Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile: The Role of Policy Diffusion [1st ed.] 9783030510077, 9783030510084

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Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile The Role of Policy Diffusion Cecilia Osorio Gonnet

Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile “This book presents groundbreaking research on one of the most important social policy innovations developed in the Global South in the past 25 years: Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT). Cecilia Osorio Gonnet overcomes the ‘territorial trap’ of conventional public policy analysis and provides a sophisticated study of CCTs in Latin America, considering both national and transnational dimensions, with particular attention to Chile and Ecuador. She weaves together the micro and macro dynamics of policy diffusion to explain the adoption of CCTs in the region, unveiling the role played by epistemic communities, governments and international organizations. The book is a must read for all scholars and practitioners interested in social policies, policy diffusion and Latin American politics.” —Osmany Porto de Oliveira, International Relations Department, Federal University of São Paulo, Brazil “Cecilia Osorio brings a crucial contribution to the discussion of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) in the framework of policy diffusion processes. Latin America was the cradle of those programs and there is a need for an enhanced understanding of why and how diverse leaders in the region made the decision to reduce poverty by recurring to the CCT policy model. Dr. Osorio’s work is context-rich and analytically sophisticated.” —Michelle Morais de Sa e Silva, University of Oklahoma, USA “Cecilia Osorio’s book significantly contributes to the study of public policymaking; an underdeveloped field in Latin America. Using a policy diffusion perspective, she identifies variables to explain the adoption of Conditional Cash Transfer programs, which have played an important role in overcoming poverty in several countries of the region in the past decades. She argues that policy choices are explained by both institutional capacity and the role of epistemic communities. Using Chile and Ecuador as case studies, the author tests her hypothesis through a combination of methodologies, providing solid comparative evidence. This research offers an original perspective to understanding how different Latin American countries have approached poverty alleviation and it also contributes to the broader debate around poverty eradication.” —Flavia Freidenberg, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM, México, Red de Politólogas - #NoSinMujeres

Cecilia Osorio Gonnet

Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile The Role of Policy Diffusion

Cecilia Osorio Gonnet Politics and Government Department Universidad Alberto Hurtado Santiago, Chile

ISBN 978-3-030-51007-7 ISBN 978-3-030-51008-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51008-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch/shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

Traditionally, political science analyses of countries have focused on internal perspectives, emphasizing the impact of domestic variables such as the structure of social classes or the institutions of the particular government system. But in the era of globalization, this domestic approach is no longer enough. It is increasingly obvious that external events and developments have profound effects on the political affairs of the vast majority of countries. Therefore, one of the great intellectual challenges that social scientists face in the third millennium is how to investigate and explain these external influences and their internal repercussions. Are they problematic interferences, such as the conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? Are they “fads and fashions” that domestic actors follow, without first assessing their costs and benefits? Or can they constitute novel solutions to difficulties that previously seemed intractable and from there lead to learning that produces significant improvements? Latin American policy specialists used to be skeptical about external influences. When dependence theory predominated in many academic circles in the North and even more so in the South, there were many suspicions that, given the hegemonic power of the United States, the impact of the international system would be disadvantageous for Latin America. However, in fact, the power of the United States did not turn out to be so hegemonic, and it has certainly diminished considerably in recent decades. v

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FOREWORD

Therefore, a recent approach that has emerged in the last few decades is the theory of diffusion, which emphasizes more horizontal influences–the examples of other similar countries; the lessons that can be inferred from external experiences; and the models offered by a variety of international organizations that do not have an explicit enforcement capacity. In fact, even the IMF has learned that conditionality is not very effective, because it usually provokes open resistance and encourages noncompliance. Within the realm of academic research into the diffusion of innovations, Cecilia Osorio Gonnet’s excellent book makes a remarkable contribution. Her thorough analysis is focused on a specific topic of great political and social relevance, the proliferation of conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America. This innovation, initially designed and implemented in Brazil and Mexico, has been adopted by almost the entire region and has lifted millions of people out of poverty. The central question in the current academic debate focuses on the mechanisms that drive the proliferation of reforms, and the corresponding implications. With her detailed empirical research, the author demonstrates the existence of a strong transnational network that connects social policy experts from all over Latin America and links them with relevant international institutions, such as the World Bank and the InterAmerican Development Bank. It is this “epistemic community” that allows for an intense exchange of experiences and ideas. Much has been written about the concept of epistemic community, but few scholars have undertaken the difficult task of reconstructing these links and demonstrating the extent of such a network. That Cecilia Osorio Gonnet has conducted a comprehensive, thorough study of an epistemic community is an important contribution of this book. The subsequent challenge was determining the specific influences that are exchanged through such a broad transnational network. Did the epistemic community she analyzed engage mainly in rational learning, promoting foreign innovations based on cost–benefit calculations? Or did considerations of normative legitimacy or social pressures lead to the adoption of conditional cash transfer programs in so many countries in the region? Cecilia Osorio Gonnet proposes a differentiated and sophisticated response: The mix of motives depends on the bureaucratic and technical capacities of each country. Developing this main argument, the book proposes an interesting explanation that systematically integrates external and internal factors, combining the approaches of Comparative Politics and theories of diffusion in a novel synthesis.

FOREWORD

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To substantiate this important thesis, the author carried out in-depth research in Ecuador and Chile. Because the Ecuadorian state has limited capabilities, social policymakers followed the recommendations of international organizations without making many allowances for or adaptations to local specificities. An eagerness to emulate the foreign innovation of conditional cash transfer programs for symbolic and normative reasons led to the adoption of external models without appropriate modifications. As a result, the Ecuadorian program suffers from problems because local circumstances were not taken into account. The case of Chile could not be more different! Because this country has a long history of leadership in social policies and formidable technical and bureaucratic capabilities, rational learning processes predominated, based not only on external models, but also on local experiences. Therefore, the program design embraced Chile’s specific needs and was organically integrated into the parameters of the local social protection system. As the governments of contemporary Chile and the political parties that have sustained them have received many criticisms in recent years, it is important to point out that in terms of the decision-making process and the results of public policy implementation, these actors have achieved very notable successes. The political cycle in Chile’s new democracy, which seems to have come to an end, has certainly benefited many of its citizens. The Chilean case also suggests how it is possible to navigate the challenges and opportunities of globalization in a reasonable and beneficial way. The central idea established by Cecilia Osorio Gonnet’s book is, “to neither surrender completely to external influences, nor to categorically exclude them.” It is good to follow international trends and import innovative models, but careful evaluation and adaptations to local requirements are vitally important as well. Strong bureaucratic structures and advanced technical capabilities are essential for the process of filtration and adaptation. The skills and abilities required are difficult to accumulate and take a long time to form, as the ultimately succesful case of Brazil exemplifies. However, they are easy to waste and even to destroy, as the disastrous case of “Bolivarian” Venezuela shows. An interesting topic that Cecilia Osorio Gonnet’s book brings to the attention of social scientists is to examine the conditions necessary to generate and strengthen such bureaucratic structures and technical capabilities.

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FOREWORD

Thus, the current work makes several important contributions, including the empirical investigation of an extensive epistemic community, the theoretical analysis of various diffusion mechanisms, and the questions it raises for future projects. This book is of great interest to social policy specialists and diffusion scholars and therefore deserves a large number of readers. February 2020

Kurt Weyland University of Texas at Austin Santiago, Chile

Contents

1

Introduction 1.1 The Main Argument 1.2 Methodological Approach 1.3 Book Structure References

2

Social Policies and Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTs) in Latin America 2.1 Conditional Cash Transfer Programs 2.2 The Social Policy Context of the 1990s 2.3 CCTs in Latin America 2.3.1 Characteristics of the CCTs 2.3.2 The Emblematic Cases of CCTs in the Region: Brazil and Mexico 2.3.3 CCTs Assessments and Challenges 2.4 The Debate About the Diffusion of the Programs References

3

Mechanisms and Actors in the Diffusion of Policies: State of the Issue and Theoretical Proposal 3.1 The Policy Diffusion Approach

1 8 11 18 19

23 23 24 27 33 39 44 47 55

61 61

ix

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CONTENTS

3.1.1 Diffusion Mechanisms 3.2 Discussion on the Approach and Study Proposal References 4

5

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Quantitative Analysis of the Diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Latin America 4.1 The Wave of Diffusion of the Conditional Cash Transfer Programs 4.1.1 The Wave of Diffusion of the CCTs 4.1.2 The Diffusion of the CCT Model and Its Behavior Over Time 4.2 Statistical Models and Their Contribution to Research Hypotheses 4.2.1 Period Analyzed and Time Variables 4.2.2 Analysis Unit 4.2.3 Dependent Variable 4.2.4 Independent Variables 4.2.5 Presentation of the Models 4.3 Analysis of Results References The Epistemic Community and International Organizations in the Diffusion of CCTs 5.1 The Epistemic Community and the Role of Banks During the First Years of the Wave of Diffusion 5.2 The Epistemic Community from 2000 5.3 The Epistemic Community and Other International Organizations 5.4 Final Comments References Chile: The Chile Solidario Program 6.1 The Economic and Political Context 6.2 The Process of Adopting the Chile Solidario Program 6.3 The Learning Diffusion Mechanism References

64 66 85

89 90 90 95 102 103 103 104 104 109 111 115

117 118 121 130 138 143 147 147 149 164 172

CONTENTS

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Ecuador, the Bono Desarrollo Humano 7.1 The Economic and Political Context 7.2 The Process of Adopting the Bono Desarrollo Humano 7.2.1 1998–2003: The Bono Solidario 7.2.2 The Inclusion of Conditionalities: The Transition from Bono Solidario to Bono Desarrollo Humano 7.2.3 The Bono Desarrollo Humano and the Social Protection 7.3 Diffusion Mechanisms: Moderate Coercion and Emulation References Conclusions 8.1 Discussion About the Hypotheses 8.1.1 “The Most Suitable Alternative.” The Consensus Behind the Adoption of the CCTs 8.1.2 Diffusion Through Various Mechanisms: Learning, Emulation and Moderate Coercion 8.1.3 National Institutional Capacities and Their Linkage to Diffusion Mechanisms 8.2 Considerations Regarding the Approach and Methodology Adopted 8.3 Remaining Issues and Future Challenges References

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175 175 178 179

185 191 194 200 205 205 206 209 211 218 221 223

Appendix 1: Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in the World 1990–2010 (Active and Inactive)

225

Appendix 2: List of Interviews Conducted

229

Appendix 3: Methodological Notes

231

Appendix 4: Activities and Publications by International Organizations 1990–2010

241

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CONTENTS

Appendix 5: List of 53 Minimum Conditions for the Chile Solidario Program

249

Index

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About the Author

Cecilia Osorio Gonnet holds a Ph.D. Degree in Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain. M.Sc. Social Policy and Planning in Developing Countries, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. Currently, she is assistant professor in the Politics and Government Department at the Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Santiago Chile. Her latest book is Osorio, Cecilia (2018) “¿Aprendiendo o Emulando? Cómo se difunden las políticas sociales en América Latina”. Editorial LOM, Santiago.

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Abbreviations

BDH BS CCT CHS CIESAS CONAM DIPRES ECLAC FAO FLACSO FOSIS GDP IDB IFPRI ILO IMF INSP IO MIDEPLAN MIES OAS ODEPLAN PPS PRI PROGRESA

Bono Desarrollo Humano Bono Solidario Conditional Cash Transfer program Programa Chile Solidario Centro de Investigaciones de Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, México Consejo Nacional de Modernización, Ecuador Dirección de Presupuesto, Chile. (Budget Division) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Food and Agriculture Organization Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversión Social, Chile Gross Domestic Product Inter-American Development Bank Instituto Internacional de Investigación en Políticas Alimentarias International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública, México International Organizations Ministerio de Desarrollo y Planificación, Chile Ministerio de Inclusión Económica y Social, Ecuador Organization of American States Oficina de Planificación, Ecuador Programa de Protección Social, Ecuador Partido Revolucionario Institucional, México Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación xv

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ABBREVIATIONS

PUENTE SEDES SELBEN UNDP UNICEF WB

Programa PUENTE, Chile Secretaría de Estado de Desarrollo Social, Ecuador Sistema de Identificación y Selección de Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales, Ecuador United Nations Development Programme United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund World Bank

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 2.1

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5 Fig. 4.6 Fig. 6.1

Wave of CCTs adoption in Latin America 1990–2010 (Source Prepared by the author with personal data base) Conditional Cash Transfer programs in Latin America (1990–2010) (Note The starting year is indicated in brackets, in two cases, considering the pilot programs for their relevance in the subsequent design. Source The author with personal data base) Degree of adoption and diffusion mechanisms (Source By the author) Conditional Cash Transfer programs in the world 1997–2010 (Source By the author based on ECLAC [2011], Cecchini and Madariaga [2011], and Fiszbein and Schady [2009]) Diffusion of central characteristics of CCTs (Source Prepared by the author using database) Diffusion of strong and soft conditionality components (Source Prepared by the author using database) Diffusion of social protection components of CCTs (Source Prepared by the author using database) Institutional dependence of the CCTs (Source Prepared by the author using database) Number of CCTs adopted according to the President’s ideology (Source By author using database) Degree of adoption and diffusion mechanism. The Chilean case (Source By the author)

5

28 84

91 96 98 99 100 107 171

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 7.1 Fig. 8.1

Degree of adoption and diffusion mechanism. The Ecuadorian case (Source By the author) Degree of adoption and diffusion mechanism. The Chilean and Ecuadorian case (Source By the author)

200 214

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 2.5 Table Table Table Table

2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9

Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 4.6

Poor and indigent population in Latin America 1980–1999 The CCTs programs in Latin America (1990–2010) Percentage of beneficiary population CCTs Percentage of total social expenditure in relation to GDP (1990–2010) CCTs budget in relation to social expenditure and GDP (2009) Essential characteristics of CCTs in Latin America Secondary characteristics in CCTs in Latin America Additional characteristics of CCTs CCTs classification according to Cecchini and Martínez (2011) Definition of motivations and means in diffusion mechanisms Summary of characteristics of CCTs in Latin America Presence of essential characteristics of CCTs in Latin America 1990–2010 Presence of secondary and additional characteristics in CCTs in Latin America 1990–2010 Evolution of CCTs coverage in Latin America (2000–2005–2009) (percentage of total population) Poverty, inequality and GDP per capita in the start-up year Ideological position of the Presidents at the time of the adoption of the CCTs

25 30 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 77 92 92 93 101 105 106

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.7

Table 4.8 Table 5.1 Table 6.1 Table 7.1 Table 8.1

Source of financing for the program, presence of multilateral bank loans and/or technical assistance from IO during the start of the CCTs Results Model 1, 2 and 3 diffusion of CCTs in Latin America (1990–2010) Members of the epistemic community Chile Solidario program 2002–2010 diffusion mechanism: learning Bono Solidario 1998–2003 diffusion mechanism: moderate coercion Summary of diffusion mechanisms Chile and Ecuador

108 111 139 170 199 212

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

During the 1990s, social policies in Latin America underwent a number of changes that marked a paradigm shift in this area (Franco 1996). These transformations are situated within the set of structural reforms applied since the end of the 1980s: structural adjustment measures, market liberalization, privatization and reformulation of the role of the State, processes of transition to democracy, and transformations in civil society.1 The new paradigm of social policies focused its objectives on overcoming poverty, thus focusing programs and benefits on the population in this situation.2 It also ended the State’s monopoly on the

Some contents of this book have already been published in academic articles Osorio Gonnet (2015, 2016, 2017) and Osorio Gonnet and Vergara (2016). There is also a Spanish version, Osorio Gonnet 2018. I would like to thank to Daniela Barraza, Daniela Castillo and Daniela Dupré for their essential contribution to the final edition of this book. 1 In this study, social policy is understood as a public policy that expresses the decision of the State to intervene in the areas of education, health, housing and social protection (which includes overcoming poverty). Social programs are more limited public actions that make up social policy. Their characteristics include objectives, beneficiaries and specific activities that should have management and evaluation indicators. 2 Also called emerging paradigm (Franco 1996) or new post-reform paradigm (Sottoli 2002).

© The Author(s) 2020 C. Osorio Gonnet, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51008-4_1

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C. OSORIO GONNET

management and financing of social policies by including new actors, promoting the application of mechanisms for selecting and targeting beneficiaries and decentralization processes, among other aspects (Franco 1996; Sottoli 2002). It is in this context that Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTs) emerged in the mid-1990s as pilot experiences in Brazil and Mexico (Cohen and Franco 2006). These programs were—and still are—aimed at providing monetary support to poor and extremely poor families and increasing human capital development in children and adolescents in those family groups (to a greater or lesser extent depending on the characteristics of the CCTs). Their essential feature was the provision of money to low-income households, on the condition that the families used certain health and/or education services (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011). Conditionality was their most distinctive component, distinguishing them from other money transfers. The provision of money or goods was already carried out in earlier programs such as Asignación Familiar (Family Assignation) in Uruguay (from the early 1940s), Asignación Familiar (Family Assignation) and Subsidio Familiar (Family Subsidy), both in Chile3 (Veras 2010). The literature generally agrees on the innovative nature of conditionality, although it also notes that the idea of compensation would already be observed in other cases.4 What is relevant here is that this component is essential to the monetary transfer and is also replicated in all of them. Also, the CCTs are distinguished because they all focus this benefit on a specific population, often on those in a situation of vulnerability, and avoid universalistic approaches. The option of targeting versus providing benefits to broader groups (for example, the 3 Both were created in 1982 and are cash transfers for children under 18 whose parents are employed in the formal sector or live in a vulnerable situation, respectively (Veras 2010). 4 Veras points out that conditionality is not a completely new feature, as it can be seen in Uruguay’s Family Allowance programme, which consisted of an income transfer for formal-sector (private) workers with children. This was received if workers made their social security contribution and if the children attended secondary or higher education (Veras 2010: 189). This is, however, a particular case and not a set of programs like the CCTs. Cohen and Franco (2006) also point out that the idea of consideration is observed in the Social Investment Funds, where it was established that the beneficiary communities would contribute work, materials, financing or other resources for the execution, in addition to assuming the commitment to maintain the work done. In this case, however, it is specified in a different way from the transfers, since they are one-off projects that are submitted by organized groups to a selection process and are only carried out if they are co-financed in some way.

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INTRODUCTION

3

working population) has been installed in social programs and policies in the region since the 1980s (and in some countries such as Chile since the 1970s). The use of targeted approaches in all Latin American CCTs (and in many other initiatives since those years) is a clear sign of their consolidation as a social policy option (Franco 1996; Sottoli 2002). During the 1990s and until 2010, CCTs spread throughout Latin America. They were also implemented, for example, in Bangladesh, Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan. There are also pilot programs in many African countries and some local experiences in cities of developed countries such as New York and Washington, DC (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Peck and Theodore 2010). However, the geographical concentration in Latin America stands out in comparison to the rest of the world, since 17 out of 20 countries have implemented them (León 2008; Fiszbein and Schady 2009). CCTs benefited, in 2010, about 113 million people in Latin America (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011: 107), and compared to other programs, their benefits were broader and their institutional characteristics more complex (Fiszbein and Schady 2009: 38). Despite this broad coverage, in most of the region’s countries the percentage of spending in relation to social investment is low—on average 0.40% in 2009 (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011: 106)—, although in all of them there is an increase from the time of their first implementation. In relation to requirements, the CCTs have demanded the improvement of measurement and monitoring instruments, which in the long term has positively affected other programs in the social sphere (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). In this regard, there are evaluations of their impact, which show a decrease in school dropouts and an increase in attendance at health checks (Johannsen et al. 2009; Barrientos and DeJong 2006; Handa and Davis 2006; Britto 2005). It also shows that CCTs have succeeded in contributing to reducing the poverty gap and mitigating the consequences of economic crises. Considering these results, the specialists have described and analyzed their characteristics in abundance, also making recommendations on their design and implementation, which forms an important knowledge base on these initiatives.5 5 There is an extensive literature on the impact of programs. Only as a sample of works produced during the period under study: León (2008), Fiszbein and Schady (2009), Johannsen et al. (2009), Cecchini and Madariaga (2011), Cecchini and Martínez (2011) and Adato and Hoddinott (2010). Also hundreds of articles in academic journals (and

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The above confirms that CCTs constitute a set of relevant social programs in Latin America and that, compared to other regions, a high concentration of these initiatives is observed in this region. Taking this as a starting point, this book seeks to identify which are the variables that explain the massive and significant presence of CCTs in the region. A plausible explanation for this question may be based on the fact that the countries have certain structural similarities—such as the presidential regime, for example—given their historical past as Spanish and Portuguese colonies. Along with this common legacy, the region as a whole had to face high levels of poverty and inequality during the 1990s as a result of structural adjustments and economic liberalization policies implemented in previous years. A first regional look would privilege these common characteristics to explain the coincidence in the policies to overcome poverty; similar countries would formulate similar policies. This might be a reasonable starting point, but at least the question arises as to why these coincidences are not observed in other programs promoted during the same period by various countries. On the other hand, a detailed analysis of the countries shows that they differ in terms of their political and institutional background. Likewise, they do so in relation to their economic development, their Gross Domestic Product and their levels of poverty. Consequently, it is necessary to clarify why different countries, such as Brazil and Honduras, have decided to apply the same type of program. A coincidence between all countries and their domestic decisions could be argued again. It could also be attributed to external pressures, coming from international organizations or multilateral banks, which would have encouraged the adoption of this particular program. However, both alternatives do not constitute a solid explanation for the notorious geographical convergence and/or “the prodigious pace” of its adoption by countries (Fiszbein and Schady 2009: 29). Considering the above, the explanation I propose is that the numerous presence of programs in the region is the result of a process of policy diffusion. That is, when information about policy adoption is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system in an uncoordinated manner, and where the first adoptions of an innovation affect the probability of doing so among those who have not specific dossiers about the programs), postgraduate theses, reports from international organizations, policy papers, reports and news in the media.

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INTRODUCTION

Wave of CCTs adop on in La n America 1990-2010

18

Number of countries with CCTs

16 14 12 10 8 6 4

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

0

1990

2

Fig. 1.1 Wave of CCTs adoption in Latin America 1990–2010 (Source Prepared by the author with personal data base)

adopted it (Jordana et al. 2011: 1347). In the analysis of the diffusion processes it is possible to identify three elements—on which there is a certain consensus in the literature—and that can be, in a preliminary way, observed in the expansion of the CCTs. First, diffusion tends to occur in waves, starting slowly with some countries, then increasing significantly in number, and finally decreasing in levels due to saturation in adoption. In graphic terms, and under certain conditions of success, a diffusion process can adopt an S-shaped curve (Rogers 1995). In Latin America, if we consider the time period between 1990 and 2010 and the countries that have adopted them, we see that the curve has this character; a small number of cases at the beginning, a larger number in the middle of the period and stabilization at the end of the curve (see Fig. 1.1). Secondly, the literature argues that diffusion usually displays a strong geographic concentration, because the effects of the neighborhood and

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the region are usually pronounced (Weyland 2006: 19).6 In this case, a geographic concentration is observed, since 17 of 20 countries of Latin America have applied it, which therefore suggests this process. Finally, the processes of diffusion produce the propagation of “similarity between diversity”. Different countries adopt similar policies, to which they can introduce certain modifications, but that conserve the fundamental design of the external innovation (Weyland 2006: 19). This can be seen in the region’s CCTs, which contain essential characteristics that identify them as such, but also variation in other components when analyzing each case. The policy diffusion approach allows to address some of the unknowns about the wave of CCTs in Latin America. For example, the success of the first initiatives, PROGRESA (now PROSPERA) in Mexico and Bolsa Escuela in Brazil, could have motivated other countries to try the same alternatives (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). In this regard, Sugiyama (2011) argues that the so-called neighbor effect occurred in the region, although the channels through which this influence was exercised are not made explicit. Likewise, Morais de Sá e Silva points out that the characteristics of the programs, which make them adaptable to different ideologies and contexts, would have favored their diffusion (not only at a regional level but also globally, Morais de Sá e Silva 2017). The support given by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank (WB) to finance these initiatives could also explain the spread of CCTs (Handa and Davis 2006). However, the banks did not grant loans to all the countries that adopted the program. And in those cases that did, it is necessary to analyze in detail the role they played in the decisionmaking process to implement it. A loan may indicate influence, but it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that governments lacked space to maneuver over their social policies (Feitosa de Britto 2004: 49). On the other hand, the bank also develops other types of activities, which can imply that its role in the diffusion process goes beyond financing. Finally, along with banks, other international organizations (IOs), such as international agencies, have a historical role in the region and were present during the wave of diffusion, although their participation has hardly been addressed (Franzoni and Voorend 2011). The policy diffusion approach allows for an analysis of the role of the countries in the region, as well as

6 However, dissemination dynamics can occur regardless of geographical proximity.

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INTRODUCTION

7

that of various international stakeholders, identifying their possible influence and the channels of action they have activated for the propagation of programs. Along with this approach, the characteristics of national policy making processes are also considered. CCTs emerge from domestic logics that are framed in the wave of diffusion, and this influences the final components of the programs. Very few policy adoptions can be explained purely as the result of internal factors (no diffusion effects) or a diffusion process (no impact of internal factors) (Berry and Berry 2007: 224). Consequently, this book focused on two levels of analysis that help explain program adoption in the region: policy diffusion and the domestic process of social policy formulation. This implies that at the national level, specific institutions, their powers and resources were identified. At the level of regional diffusion, the role of stakeholders such as international organizations or multilateral banks was observed, together with think tanks, experts and universities at both the national and regional levels.7 An attempt was made to identify and quantify the participation of these stakeholders in this diffusion process and how they operate at the regional level, but also how they interact (loans, cooperation or other types of activities) and even participate directly in the domestic process of social policy adoption. Finally, an attempt was made to clarify which factors contribute to a greater or lesser degree of influence on decision-making. Addressing these questions helps to explain the mechanisms of diffusion, from a proposal that relies on the regional level of the diffusion process, as well as the domestic process of program adoption. This study then addresses the conditions that explain the process of diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Latin America. Analyzing this issue is relevant for several reasons. As has already been said, CCTs are one of the most important social programs of the last decades in the region, highlighting their massive presence and wide coverage to date (Barrientos and Hulme 2008; Cohen and Franco 2006; León 2008). They have also had significant indirect consequences for social policies as a whole, such as the development of systems for identifying beneficiaries, which have subsequently been applied to other

7 Unlike other areas, private actors, or the third sector, are less relevant. Some

researchers have studied the policymaking process in countries of the region, in various areas such as pension, health or market reforms (Teichman 2001; 2004; Brooks 2005, 2009). These studies contribute to the present discussion, there are obviously particularities of the actors involved in the health sphere, for versus the sphere of poverty.

although Weyland although example,

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programs (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). And along the same lines, they are now linked to an emerging and important issue in the region, namely, social protection systems.8 The attention of researchers has focused mostly on discussing their characteristics and impact, but there has been few in-depth discussion of the reasons for their successful adoption, diffusion and concentration in the region. The latter is what will be addressed in this book. A second objective is to identify diffusion mechanisms and analyze their relationship with the domestic policy making process. The literature on diffusion proposes four mechanisms—learning, coercion, emulation and competition—that seek to explain how and why countries adopt them. The diffusion mechanism has important consequences for the quality of public policies, since it is possible to presuppose variation in them by considering whether the mechanism was, for example, emulation or learning. Consequently, I will seek to distinguish the variables that explain the mechanism (or mechanisms) through which countries adopt CCTs, the means and motivations, along with analyzing the role of the national and international stakeholders involved.

1.1

The Main Argument

As I have already pointed out, I maintain that the dissemination of CCTs in Latin America was the result of a process of diffusion. The first programs emerged in the mid-1990s in Brazil and Mexico and expanded significantly to the rest of the countries in the region in the following years. The question then arises as to which variables—national and/or international—can explain the diffusion of the programs. As for the first group, it could be assumed that the structural characteristics of many countries in the region, such as high levels of poverty and inequality, could explain the decision to adopt these programs. In this regard, the statistical model tested the variables of poverty, inequality and income. The latter two proved to be significant in explaining the probability of

8 A social protection system aims to “guarantee an income that allows to maintain

minimum levels of quality of life for the development of people; enable access to social services and promotion, and seek the universalization of decent work” (Cecchini and Martínez 2011: 18). To this end, it must have three components: non-contributory social protection; contributory social protection (or social security); and regulation of labor markets (Cecchini and Martínez 2011).

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adoption. That is, countries with higher rates of inequality and greater wealth—and in a sense with a higher level of development—would be more likely to adopt the program. The implementation of the CCT would be responding to the diagnosis of a public problem present in the countries of the region. However, these findings do not explain why all countries are adopting the same type of program, considering that there is a wide range of possibilities for combating poverty and inequality. Another of the domestic variables that could explain the diffusion is the ideological position of the rulers; that is, that the CCTs were mostly adopted by the governments of a certain political orientation. In this respect, this variable was also tested in the statistical model, but the results were not significant. That is, the ideology of the rulers in place at the time of adopting the program would not explain its diffusion. As developed in the following pages, the CCTs were adopted by the governments of the left, the right and the centre, with a certain predominance of the latter. It is not possible to distinguish a preponderance of one ideological position over another, as has happened with other types of policies, such as economic liberalization and privatization. At the domestic level, it could also be argued that the motivation for obtaining electoral results, i.e. the expectations of decision-makers, may have influenced the decision to adopt. On that, neither in the interviews nor in the secondary bibliography, evidence was found that allows affirming that these have been significant to explain the diffusion at regional level. Rather, considering what has already been said about the domestic variables, the idea of adopting may have been influenced by the conviction of the social problem to be addressed. As for arguments involving external variables, it could be argued that the influence of international organizations and multilateral banks would explain the regional spread, especially considering the historical presence of these stakeholders in Latin America. Because of this, a variable was included in the statistical model that allowed testing this possibility, obtaining results that were not significant. On the other hand, one of the most predictable links between multilateral banks and governments that adopt CCTs is the existence of monetary loans, which, as explained in depth below, was not predominant in the region. There were loans, of course, but they were not observed in all the countries that implemented CCTs. In some cases, technical cooperation agreements or other formal links were not detected during the formulation process either.

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However, international organizations and banks did develop a series of activities that involved accumulation and exchange of information about the programs. In that sense, the central hypothesis that I maintain here is that the variable that had the greatest impact on the regional diffusion process was the consensus about the relevance and efficiency of CCTs as a social program aimed at overcoming poverty. This conception of the programs was shaped by a regional epistemic community made up of experts who produce and diffuse knowledge and whose means of influence are significantly related to the activities of international organizations. The epistemic community acts as a structure with the capacity to build a consensus about the normative and evaluative aspects of the CCTs. The impact of this community would then influence the configuration of an idea about CCTs that would explain their popularity and regional diffusion, which is addressed and tracked in depth in Chapter 5. This process was observed at regional level, however, the analysis of its influence in the domestic policy making processes is required. That is, it is necessary to understand the extent to which other factors intervened and the degree of relevance of the epistemic community. Their role will vary depending on local conditions, the timing of the wave of diffusion and consolidation of the epistemic community itself, among other factors. Therefore, the incidence of this idea of CCTs and the community of experts is also analyzed in detail for the two case studies, since it is necessary to weigh the incidence of domestic variables and their link to the regional diffusion process in order to make progress in explaining why and how they are adopted by the countries. In this line, I propose that the mechanisms of diffusion present in a majority were learning, emulation and moderate coercion. This is contrasted by the evidence of the statistical model and by the weight of the arguments in favor of adopting CCT as an explanatory variable. However, this must also be investigated in a precise manner for each case. Above all, considering that—as argued here—regional diffusion and the domestic process of policy formulation behaved in an interrelated manner. It is therefore only possible to identify the mechanism(s) of diffusion, how it is adopted, to the extent that regional diffusion is ascertained and its impact on the domestic adoption process is identified. Thus, I propose that the institutional capacities of the countries contribute to the selection of the diffusion mechanism involved in the adoption of the program for each country. To the extent that knowledge and cooperation resources are available, countries will better adapt the program to their national context, through a learning mechanism. If these capacities are low, the

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countries will tend to emulate, to copy the model of CCT in force in the region, without specific modifications. Therefore, it is also possible to make progress in clarifying not only why and how they adopt, but also to distinguish what is adopted. In this case it was a CCT model, although I propose to distinguish between a basic, traditional or innovative model, depending on the characteristics that are identified. The variation between one or the other will be a consequence of the diffusion mechanisms operating in each case. Consequently, my main argument emphasizes that the diffusion of CCTs would have been driven by variables related to the incidence of ideas, knowledge, and how these traveled through the region. I also deepen in an aspect scarcely worked on in the diffusion studies: the link between the regional level and decision-making at the national level and how this affects the diffusion mechanisms and the type of program adopted.

1.2

Methodological Approach

Studies on diffusion processes are developed through various methodologies. Some of them analyze a limited number of cases through qualitative methods such as process monitoring or the use of counterfactuals. Other researches carry out statistical studies—analysis of the history of events and logistic regressions, among others—on an extensive number of cases (Starke 2012; Weyland 2006; Berry and Berry 2007). The explanatory capacity of each method differs, presenting both strengths and weaknesses. As for the inferential process, it allows us to confirm the existence of a diffusion process and to identify the explanatory variables of the adoption, facilitating the discarding of those that are not significant. However, it contributes to a lesser extent in explaining how those variables, in terms of the causal mechanism, would have influenced the process of dissemination and its link to the process of policy formulation at the national level (Weyland 2006). With regard to the comparative studies, a weakness is that the small number of cases does not make it possible to determine the relative weight of the explanatory variables at the general level. However, detailed analysis has the advantage of uncovering the precise functioning of these factors, and thus the case studies contribute to the identification of the causal mechanisms that drive the observed outcomes (Weyland 2006). Considering these pros and cons and seeking to obtain the best information to understand the object of study, in this work we opted to complement methods, carrying out a statistical analysis based on all the

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cases in the region and a qualitative comparative analysis of two in-depth cases. The quantitative analysis was designed to be a first step in the effort to test the hypotheses, ratify the relationship between the variables and identify which are significant for the subsequent qualitative analysis (Brooks 2009). In this type of analysis, the focus is on the interdependence between cases over time and is addressed through different techniques such as Event History Analysis, the parametric model, the semi-parametric model (Cox’s model for example) and non-parametric (logistic regressions and others) (Bernardi 2006). These models allow for the analysis of changes over time, which is key to the phenomenon of diffusion (Sugiyama 2012). They assume different functions on the behavior of the variable to be estimated in time, always with logistic models. The dependent variable measures the time it takes for a change to occur, considering the existence of variables of interest (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Considering the characteristics of the techniques and the available sample, the use of binary logistic regression was defined for this study. In order to apply event history analysis, it is advisable to have large samples. In this case, it is a medium sample, from 19 countries in a 20-year time frame.9 The dependent variable is the adoption or non-adoption of the programme (expressed as 1 and 0 respectively) and when a country adopts it is taken out of the sample; thus 273 observations are obtained. Along with this, another peculiarity is the greater presence of negative cases (0s) than positive cases (1s), which must be corrected to avoid bias in the model. For this reason, logistic regression is more appropriate than event history analysis, correcting the model with the relogit proposed by King and Zeng for rare events (King and Zeng 2001). Finally, a lag was introduced for the observations and domestic and external explanatory variables were included (Franzese and Hays 2008). The domestic variables considered are: poverty, inequality and the ideological position 9 For the development of the quantitative analysis, a database was created that collects, on the one hand, the characteristics of the CCTs in the 19 countries of the region (Cuba had to be excluded because of lack of access to the necessary information) and, on the other hand, the dissemination variables during the period 1990–2010. It is necessary to indicate that the unit of analysis is the adopted CCTs and this coincides with the number of countries (in each case, that is, in each country, a CCTs has been adopted, which may or may not remain in time with or without modifications). In some cases, there are neighboring programs or social protection networks, but the object of study is the CCTs of each country.

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of governments. For the external variables: World Bank group loans, diffusion variable and time variable.10 The qualitative analysis is based on the case studies of two country programs, Chile and Ecuador. In its development it is possible to analyze the role of the variables that appear as relevant in the quantitative model. Likewise, they allow us to discover how those factors operated, paying attention to this link between the domestic and regional levels, identifying the stakeholders and their influence channels that cannot be captured in the quantitative model. Therefore, “the case studies are useful in identifying the causal mechanisms that led to those results” (Weyland 2004: 26) and allow reflection considering the historical, political and economic context of the countries and the region. Together with this, they will allow a distinction to be made between the final result of adoption (what type of programme is adopted by each country), since the characteristics of the process and of the interaction between the regional and national levels suggest that the CCTs adopted present divergences, ranging from a traditional model to a more innovative one. Once the diffusion process has been identified, through the in-depth analysis of the case studies, the hypotheses will be contrasted, substantially complementing the results of the statistical analysis. The analysis will focus on comparing countries’ adoption processes according to certain central theoretical dimensions in order to assess the explanatory value of the variables (Collier et al. 2004: 94). In that sense, the strengths of this option lie in its potential for achieving conceptual validation, its procedures for promoting new hypotheses, its value as a means of examining the hypothetical role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases and its ability to deal with causal complexity (George and Bennett 2005: 19). In particular, through the case study it is possible to observe a wide number of variables and inductively observe aspects of a causal mechanism or identify which conditions activate or enable it (George and Bennett 2005: 21). For the study of the diffusion process, one of the strengths of this strategy is that it facilitates to theoretically relate the different mechanisms and to contrast cases with diverse values in crucial variables; in this way it is possible to evaluate different hypotheses comparing theoretical predictions with the empirical evidence or to explore new ones, unearthing 10 The main resources for its preparation were the databases of ECLAC, CEPALSTAT, and the World Bank in conjunction with CEDLAS (National University of La Plata), SEDLAC (Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean). Together with this is the available secondary literature.

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contrasting results (Starke 2012). Thus, its development addresses the diffusion mechanisms that operated in this process in the region, which is crucial for discovering the causal mechanisms that led to the spread of innovations (Weyland 2004) and will also help to understand their linkage to domestic policy-making processes. Process tracing was used to develop the cases. This is a suitable method because it is effective in examining the kind of sequences in the diffusion processes that may involve relationships between cases, enabling researchers to measure more precisely how much of the variation in outcomes is due to diffusion processes or to the influence of other independent variables (George and Bennett 2005: 33). In that sense, it seeks to consider within the case the implications of alternative causal mechanisms by relating one or several independent variables to an outcome (Collier et al. 2010; Mahoney 2010). This implies paying attention to issues of time, sequence and causal conjunction. Not all pieces of evidence are equally valued; they must be judged by the researcher based on the hypotheses and alternative explanations. In this sense, the monitoring of processes applied to diffusion seeks to trace the dispersion of policies and ideas through the historical reconstruction of decision-making at the level of the stakeholders (Starke 2012). In fact, it also continues to be the most appropriate method for tracing the ideas emanating from an epistemic community (Dunlop 2013). The researcher uses history, archival documents, interviews and other sources to observe whether the causal process that the theory holds in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and behavior of the variables involved in it (George and Bennett 2005: 6). In this sense, this process of searching for evidence, of the “smoking gun”, is appropriate for identifying and analyzing the mechanisms of diffusion. By establishing indicators for each mechanism proposed by the literature, the tracking of the evidence and the reconstruction of the facts through the tracing of processes will make it possible to confirm or rule out the presence of these in the cases studied. This method forces the researcher to take equifinality into account, considering the alternative paths through which the result could emerge. It is a research method where the narrative of events is guided by a theory and therefore, by a hypothesis that seeks to be confirmed. In this case, the hypotheses refer to the variables that would explain the adoption of the programs, linking the domestic adoption process with the regional diffusion process. For this reason, this relationship between

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the two levels can be rescued through process tracing, since it is suitable for analyzing phenomena that are the result of multiple interactions (George and Bennett 2005). In the same vein, an effort was made to keep the focus on both levels, avoiding too much attention to diffusion mechanisms in order not to neglect the interdependence between cases, i.e., to show that the change in a country’s outcome was actually caused by other cases and not independently (Starke 2012). For the development and analysis of the cases, indicators were defined to identify in the empirical evidence the adoption mechanisms, the degree of adaptation of the programs and the stakeholders, both national and international, involved in these processes. The conceptual discussion on this subject and the proposal developed in this work will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and the details of the indicators are found in Appendices 3. The design for the selection of cases was based on the criteria of different or diverse cases (Przeworski and Teune 1970). The cases present different characteristics, but the incidence of the essential independent variable to explain the phenomenon under study is observed. The dependent variable is also common in these cases, in this case the adoption of conditional cash transfer programs. Therefore, cases were sought where the same independent variable and the dependent variable were present, although other independent variables may vary. This will allow us to confirm the relevance of the key variable, but also to develop proposals regarding the conditions necessary for compliance with the assumptions (Seawright and Gerring 2008). To select the cases, it was defined that they should be positive, that is, countries where the programs had been adopted. It is often pointed out that attention to positive cases is a bias in diffusion studies (Peck and Theodore 2012) and implies a design without variation (King et al. 1994). However, this decision is justified in that the interest is in explaining the causal mechanisms that enabled the adoption, so this condition is essential (Weyland 2006: 15). However, the negative cases, Haiti and Venezuela, have been integrated into the sample for the quantitative model, as they are essential for the robustness of the analysis. Cuba, the third negative case, could not be included due to lack of the necessary information. Also considered was the time variable, i.e. at what point they are located in the wave of diffusion in the region. The adoption years for Chile and Ecuador are very close: 2002 and 2003 respectively. I sought to place adoption at a similar time, in order to control the influence of diffusion, time and independent variables. The countries that initiated the wave of innovation, Brazil and Mexico, would not allow an analysis of these

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variables. On the other hand, the cases located at the end of the wave could be affected by other variables resulting from the evolution of the programs observed later. Therefore, analyzing these final cases could overestimate the influence of certain variables on others. The Chilean case, with the Chile Solidario program, is in the middle of the wave of CCT diffusion, which allows us to consider the influence of the process in the adoption. The Ecuadorian case is installed one year after the Chilean case, in 2003. In that year, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Human Development Bond, BDH) was created, with an unconditional transfer program (Bono Solidario, Solidarity Bond, BS) as its predecessor. The variables that could be argued to have influenced the adoption or not of the program are; ideological position of the government, poverty, inequity, multilateral bank loans and wealth. Consequently, the cases of Chile and Ecuador have been chosen because they present different behaviors in this group of variables, but the same result in terms of program adoption. With regard to poverty, in Chile at the beginning of the 1990s, 38% of the population was living in poverty and indigence, and in Ecuador, 39% was living in poverty and indigence in 1994 (CEPALSTAT, 2000–201411 ). However, during the years in which the programs were adopted, variations were observed, since the figure would increase in the case of Ecuador given the economic crisis of the late 1990s, reaching 52% in 2000; in the same year, poverty in Chile was 20% (www.eclac.org12 ). Thus, the cases are diverse in this regard. In terms of inequality, both countries have a similar Gini index, of 0.56 for the year 2000, which expresses a high level of inequality in the two countries (www.eclac.org13 ). The variation observed in poverty is also expressed in terms of the GDP of the two countries. In Chile in the 1990s it was US$3927 million and in 2000 it was US$6244 million (www.eclac.org14 ). Ecuador had a similar GDP of US$2310 million in

11 ECLAC database, CEPALSTAT, at http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_ CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp. An Excel file was imported with the information on population in poverty, on 14 March 2012. The data not available were supplemented with information from the World Bank’s SEDLAC (Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean, World Bank), obtained on 26 March 2012 (percentage of individuals living in poverty). 12 Idem. 13 Idem. 14 Idem.

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1990 and US$2331 million in 2000 (www.eclac.org15 ). Finally, with regard to loans received from the World Bank, Chile had a per capita GDP of around US$142 in the 1990s and approximately US$52 in 2000 (Personal database16 ). Ecuador received USD 80 per capita in loans in the first period and USD 70 in 2000.17 Both countries have a historical relationship with multilateral banking, but to a different extent. As for the programs, in the case of Ecuador there were loans linked to the decision to adopt the program, while in the case of Chile, there were already loans for the implementation phase. Therefore, this variation will also make it possible to analyze the influence of this variable on the problem.18 In terms of ideology, the year the program was adopted in Chile, which was governed by a centre-left coalition under the presidency of Ricardo Lagos. In Ecuador, in 2003, Lucio Gutiérrez was governing, defining himself as a centre-left figure, but the change in his policies, once he had taken office, placed him more on the centre-right (CIDOB 2012).19 In the case of Chile, it was a government that formed part of a coalition that had been in power for two previous periods. In Ecuador, the Gutiérrez government did not complete its mandate, having been in power for just over two years, between 2002 and 2005 (CIDOB 2012).20 And these years were followed by other years of political instability, until 2007. Finally, the variable of the capacity of national stakeholders (in terms of the accumulated knowledge and resources of their institutions) was considered. As has been pointed out, this would be a factor that could influence the degree of autonomy that countries possess in the face of external influences. In this sense, the cases selected present the necessary diversity to shed light on this issue. Although both had a presidential regime, where legislative

15 Idem. 16 Information on international aid was extracted from the World Bank’s database, “World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, 2012”. At http://datos. bancomundial.org/ the variable is IBRD loans and IDA credits (DOD, current US$). The annual amount received in each country was divided by the population in the same year. 17 Idem. 18 It was considered to collect the information regarding the Inter-American Development Bank, but it was not possible to access it to systematize it and incorporate it into the database. 19 http://www.cidob.org/es/documentacion/biografias_lideres_politicos/america_del_ sur/ecuador/lucio_gutierrez_borbua/. Information retrieved on 12 December 2012. 20 Idem.

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and programmatic initiative resided, the political stability of their regimes differed and this affected the capacities of public institutions. Political stability in Chile since the 1990s has been greater than in Ecuador. The latter suffered instability in its governments at the end of that decade, and has been gradually improving since 2000, although numerous reforms in political and administrative institutions can be observed. As a result, the cases present divergences in institutional capacities, as well as in poverty, wealth (GDP) and ideology indices. All of these variables have been identified as relevant to the analysis and can then be tested in the quantitative model and in the case studies. The objective is to analyze their internal process and the behavior of the most relevant stakeholders in relation to the same result observed in both countries, that is, the adoption of a CCT. The information necessary for the development of the cases was collected through written sources, such as official documents from Chile and Ecuador (laws, reports, program descriptions, speeches, among others). Reports, books and working documents from international organizations and study centers were also used. This information has been complemented with semi-structured interviews with people directly or indirectly linked to the programs; national and international experts and academics, government and international organization officials, and national politicians. Fifty semi-structured interviews were conducted. These were carried out in Chile, between November 8 and 12, 2010 and August–December 2012. The field study in Ecuador was conducted between 11 and 18 June 2012, also in person. Other interviews were conducted by telephone or video conference, during 2011–2012, mainly with experts and multilateral banking officials who reside in various geographical areas. As for the secondary sources used, there is an extensive literature on CCTs in Latin America. This made it possible to complement the case studies with a varied and numerous quantity of articles published in academic journals, reports, working and official documents of the Chilean and Ecuadorian governments, and databases of multilateral banking and international organizations.

1.3

Book Structure

The structure of the book is as follows. Chapter 2 presents the context of social policies in Latin America within which Conditional Cash Transfer Programs were generated and their main characteristics. It also explains in more detail the questions that emerge when observing the research problem. Chapter 3 addresses the policy diffusion approach and its

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mechanisms, discussing the components to be applied and proposing the analytical perspective of this work. Along with this, the research hypotheses are presented. In the following chapter, an in-depth analysis is described—including a quantitative model—of the wave of CCT diffusion in the region, which contributes to identifying the relevant explanatory variables. One of them is the presence of international organizations and experts through an epistemic community, which is developed in depth in Chapter 5 and applied in the case studies below. In them, both for the case of Chile (Chapter 6) and Ecuador (Chapter 7), I seek to clarify the diffusion mechanisms that explain the adoption of the program and how they relate to the domestic policy-making process. Chapter 8 sets out the main conclusions and findings in relation to the hypotheses presented. It addresses the role of the mechanisms identified, their relationship to domestic policy-making processes, and the role of national and international stakeholders. It also discusses the contributions of the study to the diffusion approach and the remaining challenges. Finally, emerging questions are raised regarding the role of CCTs in the context of the region’s social policies and in the most recent discussion on social protection. Finally, it should be noted that this book is the result of the research carried out to obtain the PhD in Political and Social Sciences at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, in Barcelona. I am grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Jacint Jordana and to my colleagues. In addition, I would like to thank the permanent support of the Department of Politics and Government of the Universidad Alberto Hurtado, of which I am a part. Finally, to all my friends in Chile and in Catalonia, and to my family for all the support given during the years of research. Especially, to my children Vicente and Emilia. This book is about the circulation of ideas in Latin America. I wish you a life full of the same: innovative ideas and new experiences around our region and the world.

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(Orgs.) Difusão de políticas públicas. São Bernardo do Campo (pp. 65–100). Ed. UFABC. Osorio Gonnet, C. (2017). ¿Cómo viajan las ideas? El rol de las comunidades epistémicas en el diseño de políticas sociales en América Latina. Revista del CLAD Reforma y Democracia, 68, 75–112. Osorio Gonnet, C. (2018). Aprendiendo o Emulando. Cómo se difunden las políticas sociales en América Latina. Santiago, Chile: LOM. Osorio Gonnet, C., & Vergara, J. M. (2016). La difusión de políticas públicas. Estado del arte y contribuciones para la disciplina en América Latina. Revista Política, 54(2), 239–258. Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2010). Recombinant Workfare, Across the Americas: Transnationalizing ‘‘Fast” Social Policy. Geoforum, 41(2), 195–208. Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2012). Follow the Policy: A Distended Case Approach. Environment and Planning, 44(1), 21–30. Przeworski, A., & Teune, H. (1970). The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: Wiley-Interscience. Rogers, E. (1995). Diffusion of Innovations. New York: The Free Press. Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. Political Research Quarterly, 61(2), 294–308. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077. Sottoli, S. (2002). La política social en América Latina: Diez dimensiones para el análisis y diseño de políticas (Papeles de Población, 43–63). Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México. Starke, P. (2012). Qualitative Methods for the Study of Policy Diffusion: Challenges and Available Solutions (Unpublished manuscript). University of Bremen, Bremen. Sugiyama, N. (2011). The Diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in the Americas. Global Social Policy, 11(2–3), 250–278. Sugiyama, N. (2012). Bottom-Up Policy Diffusion: National Emulation of a Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Brazil. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 42(1), 25–51. Teichman, J. (2001). The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and Mexico. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Veras, F. (2010). Para onde caminham os programas de transferencia Condicionadas? As experiências comparadas Do Brasil, México, Chile e Uruguai. In J. Abrahão de Castro & L. Modesto (Org.) Bolsa Família 2003–2010: avanços e desafíos (Vol. 2). Brasilia: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA). Weyland, K. (Ed.) (2004). Learning from Foreign Models in Latin American Policy Reform. Washington, DC and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press. Weyland, K. (2006). Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER 2

Social Policies and Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTs) in Latin America

2.1

Conditional Cash Transfer Programs

The main feature of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs is the provision of cash to low-income households, on condition that families use certain health or educational services. In this regard, a traditional component of social policy is observed, namely, a direct monetary benefit to a defined group of people. Unlike other transfers, however, there is a conditionality that implies a demand for a specific action on the part of the beneficiary and that qualifies him or her—only if they are met—as a recipient. “The idea of co-responsibility establishes, in fact, that the State assumes the duty to provide the transfer and the appropriate goods and services, and the beneficiary family commits itself in turn to making use of the latter; it marks a difference from other programs to overcome poverty that were based on the delivery of products (goods and services) without demanding anything in return” (Cohen and Franco 2006: 44). The conditions for CCTs are usually that the children in the family group have their health checks up to date and that they attend educational establishments regularly. These requirements are justified as a means of strengthening incentives for families to invest more in their children’s human capital. “This exercise of meeting the trade-offs is supposed to help families increase their self-confidence, increase their responsibility for the future of the group and the new generations” (Cohen and Franco 2006: 44). Therefore, conditional transfer programs usually contain two © The Author(s) 2020 C. Osorio Gonnet, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51008-4_2

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objectives. First, they seek to provide poor households with a minimum floor of consumption. Second, they seek to promote human capital accumulation and break the vicious circle in which poverty is transmitted from generation to generation (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). CCTs are also targeted programs, since the target population is poor or extremely poor families—not individuals—with certain additional requirements (the existence in the family group of school-age children and adolescents, infants, children with malnutrition, pregnant or lactating women) (Cohen and Franco 2006: 36). The aim is not to reach the entire population, but rather to establish criteria (socioeconomic, geographical, for example) that delimit the characteristics of the beneficiary group. Finally, in terms of institutions, programmes are usually run by the ministries of social development or similar, or by secretariats specially created for this purpose (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). The degree of institutionalization varies and is linked to the autonomy of the programme, the level of resources and its sustainability over time.

2.2

The Social Policy Context of the 1990s

During the 1990s, Latin America experienced very intense years in political and socio-economic terms. The wave of democratization in the region meant processes of transition and consolidation to democracy in countries such as Chile, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. On the other hand, the socio-economic context was not easy. In the 1980s, structural adjustments and processes of economic liberalization and privatization had been implemented. In social matters, this meant that the emerging democracies faced complex problems. “The increase in poverty experienced during the 1980s was widespread, affecting most Latin American countries” (Korzeniewicz and Smith Source 2000: 8). The percentage of poor and indigent population was 40.5% in 1980 and 10 years later increased to 48.3% (see Table 2.1). Along with this, levels of inequality were high and the region was ranked as the least equitable in the world (ECLAC 2001). Poverty also manifested itself in different ways according to the rural or urban environment. On one hand, during the nineties it became a mainly urban phenomenon; in 1999, out of 211 million poor people, 134 million lived in urban areas and 77 million in rural areas (ECLAC 2004: 37). The rural-urban migration produced in the previous decades, stressed the “urban economy (which) had to face the challenge of the greater

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Table 2.1 Poor and indigent population in Latin Americaa 1980–1999

1980 1990 1994 1997 1999

Poorb

Indigentc

Total

Total

Millions

Percentages

Millions

Percentages

135.9 200.2 201.5 203.8 211.4

40.5 48.3 45.7 43.5 43.8

62.4 93.4 91.6 88.8 89.4

18.6 22.5 20.8 19.0 18.5

a Estimate for 19 countries in the region b Persons in households in poverty. Includes the population in a situation of indigence c Persons in households in a situation of indigence

Source ECLAC (2001: 38)

proportion of the population in working age and the greater demand for social services” (ECLAC 2004: 37). However, “the incidence of poverty is much higher in the rural environment than in the urban one (64% against 37%)” (ECLAC 2004: 37), with a greater amount of population in situation of indigence than in urban environments. This economic and social context was also accompanied by new perspectives for designing social policies, what has been called an “emerging paradigm” (Franco 1996). The scenario demanded new views on this subject. The diagnosis criticized the deficiencies of the traditional policy model, with the exclusivity of the State as a relevant, centralized actor, with a standardized offer limited to formal employability (Franco 1996; León 2008). A model of policies where “the peculiarities (in terms of unmet needs) of the different subgroups that composed its ‘clientele’ were not recognized and, of course, did not consider the diversity of needs and preferences of users who, in case of not being interested in the only state offer, are left without options, at least with public financing” (Cohen and Franco 2006: 24). Only as an example, the already mentioned high incidence of poor population in rural areas demonstrated the low effectiveness of traditional policies and at the same time the challenge of adapting social programs and services to these different spaces.

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As a result of the structural adjustments and state reforms, there was a reduction in its size, “of social spending and its benefits to the population, installing a model of subsidiary social policy” (Robles et al. 2013: 37). The role of the State had been modified, withdrawing from some traditional areas such as education, health and social welfare, where the reforms had privatized a large part of these services, reducing their participation in the provision and distribution.1 “The transition to states marked by privatization and the weakening of the state’s presence in each of the key areas for the democratization of welfare - resources, security and social services - was particularly evident” (Robles et al. 2013: 37). As for antipoverty interventions, it is argued that these should consider components that increase human capital, oriented to the future, seeking to break intergenerational cycles of poverty and consider social inclusion, strengthening community capacities and social capital (Peck 2011: 169). Governments began to implement policies tailored to this context. These include the inclusion of new stakeholders (private and third sector), targeting rather than universalism as an objective of programs, new sources of funding, more active participation of the target population and the development of decentralization and privatization processes (Franco 1996). Specifically in the area of policies focused on overcoming poverty, initiatives aimed at alleviating the economic consequences of the crisis emerged in the early 1990s. The aim was to provide protection, “the maintenance of the physical and human capital of those affected, so it was a priority to ensure basic consumption -especially food- and minimum employment programs” (Cohen and Franco 2006: 26). Some of the initiatives implemented were the Emergency Funds (for minimum employment, for example), specific subsidies (for example, food subsidies), which responded to the critical situation of poverty and social emergency in the early 1990s. Social Investment Funds were also developed, which were based on the Emergency Funds and constituted financing mechanisms (with international or State funds or financing 1 The privatization of sectors such as education, health and certain basic services such as electricity and water, has generated in subsequent years the need for regulation to ensure the provision and quality of services. As a result, a wave of dissemination of regulatory agencies has been generated (Calzada et al. 2009; Jordana et al. 2011; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005). In addition, a complex situation has arisen in relation to CCTs in that beneficiaries are required to attend educational establishments or undergo health checkups, although in some cases these services are not easily accessible, or the State cannot ensure their quality.

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quotas) for public investment in small projects identified, requested and executed by a group of people (fundamentally in infrastructure, community development and social services) (León 2008). This type of program already implemented these new design and management criteria for social policy: modifications in financing mechanisms, in their objectives and impacts on the beneficiary population and on the actors responsible for the programs. Subsequently, progress was made towards the creation of “intervention models” more directly geared to breaking the intergenerational reproduction of poverty (León 2008). Consequently, CCTs arise in a particular context of social policies and their components are consistent with this new perspective. The transfer of money or goods in itself is not a novelty, since Latin American states already had unconditional direct transfers, transfers of food and other goods (ECLAC 2006). However, conditionality, one of its essential features, is. It distinguishes them from previous programs and is consistent with the new policy paradigm in that it seeks to encourage families to send their children to educational establishments on a systematic basis, which would have an impact on increasing the human capital of that family group in the long term. The CCTs “have as their premise that the intergenerational reproduction of poverty is due to the lack of investment in human capital, and they seek, through the conditioning of transfers, to generate incentives for this investment. (…) They could be more effective than traditional interventions, because conditioning would reduce the opportunity cost of schooling; this in turn would reinforce the income effect of the transfer, since school attendance and child labour are substitutes for each other” (Villatoro 2005: 89). In addition, as mentioned above, these programs focus on the poor and indigent population, but do not provide a universal benefit, a characteristic that implies an important design decision and which is repeated in other programs during this period. Finally, CCTs require the creation of beneficiary identification systems that ensure that the State knows who these families are and that they actually receive the benefit.

2.3

CCTs in Latin America

There is a broad consensus in the literature regarding the relevance of CCTs in the region since the mid-1990s. The first programs were those of Mexico (pilot experience) and Brazil (in some states) in 1995. They were followed by Honduras (1998), Nicaragua (2000), Costa Rica (2000),

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Fig. 2.1 Conditional Cash Transfer programs in Latin America (1990–2010) (Note The starting year is indicated in brackets, in two cases, considering the pilot programs for their relevance in the subsequent design. Source The author with personal data base)

Colombia (2001), Chile (2002), Argentina (2005), Ecuador (2003), El Salvador (2005), Paraguay (2005), Peru (2005), Dominican Republic (2005), Bolivia (2006), Panama (2006), Uruguay (2008) and Guatemala (2008)2 (see Fig. 2.1). In addition to the geographic concentration, evident when looking at the map, the long history of the programs stands out, since only Nicaragua’s program was closed during this period. The others have remained operational, although they may have changed names or undergone changes in some of their characteristics (for example, in Mexico, Honduras and Argentina). The stability and persistence observed during these years implies that the programs have remained in place even despite changes of government between different or even opposing coalitions. 2 The starting date of the programs has been considered to be the year in which the first CCTs in each country began to operate. In cases where there were pilots that later formed an important basis for the program, such as the cases of Mexico and Brazil, the starting date of the pilot is indicated. This is because the diffusion mechanisms would operate from that stage of the formulation process.

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In this sense, it will be relevant to identify which components persist over time and which ones show modifications, which will be addressed in Chapter 4. As a starting point, it is noted that the programs do not abandon their essential components, conditionality in the field of education and health, and that—as shown in Table 2.2—it is present in most CCTs. Regarding the coverage of CCTs, it is concentrated on the population in situations of poverty and indigence. In these groups, the percentage of beneficiaries is important: in seven countries it is 100% of the indigent population and over 40% of the population in a situation of poverty (Table 2.3). The case of Ecuador stands out, reaching 100% of the population in a situation of poverty and indigence, Uruguay and Brazil reaching 100% in the indigent population and over 80% in the poor population. In Mexico, Colombia and Chile, 100% of the population is indigent and over 40% is poor. The development and implementation of beneficiary identification systems and proxy means test household selection methods were required to carry out this targeting (proxy means test ). The amount of the monetary transfer varies according to each program and is related to the emphasis of each program. However, according to analysis by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), it is estimated that “conditional and other public assistance transfers represent, on average, around 10.3% of the per capita income of the households that receive them” (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011: 124). There is also variation in this regard, since the size of the benefits ranges, for example, from 20% of average household consumption in Mexico to 4% in Honduras (Fiszbein and Schady 2009: 34). Likewise, there is a disparity in the amount that CCTs imply in the social expenditure of each country, although there has been a constant growth of the programs both in coverage and expenditure. All this, in a context in which public social spending has been increasing since the 1990s; “public social investment, which went from 12.3% of GDP in the 1990-1991 biennium to 18.4% in the 2007-2008 period” (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011: 105). However, this increase has been uneven across the region, especially in its relative and absolute levels (ECLAC 2011b). Countries such as the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay and Peru, where social spending in the 2008–2009 biennium was around (down) 10% of gross domestic product (GDP). This compares with other countries that double these figures, such as Argentina, Brazil,

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Table 2.2 The CCTs programs in Latin America (1990–2010) Country

Program namea

1

Argentina

2

Bolivia

Asignación Universal por Hijo para Protección Social (ex Familias por la Inclusión Social) Bono Juancito Pinto

3

Brazil

4

Chile

Bolsa Familia (ex Bolsa Alimentación y Bolsa Escuela) Chile Solidario (since 2012 Ingreso Ético Familiar)

5

Colombia

Familias en Acción

2001

6

Costa Rica

Avancemos (ex Superémonos)

2000

7

Ecuador

2003

8

El Salvador

9

Guatemala

10

Honduras

Bono de Desarrollo Humano (ex Bono Solidario) Comunidades Solidarias Rurales (since 2009 Programa de Apoyo a Comunidades Solidarias) Mi familia progresa (since 2012 Mi Bono Seguro) Programa de asignación Familiar (PRAF III) (since 2010 Bono Vida Mejor)

Starting year

Conditionalities

2005

School attendance and health checks

2006

School attendance School attendance and health checks Education, employment, housing, income, family life, among others School attendance, health checks and food School attendance and health checks School attendance and health checks School attendance and health checks

1995 (pilot)

2002

2005

2008

1998

School attendance and health checks School attendance and health checks

(continued)

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Table 2.2 (continued) Country

Program namea

Starting year

Conditionalities

11

Mexico

Oportunidades (since 2014 PROSPERA)

1995 (pilot)

12

Nicaragua

Red de Protección Social

2000–2006

13

Panama

Red Oportunidades

2006

14

Paraguay

Tekoporâ

2005

15

Peru

Juntos

2005

16

Dominican Republic

2005

17

Uruguay

Programa Solidaridad (since 2012 Progresando con Solidaridad) Plan Equidad (ex Ingreso Ciudadano/PANES)

School attendance and health checks School attendance and health checks School attendance and health checks School attendance and health checks School attendance and health checks School attendance and health checks

2008

School attendance and health checks

a The name of the program during the period under study is indicated, and the current or previous

name, in cases where there have been changes, is shown in parentheses Source Author, based on ECLAC (2011a), León (2008) and Cecchini and Madariaga (2011)

Costa Rica and Uruguay (Table 2.4). This variation is observed “despite the fact that almost all countries have made efforts to increase the macroeconomic priority of social spending since the 1990s” (ECLAC 2011b: 137). The amount of resources allocated to CCTs in relation to GDP also varies across the region, although it is generally low in all countries. The average percentage of their expenditure in total GDP has increased from 0.19% in 2000 to 0.40% in 2009, and has not exceeded half a point of GDP (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011: 106). One exception is the case of Ecuador, which in 2009 allocated 1.17% of its GDP to its Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Table 2.5), but most other countries are in a range close to the regional average. CCTs therefore have high visibility, which is partly explained by their broad coverage, although their cost is not significantly high.

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Table 2.3 Percentage of beneficiary population CCTs Country

Yeara

% Coverage of indigent population

% Coverage of poor population

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Colombia Costa Rica Chile Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Dominican Rep. Uruguay

2010 2009 2010 2009 2009 2008 2010 2009 2010 2010 2009 2010 2010 2009 2009

100 50.7 100 100 52.2 100 100 38.7 70.5 100 81.0 25.2 60.6 89.0 100

46.4 32.4 84.6 56.5 17.4 51.7 100 17.1 39.7 62.8 39.5 13.9 21.2 46.3 84.6

a Last year available

Source Cecchini and Madariaga (2011: 110)

If we look at the information in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, we can see that there is no direct proportionality between greater social spending and greater investment in CCTs, since, for example, Ecuador allocates proportionally more resources to this program, but has lower social spending than countries such as Chile or Bolivia. Therefore, in some cases it is a program that prevails within social investment, and in others it occupies a more limited place. Table 2.5 shows the percentage of the CCT budget in relation to social spending. There, the 18.37% that the program weighs on social investment in Ecuador stands out. The following countries follow with much lower percentages: Dominican Republic with 6.3%, Guatemala with 4.29%, Mexico with 4.52%, and Colombia with 3.14%. The remaining countries range from less than one percentage point to 3%. In these cases, such as Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica, for example, CCTs have a much lower weight in the social policy set.

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Table 2.4 Percentage of total social expenditure in relation to GDP (1990– 2010) Country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Dominican Rep Uruguay

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

18.57 … 17.63 11.88 6.04 16.13 3.95 … 3.87 6.44 5.53 6.98 6.93 2.86 3.97 4.71 16.35

21.23 … 20.31 11.92 11.51 15.23 4.43 5.35 4.47 5.62 7.71 6.88 8.31 8.27 6.88 4.29 20.57

21.43 16.36 21.15 14.99 10.78 17.32 2.86 9.24 6.54 7.82 8.62 8.6 9.06 9.81 8.62 5.8 20.69

19.95 17.65 22.51 12.87 12.83 17.26 4.68 12.04 7.59 9.79 9.42 11.17 7.53 8.12 9.55 7.05 19.69

… … … 15.64 13.62 22.93 9.84 … … 12.04 11.29 … … 11.01 9.95 7.27 …

Source Information retrieved from the ECLAC, CEPALSTAT database, extracted on 19 January 2014

2.3.1

Characteristics of the CCTs

Considering the components of the CCTs3 discussed in the numerous studies and reports, four can be distinguished as essential to qualify a program as such (Table 2.6). These are: education and health conditionality,4 the provision of cash vouchers (usually to the mother of the household), the system for identifying beneficiaries (which in most cases is done through two or more stages, with a predominance of targeting by geographical units) and methods for selecting households by indirect 3 These 10 characteristics have been defined as the most important and significant for this analysis, although there are also others that are less relevant and not present in all of them. 4 In addition to attendance at educational institutions and health checks, some programs

have incorporated other conditions. The Chilean case of Chile Solidario stands out, where, for example, regular meetings with monitors are required to improve a series of family conditions. This is also the case in Panama, where training of family members is required among others. However, the essential conditions for receiving the bonus are still mostly those related to health and education.

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Table 2.5 CCTs budget in relation to social expenditure and GDP (2009)a

Country

% CCT/social expenditureb

% CCT/GDP

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Dominican Rep. Uruguay

0.88 2.5 1.91 0.87 3.14 2.27 18.37 0.20 4.29 2.12 4.52 … 2.33 (2008) 3.21 1.68 6.3 2.11

0.20 0.33 0.47 0.11 0.39 0.39 1.17 0.02 0.32 0.24 0.51 0.14 (2006) 0.22 (2008) 0.36 0.14 0.51 0.45

a In some cases, information from the last year available is presented b For social expenditure, the simple average for the 2006–2007

biennium is used Source Author, based on ECLAC (2011a, b), Cecchini and Madariaga (2011) and Cohen and Franco (2010)

means test (proxy means test ) (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Cecchini and Madariaga 2011: 14). It is possible to point out that these components constitute the central body of CCTs, and of these, conditionality is the innovative element that distinguishes CCTs from other traditional cash transfer programs. The targeting mechanism component, despite being a rather technical aspect of the program, was gradually implemented in almost all countries in the region, and is a feature that also marked a difference from previously developed programs. The following Table 2.6 briefly describes these four essential characteristics of the CCTs. A second group of characteristics can be qualified as secondary (Table 2.7). These are also present in all programs, but there are differences in the options chosen and implemented. They have been qualified in this way, because these differences do not affect their CCT qualification following the guidelines of the literature on this matter (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011; Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Cecchini and Martínez

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Table 2.6 Essential characteristics of CCTs in Latin America Characteristics

Description

1

Education conditionality

2

Health conditionality

3

Cash transfer

4

Mechanism for identification and targeting of the beneficiary group

A percentage of attendance (between 80 and 85%) at the educational establishment is required for children and in some cases for young people from the family group Health checks are required for children and/or young people in the family group A monetary transfer is given to the person in charge of the family group. In most cases it is defined that the mother is the head of the household Two- or more-stage procedures, with predominance of geographical unit targeting and proxy means test household selection methods

Source Author’s elaboration based on Cecchini and Madariaga (2011), Fiszbein and Schady (2009), and León (2008)

2011; León 2008). The following is a description of the particularities that each of these characteristics may present in the programs. The programs can opt for various alternatives in terms of these characteristics. With regard to objectives, the central distinction refers to programs that place greater emphasis on the development of human capital—which in the long term should help to break the so-called vicious circle of poverty—as is the case in Mexico. Another group of programs aims to improve the short-term income of beneficiary families, such as the Bolsa Familia program. A third is characterized by the aspiration to include families in State support networks and strengthen their psychosocial capacities, as is the case with Chile Solidario (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011; Fiszbein and Schady 2009). There is a relationship between the objectives of the programs, the verification mechanisms and their penalties in the event of non-compliance. Countries can use various mechanisms to check compliance with conditionalities, and to penalize those who do not comply. In that sense, there is greater control and fines or suspension of benefits in programs that seek to improve the human capital of the beneficiary population as a long-term objective. With regard to the institutional framework, it

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Table 2.7 Secondary characteristics in CCTs in Latin America Characteristics

Descriptiona

5

Objectives of the program

6

Mechanisms for controlling conditionalities

7

Type of penalty

8

Institutionality

Monetary support and human capital development (indirect objective) Human capital development in children and adolescents Inclusion of families in state support networks and the strengthening of their psychosocial capacities Report of education and health facilities or specialized monitors The beneficiary reports it personally to the offices in charge or to the entities responsible for the program Soft penalty: warnings and reduction of benefit Hard: suspension of the benefit after a specific number of faults Responsible body (Council, Secretariat) reporting directly to the Presidency Responsible body under a Social Ministry

a The main alternatives implemented for these program characteristics in the region are presented.

Some minor characteristics have not been included in this description Source Author’s elaboration based on Cecchini and Madariaga (2011), Fiszbein and Schady (2009), and León (2008)

can be seen that in some programs, the institutions responsible for the programs and their implementation may depend directly on the Presidency of the Republic and in other cases be linked to the Social Ministries. These aspects influence their autonomy, independence and degree of institutionalization. Finally, it is possible to identify two characteristics that are not found in all programs and that are significant insofar as they are linked to social protection objectives (Table 2.8). One is the type of benefit, psychosocial support for beneficiary families (for example, through a monitor who accompanies them for a period of time), as is the case in Chile and El Salvador (León 2008). The second refers to whether the program is considered part of an existing social protection system, or one that may be being implemented in parallel with the program. In the region as a whole, there is a debate between tackling poverty with these specific programs

2

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37

Table 2.8 Additional characteristics of CCTs Characteristics

Description

9

Psycho-social support component

10

Being part of a social protection system

It refers to whether the beneficiary, together with the voucher or the assigned good, receives psychosocial support through specialized professionals The program is defined as a component of a social protection system (current, created together with the program or later)

Source Author’s elaboration based on Cecchini and Madariaga (2011), Fiszbein and Schady (2009), and León (2008)

(although with a more comprehensive approach than in the past) or establishing more complex protection systems that aim to provide people with a state network of comprehensive support in the face of a wide range of vulnerabilities. This is a significant distinction, since the intention to establish social protection systems is a complex and ambitious initiative that requires a new adaptation of the role of the State. Cecchini and Martínez (2011) have also characterized CCTs—defining three clusters of ideal types—and therefore, their classification contributes to this description and analysis of CCTs in Latin America. Three groups are defined: the CCTs with soft conditionality, with strong conditionality and the programmatic coordination systems or networks with conditionalities (see Table 2.9). The main objective of the first group is to ensure a basic level of consumption for poor families through cash transfers, thus focusing on income transfers, establishing “soft” sanctions for non-compliance with conditionalities and establishing flat or family-based transfers (Cecchini and Martínez 2011: 102). The flagship program of this group is Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, and there are also Argentina and Ecuador, among others. The second group of CCTs has the central objective of promoting human development of the poor through increased use of health and education services. Therefore, the objectives are long term, focused on human development, and a strict control of conditionalities is established. In addition, transfers change for different population groups (opportunity costs) (Cecchini and Martínez 2011: 110). The distinctive case of this group is Mexico’s Oportunidades program, along with Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Uruguay, among others. The third group

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Table 2.9 CCTs classification according to Cecchini and Martínez (2011) Type of program

Objectives

1. Income transfer The main objective programs with is to ensure a basic soft conditionality level of consumption for poor families through cash transfers

2. Demand incentive programs with strong conditionality

The central objective is to promote the human development of the poor through increased use of health and education services

3. Programmatic coordination systems or networks with conditionalities

The purpose is to connect poor families with the various benefits offered by specific programs and thus generate a floor of inclusion

Characteristics

Countries

– Focused on income transfer – “Soft” sanctions for non-compliance with conditionalities; flat or family composition transfers – Focused on human development – Strict control of co-responsibilities; transfers change for different population groups (opportunity costs) – Focused on the connection to the social protection system – Transfer is very low; psychosocial support to link families to the public network of social services

Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Dominican Republic

Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Bolivia, Argentina, Guatemala, Uruguay and Colombia

Chile, Colombia, Panama, Paraguay, El Salvador (and Colombiaa )

a Colombia is also mentioned in the Social Protection Systems group, since since 2006 the Familias

en Acción program has been part of the Juntos para la Superación de la Pobreza Extrema (Together to Overcome Extreme Poverty Network). However, the program is considered to be one of the programs with strong conditionality and has had an important influence on the Mexican case (Núñez and Cuesta 2006) Source The author based on Cecchini and Martinez (2011)

of CCTs are the systems or networks of programmatic coordination with conditionalities. Their purpose is to connect poor families with the various benefits offered by specific programs and thus generate a form of inclusion. They are focused on the connection to the social protection system, so the transfer is very low and includes components such

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as psychosocial support to link families with the public network of social services (Cecchini and Martínez 2011: 116). Chile Solidario is the most representative program, along with Colombia, Paraguay, Panama and El Salvador. The factors that explain the differences between the programs in each country have not been exhaustively discussed in the literature, especially in comparison to other program issues. However, they are generally attributed to the variation in the characteristics of each formulation process, and the political, social and economic context of each country (Fiszbein and Schady 2009: 34). 2.3.2

The Emblematic Cases of CCTs in the Region: Brazil and Mexico

As noted above, the innovative and emblematic cases in the region are those of Brazil and Mexico.5 Chile is also mentioned as a unique case given its social protection components, and this will be further elaborated on in the case study. This brief reference to the programs in Brazil and Mexico is necessary given that they are the first programs in the wave of diffusion, and their components have been replicated throughout the region. The Oportunidades program began in 1997, amidst high levels of poverty and economic crisis, under the name of PROGRESA (Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación). It was established under the administration of Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) and served only rural areas. The programme continued under President Vicente Fox (2000–2006), and was renamed Oportunidades in 2002. It was expanded to semi-urban and

5 Boltvinik (2012) notes that the first CCT in the region was the Family Allowance Program (PRAF I) established in 1990 in Honduras. However, this program was a compensatory mechanism to mitigate the effects of a stabilization program and not a program explicitly aimed at promoting human capital (ECLAC expert interview). As to whether it established conditions or co-responsibilities, there is no consensus in the literature (Moore 2008; Cohen and Franco 2006). Subsequently, since 1998 PRAF II has been a program that includes conditions and has the objective of human development and impact evaluations; therefore there is consensus in the literature regarding its character as a CCT. Therefore, the latter has been the program considered in the database as the Honduras CCT.

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urban areas, modifications were made to the way it was managed and benefits were added.6 The main objectives of the program were to improve the education, health and nutrition conditions of families in extreme poverty; to help children complete basic education; to eliminate malnutrition, reduce morbidity and mortality rates and improve overall family health; to change the risk structure facing poor families; to encourage responsibility and active participation by all family members in these areas; and to redistribute national income to poor families (Levy and Rodriguez 2005). Through the head of household, families received support in education, basic and child health care, support for older adults and for improving the food consumption and nutritional status of the most vulnerable members. The conditions to be met were that children and adolescents must attend educational establishments and undergo periodic health checks (Levy and Rodriguez 2005). The institution responsible for the program was the Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (Social Development Secretariat, SEDESOL) and the executing unit was the Coordinación Nacional del Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades (National Coordination of Human Development Program Oportunidades). Also participating were the Ministry of Public Education, the Ministry of Health, the Mexican Social Security Institute, the Ministry of Social Development, and the state (31 states and the Federal District) and municipal (2242 municipalities) governments. The program has grown steadily since its inception and by 2010 was serving 5,560,540 households (approximately 27,246,646 people, ECLAC 2011a). A particular characteristic of the PROGRESA program and then of Oportunidades is that from the outset it was the subject of impact assessments carried out by various institutions in different areas. From its initial conceptualization, the need to assess whether the hypotheses were correct would have been considered (Levy and Rodriguez 2005: 141; Hernández 6 Since 2014, the program has been called PROSPERA and its objective is to articulate and coordinate the institutional offer of programs and actions of social policy, including those related to the promotion of production, income generation, economic welfare, financial and labor inclusion, education, food and health. The program is aimed at the population living in extreme poverty and allows them to receive benefits and cash bonuses under co-responsibility schemes relating to the areas mentioned above (ECLAC 2011a, recovered on 10 November 2017).

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2008: 106). One of the first was carried out by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in 1998, whose results became known in 2000 (Levy and Rodriguez 2005: 142). This report reported that “the combination of education, health and nutrition provided by PROGRESA as an integrated package is an effective means of breaking the intergenerational transmission of poverty” (IFPRI 2000: 2). This early empirical evidence—together with other evaluations conducted by the National Institute of Public Health (INSP) and the Centre for Research in Higher Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESAS)—was important in at least two ways. First, it would have been an important argument for the decision about the continuity of the program, despite the change of administration in 20007 ; “the decision of the newly arrived Fox administration to maintain and, in fact, expand the program was influenced by the extremely positive conclusions of the first phase of evaluations” (Peck and Theodore 2010: 201). Along with the results, it was stated that “many of the program’s impacts will manifest themselves in the future, and it was suggested that the program and the evaluations be continued in the medium and long term” (Levy and Rodriguez 2005: 143). During the change of administration, the decision to close it could have prevailed, given that it was a legacy of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and the Fox government was seeking to establish a new phase by differentiating itself from its predecessors (Levy 2006). Likewise, in the Mexican political tradition, each new president inaugurated a great new social program (Boltvinik 2012). However, PROGRESA continued, albeit under the name of Oportunidades . Evaluations also continued to be carried out by the executing agencies (Levy and Rodriguez 2005: 142) and other evaluation agents.8 Secondly, these early evaluations allowed for

7 Other conditions that, according to Levy and Rodriguez (2005), contributed to the

continuity of the program were the existence of abundant, transparent and accessible information; clear rules of operation; an effort was made to ensure that the Congress of the Union, and in particular the Chamber of Deputies, had ample knowledge of the objectives; the mechanics of operation and the program’s budget, and that special care was taken not to link the program to political or partisan activities (Levy and Rodriguez 2005: 175–176). 8 Some of the evaluations that were carried out were evaluations of the operating rules in 2002, 2003 and 2004, conducted by the National Institute of Public Health (INSP). Also, an external evaluation of compliance with the 2005 operating rules was conducted by El Colegio Mexiquense. Other evaluations can be found at http://www.oportunid ades.gob.mx/Portal/wb/Web/inicio.

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the quick formation of a set of documents, reports and analyses about this CCT, which could have contributed to the diffusion of the programs. “In a short period of time, especially with the literature produced immediately after the initial evaluations of PROGRESA by evaluators, consultants and academics (…), the main contributions of the CCT programs have been identified: they effectively reach the poorest, positively impact on human capital accumulation, make it possible to reduce poverty in the short and long term, and decrease inequality, are capable of breaking the intergenerational transmission of poverty and are also cost-effective” (Valencia 2008: 502). Finally, it is also relevant to mention that in the case of Mexico, the role of multilateral banking during the first years was one of technical support, promoting the realization of external evaluations, with national or international agents and also their discussion (Levy 2006: 115). Only since 2002 was a loan requested from the IDB (Levy 2006). In that sense, during the PROGRESA policymaking process, the presence of the World Bank and IDB was mainly through technical advice on specific aspects of the programs (Levy 2006). It should be noted that the program was born in the country, based on solid economic and social analysis, with a comprehensive approach sensitive to political and institutional reality (Levy 2006: vii). However, it is also noted that the ties and proximity of its creators, particularly Santiago Levy, with the WB and IDB, would have influenced its original design (Peck and Theodore 2010), so the exclusively endogenous authorship of the program should be qualified. In Brazil, the current Bolsa Familia has its origin in conditional transfer programs that were implemented in 1995 in two municipalities (Campinas and Brasilia) (Coêlho 2012b). During the following years, hundreds of municipalities adopted the program9 and in 2001 these programs were implemented at the federal level. “The visibility of such programs and the national debate around them stimulated the creation by the federal government in 1997 of the Minimum Income Guarantee Program (PGRM)” (Draibe 2006: 147), which was later replaced by the Bolsa Escola in 2001. In the following years, other conditional transfer programs were set up by sector, such as Bolsa Alimentacion (since 2001), Carta Alimentacion (since 2003) and Auxilio-Gas. When Lula da Silva took office (2003–2011), he defined the strategy for overcoming poverty and hunger called Zero Hunger. However, a few months later he defined 9 According to Coêlho (2012b) the literature indicates that between 80 and 200 municipalities adopted the program, although not in all of them it would be implemented.

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the creation of the Bolsa Familia program (2003) with the objective of unifying the management, regularizing the execution and expanding the coverage of the money transfer programs to poor families, which were part of Zero Hunger: Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, Carta Alimentação and Auxilio-Gas.10 In 2005 it also unified its benefits with the Program for the Eradication of Child Labor (PETI), including specific co-responsibilities for poor families in situations of child labor. The Bolsa Familia aims to promote access to public service networks, especially health, education and social assistance, to combat hunger (in line with the Zero Hunger Program) and to stimulate the sustainability of families living in poverty or extreme poverty (Veras and Silva 2010). In terms of management, the programme also aimed to unify it, regularize its implementation and expand the coverage of existing transfer programs. Bolsa Familia provides a basic bond for extremely poor families and variable bonds according to the number of children and their age. The conditions required of the beneficiaries are school attendance for children and adolescents and for children and adolescents at risk or retired from child labor with a minimum attendance of 85% in the socio-educational services. In the area of health, periodic health checks, pre-natal checkups for pregnant women and compliance with vaccinations (Veras and Silva 2010). The responsible institution is the Ministry of Social Development and Lucha Contra el Hambre. The executing entity is the National Secretariat for Citizenship Income (SENARC) and the Interministerial Management Council of the Bolsa Familia Program—CGPBF. The coverage for 2010 was 12,582,844 families (ECLAC 2011a). The Bolsa Familia stands out for its wide coverage and the peculiarity of the federal system. In comparison with PROGRESA/Oportunidades , the Brazilian CCT places greater emphasis on redistribution rather than on encouraging the strengthening of human capital and less on carrying out impact assessments (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). As for its origin, it is noteworthy that it begins at the local level and is spread internally horizontally between cities and later vertically from the local to the national level (Sugiyama 2012; Coêlho 2012a, b). This would not have weighed significantly on the experience of Mexico or other countries that already had CCTs at that time (Sugiyama 2012: 42; Draibe

10 It should therefore be mentioned that the first experiences of this type of program were developed in various municipalities in the mid-1990s.

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2006). Likewise, there was less influence from international organizations during the first years, which were more explicitly incorporated when the Bolsa Familia was configured (Sugiyama 2012: 42), and a loan was arranged with the World Bank (IEG 2011). In the latter case, according to some experts, these external resources were sought to obtain political support for Bolsa Familia, rather than out of economic necessity. “For the Bank it is important that Brazil has a loan from the Bank; and for Brazil it is important that the Bank recognizes the role of Bolsa Familia” (UNDP CCT Expert Interview). This type of program is frequently questioned, so this support from the WB would contribute to its legitimacy (Interview with UNDP CCT Expert and World Bank Expert/Former Program Director). The peculiarities of the Brazilian trajectory explain its greater visibility on a regional and international level once it is configured in the Bolsa Familia. However, the CCTs in Brazil began in the mid-90s and also implied an accumulation of knowledge and experiences in the field. In this sense—and there is a majority consensus in the literature and among experts in this regard—both experiences are the pioneers in the region. There is also agreement as to their origin—mostly endogenous—with which they can be considered a “Latin American product” and the initiators of the wave of regional diffusion (Stampini and Tornarolli 2012; Handa and Davis 2006; Draibe 2006). 2.3.3

CCTs Assessments and Challenges

One of the characteristics of the CCTs is that “starting with Mexico’s Oportunidades program, (…) there has been an emphasis on implementing credible evaluations of its impact on different result indicators” (Fiszbein and Schady 2009: 12). The impact evaluations of the first programs (Brazil, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua) focused on measuring changes in short- and medium-term indicators of human capital accumulation. In the field of education, evaluations included measuring changes in school enrolment and attendance rates; in health and nutrition, various indicators of health service use and quality were incorporated (Rawlings and Rubio 2003). It can be stated that “at present, a distinctive feature of transfer programs is that, more than other social programs, they have been rigorously evaluated and monitored” (Ibarrarán et al. 2017: VIII).

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These measures showed positive effects in terms of lower dropouts, increased school enrolment and attendance, and increased attendance at health checks. “Conditional cash transfers can be an effective incentive for investment in the human capital of the poor” (Rawlings and Rubio 2003: 21). This is because they generate significant reductions in child labor, as in Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and Nicaragua (Fiszbein and Schady 2009: 16; Ibarrarán et al. 2017). There is also evidence of increased school enrolment and attendance in many countries, ranging from “0.5 percentage points (p.p.) in Jamaica to 12.8 p.p. in Nicaragua” (Ibarrarán et al. 2017: 2). However, the effects in terms of improving the level of learning—measuring performance in achievement tests—are not clear, which makes evident the challenges related to the quality of the educational offer (Valencia 2008; Fiszbein and Schady 2009). The same is true for raising the nutritional level of children, where the results are not decisive (León 2008; Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Barrientos 2006). Regarding the broader goal of overcoming poverty, CCT assessments would have helped to reduce the poverty gap and mitigate the consequences of economic crises. In other words, the potential of CCTs to lift families out of poverty in the short or medium term is only moderate or low (Cohen and Franco 2010). They have proved effective in “increasing consumption in beneficiary households, as well as reducing the incidence and, especially, the intensity of poverty and inequality” (Ibarrarán et al. 2017: 2). However, their impact on beneficiaries’ ability to rise above the poverty line is relative, since it also depends on families’ ability to generate more income (Villatoro 2005), an aspect that the programs do not cover. The need to specify and/or clarify the conditions for exit from the program in order to generate a transition towards autonomy for the beneficiary family has also been identified. Finally, the evidence shows that those programs that present a psychosocial accompaniment or family orientation show better results in the intervention process, being valued by the same families, because they consider that at the end of the accompaniment they are in a better situation than when they started the programs. However, they present a deficit in intervention in communities where families relate and problems of sustainability of the link with the supply of public programs and services once the intervention with family support is completed (Cecchini and Martínez 2011).

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According to the experts, the impact evaluations carried out in the first programs motivated modifications in the design of the programs, guided decisions regarding their expansion, allowed for their survival in the face of changes in governments and generated interest in replicating them at the international level (Rawlings and Rubio 2003). With regard to the first point, the relevance of the information they provide, which would have been considered in subsequent designs, is highlighted. The programs that followed them benefited from the operational experience accumulated by the first generation, which would have facilitated implementation, reduced uncertainty regarding expected results and decreased the need for prior small-scale experimentation. “CCTs have been very self-critical and open to learning. As a whole, they have an outstanding record in terms of the length and rigor of impact assessments and the public diffusion of their findings. There has been a great deal of exchange between programs and a search to learn from each other how to handle design issues and operational challenges” (Fiszbein and Schady 2009: 101). Some experts argue that along with learning, the results promoted by the executing agencies (such as IFPRI) and by the academic evaluators, had both technical and “political purposes, among them to ‘promote’ the international adoption of the programs (…) and practical, the proposal to funding agencies of more evaluations” (Valencia 2008: 501). In this regard, it will not be possible here to confirm this intention, but we will address the effect that this accumulation of information may have had on the wave of diffusion. The results of these evaluations have also shown that they meet the efficiency objectives, i.e. “they manage to reach the target population, with no lesser leakage, and that their cost-benefit results are positive” (Valencia 2008: 511). There is consensus that, through the targeting mechanisms used, these programs manage to concentrate the delivery of income transfers to the population in poverty and indigence (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). However, there are problems of inclusion and exclusion, whether due to problems of design or implementation. For example, there are apprehensions about the political use of programs, such as manipulating information or favoring beneficiaries in certain localities, although strictly speaking “there are few studies with concrete information on this subject” (Cohen and Franco 2010: 27). Nevertheless, there is a demand in the region to censure mechanisms of transparency and accountability, both for CCTs and for other social programs. Responsible institutions are another component that implies various challenges in terms of whether they have the required capacities, in

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ensuring state networks, levels of decentralization and the capacity for coordination between services or ministries, among others (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). In connection with the above, with regard to financing, experts point out that spending in relation to GDP and social spending remains very low, which reduces its potential effectiveness and the possibility of addressing the weaknesses mentioned. Along with this, “many depend on external financing from loans and grants, so sustainability over time is a major challenge” (Cecchini and Martínez 2011: 206) Nevertheless, CCTs demonstrate good short-term performance in alleviating the position of poor families, but present challenges in ensuring long-term solutions. Experts agree, especially with years of program experience, that “these (…) are not ‘the’ social policy against poverty, but a part of that social policy. They have a complementary and ‘mobilizing’ role to ensure that public investment in health and education is actually used by the poorest” (Valencia 2008: 28). Even in cases of very good design and administration, they fail to meet the needs of a comprehensive social protection system (Fiszbein and Schady 2009), a broader challenge now installed in the region.

2.4 The Debate About the Diffusion of the Programs When analyzing the reasons that explain the emergence and diffusion of CCTs in Latin America, the economic and social context, with high levels of poverty and inequity, is an unavoidable argument. In fact, “in several cases the CCTs in force today were born from the emergency programs that were implemented to mitigate the effects of crises on the population groups most affected by them” (León 2008: 133). The countries had to face the complex economic and social situation, which historically is common to much of the countries of the region and accentuated since the late eighties. Therefore, the decision to adopt programs that aim at this objective is, ultimately, the expected public action. Having clarified this, the question arises as to why the majority of countries in the region adopted the same model of programs, when these may have been dissimilar. A plausible argument that would have influenced the decision to adopt is the governments’ aspiration to obtain electoral support as a consequence of the implementation of the CCTs. However, in spite of being a reasonable alternative to be included as an explanatory variable, in this

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work I have not considered it as such, for different reasons that are detailed below. On the one hand, obtaining election results is a basic and essential objective for all governments, and one that is applicable, in theory, to all public policies. The question then is whether these particular programs could generate greater results than other programs, which could justify the weight of this variable. In this regard, Stokes et al. (2013) analyze various programs in which governments distribute goods, in various forms, from those unquestionably accepted to others that border on illegality (Stokes et al. 2013: 3). The authors define programmatic and non-programmatic distributive activities. In the former, distribution should be open, formalized, public and subject to debate. In the latter, there is no public criterion for distribution, or this criterion is subject to partisan objectives, related to clientelism, political machines or patronage (Stokes et al. 2013: 6). Likewise, it is argued that these strategies are distinguished by their unconditionality, given that compliance with certain aspects is not required to receive the benefit. In that line, the CCTs, in theory, are closer to a type of programmatic activity, since they are public, open, mostly at the national level and have the key characteristic of demanding conditionality for the delivery of the benefit. The beneficiary receives the bond not only because of certain socio-economic characteristics, but also because he or she must comply with specific conditions. A particular feature of this type of program is its focus on the most vulnerable and poor sectors through beneficiary systems. This implies greater institutionalization in this process, transparency and control mechanisms that would avoid, in theory, discretionality and manipulation in the delivery of benefits. This is an important feature of this type of program in the region, although it is clear that it will be necessary to observe whether this is effectively applied in each case. In Stokes’ work (2013), CCTs are mentioned as programs where these possibilities are diminished. “PROGRESA in Mexico is an example and one that suggests that opening and linking rules can restrict distribution in developing democracies as much as in the richest ones” (Stokes et al. 2013: 9). In fact, the electoral use of its predecessor, PRONASOL, is mentioned as a contrast, where the definition of beneficiaries was found to have electoral incentives (Fox and Haight 2009). The electoral focus of PRONASOL helped to cushion the political impact of the controversial macroeconomic measures, weakening the opposition in the short term in some areas (Fox 1994: 179). This is not to say that PROGRESA/Oportunidades was free of any irregularities,

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but rather that the CCT model would constitute a type of programmatic policy that would discourage clientelist practices of proximity (De La O 2013: 11). In fact, De La O (2015) points out that there is variation among the region’s programs in terms of the degree of political discretion and maintains that the governments of young democracies have adopted policies to overcome poverty whose operational rules suppress political discretion when they face an antagonistic legislature (which increases the effectiveness of the social program). Thus, it considers economic crises and the levels of commitment and conflict between the legislative and the executive as explanatory variables for the adoption and characteristics of the programs (De La O 2015). Consequently, it seems that for the logic of the electoral incentive, CCTs would not be particularly attractive. The expectations that policy makers might have regarding the results of this program should not be particularly increased by such a program. However, there is still very little discussion in the literature on this subject. Sugiyama (2013) stands out, who addressed electoral returns as an adoption variable for social programs in education and health at the municipal level in Brazil. His results showed that, “contrary to the common sense that politicians are driven by their electoral ambitions, I found that the political incentives approach offers a surprisingly weak explanation for the diffusion of innovative social policies” (2013: 12). Electoral interest cannot explain the variation between policymakers’ decisions to implement programs such as Bolsa Escuela and the Programa Salud de Familia; nor can it explain why some cities adopt before others (Sugiyama 2012). It could also be assumed that evidence and knowledge about these electoral benefits could influence expectations. However, there is no evidence that this information was available or that it significantly influenced the expectations of policy makers. Currently there is some development in the literature, but it is not conclusive. Regarding PROGRESA, Rocha (2001) states that it is not possible to characterize it strictly either as a program for overcoming poverty or as a vote mobilizing machine that does not respond to the criteria of this problem. On one hand, indicators play a key role in determining who the beneficiaries are, but on the other hand, he points out, PROGRESA deploys political components (Rocha 2001: 530). In the case of Brazil, the evidence is also mixed. The electoral link with the CCTs in the 2006 presidential elections has been analyzed and there is a consensus that the success of Bolsa Familia had an impact on Lula da Silva’s victory (Caldes et al. 2004; Hall 2008, 2012).

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Along these lines, De La O (2013) points out that the fact of being beneficiaries of Bolsa Familia increases the possibility of voting in favor of the incumbents (De La O 2013: 4). Likewise, other studies have shown that the program has contributed to an expansion of participation in the presidential elections (Hunter and Power 2007: 20). However, Zucco (2011) highlights the evidence that Bolsa Familia is not replicating traditional clientelist patterns because it has a complex institutionalization and a fine-tuned logic of checks and balances that makes this type of practice difficult (2011: 311). The positive effect of the program would be general, without the need to resort to local practices. Along the same lines, Hunter and Sugiyama point out that the Bolsa Familia provides tangible benefits without the beneficiaries being subject to the manipulation of local patronage (Hunter and Sugiyama 2009). They also state that the beneficiaries perceive Bolsa Familia as a non-clientele-owned way of overcoming poverty, quite different from the usual political wheeling and dealing (Sugiyama and Hunter 2013: 58). Other cases with some background are those of Argentina, with the Asignación Universal por Hijo program, and Bolivia, with the CCT Juancito Pinto. It is argued that “from a first exploratory approach we can affirm that there is no link between a positive electoral performance by the governing party and investment in CCTs spending at the provincial or departmental level” (Serravalle 2013: 55). With respect to Ecuador, it would also have been demonstrated that receiving the benefit would not have an impact on voting intentions (Buser et al. 2013). Closing this review, Sanches (2015) takes up much of the discussion on the cases in which it would have been shown that the beneficiaries vote in greater numbers for the incumbents. He cites some of those already commented on and adds evidence from studies for Colombia and Uruguay, where this situation is also confirmed. However, Sanches’ work, based on the analysis of 84 presidential elections held in 18 Latin American countries between 1990 and 2010, leads him to conclude that “the Latin American presidents who invested in CCTs are neither more successful electorally than those who did not, nor more successful than they were in the previous elections” (Sanches 2015: 64). In that sense, the programs would neither benefit nor harm them more than other social programs. Finally, it should be noted that this variable is given more weight to be analyzed in terms of relevance and transparency in the definition of the benefits of the programs, once they have been adopted. One area of political use of “social programs refers to the targeting of social resources

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according to geo-electoral criteria, that is, to certain regions or states, or to partisan corporate organizations with experience in channeling support in exchange for votes” (Fox and Haight 2009: 77). In that sense, this perspective would imply analysis of the implementation of the program, the modifications in time and their evaluations and areas that escape the defined object of study. That said, I believe that electoral expectations were not a fundamental element in the adoption of CCT programs, and do not allow us to explain their diffusion in Latin America. In another line of argument, the literature suggests that the predominant social policy approaches would have established an adequate framework for the emergence of CCTs. However, there is insufficient problematization regarding the link between social policy approaches and the programs implemented by governments.11 The ideas that inspired the policies emerge from somewhere, and both their origin and the process by which they come to determine the adoption of certain initiatives deserve further study. Specifically in the area of social policy, it is assumed that policies are framed within certain conceptual frameworks, but not enough progress has been made in addressing the mechanisms and processes that explain this. For example, what is the role of multilateral banking or international organizations in building this consensus? How do they exert influence? What factors influence the scope of this consensus? In that sense, it is a possible argument but it must be deepened. On the other hand, there is consensus that multilateral banking played a role in the adoption of CCTs. Some research in this regard indicates that both the World Bank and the IDB promoted the foundational programs as Oportunidades (Teichman 2007; Valencia 2008; Boltvinik 2012; Feitosa de Britto 2004), which has been a reference beyond the region and developing countries, as for example in Toronto or New York (Mahon and Macdonald 2010; Peck and Theodore 2010). However, it remains to clarify the motivations that these agencies would have to promote these programs, the channels through which this was done and evaluate the results of this possible influence.

11 Works describing changes in social paradigms at the agencies, experts and government levels and the influence of globalization on social policy are an essential framework for this topic. Among others: Mahon and McBride (2009), IDB (2003), ECLAC (2006), Deacon et al. (1997), Mahon and Macdonald (2010), Peck (2011), Toye (1999) and Deacon (2007).

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Along with the banks, other international organizations and experts are also present and should be considered in the explanation of policy diffusion. Sugiyama (2011)—who analyzes the expansion of CCTs from a diffusion approach—discusses two mechanisms where these stakeholders are present: learning through the exchange of norms and knowledge; and coercion through financial institutions. On the latter, he points out that international organizations and banks have been in favor of CCTs through their loans and technical assistance, which “would have at least strengthened domestic decisions and provided the necessary resources” (Sugiyama 2011: 264). About learning as a result of knowledge sharing, it is noted that the Bolsa Escola and PROGRESA-Oportunidades programs generated interest in the so-called international community for overcoming poverty (Sugiyama 2011: 262) or development policy community (Jenson 2009: 460), which is reflected in the extensive production of studies, reports, reports and articles on the subject. This is also complemented with the results of the impact evaluations mentioned above, which constituted evidence to be considered. It also highlights the role that international organizations would have played in connecting experts from different countries in the conferences, workshops and meetings. However, a more in-depth discussion is needed to address issues such as who is part of this policy community, what ideas they bring to it, their mechanisms of influence, among others. International stakeholders today act less as policy enforcers than as orchestrators and participants in knowledge networks and policy diffusion (Peck 2011: 168). In this sense, it is possible to reflect that beyond political considerations, the technical council would have exercised greater influence on the decision to adopt the program. Feitosa de Britto (2004) points out, in a comparative analysis between Bolivia, Mexico and Brazil, that the technical evidence and the proximity of policy makers to multilateral agencies are variables to consider (Feitosa de Britto 2004: 45). Although its comparative analysis is not framed within the diffusion approach, it does highlight these factors as explanations for the diffusion of the programmes, together with the interdependence between domestic and international variables. Along the same lines, Peck (2010) points out that there are strong local currents in the process of formulating CCTs, but transnational networks, which even suggests that “CCTs were in fact made to travel” (Peck and Theodore 2010: 196). Its approach is not that of policy diffusion, but rather that of analyzing “transnationalization” through a “rapid policy

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regime”, where networks, experts and policy communities and multilateral agencies meet (Peck and Theodore 2010). However, it contributes to the discussion by identifying the domestic and regional levels, and the variety of stakeholders present in this process. It is also possible to debate whether there is a policy community that would have promoted CCTs. The nature of the stakeholders that are usually considered to be members—international organizations, think tanks and multilateral banks—is diverse. In fact, observing the process also reveals the presence of experts from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, academics and members of think tanks, who could be considered an epistemic community (Haas 1990) and have played a role in the diffusion process. Franzoni and Voorend (2011) address epistemic communities as a central stakeholder for the implementation of programs in Chile, El Salvador and Costa Rica; although it does not frame it within a diffusion process. They point out that there is a community about poverty in the region that brings together politicians and experts beyond their political ideology. And its influence would have been very successful “judging by the annual rate of new programs created in the region” (Franzoni and Voorend 2011: 281). What would allow for variation in each case would be the characteristics of each national welfare state. The proposal for a single poverty policy community is debatable given certain divergences among member agencies. Moreover, since the concept is used interchangeably with that of the epistemic community, it is necessary to distinguish between the two. In this study, it is argued that as it is proposed here, the proposal of epistemic community allows this group of people—experts—to identify their notions and beliefs and their activities that would have contributed to the diffusion of CCTs more precisely. There is also some consensus on a convergence between national and international stakeholders on approaches that would have led to a set of anti-poverty standards and development policies (Jenson 2009; Sugiyama 2011; Franzoni and Voorend 2011). What requires further study and discussion is the means of influence and action of each type of stakeholder and how they interact during the policymaking process. According to Franzoni and Voorend (2011), international stakeholders have played an important role in El Salvador, but less so in Chile and Costa Rica, where national stakeholders have limited their degree of influence (Franzoni and Voorend 2011: 290). In the same line, Feitosa de Britto points out that despite the evidence about the presence of international stakeholders, this does not lead directly to the conclusion that governments

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do not have room to maneuver in the definition of policies (Feitosa de Britto 2004: 44). Teichman (2009) analyses in comparative perspective the role of civil society organizations in the processes of formulation of PROGRESA-Oportunidades and Chile Solidario, identifying greater openness to non-state actors in Mexico than in Chile. In another study, Teichman (2007) also analyzes the relationship between the influence of multilateral banks and civil society organizations in these two cases, which contributes to understanding the activities of the former and their degree of influence in less studied areas. This type of approach contributes to advance in the identification of the means of influence, the activities, the variables that could explain how both levels are related and what determines their levels of influence and/or autonomy. Brooks (2015) takes a broader look at CCTs at the global level. Using a sample of 114 developing countries, between 1990 and 2011, variables are tested through a logistic regression to explain the dispersion of programs. Their findings indicate that there is a greater probability of implementing programs with the presence of CCTs among countries in the same region (the so-called neighbor effect in the literature) and among democratic countries. In the domestic arena, democratization increases the probability of adopting, along with the existence of governments with ideological divisions between the executive and the legislature (Brooks 2015). Thus, the shift in developing countries towards this type of program would have emerged from the deepening of democracy, the improvement of macroeconomic conditions and the horizontal channels of communication between countries that allow governments to discern whether this design is appropriate for their context or not. Likewise, he points out that ideology would not be a variable with an explanatory weight in these countries, unlike what happens in European Welfare States. The debate on the subject identifies and raises relevant issues. However, it is possible to deepen even more the understanding of the phenomenon by situating these international stakeholders—as explanatory variables—within a process of diffusion. Consequently, three questions guided this work and sought to address these pending challenges. Firstly, what are the variables that explain the diffusion of conditional transfer programs in Latin America? It is necessary to test the prevalence of domestic and external variables, and to further clarify which ones could be more influential in explaining this diffusion process. The second question is which mechanisms can be observed in the wave of diffusion? The

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literature proposes four possible mechanisms to be identified in the object of study, which should also address some of the theoretical and methodological challenges present for their application in the case studies. As a third question, how does the diffusion mechanism relate to the domestic formulation process and how does this influence the characteristics of the programs adopted? Progress must be made in identifying the process of regional diffusion, its link with the domestic policymaking process and in the final characteristics of the programs.

References Barrientos, A., & DeJong, J. (2006). Reducing Child Poverty with Cash Transfers: A Sure Thing? Development Policy Review, 24(5), 537–552. Boltvinik, J. (2012). Mexico’ Salleged Influence on Poverty Reduction Strategies in Latin America. Estudios Críticos del Desarrollo, II (2), 13–40. Brooks, S. M. (2015). Social Protection for the Poorest the Adoption of Antipoverty Cash Transfer Programs in the Global South. Politics & Society, 43(4), 551–582. Buser, T., Oosterbeek, H., Plug, E., Ponce, J., & Rosero (2013). Cash Transfers and Political Support: Evidence from Ecuador. In Work prepared for the VII Latin American Congress of Political Science, organized by the Latin American Association of Political Science (ALACIP). Bogotá, September 25–27, 2013. Caldes, N., Coady, D., & Maluccio, J. (2004). The Cost or Poverty Alleviation Transfers Programs: A Comparative Analysis of Three Programs in Latin America. Economic and Sector Study Series. IDB. Calzada, J., Costas, A., & Jordana, J. (Eds.). (2009). Más allá del Mercado. Las políticas de servicio universal en América Latina. Barcelona: Fundación CIDOB. Cecchini, S., & Madariaga, A. (2011). Programas de Transferencias Condicionadas. Balance de la experiencia reciente en América Latina y el Caribe. Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. Cecchini, S., & Martínez, R. (2011). Protección social inclusiva en América Latina: una mirada integral, un enfoque de derechos. ECLAC Books, No. 111. Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. Coêlho, D. (2012a). Minimum Income in Brazil: A New Model of Innovation Diffusion. In C. Pateman & M. Murray (Ed.), Horizons of Reform: Basic Income Solutions Around the World. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Coêlho, D. (2012b). Political Competition and the Diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfers in Brazil. Brazilian Political Science Review, 6(2), 56–87.

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Cohen, E., & Franco, R. (2006). Transferencias con corresponsabilidad. Una mirada latinoamericana. Ministry of Social Development, Mexico (SEDESOL). Cohen, E., & Franco, R. (2010). Programas de transferencias condicionadas: ¿pidiendo peras al olmo? Persona y Sociedad, XXIV (3), 91–121. De La O, A. (2013). Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico. American Journal of Political Science, 57 (1), 1–14. De La O, A. (2015). Crafting Policies to End Poverty in Latin America: The Quiet Transformation. New York: Cambridge University Press. Deacon, B. (2007). Global Social Policy and Governance. London: Sage. Deacon, B., Hulse, M., & Stubbs, P. (1997). Global Social Policy: International Organizations and the Future of Welfare. London: Sage. Draibe, S. (2006). Brasil: Bolsa-Escola y Bolsa-familia. In E. Cohen & R. Franco (Ed.), Transferencias con corresponsanbilidad. Una mirada latinoamericana. Ministry of Social Development Mexico (SEDESOL). ECLAC. (2001). Panorama Social de América Latina. 2000–2001. Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. ECLAC. (2004). Una década de desarrollo social en América Latina, 1990–1999. Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. ECLAC. (2006, March 20–24). La protección social de cara al futuro: acceso, financiamiento y solidaridad. Thirty-first session, ECLAC. Montevideo, Uruguay. ECLAC. (2011a). Programa de Transferencias Condicionadas. Database of Noncontributory Social Protection Programs Latin America and the Caribbean. http://dds.cepal.org/bdptc/. ECLAC. (2011b). Panorama Social de América Latina 2011. Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. Feitosa de Britto, T. (2004). Conditional Cash Transfers: Why Have They Become So Prominent in Recent Poverty Reduction Strategies in Latin America? (Working Paper Series No. 390). Institute of Social Studies. Fiszbein, A., & Schady, N. (2009). Conditional Cash Transfers Reducing Present and Future Poverty. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Fox, J. (1994). The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico. World Politics, 46(2), 151–184. https://doi.org/10.2307/295 0671. Fox, J., & Haight, L. (2009). El condicionamiento político del acceso a programas sociales en México. In D. Gómez-Álvarez (Coord.), Candados y Contrapesos. La Protección de Los Programas, Políticas y Derechos Sociales en México y América Latina. Ciudad de México: ITESO. Franco, R. (1996). Los paradigmas de la política social en América Latina. Revista de la CEPAL, No. 58, Santiago de Chile, ECLAC.

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Franzoni, J. M., & Voorend, K. (2011). Actors and Ideas Behind CCTs in Chile, Costa Rica and El Salvador. Global Social Policy, 11(2–3), 279–298. Haas, P. (1990). Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation. New York: Columbia University Press. Hall, A. (2008). Brazil’s Bolsa Familia: A Double-Edged Sword? Development and Change, 39(5), 799–822. Hall, A. (2012). The Last Shall be First: Political Dimensions of Conditional. Cash Transfers in Brazil. Journal of Policy Practice, 1(1–2), 25–41. Handa, S., & Davis, B. (2006). The Experience of Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean. Development Policy Review, 24(5), 513– 536. Hernández, D. (2008). Historia de Oportunidades. Inicio y cambios del programa. Ciudad de México: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Hunter, W., & Power, T. (2007). Rewarding Lula: Executive Power, Social Policy, and the Brazilian Elections of 2006. Latin American Politics and Society, 49(1), 1–30. Hunter, W., & Sugiyama, N. (2009). Democracy and Social Policy in Brazil: Advancing Basic Needs, Preserving Privileged Interests. Latin American Politics and Society, 51(2), 29–58. Ibarrarán, P., Medellín, N., Regalia, F., & Stampini, M. (2017). Así funcionan las transferencias condicionadas: Buenas prácticas a 20 años de implementación. Washington, DC: Social Protection and Health Division, IDB. Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). (2011). Social Safety Nets: An Evaluation of World Bank Support, 2000–2010. Washington, DC: IEG-WB. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (2003). Poverty Reduction and Promotion of Social Equity. Strategy Document. GN-1894–7. IDB. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). (2000). ¿Está dando buenos resultados Progresa? Informe de los resultados obtenidos de una evaluación realizada por el IFPRI. Síntesis de la evaluación de impacto. Jenson, J. (2009). Lost in Translation: The Social Investment Perspective and Gender Equality. Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society, 16(4), 446–483. Jordana, J., & Levi-Faur, D. (2005). The Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism in Latin America: Sectorial and National Channels in the Making of a New Order. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598(1), 102–124. Jordana, J., Levi-Faur, D., & Fernández i Marín, X. (2011). The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies: Channels of Transfer and Stages of Diffusion. Comparative Political Studies, 44(10), 1343–1369. Korzeniewicz, R. P., & Smith Source, W. C. (2000). Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in Latin America: Searching for the High Road to Globalization. Latin American Research Review, 35(3), 7–54.

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León, A. (2008). Progresos en la reducción de la pobreza extrema en América Latina. Dimensiones y políticas para el análisis de la primera meta del Milenio. ECLAC-AECID project. Monitoring of the Poverty Component of the First Millennium Development Goal (AEC/06/003). Levy, S. (2006). Progress Against Poverty: Sustaining Mexico’s ProgresaOportunidades Program. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Levy, S., & Rodriguez, E. (2005). Sin herencia de pobreza: el programa Progresa – Oportunidades de México. Washington, DC: IDB. Mahon, R., & Macdonald, L. (2010). Anti-poverty Politics in Toronto and Mexico City. Geoforum, 41(2), 209–217. Mahon, R., & McBride, S. (Eds.). (2009). The OECD and Transnational Governance. Vancouver: UBC Press. Moore, C. (2008). Assessing Honduras’ CCT Programme PRAF, Programa de Asignación Familiar: Expected and Unexpected Realities. UNDP—International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth Country Study, 15, 1–45. Núñez, J., & Cuesta, L. (2006). Colombia: Programa Familia en Acción. In E. Cohen & R. Franco (Eds.), Transferencias con corresponsabilidad. Una mirada latinoamericana. Ciuad de México: Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL). Peck, J. (2011). Global Policy Models, Globalizing Poverty Management: International Convergence or Fast-Policy Integration? Geography Compass, 5(4), 165–181. Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2010). Recombinant Workfare, Across the Americas: Transnationalizing ‘‘Fast” Social Policy. Geoforum, 41(2), 195–208. Rawlings, L. B., & Rubio, G. M. (2003). Lecciones desde América Latina. Evaluación del impacto de los programas de transferencias condicionadas en efectivo. Ciudad de México, Secretaría de Desarrollo Social. Serie Cuadernos de Desarrollo Humano. Robles, C., et al. (2013). Persistencias de la pobreza y esquemas de protección social en América Latina y el Caribe. Buenos Aires: CLACSO. Rocha, A. (2001). Do Old Habits Die Hard? A Statistical Exploration of the Politicisation of Progresa, Mexico’s Latest Federal Poverty-Alleviation Programme, Under the Zedillo Administration. Journal of Latin American Studies, 33(3), 513–538. Sanches, D. (2015). Conditional Cash Transfer Programs, the Economy, and Presidential Elections in Latin America. Latin American Research Review, 50(2), 63–85. https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2015.0020. Serravalle, C. (2013). Programas de Transferencias Condicionadas en América Latina: ¿”Inversión social” con ganancias político electorales? El caso de la AUH y el Bono Juancito Pinto (Master thesis in Public Services and Social Policies). Facultad de Sociología y Comunicación, Universidad de Salamanca.

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Stampini, M., & Tornarolli, L. (2012, November). The Growth of Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean: Did They Go Too Far? (IZA Policy Paper N° 49). Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., & Brusco, V. (2013). Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sugiyama, N. (2011). The Diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in the Americas. Global Social Policy, 11(2–3), 250–278. Sugiyama, N. (2012). Bottom-up Policy Diffusion: National Emulation of a Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Brazil. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 42(1), 25–51. Sugiyama, N. (2013). Diffusion of Good Government. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Sugiyama, N., & Hunter, W. (2013). Whither Clientelism? Good Governance and Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program. Comparative Politics, 46(1), 43–62. Teichman, J. (2007). Redistributive Conflict and Social Policy in Latin America. World Development, 36(3), 446–460. Teichman, J. (2009). Competing Visions of Democracy and Development in the Era of Neoliberalism in México and Chile. International Political Science Review, 30(1), 67–87. Toye, J. (1999). Nationalising the Anti-Poverty Agenda. IDS Bulletin, 30(2), 6–12. Valencia, E. (2008). Las Transferencias Monetarias Condicionadas Como Política Social en América Latina. Un Balance: Aportes, Límites y Debates. Annual Review of Sociology, 34, 499–524. Veras, F., & Silva, E. (2010). Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and Gender Vulnerabilities: Case Studies of Brazil, Chile and Colombia (Working Document No. 69). International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth. Villatoro, P. (2005). Programas de transferencias monetarias condicionadas: experiencias en América Latina. Revista CEPAL, 86, 87–101. Zucco, C. (2011, February). Conditional Cash Transfers and Voting Behavior: Redistribution and Clientelism in Developing Democracies. Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.

CHAPTER 3

Mechanisms and Actors in the Diffusion of Policies: State of the Issue and Theoretical Proposal

3.1

The Policy Diffusion Approach1

The policy diffusion approach emerges from studies on diffusion of innovations in different social disciplines. One of the emblematic definitions states that “diffusion is the process through which an innovation is spread through certain communication channels over time among the members of a society” (Rogers 2004: 13). From the ’60s this approach would begin to be applied to the field of public policies.2 Walker (1969) carried out one of the first works, which had as an objective to develop propositions that could be used as guides for the diffusion of innovations and also applied to the analysis of decision making (Walker 1969). Its object of 1 There is a discussion regarding the meeting points and distinctions between the diffusion and transfer approach (e.g. Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Marsh and Sharman 2009; Jakobi 2012). For example, Learning and Emulation are mechanisms that are also observed in a transfer process. New concepts such as policy transnationalization and policy mobilization are also being discussed in Peck and Theodore (2010a, b) and Peck & Theodore (2012). This debate needs to be taken into account in order to properly identify the process and apply the relevant concept. In this case, the diffusion approach works since it would be observed the components described by the literature. 2 Meseguer and Gilardi (2008, 2009) points out that the first works on diffusion of policies date back to the end of the nineteenth century and that it is briefly mentioned under the rubric of Galton’s problem. However, the most notorious set of research has been observed since the middle of the twentieth century.

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study was the capacity of innovation in diverse areas on the part of the Federal States of the United States and its questions were similar to those that are still asked today in the studies with this approach: Why do certain States act as pioneers in adopting certain programs before others? And once they have been adopted, how do they spread across states? (Walker 1969). Among his main findings, Walker outlines some of the mechanisms (although he does not call them that) which influence diffusion: these are competition and emulation (Walker 1969). Subsequently, the number of papers on policy diffusion has been increasing, as have the topics under study. These refer to the diffusion of economic policies, health and education, welfare, poverty, agriculture, institutions, regulatory bodies and the environment, among others. In general, these studies apply different models designed to explain diffusion3 (Berry and Berry 2007). What they have in common is that following Walker’s footsteps they start from theories of innovation at an individual level or between organizations (such as Rogers) and take a step forward when considering why and how policies are diffused among states. Along with the variety of scopes, national and federal policies (especially in the United States) have been applied at various levels and also locally. Recently, it highlights a robust groups of works about diffusion in Latin America and from the region to the world (Porto de Oliveira et al. 2019). As a result, policy diffusion ends up as a specific area. Some authors work with the definition proposed by Rogers (2004), although others apply proposals such as those of David Strang (1991), understanding diffusion as the process through which the previous adoption of a practice alters the possibility of adoption by those who have not yet done so (Elkins and Simmons 2005). Levi-Faur, from the previous ones, defines diffusion “as the process by which the adoption of innovation by

3 For example, the application of the National Interaction Model, based on the interaction of officials or managers of States that have adopted certain policies with others that have not, is observed until the 1990s. Another model is the Regional Diffusion Model, which hypothesizes that a State tends to adopt the policies of its bordering States, motivated by competition or emulation (Berry and Berry 2007). Walker’s proposal (1969) assumes that some States are pioneers in the adoption of a policy and others emulate those leaders (Leader-Laggard Model). A fourth type is the Isomorphism Models, where diffusion is supposedly derived from similar but not necessarily neighbouring countries, among which there are similar cultural channels and historical connections (Berry and Berry 2007).

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member(s) of a social system is communicated through certain channels and over time, and triggers mechanisms that increase the probability of its adoption by other members who have not yet adopted it” (Levi-Faur 2005: 23). Jordana et al. (2011), stress that the process of transferring information between the various actors is uncoordinated and the first adoptions influence the possibility of adoption by those who have not done so. All these definitions assume that in a diffusion process, the adoption of an innovation by a state is not exclusively due to reasons inherent in its internal political process. The diffusion approach considers, in a certain sense, a mixed position in that there is interdependence between countries in time or with a central actor who acts as a transmitter. Countries would not act completely independently, but neither would they act in a coordinated manner. The diffusion process then responds to an uncoordinated interdependence, as Elkins and Simmons point out: “under this conception, governments are independent in the sense that they make their own decisions without cooperation or coercion, but interdependent in the sense that they factor in the choices of other governments” (2005: 35). Policy convergence is complemented by other particularities that would shape a process of policy diffusion. This would be characterized as occurring in waves, starting with a small number of actors that adopt, then increasing significantly, and then stabilizing due to saturation. This implies that, in graphical terms, the rate of adoption over time takes the form of the S curve, as long as the dissemination process is successful. In general, the studies that have applied this approach seek to discard the null hypothesis that national socio-economic and political factors are the sole cause of policy change. For example, studies on privatization policies, regulation, trade liberalization and social reforms seek to clarify the variables that influence the decision to adopt (Brooks 2009; Weyland 2004, 2006; Meseguer 2004). As for the object of diffusion, that is, what is diffused, Weyland (2006: 17) stresses that it is relevant to distinguish whether it is a model or a principle. The first refers to the dissemination of a specific and concrete policy or program that is replicated, such as, for example, a Chilean pension privatization model or the Grameen Bank microcredit system. The second describes the diffusion of a principle, a guideline that leads decisions towards certain policies, such as the autonomy of central banks, or universal access to primary health services. According to Weyland,

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therefore, what is being disseminated is a new roadmap, a key idea, but one that can be configured in concrete institutional characteristics and diverse components. The result of this diffusion is not a pattern of change as profound and uniform as in the case of the diffusion of a model. 3.1.1

Diffusion Mechanisms

The diffusion approach also seeks to understand the mechanisms through which diffusion occurs, i.e., how the decision to adopt a particular policy was made. The identification of the mechanisms will make it possible to elucidate the causal relationship of adoption and also to discuss the consequences for the quality of the policies.4 Simmons et al. (2008) distinguish four policy diffusion mechanisms— coercion, emulation, competition and learning—on the identification of which there is a relative consensus among specialists, although denominations and certain components may vary partially. The coercion mechanism refers to the imposition by pressure of policies on national governments by international organizations or more powerful and influential countries. The other three mechanisms operate to a greater extent through processes that do not involve apparent coercion. Emulation occurs when policies are adopted for their social value, rather than their own value, thus seeking legitimacy and status. Third, there is a mechanism of competition when countries competing for the same objectives or resources adopt the policy of their competitors, for fear of losing their attractiveness or falling behind in achieving certain objectives. And finally, the mechanism of learning, where a process of discernment of experiences of other countries on the policy in question is developed, which results in the decision to adopt it. The role of the latter mechanism would be more significant than those of the previous ones, since it entails a more explicit process of reflection and analysis on the previous experiences of other countries. As Meseguer and Gilardi point out: “Learning is probably a mechanism that causes the diffusion of policies. Those adopted in some countries result

4 It is possible to talk about the quality, success or efficiency of policies. The point is according to which indicators this will be measured and according to which actor (governors or citizens, for example). This is a topic discussed in the literature, which requires further discussion from the normative and policy standpoints (Marsh and Sharman 2009).

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in natural experiments from which others can learn” (2008: 323). On the other hand, literature often makes an important distinction between complete learning (or rational according to other authors) and bounded learning. In its first version, learning improves knowledge, as it involves reviewing the causal links between policies and outcomes in the light of observed experience, and improves understanding of policy consequences (Meseguer 2005). This definition therefore contributes to distinguishing between the rational learning process and emulation or symbolic imitation (Weyland 2004); since the latter seeks rather credibility, status, or simple conformity with international trends (Meseguer 2005). On the other hand, bounded learning mechanism does not imply a systematic analysis of all available information, but resorts to heuristic shortcuts in decision-making. “Instead of scanning all information, governments take a look at relevant information” (Meseguer 2005: 72). For some authors, the distinction between complete or bounded learning implies an opposition between greater and lesser rationality that deserves to be taken into account. For Meseguer (2005), cognitive shortcuts denote a certain irrationality, or at least indicate that the decision is less optimal than a complete rationality. In fact, it situates heuristic shortcuts to a certain proximity of the emulation mechanism. This is undoubtedly a questionable interpretation, since the use of cognitive shortcuts can also be the result of a rational decision to carry out selective learning, choosing which experiences to consider and evaluate. On the other hand, often the definition of comprehensive or complete rationality does not establish precise indicators that enable distinguishing it from a process of limited rationality. In this sense, complete rationality is more an ideal type to take into account than a definition that can be measured empirically. In this sense, the concept of learning proposed by Kurt Weyland (2002) stands out because it differs from the rational scheme with complete information or from the perspective adopted by the Bayesian model, since it considers that heuristic shortcuts explain the way in which the limited learning mechanism operates. He explain that policy-makers tend to make decisions under pressure and degrees of uncertainty because they do not have time to systematically analyze information, evaluate possibilities, and conduct cost-benefit analyses. In Learning from Foreign Models in Latin American Policy Reform (2004), Weyland focuses on analysing how a policy becomes a model to be imitated by other states, and when these are particularly susceptible to external influences. In this

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sense, he points out that learning will not necessarily always have a direct influence on valid inferences, diagnoses and policy recommendations. In other words, it points out that it may have sub-optimal results, depending on the circumstances (Weyland 2004). According to his model, decisions are then made on the basis of a limited rationality, by means of cognitive heuristic shortcuts that are used to process the information available. In this way, it contemplates the possibility that the actors have taken the decision to adopt a policy, for example, assigning an overestimated weight to certain information that is particularly memorable and outstanding to them; this is the shortcut of availability. The shortcut of representativeness moulds its opinion based on the evaluation of its results. Thus one tends to draw conclusions with very limited evidence or in short periods of time. Finally, the cognitive shortcut of anchorage limits the adjustments that doers make, since they give greater relevance to the information initially received (although this is arbitrary in nature) (Weyland 2006). Finally, it is also relevant to point out that institutionality and the actors involved condition the impact that cognitive shortcuts have on decisionmaking. Both components are related. The attributions of institutions, the possibility of veto and the accumulated knowledge must be considered in order to understand how cognitive mechanisms explain learning in the process of policy adoption. “Obviously, policy diffusion starts from a broader political process shaped by power and interests” (Weyland 2006: 64). In this sense, Weyland’s proposal regarding the delimited rationality and the cognitive heuristic shortcuts, contributes in an important way to the approach applied here and will be retaken when approaching the perspective of analysis applied to CCTs in Latin America.

3.2

Discussion on the Approach and Study Proposal

The policy diffusion approach provides an attractive perspective for understanding why convergence in countries’ decisions occurs when, faced with similar problems, they adopt the same public policy. As I have pointed out, an abundance of academic literature has contributed significantly in recent decades to enrich the theoretical debate and methodological tools. However, for the rest of this chapter I propose that it is possible to deepen the definition of mechanisms and actors in order to improve understanding of the causal processes that are implicit in the different

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dissemination mechanisms previously examined. From this discussion— contrasted with the object of research—emanate the hypotheses of this work, which are presented in the following pages. What explains the diffusion of the programmes? Studies on the diffusion of public policies have examined various variables in an attempt to explain how diffusion processes take place, discussing how they can favour the activation of certain mechanisms. Some of these variables identify aspects such as globalisation or liberalisation processes, the neighbouring effect, ideologies or links to international organisations. In this book, my central hypothesis is that the variable that activates policy diffusion mechanisms in the case of CCTs is the existence of a regional consensus among a group of experts and influential professionals about their effectiveness, in comparison with other social intervention programs with similar objectives. In this sense, I intend to argue that this assessment of the programmes was built through the accumulation of knowledge and actions of an epistemic community. Its configuration was significantly linked to the presence of these experts in some international organizations very active in Latin America, especially the World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and secondly the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). My argument highlights that both individual experts—with their knowledge, analytical and discursive capacity—and international organizations—which serve as meeting spaces and facilitators of resources for them—constituted key agents for the regional diffusion processes of these programs. In this sense, having an analytical framework for their study becomes an essential component for this research, which is why in the following pages I advance in its definition and in the discussion on the means for its analysis, with the aim of reconstructing its role in this diffusion process. Some authors have worked on the incidence of international norms and networks in the diffusion processes, but no detailed contributions have been made to analyze the role of experts and professionals at the regional level in building a consensus, an idea, on the adequacy of a given social policy. It is known that, in the domestic sphere, the pressure to adopt a new policy and therefore the probability of adoption increases over time if coalitions are generated to promote them (Berry and Berry 2007). In this case, however, it is not the classic model of a promoting

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coalition at the international level. My attention is focused here on the formation and development of a community of experts who, based on shared values and scientific knowledge, carry out numerous actions to diffuse and transport this policy proposal, to make its implementation easily available, and finally to facilitate its inclusion in the regional agenda of various international organizations, with great clarity. The focus on epistemic communities, already disseminated some decades ago, allows me to identify this key agent of the diffusion process, to the extent that these can be considered as “the vehicle for the development of relevant theoretical premises on the creation of collective interpretations and elections” (Adler and Haas 1992: 368). The first mentions of the concept of epistemic communities occured at the end of the seventies in the works of Ruggie (1975) and Holzner and Marz (1979), but it would be the works of Ernst Haas (1989) and Peter Haas (1990) that would obtain more propagation. Haas (1989) points out that in an epistemic community there is consensual knowledge, an understanding of certain cause-effect relationships on a subject that is important to society and that is continuously tested and confronted. It is a social construct, a group of professionals concerned primarily with public issues, and who share an agreement on a causal model and a common set of political values. Their importance is that they can influence approaches, generate organizational and institutional changes, and be an important actor in policy dissemination (Haas 1989: 44). This requires groups of people willing to offer supposedly superior explanations for the problem that worries the actors. This role is occupied by groups of experts linked to a particular body of scientific knowledge and with the commitment to make politicians listen to them (Haas 1989: 48). Peter Haas’ approach to epistemic communities partly agrees with Ernst Haas’ precedent, and also with Holzner and Marz that the community agrees with the use and acceptance of the scientific method. However, he points out that this is also accompanied by conviction in specific causal relationships and common political values.5 His perspective is one of the

5 Haas points out that concepts similar to the one he presents are collective thinking

(Fleck 1979), the invisible college (Crane 1972), the episteme (Foucault 1978) and the scientific community (Kuhn 1970; Haas 1990: 254). Bourdieu approaches with the “scientific field” the link between power, scientific knowledge and intellectuals (Bourdieu 1999). The nature of epistemic communities has also been discussed in terms of concepts such as transnational communities. This would be characterized for being a network of

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most consensual—it continues to represent the cornerstone of literature on the subject (Dunlop 2013)—and several empirical applications are observed from there.6 Together with this, considering that it emphasizes the role of communities in the decision making of States—unlike Ernst Haas who privileges the influence within international organizations—, his proposal is the one that I have considered pertinent to take as a starting point in this study. Peter Haas defines epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognized experience and competence in a specific area and with a voice of authority regarding the knowledge of policies within that area” (Haas 1992: 3). This group of experts work (in a very lax way) to improve scientific and public understanding of a topic (Speth and Haas 2006: 92). They also share four components. First, a set of beliefs and normative values; second, a cause-effect relationship in the field, that is, an interpretative framework that determines the causes that generate certain problems; third, the validation mechanisms for weighing information; and fourth, a set of practices and policies associated with the problems of its area of concern that, if applied, would benefit society (Haas 1992: 3). Derived from the above, they coincide in a vocabulary, and a common network in which these findings are exchanged and common concerns are shared (Haas 1990: 55). The community does not necessarily have a monopoly over relevant knowledge, but they must share a common understanding approach that implies that at the time of delivering interpretations, advice, policies, these would coincide (Haas 1992). The result is a determined conception before a problem, together with expectations of the possible consequences after the application of certain measures (Haas 1992: 4). Epistemic communities are providers of information and advice in scenarios of uncertainty. When there is a need for information on a particular issue, it is the precise context in which networks or communities often emerge and proliferate. Their membership is small, but as they are asked for information, they become more influential, to the extent that they consolidate bureaucratic power by locating their experts

experts that crosses borders and that eventually can be linked also with social movements, acting around nonprofit organizations (Dobusch and Quack 2008). 6 For example Adler and Haas (1992), Caballero (2009), Colacrai (2006), MaldonadoMaldonado (2005), Kutchesfahani (2010), Mani (2006), and Botto (2007).

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in certain national and international positions; and thereby they institutionalize their influence.7 Governments will give more autonomy to those scientists and experts who best understand the complex causes of phenomena and propose policies, who will provide information and policy advice. In political terms, recourse to experts is an alternative to quick solutions, discharging responsibility on them (Haas 1990: 54). Thus, the assumptions behind this concept refer to the valuation of knowledge as an important dimension of power, since when applied to policies it contributes to the cohesion and strengthening of certain proposals. The channels of influence of the experts are diverse. Members may be invited to occupy administrative positions in governments, regulatory bodies, or advisory bodies. If these councils are reiterated in various groups of policy makers, policy convergence can be generated. Their strength will be determined by the domestic power accumulated by members of the epistemic community in their respective governments and how much they manage to keep other interest groups out. Likewise, the influence of communities will be greater in countries with smaller bureaucracies that have less accumulated knowledge (Haas 1990). Adler and Haas (1992) highlight certain aspects of the functioning of communities, which I intend to review and discuss at some extremes, and then examine through my empirical case study. First, they point out that if a community acquires power in a single country or international organization, it will only be faced with the influence of one actor on another, and will not have structural effects (1992: 378). However, this limitation is not so evident in the regional dimension, where situations of concentration of power and more extreme influence may occur. Second, they argue that if the ideas of an epistemic community begin to be present in relevant areas of an individual country, they can directly influence standard setting and policy development in that country. And again, if their presence occurs simultaneously in numerous countries, informal convergence between countries can be generated (1992: 379). In this case, a direct connection between countries would not be observed, since the relationship is established at the international professional level, where the scientific research process that gives rise to the normative models of the new policy is articulated. However, it seems implausible that without any kind of solid organizational support, only through academic 7 According to Haas, the development of an epistemic community is often followed by the formation of an advocacy coalition (Speth and Haas 2006). However, it does not seem to be one of the essential characteristics or to be manifested in all areas.

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networks, such effects could occur. A third thesis of Adler and Haas (1992: 380) is that if members of a community succeed in capturing the parties that play a central role in international negotiations, they will have a direct effect on these and an indirect influence on small countries and small businesses through market pressures. For my purpose, I can also point out that if the largest and most influential countries are the first to adopt a policy, this can have much more influence on the success of the diffusion than the opposite situation. Finally, they point out that an epistemic community does not have to be very large to have an influence on international policy coordination.8 What is important is whether members are respected in their own academic discipline, whether they have ancestry in other similar ones and in the policy-making process, to get their message across properly (Adler and Haas 1992: 380). It is precisely this question, how messages are effectively conveyed from the epistemic community to decision-makers, both domestically and internationally, that constitutes a central element of the analytical perspective adopted here and that had not been addressed in detail in previous studies on epistemic communities. In relation to this last issue, it should be noted that the means of influence can be quite explicit, through conferences, specialized workshops, in which bureaucrats and policy makers participate; the relevant actors of the epistemic community seek to go beyond the academic sphere or international professional networks. On the contrary, my argument pays attention to the role of international bodies, used as instruments of transmission of ideas and normative models. It is about paying attention to “the transnational networks that operate within and between international governmental and non-governmental organizations, that establish a transnational or global discourse that is the backdrop against which global decisions are carried out” (Deacon et al. 1997: 60). Consequently, the identification of the transnational epistemic community will facilitate the identification of a group of actors with a professional and social status to make authoritative recommendations (Dunlop 2013), with relevant audience capacity in certain international organizations with resources and influence to make innovative policy proposals. As has already been mentioned, international organizations play an important role in the diffusion of policies, as they have the capacity to 8 Haas points out that studies have identified communities that have an average of 35 members.

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promote proposals, offer advice on technical capacities, and especially in some cases, have resources available, in the form of credits or technical cooperation, so that governments can make such policies effective, even in contexts of strong fiscal crises. From a constructivist perspective, its importance—and that of international society—in the diffusion of global policies and values is highlighted (Jakobi 2012: 391). In this sense, I propose to understand international organizations as autonomous entities that play a role in the international scene beyond the mandate received by States. They are bureaucracies, in other words, “a social form of authority with its own internal logic and behavioural tendencies” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 3). They administer a wide range of levels, monetary and technical resources, and produce relevant information on different areas of public policy. These elements contribute to its authority to guide it in its action and the construction of social reality. “They analyze and interpret it, giving meaning to information that orients and motivates action, transforming information into knowledge” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 7). This perspective is useful because it allows us to identify the process of creating knowledge about a policy on the ground—a social construction from a constructivist perspective—, and also the interaction that international organizations can have with States or other actors, understanding that some of these organisms exercise an articulating role in certain transnational epistemic communities. International bodies with global and regional coverage act on a wide range of issues. Organizations that share objectives and interests can converge defending certain policies and programs through various types of actions. The first of these consists of monetary loans, which is in fact the main objective of multilateral banks. Second, international organizations provide technical assistance to official agreements with countries. These forms of action are quite evident in the case of multilateral banks. However, the existence of monetary loans does not necessarily imply the search for specific models; moreover, influence can be important without any bank lending to the country. A third type of action, called meditative activities, involves research and discussion of international trends and national policies (Bradford 2009). Organizations dedicated to meditation policy “function as spaces where all kinds of experiences can be transmitted and compared, where ideas are generated and shared, and where forms of action are discussed” (Jacobsson 2006: 208). Finally, it is possible to identify a fourth form

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of action—exhortation—of these organisms, to achieve the change of policies in the domestic spheres. Through documents, reports and other formats, ideas and lessons from the meditation stages are packaged into action plans and concrete recommendations that seek to transfer knowledge and promote specific policies (Bradford 2009),9 which are then disseminated intensively through the specialized media. The existence of a well articulated and scientifically coherent framework of ideas can contribute to structuring public policies in a specific field, facilitating the subsequent elaboration of proposals on strategies and the instruments for their implementation. Ideas become influential “precisely because much of that is taken for granted and is not susceptible to scrutiny as a whole” (Hall 1993: 279). In this sense, meditation activities (e.g., seminars, meetings) and exhortation (e.g., reports, documents, policy recommendations) carried out by international organizations contribute to the socialization of a policy among relevant actors. In other words, it can be noted that, “in policy terms, ideas endorsed by international organizations help to identify problems and map the range of best practice solutions” (Mahon and McBride 2009: 3). Considering the above, I maintain that the identification of the actors who are actively present in the articulation of diffusion mechanisms and the understanding of their activities is essential to understand how a public policy diffusion process develops.10 In particular, I explore in detail the role of epistemic communities. I argue, as a hypothesis, that these act as structures with the capacity to build a consensus about the evaluative and normative aspects of certain social policy programs. However, a detailed understanding of the entire process of international dissemination of a policy through epistemic communities also implies an analysis of the political process that led countries to adopt the policy, that is, it is necessary to understand the extent to which other factors intervened and the degree of relevance of the epistemic community. It cannot be generally assumed that transnational epistemic communities have always helped domestic learning through dialogue with local experts or facilitated emulation by national actors. Their role could vary depending on local conditions, 9 I have taken these definitions of meditating and exhorting activities from Bradford (2009), because they adequately illustrate the activities of international organizations in a case of policy diffusion. 10 To apply this proposal in the analysis of the cases, I define indicators which are detailed in Appendix 3.

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the temporal moment of the wave of diffusion and consolidation of the epistemic community itself, or other conditioning factors. However, it is argued here that the role of the epistemic community may be key in certain policy diffusion processes, this being the underlying explanatory variable at the regional level. This does not mean that it is the only variable involved, either because it is interrelated with other variables, as in the case of monetary loans by multilateral banks, or because other independent variables had a much greater weight in some singular cases. How are diffusion mechanisms adopted? The identification of mechanisms to explain diffusion processes is certainly a relevant starting point, but the boundaries for distinguishing one mechanism from another are often blurred in the literature. They tend to contain aspects in common or difficult to distinguish with the certainty that they may be characterizing one in particular. This is a key point to consider during interpretation and empirical testing (Meseguer and Gilardi 2009). Mechanisms involve—though not always adequately defined—two components: means and motivations. The attention paid to one or the other component varies according to the diffusion studies, and also according to the research methods applied in each case. I propose, then, to identify in detail the motives and means of the mechanisms, which will contribute to defining their characteristics with greater precision and will facilitate the distinction between them, allowing then to discuss the role of the epistemic community to articulate or promote each one of the identified mechanisms. In the case of emulation, for example, the main distinction with the one of learning has to do with motives, since in the former the adoption of the policy would be due to the aspiration to imitate a country with a high prestige or to adopt a policy that is “in fashion”. However, in spite of this, it is possible to expect that there is an expectation in the motivation about the results of the policy, that it will provoke certain expected consequences (Meseguer 2004), otherwise the decision would be completely irrational. Thus, it is not that the motivation has been exclusively to emulate a certain policy. Likewise, we can qualify a mechanism as learning if a deep knowledge of the initiative is identified before its adoption. However, it will probably not be possible to completely rule out that the motivation to emulate has not been present. Therefore, the idea of distinguishing completely pure mechanisms in terms of

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their motivation does not capture the complexity of the process, and in methodological terms it is difficult to apply. The other mechanisms, competition and coercion, present fewer difficulties to be identified and applied. In the case of the former, it is understood that the policies adopted would directly or indirectly affect other countries in terms of economic aspects. Those negative consequences are more likely to be identified and therefore also to establish indicators to track the mechanism. With respect to coercion, the pressure exerted by an international institution or by an influential country is also possible to observe, for example through the conditionality of a loan. However, more subtle forms of coercion may also overlap to some extent with learning or emulation, which requires advancing the concept and defining more precise indicators.11 The alternative I adopt is to distinguish then that in the learning mechanism the motivation is to adopt the most appropriate policy to solve the problem faced by decision-makers. In that sense, motivation can be qualified as internal or intrinsic, since it emanates from the definition of a public problem to which the actors seek a solution. The central motivation is the solution to that problem and the decision to adopt the policy that has been implemented by other countries is due to the conviction that it is the right solution. The actors have reached this conviction through a process of knowledge of alternatives and possible results that allow them to conclude that this option is the most relevant to the problem in question and the national context.12 As for the rationality of learning, it is considered that it will in itself be limited,13 and it is

11 Meseguer and Gilardi (2008, 2009) exclude coercion from the list of possible mechanisms. The verticality and the pressure exerted would condition the voluntary nature of the decision, which they have defined as a characteristic of adoption in a diffusion process. However, this study will consider part of the set of mechanisms, in a version qualified as soft coercion, since it highlights the link with actors such as international organizations, which in this case are present and could have played a role in the adoption process. 12 In that sense, this concept of learning would consider elements of the social and instrumental learning pointed out by May. 13 For this study it has been assumed that rationality is limited. The model of complete

rationality, in which the actors consider all the alternatives and this generates a change of opinion regarding the subject, constitutes an ideal model. The definition of bounded rationality seems much more adequate to explain decision-making, given the constraints faced by policymakers. It is not possible to know all the possible alternatives (and it is probably not rational to do so), not all the available means are known, nor all the results

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not ruled out—following Weyland’s approach—the presence of cognitive shortcuts that operate as means to know the possible alternatives. As their limits are imprecise, areas are generated between the learning and emulation mechanisms that I try to clarify. In the first case, the motivation is to emulate other countries with higher status, or because it is the general trend. Therefore, the motive can be qualified as more superficial, and may lack a robust argumentative foundation or be very weak. It also has a symbolic aspect in the sense of conferring a status to which one aspires, and which will be recognized by others. However, this does not imply that the public problem does not exist, but that the decision to adopt a particular policy is more influenced by expectations of recognition that produces results. The means used in that mechanism, given the motivations, are more limited. Since the decision to adopt the policy would be determined a priori by the desire to receive recognition, a process of knowledge limited to this alternative would be carried out, without exploring others. In this sense, it is usual to emulate a program or a model that is available, that all relevant actors to grant recognition indicate, cite, indicate, as the best option. In terms of means, when emulating, adaptation to the national context will be limited or incomplete, given that it would be assumed a priori that the initiative, as observed in other countries, is feasible to be applied in one’s own. However, as I have already pointed out, it is important to consider that an intermediate zone can be observed between “optimal emulation” and “poor learning” in terms of means. What will make it possible to distinguish between the two will be the identification of motivations. Regarding the coercion mechanism, I argue that policies are adopted because of pressure or incentives offered by a more powerful actor. These incentives can be positive (such as a loan) or negative (such as international sanctions or a fine). In this sense, the motivation can be identified as external, in relation to the other mechanisms and would be mainly explained by the influence of another State or international actor (multilateral bank, international organization). As for the means, it implies a knowledge limited to the imposed policy and may or may not derive in its adaptation to the national context. Consequently, the identification of motivations and means in the mechanisms contributes to clarify their nature and functioning. To summarize, (Mele and Rawling 2004). Consideration of cognitive, time and resource limits would rationally justify the procedure.

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Table 3.1 Definition of motivations and means in diffusion mechanisms Coercion

Learning

Emulation

Motivations

Policies are adopted because of pressure or incentives offered by a more powerful actor Motivation can be identified as external

The policy is adopted as it is considered the most appropriate solution to the public problem Motivation can be qualified as internal or intrinsic, based on one’s own beliefs

Means

A limited knowledge is made to the imposed policy. It may or may not imply adaptation to the national context

There is a process of knowledge of alternatives and possible results that allow us to conclude that this option is the most appropriate

Policy is adopted seeking to emulate an actor with greater status or because policy is fashionable The reason is the recognition of others and may be unfounded (or very weak) A process of knowledge limited to this policy is carried out without considering other alternatives. It does not imply a greater adaptation to the national context

Source Author’s elaboration

in Table 3.1, I offer a synthesis of these characterizations, and their main components are highlighted.14 However, some overlap is likely to persist, due to the nature of the process and methodological limitations. The discussion about mechanisms and proposals to improve indicators is linked to the second question of this book, which seeks to understand what mechanisms are observed in the process of diffusion of CCTs, and how they are articulated with the role of epistemic communities. The hypothesis in this regard states that in the diffusion of these programs the epistemic communities influenced the generation of three different mechanisms: learning, emulation and (soft) coercion. Therefore, I assume that they can operate diverse mechanisms during a diffusion process—simultaneously or consecutively—feeding all of them the wave of dissemination.15 With this, a homogenizing assumption should be 14 To apply this proposal in the analysis of the cases, I define indicators which are detailed in Appendix 3. 15 It should also be considered that differences can be observed in the processes according to the sectors where diffusion takes place (Jordana et al. 2011).

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avoided, since in a diffusion process it may be the case that some adopt new policies because they learn from others, and that there are countries that do it by simple emulation or competition (Meseguer and Gilardi 2009). This hypothesis is relevant because it will make it possible to capture the variation observed in the way the diverse Latin American countries adopt, since the same mechanism is not always present in all cases. In fact, I maintain that the differences in the weight of the mechanisms are mainly due to the institutional capacity of governments, as a key variable for understanding the existing variation. In this sense, looking at national actors and their capacities is essential to understand their motivations and the means present at the time of adoption and which, in short, would also have an impact on the diffusion mechanism. There is a link between the latter and the process of domestic adoption of policies that must be addressed in order to understand their regional diffusion. This linkage will be explored later in the third research question and hypothesis. The diffusion mechanisms then express diverse alternatives of processes of adoption of the programs. Likewise, there is also variation in how the regional epistemic community is articulated with each one of them, both in the motivations and in the means commented on in Table 3.1. In the learning mechanism, motivation is intrinsic, there is a decision to adopt a programme to address the problem of poverty. The epistemic community would not play a significant role in this regard. It would do so in terms of means, i.e. providing knowledge that constitutes an input for designing this specific programme. The presence of an epistemic community that generates and spreads information, knowledge about how programs work in other countries, as well as proposals for basic CCT models, which will facilitate decision making for bureaucrats and politicians. The contacts that are generated between national actors and experts, through the platforms of international organizations, contribute to the fact that it is a CCT that is adopted to address the internal need for a social program. In the case of the emulation mechanism, the articulation with the epistemic community could be present both in the motivations and in the means. This is because the decision to adopt responds to the intention of imitating the decision of other countries, or of incorporating a program or policy that is “fashionable” in the international context. As I maintain here, the regional epistemic community—linked to international organizations—had an essential role in installing the idea of the relevance of

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the CCTs and in ensuring the availability of inputs in this regard, which was presented in various formats. The legitimacy granted to it by experts and international organizations contributes to supporting the decision to adopt; it gives it weight vis-à-vis other internal actors before whom it is necessary to negotiate in order to achieve this. The latter also explains the articulation of the community in the means through which programs are adopted. As I will comment later, the low institutional capacities give greater weight to the information available about the CCTs, which cannot be processed in an adequate manner, resulting in an incomplete or limited adaptation. Finally, in relation to the coercion mechanism, the incidence of the epistemic community would be lower in the motivation, prevailing over the already commented actors. For example, multilateral banking, since the need for economic resources leads to the application for loans whose conditions may include the adoption of this type of programs. This motivation is mostly exogenous, responding to incentives from other actors. As for the means, similar to what can be observed in the emulation mechanism, the role of the epistemic community had to do with the installation of this program as the alternative that other countries or multilateral banks encouraged to implement. In particular, the relationship that the experts have commented on with international organizations explains why this program was part of the requirements that were demanded for the concretion of monetary loans. The key in this sense is that, during this diffusion process, the idea of this program, the CCTs, prevails normatively over other alternative programs to overcome poverty. In that sense, it is not the epistemic community that exerts the pressure or the incentives, that is, the motivation. However, there is an important role for the means in the coercion mechanism, since it generated consensus about CCTs as the most appropriate alternative to be adopted by countries. Summarizing, the articulation of the epistemic community presents variation in the different mechanisms of diffusion that it is possible to identify in the process of diffusion of the CCTs in the region. However, as noted above, the experts were not the only actors influencing these mechanisms, and as explained below, national capacities played an important role. Likewise, these diffusion mechanisms are located at specific moments in the policy formulation process that need to be made explicit in order to complete the analytical scheme. To this end, the stages model, as a heuristic tool that helps to investigate the formulation process, is appropriate. The distinction of these different stages makes it possible to situate

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specific questions that can be approached from different approaches (Knill and Tosun 2012: 9). In this book, therefore, the analysis is placed in two specific moments: the emergence of the problem and the agenda setting, and the stage of policy formulation; in this case, the CCTs. Related to the first one, it is relevant to detect if the issue of extreme poverty was considered a significant problem in the governmental agenda, whether being part of the government program or being introduced by an unexpected event, such as an economic crisis. One of the questions in question is why it is decided to adopt policies in this regard at a given moment. It is evident that, in the region, poverty is a deep and persistent reality and it can be assumed that governments have been paying attention to the problem for decades. However, the decision to adopt a new policy in this regard responds to a juncture that must be considered for analysis. It is interesting to pay attention to the period during which political actors made the decision to adopt a policy for the poor, the alternatives they considered and which they discarded. This will make it possible to detect the motivations and means of clarifying the diffusion mechanism developed at the domestic level and linked to the regional diffusion process. In that line, following partially the approach of Spiller et al. (2008), I consider the capacity of cooperation and coordination of the actors. I maintain that these have diverse information and knowledge resources, as well as attributions, and that they are developed within the logic of the functioning of the policies that is particular to each country. These aspects are fundamental since they would influence the diffusion mechanism at the domestic level and therefore in the characteristics of the policies that are finally adopted. In those environments that facilitate political agreements, policy making is more cooperative leading to more effective and sustainable public policies. In contrast, in environments where cooperation is difficult to develop and sustain, policies will be more unstable or very inflexible, poorly coordinated and there will be little investment in long-term capacities (Spiller et al. 2008: 6). In this sense, I use the notion of institutional capacity, which gathers the knowledge resources of the actors and their willingness to cooperate, as a particularly relevant variable for analysing the moment when the decision is taken on the policy to be adopted. It is important to identify whether the actors have information and knowledge resources (databases, documents, studies, evaluations, among others) that should contribute to more appropriate decision-making. As has already been discussed around

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epistemic communities, the value of knowledge is central and the key question is to consider the extent to which these communities have been able to provide the cognitive tools that the most outstanding national actors have at their disposal. In relation to these topics, the third question in this book emerges: how does the diffusion mechanism relate to the domestic formulation process and how does it influence the characteristics of the programmes adopted? My hypothesis in this regard is that the policies adopted are significantly influenced by the characteristics of the actors in the policy making process (politicians and bureaucrats). If a high institutional capacity (knowledge resources and cooperation) is observed, the learning mechanism will have a greater weight in the adopted policies. If a medium or low institutional capacity is noticed, then we can expect that there will be a greater weight of emulation or coercion (the latter will also be influenced by the socio-economic context of the country). Therefore, the identification of the mechanisms that have finally been effective in diffusing policies, considering motivations and means, is only possible to the extent that the actors involved in the processes are also clarified. In other words, who adopts? is a key question, which has often been overlooked in many policy diffusion studies. In this sense, a weakness of the models, especially the quantitative ones, is to assume the policy makers and politicians as a uniform whole, which turns them into a “black box”, which can be the State as a whole. It is necessary to clarify, at least, who intervenes in the processes, what their competencies are and to what extent they are linked to the networks of epistemic communities. Otherwise, for example, important differences in the attributions and motivations of ministers versus other bureaucratic levels would not be recorded. The differences in motivations, and attributions between one and the other are important, since for example, the policy maker may be more interested in the substance of politics and the politics of election results. Sugiyama (2013) specifically points out that, between mayors and technocrats, the key difference is motivational. Differences are also observed within each of these groups. Weyland (2006) states that among policy makers, it is necessary to distinguish between the bureaucratic apparatus and those who hold positions of power. Along with this is considering the distinctions in terms of resources, knowledge, networks, among others. Considering the above, I propose to distinguish who adopts into two groups, the public employees and the politicians. As for the former, they

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are defined as the civil servants of the public apparatus who thus present more continuity and systematicity in terms of their presence in the policy formulation process. It can be assumed that they would privilege a decision making based on continuity and the tradition of the antecedents in the policies. The basis of their knowledge and proposals is determined by the information and accumulated experience of the institution to which they belong. Their scope for action is also limited by the regulations of the institution of which they are a part and their powers are more defined. However, in this group, it is necessary to identify among those who have been appointed to a position of trust, as opposed to those who have developed a career as a civil servant in the public administration. This will mean partial variations in the aspects mentioned above. The second group refers to positions of political authority, appointed from the Executive, the latter’s authorities and the Legislative Branch. This group has greater margin of action and attributions, which together with its interests could imply more ideological and circumstantial decision making. Their knowledge is based more on their competencies and their connection with academic or expert networks at the international level. They will also be able to draw on the accumulated knowledge of the relevant institutions but have other means, unlike bureaucrats. Returning to the third hypothesis, the institutional capacity of domestic actors—that is, knowledge and cooperation resources— contributes to the fact that, as a result of the dominant diffusion mechanism, the programme adopted presents similarity in the basic components—compared with the region as a whole—but divergence in terms of its secondary and/or additional components, the details of which may depend to a large extent on the adjustment work of public servants. Greater cooperation among the actors in the process and greater knowledge accumulated in the institutions involved would contribute to the predominance of learning mechanisms in the consideration of alternatives. Thus, the evaluation of the possibilities will be carried out on the basis of available relevant information, and the possibilities that best adapt to the national context will be adequately evaluated. In short, a greater margin of action is generated in the learning process, given the institutional capacities. This may result in programs that preserve the basic characteristics of the CCTs, but with innovative aspects and/or contextualized to the national reality. Domestic actors could even use cognitive shortcuts, but given their capacities, this would not necessarily imply a greater irrationality of the process. In cases of low institutional capacities,

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the probability of impact of external models prevailing at the regional level will be greater and a limited contextualization of the program will be observed; that is, a greater presence of the emulation mechanism will be appreciated. As for the product, this will be a basic CCT, with the possibility of containing secondary components, but probably not innovative. In the case of a predominance of the coercive mechanism, it will be derived from the absence of institutional capacities together with other domestic variables such as the context of economic crisis or a very low GDP. In this context, the decision to adopt will possibly be linked to an economic need to receive external income. If institutional capacities are very restricted, only a basic CCT model can be observed. If capacities are somewhat greater, it could contain secondary components, given a certain margin of manoeuvre for domestic actors. Thus, the mechanisms identified are not only relevant in themselves, but are relevant because as a result various variations of the standard reference program type are adopted. In other words, how it is adopted determines what is adopted. Here Weyland’s distinction between model or principle learning (Weyland 2006) is very useful. The latter would refer to learning an approach, a general principle on which to design a policy or programme. A model will refer to a policy or programme that is learned with all its components and that is replicated in the same way, without significant variations. These models can then be placed in a dimension that places the basic model at one end, going from the traditional model to the innovative one. Likewise, the mechanisms can be placed in a dimension that considers an end to learning, emulation in a following point and then soft coercion. These two dimensions can be visualized together and illustrate the complexity of the possible cases, observing the relationship between how countries adopted and what type of program was the result of that process (see Fig. 3.1).16 In the next chapters, I will use this figure to illustrate the two cases of adoption of CCT in Chile and Ecuador. To summarize the discussion of this chapter, in this work I have sought to identify the variables that would explain the regional diffusion processes of new social policy programs, taking the CCTs as a case study. The hypotheses formulated propose the relevant weight of a well articulated epistemic community to facilitate the diffusion of innovation

16 More detail about this in Appendix 3.

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Fig. 3.1 Degree of adoption and diffusion mechanisms (Source By the author)

in public policies, and argue that this dissemination can be produced through three different mechanisms. I have also pointed out that, for each mechanism, the way in which the epistemic community may influence is different. Finally, as a third hypothesis, I argue that the success of each diffusion mechanism as a key element to explain policy adoption will be determined by the characteristics of the national actors—bureaucrats and politicians—their motivations and means, and the institutional capacity (knowledge and cooperation resources) available to make decisions. Furthermore, institutional capacities and the type of mechanism would explain the type of programme adopted, considering that it is possible to distinguish among basic, traditional and innovative models.

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Elkins, Z., & Simmons, B. (2005). On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598, 33–51. Fleck, L. (1979). In T. J. Trenn & R. K. Merton (Eds.), Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Foucault, M. (1978). Las palabras y las cosas. Madrid: Siglo XXI. Haas, E. (1989). When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University California Press. Haas, P. (1990). Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation. New York: Columbia University Press. Haas, P. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization, 46(1), 1–35. Hall, P. A. (1993). Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics, 25(3), 275–296. Holzner, B., & Marx, J. H. (1979). Knowledge Application: The Knowledge System in Society. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Jacobsson, B. (2006). Regulated Regulators: Global Trends of State Transformation. In M. Djelic, & K. Sahlin-Andersson, Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jakobi, A. P. (2012). Facilitating Transfer: International Organizations as Central Nodes for Policy Diffusion. In G. Steiner-Khams & F. Waldow (Eds.), World Yearbook of Education: Policy Borrowing and Lending (pp. 391–407). London: Routledge. Jordana, J., Levi-Faur, D., & Fernández i Marín, X. (2011). The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies: Channels of Transfer and Stages of Diffusion. Comparative Political Studies, 44(10), 1343–1369. Knill, C., & Tosun, J. (2012). Public Policy: A New Introduction. Londres: Palgrave Macmillan. Kuhn, T. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press Ltd. Kutchesfahani, S. (2010). Who Shapes the Politics of the Bomb? The Role of Epistemic Communities in Creating Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policies (LSE Global Governance Working Paper WP 03/2010). London. Levi-Faur, D. (2005). The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598(1), 12–32. Mahon, R., & McBride, S. (Eds.). (2009). The OECD and Transnational Governance. Vancouver: UBC Press.

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Maldonado-Maldonado, A. (2005). Comunidades epistémicas: una propuesta para estudiar el papel de los expertos en la definición de políticas en educación superior en México. Revista de la Educación Superior, XXXIV (2), 104–122. Mani, S. (2006). Epistemic Communities and Informed Policy Making for Promoting Innovations: The Case of Singapore. In L. Box & R. Engelhard (Eds.), Science and Technology Policy for Development, Dialogues at the Interface. London: Anthem Press. Marsh, D., & Sharman, J. C. (2009). Policy Diffusion and Policy Transfer. Policy Studies, 30(3), 269–288. Mele, A., & Rawling, P. (2004). The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. New York: Oxford University. Meseguer, C. (2004). What Role for Learning? The Diffusion of Privatization in the OECD and Latin American. Journal of Public Policy, 24(3), 299–325. Meseguer, C. (2005). Policy Learning, Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New Order. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598(1), 67–82. Meseguer, C., & Gilardi, F. (2008). Reflexiones sobre el debate de la difusión de políticas. Política y Gobierno, XV( 2), 315–351. Meseguer, C., & Gilardi, F. (2009). What Is New in the Study of Policy Diffusion? Review of International Political Economy, 16(3), 527–543. Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2010a). Recombinant Workfare, Across the Americas: Transnationalizing ‘‘Fast” Social Policy. Geoforum, 41(2), 195–208. Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2010b). Mobilizing Policy: Models, Methods, and Mutations. Geoforum, 41(2), 169–174. Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2012). Follow the Policy: A Distended Case Approach. Environment and Planning, 44(1), 21–30. Porto De Oliveira, O., Osorio, C., Montero, S., & Kerches da Silva Leite, C. (2019). Latin America and Policy Diffusion: From Import to Export. New York: Routlegde. Rogers, E. (2004). A Prospective and Retrospective Look at the Diffusion Model. Journal of Health Communication, 9(6), 13–19. Ruggie, J. G. (1975). International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends. International Organization, 29(3), 557–583. Simmons, B., Dobbins, F., & Garrett, G. (Eds.). (2008). The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Speth, J. G., & Haas, P. M. (2006). Global Environmental Governance. Washington, DC: Island Press. Spiller, P. T., Stein, E., & Tommasi, M. (2008). Political Institutions, Policymaking, and Policy: An Introduction. In E. Stein & M. Tomassi (Eds.), Policy Making in Latin America: How Politics Shape Policies. BID. David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies Harvard University.

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CHAPTER 4

Quantitative Analysis of the Diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Latin America

The aim of this chapter is to present an in-depth analysis of the wave of diffusion of CCTs, their characteristics and behavior over time, which constitute the first results towards contrasting the hypotheses. The first section provides a description of the diffusion and components of the programs, seeking to answer the question of what is being diffused: is it the initiative to carry out a CCT, or the specific characteristics of these programs? It also discusses the extent to which these components vary during the study period, that is, whether there is diffusion within diffusion. To what extent do important adjustments to CCTs in one country also experience a diffusion path, influencing reforms in other countries? In the second section, an explanation is sought for the diffusion patterns of the CCTs identified in the descriptive analysis. For this purpose, a quantitative analysis is introduced, applying statistical models that allow to relate the process of CCT diffusion with variables whose evolution over time can contribute to explaining this process and what configured it. Therefore, the independent variables, which are related to the explanatory hypotheses, are identified and the indicators used to measure them are presented. Finally, the results of the models are commented which, together with confirming the existence of a clear diffusion process, allow for a discussion of the role of the variables and their degree of influence in this diffusion process. These findings allow us to © The Author(s) 2020 C. Osorio Gonnet, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51008-4_4

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advance in the answers about the research hypotheses, as well as to refine the look for the subsequent analyses of Chapter 5 and also of the case studies (Chapters 6 and 7).

4.1 The Wave of Diffusion of the Conditional Cash Transfer Programs 4.1.1

The Wave of Diffusion of the CCTs

The characteristics of the wave of diffusion have already been commented on briefly above, so it is now time to go into them in greater depth. On the one hand, there is geographical convergence, i.e. the concentration of countries within a given area. In this case, there are 17 Latin American countries, out of a total of 20, which have implemented them. As can be seen in Fig. 4.1, there has been a notable expansion of CCTs in the world since the 1990s, with the concentration in this region standing out above others. Considering the time period and the countries that have adopted CCTs, it can be seen that this process takes the form of an S curve between 1990 and 2010, with a small number of cases at the beginning, a larger number in the middle of the period and stabilization at the end of the curve (see Fig. 1.1). This curve is an essential characteristic of the processes of diffusion of innovation and confirms the progressive effect of the first cases on the rest of the group (Rogers 1995). Complementing this evidence, the results of the statistical model are presented in Sect. 4.2. Finally, another characteristic that can be observed in this process of diffusion is the coincidence in the policies adopted, although there are also partial differences (Weyland 2006). In this case, and as mentioned above, the programs have important characteristics that are common to the whole group, although diversity can also be observed in others. Table 4.1 summarizes the essential, secondary and additional characteristics that have already been explained in Chapter 2 (in Tables 2.6–2.8). In terms of the essential characteristics, it is possible to identify four of them that are observed in practically all programs (Table 4.2). The first is that all CCTs share a central component that is conditionality in terms of attendance at educational institutions. The second predominant conditionality is having up-to-date health checks, which is observed in 16 of them. A third central feature is the delivery of the cash bonus in

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Fig. 4.1 Conditional Cash Transfer programs in the world 1997–2010 (Source By the author based on ECLAC [2011], Cecchini and Madariaga [2011], and Fiszbein and Schady [2009])

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Table 4.1 Summary of characteristics of CCTs in Latin America Essential characteristics 1 Education conditionality 2 Health conditionality 3 Cash transfer 4 Mechanism for identification and targeting of the beneficiary group Secondary characteristics of CCTs in Latin America 5 Program aims 6 Mechanisms for controlling conditionalities 7 Type of penalty 8 Institutionality Additional characteristics of the CCTs 9 Psychosocial support component 10 Membership of a social protection system Source The author based on the classification of Cecchini and Martínez (2011), information available in Cecchini and Madariaga (2011) and own database

Table 4.2 Presence of essential characteristics of CCTs in Latin America 1990– 2010 Characteristics 1 2 3 4

Education conditionality Health conditionality Cash transfer to the head of household Mechanism for identification and targeting of the beneficiary group

% of countries that include it when adopting CCTs 100 94 100 94

Source Prepared by the author using database

exchange for compliance with both education and health conditionalities. Finally, most programs (16) use the proxy means test mechanism, which can be complemented with other means, such as geographical or community-based targeting. These four characteristics are therefore essential to CCTs and are replicated in virtually all cases; this is the program model that is diffused. When analyzing the secondary and additional characteristics, differences between the region’s CCTs can be observed. Table 4.3 shows the percentage of countries that choose the diverse variants identified for each of these components.

Objectives of the program

Mechanisms for controlling conditionalities

Type of penalty

Institutionality

Psychosocial support

6

7

8

9

Characteristics Monetary support and human capital development Human capital development in children and adolescents Inclusion of families in state support networks and strengthening families’ psychosocial capacities Report of education and health facilities or specialized monitors Beneficiary reports it personally to offices in charge of the entities in charge of the program Soft penalty: warnings and reduction of benefit Hard: suspension of benefit after a specified number of faults Responsible body reporting directly to the Presidency Responsible body attached to the existing Ministry (Social Development, Poverty, etc.) It refers to whether the beneficiary, together with the voucher or the assigned good, receives psychosocial support through specialized professionals

Description

35

58

4

5 47

23

77

41

58

35

(continued)

% of countries that include it when adopting CCTs

Presence of secondary and additional characteristics in CCTs in Latin America 1990–2010

5

Table 4.3

4 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFUSION …

93

Being part of a social protection system

Characteristics

(continued)

Source Prepared by the author using database

10

Table 4.3

The program does not include psychosocial support for beneficiary families The program is defined as a component of a social protection system (current, created together with the program or later) The program is not defined as a component of a social protection system

Description

42

58

65

% of countries that include it when adopting CCTs

94 C. OSORIO GONNET

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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFUSION …

95

The characteristics that refer to objectives, belonging (or not) to a social protection system, and institutionality confer—in their presence or absence—an emphasis of the CCTs on social protection. Likewise, they vary over time—they are not found during the entire wave of diffusion—an aspect that will be deepened in the following section. Finally, the programs present variation in terms of the percentage of coverage in relation to the poor population. Considering 15 countries, it can be seen that 7% of the programs benefit 100% of the poor population. Some 33% benefit between 50–80% and 60% less than 50% of the population in that condition. Beyond these divergences, which can be explained by technical, political and structural factors, attention should be paid to what has been the trend during the diffusion process. Likewise, it is important to insist that the variations observed do not alter their belonging to what has been defined as CCT. They respond to decisions made during the process of program formulation, so that is where the analysis should be focused; along with considering how this is linked to the diffusion mechanism developed in each case. 4.1.2

The Diffusion of the CCT Model and Its Behavior Over Time

4.1.2.1 The Essential Characteristics As stated above, the four essential characteristics of the CCTs are observed in practically all the programs and have also been maintained over time under study. The differences observed do not change the essence of the program model. Consequently, it can be noted that the diffusion that has been developed is of a model and not of a principle (Weyland 2006). In other words, when asked what has been diffused, the answer is a conditional cash transfer program that contains these four central characteristics: health and education conditionality, monetary transfer to the mother, and mechanisms for identifying and targeting beneficiaries. These can be seen throughout the period, from the mid-1990s to 2010, as shown in Fig. 4.2, where the curves overlap as their presence over time is represented. They have therefore been part of the pioneering cases of Mexico and Brazil, up to the latest ones in Uruguay and Guatemala. Likewise, they were incorporated from the moment of adoption of each program and have not undergone major modifications. The conditionality (in health and education) for the delivery of the voucher is one of the innovative features of this program and allows it to

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18 16 14 12 Cond. Educ.

10

Cond. Health

8

Head of household

6

Media targeting Diffusion CCT

4 2 0

Fig. 4.2 Diffusion of central characteristics of CCTs (Source Prepared by the author using database)

be identified as a different program from the previous ones. They are the basic characteristics adopted by the countries, regardless of their ideological position, which, as mentioned above, is diverse (see Table 4.6). “Everyone in general (…) more right less right or more left less left, buys the idea of the basic menu” (Academic CCT expert). Where there is variation in terms of ideological positions is with respect to the other components of the programs, which as discussed with the classification of Cecchini and Martinez (2011) in Sect. 2.3.1, can establish differences in the emphasis of the programs, without affecting its nature of CCT. The in-depth analysis must be done on a case-by-case basis, but some lights can be seen from the regional panorama when observing the variation of these secondary and additional characteristics, which will be commented on in the following section. Targeting is a technical aspect, but substantial in terms of decreasing the chances of arbitrariness and favoritism in the process of identifying beneficiaries. Its incorporation into the programs entailed technical challenges for the institutions in charge, since this instrument had not been used before the CCTs. Therefore, as a result of its implementation, beneficiary registers, targeting methods, and the necessary institutionality were created or improved. This was the case, for example, in Ecuador, Nicaragua and Panama (Rodríguez 2010; Largaespada 2006; Naranjo 2008). In this regard, and although it requires an in-depth case-by-case analysis, it is possible to see an impact on all social institutions as a result

4

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of the inclusion of these instruments. “In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that, in general, the CCTs have promoted progress in terms of standards for implementing targeted social programs” (Fiszbein and Schady 2009: 7). Once the instrument is installed, and an index of beneficiaries is developed, it can also be used for other social programs, beyond the CCTs. Finally, the characteristic of the cash bond given to the head of household is also observed throughout the period and once incorporated into a component that is maintained. And in fact there is a good evaluation of this, especially of the delivery to women, “the evidence shows that women administer economic aid more efficiently than men” (Villatoro 2005: 99). 4.1.2.2

Behavior Over Time of Secondary and Additional Components To analyze the evolution in time of the secondary and additional characteristics of the CCTs, it is relevant to observe the type of program that is configured when these components are combined. In that sense, the typology proposed by Cecchini and Martínez (2011) and commented on in Chapter 2, establishes a classification that is very useful for understanding these effects. Programs are divided into three groups: programs with soft conditionality, strong conditionality, and programs with a social protection approach. The difference between each of these categories is given by the variation in characteristics that have been described here as secondary. These are: the objectives of the programs, the control of compliance with conditionalities (verification mechanisms and type of penalty) and whether the program is part of a social protection system. An analysis of their evolution in the wave of diffusion shows that they are distributed over different periods of time. CCTs with strong conditionality are characterized by their objectives of improving the human capital of the population and by strict control of compliance with conditionalities (monitoring of reports and hard penalties). These programs predominate during the first 10 years of the wave of diffusion, except in the case of Brazil (Fig. 4.3). Then they are maintained until they increase again at the end of the wave of diffusion (after 2006). This prevalence can be explained by the fact that the Mexican case had greater public exposure, considering the early evaluations that were carried out in collaboration with the IO. The literature indicates that evidence of PROGRESA would have been influential in the cases of Nicaragua (in 2000) and Honduras (in 1998) (Largaespada 2006; Levy

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18 16 14 12 10

Soft Cond. Strong Cond.

8

Diffusion CCT

6 4 2

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

0

Fig. 4.3 Diffusion of strong and soft conditionality components (Source Prepared by the author using database)

and Rodriguez 2005). Consequently, it was a clearer reference from the beginning of the wave of diffusion. Programs with soft control of conditionalities and the main objective of monetary support began to prevail in 2001 and were concentrated until 2006 (Fig. 4.3). In the case of Brazil, as already mentioned, the current program was complemented by the sum of several programs, whose origins date back to the mid-1990s and because of their relevance to the current design, it is considered in the analysis from that date. However, it was not until it was configured as Bolsa Família that it acquired the character of a relevant and emblematic national program for the Brazilian state, which we see today. In fact, this program was used within a strategy of international positioning, since the Lula da Silva government, social policies have been an axis of its foreign policy (Faria 2012). Consequently, as shown in Fig. 4.3, the combination of the secondary characteristics of targets, verification mechanisms and type of penalty makeup two types of CCTs that diffuse differently over time, developing different curves to the regional diffusion wave.

4

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The third type of CCT—which is linked to social protection systems— arises from the combination of characteristics referring to objectives, membership in a social protection system and also the existence of psychosocial support. The objectives of these programs include, along with monetary support or human capital development, the inclusion of families in state support networks and the strengthening of their psychosocial capacities. In addition, the CCT is defined as a component of a social protection system and psychosocial support for beneficiary families is incorporated into the benefits. These characteristics give the programs a more complex character, which adds to the logic of redistribution or investment in human capital, that of establishing networks and links between the beneficiaries and the State, through the social protection system. As can be seen in Fig. 4.4, these characteristics were not observed at the beginning of the wave, but rather emerged in the early years of 2000, thus showing a different curve from the regional one. Once they appeared, they have had a similar behavior pattern: few cases at the beginning, a later increase, and then stagnating their growth. The evolution of these components can be explained by the fact that, on the one hand, it was only in 2000 that multilateral organizations began to discuss and install the issue of social protection in the region (an aspect that will be examined in greater depth in Chapter 5). In 2002, 18 16 14

Psychosocial support

12 10

Social protection system

8 6 4

Social Protection Objectives Diffusion CCT

2 0

Fig. 4.4 Diffusion of social protection components of CCTs (Source Prepared by the author using database)

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the Chile Solidario program was launched, the first to include features along these lines, and some of its components were replicated. “The impact, in general, of Bolsa Familia-Brazil and Oportunidades-Mexico, and recently of Chile Solidario-Chile, on the new CCT programs that have been rapidly generated in Latin America, especially since 2000, can be highlighted” (Valencia 2008: 502). A third element is the shift to the left that is evident at the level of the governments of some countries in the region in the second half of 2000 (Uruguay, Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay) that could have influenced a redistributive and social protection emphasis (CCT expert, IDB). “The left had to rethink its position with respect to CCTs, how they can incorporate them into their discourse and program practice. I think that this is where a whole variation of different models was born” (CCT expert, UNDP). Finally, it is necessary to refer to the other characteristics. In relation to institutionality, this is a component of the programs that has a different trajectory in time than the wave of diffusion (Fig. 4.5). Most programs have depended on the corresponding social ministries since the first programs were established. However, since the case of Honduras in 1998, there have also been programs that depend directly on the Presidency. The difference between the two options is that the linkage with a social ministry could mean greater sustainability over time of the 18

Presidency

16

Social Ministry

14

Diffusion CCT

12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Fig. 4.5 Institutional dependence of the CCTs (Source Prepared by the author using database)

4

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFUSION …

101

programs and a higher degree of institutionalization. A program that depends directly on the Presidency is more likely to be removed or modified with a change of government. In this regard, the evolution over time of the CCTs that depend directly on the Presidency can be explained by the fact that the countries that adopt them have weaker institutionality, as in the cases of Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. On the other hand, the countries where CCTs depend on social ministries are those with a more stable institutional tradition, such as Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay. However, given this characteristic, it would seem that there is no tendency towards one type of dependency or another, but rather that it is linked to the institutional characteristics of each country; which must be corroborated in the case study. Both the amount of the bonus given and the coverage of the programs have increased over time. Countries have tended to increase the number of beneficiaries and improve the amount of the bond, not decrease it. As shown in Table 4.4, all countries increased coverage in the period 2000– 2010, and in many cases doubled the initial number of beneficiaries. Table 4.4 Evolution of CCTs coverage in Latin America (2000–2005–2009) (percentage of total population)

Country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Dominican Republic Uruguay

2000

12,2 3,5 0,9 10,8

8,3 12,5 1,2

2005

2009

0,9 11,6 20,6 3,4 5,4 0,2 36,1 1,0

8,3 17,5 26,4 6,8 25,2 3,3 44,3 8,2 22,6 8,7 24,6

9,1 23,3 2,5 2,8 0,3 0,6 8,9 9,4

Source Based on Cecchini and Martínez (2011): 108

10,9 8,6 7,6 21,2 11,6

102

C. OSORIO GONNET

Consequently, it has been pointed out so far that the diffusion of CCTs is characterized by the expansion of a model with four central characteristics that are observed throughout the period. Together with this, secondary characteristics are also identified that configure three types of CCTs that have evolved in different ways over time. A central group of CCT characteristics is then observed in the diffusion wave, which allows us to claim that there was diffusion of a model during the whole period. Then, the characteristics that present variation over time allow us to distinguish between programs with strong and soft conditionality. These emphases could be given by the influence in the countries of the Mexican and Brazilian models respectively. As noted above, these programs differ in terms of the control and penalization of conditionality. Likewise, they are the initial programs and have become visible in the region. On the other hand, the characteristics incorporated in the middle of the wave of diffusion, and which refer to the issue of social protection, may have been influenced by the particular emphasis given to the epistemic community, the emergence of the Chile Solidario program or the left-wing ideologies of some governments during the second half of 2000. However, these assumptions emerging from what has been presented here can only be addressed in depth by analyzing each case. It is true that, for example, Chile Solidario emerged in the middle of the period, but its level of influence on the following programs must be analyzed specifically in each case.

4.2 Statistical Models and Their Contribution to Research Hypotheses The statistical models developed seek to advance the explanation of the diffusion patterns of CCTs identified above. They seek to detect whether the variables linked to the hypotheses contribute to explaining the process of program diffusion already described. Next, the variables defined and the indicators used are presented, and then the models applied are explained. Then, the results of the model are commented which, together with confirming the existence of a clear diffusion process, allow for a discussion of the role of the variables and their degree of influence in this diffusion process.

4

4.2.1

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFUSION …

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Period Analyzed and Time Variables

The period of time analyzed is from 1990 to 2010, since the first pilot programs considered in the sample were implemented in 1995 and the last ones were adopted in 2008. The start of the sample in 1990 is justified because at the beginning of the decade certain political trajectories were common in the region, such as the processes of transition and consolidation of democracy (Huntington 1994; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1988) and positive results of economic reorganizations, such as reduction of the inflation rate and recovery of growth, etc. (ECLAC 1994). Likewise, in an attempt to avoid the problem of many variables and few cases, an attempt was made to analyze the explanatory variables over the longest possible period of time and with theoretical justification, thus increasing the number of observations (Landman 2000). Considering this period, for the dummy variables, we opted to create three variables that would pinpoint, following Rogers (2004), the three moments of the diffusion wave that allow us to distinguish between the first countries that adopted, the majority group that did so and those that adopted late or lagged behind. In this way, it was possible to avoid having a large number of time dummy variables, which is one of the weaknesses observed when introducing them into the models (Box-Steffensmeier 2004). The period (pe1) between 1990 and 1999 was then defined; period 2 (pe2) between 2000 and 2005; and period 3 (pe3) between 2006 and 2010. In addition, considering that the choice of the appropriate alternative is an empirical matter (Box-Steffensmeier 2004), several options were tested until they confirmed this one as the most suitable for the statistical model. 4.2.2

Analysis Unit

In terms of the unit of analysis, for both quantitative and qualitative purposes, these are the 19 countries of Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Uruguay. The entire group of countries has been considered, taking into account those that have adopted as well as those that have not. Cuba was initially included in the analysis, but had to be excluded considering that it was not possible to access the necessary information for the analysis.

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4.2.3

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the adoption or non-adoption of the program in a given year. 4.2.4

Independent Variables

The independent variables, domestic and external, are also measured year by year between 1990 and 2010. The domestic variables initially defined were: inequality, poverty, ideological position of governments and GDP per capita. The independent external variables are: World Bank group loans, diffusion variable and time variable. 4.2.4.1 Domestic Independent Variables Inequality and Poverty It was decided to test in models of inequality and poverty, since their high levels in the countries at the moment of adoption could explain the motivation to implement this type of program. For inequality, the indicator used is the Gini index, from the ECLAC database. For poverty, the indicator used was the percentage of population living below the poverty line (poor and indigent population) according to ECLAC data and supplemented by SEDLAC. As shown in Table 4.5, the percentage of the population living in poverty in the year the CCT was adopted is significant in most countries. However, there is also wide variation among the countries in the year they adopted the programs, from 13.7 in Uruguay to 79.10 in Honduras. The rest of the countries fall between these two extremes, and all of them adopted CCTs. Therefore, it is necessary to test whether this was a variable that influenced the adoption of the program. In terms of equity, the Gini Index shows less significant variation than the percentage of poverty; the indices fluctuate between 0.44 (Uruguay) and 0.62 (Brazil). Despite this fluctuation, the regional picture is one of strong inequality. Ideology The third domestic variable refers to the ideological position of governments during the period. It is possible to assume that the government’s political position could influence the decision to adopt or not this type of program, which must be tested empirically and contrasted with existing analysis (Sugiyama 2011). The indicator used has been the political party of the incumbent President, classified as right, centre or left. Considering

4

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Table 4.5 Poverty, inequality and GDP per capita in the start-up year Country

Program name

Start year

Poverty (%)

Gini index

GDP per capita

1

Argentina

Asignación Universal por Hijo

2005

0,53

3.756

2

Bolivia

2006

0,56

1.069

3

Brazil

Bono Juancito Pinto Bolsa Familia

29,4 (2004, urban area) 63,9

4 5

Chile Colombia

6 7

Costa Rica Ecuador

8

El Salvador

9

Guatemala

10

Honduras

11

Mexico

12

Nicaragua

13

Panama

14 15 16

Paraguay Peru Dominican Republic Uruguay

17

Chile Solidario Familias en Acción Avancemos Bono de Desarrollo Humano Comunidades Solidarias Rurales Mi Familia Progresa Programa de asignación Familiar Oportunidades Red de Protección Social Red Oportunidades Tekoporâ Juntos Programa Solidaridad Plan Equidad

1995 (pilot) 2002 2001

45,3

0,62

4.306

20,2 54,9

0,56 0,57

6.443 3.086

2000 2003

20,3 51,2

0,47 0,55

4.159 2.514

2005

47,5

0,49

2.822

2008

54,8

0,58

2.299

1998

79,1

0,55

1.253

1995 (pilot ) 2000

45,1

0,53

6.450

69,9

0,58

2006

29,9

0,54

5.106

2005 2005 2005

56,9 48,7 47,5

0,52 0,53 0,56

1.265 2.852 3.631

2008

13,7

0,44

6.302

817

Source Prepared by the author using database

the strong presidential character of the region’s democratic regimes and that it is from there, and not from Congress, that the decision to implement the programs is made, the political affiliation of the President is an appropriate indicator. As can be seen in Table 4.6, the ideologies of the governments at the time of adoption are varied.

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Table 4.6 Ideological position of the Presidents at the time of the adoption of the CCTs Country

Start year CCT

President

Party

Political position

Argentina

2002

Bolivia

2006

Eduardo Duhalde

Partido Justicialista

Right

Evo Morales

Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)

Brazil

1995

Left

Fernando Henrique Cardoso

PSDB

Centre Centre

Chile

2002

Ricardo Lagos

Partido Socialista

Colombia

2001

Andrés Pastrana

Partido Conservador Colombiano

Right

Costa Rica

2000

Miguel Angel Rodríguez

Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC) Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP)

Centre

Ecuador

2003

Lucio Gutiérrez

El Salvador

2005

Elías Antonio Saca

Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA)

Centre Right

Guatemala

2008

Álvaro Colom

Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) Partido Liberal de Honduras (PLH)

Left

Honduras

1998

Carlos Flores

Mexico

1995

Ernesto Zedillo

Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)

Centre Centre

Nicaragua Panama

2000 2006

Arnoldo Alemán Martín Torrijos

Alianza Liberal (AL) Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD)

Right Centre

Paraguay Peru Dominican Republic

2005 2005 2005

Nicanor Duarte Alejandro Toledo Leonel Fernández

Partido Colorado Perú Posible Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD)

Centre Centre Centre

Uruguay

2008

Tabaré Vásquez

Frente Amplio

Left

Source Compiled by the author on the basis of CIDOB (2012), Alcántara (2004), and Center for Latin American Studies (2012)

Despite of the diversity of ideological positions, a predominance of the centre can be observed against the other two positions of the left and the right; of 10 governments of the centre, with over 7 of the other two positions (Fig. 4.6). Consequently, the variable has been included in the models to test whether this predominance of the centre is statistically significant, or whether the diversity of identified ideological positions is significant. Gross Domestic Product Fourth, it is also necessary to consider whether the country’s wealth may affect the likelihood of adopting CCTs. This is why the variable of Gross Domestic Product per capita has been included in the model; the richest countries could have a chance of adopting them. In this sense, there is also

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12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Left-wing

Centre

Right-wing

Fig. 4.6 Number of CCTs adopted according to the President’s ideology (Source By author using database)

a wide variation among countries, from $800 per capita to over $6000, all of which adopted CCTs (see Table 4.5). This means that the model needs to check the possible relationship between a country’s wealth and its adoption of the program. Finally, the population of the country for each year was introduced into the model as a control variable. 4.2.4.2 External Independent Variables World Bank Loans The World Bank’s lending variable was defined to reflect the influence of multilateral banks on countries, since an explanation for the adoption of CCTs could be the incentive to receive financing to implement them. However, it should be mentioned that prior to the country’s request for a loan there must be a decision to develop a social program. Therefore, it can be argued that the existence of a loan during implementation is not an adequate indicator to explain adoption, since this could be a decision made beforehand. In addition, it is not possible to include it in the model, given the high correlation with the adoption-dependent variable. Finally, they also fail to capture the influence that IOs exert in terms of technical assistance, information exchange and consensus regarding programs. As can be seen in Table 4.7, the linkage between countries and banks does not refer only to loans, but also to technical cooperation, and both or only one of these situations can occur. Of the 17 countries, 5 received neither monetary loans nor formal technical cooperation during

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Table 4.7 Source of financing for the program, presence of multilateral bank loans and/or technical assistance from IO during the start of the CCTs Country

Source of resources

Monetary loans

1

Argentina

Public Resources and WB

Yes

Technical Cooperation Agreements No

2

Bolivia

Public Resources

No

No

3

Brazil

Public Resources and WB

Yes (later in Bolsa Familia phase) No

No Yes

4

Chile

Public Resources

5

Colombia

Yes

No

6

Costa Rica

Public Resource, WB and IDB Public Resources and WB

Yes

Yes

7

Ecuador

Yes (first etape)

Yes

8

El Salvador

Yes

Yes

9

Guatemala

Public Resource, WB and IDB Public Resource, WB and IDB Public Resources and IDB

No

Yes

10

Honduras

Public Resources and IDB

Yes

Yes

11

Mexico

Yes

Yes

12

Nicaragua

Public Resource, WB and IDB Public Resources and IDB

Yes

No

13

Panama

Public Resources

No

No

14

Paraguay

Yes

No

15

Peru

Public Resources, WB and IDB Public Resources

No

No

16

Dominican Republic Uruguay

Public Resources

No

No

Public Resources

No

No

17

Source Author, based on ECLAC (2011), León (2008), and Cecchini and Madariaga (2011)

the program formulation process, 8 received either monetary resources or technical cooperation and 4 received both. What is clear is that it is not possible to assume that loans were made in all the countries and then, even if they were, it is necessary to identify whether this was before or after the decision to adopt; information that the statistical model does not allow to garner and that must be addressed in the case studies. Consequently, this work has chosen to address these aspects through an in-depth analysis of the role of IOs and epistemic communities. In order to enrich the statistical model, the variable already mentioned was introduced, which indicates the total loans granted by the World Bank to the country in each year up to the year of adoption. This variable therefore reflects the greater or lesser prior involvement of the bank with the countries and which could have affected the decision to adopt considering the probability of obtaining the financing to develop it once adoption

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109

was defined. Likewise, it allows us to capture another situation that could explain it: the request of a broad loan from the multilateral bank, where it is the latter that establishes as a condition the implementation of this type of program in the social area (although the loan may even be occupied in other policy areas). Therefore, considering the previous relationship of countries with the World Bank group through this variable should help to measure whether it is a robust explanatory variable. Diffusion Variable The diffusion variable refers to the number of countries that have adopted the program from 1990 to the previous year of a country’s adoption. Graphing this number of countries for the period 1990–2010 gives the S-shaped adoption curve, which is characteristic of diffusion processes. Therefore, by including it in the model up to the previous year of adoption of each country, the influence of the wave of adoption of programs that was taking place in the region is reflected. In order to do so, the proportion of this number in the total number of cases and the logarithm of that number were calculated. Time Variable Regarding the time variable, as indicated above, it was decided to include it in three time periods (pe1, pe2 and pe3), as it proved to be significant in this way without the need to include more complex time structures. It was also tested using as an indicator for the years between the adoption of the programme and the year a country adopted (t ), and also squared (t 2 ) and cubed (t 3 ), suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010). However, this alternative had to be discarded because it presented a high correlation with the diffusion variable (0.93) and when it was included the results were not significant. 4.2.5

Presentation of the Models

As discussed above, binary logistic regression was applied in the models, which is appropriate considering the sample size. It has also been corrected according to the relogit proposed by King and Zeng to better control the particularities of the number of events where the positives are smaller than the negatives (King and Zeng 2001).

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To arrive to the models presented here, several combinations of variables were tested. Thus, for example, an independent variable of neighbors was initially included, considering the percentage of neighboring countries that had adopted the program before the adoption of a country. The indicator was constructed by calculating the percentage of neighboring countries that had adopted the program up to the year prior to the country’s adoption. However, this variable was highly correlated with the diffusion variable (0.79), and when included independently, did not present significant results. Consequently, it was excluded from the models. In addition, the models initially included both the poverty (using the indicator of the percentage of the population living below the poverty line) and inequality (Gini index) variables mentioned above. However, both are correlated (0.57), so they were tested independently. The results were significant only with the inequality variable, so it was decided to include it instead of poverty. Finally, models with interactions between variables such as ideology and loans from international organizations were also tested, but the results were not significant. Consequently, three models were defined to apply the variables described above and presented significant results for the research. Model 1 integrates the independent variables of inequity, Gross Domestic Product, ideology of center, diffusion, time periods pe1 and pe2, World Bank loans and the population control variable. This model emphasizes checking, therefore, whether these variables are significant in explaining diffusion. It also seeks to test diffusion as well as the greater probability over time of adopting CCTs and by including the center variable, whether it presents greater relevance than the other ideologies. As noted above (Fig. 4.6), there is variation between the three positions left, centre and right, but the centre has a slight preponderance. In Model 2, all the above variables were retained, but the time periods were excluded and only the diffusion period was considered. This, because a correlation between the two was detected, and by eliminating the periods, it is possible to better observe the influence of diffusion. As for the ideological position, as in model 1, the ideological centre position was included, to compare it with the left and right position. In Model 3, the variables of inequality, GDP, diffusion, population control variable and World Bank loans are again considered. In terms of ideology, the left and right ideological positions are now included and the centre variable is excluded. This is because, by considering only the centre

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variable in the previous models, it was placed in the same group on both the right and the left. Seeking to better specify the ideological positions, in this Model 3 the other two are included and their degree of influence is compared with the ideological position of centre.

4.3

Analysis of Results

The results of the models are presented in Table 4.8. The results of the quantitative model allow us to clarify some important points regarding the questions of this book and its hypotheses. Regarding the variables that explain the diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Latin America, the domestic variables that are significant in Table 4.8 Results Model 1, 2 and 3 diffusion of CCTs in Latin America (1990–2010)

Inequality GDP Population Centre ideology Left ideology

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

10.329 (5.19)** 1.615 (0.96)* 0.841 (0.62)

11.242 (5.22)** 1.934 (0.88)** 0.873 (0.54)

10.794 (5.67)* 1.901 (0.89)** 0.891 (0.54)

0.791 (0.48)

0.900 (0.53)*

WB loans

0.712 (0.90)

0.941 (0.66)

Diffusion

−1.580 (1.14) −7.248 (2.83)**

1.475 (0.31)***

−0.963 (0.94) −0.791 (0.67) 0.940 (0.64) 1.499 (0.36)***

−20.190 (6.32)***

−18.987 (6.35)***

Right ideology

Period 1990–1999 (pe1) Period 2000–2005 (pe2) Constant

−3.655 (1.21)*** −15.286 (5.73)***

n: 273 observations. Standard error in brackets. *Significant at 90%. **Significant at 95% ***Significant at 99%

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all three models are inequality and Gross Domestic Product. Thus, countries with higher inequality indices, and with greater wealth—and in a certain sense with a higher level of development—would have a better chance of adopting the program. Thus, the influence of these domestic factors on the decision to adopt CCTs would be observed. Countries faced a problem to be solved in terms of equity (and probably poverty), to which programs were a viable solution. The fact that high levels of GDP are significant indicates that the greater the wealth, the greater the possibility of adopting them. Therefore, there is autonomy in the decision against possible loans from multilateral banks. Considering the wide variation in GDP in the region, it is clear that there were countries that required external resources to implement CCTs, but this result indicates a general trend that shows that own resources, more than external ones, were influential in the decision to adopt them. As for ideology as an influential domestic variable, the results are not significant. Only in Model 2 is it observed that governments with a President of centre ideological position would be more likely to adopt CCTs. However, this result is significant—although only at 90%—, given the majority, already commented before, of governments that have that position at the time of adopting the program: 10 of centre over 7 (governments of the left plus those of the right). Therefore, it is effective that there are more possibilities of adopting the program with a centre position, but it also stands out that governments of left and right have adopted it in the region. Therefore, and as mentioned before, the CCTs are not an exclusive program of the centre governments—although they predominate—but they are adopted by all ideological positions (Table 4.6 and Fig. 4.6). In this sense, it is possible to discard it as one of the variables that could be assumed to have been decisive in the adoption. However, as suggested above, ideology could influence future program modifications. The analysis of the evolution of social protection components provides indications of a certain link with left-wing governments, which would seek to insert CCTs into social protection systems and include other benefits. The quantitative analyses will have to be complemented with other methods to deepen this idea, since the case by case or comparative study will allow observing modifications to the programs that could be linked to ideological positions. By way of example, the rightwing government of Sebastián Piñera (2010–2014) has made changes to Chile Solidario that detract from the importance of the social protection and psychosocial support components and highlight the importance

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of conditionality in education and health. These modifications, in the opposite direction to left-wing governments, show that ideology could influence CCT reforms. The last of the domestic variables, population control, does not present significant results, which shows the variation in the countries that adopt it, regardless of their number of inhabitants. Of the external explanatory variables that could have influenced the adoption process, the one that indicates the existence of previous monetary loans from the World Bank is not significant in any of the three models. As discussed above, one would expect that if there was a fluid relationship with the Bank, the probability of adoption would be higher, but this is not the case. This opens up the possibility that the World Bank’s influence will be less, or that it will be exercised in ways that are complementary to the loans or even without the presence of the latter. As a result—and as commented before and shown in Table 4.7—the variation in the presence of these agencies and their type of participation in the countries is very wide. Multilateral banking is present in a significant way, but considering these two indicators, it is not necessarily present in all cases in the same magnitude or through formal channels. The hypothesis about the existence of a consensus about the effectiveness of CCTs generated from an epistemic community and the activities of IOs, then, emerges as a plausible explanation and will be developed in the following chapter. Regarding the second research question, concerning diffusion mechanisms, the findings of this quantitative model shows a low relevance of multilateral bank loans. This provides indications that coercion could be observed in fewer cases than imagined. It has already been mentioned that the motivation to adopt would be boosted by the existence of a public problem—inequality—so the probability that it is linked to the objective of obtaining monetary resources, decreases. This does not mean that there are no cases where this happens, but that the general trend—about which this model provides indications—shows that they would not be a significant trend. The fact that the domestic variable of inequality is significant, indicates that the motivation for adoption is mostly endogenous, which is an indicator of the presence of mechanisms for the diffusion of emulation or learning. The means of these mechanisms remain to be clarified, in order to distinguish between one or the other. This information cannot be extracted from this model but must be addressed in the case studies.

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What this analysis has made possible is to focus on these mechanisms through over-coercion. The third question—which seeks to analyze the link between diffusion mechanisms and the domestic formulation process—must be addressed through the case studies. In the analysis in Sect. 4.1, the variation observed in terms of the institutional dependence of the CCT and how this could be linked to the greater stability and consistency of the countries in this sense was commented on. These are aspects that will be discussed in greater depth in subsequent chapters. Consequently, the contribution of the quantitative model is—on the one hand—the confirmation of the diffusion process experienced in the region, since the diffusion variable is significant in Model 2 and 3; and in Model 1, the variables expressing time periods are significant. All of them indicate a propensity for adoption as the years of the period under study pass. Thus, the possibility that this process of regional convergence is the result of a mere coincidence in the policy adopted is ruled out. Also, the evidence about inequality variables and GDP as influencing factors in adoption is relevant to the research. It denotes the presence of domestic factors in the decision to adopt. Together with this, the model allows us to rule out the possibility that ideology has had a significant influence, although it is possible that it has done so in subsequent modifications to the programs, which in any case, do not modify their nature as CCTs. This hard core of the model is stable over time, as discussed in Sect. 4.1. Finally, the finding regarding multilateral banking leads to a deeper hypothesis about a more complex role of both banking and other IOs. These organizations could have contributed, together with other stakeholders, towards the creation of a consensus about the relevance of CCTs to tackle poverty in Latin America. It can be ruled out that the previous relationship of the countries with the banks was significant in explaining the adoption. As complemented with the information contained in Table 4.7, the traditional banking activities, loans and technical cooperation, are present, but there is a significant percentage of countries—around 30%—that did not link through them with the banks, and equally adopted the CCTs. The explanation for this must then be explored through other variables. To summarize, the analysis that I present in this chapter sheds light on the first hypothesis, although it is pending to clarify if the variable of the consensus generated from the epistemic community would have been a

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determinant in the regional diffusion. This will be discussed in Chapter 5. Regarding the second hypothesis, it enabled ruling out that coercion was the predominant mechanism at the regional level, since the variable of the loans from the multilateral banking does not present significant results. A more detailed look at the mechanisms will be developed in the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7. Finally, in relation to the third hypothesis, the nature of this model does not allow progress in dealing with it, so it will also be considered in the last chapters mentioned.

References Alcántara, M. (2004). ¿Instituciones o máquinas ideológicas? Origen, programa y organización de los partidos latinoamericanos. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS). Box-Steffensmeier, J. M. (2004). Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists. Bradford S. Jones: Cambridge University Press. Carter, D., & Signorino, C. (2010). Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data. Political Analysis, 18(3), 271–292. Cecchini, S., & Madariaga, A. (2011). Programas de Transferencias Condicionadas. Balance de la experiencia reciente en América Latina y el Caribe. Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. Cecchini, S., & Martínez, R. (2011). Protección social inclusiva en América Latina: una mirada integral, un enfoque de derechos (ECLAC Books, No. 111). Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. Center for Latin American Studies, Georgetown University. (2012). Political Data Base of Americas. http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Executive/executive. html#chronology. CIDOB. (2012). Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa. Biografía de Líderes Políticos. http:// www.cidob.org/es/documentacio/biografias_lideres_politicos/america_del_ sur/ecuador/lucio_gutierrez_borbua#4. ECLAC. (1994). Panorama Social de América Latina, 1994 (LC/G.1844). Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. ECLAC. (2011). Programa de Transferencias Condicionadas. Database of Noncontributory Social Protection Programs Latin America and the Caribbean. http://dds.cepal.org/bdptc/. Faria, C. A. (2012). A difusão de políticas sociais como estratégia de inserção internacional: Brasil e Venezuela comparados. Interseções. Revista de Estudios Interdisciplinares, 14(2), 335–371. Fiszbein, A., & Schady, N. (2009). Conditional Cash Transfers Reducing Present and Future Poverty. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

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Huntington, S. (1994). La Tercera Ola. La democratización a finales del siglo XX . Barcelona: Paidós. King, G., & Zeng, L. (2001). Explaining Rare Events in International Relations. International Organization, 55(3), 693–715. Landman, T. (2000). Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction. London: Routledge. Largaespada, C. (2006). Nicaragua: Red de Protección Social y Sistema de Atención a crisis. In E. Cohen & R. Franco (Eds.), Transferencias con corresponsabilidad. Una mirada latinoamericana. Ciudad de México: SEDESOL. León, A. (2008). Dimensiones y políticas para el análisis de la primera meta del Milenio. ECLAC-AECID project. Monitoring of the poverty component of the first Millennium Development Goal (AEC/06/003). Levy, S., & Rodriguez, E. (2005). Sin herencia de pobreza: el programa Progresa – Oportunidades de México. Washington, DC: IDB. Naranjo, M. (2008). Ecuador: reseña de los principales programas sociales y lecciones aprendidas, 2000–2006. Project Document “Cooperación interregional para el fortalecimiento de la inclusión social, la equidad de género y la promoción de la salud en los objetivos de desarrollo del Milenio (ODM)”. ECLAC. O’Donnell, G., & Schmitter, P. (1988). Transiciones desde un gobierno autoritario. Conclusiones tentativas sobre las democracias inciertas. Buenos Aires: Paidós. Rodríguez, A. (2010). Programas de transferencias condicionadas, políticas sociales y combate a la pobreza en Panamá (Social Policy Series No. 162). Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. Rogers, E. (1995). Diffusion of Innovations. New York: The Free Press. Rogers, E. (2004). A Prospective and Retrospective Look at the Diffusion Model. Journal of Health Communication, 9(6), 13–19. Sugiyama, N. (2011). The Diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in the Americas. Global Social Policy, 11(2–3), 250–278. Valencia, E. (2008). Las Transferencias Monetarias Condicionadas Como Política Social en América Latina. Un Balance: Aportes, Límites y Debates. Annual Review of Sociology, 34, 499–524. Villatoro, P. (2005). Programas de transferencias monetarias condicionadas: experiencias en América Latina. Revista CEPAL, 86, 87–101. Weyland, K. (2006). Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER 5

The Epistemic Community and International Organizations in the Diffusion of CCTs

One of the main arguments of this book is that the existence of a consensus about the effectiveness of CCTs is a relevant variable to explain the diffusion of the programs in the region. Through the statistical model already mentioned, the low significance of the other variables was detected, so this chapter seeks to present the evidence that would confirm hypothesis 1. This community had important links with international organizations and their activities, so that these constituted a platform and a means of action for the former. The actions and capacity of influence of both stakeholders are linked and it is not possible to explain the impact of one without considering the other. In this chapter, I explain the configuration of this epistemic community and the role of international organizations, analyzing its formation and development. To do this, I pick up on what was already commented on in Chapter 3 regarding their role in the processes of diffusion. Likewise, I apply the instruments explained in Appendices 3 to identify the key actors that promoted the programs, the networks they established and the contribution of such stakeholders to the diffusion and policy implementation cycle. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, the literature has referred to the policy communities and the influence of ideas in the convergence of CCTs in Latin America, but the channels through which these ideas traveled, the stakeholders who had an impact and who intervened in the adoption

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mechanisms of each program have not been identified. The reconstruction of these activities allows for progress in this direction. However, what I show in this chapter is the existence of this regional epistemic community, its activities and channels of influence, and how all this contributes to the explanation of the regional diffusion. The impact on the decision to adopt the CCT in a country must be analyzed in depth in each case, since, as I pointed out earlier, the national characteristics of the policy and program formulation process must be considered. I present two moments in the trajectory of this epistemic community. The first was from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, when the community of experts was being formed on the basis of the knowledge acquired about the first programs. In a second moment, from 2000 to 2010, the epistemic community was already established at the regional level, linked to the IO and their activities, contributing to the construction of this consensus about the CCTs and experiencing an evolution in the reflexion on the programs.

5.1 The Epistemic Community and the Role of Banks During the First Years of the Wave of Diffusion In the process of diffusing CCTs in Latin America, along with the start of the first programs, an epistemic community was formed that contributed to creating a consensus about their effectiveness and relevance for alleviating poverty in the region. During the mid-1990s and early 2000s, we observed the birth of this community that will play a significant role in diffusing these initiatives. It is possible to identify three areas from which its members come. On the one hand, the community gradually began to be made up of experts (some of them academics) linked to the evaluations of the first programs (in Mexico, Brazil, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Honduras). Likewise, local policy makers and managers of the implemented CCTs were identified and gained significant experience in this regard. Finally, multilateral banking officials who were involved in the programs to varying degrees, and in the following years experts from other specialized agencies would also be included. The common characteristic that allows this group of people to identify themselves as an epistemic community and

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distinguish themselves from other collective stakeholders is their knowledge about CCTs, acquired from practice, academia, and research, and which was accumulated during this period and in the following years. Regarding the first and second areas mentioned, the case of Mexico is illustrative. PROGRESA (later Oportunidades ) had a mainly endogenous origin,1 and its creators were some of the first experts who contributed to its knowledge in the region, disseminating its characteristics and the results of the early evaluations carried out. Santiago Levi,2 for example, played a central role in the early years of the program and is frequently mentioned as a reference in the field. Likewise, Paul Gertler,3 an economist and professor at the University of California at Berkley, who advised IFPRI’s impact evaluations, also carried out other analyses and has subsequently written several reports on the subject.4 As for the officials from the multilateral banks, it is necessary to remember that they had different roles during these years. As mentioned in previous chapters, in the first cases of Brazil and Mexico, links with the banks were established at the level of knowledge exchange, technical advice and support in impact assessments. In other countries there was direct participation through loans (Nicaragua) or technical cooperation (Honduras). As a result, a group of experts was consolidated within these entities, based on the implementation of the programs, the knowledge was gradually accumulated and its diffusion began through the various platforms of these organizations. Likewise, these different spaces show that the CCTs were attractive to the banks. On the one hand, as to be a 1 In this regard, the debate on how endogenous the first programs in Brazil and Mexico are has already been mentioned (e.g., Peck and Theodore 2010a, b). Here it is argued that they are largely endogenous, despite the closeness that may exist between Mexican policymakers and certain content that banks may be working on, such as targeting, for example. This could have contributed to the design, but the motivation and the group of experts who designed them, are mostly from the country, and not from the banks. 2 Santiago Levi Alzazi (16 January 1956). PhD. in Economics, Boston University. Main positions: Minister of Finance in Mexico (1994–2000), Director General of the Mexican Social Security Institute (2000–2005). Vice President of Sectors and Knowledge, InterAmerican Development Bank (2008–2018). Currently expert at Brookings Economic and Social Policy in Latin America Initiative https://www.brookings.edu/es/experts/santiagolevy-2/. Recovered August 2, 2020. 3 Economist, professor at the Haas School of Business and the School of Public Health at the University of California, Berkeley. He is considered one of the pioneers in the random evaluation of social programs in developing countries (http://facultybio.haas.ber keley.edu/faculty-list/gertler-paul. Retrieved January 31, 2014). 4 Gertler (2004), Fernald et al. (2009), Gertler et al. (2006), and Fernald et al. (2008).

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good product to “be sold” to the countries, considering that these institutions are, above all, banks. “The bank has to promote development, but in the end it has to enter the business where the kind of project to be financed is relevant… a bank that does not manage loans well will disappear” (CCT expert, FAO). The programs constitute concrete and limited models, which mean “a predictable flow of resources” (CCT expert, IDB). Together with this, they opened up a possibility for these entities to link directly with regional social policies; “the banks have to execute, so they were given the possibility of doing their work in an instrumental manner” (CCT expert, ECLAC). The social sector officials of the banks, who are responsible for linking the countries with the programs, also contributed to the establishment of the programs within the entities as an important instrument, even meaning certain institutional adaptations. In the case of the IDB, for example, a formal process was developed to enable it to grant loans. This was because the Bank had two types of instruments at that time, investment loans and policy loans. When the loans were requested for the programs in Honduras and Nicaragua, “the legal department showed a lot of reticence, because they said (…) this is not an investment loan (…) So there was a long period of time between the technical teams and the legal teams of the banks to make them understand that the demand incentive, (…) has to be understood as an investment loan. (…) Before the IDB financing began, the legal department had to free up this concept” (CCT expert, IDB). Although the magnitude of this internal process of the banks cannot be addressed in detail in this study, it shows that the banks joined this initiative, and that during this wave of diffusion it implied a learning—in different magnitude—for all the actors involved. In short, it was a program that “nobody knew about 15 years ago (…) and it was necessary to develop and identify (on the part of the banks) the technical capacity to respond to specific operational demands that the programs had, such as a targeting system” (World Bank CCT expert). As for the connections and initiatives that enabled the linking and contact of its members, together with their gradual influence in the creation of this consensus about the CCTs, it is possible to distinguish some more explicit instances linked to the process of program formulation and others linked to multilateral banking. With respect to the former, it depends on the meeting points among the members. In the cases where there were loans and technical cooperation between the banks and the countries, there were official instances where this occurred. In other cases,

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as pointed out by the experts interviewed, informal meetings could be held between members who contacted program officials, academics or bank officials. Although they were still in their initial stages during this period, it is also possible to identify some meditating and encouraging activities from the multilateral banking sector that contributed to the configuration and visibility of the experts as agents for the diffusion of the programs. In the late 1990s, the IDB implemented the Regional Policy Dialogue (RPD), a mechanism to promote the exchange of knowledge among high-level government officials in Latin America and the Caribbean and experts in key development areas.5 The RPDs addressed various issues, such as innovation, water and health, education, energy, labor markets, social protection and health networks, among others. To facilitate this exchange, the network promotes high-quality reporting, research and studies. The Social Protection and Health Network, where the discussion and exchange of information about CCTs would be located, would start to meet from the year 2000 and become a meeting place for experts and program managers. Finally, the publication of documents with policy recommendations was still limited during these early years. It should be noted that the first studies and research about the programs were being developed. In fact, the first evaluations of PROGRESA began in 1998 and the results were to be reported two years later (IFPRI 2000).

5.2

The Epistemic Community from 2000

The emerging community of experts would be consolidated during this second period. This community was significantly influenced by its links with international bodies, together with the meditative and encouragement activities carried out by the banking sector and other international bodies that were more strongly developed. In recent years, the activities carried out by other regional organizations, such as ECLAC, OAS, UNDP and FAO, have become more visible, and members of the epistemic community have been identified. In relation to the members who were Directors of CCTs, it is noted that some of them, due to their practical knowledge and solid professional profile, began to be recruited as staff of the World Bank, the IDB 5 http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/regional-policy-dialogue/regional-policydialogue,2392.html. Rescued on November 20, 2012.

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and the OAS, since the mid-2000s. For example, Veronica Silva,6 one of the managers of the Chile Solidario program, became part of the World Bank’s Social Protection Department. Likewise, Manuel Salazar,7 from Familias en Acción, Colombia, joined the World Bank in 2002, as did Rogelio Gómez Hermosillo8 from Oportunidades , Mexico, who is now an external consultant to the Bank. Santiago Levy, one of the “fathers” of PROGRESA, has been with the IDB since 2007 and is currently the Vice President of Sectors and Knowledge. Similar cases are those of Francisca Rivero,9 who worked at FOSIS, Chile (linked to the PUENTE program, a component of Chile Solidario) and then went to the OAS, and Graziano da Silva,10 who was part of Hambre Cero project in Brazil, and then went to FAO. From these roles, their influence as a community is even greater. Following Haas, as an epistemic community consolidates its bureaucratic power within international organizations, it “institutionalizes its influence and insinuates its views into a broader spectrum of international politics” (Haas 1992: 4). Considering furthermore the involvement of banks in the formulation processes of some programs, the role they acquire in this new position could imply a greater degree of influence in countries’ decision-making. In this sense, it is possible to say that the legitimacy of the members of the community is based on their own experience, and also strengthened in some cases by their links with international bodies. This aspect has positive consequences for the community and its influence, and it 6 Social worker. Between 1999 and 2000, she was Director of the Social Division of the Ministry of Development and Planning in Chile (MIDEPLAN). In 2001 she became Program Director of the Social Solidarity Fund (FOSIS) (Personal interview conducted on October 31, 2011). 7 Economist. Director of Familias en Acción, Colombia. Since 2002 at the World Bank

(Personal interview conducted March 26, 2012). 8 Sociologist. National Coordinator of the Oportunidades Program, Mexico, between 2001 and 2006. As of 2007, international consultant for the World Bank (Personal interview conducted on February 22, 2012). 9 Social worker. FOSIS officer between 2000 and 2010. From 2010 to 2013 in the Inter-American Social Protection Network, RIPSO, of the Organization of American States (OAS). (Personal interview conducted on November 11, 2011). 10 Agronomist. Between 2003 and 2004 he was Extraordinary Minister of Food Security, being responsible for the implementation of the Hambre Zero Program. From 2011 he was elected Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (in http://www.fao.org/about/who-we-are/director-gen/biography/es/. Recovered on January 31, 2014).

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also had a favorable impact on the role of banks in their links with the CCTs in the region. The incorporation of experts was part of a learning process, of enriching the information about the CCTs. “At the World Bank we learned, we found out what Mexico, Brazil, Chile were doing” (Former Director Families in Action/Current WB Expert). As a result of this incorporation process, it is possible to distinguish two groups: those with a professional profile who usually start working at the Bank from the beginning of their career. A second group are those who join after having worked in the region’s governments (World Bank CCT expert/former Program Director), as is the case with the former managers who have been identified. Likewise, especially in the case of the WB, a process has been observed in which an attempt has been made to include among the officials dedicated to the region, personnel with a “Latin American profile” (CCT experts, ECLAC and WB) and also professionals from various disciplines—as is the case of some of the former directors—to provide a more pluralist profile, where economists have traditionally predominated (Hall 2007). At present “it is not only the economists who arrive with the models, the Banks are more heterogeneous” (CCT Expert, UNDP). The fact that some members of the community are involved in multilateral banking gives them greater capacity to influence, given the spaces to which they have access thanks to the activities of these entities. But also, their role is greater given their character as former program managers; this facilitates relations with countries and dialogue among policy makers. Interviewees agree that trust and legitimacy are enhanced if recommendations or responses to concerns come from a person who has managed a program. “If in your curriculum you have been a manager of this type of program you are looked at with different eyes” (CCT Academic Expert). They pointed out that both policy makers and directors find it easier and more enriching to discuss with other experts who use technical language, and who have had similar problems and concerns, whose solutions are possible to know only in practice. Their profile would facilitate the circulation of knowledge with the credibility that comes from having been involved in the implementation and management of processes, and not just from having knowledge of policy designs and concepts (Peck and Theodore 2010b). The group of community members is completed by those who stand out for their exhaustive knowledge of the programs in the region, obtained through research and evaluations, and therefore authors of

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reports, books and studies on CCTs, some of them very influential.11 For example, Paul Gertler is mentioned as one of the references since he participated in the first impact evaluations of the PROGRESA program and based on that he also made several publications. Ariel Fiszbein12 and Norbert Schady13 of the World Bank and, in recent years, Simone Cecchini14 of ECLAC and Fabio Veras15 of UNDP also stand out. As for meditative and exhortation activities—which allow experts to meet and influence their approach to CCTs—these were more important during this period. As of 2001, the Social Protection and Health Network began operating at the IDB as part of the Regional Policy Dialogue initiative mentioned above. Its main objective is “the creation of a forum where the countries of the region can share experiences, learn about practices carried out outside the region and explore opportunities for regional cooperation in the areas of poverty reduction and social protection” (IDB 2001: 1). It was constituted by the vice-ministers and their respective secretaries of the countries of the region, who sought to identify opportunities for technical cooperation between the Bank and the countries members.16 The network financed annual meetings where the representatives analyzed and discussed critical issues identified through the constant dialogue between the Bank and the member states. From its inception through 2012, 11 hemispheric meetings of this network were

11 Some of the publications are Fiszbein and Schady (2009), Levy and Rodriguez (2005), Cecchini and Madariaga (2011), and Cecchini and Martínez (2011). 12 Economist. Currently Director of the Education Program at the Inter-American Dialogue (https://www.thedialogue.org/experts/ariel-fiszbein/. Recovered on August 2, 2020). He held various positions in the World Bank since its entry in 1991 (at http:// blogs.worldbank.org/es/team/ariel-fiszbein. Recovered on January 31, 2014). 13 Economist. Senior Economic Advisor for the Social Sector at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), also advisor to the World Bank and UNICEF, and has been a professor at Georgetown University and Princeton University (at http://www.iadb.org/ es/temas/desarrollo-humano/norbert-schady,4739.html. Retrieved January 31, 2014). 14 Economist. Researcher at ECLAC’s Social Development Division. He is dedicated to

the study of social protection and poverty reduction policies and programs in the region, and is an expert on social indicators (Personal interview, 23 November 2011). 15 Researcher at the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), UNDP (Personal interview conducted on 14 November 2011). 16 http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/regional-policy-dialogue/social-protec tion-and-health-network,2395.html. Retrieved November 20, 2012.

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held, all in Washington, DC.17 Since CCTs are one of the most important programs in this regard, many of these meetings were devoted to presentations linking the programs to the central theme of the meeting; for example, at the 10th Meeting, the theme focused on CCTs and financial inclusion. Within the framework of this network, annual meetings have been organized since 2001, with the corresponding production of documents and related material requested from the experts (until 2012 there were around 230 documents available on the website18 ). These activities are beginning to include the presence of experts invited by the banks, whose names become a reference in certain matters and are part of the epistemic community. For example, Santiago Levy attended the first Regional Policy Dialogue as a guest in 2001,19 in his role as Director of the Mexican Social Security Institute. He also attended the 11th Meeting in 2009.20 Likewise, Argentine expert Fabián Repetto21 has been present at four of these meetings22 and Chilean expert Ignacio Irrarázaval was at three of them.23 Other experts attending some of these meetings were

17 http://www.iadb.org/es/investigacion-y-datos/dialogo-regional-de-politica/reunio nes-proteccion-social,3247.html. Rescued on February 10, 2013. The meetings were held on 11 June 2001; 10 December 2001, 23 May 2002, 11 November 2002, 23 May 2003, 9 December 2003, 11 November 2004, 24 April 2006, 13 September 2007, 6 November 2008, 29 October 2009. 18 http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/regional-policy-dialogue/documentssocial-protection-health,3272.html. Rescued on November 20, 2012. 19 Between 2000–2010, 20 meetings have been held, some of them hemispheric and others subregional (Andean and Caribbean area). http://www.iadb.org/en/researchand-data/regional-policy-dialogue/meetings-social-protection,3247.html. Rescued on November 20, 2012. 20 Information gathered based on the review of the lists of attendees at the Regional Meetings. Retrieved from http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/regional-policy-dia logue/meetings-social-protection,3247.html, November 20, 2012. 21 Political Scientist. Director of the Social Protection Program of CIPPEC (Center for

the Implementation of Public Policies for Equity and Growth), Argentina. Consultant for UNICEF, UNESCO, ECLAC, UNDP, IDB and WORLD BANK (in http://cippec.org/ priorizarlaequidad/entrevista-a-fabian-repetto/. Recovered on January 31, 2014). 22 In 1st, 3rd, 7th and 8th regional meetings, held in 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2006. Idem. 23 In the 7th, 8th and 10th, the years 2004, 2006 and 2009. Idem.

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Norbert Schady of the IDB, Colombian expert Rita Combariza24 and Paul Gertler.25 All of them have solid knowledge of the initiatives, ranging from the conceptual framework to practical aspects. Community members were also present at the First International Workshop on CCTs, held in Puebla, Mexico in May 2002. This would be the first of three international meetings organized by the World Bank’s Social Protection Division. The objective of the Workshops was “to provide a forum for implementers of different CCTs to share their experiences -both successes and challenges- and learn from each other in order to improve the operation of their programs” (Ayala Consulting Co 2003: 3). In effect, these instances provided a meeting point for community members and for the exchange of information and diffusion about the CCTs. Along with this, the quality of the exhibitors and the fact that it was organized by the World Bank gave relevance to the events. In fact, they have been repeatedly mentioned as a reference for program managers and experts. In the first workshop held in 2002, there was a presentation by Rogelio Gómez Hermosillo, from the Oportunidades program, and also two experts from the World Bank, Laura Rawlings26 and Margaret Grosh,27 stood out. They also made presentations at the Second Workshop held in Sao Paulo, Brazil, in 2004. The experiences of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, among others, were also presented, highlighting the participation of National Directors such as Verónica Silva of Chile Solidario and Ana Fonseca of the Brazilian Ministry of Development, as well as Michelle Adato of IFPRI. Two years later, the Third Workshop on CCTs

24 Social Science Professional. National Coordinator of Familias en Acción, Colombia, between 2001–2012 (in http://cippec.org/priorizarlaequidad/entrevista-a-rita-combarizacruz/. Recovered on January 31, 2014). 25 Experts and IDB staff were also recurrent members at these seminars. Not all of them are considered members of the epistemic community, as they must have also influenced through other networks and been called to other activities based on their knowledge about CCTs. 26 Economist. Currently Lead Economist with the Human Capital Project at the World Bank. She has also been a consultant for the World Bank’s Economic Development research group (at https://blogs.worldbank.org/team/laura-b-rawlings. Recovered on August 2, 2020). 27 Economist. She has held diverse positions at the World Bank. Until the end of the period of this study, Head of the Human Development Section of the World Bank for Latin America and the Caribbean (at http://blogs.worldbank.org/es/team/margaretgrosh. Recovered on January 31, 2014).

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was held in Istanbul, Turkey. This workshop was the first outside Latin America and had a larger attendance than the previous ones (about 300 people). Experiences from other regions were also presented, such as the CCTs of Turkey, South Africa, Bangladesh, and Kenya. The presence of governments and their counterparts who were implementing programs or were considering doing so was privileged (www.worldbank.org28 ). Some of the experts identified who are again present are Norbert Schady and Ariel Fiszbein from the World Bank, Rogelio Gómez Hermosillo from Oportunidades Mexico, and Rita Combariza from Colombia. The global reach of this Third Workshop is explained by the concentration that CCTs had already reached in Latin America, and the emerging presence in other countries outside the region. In fact, representatives from 8 nations participated in the first conference, the second from 25, and the third from 40, bringing together 375 face-to-face participants and approximately 1600 through the website’s online conferences (World Bank 2006). Along with this, information on the functioning of the CCTs had already been generated and accumulated. The World Bank call noted that a “first generation” of programs already showed results of evaluations with increased school enrollment, health checks and household consumption (www.worldbank.org29 ). This meeting was therefore taking place at a time when the CCTs had already reached a certain degree of maturity compared to the previous two encounters. There were also other activities that constituted instances of exchange and diffusion of knowledge about the CCTs and where a role for community experts was outlined. One of them was the so-called “study tours”, which constituted research missions where policy makers from one or several countries could obtain first-hand experiences. “Since 2001, the Bank has organized study tours of the Oportunidades Program in Mexico, Familias en Acción in Colombia and Bolsa Familia in Brazil with more than 30 countries. (…) The study tours were tailored to the needs of the participants and all aspects of the CCTs were covered” (IEG 2011). The World Bank supported the trips and the countries also carried them 28 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/SPLP/ 0„contentMDK:20892674~pagePK:64156158~piPK:64152884~theSitePK:461654,00. html. Recovered on November 20, 2012. 29 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/SPLP/ 0„contentMDK:20892674~pagePK:64156158~piPK:64152884~theSitePK:461654,00. html. Recovered on November 20, 2012.

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out individually. Thus, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and Chile hosted policy makers, coordinating and defining a schedule, information and places of interest for visitors. “We have received visits from various countries in Latin America and also from the rest of the world, numerous visits during the year” (Former Director of the Puente- Chile Solidario Program). These allowed contact between national experts, which contributed to the exchange of knowledge and generation of trust. Likewise, the World Bank financed the “Expert Visits”, that is, when an expert from the Bank or an external advisor travels to a country to support the design and implementation of the program. The interviews mention, for example, Verónica Silva, Rogelio Gómez Hermosillo and María Concepción Steta Gándara,30 who were invited to present their knowledge about CCTs, which contributed to their recognition among policy makers as experts in the field. Regarding diffusion documents, from 2000 onwards, there are some more complete publications that provide a broad perspective on the programs, reflecting the results of the evaluations carried out in the first initiatives. “Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs” (Rawlings and Rubio 2003) analysed the evaluations of the first generation of CCTs in Brazil, Mexico, Nicaragua and Colombia. Likewise, “Redistributing the Income of the Poor and the Rich: Public Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean” (Lindert et al. 2006) states that they have proven to have had a favorable impact on human capital and the ability to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Published by the IDB, Tejerina and Bouillon (2006) also analyze the evaluations of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras and Mexico (developed between 1997–2003). They conclude that they are “very effective instruments” for reducing poverty and inequality “in the long term” and for alleviating poverty “in the short term” (Tejerina and Bouillon 2006). The authors of these publications are the same experts whose presence is recurrent in the workshops and conferences and who are mentioned as references by policymakers. In mid-2000, reports were also published as a regional compilation that indicated an official position of the banks towards the CCTs. Ariel Fiszbein and Norbert Schady (2009) are the authors of “Conditional 30 She was Director General of Planning and Evaluation of the Oportunidades program, from 2004–2009. Currently a specialist in Social Protection and a member of the World Bank’s Global Networking Expert Group.

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Cash Transfers: Reducing Poverty Today and in the Future”, a book in which the World Bank compiles the experience and analysis of these years. In the IDB’s 2005 Annual Report (2006), it was noted that CCTs have been successful in “reducing poverty levels, promoting human capital accumulation and access to basic social services” (IDB 2006: 12). These studies gathered information about several countries and establish critical points and lessons learned regarding the programs.31 There is a favorable official position on the programs and specific recommendations regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the CCTs. Finally, a relevant initiative from the banking sector is the “Community of Practice” on CCTs, which are defined as an “informal group of professionals who share knowledge about common development problems, in the search for joint solutions” (WB, undated). The WB has numerous communities of practice on a wide range of issues and they are considered “the heart and soul of knowledge sharing in the organization, due to the wealth of experiences, views and perspectives - the Bank’s social and organizational capital - that its members offer” (WB, undated). The Community of Practice on CCTs was created in 2006 due to the growing interest of countries such as Chile, Brazil, Mexico, El Salvador and Colombia, who requested the World Bank to act as a regional facilitator of knowledge, learning and innovation on the programs (IEG 2011). Since then, active work has been carried out, including annual meetings, 3 or 4 videoconferences per year, exchange of information by e-mail, publication of reports and data sets on the website, a videoconference entitled “Learning Circle” and face-to-face sessions among experts, among others (WB Expert and Fiszbein and Schady 2009). It is also worth mentioning an Analysis and Reflection Workshop held in January 2008 in Mexico, which sought to analyze the lessons of the CCTs “6 years or more after their installation” (World Bank 2008). High-level officials from the CCTs of Chile, Colombia, Brazil, El Salvador and Mexico participated in this workshop. As for the experts, those in charge of the Bank already present on previous occasions, such as Helena Ribe,32 Polly

31 For example, Tejerina and Bouillon (2006), Rawlings and Rubio (2003), and Fiszbein and Schady (2009). 32 Economist. Retired senior executive from the World Bank. She hold diverse management positions at the Bank (Personal interview held March 8, 2012).

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Jones,33 Emanuela Galasso, and also former directors of programs in the region, already integrated into the World Bank, such as Verónica Silva and María Concepción Steta; and experts from the IDB and UNDP. Policymakers and experts from other international organizations agreed on the importance of this group and its ability to generate greater impact than, for example, participation in an annual seminar (CCT expert, ECLAC). The set of documents and reports, based on the many evaluations of the programs, constitute a source of legitimacy and play the role of calling for, inviting debate about poverty and the solutions that countries can follow. Many of them respond to the requests of the governments themselves, others correspond to studies developed by the same agencies, along with the debate and exchange of information from universities or research centers that are requested for seminars and meetings. In addition, public databases allow access to systematized information on CCTs and contribute to their diffusion. “This preeminence is rather guaranteed in the amount of studies, analyses, evaluations, experiments that have been developed. I would say (…) that these programs are one of the most studied social programs in the history of public policies” (CCT expert, World Bank). All of the resources integrate a broad set of knowledge about the programs, which is solid in terms of its empirical evidence and the breadth of issues it covers, and which continues to grow steadily.

5.3 The Epistemic Community and Other International Organizations In recent years, the epistemic community has been including in its debate the challenges that CCTs imply in the logic of social rights and social protection, along with warnings, from experience in the subject, about their weaknesses or complex aspects. This is evident in the preeminence of experts who emphasize these issues and the more relevant role of international organizations close to this approach, that is, ECLAC, FAO and OAS. These organizations have also led the activities related to the accumulation of knowledge and debate about the CCTs in recent years, and 33 Economist, during the period under study she was researcher in the poverty group of the Development Research Group of the World Bank. World Bank official since 2000 (at http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?authorMDK=167976&theSitePK= 469372&pagePK=64214821&menuPK=64214916&piPK=64214942. Retrieved January 31, 2014).

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where community experts are identified. “In the beginning the Bank was more important. Today that community is very heterogeneous as the programs are heterogeneous, and there are other preeminent stakeholders. For example, ECLAC (…) and OAS” (CCT expert, UNDP). According to some interviewees, these bodies would have greater legitimacy among policy makers and experts. “A workshop organized by ECLAC is more interesting than a workshop organized by the Bank. (…) I think the correlation of forces has changed enough” (CCT Expert, UNDP). Its late presence in this process could be explained by the fact that in some cases banks played an essential role from the beginning through monetary loans, an action that these bodies do not carry out. Their objectives and capacities, therefore, differ from those of multilateral banking. “I think we have different contributions, slightly different ideas (…) and obviously we have less interference, because one thing is to go to a country with good direct financing or technical assistance budget (…) we who have few resources (…) go with ideas and those who want to listen to us well and those who do not, do not” (CCT expert, ECLAC). In this sense, their participation in the debate on CCTs coincides with the existence of more background information and a more complex and comprehensive view of the programs. The official attention paid by ECLAC to the programs is somewhat belated. One of the first works to address a characterization and analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the CCTs is that of Pablo Villatoro (2005), reissued the following year in ECLAC’s magazine. Likewise, Lorena Godoy’s paper addressed Brazil’s Renta Mínima program (which later became part of Bolsa Familia), although it is not mentioned and/or defined as a CCT. Other works focused on specific aspects, such as its impact on areas such as gender, education and institutional characteristics.34 These were one-off studies, some of them linked to research on other subjects where CCTs could be included (CCT ECLAC Expert Interview). ECLAC’s official interest in CCTs began in 2005–2006, as reflected in the document La protección social de cara al futuro: acceso, financiamiento y solidaridad (ECLAC 2006), presented at the thirty-first session. In particular, Chapter V presents an analysis of social programs in which “special importance is given to those that have had the greatest

34 For example, Godoy (2004) and Armas (2005).

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coverage and diffusion in the recent past: employment-related emergency programs and conditional transfer programs” (ECLAC 2006: 150). It was also from these years on that the social rights and social protection approach took center stage in the research agenda of the organization (Cecchini and Martínez 2011). From this perspective, ECLAC recommends that states should fulfil their responsibility to honor their commitments to the international community to respect, protect and promote social rights and to adopt concrete measures through social protection policies (ECLAC 2006). Taking into account this social protection perspective, CCTs are a specific tool that should be analyzed in this context. In this sense, in the following years ECLAC developed a broad production of knowledge on the subject.35 There are complete works that provide information about the reality in the region, taking into account the characteristics of the programs and their role in social protection. In 2008, a study was published on the contribution of CCTs in the fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals, i.e., the degree to which the countries implementing the programs have reduced (or not) poverty (León 2008). Another central work published by ECLAC is Cecchini and Madariaga (2011), Programas de Transferencias Condicionadas. Balance de la experiencia reciente en América Latina y el Caribe. This is a thorough and complete analysis of the region’s programs, considering various aspects such as their central characteristics, type of conditionality, impact, institutionality, among others. Finally, in “Inclusive social protection in Latin America: a comprehensive view”, a rights-based approach, programs are analyzed in terms of their relationship with social protection and the rights-based approach (Cecchini and Martínez 2011) and their strengths, weaknesses and challenges are discussed from this perspective. As discussed above, the authors classify programs according to their type of conditionality (soft or hard) and if whether they are part of a social protection system or not. Along these lines, CCTs are considered a component, generally which allows entry into the system, by broader

35 In terms of access to information it is important to mention the ECLAC database,

where it is possible to find the description of the main components of the region’s CCTs, statistics and documents. At http://dds.cepal.org/bdptc/ it is also possible to find working documents, such as the Social Policy Series, which diffuse studies on more specific aspects of the programs. For example, Román (2010), Villatoro (2005), Rodríguez (2010), and Arim et al. (2009).

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social protection strategies. These works are the result of research carried out by the agency’s experts and also the results of discussions and presentations by experts at workshops and seminars organized by ECLAC.36 In this regard, just as in the banking sector, the authors of these studies are members of the epistemic community, Simone Cecchini and Rodrigo Martínez, for example, who participated in the seminars and meetings and are mentioned as references by policymakers. All these actions and publications produced by ECLAC provide a platform for discussion for the experts involved and are meeting points for national policy makers. In addition, in comparison with other organizations, ECLAC maintains a closer relationship with universities and academic centers, such as the University of Chile and Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, CIPPEC in Argentina and UNAM in Mexico (ECLAC CCT expert). Finally, one of ECLAC’s most recent initiatives is a new website dedicated to the topic of social protection created in 2012.37 Its objective is to disseminate the work developed and accumulated by the ECLAC Social Development Division and other institutions in the area of social protection. In line with what was previously mentioned, the ECLAC database that already existed some years ago became a component of this website on social protection, together with a new database on pensions.38 In view of the above, ECLAC, as an international organization, has provided a platform for the discussion of experts, exchange of knowledge between countries and also provides important systematized information about CCTs. In this way, it is linked to the formulation and analysis of national social policies in the region. Another UN agency that has played a pre-eminent role and facilitated the influence of community experts is the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (established in 1945). FAO, with its regional office located in Santiago, Chile, began in 2006 with the launch of the “Hunger-Free Latin America and the Caribbean Initiative” (a politicalinstitutional advocacy body to eradicate hunger in the region within a generation), and has focused its work on strengthening the dimension of access to food for the poorest families. In this context, FAO also focused 36 Expert Workshop “Social Protection, Poverty and the Rights-Based Approach: Links and Tensions” Organized by ECLAC and GTZ, Santiago, 5–6 November 2009. ECLAC has also co-organized several of the Seminars organized by FAO mentioned below. 37 http://dds.cepal.org/proteccionsocial/. Recovered on January 20, 2013. 38 http://dds.cepal.org/bdps/. Recovered on January 20, 2013.

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its work on evaluating CCTs and their impact on hunger eradication and child nutrition, and on exchanging information on programs between experts and policy makers through regular seminars.39 However, there was a partial shift in this emphasis in 2006 with its new Director, Graziano da Silva, who participated in the design and implementation of Hambre Cero 40 in Brazil, the integrated system of social policies of which Bolsa Familia is a component. The arrival of this expert, who was part of this community on CCTs, focused attention on the impact of CCTs on nutrition and social protection. For this reason, the seminars are considered an opportunity to diffuse the analysis of the programs and their relation to obtaining adequate nutrition for the population in conditions of extreme poverty. These instances went from having very few participants and partners during the first years, to reaching increasing degrees of complexity, with inter-agency participation and collaboration (FAO CCT Expert). Since 2006, seven international seminars have been held, with the assistance of experts from the region and other organizations such as ECLAC, academics, research centers and governments.41 An Expert Workshop was also held in 2011.42 Considering this set of activities, the participation of several members of the community is identified, such as Verónica Silva, Ana Fonseca (as a consultant FAO and/or minister of the Brazilian government), José Graziano da Silva (FAO), Simone Cecchini (ECLAC),

39 Fonseca (2008), Garret et al. (2009), Hoddinott and Bassett (2009), and Paes Sousa and Pacheco Santos (2009). 40 Graziano da Silva participated in the elaboration of the Hambre Cero program and in its implementation as Extraordinary Minister of Food Security and Fight against Hunger. Hambre Cero aims to ensure the human right to adequate food, promoting food security and contributing to the conquest of citizenship among the most vulnerable population. It is an integrated system of policies, which has components of access to food, strengthening of the rural family, income generation and social coordination and commitment. 41 “I Seminario de Programas de Transferencias Condicionadas”, Santiago de Chile, 4–5 December 2006; “II Seminario Programa Transferencias Condicionadas”, Santiago, 3–4 December 2007; “III Seminario Programa Transferencias Condicionadas”, Santiago, 1–2 December 2008; “IV Seminario Programas Transferencias Condicionadas”, Santiago, 5–6 November 2009; “V Seminario Programas Transferencias Condicionadas, perspectivas de los últimos 10 años”, Santiago, 30 September and 1 October 2010; “VI Seminario programa Transferencias Condicionadas”, Santiago, 29–30 September 2011; “VII Seminar on Food Security, Rural Poverty and Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean”, Santiago, 22 and 23 November 2012. 42 Workshop “Los Programas de Transferencias Condicionadas desde un enfoque de derechos”, held on March 17 and 18, 2011, in Santiago de Chile.

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Rodrigo Martínez (ECLAC), Francisco Pilotti (OAS), Laura Pautassi and experts from IFPRI, such as Jere R. Behrman or John Hoddinot. At the last seminar held in November 2012, the importance of these bodies and the thematic shift that has been generated towards the challenge of advancing social protection became clear. In the opening speeches, Adoniram Sanches, FAO Policy Officer, said that “CCTs are now behind us and we are moving towards protection systems” in the region (www.rlc.fao.org43 ). For 2012, the “thematic expansion of the VII event was envisaged in order to address the various challenges posed by social protection in rural areas in its contributory and non-contributory pillars and labor regulations, on the understanding that only through a comprehensive protection system can a permanent state of food security be strengthened and consolidated for the Region’s most vulnerable population” (FAO 2012: 2). In other words, and as stated by Martín Hopenhayn, Director of the Social Development Division, ECLAC, “this was the CCT seminar and it has been evolving towards the vision that more comprehensive and complex systems are required in the region” (www.rlc.fao.org44 ). Since September 2009, the Organization of American States (OAS) has played an important role as a platform for debate on CCTs, when the Inter-American Social Protection Network (RIPSO) was created. The launch was on September 2 in New York and was attended by Presidents of State and representatives from Chile, the United States, Mexico and Colombia, among others.45 The network is a community of ministries and national social development agencies, in collaboration with international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, the private

43 Opening speech by Adoniram Sanches, FAO Policy Officer, FAO Seminar, November 2012. Retrieved February 10, 2013 from http://www.rlc.fao.org/es/proyectoiniciativa/ agenda/septimo-seminario-internacional-seguridad-alimentaria-pobreza-rural-y-proteccionsocial-en-america-latina-y-el-caribe/presentaciones/. 44 Opening speech by Martín Hopenhayn, Director of the Social Development Division, ECLAC. FAO Seminar, November 2012. Retrieved February 10, 2013 from http://www.rlc.fao.org/es/proyectoiniciativa/agenda/septimo-seminario-internacionalseguridad-alimentaria-pobreza-rural-y-proteccion-social-en-america-latina-y-el-caribe/pre sentaciones/. 45 http://redproteccionsocial.org/. Rescued on February 7, 2012. Highlights the participation of Hillary Clinton, as U.S. Secretary of State.

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sector, and academia, to promote the exchange and transfer of experiences and knowledge about social protection.46 In addition, it seeks to provide a meeting place for key institutional stakeholders, to implement cooperation mechanisms in the region and to generate a community of practice for policymakers and experts through a knowledge and learning network.47 Many of the activities that the network has developed so far are seminars and expert meetings, together with the creation of improvement programs for professionals in the social development sector.48 This network also counts on the collaboration of the most important international stakeholders in the region, such as the World Bank, ECLAC, UNDP, FAO, ILO, among others.49 In fact, this cooperation is evident in the circulation of experts among these activities (for example, RIPSO’s director, Francisco Pilotti, is a frequent speaker at FAO seminars and Simone Cecchini of ECLAC participates in FAO events). Finally, it is worth mentioning the activities of the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG).50 This centre located in Brasilia and was founded in 2004 as a partnership between the United Nations 46 http://www.socialprotectionet.org/espanol/index-4.html. Rescued on November 30, 2012. 47 1. To bring together key stakeholders and institutions in the region for dialogues related to the social protection agenda. 2. To strengthen the institutional capacities of social development agencies (…), and to facilitate broad intersectoral cooperation on social protection. 3. To implement an inter-American mechanism for cooperation and 4. To generate a community of practice for policy makers and experts through knowledge and learning networks. http://www.socialprotectionet.org/espanol/index-4.html. Rescued on November 30, 2012. 48 For instance, “Seminario de Políticas Públicas Intersectoriales: Protección Social, Trabajo y Empleo”, organized by OAS, Brazilian Labour Minister and Brazilian Social Development and Fight Against Hunger Minister, Rio de Janeiro, 30th November and 1° December 2010. Workshop “Política Social y Cooperación Internacional: Desafíos para el ministerio de Desarrollo Social y la Red Interamericana de Protección Social”, Brasilia, 15–16 July 2010. A second and third version of this workshop was held in Brasilia, between 4–6 July 2011 and in Santa Marta, Colombia, between 31st October and 2nd November 2012, respectively. Beside this, “Taller de Aprendizaje Virtual para una más efectiva Política Social” in Coco Palm Resort, Bright St., 10–11 March 2011. Finally, the Conference in the Caribbean about “Cooperación Horizontal y Protección Social”, St. Michael, Barbados, 19– 20 January 2011, among other activities. In http://redproteccio nsocial.org/eventos. Recovered on February 10, 2013. 49 RIPSO associated organizations: WB, IDB, ECLAC, FAO, ILO, UNICEF, UNDP and Pan American Health Organization. 50 http://www.ipc-undp.org.

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Development Programme (UNDP) and the Government of Brazil. Its contributions are a database on development policies, its role as a facilitator of dialogue in the South and effective use of communication and advocacy tools to strengthen the role of key stakeholders in developing countries (www.ipc-undp.org).51 Its areas of work are inclusive growth, rural and sustainable development, innovation in development, South-South dialogue and social protection. In this last area of work, it produces studies and reports52 on CCTs in the region and information on programs around the world.53 In the last two years, emphasis has been placed on the relationship between CCTs and social protection. The IPCIG approach recognizes the importance of CCTs in Latin America and other regions and seeks to address their relationship with social protection in the quest to combat inequality, poverty, and social exclusion. In this sense, it is aligned with the debate that has been generated in the region and contributes to the generation of discussion instances and relevant information. However, the IPC-IG does not yet seem to be a reference as is ECLAC, considering that it is rarely mentioned by the interviewees. One of them even points out that “in terms of influence, of policy dialogue, I can assure you that the role it has played in relation to the others is minimal” (IDB CCT expert). On the other hand, its area of study is global and not regional, placing special emphasis on South-South cooperation, so it is possible to find information about CCTs in Asia and Africa, for example. Fabio Veras, Coordinator of the Social Protection and Conditional Transfer Programs Unit is identified as a specialist. As a member of the epistemic community he has participated in the seminars and meetings and has published research that has been carried out since the IPC-IG.54

51 http://www.ipc-undp.org/pages/newsite/menu/about/introduction.jsp?active=0. Rescued on January 9, 2013. 52 http://www.ipc-undp.org/CctNew.do?active=3. Rescued on January 10, 2013. 53 http://www.ipc-undp.org/PageNewSite.do?id=101&active=3. Rescued on January

10, 2013. 54 For instance: Fabio Veras Soares (2012), Britto Tatiana and Fabio Veras Soares (2011), Holmes et al. (2010), and Fabio Veras Soares and Elydia Silva (2010).

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5.4

Final Comments

Taking into account the timeline presented, we can observe from the mid-1990s to 2010 the configuration of an epistemic community that contributed to installing a consensus about CCTs as an effective program to fight poverty in Latin America. In that sense, this evidence—the identification of the regional epistemic community, its origin and influence paths—contributes to confirming the first hypothesis of the research (although future challenges emerge that are commented on at the end of this section). The operating characteristics of this community coincide with those proposed by Adler and Haas (1992). In first place, the experts have not only had an influence on one country or one international organization, but, as explained above, the different experts are present in ECLAC, FAO, WB, IDB, and UNPD, among others, which has generated an impact in the countries where the CCTs were implemented (until 2010). Secondly, the diffusion of the CCTs was not the result of a direct connection between countries, but rather the relationship was established at the international professional level, only through diverse networks. Thirdly, community members have proven to play a central role in international negotiations, which has made it easier to influence the importance of CCTs indirectly in both small and large countries. Finally, this community is characterized by a small number of experts, its members are respected in their own academic disciplines, and they have experience in the policymaking process in their own countries as well as in others. I present below a proposal from the group of experts that constitutes this community (Table 5.1) obtained from the analysis of primary and secondary literature and interviews, identifying those who are mentioned recurrently, members of specialized groups and permanent speakers at seminars and conferences (according to mentioned in Appendices 3). The proposed group includes those who were identified with these characteristics during the research. However, it is impossible to affirm that this is the definitive group, as it is likely that members who were not visible during the study were omitted. Consequently, these names are not presented as a closed list. It should also be mentioned that given the magnitude of the

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Table 5.1 Members of the epistemic community Name

Institutional Link

Ariel Fiszbein Cristovam Buarque

World Bank Governor of the Federal District of Brazil, between 1995–1998, where he implemented Bolsa Escola World Bank Academic International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), UNDP Chile Solidario. At OAS since 2010 Hambre Cero, Brasil. Currently in FAO Tekoporá, Paraguay World Bank Academic World Bank Familias en Acción, Colombia. World Bank Consultant since 2002 Oportunidades, Mexico. At World Bank since 2009 Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank Academic National Coordinator Familias en Acción (2001–2012) Oportunidades. Since 2007 external advisor for World Bank PROGRESA-Oportunidades. At IDB since 2007 ECLAC Chile Solidario. At World Bank since 2010

Emanuela Galasso Fabián Repetto Fábio Veras Soares Francisca Rivero Graziano da Silva Héctor Cárdenas Helena Ribe Laura Pautassi Laura Rawlings Manuel Salazar Maria Concepción Steta Gándara Norbert Schady Paul Gertler Rita Combariza Cruz Rogelio Gómez Hermosillo Santiago Levi Simone Cecchini Verónica Silva

Source based on information collected by the author

studies, analyses, and research about CCTs, other authors and specialists in the field55 and national officials linked to the implementation of the programs are also identified. However, they don’t have the characteristics of an epistemic community, but rather of what could be called a CCT policy community or network. This is a larger critical group that studies, analyses and implements this type of programme, but does not 55 For example, the cases of Ernesto Cohen and Ronaldo Franco, who wrote Transferencias condicionadas con corresponsabilidad (2006) published with the Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL). This publication is an important study on CCTs, but it does not comply with the other indicators proposed.

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have the level of expertise and advocacy that is observed in the community identified in Table 5.1. The majority of the group members played a permanent role during the period under study, although some of them played a more visible and active role than others. In this sense, they are periodically invited to present and participate in the seminars and conferences organized in the different countries of the region and in others such as Asia or Africa. In addition, they are often mentioned in the interviews conducted as authorities on the subject and their books are essential references. These documents constitute relevant inputs for the meditative activities but also have an important role as an instrument of exhortation. As I have already mentioned, the various international bodies have carried out numerous investigations and studies on CCTs and their impact on the region. Most of them are available on their respective websites reaching a wide spectrum of audiences, including academics, politicians, students, and the media, among others. The information presented there has solid empirical support, and the specific recommendations for the design and implementation of CCTs constitute an essential resource, with legitimacy and authority, for the debate on the topic in the region. In that sense, in terms of the policy formulation process, this information contributes to the mitigation of uncertainty and offers accessible perspectives and solutions to public problems with legitimacy and authority. This type of publication has the latter two aspects, which makes it valuable in the process of negotiating alternatives and building policy solutions. The epistemic community agrees on a comprehensive and multidimensional approach to poverty—a policy paradigm on poverty—, and that social policies should contribute to improving living conditions in various areas. In general terms, this approach can also be observed in international organizations, in terms of the relevance of social policies to alleviate poverty in the region and the establishment of social protection networks. In recent years, ECLAC, OAS and FAO stand out in this regard, although the banks, mainly IDB, have also established initiatives. However, there are divergences between banks and other bodies—in relation to the debate on the role of the State and the market, and in the area of social protection systems—that are more evident in more recent years. Indeed, this divergence is not new, “although development banks tend to dominate, the ILO and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean continue to offer alternative views” (Ervik 2005: 36). In the case of the World Bank, in Las Transferencias condicionadas reduciendo

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pobreza hoy y en el futuro (Fiszbein and Schady 2009), the role of social protection programs and the need to strengthen the social order components of the protection system are discussed. However, they are also mentioned as components of safety nets, as in the 1990s. “The potential impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on living standards in the developing world has given new social emphasis to the importance of safety net programs (…)” (Fiszbein and Schady 2009: XI). Also, for example, only Brazil’s Bolsa Escola is analyzed, not the Bolsa Familia, which has broader objectives, close to a social protection system, and there is no mention of Uruguay’s PANES programme, which has a stronger redistributive component (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). In this sense, the report differs from other comparable ECLAC publications—which seek to provide a regional vision of CCTs—since the former seems to have the objective of promoting CCTs and providing guidelines for their design. On the other hand, Cecchini and Martínez (2011), in ECLAC publications, propose a slightly more critical view of CCTs, establishing, for example, the idea that they should not become “Christmas trees”—in the sense of adding components without further analysis—an expression that is mentioned on several occasions during interviews with experts. These divergences are partly due to the nature of the institutions, their objectives, and the pre-eminence of certain types of experts. However, there is agreement, especially in the early years, about CCTs as a viable policy for poverty alleviation, in their favorable impact and efficiency. Furthermore, they converge on the means of validation, i.e. impact assessments, monitoring, methods of determining objectives, among others. Likewise, on the need for verifiable instruments for the design, implementation and evaluation of social policies. For example, the proxy mean test is a characteristic of almost all programs and experts agree that it was constantly promoted by banks as the most relevant tool for the selection of beneficiaries (CCT Experts, UNDP and WB). In summary, the epistemic community coincided in the first years in a positive perception of CCTs as an effective program for overcoming poverty and in that sense it was presented and disseminated. In recent years, with the programs already installed in the region, the approach seeks to solve the weaknesses of CCTs and place them in a broader social protection structure. With respect to the channels of influence and meeting points of these experts, an important role can be observed for international organizations and the meditative and exhorting activities they carry out. The experts have great knowledge about CCTs, which

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is reinforced by the legitimacy of being frequent speakers at the seminars and meditative activities described above. In addition, the support provided by international organizations allows them to produce reports, books and publications, and access to national and international databases, contacts with policy makers, and other information. The many activities described56 are linked to domestic policy making processes. Visits, seminars and access to certain documents occur during this process and can influence, in one way or another, the definition of adopting the program or the components it will have. Specialized conferences, such as those held by the World Bank, IDB or FAO, usually include the presentation of national cases, along with specialized discussion of issues related to the challenges of social policies and CCTs and more specialized areas of program operationalization (financing, targeting methods, indicators for monitoring, among others). All these instances facilitated the creation of this regional consensus on CCTs, which is one of the explanatory variables for the process of diffusion of the programs in Latin America and even to other countries outside the region.57 In this sense, the evidence gathered is consistent with the proposal for operationalization (Chapter 3 and Appendices 3) and confirms the role of community experts and international organizations. This, together with what was discussed in Chapter 4 in terms of discarding the significant weight of other external variables, makes it possible to confirm hypothesis 1 of this book. That is, the variable that

56 A general list of the activities and publications of the international organizations discussed during the chapter is included in Appendices 4. 57 Community members are mentioned as influential agents in the process of exploring alternatives for a poverty alleviation program in New York. Starting in 2006, impressed by the success of Oportunidades and other CCT programs, Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO) began to explore whether a similar program could be adapted for New York City’s poorest neighborhoods (Peck and Theodore 2010a). Oportunidades New York (2008–2011) was inspired and influenced by Mexico and had a close collaboration with the World Bank (CCT expert, MRDC). Conferences were held to learn about the experiences, where WB experts participated (Helena Ribe, Ariel Schady, Laura Rawlings, Santiago Levi and Margaret Grosh) (Peck and Theodore 2010a). In addition, they had contacts with policy makers from Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Brazil. The body in charge of implementing the program was the MRDC Foundation (http://www.mdrc.org/) a non-profit institution, funded by the Ford Foundation, to contribute to research and policy design in poverty and education (Riccio et al. 2010). MRDC won a Rockefeller Foundation grant to fund an international conference at the Bellagio Study and Conference Center in July 2008.

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would explain the diffusion of CCTs is the existence of a consensus about their effectiveness; “CCTs are efficient and work in the region”. This idea has evolved over time, and although in general terms it persists, in recent years it has become more critical and aims to place CCTs in a limited space in complex social protection systems that also involve a discussion about the challenges to ensure social rights in the population. Along with this, the wide range of research and reports that characterize and analyze CCTs have packaged the programs into a generic model (considering, for example, the essential characteristics already identified in Chapter 2) that facilitates their diffusion. This is a product that can travel and is easy to present and discuss. However, the influence of this consensus on the programs may have been more relevant in some countries than in others and it will be through the case studies that this can be observed. It remains to be detected, for example, the variation in its influence according to the institutional capacities of each country. Whether they exercised influence only during the adoption of the CCT or in possible subsequent adjustments is also important to consider. In this chapter I have presented the arguments that support the regional epistemic community variable as an explanatory factor in this process of diffusion at the regional level. In the case studies presented below, it will be possible to confirm the weight of this variable over others and also its degree of influence on the diffusion mechanism observed in the decision to adopt a program. A more detailed look at the regional level would require an increase in the number of case studies. Also emerging from this discussion is the challenge of addressing in greater detail the process of installing CCTs as a relevant issue within multilateral banking, and whether, for example, a learning process was developed, as some preliminary evidence suggests in the case of banks. Finally, progress should be made in identifying more precisely the trajectory of the experts and their degrees of influence on the processes of adopting CCTs in the other cases in the region that are not addressed in this research.

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Garret, J., Bassett, L., & Marini, A. (2009, April). Designing CCT Programs to Improve Nutrition Impact: Principles, Evidence and Examples (FAO Working Paper No. 6). Gertler, P. (2004). Do Conditional Cash Transfers Improve Child Health? Evidence from Progresa’s Control Randomized Experiment. American Economic Review, 94(2), 336–341. Gertler, P., Martinez, S., & Rubio-Codina, M. (2006). Investing Cash Transfers to Raise Long-Term Living Standards (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3994). Godoy, L. (2004). Programas de renta mínima vinculada a la educación: las becas escolares en Brasil (Social Policies Series No. 99). Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. Haas, P. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization, 46(1), 1–35. Hall, A. (2007). Social Policies in the World Bank: Paradigms y Challenge. Global Social Policy, 7 (2), 151–175. Hoddinott, J., & Bassett, L. (2009, April). Conditional Cash Transfer Programs and Nutrition in Latin America: Assessment of Impacts and Strategies for Improvement (FAO Working Paper No. 9). Holmes, R., Jones, N., Vargas, R., & Veras, F. (2010, December). Cash Transfers and Gendered Risks and Vulnerabilities: Lessons from Latin America (Policy Research Brief No. 16). Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). (2001, June 11–12). Presentation of First Meeting of the Poverty Reduction and Social Protection Network. Regional Policy Dialogue. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). (2006). Inter-American Development Bank Annual Report 2005. IDB. https://publications.iadb.org/publicati ons/english/document/Inter-American-Development-Bank-Annual-Report2005.pdf. Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). (2011). Social Safety Nets: An Evaluation of World Bank Support, 2000–2010. Washington, DC: IEG-WB. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). (2000). ¿Está dando buenos resultados Progresa? Informe de los resultados obtenidos de una evaluación realizada por el IFPRI . Síntesis de la evaluación de impacto. León, A. (2008). Progresos en la reducción de la pobreza extrema en América Latina. Dimensiones y políticas para el análisis de la primera meta del Milenio. ECLAC-AECID project. Monitoring of the poverty component of the first Millennium Development Goal (AEC/06/003). Levy, S., & Rodriguez, E. (2005). Sin herencia de pobreza: el programa Progresa – Oportunidades de México. Washington, DC: IDB.

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Lindert, K., Skoufias, E., & Shapiro, J. (2006). Redistributing Income to the Poor and the Rich: Public Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean. Social Safety Nets Primer Series. Washington, DC, World Bank Institute. Paes Sousa, R., & Pacheco Santos, L. (2009). Measuring the Impact of Bolsa Familia Program Based on Data. From Health and Nutrition Days (Working Paper No. 7). FAO ALCSH Initiative. Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2010a). Recombinant Workfare, Across the Americas: Transnationalizing “Fast” Social Policy. Geoforum, 41(2), 195–208. Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2010b). Mobilizing Policy: Models, Methods, and Mutations. Geoforum, 41(2), 169–174. Rawlings, L. B., & Rubio, G. M. (2003). Lecciones desde América Latina. Evaluación del impacto de los programas de transferencias condicionadas en efectivo. Ciudad de México, Secretaría de Desarrollo Social. Serie Cuadernos de Desarrollo Humano. Riccio, J., Dechausay, N., Greenberg, D., Miller, C., Rucks, Z., & Verma, N. (2010). Toward Reduced Poverty Across Generations. Early Findings from New York City’s Conditional Cash Transfer Program. MDRC, Building Knowledge To Improve Social Policy. New York. Rodríguez, A. (2010). Programas de transferencias condicionadas, políticas sociales y combate a la pobreza en Panamá (Social Policy Series No. 162). Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. Román, I. (2010). Sustentabilidad de los programas de transferencias condicionadas: la experiencia del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social y “Avancemos” en Costa Rica (Social Policy Series No. 160). Santiago de Chile, ECLAC. Tejerina, L., & Bouillon, C. (2006). Do We Know What Works? A Systematic Review of Impact Evaluations of Social Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Sustainable Development Department. Poverty and Inequality Unit. IDB. Veras, F. (2012). What is Happening with El Salvador’s CCT Programmes? One Pager N° 168. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth. Veras, F., & Silva, E. (2010). Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and Gender Vulnerabilities. Case studies of Brazil, Chile and Colombia (Working Document No. 69). International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth. Villatoro, P. (2005). Programas de transferencias monetarias condicionadas: experiencias en América Latina. Revista CEPAL, 86, 87–101. World Bank. (2006, November 6). Lessons Learned, Third International Conference on Conditional Cash Transfers, Istanbul, Turkey, June 26–30, 2006. Presentation in PDF format for Internal Evaluation Workshop about the Conference 2006. World Bank. (2008). Lecciones, resultados y desafíos: ¿Cuál es el camino a seguir para fomentar políticas públicas más amplias y sostenibles? Después de 6 años y más de su implementación ¿qué? Workshop Analysis and Reflection Program for Conditional Transfer Programs, World Bank.

CHAPTER 6

Chile: The Chile Solidario Program

Chile Solidario was created in 2002, during the government of Ricardo Lagos, with the aim of promoting the integration of families in situations of extreme poverty into the State’s social networks and their access to better living conditions (Law 19.949 2004). Since its early years, it was the main instrument of social policy for overcoming poverty in Chile (certainly until 2010), serving 332,995 families in 2008 (ECLAC 2011).

6.1

The Economic and Political Context

In 2002, the center-left coalition, the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Coalition of Parties for the Democracy), was governing in Chile and its President was Ricardo Lagos Escobar. The coalition had been in power since 1990—the first democratic government after 17 years of military dictatorship—, Lagos was its third elected president and the first President from the Socialist Party. Two strategic priorities can be seen in the government programs and policies implemented in these three periods: economic growth and the payment of the social debt, that is, the serious consequences in social matters after the structural adjustments made at the end of the 1980s. An economic and social strategy was chosen under the slogan of “Growth with Equity” (Boeninger 2007); this is, to actively enter the globalized

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capitalist market, while in the social field the focus was on the most vulnerable and on generating equal opportunities (Boeninger 2007; Raczynski and Serrano 2003; Larrañaga and Contreras 2010). As for the economic model, the government gave continuity to the economic policy of the final years of the military regime, but introduced “major adjustments in the regulatory environment, in the priority and financing of social policy and in the macroeconomic management that became more active and counter-cyclical” (Ffrench-Davis and Stallings 2001). In terms of social policies, important modifications were made. On one hand, there was a growing and systematic incorporation of components in policies and programs relating to equity, citizen participation and the introduction of social rights. On the other hand, components introduced during the 1980s that marked a difference with the policies of previous decades were maintained, such as the emphasis on decentralization, the incorporation of non-governmental stakeholders in service provision and programme execution, and private contributions to the financing of services, among others (Raczynski and Serrano 2005). During Patricio Aylwin’s government (1990–1994), between 1990 and 1991, various agencies were created to serve target groups that had not previously had specialized entities: the Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (National Service for Women, SERNAM), the Fondo Nacional para la Discapacidad (National Fund for Disability FONADIS), the Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena (National Corporation for Indigenous Development, CONADI), the Instituto Nacional de la Juventud (National Youth Institute, INJUV), and the pu Fondo para la Solidaridad e Inversión Social (Solidarity and Social Investment Fund, FOSIS). All of them reported to the Ministerio de Planificación y Desarrollo (Ministry of Planning and Social Development MIDEPLAN, since 2019 Ministry of Social Development and the Family), also institutionalized in 1990. Poverty in the country had decreased between 1987 and 2000 from 45.1 to 20.6%, and indigence from 17 to 5.7% (Cohen and Franco 2006). Despite this satisfactory decline, the government’s diagnosis for 2002 pointed to areas of concern. In absolute terms, poverty has decreased more than indigence, but the intensity of the decline in the former had fallen since 1996; between 1998 and 2000 it only fell from 21.7 to 20.1% (Puentes 2010). In the case of indigence, after a significant decline between 1990–1996 from 13.0 to 5.7%, no major variations had

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been observed between 1996–20001 (Puentes 2010; Cohen and Franco 2006). Faced with these figures, politicians and government technicians began to question the effectiveness of the social policy applied to date (Puentes 2010). Experts coined the concept of the “hard core of poverty” to identify the poor population that could not overcome this condition by the sole action of economic growth. It was also pointed out that government programs were showing too much rigidity and too little beneficiary participation (Raczynski and Serrano 2002). Criticism from think tanks and experts linked to the opposition referred to the poor management of MIDEPLAN and the inadequate targeting of government policies (Puentes 2010). In Latin America, five conditional transfer programs were in operation. In Mexico, Oportunidades was already established, collecting the experience of its pilot programs and PROGRESA. In Brazil, experiences had also been developed at the state level and in 2001 Bolsa Escola had already been set up. In Honduras, the Programa de Asignación Familiar had been adopted in 1998, the Red de Protección Social in Nicaragua since 2000, and the Programa Familias en Acción in Colombia since 2001. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there was already a precedent of significant programs in the region and a body of studies and specific information already accumulated.

6.2 The Process of Adopting the Chile Solidario Program The public announcement of the creation of the Chile Solidario program occurred in May 2002. However, the national stakeholders involved had been developing processes of accumulation of knowledge and discussion of proposals prior to this date and contributed to the explanation of the adoption mechanism. The Ministerio de Planificación y Desarrollo Social (MIDEPLAN) was designated as a ministry in 1990 from the Office of Planning and its central role is to coordinate the various offices specializing in indigenous issues, gender, poverty, disability and youth. Its work is fundamental in

1 It is mentioned that even a slight increase was observed in 2000 (5.7%) with respect to 1998 (5.6%) (Cohen and Franco 2006), although in statistical terms it is not significant.

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the area of social policy, although its status had been questioned within the public apparatus. In fact, in the late 1990s, the Ministry was strongly criticized by the opposition and even by the Executive, when in March 1998 President Eduardo Frei publicly announced its closure (Puentes 2010), although this didn’t happen. The Ministry has a coordinating role with other State entities, which the ministers in charge have tried to make concrete, although this mandate has not always been recognized by the other ministerial entities, such as those of health, education and housing (former director of the Budget Office). Nevertheless, the Ministry had accumulated knowledge in the area of social policies, methodological instruments for the study of poverty, systematization of information and technical knowledge of its professional teams. For example, the Ficha CAS (Socioeconomic Classification Sheet (today Cartola Hogar) has been applied since 1980; and the Encuesta CASEN (Socio-Economic Characterization Survey) that provides the measurement of poverty and indigence has been carried out every 2 or 3 years since 1985.2 In addition to the experience already accumulated, during the 1990s experts in the area joined the Ministry from study centers and NGOs. “There was an overflow and a flow of information of knowledge and conceptual development from the world of NGOs, which developed both in international academia and in practical practice” (former director of MIDEPLAN). All of this configured capacities and expert knowledge based on exclusive information on the subject that was recognized within the State apparatus (former director of the Budget Office and former director of MIDEPLAN). In this regard, during 1999 and 2000, the Social Division of MIDEPLAN, under the direction of Verónica Silva,3 began a diagnosis of the stagnation in the reduction of indigence and the development of an intervention strategy in families in extreme poverty (Palma and Ruz 2005). The result of this work was a report that considered families, rather than individuals, as the unit of analysis. More specifically, as early as 2000 and

2 To date, the surveys applied correspond to the years 1985, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2011. At http://observatorio.ministeriodesar rollosocial.gob.cl/casen_obj.php. Retrieved April 28, 2013. 3 Veronica Silva had the experience of the La Florida commune, one of the most populated in Santiago, where an Integrated Action Program (PAI) for Families in Extreme Poverty had been implemented (Palma and Ruz 2005). This program would be analyzed by the Social Division in the search for a social intervention strategy.

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“within the framework of the goals of the first 100 days of the government of President Ricardo Lagos, the Social Division of MIDEPLAN assumed the task of designing an Integrated Intervention Strategy in favour of families in extreme poverty” (Palma and Ruz 2005: 18). The previous work would have a new emphasis given by the new administration and the presidential mandate. The requested strategy began to be developed in conjunction with related services of the Ministry4 and taking into account the diagnosis made by the Social Division. During this process, those responsible for the Division visited and learned about “four successful public and private experiences in addressing poverty at the territorial level, carried out by the Municipality of La Florida, the Municipality of Quillota, the Rodelillo Foundation and Hogar de Cristo. From the first three, elements were taken to be incorporated into the strategy” (Palma and Ruz 2005: 19). For example, the idea of the minimum conditions that the family had to meet in order to leave the Program of Integrated Actions for Families in Extreme Poverty (PAI) of La Florida; the figure of the family contract of work of the Municipality of Quillota; and of the Rodelillo Foundation the integrated actions and the activities of exit (Palma and Ruz 2005). In addition, MIDEPLAN took the World Bank’s risk management approach as a reference for its proposal, arguing that it was necessary to improve the capacities of indigent families for the prevention, mitigation and confrontation of risk situations (Former Director FOSIS; Cohen and Franco 2006). As a result of this process and in order to meet the goals of the first 100 days, the Social Division presented a Comprehensive Intervention Strategy in mid-2000 to the Secretaría General de la Presidencia (General Secretariat of the Presidency, SEGPRES) (Palma and Ruz 2005). This considered three areas of intervention. The first was to generate the minimum conditions needed to initiate processes aimed at improving families’ standard of living and restoring their basic operating capacity. Second, the dimension of social insertion, where it was expected to strengthen local institutions and bring families closer to the services and benefits they need and which are offered by the State, and to generate some actions aimed at the insertion of families or some of their members

4 FOSIS, FONADIS, CONADI, INJUV, SERNAM and by the Departamento de Desarrollo Social del Gabinete de la Señora del Presidente (Social Development Department of the First Lady).

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into community networks of some kind. Thirdly, was the area of development (conclusive phase), where the aim was to generate conditions and opportunities for families to carry out community self-management initiatives and social promotion actions aimed at favoring their organization and association (Palma and Ruz 2005). In 2001, MIDEPLAN commissioned FOSIS to design a program to implement this intervention strategy designed by the Social Division (Palma and Ruz 2005). At that time, FOSIS was directed by Mario Ossandón (Social Worker by profession) who was a councilor between 1992 and 1996 in the municipality of La Florida, and therefore had the experience of the Integrated Action Program that they had carried out at the local level. He also knew Verónica Silva, who had experienced the case of La Florida closely and had been in charge of designing the Strategy from MIDEPLAN. She joined FOSIS in January 2001, as Program Director, and was in charge of the design requested by MIDEPLAN5 (former Directors of FOSIS and MIDEPLAN). The program was presented to DIPRES three times, and finally got its approval to be implemented as a pilot program, the Programa Puente, in four regions of the country (Palma and Ruz 2005). From there, then, during that year FOSIS developed a proposal for a programme with national coverage, to be implemented between 2002 and 2005, and aimed at serving all families in extreme poverty in the country (Palma and Ruz 2005). In parallel to the accumulation of technical knowledge and the development of proposals being developed at MIDEPLAN and FOSIS, since 2001 the Dirección de Presupuesto (Budget Directorate, DIPRES) of the Ministry of Finance had begun to study and evaluate the various social programs aimed at the extremely poor population in order to detect shortcomings and address the stagnation in indigence indices. Given its relevance in the public budget process, DIPRES is a relevant player in the design of all policies and in general in all governments, although its weight varies according to the operating logic of each administration.6 During the Lagos administration, “DIPRES (…) was an extremely powerful institution, from the technical point of view” (former FOSIS/MIDEPLAN 5 Verónica Silva would later return to MIDEPLAN between 2006–2009, where she would be in charge of the Executive Secretariat of Social Protection. As of 2010, she would join the World Bank as a specialist in the area of social protection. 6 Interviewees agree that the influence of DIPRES was more significant during the Frei and Lagos administrations, and less so during the Bachelet administration.

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director and social policy expert). It also has a team of officials specialized in the various areas of public policy who participate in the drafting processes with officials from other ministries and even directly with the ministers (Former official and manager, DIPRES). It is therefore perceived as an entity with which the components of the programs to be implemented should be negotiated, “you do not try to influence them to modify (…) (their) vision; you are bound to lose, because it is always in the counterweight that DIPRES is most important” (Official and manager, DIPRES). By the end of that year, they identified what they considered to be the main weaknesses of the set of monetary transfers managed by the Chilean state apparatus. These weaknesses were the lack of integration between different public programs, differences in beneficiary eligibility criteria, the existence of multiple and unclear “windows” for accessing benefits, and the system’s excessive dependence on the initiative of beneficiaries to apply for benefits (Puentes 2010). The discussion centered on “how to organize, how to somehow rationalize (…) in the sense of making the number of programs, benefits, initiatives, etc. more efficient (…) and more effective, in a much more logical way of rationalizing fiscal resources (rather than overcoming poverty)” (Former FOSIS/MIDEPLAN directive). DIPRES then began working on the idea of designing a new social protection system. For this purpose, along with their internal exploratory work, they went to the World Bank to request an evaluation of the country’s non-contributory subsidy system. During 2001, they held working meetings with World Bank experts, which led to the delivery of a series of preliminary documents by the Bank (Puentes 2010). The result of this evaluation—which involved contact between the World Bank team and DIPRES and also with entities such as FOSIS and MIDEPLAN (World Bank Executive Interview)—was the document, “Risk Management and Social Protection in Chile”.7 Although the final document is subsequent to the creation of the CHS, its content allows us to know the general ideas that should have been included in the preliminary documents received by DIPRES. In this regard, the report highlighted the progress made in overcoming poverty, although it also identified the stagnation in the reduction of indigence. In addition, it recommended, among other things, that the coverage of the social protection system should be improved to include 7 Original title World Bank (2005). Household Risk Management and Social Protection in Chile (A World Bank Country Study, N° 34421).

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the sectors that were still excluded and to increase the efficiency of social institutions. It was recommended, in the logic of Social Risk Management, to refine the set of public interventions to improve their impact, while supporting people in extreme poverty. On the other hand, in March 2002, in parallel with the contacts with the World Bank, DIPRES was also interested in learning about the European experience, in particular the Spanish experience, with social protection. In this respect, a specific approach was made to a Spanish official (of Chilean origin), René Solís de Ovando, of the Ministry of Social Security, who traveled to Chile in 2001 and 2002 (former director of DIPRES and social policy expert). This was a contact made after a visit to Spain by the director of DIPRES. “We had been looking a little more at the case of Spain, where it is more a case of social protection systems involving different programs, different access to different types of support. And that went on until finally this whole internal process was closed and the initiative was announced in the Presidential message” (former DIPRES director). Attention was paid to the interconnection of programs in the logic of networks (Puentes 2010; Social Policy Expert); aspects that would be incorporated into the proposal that was internally discussed with other actors in the process. DIPRES was also aware of emerging initiatives in Mexico and Brazil. “At that time - we are basically talking about 2002 - Mexico was just moving from Progresa to Oportunidades, (…) in other words, until then it had basically been known as Progresa. In Brazil (…) it was still Bolsa Escuela under the umbrella of the First Lady” (former Director of DIPRES). To recapitulate, during the DIPRES internal discussion process, there was a link with multilateral banking and its proposals for social protection in the region. Likewise, there was knowledge of Latin American experiences and the Spanish case was studied in depth. In January 2002, President Lagos made a cabinet reshuffle of six ministries, justified in the “exercise of their constitutional powers” (Radio Cooperativa, 7 January 2002).8 This change was aimed at renewing the cabinet and improving the figure of President Lagos, who had been criticized and whose popularity dropped during the first two years (Funk 2006). Among the changes made, a minister expert in the field of poverty, Cecilia Pérez, was appointed to MIDEPLAN, and was given the 8 In http://www.cooperativa.cl/noticias/pais/el-presidente-ricardo-lagos-realizo-sietecambios-en-su-gabinete/2002-01-07/174400.html. Retrieved 24 October, 2014.

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task of proposing new alternatives for tackling the problem of extreme poverty. The Government did not have a concrete proposal in this regard on its program agenda. The implementation of the set of policies would contribute to the reduction of poverty, but no specific measures were mentioned in the government programme during the presidential campaign in 1999. “Growing up with equality makes new demands in terms of health reform, adaptation of education for the new millennium, protection of the family, security for people and the nation, full integration of women, care for the environment and humanization of cities, combating centralism, development of a free culture, greater democracy and participation, and economic growth that provides more and better jobs. These are the commitments of Ricardo Lagos’ candidacy” (Lagos 1999). Therefore, although there was no concrete proposal from the government programme, as noted above, the concern about the limited reduction of poverty and especially destitution, had been installed in the public agenda in early 2002 (Puentes 2010). During this period, the alternatives that were being designed in parallel by MIDEPLAN and DIPRES began to converge as a result of the presidential mandate to generate a concrete initiative. In other words, once the problem was put on the government’s agenda, the discussion of alternatives began. Experts from both agencies held meetings and progress was made on the idea that the Programa Puente, which was being developed at the pilot level, could become the “gateway” for poor families to access the government’s social network through a single program (Puentes 2010). The meetings between DIPRES and MIDEPLAN were characterized by a climate of dialogue and cooperation in which the actors presented their various positions on the subject. These meetings were attended by officials who can be identified as bureaucrats and also by managers with a profile closer to what has been defined as politicians. A “quite positive and virtuous alliance was generated with the team of MIDEPLAN and FOSIS that was in charge of this process and (…) we always found quite a lot of support and a good disposition to generate the budgetary resources” (Former FOSIS official). However, certain different emphases were identified between the two groups of actors. From DIPRES there was a greater preponderance of the idea of delivering a specific and properly targeted bonus to the poorest families. MIDEPLAN/FOSIS gave priority to psychosocial support and to linking families to government programs. The bonus was understood as a training component, which

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expressed the support from the State, but it was emphasized that it was a decreasing transfer, limited in time and in a low amount, in order not to create dependency from the families (Former FOSIS official). By the end of January 2002, DIPRES and MIDEPLAN jointly presented Lagos with the alternative of expanding the Programa Puente nationally. The President would have welcomed the proposal, although it was considered necessary by DIPRES and the Presidency to gather expert opinions on the matter (Puentes 2010; Former DIPRES official and former President of the Republic). For this reason, a “Presidential Seminar” was convened with academic and civil society experts, together with the Minister of MIDEPLAN, the Director of DIPRES, the Minister of Finance and presidential advisors.9 At that meeting, on 11th April 2002, various aspects were raised. On the one hand, DIPRES presented the problems that had been detected in the current monetary transfers, based on the World Bank Report. The characteristics of the Puente that was being developed as a pilot program and the feasibility of being replicated at the national level were also presented. In addition, the exchange of views pointed out that the country already had the systems and indicators to measure poverty and identification mechanisms for beneficiaries. There was also agreement on the role of the municipalities in the implementation of programs of this type. As a result of the debate, the design of a social protection system proposed by DIPRES and the implementation of programs based on the strategy developed by MIDEPLAN and materialized in the Puente were proposed as alternatives by the government. At the seminar, although without much success, experts identified with the political right, from the 9 Attending this meeting were: President Ricardo Lagos, Osvaldo Larrañaga (Director Economy Department, U. de Chile), Claudia Serrano (Development Consultants), Dagmar Raczynski (Development Consultants), José Pablo Arellano (Executive Director Cieplan), Harald Beyer (Academic Coordinator CEP), Ignacio Irarrázaval (Focus Consultants), Clarisa Hardy (Executive Director Chile 21), Mónica Espósito (Hogar de Cristo), Berta Teitelboim (Head of Dept. Social Information MIDEPLAN), Francisca Márquez (researcher SUR), Verónica Silva (sub director of Program Management FOSIS), Álvaro García (Minister SEGPRES), Nicolás Eyzaguirre (Minister of Finance), Marcelo Tokman (Economic Policy Advisor Min. Finance) Mario Marcel (Director of Budget), Jaime Crispi (Head Dept. Studies DIPRES), Alberto Arenas (Sub-Director Rationalization and Public Function), Cecilia Pérez (Minister MIDEPLAN), Angel Flisfisch (Executive Director State Reform and Modernization Project), Gonzalo Martner (Undersecretary Ministry SEGPRES), Víctor Tokman (Presidential Advisor) (Palma and Ruz 2005 and interviews with social policy experts).

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Centro de Estudios Públicos (Centre for Public Studies, CEP), defended the idea of designing and implementing direct monetary subsidies focused on the indigent population (voucher-type) that would allow them to escape from the poverty line by increasing their income (Palma and Ruz 2005; Puentes 2010; Presidential Adviser and Former Director of MIDEPLAN). Members of one of the study centres—Asesorías para el Desarrollo (Development Consultants)—who participated in the Seminar had the initiative to dedicate one of their periodic workshops to continue discussing this issue.10 Thus, a workshop was convened on 26 April 2002 on social protection and poverty, attended by professionals from DIPRES, MIDEPLAN and other study centers (Social Policy Expert; Palma and Ruz 2005).11 At that workshop, an analysis was made of the shortcomings and challenges of the existing range of social policies in terms of targeting, intersectoral coordination and the tension between social protection, social policy and citizenship (Asesorías para el Desarrollo 2002). The meeting made it possible to continue the debate that had been initiated and to bring the positions of the state actors present closer together—MIDEPLAN and DIPRES—, as well as to obtain greater input for the current debate and for the positions held by the actors (Social Policy Expert; Palma and Ruz 2005). Following the Presidential Seminar, Lagos instructed DIPRES to refine a proposal for social protection and requested FOSIS to make a more detailed presentation on the Puente program. The time had therefore come to define the policy, a decision that fell to President Lagos. Later, in a short period of time, the President instructed DIPRES, FOSIS, MIDEPLAN and presidential advisers to establish a working group to determine the design and characteristics of a programme aimed at extreme poverty.

10 They organized the workshop in the context of the activities of the “Red de Integración Social, Ciudadanía y Pobreza”, which coordinated Asesorías para el Desarrollo with support from the Ford Foundation (Asesorías para el Desarrollo 2002). 11 This workshop was attended by several of those who attended the Presidential Seminar: Jaime Crispi (Dipres), Clarisa Hardy (Chile XXI), Francisca Márquez (Red), Dagmar Raczynski (Red-Asesorías), Claudia Serrano, (Red-Asesorías) and Berta Teitelboim (MIDEPLAN). Also attending were Julio Guzmán (Treasury), Fernando Munita (Actúa), Leonardo Moreno (MIDEPLAN), Ximena Quintanilla (Undersecretary of Social Security, Ministry of Labour), Carola Rojas (Red-Asesorías), Consuelo Valderrama (Red-Asesorías) (Asesorías para el Desarrollo 2002).

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“Between MIDEPLAN, FOSIS and DIPRES, finally after many negotiations and much discussion, the Chile Solidario proposal was finalized (Palma and Ruz 2005: 30). Some of the experts present were Verónica Silva and Mario Ossandón (FOSIS), Berta Teitelboim and Leonardo Moreno (MIDEPLAN), Jaime Crispi and Julio Guzmán (DIPRES) and Víctor Tokman and Ernesto Ottone (presidential advisors) (Palma and Ruz 2005: 30). The final proposal was made public as the Chile Solidario Social Protection System and was announced by President Ricardo Lagos on May 21st at the National Congress during the State of the Nation Public Account. In formal terms, as it was a presidential initiative, it was able to begin operating without the need to send legal bodies for discussion and approval in the legislative branch. As for the presence of international stakeholders, despite the fact that the World Bank had been in contact with DIPRES, it should be noted that there was no direct and formal participation in the discussion of the Puente program. Nor was there a relevant role for other international organizations in its formulation, although ECLAC became involved in its development later, once the program had been implemented, carrying out an impact evaluation of the first years of the Program (Cohen and Franco 2006). The World Bank executives knew the experts from MIDEPLAN and FOSIS, but there were no formal conversations with them. Rather, the Bank proceeded as usual, which is to privilege, in the first instance, contact with DIPRES, the government’s financial managers, through the relationship of the aforementioned report. Recalling that period, a World Bank official said: “I remember very well that it was in January-February 2002 when we first heard that this Programa Puente was going to be carried out (…) in the World Bank our first reaction was: this is too complex… why so much complexity? (WB Executive). When already in “the speech of President Lagos of that same year suddenly announced a whole government policy, around this program that was so small, so experimental until then. Then it took us by surprise” (WB Executive). Now, “he was responding to our arguments, even though it was not the first thing we would have recommended” (WB Executive). I conclude that the World Bank’s influence was not so direct in the formulation of the Chilean conditional transfer program, but it undoubtedly had an influence on DIPRES by defining the priority of the problem and suggesting solutions. Moreover, a clear indicator of this harmony is that after the program was adopted, the Chilean government negotiated

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two loans with the World Bank. One of these was a Social Protection Sector Adjustment Credit (No. 7202-CH), which was requested in October 2003 and finalized on January 6th, 2004, for US$200,000,000 (World Bank 2004a). This loan was requested in October 2003 and was precisely to support the actions and policies implemented to make structural adjustments to the Social Protection System. The objective was to support the Chilean government in reforming the system by maintaining macroeconomic balance and reforming poverty reduction and social protection policies (World Bank 2004a). The second was a Technical Assistance Credit for Social Protection (No. 7211-CH), for USD10,710,000. Its purpose was to provide technical support for the design and implementation of a national information system for social protection; training for social workers and agencies involved in the implementation of CHS; implementation of a system for the analysis, evaluation and monitoring of social programs and policies; and institutional strengthening of MIDEPLAN (World Bank 2004b). The law that institutionalized the Social Protection System was discussed in Congress once the program was already being implemented. This allowed for more information and background to be available as input for parliamentarians. Through work in commissions and hearings, the positions of various stakeholders (technicians and professionals, government officials, think tanks, NGOs and municipalities) were made explicit (Palma and Ruz 2005). Some of the experts who had participated in the process also attended these instances (Social Policy Expert). However, although there were discussions regarding some aspects more linked to the implementation (for example, the hiring of monitors in charge of psychosocial support), Law No. 19.949 was approved in 2004 and the central characteristics of the Program were essentially those announced by the Executive in May 2002. Consequently, the program was institutionalized as a Social Protection System in 2004 (Law No. 19.949). Its operation was nationwide in a decentralized manner through local governments (municipalities), with MIDEPLAN and FOSIS as the responsible agencies. Together with the Programa Puente, the CHS was linked to programs for the elderly (Programa Vínculos ), for people living on the streets (Programa Calle) and for children from families where there are situations of forced separation due to the serving of a sentence by one of their members (Caminos ). In 2009, the government of Michelle Bachelet created an Intersectoral Protection System, where CHS became one of the two subsystems, along

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with the Crece Contigo (Early Childhood Protection Programme) (Law No. 20.379 2009). The program’s components were defined along four lines: personalized psychosocial support, family protection voucher, guaranteed monetary subsidies and preferential access to social promotion programs. Psychosocial support was provided to families for two years to support them in meeting 53 established minimums, and is carried out by professional monitors. The Bono de Protección Social (Social Protection Bond) was a decreasing monetary transfer, conditioned to the fulfillment of the family contract. This benefit was given to the female head of household or partner of the head of household (Cohen and Franco 2006). The guaranteed cash subsidy component consisted of ensuring that families that joined the program and met the eligibility criteria had rapid access to a set of State cash transfers: access to the family subsidy, welfare pensions, subsidy for drinking water and sewerage services, and the school retention subsidy. The component of preferential access to social promotion programs provided beneficiary households with priority access to State programs and services12 (Cohen and Franco 2006). Families in situations of extreme poverty were classified by MIDEPLAN through the Ficha de Protección Social (formerly known as Ficha CAS, Socioeconomic Classification Sheet13 ). The ministry informed the municipalities of the cut-off score and the beneficiary quotas available for

12 The subsidies provided to the beneficiary already existed prior to the program: Family subsidy Law No. 18.020, Welfare pensions under Decree Law No. 869 of 1975, subsidy for the payment of drinking water consumption and sewerage services under Law No. 18.778, and subsidy for school retention under Law No. 19.873. The bonuses and psychosocial support were new benefits that arose with the program: the Protection Bonus and the discharge are established in the 2nd transitory article of Law No. 19.949, and the psychosocial support in the 4th article of Law No. 19.949 (Decree 235, 2005). 13 The Ficha de Protección Social, today Cartola Hogar (Household Sheet) is the instrument of socioeconomic stratification used to identify, prioritize, and select potential beneficiaries for social programs. With the information obtained, a score was calculated to determine whether one qualified for benefits, subsidies or transfers. It was valid for two years and was applied by each municipality. This information is part of the Social Registry of Homes, an information system built with data provided by the household and administrative bases held by the State, such as: the Social Registry of Homes, the Internal Revenue Service (SII), the Civil Registry, the Administrator of the Severance Fund (AFC), the Social Security Institute (IPS), the Superintendency of Health and the Ministry of Education, among others (http://www.registrosocial.gob.cl/registro-social/ que-es-el-registro-social/. Rescued on November 17, 2017).

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each commune. The families were invited to participate from the municipality, according to those who qualified by score and available quotas (Decree 235, 2005). Once invited, the families had to agree to participate first in the Programa Puente—subprogram of the CHS—, in charge of managing the psychosocial support (www.chilesolidario.gob.cl).14 When they entered the program, the family undertook, through a “Family Contract”, to comply with the conditions of the system. From that moment on, they were considered part of the Chile Solidario Social Protection System, receiving monetary subsidies from the State and preferential access to social programs.15 The conditions of the system consisted of 53 minimum objectives to be met by the beneficiaries incorporated into Chile Solidario, within seven dimensions or categories of family life: Identification, Health, Education, Family Dynamics, Habitability, Work and Income (Decree 235, 2005). For example, in the Identification dimension, family members must have their identity card and an updated Social Protection Card. In Education, children of the appropriate age must attend pre-school and school education; school integration of children with disabilities. In the dimension of Family Dynamics, that there should be clear rules for living together and a distribution of tasks in the home. In health, the control of pregnancy, health checks and up-to-date vaccinations of children, among other activities16 (MIDEPLAN 2004). The psychosocial support was a personalized accompaniment to the families by a suitable professional or technician, in order to promote the development of the personal and family skills necessary to satisfy these 53 minimums (Decree 235, 2005). This personalized care was also intended to strengthen the effective linkage of beneficiaries with local networks and access to the benefits available to them. The support was provided for 24 months and consisted of a system of regular working sessions with the families or persons living in the household (Decree 235, 2005). The monitors were responsible for entering information on the work sessions held with the families, recording their progress and results in the CHS registration and monitoring system. 14 http://www.chilesolidario.gob.cl/preg/07_preguntas.php. Retrieved 26 April, 2013. 15 Regarding the programs, different institutions and organizations in the areas of

Health, Education, Labor, Housing, Justice, among others, are committed to MIDEPLAN to give priority to the beneficiaries of Chile Solidario. 16 The complete list of the 53 minimums can be found in Appendix 5.

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As stated above, Chile Solidario beneficiaries who met the eligibility criteria were granted expedited access to a set of existing pre-CHS state cash transfers. They also received the Bono de Protección Social (Social Protection Bond) and the Bono de Egreso (Exit Bond), which were specific transfers linked to the CHS. The former was given to the female head of household for a maximum period of 24 months from the date it was granted. “It shall be granted only once and shall cease in the event that families and individuals do not meet the conditions to which they have committed themselves, duly certified by the entity responsible for implementing the psychosocial component” (Decree 235, 2005: 9). The amount of the monetary transfer was decreasing, during the first 6 months it was $10,000 (approx. USD21), the next 6 months $8000 (approx. USD17), then it decreased to $5000 (approx. USD11.6) and the last 6 months to the reference value of the family subsidy.17 The Bono de Egreso was given once during a period of 3 months and was the equivalent value of the family subsidy. It is important to highlight that the CHS was conceived as a Social Protection System, and at the same time qualified as a conditional transfer program in the formal sense. This was because it granted the Bono de Protección Social in exchange for people signing the Family Contract and carrying out the comprehensive support activities that contributed to compliance with the 53 minimums. However, other components of the program—personalized psychosocial support, guaranteed monetary subsidies and preferential access to promotion programs—were mainly aimed at strengthening the family group and bringing it closer to the State’s protection networks. Lastly, the amount of the conditional transfer was low, since during the first six months it represented about 30% of the urban indigence line and 15% of the urban poverty line, only to fall in the following months. Unlike the approach of many conditional transfer programs, therefore, the emphasis shifted from the transfer to connecting demand with the supply of social services (Galasso 2006). The period of study of this book extends to 2010. However, it is necessary to briefly mention the changes that took place during the period of Sebastián Piñera (2010–2014), the first right-wing government after 20 years of the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia. 17 Values calculated based on the value of the USD in May 2013. 1USD = 480 Chilean pesos. The values of the bonds will be adjusted in February of each year, according to the Consumer Price Index.

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In May 2012, a new program was created, the Ingreso Ético Familiar (IEF, Family Ethical Income), whose official name is the Subsystem of Promotion and Social Protection, “Security and Opportunities”. This subsystem, created through Law 20.595 (published on May 17, 2012), was integrated into the existing Intersectoral Social Protection System, and replaced the previous Social Protection Subsystem, Chile Solidario (http://www.ingresoetico.gob.cl.18 ) The Family Ethical Income coexisted during 2012–2013 with the CHS, with a set of transitional measures that ensure coverage of those who entered CHS. However, as of 2014, no new beneficiaries joined the latter (Law 20.595). The benefits defined in the IEF are a proportional Family Base Bond that is calculated using information on the subsidies that the family receives, plus data from the Socio-Economic Characterization Survey (CASEN) and the Social Registry of Homes.19 It also includes a cash transfer conditioned on the health control of children and attendance at educational establishments, corresponding to $6000 (approximately USD9.5) per month. It also includes a Protection Bond, which decreases over time, a Woman’s Work Bond and a Bond for School Achievement.20 The law also established support programmes—the Eje Program—, a psychosocial support program and a social and labor support program (Act No. 20595). Likewise, there were reforms in the social institutions since MIDEPLAN became the Ministry of Social Development, through Law 20.530, published on October 13, 2011. Its faculties were expanded, positioning itself as a coordinating body for social policies, articulating inter-ministerial initiatives and overseeing its operation (www.ministeri odesarrollosocial.gob.cl.21 ). To this end, the Undersecretariat of Social Services was created (in charge of articulating the actions of all related services and also of coordinating with other ministries the entire social

18 http://www.ingresoetico.gob.cl/que-es-ief/. Rescued on May 19, 2013. 19 At http://www.ingresoetico.gob.cl/como-funciona/. Rescued on November 17,

2017. 20 The bond is for families with children under 24 years of age who are between 5th grade and 13th grade, who belong to the most vulnerable 30% of the population and who are within the 30% of best academic performance in their class. At http://www.ing resoetico.gob.cl/como-funciona/. Rescued on November 17, 2017. 21 At http://www.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/conocenos/historia/. Rescued on May 19, 2013.

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protection system22 ) and the Undersecretariat of Social Evaluation (in charge of monitoring and evaluating social policies).

6.3

The Learning Diffusion Mechanism

Considering the motivations and the means, in this process of adopting the Chile Solidario program I identified how the mechanism for the diffusion of learning was put into practice. As for the reasons, they are endogenous and respond to the diagnosis of a public problem that had been installed in the agenda and decided to be addressed by the government of Ricardo Lagos. In this sense, it is worth noting that there was agreement among various actors in the Executive Power regarding the relevance and pertinence of this issue. In fact, as noted above, both DIPRES and MIDEPLAN had been diagnosing and debating this issue prior to the presidential mandate to develop a specific program on the subject, although in the case of DIPRES it was under some influence from the World Bank. There is a coincidence in the motivation of the stakeholders involved in the domestic process of social policy formulation. This contributed to the fact that collaboration among stakeholders and agreement on the characteristics of the program were a priority in this process. Expectations of electoral returns do not emerge clearly from the analysis of interviews and secondary information. The arguments to implement the CHS in this line are technical and supported by the existence of a relevant social problem that is installed in the public agenda. Likewise, the process of formulation of the program included several governmental stakeholders, national experts, with an important process of specific discussion on the matter. On the other hand, it was decided to implement the program through all the municipalities which accepted to participate in the program, independently of their ideological position.23 In that line, the possible electoral returns are diluted, since, although it is a government program at the national level, when implemented by the municipalities, it constitutes the first contact for the beneficiaries. The possible electoral benefits could be reflected in the mayors of the entire political spectrum, not only of the Concertación de Partidos por 22 These services are SENAMA, CONADI, FOSIS, INJUV and SENADIS. 23 The 2000 municipal elections had left the mayors with 52.1% to the Concertación

de Partidos por la Democracia and 40.1% to the Alianza por Chile, and 7.9% to smaller independent parties (Leseigneur et al. 2001).

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la Democracia parties, to which President Lagos belonged. Thus, the electoral expectations may be within what is expected as retribution of a public program, and one that, according to Stokes et al. (2013), is not particularly effective in obtaining returns in that area. As for the means, it can be highlighted that in this learning process it was privileged to observe national experiences at the local level and although they are known, the influence of the regional CCTs alternatives existing up to that moment would be limited. As I pointed out earlier, in those years the PROGRESA programme was already in place and would be called Oportunidades. In the case of Brazil, Bolsa Escola and other programs already existed, although the Bolsa Familia was not yet configured as such. Consequently, there were important experiences in the region, and empirical evidence through their evaluations (especially in the case of Mexico). MIDEPLAN and DIPRES experts were aware of these experiences, but they did not have much influence on the final model. In fact, “Chile did not go to Mexico and did not go to Brazil to learn from these experiences, but we took it more as an antecedent that was put on the table” (Former FOSIS official). Regarding the link with the international seminars on CCTs, during this period the Workshop on Conditional Transfer Programs organized by the World Bank was held in Puebla, Mexico, between 29 April and 1 May 2002, which was not attended by any Chilean representative (Ayala Consulting co 2003). The second workshop was held in 2004 in Sao Paulo, Brazil, where Veronica Silva presented the experience of the Programa Puente and Chile Solidario. As for the activities generated by the IDB, representatives of MIDEPLAN and advisors to the Presidency attended the first Regional Policy Dialogue, of the Network for Poverty Reduction and Social Protection, held on June 11th and 12th, 2001, in Washington D.C. Fabián Reppeto presented a diagnosis of social protection programs in the region, Jere Behrman presented data from PROGRESA, Mexico, and Santiago Levy was the moderator. Chile also participated in the third meeting of this network, held on 23rd and 24th of May 2002, two days after the announcement of the launch of Chile Solidario, with a presentation by the Undersecretary of MIDEPLAN, who spoke about the Chilean experience in poverty reduction policies and commented on the new programme that had just been announced (IDB 2002). It can be seen that officials and managers of Chilean organizations were already in contact and participated in this type of activity, where they presented their first experiences and assessments of the programs, and

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where they established contact with experts from the epistemic community that was taking shape at the regional level. This must have had an impact on the configuration of the idea of the relevance of this type of program, its components and its principles. This learning mechanism operated differently according to the stakeholders involved in the process. In the case of MIDEPLAN and FOSIS, an important progressive learning process was observed over almost two years during which experiences were reviewed, discussed and numerous reports and studies were analysed. “In 2000 (…) we spent a lot of time studying…” (Ex MIDEPLAN Directive). However, it was a learning process that considered national experience in an important way and calibrated it with external conceptual frameworks. The pilot programs carried out in Santiago’s communes and regions, the Risk Matrix of World Bank and the integral poverty approach formed a conceptual framework that endorsed the Program’s components and activities. In this sense, we can observe the shortcut of representativeness, since we considered the information about these national experiences that were already known and about which their results were known. The components applied for the FOSIS and MIDEPLAN proposal were included based on the analysis made of their components and the consequences observed. However, these stakeholders were also aware of the Brazilian and Mexican experiences, but they would not have been considered relevant to the case, but information on the national experiences already mentioned was privileged. “Some of them did know each other (…) we knew about PROGRESA, we knew about the impact assessment study that the World Bank had already started. And we also knew, but less directly, what the Bolsa Escola was” (Ex FOSIS Directive). Therefore, an option would have been made, in which the characteristics of national initiatives were privileged over foreign ones, but the comparison and discussion of these favored their own learning process. “At that time, the experience of both Brazil and Mexico was fundamentally what we know today as a typical Conditional Transfer Program from the point of view of monetary transfer associated with a conditionality (…) and in the case of Chile that was not the design we wanted to implement” (Former FOSIS Directive). At this point, it should be noted that a group of relevant stakeholders in this policy who influenced the learning mechanism were experts in the field from NGOs and study centers. As noted above, the inclusion of many of them in the public apparatus since the 1990s contributed in this sense. Subsequently, the connections between those who were

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in the State and those who continued in civil society made it possible to generate debates and an exchange of ideas, which in the case of the CHS were significant. This favored the generation of a certain consensus regarding the theoretical perspective from which poverty and indigence should be analyzed and solutions proposed. However, its capacity for veto or binding participation in the decision-making process is limited. The formulation process does not provide institutionalized spaces for this, since in fact on this occasion, their presence was due to the presidential initiative to convoke them. Later on, during the initial implementation of the program, the scientific-technical community would be directly involved in the evaluation and monitoring of the initiative, through tendered evaluations or advisory services to government agencies (Palma and Ruz 2005). The means to identify learning is also seen in another stakeholder, DIPRES. On one hand, the Spanish experience was analyzed in detail and, along with it, the CCTs already implemented in Brazil and Mexico were known. On the other hand, the contribution of the World Bank was requested, from where the new conceptual frameworks also arrived, together with scientific arguments based on quantitative assessment procedures and proposals to address the problem. DIPRES’ proposals focused on improving the coordination of public agencies, bearing in mind the logic of a social protection system. As for a specific programme that would help to overcome poverty, they favoured the provision of a monetary subsidy that would have a direct impact on poverty and indigence indicators (Palma and Ruz 2005). In this case, the proposal was motivated by the need for a shortcut in terms of anchorage and availability. The first is that his interest in the Spanish case was motivated in part by contacts generated during a trip to Spain by the Director of DIPRES. Therefore, this is an early experience that influenced the analysis of this approach. The information requested and received by the World Bank about a social protection system was possibly more influential and closer—the availability shortcut—at the time when alternatives are being discussed. In the final stage of the program formulation process, once the policy to be implemented was broadly defined, MIDEPLAN (and FOSIS) and DIPRES were called to work together and present a proposal agreed upon by both parties. In this sense, there was coordination, but it was forced by the presidential authority that demanded concrete results in a very short period of time. The capacity to veto lies here, evidently, in the presidential

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figure. This joint work forced two ministries in unequal conditions to negotiate their program alternatives and support them before the authority. In this regard, MIDEPLAN in particular had a conceptual framework and prior learning that supported its proposal. In fact, the use of the Risk Matrix endorsed by the World Bank was also a strategic option since the preventive approaches of this banking organization were positively received by DIPRES and the Government in general. “Issues put forward by UNDP, ILO, UNICEF, and the WB put forward by the IDB are issues considered by political authorities” (Ex MIDEPLAN Directive). In this process of learning from national stakeholders, the role of the World Bank was limited but relevant. It provided structured information and internationally accepted evaluation criteria to DIPRES, which was a key input to facilitate the process of adopting the CHS, even if it was not its original purpose. In addition, once the project was being debated in Congress, the Bank would have insisted that civil society organizations be allowed greater participation in the design and monitoring of the program. This would not happen as the government argued that it was not necessary, because “Congress is the legitimate place for public involvement in politics” (Teichman 2009: 78). This shows how the influence of these actors is limited to the transmission of ideas and conceptual frameworks, and not so much to the transfer of their standard programs already designed, to the extent that domestic actors and institutions are stable, strong and with technical capacities; even with monetary loans involved. Similarly, it confirms the lack of willingness to open up spaces for civil society in the process of social policy formulation in Chile. When analyzing the means observed in this learning mechanism, the convergence of perspectives by national stakeholders stands out. Although DIPRES privileged the bonus, in line with the predominant ideas on CCTs at the regional level at the time, over other components proposed by MIDEPLAN, the officials of both agencies and their managers—to some extent bureaucrats and politicians—agreed on the diagnosis of the Chilean social apparatus and its weaknesses. They agreed on the paradigm of a comprehensive approach to poverty and the need to move towards a social protection system; in other words, they spoke the same language. According to external stakeholders, this convergence of perspectives is unusual, and favoured cooperation and dialogue among the actors and ultimately the achievement of the objectives. “People in DIPRES are very

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interested in social protection, that is not normal, (…) but at that time there was a combination of interest as well”24 (Executive World Bank). The World Bank also recognizes its limited role in this formulation process. “Chile Solidario was actually a Chilean design and had a justification, an analysis, a support of a design that we had to explain a lot in the Bank, although we classified Chile Solidario as if it were a Conditional Transfer Program” (WB Executive). Along with this, the bank’s executives perceived the pre-eminence of national proposals and knowledge over external experiences, despite having information on the latter. “All the people involved in the design of the Puente will have had a lot of knowledge of the program in Mexico and also in Brazil” (BM Executive). Within this learning mechanism, a limited rationality can be observed. MIDEPLAN, faced with the President’s demand to present proposals in 100 days, resorted to the proposals it had available, therefore using the shortcut of representativeness and availability. In fact, the proposal to extend the Puente program was made without yet having any evaluation of this pilot. In the case of DIPRES something similar happens, in that it used what they had already been discussing together with the World Bank. This whole process took no more than four months, which for the design of a system of this magnitude is a short period. These two stakeholders thus presented the President with two proposals, one comprehensive (MIDEPLAN) and one assistance (DIPRES), which responded to different approaches to poverty. The Executive combined the two into a Social Protection System, a decision also taken within a short period. At this point, the President played a central role in the main design of the Program, by asking the specific stakeholders in each area to combine their proposals and put together a concerted proposal. This was a pragmatic decision, where the available alternatives were considered and a model was built. Considering all the above, it is possible to present the reasons and means analyzed and their indicators according to the proposal of the study (see Table 6.1). A national decision then predominates, with little external influence on traditional paths or through the identified regional epistemic community. The articulation of the epistemic community with the learning mechanism 24 According to the interviewees, this confluence was concentrated in some managers and staff of DIPRES. “It is very clear to me that if it had not been for three people at DIPRES there would not have been a social protection report commissioned from the Bank; Mario Marcel, Alberto Arenas and Jaime Crispi” (BM expert).

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Table 6.1 Chile Solidario program 2002–2010 diffusion mechanism: learning Motivation

Indicator

Addressing the problem of the hard core of poverty To propose a relevant policy for the poverty issue, which was placed on the public agenda in 2001–2002 and which was being demanded by various stakeholders Means Accumulated knowledge in social entities about poverty Diagnosis and discussion of alternatives by DIPRES about the weaknesses of the programatic offer in social matters, with the support and influence of the World Bank in its diagnosis Diagnosis and discussion of alternatives by MIDEPLAN to address poverty from a comprehensive approach Discussion of alternatives by institutional actors (President, DIPRES; MIDEPLAN, advisors) and civil society actors (NGOs, Centers of Studies and Experts)

Empirical evidence of the problem through the results of the CASEN survey, which pointed to the stagnation in the decrease of indigence The issue is discussed in the public agenda by various stakeholders Indicator CAS file (today Social Protection), CASEN survey DIPRES studies the issue and requests a report on Social Protection from the World Bank MIDEPLAN, through the Social Division, studies diverse experiences of social programs, which will be used in the Strategy for Overcoming Poverty Presidential Seminar with institutional and civil society stakeholders. A second debate seminar in one of the Study Centers Meetings with MIDEPLAN/FOSIS and DIPRES.

Source Author’s elaboration

is observed—following what was commented in Chapter 3 and Appendix 3—in the means and not in the motivations. In this case, however, the particularity is that the incidence of the community in the means of learning was low. Consequently, it is a case of weak diffusion not coordinated through identifiable agents—in this case national—that adopt in knowledge of the information that existed in the regional environment. Chilean managers and officials were aware of the region’s experiences and regularly participated—and would continue to do—in regional meetings and policy networks generated by international organizations. However, the high capacities of national actors, their own knowledge and local experiences explain the learning mechanism and the scarce weight of foreign initiatives. Despite this particularism, Chile Solidario is part of this wave of diffusion of CCTs in Latin America. Later, Chilean experts will integrate the regional epistemic community and the characteristics of the program will be incorporated into others in the region (as discussed in Chapter 5). This initiative, without being framed in a regional diffusion process, it is

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doubtful that it would have taken the form it did. The presence of the World Bank and its influence among DIPRES economists undoubtedly facilitated the adoption process and the formulation of consensus among different government units; on the other hand, without the knowledge and analysis of other previous experiences in the region, it would have been difficult to develop such a sophisticated program. To conclude, in relation to the type of adoption, it is an innovative adoption resulting from the described learning process, as illustrated in Fig. 6.1 “Chile is the best example of what I have just said (…) it does not have something similar to PROGRESA, Oportunidades , Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Familia, (…) it is something that was really adopted to the Chilean

Fig. 6.1 Degree of adoption and diffusion mechanism. The Chilean case (Source By the author)

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context” (WB expert). In the final product, there are components of the CCTs, i.e. conditionalities and monetary transfers, but they do not constitute the essence of the program. The amount of the transfer is low in absolute terms for the Chilean reality and also compared to the rest of the region; it is also decreasing and limited to two years. On the contrary, the program’s main features are the psychosocial support provided to families and the conception of the program as part of a social protection system. Consequently, this is a particular CCT that emerges within the regional diffusion wave and that will later influence the characteristics of the following programs resulting from the diffusion of CCTs in Latin America.

References Asesorías para el Desarrollo. (2002, April 26). Social Protection and Poverty Workshop Memorandum. Ayala Consulting Co. (2003). Final Report. Workshop on Conditional Transfer Programs (CCTs): Operational Experiences. Prepared for the World Bank. Quito, Ecuador. Boeninger, E. (2007). Políticas Públicas en Democracia. Institucionalidad y experiencia chilena 1990–2006. Santiago: Uqbar Editores. Cohen, E., & Franco, R. (2006). Transferencias con corresponsanbilidad. Una mirada latinoamericana. Mexico (SEDESOL): Ministry of Social Development. ECLAC. (2011). Programa de Transferencias Condicionadas. Database of NonContributory Social Protection Programs Latin America and the Caribbean. http://dds.cepal.org/bdptc/. Ffrench-Davis, R., & Stallings, B. (2001). Reformas, Crecimiento y Polítics Sociales en Chile desde 1973. Santiago de Chile: LOM- CEPAL. Funk, R. (Ed.). (2006). El gobierno de Ricardo Lagos. La nueva vía chilena hacia el socialismo. Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales. Galasso, E. (2006, March). “With Their Effort and One Opportunity”: Alleviating Extreme Poverty in Chile. Development Research Group, World Bank. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). (2002, May 23–24). Minute of the Second Meeting of the Network for Poverty Reduction and Social Protection. Regional Policy Dialogue. Washington, DC. Lagos, R. (1999). Para Crecer con Igualdad. Programa de Gobierno de Ricardo Lagos E. (Government Program). Santiago de Chile. Larrañaga, O., & Contreras, D. (Eds.). (2010). Las Nuevas Políticas de Protección Social en Chile. Santiago de Chile: Uqbar Editores. Law 19.949. (2004, June 5). Establece un Sistema de Protección Social para familias en situación de extrema pobreza denominado Chile Solidario.

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Law 20.379. (2009, September 12). Crea el sistema intersectorial de protección social e institucionaliza el subsistema de protección integral a la infancia “Chile Crece Contigo”. Law 20.595. (2012, May 17). Crea el Ingreso Ético Familiar que establece bonos y Transferencias condicionadas para las familias de pobreza Extrema y crea Subsidio al Empleo de la Mujer. Leseigneur, M., Martinovic, H., & Toro, A. (2001). Análisis electoral de la década y de la elección municipal 2000 (IDEAS second year, No. 6. Fundación Chile 21). MIDEPLAN. (2004). Conceptos Fundamentales. Sistema de Protección Social. Chile Solidario. Ministerio de Planificación y Desarrollo. Santiago de Chile. Palma, J., & Ruz, M. A. (2005). Análisis del proceso de elaboración e implementación del sistema Chile Solidario (Informe Preliminar). Programa Participación, Ciudadanía y Políticas Públicas. Instituto de Asuntos Públicos, Universidad de Chile. Puentes, G. (2010). Unravelling the Policy-Making Process: The Case of Chilean Poverty-Alleviation Policy (Thesis submitted to the Department Social Policy of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy). London. Raczynski, D., & Serrano, C. (2002). Nuevos y viejos problemas en la lucha contra la pobreza en Chile. In O. Muñoz, & C. Stefoni (Eds.), El periodo del presidente Frei Ruiz-Tagle. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria. Raczynski, D., & Serrano, C. (2003). Derechos sociales básicos, superación de la pobreza y protección social ante la vulnerabilidad. Santiago de Chile: Asesorías para el Desarrollo. Raczynski, D., & Serrano, C. (2005). Las políticas y estrategias de desarrollo social. Aportes de los años 90 y desafíos futuros. In P. Meller (Ed.), La Paradoja Aparente. Equidad y Eficiencia: Resolviendo el Dilema (pp. 225– 283). Santiago de Chile: Taurus. Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., & Brusco, V. (2013). Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Teichman, J. (2009). Competing Visions of Democracy and Development in the Era of Neoliberalism in México and Chile. International Political Science Review, 30(1), 67–87. World Bank. (2004a, January 6). Loan Number 7202-CH. Loan Agreement (Social Protection Sector Adjustment Loan) Between Republic of Chile and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. World Bank. (2004b, May 10). Loan Number 7211-CH. Loan Agreement Social Protection Technical Assistance Project Between Republic of Chile and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. World Bank. (2005). Household Risk Management and Social Protection in Chile (A World Bank Country Study, No. 34421).

CHAPTER 7

Ecuador, the Bono Desarrollo Humano

The Bono Desarrollo Humano (Human Development Bond, BDH) of Ecuador has its origin in the Bono Solidario (Solidarity Bond, SB), created on October 1st, 1998 during the government of Jamil Mahuad (1998– 2000). It emerged as a compensatory measure to the elimination of most domestic gas and electricity subsidies, and has gradually become a central social protection programme in that country. In 2010, coverage was 1,178,921 households (ECLAC 2011a), making the BDH the largest CCT in the region, reaching 100% of the poor and indigent population (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011: 110).

7.1

The Economic and Political Context

From the 1950s to the early 1980s, it is argued that a structuralist model was installed in Ecuador, whereby it is the State that promotes and articulates economic and social policies, with measures such as import substitutive industrialization, agrarian reform, broad coverage education and health policies (Carrasco et al. 2011). Since the 1970s, with the incorporation of oil, investment and subsidies have increased due to the level of available resources and the ease of external credit. However, the economic crisis of ’82 meant an important economic and capital decrease, monetary and financial imbalances that aggravated unemployment and increased the prices of basic necessities. The response to this came hand in hand with © The Author(s) 2020 C. Osorio Gonnet, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51008-4_7

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the stabilization policies of the World Monetary Fund and the adjustments were concentrated in the monetary, exchange and financial areas (Carrasco et al. 2011). The role of the State was moving towards a more passive and decentralized one, “with neutral and open public policies and with a private and unregulated economic regime oriented towards free trade” (Vásconez et al. 2005: 29). In this period, social policies are seen as separate from economic policies, and lacking proper discussion and design. There was a decline in the national planning system, the State acquired a subsidiary role in a flexible model that included new actors (NGOs, civil society, private actors) from the fiscal balance. However, these actors did not manage to play an important role in the process and at the same time, specific entities, such as the National Planning Council, were losing physical, technical and human resources. Thus, during the 1990s it is claimed that policy design was concentrated in teams close to the governors and then institutionalized (meso level) through some State ministries, especially Finance (Vásconez et al. 2005). During the government of Durán Ballén (1992–1996), neoliberal reforms continued to be applied, promoting the privatization of strategic areas (such as telecommunications, the electric sector and hydrocarbons) and the modernization of the State, which, according to the government, would have a social character, since the income from the privatizations would be destined to social spheres (Vásconez et al. 2005: 43). In order to initiate the modernization process, in 1993 the State created the National Modernization Council (CONAM), which became the governing body of the State’s modernization and privatization processes. In this process there was the presence of international actors, especially multilateral banks. “It is from this government that the interference or transfer of policies from the development bank becomes more evident” (Vásconez et al. 2005: 45), especially linking poverty reduction policies to the reform processes of the State as a whole. CONAM was closely related to the World Bank, as it supported this modernization process with a State Modernization Project (Project [MOSTA], IBRD-3822-EC) (Mancero 2008). Through this project, legal and administrative reforms were carried out that modified the institutional structures of the Ecuadorian State. Three components were worked on: administration and control

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of public finances; modernization of the public sector; and coordination of the Reform Program and Agreements (Mancero 2008).1 As for economic development and poverty, the country developed a low rate of economic growth since the 1980s, as real GDP between 1980 and 2001 increased “at a rate of 2% per year, that is, less than population growth and one of the lowest growth rates in Latin America” (Sánchez 2005: 1). Later, the economic crisis in the period 1998–2000 during the government of Jamil Mahuad (August 1998–January 2000), was of significant magnitude: GDP had a negative growth rate of 7% in 1999, with effects such as a fall in per capita income of 9% (Vos 2000) and poverty stood at 52.18% (Espinosa 2011). As a result, “between 1990 and 2001, national poverty measured by consumption increased from 40 to 45%, while the number of those in poverty increased from 3.5 million to 5.2 million” (Sánchez 2005: 1). This phenomenon was also strongly expressed in the population under the age of 15, of which in 1999 92% in rural areas and 65% in urban areas were in poverty (Rivera 2003: 19). The crisis generated the search for economic and financial reforms, and one of the measures that began to be discussed in the late nineties was the elimination of subsidies for gasoline, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and electricity. These subsidies to derivatives of hydrocarbons have existed since 1978 and it is the responsibility of the President of the Republic to determine the sale price to the consumer (MCPEC 2010: 9). The debate arose from the fact that subsidies constitute an important item of central government expenditure and experienced an increase in prices. For example, in 2008, “Central Government spending on Health and Education reached 0.8% of nominal GDP, while the subsidy was 3.7% of nominal GDP” (MCPEC 2010: 10). Likewise, subsidies are regressive, especially for gasoline (León et al. 2001: 15). “85% of subsidized gasoline benefits exclusively the richest quintile of the population, and (…) the liquefied gas (LPG) subsidy benefits the richest quintile five times more than the poorest quintile. (…) the richest quintile concentrates 54.9% of total fuel consumption, while the poorest quintile represents only 3% of total consumption” (MCPEC 2010: 10). At the same time, the low

1 “The credit agreement for the implementation of the MOSTA project, signed in 1995, granted the sum of $20 million, with a local counterpart of $4.47 million and a grant from the Government of Japan of $530,000” (Mancero 2008).

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prices at which liquefied gas can be purchased in Ecuador have encouraged smuggling into neighboring countries Colombia and Peru (Andrade 2011: 8). Since 1996, the governments of Abdalá Bucaram (1996–1997), Jamil Mahuad (1998–2000) and Gustavo Noboa Bejarano (2000–2003) tried unsuccessfully to eliminate or focus the gas subsidy. However, social pressure neutralized and reversed attempts to do so. In fact, “fuel prices remain frozen since 2003 (2001, in the case of LPG) and a series of new subsidies have been created in the electricity sector” (MCPEC 2010: 9).

7.2 The Process of Adopting the Bono Desarrollo Humano In the process of formulating the Bono Desarrollo Humano it is possible to distinguish three moments where the decisions of the stakeholders respond to diverse motivations and have different means, which determines the mechanisms of diffusion. The first one is developed between 1998 and 2003, when the Bono Solidario (BS) was created, monetary transfer without conditions. A second moment is from 2003 to 2006, when the BS was redefined as the BDH with conditionalities. Finally, a third stage has been developed from 2006 until today,2 where control mechanisms have been established for the conditions, and the monetary transfer has been complemented with another type of benefits that respond to a social protection approach. In the analysis of the process of adoption of the Bono Desarrollo Humano, I have considered the Bono Solidario phase—even though this was an unconditional monetary transfer-, since the former constitutes a modification of the latter, so it is not possible to exclude it from the analysis. Likewise, both processes are within the wave of diffusion of CCTs, so it is interesting to analyze why from the beginning the Bono Solidario was not conceived as a program with conditionalities. In that same sense, the discussion has been extended some years after its process of adoption, since the posterior modifications would also respond to influences that are explained from the process of diffusion of the CCTs in the region.

2 Although the study period is until 2010.

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1998–2003: The Bono Solidario

In the context of the adjustment policies initiated in the 1990s and seeking to confront the deep economic crisis, the elimination of subsidies on the prices of electricity, gas for domestic use and gasoline was contemplated. This last measure was highly unpopular, as it increased the prices of diesel and gasoline by 40 and 12%, respectively (Aragón et al. 2000). Therefore, the Executive considered the introduction of compensatory measures to reduce the impact on household income. In this sense, the primary motivation for the creation of the Bono Solidario, established on October 1, 1998,3 was to provide an immediate and effective compensatory measure for the population in a situation of poverty and extreme poverty that would allow them to maintain the minimum levels of wellbeing (León et al. 2001). The bond would be financed—and this is how it continued to be in the following years- through fiscal resources (León et al. 2001). The aim of this transfer was to contribute to social cohesion, given the resistance to the elimination of subsidies and the social protests that could have been unleashed. In that sense, another of the compensatory measures for the elimination of the subsidy was the increase of the minimum wage (Ex-director MIES). The context of the economic and social crisis continued to mark the development of the bonus, since in April 1999 its amount was increased by 50%. However, because social tension continued and after strong mobilizations of the population, in June 1999 the prices of gasoline and domestic gas were frozen for one year (Aragón et al. 2000). The stakeholders involved in defining these policies were the National Council for State Modernization (CONAM) and the Ministry of Finance. During the first few years, these two institutions were responsible for the voucher, which in 2000 became the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Welfare (León et al. 2001). This step implies the intention of institutionalizing it and removing it from the indirect dependence of the Presidency of the Republic. In this sense the fact that in its design and first stage of implementation the social organisms did not play a relevant role stands out, making explicit the logic of the preeminence of the economic institutions over the social ones already commented on above. CONAM was part of the efforts to modernize and establish adjustment policies, and its counterpart was the Ministry of Finance, not the Social Ministry. The 3 Through Decree 129 published in the Official Journal 29 of September 18, 1998.

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policy makers identified in the design and implementation process were both economists. One of them is Nataly Cely, Ecuador’s current ambassador to the United States (since January 2012). Cely was in charge of CONAM’s Benefits Program from August 1998 to July 1999. Her profile is that of a political actor—with a solid academic background4 —who has had varied responsibilities in the public apparatus, consulting firms and international organizations.5 Likewise, Joaquín Morillo, is an economist with a master’s degree in Economics from Georgetown, in his role as executive director of CONAM.6 On the other hand, the Ministry of Finance based its influence on the use of resources and on “the policies of financing, indebtedness and the management of fiscal policy as dollarization has become crucial in the country” (Vásconez et al. 2005: 21). In this sense, despite the existence of a good technical level in terms of professionals in the social sector portfolios, the governmental planning entities had a lower weight in terms of “the concentration in the economic axis of policies and the emergence of the crisis” (Vásconez et al. 2005: 49). As a result of the reforms carried out to modernize the State by CONAM, it is pointed out that “a concentration of attributions was generated in the Ministry of Economy and Finance, while some institutions were dismantled and others had their functions taken away” (Mancero 2008: 83). Finally, it is also argued that in fact the Solidarity Bond “was feasible because its design and implementation was the responsibility of the economic front of the government and not of the social front. The tradition and practices of the governmental social sector would possibly have determined a non-monetary social compensation” (León et al. 2001). Along with the role exercised through CONAM by the World Bank, the presence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stands out. Since 4 Master’s in Public Administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and PhD in Economics from FLACSO, http://www.ecuador.org/nue vosite/MinCely.php. Retrieved March 22, 2013. 5 Nataly Cely also served as Minister Coordinator of the Ministry of Social Development from 2007–2009. Between 2009–2011 at the Ministry of Production and Employment. She has also done consulting work for IOs and as a representative of the government of Ecuador. At http://www.ecuador.org/nuevosite/MinCely.php. Retrieved March 22, 2013. 6 Morillo has a more academic profile linked to the financial world. He has numerous publications, is a researcher and has served as Dean of the Faculty of Economics at the University of the Americas, Ecuador.

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1998, the government of Ecuador began to hold conversations with the IMF to request a stand-by loan to provide liquidity to its balance of payments. In June 1999, the IMF delivered a series of recommendations that had to be considered in order to reach an agreement.7 Due, among other factors, to the political instability in Ecuador, this did not materialize until April 4, 2000, when Gustavo Noboa’s government presented the “letter of intention” to the IMF (ratified on April 19, 2000) (Aragón et al. 2000). In it, a significant reduction in subsidies for oil derivatives was committed to as of June 2000. As a compensatory measure, there was an increase of 50% of the Bono Solidario program.8 Likewise, the recommendations that the IMF had already made in June 1999—9 months after the start of the programme—regarding the errors in the targeting of the bond, which was demonstrated in 28.3% of the beneficiary population (Aragón et al. 2000: 107), were also included. Therefore, the government of Ecuador proposed “to improve the targeting of the Bono Solidario, to provide medical and nutritional support to young children and pregnant women, and the creation of a fund to accelerate the economic and social development of indigenous communities, with financial assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank (Aragón et al. 2000: 1)”. To this end, the letter of intent stated that financial assistance from the IDB and the acceleration in the delivery of already available resources had already been committed (Aragón 2000). Nevertheless, the decision about this bonus—discussion of alternatives and definition of the policy to be adopted—was a closed and self-referential process at the governmental level, where there was no participation of other national actors beyond the state apparatus. “The work of government agencies in the agenda process was not known by the population or recognized by the presidency. It did not even incorporate sectors of civil society into the public discussion, since the dissemination of the social agenda was not one of the priorities of the regime” (Vásconez et al. 2005: 49). Consequently, the decision was concentrated in the Executive, supported by CONAM and the Ministry of Finance and relying on the legitimacy of the multilateral banking system, specifically from the IMF and the World Bank. The IDB would not have

7 Document entitled “Ecuador: Social Protection in the Face of the Economic Crisis”. June 24, 1999, cited in (Aragón et al. 2000). 8 The monetary transfer was increased in April 2001 (León et al. 2001).

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been so directly linked to the origin of the BS—although it is present in subsequent support commitments through IMF loans—but the program itself coincided with its social agenda and with the activities it had been developing in Ecuador in those years (sectoral programs in the financial, agricultural and transport spheres and improving access to and the quality of education and health for low-income groups) (Rivera 2003). Consequently, the Bono Solidario arises in a context of crisis, as a reaction to other measures. This can be seen in the fact that the assessment of the resources needed to implement it, and the analysis of the existing ones, was deficient. The Ecuadorian State did not have a beneficiary identification system that allowed families to be identified. Although the Ecuadorian System of Social Indicators had existed since 1995, it did not have the necessary information to carry out this process (former BS and BDH directors). In spite of this, the decision to adopt the program was taken, demonstrating greater commitment than technical strength. “In the case of Ecuador, I believe that there was a great will to do it but also an institutional fragility” (IDB PTC Expert). Thus, it was defined to directly carry out a large-scale program in terms of coverage, lacking the essential identification mechanisms. This decision responded to the need to define beneficiaries quickly, but did not ensure accuracy in targeting. The accuracy of the information on which they were selected was questionable and therefore generated targeting errors (Schady and Araujo 2006). The procedure was simple and expeditious, since it was based on the beneficiaries’ self-identification vis-à-vis Catholic priests and evangelical pastors, who acted as judges to define the veracity of what the people said regarding their quality as “poor”9 (Recalde 2007). The data were then entered into a database run by the National Banking Network (BANRED), through which the monetary transfer would be paid. These data were contrasted with data from Social Security, electricity companies, private banks, and Traffic Office (Lizano 2013). This in order to identify those who had stable jobs, consumed electricity on certain indexes, maintained credits or certain sums of money, or had a vehicle. However, no direct checks were made on their income level. As a result, this self-identification led to major failures in targeting. For example, “an under-coverage of 48.1% and a leakage of 63.4%” were detected. That is, with the 1999 data, “about 1 out of every 2 people eligible for the Bono 9 This collaboration on the part of the churches was even questioned among some sectors within them, given the responsibility involved (Recalde 2007).

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Solidario do not receive this benefit, while 6 out of every 10 individuals who receive the bond are ineligible” (León et al. 2001: 13). However, the initial motivation, the compensation for the elimination of the subsidy, remained unfounded in the short term, despite the commitments made to the IMF. The acceleration of inflation and the depreciation of the exchange rate led to the reappearance, not without opposition, of the subsidies to gas and electricity, which still exist today (Vos 2000). As a result, in this first stage, from 1998 to 2003, the programme focused on mothers and older adults (with a determined maximum income10 ), and persons with disabilities, who received an unconditional cash transfer. The payment was made through the banking system and there were several increases in the amount of cash transfer during the following years. At the beginning the program gave a figure of 100,000 sucres per month, that is approximately USD15. In April 1999 this figure increased by 50% (Ponce and Bedi 2008). In terms of coverage, the Bono Solidario began with a large number of beneficiaries and by 2000 had reached about 1.2 million households, about 45% of Ecuadorian households (Ponce and Bedi 2008). During the following years, the intentions of perfecting the social institutionality linked directly or indirectly to the Bono Solidario stand out. Thus, once this was in place, the Integrated Social Plan proposed in 1999 by the Secretaria de Estado de Desarrollo Social (Ministry of Social Development SEDES) tried to impose greater coherence and systematization in the targeting criteria. However, SEDES was later replaced by the Secretariat of State for Human Development in 2000, so this effort was discontinued. Finally, that same year, the State Secretariats would be eliminated, and the ministries would again have a relevant role gathered in the Social Front,11 a supraministerial entity that had “a Technical Secretariat in charge of providing technical assistance, systematizing,

10 For mothers of families with at least one child under 18 years of age, the monthly income should not exceed one million sucres, and neither she nor her spouse should receive a fixed salary or be affiliated with the Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security. The family income of those over 65 years of age must not exceed one million sucres and they must not receive a fixed salary in order to receive the bonus. 11 This entity groups together the Ministries of Health, Urban Development and Housing; Education, Culture and Sports; Labor and Human Resources; and Social Welfare.

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evaluating, monitoring and carrying out follow-up actions for the execution of social programs” (Rivera 2003: 24). Therefore, the leading role on social policies and responsibility for the Bono Solidario was concentrated in the Ministry of Social Welfare together with the Planning Office (ODEPLAN), created in 2000 (Vásconez et al. 2005: 62). Subsequently, in June 2002, during the government of Lucio Gutiérrez, the Programa de Protección Social (the Social Protection Program (PPS) was created as a public entity attached to the Ministry of Social Welfare. The PPS was assigned the mission of administering monetary and economic transfer programs to families at risk and the vulnerable. Likewise, the conversations with the WB and the IDB continued during 2001 and the following years, in the sense of perfecting the mechanisms and establishing conditionalities; all of the above in line with the regional CCTs. “The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank have been negotiating with the government complementary monetary transfer programs, which, unlike the Bono (Bono Solidario), would be conditional on investment in human capital, such as a scholarship program (Beca Escolar) and one for maternity transfers and medical check-ups for children (Bono Materno-infantil )” (León et al. 2001). In this context, in March 2001 the Technical Cooperation Loan Agreement was signed with IDB N° 1261/OC-EC, which creates a System for Identification and Selection of Beneficiaries of Social Programmes (SELBEN), under the Ministry of Social Welfare (Official Register N° 287, year 2001). This system would be useful both for the Bono Solidario and for other existing social programs. In addition, one of the first impact evaluations was carried out, in cooperation with the World Bank, by Mauricio León, Roby Vos and Wladymir Brborich (2001). It states that the impact of the program “on the incidence of income poverty is negative, insofar as the value of the transfer is more than compensated for by the lost income due to the reduction in labor effort. However, at the same time it is observed that the negative incentive in the labor supply does not apply to the poorest of the poor” (León et al. 2001: 31). It is also stated, preliminarily, that “BS seems to have had positive indirect effects on structural poverty. School enrolment among the group of beneficiaries is higher than in the comparison group” (León et al. 2001: 31). Thus, the unconditional transfer would have generated the behavior change that would later be established as an explicit condition of the program. Finally, as a result of cooperation with UNICEF and in the context of conversations with banks, a School Scholarship was established in 2003, where the experiences of Oportunidades of Mexico and Bolsa Escola in

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Brazil (former CCT Ecuador directors) were kept in mind. This scholarship was implemented for a few months, as it was closed when the Bono Solidario became the Bono Desarrollo Humano and the school attendance component was established as a condition. 7.2.2

The Inclusion of Conditionalities: The Transition from Bono Solidario to Bono Desarrollo Humano

During the government of Lucio Gutiérrez (2003–2005), in 2003, the program was renamed Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Human Development Bond), and it took a conceptual turn in order to become a tool for accumulating capacities for the poorest population (Calvas 2010). Its objective is to “expand human capital and avoid the persistence of poverty by providing direct monetary compensation to families below the poverty line” (MIES 2011). The monetary transfer was increased, focusing on the poorest families and including conditionalities in the area of education and health, except for older adults and persons with disabilities.12 Executive Decree No. 347 of April 25th, 2003 changed the denomination of Bono Solidario to Bono Desarrollo Humano. The announcement had been made a few days before President Gutiérrez took office, in the context of the “Program for Economic Order and Human Development” which contemplated the immediate increase in fuel prices, the freezing of salaries in the public sector and reductions in State spending (CIDOB 2012). The fundamental modification between one and the other was the introduction of co-responsibilities,13 which was justified by the Secretariat of the Social Front in two main objectives: (1) to reduce poverty by consumption; and (2) to increase investment in human

12 In 2006, the cash transfer for older adults was renamed the Old Age Assistance

Pension, which consists of a monetary transfer (USD11.5) for poor older adults who are among the poorest 40 per cent of the population and are not pensioners of the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute (IESS) (Alomía, undated). In 2007 and 2009, the amount was again increased to USD 35. And from 2008, with the approval of the new Constitution, the pension was guaranteed to all persons over 65, eliminating the condition of belonging to the poorest 40%. 13 In Decree 347, which marks the change from BS to BDH, the designations of requirements and conditions are used. Subsequently, Agreement 512 of the Ministry of Social Welfare, of August 7, 2003, uses the expression co-responsibility, explaining the requirements that the beneficiaries should comply with in the areas of health and education (Decree 347, 2003; and Agreement 512, 2003).

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capital (to increase the use of education and preventive health services) (Ponce and Bedi 2008). The program was part of the Juntos Podemos Basic Social Agenda, established by the government of Lucio Gutiérrez. This agenda was considered the “main instrument of State social policy management, which encourages the participation and active responsibility of family members and society as a whole, to improve the living conditions and quality of life of the most vulnerable groups, which at the same time makes it possible to confront, prevent and reduce extreme poverty by promoting redistributive social justice in its spatial, sectoral and generational dimensions” (Decree 347, 7th May 2003). The conditionalities established referred to education and health. In the first area, families should carry out bimonthly controls for children under 6 years of age. Likewise, in families with children between 6 and 15 years of age, they had to be enrolled and meet an attendance rate of at least 90% per month. The bonus established in 2003 was US$15 per month for families (approximately 10% of the income of first quintile families) (Ponce and Bedi 2008). Since the government of Noboa (2000–2002), social policies are already present in the discourse, and concepts such as “human development, capital, social protection, and it has clearly differentiated it from economic policy (at least in the discourse)” (Vásconez et al. 2005: 71) stand out in government agendas. Although it was not part of its government program, in August 2000, a few months after its assumption, ODEPLAN presented a “Plan of Action 2000-2003, For a New Country”, where it was proposed to maintain the Bono Solidario and increase its amount during the year 2000 (Constitutional Presidency, 2000). Likewise, conversations and debates were being held with the multilateral banks, also in the sense of perfecting the existing programs based on the new instruments installed, such as SELBEN. This line of work continued under the government of Lucio Gutiérrez (2002–2005). As a result, there was internal motivation to perfect the program from the national actors, the Frente Social and specifically the Social Protection Program. However, given the complex economic context and the permanent contact with the multilateral banks, this motivation was significantly influenced by other reasons. The talks with the World Bank were concluded on 27 August 2003 with a loan of USD 50 million (Loan No. 7173-EC). To receive it, the government of Ecuador committed to a series of actions through a letter on April 25, 2003. Among them was the change from Bono Solidario to

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Bono Desarrollo Humano; in fact, the letter sent to the Bank is dated on the same day the credit was issued. Thus, at the time it was granted, the government increased the budget in the areas of education, health and social security in relation to 2002. Likewise, the Bono Desarrollo Humano had been created, “in a form and substance satisfactory to the Bank” (World Bank 2003a: 14) and its budget for 2003 had been increased (in relation to that allocated to Bono Solidario in 2002). Finally, among other social measures, the government of Ecuador undertook to carry out a baseline survey, monitoring and evaluation of the Bono Desarrollo Humano (presenting methodology and timeline) (World Bank 2003a). Specifically, on the issue of conditionality control, no reference was made. The action of modifying the program in terms of conditionality was framed within the logic of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of basic social programs and services, in the “Program on Economic Management and Human Development” (World Bank 2004). Three successive loans were approved, the first of which would be received in 2003, the next in May 2004 and the third in May 2005.14 Within a year of implementation, the Bank recognized that achievements in conditionality controls were not sufficient (World Bank 2004). This operation was in close collaboration with the MFI, as it required bilateral dialogue and common perspectives (World Bank 2004), given the financial components to which the government of Ecuador committed. As for the IDB, its operation was more focused on strengthening the social safety net, ensuring public spending in social sectors and promoting structural changes in education and labor markets. The WB and the IDB worked together to ensure maximum coordination between the two operations, including missions and meetings with representatives of the Ecuadorian government to discuss its contents (World Bank 2004: 26).15 The IDB loan, signed on August 27th, 2003, was also projected for the years 2003–2005 and was for USD 200 million. The objective 14 Of the three stages of the loan, the first loan and the second (albeit late) would have been completed. The delivery of the third phase of the loan was suspended due to noncompliance with the clauses in the Oil Regularisation Fund. This refusal and supposed pressure received from the World Bank were used as an argument for the expulsion of the World Bank representative by the government of Rafael Correa in June 2007. 15 In the letter from the Government of Ecuador to the WB in April 2003, it was pointed out that with the assistance of the IDB, the database of the BS would be improved, which would make it possible to better focus aid and eliminate domestic gas subsidies (World Bank 2004).

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was to consolidate the social protection system and improve the efficiency of social spending. It was pointed out that the system would be strengthened through the introduction of the Bono Desarrollo Humano seeking, among other aspects, to achieve effectiveness in the programs and resources destined to child nutrition and education. Along with explaining the existing coordination with the World Bank, it was also proposed that these programs were part of the measures taken by the government of Ecuador with the IMF for fiscal stabilization (IDB 2003). Less emphasis is placed on the issue of conditionality control, since monitoring and evaluation of the process are mentioned, but aspects related to verification of compliance with conditionalities are not detailed. On the other hand, in the letter of intent of the Ecuadorian government, the diagnosis was presented regarding the need to improve the Bono Solidario, recognizing its shortcomings with respect to targeting and impact, and the amount of the benefit. The merger of the Bono Solidario and the Bono Desarrollo Humano Scholarship was also proposed as part of its agenda (IDB 2003). Now, considering the link to these two loans, it is possible to note that, as the interviewees point out, the “negotiation in 2003 was not very horizontal (was) very encouraged by the loans” (CCT Expert). Important evidence in this sense is that in the “Program for Economic Order and Human Development” only general objectives were presented that spoke of improving the Bono Solidario. Months later, the letter of intent to the World Bank proposes an increase in the Bono Solidario from US$11.5 to US$15 and to replace the regressive gas subsidy with one focused on the poorest people. It also points to protecting the social area from financial cuts and implementing reforms in the social sector16 (World Bank 2003b). Consequently, it emphasizes that there is no mention of transforming the BS into a conditional program, but only of increasing the amount of the transfer. Subsequently, the change to a conditional program was proposed as part of this agenda. Therefore, this would indicate that the decision to include conditionality and merge the Bono Desarrollo Humano Scholarship with the Bono Solidario would have responded to the requirements of the WB (and indirectly of the IDB and the IMF, given the convergence that existed in their missions and projects 16 Some of the reforms proposed were to include the Ministry of Economy and Finance in the Social Front’s Cabinet, to finance the Social Front’s policies, and to focus programs on poorer sectors (World Bank 2003b).

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in Ecuador). In this sense, it also highlights the common perspective of the banks regarding the diagnosis of the Bono Solidario and the need to transform it into Bono Desarrollo Humano. The convergence observed in the official documents of the loan agreement and the letters of intent on the part of the Ecuadorian government indicates a process of conversation and prior alignment towards this diagnosis and measures. As it has already been pointed out, although conditionalities were established in the guidelines of the program, the control mechanisms were not defined that would allow evaluating their compliance in practice in a generalized manner. “Legally they set the conditions, but in reality the follow-up mechanism did not pass (…) to start implementing a follow-up program, you need a lot of resources and it is very expensive, and the program did not do that” (Ex-director CCT). One year after its implementation, the WB report on the loan indicated that the achievements in conditionality controls were not sufficient (World Bank 2004). And to date, no permanent, institutionalized mechanism has been established. It was decided to use the media, public recreation spaces—such as concerts and mass gatherings—to register beneficiaries and to make known the characteristics of the program, explaining the fulfillment of the conditions in education and health (Schady and Araujo 2006). The fact that a strict control of conditionalities was not established is now revealed as a certain demonstration of autonomy and that the banks were not able to fully impose their agenda. Some interviewees point out that once BDH was part of the Social Protection Program, policymakers were integrated to apply an equity and rights approach. They would have opposed the requirement of conditionality, since it is opposed to the social rights approach that should ensure the delivery of the benefit without the need for any condition and a program that would establish it (CCT Expert, Ecuador). The evidence gathered in this paper is not conclusive. It is also argued that there was knowledge that conditionality did not have a significant effect on people’s behavior, based on evidence from the impact assessment published in 2001 that showed that families sent children to school without conditionality (León et al. 2001: 31). There it is stated that the BS would generate the desired incentive, in spite of not having the conditionality. However, it is also pointed out that “this conclusion should (…) be taken with some reservation due to the fact that more research is required on some of the determinants of the results presented here” (León et al. 2001: 31). This was because it was a semiexperimental analysis, based on a comparison between beneficiaries and

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non-beneficiaries of the BS during 1998–1999 on the basis of the Living Conditions Survey (LCS).17 Consequently, there was some evidence to argue that control of conditionality was not essential in the Ecuadorian case and this would be reinforced in subsequent studies.18 Likewise, it was considered that implementing it would increase costs significantly and also implied administrative capacities that were not available. “A conditional transfer program at that time was very expensive and also the complexity of such a large program was 40% of families in Ecuador, with an education and health system that is not sufficiently trained to be able to inform you whether or not people are attending health centers” (Former CCT Ecuador executive). However, conditionalities were part of the commitment made to the bank for negotiated loans: in other words, “in the text there was supposed to be conditional transfer” (Ex-director CCT). This then meant a permanent debt, “a constant martyrdom” (ex-director CCT Ecuador), with the multilateral banks. Finally, on this point it is also necessary to question why, if there was certain evidence supporting the idea of not controlling conditionality (which in practice is not conditioning), it was accepted as part of the bank’s requirements. In this respect, on the one hand it must have been accepted as a necessary requirement for loans, and this undoubtedly constitutes a compelling reason. In that sense, the interviewees also expressed the conviction that the institutional requirements to carry it out were not developed within the Ecuadorian state apparatus. This diagnosis was shared by the banks, so that in the related activities progress was demanded in these aspects. As for the influence of other countries, Brazil would have been particularly influential. In fact, one of the creators of Bolsa Escola, Cristovam Buarque, visited Ecuador in 2000,19 through the IDB, to exchange his

17 León and Younger (2007) also conducted an impact evaluation of BS using the Survey and focusing on the impact of BS on children’s health. Subsequently, Oosterbeek et al. (2008) evaluate the BDH based on a randomized experiment conducted for the first quintile and a discontinuous regression design conducted for the second quintile. 18 The impact evaluation carried out between 2003 and 2005, and disseminated in 2006, showed that the advertising campaigns would have installed the idea that they had to comply with school attendance, since otherwise the cash transfer would be lost (Schady and Araujo 2006; Former Director Ecuador). 19 The precise date of the visit has not been possible to trace. The collection of information regarding these visits and trips has presented significant difficulties, since it is not systematized by the responsible agencies.

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experience with Ecuadorian experts, such as Mauricio León20 and David Alomía21 (CCT Ecuador Experts). “I invited Cristovam Buarque to go and explain in Ecuador how it worked (Bolsa Escola), the benefits, and the Ecuadorians adopted it but they wanted to do it immediately in the urban sectors. That implies a much higher complexity” (IDB CCT Expert). Mexico would also be a reference, and Ecuadorian experts would have traveled to learn about PROGRESA’s experience22 (IDB CCT Expert, and former CCT executives). However, although the Mexican experience was known, it would have been decided not to adopt all the components of the program, for example in terms of centralized monitoring (Ex-director CCT). These meetings with experts and attendance at international seminars also demonstrate contact with experts from the epistemic community. 7.2.3

The Bono Desarrollo Humano and the Social Protection

As a corollary to the process of adoption and refinement described above, it is necessary to mention that BDH was legitimized and recognized by President Rafael Correa’s government plan (2007–2017) as “one of the country’s largest social programs with the greatest impact on equity” (Plan de Gobierno Alianza País: 66). The amount of the bonus doubled from USD15 to USD30 in February 2007 and its coverage was also increased, especially for people with disabilities23 and older adults (for whom the monetary transfer is unconditional), constituting an important component of social policy (León 2009). Within Correa’s government program, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano refocused as a promise of a social protection policy for the vulnerable 20 On that date, a researcher from the Technical Secretariat of the Social Front of the System Integrated Social Indicators of Ecuador (1998–2003). Between 2004–2007, Coordinator of the Vice-Minister of Economic and Social Inclusion (former Ministry of Social Welfare). 2007–2009 Deputy Minister of Economic and Social Inclusion (former Ministry of Social Welfare) and between 2009–2011 Deputy Minister for the Coordination of Social Development. Technical Secretary of the Sectorial Council of Social Policy. 21 Director of the scholarship between 2001–2003 and later in charge of the Social Protection programme 2003–2012. 22 The interviewees clearly remember having traveled to Mexico, but the exact date could not be specified. 23 For example, it was modified so that people with more than 40% disability could receive it, instead of the previous 70%.

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population from a rights and inclusion perspective. It was proposed as an objective that the population in a situation of poverty be part of the distribution of wealth and above all be assumed as the responsibility of the State (Recalde 2007). Likewise, the bonus was considered an “economic recognition of the work carried out by housewives with fewer resources in their homes” (Recalde 2007: 20). The essential components of the program were maintained (Bono Desarrollo Humano, Disability Pension and Elderly Pension, the latter two without conditions). Likewise, at least from a formal point of view, the problem of controlling compliance with conditionalities persisted. Until that date, as has been pointed out, this had not been implemented systematically, and only at the end of 2006 began the planning of a system to carry out the first pilots, which were carried out in 2007 (CCT Ecuador expert). Thus, in that year a partial control of conditionalities was implemented in both urban and rural areas. In the former, a random sample is selected for monitoring, who are notified when their payment is received. Individuals must then submit, within two months, documentation demonstrating compliance with the conditions. If there is no justification within this period, the transfer is suspended until the documents are presented. In rural areas, locations were defined where there was a greater probability of non-compliance. In these areas, the technicians of the Social Protection Program coordinated with the provincial authorities to receive the documents that certify compliance with the conditions (45 days and in case of justification the transfer is suspended) (Former directors and CCT officials Ecuador). In December 2008, in an official presentation on the program at the III International Seminar “Conditional Transfers, Eradication of Hunger and Chronic Undernutrition”, organized by the FAO Regional Office,24 it was pointed out as a weakness that a control of co-responsibilities had not yet been implemented throughout the country. Along with this, national coverage was recognized as an impediment that would generate problems of scale for the implementation of co-responsibility control (MIES 2008). Consequently, verification of conditionality continued to be an aspect in which the Social Protection Programme does not clarify whether it is a systematic process or periodic one. The information available at the end of this research indicates that during the first half of 2012, control was 24 Representatives of the programme (usually Mauricio Leon and David Alomía) attended FAO CTP Seminars 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011.

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carried out on 10,706 households in urban areas and 51,507 in rural areas (MIES 2012), but it was not possible to systematize previous years, nor to establish the periodicity with which these measurements were established. Where the government made the most significant progress was in the process of identifying beneficiaries. In August 2009, a refocusing was carried out by means of a new socio-economic survey for individual targeting, known as the Social Register (by means of a proxy means test), which was carried out between December 2007 and July 2009. Along with this, it was defined that the beneficiaries would be specified from those who are below the poverty line, and not focusing only on quintiles 1 and 2 (León 2009). In addition, it should be noted that during Correa’s administration the term co-responsibility versus conditionality was introduced with greater force. The government explicitly assumed an economic and social rights approach, present in the new Constitutional Charter of 2008, the result of a Constituent Assembly process. In fact, in November 2012 it was specified in a Decree that co-responsibility is the shared responsibility between the State and the citizen(s) receiving the Bono Desarrollo Humano (Ministerial Agreement No. 000134). Finally, as far as international stakeholders are concerned, their role has been much more limited since 2007, when the World Bank representative was expelled (Machado 2008). The reason given was the WB’s suspension of the 2005 loan, which had already been approved.25 Relations would also be frozen with the IMF, but not with the IDB. However, the participation of the IOs is more limited and with greater follow-up in terms of the actions carried out by international cooperation (Ex-director PTC Ecuador). Regarding the national stakeholders, entities such as the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) and also the Escuela Politécnica de Litoral de Guayaquil (ESPOL) would have participated at the beginning of Correa’s government. However, this would have decreased later and a very limited relationship was established with academic centers and think tanks (CCT Expert). By the end of the period under study, the inclusion of the Human Development Credit to the set of initiatives of the Social Protection

25 http://elpais.com/diario/2007/04/27/internacional/1177624819_850215.html and http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2007/04/26/actualidad/117753 8425_850215.html. Retrieved on 16 April 2013.

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Program from 2007, together with the mortuary insurance, the emergency bonus (in case of natural catastrophes two monetary transfers of USD45 each are given) and the Solidarity Protection Network (ensures treatment for catastrophic diseases in the public health network), complemented the Bono Desarrollo Humano and configured a set of benefits that aspire to establish a social protection network for the poorest population. For 2010, the responsible institution was the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion (MIES) and the executing agency the Social Protection Program (PPS). The current beneficiaries are families with coresponsibility in education and health. The representative (the mother) receives a monthly amount of USD35 per household,26 regardless of the number of children and their sex and age (up to 18 years). Coresponsibility in health is attendance at preventive health checks (every two months for children aged 0–1 year, and at least once every 6 months for children between 1 and 5 years). In terms of education, children and young people between the ages of 5 and 18 must be enrolled in the school system and complete an attendance of at least 75% (MIES 2011). The PPS also provides the Welfare Pension for the Elderly and the Welfare Pension for people with disabilities (between 18 and 65 years old) (both of USD35 without conditions). The payment system is through private banks, cooperatives and the National Development Bank. In 2008, the MIES Bono Rápido debit card was introduced, with which people can redeem at ATMs and access discounts in retail networks. Finally, the resources with which the program operates emanate exclusively from the State budget.

7.3 Diffusion Mechanisms: Moderate Coercion and Emulation As I have already pointed out, in its first stage the Bono Solidario was not created as part of a structural policy to fight poverty, but as a monetary compensation mechanism for the elimination of subsidies on the prices of gas for domestic use, gasoline and electricity (León et al. 2001: 11). The motivation was to compensate and generate social cohesion, objectives that are sought from an internal diagnosis that must face an economic 26 This structure is maintained until today, March 2013. In January 2013 there was an increase from USD35 to USD50 for the Human Development Bond, the Old Age Pension and the Pension for People with Disabilities.

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crisis and the consequences of adjustment policies. In this sense, the motivation responds not to a diagnosis of a public problem, but as part of a logic of compensation for other measures, in this case, the elimination of subsidies. Therefore, an endogenous component is observed in the motivation, although the influence of the multilateral bank—WB through CONAM—in the decision to adopt the measure is also observed. The elimination of subsidies was directly suggested given their regressive nature and targeting errors. Thus, compensatory actions, foreseeing social unrest, should be considered. In this sense, the political character of this decision stands out in the motivation and that given the urgency, it would also influence the means. “Because the adoption of the bond was guided by political considerations, it was hastily implemented, and no ex-ante provision was made for its evaluation” (León and Younger 2007: 1127). Moderate coercion components are also observed in the characteristics of the initial program design. “In the case of the Bono Solidario, it is not evident what the desired impact was” (León et al. 2001: 16). In fact, when the Bono Solidario originated outside the spectrum of social policy and programmatic goals to combat poverty, it not only had high weaknesses in the targeting system, but in general it lacked a design and a technical programatic support that identified its objectives, and in which a monitoring and evaluation system was established from its beginnings. In this regard, targeting was ineffective, with an inclusion error of 19.5% and an exclusion error of 24.2%. “In other words, approximately 6 out of every 10 people eligible to receive the subsidy do not benefit from it, while 1 out of every 2 individuals who receive it are not eligible according to the criteria established by the program itself” (Vos 2000: 41). This evidence reinforces the idea of emulation and that it was adopted without the necessary institutionality to ensure the systematic implementation of certain components of the program. “Ecuador adopted, (…) but had not done the preparatory work” (IDB CCT Expert). When analyzing the means that are observed in the mechanism of diffusion, the presence of international stakeholders stands out. The IDB and the signing of the letters of intent and the loans that imposed social conditions are indicators of what could be described as moderate coercion. However, it is worth noting that suggestions from the banks led to the adoption of a transfer program, but without conditions. At the end of the nineties, the CCT diffusion curve gradually began to increase. The CCTs of Brazil and Mexico had only been in place for a few years, and Honduras had also been doing so since 1998. On the other hand,

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empirical evidence was still incipient, along with meditative and exhorting activities. In other words, the consensus about the efficiency of the programs in the region was not yet as consolidated as in subsequent years. As for the national stakeholders, in the origins of the Bono Solidario there is a limited role of social institutions versus economic institutions in the definition of social policy priorities, within the framework of State reform processes in Ecuador and Latin America. The Ministry of Economy and Finance and the National Council for Modernization are the initial designers and implementers of this Program in the country; only once it is adopted and in operation is it transferred to the Ministry of Social Welfare. In the origins of the Bono Solidario we find a concrete example of the smaller specific weight that maintains the social institutionality before the economic one (Calvas 2010). As I pointed out earlier, according to experts, this pre-eminence of the economic front would explain the adoption of the program. The origins of this program do not include processes of participation by the population, civil society organizations or local governments. The measure was adopted by central authorities and implemented in the country in less than two months at the national level. Other national actors, such as political parties, were not constituted as relevant stakeholders in this process. “The main political parties have a formal interest in welfare policy, which translates into political initiatives that respond to defined clienteles (…) Fragmented visions of social policy issues, based on particular interests or corporate representations, are a strong obstacle to building stable alliances that operate both in society and in the political system and specialized spaces” (Vásconez et al. 2005: 32). Finally, the National Congress did not participate in the design but establishes the necessary legal framework. In this discussion its role was not relevant, and it is maintained that the topic of social policies would not generate too much interest among the incumbents (Vásconez et al. 2005: 33). The moderate coercion mechanism is also observed in the process of adopting conditionalities in 2003, with the change from Bono Solidario to Bono Desarrollo Humano. The motivation to adopt, or more specifically to continue with the program, was present in the government program. The conditionality component would have been established in the agenda as part of the loan requirements which, while not directly financing the program, would do so for other national ones. In this sense, in the case of both BDH and BS, the motivation to obtain electoral revenues is not identified during the reconstruction of the diffusion mechanisms, but the

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context of the crisis and the influences of external actors would have prevailed. The emulation mechanism seems to be more influenced by the predominance of CCTs in the regional environment as an efficient program, rather than by electoral evidence. As has already been stated, this does not mean that this motivation is not present at all—which is quite unlikely for a public policy or programme—but it would not be predominant. At this second moment the adoption of conditionality responds to this moderate coercion and the means by which it is carried out confirm this. Loans are signed and conditionalities are established in law despite the fact that the decision-makers were aware that they did not have the technical capacity to effectively monitor compliance. Likewise, from their point of view, there was evidence that conditionality was not necessary to ensure attendance at educational establishments or health control. Nevertheless, the control of conditionalities is established in the law, “on paper,” although there was no will to implement it that way. The attempts to control that were made in the following years also responded to a particular design, which denotes an approximation between the objective of random control, but at the same time still recognizing that the capacities were limited to do so in a total manner. Consequently, the adoption of conditionalities in 2003 responds to the demands of multilateral banks, which were already appropriate for CCTs, as opposed to 1998. The moment of the wave of diffusion is of greater dissemination of the programs, there were already impact evaluations of the main programs and some of the specialized Seminars had been carried out. Some of the national experts had been aware of these initiatives and had participated in these meetings. The influence of emblematic CCT models, such as the Brazilian one, which would have inspired the scholarship that would have a very short duration to be included later in the Bono Desarrollo Humano is also observed. This was done through direct contact with some members of this community of experts, such as the visit of Cristovam Buarque. In this sense, the adoption mechanism identified in the transition from Bono Solidario to Bono Desarrollo Humano is one of moderate coercion and emulation. An indefinite area is observed here, where the exercise of delimiting with precision presents difficulties. The evidence of coercion is overwhelming, since the requirement to focus and apply conditionality was part of the loan clauses. As a result, the room for manoeuvre of

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policy makers was limited. At the same time, however, given the evaluations that had already been carried out (León et al. 2001), there was awareness of the deficiencies of Ecuador’s social institutionality (exdirector CCT Ecuador). The profile of policy makers was technical, several of them with years in the public apparatus and solid academic backgrounds. As they explained in the interviews, they knew the Mexican and Brazilian experiences, and had been in contact with some of the regional experts and those in charge of banking. The ambiguous position regarding verification of compliance with conditionalities would also be an indicator of this. At the 2008 FAO Seminar, the need to condition or not the delivery of the benefit and the alternative of controlling in a random or universal manner (MIES 2008) were raised as a topic for discussion. This ambiguity can also be seen in a critical position on conditionality, expressed in seminars and interviews. It was argued that compliance should not be controlled if the program does not establish the conditions for adequate reporting in education and health and considering that the costs of doing so are very high for some beneficiaries (Ex official CCT Ecuador). It was also pointed out that conditionality would be required only for groups that have a higher risk of non-compliance, for example in secondary education (Ex official CCT Ecuador). Consequently, coercion is observed, but together with an incipient local diagnosis that would respond to a process of emulation, especially in terms of the means. That is, a limited diagnosis of nearby and influential experiences and an incomplete adaptation of the program to the national context. Table 7.1 shows the indicators that have been tracked and identified in the previous pages, paying attention to the first two phases of the programme: the adoption in 1998 and the transition to CCT in 2003. The last few years during the Correa administration will be discussed later in this final discussion, as part of the evolution of the CCT and which is linked to the evolution of the wave in the region. However, this diffusion mechanism matrix has not been applied to this last period, since these are modifications to the CCT already adopted. Finally, when analyzing the diffusion mechanisms, there is also evidence regarding the type of adaptation observed. If the Bono Solidario is considered, although it does not include conditionalities, it can be located in the most basic adaptation of the CCTs, in the quadrant formed by the coercion dimension (see Fig. 7.1). With respect to the BDH, this is already located in the traditional adaptation, at an intermediate point between coercion and emulation.

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Table 7.1 Bono Solidario 1998–2003 diffusion mechanism: moderate coercion Motivation

Indicator

Immediate and effective compensatory measure for the population in situations of poverty and extreme poverty

Not part of the government program. Response to economic crisis Role of WB influence through CONAM Convergence of IMF and IDB lending and cooperation in the following months Indicator There was no system for identifying beneficiaries The restitution of the gas subsidy shows little analysis of the feasibility of the measures that were linked The role of the Ministry of Economy and Finance prevailed over the social area

Means Limited knowledge of the program. Program that is one more of a group to compensate for the crisis An economic approach prevails over a finished social analysis prior to adoption

Transition from Bono Solidario to Bono Desarrollo Humano 2003–2010 Diffusion mechanisms: moderate coercion and emulation Motivation

Indicator

There was a decision to maintain the Bond without conditionality in the government program Conditionality emerges as a requirement from the WB and IDB

“Economic Regulation and Human Development Program” points out the maintenance of the bond without conditionality Letter of intent from the Government of Ecuador indicating the maintenance of the bond with conditionality Requirements from the WB and the IDB regarding the installation of conditionality Indicator The conditionality control system is installed without the technical capacity to be implemented National limited knowledge about CCT through the School Scholarship Presence and participation of policy makers of the Social Protection Program

Means Limited knowledge from national stakeholders Presence of international stakeholders: banks and experts from other countries (Brazil, Chile and Colombia)

Source Author’s own

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Fig. 7.1 Degree of adoption and diffusion mechanism. The Ecuadorian case (Source By the author)

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Ministerio Coordinador de la Producción, Empleo y Competitividad (MCPEC). (2010). Informe final del estudio: Los Subsidios Energéticos en el Ecuador. Quito. Ministerio de Inclusión Económica y Social (MIES). (2008, December). El Bono de Desarrollo Humano en el Ecuador. Official Power Point presentation prepared by M. León, & D. Alomía. Ministerio de Inclusión Económica y Social (MIES). (2011). Programa de Protección Social. Policy Paper by the Research Division. Quito. Ministerio de Inclusión Económica y Social (MIES). (2012, June). Informe de Programas, Programa de protección Social. Quito. Official Register N° 287. (2001, March 19). Órgano del Gobierno del Ecuador. http://www.derechoecuador.com/index2.php?option=com_con tent&do_pdf=1&id=1917. Accessed September 5, 2012. Oosterbeek, H., Ponce, J., & Schady, N. (2008). The Impact of Cash Transfers on School Enrollment: Evidence from Ecuador (Working Document, No. 4645). Washington, DC: World Bank. Ponce, J., & Bedi, A. S. (2008). The Impact of a Cash Transfer Program on Cognitive Achievement: The Bono de Desarrollo Human of Ecuador. Institute of Social Studies, The Hague and Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (IZA Discussion Paper No. 3658). Bonn: IZA. Recalde, P. (2007). La redimensión de la política social en el ecuador: el Bono de Desarrollo Humano en el gobierno de Rafael Correa. Observatorio Político – CELA, Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador. Rivera V. F. (2003). Análisis de las Políticas y Programas Sociales en Ecuador. Lima, ILO-Regional Office for the Americas/IPEC South America Program (Working Papers Series No. 167). Sanchez, C. (2005, May). Pobreza en Ecuador (Brief Bulletin, No. 71). World Bank. Schady, N., & Araujo, M. C. (2006). Cash Transfers, Conditions, School Enrollment, and Child Work: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Ecuador (Working Document No. 3930). Washington, DC: World Bank. Vásconez, R., A., Córdoba, R., & Muñoz, P. (2005). La construcción de las políticas sociales en Ecuador durante los años ochenta y noventa: sentidos, contextos y resultados (Social Policy Series No. 105). Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. Vos, R. (2000). Ecuador: crisis y protección social. Estudios e informes del Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador (SIISE). SIISE y Ediciones Abya-Yala. World Bank. (2003a, August 27). Loan Agreement (Programmatic Human Development Reform Loan) Between Republic of Ecuador and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Loan Number 7173-EC.

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World Bank. (2003b, April 28). Program Document for a Proposed Fiscal Consolidation Aid Competitive Growth Adjustment Loan in the Amount of US$50.0 Million to the Republic of Ecuador (Document of The World Bank, Report No. 25786-EC). World Bank. (2004, June 29). Simplified Implementation Completion Report on a Loan to Republic of Ecuador for the First Programmatic Human Development Reform Operation in the Amount of US$50.0 Million (Ln 71730-Ec. Report No. 29122). World Bank Document.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusions

In this section I present the final conclusions of this book in three areas. First, I expose the conclusions related to the contrasting of the hypotheses, taking up again the main findings, considering the quantitative model and the case studies of Chile and Ecuador. I comment on the evidence obtained regarding the mechanisms of diffusion, their motivations and means, applying the proposed matrix. Secondly, the conclusions that emerge from the application of the approach and methodology proposed here are presented, and a broad reflection on the theoretical framework adopted. Finally, I raise the challenges and future questions that emerged during the development of this work.

8.1

Discussion About the Hypotheses

The purpose of this work was the diffusion of social policies in Latin America, specifically in the case of Conditional Cash Transfers Programs. The findings of this study confirm that their presence in the region is the result of a diffusion process that is distinguished by three central components. Firstly, the geographic concentration of CCTs in the region— which is not observed in other areas of the world—, where 17 countries, within a possible group of 20, have implemented them. The second component is that the countries’ adoption over time, between 1990 and 2010, takes the form of an S curve, with a small number of cases at the © The Author(s) 2020 C. Osorio Gonnet, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51008-4_8

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beginning, a larger number in the middle of the period and a stabilization at the end of the curve. This characteristic is verified both when plotting adoption and in the statistical model, where the diffusion variable and the time variable were significant. Finally, the type of program that has been diffused has been, following Weyland (2006), a CCT model. This contains elements that have been identified as essential, although it presents variation in aspects defined as secondary and additional. Once the assumption about the diffusion of CCTs in Latin America was confirmed, it was sought to advance in the understanding of the conditions that explain this process in the region. Three hypotheses were proposed to answer this question. I will now comment on the findings obtained with respect to each of them. 8.1.1

“The Most Suitable Alternative.” The Consensus Behind the Adoption of the CCTs

My first hypothesis is that the diffusion of CCTs is explained by the existence of a consensus about their effectiveness, promoted by a regional epistemic community and linked to the various activities carried out by international organizations. This assumption was confirmed through two exercises. First, the influence of possible independent variables—both external and internal—that could have affected the countries’ decision to adopt was tested through log-corrected regression models. The results indicate certain general trends in the region, but these must be ascertained on a case-by-case basis. Thus, in terms of domestic variables, the results indicated that inequity and poverty would have increased the likelihood of program adoption. In the cases analyzed, I found that there were high levels of poverty and inequity, both in Chile and Ecuador, in the year the CCT was adopted. Another variable that turned out to be statistically significant for the region was GDP; that is, the greater the wealth, the greater the probability of adopting a CCT. However, in the cases studied here, it is noteworthy that Chile and Ecuador have different levels of wealth. The higher GDP of the former would be consistent with the result of the statistical model, although it would not work in the same way for the latter. This reinforces the idea already put forward that the model provides guidance on the process in the region, but that it must be analyzed in depth in the process of formulating each program.

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As for the external variables, the influence of the bank was a reasonable assumption, which was tested through the variable of the historical trajectory of the countries’ linkage with the World Bank. However, this is not significant at the regional level, which shows that the previous linkage of countries with the World Bank would not increase the probability of adopting the program. However, considering the case studies, in Ecuador in the midst of an economic crisis, the linkage with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank was an important factor in the decision. In the Chilean case, there were contacts with World Bank experts, and they had been commissioned to analyze issues related to social protection. However, their influence was not decisive in the adoption of the CCT. The results of the quantitative model then indicate the influence of these variables, but this does not give a satisfactory answer to the questions of this research. In that sense, I then proceeded to address the role of epistemic communities and international bodies, as an independent variable that would have influenced the decision to adopt. Given its characteristics, it could not be included in the statistical model, so in Chapter 5 I approached its formation and development from a qualitative exercise perspective. I identified the nuclei from which the programs were promoted, the networks they established and the contribution of these stakeholders to the policy making and policy diffusion processes. The community is made up of experts and academics linked with the first evaluations of the programs, officials and former directors of CCTs in the region, and officials from the banking sector and organizations that were linked to the programs and have specialized in their study. Their channels of influence are strongly linked to the activities of multilateral organizations, both those defined as meditative (seminars, conferences, expert trips, “study tours” and the formation of networks) and those of exhortation (publication of reports, reports, evaluations and databases, among others). I also distinguished two moments in the life of this community, the first from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, when the community of experts was taking shape based on the knowledge acquired from the first programs. During this period, the presence of multilateral banks was observed as agencies that are linked to the programs, they were also learning their characteristics and contributing to the circulation of experts and knowledge about them. From 2000 to 2010, a second moment can be observed with the epistemic community already established at the

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regional level and where there were already impact evaluations, databases, reports and reports about the CCTs. Likewise, the banking sector and other organizations—ECLAC, OAS, FAO—contributed during these years with their activities to the circulation of experts, exchange of information and debate on the subject. In this sense, the consensus about the relevance of the programs is maintained, but it has been accompanied by a critical view that seeks to adequately determine their contribution to overcoming poverty and to lead the discussion towards the challenge of building social protection systems in Latin America. The presence of this community and its channels of influence at the regional level were explained in detail. Through the definition of epistemic community, the stakeholders involved in the process of regional diffusion and influencing the mechanisms of diffusion are clearly identified. The degree of influence in each case could be assessed by analyzing the formulation process in depth. It is then that the appreciation of this variable contributes to the explanation of the diffusion mechanisms. In the Chile Solidario program, this consensus about the effectiveness of CCTs had less influence on adoption. In fact, the particularity of the program is recognized in comparison with regional programs (World Bank expert interview). The characteristics of the programs that had been implemented in the region were known, there was contact with multilateral bank officials, and participation in activities organized by international organizations. Also, the World Bank’s Risk Matrix perspective, which was known by MIDEPLAN’s specialists and was considered in the theoretical framework of the program’s design, was influential. In this sense, this case being part of the diffusion wave and receiving the contact of the “regional environment”, a different alternative was chosen. The defined program has particular characteristics and includes the so-called secondary and additional components. The knowledge developed and accumulated in MIDEPLAN and DIPRES prevailed, and also the consideration of national experiences from where components were collected to be included in CHS. On the other hand, the influence of the approaches of these agencies can be observed in terms of the paradigm of overcoming poverty, when for example MIDEPLAN incorporates the logic of the World Bank Risk Matrix in the design of the CHS. In Ecuador’s Bono Solidario, in the the first stage I identified the mechanism of moderate coercion, and where the influence of multilateral banking proceeded through the more traditional channels, i.e., loans and

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technical cooperation. However, in the second stage—when the Bono Solidario became a Bono de Desarrollo Humano—the existing consensus on CCTs was more influential and its presence was explicit. This is reflected in the adoption of the conditionalities even though there was awareness of the technical limitations to be able to implement their follow-up in an adequate manner. There was also more contact between national policy makers and community experts. The former participated in the meditative activities—seminars, expert visits—which allowed for a more thorough knowledge of the CCTs, although not all components were incorporated. In conclusion, with the evidence presented, the explanatory contribution of the proposed hypothesis is confirmed. The consensus, the idea about the CCT model diffused by the experts of epistemic communities and linked to the International Organizations, constitutes a relevant explanatory variable for the diffusion at a regional level. However, its degree of influence in the policy making processes and diffusion mechanisms of each case must be analyzed in depth. This reveals the relevance of combining the policy diffusion approach, together with a look at the domestic policy formulation process. 8.1.2

Diffusion Through Various Mechanisms: Learning, Emulation and Moderate Coercion

In relation to the second hypothesis, I maintain that the diffusion of the programs was carried out through three mechanisms: learning, emulation and (moderate) coercion. The contribution of the study to the development of this hypothesis was to distinguish the motivations and the means and to establish indicators for this. This will make it possible to identify more precisely which mechanism(s) are observed in the cases analyzed. Along with this, it was proposed to combine in a matrix the dimension of the types of mechanisms, with the characteristics of the programs adopted, seeking to understand not only how the decision to implement was made, but also the characteristics of the policy. In this regard, the findings of the quantitative model show a low relevance of multilateral bank loans, which would indicate a low preponderance of the coercive mechanism in the region. The statistically significant results on the domestic variables of inequality and poverty would indicate that the motivation for adoption is mostly endogenous, and therefore there would be a greater probability of generating emulation or learning mechanisms. This can be seen in the case of Chile, where the mechanism

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detected is learning, with an internal motivation such as the confirmation of the problem of poverty and the diagnosis that it is necessary to strengthen the State’s supply of programs aimed at overcoming poverty. In relation to the means, the economic capacities that diminish the need for monetary loans to the multilateral banks stand out. Together with this, institutional capacities ensure greater autonomy and room for maneuver in the process of program design and adoption. In the case of Chile, high institutional capacities can be observed, installed in both MIDEPLAN and DIPRES. The region’s CCTs are known, but the application of models in this regard is ruled out, since they would not be suitable for the national reality. “It is not an a priori discard, but rather (question) the conditional transfer as an instrument and for what (…) our bet was another with another context, with a very different objective population, (…) very specific, which is not the same as Mexico. And with primary schooling rates and super high health control rates” (Ex CCT Chile directive). The proposed program, Chile Solidario, is more complex than the programs observed in the region and this is highlighted by those who observe this process. “In the case of Chile, it was designed before our participation but also the capacity in Chile was very high at that time” (WB expert). Likewise, the Chilean government already had instruments for identifying beneficiaries that allowed for adequate targeting, along with reliable indicators about national poverty levels. The high institutional capacity also determines the relationship with the banking experts, who are asked for precise and punctual information that contributes to the process they are conducting. This was observed by DIPRES, which requested the report, and later, already in the CHS implementation phase, when the WB was called upon to finance the training of the monitors in charge of psychosocial accompaniment. In the case of Ecuador, the mechanisms of moderate coercion and emulation would explain the decision to adopt the program. Regarding to the motivations, the objective of confronting the economic crisis prevailed for the adoption of the Bono Solidario. This was significantly reinforced by bank loans that required the installation of monetary transfers. In the second moment, when the program became the Bono Desarrollo Humano, the adoption of the conditionalities was part of the demands of the banks; therefore the motivation was mostly external. The internal argument in favor of including the conditionalities is weak, responding to the demands of the banks and the regional trend. In terms of agreement, as for the means they also indicate emulation, since a limited knowledge of other

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experiences and a design that denotes insufficient contextualization to the national reality is observed. The inclusion of conditionalities is again a good indicator, since the instruments and capacities needed to monitor their compliance were not available once they were established. It should be noted that one possible motivation, and one that was only partially considered since it escapes the approach adopted here, was the expectation of electoral returns. In the information gathered through the interviews and the secondary information, it was not detected that this was present in a significant way in the two cases analyzed. This could be traced through the qualitative exercise, not emerging as a central motivation in decision making. As stated, it is presumable that the expectation exists, as for many policy decisions, but it does not stand out in these cases as essential in the policy making process of the programs. Another aspect pending analysis in this regard, however, is whether there would be—once the CCTs are implemented—political use in the designation of program beneficiaries. The following Table 8.1. summarizes the motivations and means identified in the case studies of Chile and Ecuador. When illustrating the type of adoption and the diffusion mechanisms, it can be seen that the cases are located in different quadrants (Fig. 8.1). As for the program in Ecuador, in the first period it is located in the soft coercion mechanism (Bono Solidario) and then in an area between coercion and emulation (Bono Desarrollo Humano). With regard to the dimension of the type of adaptation, in the first period of moderate coercion it is a basic adaptation, which is modified to traditional during the second period. The figure graphically expresses the change in the type of program and the diffusion mechanism detected in the case of Ecuador. For the Chilean, the Chile Solidario program is located in the dimension of mechanisms in a learning position and in relation to the dimension of type of adaptation it is an innovative CCT. 8.1.3

National Institutional Capacities and Their Linkage to Diffusion Mechanisms

On the third research hypothesis, I argue that the mechanisms of diffusion are significantly influenced by the characteristics of the stakeholders of the policy making process (politicians and bureaucrats). If high institutional

Summary of diffusion mechanisms Chile and Ecuador

– There was no beneficiary – The conditionality control system is identification system in place installed without technical capacity to be implemented – The restitution of the gas subsidy shows little analysis of the feasibility – Bounded national knowledge about of the measures that were linked CCT – The role of the Ministry of – Presence and participation of policy Economy and Finance prevailed makers of the Social Protection over the social area Program

– Limited knowledge of the program – Bounded knowledge from national stakeholders – An economic approach prevails over a social analysis – Presence of international stakeholders: banks and experts from other countries (Brazil, Chile and Colombia)

– It was not part of the government’s – “Programa de Ordenamiento program. Response to economic Económico y Desarrollo Humano” crisis points out the maintenance of the transfer without conditionality – WB’s role of influence through CONAM – Letter of intent from the Government of Ecuador indicates a – Convergence of IMF and IDB bond without conditions loans and cooperation in the following months – IDB and WB indicate to install conditionality

Table 8.1

Indicator

Means

Indicator

– CAS file (today Protection Social), CASEN survey – DIPRES studies the issue – MIDEPLAN, through the Social Division, studies diverse experiences of social programs – Presidential Seminar and second debate seminar in a think tank – Meetings between MIDEPLAN/FOSIS and DIPRES – Accumulated knowledge in social entities about poverty – Diagnosis and discussion of alternatives by DIPRES and MIDEPLAN – Discussion of alternatives by institutional stakeholders – Empirical evidence of the problem through the results of the CASEN survey, which pointed to the stagnation in the decrease of indigence – The issue is discussed in the public agenda by various stakeholders

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– Immediate and effective compensatory measure for the population in poverty and extreme poverty

Programa Bono Solidario 1998–2003 Diffusion mechanism: moderate coercion

Motivation

Program

– There was a decision to keep the – Addressing the problem of the monetary transfer without hard core of poverty conditionality in the government – To propose a relevant policy for program the poverty issue, which was placed on the public agenda in – Conditionality emerges as a requirement from the WB and IDB 2001–2002 and which was being demanded by various actors Programa BDH Programa Chile Solidario 2003–2010 2002–2010 Diffusion mechanism: moderate Diffusion mechanism: Learning coercion and emulation

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Fig. 8.1 Degree of adoption and diffusion mechanism. The Chilean and Ecuadorian case (Source By the author)

capacity (knowledge resources and cooperation) is observed, the mechanism will be learning. If medium or low is observed it will be emulation or coercion (the latter is also influenced by the socio-economic context of the country). The development of this question was addressed through in-depth case analyses, as the quantitative model does not provide meaningful information in this regard. Thus, in the case of Ecuador, low institutional capacity was detected at the first stage of the study (late 1990s and early 2000s). As noted above, there is a high degree of instability, discontinuity and short-term nature of public and social policies (Vásconez et al. 2005). This situation, together with the economic crisis, favors a greater degree

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of influence of the multilateral banking system, which provides important guidance—moderate coercion—for the decision to adopt a CCT. During the transition to the BDH, although the institutional capacity and the available instruments were strengthened, characteristics linked to emulation and not to learning can still be observed. In the case of Chile Solidario, the evidence from the case study indicates that the characteristics of the stakeholders and institutions present in the domestic formulation process would explain the more ambitious design of the program and its stability and coherence over time. The program has the characteristics of a conditional transfer program, but it is situated in a broader approach, that of social protection. The high capacities help explain the limited influence of the epistemic community and the consensus that was being created about the efficiency of CCTs. This does not mean that these ideas are completely ignored, but rather that they were used when it was considered relevant and to obtain legitimacy and authority for the various proposals advocated by MIDEPLAN or DIPRES. As other studies have also detected, the high capacities of Chilean bureaucrats and politicians (Teichman 2007) allow these domestic stakeholders to play a role in this process and, in the case of Chile, contribute to filtering international policy prescriptions (Franzoni and Voorend 2011). In the same vein, bureaucrats made use of IO approaches to gain legitimacy and authority for their proposals. Within the process of internal formulation of the CHS, although there was collaboration and agreement on central aspects of the perspective on poverty between DIPRES and MIDEPLAN, both stakeholders had a role to play in the negotiation. Thus, the inclusion of the risk matrix, a World Bank approach, also had the sense of using a proposal with legitimacy and authority from this international body. On the other hand, once the design of the Programa Puente as a pilot was advanced, the WB executives were initially skeptical but later supported it, which would also confer greater legitimacy to MIDEPLAN/FOSIS vis-à-vis DIPRES and President Lagos (Teichman 2007; Former directors of FOSIS). In terms of the internal formulation process, it also highlights that other national stakeholders do not play a relevant role in the process. Given the characteristics of the political regime and its institutions, the prevalence of the Executive and the ministries is central to other stakeholders such as political parties and society. In this case, experts and think tanks had a limited participation, but this is something that can be

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observed only in some cases and that in this particular case, was closely linked to the decision-making style of President Lagos. Regarding civil society, despite the fact that Ricardo Lagos’ government had a discourse of greater citizen participation and in fact a Civil Society Council had been created in 2000 (with IDB support), its capacity of influence was low. Specifically around the CHS, some of these bodies sought to influence and participate in its implementation process, but this would not have been forthcoming. By 2003, when implementation issues were still being discussed, DIPRES and MIDEPLAN managers were not willing to involve civil society organizations (Teichman 2007). As for political parties, their participation has been very low as they are not explicitly incorporated into the process. For example, the presidents of the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia were not included in the Presidential Seminar. Their implicit inclusion in the discussion is through current communication spaces, such as the periodic meetings of party presidents with the Minister of the Interior. Likewise, the parliamentary representatives were present in the discussion of the law in the National Congress. In that space, the discussion was limited, since the program was implemented directly by the government apparatus and did not require as a condition the sending of legal bodies for discussion, elaboration and approval by the Parliament (Palma and Ruz 2005). In the case of Ecuador, the degree of interference by international agencies was found to be due, among other reasons, to weak institutional capacity. In the first place, it is essential to take into account that—especially at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000—this was a period of high political instability and with a very uncertain economic and social context. In the field of public and social policies, “high instability, discontinuity, little fluidity and short term character of public policies and more specifically those called ‘social’ is observed; (and) the non consolidation of a system of policies within a determined model of State” (Vásconez et al. 2005: 8). These aspects that can be observed in the CCT formulation process “have promoted instabilities in the design, management and implementation in the concrete field of social policies, a factor that has definitely influenced international organizations to deploy their own work agendas even within the same state entity” (Rivera 2003: 33). There would be no integral development policy and a wide gap would be observed between what is stated in the discourse and the policies. The State commits itself to a program for which it does not have the necessary infrastructure and

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capacities, which is clearly observed as far as the subject of the verification of the conditionalities is concerned. “From a brief review of government agendas we can visualize the elaboration of more than fifteen official documents related to development policies and agendas in the country in the last two decades. In them, the idea of social justice camouflaged (or not) under the concept of Human Development prevails: all governments have had a way of approaching the issue. To achieve it is one of the main objectives and it is the vector from where the goals start in pursuit of its achievement” (Vásconez et al. 2005: 8). The factors that have been identified as influencing the determination of the social policy agenda in this period are the pressures of social conglomerates, power groups or international organizations, the fiscal deficit, the bureaucratic state apparatuses and the absence of planners and officials with a technical profile (Recalde 2007). In the case that has been analyzed, all of them are observed in different degrees for the two moments investigated. On the one hand, the crisis and fiscal deficit that forces taking unpopular measures to reduce the expenditure (the elimination of subsidies), but faced with the social pressure they must contemplate an immediate compensation as is the Bono Solidario. The presence of international organizations and national stakeholders, essentially the bureaucratic apparatus and experts, is also observed. The latter, with a low level of technical and negotiating capacity in the first years, but which would have gradually improved in subsequent years. The third stage of the BS-BDH has been essentially a stage of continuity of the benefit and improvement of the institutionality that supports it. At no time has its elimination been considered. The 2008 Constitution establishes a broader social discourse, with recognition of social rights at the constitutional level. At the institutional level, there is greater coherence and a growing intention to strengthen social institutions based on a discourse of rights and social protection. Likewise, with the creation of new institutions and the elimination or modification of old ones, teams of young technocrats from universities of international prestige entered the government. This may have influenced the policymakers’ perception of a more horizontal technical dialogue with the banks. On the other hand, the presence of international organizations is significantly limited, especially the World Bank, with which relations have only been resumed since June 2010 (former director of the PTC Ecuador).

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The findings of this work allowed us to confirm the hypotheses in terms of diffusion at a regional level and the variables that explain it. Likewise, the case studies reveal the diverse trajectories that can be observed in the relationship between domestic formulation processes and regional diffusion. The consensus on CCTs had a greater impact on the Ecuadorian case than on the Chilean case. In the case of Ecuador, it was also observed that the low institutional capacities and the need for economic resources from the banking sector would explain the coercion and emulation mechanisms through which the BS—a basic CCT—was first adopted and later modified to BDH, a more traditional type of CCT. In the case of Chile, there is less influence of this consensus, since a learning mechanism is distinguished in the decision to adopt, which is explained given the high technical capacities and which generates as a result a much more innovative type of CCT. In short, this work has made it possible to highlight these particularities in the diffusion mechanisms and in the type of program adopted, which constitute various expressions of the regional diffusion of CCTs in Latin America.

8.2 Considerations Regarding the Approach and Methodology Adopted With the designed approach, the levels at which this diffusion process is developed—regional and domestic—, and how these are linked, were identified. Likewise, it allowed for reflection on the fact that the adoption of a CCT in a diffusion process is a decision that cannot be exclusively attributed to some of these processes. My methodological proposal established indicators to identify the stakeholders at the national and international levels, the different activities they carry out and the moments of interaction. In this way, it was possible to see how the process of domestic policy formulation is linked to the diffusion mechanism. However, it is necessary to comment that the distinction between bureaucrats and politicians does not always manage to contribute to the identification of stakeholders. This is due to the fact that, in practice, there is an intermediate category of professionals with a high technical knowledge and a strong political profile that places them in different managerial positions within public institutions. This is especially so in cases of continuity of the governing coalition, implying that they occupy various managerial positions at the middle level, but not because they follow a bureaucratic civil service career, but because

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of their knowledge and political profile. Consequently, their intermediate category makes it difficult to make a clear distinction, and it is therefore necessary to improve the instruments for addressing and classifying these stakeholders. At the international level, a more complex role was observed in the organizations than the management of loans and international cooperation, so that the mention of the various activities—loans, technical cooperation, meditative and exhortation activities—made it possible to capture these various instances. This approach goes beyond the traditional reading of the role of international organizations, especially multilateral banks, as financiers of social policies imposed on countries. A more complex look reveals subtle forms of influence and also of dialogue and cooperation, especially to the extent that the national counterpart has high levels of technical capacity. In addition, the various types of activities carried out by these organizations contributed to the generation of information and debates on social policies that are relevant to their design and implementation in the region. In the Chilean case, for example, the World Bank’s Risk Matrix proposal constitutes a complement and a legitimizing basis for national arguments. Along with this, the role of experts, through the concept of epistemic community, ensures the presence of people who stand out for their specific knowledge and who, from that base, contributed to the dissemination of policies. Their relationship with international organizations was identified, insofar as they provide a platform for action that contributes to the flow of knowledge about policies. The many and varied activities and actions facilitate the circulation of experts and therefore of ideas that travel throughout the region. Some of them are part of these bodies, and others were recruited because of their knowledge about CCTs. Experts located in universities or think tanks were also observed. All of them form an epistemic community about CCTs that is, in a recurrent way, consulted and quoted. Their degree of influence, as observed in the case studies of Chile and Ecuador, will vary according to the characteristics of the formulation processes of each country. It depends in part on local technical capacities, in the existence of spaces for dialogue with actors outside the governmental space, and on the objectives behind each decision. In other words, how the motivations and means are present in the diffusion mechanisms. Consequently, the use of this approach made it possible to identify and analyze the presence and actions of these experts who had a significant impact on this diffusion process. It helped to clarify and explain

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how what had already been pointed out in the literature as the presence of a policy community or the existence of certain social policy paradigms affect the diffusion mechanisms in each country. In short, it contributes to clarifying the causal mechanisms present in these processes. The benefits of using both qualitative and quantitative methodology were also noted. Both contribute with relevant results and complement each other according to the assumptions made. Thus, the quantitative model made it possible to confirm the diffusion, test the independent variables and help define which were significant in the region. Therefore, its contribution is at an aggregate level and requires a dialogue with the results that are extracted from the case studies. The latter make it possible to clarify how the diffusion mechanisms operated, reconstructing the processes, identifying stakeholders and thus distinguishing more pertinently their limits, which in themselves are diffuse. Along these lines, the distinction between means and motivations in the diffusion mechanisms helps to identify them more clearly, establishing indicators that facilitate the tracking of processes, already complex, about which the researcher does not have all the information. This type of qualitative study—which addresses what is carried out in the “kitchen” of public and social policies—requires numerous instruments that allow for the collection of the information necessary to reconstruct the process from various sources. What is proposed in this book seeks to contribute in that direction. Along with improving the analysis of how the policies were diffused through the mechanisms, we sought to advance the outcome of the diffusion, that is, what is adopted? One of the characteristics of the diffusion process is that the policies have a number of central properties in common, but may differ in other secondary properties. In this case, a group of basic components of CCTs and others defined as secondary and additional were observed. According to the components of each case, it was catalogued whether the program was basic, traditional or innovative (in increasing order of components). In this way it is possible to better address the diffusion object and also to observe if there were modifications of these components during the diffusion wave. As discussed in Chapter 4, the basic components of the CCTs are maintained throughout the period. However, from 2000 onwards the adopted CCTs also have secondary and additional components, which shows an evolution within the diffusion wave. This is an issue that can still be further developed and addressed in more detail. The introduced concept of epistemic community can help explain the reforms over time of these programs, which

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can also include diffusion processes (in adjustment measures, evaluations, techniques, among others). It is even likely that the weight of the epistemic community in the diffusion of reforms and adjustments, without becoming a fully coordinated or hierarchical formula, was even more important than in the initial adoption phases for many countries. This is a facet to be further explored with new case studies. Finally, we would like to highlight the proposal to link the information collected on the mechanisms and type of adoption of the programs in the cases of Chile and Ecuador in a matrix that enable the visualization of the mechanism of diffusion and the type of adoption identified. This exercise would be even more productive to the extent that other programs in Latin America or other regions could be compared (or tested in cases of diffusion of other policies).

8.3

Remaining Issues and Future Challenges

During the development of the research, several questions related to the subject matter arose that could not be addressed in depth and that outline future challenges. In this sense, a plausible question in relation to this issue is why this diffusion is observed in Latin America and not in other regions such as Africa or Asia. According to what has been observed during this research, this is not a subject that has been studied in depth. However, it is possible to propose, as a preliminary step, that in order to address this topic, the impact that the wave of diffusion in Latin America could generate in other regions should be considered. This implies considering a possible influence of the consensus about CCTs generated by the regional epistemic community. On the other hand, it will also be necessary to identify the stakeholders present in the process, since in the case of Africa, for example, the presence of donor organizations could make a difference. “Another thing that is totally different is Africa, where if there is a much more debate at the level of donors and the Bank, and support for conditional and unconditional transfers comes from many other sources, including Latin American countries” (WB CCT expert/former program director). New questions that emerge refer to detecting whether other waves of diffusion have been generated and what link they might have to the subject under study. Some interviewees suggested that social investment funds, a type of social programme that spread in several countries of the region during the 1990s, would be the result of a wave of diffusion,

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although it has not been addressed from that perspective. “Social funds were another wave (…) a wave that lasted between 10 and 15 years” (Former director and CCT expert). It might therefore be relevant to move forward to detect first whether it constituted a diffusion process. If the answer were positive, the next question would be to identify which stakeholders were present, what similarities and differences are observed with the CCT wave and whether there is any connection between the two phenomena. Another theme that emerges from this work, and which requires further elaboration, is the role of expert knowledge in the generation of social policies in Latin America. This implies discussing their role in defining agendas, the process of formulating policies and programs, and how they build new arenas for policy development, establishing frameworks for experimentation, and providing support for certain approaches (Peck 2011). Some authors have called them ‘travelling technocrats’ in the context of neoliberal economic reforms, meaning that they move between the private, public and third sector organizations, and between local, national and international institutions. In this process their role can change, from technocrats to politicians, scientists to policy experts or academics to activists (Larner and Laurie 2010). In this study, trajectories along these lines were detected, especially in relation to former program managers who later move on to multilateral banking. However, it is necessary to go deeper into this issue, to consider the wide spectrum of experts, and the different levels at which they mobilize in order to understand their role in the definition of specific policies or paradigms. This is also necessary not only for the study of cases of policy diffusion, but also to address transfer or technical cooperation processes, or specific cases of social policy adoption in the region. In the region, the expert knowledge accumulated in some countries has generated processes of knowledge transfer—as in the case of Chile Solidario in Central America—, also mediated by international organizations such as the OAS. There are therefore various modalities of knowledge transfer, which involve the installation of an expert role for certain countries, giving it a particular regional status. Likewise, the role of policy intermediaries and generators of networks and connections that some IOs have developed should be studied. Some of these networks have been built on the basis of historical connections between stakeholder and institutions that have a particular vision of development and poverty issues. It is therefore a question of diffusion or in

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other cases transfer of ideas and specific technical knowledge that affect the design and implementation of countries’ social policies and programs. Finally, as already mentioned, in some countries CCTs are part of more complex social protection systems. They aim to provide people with a comprehensive state support network in the face of a wide range of vulnerabilities. Some governments have made significant progress in this regard, especially at the level of political discourse, but it has not necessarily been possible to put this into practice. On the other hand, this generates the tension of analyzing how programs will adapt to these more complex challenges. It cannot be expected that just by adding more components and benefits—the so-called “Christmas tree syndrome”—programs will meet more complex objectives (Cecchini and Martínez 2011). To be “an effective social protection tool and not a mere isolated and fleeting intervention, CCTs must become a gateway to the system and help establish continuity between benefits at different levels of social policy” (Cecchini and Martínez 2011: 206). ECLAC guides the debate in this sense, but there are nuances from other stakeholders. In that line, it remains to be analyzed if an epistemic community will be formed, if the programs will suffer changes in this sense and how these will be expressed in the region and in each country. Along with this, it will be interesting to observe whether in the knowledge transfer processes about CCTs already detected in other regions—such as Africa—the programs “travel” in their traditional or more innovative version. The Conditional Cash Transfer Programs installed today in Latin America as a result of the diffusion process show no signs of disappearing. On the contrary, their tendency has been to consolidate and adapt to changes in social policy paradigms. In the next few years, it will be necessary to observe what the trajectory of this significant diffusion will be. Will the programs evolve towards new formats? Where will the consensus about CCTs change? Will they converge with programs of a more universalistic nature? Will the regional epistemic community have an impact on these new contexts? These and other questions emerge today as themes to be developed in future studies.

References Cecchini, S., & Martínez, R. (2011). Protección social inclusiva en América Latina: una mirada integral, un enfoque de derechos (ECLAC Books, No. 111). Santiago de Chile: ECLAC.

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Franzoni, J. M., & Voorend, K. (2011). Actors and Ideas Behind CCTs in Chile, Costa Rica and El Salvador. Global Social Policy, 11(2–3), 279–298. Larner, W., & Laurie, N. (2010). Travelling Technocrats, Embodied Knowledges: Globalising Privatization in Telecoms and Water. Geoforum, 41(2), 218–226. Palma, J., & Ruz, M. A. (2005). Análisis del proceso de elaboración e implementación del sistema Chile Solidario (Informe Preliminar). Programa Participación, Ciudadanía y Políticas Públicas. Instituto de Asuntos Públicos, Universidad de Chile. Peck, J. (2011). Global Policy Models, Globalizing Poverty Management: International Convergence or Fast-Policy Integration? Geography Compass, 5(4), 165–181. Recalde, P. (2007). La redimensión de la política social en el ecuador: el Bono de Desarrollo Humano en el gobierno de Rafael Correa. Observatorio Político – CELA, Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador. Rivera, V. F. (2003). Análisis de las Políticas y Programas Sociales en Ecuador (Working Papers Series No. 167). Lima: ILO-Regional Office for the Americas/IPEC South America Program. Teichman, J. (2007). Redistributive Conflict and Social Policy in Latin America. World Development, 36(3), 446–460. Vásconez, R., A., Córdoba, R., & Muñoz, P. (2005). La construcción de las políticas sociales en Ecuador durante los años ochenta y noventa: sentidos, contextos y resultados (Social Policy Series No. 105). Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. Weyland, K. (2006). Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Appendix 1: Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in the World 1990–2010 (Active and Inactive)

Conditional transfer programs in the world (actives) Country South America Argentina

Bolivia (Estado Plurinacional de) Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Uruguay North America Mexico Caribbean Belice Costa Rica

Name of the program

Starting yeara

Asignación Universal por Hijo para Protección Social. (Ex Familias por la Inclusión Social) Bono “Juancito Pinto” Bolsa Familia (Ex Bolsa Alimentación y Bolsa Escuela) Chile Solidario Familias en Acción Bono de Desarrollo Humano Tekoporá Juntos (Programa Nacional de Apoyo directo a los más Pobres) Asignaciones Familiares

2005

2006 2003 2002 2001 2003 2005 2005 2008

Oportunidades (ex Progresa)

2001

Creando oportunidades para nuestra transformación social. Avancemos (ex Superémonos)

2001 2000 (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Osorio Gonnet, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51008-4

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APPENDIX 1: CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS …

(continued) Conditional transfer programs in the world (actives) Country

Name of the program

Starting yeara

El Salvador

Comunidades Solidarias Rurales (ex Red Solidaria) Mi bono seguro Ti ManmanCheri. Bono 10.000 Educación, Salud y Nutrición (Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF Ex) Programa de avance mediante la salud y la educación (PATH) Red de Oportunidades Solidaridad Programa de transferencias monetarias condicionadas focalizadas (TCCTP)

2005

Guatemala Haití Honduras

Jamaica Panama Dominican Republic Trinidad and Tobago

Africa Burkina Faso Kenia Nigeria Asia-Pacific Bangladesh

Cambodia Philippines India (Haryana) Indonesia Pakistan

Turkey Yemen

2012 2012 1998

2001 2006 2005 2005

Orphans and Vulnerable Children Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children Care of the Poor

2008 2004

Female Secondary School Assistance Program Primary Education Stipend Program Reaching Out-of-School Children Cambodia Education Sector Support Project PantawidPamilyang Pilipino Program ApniBetiApnaDhan (Our Daughter, Our Wealth) Program KeluargaHarapan Child Support Program (Programa Piloto) Punjab Education Sector Reform Program/Punjab Female School Stipend Program Social Risk Mitigation Project Basic Education Development Project (Programa Piloto)

1994

2008

2002 2004 2005 2008 1994 2007 2006 2004

2001 2007

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APPENDIX 1: CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS …

Conditional transfer programs in the world (completed or redesigned in another CCT) South America Argentina Jefes y Jefas de Hogar desocupados Brazil Bolsa Escuela Bolsa Alimentación Ecuador Bono Solidario Uruguay Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES) Central America Costa Rica Superémonos Guatemala Protección y desarrollo de la Niñez y Adolescencia Trabajadora Mi familia progresa Honduras Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF BID II) Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF BID III) Nicaragua Red de Protección Social (RPS) Sistema de Atención a Crisis (SAC) Africa Cambodia Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction Girls Scholarship Program Asia Indonesia JaringPengamananSosial Pakistan Participation in Education through Innovate Scheme for the Excluded Vulnerable

2002 2001 2001 1998 2005 2000 2007 2008 1998 2007 2000 2005 2002 1998 2003

Source Cecchini and Madariaga (2011), Fiszbein and Schady (2009) and personal database a In the case of Brazil and Mexico, the official starting date of the programs has been considered here and not the pilot programs as in Table 2.2

Appendix 2: List of Interviews Conducted

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Roll

State

Government official. Former Director CCT Chile Social Policy Expert CCT Expert, ECLAC National Politician. Presidential Advisor Chile Social Policy Expert Social Policy Expert CCT Expert, ECLAC National Politician. Presidential Advisor Chile Social Policy Expert National Policy. Former director of the Ministry of Social Development Chile Government official. Advisor to the Chilean Budget Office Government official. Former director of the Ministry of Social Development Chile National Politician. Former President of the Republic 2000-2006 National Expert. Former Director of the Budget Office Chile CCT Expert, ECLAC Government official. Former Director Ministry of Social Development Chile CCT Expert, UNDP

November 10, 2010 November 10, 2010 November 9, 2010 November 8, 2010 November 8, 2010 November 11, 2010 November 9, 2010 November 9, 2010 November 12, 2010 September 10, 2008 y July 7, 2011 (questionnaire by email) November 11, 2010 October 31, 2011 June 20, 2011 November 16, 2011 November 9, 2011 November 11, 2011 November 14, 2011

(continued) © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Osorio Gonnet, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51008-4

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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

(continued)

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

Roll

State

Social Policy Expert. OAS Director CCT Expert, FAO CCT Expert, ECLAC Social Policy Expert, FAO Management Official World Bank Social Policy Expert Social Policy Expert Spain World Bank Official International Officer. World Bank Expert Social Policy Expert CCT expert and International Officer. Former Director Mexico International Officer. Former IDB Director. CCT Expert. Former Director Mexico CCT expert. Former Director Paraguay Social Policy Expert. Director CCT New York International Civil Servant. World Bank Expert CCT Expert. Former Directive Opportunities International Officer. Former IDB Director. CCT Expert. Advisor CCT Colombia International Officer. Former IDB Director International Civil Servant. World Bank Expert Social Policy Expert Ecuador Government official. Former Director Ministry of Coordination Ecuador Government official. Former Director Ministry of Social Development Ecuador Government official. Advisor CCT Ecuador Government official. Former executive CCT Ecuador Social Policy Expert Ecuador Government official. Former Director CCT Ecuador Government official. Former Director CCT Ecuador Government official. Former Director CCT Ecuador Social Policy Expert ECLAC Social Policy Expert Former Director MIDEPLAN Chile Social Policy Expert. Former advisor Ministry of Social Development Ecuador

June 17, 2011 January 26, 2012 November 23, 2011 January 16, 2012 January 20 , 2012 January 25, 2012 February 8, 2012 February 2, 2012 February 10, 2012 February 15, 2012 February 17, 2012 February 22, 2012 February 22, 2012 February 22, 2012 February 27, 2012 March 8, 2012 March 21, 2012 March 26, 2012 March 26, 2012 May 18, 2012 May 29, 2012 June 11, 2012 June 11, 2012 June 12, 2012 June 13, 2012 June 13, 2012 June 13, 2012 June 13, 2012 June 14, 2012 August 10, 2012 September 3, 2012 October 1, 2012 October 8, 2012

Appendix 3: Methodological Notes

Indicators for the Qualitative Analysis of Cases Diffusion Mechanisms In order to analyze the diffusion mechanisms in the case studies, indicators were established to approximate the available empirical evidence. For the coercive mechanism, the indicators of external motivation are the existence of direct or indirect incentives from an external stakeholder, such as loans, donations or technical cooperation. Negative incentives can also be observed, i.e. if the country does not adopt the program, it receives a fine or some type of economic, political and/or symbolic penalty, such as not being integrated as a participant in a certain organization (or in commissions within it) or being excluded from prestigious international meetings, for example. An indicator for the means is the number of meetings with external stakeholders (experts, politicians from other countries or members of international bodies). Also the existence of loan signature protocols, technical cooperation conventions, for example. As for the reasons for learning, these are reflected in the presence of the public problem explicitly in government programs or eventually installed in the public agenda. The indicators for the means through which learning takes place are meetings with experts from international organizations or from other countries; the participation of persons in

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Osorio Gonnet, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51008-4

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national and international seminars on the subject; the preparation of adhoc policy documents; and evidence of the knowledge and use of other reports and documents that report on similar programs in the comparative experience. Along these lines, one variable that would influence this mechanism is the institutional capacity that allows for this continuous process of studying alternatives and making decisions. In the case of the emulation mechanism, reflecting the areas of overlap that occur, its indicators are similar to those of learning, but its development would be partial and limited. It should be noted that in the cases of emulation there would be less national production of documents, reports or discussions on the subject, which would reflect a more limited knowledge and less contextualization. In terms of motivations, the problem would not be so clearly established in the public agenda, nor would it have been part of the government’s programme. The indicators I propose are summarized below. Indicators for diffusion mechanisms

Motivation

Means

Coercion

Learning

Emulation

The adoption of the program is explicitly linked to obtaining financing from the multilateral banks Adoption is linked to the application of a fine, or a penalty if it is not carried out Number of meetings between policy makers and experts from multilateral banks or international organizations Existence of loan signature protocols, technical cooperation agreements

Whether or not the public problem in question is part of government programs The problem is clearly on the public agenda

Whether or not the public problem in question is part of government programs The program is not relevant to the public agenda

Number of meetings between policymakers and experts from other countries or multilateral banking experts Meetings in Seminars, Congresses, multilateral meetings Existence of ad-hoc national documents

Number of meetings between policy makers and experts from other countries or multilateral banking experts Existence of ad-hoc policy documents

Source Author’s elaboration

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Cognitive Shortcuts Cognitive shortcuts contribute to the understanding of policymakers’ decision-making in a process of diffusion (Weyland 2006). However, one difficulty in establishing indicators is the subjective nature of these shortcuts in that they respond to the information management that each person possesses. This may emerge from the interviews conducted, although it should be considered with caution and counterbalanced with other primary and secondary sources. Despite the above—based on Weyland’s work (2006) and the analysis itself—the following indicators are proposed for the research. Indicators for cognitive shortcuts Cognitive Shortcuts

Indicators

Representativeness

Documents, reports and evaluations about the programs that were available to policy makers. A source of knowledge about the program During the formulation process, it was noted that this information was relevant to decision making Conducting seminars, meetings, visits of regional experts on the programs. A significant and upcoming event This event influences the perception of the programs and from this it is considered an option to be adopted Documents, reports, seminars, visits by experts that publicize the experience of the programs. An early experience or information This event or information constitutes a first approach to the programs and is referred to in a meaningful way

Availability

Anchorage

Source Author’s elaboration

Degree of Adoption As explained in Chapter 3, Sect. 3.2, it was proposed to define three degrees of program adoption: basic, traditional and innovative, considering the 10 characteristics defined for the programs in Chapter 2 (Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8). Incorporating the core components would be referred to as basic adoption, which is ultimately the core model for CCTs. If the core plus secondary components (or a majority of them) are considered, this will be referred to as traditional adoption. Finally, if all of

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the above components plus additional ones are included, it will qualify as an innovative adoption. The following summarizes the approach. Indicators for degree of adoption Type of adoption

Indicators

Basic adoption

The essential components of the CCTs are incorporated: education and health conditionality, cash voucher delivery, and a mechanism for identifying and targeting the beneficiary group The essential and secondary components of the CCTs are adopted: program objectives, conditionality control mechanisms, penalties and institutionality The essential, secondary and additional components of the CCTs are adopted: psychosocial support component and membership in a social protection system

Traditional adoption

Innovative adoption

Source Author’s elaboration

International Stakeholders The national stakeholders already defined in the previous chapter must be identified in order to decipher the functioning of the diffusion mechanisms. It is necessary to clarify what role they play in the national policy making process and the characteristics of the policy environment under consideration, in this case, social policies. Therefore, attention will be paid and indicators will be established for these stakeholders that will consider the following aspects: motivations of the stakeholders, attributions of the position and personnel (academic level, networks, etc.), institutional capacity (knowledge and cooperation resources) of the organizations involved in the process and contact and influence with other stakeholders. Also, the organizational structure in which these actors are embedded should be considered, assuming that the learning process involves individuals, organizations and the relationships between them (Moran et al. 2006). In that sense, there will be organizations that will give more space to establish contact and exchange knowledge, for example, than others. Therefore, attention should be paid to the characteristics of policy makers, the institutions in which they are embedded and other stakeholders that

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235

influence them (interest groups, NGOs, academia, advocacy coalitions and/or epistemic communities). Detecting such instances is relevant for re-constructing the diffusion mechanism, since according to their characteristics they could indicate emulation, moderate coercion or learning moments. It is also important to identify their position within the state apparatus, or in relation to regional and global organizations; in short, what their role and status is. The following table summarizes what has been said Indicators for the identification of national stakeholders Bureaucrats: refers to stakeholders belonging to the public administration. Among them, a distinction must be made between career civil servants or those who come to a certain position through a trusted appointment Characteristics Duties of the position: managerial or middle position, functions and resources Characteristics of the institutions to which these stakeholders belong, in this case it is a Ministry or Secretariats. It refers to accumulated knowledge, characteristics of the organization (such as openness to innovation, resources, organization) Contacts with other stakeholders such as NGOs, interest groups, multilateral organizations, academia and financial institutions (national or international). Meetings, attendance at seminars, exchange of documents, among others Politicians: this refers to the stakeholders who are part of the executive and legislative powers and who are in charge of representing the people (President, Members of Parliament). Likewise, those positions appointed by the executive branch as a position of trust for specific tasks (Ministers, directors of other bodies, advisors) Characteristics Preferences in terms of program components Duties of the position: managerial or middle position, functions and resources Characteristics of the institutions to which these stakeholders belong, in this case Ministries, Secretariats, advisory bodies and Congress. It refers to accumulated knowledge, characteristics of the organization (such as openness to innovation) resources and organization Contact with other stakeholders, such as NGOs, interest groups, multilateral organizations, academia and financial institutions (national or international) Meetings, attendance at seminars, exchange of documents, among others Source Author’s elaboration

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International Stakeholders International agencies practice various types of authority and can use their knowledge in different ways (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). It is possible to add that the authority of experts must be considered along with the legitimacy they possess in the eyes of other stakeholders, and that it could influence the desire to emulate certain policies or present these stakeholders as backing that provides legitimacy during the policymaking process. “These organizations exercise power not only through tangible mechanisms, such as economic conditionality, but also through the shaping of the terms of the social welfare discourse” (Deacon 1997: 58). Finally, on the international organizations it is necessary to clarify that during the investigation they have been considered as an institution and more specifically attention has been paid to the sections in its interior, in charge of the social area and poverty for the region. Four types of activities have been defined to identify the actions of these bodies. Indicators for actions of International Organizations Type of activities

Monetary loans (exclusive to multilateral banks) Formal and informal technical assistance that is requested by governments to support policy development Meditative activities involving research and discussion of international trends and national policies (Bradford 2009). The organizations would function as “spaces where all kinds of experiences can be transmitted, where ideas are generated and shared”, and the ways of action are discussed (Jacobsson 2006: 208). Meditative activities involve hiring experts to guide the dialogue and provide recommendations to bureaucrats and politicians (Bradford 2009) Exhortation activities, seeking policy change. The ideas and lessons generated from the meditative activities are packaged into concrete action plans and concrete recommendations that seek to transfer knowledge and promote specific policies (Bradford 2009)

Source Author’s elaboration

In relation to epistemic communities, a first step is to identify the members of the community, through an exercise of reviewing who are the experts who attend meetings on CCTs, and/or visits between countries, who are the authors of reports and policy documents. However, it is not just a matter of identifying individuals, but they belong to a

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237

community, albeit with loose ties. In that sense, the literature does not elaborate on whether individuals should be recognized as members of a community. In this regard, in this work attention has been paid to testing, especially through interviews, those who are identified as experts in the field and whether they know each other. Also through the revision of documentation and activities, if they carry out research or write jointly and if they coincide in the participation of seminars and meetings. “Individuals in a community can be found among the respected experts whose names are recurrent in the lists of delegations to intergovernmental meetings or among those responsible for developing reports and documents” (Haas 1992: 35). A second aspect is to identify the principles and beliefs held about public problems; the diagnosis and the policies they pose to solve them. To identify the beliefs of the communities, we suggest the analysis of materials such as the publications of community members, presentations before legislative bodies and interviews, among others (Haas 1992). As to the extent of the influence of the beliefs of the epistemic community, it can on the one hand be evaluated through a judicious use of secondary literature considering the intellectual history of the disciplines from which the epistemic community emerges (Haas 1992: 35). This, since the influence of its research and publications in the academic and expert spheres is observable according to its presence in the specialized literature. However, a major difficulty arises in addressing the impact of a community on the process of program formulation and adoption. One indicator in this regard is the number and importance of States that can be “captured” in its network of understanding. In this case, it would be the number of States that have adopted CCTs in the region. Also, “these States would influence and disseminate this consensus understanding of the network” (Adler and Haas 1992: 389). However, communities influence policy makers through communication and knowledge transfer, which would be reflected in actions. However, this implies, as Haas points out, considering knowledge and action as a whole that is not possible to distinguish methodologically. This presents difficulties, since it is not necessarily because of knowing certain alternatives that the decision to adopt them will be made. In this sense, in this work, attention was paid to detecting whether experts from this community (which has been previously identified) were involved in the formulation process, whether contacts existed or whether reports and documents of their authorship

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were used. Therefore, it is expected to include evidence in the reconstruction of the development of diffusion mechanisms, paying attention to causal relationships, tracking community activities and demonstrating their influence on decision makers over a period of time. This also involves exploring whether there were alternative explanations or actions to those taken and considering policies taken before and after to determine the emergence and persistence of their influence (Haas 1992). Consequently, the following aspects will be taken into account for the identification of the epistemic community, its ideas and diagnosis and its means of influencing the mechanisms of diffusion. Indicators for epistemic communities Indicators

Identification of experts who are recurrently mentioned in the literature; members of specialized groups, permanent exhibitors at Seminars and Conferences Ways of contacting and transmitting information and knowledge with bureaucrats and politicians Publications by community members, testimony before legislative bodies, speeches, biographical accounts and interviews (Haas 1992: 35)

Source Author’s elaboration

Information on the Construction of the CCT Database During the process of developing the database, certain exceptions had to be taken to complete the information when it was not available: – When a year’s coverage data was not available, it was replaced with the average between the previous and subsequent data. – When specific data on how conditionality is verified are not available, it was assumed that educational and health facilities do so. – When the detail of the frequency of verification does not exist, it is assumed to be annual. The programs indicate that some type of verification is carried out, regardless of whether it is actually done or not. – The frequency of verification in Argentina between 2002–2005 was assumed to be annual.

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As for certain variables: – The psychosocial support component is specifically understood as the figure of a monitor in charge of accompanying and supporting families in the process of fulfilling the necessary conditions to obtain the voucher. – For the classification of the programs among those who present soft or hard penalties, it is if after faults and temporary suspensions of the benefit, it can be revoked completely to the beneficiaries. – It is considered a soft penalty for compliance, when some type of penalty for misconduct is not explicitly specified in the conditions. – Financing from international organizations is considered to be loans for the implementation, training and evaluation phase. It is considered from the year the loan was granted and the following ones, considering that the consequences of the activities carried out are linked to future activities. – In the case of IO’s technical support, it was assumed for the first three years of the program, assuming that they are assistance during the formulation process. It would be recorded differently if the detail is available. – On the poverty variable: in the case of Uruguay between 1990– 2005 it includes only urban areas. In the case of the Dominican Republic, the measurement for 2000, 2001, corresponds to October 2001 (one is available for April 2001). Argentina 1990–2002 is the measurement for Greater Buenos Aires 2003–2010 is urban poverty (SEDLAC data). Panama, 1990 is 1989. Mexico, 1990 is 1989. In the case of poverty and inequality in Haiti, the available data (2001) have been repeated for all years since 2000–2010. These are taken from World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, The World Bank, 30 April 2012. – About the Gini Index: in Argentina, it refers to the greater Buenos Aires, year 1992. For the years 2000–2003, they were the 28 main cities. 2004–2010, only urban. Bolivia 1993, only urban. Ecuador, only urban, year 1995–1998. Paraguay, 1990 is only Asunción. Uruguay was only urban in 1989 (instead of 1990), 1992, 1995–1998, 2000–2006. – When data on poverty and inequality are not available and if data from the previous and subsequent years are available, they are

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completed with the average between these two values. If no data is available to derive the average, the available value has been repeated. – For the neighbouring countries variable, neighbouring countries are understood. In the case of Haiti, its neighbours are the Dominican Republic and Cuba.

References Adler, E., & Haas, P. M. (1992). Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program. International Organization, 46(1), 367–390. Barnett, M., & Duvall, R. (Eds.). (2005). Power in Global Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bradford, N. (2009). The OECD’s Local Turn. In R. Mahon & S. McBride (Eds.), The OECD and Transnational Governance. Vancouver: UBC Press. Deacon, B., Hulse, M., & Stubbs, P. (1997). Global Social Policy: International Organizations and the Future of Welfare. London: Sage. Haas, P. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization, 46(1), 1–35. Moran, M., Rein, M., & Goodin, R. (Eds.). (2006). The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy. New York: Oxford University Press Inc. Weyland, K. (2006). Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Appendix 4: Activities and Publications by International Organizations 1990–2010

Seminars organized by International Organizations Name and main organizer(s)

Date

April 29–May 1, 2002 Primera Conferencia Internacional sobre Programas de Transferencias Condicionadas. (Taller de Aprendizaje), Banco Mundial. – (First International Conference on Conditional Transfer Programs. Learning Workshop, World Bank) April 26–29, 2004 Segunda Conferencia Internacional sobre Programas de Transferencias Condicionadas Banco Mundial (Second International Conference on Conditional Cash Transfer Programs World Bank)

Place Puebla, Mexico

Sao Paulo, Brazil

(continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Osorio Gonnet, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51008-4

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(continued) Seminars organized by International Organizations Name and main organizer(s)

Date

Place

Tercera Conferencia Internacional sobre Programas de Transferencias Condicionadas Banco Mundial. (Third International Conference on Conditional Cash Transfer Programs World Bank) I Seminario de Programas de Transferencias Condicionadas, FAO-PNUD. (I Seminar on Conditional Cash Transfer Programs, FAO-UNDP) II Seminario Programas Transferencias Condicionadas, FAO-PNUD. (II Seminar on the Conditional Cash Transfer Programs, FAO-UNDP) III Seminario Programas Transferencias Condicionadas, FAO. (III Seminar on the Conditional Cash Transfer Programs, FAO) IV Seminario Programas Transferencias Condicionadas, FAO. (IV Seminar on Conditional Cash Transfer Programs, FAO) V Seminario Programas Transferencias Condicionadas “Perspectivas de los últimos 10 años”. FAO. (V Seminar on Conditional Cash Transfer Programs “Perspectives of the last 10 years”. FAO)

June 26–30, 2006

Estambul, Turquía

December 4 and 5, 2006

Santiago, Chile

December 3 and 4, 2007

Santiago, Chile

December 1 and 2, 2008

Santiago, Chile

November 5 and 6, 2009

Santiago, Chile

September 30–October 1, 2010

Santiago, Chile

(continued)

APPENDIX 4: ACTIVITIES AND PUBLICATIONS …

243

(continued) Seminars organized by International Organizations Name and main organizer(s)

Date

Place

VI Seminario Programas Transferencias Condicionadas. “Los Programas de Transferencias Condicionadas desde un enfoque de Derechos”. FAO-CEPAL. (VI Seminar on Conditional Cash Transfer Programs “CCTs from a Human Rights Perspective”. FAO-ECLAC) Seminario “Políticas Públicas Intersectoriales: Protección Social, Trabajo y Empleo”. Red Interamericana de Protección Social, OEA. (Seminar “Intersectoral Public Policies: Social Protection, Labour and Employment”. Inter-American Social Protection Network, OAS) Conferencia “Cooperación Horizontal y Protección Social” Red Interamericana de Protección Social, OEA. (Conference “Horizontal Cooperation and Social Protection” Inter-American Social Protection Network, OAS) VII Seminario Programas Transferencias Condicionadas. “Seguridad Alimentaria, Pobreza Rural y Protección Social en América Latina y el Caribe”. CEPAL-FAO. (VII Seminar on Conditional Cash Transfer Programs. “Food Security, Rural Poverty and Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean”. ECLAC-FAO) Workshops

September 29 and 30, 2011

Santiago, Chile

November 30–December 1, 2010

Río de Janeiro, Brasil

January 19 and 20, 2011

St. Michael, Barbados

November 22 and 23, 2012

Santiago, Chile

(continued)

244

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(continued) Seminars organized by International Organizations Name and main organizer(s)

Date

Place

Taller de Análisis y Reflexión, análisis de las lecciones de los PTC a 6 años o más de su instalación. Banco Mundial. (Workshop of Analysis and Reflection, analysis of the lessons of the CCTs 6 years or more from their installation. World Bank) Taller de Expertos “Protección social, pobreza y enfoque de derechos: vínculos y tensiones”. CEPAL-GTZ. (Expert Workshop “Social Protection, Poverty and the Rights-Based Approach: Links and Tensions” ECLAC-GTZ) Taller “Política Social y Cooperación Internacional: Desafíos para el ministerio de Desarrollo Social y la Red Interamericana de Protección Social”. OEA. (Workshop “Social Policy and International Cooperation: Challenges for the Ministry of Social Development and the Inter-American Social Protection Network”. OAS) Taller “Los Programas de Transferencias Condicionadas desde un enfoque de derechos”. FAO. (Workshop “Conditional Cash Transfer programs from a rights approach”. FAO)

January 15–18, 2008

Cuernavaca, México

November 5 and 6, 2009

Santiago, Chile

July 15 and 16, 2010

Brasilia, Brazil

March 17 and 18, 2011

Santiago, Chile

(continued)

APPENDIX 4: ACTIVITIES AND PUBLICATIONS …

245

(continued) Seminars organized by International Organizations Name and main organizer(s)

Date

Place

II Taller “Política Social y Cooperación Internacional: Desafíos para los Ministerios de Desarrollo Social y la Red Interamericana de Protección Social”. OEA. (II Workshop “Social Policy and International Cooperation: Challenges for Ministries of Social Development and the Inter-American Social Protection Network”. OAS) III Taller “Política Social y Cooperación Internacional: Desafíos para los Ministerios de Desarrollo Social y la Red Interamericana de Protección Social” OEA. (III Workshop “Social Policy and International Cooperation: Challenges for Ministries of Social Development and the Inter-American Social Protection Network” OAS) Networks Diálogo Regional de Política (Regional Policy Dialogue, RPD), Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (IDB) Red de Protección Social y Salud (BID). (Componente de Diálogo Regional de Política, BID). (Social Protection and Health Network, IDB. Regional Policy Dialogue Component, IDB) Comunidad de Prácticas sobre los PTC, Banco Mundial. (Community of Practice on CCTs, World Bank)

July 4 and 6, 2011

Brasilia, Brazil

October 31–November 2, 2012

Santa Marta, Colombia.

1999

2001

2006

(continued)

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(continued) Seminars organized by International Organizations Name and main organizer(s)

Date

Red Interamericana de Protección Social (RIPSO). (OEA—Inter-American Social Protection Network, RIPSO. OAS)

2009

Place

Most relevants publications Title

Year

Organization/author

World Development Report. Poverty Assistance Strategies to Reduce Poverty Poverty Reduction Handbook Social Safety Nets Report Poverty Strategy 1997 Comprehensive Development Framework Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Equidad de los modelos Social protection sector strategy. From safety net to springboard Perfil de la Estrategia del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Reducción de la pobreza y promoción de la equidad social. Poverty Reduction and Promotion of Social Equity: Strategy Document The cost or poverty alleviation transfers programs: a comparative analysis of three programs in Latin America. Economic and Sector Study Series. IADB. “Programas de renta mínima vinculada a la educación: las becas escolares en Brasil”, Serie Políticas Sociales Nº99. ECLAC Sin herencia de pobreza: el programa Progresa – Oportunidades de México. “Redes e Institucionalización. Bono de Desarrollo Humano”. Serie Políticas Sociales, ECLAC, Nº76

1990 1991 1991 1993 1997 1999

World World World World IDB World

1999 2000 2001

World Bank ECLAC World Bank

2002

IDB

2003

IDB

2004

IDB, Caldes, Natalia. Coady, David and Maluccio, John

2004

ECLAC, Godoy, Lorena

2005

IDB, Levy, Santiago y Rodríguez, Evelyne ECLAC. Armas, Amparo

2005

Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank

(continued)

APPENDIX 4: ACTIVITIES AND PUBLICATIONS …

247

(continued) Most relevants publications Title

Year

Organization/author

“Programas de transferencias monetarias condicionadas: experiencias en América Latina”. Revista de la ECLAC, N° 86. “Demand side for better health for the poor: Conditional Cash Transfer in Latin America and the Caribbean”. Economic and Sector Studies Series. La protección social de cara al futuro: acceso, financiamiento y solidaridad. Trigésimo primer período de sesiones. Equidad, Desarrollo y Ciudadanía Protección Social Transferencias condicionadas con corresponsabilidad “Do we know what works? A systematic review of impact evaluations of social programs in Latin America and the Caribbean” “Los sistemas de protección social en América Latina: focalización vs. universalidad”. Iniciativa ALCSH Working paper n° 04 Progresos en la reducción de la pobreza extrema en América Latina. Dimensiones y políticas para el análisis de la primera meta del Milenio. Proyecto CEPAL-AECID. Seguimiento del componente de pobreza del primer objetivo de desarrollo del Milenio (AEC/06/003) Las transferencias condicionadas reduciendo pobreza hoy y en el futuro Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America: Problems and Opportunities Measuring the impact of Bolsa Familia program based on data. From health and nutrition days. Working Paper Nº7 “Designing CCT programs to improve nutrition impact: principles, evidence and examples”. Working Paper Nº6 Conditional cash transfer programs and nutrition in Latin America: assessement of impacts and strategies for improvement. Working Paper Nº9

2005

ECLAC. Villatoro, Pablo.

2006

IDB, Glassman, Amanda. Gaarder, Marie and Todd, Jessica

2006

ECLAC

2006 2006 2006

ECLAC ECLAC SEDESOL, Cohen and Franco

2006

IDB, Tejerina, Luis. Bouillon, César

2008

FAO, Fonseca, Ana

2008

ECLAC. León, Arturo

2009

World Bank, Ariel Fiszbein and Norbet Schady IDB, Johannsen, Julia. Tejerina, Luis and Glassman, Amanda FAO, Paes Sousa and Rômulo Pacheco Santos, Leonor Maria

2009 2009

2009

FAO, Garret, James. Bassett, Lucy and Marini, Alessandrai

2009

FAO, Hoddinott, John and Bassett, Lucy

(continued)

248

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(continued) Most relevants publications Title

Year

Organization/author

“Sustentabilidad de los programas de transferencias condicionadas: la experiencia del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social y “Avancemos” en Costa Rica” Serie Políticas Sociales 160 Achieving Effective Social protection for all in Latin America and the Caribbean. From Right to Reality Social Safety Nets Report Programas de Transferencias Condicionadas. Balance de la experiencia reciente en América Latina y el Caribe Protección social inclusiva en América Latina: una mirada integral, un enfoque de derechos Should Cash Transfers Be Confined to the Poor? Implications for Poverty and Inequality in Latin America. Policy Research Working Paper 5875 Protection Strategy “From Safety Nets to Springboards”

2010

ECLAC, Román, Isabel

2010

World Bank. Ribe, Helena; Robalino, David A. and Walker, Ian

2011 2011

World Bank and IMF ECLAC. Cecchini, Simone and Madariaga, Aldo

2011

ECLAC. Cecchini, Simone and Martínez, Rodrigo

2011

Banco Mundial. Acosta, Pablo. Leite, Phillipe and Rigolini, Jamele

2011

World Bank

Appendix 5: List of 53 Minimum Conditions for the Chile Solidario Program

Identification 1. That all family members are registered in the Civil Registry 2. That all family members have an identity card 3. The family must have a valid CAS form in the municipality where they live (the form must be valid on the date of departure) 4. That all the men in the family over 18 years of age have their military status up to date (if they have been called up for military service, this must be done or postponed) 5. That all adult family members have their background papers regularized (at least in the process of regularization) 6. That the members of the family who have a disability have it duly certified by the Commission on Preventive Disability Medicine (COMPIN) and are registered in the National Disability Registry, in the event that the disability warrants it Health 1. That the family is registered with the Primary Health Care Service (they have the credential or document certifying their registration) 2. Pregnant women must have their health checks up to date (according to Ministry of Health regulations) (the last check must be carried out on the date of departure) 3. Children 6 years old or younger must have their vaccinations up to date (according to Ministry of Health regulations) (the last vaccination must be up to date on the date of departure) 4. Children aged 6 or under must have their health checks up to date (according to Ministry of Health regulations) (the last check up to date must be on the date of departure) 5. Women age 35 and over should have an up-to-date Pap test (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Osorio Gonnet, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51008-4

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(continued) 6. That women who use a contraceptive method are under medical control (at the date of discharge should be the last control that corresponds to be made) 7. That the older adults of the family are under medical control in the office (the last control should be done on the date of discharge) 8. That the members of the family who suffer from a chronic illness are under medical control in the corresponding health centre (on the date of discharge the last control must be carried out) 9. That the family member or members with disabilities, who are susceptible to be rehabilitated, are participating in some rehabilitation program (at least the alternatives are known and in the process of being incorporated) 10. That family members are informed about health and self-care (information according to the contents and criteria determined by each family intervention unit in conjunction with the local intervention network Education 1. That preschool children attend some kindergarten education program (in case there are no vacancies, at least registered and applying) 2. That in the presence of a working mother and in the absence of another adult who can take care of him, the child or children under 6 years of age are incorporated into some system of child care (in case there are no vacancies, at least registered and applying) 3. That children up to 15 years of age attend some educational institution (in the case of dropouts, in the process of re-entering the school system) 4. That children attending pre-school, basic or secondary education are beneficiaries of the corresponding school assistance programmes (of the existing benefits in the commune, according to the parameters set by the family intervention unit in conjunction with the local intervention network) 5. That children over 12 years old can read and write (at least learning to read and write) 6. That the child or children with disabilities who are able to study are incorporated into the educational system, regular or special (in case there are no vacancies, at least registered and applying. In case there are no establishments, at least learning to read and write and basic operations, according to their age) 7. There is an adult responsible for the child’s education who is in regular contact with the school (accredited as a proxy at the school and has attended the last proxy meeting corresponding to the date of departure) 8. That adults have a positive and responsible attitude towards education and school, at least recognizing the usefulness of children’s participation in formal educational processes 9. That adults know how to read and write (at least by learning basic literacy and operations, those who are willing to do so) Family dynamics 1. That there are daily conversation practices in the family on topics such as habits, schedules and spaces for recreation 2. That the family has adequate mechanisms to face conflicts 3. That there are clear rules for coexistence within the family (continued)

APPENDIX 5: LIST OF 53 MINIMUM CONDITIONS …

251

(continued) 4. That there is an equitable distribution of household tasks (among all family members, regardless of the sex of their members and according to the age of each of them) 5. The family should be aware of the community resources and development programs available in the local network (sports clubs, senior centers, initiative groups, community organizations, among the main ones) 6. That in the event that intra-family violence exists, the people directly involved in this situation are incorporated into some support program (at least they know the alternatives and are in the process of integrating) 7. That the family that has a child in some protection system, visit it regularly 8. That the family that has a young person deprived of liberty supports and collaborates with the rehabilitation program Habitability 1. That the family has its housing situation clear in relation to the tenancy of the site and the dwelling they inhabit 2. If the family wants to apply for housing, they should be applying 3. That they have clean water 4. That they have an adequate energy system 5. That they have an adequate excreta disposal system 6. That the house does not rain, does not flood and is well sealed 7. That the house has at least two habitable rooms 8. Each member of the family has a bed with basic equipment (basic equipment means sheets, blankets, pillow) 9. That they have basic equipment for feeding the members of the family (basic equipment means kitchenware, crockery and cutlery for all members of the family) 10. That they have an adequate system of garbage disposal 11. That the housing environment is free of contamination 12. That the family has access to the Subsidy for the Payment of Drinking Water Consumption, if applicable Work 1. At least one adult member of the family works regularly and has a stable income 2. No child under the age of 15 leaves school because of work 3. That persons who are unemployed are registered with the Municipal Employment Information Office (OMIL) Income 1. That family members who are entitled to SUF (Single Family Allowance), obtain it (at least they are applying) 2. That the members of the family who are entitled to Family Allowance obtain it 3. That the members of the family who are entitled to PASIS (Assistance Pension), obtain it (at least they are applying for it) 4. That the family has an income above the poverty line 5. That the family has a budget organized according to its resources and priority needs Source Palma and Ruz (2005)

Index

B Bolsa Escola, 42, 52, 139, 141, 149, 165, 166, 171, 184, 190, 191 Bolsa Familia, 30, 35, 37, 42–44, 49, 50, 105, 127, 131, 134, 141, 165, 171 Bono Desarrollo Humano (BDH), 16, 175, 178, 182, 185, 187–194, 196–198, 210, 211, 215, 218 Bono Solidario (BS), 16, 30, 175, 178–189, 194–198, 208, 210, 211, 217, 218 C Centro de Investigaciones de Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, México (CIESAS), 41 Characteristics of CCTs, 2, 12, 34, 44, 95–97, 102 Coercion, 8, 10, 52, 63, 64, 75–77, 81, 83, 113, 115, 195, 197, 198, 208–211, 214, 218 Cognitive shortcuts, 65, 66, 76, 82

Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCT), 2–13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 26–29, 31–34, 37, 39, 42–54, 66, 67, 77–80, 82, 83, 89, 90, 92, 95–102, 104, 106, 107, 110–114, 117–121, 123–135, 137–143, 165, 167, 168, 170, 172, 178, 184, 195, 197, 198, 205–211, 215, 216, 218–223 Consejo Nacional de Modernización, Ecuador (CONAM), 176, 179–181, 195, 199, 212 Correa, Rafael, 187, 191, 193, 198 D Degree of Adoption, 84, 171, 200, 214 Diffusion mechanisms, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 19, 28, 55, 64, 67, 73, 77–82, 84, 95, 113, 114, 143, 196, 198, 208, 209, 211, 218–220

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 C. Osorio Gonnet, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Ecuador and Chile, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51008-4

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INDEX

Dirección de Presupuesto (DIPRES), 152–158, 164, 165, 167–171, 208, 210, 215, 216

E Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 13, 16, 27, 29, 31, 40, 51, 67, 103, 104, 108, 120, 121, 123–125, 130–140, 147, 158, 223 Emulation, 8, 10, 61, 62, 64, 65, 73–75, 77, 78, 81, 83, 113, 195, 197, 198, 209–211, 214, 215 Epistemic community, 10, 14, 19, 53, 67–74, 77–79, 81, 83, 102, 108, 113, 114, 117, 118, 121, 122, 125, 126, 130, 133, 137–141, 143, 166, 169, 170, 191, 206–209, 215, 219–221, 223 Experts, 7, 10, 18, 19, 44, 46, 47, 52, 53, 67–70, 73, 78, 79, 118, 119, 121, 123–131, 133, 134, 136, 138, 141–143, 150, 153, 156, 158, 159, 164–166, 170, 191, 196–199, 207–210, 215, 217, 219, 222

F Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), 180, 193 Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversión Social, Chile (FOSIS), 122, 148, 151–153, 155–159, 164, 166, 167, 170, 212, 215 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 67, 120–122, 130, 133, 134, 136, 138–140, 142, 192, 198, 208

G Gross domestic product (GDP), 4, 16, 18, 29, 31, 47, 83, 104, 106, 110, 112, 114, 177, 206

I Instituto Internacional de Investigación en Políticas Alimentarias (IFPRI), 41, 46, 119, 121, 126, 135 Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública, México (INSP), 41 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 6, 17, 42, 51, 53, 67, 100, 119–122, 124, 126, 129, 130, 138–140, 142, 165, 168, 181, 184, 187, 188, 190, 193, 195, 199, 207, 212, 213 International Labour Organization (ILO), 136, 140, 168 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 180, 181, 183, 188, 193, 199, 212 International Organizations (IO), 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 18, 19, 44, 51–53, 64, 67–73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 110, 117, 118, 122, 130, 133, 135, 138, 140–142, 158, 170, 180, 206, 208, 209, 216, 217, 219, 222

L Lagos Escobar, Ricardo, 147 Learning, 8, 10, 46, 52, 61, 64–66, 74–77, 83, 113, 129, 164, 167, 168, 207, 209, 210, 214, 215

M Means, 8, 29, 41, 53, 66, 67, 71, 74–82, 84, 92, 107, 164, 165,

INDEX

169, 178, 197, 205, 209–211, 219, 220 Ministerio de Desarrollo y Planificación, Chile (MIDEPLAN), 122, 148–161, 163–170, 208, 210, 215, 216 Ministerio de Inclusión Económica y Social, Ecuador (MIES), 185, 192–194, 198 Motivations, 8, 51, 74, 76, 78, 80, 81, 84, 164, 170, 178, 205, 209–211, 219, 220 O Oficina de Planificación, Ecuador (ODEPLAN), 184, 186 Oportunidades , 31, 37, 39–41, 43, 44, 48, 51, 105, 119, 122, 127, 128, 139, 142, 149, 154, 165, 171, 184 Organization of American States (OAS), 67, 121, 122, 130, 135, 136, 139, 140, 208, 222 P Policy diffusion, 4, 6, 7, 18, 52, 62, 63, 66, 67, 73, 74, 81, 222 Programa Chile Solidario (CHS), 153, 159, 161–164, 167, 168, 208, 210, 213, 215, 216 Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA), 6, 39–43, 48, 49, 97, 119, 121, 122, 124, 149, 165, 166, 171, 191 Programa de Protección Social, Ecuador (PPS), 184, 194 Programa PUENTE, Chile (PUENTE), 152, 155, 158, 159, 161, 165, 215

255

S Secretaría de Estado de Desarrollo Social, Ecuador (SEDES), 183 Sistema de Identificación y Selección de Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales, Ecuador (SELBEN), 184, 186 Social policies, 1, 2, 6, 7, 18, 19, 25, 27, 98, 120, 133, 134, 140–142, 148, 150, 157, 163, 164, 175, 176, 184, 186, 196, 205, 214, 216, 219, 222, 223 Social protection, 1, 8, 19, 36, 39, 95, 99, 102, 112, 121, 124, 130, 132–137, 140, 152, 154, 157, 159, 169, 170, 178, 186, 207, 215, 217, 223

U United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 100, 121, 123–125, 130, 131, 136, 137, 139, 141, 168 United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), 124, 125, 136, 168, 184

W Wave of diffusion, 6, 7, 10, 15, 39, 46, 74, 89, 90, 95, 97, 98, 100, 102, 120, 170, 178, 197, 221 World Bank (WB), 6, 13, 17, 42, 44, 51, 53, 67, 107–110, 113, 121–124, 126, 127, 129, 130, 136, 138–142, 151, 153, 154, 156, 158, 159, 164–171, 176, 180, 181, 184, 186–189, 193, 199, 207, 210, 215, 217