and Streck (2001). Their description is quite comprehensive and basically covers the counterfactual conditions we need to consider. However, there are several matters that nevertheless necessitate a new review and description of the material. First, the corpus used by Krebernik and Streck is much more diverse than the corpus considered here, which means that certain insights can be gained simply by confining ourselves to a more cohesive text corpus (as we have practiced all along). Second, the description here is carried out within the context of conditional structures in the letters, the context in which counterfactual conditionals are naturally compared and in which the distinctive features of the respective patterns are formulated. Third, while most of the examples are considered by Krebernik and Streck, a few examples are not, and due to the small number of examples in our corpus, they need to be considered as well. 108 Fourth, the various views regarding verbal categories within this framework are markedly different from the perspective presented by Krebernik and Streck. In principle, both protasis and apodosis are marked by the particle -man; the protasis is additionally marked by šumma. Like all other conditional patterns, the counterfactual structure occurs only where a precative form does—namely, outside of subordination. The following examples are attested in our corpus: [189] š[umm]an lā ú-da-AḪ-ìs-su 109 ˹ul˺la–man ībirakkim ‘If I had not put pressure on him he would not have crossed over to you’ 6, 188:39′–40′ 106.  They are defined, along similar lines, in typological frameworks as “des phrases présentant une situation placée dans le passé ou le présent, mais purement imaginaire, c’est à dire à la réalité passée ou présente” (Lazard 2001: 413), as well as “A counterfactual expression hypothetically presents as having happened an event which did not happen” (Lazard 2006: 61). Note the temporal component in the definition. Declerck and Reed (2006: 170), referring to English, states that a counterfactual meaning exists when the conditional clause creates a suppositional space that is assumed to be contrary to the actual world. 107.  For example (contemporary written Hebrew), bi-mqom-o hayiti mevater al ha-minuy, aval ani lo bi-mqom-o ‘(If it had been me) instead of him, I would have given up the appointment, but I am not instead of him’ (Yediot Aharonot 6.3.09). 108.  Exx. [191], [200], and [189]. 109.  See AbB 6, 188 note f to the translation.

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[190] šumman aššum mê lā apṭuram 110 10 būr eqlam assapam–man ‘If I had not interrupted (the work) because of the water, I would have flattened a field of 10 būr’ 14, 61:7–8 [191] šumman gušūr[ī] ublūnim ištu 6 ūmī gam[er–man] ù PN nagā[ru]m i[n]awwer–man ‘Had they brought me the beam[s], it would have been ready for six days now, and PN the carpenter would have beamed’ 5, 157:6′–10′ [192] šumma–man ṣibûtam lā īšu matī–man ašpurakkum ‘If I had not had a need, when would I have written you? (or: would I ever have written you?)’ 3, 33:9–10 [193] šumman ālum ana ṣibûtišu lā nussus ṣidīssu–man uḫtalliq (or iḫtaliq) 111 ‘If the city would not have complained about its/his need, he would have lost his provisions (or: his provisions would have been lost)’ Goetze 1958: 21, 4:37–38 [194] šārū ul išarū-ma akkali šumman šārum išširam šeʾam kalašu–man uzzakki ‘The winds were not right so I got held up. If the wind had been favorable to me, I would have cleaned all the barley’ 14, 58:7–10 [195] šumma [sic] kīma aqbûqum amšali ittīya illakam mimman ūmam iklanni ‘If, as I told you, he would have come with me yesterday, would anything have held me today?’ 10, 5:21–22 [196] šumman ḫamuttam išatum–man ītakalšunūti ‘If it had been at once, a fire would have consumed them’ 9, 41:24–26 Note that ḫamuttam is analyzed as a unipartite clause, not quite like the following examples. 112 The following group of examples has a noun for protasis. However, unlike šumma protases, where a noun in that slot is in fact a unipartite clause (see §2.1.2.1.7) and for that reason is generally marked as nominative, the situation here is different: [197] šumman lā DN1 u DN2 1 awīlum ul–man ibluṭ ‘If it had not been for DN1 and DN2, not one man would have lived’ 5, 232:24–27 [198] šumman lā PN mannum–mani kīma šeʾam lā iddinunikkim ṭēmki–man ubla ‘If it had not been for PN, who would have brought you your report that they did not give you barley?’ 10, 169:6–8

110.  See AbB 14, 61 note c to the translation. 111. For nussus, see AHw 753b and for ṣidīssu CAD Ṣ: 172b. 112.  Krebernik and Streck (2001: 61) analyze this case as having only a protasis: “Wenn sie (i.e., die Datteln) doch gleich verzehrt hätte!”—that is, as an impossible wish (see 2001: 65). The edition (9, 41:24–26) translates “If (only) a fire had destroyed them (= the dates) in a moment!” However, the fact that we have an explicitly marked apodosis (išatum-man ītakalšunūti ) compels us to analyze this example as a complete conditional structure and translate accordingly.

2.6.  Counterfactual conditionals

103

First, it becomes immediately apparent that the noun in the protasis is negated. As becomes clear from the following cases, the noun is marked, whenever possible, as genitive: [199] š[um]man lā surri 113 ana dakkišu ula–man ušdīkšu ‘If it had not been for the deceit, as for killing him, I would not have had him killed’ 9, 255:11–15 [200] [šum]man lā šamêm [an]a erēšim kalušu–man gamer ‘[If ] it had not been for the rain, all of it would have been finished (as far as) plowing (is concerned)’ 14, 59:19–20 [201] šumman lā kâti awīltum šī iḫtaliq–ma⟨an⟩ 114 ‘If it had not been for you, the lady would have been lost’ 14, 190:13–15 115 What nevertheless makes these cases counterfactual CSs is the fact that the apodoses are identical to other counterfactual apodoses. In other words, the protases are all capable of interchanging with one another. The following two cases are sui generis. The first looks different from the examples presented thus far, but it is a counterfactual conditional: [202] mādiš ṭāb kīma ṭābu lū īde mimma–man ana PN ul ušēbil ‘It (the ušummu mouse) was very good. If I had known that it was good, I would not have sent (the rest of the ušummu mice) to PN at all’ 14, 67:12–15 This example forces a counterfactual interpretation: the writer had sent someone five ušummu mice, apparently a local delicacy, but had left one for himself. After having tasted it, he regretted that he had sent the rest. Actually, a counterfactual conditional with lū is not normally a part of the OB repertoire and is attested in Northwest Semitic only (see introduction, §§1.4.1 and 1.4.4). In view of the case in ex. [202], the next example may be judged similarly, since it appears to conform to the same pattern: [203] lū ṭābkim ḫamšīšu–man iḫtīṭanni ‘If it had been good for you, he would have checked me five times’ 9, 240:23–25 This lū is unlike šumma(ma)n in that it immediately precedes the predicative form, rather than the entire clause. In other words, it is possible to analyze the form itself (lū īde and lū ṭāb) as counterfactual protasis. In view of the scanty evidence, however, no conclusive statement can be reached. The last two examples are not conditional at all. One is a uniclausal counterfactual: 113.  Von Soden (1982: 592, as well as in AHw 1063a) seems to prefer to translate surrû as ‘überprüfen’. 114.  The original form iḫ-ta-li-iq–ma is emended to iḫ-ta-li-iq–ma⟨-an⟩ based on the other cases of šumman lā + (pro)noun, where the apodosis is always marked by the particle -man. 115.  Compare the absolutely unique case of a subordinate šumma construction: kīm[a] šumma lā kâti pāris warkātim lā īšû ul tīdî ‘Do you not know that if not for you I have no handler of cases?’ (9, 63:5–7). There is one more probable case of a šumma protasis with a substantive in the genitive: ex. [91] (p. 63).

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[204] ana mīnim kaspam 1 šiqil 2 šiqlīn lā tušābilīm aššum redîm ana kaspim–man ašapparam ‘Why did you not send me a sheqel or two? Would I have written for silver in order to appropriate (it)? 11, 17:7–12 The second is not a usual case but quite similar to tuša ‘as if’: [205] ina 1 eleppum 5 kur ⟨še⟩ʾam nitbuk–ma mê iddiam–ma iṭṭebû–man šeʾša nittapal ‘We poured 5 kor of barley into one boat, it began to throw water, as if it would sink. 116 We have been compensated 117 for its barley’ 13, 6:26–28 This is reminiscent of Gilgameš’s mourning Enkidu: [206] urrī u mūšī elīšu abki ul addiššu ana qebērim ibrī–man itabbeam ana rigmiya ‘Day and night I wept over him, I did not give him to burial, as if my friend would rise to my call’ Gilg X 2:5′–7′ The two cases in exx. [204] and [205] may reflect counterfactual status, but because they do not constitute CSs, they are outside the scope of this study. The data for the protasis are shown in Table 2.22. The paradigmatic constitution of the counterfactual protasis in the corpus is externally similar to šumma protases, containing iprus, iparras, and paris. It differs in the specialized counterfactual signal šumman used (šummaman occurs but once), in the fact that iptaras is not attested (Krebernik and Streck 2001: 66), and in one additional, important parameter: it allows a (pro)noun marked as genitive (specifically, exx. [199] and [200]), from which we conclude that this analysis is valid for the rest of the examples in which a nominal occurs as the protasis (exx. [197]–[201]). This essentially means that šumman lā + (pro)noun is in fact a genitive construction, precisely like a prepositional phrase. The attributive form of the verb (i.e., the subordinative) generally occurs in exactly the same syntactic rubric as the genitive. However, when the verbal forms in the protasis are ex­amined, there is no conclusive evidence of the subjunctive. 118 If this is the case, then šumman has two different constructions: one with a genitive or attributive (pro)noun, another with an indicative clause. Their interchangeability with one another seems to be nonetheless well substantiated. Krebernik and Streck (2001) approach the issue of tense by judging everything according to the apodosis: it alone determines the tense of the protasis and accounts for the fluctuations in tense values. Note, however, that there is no necessary temporal sequence between both parts of the counterfactual condition; a case in point is supplied by 116.  Or, simply, ‘it almost sank’. For the link between irrealis and the notion of ‘almost’ and its explanation, see Ziegeler 2000. 117.  Unlike the edition, where the form nittapal is translated in the active voice. 118.  One explicitly indicative form is nussus (ex. [193]). In fact, if we accept the form ú-da-AḪ-ìs-su (ex. [189]) as a D-stem of dâṣum (see the edition), then this form is marked as indicative as well. The rest of the cases are masked by the ventive or by suffixed pronouns.

2.6.  Counterfactual conditionals

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Table 2.22 The Protasis Paradigm

examples

intr. particle

verbal form

form type

[189]

š[umm]an

lā ú-da-AḪ-ìs-su

iprus

[190]

šumman

lā apṭuram

iprus

[191]

šumman

ublūnim

iprus

[192]

šumma–man

lā īšu

paris/iprus a

[193]

šumman

lā nussus

paris

[194]

šumman

išširam

iparras

[195]

šumma

amšali. . . illakam

iparras

[196]

šumman

ḫamuttam

adv

[197]

šumman

lā DN u DN2

S

[198]

šumman

lā PN

S

[199]

š[um]man

lā surri

Sgen

[200]

[šum]man

lā šamêm

Sgen

[201]

šumman

lā kâti

pronobl

[202]

lū

īde

paris/iprus

[203]

lū

ṭābkim

paris

a.  This is always difficult: the form is iprus, but syntactically it has no temporal or aspectual opposition with other forms.

Declerck and Reed (2006: 177–85), where different sequences are described. Moreover, as has been shown above, the tense value of ordinary šumma protases is determined visà-vis the co-text, not the apodosis. As for the respective values of the verbal forms, Krebernik and Streck (2001: 66) conclude that, in the protasis, iprus stands in relative anteriority to the apodosis, either past or future (depending on the value determined for the apodosis). In the protasis, Iparras stands for the present and the future but mainly for irrealis in the past. In our corpus, there are only two examples with iparras in the protasis (exx. [194] and [195]) that are clearly referential to the past. This is obviously different from the function of iparras in protases of ordinary conditionals, where it generally signals the non-past sphere. Note in addition that, in our confined corpus, there is no future reference in any of the apodoses (for which, see further below). Contrary to Krebernik and Streck (2001), despite the specific past reference noted here of iparras, there are neither temporal nor modal oppositions between the various verbal forms in the protasis—all semantically neutralized, as it were, within the framework of counterfactual condition. That is, if both iparras and iprus denote the past, there is no temporal opposition between them. This is one of the substantial differences between šumma and šumman protases.

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It is the counterfactual apodosis, however, that is extremely different from šumma apodoses in the corpus: iprus and iptaras are the most common forms, whereas in apodoses of the šumma pattern, they are regarded as mere exceptions (in fact, iprus forms are not part of the apodosis at all; see §2.1.2.2.1). Precative forms, the most common form in šumma pattern apodoses, are altogether absent from the counterfactual con­ditionals in the corpus, and iparras, the second most common form in šumma apodoses, is here rare, as also is paris: Table 2.23 The Apodosis Paradigm

exx.

verbal form

form

remarks

[189]

(neg) ībirakkim

[192]

ašpurakkum

[195]

iklanni

[197]

(neg) ibluṭ

[198]

ubla

[199]

(neg) ušdīkšu

[202]

(neg) ušēbil

[190]

assapam

[193]

uḫtalliq

[194]

uzzakki

[196]

ītakalšunūti

[201]

iḫtaliq

[203]

iḫtīṭanni

lū protasis

[205]

iṭṭebû

no protasis

[200]

gamer

[191]

gamer, inawwer

[204]

ašapparam

iprus

lū protasis

iptaras

paris iparras

no protasis

For Krebernik and Streck (2001: 65), iprus and iptaras denote the past irrealis, and the difference between them has nothing to do with the degree of likelihood; it is instead analogous to the use of these forms in non-counterfactual environments. This statement, however, is not sufficiently substantiated: for instance, iptaras forms occur in a polar question (see ex. [55]) outside of the conditional domain, but not here. Looking at the examples in our corpus, it is quite apparent that iptaras forms are always affirmative, whereas iprus forms can occur either as negative (exx. [189], [197], [199], and [202]) or as affirmative in environments of inconclusive polarity, such as questions and expressions of doubt (exx. [192], [195], and [198]). It works out nicely: the result is an efficient complementary distribution between iprus and iptaras. This distribution is definitely not a reflection of a factual environment but is sui generis.

2.6.  Counterfactual conditionals

107

Table 2.24 Location of Apodotic -man

apodosis

entity

[202]

mimma–man ana PN ul ušēbil

Adverb

[203]

ḫamšīšu–man iḫtīṭanni

Adverb

[189]

˹ul˺la–man ībirakkim

neg particle

[197]

1 awīlum ul–man ibluṭ

neg particle

[199]

ana dakkišu ula–man ušdīkšu

neg particle

[194]

šeʾam kalašu–man uzzakki

Pronoun

[200]

[an]a erēšim kalušu–man gamer

Pronoun

[195]

mimman ūmam iklanni

Pron Indef.

[192]

matī–man ašpurakkum

Pron Interr.

[198]

mannum–mani. . . ṭēmki–man ubla

Pron Interr.

[204]

ana kaspim–man ašapparam

substantivegen

[193]

ṣidīssu–man uḫtalliq/ iḫtaliq

substantiveacc/nom

[198]

mannum–mani. . . ṭēmki–man ubla

substantiveacc

[196]

išatum–man ītakalšunūti

substantivenom

[190]

10 būr eqlam assapam–man

verb

[191]

ištu 6 ūmī gamer–man, PN nagā[ru]m inawwer–man

verb verb

[201]

awīltum šī iḫtaliq–ma⟨an⟩

verb

[205]

mê iddiam–ma iṭṭebû–man

verb

Krebernik and Streck describe the function of iparras as either posterior past, present, or future. This basically means that it can denote any temporal category. However, in terms of our corpus, the same situation obtains as in the protasis; see ex. [191], where gamer and inawwer (the only iparras form in counterfactual apodosis in the entire corpus) both refer to six days prior to the utterance. Yet another paris form (ex. [200]) refers to three previous instances of rainfall (14, 59:21–22). With regard to iprus forms, ex. [195] mimman ūmam iklanni ‘would anything have held me today?’ is marked adverbially for today (which is not revealing), but in other cases—for example, in ex. [197], ul–man ibluṭ—the form is aoristic, similar to a nonverbal clause. In view of the fact that iparras, paris, and iprus seem to cover the same notions and hence show no opposition between them, we conclude that there are no definite temporal values that can be attributed to the forms. Using the method chosen here does not reveal any oppositions, a situation that is markedly different from the various oppositions actually found between the forms elsewhere, including in šumma conditionals. In view of how this works in West Semitic (see

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§§1.4.1, 1.4.3, and 1.4.4 above), the counterfactual apodosis is generally marked by a form otherwise used for the past—that is, no temoporal or modal op­positions are found there as well. In the counterfactual protasis, only Biblical Hebrew has a variety of forms, but nowhere is it stated precisely what the functional difference between the forms is. Looking at Table 2.24 above (p. 107), the position of the counterfactual particle -man seems quite enigmatic. The table classifies the occurrences of -man according to the entity to which it is appended. The particle -man can be found almost anywhere, and it is very difficult to understand the rationale behind its location. It is even impossible to state that -man is appended to the most salient entity in the ctlause: in ex. [197], -man is appended to the negative particle in the clause but another entity is the most salient, namely, 1 awīlum ‘one man’ (‘not one man would have lived’). The form paradigms of the counterfactual CSs are summarized in Table 2.25, arranged by decreasing frequency. Table 2.25 particle šumma(ma)n lū

protasis

apodosis

iprus Sgen paris iparras adverb

iprus iptaras iparras paris

The distinctive features are: 1. The particle that introduces the structure is šumma(ma)n and, marginally (but related to West Semitic), lū. 2. In the protasis paradigm, there are neither iptaras forms nor NVCs. On the other hand, a genitive (pro)noun is rather common. 3. The apodosis paradigm has neither precative forms nor NVCs, and the most common forms are iprus and iptaras. These two forms conform both with West Semitic counterfactual apodosis, which consists of forms whose value is basically past reference, as well as with the most common typological marking, a form denoting the past together with a mark of irrealis (Lazard 2001: 414–17). 4. In both protasis and apodosis, no oppositions of temporal, modal, or aspectual nature are detected. 5. The particle -man marks each of the domains (in case of a long domain, even twice, see ex. [198]) as counterfactual. 2.7. Conclusions Conclusions regarding the conditional patterns in the letter corpus consist of two parts: (1) an overview of the information gathered regarding each of the strategies that signal ordinary conditions; (2) a discussion based on this information, the aim of which is to focus on several issues pertaining to the nature of the conditional patterns in the letter corpus.

2.7. Conclusions

109

Table 2.26 A.  Conditional patterns conditional type

protasis (forms)

connective

apodosis

-ma (variant ‘→’)

iparras

paratactic

ul iprus iparras paris

conditional particle

šumma

iprus iptaras iparras paris NVC

iia

hypothetical

šumma

iptaras

iparras + Q

iii

modal particle

pīqat, midde

iparras

precative

i

ii

šumma(ma)n

iv

lū

iprus Sgen paris iparras adverb

paris precative

± Q

NVC

—

iprus iptaras iparras paris

v

asseverative

lū paris lū iprus lū iparras

purus

vi

precative

liprus (ayyiprus)

lū iparras

-man

B.  Non-conditional patterns vii

imperative

purus

viii

concessive conditional

liprus

ix

temporal/causal/ conditional

ištū–ma

iprusu iptarsu iparrasu parsu

iparras -ma/→

iparras, paris precative NVC iparras

—

paris precative

2.7.1.  Summary and conclusions The various conditional-related structures in the letter corpus have been described in detail up to this point. There are a few issues that become salient only in an overview. Table 2.26 is organized according to comparative rationale rather than the original order in which the patterns and structures were described. Table 2.26A covers the conditional patterns and Table 2.26B the structures that are not clear-cut conditionals: i (§2.2.1).  This is a rather common paratactic, strictly prospective conditional pattern. The protasis often follows a directive with opposite polarity but with the same lexeme (‘go; you do not go. . .’) and allows items with a polarity that is different from

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what is usual for them. The protasis consists of forms that generally have indicative value in other syntactic environ­ments, but in this environment they signal modality. The oppositions in the protasis distinguish in the negative only between the notions perfect, non-perfect, and stative. The protasis and apodosis are uniquely separated by the asymmetric connective -ma. Despite a super­ficial similarity to many other chains, the pattern has enough distinctive characteristics to set it apart as conditional. This pattern is one of the only syntactic environments in which the particle -ma is standing at the boundary between different domains, consisting of forms that do not interconnect under other syntactic circumstances. ii (§2.1).  This pattern is the default type of conditional in the letter corpus. The protasis shows some evidence of embeddedness but is nevertheless non-subordinate. The most prominent category in the protasis paradigm is tense, dis­tinguishing past, non-past, and perfect. The main category in the apodosis paradigm is modal by its oppositions, differentiating between nonmodal, deontic, and interrogative. The apodosis paradigm is the same one found in the paratactic con­ditional pattern, and it hints at the tight syntactic (in addition to the obvious functional) link between the two patterns. iia (§2.1.2.1.3).  A narrow subpattern of ii, this category has a hypothetical value— that is, showing a higher level of unlikelihood than the ordinary conditional and a lower level than the counterfactual conditional. It is not clear whether the iptaras form in this pattern still has a linguistic non-past perfect value as well, as it does elsewhere. This subpattern, together with the following strategy, emphasizes the paramount importance of the sequences consisting of specific forms (in this case iptaras—iparras) in the syntax of OB. iii (§2.3).  The modal particle (MP) conditional is a narrow pattern in which modal particles, which otherwise stand for ‘perhaps’, function as conditional markers (or connectives), like šumma. This pattern is in fact very similar to šumma conditionals: (1) the pattern (#MP+iparras+liprus#) is very similar to the most common sequence in šumma conditionals, and (2) the modal particle, like šumma, precedes the protasis but in fact marks the entire structure (and as a byproduct, the relationship between the protasis and the apodosis) as conditional. Unlike šumma conditionals, the protasis and apodosis of this pattern, consisting each of one specific formation, show no oppositions. This is similar in principle to the basic conditional pattern of CA, which consists of fixed forms and hence shows no oppositions. The modal particle pattern is unique for the super-paradigm of conditional patterns in the letter corpus, because it is found in no other genre. It is hence considered a distinctive feature of this super-paradigm, the token of ordinary con­ditionals. iv (§2.6).  The counterfactual conditional is sui generis, characterized by the different marking of both protasis and apodosis, mostly by the particle ‑man. The verbal forms in the apodosis are typically iprus and iptaras, and this is a distinctive feature vis-à-vis the other patterns. This conditional type is very important in the super-paradigm of CSs in the letter corpus, since it clearly opposes all the other patterns by the high degree of unlikelihood that it signals and thus corroborates the various shades of epistemic modality at work in this super-paradigm.

2.7. Conclusions

111

v (§2.4).  This is a marginal pattern, the exact opposite of pattern vi as far as the order of elements is concerned, in which an asseverative form (e.g., lū iprus, lū iparras) is the protasis and a purus form is the apodosis. The connective ‑ma does not interconnect the protasis and the apodosis; they are merely juxtaposed. This is the only pattern, except for the šumma conditional pattern, that has a temporal opposition in the protasis. The apodosis, on the other hand, shows no oppositions with the form purus. vi (§2.2.2).  Precative conditionals constitute another marginal pattern in which a precative form (which is different, however, since its negative counterpart is the form ayyiprus, rather than lā iparras) is the protasis and an asseverative form functioning as oath is the apodosis (lū iparras). Here, too, no ‑ma is found; it may be that asseveratives do not otherwise interconnect with precative forms. The paucity of examples is nevertheless compensated for by the fact that a similar pattern is attested to by more examples in the neighboring dialect of Old Assyrian, which means that this pattern is not accidental. vii (§2.2.2).  This structure (purus–ma iparras) may (but does not have to) be interpreted as conditional; the cases in the corpus do not include any clear-cut conditional examples, and it is therefore not considered to be a conditional pattern and is hence classified in Table 2.26B. viii (§2.2.1).  This is an unambiguous pattern, but it has concessive-conditional value, namely, that while the protasis is very similar to a conditional protasis in expressing an uncertain, potential eventuality, the apodosis is nevertheless not conditioned by the protasis and hence retains the value it has outside this construction—that is, it is non-conditioned. ix (§2.5).  The conjunction ištū–ma in only one case exhibits clear-cut conditionality, whereas all the rest of the examples are either clear-cut adverbial (causative and temporal) or ambiguous. For this reason, it is not considered to be a conditional pattern. 2.7.2.  The syntactic nature of the protasis 1. Embedding.  When discussing the syntagmatics of šumma conditionals (§2.1.1), it was stated that some syntactic features may hint that the protasis is embedded in the apodosis. These features are: 1. the fact that šumma protases, like adverbial clauses, are focusable: [207] 2 šiqil kasp-am š-ūbil-aš-šu sheqel silver-acc caus-carry-imp-2ms-dat.1cs-acc.3ms {[š]umma lā t-uš-arš-am}–ma 1 if neg 2ms-caus-have-pst-dat.1cs=foc 1 t-uš-abbal-am 2ms-caus-carry-npst-dat.1cs ‘Have him send me two sheqels (of) silver. Only if you cannot supply me, you (can) send me (only) one’ 7, 79:7–9 (= ex. [29] above)

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The Letter Corpus

2. the initial position of the protasis in the construction, like adverbial clauses; 119 and 3. one of the signals of clause boundary is the particle -ma. The clause is the segment that stretches, within a domain formed by the particle -ma, between two consecutive ‑ma particles; šumma protases, as well as adverbial clauses, do not constitute a clause, according to this standard. On the other hand, other features contradict the idea of embeddedness, namely: (1) the fact that the protasis does not show formal morphological signals for subordination, unlike adverbial clauses (compare, in Table 1.1 on p. 3 above, rubric no. 1c); (2) the fact that the protasis, unlike adverbial clauses, is not reducible, or not interchangeable, with a simple entity in the same syntactic setting (see §2.1.2 above); and (3) the mutual dependency between the protasis and the apodosis is not quite compatible with this sort of embedding, which is typically associated with unidirectional dependency. The mixed signals do not allow for a definitive answer. However, some of these problems may be solved if we pursue another direction. The idea that the apodosis is not a clause but a domain that consists in posse of several clauses has been mentioned several times. It can be shown that, if the šumma protasis is embedded at all, it is in the domain rather than in a clause. At any rate, its mutual dependency obtains, undoubtedly, with the entire apodosis domain. 2.  The domains.  The existence of separate domains in the OB conditional patterns is transparent first and foremost in the modal particle conditional pattern. The following example, reproducing ex. [172] above, illustrates this idea: [208] u midde annikīam ibaʾʾ-ū-ka=ma conn perhaps here 3mp-pass-npst-acc.2ms=conn alp-ī ana āl-im ayy-im=ma inassaḫ-ū=ma ox-obl.pl to city-gen some-gen-ptcl 3mp-move-npst=conn būrt-um iḫalliq # alkam–ma cow-nom 3cs-get_lost-npst come-imp-2ms=conn būrt-am purus–ma taru cow-acc separate-imp-2ms=conn lead_away-imp-2ms ‘But if they pass you by here and move the oxen to some town and (as a result) the cow may perish, come here, separate the cow and lead (it) away’ 9, 83:18–24 The domains are part of šumma patterns as well:

119.  Although in a couple of cases šumma protasis and a temporal clause are compatible; see §2.1.1 above.

2.7. Conclusions

113

[209] šumma warkat eql-im šuāti lā ip-p-aris 120 if matter-nuc field-gen dem.obl.cs neg 3cs-pass-investigate-pst PN4 eql-am šuāti lā ubīr–ma ana PN1 field-acc dem.obl.cs neg 3cs-establish-pst to lā iddin kakk-um ša il-im ana eql-im neg 3cs-give-pst weapon-nom pron.nuc god-gen to field-gen l-i-rid–ma attunu . . . maḫar il-im juss-3cs-descend=conn nom.2mp before god-gen birr-ā–ma eql-am ana dūr-i-šu establish-imp-2cp=conn field-acc to permanent _status-gen-gen.3ms idn-ā give-imp-2cp ‘If the matter of the field was not investigated, PN4 did not establish this field and did not give (it) to PN1, may the divine emblem descend to the field and you, town and witnesses, establish the matter of this field in front of God and assign the field its permanent status’ 4, 40:29–36 (= ex. [51]c) Table 2.27 is a scheme of the forms in each domain in the preceding examples. Table 2.27 type

protasis domain

apodosis domain

midde

iparras–ma

iparras–ma

iparras#

purus–ma

purus–ma

purus

šumma

iprus

iprus–ma

iprus#

liprus–ma

purus–ma

purus

In the modal particle conditional pattern, the protasis domain consists of one or more iparras forms. Two clauses or more always interconnect. The apodosis domain is similar, except that it is made up of interconnected precative forms. The boundary between the domains is marked by the absence of the particle ‑ma, combined with a shift from iparras forms to precative forms. The same system obtains for šumma conditionals, although the boundary between the domains may occasionally depend only on the absence of the particle ‑ma. 121 The existence of these boundaries, however, is clear beyond any doubt. In view of this, it is reasonable to conclude that mutual dependency obtains not just between the protasis and the first clause of the apodosis but rather with the entire apodosis domain. This is not true with regard to adverbial clauses: 120. This iprus form is not followed by the particle ‑ma. In view of the relative rarity of this particle in šumma protases (see §2.1.2.2.8), this is quite expected. 121.  In extreme cases, where focus is marked by the particle ‑­ ma (as in ex. [207), this absence is masked, because the (focus) particle ‑ma occurs between the domains.

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[210] urram {kīma ak-t-amsa} [a]šappar-akkum–ma tomorrow as 1cs-finished-pf 1cs-write-npst-dat.1ms=conn 50 umman-āt-i-ka ana ṣēr-i-ya t-aṭarrad-am worker-pl-obl-gen.2ms to on-gen-gen.1cs 2ms-send-npst-dat.1cs ‘Tomorrow, {when I have finished}, [I] will write to you and you will send me 50 workers of yours’ 10, 167:15–18 ‘Tomorrow’ and the time the writer will have finished pertain only to the action of writing—that is, to the first clause. Sending the troops (the second clause) will happen some time later (the letter has to be sent, and it takes time to arrive, etc.). Accordingly, from a syntactic point of view, the temporal clause is embedded in one clause, serving as a part of it. The following example is similar: [211] ina ṣāb PN1 u PN2 100 ṣāb-um ittī-šu from army.nuc and troop(s)-nom with-gen.3ms l-i-llik–ma 5 ūm-ī {adi PN1 u PN2 ištu GN juss-3ms-go=conn 5 day-obl.pl   until and from i-llak-ū-nim#} ina āl-ānī l-i-p-tar-rik-ū–ma 3mp-come-npst in city-obl.pl juss-3mp-iter-trouble=conn ḫarrān-āt-im {ša ī-ten-errub-ā-nim#} [i]šteat ū šitta caravan-obl-pl   pron.nuc 3fp-iter-come_in one or two l-i-dūk-ū–ma l-ī-dur-ā# juss-3mp-strike=conn juss-3fp-fear ‘Let one hundred troops from the troops of PN1 and PN2 go with him, and let them cause constant difficulties in the cities for five days {until PN1 and PN2 come from GN}, and let them strike at one or two caravans . . . so that they be afraid’ 11, 193:13–23 (= ex. [51]c) Note that here, too, the last clause, referring to the purpose of the entire plan—to frighten the (people of the) caravans—is not limited to the period of five days in which the operation is intended to take place. In contrast, the šumma protasis is mutually dependent with and relevant to the entire apodosis domain between two numbers signs: [212] šumma inanna t-usakkap-anni# bēl šukūs-im . . . if now 2ms-keep_away-acc.1cs owner.nuc subsistence-gen illakam–ma šukūs wāšib-ūt libbi 3cs-come-npst=conn subsistence.nuc dweller-mp.nuc center.nuc āl-im immar–ma maḫar PN t-adabbub-ā# city-gen 3cs-look-npst=conn in_front.nuc PN 2ms-speak-npst-2cp

2.7. Conclusions

115

‘If you (intend to) keep me away now, #the owner of the subsistence (field) . . . will come and inspect the subsistence of the city dwellers, and (then) you will (have to) make a statement in front of PN#’ 1, 29:21–27 This is true in general, for all of the ordinary conditionals in the letter corpus. The question of embeddedness, however, is relevant only to šumma patterns. Combining a clause with a combination of clauses (for example, ex. [212]: iparras+​ {iparras–ma iparras–ma iparras}) is illustrated by Matthiessen and Thompson (1988). They claim that embedding of the combined clause in any specific clause is not possible. In other words, when a linguistic entity is combined with an entire multiclausal unit, it is not part of any specific clause in this multi-clausal unit. 3.  The nature of the particle šumma.  Two scholars of Akkadian view the CS introduced by šumma as two coordinated clauses. (1) Von Soden (GAG §160) classifies CSs under the title “Koordinierte Hauptsätze,” which are perceived predominantly as a link between two main clauses marked either by ‑ma or by the particle šumma preceding the entire construction. This idea originates, it seems, from the fact that the forms in the šumma protasis are not marked as subordinate. (2) Buccellati (1996: §86.2) regards CSs as two conjoined sentences, because the protasis, unlike other sentence constituents (e.g., adverbial clauses), is not reducible. In fact, Buccellati discusses the CS with šumma along with clauses interconnected by the particle ‑ma. This view is corroborated by the existence of explicitly chained conditional patterns (see §2.2.1 above), which are ubiquitous in our letter corpus, as well as by other patterns in which the link is marked only by the syntactic characteristics of the pattern. Because OB has no subordination whatsoever without a designated exponent, 122 what we find essentially are asymmetrically coordinated (protasis first, apodosis second) structures (von Soden calls this connection “Nachordnung”). Consider the following examples: [213] pīqat illakak-kum teriqt-am ana mamman mp 3cs-come-npst-dat.2ms fallow_land-acc to anyone lā t-anaddin neg 2ms-give-npst ‘If he comes to you, do not give the uncultivated land to anyone’ 14, 114:25–27 [214] šumma ab-ū-ni urram illakam if father-nom-gen.1cp tomorrow 3cs-come-npst ṭupp-ā[t]-i [šināti] l-i-lq-û-niāšim tablet-obl-pl dem.obl.fp juss-3mp-take-dat.1cp ‘If our father comes tomorrow, let them take [these] tablets for us’ 1,131:22–23 (= ex. [69]) 122.  Not “Konjunktionlos” but rather without a nucleus in the construct state, which serves as this designated exponent (that is, Akkadian has nothing like Arabic ṣifa, e.g., hāḏā ʾinsānun lam ʾara miṯlahu lit., ‘this is a man I have not seen like him’).

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Note that the sequences in both patterns are similar: they consist of the same forms, namely, iparras followed by a precative. It is true that, throughout this study, the matter of pattern, together with its morphological and syntactic characteristics, have been stressed as the entity that ultimately marks the structure as conditional. Nonetheless, if we isolate the most prominent of the features in the patterns represented in exx. [213] and [214], it would be the introductory particles, pīqat and šumma. What would otherwise be different, disconnected domains, often with only a vague relationship between them, are linked by these two particles. In other words, if we had to circumscribe the function of these particles in this case, it would be (1) interconnecting the two domains into a pattern and (2) marking them as hypothetical. The order is important, because šumma indeed interconnects clauses in other genres—where the resulting pattern need not be hypothetical—but it always consists of two interconnected domains. One fact corroborates this view: these two particles are incompatible with a connective ‑ma between the protasis and apodosis domains (there is no problem with ‑ma occurring inside each of the domains). This incompatibility of šumma or pīqat with ‑ma between the domains may be thought of as mutual exclusion. This phenomenon occurs with entities that have the same function in different environments; this phenomenon is charted in Table 2.28. Table 2.28 Connecting Means

conditional pattern i

ii

iii

protasis

(forms)

paratactic

ul iprus iparras paris

conditional particle

iprus iptaras iparras paris NVC

modal particle

šumma

pīqat, midde

iparras

connective -ma

apodosis iparras paris precative

—

NVC Q precative

Despite their initial position in the structure, šumma and pīqat are related to both protasis and apodosis in CSs, interconnecting them and marking them as such. According to this view, then, it makes good sense to regard šumma as well as the modal particles pīqat and midde, in this function, as conditional connectives. Both von Soden and Buccellati were cited above as holding a similar view, but the rationale elaborated here is different. Table 2.29 takes these conclusions one step further. The two examples (exx. [135] and [153], respectively) shown in the table oppose two syntagms, each consisting of a double CS (see end of §2.2.1, above). In the first, a šumma conditional pattern constitutes the apodosis of a paratactic conditional pattern; in the second, the paratactic pattern constitutes the apodosis of a šumma conditional pattern.

2.7. Conclusions

117

Table 2.29 1  primary protasis

primary apodosis 2  secondary protasis

3  secondary apodosis

. . . t-arašši-ā-šim–ma   2cp-be_negligent-dat.3fs=conn

šumma elepp-um šī if boat-nom dem.nom.3fs im-t-ūt 3cs-die-pf

. . . ša kīma šâti pron.nuc as dem.obl.3cs n-ir-t-êb 1cs-replace-refl-npst

‘should you be negligent,

if this boat were to sink

would we be able to replace it. . . ?’

šumma bēl-ī atta a if lord-gen.1cs nom.2ms

amât–ma 1cs-die-npst=conn

ṭāb-kum good-stv-3ms-dat.2ms

‘if you are my lord

should I die

would it be good for you?’

a.  This example does not belong with the politeness formula discussed in §2.1.3.1; note that the apodosis is not a directive but a question. Therefore, the apodosis is regarded as nonfactual (it is nonfactual de facto, as always when someone is discussing his or her own death).

If we consider šumma to be a connective, then there always is one connective between clauses in both syntagms, whether it be šumma or ‑ma. The fact that šumma immediately follows ‑ma in the first example is immaterial, because each connects a different clause: ‑ma interconnects 1 with 2 and 3, and šumma interconnects 2 with 3. Similarly, in the second example, šumma interconnects 1 with 2 and 3, and -ma interconnects 2 with 3. Further corroboration of this is the fact that the apodosis paradigm is basically identical for the strategies of both šumma and -ma conditional patterns. Identity of a very complex form (= the apodosis paradigm) can hardly be considered accidental. 4. Topicality.  The matter of topicality often arises in discussion of conditionals, and the šumma conditional protases are examined here (end of §2.1.1) for givenness. The conclusion is that the protasis in the corpus is never entirely presupposed: either the conditioning factor or the opposed polarity is always new in the protasis. Other signals of topicality of the conditional protasis are separation between protasis and apodosis (like CA fa-) or a resumptive element that represents the protasis inside the apodosis (as English then). These signals are rare in OB. One instance of resumption of the protasis is found in a special case: [215] šumma kīma PN1 šū iqb-û . . . PN2 . . . if as dem.nom.ms 3cs-say-pst-subj ilqē–ma ikkal elī-ša awāt-um maruš-t-um 3cs-take-pst=conn 3cs-eat-npst on-gen.3fs matter-nom bad-fs-nom ul ibašši neg 3ms-exist-npst ‘If, as that PN1 said, . . . PN2 took and feeds off. . . , there is nothing worse than that’ 4, 79:14–21 (ḪL) This case is a verificational conditional, which often repeats parts of a report inside the protasis: it is especially similar to a given topic (again, minus the conditioning factor). In

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this unique case, the entire protasis is resumed in the apodosis by a genitive pronoun (‑ša ‘her’), thus forming a structure where the extrapositive entity (the protasis) is resumed in the comment (the apodosis). Yet another case is found in ex. [153] (glossed in Table 2.29 above, second example). The form ṭābkum (‘would it be good for you?’) in the apodosis has a ∅ that signals 3ms. This ∅ resumes the hypothetical case suggested in the protasis. However, the idea of givenness as an exclusive parameter for determining topicality is problematic, as argued by Schiffrin (1992: 166–72), and certain­ly does not cover all instances of topical entities. Schiffrin proposes that we aim higher and examine the topic from a discourse perspective, on different levels of message. Thus, segments that are backgrounded by various devices often constitute the circumstances that are the textual support for the following text (rather than clause). This is evident in Ramsay (1987), where preposed and postposed conditional protases in English are contrasted and it is shown that the latter are only related to their own main clause, while the former are associated both backward and forward, very much like a topic. The protasis in OB does contain, at least in principle, the circumstances or background of the apodosis, and this claim pertains to any kind of protasis. This textlinguistic view of topic is appropriate for the conditional patterns in general. The question is whether this fact is in any way instructive for our understanding of conditional structures. The answer is that this type of topicality in fact goes hand in hand with the syntactic relationship found between the protasis and apodosis. Backgrounding of this kind is analogous to the case of initial background clauses in OB narrative, where it is easier to illustrate this function. Backgrounding in OB epic is marked by various signals, sometimes apparently adverbial and at other times by predicative forms that signal this function in narrative. 123 The former type may look like temporal clauses but in fact have a different relationship with their main clause: [216] . . . ipšiḫ uzza-šu–ma inēʾ 3cs-calm_down.pst rage-gen.3ms=conn 3cs-turn.pst iras-su ištu iras-su inēʾ-u enkidu chest-gen.3ms since chest-gen.3ms 3cs-turn-pst-subj ana šâšim issaqqaram to dat.3cs 3cs-say.npst ‘. . . his anger subsided and he broke off. As he broke off, Enkidu said to him . . .’ Gilg P229–231 In this example from the OB epic, a temporal clause repeats the information immediately preceding it and supposedly provides a temporal point from which the rest of the story continues. However, this is not its function, because it is already clear that Enkidu is speaking after breaking off. The function is in fact to serve as a narrative boundary between the fight recounted up to this point and the next dialogue, which is a turning 123.  See, for the entire narrative system, Cohen 2006: 54–63.

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point in the relationship between Gilgamesh and Enkidu. This temporal clause is a topical, backgrounded segment that is merely packaged as an adverbial clause. The blend of adverbial exterior with a topical function is confusing and is suggestive of conditional protases, which are presented both as adverbial and topical in many languages. However, this is not the only way backgrounded material is presented. Consider the following example, which is from the OB epic as well: [217] #ul illik–m[a] 1200 šan-āt-im [sic] neg 3cs-go-pst-conn 1200 year-pl-obl māt-um ir-tap-piš nīš-[ū im-]tid-d-ā land-nom 3cs-iter-extend-pst men-nom 3fp-iter-became_many-pst ‘1200 years had not passed and the land grew continuously, 124 the people became more and more numerous’ Atra-ḫasis 2, 1:1–2 This is the beginning of the second tablet of Atra-ḫasis. As a rule, the form ul iprus in OB epic narrative never represents an event but is descriptive, providing background material. Chaining is yet another means by which background information can join the foreground: [218] maruṣ–ma ul illikam sick-stv-3ms=conn neg 3ms-come-pst ‘Being sick (lit., he is sick and) he has not come’ 2, 212:9–10 This phenomenon relates back to the paratactic conditional pattern in which the protasis is interconnected with the apodosis via ‑ma. In chaining of this kind, a preceding clause can function as background circumstances for the following text. 5.  The syntactic relationship between the protasis and the apodosis.  At the end of §1.3 above, a statement made by Dancygier (1998: 72: “the only assertion that is made in a conditional construction is about the relation between the protasis and the apodosis”) was tested against two examples in which the modal particle maybe precedes the conditional construction. The conclusion reached is that the modal particle in this syntactic setting indeed refers to the relationship between the protasis and the apodosis, changing this assertion to non-assertion. In other words, the relationship between the protasis and apodosis is not a fact any longer. It was stated that epistemic modal particles refer, in a clause, to the predicative link, the nexus, between the theme (given information) and the rheme (new information). It was further suggested that the relationship between protasis and apodosis is analogous to the predicative link.

124.  The forms ir-ta-pi-iš and [im-]ti-da may be analyzed either as the iterative stem (TAN) of iprus (which together yield perfective yet iterative value) or as iptaras, which is more difficult to account for, although this entire segment (Atra-ḫasis 2, 1:1–5) has two more iptaras forms: ittaʾdar and išteme (both could be analyzed as TAN as well).

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However, the OB material is of limited help in the attempt to determine whether similar conclusions can be reached regarding this language. The only relevant phenomenon turns out to be rhetorical interrogative apodoses (§2.1.2.2.7). In these cases, it is possible to recognize some influence on the relationship between protasis and apodosis: [219] šumma anāku aḫ-ū-ka kaqqad-ka if nom.1cs brother-nom-gen.2ms head-gen.2ms ul kabit neg respected-stv-3ms ‘If I 125 am your brother, are you not respected?’ 6, 139:5 (= ex. [112]) This example is about whether there is any connection at all between two hypothetical states of affairs: (1) the speaker (rather than anyone else) is the brother of the addressee; and (2) the addressee is not respected. If not for the (rhetorical) question, the relationship between both sides would have been asserted. The rhetorical question in fact undermines this assertion, arguing, so to speak, that there need not be a connection between these two states of affairs. Needless to say, this is very similar to a question that pertains to the predicative link between the theme and the rheme of a sentence. The conditional link and the predicative link are analogous relationships. The difference lies in the respective levels of analysis. While the predicative link is confined to intraclausal relationships, the conditional link is analyzed at a higher level, at the interclausal level, where topicality is analyzed as well. In addition, functionally speaking, theme and rheme are constituents of information structure (the rheme being the new information stated about the theme), whereas protasis and apodosis are not. The entire CS (in the letters!) reveals hypothetical status and sequential relationships where a clause does not. OB, while marking exceptionally well the syntactic relationships at the clause level, is like many other languages in that, at the interclausal level, exponents tend to neutralize these relationships. 125.  This is the focal pattern (see ex. [9], p. 6) where anāku ‘I’ is the contrastive focus.

Chapter 3 CONDITIONAL STRUCTURES IN THE LAW COLLECTIONS The law collections and legal practices of Mesopostamia have been given ample consideration in the Assyriological literature, as well as within other scholarly contexts (ancient law, biblical law, etc.). The laws, along with with the omens, constitute a portion of the Babylonian scientific literature. This is made apparent, for example, by Westbrook (2003: 16–19) and also by Metzler (2002), whose second chapter (pp. 35–298) describes the tense in “wissenschaftsliterarische Texte”—that is, this general classification of the texts is viewed as linguistically pertinent, that is, as responsible here for functional differences between genres. This distinction is not always made, despite the fact that it is decisive for description of the grammar, especially the syntax, of these genres. The texts from ancient Babylon that we describe as “scientific,” first and foremost are lists: the Babylonians learned by compiling lists and studying them, rather than learning by induction (Rubio 2007: 33; 2009: 170; Winitzer 2006: 15–20). The corpus of OB law collections was explored linguistically very early in the history of Mesopotamian studies, a very short time after its discovery (Ungnad 1903–5). Ungnad’s study in fact constitutes the foundation of clause-level syntax in OB. In addition, much linguistically oriented recent work on the legal corpus has covered the functional values of the predicative forms, mainly in regard to tense (Goetze 1936; Hirsch 1969; Maloney 1982: 262–361; Streck 1995, 1998a, 1998b, and 1999; Metzler 2002: 33–298; and Loesov 2004: 147–56. Kouwenberg’s study (2010), which is an overview, refers to OB in general in §6.3.1. Most of these scholars have been aware of the differences among the various genres, but none of them explicitly refers to the difference between various CS strategies in each genre—namely, the letters and the laws. One of the aims of this chapter is to examine these differences, and, as it turns out, the syntactic differences reflect the practical differences between the two genres. The nature of the CS in the law collections has not been given any special linguistic consideration. In fact, von Soden, the most influential grammarian of Akkadian in the 20th century, treats šumma conditionals (GAG §161) as a single block of material, without regard to the genre to which they belong. In von Soden’s defense, it should be said that the laws are written in a language very similar to the language found in the letters, and he wrote a Grundriß describing many dialects of Akkadian. However, where tense was involved, more linguistic sensitivity often led to a priori separation between the different genres, despite the external linguistic similarity (see, e.g., Maloney 1982; 121

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Metzler 2002; Loesov 2004). Cross-genre divergence in the value of verbal forms in fact hints at the existence of other differences as well, some of which the present chapter sets out to describe. The CSs in the law collections from the outset exhibit several characteristics that are very different from the epistolary CSs described in the previous chapter: 1. They are impersonally constructed—that is, 3rd person only. The 1st and 2nd persons occur only in direct speech. 1 2. They are not directed to a specific addressee but instead to anyone, any time (at least as long as the laws are relevant). 3. They lack the characteristic of hic et nunc ‘here and now’—that is, they show no reference to a concrete time or location. 4. They are devoid of forms that denote speaker-oriented modality, such as directives (signaled by precative forms), except for the rare occurrence of direct speech. 5. They do not have a textual context specific to each (in contrast to the CSs in the letter corpus). Thus, they all refer to the same, unchanging background, whatever it may be. 2 6. If we examine a typical CS construction a bit deeper, we note that, when the substantives first occur in a law, they represent a prototype—a man, a woman, a slave. There is no explicit means of expressing this in Akkadian, because noun (in)determination is explicitly marked only rarely. This issue, however, is always reflected in translation (which reveals our own biased judgment). Note, in addition, that in the letters, where there are specific substantives, the substantives cannot be both indefinite and function as the theme (that is, the given entity of a clause) at the same time. In their second occurrence in a law, substantives are characterized just enough to distinguish them from an apparently identical substantive (ša elīšu kišpū nadû ‘the one who is blamed with witchcraft’ vs. ša elīšu kišpī iddû ‘the one who blamed him of witchcraft’—CH §2) but never actually become more specific than this (even when the substantive is followed by the pronoun šū, as in CH §§191 and 229, it still refers to the same prementioned prototype). These points are all characteristic of generic conditionals—timeless, impersonal dependencies in which every occurrence mentioned in the protasis has its consistent consequence(s) in the apodosis. This matter will be given more comprehensive consideration below. 1.  ana abim murabbīšu ū ummim murabbītišu ul abī atta ul ummī atti iqtabi ‘If he says to the father raising him or to the mother raising him “you are not my father, you are not my mother”’ (CH §192). 2.  As is explained below, this characteristic is true of primary laws, which state a case for the first time. Secondary laws—laws that continue, or are dependent on, a preceding law—are of course referential to it. Any attempt to consider the CH prologue as the reference context for the laws is doomed. The turning point between the prologue in CH and the laws is in effect a shift between two extremely different genres, namely, royal inscriptions and law collections, which happen to occur in the same text.

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123

The two extant law collections written in OB serve as our primary corpus for this inquiry. The Code of Ešnunna (LE) is best suited and hence preferable for analyzing and describing the nature of the OB legal CS. Although shorter, it is much more instructive because it is far less regularized in terms of the number of strategies used (e.g., šumma, ša, etc.), the various strategies being a key feature in the attempt to determine the type of CS occurring in the laws. Furthermore, the internal makeup of the protases seems to be more consistent syntactically in this corpus, which makes it easier (or even simply possible) to describe. The Code of Ḫammurabi (CH) is usually the collection considered to be representative of OB law and, hence, it is the corpus more fully discussed in the literature. In its syntax, however, there are many issues that remain a pending problem. It may be that CH, being a solemn, commemorative, emblematic text, has been edited or collated from various sources (see Charpin 2000: 84–85 for a suggestion that some of the laws are translations from Sumerian). 3 Despite these features, the CH is a larger composition and is more complex textually (for instance, unlike the LE, it has many secondary protases, adverbial clauses, etc.). Many of the problems raised in connection with the structure of laws actually stem from the laws of Ḫammurabi. They are therefore indispensable and of utmost significance for our discussion. An additional, very instructive source that is sometimes compared to these two collections is the Edict of Ammīṣadūqa (Kraus 1984: 169–83). The aims of this chapter are to analyze and describe the CSs in the corpus based upon their distinctive characteristics and in comparison with the conditionals in the letters (chapter 2) and the omens (chapter 4). The method consists of (1) conducting a comparison between the super-paradigm formed by the various strategies capable of expressing a law and the super-paradigm of strategies that express an ordinary condition; and (2) examination of law formulations in other corpora, such as letters and royal edicts. These research strategies yield an anticipated result: the final picture confirms the hypothesis that the external similarity of both types of CSs is largely superficial. 3.1.  Various strategies and paradigmatic constitution In this section, the variety of strategies that are used in formulating laws in OB are examined—šumma structures, paratactic structures, as well as inūma, ūm, and ša clauses. The description includes the various protasis and apodosis paradigms of each strategy. The results of this examination shed light on the syntactic nature of the CSs in the laws. 3.1.1.  šumma structures The protases in the most common structure in the LE corpus and the main strategy in the laws of Hammurabi seem externally identical to the protases in the letters and the omens. However, a closer look reveals differences: the most common form is a chain 3.  One of the marks of editing is syntactic irregularity. By comparison, the thousands of OB letters, which come from a large area and a lengthy temporal span, often exhibit a better internal syntactic regularity, simply because they were not subject to any manipulation after their initial formulation when written.

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iprus–ma . . . iptaras# (or lā iprus# when negative) occurring in slightly more than 60% of the total occurrences (chains and single forms) in the LE corpus. 4 This chain can house paris forms with(in) it (e.g., ex. [221] above. The second-most common form is an unchained iptaras (22% in LE). The rest of the possibilities are rather rare: 2 cases of iparras, 2 cases of a single iprus, one chain iprus–ma iprus, and one case with paris forms. The chain #iprus–ma . . . iptaras# is the most marked difference from epistolary šumma structures, where chains are a relative rarity (see §2.1.2.1.9 above) and this specific chain never occurs. As mentioned by Loesov (2004: 148), this chain is similar to the report in the Ḫammurabi letters (as well as, in fact, to any report in the letters that states a case). However, whereas the case report in the letters is opposed temporally to other forms (e.g., a chain of iparras forms, which may account for various events), in the law collections no such opposition occurs—that is, iparras is opposed temporally to neither iprus nor iptaras, and a chain made up of these forms is in fact the only way of depicting a chain of events. When the last event in a chain is negative, the form used is lā iprus (in the CH there are slightly more cases of lā iptaras than of lā iprus at the end of the chain: the ratio is 10 : 7, respectively). A single event is normally communicated by a single iptaras form. This could be explained by its being a boundary not only marking off the chain but also marking the shift between protasis and apodosis. (This issue has been discussed above in §2.7.2 with regard to the CSs in the letter corpus.) Exceptions occur in LE §§21 and 47, where iprus forms occur instead. This phenomenon is well known from CH as well (where a single iprus form is very common, in addition to the better attested single iptaras form) and remains unexplained. Actually, however, both iprus and iptaras are equally practical for signaling the end of the protasis, since neither of them normally figures in the apodosis (see the only exception in n. 12, p. 130). In LE §29 (and CH §34), all forms are non-chained, single iptaras forms. The standard chain is exemplified in LE §56: [220] šumma kalbum šegī–ma bābtum ana bēlišu ušēdī–ma kalabšu lā iṣṣur–ma awīlam iššuk–ma uštamīt ‘If a dog is raving and the ward authorities notify its owner but (the owner) does not guard his dog and it bites a man and kills (him) . . .’ (and similarly, CH §112) The case is made up of a group of events expressed by iprus forms and marked off by an iptaras form. 5 The list of events follows a single paris form that opens the chain, describing the circumstances affecting the dog. These forms can be embedded in the chain without disrupting it: 4.  The CH corpus is more complicated in this respect (see Maloney 1982: 271–99), and the percentage of these chains is lower: roughly 80 cases in 300 protases, some 27%. Unchained iptaras makes up roughly 75 cases out of 300 (see Maloney 1982: 266–70), some 25%. The rest of the forms are less common—38 cases of unchained iprus, 18 cases of iparras, etc. Note that the proportions are not quite the same as in the LE corpus; a case in point is lā iptaras: there are none in LE and more than 20 in CH. 5.  This is yet another case where LE differs from CH, in which the behavior of these chains is much more erratic; for instance, there are 8 cases of iptaras–ma (that is, this form functions in mid-chain).

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[221] šumma awīlum bušêšu ana napṭarim ana maṣṣartim iddin–ma bītum lā pališ sippum lā ḫališ aptum lā nasḫat bušê maṣṣartim ša iddinušum uḫtalliq . . . ‘If a man gives his property to a napṭarum for safekeeping, and he (the napṭarum) loses the property for safe keeping which he (the man) gave him (while) the house is not broken into, the threshold not scraped, the window not moved . . .’ §36 6 It appears that the paris forms, whether part of or embedded in the chain, have the same temporal reference as the other forms. They are different in their diathesis (mostly passive when the lexeme is transitive) and the fact that they depict a state and are therefore opposed aspectually to iprus and iptaras forms, which seem to represent events. The foregoing tidy-looking description is a feature of the LE corpus. The CH corpus presents an array of difficulties that are reviewed above and discussed at greater length below, in the following sections. It is important to note here one factor that is relevant to the syntagmatics of these structures in the law collections, especially the CH. In comparison to the average šumma CS in the epistolary genre, in addition to the chains in both protasis and apodosis already discussed above, the individual clauses in the CH occasionally show great complexity and contain a relatively large number of substantival, adjectival, and adverbial clauses (see §3.1.1.5) that must be taken into consideration to produce a comprehensive statement. In this respect, they are indeed similar to epistolary reports, as suggested by Loesov. 3.1.1.1.  The protasis in the law collections: literature review The function of predicative forms in legal šumma protases has been given ample, if nondefinitive, description. Views regarding the values of the predicative forms in the legal protasis diverge considerably. 1.  Goetze (1936) was the first to recognize the form iptaras as a separate tense; he described it: On the basis of all this evidence, the assumption is justified that it is the function of the t‑form—or at least one of its functions—to link the past to the present; that it denotes the action which has just been performed and still affects the situation. The best rendering, then, is (wherever possible) by the English perfect “someone has done something,” “something has happened,” “something has been done.” By this translation the t-form is kept apart from the primary preterit which contains a mere statement and refers to an action as a past fact: “somebody did something.” It is differentiated also from the permansive which denotes a state or condition without indicating any 6.  All references to LE are cited by § only; references to codex Ḫammurabi are designated by CH and the relevant section number

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connection with previous actions: “someone or something is in such and such a state.” (Goetze 1936: 312)

As pointed out by Maloney (1982: 13–14), Goetze discusses the various functions of the form as well: it serves as an aorist and also as the relative tense in subordination (Goetze 1936: 319–21). 2.  GAG §161d describes iprus in the protasis as corresponding to the present, but in the additions in the revised edition (at the beginning of §161), following the conclusions reached by Hirsch (1969; see below), the possibility of interpreting iprus as preterite is mentioned as well. iparras is said to denote habitual action only rarely and otherwise mostly denotes modality. Note that this statement is made with regard to the protasis in OB in general, comprising all genres. 3.  Streck’s work heavily relies on Denz’s Noetic theory. 7 In this theory, the conditional is normally found in the future (Denz 1971: 38). Consequently, for Streck, iprus denotes anteriority vis-à-vis the reference point; in a law, because the apodosis provides a future reference point, iprus is future anterior (Streck 1998a: 188–89). Streck (1998b: 304) states that in the laws the protasis (and apodosis) lie after the present point, that is, in the future:

past

present

a b c d future legal case legal consequence

Streck (1995: 200–201 and 1999: 112–13) is even more specific regarding the function of the forms, this time in a chain (which in principle does not apply, as shown in §2.1.2.1.9 above, in the letters):

iprus–ma past present

iptaras apodosis future

The behavior of iprus compels Streck to regard it as an anterior, relative tense, rather than a past tense, which it often is (e.g., in epistolary šumma clauses, main clauses, etc.). In addition, as already pointed out above (p. 39 n. 18), Streck does not differentiate functionally between affirmative and negative iprus, which seriously affects his conclusions. The future status attributed to the protasis or the apodosis probably stems from Denz’s (1971) a priori description of what constitutes a conditional. The difference between 7.  “Was eine Bedingung ist und wie sie demzufolge definiert werden muß darüber entscheidet nicht die Sprache—die ist nur Zeichen für die Bedingung—, und auch nicht der Gebrauch von Partikeln, sondern nur die Noetik. Es ist also die Frage zu stellen, was für eine noetische Beziehung es ist, die zwischen dem bedingenden und dem bedingten Sachverhalt besteht und, ist diese Beziehung einmal definiert, die Konsequenzen für die Grammatik, d. h. für die Verbalsyntax zu ziehen” (Denz 1971: 36).

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iprus and iptaras, according to Streck, is that, although the former only shows the anteriority of the protasis to the apodosis, the latter shows, in addition, the posteriority of the protasis to the present moment. Streck (1998a: 183–84) describes iparras as simultaneous or posterior to a given reference point (which is the time of the law formulation) but also mentions that, since the future is close to modality, it can denote the latter in the legal protasis (CH §138; see ex. [233]), but also plurality (CH §186; see ex. [238]). 4.  For Metzler (2002: 873–75), whose analysis covers the entire body of literary OB, iprus signals relative anteriority of the present, future, or past; in the case of the laws, it is the present, or the recipient’s point of view (i.e., the point of legal decision making, 2002: 43), and the form depicts a completed action. The form iptaras has the same meaning as iprus plus an additional but elusive nuance. At the end of chains (“Perfekt des Fortschreitens”), it is anterior to the past or the present (pp. 875–76). As for iparras, it is viewed as denoting cotemporaneity (in the protasis) and posteriority to reference time (in the apodosis; p. 887), modality (p. 888), and plurality (habitual or durative; pp. 888–89). 5.  Loesov, like Metzler, prefers to locate the reference point at the time of legal decision-making (Loesov 2004: 150–55), but in a later article (2005: 713–14), he retracts this statement. According to Loesov, iptaras forms represent the events that are legally the most relevant, the “problem” part. By analogy to the Ḫammurabi letters, where one occasionally finds a shift from the complaint to an iptaras form that denotes a present perfect, Loesov maintains that iptaras in the legal protasis signals an analogous shift from narrative to discourse interpretation, located at the reference point: protasis ‘narrative’ iprus

∅ point: legal decision-making ‘discourse’ iptaras (present-perfect-like)

apodosis (future)

In the legal protasis, iparras forms are used as durative, habitual, or iterative. 6.  Maloney’s (1982: 262–361) description is by far the most detailed, dealing primarily with iprus and iptaras forms. Maloney views chained iprus forms as background for the more salient facts, which basically occur as iptaras, often containing the “punishable act.” 8 Maloney is unable to formulate the difference between single occurrences of iprus and iptaras. In fact, this problem has not received a satisfactory solution to this day (and the reason for this may well be the problem discussed in n. 3, p. 123). However, temporally speaking, both iprus and iptaras together are essentially viewed as aoristic: [I]t is probably best to consider the preterites and perfects in the legal sections of the CH as well as the LE as essentially aoristic (in the etymological sense). They serve to express punctual events, in contrast to the present-future, but their tense reference is really 8.  Sometimes, it is simply the act of being caught in the act that is expressed by iptaras, as in, for example, CH §22 (see ex. [222] below); no doubt, this is crucial for the legal process even though it is not a crime in itself (see Loesov 2004: 152).

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indeterminate. The law codes themselves provide no strong contextual indicators to help us in this area, and so we shall leave the question aside here.” (Maloney 1982: 263; my emphasis)

Maloney’s formulation for the law corpus is closest to the one chosen in this study, since it goes hand-in-hand with the generic nature of the laws. In view of the strikingly divergent opinions the scholars cited above have regarding the function of predicative forms in the protasis of the šumma strategy, it seems good to attempt to review what we do know and use that as a basis for our continued investigation. Two issues are central for establishing the functional value of predicates: (1) syntagmatically, the specific context surrounding the CSs; and (2) paradigmatically, the other predicative types that are opposed to the form in question, at the same point. It has already been pointed out that CSs in the law collections have nothing to lean on syntagmatically—that is, outside of the CS itself. 9 In addition, in contrast to the CSs in the letters to which we can oppose, in toto, other forms (indicative, precative, etc.), in the law collections we can only oppose legal structures to themselves. This means that temporal values cannot be determined on the basis of and relative to the external context. In other words, any reference point we choose necessarily is arbitrary. Stating that the temporal point of reference is the point of legal decision-making between the protasis and apodosis (as do Metzler and Loesov) is no better than Streck’s asserting that it is located before the protasis (because the entire thing has not yet happened). Objectively, only the two paradigms of opposing predicative forms in the protasis and in the apodosis remain. One issue that could make these decisions less arbitrary is the clearly generic nature of the laws (see p. 122 above), because this provides us with a good reason to stop searching for an exact reference point and permits us to focus on more concrete data. So much for syntagmatics. 3.1.1.2.  iprus versus iptaras The most common forms in the legal protasis paradigm are iprus and iptaras, for which we can only assume, based on the lack of external context, general unmarkedness with regard to temporal reference. This unmarkedness becomes obvious in translation of these forms, which typically fluctuate between past, present, and even, in Streck’s translations, future. Note that even scholars who see a temporal difference between iprus and iptaras encounter difficulties in reproducing their solutions in translation. There are certain problems with temporally detaching from one another iprus and iptaras forms that occur on the same ‑ma chain. Streck (1998a: 190 n. 36) analyzes iptaras as removed temporally from the preceding iprus forms with the help of a temporal adverb (warkānum–ma ‘later’; 1999: 112). 10 It is important to remember that chains are characterized by a principle whereby one form follows another, the order 9.  This does not apply to secondary, or dependent protases; see §3.1.1.5.1. 10.  Unless of course Streck means that his explanation applies only to warkānum. The adverb warkānum creates a temporal gap even between two similar forms.

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(theoretically) being iconic—that is, the events tend to follow each other. The same statement applies to iptaras forms, which follow, temporally or logically, what precedes them. This order is sometimes not perfect in that the final event, the iptaras form, may occasionally be co-temporaneous, at least partially, with the preceding action: [222] . . . ḫubtam iḫbut–ma ittaṣbat ‘. . . commits a robbery and is caught’ (during the robbery) CH §22 [223] . . . ana numāt bēl bītim īnšu iššī–ma numāt bēl bītim ilteqe ‘. . . covets the possessions of the owner and takes the possessions of the owner’ (coveting is still going on when he takes the possessions) CH §25 [224] . . . aḫšu iddī–ma eqlam lā iptete ‘. . . he is negligent and does not open the field’ CH §44 (and similarly CH §55) (again, negligence is still valid when he fails to open the field) That is, in addition to the occasional examples in which two similar forms are in fact co-temporaneous, such as iprus–ma iprus (e.g., CH §228, GAP U) and iptaras–ma iptaras (e.g., CH §§2, 16, 27, etc.), we have cases in which, despite the obvious shift iprus → iptaras, the activities co-occur, partially (or fully) overlapping. This seems to be enough evidence for us to rule out different temporal spheres for each of these forms, iprus and iptaras. It is almost an axiom that each form in the chain basically precedes the following one (temporally or logically), but this does not mean that each of them needs to have a different temporal sphere. Loesov’s view regards the two parts of this chain—the one consisting of one or more iprus forms and the one with iptaras form—not merely as two different tenses but as forms actually belonging each to a different macrosyntactic domain. In other words, although the iprus sequence is compared with a narrative, the iptaras form is part of the dialogue (Loesov uses the term “discourse”). This solution is a problem in OB, because the asymmetric connective ‑ma (which is generally found between the last iprus and the first iptaras in the chain) creates domains in which all the forms are interconnected, each domain showing certain features common to the forms (such as indicative, modal marking, subjunctive, infinitive, etc.; see §2.7.2). These domains in principle never intermix. 11 In view of this, interconnection via ‑ma between dissimilar higher-order domains such as direct speech and report is highly unlikely in OB. It can occur, with -ma intervening between the domains, only with the assistance of the direct speech converter umma x–ma, which allows direct speech to occur wherever it is needed, including in interconnection with another clause (see ex. [176], p. 95). 12 Otherwise, in CH as well 11.  The paratactic conditional patterns constitute the most prominent “exception”; see §2.2.1 above. The data on these domains are discussed by me in a forthcoming essay (Cohen forthcoming). 12.  An example of the problem: lūriška–ma ana qīštim taddinaššu ṭēmka gamram šu[p]ra[m–ma] ‘Let me ask you to sen[d m]e your complete report (saying): “you gave it to me as present” . . .’ (AbB 11, 16:17–20). The phrase ana qīštim taddinaššu is outside the precative domain (lūriška–ma . . . šupram) and is in fact the verbatim content of ṭēmka. Yet another example is AbB 14, 168:13–17 (our ex. [159]), where

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as in the letters, direct speech occurs in the slot of the object, immediately preceding the verbal form iqbi or iqtabi (e.g., CH §9). Direct speech in OB is not interconnected by ‑ma with its speech-introducing verb. In fact, Loesov attempts to house what may be two altogether different functions of iptaras under the same roof, namely, its chain-ending function and its linguistic perfect function. However, there is no evidence that the two functions can coincide in OB. The solution to this problem offered here is to view iptaras at the end of chains as an abstract textual boundary, marking off the chain and thus the domain, which is in this particular case the legal protasis, at least in principle. This is how it works in LE, and this is how it tends to work in CH. Incidentally, because iptaras constitutes the end of the chain, it also often coincides with the most salient event. Therefore, iptaras does not have a different temporal value than iprus, whatever value the latter may have. This function of iptaras is the same, in essence, as its function in epistolary reports or even in the narrative of the epic, where punishable acts are not relevant. It has already been mentioned that this boundary could have been set by iprus forms as well, because neither form occurs in the apodosis. 13 Because this chain-ending function is a pan-OB linguistic fact, 14 working this way even outside the domain of conditional structures, this explanation for the function of iptaras forms at the end of the chain seems better than any other. 3.1.1.3.  lā iprus and iptaras Hirsch (1969) is a prominent opponent of two different directions taken in research, including the one taken in this study. One proposal views the iprus forms in the protasis as denoting the present (in fact, translated by the present; GAG §161d); the other direction focuses on the putative modality of iparras forms in the protasis. Hirsch states the problem by adducing valid counterexamples from CH; in view of the claim made above, that the laws have a generic nature, Hirsch’s counterexamples need to be confronted, so that the generic claim can be asserted as valid for the entire genre (not just the LE corpus). Hirsch (1969: 123–25), examining the temporal value of iprus, is concerned with cases where the form iprus cannot be rendered by the present tense. He even circumscribes these cases syntactico-semantically: these occurrences are always contrastive to the preceding context: [225] šumma awīlum nadītam īḫuz–ma amtam ana mutiša iddin–ma mārī ittalad warkānum amtum šī itti bēltiša uštatamḫir aššum mārī uldu bēlessa ana kaspim ul inaddišši . . . ‘If a man marries a nadītum and she gives a maid to her husband and she bears children, thereafter the maid considers ‑ma appears to have been erased. This explains why the particle between two direct-speech sections is put in parentheses. 13.  There is only one exception, in CH §11: tuššam–ma idke/iddi. 14.  The only genre that has a different parallel mechanism is the royal inscription corpus; see Cohen 2005a: 69–72.

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herself on equal status as her mistress, (but) because she bore children, her mistress may not sell her’ CH §146 [226] šumma mārī lā ulid bēlessa ana kaspim inaddišši ‘If she did not bear children, her mistress may sell her’ CH §147 Hirsch claims that lā ulid in ex. [226] is contrasted with aššum mārī uldu ‘because she bore children’ in ex. [225]; both cannot be rendered with the present tense. He has no problem with ittalad. [227] a  šumma awīlum ana mārišu nasāḫim pānam ištakan ana dayyānī mārī anassaḫ iqtabi dayyānū warkassu iparrasū–ma ‘If a man decides to disinherit his son, (and) says to the judges “I will disinherit my son,” the judges will consider his case . . .’ b  šumma mārum arnam kabtam ša ina aplūtim nasāḫim lā ublam abum mārašu ina aplūtim ul inassaḫ ‘if the son did not commit a serious crime which calls for disinheritance against his father, the father may not disinherit his son’ CH §168 c  šumma arnam kabtam ša ina aplūtim nasāḫim ana abīšu itbalam ana ištiššu pānīšu ubbalū ‘if he committed a serious crime which calls for disinheritance against his father, for once, they shall pardon him’. d  šumma arnam kabtam ana šinīšu itbalam abum mārušu ina aplūtim inassaḫ ‘If he committed a serious crime twice, the father may disinherit his son’ CH §169 This is a similar case, although, of course, the lexeme wabālum does not occur before b. Nevertheless, Hirsch is absolutely correct in contending that the occurrences in bold type (lā ublam in b, itbalam in c and d) are not and cannot be deemed as present. In these cases and a few more, 15 these lā iprus and iptaras forms indeed cannot be regarded as present because they refer to an event prior to the current temporal point, whatever it may be. Moreover, these occurrences and their polar contrast with the context remind us of the asseverative paradigm of OB (see Cohen 2005a: 17–68). In a nutshell, asseverative forms constitute an emphatic response to a form, expressing a contrastive polarity. In English, the affirmative forms of this kind of response consist of a stressed auxiliary (e.g., ‘I did do it’) and the negative forms of stressed negation (e.g., ‘I did not do it’). This may be the case here as well. Hirsch’s examples occur either in a subordinate clause (in an adverbial clause with aššum or an adjective clause headed by ša) or—and this is very important—in a secondary protasis (see below, §3.1.1.5.1)—that is, one that continues the main case. The former case is characterized by partial information vis-à-vis the main protasis: only what is necessary is left. Both subordinate clauses and secondary protases have one 15. (1) nudunnâm ša mussa iddinušim ‘the marriage gift that her husband gave her’ (CH §171) leads to šumma mussa nudunnâm lā iddiššim ‘if her husband did not give her a marriage gift’ (CH §172). (2) ša abūša šeriktam išrukušim ‘whose father gave her a gift’ (CH §179) leads to šumma abum ana mārtišu . . . šeriktam lā iš⟨r⟩ukšim ‘if a father did not give a present to his daughter’ (CH §180).

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important trait in common: unlike the main protases of laws, which have no context except the one common to all laws (which is vague and here labeled generic), they have a context to which they are referential, temporally as well as anaphorically. So, unlike main protases in which the temporal reference cannot be determined because, being entirely generic (both actor and action), they are not referential 16 to anything outside the law, in secondary protases as well as in subordinate clauses there is referentiality. This referentiality may explain the existence of relative tense (which is very clear in the case of subordinate clauses; see §3.1.1.5.2). In terms of the structural analytic method followed here, the secondary protases and subordinate clauses (see below, §3.1.1.5) constitute distinct functional slots, different from main protases, and consequently, each has its own paradigm. In these paradigms, in sharp contrast with the main protases’ paradigm, temporal opposition between the forms may occur. 17 Yet another type of secondary protases refers to the outcome of the preceding apodosis (mentioned by Maloney 1982: 309–10). This is rare but, nevertheless, because the forms in the secondary protasis are referential to what happens in the preceding apodosis, the temporal value of these forms may also have a different temporal value. 3.1.1.4.  iprus and iprusu Metzler has reservations regarding the tenselessness of iprus forms: [228] šumma awīlum aššatum īḫuz–ma laʾbum iṣṣabassi ana šanītim aḫāzim pānīšu ištakan iḫḫaz aššassu ša laʾbum iṣbatu ul izzibši ‘If a man marries a woman and laʾbum afflicts her, and he decides to marry another, he may marry. As for his wife whom laʾbum afflicted, he may not leave her’ CH §148 [229] šumma makkūram uḫtalliq # mimma ša uḫtalliqu irīab ‘If he caused property loss, he shall pay back whatever was lost’ CH §232 Metzler (2002: 43) claims that the protasis cannot be translated by the German present tense because doing so would result in incongruent meaning of what he considers to be the same form (iṣṣabassi vs. iṣbat in ex. [228] and uḫtalliq vs. uḫtalliqu in ex. [229]), or from another angle, that one event may be represented by two different temporal references. In effect, both examples answer to the same syntactic point: the form iprusu in an 16.  Compare the temporal frame of the narrative. Although in many languages consisting of otherwise preterite-denoting forms, the narrative is often not anchored, or referential, to any text, which makes it a priori atemporal. Imagine, as an example, a science fiction work written about a specific future (e.g., Orwell’s 1984, published in 1949, an example brought up by Weinrich [2001: 62–63], already in his first edition [1964]) but nonetheless told, like any other story, by preterites that denote not the past but something different—the events in the narrative. The subordinate clauses in the narrative, however, are often referential to the main event line and show their own, perfectly legitimate, temporal paradigm. 17.  The different paradigm of secondary protases is yet to be defined precisely. Maloney (1982: 309–21) lists all the cases of what he terms “continuing protases” for other purposes (the distribution of iptaras forms). It is not entirely clear whether his criteria for secondary protases are the same as the criteria used here. See §3.1.1.5.1 below.

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adjective clause headed by ša in the apodosis is referential to an event in the protasis. However, (1) as I have argued throughout this study, the protasis and the apodosis are two distinct paradigms, and the values of forms in each of them may therefore be different; and (2), iprus and iprusu do not need to have the same values—they are a priori different forms. Basically, iprusu forms occur only in clauses that follow a nucleus and, in fact, they are the only way to refer to an event in the protasis. The solution has already been suggested above: adjectival and adverbial clauses are always referential to other events and states of affairs, which explains their different functional values. [230] šumma awīlum ṣeḫram ana mārūtim ilqe inūma ilqûšu abāšu u ummašu iḫīaṭ # tarbītum šī ana bīt abīšu itâr ‘If a man takes a child for adoption, and when he takes him he (the child) wishes to search for his father and mother, the adopted child shall return to his family’ CH §186 Metzler (2002: 44) opposes interpreting iprusu as present in this case as well. The value of this iprusu form can be explained in several ways. (1) Its value cannot be determined because there is no paradigm—that is, there are no forms that interchange with it (see the following section). (2) The form iḫīaṭ (iparras) may actually not be a part of the šumma protasis but instead constitutes the protasis of a secondary condition (for which see §3.1.1.6). (3) As seen above (§1.2), the paradigms of temporal clauses change with the forms in their main clauses, which has an effect on the value of the individual verbal forms. 3.1.1.5.  Referential environments in the laws This section discusses two important exceptions to the generic nature of the law collections: one consists of the secondary protases (discussed also by Maloney 1982: 309– 10) and the other involves the large number of subordinate clauses in the laws. Both types of exception have in common that they are dependent on and referential to either a preceding law or their main clause. 3.1.1.5.1.  Secondary protases in CH Secondary protases are protases that continue, and thus refer back, to a main protasis. They are characterized by several features that prove their textual dependency, the fact that they cannot occur alone. For instance, pronouns may represent entities in the primary protasis (or apodosis): for example, iktašas-su ‘reaches him’ (CH §2); āl-šu ‘his town’ (CH §27); and māru-šu ‘his son’ (CH §29). Another facet of this dependency could be a verbal form whose agent is mentioned only in the preceding main protasis, as in uṣiam ‘he comes out’ (CH §4) and uddappir ‘he leaves, runs away’ (CH §31). Dependency is also apparent in noun definiteness: wardum šū and wardam šuāti (CH §§18 and 19). All of these cases may be retrievable only if they have been mentioned earlier: a verbal form whose referent is missing tells us nothing. Secondary protases 18 in CH 18.  The number after the decimal point is the number of the protasis inside the law: CH §§2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4 , 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 13.1, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 27.1, 29, 30.1, 31, 32.1, 32.2, 32.3, 43, 46, 47, 49.1,

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Table 3.1 Primary vs. secondary protases in CH parameters

primary secondary (±195 cases) (±114 cases)

single lā iptaras

2

11

chain-final lā iptaras

6

2

lā iparras

1

7

NVC/unipartite occurring alone

—

3+16

NVC/unipartite followed by events

5

—

are both law-internal (36 cases) and self-standing (78 cases). Law-internal cases occur within the same section (and are marked in n. 18 by the number after a decimal point), whereas self-standing cases are marked as a new section. Table 3.1 compares several features in main and secondary protases. A natural difference is that the secondary protases are shorter because they do not have to specify anything already mentioned. They are characterized by a relatively large number of initial lā iptaras forms, lā iparras forms, and especially by unipartite nonverbal clauses that are not followed by additional information. Their textual dependence is apparent in the fact that they may show tense values relative to their (generic) main protases (see §3.1.1.3, where these relative tense values are discussed). They are similar in this respect to the subordinate clauses discussed in the following section. 3.1.1.5.2.  Subordinate clauses in CH Although this monograph does not attempt a syntactic description of the CH corpus, it seems nevertheless important to illustrate the principle by which the functional values of the forms in subordinate clauses can be determined. Neither the subordinate clauses nor the secondary protases of the CH have been thoroughly investigated, so our understanding of their function is limited. 19 The subordinate clauses in CH have their own paradigms. The few details given here do not constitute a full account of their function: an account of this kind belongs in a comprehensive syntactic description of the law collections, which is beyond the scope of the present study. In addition to the secondary protases, which are referential to the preceding (primary) protasis or apodosis, there exist several types of subordinate clauses: for instance, adjec50, 51, 52, 54, 61, 62, 62.1, 63, 65, GAP H.1, GAP H.2, GAP T.1, GAP U.1, 100.1, 101, 103, 105, 106, 116, 116.1, 116.2, 118, 123, 129.1, 133b, 136.1, 139, 140, 141.1, 141.2, 142.1, 143, 147, 149, 151.1, 151.2, 152, 163.1, 164, 168.1, 169, 169.1, 171, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 174, 176b, 178.1, 189, 197, 198, 199, 207, 207.1, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 220, 222, 223, 225, 230, 231, 232, 242/243, 251, 252, 253.1, 254, 255, 256, 260, 263, 269, 270, 276, 280.1 and 281. 19.  One of the difficulties is that subordinate clauses may occur within secondary protases, which creates a further difficulty. These are the cases: CH §§8.3, 10, 47, 62, 100.1, 101, 105, 152, 151.1, 151.2, 163.1, 171, 173, 263.

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Table 3.2 protasis forms (cases) —

subordinator apodosis (cases) adi

6 —

forms parsu

6

iprusu (1× parsu)

ašar

1

iprusu

aššum

6

iprusu

2

parsu

ēma

2

parsu

4

iprusu

inūma

3

iparrasu

2

iprusu (1× iptarsu)

ištu

3

iprusu (1× iptarsu)

2

iparrasu

lāma

—

1

iprusu

mala

8

2

iprusu, parsu

mimma ša

14

iprusu (1× parsu)

3

iprusu

subst.

10

iprusu

iprusu, parsu (1× iparrasu)

ša

44

iprusu, iparrasu, parsu

warka

11

iprusu/iptarsu

41 —

iprusu (1× iparrasu)

tive clauses headed by ša; attributive clauses headed by a substantive in the construct state; adverbial clauses (headed by causal aššum, temporal/conditional inūma, temporal ištu, locative ašar, etc.). I have tabulated (Table 3.2) the various cases, together with some related data: the number of occurrences of each subordinator with the predicative forms that co-occur within its scope, as well as their distribution between protasis and apodosis. Tables 3.3–3.4 (p. 136) present the paradigms of forms in a representative group of subordinate clause types in the CH corpus. Functional values are found, as usual, in the opposition between forms. Where we find no opposition, we cannot specify value. Three subordinate types are represented in the tables: adjective clauses (headed by ša), attributive clauses (headed by a substantival nucleus in the construct state), and temporal inūma clauses. Adjective ša clauses are the only clauses in which any consistent oppositions between the forms is found. In the protasis, iprusu is anterior to its main clause and parsu is unmarked, occurring either as anterior or as cotemporaneous with its main clause. In the apodosis, iprusu is anterior to its main clause, parsu is co-temporaneous with it, and iparrasu is non-anterior, meaning that it is either co-temporaneous or posterior to its reference point. This clearly shows that the state of affairs in the protasis is different from that in the apodosis. The terms are always relative to their environment (which, in itself, is not referential), but in terms of translation, they are given nonrelative representation (simple forms in English are in essence nonrelative temporally). The distinct paradigms in fact explain why iprusu forms in adjective clauses should be considered different from main-clause iprus forms: in the protasis, they are referential to a point prior to the event in the protasis (their own main clause), whereas in

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Table 3.3 Subordinate clauses in the protasis head

form

value (relative)

examples (CH §)

iprusu

anterior

9 25* 159 166

parsu

unmarked

subst.

iprusu

inūma

iprusu

no opposition, hence no value

ša

anterior

9 26 32 158

co-temp.

141 151 165 3 9 10 176a 186

Table 3.4 Subordinate clauses in the apodosis head ša

form

value (relative)

examples (CH §)

iprusu

anterior

6 9 23 41 49 53

iparrasu non-anterior parsu

subst. inūma

co-temporaneous

no opposition, iparrasu hence no value iprusu

46 49 150 2 166 (GAP A) 5 9 232 165–6 177

the apodosis they are in principle either co-temporaneous with, or even anterior to, the events in the protasis. The form parsu is different as well. Although in the protasis it is obviously unmarked, often being referential to a point prior to the event in the protasis, in other cases it is (less frequently) co-temporaneous with its main clause. In the apodosis, parsu is merely co-temporaneous with its main clause. The form iparrasu does not occur in the protasis in adjective clauses at all, and in the apodosis it is non-anterior, referential to the temporal frame of the apodosis and onward. In contrast, the other two types (bīt īpušu and inūma clauses) do not have a paradigm, since in each environment they have only one option. This means that they are not opposed to anything. In these cases, it appears, the meaning is determined either by analogy to other paradigms or syntagmatically, depending on the event referred to. For instance, the type bīt īpušu always occurs with iprusu, which has a reference similar to the same form in adjective clauses. 3.1.1.6.  The functions of iparras Now we can move on to the values of iparras forms. LE has but two examples, and both are quite clearly modal. The CH exhibits a somewhat more complicated situation in which there are four potential solutions: (1) modality (GAG, Streck), (2) durative, habitual (Metzler, Loesov), (3) present (Hirsch), and (4) secondary protasis of a paratactic condition (Hirsch). The primary issue now is to determine the functional value of iparras in opposition to the other forms.

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The next item to take up is Hirsch’s justifiable objection to seeing iparras forms in the protasis as signals of modality (GAG §161i). Hirsch lists three groups of exceptions (1969: 120–23): one group is perceived as indicative, rather than modal (CH §§122, 67+a, 138, 274, and 172), the second group is judged to be durative (CH §§141–143), and in the third group iparras forms are analyzed as protases of a connected conditional (CH §§186, 66, and 118). The first group has iparras forms that are often translated as volitives, but Hirsch does not accept them as volitives: [231] šumma awīlum ana awīlim kaspam ḫurāṣam ū mimma šumšu ana maṣṣarūtim inaddin, mimma mala inaddinu šībī ukallam riksātim išakkam-ma ana maṣṣarūtim inaddin ‘If a man wishes to give silver, gold, or anything to a man for safekeeping, he will show whatever he shall give to witnesses, make out contracts, and then he may give (it) for safekeeping’ CH §122 Note that the apodosis has the phrase mala inaddinu ‘as much as he pays/will pay’ (in opposition with mala iddinu ‘as much as he gave’ in CH §§113 and 116), which means that he has not given anything yet. Thus, the volitive (rather than an actual event) seems to be the appropriate interpretation in the first example. As for the rest of the examples, Hirsch may be correct: 20 [232] šumma . . . inaddin ina mimma ša iddinu ītelli ‘If he gives. . . , he shall forfeit whatever he gave’ CH §67+a (GAP C) Here, in contrast to ex. [231], ša iddinu ‘what(ever) he gave’ confirms that giving did take place. [233] šumma awīlum ḫīrtašu ša mārī lā uldušum izzib, kaspam mala terḫatiša inaddiššim u šeriktam ša ištu bīt abīša ublam ušallamšim-ma izzibši ‘If a man intends to divorce/divorces his wife who did not bear him children, he will give her as much silver as her bride-price, and also repay to her the dowry that she had brought from her father’s house, and then he may divorce her’ CH §138 Hirsch is reluctant to accept intent as a basis for a legal consequence, but in this case, because it is nothing more than a set of instructions of what to do in these circumstances, his difficulty of interpreting intent as a basis for consequence is not clear: izzib specifies intent, rather than an event.

20.  One example is left unexplained: šumma awīlum mār ummānim iggar . . . ‘If a man intends to hire/ hires a craftsman . . .’ (CH §274). This example is found among several iprus forms with the same lexeme, which leaves the reason for using iparras unclear.

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[234] šumma mārūša aššum ina bītim šūṣîm usaḫḫamūši dayyānū warkassa iparrasū–ma ‘If her sons pressure her in order to make her leave the house, the judges shall investigate her case and . . .’ CH §172 What exx. [232] and [234] have in common is that they both occur in a secondary protasis, which means, as already suggested above, that it is in fact another paradigm, with different functional values of the forms. This allows us to conclude that iparras in this paradigm has no modal value but instead is merely opposed to lā iprus/iptaras forms that have a relative past function or, in other words, that it has a value of contemporaneity or relative present. The following group of iparras forms are attested in three consecutive laws and exhibit an anomalous behavior in CH: [235] šumma aššat awīlim ša ina bīt awīlim wašbat ana waṣêm pānīša ištakam-ma sikiltam isakkil bīssa usappaḫ mussa ušamṭa ukannūši-ma ‘If a man’s wife who is living in a man’s house decides to leave (while she) acquires property illegally, squanders her own house, (and) belittles her husband, she will be convicted and . . .’ CH §141 [236] šumma sinništum mussa izēr–ma ul taḫḫazanni iqtabi warkassa ina bābtiša ipparras–ma šumma naṣrat–ma ḫiṭītam lā īšu u mussa waṣī–ma magal ušamṭāši sinništum šī arnam ul īšu. . . ‘If a woman hates her husband and says “you will not have me,” her case will be investigated in the district authorities, and if she is cautious and has no fault, (while) her husband goes out and treats her very badly, this woman has no offense . . .’ CH §142 [237] šumma lā naṣrat waṣiat bīssa usappaḫ mussa ušamṭa sinništum šī ana mê inaddûši ‘If she is not cautious (but) goes out, (while she) squanders her estate and treats her husband badly, this woman will be thrown in the water’ CH §143 A modal function for these iparras forms is naturally out of the question, and Hirsch advocates viewing them as duratives. The fact that these forms co-occur with other iparras or paris forms may mean that we have yet another group, but there are too few such examples to make a rule. However, instead of durative, we are looking at forms that remind us of Zustandsätze, circumstantial clauses, especially in view of their proximity to stative paris forms. 21 In the case of the last group to which Hirsch refers (1969: 121 and nn. 27–28), he denies the volitive function and advocates a secondary conditional in all cases: [238] šumma awīlum ṣeḫram ana mārūtim ilqe {inūma ilqûšu abāšu u ummašu iḫīaṭ} tarbītum šī ana bīt abīšu itâr ‘If a man takes a baby for adoption but 21.  This function is rare in the letter corpus as well (for the form iparras), and there too it is difficult to determine the precise syntactic environments in which this function is found. In the epic literature, on the other hand, it is quite clear (see Cohen 2006).

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after he took him he wishes to look for his (biological) father and mother, the adopted child may return to its (biological) family . . .’ CH §186 In this example, the clause in curly brackets may be interpreted as a volitive in the protasis (‘he wishes to look for . . .’), perhaps as durative (‘ceaselessly looking for his parents’), or as a secondary protasis (‘after he took him, (if) he looks for . . .’) that actually belongs with another law-expressing strategy (for which see §§3.1.3 below). In the remaining two examples, a volitive solution seems forced, and the secondary protasis option is probably the better solution: [239] šumma awīlum kaspam itti tamkārim ilqē-ma tamkāršu īsiršū–ma mimma ša nadānim lā ibaššīšum kirišu ištu tarkibtim ana tamkārim iddim–ma suluppī mala ina kirîm ibbaššû ana kaspika tabal iqbīšum {tamkārum šū ul immaggar} suluppī ša ina kirîm ibbaššû bēl kirîm-ma ileqqē-ma kaspam u ṣibassu ša pī ṭuppišu tamkāram ippal-ma suluppī watrūtim ša ina kirîm ibbaššû bēl kirîm-ma il[eqqe] ‘If a man received silver from a merchant and his merchant presses him but there is nothing for him to give and he gives the merchant his orchard after pollination and says to him, “take as many dates as may grow in the orchard for your silver,” {(if) the merchant does not agree} (it is) the orchard owner (who) will get the dates that grow in the orchard, and then he will pay the merchant the silver and its interest according to his document, and the orchard owner himself will re[ceive] the excess dates that grow in the orchard’ CH §66 (GAP A) [240] šumma wardum ū lū amtum ana kiššātim ittandin {tamkārum ušetteq ana kaspim inaddin} ul ibbaqqar ‘If a male or female slave is sold 22 for debt servitude, {(if) the merchant lets the period elapse and sells (him/her)}, it may not be claimed’ CH §118 In all three examples, the iparras form is certainly neither durative nor circumstantial, 23 and in exx. [239] and [240], it does not seem to be a volitive. Hirsch’s solution is not ad hoc, because this strategy definitely exists in the law collections (see further §3.1.3 below). Huehnergard (2005b: 95) and Roth (1997: 103) analyze the form ušetteq as part of the apodosis; for this reason, it need not be discussed in this section, where the function of iparras in the protasis is described. In šumma clauses of the LE, iparras forms are not opposed temporally, but instead, as proposed in GAG §161i, modally: [241] šumma ina atḫī ištēn zittašu ana kaspim inaddin u aḫūšu šâmam ḫašeḫ . . . ‘If in a partnership, one wants to sell his share and the other is willing to buy . . . CH §38 24 22.  The form ittandin is analyzed in AHw 702b as preterite of Gtn, and therefore as an active form; so also Roth (1997: 103). I analyze this form “by the book,” following Huehnergard (2005b: 95), that is, as iptaras in the N stem. 23.  In the narrow sense, of course; there is a general association between the general framework of circumstantial expressions and the specific function of a conditional protasis. 24.  Additional cases are found in LE §41 and CH §30. CH §§122 and 186 are discussed above.

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Ex. [241] is a key example demonstrating modality. This iparras form is not distinguished temporally from the rest of the forms. The modal value is not quite like precative forms in an independent environment (which is mostly directive) but actually somewhat broader: [242] šumma igārum iqâm–ma bābtum ana bēl igārim ušēdī–ma igāršu lā u⟨dan⟩nin igāarum imqut–ma mār awīlim uštamīt . . . ‘If a wall threatens to collapse, and the ward authorities notify the wall’s owner but he does not reinforce his wall, and the wall collapses and causes the death of a member of the awīlum class . . .’ §58 The common denominator in all of these occurrences of iparras in the legal protases in LE is non-factuality as well as potentiality of the action—selling in ex. [241] is only a potential event, and so is collapsing in ex. [242]. In conclusion, the šumma protasis in law collections, unlike the epistolary protasis, is not part of a wider context. Therefore, the temporal reference point is arbitrary. Since these laws are analyzed on the basis of typical characteristics, as generic expressions that are always valid, the direction taken in translation is to represent them as an aoristic present (although any fixed temporal point is equally legitimate, because the structures are not referential to a specific point in time). The predicative forms in primary protases are not opposed temporally. The oppositions are, in the LE corpus, modal (iprus/iptaras representing events versus iparras, which express will as well as potentiality), in addition to the ever-present opposition with paris forms that denote a state. The CH proves more complex, exhibiting a few instances of iparras forms that have a durative or circumstantial function. The forms that are analyzed as secondary protases of the paratactic structure are dealt with below (§3.1.3). Table 3.5 illustrates these conclusions. Table 3.5 non-referential forms (primary protases) iprus lā iprus1 iptaras lā iprus2 and lā iptaras

event end/salient event

iparras

volitive or durative

paris

state/circumstances

non-temporal opposition

This results in a protasis that is very different indeed from the šumma conditional clause in the letters: modality is a value expressed by a consistent exponent, but tense is not, and the protasis often contains a chain of events that reports a case. In two types of environments, this characterization is inadequate: in secondary protases and in subordinate clauses. In secondary protases, as first noted by Hirsch (1969)

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Table 3.6 referential forms in secondary protases iprus

unmarked

lā iprus lā iprus iptaras

(only when mutually contrastive)

iptaras lā iptaras iparras

anterior

temporal opposition

unmarked co-temp.

and further developed above, there is temporal opposition between forms, as shown in Table 3.6. That is, in the paradigm of secondary šumma protases, the forms lā iprus and iptaras discussed by Hirsch (see §3.1.1.3, exx. [225]–[227]) signal anteriority, whereas iparras forms occurring in the same paradigm (§3.1.1.6, exx. [232] and [234]) are opposed and and signal cotemporaneity. The other two pairs in the table, the oppositions iprus versus lā iprus and iptaras versus lā iptaras, seem, based upon the list of secondary protases (p. 133 n. 18 above and Maloney 1982: 309–21), not to be affected by the special secondary protasis paradigm, but this is yet to be verified. This is why the only values given are for forms that show marked difference from their function in primary protases. 3.1.1.7.  The apodosis paradigm The apodosis paradigm of the šumma conditional strategy in the law collections is sui generis as well, compared with apodoses in the letters: around 90% of the apodoses here contain one or more iparras forms: [243] šumma wardam iššuk–ma uštamīt 15 šiqil kaspam išaqqal ‘If it bites a slave and kills him, he shall pay 15 sheqels (of) silver’ CH §57 This law is the direct continuation of ex. [220]: the apodosis is typical ‘he shall pay . . .’ An example of a chain of iparras forms is found in CH §28 (ex. [254], p. 145). In several cases, the apodosis is a complex clause, temporal or conditional. In some cases, there is a good reason to think that the chain of two iparras forms is another CS: [244] šumma awīlum mārašu ana šūnuqim ana tarbītim iddin–ma ipram piššatam lubuštam šalaš šanātim lā iddin 10 šiqil kaspam tarbīt mārišu išaqqal–ma mārašu itarru ‘If a man gives his son for suckling and for rearing but does not provide food, oil (or) clothing for three years, should he pay ten sheqels (of) silver, (the cost of) his son’s rearing, he may take away his child’ CH §32 (and see further below, §3.1.3)

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The rest of the cases consist of two occurrences of the predicative state of a noun and two with a substantival syntagm. The common iparras form is not opposed here to precative forms (contrary to the epistolary apodosis), which generally leads to neutralization of the modal component. However, the rare predicative state forms—all consisting of nonverbal lexemes—ul aššat ‘she is not a wife’ (LE §27) and šū–ma šarrāq ‘he is a thief’ (LE §40) 25 may constitute the opposition we need. These clauses are in fact rare cases of conclusions drawn from the case itself, rather than corrective measures that in fact call for, or allow, certain actions. The contrast between conclusions and corrective measures or, in other terms, between judgment and sentence, is not quite linguistic but rather an opposition between different legal concepts. If we attempt to formulate this opposition in linguistic terms, we have two options: tense or modality. A tense opposition means that iparras signals posteriority vis-à-vis the predicative state forms; but this formulation seems to miss the point and dwells on secondary criteria. Some kind of modal opposition, on the other hand, seems to be more to the point; whereas iparras signals modality (either directive or permissive 26), a predicative state form signals factuality or indicative value (‘he is a liar’). This formulation can also house the one and only iprus form in the apodosis (tuššam–ma idke/iddi ‘it is slander (that) he raised’ CH §11), which is classified with the predicative state forms as indicative, a factual statement. It is very interesting to note that some NVCs in the apodosis—for instance, bitiqtum ša errēšim–ma ‘the loss is the cultivator’s (rather than anyone else’s)’ (CH §45)—essentially belong together with iparras forms to the modal expression or to the legal sentence part, namely, something that should be observed rather than a conclusion of some sort. Consider the following pair of examples: [245] [šumma aw]īlum [. . .] īgur ina ūmim ištēn 3 uṭṭet kaspum idūša ‘[If a m]an rents [a boat], its hire is 3 grains (of) silver per day’ CH §275 [246] šumma māḫirtam īgur 2½ uṭṭet kaspam idīša ina ūmim ištēn inaddin ‘If he rents a boat going upstream, he shall pay 2½ grains (of) silver, its hire per day’ CH §276 These two sections are very similar in their contents, but the first is constructed as a NVC and the second is verbal. The opposition between the iparras form, which signals modality, and the NVC, yields no results—there is no substantial difference between them in overall meaning. The NVC in the apodosis is therefore judged to be modal, equivalent to the things that should or may be done. As for the apodosis, which consists of napištum ṣimdat šarrim ‘it is a capital case, (refer to) the king’s decree’ (LE §58), two unipartite NVCs, common sense dictates that the former is more like the predicative state form and the latter belongs with the rest of the NVCs. 25.  The same forms, having the same function, are found in CH §§11 and 13 (sar ‘he is a liar’), §§7, 9, and 10 (šarrāq ‘he is a thief’), and §128 (aššat ‘she is a wife’). 26.  See, e.g., ex. [255] on p. 145 below, where ipaṭṭar is interpreted as ‘he may redeem’, that is, as a permissive.

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Table 3.7 Legal šumma structures: no tense involved protasis exponent

value

iprus

event(s)

iptaras

chain-final event

paris

state

iparras

intent (CH durative too)

apodosis categories aspect and modality

exponent

value

predicative

factual

iparras NVC

modal (obligation / permission)

categories

modality

In two cases, the substantival conclusion occurs before the corrective measure: [247] . . . dīn napištim–ma imât ‘It is (nothing but) a capital case, he 27 shall die’ CH §26 (and similarly §24) The first clause seems to be a conclusion, a factual statement, and the second tells the reader/hearer what is to be done. Table 3.7 summarizes the data and conclusions for the legal šumma structures. It refers to nonsubordinate predicative forms in main protases only. Despite the external similarity to epistolary šumma structures, note that the final categories of the legal šumma structures are markedly different. The protasis has both aspectual and modal oppositions (in contrast to predominantly temporal oppositions in the letters). The apodosis reflects a modal opposition, but the forms that show this opposition are different from those found in the epistolary apodosis, where only the precative forms are marked as modal. This conclusion is but an extension of the principle that linguistic entities always consist of their form together with the form’s specific syntagmatic co-text, on the one hand, and its function, on the other. 3.1.2.  Precative protasis Use of the precative in the protasis is unique to the LE and altogether absent from the CH. There are four cases, similar to those discussed in §2.2.2 above. However, in LE only one case is concessive-conditional (in the letter corpus, most of them signal concessive-conditionality), but this case is not a legal protasis. 28 Two of the examples are primary conditions for a following šumma clause: [248] awīlum 1 šiqil kaspam ana eṣēdi ana agrim [li]ddin–ma šumma rēssu lā ukīl–ma [e]ṣēdam eṣēdam lā īṣissu 10 šiqil kaspam išaqqal ‘[Shou]ld a man give one sheqel (of) silver for a hired hand for harvest, if (the hired 27.  This could equally be a circumstantial clause ‘(this being) a capital case. . .’. 28.  . . . lišim–ma ul aššat ‘. . . even if she dwells . . . she is not a wife’ (LE §27).

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hand) was not at his disposal and (as a result) could not harvest for him the harvest, 29 he will pay ten sheqels (of) silver’ §9 (and similarly, §17) It is important to note that, like šumma constructions, this type of case may occur independently as a law (LE §14). In CH, these constructions are not attested and instead we find two consecutive šumma constructions. The form liprus in this strategy is always chained forward by the particle ‑ma. A note regarding the value of this strategy: it appears that, despite the dissimilarity in form, liprus–ma is functionally very similar to šumma iprus: [249] mār awīlim ana bīt emim terḫatam libil–ma ‘If a member of the awīlum class brings bride payment to the house of his father-in-law . . .’ §17 [250] šumma awīlum ana mārat awīlim terḫatam ubil–ma ‘If a man brings bride payment to a daughter of a man . . .’ §26 The most prominent difference is that the protasis consisting of liprus is limited to a single clause only. The apodosis in this strategy consists of either a NVC (LE §14) or, following a secondary šumma protasis, iparras forms (LE §§9, 17). 3.1.3.  “Indicative” protasis This structure is very common in the letters (§2.2.1); note, however, that in the laws it does not have the specific characterization it carries in the letters. In addition, unlike the letters, in the laws it is marginal and cannot stand alone: 30 [251] šumma amtum usarrir–ma mārša ana mārat awīlim ittaddi(n) inūma irtabû bēlšu immaršu iṣabbassu–ma itarrušu ‘If a maid acts dishonestly and gives her son to a woman of the awīlum class, when he has grown up, should his master locate him, he may seize him and take him’ §33 [252] šumma šakkanakkum šāpir nārim bēl têrtim mala ibaššû wardam ḫalqam amtam ḫaliqtam alpam ḫalqam imēram ḫalqam ša ekallim u muškēnim iṣbat–ma ana GN lā irdeam–ma ina bītišu iktala ūmī eli warḫim ištēn ušetteq–ma ekallum šurqam ittīšu itawwu ‘If a governor, a canal supervisor (or) any official it may be siezes a fugitive slave, a fugitive slave woman, a stray ox (or) a stray donkey of the palace or a commoner, and does not lead it to GN and then detains (it/him/her) in his house, should he let more than one month pass, the palace will charge him with theft’ §50 (text B only)

29.  For a discussion of this construction, see Cohen 2008b. 30.  Hirsch (1969: 121 n. 28) suggests reading in §9 (ex. [248]) [i-na]-di-in-ma instead of the accepted reading [li]-di-in-ma. Since, however, this strategy does not otherwise stand for a primary protasis, this reading seems implausible.

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In these two examples (as well as in ex. [244] above), the pattern functions as a secondary condition only. Note that, in all cases attested in the LE corpus, it follows iptaras forms (or lā iprus, when negative) at the end of the primary protasis. The same strategy is probably found in Hirsch’s examples (exx. [238]–[240] above), which are from the CH corpus, but note that in these cases the particle ‑ma does not separate the domains. Moreover, this strategy in the law collections strictly consists of iparras(-ma) iparras sequences. As a result, functional values cannot be determined for the protasis, unlike the corresponding paratactic pattern in the letters, where a paradigm exists in the protasis and, consequently, different functional values as well. The strategies described thus far are all known as conditional strategies in the letter corpus as well as in the law collections. The following strategies differ, however, in this respect; they have this function only in the law collections. From this point on, the strategies described constitute distinctive features of the group of patterns that constitute a law in OB. 3.1.4.  inūma clauses In §2.5 above, ištūma clauses were discussed and found to be examples of the functional duality (or neutralization) of adverbial/conditional clauses in the letter corpus. Above (p. 100 n. 103), I mentioned German “wenn” clauses, which are both temporal and conditional. In LE, inūma clauses are very similar conceptually. All of the cases occur with iptarsu forms: [253] šumma awīlum ālšu u bēlšu izēr–ma ittaʾbit aššassu šanûm–ma ītaḫaz inūma ittūram ana aššatišu ul iraggam ‘If a man hates his city and his master and flees, (and then) his wife marries another, if/when he returns, he shall have no claim to his wife §30 (and similarly §§29 and 33) Note, however, that inūma irtabû in ex. [251] above is clearly temporal. This temporal/ conditional strategy is not capable of standing alone as a primary protasis of a law. Basically, inūma in the letters does not introduce CSs. 3.1.5.  ūm clauses Clauses introduced by ūm are usually temporal clauses in the epistolary corpus and are never conditional. In the laws, these cases seem to be more than just temporal clauses: [254] šumma [. . .] riksātim u kirram ana abīša u ummiša iškun–ma īḫussi aššat ūm ina sūn awīlim iṣṣabbatu imât ul iballuṭ ‘If [. . .] he arranges a contract and a nuptial feast and marries her, she is a wife. The day she is caught in the lap of a man, she shall die, not live’ §28 [255] šumma awīlum īniš–ma bīssu ana kaspim ittadin ūm šāyimānum inaddinu bēl bītim ipaṭṭar ‘If a man becomes impoverished and sells his house, the day the buyer will sell, the owner of the house may redeem (it)’ §39

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In CH §28, ūm appears to introduce a new matter, but the time the woman is caught is immaterial. It is instead the case of adultery itself to which the corrective measure applies. In CH §39, again, the corrective measure applies only in case the buyer sells. Roth (1997) translates, in the latter case, ‘whenever’, which basically captures the spirit of all laws (but not all šumma structures). This strategy cannot constitute a primary conditional as well. 3.1.6.  ša clause The ša clause strategy (Metzler 2002: 248–55) is the most emblematic strategy, best representing the nature of the CSs in the LE corpus and, in fact, for the entire law-collection corpus. These cases are constructed in such a way that the information otherwise put in a conditional protasis is conveyed via an adjective clause or even a simple adjective: [256] mār awīlim lā zīzu ū wardum ul iqqīap ‘A son of a man without inheritance or a slave will not be given credit’ §16 Adjective clauses, because they occur somewhat more frequently, are capable of conveying more information: [257] awīlum ša ina bītim ša muškēnim ina bītim ina muṣlālim iṣṣabbatu 10 šiqil kaspam išaqqal ša ina mūšim ina bītim iṣṣabbatu imât ul iballuṭ ‘A man who is caught in the house of a commoner within the house at midday shall pay 10 sheqels (of) silver; he who is caught within the house at night shall die, he will not live’ §13 Examples of this kind occur with iparrasu in the ša clause and iparras in the main clause (LE §§12 (2×), 19 as well as CH §177b). Two cases occur with paris forms (LE §§51 and 52). §52 also has a unique iptaras form, and the apodosis is iparras followed by a connected paris form: [258] wardum ū amtum ša itti mār šiprim naṣru–ma abul GN īterbam kannam maškanam ū abbuttam iššakkan–ma ana bēlišu naṣer ‘A slave or a maid who is kept safe with a messenger and enters the gates of GN, will be made to bear fetters, shackles or a hairlock and thus be kept safe for his owner’ §52 It is impossible to determine the value of this unique ocurrence of iptarsu within the ša clause. Note that this strategy is capable of standing independently, as a primary protasis. As claimed at the beginning of this section, this strategy is viewed as the token of the group of structures that are legal formulations. It is true that, in Akkadian, no one considers this strategy to be a CS, but in Arabic, similar constructions (e.g., clauses with indefinite pronouns such as man or mā) are normally viewed as such (see Reckendorf 1898: 697–700). Nevertheless, the conclusion is that this stategy occurs interchangeably with šumma structures only in the law collections.

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3.2.  Additional characteristics In addition to the various strategies used in the laws, the laws are constructed impersonally (see below, §3.3), except for citations (e.g., §22 mimma elīya lā tīšû ‘I do not owe you anything’). Focus constructions, which are otherwise a sign of personal involvement (e.g., they are normally found in dialogues rather than narratives) 31 are sometimes used in the laws to show contrast and promote precision: In the protasis: [259] aššassu šanûm–ma ītaḫaz ‘another marries his wife’ LE §30 (see ex. [253] above for the full context) [260] ina mātim šanītim–ma itta[šab] ‘(or even) re[sid]es in a foreign country’ §29 In the apodosis: [261] kaspum ana bēlišu–ma itâr ‘the silver shall return to its owner’ §17 (and similarly, §18) [262] dīn napištim–ma ‘It is (nothing but) a capital case’ §26 [263] šū–ma šarrāq ‘He (rather than anyone else) is a/the thief’ §40 [264] māram lū mārtam ša iddinu ekallum itabbal ‘The palace will take away the son or daughter whom she gave’ §34 Note that not only -ma but also the focal pattern #object+(explicit) subject+verbal form# (see Cohen 2005a: 34–35) is used in the laws (and in the omens as well). 3.3.  The nature of the conditional constructions in the law collections The various structures (except inūma clauses) described in the former sections form a group of patterns, a super-paradigm, in which they are interchangeable with one another, each capable of expressing a law. Not all of them are capable of standing alone; some occur only as secondary structures. Only three strategies—šumma, precative, and ša structures—occur as primary protases. The super-paradigm of these structures, although at times similar to the paradigm of CSs in the letters, is actually markedly different (see Table 3.8, p. 148). The structures that are unique to each group are those worth special consideration. The modal particle conditional pattern is the representative pattern of the conditional type in the letter genre. Structures with ūm and ša are representative of the type in the law collections. However, because the codes have only a few examples of ūm and ša structures, we need to turn to other sources. Three sources are (1) the legal edicts, which are meant to expand, or update, the law collection(s); (2) law-like formulations found in the letter genre; and (3) the process by which a specific case becomes a generic formulation of a law. 31.  For example, in citations, as in nādinānum–mi iddinam maḫar šībī–mi ašām ‘(it was) a (specific) seller (who) sold me, (it was) in front of witnesses (that) I bought (it)’ (CH §9).

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Table 3.8 CSs in the letters and in the codes strategy

letters

codes

remarks

modal particle

+

–

letter corpus only, hence representative

šumma structure

+

+

marked differences in internal constitution

‘indicative’ protasis

+

+

‘precative’ protasis

+

+

ūm clause

–

+

ša clause

–

+

“šumma-equivalent” only in the codes, hence representative of this type

1. In the Edict of Ammīṣadūqa, ša clauses freely alternate with šumma clauses in the same function, both being formulations of laws. In this text, a sort of an addendum to the existing law, ša clauses are more abundant. The major difference is that they primarily consist of iprusu forms, unlike the clauses in the codes, which occur with iparrasu: [265] ša šeʾam kaspam ū bīšam ana šīmim . . . iddinu–ma kanīkam ušēzibu ina kanīkišu ša ušēzibu [ḫ]adānšu ittiq–ma [ka]spum ṣibtam irašši [tam]karum ušašṭeru ulū [ri]ksātim watrātim urakkisu [ana pī ri]ksātišu ul utār ‘He who lends barley, silver or property as price . . . and has a document drawn up, and in the document he drew up the [mer]chant writes “should the [t]ime limit pass by, the [si]lver will accumulate interest,” or agrees to additional conditions, he will not pay back [according to (these additional) c]onditions’ Edict of Ammīṣadūqa §9 (similarly, ibid. §§5 and 8) Compare with the better-known formulation: [266] [šum]ma awīlum šeʾam ū kaspam ana ḫubullim idd[in] u ṭuppam ušēzib . . . ‘[I]f a man gi[v]es as interest-bearing loan barley or silver, and draws up a document . . .’ Edict of Ammīṣadūqa §7 The adjective-clause formulation is rarely attested with iparrasu as well as parsu: [267] [r]āʾibānu gerseqqi mātim [ša] ana bīt rēdîm ū bāʾerim šeʾam kaspam ū šīpātim ana eṣēdim ū šiprim ep[ēš]im [i]na emūqim ina[dd]inu imât ‘A substitute, a temple attendant [who] gi[v]es by force barley, silver, or wool to a family of a soldier or a fisherman for harvest or to d[o] a task, shall die’ Edict of Ammīṣadūqa §22 Twice (Edict of Ammīṣadūqa §§12 and 16), iparrasu is given habitual value, but perhaps not in other cases (e.g., Edict of Ammīṣadūqa §15). Kraus (1984: 200–201; commentary to §4 of the edict) refers to the opposition iprusu versus iparrasu without reaching any definite conclusion. On the other hand, Malul (2010: 288–90) implements these insights in his interpretation, and the result makes perfect sense, in §15 as well.

3.3.  The nature of the conditional constructions in the law collections

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The interchange between the two strategies found in this corpus, without a detectable difference in value between them, further corroborates their functional equivalence in the law collections. 2. The legal formulations found in the epistolary genre are not represented by many cases, but those found are truly instructive: [268] awīlum balṭum gimil gāmilišu utār šumma balṭāku gimillaka utār ‘A healthy man returns the favor of his benefactor. If I live, I will return your favor’ 3, 33:24–26 This formulation, consisting of an adjective (balṭum ‘alive, well’), is identical in structure to ex. [256] above, except that it is found in a letter. In addition, this legal formulation (which may well be a mere rule of conduct) is implemented: its contents are repeated inside an ordinary conditional pattern. The difference immediately stands out: although the adjective formulation refers to an issue with general validity, which has a generic nature, the following conditional refers to the here-and-now dimension, merely a specific case. The same principle is found in the following example: [269] ša lā izzazzu mim⟨ma⟩ ulileqqe [sic]. . . 7 mana aklam išdudūnim ulazzaz–ma [sic] mannum litēršu ‘He who does not serve does not take anything . . . they provided me with seven minas of food; if I do not serve, who would pay it back?’ 11, 27:12–17 The legal formulation is an adjective clause. Here, too, mentioning a rule is immediately followed by its practical aspect. In both cases, the legal formulation is constructed with the adjective (clause) formulation. Similarly constructed legal formulations, such as royal decrees, are found, rarely, even inside letters: [270] kīma tīdû ina ṣimdat bēliya ša ušaddinu–ma ilqû utār . . . ṭuppī ina amārika šeʾam ša tušaddinu–ma telqû tēr ‘As you know, in my lord’s decree he who collected (unduly) and took (it) will return (it) . . . upon seeing my tablet, return the barley that you (unduly) collected and took’ NBC 6311:15–23 (Tammuz 1996: 125–26, translated and commented on in Charpin 2005: 104–5) The same information is actually repeated twice: once in the form of a relative clause (ša . . . utār ‘he who . . . he will return’) and the second time as a directive (šeʾam ša . . . tēr ‘return the barley that . . .’). Note that here too the different packaging shows different values: the decree is generally valid, while the directive is specifically meant for the moment of reading and for a particular addressee. To sum up, the ša clause is a cross-genre exponent of law formulation, and it has a stronger standing in OB than any other genre-specific exponent. 3.  The third source is the process of legal formulation. The following example, from a King Samsu-Iluna letter, has been translated and discussed by Charpin (2005:

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96–97). The complaint is about some girls of Sippar who are encloistered without being provided for by their relatives while the provisions for their sustenance are coming from the king’s stores. This is the reaction of the king: [271] a.  nadīt Šamaš lā suddud ana gagîm lā šūrubša anāku aqbi ‘(As for) a/ the nadītum of Šamaš who cannot be provided for, 32 I ordered not to let her enter into the cloister’ Janssens 1991: 5, lines 16–17 b.  u nadīt Šamšim ša abūša u aḫḫūša lā uṣiddūši ṭuppam lā išṭurūšim–ma ina gagîm wašbat abāša u aḫḫīša esēram–ma ṭuppam šaṭāram–ma ana gagîm šūrubša aqbi ‘(As for) a/the nadītum of Šamaš whose father and brothers did not provide for her, did not write her a tablet, and (who) lives in the cloister, I ordered to put pressure on her father and brothers to write a tablet and then to let her enter into the cloister’ Janssens 1991: 5–6, lines 18–23 The formulation in ex. [271] is not quite that of a law but instead concerns a specific case (a nadītum who is not provided for), and the corrective measures are stated, in both cases, as infinitives that are the object of aqbi ‘I ordered’. The difference from a law formulation is that this formulation still carries a stamp of hic et nunc, referring perhaps to a specific case where this semi-decree was uttered. This hic et nunc is even more pronounced in the next few lines: [272] c.  u mimma ša ana mārtišu inaddinu . . . lipaqqid–ma ṭuppam lišṭurši ana gagîm lišēribši ‘And whatever he gives his daughter let him guarantee her and write her a tablet and then let her enter the cloister . . .’ Janssens 1991: 6, lines 24–33 In the direct contination of ex. [271]b, the king turns to directives, which are very typical in letters and in dialogues in general. The second complaint, in the same letter, is about a judge who, not having been paid a debt, threatens to take the slave of a nadītum, the daughter of the man who is indebted to him. The king, rather than responding to the specific case, formulates a decree: [273] nadīt Šamšim ša abūša u aḫḫūša uṣiddūši ṭuppam išṭurūšim–ma ina gagîm wašbat ana ḫubulli u ilki ša bīt abīša u aḫḫīša ul [. . .] ‘A nadītum of Šamaš whose father and brothers provided for her, wrote her a tablet, and (who) lives in the cloister is not [. . .] for the debts and ilkum duties of her father and brothers’ house’ Janssens 1991: 7, lines 43–47 32.  nadīt Šamaš lā suddud is syntactically analogous to qabal lā maḫār ‘an invincible battle’: it is a substantival construct state followed by an infinitive absolute (for this solution, see Kienast 1977). The phrase nadīt Šamaš, here analyzed as construct state (perhaps in contrast with nadīt Šamšim), is probably a single substantival compound, as as is implied by the parallel construction in 1, 34:22 (urʾud 5 lukur-dutu. m e š) as well as 6, 62:9. Note that the plural marker refers to the entire compound (Šamšum is one and only). Presumably, then, this compound can stand in the construct state and be modified by an attributive genitive or by a clause.

3.4. Conclusions

151

Note that, despite the absence of a verbal form at the end of the decree, the negative particle ul is sufficient to indicate the declarative rather than directive expression of the utterance. The generic legal formulation of this letter is, exactly as shown above, constructed with an adjective clause. Charpin comments: On observe d’abord la façon dont le roi rendit son verdict. Au lieu d’écrire “Le juge Awīl Sîn n’a pas le droit de saisir l’esclave de la fille nadītum de Mār-Šamaš,” il formula de manière anonyme une règle ayant une portée générale, que les autorités locales devaient ensuite mettre en application. Le style même du passage ressemble tout à fait aux verdicts (apodoses) du Code de Hammurabi. Le genre littéraire est cependant différent, puisqu’on a une affaire à une lettre. (Charpin 2005: 97; my emphasis)

The anonymity, general meaning, and lack of hic et nunc are all the hallmark of laws in OB, wherever they occur. In exx. [268]–[270] and [273], they occur inside letters. This explains why they are in these contexts formulated as adjective clauses and not as CSs, which in the letters never express a law. 3.4. Conclusions In the general linguistic literature, which unfortunately focuses on English, there is discussion of generic conditions. Snitzer-Reilly (1986) describes generics as timeless dependencies where if is paraphraseable by when(ever) (similar to ūm in the example above), which may occur in a variety of tenses (this may be the case for the ša clause formulation and may explain the absence of the tense category from the laws in general). Podlesskaya (2001: 1000) notes the similarities that this type of conditionals (“habitual”) has to temporal clauses and relative clauses. Athanasiadou and Dirven (1996), working in a somewhat different direction, primarily differentiate between course of event conditionals (CECs) and hypothetical conditionals. Although the latter refer to a single occurrence, the former represent relations between recurring events. These events belong to a world of reality, characterized by an interchange between if and whenever, which does not change the reality status of the events. The events are characterized as “generally occurring events” rather than hic et nunc occurring events—that is, they are events that take place in a specific time and location. CECs are subdivided into three groups, one of which, the instructive type, is of special interest here. It is defined as follows: [T]he main clause denotes an instruction of what is to be done in case the situation denoted in the subclause arises (Athanasiadou and Dirven 1996: 626).

The instruction is not presented as a hypothetical case but as something that normally happens. The best parallels for these clauses are in the very rare medical texts (e.g., Wasserman 1996–97), but they remain quite similar to what we have in the law collections, expressed by conditional as well as other structures. Note that the hypothetical factor is essentially missing from the legal formulation—whereas in ordinary conditionals in the letters, the structure expresses obvious

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uncertainty (best symbolized by the modal particle strategy, which basically conforms with the idea of ‘maybe’). This is evident from the ša clause formulation, especially when compared, inside the letters, to šumma conditionals. This strategy, more than any of the other strategies, seems to be representative of the law collections’ super-paradigm. Uncertainty is not a factor in these laws even though it is a central facet of the conditional types found in the letters. The temporal factor in CSs in the laws—what tense, precisely, is referred to in the protasis and the apodosis and whether there is a zero point (e.g., Loesov 2004: 150)— requires some comment. It is important to note that a generic expression has universal validity, far beyond the time it was formulated or used, and therefore questions of temporality are linguistically non-pertinent, as long as one accepts the generic nature of these structures. It does not really matter when the law was written, who wrote it, or when the offence that the law addresses took place. What matters is the type of offence, the correlative corrective act, and and the mutual dependency between them, all of which are signaled by the various structures that together form the super-paradigm of the law collections of OB.

Chapter 4 CONDITIONAL STRUCTURES IN THE OMENS Kaspar Riemschneider’s Lehrbuch des Akkadischen was the standard introduction for several generations of students of Akkadian. The OB omens, for these students, must have seemed to be the most natural, standard OB. In some respects these texts meet that expectation, but the omen texts are actually an idiosyncratic genre, characterized by strict and concise formulations and using highly specialized technical terminology often not attested in other genres. These characteristics make it clear that this genre, a compilation of divinatory principles consisting of single cases, was meant to be used by a restricted circle of divinatory experts who were very familiar with the exta of animals as well as other media. The initial impetus to consider this genre in this monograph came from the aspiration to be exhaustive: any genre in which there are CSs should be investigated. Metzler (2002), in his second chapter, attempts to arrive at a general statement about the use of tenses in this genre, which he considers together with the law collections, both deemed to be scientific literature. Despite considering both genres in a single chapter, Metzler provides separate (although discontinuous) descriptions for the tense system in each. The differences stand out immediately, and this raises the question why and how the omens are different from the law collections. Because both genres are collections of what appear to be CSs, the purpose of this chapter is to answer this question and to determine whether the obvious differences between the omens and other genres can be assigned a linguistic formulation. The omens consist of a protasis, which contains a presentation of the physical findings in the medium that has been read (liver, oil, smoke, sky, etc.), and an apodosis, where the interpretation of the findings is reported. The word presentation is used here simply because the tendency today is to view the omens as based only partially on actual observation: most of the omens were “generated” (Winitzer 2006: 11–20; Rubio 2009: 170–71) to produce more comprehensive lists of omens. The corpus used for this enquiry was published in YOS 10, a large compilation of omens. The locus for the examples from this corpus are specified by numbers only (namely, tablet (column):line(s)). 4.1.  Distinctive characteristics of omens Omen compendiums constitute an enormous corpus but nonetheless show strict formulation throughout, with very clear, distinctive features: 1. The CS of omens is quite uniform. Whereas the CSs in other genres examined here consist of several strategies, omens consist of one only, namely, šumma CSs. 153

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2. The writing conventions of these CSs are unique (see below). 3. Omens, like the laws, have no textual context, or co-text; that is, the verbal forms are not referential to previous occurrences taking place in reality outside the structure. 4. Like law collections, omens seem to have a generic nature: they represent a general rather than a specific case (and this was probably the original reason for their compilation). However, the signals of this generic quality are weaker in omens than they are in the law collections. It is as though the abstraction phase, which takes place when formulating a specific case (as found in ex. [311], p. 163, below) as a case of general validity, took place only partially. 4.1.1. Markers A prominent external difference from the other genres is the use of logographic signs (AŠ, BE, DIŠ, MAŠ, as well as others), in addition to writing šumma explicitly, to introduce the protases. The protases, although introduced by seemingly different markers, seem to have the same syntax: 1. The same proportional distribution of predicative forms (i.e., the protasis paradigm) occurs, regardless of the signs used to introduce the protasis. 2. In the examples where negation is attested in the protasis, it is lā rather than ul (e.g., with AŠ, 23:7; and with DIŠ, 56i:23, ii:15). In this variety of OB (that is, other than OB epic), the form lā iprus figures only in šumma protases and in pronominal questions (the latter are generally not attested in the omens). 3. Two texts (51 and 52), which are almost identical, differ in that the former has šumma while the latter has BE for an introductory particle: both have the same function, to introduce the protasis. For these reasons, the difference between various logographic signs and šumma is regarded here as linguistically non-pertinent, and these structures are all considered to be fully equivalent to šumma structures (in conformity with Huehnergard 2005b and Winitzer 2006). The relative uniformity of the CS structure in the omens makes it possible, eventually, to discuss one specific syntactic link between the protasis and the apodosis in the omens, which is easier to describe here than in the other genres. 4.1.2. Protasis The protasis in this corpus displays several peculiarities in comparison with šumma protases in the other corpora. First, NVCs are much more widespread. These NVCs are special, in that they denote either existence or comparison. Existential NVCs (which are rather rare elsewhere) occur either with some kind of locative support or with a numeral: [274] šumma ina libbi na[ṣ]raptim padānum ‘If there is a path inside the depression . . .’ 11 iv:16–17 1 1.  Similar occurrences of existential expressions are rare elsewhere, but note that in Arabic they are common. Also, compare English “in the depression is a path.”

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[275] šumma izbum šinā zibbātušu ‘If a fetal anomaly has two tails (lit., its tails are two)’ 56 ii:10 The most common existential or locative expression (they are not always easy to tell apart) is the form šakin. The most common existential elsewhere, ibašši ‘(there) is’, is attested primarily in the negative (neither expressions are NVCs): [276] šumma (. . .) bāb ekallim martum ū ubānum lā ibašši ‘If (. . .) there is no palace gate, gallbladder or finger . . .’ 31 xiii:6–13 (and similarly 56 ii:14–15; 43–44) As a copular expression, ibašši may be negative as well as affirmative: [277] šumma bāb ekallim ina maškanišu lā ibaššī–ma ‘If the palace gate is not in its place . . .’ 23:7 [278] šumma martum ṣurīrītum ibašši ‘If the gallbladder is a lizard (or: if there is a lizard(-like) gallbladder)’ 31 xiii:42–44 2 The comparative NVC does not occur in šumma protases of other genres: [279] šumma martum appaša kīma ṣurīrītim ‘If the gallbladder’s nose is like a lizard’ 31 x:4–6 [280] šumma libbum kīma iškī immerim ‘If the heart is like a sheep’s testicles . . .’ 9:21 The type and distribution of NVCs is markedly different than in šumma protases of the other genres. This of course reflects the stative nature of the omen protases. Another very common phenomenon is topical extraposition (Huehnergard 2005a: §22.3). This pattern, traditionally termed “casus pendens,” is a mechanism whose function is to mark a nominal entity, which may have another function inside the clause (e.g., object), as topic—namely, the entity about which the rest of the information is predicated. This is the regular case when it is a šumma izbum omen, where izbum is always the topic, but this phenome­non is common in other cases too: [281] šumma martum mû[š]a ana kīdim ḫa[l]ṣū ‘If (as regards the) gall-bladder, its liquids are squeezed out . . .’ 31 x:34–36 The unmarked clause-pattern would have been mû martim . . . ḫalṣū ‘the liquids of the gall-bladder are squeezed. . .’; however, in this case, the discussion would not be strictly about the gall-bladder but about the liquids. Since omens are organized by certain fundamental entities (martum ‘gall-bladder’ is one), this pattern is a natural way to achieve such organization. 2.  Explicitly marked nominative (ṣurīrītum) on the predicative complement is unique (see Izre'el and Cohen 2004: 73–74, where it is shown that these complements are adverbial or in the accusative, as would be the case in Arabic). This is why it is preferable to analyze martum and ṣurīrītum as a single syntagm, ‘a lizard(-like) gall­bladder’ (an interpretation suggested by Guy Ron-Gilboa). If an interpretation of this sort is adopted, then this example is an existential, rather than a copular, expression.

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On the other hand, focus phenomena in the protasis, where an element is emphasized mostly for reasons of contrast, are much less common: [282] šumma bāb(ū) ekallim šinā–ma ritkubū ‘If two palace gates (rather than one) lie on top of each other . . . ’ (or: ‘if there are two (and) they lie . . .’) 24:2 Despite the tendency toward an impersonal, or generic, character of the omens, there is in the protasis an occasional use of 1st and 2nd person forms (Jeyes 1989: 43): [283] [šumma bāb ekallim] ⟨⟨ ta⟩⟩[r]īq–ma u šittā ubānāti[ya] ana libbim [u]bbal ‘[If the palace gate] is empty and [I] can bring two of [my] fingers inside . . .’ 25:13 [284] šumma tallu ikbir–ma ana pilšišu ubān[ī u]šērib/[u]šerreb ‘If the diaphragm has become thick, but [I] (can/could) insert [my] finger into its perforation’ 42 iii:31–32 [285] šumma bāb ekallim rīq–ma ana libbišu šittā ubānātuka īrubū/irrubū ‘If the palace gate is empty and two of your fingers (could) penetrate its center’ 24:30 It appears that in this case the 1st- and 2nd-person forms are not significantly different from the generic formulation, such as ‘(any) two fingers can fit’. Based on what we know of the descriptive nature of omen protases as well as on the nature of the media used for examination (most notably, internal organs), we can deduce that there was no actual movement during the examination (whether real or generated). The diviner essentially inspected (or at least considered) a state of affairs. For this reason, the predicative forms in the omen protasis exhibit a peculiar system. The opposition between them is aspectual in nature, rather than temporal or modal. 3 Metzler’s dichotomy of past and present rests on the telicity 4 of the lexeme (Metzler 2002: 66–67, 161–62), but this distinction does not really seem necessary. The animal omens, 5 unlike those concerning extispicy, may answer to a different set of rules: animals actually do things, but exta, in the omens that concern them, do not. The actions of animals can be analyzed as events, analogous to the situations found in law protases. On the other hand, in extispicy, the diviner analyzes a state and may find in this state clues to events that have brought it about. These states are represented as unmarked (paris), durative 3.  OB often has some aspectual oppositions, between paris and the other forms (there are exceptions: the apodosis of law collection, §3.1.1.7; the apodosis of the omen, §4.1.3 below), as well as between TAN and simple stem formation. However, a purely aspectual system is found only here and in OB epic narrative (Cohen 2006: 54–63). 4.  A semantic feature that has to do with the distinction between lexemes having an endpoint (telic) and those that do not (atelic). 5. E.g., šumma immerum pīšu iptenette rigmū; šumma immerum lišāššu ušteneṣṣeam niprū; šumma immerum lišāššu ištanaddad ana šarrim awātum damiqtum imaqqut ‘If the sheep keeps opening its mouth, noises; if the sheep keeps sticking out its tongue, progeny; if the sheep keeps pulling in its tongue, something good will happen to the king’ (47:5–7).

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(iparras), or coupled with an inference of the original, unwitnessed event leading to the current state (iprus). The two characteristics discussed above—the lack of concrete reference to actual events in the context and the generic nature (implying general validity, see §4.1)—lead to the inevitable conclusion that the predicative forms in the protasis are not referential to a specific point of time. All of the predicative forms in the protasis are referential to a single context and hence to the same temporal point, whatever it may be. There seem to be no temporal oppositions between them. The most common form in the protasis is paris (single or chained), which denotes an unmarked state. Because its functional value seems to present the least problems, it makes sense to compare it with the other forms in minimal pairs. 4.1.2.1. paris versus iparras The following example confronts two cases of the same lexeme: [286] šumma izbum ina irtišu petī-ma u daltum . . . šaknat-[m]a ippette u i⟨nne⟩ddil  6 ‘If the anomaly is open in its chest and there is a door . . . and it is (being) opened and closed’ 56 ii:1–2 Both examples have the same diathesis (medio-passive); the difference seems to be between an unmarked, neutral state in peti (paris) versus some kind of durative or dynamic state, which in this case even shows recurrent movement (iparras). The connection via u (rather than -ma, which marks a fixed order of predications) between both iparras forms expresses the impression of iterativity, movement back and forth. 4.1.2.2. paris versus iprus Although the durative function of iparras here is not much different from one of its functions in the law collection protasis, 7 the form iprus has an unusual function. Consider the following minimal pair: [287] šumma nīrum saḫer ‘If the “yoke” is turned’ Nougayrol 1950: 13 line 11 [288] šumma martum isḫur–ma muḫḫam ša ubānim iltawi ‘If the gall- bladder has turned and surrounded the edge of the finger’ 31 ii:31–35 First, ex. [288] consists of a chain iprus–ma iptaras. This chain is found anywhere in OB (except royal inscriptions) regardless of the exact functional values of the forms. 8 In the omen protasis, this chain obviously does not represent events. The claim made several times above, that iptaras merely marks off the chain, is just as valid here as elsewhere. Both saḫer and isḫur denote a state. However, although saḫer only signals a state, isḫur seems to refer to two points: (1) the action itself, which is not actually witnessed 6.  See, for the emendation, AHw 186a. 7.  See exx. [235]–[237] in §3.1.1.6 (p. 138). 8.  For instance, in the letters it is found in reports and is referential to the past. In the narrative of the epics, it reports events that are not referential to any specific time, and this is true in the law collections as well.

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but inferred, and (2) the resulting state (see, along similar lines, Metzler 2002: 66). That is, the function of iprus in this context is similar to the linguistic notion of a resultative perfect (for which see Comrie 1976: 56–58). 9 TAN formations are usually paired with iparras (see the example above, p. 156 n. 5). However, they are sometimes found with iprus as well: [289] šumma martum išissa šīram katim ‘If the gallbladder base is covered by flesh’ (or ‘covers flesh’?) 31 iv:25–27 [290] šumma izbum uznāšu īnīšu iktattamā ‘If (as for) the foetal anomaly, its ears have been covering its eyes’ 56 ii:23 The form ik-ta-˹ta˺-ma is interpreted as TAN formation of iprus, because a t-formation of iparras does not make sense syntactically (there is a marked object, which is incompatible with reflexives in OB). 10 Note that, like the former pair of examples, there is often a difficulty with the diathesis of paris forms: the decision whether katim is active (with accusative object) or passive (with the accusative of relation, or tamyīz) is difficult (see, for instance, Loesov 2011: 257–60, the excursus “šumma awilum kalbam našik,” where some of these problems are discussed). paris vs. iptaras The single, unchained iptaras form in the omen protasis seems to have the same value as iprus: it is a resultative perfect: [291] šumma ina mu[ḫ]ḫi nīri kakkū šinā imittam u šumēlam šaknū ‘If above the yoke two weapons are situated on the right and the left’ 42 iv:21–22 [292] šumma ina rēš iṣṣūrim ina imittim sūmum ištu 3 adi 6 ittaškanū ‘If from three to six red spot(s) have been situated at the top of the “bird” on the right’ 52 i:3–4 In both examples, the lexeme is the same and so is the diathesis: šaknū reflects an unmarked state, ittaškanū a resultative perfect. iprus vs. iparras The opposition between these forms is often central in many syntactic environments in OB. In the omen protasis, however, the opposition heavily depends on the type of lexeme: [293] šumma kakki imittim kīma sikkatim izziz ‘If the weapon on the right has stood up like a peg’ 46 iv:30 9.  The form iprus itself has this value only here. Elsewhere, externally similar forms such as lā iprus2 (in epistolary šumma protases; §2.1.2.1.4) and ul iprus (in the epistolary paratactic conditional protasis, §2.2.1) do have a similar value, namely, non-past perfect, and so does the form iprusu in temporal clauses headed by lāma (see §1.2). 10.  Sergey Loesov (pers. comm., Oct. 7, 2010) tells me that the form is most likely ik-ta-[at]-ma rather than ik-ta-[ta]-ma, which then would mean that it is iptaras of the G stem rather than iprus of Gtn or iparras of Gt. 

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[294] šumma naplastum ittaziz ‘If the lobe has stood up’ 17:36 [295] šumma ina amūtim 4 naplasātum ištēniš izzazzā ‘If in the liver four lobes (are) stand(ing) together’ 11 i:23–24 The paris formation of izuzzum is rare in OB, and this iparras form is possibly the one used to signal stative value (GAG §107e). The difference between iparras, on the one hand, and iprus or iptaras, on the other, is hence analogous, at least in principle, to the pairs above that have a paris form. What is quite clear is that there is still no temporal opposition between the forms. The lexeme naṭālum ‘to face’ (which has a paris formation) seems to have somewhat different distribution: [296] šumma maskiltum ša ubān ḫašîm ḫurḫudam iṭṭul ‘If the maskiltum of the finger of the lung has faced the neck’ 36 iv:8–9 [297] šumma kakki imittim ina rēš martim šak[im–ma] martam īmid–ma (or immid–ma) šumēlam inaṭṭal ‘If the right weapon lies at the head of the gallbladder and leans (lit., ‘has leaned or is leaning’) on the gallbladder and is facing the left’ 46 i:1–2 Metzler (2002: 165) mentions that there is a difference in the nature of objects (or perhaps adverbial complements: šumēlam ‘left’ can function both nominally and adverbially) between the two tense formations: iṭṭul occurs with various parts of the internal organs and inaṭṭal only with šumēlam ‘left’. In other respects, Metzler retains the original opposition: resultative perfect vs. durative state. Table 4.1 summarizes the values of predicative forms in the omen protasis: Table 4.1 forms

functions

remarks

paris and NVC

depicting a state

iprus and iptaras

representing a state resulting from an inferred action (= resultative perfect)

• aspectual oppositions • no events • no temporal oppositions

iparras

durativity, dynamicity, or iterativity

4.1.3.  The omen apodosis It is the omen apodosis that presents the most marked features in comparison with the apodoses of šumma structures in other genres. First, unlike the apodosis in the law collections, which is entirely impersonal and thus addressed to anyone, the omen apodosis, although mostly constructed with the 3rd person, occasionally refers to the 1st and 2nd person, either by various personal pronouns or in the verbal form itself: [298] . . . [m]āt nakrika tušamqat ‘. . . you will overthrow the land of your enemy’ 56 iii:23

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The 2nd person in many cases does not seem to have, in this corpus, a specific referent, and may express the same generic nature otherwise expressed by 3rd-person forms. What is even more surprising is that there are some references to 1st person that cannot be linked to anything generic but instead refer to the diviner himself (Jeyes 1989: 22) or even to the king himself (A. Winitzer, personal communication): [299] ša lišāniya ina mātim ittanallak ‘My informer will walk throughout the land’ 36 iv:10–11 The genitive personal pronoun is the most common, but there are other cases, such as the possessive adjective: [300] qarrādū yāʾūtun u ša nakrim ištēniš imaqqutū ‘Warriors, mine and the enemy’s, will die together’ 42 iv:22–23 Even rare 1st-person verbal forms are attested: [301] šumma šupat šumēli eliš ekmet nakrī ina šubtišu šallassu ašallal ‘If the left quarter is inverted upwards, I shall plunder my enemy in his quarter’ OBE 18:1–3 (and similarly šallat ašallalu ‘the plunder I shall plunder’ 36 ii:20) These examples, absent from the apodoses of law collections, make it more difficult to consider the omens as having a fully generic quality. This is further corroborated by a few concrete deictic expressions (Jeyes 1989: 44). Some of these expressions can arguably be considered general 11 but others cannot: [302] āl nakrim ūmam urradam ‘the enemy’s city will come down today’ 36 i:49 In this example, ūmam seems to have a concrete deixis. In addition, Jeyes (1989: 44) enumerates collective names for the enemy, such as Amurrûm, Šubarûm, and so on—all of which are concrete. Another case referred to by Jeyes is ullu ‘no’ (OBE 13 rev. 16, following the adverb šanîš  ), which may have been a concrete answer to a concrete question. Thus, unlike the legal apodosis, we cannot say that these apodoses are entirely devoid of signals for hic et nunc: it appears that the omen compendia have not been thoroughly converted from their original specific formulation to their final generic form. As for predicative forms, the apodosis paradigm contains iparras forms (the most common) as well as paris forms, thus generally showing similarity to the apodosis in the law collections. However, in addition to these forms, iprus forms are attested as well: [303] . . . tešlīt awīlim ilum išme ‘The god heard the man’s prayer’ 25:20 (other cases are adduced by Metzler 2002: 213–17) 11.  For example, šamûm ina 3 ūmī izannu[n] ‘rain will fall in three days’ (39:rev. 5) and ūmam šâti–ma nakrum išaḫḫit ‘that very day the enemy will attack’ (44:44; both examples cited by Jeyes 1989: 44).

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This phenomenon is not common in the omen apodoses, but it is not as odd as it is in the law collections (cf. the unique tuššam–ma idke/iddi CH §11) or in the epistolary conditional apodoses (§2.1.2.2.1). Nonetheless, it is considered important for two reasons: (1) because it hints that the apodosis paradigm has temporal oppositions (unlike any other apodoses in OB seen thus far), and (2) because it is very instructive when trying to understand the nature of sequence between the omen protasis and apodosis. Unlike the epistolary and legal apodosis, where the oppositions are modal (see §§2.1.2.2.9 and 3.1.1.7, respectively), the apodosis in the omens has temporal oppositions: iparras primarily denotes the future, paris marks the present, 12 and iprus refers to events that already have happened (as shown in the previous example): [304] šumma izbum šinnāšu waṣâ šarrum ūm[ūšu] gamrū ina kussîšu šanûm uššab ‘If an anomaly’s teeth are out, the king[’s] day[s] are over, another will sit on his throne’ 56 i:34–35 There are occasional exceptions, but this example is representative. The link between temporal values and co-text has been emphasized on several occasions; however, it is clear that omens do not have a co-text. This contradiction can be settled by the same means used to resolve it in secondary protases as well as subordinate clauses in the law collections: both are deemed referential to a co-text—primary protases for the former and main clauses for the latter. The omen apodoses are referential to their protases. However, because the protases themselves, being generic, are not anchored in concrete time, the temporal oppositions found in the apodosis yield relative tense. Because iprus forms are found in the apodosis, we must reconsider the accepted terms of the sequence protasis—apodosis. In several places, the protasis is viewed as related temporally (inter alia) to the apodosis, preceding it by one step: the protasis occurs, and only then the apodosis. This may be true in many cases, but it does not hold for this genre: the omen apodosis contains the signifié that conveys events and states that occur throughout the entire temporal spectrum and, in fact, may have begun, or even taken place, before the omen was read. The sequence in the CSs in omens is different: instead of a sequence consisting of one thing followed by another, it signifies one thing and what it means. See further on this issue §4.2.3 below. Another special characteristic of the apodosis is the common occurrence of a known pattern, #object+(explicit) subject+verbal form#, the function of which in the epistolary corpus is to mark the subject as focus. 13 [305] nakrum mātam ušamqa[t] ana muškēnim bīssu u unêtiš [u] ekallum iredde ‘. . . an enemy will ruin the land; as for the muškēnum, the palace will claim possession of his house and his house equipment’ 56 i:19–20 12.  Nougayrol 1950: 33 (cited by Metzler 2002: 190). 13.  See Izre'el and Cohen 2004: 92–93 (for literary OB); Cohen 2005a: 34–35; and Cohen 2008: §2.2.1 (for the letters).

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Note that the first clause has the common order, subject preceding object, whereas in the second clause the object precedes and the subject takes the slot immediately before the verbal form. This pattern in the letters indicates focus, but in the epic a similar version 14 marks contrast, which could be either focal or topical. In ex. [305], it seems plausible that the palace is contrasted with the enemy. However, it is difficult to determine (based on the limited context) which kind of contrast is intended: focal or topical. Because this pattern is quite common, however, it is probably not focal (focus, if too common, tends to lose its emphasis). The same could be said about the following example: [306] bīšam ša mātim šâti [mā]tum [ša]nītum itabbal ‘[An]other [la]nd will carry off the possessions of this land’ 56 i:32–33 Here, mātum šanītum in this pattern functions as a contrastive topic. This solution for this pattern in the omen apodosis is challenged by either qāssu or qātka occurring in the same preverbal position: [307] šarrum ālam nakram qāssu ikaššad ‘The king will personally conquer a foreign city’ 31 viii:34–37 The translation of qāssu offered by Huehnergard (2005b: 56) takes it as an adverbial phrase (lit., ‘in his own hand’). However, in some places it is impossible to analyze this syntagm as adverbial: [308] āl pātika ša ibbalkituka qātka ikaššad ‘Your hand will reach (this) border town of yours that rebelled against you’ 44:17 Note that in this example qātka must be the thematic referent of the 3rd-person index in the verbal form—that is, the subject. Huehnergard (2005b: 135) translates it with a 2nd person: ‘you will personally. . .’. In the omens, qātka/qāssu always occurs in this preverbal slot and, when not adverbial, conforms to the pattern in question. The idea subsumed in ‘personally’ or ‘himself’ is usually regarded as focal (him rather than anyone else), and regarding these cases as topical is not very appealing. The overall solution will be the one adopted for the OB epic: this pattern signals either topicality or focality. The last distinctive characteristic to be discussed is the fact that the apodosis can consist, in addition to the forms already discussed, of a substantive in the nominative: [309] šumma martum ina abullim nadiat nikurtum dannatum ‘If the gall bladder is lying in the “city gate,” severe hostility’ 31 xi:43–47 [310] šumma šumēl ubānim pūṣam itaddâ tibût erbîm ‘If the left-side of the finger is covered (with) white (spots), locust attack’ 11 iii:25–26 Unlike the letters, where this phenomenon is not attested, and the law collections, where it is restricted to technical terminology (e.g., LE §58, which has napištum ṣimdat šarrim 14.  Note that in OB epic the verbal form can occur anywhere in the clause—the only criterion is that the object precede the subject (see Izre'el and Cohen 2004: 92–93).

4.2.  The syntactic nature of omen CSs

163

as its apodosis), in our case this phenomenon is regular and not limited to technical terminology. The significance of this phenomenon is explored in §4.2.3 below. 4.2.  The syntactic nature of omen CSs The structure of omens has been dealt with extensively by Winitzer (2006). Chapter 2 of his work (2006: 38–203) describes in detail the internal organization of omens. Based on solid data, he draws a picture of how the omens are constructed. Rochberg (2009), in another study, exclusively discusses the conditional structure of omens, mainly adhering to philosophical concepts, preferring them to hard data. In this study, we will conduct several comparisons in order to reveal the internal syntactic relationships of the CS in the omens: (1) with an epistolary omen report; (2) with other semiotic systems; and (3) with other paradigms in OB that are similar to the omen apodosis paradigm. 4.2.1.  The epistolary omen report As noted above (§3.3) in regard to the formulation of a law inside a letter, it is very instructive to see how omens are formulated inside a different genre, and there are letters that report an omen reading. The Mari archive contains divinatory material that is extensively treated in much of ARM 26/1 (the entire first part, pp. 4–373). The most instructive text type for us here is a report of reading an omen, and several such reports are attested. Unlike the reports (found, e.g., in Goetze 1957 and Nougayrol 1967, some of which are provided with a new edition in ARM 26/1) that contain no “apodoses”—only the technical results of the omen reading itself—the epistolary omen reports sometimes contain both relevant parts: the physical findings and their interpretation. The reports of these readings in the letters refer to a specific case, an omen reading with a particular purpose in mind (e.g., aṣṣabāt ālim ‘for capturing the city’, ex. [311] below). The physical results are occasionally reported, often following the phrase têrētim ēpuš–ma ‘I read the omen. . .’; the contents are mostly reported using paris forms and, less frequently, by iprus or iparras forms. The interpretation of these findings is generally reported using future-denoting iparras as well as by present-denoting paris. In a few cases, the interpretation is more complex and involves a conditional clause as well. Specific legal cases found in the letters consist of a report (in direct speech) and directive(s) uttered by the king, which are not packaged as a CS. A similar case is found in a letter reporting the reading of an omen: [311] têrētim aṣṣabāt ālim ana 3 ūmī ēpuš–ma 7têrēt[u]ya šalmā 9karšum šumēlam [t]arik [u] tirānū waṣbū 14[t]êrē[t]uya kišdātim īšâ ina kakkim dan[nim] bēlī ālam iṣabbat ‘I read the omens for capturing the city for the three days and my omens are good; the left-side belly is dark [and] the intestines are swollen. My [om]ens include conquest. My lord shall seize the city by strong arms’ ARM 26, 117:5–18

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The report consists of (1) the goal of the omen (lines 5–6); (2) results reproted in a nutshell (lines 7–8); (3) the physical findings (lines 9–13, corresponding in content to the omen protasis); and (4) the prediction (lines 14–18, corresponding to the omen apodosis). Note that the concrete, specific case in the letter is never packaged as a CS. The omen is communicated for the most part by using the same predicative forms, whether the omen is reported in a letter or found in a compendium of omens. The difference between the two contexts are (1) the specific nature of the letter versus the relative generic character of the omen compendium and (2) the packaging: the report of the physical findings consists only of a sequence of predicative forms in the letter but has the form of a CS in the omen compendium. This structural difference suggests that, despite the CS, the value is not that of an ordinary conditional (the same information is communicable via a nonconditional sequence of forms) and that the CS is simply a form that functions to signal the relationship between the physical findings and their interpretation. 4.2.2.  Other semiotic systems The semantic relationship between the protasis and the apodosis in the omens is often described as signifiant–signifié (see p. 6 above, under C, as well as Winitzer 2006: 38–39 and Loesov 2004: 148 n. 139), where “die Protasis die Apodosis bezeichnet” (Metzler 2002: 41). For an expert in reading omens, the content of the protasis implies the events and states described in the apodosis. The omens are a semiotic system, a system of signs. Another such system is language. Both systems consist of signs that are twofold: a signifiant and a signifié. In language, the signifiant is the form and the signifié its content. A corresponding linguistic compilation of these signs is a dictionary, where the signifiant (form) is given side by side with the signifié (definition). In the system of omens, the signifiant is what is found in the protasis, the physical findings, and the signifié is their interpretation, found in the apodosis. There are many such systems, some more complex than others. Yet another semiotic system with a similar content is graphology. Graphological signs also consist of a signifiant (the features of handwriting) and a signifié (the corresponding personal characteristics of the writer). The linguistic formulation of these signs consists of several possible strategies. The first formulation is conditional, like the omens: [312] If the MZ (middle zone) is very small but both of the other zones are extended and the baseline firm but flexible, the personality has found equilibrium, albeit on a tightrope (Amend and Ruiz 1980: 15) [313] If the LZ (lower zone) dominates in size both the middle and upper zones, it follows that the writer will be dominated by those powerful unconscious forces relating to survival needs, materialism and reproductive imperatives. (Amend and Ruiz 1980: 20) [314] If the stroke ends in a point, he is all the more sensitive and vulnerable to others’ basic demands. (Amend and Ruiz 1980: 21)

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165

In contrast to the omens in the compendia, however, English has alternative linguistic expressions. One is the temporal-clause formulation: [315] When the upper zone is very small in relation to the MZ and LZ, the writer is one who lacks creativity and imagination. (Amend and Ruiz 1980: 11) [316] When the hand moves back along the same stroke so that the result is one line where there would normally be a loop, the graphological meaning is the inhibition of feeling because of painful associations. (Amend and Ruiz 1980: 13) [317] When the downstroke is long but ends in a pool of ink, it means that the person has energy left over and is capable of continued determination. (Amend and Ruiz 1980: 21) Note that there is no difference between the conditional and temporal-clause formulations, at least in principle: the same type of information is communicated. However, this variation is not always possible with other types of CSs. It is possible with generic cases (Snitzer-Reilly 1986), such as “if/when water temperature drops below 32 degrees Fahrenheit, water freezes.” There is yet another formulation that is particularly relevant: the copular clause: [318] Remember that a simple and speedy script is a sign of maturity and purposefulness. (Amend and Ruiz 1980: 67) [319] Surprisingly, a number of small script writers are not retiring persons, but rather possess a strong power drive. (Amend and Ruiz 1980: 50) [320] This formation acts more as a cover-up than as a protector. It has a sinuous and snaky quality to it and is an indication of an aloof, narrow-minded, rigid and hypocritical nature. (Amend and Ruiz 1980: 80) Or it may be a paraphrase of a copular phrase: [321] Pressure exerted at the top of a letter instead of increasing with the downward motion can be taken as another sign of anxiety. (Amend and Ruiz 1980: 39) [322] Smaller than Average Size handwriting denotes an introspective person. (Amend and Ruiz 1980: 50) The copular formulation is even found without the copula, constructed in a manner similar to the OB NVCs: [323] Long starting strokes from below the baseline—this stroke is a so-called waste of time and energy. (Broschk 2004: 112) [324] Starting strokes touching the head of capitals—this is a sign of a person under stress. (Broschk 2004: 114)

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This formulation is interesting because, unlike the CS, which may mask various relationships, the copular formulation shows, clearly and simply, a theme – rheme articulation—that is, a given entity and a new information entity. The rhematic part, after the copula (or dash as cited here) basically has a resumptive entity (“this stroke” in ex. [323], “this” in ex. [324]) whose function is to represent the theme inside the rheme (this in fact is a topical construction). In other corpora that are linguistically closer to OB, there are similar formulations of yet another semiotic system—dreams and their inter­pretations, which are constructed in the same manner, namely, theme – rheme. The first example is from Biblical Hebrew, and the second from epic OB: [325] wəhinne min hayʾōr ʿōlōṯ šɛḇaʿ pārōṯ yəp̄ōṯ marʾɛ . . . šɚḇaʿ pārōṯ haṭṭōḇōṯ šɚḇaʿ šānīm hennā ‘(dream:) “And, behold, there came up out of the river seven well favored kine. . .” . . . (interpretation:) “The seven good kine are seven years”’ Genesis 41:2, 26 [326] mê nādišu [išq]ianni . . . ša mê nādišu išqûka ilka mukabbit qaqqadika Lugalbanda ‘(dream:) “[He let] me [drink] from his waterskin” . . . (interpretation:) “The one who let you drink from his waterskin is your god, who honors you, Lugalbanda”’ Gilg. Harmal 1:9–16 Note that both examples contain a part that resumes the data from the dream (‘the seven good cows’ and ‘the one who let you drink’) within the interpretation. The meaning of the syntagm is given thereafter. The syntactic relationship between the resumptive part and its meaning is predicative in both cases, as it is in the English examples above (exx. [317]–[324]). A similar example is occasionally found in other types of omen reports in the letters: [327] [ūm]am 14 antallûm ša warḫim išš[a]kin u naškun antallîm [š]âti maruṣ ‘On the 14th [day], an eclipse of the moon appeared, and the appearance of such an eclipse is unpleasant’ ARM 26, 81:5–8 A concrete case of lunar eclipse is reported in the first clause. In the following clause, the appearance of the eclipse (naškun antallîm šâti) is the thematic entity of the clause and the interpretation (maruṣ) is the rheme, predicated about the theme. The same structure is common in diviner’s letters, where the essence of the divination act is given, often at the beginning: têrētuya šalmā ‘my omens are favorable” (e.g., ARM 26, 98:9, and passim in the ARM letters); again, these are explicit cases of predicative relationships (see §1.3 above). 4.2.3.  The omen apodosis paradigm The preceding paragraphs only examine analogous semantic situations, not the problem itself. It appears, however, based upon syntactic evidence, that the CS in the OB omens consists of a clear predicative link between its protasis and apodosis.

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167

As explained in §1.2 above, in the structural-analysis method, when two linguistic entities interchange in the same slot and in the same syntactic setting, they also have the same function. As stated above (at the end of §4.1.3), a substantive in nominative status and an independent verbal form are interchangeable in the omen apodosis. This may seem almost trivial, because both evidently function as the apodosis of the omen. However, this is not a common occurrence in every šumma structure: it never happens in the epistolary corpus and is found only rarely with legal šumma structures, and then only when it is a technical term (e.g., dīn napištim ‘capital case’). The identity in function of substantives in the nominative and verbal clauses is verifiable from another angle: symmetric connectives generally connect entities that have a similar function. This is explained by Dik (1968: 27–29), who shows that connection is possible only between similar entities, even when they do not have the same morphological marking: it is enough for them to be syntactically equivalent. One convincing example is found in ex. [300] above (qarrādū yāʾūtun u ša nakrim ‘Warriors, mine and the enemy’s’), where a morpho­­logical adjective (‘mine’) is connected to a ša syntagm (‘those of the enemy’), which is essentially a syntactic adjective. 15 Similar cases are found in the omens. Winitzer (2006: 65–125) convincingly discusses two of these connectives; the main one is šanûm šumšu ‘its other interpretation’ (2006: 65–110), which is disjunctive, like ū ‘or’, and stands between alternative interpretations: [328] šumma bāb ekallim erbet tibût šar ḫammê šanû šumšu ḫiṣbu ana ekallim ul irrub ‘If the “palace gates” are four, uprising of a usurper king; its other interpretation: products will not enter the palace’ 24:11 (Winitzer 2006: 82, ex. 2.66) [329] [šumma] ina qabliat naplastim ina imittim šīlum nadi ina aḫiāt awīlim mammān[an] imât šanû šumšu namtalli qablītim ‘[If ] in the middle of the ‘view’ in the right a concavity is situated, someone from the man’s dependents will die; its other interpretation: an eclipse of the middle watch’ 17:50 (Winitzer 2006: 86, ex. 2.70) The essence of both examples is summarized in Table 4.2. Table 4.2 1st interpretation ex. 328

tibût šar ḫammê

ex. 329

ina aḫiāt awīlim mammān[an] imât

2nd interpretation šanûm šumšu

ḫiṣbu ana ekallim ul irrub namtalli qablītim

Note that the interpretations consisting of either a clause or a substantive occur on either side of the connective šanûm šumšu. The fact that the interpretations, whether they are

15. On ša syntagms as syntactic adjectives, see Cohen 2008a.

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a clause or a substantive, can connect in this way, proves their syntactic equivalence in the apodosis and corroborates their common interchange in this slot. In addition to the apodosis of omens, there is only one syntactic slot, or function, in OB where a substantive in nominative status 16 freely inter­changes with an independent (i.e., nonsubordinate) predicative form, thus showing functional equivalence between them: it is the rheme paradigm following a substantival theme. Compare the pairs that come from the letter corpus (Table 4.3). Table 4.3 ex. [330] [331] [332] [333]

theme awātum šī . . . awātum šī awīlû šunu awīlû šunu

rheme iqqabiakkum takittum illikūnim wardū ša nadiat DN

translation The matter was told to you . . . The matter is a confirmation These men came (If) these men are slaves of a nadītum of DN

locus AbB 10, 13:19–20 AbB 10, 150:15 AbB 7, 58:14 AbB 1, 115:8′

The substantival rhemes in exx. [331] and [333] interchange with the respective verbal clauses in exx. [330] and [332] in a manner similar to the interchange in omen apodoses. It is true that the rheme paradigm in the letters is somewhat wider: it allows prepositional syntagms, which are not attested here in rheme function. 17 A similar case of paradigmatic identity is attested in another related domain in OB: the apodosis paradigm of both the šumma conditional pattern and the paratactic conditional pattern (§2.7): Table 4.4 conditional type i

ii

protasis (verbal forms)

connective

apodosis

paratactic

ul iprus -ma iparras (variant ‘→’) paris

iparras

precative

conditional particle

iprus iptaras iparras paris NVC

šumma

—

paris

NVC Q

16.  Of course, a substantive in genitive status commutes freely with verbal forms marked by the “subjunctive” (iprusu, iptarsu, iparrasu, etc.), both occurring following a nucleus, namely, any entity in the construct state. In this case, both substantives and clauses function as attributes of the nucleus. 17.  Prepositional syntagms are attested but in functions other than the rheme: ina kakkim tēšûm ‘by weapon—chaos’ (17:43) or as topic (see presently). This is probably due to the interpretive nature of the omen apodosis, which cannot be represented via a prepositional syntagm. There is possibly one example, mentioned above in §4.1.3, of ullu ‘no’, which is hard to judge syntactically (like annam ‘yes’ is) but could hardly be an adverb.

4.3.  Concluding remarks

169

A comparison between the two most common conditional patterns in the epistolary corpus shows that the structures are markedly different: the distribution of forms in the protasis and the syntactic characteristics of each of the protases are not the same. Nonetheless, the apodosis paradigm in both patterns looks identical. In other words, two a priori differently characterized patterns have a paradigm in common. An identity between two complex signals such as this paradigm can hardly be accidental. Based on this observation, it is more than reasonable to conclude that the identity of the rheme paradigm and the omen apodosis paradigm (in their most peculiar feature) is not accidental either. The striking similarity at the core of the paradigm should be interpreted as follows: the apodosis of omen šumma constructions is a rheme, that is, the new information, predicated on the theme, which is the given or presupposed information. By default, if the apodosis is the rheme, the protasis is the theme of the construction. One might ask: how can a šumma syntagm can function as a thematic entity (note that the link between topic and conditional protasis is discussed above, §2.7.2)? The answer is found in the examples grouped in Table 4.5, all coming from omen apodoses. Table 4.5 topic/theme

rheme

[334]

šumma ana marṣim

[335]

ana marṣim

[336]

marṣum

‘(as for) the sick, he shall live’ ARM 26, 3:8, OBE 4:5′, 11′; 6:6′

iballuṭ

58:3 57:27

This happens when the signals in the omen protasis are applied to an alternative entity, which may be presented by all these strategies, in the same syntactic setting: a šumma protasis (ex. [334]), 18 a prepositional syntagm (ex. [335]), and a nominative-status entity (ex. [336]). All of them function as contrastive topics or themes in the clause (see Winitzer 2006: 57–65, Jeyes 1989: 45, 48). 4.3.  Concluding remarks The omens are CSs that convey a sort of equation between both parts. The first part (the protasis) consists of physical findings that emerge during the examination of the medium, and the second part (the apodosis) interprets the meaning of the data cited in the protasis. Because the omens occur in only one strategy, they do not form a paradigm of strategies. This, and the fact that they are not found inside a textual context, makes it impossible to obtain any information on their nature. As an alternative procedure, these CSs have been examined against formulations from other semiotic systems (graphological 18. Occasionally, šumma functions as a disjunctive conjunction, like ū. However, this is not the case here, since it is compatible with u (e.g., u šumma, 41:42). Note that this is an indirect corroboration of the true disjunctive nature of šanûm šumšu, which never co-occurs with u.

170

Conditional Structures in the Omens

rules, dream interpretations) and against specific omen readings reported in the letters. These directions turn out to be quite instructive: they show that 1. OB as well as other languages (BH, English) have several strategies capable of formulating similar relationships between signifiant and signifié—CSs, temporal structures, and most revealing of all, copular strucures or NVCs; and 2. specific cases of omen-reading reports in the letters are not packaged as CSs, probably to avoid a conflict with the ordinary conditional patterns in the letters. The last step involves comparing the unique apodosis paradigm of the omen structure with a similar paradigm in the letter corpus, the rheme paradigm, where substantives in nominative status interchange with predicative forms. Because identity between complex paradigms is not considered accidental, we have concluded that the apodosis is actually a rheme and, by process of elimination, the protasis is the theme, and between the two is found a predicative link, or a nexus. This conclusion matches the strategy used in OB to interpret a dream, which has the same predicative relationships between the dream and its interpretation. The details gathered and discussed throughout this study are summarized in Table 4.6. Table 4.6 Omen šumma structures: No modality protasis (= theme) exponent

value

iprus/iptaras

resultative pf.

iparras

durativity

paris

unmarked state

NVC

apodosis (= rheme) categories aspect

exponent

value

iprus

past

paris

present

iparras

future

NVC

future?

categories tense

The paradigms are unique in comparison to šumma structures in other genres: the predominant category in the protasis is aspect, while in the apodosis it is tense.

Chapter 5 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS This monograph consists of a comprehensive description of the CSs in OB. The genres chosen for the enquiry have been those where this phenomenon is sufficiently attested to allow analysis and description. Because every type of CS, as well as entire groups of structures found in each genre and described throughout the mono­graph, has been provided with its own concluding section, this final chapter is a comparative statement that summarizes the most important points raised earlier in this study. 5.1.  The procedure It is both reasonable and helpful to begin the general conclusions by recapitulating the discovery procedure followed throughout this monograph. The procedure is illustrated in fig. 5.1. Fig. 5.1

A. The data for each potential CS is obtained syntagma­tically (the overt material in the text) at the first stage. Data is collected about the following functional slots: 1. The co-text, both general and immediate, its restrictions, and its overt link to the following CS; 2. Introductory particle (if applicable); 3. The forms that constitute the protasis domain, its complexity potential, links between the forms, etc.; 4. The boundary type separating the protasis from the apodosis; 5. The forms found in the apodosis domain, interconnection, complexity, etc. 171

172

General Conclusions

This procedure is repeated for any structure suspected as conditional. B. The next step involves the paradigmatic axis: the data collected for each CS is compared against similar cases. This comparison allows the study of paradigmatic constitution and restrictions for functional slots that involve several variables, mainly in the protasis and apodosis. The variables that constitute the paradigm usually have some opposition between them that needs to be examined and then determined. In addition, various characteristics of each paradigm are examined: the functional sentence perspective, the personal sphere, as well as unique traits. This permits a formulation of the general syntactic and semantic information for the types of CSs, which by now are defined as syntactic patterns. C. This done, the different types of conditional patterns can be compared in toto with other conditional patterns as well as other forms occurring in the same functional slots in the text. For instance, purus forms, which function as imperatives, figure in the same slot occupied by conditional patterns. The full procedure has been applied to the conditional patterns in the letter corpus. However, not all of the stages of the procedure could be applied to the other genres: the main protases in the law collections have no textual context, so this stage was applied only to the secondary protases in this case. The omens have no context and only one pattern, so cross-pattern comparison is not applicable, which is why we had to resort to extra-corpus comparison. 5.2.  Comparative perspective on the patterns in each genre The comparison shown in Table 5.1 presents the patterns in each genre, based on the cumulative data that arose from the synthesis of the various paradigms in each of the strategies. Note that the most common forms in each paradigm are set in boldface type: 1. There are no two protases that are are identical in all parameters. For instance, The protases of B and M consist of virtually same forms, but the oppositions between these forms and, consequently, their values show that the paradigms are in fact quite dissimilar. Some structures consist of paradigms in which there exists an opposition between the forms (A, B, F, H, M). Other structures either consist of one form only, forming no opposition (C, E, G, I–L), or consist of several forms between which no opposition is found to exist (D). 2. A paradigm in the apodosis implies a choice between forms, for example, a precative or iparras form. Whereas the protases mostly consist of paradigms, paradigms in the apodoses are found only in šumma structures (B, H, M) and in one more pattern (A), which shares the apodosis paradigm with B. The other patterns do not have paradigms (for instance, in E the apodosis must be a precative form), and choice then only exists between different patterns. This lack of choice in the apodosis seems to play an important role in marking the CS as such. A designated morphological marking of the apodosis is not found

5.2.  Comparative perspective on the patterns in each genre

173

Table 5.1 A.  The conditional super-paradigm: the letters conditional type

protasis (forms)

connective

conditional particle

šumma

C

hypothetical

šumma

D

counter-factual

šum(ma)man lū

E

modal particle

pīqat, midde

F

asseverative

G precative

iptaras iprus pron/Sgen paris iparras adverb iparras

common paradigm

ul iprus -ma iparras (variant ‘→’) iparras (paris) paris precative iprus NVC iptaras Q iparras conditional pattern paris NVC

A paratactic

B

apodosis

iparras+Q

—

iprus iptaras iparras paris

-man

precative

lū paris lū iprus lū iparras

purus

liprus (ayyiprus)

lū iparras

B.  The CS super-paradigm: laws conditional type

protasis (forms)

connective iprus iptaras iparras paris

apodosis iparras predicative noun NVC CS

conditional particle

šumma

I

‘relative’

ša

iparrasu

iparras

J

‘temporal’

ūm

iparrasu

K

paratactic

iparras

iparras secondary iparras cond.

L

precative

liprus

H

—

-ma (variant ‘→’) NVC, šumma CS

C.  Conditional structures: omens conditional type

M

conditional particle

protasis (forms)

šumma

connective iprus iptaras iparras paris NVC

apodosis iprus

—

paris iparras (unipartite) NVC

174

General Conclusions

in OB (nor is it common cross-linguistically), and when conditional marking is not specific enough (for example, when šumma does not occur), the unchanging form in the apodosis occasionally constitutes the distinctive feature. This is clear, for example, in the modal particle conditional pattern (E), where without the precative form in the apodosis, the syntagm is not conditional. The same idea applies when the protasis and the apodosis each consists of a specific form (for instance, C, E, and G), which, again, makes pattern recognition easier. 3. Only patterns A, B, H, and L may take an entire CS for apodosis. This has repercussions for the modal oppositions in the apodosis only in the first two patterns, both in the epistolary genre. In the apodoses of legal CSs, this secondary conditional is connected with special temporal oppositions (see below, §5.3, for both cases). 5.2.1.  The hypotheticality scale The comparative table of patterns in the epistolary genre (Table 5.1A) is special in that it shows its own epistemic scale. Specific patterns in that table (C and D) demonstrate different levels of likelihood than the rest of the patterns, which are neutral regarding the chances of actualization. Pattern C is a restricted hypothetical pattern (occuring only with a question), pointing at lower likelihood than the other patterns. Pattern D is the counterfactual pattern, signaling the least likelihood (but not absolute lack of likelihood, or else it would have been equivalent to a similar factual statement, which it is not). Because the counterfactual conditional value is close to the indicative value, which is found in the same paradigm with all of these conditional patterns (as well as other forms; see below), the scale should to be viewed as circular (see fig. 5.2, left). Fig 5.2.  Within conditionals: the hypotheticality scale. Main Clause Modal Paradigm indicative epistemic  conditional (the entire scale)     ordinary conditionals     hypothetical conditionals     counterfactual conditionals  judgments  evidentials  interrogative deontic asseverative

5.2.  Comparative perspective on the patterns in each genre

175

The list on the right in fig. 5.2 is the paradigm of independent/chained clauses, which shows where conditionals are found and with what forms they are regularly capable of interchanging. In this paradigm, the conditional patterns belong to a single subtype of epistemic modality (which is additionally marked by modal particles; see §2.1.1 above). These conditional patterns are opposed to other types of modality, whether deontic or asseverative, 1 and these modal oppositions are unique to the letter genre. For this reason, the other genres, which do not exhibit these oppositions (both between the patterns and with forms outside the conditional group), cannot be considered modal and are consequently a‑modal or modally neutralized. This a‑modality conforms to the fact that hypotheticality does not play a part in the law collections or in the omens. That is, modal oppositions do exist within the individual paradigms inside the patterns but not with regard to the entire conditional pattern. 5.2.2.  Conditional types The main conditional type found in the letter genre are actualization conditions in which the realization of one state of affairs is contingent upon another. This fits the truly functional or instrumental nature of OB epistolary communication and is corroborated by the common precative forms in the apodosis. Another conditional type is the group of inferential conditions in which the apodosis is a conclusion inferred from the protasis. There are only a small number of examples of this type: [337] ṣubāt-am ana pān-ī-ya šām–ma ana garment-nom to face-obl.pl-gen.1cs buy-imp-2ms=conn to pān-ī-ya ul t-ašâm → mimma face-obl.pl-gen.1cs neg 2ms-buy-npst at_all ul

rāʾim-ī

atta 2

ittī-ka

ul

adabbub

neg love-ptcp-gen.1cs nom.2ms with-gen.2ms neg 1cs-speak-npst ‘Buy a garment for me; should you not buy (it) for me, (then) you do not love me at all, I will not speak to you’ 8, 93:18–21 (see also exx. [102], p. 66, and [106], p. 67 above) “You do not love me at all” is the conclusion inferred from the potential failure of the addressee to carry out what is asked of him. The precative is never a part of this kind of inferential apodosis. In one unique case, where a deontic nuance was nevertheless needed, an ad hoc modal infinitive construction is used instead:

1.  For the modality of asseverative forms, see Cohen 2005a: 65–67. 2.  Edzard (1992: 141) mentions that this is in fact a client (and not a woman) talking with someone he does business with.

176

General Conclusions

[338] [š]umma ekall-um–ma lā iqbi ṣuḫār-u šū if palace-nom=foc neg 3cs-say-pst servant-nom dem.nom.ms ana wuššur-im to release-inf-gen ‘If the palace itself did not order (or: has not ordered) (it), (then) this servant is to (be) release(d)’ 1, 74:23–25 (= ex. [105], p. 67) The few cases of rhetorical questions in the apodosis (§2.1.2.2.7) are similar to inferential conditionals, except that, in addition, they cast doubt on whether the apodosis is indeed a conclusion inferred from the protasis. Note that the apodosis of ex. [337] consists of an inference followed by an actualization clause (‘I will not speak to you’). In fact, this type of conditional is reminiscent of the role played by the rare predicative noun in the apodosis, which generally occurs with stems of sub­stantives, in the apodoses of law collections—for example, especially, šarrāq iddâk ‘he is a thief, he shall be killed’: [339] šumma ina 6 warḫ-ī šīb-ī-šu lā if within 6 month-obl.pl witness-obl.pl-gen.3ms neg irdeam awīl-um šū sar 3cs-lead_forth-pst man-nom dem.nom.ms liar-stv-3ms ‘If within six months he does not produce his witnesses, this man is a liar’ CH §13 This function is discussed above (§3.1.1.7) with regard to conclusions of the premise in the protasis. Note that the semantic relationships between the protasis and the apodosis have nothing to do with the hypotheticality of the structure. Note further that all CSs in the omens are somewhat similar: a conclusion is drawn from a certain state of affairs in the medium examined. Yet another conditional type is the pleonastic conditionals (§2.1.2.2.2) in which the apodosis repeats the protasis, to denote approval: [340] šumma ina sūt GN i-n-naddin ina sūt if in measure.nuc 3cs-pass-give-npst in measure.nuc GN l-i-n-nadin



juss-3cs-pass-give

‘If it must be sold according to the seah measure of GN, fine (lit., ‘let it be sold according to the seah measure of GN’)’ 12, 70:5′–8′ (and similarly 9, 19:7–8, with iparras in the apodosis, as well as exx. [94]–[95], p. 64) These conditionals are hypothetical, as is evident from ex. [95] above, which has an immediately following alternative: ‘If they have given you, fine (lit., ‘they have given you’). If they have not given you, entrust a maid so she does not get lost’.

5.2.  Comparative perspective on the patterns in each genre

177

The alternative in this case compels a hypothetical interpretation, since the alternative CS is an ordinary condition. 5.2.3.  Lack of hypotheticality Hypotheticality is a feature of ordinary conditionals, which occur only in the epistolary genre (see §5.2.1 above). This probably has to do with the oppositions of the structure in the paradigm—that is, with other forms that figure in the same functional slots. However, parts of the CS may occasionally show lack of hypotheticality. As already mentioned, the entire construction is not hypothetical in the law collections and in the omens. In the epistolary genre, there are only a few cases of CSs that are not hypothetical and in which the apodosis is not contingent upon the protasis for its realization—the polite requests (§2.1.3.1) and suggestions (§2.1.3.2): [341] šulum-šu elī-ka īšu well_being-gen.3ms upon-gen.2ms (1)cs-have-stv šumma t-aramm-anni šullim-šu if 2ms-love-npst-acc.1cs keep_well.imp-2ms-acc.3ms gimill-am šuāti elī-ya t-īšu favor-acc dem.obl.cs upon-gen.1cs 2ms-have.stv ‘You owe me his well being. If you love me, keep him well. I (will) owe you the favor’ 9, 209:12–18 [342] šumma aw[ā]t-um īn-ka maḫr-at if matter.nom eye-gen.2ms meet-stv-3fs ṭupp[a-k]a ana awīl-im š-ūbil-am–m[a] tablet-gen.2ms to man-gen caus-send-imp-2ms-acc.1cs=conn ‘If the matter pleases you, send [you]r tablet to the man . . .’ 12, 69:29–30 (= ex. [127], p. 76) Ex. [341] is classified as a polite request: the request is not dependent on whether the addressee loves the writer or not and hence it is not hypothetical. Rather, the conditional construction is merely a linguistic device to convince the addressee to do something the writer needs done. Note that in this example this device is used in conjunction with two auxiliary utterances: one reminds the addressee “you owe me his well-being” and the other is a promise “I (will) owe you this favor.” Ex. [342] is similar to French s’il vous plaît ‘please (lit., ‘if it pleases you’)’. In OB, the device affects the modality signaled by the precative form, but the precative is not hypothetical. The apodosis is not hypothetical in concessive-conditional interpretation:

178

General Conclusions

[343] urram apāl-am ul e-leʾʾi šumma ana bīt tomorrow pay-inf-acc neg 1cs-can-npst if to house.nuc il-im išap  ⟨pa⟩r-ū-­ninni apāl-am ul e-leʾʾi god-gen 3mp-send-npst-acc.1cs pay-inf-acc neg 1cs-can-npst ‘I will not be able to pay tomorrow. (Even) if they send me to the temple of god, I will not be able to pay’ 6, 4:12–15 (= ex. [157], p. 91) Not being able to pay is not conditioned by the protasis. This is one of the characteristics of concessive-conditionals—that is, they are half-conditional (only the protasis denotes uncertainty, while the apodosis is factual). Note that the apodosis has its own modality (±deontic), independently of the modality imposed by the CS: it could be a directive in addition to the hypotheticality it expresses as apodosis. 5.2.4.  Similar types cross-genre Some of the information about the nature of CSs in each genre has been obtained by looking for similar formulations in other genres: 1. A unique occurrence of an ordinary condition, otherwise found only in the epistolary genre, is found in a legal edict: [344] ša (. . .) kanīk-am uš-ēzib-u ina pron.nuc document-acc (3)cs-draw_up-pst-subj in kanīk-i-šu ša uš-ēzib-u document-gen-gen.3ms pron.nuc (3)cs-draw_up-pst-subj [ḫ]adān-šu ittiq–ma [ka]sp-um ṣibt-am time_limit-gen.3ms 3cs-pass-npst=conn silver-NOM interest-acc irašši [tam]kar-um u-ša-šṭer-u . . . 3cs-acquire-npst merchant.nom 3cs-caus-write_down-pst-subj ‘He who (. . .) has a document drawn up, and in the document he drew up the [mer]chant writes “should the [t]ime limit pass by, the [si]lver will accumulate interest”. . .’ Edict of Ammīṣadūqa §9 This edict is close kin to the law collections, but unlike the latter, it uses only two strategies to formulate legal clauses: šumma structures and adjectival ša clauses. The paratactic conditional in ex. [344] is sufficiently distinct from the laws that it is able to signal something completely different: an ordinary condition in a short passage of direct speech. This pattern is the second most common in the letter corpus. 2. On the other hand, a šumma CS signals an ordinary conditional in the letters. This type of conditional and law-like formulations in the epistolary genre are viewed as two distinct linguistic expressions, because the latter always occur with an adjectival ša formulation (‘he who . . .’) or its morphological equivalent, a simple adjective:

5.2.  Comparative perspective on the patterns in each genre

179

[345] awīl-um balṭ-um gimil gāmil-i-šu man.nom healthy.nom favor.nuc benefactor-gen-gen.3ms utār šumma balṭ-āku gimilla-ka (3)cs-return-npst if healthy-stv-1cs favor-gen.2ms utār (1)cs-return-npst ‘A healthy/living man returns the favor of his benefactor. If I live/am well, I will return your favor’ 3, 33:24–26 (= ex. [268], p. 149) Ex. [345] shows a legal protasis in the form of an adjective. This formulation has a generic nature: it is generally valid. In the same example, similar material is formulated in a šumma structure, which is, as is the case in this genre, an ordinary condition. It describes a particular case that pertains to concrete hic et nunc and addresses a specific person. This example shows very well the differences between legal formulations on the one hand and ordinary conditions on the other. 3. The material in the omens is rarely reported in letters: [346] a. [tê]rt-am āmur–ma šumēl ubān-im [p]aṭer omen.acc 1cs-look-pst=conn left.nuc finger-gen split-stv-3ms b. ubān ḫašî qablītum ana imitt-im itḫi finger-nuc lung-gen middle to right-gen 3cs-approach-pst c. šīr šum-im bēl-ī lū ḫadi omen.nuc name.gen lord-gen.1cs ptcl rejoice-stv-3ms ‘I read the [om]en and the left of the finger was split, the finger of the lung at the center approached the right. (It is) a good omen. Let my lord rejoice’ ARM 26, 88:33–35 [347] a. [ūm]-am 14 antall-ûm ša warḫ-im i-š-š[a]kin day.acc 14 eclipse-nom pron.nuc moon-gen 3cs-pass-put-pst b. u naškun antall-îm [š]âti maruṣ and pass-put-inf-nuc eclipse.gen dem.obl.cs sick-stv-3ms ‘On the 14th [day], an eclipse of the moon appeared, and the appearance of such an eclipse is unpleasant’ ARM 26, 81:5–8 (= ex. [327], p. 166) Ex. [346] is an epistolary report of reading a specific omen. The information regarding this reading is not packaged as a conditional construction but instead it is reported in a series of predications that is similar to the one in the šumma formulation. Lines a and b correspond to the protasis, while c matches the apodosis. Ex. [347] is different from the omens surveyed in this monograph, but the manner of its syntactic construction is enlightening. A natural phenomenon is described in a, and its meaning is given in b. Note that b contains the phenomenon referred to as topic,

180

General Conclusions

Table 5.2 A. Epistolary šumma structures: no aspect protasis exponent

value

iprus

past

iptaras

non-past perfect

iparras

non-past

paris NVC

apodosis category

absolute tense

a-temporal

exponent

value

liprus

directive

iparras paris

indicative

question

interrogative

CS

conditional

category

modality

B. Legal šumma structures: no tense (primary) protasis exponent

value

iprus

event(s)

iptaras

chain-final event

paris

state

iparras

intent (CH durative too)

apodosis categories aspect and modality

exponent

value

predic.

factual

iparras NVC

modal (obligation/ permisssion)

C. Secondary legal šumma protases iprus~ lā iprus

unmarked

lā iprus~iptaras

anterior

iparras

co-temp

relative iptaras~ lā iptaras unmarked tense

category

modality

remarks lā iprus~iptaras forms denoting anteriority are those contrastive to each other across protases only

D. Omen šumma structures: no modality protasis exponent

value

iprus/ iptaras

resultative perfect

iparras

durativity

paris NVC

state

apodosis category

aspect

exponent

value

iprus

past

paris

present

iparras

future

NVC

future?

category

relative tense

or theme, and the interpretation is its predicate. This is somewhat similar to the way in which the adjectival ša clause strategy in law formulations is constructed, but different from the construction of ordinary conditionals.

5.3.  Cross-genre comparison of šumma structures

181

This cross-genre comparison corroborates and emphasizes the differences between the CSs in each genre and in general. 5.3.  Cross-genre comparison of šumma structures Another comparison, between šumma structures in each of the genres discussed, is useful. At first glance, these šumma structures look almost indistinguish­able with regard to the various paradigms. However, analysis shows that the values of the different oppositional sets in the paradigms and the predominant category of each paradigm are quite different for each šumma structure. Some characteristics (mentioned above) are not presented in Table 5.2 for lack of space. The most decisive factor for the nature of šumma structure in the letter genre (Table 5.2A) is the fact that it is characterized by a concrete hic et nunc, in addition to other dialogic features: all personal spheres are found, as well as interrogatives and directives. These structures are uttered by a specific speaker and directed at a specific addressee. These characteristics, which are obvious in the concrete examples, are unique to the epistolary šumma structure. The other šumma structures are similar to narrative: they are referential to an arbitrary point, not rooted in textual context, devoid of any personal sphere (the 3rd person is not opposed to any other person), the speaker is not always specified, and the address is made to anyone. These differences are crucial for the resulting analysis. The šumma structures have distinct patterns. The information in Table 5.2 has already been presented and discussed separately, each in its respective chapter. 5.3.1.  Modality, tense, and aspect Modality is found in three paradigms: the epistolary apodosis, the legal protasis, and the legal apodosis. The modal opposition in each of them is of a different nature. In the epistolary apodosis, the opposition is indicative versus directive (versus interrogative). In the legal protasis, events and states are opposed to an expression of intent, whereas in the legal apodosis, a conclusion is opposed to the expression of obligation or permission: Table 5.3 paradigm

non-modal

modal

form(s)

iparras, paris, NVC precative

various forms

conditional structures

function

indicative

directive

interrog.

conditional

legal protasis

form(s)

iprus, iptaras/paris

iparras

function

events/states

intent

legal apodosis

form(s)

predicative state

iparras, NVC

function

factual: conclusion

modal: obligation, permission

epistolary apodosis

182

General Conclusions

Note that modality type can vary even between two paradigms of the same pattern. This is not all: as can be seen in Table 5.1A, summarizing the conditional patterns in the letters (§5.2 above, p. 173), the apodosis paradigm common to patterns A and B contains CSs, in addition to the simple predicative forms. The modal category in the epistolary apodosis then consists of four types: indicative, directive, interrogative, and conditional. The interrogative is difficult. First, its marking in OB is sporadic. Second, it is compatible with other modality types (e.g., the precative). Nevertheless, there are some indications that the interrogative in OB is linked with other modality types: they occupy the same syntactic slots and therefore cohabit the same paradigm. Temporal opposition is found in the protasis, as a rule, only where there is a concrete context to which the protasis is referential. This state of affairs exists, naturally, in the epistolary šumma pattern (Table 5.2A). Yet another protasis that shows at least a partial temporal opposition is the protasis paradigm of secondary šumma CSs in the law collections (Table 5.2C). Note that although in the first case the temporal values are absolute— they are relative to the moment of utterance—in the second case, the temporal values are relative to the primary protasis, which in itself has an arbitrary reference point. This is why the labels used for the values are relative: anterior and cotemporaneous. A vexing problem with the temporal values of the apodosis of the šumma structures in the omens (Table 5.2D) remains. The omens are generic, not located in a textual context, and absolute tense is therefore out of the question. Relative tense is possible, if we consider the protasis as a co-text. The apodoses are rendered as absolute tenses only for practical reasons: the protasis is arbitrarily interpreted as a (generic) present (which is not quite an actual present), but the apodosis is rendered as relative to this present. In this structure, the apodosis does not necessarily follow the protasis temporally but may precede it as well. Aspectual oppositions do not depend on reference to the context. In agreement with what is claimed above (§5.3), both laws and omens have characteristics similar to the narrative. The main protases of the legal genre and the protases of omens are similar in that they exhibit aspectual oppositions: there is no temporal difference between iprus and iparras forms but instead an opposition punctual versus durative. Indeed, in the case of the legal protasis, this is rare, but it is always the case in the omen protasis (i.e., perfect resultative versus durative). The opposition perfect versus non-perfect seems to be a somewhat different category, because it co-occurs both with temporal oppositions (e.g., the epistolary šumma protasis) and with aspectual oppositions (e.g., the omen protasis). 5.3.2.  šumma structures across the OB genres Despite all of these dissimilarities, there must be, nevertheless, some function(s) common to all conditional šumma structures throughout OB. This function in fact is to interconnect, or join together, two related states of affairs (of varying complexity)

5.3.  Cross-genre comparison of šumma structures

183

into one larger, compound linguistic unit. This linguistic unit is characterized by mutual dependency between its two principal parts. Moreover, the particle šumma is the most consistent marker of these compound linguistic units. As shown above for the epistolary šumma patterns (§2.7.2), it constitutes a connective between the protasis domain and the apodosis domain. This statement is easier to prove for the epistolary genre but it is valid anywhere in OB where conditional šumma structures are attested. The protasis and apodosis domains in šumma structures both consist of predicative forms interconnected by the particle -ma. The complexity of the domains varies across genres: in the letters, the apodosis domain is often more complex than the protasis. In the omens, it is the opposite: the protasis tends to be more complex. Legal šumma structures are often complex on both sides (and may contain, in addition, a rich array of subordinate clauses). The particle šumma, then, is a connective of domains, unlike ‑ma, which basically interconnects clauses inside the same domain. The only consistent exception to this, in the epistolary genre, is found in the paratactic CS, where the particle ‑ma can interconnect different domains. The essential conclusion, however, as this study goes to great lengths to show, is that domain interconnection and mutual dependency are almost the only characteristics that the three genres share. The different nature of the šumma structures in each genre is explained by their context (when available), their interchangeability with other patterns, and their functional parallels in other genres. Consequently, each type of šumma structures produces an entire array of relationships and values and manifests various individual characteristics that become evident through analysis.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations AbB AHw

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INDEX OF TEXTS CITED AbB 1, 17 26–29 31 1, 27 24–28 83 1, 29 16 80 21–24 55 21–27  71, 115 1, 31 12–15 76 1, 34 22 150 1, 39 6–15 96 1, 46 11 58 1, 51 23–26 96 29–32 96 33–36 96 1, 53 26 80 1, 65 7–10 93 1, 67 6′–8′ 31 1, 68 4–9 96 1, 71 18–22 96 1, 74 23–25  67, 176 1, 76 9–10 33 1, 81 30–34 62 40–44 37 1, 82 9–11 8 1, 91 4–13 39 1, 105 16–17 31 1, 115 7′–9′ 31 8′ 168 1, 117 13–15 100

AbB (cont.) 1, 122 29–33 61 1, 131 22–23 55 1,131 22–23 115 1, 135 8–12 80 25–27 96 1, 139 9′–10′  94, 96 1, 142 15–23  35, 39 20–23 65 2, 1 3–8 95 2, 6 6–9, 14–20  40 2, 11 4–24 39 7–13, 20–24  39 2, 59 14–21 84 2, 92 15 57 2, 96 6–7, 13–21  53 2, 100 8–10, 14–19, 22–23 56 22–23 31 2, 101 22 14 2, 116 13 4 2, 129 4–19  52, 66 8–9 4 10–19 39 2, 142 6–11 32 2, 144 22–25 71 2, 157 11–13 100 2, 173 12–15 100

AbB (cont.) 2, 212 9–10 119 3, 2 18–23  31, 71, 83 43–45 93 3, 7 16–18 71 3, 11 46–47 96 3, 14 5–6 83 3, 33 9–10  39, 102 24–26  149, 179 3, 34 19, 37–38  83 3, 35 25–28 44 26–28  31, 47, 80 3, 38 26–29 49 28–29 47 3, 39 12–15 96 16–24 39 20–24 41 3, 44 4–10 39 3, 53 14–15 28 3, 65 11 33 3, 72 14–23 61 3, 82 19–21 47 3, 90 24–28 93 4, 11 29–33 81 4, 16 15–20 31 4, 18 15–19 31 4, 38 6–13, 15–24  39 15–24 31

193

AbB (cont.) 4, 39 12–17 31 4, 40 5–21 42 6–28 39 22–28 42 29–36  42, 113 4, 50 8–10 96 4, 51 20–28 57 4, 64 16–19 31 4, 65 17–21 45 4, 79 6–11, 14–26  41 7, 17  57 14–21 117 14–23  13, 66 4, 80 4–8 45 4–17 53 11 57 4, 88 6–20 57 4, 134 18–22 33 4, 137 7 80 4, 145 31–35 82 4, 150 33 96 4, 151 4′–6′ 70 4, 152 16–17 94 4, 161 21–31 53 24–26 81 5, 26 3′–7′ 84 7 100 5, 79 7′–9′ 100 5, 138 12′–21′ 70

194 AbB (cont.) 5, 151 6′–9′ 31 5, 157 6′–10′ 102 5, 165 18–20 62 5, 171 33–35 83 5, 207 16–21  47, 60 5, 212 28–34 58 5, 213 29–33 65 5, 232 24–27 102 5, 255 7–16 46 6, 4 12–15  91, 178 6, 6 10, 23–25  41 6, 41 10 14 6, 48 19 30 6, 62 9 150 6, 73 10–17 82 6, 79 20–23 31 24–25 30 6, 89 25–27 83 6, 96 4–6 100 6, 102 7 57 6, 120 7–10 83 6, 125 19–22 95 6, 129 20–24 96 6, 133 9–12 93 6, 139 5  70, 120 6, 140 20–25 79 6, 148 27–29 83 6, 162 12–14 96

Index of Texts Cited AbB (cont.) 6, 170 7 58 6, 173 16, 20  55 18–22 32 6, 177 26–31 100 6, 188 32′–35′ 100 39′–40′ 101 6, 207 13–19  79, 83 7, 42 15–18 96 7, 55 12–13 33 7, 58 14 168 7, 67 13–18  79, 82 7, 79 7–9  32, 66, 111 7, 80 9–10 55 7, 90 3′–6′ 93 7, 110 27–29 31 7, 145 8′ 82 7, 168 5′–10′ 79 7, 172 15–18 81 8, 19 26′–31′ 47 8, 28 11–15 100 8, 93 14–21 83 19–21 175 8, 99 12–13 95 13  34, 94 8, 100 18–23 74 8, 101 5–16  46, 64 8, 108 4–11 100 12–18 74 8, 109 9 96 8, 130 8′ 75

AbB (cont.) 9, 1 25–26 93 9, 11 5–10 100 9, 16 9–14 54 9, 19 7–8  56, 64, 176 21–27 43 35–36 83 9, 31 15–22 96 9, 35 6–10 73 9, 41 24–26 102 9, 63 5–7  30, 103 9, 83 15–24 96 18–24 112 9, 84 25–30 46 9, 86 15–19 93 9, 88 12–16 68 9, 106 5 95 9, 130 10–13 93 9, 132 10–12 83 9, 141 5–7 4 9, 150 6–11 96 9, 152 26–29 91 9, 192 10–17 79 9, 196 3–19 53 9, 209 12–18 177 9, 214 6–8 74 9, 226 4–6 88 9, 227 5–8 51 9, 232 21–22  70, 74, 87 9, 240 23–25 103

AbB (cont.) 9, 252 19 30 9, 255 11–15 103 9, 270 10–15  83, 85 10, 4 39–41 76 10, 5 21-22 102 10, 10 5–7, 10–13  47 10, 13 19–20 168 10, 16 13′–14′ 47 10, 29 11–13 31 12-13 58 10, 56 23–25 96 10, 66 4–6 3 10, 74 13–20 46 10, 122 18–21  51, 65 10, 145 10–11, 15–19  64 15 30 15–19 53 10, 150 15 168 10, 159 21–24 68 10, 166 7–12 96 10, 167 15–18 114 10, 169 6-8 102 10, 170 17–20 96 10, 178 25–30 65 26–30 31 10, 180 9′ 56 9′–10′ 58 10, 188 10′–11′ 70 10, 189 5–10 70 9 30

Index of Texts Cited AbB (cont.) 10, 198 17-19 58 20–21 4 10, 206 16–17 83 10, 207 10–12 74 11, 17 7–12 104 11, 26 16–22 62 11, 27 12–17  83, 88, 149 11, 40 6–8 91 9–21 91 11, 62 16′–20′ 100 11, 84 17–19 96 11, 94 15–16 80 11, 114 6′, 8′–10′, 13′–14′ 55 11, 137 12–19  83, 86 11, 168 7–10 82 11, 175 5–10 83 10 100 11, 176 7–16 76 11, 178 24–26 96 33 73 11, 184 4–7 76 11, 193 13–23 114 11, 194 21–26 90 12, 11 16–19 84 12, 13 14–18  94, 96 12, 18 7–26 45 12, 25 19–20  81, 83 12, 31 3 81 12, 32 19–26 36

195 AbB (cont.) 12, 38 25–27 96 26–27 96 12, 40 12–18 96 12, 42 7–10 67 12, 50 23–26 96 12, 52 13–17 68 12, 53 5–8 84 5–8, 10–12  55 17–20 79 21–22, 26–31  49 12, 63 22–25 96 12, 64 31–33  79, 80 12, 67 38 81 12, 68 22–24 81 27–31 62 28–29 62 12, 69 29–30  76, 177 12, 70 5′–8′  56, 176 9′–12′ 69 12, 78 33 100 12, 89 29–32 58 12, 113 17–19 96 12, 117 19–21 83 12, 121 8–14 31 12, 129 12–16 64 19–20 66 12, 133 12–17 63 12, 149 18′ 63 12, 169 15 73 20–26 92 12, 175 11–15 74 12, 180 16–18 32

AbB (cont.) 12, 194 14–18 81 12, 196 4–11 76 12, 200 9–26 54 13, 6 26–28 104 13, 15 19–26 43 13, 18 4–12, 22–28  39 13, 37 16–19 41 13, 43 19–23  31, 33 13, 62 9, 12–20  100 14–16 84 13, 79 19–20, 25–28  40 13, 85 29–32 55 13, 96 16–32 99 13, 104 8′–14′ 99 13, 111 11′–13′ 55 13, 120 11–17 31 13, 125 7–13 48 13, 200 2′–4′ 55 14, 27 15–18 32 14, 37 13–17 97 14, 53 19–23 69 14, 55 11–15 35 15–16 35 14, 58 7–10 102 14, 59 19–20 103 21–22 107 14, 61 7–8 102 14, 67 12–15 103 14, 104 8–11 98

AbB (cont.) 14, 106 14–17 74 14, 112 39–42 96 14, 114 25–27 96 14, 116 25–29 99 14, 118 5–7 81 14, 123 9–10 67 14, 145 12–19 96 21–25 96 14, 163 8–11; 16–21  98 18 5 14, 164 29–33 96 14, 168 13–17  48, 91 14, 190 13–15 103 14, 205 20–21 63 14, 221 3–14 75 Anbar 1975: p. 121 lines 4–8  92 ARM 26 3:8 169 81:5–8 166 98:9 166 117:5–18 163 81:5–8 179 88:33–35 179 207:15–17 93 Atra-ḫasis 2, 1 1–5 119 CH §2  122, 129, 133 §4 133 §7 142 §9  130, 142, 147 §10 142 §11  130, 142 §13  142, 176 §16 129 §18 133 §19 133

196 CH (cont.) §22  127, 129 §24 143 §25 129 §26 143 §27  129, 133 §28  141, 146 §29 133 §30 139 §31 133 §32 141 §34 124 §38 139 §39 146 §44 129 §45 142 §55 129 §57 141 §66  137, 139 §67+a 137 §112 124 §113 137 §116 137 §118  137, 139 §122  137, 139 §128 142 §138  127, 137 §141  137, 138 §142  137, 138 §143  137, 138 §146 131 §147 131 §148 132 §168 131 §169 131 §171 131 §172  131, 137, 138 §177b 146 §179 131 §180 131 §186  127, 133, 137, 139 §191 122 §192 122 §228 129 §229 122 §232 132 §274 137 §275 142 §276 142

Index of Texts Cited Edict of Ammīṣadūqa §5 148 §7 148 §8 148 §9  148, 178 §12 148 §15 148 §16 148 §22 148 Gilgamesh Harmal 1 9–16 166 Ishchali 15′ 93 P 229–231 118 X 2:5′–7′ 104 Goetze 1958 21:37–38 102 45, 21:8–14  37 56, 30:16–20  36 Janssens 1991 p. 5 lines 16–17 150 pp. 5–6 lines 18–23 150 p. 6 lines 24–33  150 p. 7 lines 43–47  150 LE §9 144 §12 146 §13 146 §14 144 §16 146 §17  144, 147 §18 147 §19 146 §21 124 §22 147 §26  142, 144, 147 §27 143 §28 145 §29  124, 145, 147 §30  145, 147

LE (cont.) §33  144, 145 §34 147 §36 125 §39 145 §40  142, 147 §41 139 §47 124 §50 144 §51 146 §52 146 §56 124 §58  140, 142, 162 NBC 6311:15–23 149 Nougayrol 1950 13 line 11  157 OBE 4:5′ 169 4:11′ 169 6:6′ 169 13 rev. 16  160 18:1–3 160 VAB 5, 156 1′–3′′ 92 YOS 10 9 21 155 11 i:23–24 159 iii:25–26 162 iv:16–17 154 17 36 159 43 168 50 167 23 7 155 24 2 156 11 167 30 156 25 13 156 20 160

YOS 10 (cont.) 31 ii:31–35 157 iv:25–27 158 viii:34–37 162 x:4–6 155 x:34–36 155 xi:43–47 162 xiii:6–13 155 xiii:42–44 155 36 i:49 160 ii:20 160 iv:8–9 159 iv:10–11 160 39 rev. 5  160 41 42 169 42 iii:31–32 156 iv:21–22 158 iv:22–23 160 44 17 162 44 160 46 i:1–2 159 iv:30 158 47 6–7 156 52 i:3–4 158 56 i:19–20 161 i:32–33 162 i:34–35 161 ii:1–2 157 ii:10 155 ii:14–15, 43– 44 155 ii:23 158 iii:23 159 57 27 169 58 3 169

INDEX OF TOPICS The index of topics lists subjects that are not easily found by consulting the table of contents; bold type refers to a definition. adīni  55 n. 52 aḫam nadûm 80 allo-syntagms 5–6 apodosis ~ consisting of a substantive  162–63, 166–68 conditioned value  33, 60, 68–69, 72 interrogative ~  69–70 non-conditioned ~  61, 74–77, 91–92, 178 arḫiš 81 aspect aspectual oppositions  88, 125, 143, 156–57 and n. 3, 159 asseverative ~ forms  3, 5 ~ protasis  97–98 boundaries clause ~  31 domain ~  87, 89 narrative ~  118–19 protasis ~  with iptaras  124, 130–32 syntactic ~  40 n. 20, 49 chain  29 n. 1, 78–79 ~ in paratactic conditionals  78–90 ~ in the apodosis  71 ~ in the protasis  60 comment  9 conditional  ~ characterization  78–90, 93–97 ~ pattern  15, 28, 29, 78 ~ relationship  117–20 concessive ~  90–93, 177–78 counterfactual ~  101 hypothetical ~ pattern  48 inferential ~  66, 67, 175–76 ordinary ~  15 pleonastic ~  64, 176–77 conditional structures  28 context 31 general ~  27, 38–41 immediate ~  31–32, 79 lack of ~  122 scale-reversing ~  79–81 corpus 25–27 dependency  mutual  15, 30, 34, 111–13, 181–82 unidirectional  17, 34

direct speech coverter  95–96 ~ followed by iptaras  48–49 ~ in the protasis and apodosis  96 interconnectivity of ~  129–30 and n. 12 domains  ~ in conditionals  112–15 ~ in modal particle conditionals  94–97 ~ in paratactic conditionals  85–87, 89 epistemic  ~ modality  10 ~ particles as source for conditional markers  9; making up conditional pattern  93–97 ~ scale  10, 15, 174–75 influence of ~ particles on ordinary condition 15 integration of ~ particles in the clause  11–12 focus  9 ~ in protasis of laws  147 ~ in omens  156 ~ of the protasis 32, 111 ~ pattern  120 n. 125, 147, 161–62 Functional Sentence Perspective (FSP)  9 functional value  7 ~ in temporal clauses  7–9 genitive constructions  14 and n. 25 in counterfactual conditions  104 genre  28, 172–74 ~ distinction  121–22, 125, 147–51 cross-genre similarities  178–81 homonymy and polysemy  2, 30, 52 hypotheticality  47–48, 174–75 lack of ~  61, 74–77, 91–92, 177–78 idam šuršûm 81 inserted remark  61–63, 67, 68, 72, 74 n. 70 interrogative  ~ conditional  69–70, 87–88; in relation to protasis and apodosis  119–20 forms in pronominal questions  3–4 indirect question  28 n. 45 relationship with protasis  10 and n. 14, 18–9 inūma strategy  7–8, 135–36, 145 ištūma 98–100 law collections  generic characteristics  122, 127–28, 132, 140, 151–52 generic formulation in letters  149 (macro)syntactic characterization  122, 151–52

197

198 lū  expressing modality  5 (asseverative), 74 (deontic) introducing asseverative protasis  97–98 introducing counterfactual condition  16, 103 -ma  connective particle  29 n. 1, 31, 60, 78–79, 82–88, 89–90 focusing particle  32, 147 homonymy or polysemy  2 -man 107–08 methodological principles  discovery procedure  171–72 structural linguistic analysis  5–9 midde  93–97 and n. 97, 112–13 modal congruence  78, 82–83, 85 modality  ~ in the apodosis  68–69, 72 (letters) ~ in the protasis  136–41 (laws) conditionals and ~  10, 33–34, 142–43 (laws), 174–75 lack of ~  122, 151–52 morphological categories: the predicative forms in various syntactic positions  2–5 nexus (the predicative link)  13–14, 34, 119–20, 170 nīdi aḫim rašûm 80–81 non-past sphere  7, 97, 105 non-verbal clause (NVC)  57–59, 67–68, 142–43, 154–55 abī/aḫī/mārī/bēlī atta  73–75 digilka/niṭilka/libbaka  75–77 existential  34, 154–55 unipartite ~  34, 57–59, 75, 102, 134, 142 oath asseverative ~  92 šumma ~  70–71 n. 65 omens  distinctive features  153–54, 156–57 paradigm  6 n. 7, 36 ~ in law collections  123, 147–48, 152 comparative view  147–48, 173 conditional super-paradigm in letters  110 paradigmatic axis  6–7 perfect (linguistic category)  8, 48–51 future ~  48, 81–82 present ~  48–49 non-past ~  50–52 pīqat  93–97 and n. 97, 112–13 polarity  ~ with co-text  44 n. 26, 45–47 inconclusive ~  106 negative ~ items  79–81 opposite ~ directive  79 polar insistence  97–98

Index of Topics precative  ~ protasis  90–93, 143–44 protasis secondary ~  130–32, 133–34 n. 18, 140–41 syntactic nature of ~ in letters  111–20 syntactic nature of ~ in omens  169 verificational ~  38–43 protasis and apodosis relationships between ~  13–15, 30–35, 117–120 relationships between ~ in omens  166–69 referentiality to context  38–41 relative referentiality  130–36, 140–41 rheme  9 subordinate clauses  4, 7–8, 14 n. 25, 134–36 subordinative  see subjunctive subjunctive  forms 3–4 interchangeability with nouns  14 n. 25, 168 n. 16 syntactic relationships ~ in conditionals  117–20 attributive relationship  14 and n. 25 completive relationship  14 predicative relationships (nexus) 13–14, 119–20 syntagmatic environment  8 compatibility with temporal clauses  32 ša strategy  146, 148–49 šanûm šumšu 167–68 šumma  ~ in indirect question  28 n. 45 cross-genre comparison of ~ structures  181–83 nature of the particle ~  115–17 origins of ~  29 n. 2 various functions  29–30, 36–37, 169 šum(ma)man 101–05 temporal conjunctions  compatibility with verbal forms  7–9 non-past sphere  7–8 past sphere  8 tense ~ in epistolary protases  38–59 relative ~ in omen apodoses  160–61 relative ~ in secondary protases  130–34, 136, 137–38 theme  9 topic  9 ~ shift in omens  155 protasis as ~  34–35, 117–19, 169 ulašūma 36–37 ūm strategy  145–46 umma x–ma  see direct speech converter